Essays on Migration, Selection and Sorting in the Spatial Economy

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To my family.

Contents

Introduction

In how far individuals react to economic incentives is one of the core questions in all of economics. Basic economic theory predicts that workers take advantage of changes in economic activity by moving to those places or occupations that offer them the highest utility. How strong is this migration response into different parts of the economy and in how far does it impact the regional and sectoral distribution of economic activity? To answer these questions it is important to understand the underlying economic mechanisms. Policymakers, for example, need to consider the mobility response of economic agents across regions and occupations when providing local public goods or redistributing income. By focusing on the causes and consequences of migration and sectoral choice responses of heterogeneous workers, this thesis contributes to the understanding of these questions

The first chapter of this thesis is joint work with Gabriel M. Ahlfeldt, Duncan H.W. Roth and Tobias Seidel. We show how to estimate and quantify *quality of life* when specifically accounting for migration frictions. Quality of life is an index of location-specific amenities, which the canonical literature identifies using the concept of a *spatial equilibrium*, as first conceptualized in the Rosen (1979)-Roback(1982) framework. Under the assumption of frictionless worker mobility, utility is herein equalized across space, such that the spatial variation in real wages identifies quality of life as a residuum that best fits a common level of utility in the economy [1].
Yet, workers are not perfectly mobile and face substantial utility costs of migration. We, therefore, develop a dynamic, spatial model with migration frictions and forward-looking agents and find that the quantitative spatial models which rely on perfect worker mobility significantly understate spatial differences in quality of life. As a result, local public goods (such as the absence of crime or pollution) may be valued much more highly than previously thought. Additionally, we provide empirical and theoretical evidence of urban quality of life premia, whereby quality of life tends to be largest in the biggest metropolitan areas of the economy.
Furthermore, we document heterogeneous welfare effects across regions in several counterfactual applications that shift quality of life because group-specific utility is not equalized

[1] *Quality of life* therefore tends to be the largest in regions with small real wages.

across space in our model framework. This is an important contribution to the literature on place-based policy evaluation wherein the spatial incidence of these policies is well understood theoretically (Kline and Moretti, 2014) but ruled out in the quantitative spatial models based on perfect worker mobility (Fajgelbaum and Gaubert, 2020).

The second chapter of this thesis is joint work with Marcel Henkel. We show how the supply of local public goods decreases gender gaps in employment. Local governments, however, often lack sufficient fiscal resources to finance their provision. Furthermore, recent empirical literature documents how a higher supply of different components of local public goods (such as public childcare facilities) increases labour force participation, especially for female workers. In the empirical part of this chapter we, therefore, first show that changes in fiscal capacities of local governments, as a proxy for local public good provision, decrease gender gaps in labour force participation rates. In the theoretical part of this chapter, we subsequently extend quantitative spatial models with heterogeneous workers and intergovernmental transfers to include selective sorting across local labour markets and sectors as well as extensive labour supply decisions of female and male workers. Inspired by the empirical evidence, we hereby allow these decisions to be endogenously affected by the provision of local public goods. Counterfactual simulations imply that fiscal re-distribution has decreased gender employment gaps by 2.6 % in recipient regions on average (mainly in Eastern Germany).

Quality of life in a dynamic spatial model

Abstract

The economics literature on *quality of life* is rooted in the canonical frictionless spatial equilibrium framework. We show how to measure quality of life and evaluate quality-of-life policies within a dynamic spatial model with heterogeneous, imperfectly mobile, and forward-looking workers. We find that the canonical spatial equilibrium framework understates spatial quality-of-life differentials, the urban quality-of-life premium and the value of local non-marketed goods. Unlike the canonical spatial equilibrium framework, a dynamic spatial model predicts local welfare effects that motivate many place-based policies seeking to improve quality of life.

A Introduction

In economics, *quality of life* (QoL) is a location-specific utility shifter that can be used to value local public goods or bads such as clean or dirty air. From Ricardo (1817) via the neoclassical Rosen (1979)-Roback (1982) framework to quantitative spatial models (QSMs) (Allen and Arkolakis, 2014; Ahlfeldt et al., 2015), economists have inferred QoL assuming a *competitive spatial equilibrium* (CSE) in which free mobility of homogeneous workers leads to perfect spatial arbitrage. Spatially invariant utility then ensures that spatial differences in amenity values are offset by differences in real wages, the so-called *compensating differential*. These assumptions stand in sharp contrast to a rapidly growing literature using dynamic spatial models (DSMs) in which spatial frictions lead to imperfect spatial arbitrage and spatially variant utility (Desmet et al., 2018; Caliendo et al., 2019b,a; Monras, 2019; Balboni, 2019; Bilal and Rossi-Hansberg, 2021; Allen and Donaldson, 2020). This literature acknowledges that spatial economies are generally not observed in a stationary spatial equilibrium (SSE) but in a transitory spatial equilibrium (TSE) in which unbalanced migration flows result in non-stationary factor and goods prices.

We leverage on the recent methodological advances brought forth in the DSM literature to improve the measurement of QoL and the evaluation of QoL policies. Our first contribution is to fully invert a DSM under different expectation regimes. In particular, we evaluate different special cases of a DSM in which workers are either myopic or make migration decisions in anticipation of the TSE-SSE transition path of goods and factor prices. This is an important step to connect the literature concerned with QoL, which is an unobserved structural fundamental, to the DSM literature that has solved for the transition path from the TSE to the SSE

under perfect foresight without inverting the model's fundamentals (Caliendo et al., 2019b,a; Balboni, 2019). Hence, we propose a new way of measuring QoL in a frictional spatial economy which, unlike the canonical approach based on the CSE (Roback, 1982; Blomquist et al., 1988; Albouy, 2011), accounts for worker heterogeneity and costly migration.

Our second contribution is to show, theoretically and empirically, that the canonical CSE framework severely understates spatial QoL differentials. This result is driven by the DSM's ability to quantitatively account for imperfect spatial arbitrage due to imperfect worker mobility. In relative terms, the choice of the expectation regime has minor effects. One important implication is that the canonical approach using the compensating differential to value local public goods such as clean air (Chay and Greenstone, 2005), safety (Linden and Rockoff, 2008) or good public schools (Cellini et al., 2010) delivers lower-bound estimates. Another important implication is that a large literature reviewed by Ahlfeldt and Pietrostefani (2019) and Duranton and Puga (2020) has understated the role of the urban QoL premium as a driver of urbanization.

Our third contribution is to illustrate how QoL policies have welfare consequences that vary in space and over time within a DSM, whereas the welfare effect of place-based policies is spatially invariant and instantaneous by assumption within CSE models (Blouri and Ehrlich, 2020; Fajgelbaum and Gaubert, 2020). While in DSMs QoL shocks have larger effects in the short-run than in the long-run, there are persistent spatial effects owing to imperfect spatial arbitrage. Hence, local QoL policies do not just shift economic activity to potentially less productive places (Glaeser, 2008); they improve the lives of those living in disadvantaged areas, implying complex redistributive effects that call for a social welfare function (Gaubert et al., 2021). In fact, targeting poor places can help the poor in rich places by easing pressure on housing markets.

To facilitate these contributions, we require a fully quantifiable DSM that is amenable to different expectation regimes and can account for heterogeneity in worker mobility, valuation of amenities, and net-returns to agglomeration. To this end, we combine elements from various general equilibrium models. We model migration decisions similar to Caliendo et al. (2019b). Workers spend their labour income on tradable goods and non-tradable housing. In each period, they choose where to supply their labour, taking into account wages, rents, quality of life, as well as bilateral migration costs and idiosyncratic amenity shocks in the spirit of Artuç et al. (2010). We nest the migration model into a spatial economy that consists of discrete local labour markets in which there are costs of and returns to agglomeration. To generate a concentration force, we add agglomeration effects that arise from density in the form of greater productivity as in Allen and Arkolakis (2014). To generate a dispersion force in the form of higher rents, housing is produced using inelastically supplied land as in Ahlfeldt et al. (2015). Workers belong to an arbitrary number of groups that differ in terms of productivity and preferences (Diamond, 2016). QoL is a group-region-specific structural fundamental that shifts utility (Roback, 1982). Exogenous group-region labour productivity and regional housing productivity and land supply are the other structural fundamentals. All markets are competitive.

