



Centre for
**Global
Cooperation
Research**

UNIVERSITÄT
**D U I S B U R G
E S S E N**

Open-Minded

Käte Hamburger Kolleg (KHK) / Centre for Global Cooperation Research

at the University of Duisburg-Essen (UDE)

Gift-giving and reciprocity in global society: Introducing Marcel Mauss in international studies

Heins, Volker M.; Unrau, Christine; Avram, Kristine

Manuscript Version: Published Version

Terms of use: All rights reserved.

This publication is with permission of the rights owner freely accessible due to an Alliance licence and a national licence (funded by the DFG, German Research Foundation) respectively.

Originally published by SAGE Publications.

Heins, V. M., Unrau, C., & Avram, K. (2018). Gift-giving and reciprocity in global society: Introducing Marcel Mauss in international studies. *Journal of International Political Theory*, 14(2), 126-144. © The Author(s) 2018. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1755088218757807>

This open access publication is made available via [DuEPublico](#), the institutional repository of the University of Duisburg-Essen. URN: [urn:nbn:de:hbz:465-20230414-124220-5](https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:hbz:465-20230414-124220-5)

Suggested Citation: Heins, Volker M.; Unrau, Christine; Avram, Kristine (2018). Gift-giving and reciprocity in global society: Introducing Marcel Mauss in international studies. *Journal of International Political Theory*, 14(2), 126–144. <https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:hbz:465-20230414-124220-5> (Published version)

Research for this publication was done at the Käte Hamburger Kolleg/Centre for Global Cooperation Research at the University of Duisburg-Essen, Germany, sponsored by the Federal Ministry of Education and Research (grant number 01UK1810).

Gift-giving and reciprocity in global society: Introducing Marcel Mauss in international studies

Journal of International Political Theory

2018, Vol. 14(2) 126–144

© The Author(s) 2018

Reprints and permissions:

sagepub.co.uk/journalsPermissions.nav

DOI: 10.1177/1755088218757807

journals.sagepub.com/home/ipt**Volker M Heins and Christine Unrau**

University of Duisburg-Essen, Germany

Kristine Avram

University of Marburg, Germany

Abstract

How do multiple obligations to give, to receive, and to reciprocate contribute to the evolution of international society? This question can be derived from the works of the French anthropologist and sociologist Marcel Mauss, in particular from his classic essay *The Gift*, published in 1925. The aim of this article is to introduce Mauss' theory of the gift to international political theorists, to develop a general theoretical argument from his claim about the universality of gift-giving, and to lay out the plan of the Special Issue. First, we explore the basic concepts of gift-giving and reciprocity and how they highlight a type of exchange that differs from market exchange and from other forms of quid-pro-quo interactions. Second, we consider the Marshall Plan as an iconic and controversial example of international gift-giving. Third, we use Martin Wight's division of international political thought into realism, rationalism, and revolutionism to locate the work of Mauss and neo-Maussian scholars within the tableau of modern international thought. Fourth, we take a look at the interplay between analytical and normative aspects of Mauss' works and assess the theoretical purchase of these works for international studies. Finally, we introduce the contributions of the Special Issue.

Keywords

Foreign aid, gift, global cooperation, Marcel Mauss, reciprocity, solidarity

Corresponding author:

Volker M Heins, University of Duisburg-Essen, Käte Hamburger Kolleg / Centre for Global Cooperation Research, Schifferstraße 44, D-47059 Duisburg, Germany.

Email: volker.heins@uni-due.de

What makes the world hang together?

Neorealism in international relations (IR) and neo-utilitarianism in the social sciences more generally are often criticized for their normative deficiencies. However, it is perhaps more appropriate to consider their lack of explanatory power. They have little to say about ubiquitous yet underexplored practices such as international debt forgiveness, humanitarian aid, or the willingness of comparatively rich member states of the European Union to transfer considerable amounts of money to less wealthy members through structural funds each year. Theories based on neo-utilitarian premises cannot account for the formation of “societies” of states beyond short-lived alliances. At a more fundamental level, they do not seem to be interested in the consequences of the evolutionary fact that humans are not like mythical Hobbesian wolves but rather “ultra-social animals” (Tomasello, 2014) uniquely equipped to form like-minded groups and to empathize with others. Those theories cannot really tell us, in the words of John Ruggie (1998), “what makes the world hang together.” While it is certainly true that international politics is driven by the struggle for power and wealth at the expense of competitors, we also need to explain how states and groups in society manage to build trust and cooperate across political and cultural divides.

At the other end of the spectrum, normative or critical theories in the tradition of Habermas often adopt an overly harmonious and teleological approach to political conflicts, and often take for granted the existence and motivating power of uncontroversial norms. When Axel Honneth, for example, writes about struggles for recognition, the term “struggle” is stripped of its existential dimension and reduced to mean only legal efforts to fully implement the modern ideals of freedom, equality, and solidarity (Honneth, 2014; cf. Heins, 2016).

Among the many responses to the growing dissatisfaction with both neo-utilitarian and normative theories, we have in recent years witnessed a blossoming of research inspired by Marcel Mauss’ (1990 [1925]) classic *The Gift*, which was first published in 1925, as well as attempts to derive a general theoretical argument from his claim about the universality of gift-giving.¹ We define gift-giving, in the spirit of Mauss, as the generous transfer of socially valued objects without any (legal or contractual) guarantee of reciprocation. Reciprocity in gift exchange is *asynchronous* (there is a time interval between giving and reciprocating) and *in kind* (the transaction is not measured in monetary terms). This allows gift exchanges to be framed as expressing the social bond rather than as deferred payback for benefits received earlier. Starting from the conceptualization of the specifics of non-market exchanges, Mauss addresses the question of how clans or tribes managed conflicts and established lasting relationships before markets and contracts came into being. He is particularly interested in the spirit or meaning attributed to gifts which seem to demand that they are not only accepted but also *returned* in one form or another.² The failure to return a gift changes its very character. In this case, the gift “poisons” relationships, as Mauss claims, who is fascinated by the “double meaning” of the word “gift” in Germanic languages where it also means “poison” (1990 [1925]: 81).³

Building on these insights, we go a step further by asking how multiple obligations to give, to receive, and to give in return contribute to the reproduction and evolution

of international society. This project is in line with Mauss' own interest in international politics and his largely unfulfilled ambition of producing a new sociology of international (or intersocietal) relations (Meszaros, 2017). Mauss believes that the purpose of gift exchange between societies is not so much the redistribution of resources but rather the creation and maintenance of relationships. At the same time, he distances himself from Durkheim's preference to formulate problems in terms of dichotomies by claiming that gift exchanges move beyond the opposition of liberty and obligation or generosity and self-interest. Gift exchanges such as the *potlatch* or the *kula* practiced by indigenous peoples are neither fully voluntary nor a strict duty or necessity; they are about showing respect, but sometimes also about establishing hierarchy and exclusive prestige; they are not altruistically motivated, but neither can they be explained as a result of cost-benefit calculations. Mauss defines the *potlatch* as a system of "total services of an agonistic type" characterized by "very acute rivalry and the destruction of wealth" (1990 [1925]: 8). *Potlatching* among the coastal tribes of Northwest America was fiercely competitive and became even more competitive after the rise of European settler economies (for illustrations, cf. Wolf, 1997: 191–192). Mauss (1990 [1925]: 54) calls the *potlatch* a "monstrous" kind of exchange. By contrast, the *kula*-type system of ceremonial exchanges is based on a different kind of reciprocity: circular, not antagonistic. The objects exchanged in this system serve to forge social relationships and enhance trust among separate tribes. Because it is based on a constant process of giving and taking, which creates a permanent connection, Malinowski (1922) coined the term "kula ring." Mauss (1990 [1925]: 28) calls *kula* "a noble kind" of exchange. From his perspective, gifts are exchanged, whether consciously or not, to create, maintain, or restore relationships between individuals or groups of people. Gift exchange can coexist with other types of exchange, in particular with the "economic" exchange of equivalents in markets. Mauss does not think of gifts and markets as opposites. Rather, he is convinced that not even in capitalist market economies there is such a thing as a purely economic rationality.

