„Sinn für Ungerechtigkeit“ : Über die Rolle von Gefühlen bei epistemischem Widerstand
The recent literature on epistemic injustice has convincingly showed that injustice is often self-conceal-ing, because those who suffer it lack the hermeneutical resources to talk about it. How, then, are thevictims of epistemic injustice capable of denouncing and resisting it? The article seeks an answer tothis question by inquiring into what Judith Shklar calls the “sense of injustice.” Following Shklar, Iargue that the identification and critique of injustice relies on feeling rather than established moralvalues. In order to clarify how feelings can be the source of universal claims, I turn to an interpreta-tion of Kant’s analysis of the feeling of the sublime developed by Jean-François Lyotard. According tothis interpretation, any act of communication generates a silence that calls to be expressed. Followingthis view, I argue that epistemic injustice leads to a universalist act of epistemic resistance on the basisof the feeling that silenced voices ought to be head.
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