For the measurement of QoL and the evaluation of QoL policies, two features of this setup

are particularly important. The first one is the stochastic formulation of amenity shocks, which provides the microeconomic foundation for a migration gravity equation that has been found to be empirically successful (Kennan and Walker, 2011; Bryan and Morten, 2019; Tombe and Zhu, 2019). The dispersion of the idiosyncratic component is inversely related to the migration elasticity, which monitors how strongly bilateral migration probabilities respond to differences in expected indirect utility at migration destinations. We show that for values of the migration elasticity found in our data and in previous research (Caliendo et al., 2019b), the marginal worker's willingness to accept high real living cost steeply decreases in the size of a local labour market. It is because of this idiosyncrasy in tastes that our model rationalises real living cost differentials by much larger differences in group-specific average QoL than the canonical CSE framework, leading to a higher urban QoL premium, larger valuations of local public goods, and greater welfare effects of QoL policies.

The second important feature is that workers, when switching between labour markets, pay an origin-destination-group-specific migration cost in the form of foregone utility in the relocation period. These costs imply that spatial adjustments are non-instantaneous, giving rise to the dynamic structure of the model and distinct notions of spatial equilibria. The role of the TSE is to rationalise observed data assuming that goods and factor markets clear without imposing any restriction on trends in prices and quantities on labour and housing markets. In the SSE, goods and factor markets clear *and* all prices and quantities are stationary. Intuitively, the SSE is a counterfactual situation to which a spatial economy would mean-revert in the absence of further shocks to the model's structural fundamentals. The implication is that once we acknowledge that spatial adjustments are frictional, we can no longer assume that we observe wages and rents—the key ingredients of the traditional compensating differential—in a SSE. Instead, we use the DSM to solve for the TSE-SSE transition path and the QoL fundamental simultaneously. This way we account for temporary shocks to fundamentals that affect wages and rents and recover a theory-consistent QoL measure from the TSE. Importantly, migration costs also break the equalization of (expected) utility across regions in the CSE. Consequently, place-based QoL policies can have positive welfare effects in the targeted regions.

The quantification of the model follows the basic steps known from the QSM literature (Redding and Rossi-Hansberg, 2017).[1] First, we use observed data and the structure of the model to estimate the key structural parameters. Second, we use observed data, the structure of the model, and the structural parameters to invert the structural fundamentals. For the quantification, we leverage on a matched employer-employee data set covering about 30M German workers contributing to social insurances, who we track over space and time. In particular, we observe the local labour market in which they work (Kosfeld and Werner, 2012), the nominal wage, and a range of characteristics including age, gender, and education for all years from 1993 to 2017. Aggregation of these microdata yields total employment and bilateral migration by region, year and 18 worker groups based on age, gender, and skills. To these data, we merge a regional mix-adjusted property price index starting in 2007, which we generate from

[1] See e.g. Allen and Arkolakis (2014); Ahlfeldt et al. (2015); Monte et al. (2018); Heblich et al. (2020).

property microdata containing about 17M observations.

We derive all empirical specifications used in the estimation of the structural parameters directly from the structure of the model. The identification strategies we use are close to what we consider the current best-practice examples in the respective literature. Our contribution is to exploit the richness of our data to provide parameter estimates for 18 gender-skill-age groups. In particular, we provide group-specific estimates of the migration elasticity that range from 0.12 to 0.58 which compares to an estimate of 0.5 for the average worker in the US (Caliendo et al., 2019b). We also provide original estimates of the intensive-margin housing supply elasticity (4.3) and group-specific estimates of the agglomeration elasticity (ranging from near zero to 0.42). Combining our estimates of the migration elasticity with estimates of a non-parametric migration gravity equation, we monetise the average moving cost at €170K which is towards the higher end of the survey-based estimates provided by Koşar et al. (2021). Controlling for distance and instrumenting with historic dialect similarity (Falck et al., 2012), social connectedness as measured by Bailey et al. (2018) has a large and positive effect on our estimated migration costs, suggesting a role for social capital (Glaeser et al., 2002).

Conditional on these estimates, the inversion of fundamental housing and labour productivity is straightforward as there is a one-to-one mapping from wages and rents for given structural parameters and observed density. Under myopia, the inversion of QoL is similarly straightforward using observed values of wages, rents, and bilateral migration flows.[2] In contrast, the inversion of QoL from the TSE in a DSM with forward-looking agents is challenging. While QoL is straightforward to invert for given expected wages and rents, the model requires QoL as an input to forecast the transition paths of wages and rents to the SSE. The DSM literature has not yet found an elegant solution to this circularity problem in high dimensional settings.[3] We develop a new procedure that treats the identification of the unknown group-region-specific QoL *and* the TSE-SSE transition path as a fixed point problem that is solved numerically. In the baseline scenario reported in the main paper, we use this procedure to solve the model for a special case in which workers expect to stay put at their migration destination, an assumption that is consistent with the average German worker changing the local labour market only once over the employment biography. In the appendix, we demonstrate that allowing workers to anticipate one additional move or imposing entirely myopic expectations has minor effects on the recovered structural fundamentals, an important insight for future work aiming at model inversion in high-dimensional settings. Since our baseline scenario yields the most conservative results, all main conclusions generalize to the other special cases.

In the first application of our quantified model, we establish that our novel QoL index (DSM-QoL) is much more dispersed than the canonical Rosen-Roback measure (RR-QoL). In log terms, the within-group standard deviation of the DSM-QoL exceeds that of the RR-QoL

[2] Desmet et al. (2018), Conte et al. (2020), and Allen and Donaldson (2020) apply DSMs with static expectations.

[3] Monras (2020) avoids the problem by assuming that the economy is observed in a long-run equilibrium. Caliendo et al. (2019b), Caliendo et al. (2019a) and Balboni (2019) use "dynamic hat algebra" to solve the dynamic model and the stationary equilibrium that is consistent with the data, but they do not invert QoL. See Table A1 for a summary classification of the related literature.

by a factor of three. This is a striking result that has major implications for the literatures on the origins of QoL (e.g. Roback, 1982; Blomquist et al., 1988; Albouy, 2011; Lee et al., 2021) and the value of local public goods (e.g. Chay and Greenstone, 2005; Linden and Rockoff, 2008; Cellini et al., 2010). We estimate that the city size elasticity of the DSM-QoL, at about 0.45, is about four times as large as for the RR-QoL. Hence, the extant literature may have dismissed an urban QoL premium too soon (see Albouy, 2011, for a summary). We find that consumption benefits contribute more to the spatial concentration of workers in cities than productivity advantages, which helps to rationalise why high-skilled workers tend to live in cities although many of their jobs could be done remotely (Althoff et al., 2020). The relatively low dispersion of the RR-QoL is also consequential for the valuation of local public goods. As an example, a decrease in air pollution is associated with a more than twice as large increase in DSM-QoL than in RR-QoL.[4] This result helps to reconcile the puzzling finding that the monetised effect of dirty air on self-reported well-being is larger than the willingness to pay for clean air inferred from property prices under the CSE assumption (Luechinger, 2009). Since a simple count measure of geotagged photos shared online (Ahlfeldt, 2013) explains almost 60% of the variation in DSM-QoL, social media represents an alternative avenue to proxy for QoL differentials, similar to the use of lights at night as a proxy for GDP (Henderson et al., 2012).