The return to the works of a French anthropologist and sociologist, who wrote between the two world wars about "archaic" societies from Polynesia to the American Northwest, may seem surprising and far-fetched. In fact, to make use of Mauss' insights for the purposes of international political theory, it needs to be shown that his theory can be transferred, first, from archaic to modern societies and, second, from intergroup to international relations. Interestingly, both these shifts were already prepared by the anthropologist himself. Mauss, a disciple and a dissident (as well as a nephew) of Émile Durkheim, argues that practices of gift exchange are universal and constitutive of social life. In the Introduction to *The Gift*, he explicitly states that systems of exchange not based on legal contracts or markets "still function in our own societies, in unchanging fashion and, so to speak, hidden, below the surface" (Mauss, 1990 [1925]: 5). The conclusion is even more explicit:

It is possible to extend these observations to our own societies. A considerable part of our morality and our lives themselves is still permeated with this same atmosphere of the gift, where obligation and liberty intermingle. Fortunately, everything is still not wholly categorized in terms of buying and selling ... We possess more than a tradesman morality. (Mauss, 1990 [1925]: 83)

Mauss also raises the possibility of extending a conceptual apparatus constructed to understand premodern intergroup relations to modern IR. This extension is easy, Mauss argues, because the modern nation state is not as different from archaic polities as we might think. In essays and articles written shortly after World War I—“*cette abominable guerre*” (Mauss, 1969: 620)—he critically compares the European nation state to the structures and mentalities of archaic societies. The modern nation state, he writes in a sarcastic tone, is “homogeneous like a primitive clan”; the national flag is like a “totem”; and the cult of the nation is no different from the cult of “ancestral animal gods” (Mauss, 1969: 593–594). Following Durkheim, Mauss conceives the modern state not as a power beyond society, but as its very expression. Therefore, “international” relations between states are, in reality, “intersocietal” (Mauss, 1969: 606) relations, regardless of how the societies in question are organized internally.

These two conceptual moves, from archaic to modern societies and from intergroup to intersocietal relations, prepare the ground for what Grégoire Mallard (2011) has claimed to be a “universal theory” (2011: 225) of gift exchange. For Mauss, gift-giving is not only a fact of international life but also the reason why the structural “anarchy” of the international system does not preclude the formation of some kind of civilized and peaceful international society. This fundamental claim separates him from critical theory and from realism.

Despite some general affinities between Mauss and the Frankfurt School of critical theory—in particular their common opposition to fascism, nationalism, and philosophical irrationalism—the differences between these two bodies of modern political thought are stark and profound. To start with the most obvious difference, Theodor Adorno, for example, did not believe in the very possibility of genuine gift exchange in modern society. He was convinced that the “decay of giving” was irreversible in a global market society dominated by economic rationality and the “exchange principle” (Adorno, 2005 [1951]: 42). There are more commonalities between Mauss and Habermas, a more recent representative of the Frankfurt School tradition, who is also one of the few critical theorists who have contributed to the field of international studies. However, Mauss would have rejected Habermas’ utopian belief in the civilizing power of supranational institutions. Instead, his thinking was focused on the conditions for genuine internationalism and the rise of a new European and trans-European “international” (Mauss, 1969: 630).

The authors assembled in this Special Issue argue that it is exactly because international interactions are not regulated by an overarching public authority that they lend themselves particularly well to a gift-theoretical analysis. Under certain circumstances, practices of gift exchange may contribute to the establishment of stable patterns of peaceful cooperation between states and other actors in international society. By way of illustration, we now proceed to discuss an iconic historical example: the Marshall Plan. The reasons for choosing this example are threefold: First, in international studies, especially scholars of foreign aid practices have drawn inspiration from Mauss’ essay on the gift (e.g. Furia, 2015; Hattori, 2001; Heins and Unrau, 2016). Second, the Marshall Plan often serves as a master analogy for asymmetrical, gift-like aid and public investment programs in international society. And third, this particular example has been commented on by scholars in the tradition of Mauss.

The example of the Marshall Plan

Officially known as the European Recovery Program (ERP), the Marshall Plan was an aid program launched by the United States in favor of 16 European countries after World War II. Between 1948 and 1952, roughly US\$13 billion worth of aid—amounting to well over 1% of the US gross domestic product (GDP)—was given to facilitate post-war reconstruction in Europe. It also helped to push French political elites to accept a cooperative path toward European unification (Monnet, 1978: 264–270; Parsons, 2003: 23, 41). Overall transfers, which represented over 2.5% of the combined GDP of the recipient countries, were mainly used to buy manufactured goods and raw materials from the United States. Although the Plan has been praised as “the greatest moral act in history” (Winston Churchill, cited in Chomsky, 2004: 616), its nature and overall impact are a matter of controversy. Everyone agrees that the United States was not legally obliged to help Europe. The country was guided by the perception of an obligation to give—“a grand historic duty” (Monnet, 1978: 265)—as well as by what it saw as its national interest.

Much of the critical literature on the Marshall Plan focuses on America’s ulterior motives. Authors such as Noam Chomsky have portrayed the Plan as a form of economic imperialism that benefited first of all American business interests. Like other radical critics, Chomsky (2004: 616) argues that the Plan was not a “noble gift,” but a subsidized program that allowed American corporations to export their surplus production. However, Chomsky assumes the traditional dichotomy of morality versus self-interest which Mauss rejects. Mauss (1990 [1925]) is interested in “forms and ideas” that are not contrary to self-interest, but “partially *complement* the notion of individual self-interest” (1990 [1925]: 4; emphasis added).

Unlike Chomsky, George Bataille, a French writer and student of Mauss, presents a non-moralistic interpretation of the Marshall Plan as a kind of huge international potlatch. Toward the end of his book *The Accursed Share*, he seems to agree with Chomsky when he writes that the Marshall Plan was an outlet for the dissipation of “excess resources” (Bataille, 1988 [1949]: 179). But he also sympathizes with the assessment of the French economist François Perroux that the Marshall Plan initiated and symbolized fundamental changes in the relations between states. Writing in a deliberately ambiguous style, Bataille offers a variety of not fully coherent characterizations: the Plan wasted resources on European populations; from the viewpoint of a more narrowly defined self-interest, these resources could have been used differently and more productively; the Marshall Plan was a policy “external to capitalism” (1988 [1949]: 185); at the same time, it was “an unsecured *investment*” (1988 [1949]: 182; emphasis added). Much of this makes sense only when we keep in mind that Bataille assimilates the concept of gift to that of sacrifice and did not share Mauss’ rationalism (Marcel, 2003). Whereas Mauss (1990 [1925]) conceives of gift exchange as a potential way of nurturing “the bond of alliance and commonality” (1990 [1925]: 17) between separate political communities, Bataille overemphasizes its agonistic character and reduces the gift to a means of acquiring power and humiliating competitors, in this case the Soviet Union. Without the Soviets, he writes, there would have been no international rivalry and hence “no Marshall Plan” (Bataille, 1988 [1949]: 183). In this respect, the Marshall Plan was ultimately nothing but another instantiation of the logic of potlatch or indeed, and contrary to

Chomsky's claim, a "noble gift." The United States, according to Bataille (1988 [1949]), acted like a tribal chief who wants to increase his prestige by publicly destroying wealth: "He regards his virtue ... as an asset, as a power that he now possesses. He enriches himself with a contempt for riches" (1988 [1949]: 69).

After the Marshall Plan period of the rise of Pax Americana, Wilton Dillon, a cultural anthropologist, used the work of Mauss to shift attention from the givers to the receivers of gifts. Mauss insisted on the strongly felt, non-contractual "obligation" to repay a gift, and he alluded to the psychological consequences of not being able to do so:

The unreciprocated gift still makes the person who has accepted it inferior, particularly when it has been accepted with no thought of returning it ... Charity is still wounding for him who has accepted it, and the whole tendency of our morality is to strive to do away with the unconscious and injurious patronage of the rich almsgiver. The invitation must be returned, just as "courtesies" must. (Mauss, 1990 [1925]: 83–84)⁴

In *Gifts and Nations: The Obligation to Give, Receive, and Repay*, Dillon (1968) elaborates on the psychological frictions caused among Europeans as a consequence of the "unreciprocated gift" of the Marshall Plan. Based on a case study of a French engineer and owner of a small factory, who took part in a productivity mission organized by the Marshall Plan, Dillon argues that the social process of exchanging gifts among preliterate societies can be generalized to yield interesting insights into the workings of technical assistance programs between modern states such as the United States and France. The Marshall Plan is introduced as a case of international "downward giving":

The "good things of life" (machines, capital, knowledge of industrial and agricultural productivity, better "human relations in industry," etc.) were to be shared and passed down to people who were weaker, poorer, and less learned in the ways of industrial civilization. The main contrasting elements were: a) Americans, as aid administrators, gave to members of an out-group rather than ... to members of their own community, and b) Americans, from the standpoint of age-grading among nations, were giving as age juniors to age seniors, and expected gratitude more than deference in return. (Dillon, 1968: 49)

Dillon addresses the puzzle that many Frenchmen were not grateful to receive Marshall Plan gifts and responded instead with resentment and anti-Americanism. The reason is that the French felt the obligation to repay gifts but did not have the possibility to fulfill their obligation and thereby to become accepted as equals. The gift turned out to "poison" an international relationship instead of improving it. To reduce the psychological weight of the obligation on the part of the French, various strategies were tested and implemented, for example, the largely symbolic pursuit of *grandeur* through the development of nuclear weapons, military adventures such as the Suez Crisis in 1956 or intellectual efforts to play down the moral indebtedness of France toward the United States by interpreting the Marshall Plan as a self-interested business operation (Dillon, 1968: 63–64, 74–81). In a fascinating conclusion, Dillon suggests thinking about the *kula* ring—a circular exchange system studied in Papua New Guinea by Malinowski (1922) and further discussed by Mauss (1990 [1925]: 27–39)—as a useful heuristic analogy for the design of better models for "the offering and receiving of gifts between

nations” (Dillon, 1968: 101). The Marshall Plan is criticized by Dillon for not having allowed Europeans to respond in a psychologically gratifying way to the obligation to repay the American gift. In other words, instead of being sufficiently *kula*-like and based on circular reciprocity, the Plan took on some features of an archaic “potlatch ceremony” (Dillon, 1968: 15) in which property was destroyed and the poor were humiliated.

Four types of European international political thought

We now proceed to locate the work of Mauss and neo-Maussian scholars within the tableau of modern European international political thought. We do this by looking at different concepts of exchange (equal and unequal, market and non-market) that are fundamental to modern social and political theory and by referring to Martin Wight’s (1991) influential division of international political thought into three categories: realism, rationalism, and revolutionism. By international political thought, we do not mean academic IR theories, but rather “political languages” which are defined by Pocock (1989) as “paradigms” used by people inside and outside of academia to make sense of international relations and to “exert political effects” (1989: 20).

Adorno’s despair over what he saw as the nearly total domination of all social relationships by the “exchange principle” marks the end of a long era that began with the Enlightenment celebration of the spirit of “commerce” as a force for good in the world. In the eighteenth century, political philosophers believed that the give and take of market interests ultimately leads to a self-stabilizing civil society. People were thought to become better citizens by entering into reciprocal exchange of goods and services. In its different versions, the “doux-commerce” thesis defended by Montesquieu, Hume, Kant, Thomas Paine, and others claims that the spirit of commerce makes individuals less heroic and noble, but also more patient, hardworking, and gentle, and that free trade lays the foundation for perpetual peace and global cooperation among nations by attenuating the passions and overcoming prejudices (Hirschman, 1977). In other words, reciprocity—understood narrowly as being synonymous with market exchange—was elevated to a moving force of civilization.

Trust in the moral role of commerce and economic reciprocity in IR is key to some versions of what Wight has called international “rationalism.” According to his typology, rationalists—unlike realists and revolutionists—believe in the value of “international intercourse” (Wight, 1991: 13) and its potential for institutionalizing shared interests beyond the nation state and, more generally, for improving the relations between states and peoples. International society is similar to domestic society in that it is an evolving “field of co-operation” (Wight, 1991: 29) amenable to structural reform. From here, we can follow a path that leads to Jean Monnet’s practical ideal of a united Europe in which nations interact without “humiliation” and “fear” or to more recent English School reflections on the development of international and global “harm conventions” (Linklater and Suganami, 2006; Monnet, 1978: 291–292).