In the second application of our quantified model, we introduce a procedure suitable for the evaluation of any spatial policy that has an effect on any of the structural fundamentals in general equilibrium, including QoL. To illustrate the implications for the literature concerned with the evaluation of QoL policies, we apply the procedure to a hypothetical policy that reduces air pollution in the most polluted areas, similar to the US Clean Air Act (Chay and Greenstone, 2005). To this end, we establish the group-specific causal link between the inverted DSM-QoL and observed air pollution (PM^{10}) exploiting wind-induced exogenous variation (Deryugina et al., 2019; Heblich et al., 2021). Since we account for taste heterogeneity when valuing air quality, our aggregate effects are larger than they would be within a CSE framework. At the regional level, we find that workers move from the untreated to the (positively) treated regions, triggering agglomeration effects and sorting because the high-skilled value clean air more, enjoy greater returns to agglomeration, and are more mobile.[5] Since we allow for migration costs, we do not equalize expected utility across migration origins so that spatial policies can have spatial welfare effects. This is an important contribution to the literature on place-based policy evaluation in which the incidence on non-marginal workers is well understood theoretically (Moretti, 2011; Kline and Moretti, 2014), but ruled out in the extant quantitative frameworks based on the CSE (Blouri and Ehrlich, 2020; Fajgelbaum and Gaubert, 2020).[6] While, over time, some of the local short-run welfare effects are eliminated by spatial arbitrage, almost three quarters persist. Expected utility also increases in the untreated areas since the relocation of workers reduces congestion on the housing market. In our example, spatial incidence

[4]This finding echos Bayer et al. (2009) who extend a hedonic model to account for moving cost when estimating the marginal willingness to pay for clean air.

[5]For the study of within-sorting in a dynamic model, we refer to (Almagro and Domínguez-Iino, 2020).

[6]Much of the place-based policy literature focuses on reduced-form methods to provide causal evidence (Kline and Moretti, 2013, 2014; Criscuolo et al., 2019). See Neumark and Simpson (2015) for a recent summary.

increases spatial inequality in welfare. Applying a lower-bound penalty for inequality aversion following Atkinson (1970) reduces the social welfare effect by 13%. This is an important insight for the literature in the tradition of Rosen (1979)-Roback (1982) which has abstracted from a potential efficiency-equity trade-off by assuming perfect spatial arbitrage.

The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section B presents stylised evidence that guides our modelling choices. Section C outlines the model. Section D describes the quantification of the model. Section E compares our new QoL index to the canonical measure in the literature. Section F shows how to use the model for policy analysis. Section G concludes.

B Stylised facts

To motivate the structure of the model developed in Section C, we present some stylised facts of a spatial economy in Figure 1 using data that we describe in Section D.1. The upper panels show how spatial concentration is associated with benefits due to agglomeration economies on labour markets (a) and costs due to congestion on housing markets (b). Intuitively, the strengths of these agglomeration and dispersion forces determine the spatial concentration of economic activity.

In the middle panels, we turn to causes and consequences of migration. There is a positive association between the wage a local labour market offers and the number of workers it attracts (c). At the same time there is a positive association between net in-migration into labour markets and changes in local housing cost (d). This descriptive evidence supports some important assumptions that are implicit to the notion of a spatial equilibrium and the idea of spatial arbitrage. First, workers are at least imperfectly mobile and respond to economic incentives when making location decisions. Second, due to inelastic supply of land, migration into attractive destinations leads to rising house prices and mean reversion in the attractiveness of locations.

Yet, the bottom panels of Figure 1 reveal that workers are not perfectly mobile. The average worker changes the labour market region about once (1.08) over the employment biography, although there is some variation across groups (e). Conditional on migrating, the propensity of a location becoming a migration destination declines rapidly in space, which points to spatially variant migration costs (f).

Motivated by these stylised facts, we develop a model in which imperfectly mobile workers trade off expected utility at migration destinations against migration costs. In-migration reduces incentives to migrate into a region since the cost of agglomeration exceeds the benefit, so that in the absence of shocks, the spatial economy tends to revert to a stationary spatial equilibrium.

Figure 1: Stylized facts of the spatial economy



(a) Agglomeration benefits



(b) Agglomeration costs



(c) Wages and migration



(d) Migration and housing costs



(e) Number of moves in employment biography



(f) Spatial decay in migration flows

Note: Unit of observation in panels (a)-(d) is 141 labour market areas as defined by Kosfeld and Werner (2012). Residualised variables have been purged of mean differences between East and West German regions. Panel (e) uses all workers observed in at least 35 years over at least 40 years starting in 1975 (in West Germany). A "move" is a change in local labour market. Outcomes in panels (a-d) are residualised in regressions against zone (for former East and West Germany) fixed effects. Panel (f) is based on 5km-bins of bilateral distance between labour market regions. Sub-section D.1 provides a description of the underlying variables.

C Model

Consider an economy that is populated by $\bar{L} = \sum_\theta \bar{L}^\theta$ workers who we categorise into groups $\theta \in \Theta$ (e.g. according to age, gender, skill) and who supply one unit of labour inelastically. Individuals choose their place of residence and work among $i, j \in J$ local labour markets to which we refer as regions. Workers in i have idiosyncratic tastes for living in j and incur a cost when migrating from i to j. Each region is endowed with a measure $\bar{T}_i$ of land used for housing.

C.1 Workers

Individual ω belonging to group θ, living in region i at time period t, and previously living in region k derives utility from the consumption of a freely-tradable homogeneous good ($x^\theta_{i,t}(\omega)$), housing ($h^\theta_{i,t}(\omega)$) and amenities ($A^\theta_{i,t}$, $\exp[a^\theta_{ki,t}(\omega)]$) according to

$$U^\theta_{i|k,t}(\omega) = \left(\frac{x^\theta_{i,t}(\omega)}{\alpha}\right)^\alpha \left(\frac{h^\theta_{i,t}(\omega)}{1-\alpha}\right)^{1-\alpha} A^\theta_{i,t} \exp\left[a^\theta_{ki,t}(\omega) - \tau^\theta_{ki}\right]. \tag{1}$$

The Cobb-Douglas structure implies that individuals spend constant shares α and $1-\alpha$ of their income on the tradable good and housing. Normalising the price of the homogeneous good to unity, $p_{i,t}$ represents the relative price of housing in region i. We then obtain the demand functions

$$\begin{aligned} x^\theta_{i,t}(\omega) &= \alpha(1-\iota)w^\theta_{i,t}(\omega) \\ h^\theta_{i,t}(\omega) &= \frac{(1-\alpha)(1-\iota)w^\theta_{i,t}(\omega)}{p_{i,t}}, \end{aligned} \tag{2}$$

where ι denotes the federal income tax rate and $w^\theta_{i,t}(\omega)$ are gross wages for an individual ω in group θ in region i. Evidently, the choice of a freely-tradable good greatly simplifies the model. It comes at little cost in our application because we quantify our model for a small, highly integrated economy where tradable goods prices barely vary in space (see Appendix K.1.6). For an application to a more heterogeneous country or a multi-country setting, it would be straightforward to account for trade frictions via an Armington (1969) price index (see e.g. Allen and Arkolakis, 2014).

Migration from k to i comes at a time-invariant cost that depreciates utility in the moving period to $\exp\left[-\tau^\theta_{ki}\right]$, with $\tau^\theta_{ki} \geq 0$ and $\tau^\theta_{k,i=k} = 0$. Since we allow for arbitrary group-origin-destination-specific migration costs, we can remain agnostic about the exact nature of this cost. An intuitive interpretation is the cost of rebuilding social capital (Glaeser et al., 2002) which may depend on how closely two regions are connected geographically, culturally (Falck et al., 2012), or socially (Bailey et al., 2018).