This whole stream of international theory has been challenged from different perspectives. Marxists have argued that the apparent symmetry of give and take which characterizes market exchanges hides the deeper truth of exploitation. Exploitation implies an institutionalized asymmetrical relationship in which one group takes more from another

group than it gives. It is the opposite of gift-giving, although exploitation shares with gift exchange its noncoercive character. This is, in fact, the innovative idea introduced by Marx: exploitation is different from, and does not require, political coercion because it is based on the normal workings of labor markets under conditions of capitalism. Exploitation is the result of the quiet extraction of surplus labor in the production process. This is achieved by making workers work longer hours than they would need to produce the equivalent of their wages. Marxist writers from Lenin onwards have expanded the theory of exploitation by applying it not only to labor markets but also to global commodity markets and international trade. “Unequal exchange” was the term used by Samir Amin (1977) to describe the interdependent and uneven development of rich and poor countries in the age of postcolonial imperialism. This new revolutionist current in Marxist (and in this sense “European”) international political thought found its most systematic expression in the works by Immanuel Wallerstein and his colleagues on the capitalist world system, in which they deny that the nation state is a relevant unit of analysis at all. Referring to the revolutionism of Mao Tse-tung, Wallerstein (1974) predicted in the 1970s that the ability of the capitalist classes to co-opt sections of the exploited population would slowly wane in the midst of continual worldwide class struggles and growing antisystemic movements, which would ultimately lead to the replacement of the states-system with a “socialist world-government” (1974: 415).

Much of this theorizing and the related narratives of civilizational decline and revolution have become irrelevant today, mostly because of the utterly implausible picture of an emerging world society in which neither nationalism nor religion nor nation states play a role and also because in world politics, “hard” revolutionism has always turned out to be dangerously close to very nasty versions of “extreme” realism (Wight, 1991: 47). Marxist revolutionism deserves credit for having drawn our attention to the often diffuse harms of international exploitation that are typically overlooked by mainstream theorists (Linklater and Suganami, 2006: 182). Marxist critics were also right to question the civilizational merits of commerce in times when many poor countries were pressed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank to sign free-trade treaties to their own disadvantage. Entire countries or social groups get rich or stay wealthy at the expense of other countries, social groups, or classes. And yet the main proposition of Marxist revolutionism—the assimilation of entire world regions (core/periphery) to domestic social classes (bourgeoisie/proletariat)—is neither theoretically convincing nor helpful for sketching a practical agenda of political transformation.

An entirely different attack against the precepts and premises of liberal rationalism has been made by the infamous but influential German legal scholar and political theorist Carl Schmitt and contemporary “neo-Schmittians” (Teschke, 2011). Schmitt shares the Marxist critique of free-trade imperialism, which he associates with the rise of the United States after World War II. But instead of criticizing exploitation and unequal exchange as unjust, he wants to restore what he thinks is the forgotten good reputation of taking things from others by force. In two essays on the meaning and etymology of the Greek term “nomos,” written and published in the 1950s, and appended to the English translation of *The Nomos of the Earth*, Schmitt presents the outline of a political philosophy that is diametrically opposed to Mauss’ gift theory. For Mauss, giving comes first: giving, accepting, reciprocating. For Schmitt, taking comes first: taking, distributing, producing.

In “Appropriation/Distribution/Production: An Attempt to Determine from *Nomos* the Basic Questions of Every Social and Economic Order,” Schmitt (2006 [1950]) tells us that the term “nomos” has three meanings: (1) taking or seizing things which belong to others or to nobody, (2) distributing things among the members of a community according to criteria of justice, and (3) “grazing” or putting things to productive use (2006 [1950]: 324–335). In a next step, he addresses the problem of how these three meanings or processes were “practically and morally” (Schmitt, 2006 [1950]: 328) ranked and evaluated by different people in different times and places. The German professor, a supporter of National Socialism during the war, leaves no doubt as to where his preference lies. The “foundation of all productivity” and of distributive justice is appropriation, in particular appropriation of land (and the high seas):

The history of peoples, with their migrations, colonizations, and conquests, is a history of land-appropriation. Either this is the appropriation of free land, with no claim to ownership, or it is the conquest of alien land, which has been appropriated under legal titles of foreign-political warfare or by domestic-political means, such as proscription, deprivation, and forfeiture of newly divided territory. (Schmitt, 2006 [1950]: 328)

So when Mauss writes that we possess “more than a tradesman morality,” Schmitt would agree and add that we also possess a predator morality. For Schmitt, all currents of modern European political thought are ultimately about the sequence of appropriation, distribution, and production. According to Schmitt, both Marxism and liberalism ignore the truth of history, which is a history of appropriation, in favor of either the primacy of production or a socialist “doctrine of redistribution.” Yet, the “primitive right of plunder” (Schmitt, 2006 [1950]: 331) is still exercised, but without being acknowledged as such. The greatest irony for Schmitt is that revolutionary Marxism confirms in practice what it denies in theory by advocating the “expropriation” of the capitalist class as a precondition for redistributing wealth to the poor. Here, too, giving requires prior taking. In this reading, socialism is the highest, “most modern” (Schmitt, 2006 [1950]: 334) stage of predation.

Schmitt’s whole argument is based on a fallacy. Apart from the fact that it is doubtful whether—even in the case of early colonialism⁵—appropriation always came first, Schmitt surreptitiously (and wrongly) concludes that the temporal *precedence* of appropriation implies its normative or political *primacy*. This motif of the primacy of appropriation is taken up again in the essay “Nomos—Nahme—Name,” whose title plays with the fact that the German words for “taking,” *Nahme*, and “name,” *Name*, sound alike and have the same root (Schmitt, 2006 [1950]: 336–350). Here, Schmitt (2006 [1950]) writes that until recently, “man *took* a wife,” before she “*recognized* the husband” (2006 [1950]: 347; emphasis by Schmitt) by accepting his surname. In the same way, the Bolsheviks took cities throughout Russia and renamed them, for example, Leningrad or Kaliningrad. But what is more interesting is that some of Schmitt’s remarks read as if they were written with Mauss and his gift theory in mind. Schmitt ridicules the narrative of industrialism and the modern belief in unlimited economic growth. Only in this utopian world of socialist dreamers, he writes, does the need for constant appropriation end, and “man can give without *taking*” (Schmitt, 2006 [1950]: 347; emphasis by Schmitt).

Table 1. Four types of international political thought.

	Liberal rationalism	Marxist revolutionism	Anti-liberal realism	Solidarist rationalism
Paradigm of exchange	Contract	Exploitation	Predation	Gift-giving
Representative	Montesquieu	Marx	Schmitt	Mauss
Key phrase	“doux commerce”	“unequal exchange”	“the primitive right of plunder”	“the bond of alliance and commonality”
Narrative	Civilizational progress through transnational market exchange	Civilizational regression through global capitalism (countered by antisystemic movements)	Civilizational regression through free-trade imperialism	Civilizational progress through gift-giving and reparative justice (jeopardized by revolutionism and fascism)

None of this implies that there is no place for giving in this distinctly misanthropic philosophy. In fact, the French Hegelian Alexandre Kojève, who befriended Schmitt after the war, gave a lecture at his invitation in Düsseldorf in 1957, in which he used Schmitt’s idea of *nomos* to outline a transformation of French colonialism. In line with the French government, Kojève did not want France to lose her colonies in the Middle East and North Africa but was aware of the need to adjust to the growing moral and political power of the United States—“the least imperialist modern nation” according to Mauss (1969: 588–589). Following Schmitt, Kojève (2001) suggested a transition from a predatory, “taking” colonialism to a more benevolent, “giving colonialism” (2001: 123–124). However, Kojève (2001: 124) did not have voluntary gift-giving in mind, but rather “legally-required disbursements,” in particular in favor of the colonies in the Mediterranean. Faithful to Schmitt, he believed that gifts in IR were meaningless unless the beneficiaries remained part of the extended domestic realm of a modernized regime of colonial appropriation.