The composite amenity consists of two components. The first component is QoL, an exogenous group-region utility shifter that collects the group-specific effects of region-specific

(dis)amenities as conventional in the QoL literature (Roback, 1982; Blomquist et al., 1988):

$$A^{\theta}_{i,t} = \zeta^{\theta}_{t} \bar{A}^{\theta}_{i,t}, \tag{3}$$

where ζ^{θ}_{t} is a group-period-specific constant and $\bar{A}^{\theta}_{i,t}$ is a relative QoL measure with a within-group mean of one. The second component $\exp[a^{\theta}_{ki,t}(\omega)]$ is a stochastic bilateral amenity shock, with $a^{\theta}_{ki,t}(\omega)$ being drawn from a type-I-extreme value (Gumbel) distribution

$$F^{\theta}_{ki,t}(a) = \exp\left(-\tilde{B}^{\theta}_{ki,t} \exp\left\{-\left[\gamma^{\theta} a + \Gamma\right]\right\}\right) \qquad \forall \;\; \theta \;\; \text{and} \;\; \gamma^{\theta} > 0, \tag{4}$$

where $\tilde{B}^{\theta}_{ki,t} \equiv \left(B^{\theta}_{ki,t}\right)^{\gamma^{\theta}}$. With this formulation, we follow the multinomial logit model of discrete response (McFadden and Train, 2000) and allow for a group-specific mean and a group-specific variance of the amenity shock. $\ln(B^{\theta}_{ki,t})$ is the time-varying, group-specific mean of the amenity shock and Γ is the Euler-Mascheroni constant.[7] γ^{θ} governs the group-specific dispersion of individual amenity shocks. Such amenity shocks to individual utility are a standard feature of DSMs that generate idiosyncrasy in tastes and imperfect spatial arbitrage in an empirically tractable manner (Desmet et al., 2018; Caliendo et al., 2019b). Unless we are in the limit case $\gamma^{\theta} \to \infty$ and tastes are homogeneous, there will be some workers within a group who will have decided to migrate from k to i for given wages, rents, QoL, and migration costs, while others did not.

Since we augment the standard one-group case to a setting with arbitrary worker groups, we allow for heterogeneity in tastes across workers of different groups θ via $\tilde{B}^{\theta}_{ki,t}$. Given that we parameterize migration costs as time-invariant, these group-specific shocks rationalise migration flows that vary over time within groups and bilateral region pairs even if wages, rents, and QoL remain constant. Intuitively, group-specific shocks capture common trends such as downtown gentrification that make specific pairs of locations closer substitutes for certain groups in certain periods.

C.2 Production

Tradable good. Firms produce the tradable good under perfect competition using labour as their only input. Following the conventions in urban economics (Combes and Gobillon, 2015) we model the productivity of individuals, $\varphi^{\theta}_{i,t}(\omega)$, as dependent on location factors that are exogenous to our model (e.g. access to navigable rivers), endogenous agglomeration (employment density), and an individual effect that consists of time-invariant (innate skill) and time-varying (e.g. employment status) factors:

$$\varphi^{\theta}_{i,t}(\omega) = \psi^{\theta}_{i,t} \left(\frac{L_{i,t}}{\bar{T}_i}\right)^{\kappa^{\theta}} \delta^{\theta}_{i,t}(\omega), \tag{5}$$

[7] This implies that shocks are i.i.d across locations, individuals, and time. This approach is established in the literature and has been applied to describe productivity distributions, e.g. as in Eaton and Kortum (2002), or individual preferences, e.g. as in Ahlfeldt et al. (2015).

where $\delta^{\theta}_{i,t}(\omega)$ summarises idiosyncratic determinants of productivity and the group-region productivity $\varphi^{\theta}_{i,t} = \psi^{\theta}_{i,t}(\frac{L_{i,t}}{\bar{T}_i})^{\kappa^{\theta}}$ depends on an exogenous component $\psi^{\theta}_{i,t}$ and on density $L_{i,t}/\bar{T}_i$. Prompted by evidence on skill-biased returns to agglomeration (Baum-Snow and Pavan, 2013), we allow the density elasticity of productivity $\kappa^{\theta} \geq 0$ to vary across groups. Similarly, each group is equipped with a location-specific exogenous productivity $\psi^{\theta}_{i,t}$ to capture any complementarity between skills and exogenous location factors, such as an airport that allows high-skilled workers to quickly travel to business meetings.

We assume that firms only observe the average productivity per group, so we impose $\delta^{\theta}_{i,t}(\omega)$ to be a log-normally distributed error term of mean zero for the sake of simplicity. As the price serves as the numeraire, the first-order condition of labour demand implies that group-region productivity $\varphi^{\theta}_{i,t}$ directly maps into wages:

$$w^{\theta}_{i,t} = \psi^{\theta}_{i,t}\left(\frac{L_{i,t}}{\bar{T}_i}\right)^{\kappa^{\theta}}. \tag{6}$$

Total output (equal to revenues and nominal income) in i is then given by $X_{i,t} = \sum_{\theta} L^{\theta}_{i,t}\varphi^{\theta}_{i,t}$.

Housing. As in Ahlfeldt et al. (2015), profit-maximizing developers supply housing under perfect competition according to a Cobb-Douglas production function combining a share of the globally available capital stock with location-specific land:

$$H^{S}_{i,t} = \eta_{i,t}\left(\frac{\bar{T}_i}{\beta}\right)^{\beta}\left(\frac{K_{i,t}}{1-\beta}\right)^{1-\beta}, \tag{7}$$

where $K_{i,t}$ is the capital used in region i and $\eta_{i,t}$ denotes total factor housing productivity, capturing the role of regulatory (e.g. height regulations) and physical (e.g. a rugged surface) constraints (Saiz, 2010). Owners of employed capital and land are absent so their income is irrelevant for local demand. Normalising the world price of capital to unity and assuming that developers make zero profits and housing markets clear, we obtain

$$p_{i,t} = \left(\frac{(1-\alpha)\beta(1-\iota)X_{i,t}}{\eta^{\frac{1}{\beta}}_{i,t}\bar{T}_i}\right)^{\beta}. \tag{8}$$

This formulation implies that both capital input and housing prices are increasing in housing expenditure, and that $p_{i,t}$ is lower in locations with more land supply and higher housing productivity, ceteris paribus. The larger the share of land in housing β, the smaller the housing supply elasticity $(1-\beta)/\beta$, and the greater the congestion force the housing market generates (see Appendix J.1 for details).

C.3 Migration and timing

We model migration decisions similar to Caliendo et al. (2019b). Intuitively, workers trade expected returns in the form of utility flows against a migration cost, e.g. for rebuilding social

capital at a potential destination. The timing is as follows. Throughout period t, workers living in i realise their k-i-worker-specific utility. At the end of period t, workers receive i-j-worker-specific amenity shocks introduced in Section C.1. At the beginning of period $t+1$ workers choose location $j \in J$ such that they maximize their expected utility. Then, the procedure starts over again.