Against this backdrop, we now wish to examine how Mauss’ thinking relates to liberal rationalism, Marxist revolutionism, and anti-liberal realism. The editors and authors of this Special Issue agree that the works of Mauss foreshadow a kind of European political thought that is different from the liberal-rationalist “doux-commerce” thesis of the Enlightenment, and opposed to both Marxism and the hard realism of European fascism and imperialism. The list of four types of international political thought presented in Table 1 is not meant to be exhaustive or complete but aims to provide some guidance for the analysis of the main differences that are relevant for the discussion of the place of Mauss in international studies.

Mauss defends rationalism in the sense of Wight but also in the broader sense of a belief in the possibility of moral progress in international society. This belief unites Mauss and neo-Maussians with the liberal rationalism of the Enlightenment period.⁶ Like Montesquieu (1989 [1748]), Mauss focuses on “commerce” understood broadly as

an intertwined process of “communication among peoples” (Montesquieu, 1989 [1748]: 357) that cannot be reduced to belonging to only one sphere of human action such as the economy. Mauss rejects the whole idea of compartmentalizing social phenomena into separate spheres of social action. At the same time, he differs from Enlightenment thinkers by opposing the dichotomy between “civilized” and “primitive” cultures and the related idea of linear progress from traditional to modern life.

Apart from being a rationalist, Mauss is also a “solidarist.” For one thing, his thought resonates with convictions held by English School theorists who emphasize not only the possibility of progress in international relations but also the power of international society to take into account human and global concerns on the basis of solidarity, understood as the consciousness of mutual dependence and common belonging (Linklater and Suganami, 2006: 135–146). In the French context, solidarism has an additional meaning because Mauss was associated with the intellectual movement of “les solidaristes,” a group of legal and social scholars lobbying around questions of international solidarity and social cohesion across borders. The French “solidaristes” were struggling for the expansion of solidarity from the domestic to the international sphere. In particular, they were highly critical of the Versailles Treaty, which settled the shaky peace between Germany and the Allies after World War I. French solidarists believed that the Treaty provisions did not clearly demarcate the legitimate payment of reparations from the illegitimate extraction of war indemnities. Against French nationalists, Mauss not only advocated a policy of sovereign debt forgiveness with regard to Germany but also—according to Mallard (2011)—wrote *The Gift* in precisely this spirit of solidarism and “reparative justice” (2011: 227–228).

In this context, it is important to note that the term “justice” appears only once in *The Gift* and only in relation with the “ancient morality of the gift” (Mauss, 1990 [1925]: 23) as it is still practiced particularly by Jews and Muslims. Nelson (2010) notes that in biblical Hebrew, which Mauss had learnt as a Jewish boy, there is no distinction between giving in response to a legal duty (justice) and giving based on personal discretion (charity) (2010: 65). The same Hebrew word *tzedakah* (like its Arabic equivalent) refers both to the fulfillment of legal obligations *and* charitable acts.⁷ Here as elsewhere, the spirit of solidarism is based on a blurring of boundaries.

In Mauss’ account of expanding cycles of giving, there is an implicit narrative of civilizational progress toward a deepening solidarity based on learning. He makes this explicit in one of the closing paragraphs of *The Gift* in which he emphasizes that throughout history clans, tribes and peoples have learnt how to express and live out their differences without engaging in perpetual warfare, concluding that “this is what tomorrow, in our so-called civilized world, classes and nations and individuals, also, must learn. This is one of the enduring secrets of their wisdom and solidarity” (Mauss, 1990 [1925]: 106). Here again, Mauss uses a very broad concept of giving which includes all kinds of objects and services (prestations), including something of the giver himself or herself, and which is closely linked to the Durkheimian theme of solidarity (Bateman, 2016).

Solidarist rationalism differs strongly from Marxist revolutionism and is diametrically opposed to anti-liberal realism. Mauss has various objections against these powerful political languages. His critique of revolutionism is straightforward. He shares with the French Socialist leader Jean Jaurès “a sacred horror of violence” and explicitly

rejected “revolutionism” [*révolutionnarisme*] in the shape of Bolshevism and its “slightly farcical imitation: fascism” (Mauss, 1997: 529). What is more, in an essay entitled “Sociological Appreciation of Bolshevism,” published in 1924, he defends the market economy, the freedom of industry and trade, and the freedom of intermediary bodies such as interest groups and professional associations. In no way does he elevate the gift to a universal solution to all problems affecting humanity, although he argues in favor of worker and consumer cooperatives where people help each other and build things together (Mauss, 1997: 541–545).

As for anti-liberal realism, we have already pointed to the diametrical opposition between Schmitt’s preference for appropriation and Mauss’ focus on giving. However, and perhaps surprisingly, Mauss’ gift theory resonates in some respects with classical realism, in particular with Hobbes, whose political philosophy assigns a place to gift exchange in the process of the constitution of sovereignty. For Hobbes, a “covenant” differs from a “contract” by virtue of an element of gift-giving. In Part I, Chapter 14 of *Leviathan*, the transfer of rights that constitutes sovereignty by way of a covenant is explicitly said not to be “mutual”; only one party, humans in the state of nature, transfers its rights to allow a second, sovereign party to emerge. This sovereign party is “trusted” (Hobbes, 1985 [1651]: 193) to repay the gift of submission and obedience with protection and the maintenance of the commonwealth. Hobbes is also very clear about the difference between the gift itself and “some voluntary and sufficient signe, or signes,” (1985 [1651]: 191) that need to accompany the act of exchange to make it intelligible. At a later point, when he discusses the laws of nature, Hobbes remarks that an “Antecedent Free-gift,” which is always “Voluntary,” needs to be reciprocated in a spirit of “gratitude,” because otherwise “there will be no beginning of benevolence, or trust; nor consequently of mutual help; nor of reconciliation of one man to another” (1985 [1651]: 209). This thought is, of course, never extended to international or intersocietal relations. Without an awe-inspiring sovereign authority, it would be naïve, Hobbes argues, to expect any gift to be recognized as such or to be returned with gratitude.⁸

Another reason why solidarist rationalism is ultimately incompatible with realism is linked to its idea of human nature and the passions. Anti-liberal realists, following Hobbes, emphasize fear as the most basic human passion: fear of the other as the source of the covenant establishing sovereignty, and fear of the enemy as the driving force of behavior in the international arena. By contrast, *The Gift*, a founding text of solidarist rationalism, starts with an epigraph from the Icelandic epic Edda that rejects fear in favor of courage or valiancy. Against fear and rage, and against realists and revolutionists, Mauss hopes for the rise of a kind of socialist *noblesse oblige* without which transformative gift exchange in global society is impossible: “Noble and valiant men / Have the best life; / They have no fear at all / But a coward fears everything / The miser always fears presents” (Mauss, 1990 [1925]: 3).⁹

Analytical perspective and normative ideal

Before we introduce the other contributions to the Special Issue, we wish to conclude by listing what we believe are distinct advantages of a neo-Maussian approach to the study of international society. The concept of the gift is useful both for exploring underappreciated

aspects of the reality of world politics and for rethinking fundamental categories of international theory. First, Mauss has recognized gift exchange as being based on a specific type of reciprocity which can bring about cooperation across tribal, national, and cultural divides without relying on other mechanisms such as generalized altruism, preexisting collective identities, or the threat of legal sanctioning. Moreover, unlike most IR scholars, the French anthropologist does not start from the premise that reciprocity only works among like-units such as sovereign states in an ideal Westphalian order. Rather, he encourages us to investigate forms of exchange that trigger cycles of repeated interaction without being based on formal equality or symmetry. Besides, Mauss invites us to adopt a long-term view when studying such interactions in IR. Going beyond a reciprocal relation, the process of giving and receiving is iterative and may potentially span over a longer period. Dillon's study of a few Americans and Frenchman after the implementation of the Marshall Plan from 1951 to 1960 is a striking example of how an international gift can lead to lingering feelings of humiliation and resentment.

As we have already pointed out, a central motif in the works of Mauss is the intentional subversion of a number of conceptual binaries that structure much of mainstream social theory and international studies. Mauss (1990 [1925]) expressly mentions the binaries of "liberty" versus "obligation" and of "generosity" versus "interests" and suggests "to put them into the melting pot once more" (1990 [1925]: 93). Implicitly, he also questions the dualism of the domestic versus the international, or at least prompts us to think about the pliable border between the two concepts. This is interesting from the perspective of comparative political theory. In particular, it tells us something about the affinity as well as the difference between a neo-Maussian international theory and the English School of International Relations. Mauss can be regarded as a precursor of the kind of solidarism in IR that was later developed by English School theorists. At the same time, he would have objected to the idea favored by some English School authors that the international sphere is *sui generis* and fundamentally different from the domestic sphere of modern societies (Linklater and Suganami, 2006: 44–45). Instead, Mauss (1969) argues that, by addressing common tasks that no one can take on alone, solidarity does for nations within international society what it does for individuals within nations (1969: 625).

To develop this point further, it is important to consider how Mauss' use of the term "solidarity" navigates between the analytical and the normative. For him, group solidarity is not a prerequisite of successful cooperation, but a resource that needs to be built up through cycles of gift exchange. In many contexts, cooperation can be initiated by what Eric Wolf (1997) calls "diplomatic gifts" (1997: 166). In the past, gifts often helped to start and stabilize reciprocal intergroup relationships not only between clans and tribes but also between Europeans and indigenous peoples in the course of European expansion in the Americas. Giving and inviting gifts has also proven to be an important leadership tool in contemporary global politics (Dillon, 1968: 100). On the other hand, making sense of the category of the gift to better understand certain international phenomena does not preclude a step toward a normative approach. Gift-giving *ought* to be considered in situations when politics are stuck and the goal is to break a gridlock. This entanglement of analytical and normative aspects has already been expressed by Mauss, when he states:

But to note the fact is not enough. One must deduce practice from it, and a moral precept ... These facts not only throw light upon our morality and help to direct our ideas. In their light, we can analyze better the most general economic facts, and even this analysis helps us dimly to perceive better organizational procedures applicable in our societies. (Mauss, 1990 [1925]: 87, 91)

This connection between facts and norms is crucial for understanding Mauss' contribution to international studies. However, it would be a mistake to interpret *The Gift* as containing a normative political theory. The main purpose of this essay was rather to alert its readers to the fact that humans are mutually dependent on each other, regardless of whether they are aware of this interdependence or not. Mauss wanted to convince his audience that giving (not taking) always comes first. Someone gave birth (and then food) to each of us. The emphasis on this universal moral fact corresponds to Mauss' rejection of utopianism which he shared with classical realism as well as, for example, with the workers' cooperative movement in Britain and elsewhere (Fournier, 2006: 309). Mauss did not preach a new secular "religion of brotherliness" (Weber, 1958: 330) but built his normative ideal on empirical evidence about human behavior.¹⁰ And he did not see any reason to confine this kind of empirically grounded ideal to the so-called domestic sphere of politics. Since there is evidence that under certain circumstances gift-giving can be used strategically to attenuate global conflicts and to provide a way out of mutual fear or indifference, political leaders and activists should redouble efforts to internationalize solidarity beyond culturally unified regions such as "the West."

Plan of the issue

The questions touched on in this Introduction are taken up and further elaborated from different angles by the contributors. What all contributors have in common is the conviction that Mauss' critique of neo-utilitarianism, understood narrowly as rational choice theory, is to be taken seriously because neo-utilitarianism¹¹ is inadequate, or at least insufficient, for understanding today's complex international and global relations.

The first two articles discuss Mauss from the perspective of IR theory. John Oates and Eric Grynawski use Mauss' *The Gift* and in particular his distinction between two types of gift exchanges—potlatch and *kula*—to rethink the agent-structure debate in IR theory, arguing that the model of social relations Mauss outlines sheds new light on basic concepts of international political theory such as reciprocity, hierarchy, and obligation. Mauss is read as an author who avoids false alternatives such as reducing political order to either deeply internalized social norms or merely instrumental interests. Instead of focusing on interests or on identity, his social ontology provides a new and original explanation of cooperative practices which are grounded in shared understandings of common fate and mutual vulnerability. The article concludes by developing a moral argument about the importance of certain foundational norms of international politics and the "stewardship" obligations that states and other transnational actors owe each other in world politics.

From a continental perspective, Frédéric Ramel makes a similar argument by offering a broader reading of the concept of reciprocity which is fundamental to the analysis of global politics. Reciprocity, he argues following Mauss, is not always direct but can also be

indirect and delayed. The idea of “chains of reciprocity” is then exemplified by references to issues such as the protection of the environment or cultural heritage sites and compared to analogous reflections in the tradition of the English School of International Relations.

After these articles on Mauss and IR theory, Grégoire Mallard reminds readers of the historical context in which Mauss published *The Gift*. Mauss’ reflections on gift-giving were influenced by the debates of his time on European debt crises, reparation policies after World War I and, perhaps most importantly, by colonial policies. The three obligations which Mauss identified as the basis of both domestic and international society—the obligation to give, to receive, and to reciprocate—were applied to rethink the international relations between Paris and its colonies. Mallard identifies the complex relationship of Mauss’ essay with the colonial ideology of European powers and explores how the essay resonated with administrative and public discourses of the French colonial administrators in Algeria up to the war of independence. He discusses the origins of the notion of the “gift of civilization” and the eclipse of the gift ideology by highlighting little-known sociological and discursive legacies of Mauss’ interwar essay and its colonial uses.

The remainder of the Special Issue is devoted to contributions that apply gift theory to specific global problems and policy areas. Addressing the question of whether there can be something like “false” gifts, Auriane Guilbaud explores drug donations by global pharmaceutical corporations. Drawing on Mauss and again on the distinction between potlatch and *kula* as different types of gift practices, she studies this particular case of corporate charity to substantiate the general claim that in contemporary global society gifts and markets are far from opposites. Guilbaud emphasizes Mauss’ central idea that gift-giving undermines the dichotomy of self-interest and altruism. There is no such thing as a free gift, and gift-giving is sometimes conducive to the accumulation of prestige and power. Her article argues that drug donations can be several things at the same time: beneficial and harmful, helpful and humiliating. Global corporations, she continues, should be regarded as complex actors that do not necessarily follow a single logic of maximizing profits but leave room for individual gift-giving practices of employees which in turn are embedded in wider organizational contexts. She argues that the focus of future research should be on analyzing the role of ideas and collective representations in shaping gift practices.