Workers have logarithmic preferences. This gives a migration net present value (NPV) for a worker of type θ who was in region k in period $t-1$, is in region i in period t, considers moving to region j in period $t+1$ and expects to be in regions $\{m, ..., n \in J\}$ in the subsequent periods and in $h \in J$ from $(t+1)+T$ onward (see Appendix J.2 for derivations):

$$\begin{aligned}\ln NPV^{\theta}_{i|k,t}(\omega) = &\ln\left(v^{\theta}_{i|k,t}(\omega)\right) + \max_{\{j,m,...,n,h\}^{J}_{j,m,...,n,h=1}} \Bigg\{\frac{1}{1+\rho}\ln\left(v^{\theta}_{j|i,t+1}(\omega)\right) \\ &+ \left(\frac{1}{1+\rho}\right)^{2} E\left[\ln\left(v^{\theta}_{m|j,t+2}(\omega)\right)\right] + \ \ldots + \left(\frac{1}{1+\rho}\right)^{T+1}\Bigg[E\left[\ln\left(v^{\theta}_{h|n,(t+1)+T}(\omega)\right)\right] \\ &+ \sum_{s=(t+2)+T}^{\infty}\left(\frac{1}{1+\rho}\right)^{s-(t+1+T)} E\left[\ln\left(v^{\theta}_{h|h,(t+2)+T}(\omega)\right)\right]\Bigg]\Bigg\},\end{aligned} \tag{9}$$

where ρ is a discount rate monitoring the time preference, and $v^{\theta}_{i|k,t}(\omega)$ is the per-period indirect utility defined by Eqs. (1) and (2). Intuitively, the NPV depends on future wages, rents, and QoL in the next and all subsequent migration destinations, the probabilities at which subsequent migration destinations will be accessed, and the migration cost at which the next and the subsequent destinations can be accessed.

Given the distributional assumption regarding the idiosyncratic amenity component, we obtain the following conditional probability that a worker from group θ migrates from i to j (see Appendix J.3 for derivations):

$$\chi^{\theta}_{ij|i,t} = \frac{\left(m^{\theta}_{ij}B^{\theta}_{ij,t+1}\mathcal{V}^{\theta}_{j,t+1}\right)^{\gamma^{\theta}}}{\sum_{n\in J}\left(m^{\theta}_{in}B^{\theta}_{in,t+1}\mathcal{V}^{\theta}_{n,t+1}\right)^{\gamma^{\theta}}}, \tag{10}$$

where $m^{\theta}_{ij} = \exp\left[-\tau^{\theta}_{ij}\right]$ and $\mathcal{V}^{\theta}_{j,t+1} = \exp\left[\ln\left(\frac{(1-\iota)w^{\theta}_{j,t+1}A^{\theta}_{j,t+1}}{p^{1-\alpha}_{j,t+1}}\right) + \mathcal{O}^{\theta}_{j,t+2}\right]$ is a function of next period's utility as well as the migration option value $\mathcal{O}^{\theta}_{t+2}$.

This migration option value at j in $t+1$ is an expected NPV of utility a worker can attain at any location $m \in J$ in period $t+2$, weighted by the expected probability to migrate from j to m. The expected utility at m in $t+2$ itself depends on the migration option value $\mathcal{O}^{\theta}_{m,t+3}$ a worker expects at that destination. Similarly, all future migration option values up until the next-to-last location $n \in J$ reached in period $t+T$ enter the equation. Intuitively, the migration option value $\mathcal{O}^{\theta}_{j+2}$ captures the ease at which migration destinations can be accessed

in the future should there be idiosyncratic reasons to relocate, e.g. a new romance:

$$\mathcal{O}^{\theta}_{j,t+2} = \frac{1}{1+\rho} \ln \Big[\sum_{m \in J} \Big(\exp \Big\{ E \Big[v^{\theta}_{m|j,t+2}(\omega) \Big] + \mathcal{O}^{\theta}_{m,t+3} \Big[\mathcal{O}^{\theta}_{l,t+4} ... \mathcal{O}^{\theta}_{n,(t+1)+T} \Big] \Big\} \Big)^{\gamma^{\theta}} \Big]^{\frac{1}{\gamma^{\theta}}} \quad (11)$$

Migration flows from i to j are simply given by $M^{\theta}_{ij,t} = \chi^{\theta}_{ij|i,t} L^{\theta}_{i,t}$. Since all workers migrate to a destination in period t (which can be the origin), aggregate employment in region i in $t+1$ equates to the sum of inflows $M^{\theta}_{ji,t}$ from all locations j:

$$L^{\theta}_{i,t+1} = \sum_{j \in J} M^{\theta}_{ji,t} = \sum_{j \in J} \chi^{\theta}_{ji|j,t} L^{\theta}_{j,t}. \quad (12)$$

Eq. (10) provides the micro-foundations for a migration gravity equation with a destination-group-specific present value of future utilities $\mathcal{V}^{\theta}_{j,t+1}$, origin-destination-group-specific migration costs τ^{θ}_{ij} and bilateral amenity shocks $B^{\theta}_{ij,t+1}$, and an origin-group-specific component akin to the multilateral resistance known from trade models (the denominator). Via $\mathcal{V}^{\theta}_{j,t+1}$, higher wages, lower rents, a greater QoL and a larger migration option value at a potential destination increase the probability that workers migrate to j.

The amenity dispersion parameter γ^{θ} can be interpreted as a migration elasticity as it moderates how sensitive migration decisions are to economic incentives. At low values of γ^{θ}, the idiosyncrasy of tastes dominates and migration is inelastic whereas at high values difference in wages, rents, and QoL have large effects on migration flows. Migration costs τ^{θ}_{ij} are critical to rationalising why physically, culturally, or socially close region pairs generate larger migration flows. Since all $\tau^{\theta}_{i,j \neq i} \geq 0$ are defined relative to $\tau^{\theta}_{i,j=i} = 0$, migration costs critically determine the share of workers leaving a region in a period and, hence, the speed of spatial adjustments in our DSM. Empirically, the effects of migration costs and the migration elasticity are jointly determined by the origin-destination-group component $\tau^{\theta}_{ij} \times \gamma^{\theta}$, which we term *migration resistance*. Therefore, the typically observed distance decay in migration flows can be rationalised by a large difference in migration cost if tastes are heterogeneous (small γ^{θ}) or a small difference in migration costs if tastes are homogeneous (large γ^{θ}).

It is immediate from Eq. (10) that there are isomorphic model formulations in which bilateral amenity shocks $B^{\theta}_{ij,t}$ are subsumed into time-varying migration costs, or vice versa. We choose our parameterisation because we believe that differences in average migration flows observed over 25 years in our data are most likely driven by fundamental determinants of migration costs that hardly change over time, whereas deviations from the long-run average most likely reflect the short-run effects of random events that tend to cancel out over time.

C.4 Equilibrium

We take the *structural parameters* $\{\alpha, \beta, \rho, \iota, \gamma^{\theta}, \kappa^{\theta}, B^{\theta}_{ij,t}, \tau^{\theta}_{ij}\}$, *structural fundamentals* $\{\psi^{\theta}_{i,t}, \eta_{i,t}, A^{\theta}_{i,t}\}$, and labour and land endowments $\{\bar{L}^{\theta}_{t}, \bar{T}_{i}\}$ as exogenously given. We impose the

following labour market clearing conditions:

$$\bar{L}_t^\theta = \sum_{i \in J} L_{i,t}^\theta \tag{13}$$

with the economy-wide labour endowment $\bar{L}_t = \sum_\theta \bar{L}_t^\theta$. Region-group specific labour supply determined by Eq. (12) aggregates to regional employment $L_{i,t} = \sum_\theta L_{i,t}^\theta$ which maps into wages $w_{i,t}^\theta$ via the first-order condition of labour demand, Eq. (6). Likewise, we impose housing market clearing so that regional employment $L_{i,t}^\theta$ maps into rents $p_{i,t}$ via output $X_{i,t}$ according to Eq. (8) (see Appendix Section J.1). Trade with the rest of the world clears the markets for tradable goods and capital inputs.

Transitory spatial equilibrium. Frictional migration implies that shocks to structural fundamentals lead to non-instantaneous adjustment in $L_{i,t}^\theta$. The role of the TSE is to rationalise unbalanced migration flows and non-stationary employment that are typically observed in data.