Volker Heins and Christine Unrau shift the focus from the international arena to what they call the intensifying internal transnationalism of encounters between native populations and refugees. Against competing political theories of the integration of refugees, which focus on international legal obligations or on the analogy of the social contract, they propose to reframe the relationship between the populations of host countries and arriving refugees in terms of a theory of gift exchange. Increasingly, the argument goes, the “international” becomes part and parcel of the “domestic” sphere. Considering the example of the decision of the German government in September 2015 to open its borders to almost a million refugees within one year and the different responses from civil society, ranging from “inclusionary enthusiasm” to open racism, the authors make use of Mauss’ reflections on how separate, culturally different communities can establish ties of solidarity and cooperation among each other. In particular, gift theory appears to contribute to the clarification of the concept of integration which is at the heart of recent debates on the ethics of immigration.

Finally, Ariel Colonomos starts from Mauss' observation that hostages in ancient and medieval societies were often not taken by force, but given voluntarily as gifts to foreign rulers to restore or maintain good relations. Hostages were stakes and instruments of proto-diplomacy. Analyzing hostageship in Maussian terms as a "total social phenomenon" that combines political, legal, and economic aspects, Colonomos then offers reasons why the function of hostages has radically changed over time. Finally, he discusses contemporary hostageship from a normative perspective, arguing, along with Mauss, against an interest-based utilitarian vision of hostageship and in favor of a solidarist approach.

Acknowledgements

We would like to thank Galya Ben-Arieh Ruffer, Katja Freistein, Claus Leggewie, and Mario Schmidt for many valuable comments and Eva Marie Trösser for her meticulous editing of the manuscripts. We also gratefully acknowledge financial support from the German Federal Ministry of Education and Research (BMBF) for the Käte Hamburger Kolleg / Centre for Global Cooperation Research.

Notes

1. When quoting from *The Gift*, we and the other contributors to this Special Issue will refer to the translation by W. D. Halls (Mauss, 1990 [1925]), although there is both an older and a more recent translation. The main reason for this choice is that the translation by Halls is easily accessible, both in print and online, and has been praised even by Jane Guyer (2016), the translator of a new, "expanded edition" of the original *Essai sur le don* and a number of related texts as a "timelessly relevant source for all students and scholars" (2016: 1).
2. This is in stark contrast to Jaques Derrida's (1992) conviction that the gift is impossible precisely because it is in its nature not to be returned: If there is gift, the *given* of the gift ... must not come back to the giving ... It must not circulate, it must not be exchanged, it must not in any case be exhausted, as a gift, by the process of exchange, by the movement of circulation of the circle in the form of return to the point of departure. If the figure of the circle is essential to economics, the gift must remain *uneconomic* ... It is perhaps in this sense that the gift is the impossible. (Derrida, 1992: 6)
3. For a sophisticated analysis of the challenges of translating Mauss' nuanced vocabulary and the possibilities for understanding his key terms, see Guyer (2016). For our purposes, it suffices to draw attention to her remark, which is based on a footnote in the first chapter of Marx's *Capital*, that even the term "gift" has a double meaning: it is both the "actual thing" that is given away (or given up) and how it—the thing or the act of giving it away—is reflected in the minds of givers and receivers (Guyer, 2016: 18).
4. A similar remark on "charity" and "administered beneficence," written perhaps with the Marshall Plan in mind, can be found in Adorno's (2005 [1951]) *Minima Moralia*: "In its organized operations there is no longer room for human impulses, indeed, the gift is necessarily accompanied by humiliation through its distribution, its just allocation, in short through treatment of the recipient as an object" (2005 [1951]: 42).
5. James Tully (2008), for example, argues that Canada was founded on the sharing of gifts: "The Aboriginal peoples shared their food, hunting and agricultural techniques, practical knowledge, trade routes and geographic knowledge with the needy newcomers. Without this, the first immigrants would have been unable to survive" (2008: 244–245).

6. To be sure, Mauss is not a rationalist in the way Jacob Levy (2015) defines the term in his profound analysis of “rationalist” and “pluralist” strands in liberal political theory since Montesquieu. If pluralists are “skeptical of the central state and friendly toward local, customary, voluntary, or intermediate bodies, communities, and associations” (Levy, 2015: 2), then Mauss, a strong advocate especially of the British cooperative movement, would certainly count as a pluralist. The opposite of rationalism, for Mauss, is not pluralism, but the “return of primitivism” and “absolute irrationalism” (cited in Fournier, 2006: 327) which he saw in Europe’s self-destructive descent into fascism and Bolshevism and, more specifically, in the intellectual development of some of his students and colleagues.
7. The reason is that according to the Hebrew Bible, God is the owner of all things and thus free to impose conditions on the use of his property by human beings. When people care for others or share goods out of solidarity, their actions are not discretionary because they do not really own what seems to be their property (Nelson, 2010: 65–66). On Mauss’ Jewish background and religious education, see Fournier (2006: 15–16).
8. Marshall Sahlins (2004 [1972]) has explicitly compared Hobbes and Mauss: “For the war of every man against every man, Mauss substitutes the exchange of everything between everybody” (2004 [1972]: 168).
9. There is perhaps more than a whiff of nostalgia in Mauss for what Elena Russo (1999: 251) has called “aristocratic moral economies.” In fact, Mauss (1990 [1925]) suggests at one point that we must return to the “habits of ‘aristocratic extravagance’” and that “the rich must come back to considering themselves—freely and also by obligation—as the financial guardians of their fellow citizens” (1990 [1925]: 88).
10. We are indebted to Mario Schmidt, University of Cologne, for drawing our attention to this important point. By contrast, some neo-Maussian intellectuals have moved in the opposite direction of advocating a concrete “utopia” (Leggewie, 2016) of the gift. See, for example, the French “Convivialist Manifesto,” published in English by Käte Hamburger Kolleg—Center for Global Cooperation Research, Duisburg, Germany, available at: <http://www.gcr21.org/publications/global-dialogues/2198-0403-gd-3/> (accessed 15 January 2018).
11. It should be clear that what Mauss (1990 [1925]) calls “icy, utilitarian calculation” (1990 [1925]: 98) has very little to do with the original philosophical utilitarianism of John Stuart Mill and others. Mill’s (2008 [1861]) utilitarianism is generally concerned with the “essentials of human well-being” beyond strategic success and explicitly puts the “Just” above the “Expedient” (2008 [1861]: 195, 197).