Stationary spatial equilibrium. Migration is spatially neutral if the sum of outflows equals the sum of inflows for each location:

$$\sum_{j \in J} \chi_{ij|i,t}^\theta L_{i,t}^\theta = \sum_{j \in J} \chi_{ji|j,t}^\theta L_{j,t}^\theta \qquad \forall \;\; j \in J, \theta \in \Theta. \tag{14}$$

This condition enforces that $L_{i,t}^\theta$ is stationary, but it does not rule out migration due to idiosyncratic taste shocks. In models with agglomeration externalties, a multiplicity of equilibria can arise (see e.g. Ahlfeldt et al., 2015). In our model, we constrain returns to agglomeration to arise within the same spatial units in which the congestion force operates. The former is governed by κ^θ for each group according to Eq. (6). The latter works through the price for housing as described by Eq. (8).[8] Moreover, we assume that the congestion force dominates the agglomeration force to ensure that all regions are populated. As a result, our parameterization is isomorphic to a model in which there is a net cost of agglomeration, but no agglomeration externality. It is, therefore, no surprise that Monte Carlo simulations confirm that—conditional on given primitives—we solve for the same SSE, irrespective of the distribution of economic activity in the TSE (see Appendix J.4). Since Eq. (14) is unlikely to hold in the data, we view the SSE as a counterfactual situation to which an economy observed in a TSE would converge in the absence of further shocks.

Dynamic equilibrium. For given structural parameters and structural fundamentals the dynamic equilibrium of the model is referenced by a $(J \times \Theta) \times Z_t$ vector of region-group-year-specific employment $\mathbf{L}_{\mathbf{i,t}}^\theta$, where Z_t denotes the number of periods in the transition period from a TSE in t to the SSE reached in $t + Z_t$. Hence, the dynamic equilibrium nests the SSE and all TSEs up to the period where the spatial economy has converged to the SSE. For given

[8] The effect of changes in population on individual housing expenditure is given by $(1-\alpha)\partial p_{i,t}/\partial L_{i,t}^\theta$.

structural fundamentals $\{\psi^{\theta}_{i_t}, \eta_{i,t}\}$, $\mathbf{L}^{\theta}_{\mathbf{i,t}}$ maps to $(J \times \Theta) \times Z_t$ vectors of wages $\mathbf{w}^{\theta}_{\mathbf{i,t}}$ and prices $\mathbf{p_{i,t}}$ via the first-order condition of labour demand, Eq. (6), and housing market clearing, Eq. (8).

Competitive spatial equilibrium. Characteristic for the CSE is the absence of spatial frictions. Within our framework, we can remove frictions by setting preference shocks and migration costs to zero ($a^{\theta}_{ki,t}(\omega) = 0, \tau^{\theta}_{ki} = 0$). Since workers optimally relocate across locations within any period, we can impose the standard spatial equilibrium condition that workers are indifferent between locations. To this end, we set the indirect utility equal to a group-time-specific reservation utility $\bar{U}^{\theta}_t$.

$$V^{\theta}_{i,t} = \left((1-\iota)w^{\theta}_{i,t}\right)^{\alpha} \left(\frac{(1-\iota)w^{\theta}_{i,t}}{p_{i,t}}\right)^{1-\alpha} \mathcal{A}^{\theta}_{i,t} = \bar{U}^{\theta}_t \tag{15}$$

Hence, observed wages and rents directly map to a Rosen-Roback (RR) QoL measure $\mathcal{A}^{\theta}_{i,t} = q^{\theta}_t p^{1-\alpha}_{i,t}/w^{\theta}_{i,t}$ (where q^{θ}_t collects all group-period-specific constants).

C.5 Worker expectations

The literature employing DSMs has taken different approaches on how to model worker expectations. Desmet et al. (2018) develop a fully tractable DSM under static expectations, i.e. workers project current realizations of good and factor prices into the infinite future. In contrast, Caliendo et al. (2019b) exploit Bellman's principle to estimate model parameters and conduct counterfactual analyses under perfect foresight without pinning down all primitives. Empirically, the way workers form expectations is a contentious issue so that we do not wish to take a strong stance.[9] Instead, we consider different regimes to evaluate how the choices made affect the measurement of QoL and the evaluation of QoL policies.

Our choices in our baseline scenario are guided by the stylised fact that the average worker switches between local labour markets only once over the entire employment biography (see Section B). Therefore, we quantify the model using a special case in which workers deciding on a migration destination j do not expect to make a further move in the future. Workers who expect to migrate only once may form sophisticated expectations with respect to the evolution of wages and rents. Therefore, we assume that workers correctly anticipate the dynamic equilibrium referenced by the employment vector $\mathbf{L}^{\theta}_{\mathbf{i,t}}$ and all model-endogenous adjustments in wages and prices summarised by $\mathbf{w}^{\theta}_{\mathbf{i,t}}$ and $\mathbf{p_{i,t}}$. Shocks to exogenous structural fundamentals cannot be anticipated, so workers project observed realisations of QoL $A^{\theta}_{i,t+1}$ into the future. Consistent with the distributional assumptions in Eq. (4), workers expect a bilateral amenity $\mathbb{E}(B^{\theta}_{ij,t+s}) = 1$ for $s > 1$. In line with the conventions in DSMs, workers have an infinite time horizon and do not expect to age.

[9] As an example, there is no consensus in the literature on how consumers anticipate future fuel costs (Busse et al., 2013; Gillingham et al., 2021).

The assumption that workers do not expect to re-optimise their location choice in the future delivers a special case in which we can abstract from the migration option value $\mathcal{O}^{\theta}_{j,t+2}$ in Eq. (10) (see Appendix J.3 for details). To evaluate the role of expectations in a DSM, we replicate the main stages of our quantitative analyses under more and less restrictive special cases. In a less restrictive special case, we allow residents to anticipate one additional migration decision subsequent to an initial migration decision, which results in a migration option value $\mathcal{O}^{\theta}_{j,t+2}$ that does not depend on the option value $\mathcal{O}^{\theta}_{m,t+3}$. This special case covers nearly 90% of German workers who migrate twice or less over their employment biography. Extending expectations to additional future migration decisions results in a dimensionality problem in the inversion of structural fundamentals as highlighted by Caliendo et al. (2019b). In a more restrictive special case, we assume that workers are myopic and expect goods and factor prices to remain constant in real terms. We provide a detailed discussion of the motivations for and the consequences of our choices concerning expectations in Appendix N.

The main takeaway for the QoL literature is that the choice of the expectation regime is second order to the introduction of frictional migration.[10] This is an important insight as it suggests that even the seemingly restrictive assumption of myopic agents may represent a sensible approximation in high-dimensional settings.[11] Because, among the considered special cases, the baseline expectations regime delivers the most conservative quantitative results, our main conclusions generalize to the other cases.

C.6 Spatial arbitrage

The CSE is the urban economics equivalent of the no-arbitrage condition in financial economics (Glaeser, 2008). Perfect spatial arbitrage is an assumption that leads to constant reservation utility as a building block of neoclassical urban economics models. In contrast, spatial arbitrage is an endogenous process in our DSM that moderates the transition from the TSE to a SSE.

Intuitively, shocks to structural fundamentals affect expected utility directly or indirectly. For example, a positive shock to labour productivity maps into higher wages $w^{\theta}_{i,t+s}$ according to Eq. (6) due to perfect competition on goods and labour markets and the choice of the tradable good as the numeraire. Likewise, a positive shock to housing productivity maps into lower housing costs $p_{i,t+s}$ according to Eq. (8) due to perfect competition among developers. Higher $w^{\theta}_{i,t+s}$ and lower $p_{i,t+s}$ affect bilateral migration probabilities $\chi^{\theta}_{ij|i,t}$ according to Eq. (10), leading to in-migration. Given Eq. (12), this results in endogenous changes in employment which in turn determine changes in wages according to Eq. (6) and housing costs according to Eq. (8). As long as agglomeration costs exceed agglomeration benefits at the margin, the consequence of migration is to reduce the differences in expected utility that cause migration. The pace at which this spatial arbitrage process takes place depends positively on the migration elasticity γ^{θ} and negatively on migration costs τ^{θ}_{ij}. Eqs. (10) and (12) establish how regions offering a greater indirect utility $\mathcal{V}^{\theta}_{j,t+1}$ will experience larger net-immigration the larger γ^{θ} and

[10] We acknowledge that we abstract from the of role expectation in production of goods and housing.
[11] Desmet et al. (2018), Conte et al. (2020), or (Allen and Donaldson, 2020).

the smaller the migration resistance $\tau_{ij}^{\theta} \times \gamma^{\theta}$, ceteris paribus.

C.7 Quality-of-life premiums

The revealed-preference literature computes the value of amenities that jointly constitute QoL via spatial differences in *real living cost* $p_i^{1-\alpha}/w_i^{\theta}$, the inverse of the real wage (Rosen, 1979; Roback, 1982). Using the structural parameters and fundamentals quantified in Section D, Figure 2 provides a graphical illustration of the simulated model to show how QoL premiums are determined. Our case in point is the *urban QoL premium* which captures how QoL depends on city size, a question that is controversially debated in the literature (Albouy, 2011). To ease the presentation, we focus on the special case with one worker group and refer to Appendix J.5 for formal derivations.

Figure 2 depicts two equilibrium loci for locations $i = \{1, 2\}$. The solid lines refer to location 1 while the dashed schedules indicate location 2. The *housing equilibrium locus* (HH_i) is a log-linearised version of Eq. (8) collecting all combinations of real living costs and employment that satisfy all housing-market related conditions that must hold in the TSE (and the SSE). Under plausible parameterisations, the expenditure on housing increases faster in city size (due to inelastically supplied land) than the wage (due to agglomeration economies). Therefore, the housing equilibrium locus is positively sloped. Greater housing productivity η_i shifts the housing equilibrium locus downwards.

Likewise, the *migration equilibrium locus* (LL_i) collects all combinations of real living costs and employment that satisfy all migration-related conditions that must hold in the SSE. It is derived from Eq. (12). Intuitively, idiosyncratic amenity shocks imply that workers are heterogeneous with respect to their preference for living in a city. Therefore, there is a finite number of workers who are willing to bear any level of real living costs in any city. Because an expansion in the worker population requires in-migration of workers with lower preferences for living in a city, the real living cost of the marginal worker must decline in equilibrium, resulting in a downwards-sloping migration equilibrium locus. This is akin to a downward-sloping housing demand curve in a setting with preference heterogeneity (Arnott and Stiglitz, 1979; Moretti, 2011). The slope of the migration equilibrium locus is inversely related to the migration elasticity γ^{θ}. Higher QoL A_i^{θ} shifts the migration equilibrium locus upwards. The intersection of both equilibrium loci is the only combination of real wages and employment that satisfies all SSE equilibrium conditions and, hence, we can use it to quantify the model and derive QoL premiums.

The two vertical dashed lines mark two cities of different size with $L_2 > L_1$. Housing productivity η_i is higher in the larger city, which gives the city an edge in the competition for workers since the housing sector provides more housing at the same equilibrium price (HH_2 is below HH_1). Yet, despite the housing productivity advantage, the city size differential can only be rationalised by a greater labour supply in the larger city and an upward-shifted migration equilibrium locus (LL_2 vs. LL_1). Intuitively, the lower idiosyncratic amenity of the marginal resident must be compensated for by a higher average group-specific QoL A_i^{θ} in the larger city.

Hence, there is a positive urban QoL premium.

With decreasing taste heterogeneity, the migration elasticity γ^θ increases, the slope of the migration equilibrium flattens, and the urban QoL premium shrinks. For the limit case $\gamma^\theta \to \infty$, our model nests the canonical CSE framework in which the migration equilibrium locus is simply a horizontal line shifted by $\mathcal{A}_i^\theta$ (see Eq. (15)). The corresponding migration equilibrium schedules are described by LL_i^{CSE}. In the given example, because the larger city has a fundamental housing productivity advantage, we qualitatively misrepresent the urban QoL premium if we abstract from taste heterogeneity.

The important takeaway is that the urban QoL premium in the DSM with taste heterogeneity is necessarily more positive than in the canonical spatial equilibrium framework unless the migration elasticity γ^θ is large. More generally, we necessarily recover larger QoL differentials from a model with taste heterogeneity. Since, consistent with the literature (Caliendo et al., 2019b), we estimate relatively low values of γ^θ for all groups, we expect our quantitative framework to deliver larger valuations of local non-marketed goods than the canonical Rosen-Roback framework.

Figure 2: Urban quality of life premium



Notes: A formal derivation of demand and supply shifters and elasticities is in Appendix J.5. We use parameter values $\gamma = 0.5$ and $\beta = 0.2$ which are within the range of estimates in the literature and our own estimates in Section D. We use the structural fundamentals quantified in Section D. To ease the presentation, we derive all curves for one worker group (middle-aged, skilled male workers) exclusively.

D Quantification

The quantification of the model consists of two steps. First, we obtain values of the structural parameters $\{\alpha, \beta, \rho, \iota, \gamma^\theta, \kappa^\theta, B_{ij,t}^\theta, \tau_{ij}^\theta\}$. We borrow $\{\alpha, \iota, \rho\}$ from the literature and estimate the remaining parameters using variables observed in data $\{L_{i,t}^\theta, \bar{T}_i, w_{i,t}^\theta, \chi_{ij|i,t}^\theta, p_{i,t}\}$ and the structure of the model. Second, we use data, the estimated parameter values, and the structure

of the model to invert the structural fundamentals $\{\psi^{\theta}_{i,t}, \eta_{i,t}, A^{\theta}_{i,t}\}$ and to solve for the region-group-time-specific employment vector $\mathbf{L}^{\theta}_{\mathbf{i,t}}$ that references the dynamic equilibrium.

D.1 Data

As an empirical correspondent to locations indexed by i in the model, we choose 141 German labour market regions defined by Kosfeld and Werner (2012) based on commuting data. The centre of a labour market region is the municipality with the largest number of workers. We treat periods t in our model as years in the data. We briefly discuss the sources and processing of our data below and refer to Appendix K.1 for details.

Employment. Our measure of employment $L^{\theta}_{i,t}$ is constructed from the Employment History (BeH) covering the years 1993-2017. This dataset is provided by the Institute of Employment Research (IAB) and contains information on the universe of employees in Germany (with the exception of civil servants and the self-employed) on a daily basis. We only select those workers who are employed subject to social security contributions (including apprentices) and compute region-year-specific employment levels for different groups which are defined according to the interactions between sex, three skill categories (no apprenticeship, completed apprenticeship and tertiary education) and three age categories (16-30 years, 31-50 years and 51-65 years).

Migration. We assign workers to labour market regions using their place of employment as reported in the BeH. Bilateral group-specific migration flows $M^{\theta}_{ij,t}$ are then constructed by computing the number of workers belonging to group θ who were employed in region i in year t and in region j in year $t+1$. The conditional migration probabilities are then observed as $\chi^{\theta}_{ij|i,t} = M^{\theta}_{ij,t}/L^{\theta}_{i,t}$.

Wages. We follow the standard approach in labour and urban economics and identify the region-group-year wage $w^{\theta}_{i,t}$ from movers by regressing individual wages against region-group-year fixed effects, controlling for individual fixed effects (Abowd et al., 1999; Combes et al., 2008). We use matched employer-employee data including nominal wages from the IAB covering the universe of German workers and establishments from 1993 to 2017.