References

- Adorno TW (2005 [1951]) *Minima Moralia: Reflections from Damaged Life* (trans. EFN Jephcott). London; New York: Verso Books.
- Amin S (1977) *Imperialism and Unequal Development*. New York; London: Monthly Review Press.
- Bataille G (1988 [1949]) *The Accursed Share: An Essay on General Economy, Vol.1: Consumption* (trans. R Hurley). Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
- Bateman S (2016) When Marcel Mauss’ *Essai sur le Don* becomes the gift: Variations on the theme of solidarity. *Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics* 37(6): 447–461.
- Chomsky N (2004) *Language and Politics*. 2nd ed. Oakland, CA: AK Press.
- Derrida J (1992) *Given Time: I. Counterfeit Money*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- Dillon W (1968) *Gifts and Nations: The Obligation to Give, Receive and Repay* (with a foreword by T Parsons). The Hague: Mouton de Gruyter.
- Fournier M (2006) *Marcel Mauss: A Biography* (trans. JM Todd). Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

- Furia A (2015) *The Foreign Aid Regime: Gift-Giving, States and Global Dis/order*. Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Guyer JI (2016) The gift that keeps on giving. In: Guyer JI (ed.) *Marcel Mauss: The Gift*. Expanded ed. Chicago, IL: Hau Books, pp. 1–25.
- Hattori T (2001) Reconceptualizing foreign aid. *Review of International Political Economy* 8: 633–660.
- Heins VM (2016) Recognition, multiculturalism and the allure of separatism. In: Hayden P and Schick K (eds) *Recognition and Global Politics: Critical Encounters between State and World*. Manchester: Manchester University Press, pp. 69–84.
- Heins VM and Unrau C (2016) Introduction: Cultures of humanitarianism, old and new. In: Heins VM, Koddenbrock K and Unrau C (eds) *Humanitarianism and Challenges of Cooperation*. London; New York: Routledge, pp. 1–14.
- Hirschman AO (1977) *The Passions and the Interests: Political Arguments for Capitalism before Its Triumph*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Hobbes T (1985 [1651]) *Leviathan* (ed. CB Macpherson). London: Penguin Books.
- Honneth A (2014) *Freedom's Right: The Social Foundations of Democratic Life* (trans. J Ganahl). New York: Columbia University Press.
- Kojève A (2001) Colonialism from a European perspective. *Interpretation* 29(1): 115–130.
- Leggewie C (2016) The concrete utopia of the gift: A genuine sociological approach to interdisciplinary cooperation theory. In: Messner D and Weinlich S (eds) *Global Cooperation and the Human Factor in International Relations*. London; New York: Routledge, pp. 181–198.
- Levy JT (2015) *Rationalism, Pluralism, and Freedom*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Linklater A and Suganami H (2006) *The English School of International Relations: A Contemporary Reassessment*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Malinowski B (1922) *Argonauts of the Western Pacific: An Account of Native Enterprise and Adventure in the Archipelagoes of Melanesian New Guinea*. London: G. Routledge & Sons.
- Mallard G (2011) The gift revisited: Marcel Mauss on war, debt, and the politics of reparations. *Sociological Theory* 29(4): 225–247.
- Marcel J-C (2003) Bataille and Mauss: A dialogue of the deaf? *Economy and Society* 32(1): 141–152.
- Mauss M (1969) La nation et l'internationalisme. In: Karady V (ed.) *Oeuvres. Volume 3: Cohesion sociale et divisions de la sociologie*. Paris: Éditions de Minuit, pp. 569–639.
- Mauss M (1990 [1925]) *The Gift: The Form and Reason for Exchange in Archaic Societies* (trans. WD Halls). London; New York: Routledge.
- Mauss M (1997) *Écrits politiques* (ed M Fournier). Paris: Fayard.
- Meszaros T (2017) The French tradition of sociology of international relations: An overview. *The American Sociologist* 48(3–4): 297–341.
- Mill JS (2008 [1861]) Utilitarianism. In: Gray J (ed.) *On Liberty and Other Essays*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 129–201.
- Monnet J (1978) *Memoirs* (trans. R Mayne). New York: Doubleday.
- Montesquieu (1989 [1748]) *The Spirit of the Laws* (ed AM Cohler, BC Miller and HS Stone). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Nelson E (2010) *The Hebrew Republic: Jewish Sources and the Transformation of European Political Thought*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Parsons C (2003) *A Certain Idea of Europe*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Pocock JGA (1989) Languages and their implications: The transformation of the study of political thought. In: Pocock JGA (ed.) *Politics, Language & Time: Essays on Political Thought and History*. Chicago, IL: Chicago University Press, pp. 3–41.
- Ruggie JG (1998) What makes the world hang together? Neo-utilitarianism and the social constructivist challenge. *International Organization* 52(4): 855–885.

- Russo E (1999) Virtuous economies: Modernity and noble expenditure from Montesquieu to Caillois. *Historical Reflections/Réflexions Historiques* 25(2): 251–278.
- Sahlins M (2004 [1972]) *Stone Age Economics*. New York; London: Routledge.
- Schmitt C (2006 [1950]) *The Nomos of the Earth in the International Law of the Jus Publicum Europaeum* (trans. GL Ulmen). New York: Telos Press.
- Teschke BG (2011) Fatal attraction: A critique of Carl Schmitt's international political and legal theory. *International Theory* 3(2): 179–227.
- Tomasello M (2014) The ultra-social animal. *European Journal of Social Psychology* 44(3): 187–194.
- Tully J (2008) *Public Philosophy in a New Key. Volume 1: Democracy and Civic Freedom*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Wallerstein I (1974) The rise and future demise of the world capitalist system: Concepts for comparative analysis. *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 16(4): 387–415.
- Weber M (1958) *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology* (ed. HH Gerth and C Wright Mills). New York: Oxford University Press.
- Wight M (1991) *International Theory: The Three Traditions* (ed. G Wight and B Porter). London: Leicester University Press.
- Wolf ER (1997) *Europe and the People without History*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

Author biographies

Volker M Heins is a Professor of Political Science and a Member of the Faculty of Social Sciences at the University of Duisburg-Essen, Germany, as well as a Senior Researcher at the Käte Hamburger Kolleg / Centre for Global Cooperation Research at the same university. He is also a Permanent Fellow at the Institute for Advanced Study in the Humanities (KWI) in Essen, Germany. His current research focuses on the relation between democracy and open borders. His latest publication is “Judith Shklar and the Frankfurt School,” in Samantha Ashenden and Andreas Hess (eds), *Between Utopia and Realism: Judith N. Shklar* (Penn State University Press, forthcoming).

Christine Unrau received her PhD in Political Theory from the University of Cologne and is a Research Group Leader at the Käte Hamburger Kolleg / Centre for Global Cooperation Research (University of Duisburg-Essen). Her research interests include political emotions, religion and politics, and social movements in the context of globalization. Her book *Erfahrung und Engagement: Motive, Formen und Ziele der Globalisierungskritik (Experience and Commitment: Motives, Forms and Aims of the Global Justice Movement)* is forthcoming with transcript in 2018.

Kristine Avram is a Research Fellow and a Lecturer at the Center for Conflict Studies, Philipps University of Marburg, Germany. Her current research project deals with the ascription of individual criminal responsibility in the aftermath of collective violence and repression. Her research interests include theories of collective violence and conflict, sociology of law in transitional contexts, and narrative analysis.