Rents. We follow Combes et al. (2019) and compute a house price index for a representative property at the centre of a labour market area. Assuming a monocentric region, this is the only location where we can abstract from commuting costs when inferring QoL (Albouy and Lue, 2015). The price index maps into rent p_i via a constant cap rate of 0.035 (Koster and Pinchbeck, 2021). The property micro data we use is from Immoscout24 covering more than 16.5 million sales proposals for apartments and houses between 2007-2017. The data were accessed via the FDZ-Ruhr (Boelmann and Schaffner, 2019).

Geographic variables. We use a geographic information system (GIS) to compute the land area $\bar{T}_i$ of all regions and the great circle distance between all pairs of regions. For a cultural

distance measure, we use the inverse of the county-based dialect similarity index by Falck et al. (2012), which we aggregate to labour markets.

Social media. We use social media data from Facebook, Flickr, and Picasa to approximate regional amenity value and social connectedness. We use those data to over-identify estimated structural parameters and inverted structural fundamentals.

Location characteristic. For our policy application, we collect the concentration of particular matter (PM^{10}), the spatial distribution of coal deposits, the locations of coal power plants, and the distribution of winds by direction for all regions. We also collect a comprehensive data set on fundamental first-nature characteristics that potentially affect productivity (e.g. access to navigable rivers), amenity (e.g. opera houses, World War II destruction), and housing TFP (e.g. physical constraints to development).

D.2 Structural parameters

We set the housing expenditure share to $1 - \alpha = 0.33$, which is in line with a literature summarised in Ahlfeldt and Pietrostefani (2019) and official data from Germany (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2020). We use a tax rate of $\iota = 0.49$ which incorporates social insurance contributions that are proportionate to income in Germany (OECD, 2017). Likewise, we set the intertemporal discount rate to $\rho = 0.11$ following the economics literature on time-preferences in the context of employment life cycle decisions (Moore and Viscusi, 1988; Frederick et al., 2002).[12] Lastly, we impose that stayers face no migration cost ($\tau^{\theta}_{ij=i} = 0$).

We estimate all other parameters using estimation equations that we derive from the structure of the model. For identification, we generally follow the current best-practice examples in the respective fields. Our main empirical contribution is to exploit our rich data to account for greater inter-group heterogeneity than in previous work. We briefly discuss the parameter values along with references to the identification strategies and the relevant literature below. For a formal derivation of all estimation equations and full estimation results we refer to Appendix K.2.

Density elasticity of productivity (κ^{θ}). The estimating equation for κ^{θ} is a log-linearised version of Eq. (5). Identification comes from between-labour-market-area movers and is conditional on individual effects (Combes et al., 2008). We use a 100-year lag of population density following a literature that argues that production fundamentals that determined productivity in history are no longer relevant today (Ciccone and Hall, 1996). With this approach, we estimate the agglomeration elasticity for $\Theta = 18$ groups and find that returns to agglomeration (κ^{θ}) are not only biased with respect to skills (Baum-Snow and Pavan, 2013), but also gender, with women benefiting more from agglomeration. The weighted average elasticity estimate of 0.024 is close to the typical result in the literature (Combes and Gobillon, 2015).

[12] Housing markets discount the future at lower rates (Giglio et al., 2015; Bracke et al., 2017; Koster and Pinchbeck, 2021)

Land share (β). The estimating equation for β is a log-linearised version of Eq. (8). The estimation equation is similar to the one in Combes et al. (2019), although, following from our general equilibrium setting, the main independent variable is GDP density rather than population. Following the literature we, again, use the 100-year lag of population density as an instrument. Our estimate of $\beta = 0.19$ implies a population density elasticity of house prices of 0.2, which is within the typical range in the literature (Ahlfeldt and Pietrostefani, 2019). The implied intensive-margin housing supply elasticity $(1 - \beta)/\beta = 4.3$ is close to existing structural estimates (Epple et al., 2010).

Migration elasticity (γ^θ). The estimating equation for γ^θ is a log-linearised and spatially differenced version of Eq. (10) in which leading migration probabilities control for future utility flows according to the Bellmann's principle (Artuç et al., 2010). We follow the literature and estimate γ^θ using GMM. In our preferred approach, we restrict the identifying variation to lagged group-specific average wage differences between eastern and western states that likely capture a legacy of the cold-war era. The estimated average elasticity of 0.3 is somewhat larger than when we use the standard IVs (lagged wage and migration probabilities), but somewhat smaller than previous estimates for the U.S. (Caliendo et al., 2019a). Novel to the literature using this estimation approach, we find that middle-aged and middle-skilled male workers are those that are most responsive to economic migration incentives.

Migration costs (τ^θ_{ij}). The estimating equation for τ^θ_{ij} is a log-linearised version of Eq. (10) using a PPML estimator. Destination-group-year and origin-group-year effects control for arbitrary pull factors and multilateral resistance (Head and Mayer, 2014). Exploiting the panel-dimension, origin-destination-time effects non-parametrically identify origin-destination-group-specific migration resistance $\tau^\theta_{ij} \times \gamma^\theta$ up to a constant. Exploiting the no-internal-migration-cost constraint $\tau^\theta_{i,j=i} = 0$, we derive theory-consistent estimates of τ^θ_{ij} for given values of γ^θ. Female, old, and middle-skilled workers have the largest resistance to migrate. Yet, middle-skilled workers experience low migration costs. Because their tastes are relatively homogeneous (large γ^θ), small differences in migration costs rationalise large differences in migration flows. In monetary terms, the weighted average migration cost corresponds to about €170K which is more than revealed in survey-based research for the average U.S. citizen, though much less than for those who report themselves as "rooted" (Koşar et al., 2021).

Bilateral amenity. The estimating equation for B^θ_{ij} is the same gravity migration equation from which we infer migration resistance $\tau^\theta_{ij} \times \gamma^\theta$. For given values of γ^θ, we infer B^θ_{ij} from the structural residual. Consistent with theory, we rationalise migration flows of zero by setting $B^\theta_{ij} = 0$.

D.3 Structural fundamentals

Labour and housing productivity. Given our estimates of the agglomeration elasticity κ^θ and observed wages $w^\theta_{i,t}$, regional employment $\sum_\theta L^\theta_{i,t}$, and land area $\bar{T}_i$, we invert fundamental

labour productivity $\psi^{\theta}_{i,t}$ using the first-order condition of labour demand, Eq. (6). Likewise, we use our estimate of the land share β and observed rents $p_{i,t}$, output $\sum_{\theta} w^{\theta}_{i,t} L^{\theta}_{i,t}$ and land area $\bar{T}_i$ to invert fundamental housing productivity $\eta_{i,t}$ using housing market clearing, Eq. (8).

Quality of life. In the special case with myopic agents, we can directly invert group-region QoL from Eq. (10) because we observe wages, rents, and bilateral migration costs. In our cases with forward-looking expectations, however, the inversion of QoL $A^{\theta}_{i,t}$ is less straightforward. Given observed data on conditional migration probabilities $\chi^{\theta}_{ij|i,t}$ and estimates of bilateral amenities $B^{\theta}_{ij,t}$, migration costs τ^{θ}_{ij} and the migration elasticity γ^{θ}, we can invert the within-group QoL $\bar{A}^{\theta}_{i,t}$ up to the group-year constant ζ^{θ}_{t} for a given dynamic employment vector $\mathbf{L^{\theta}_{i,t}}$ that determines future wages $w^{\theta}_{i,t+s}$ and rents $p_{i,t+s}$ (see Section C.4) using the migration gravity Eq. (10). However, to forecast $\mathbf{L^{\theta}_{i,t}}$ using the dynamic structure of the model, we require values of $\bar{A}^{\theta}_{i,t}$ that feed into labour supply, Eq. (12), via the migration gravity Eq. (10).

Therefore, we solve for the endogenous employment vector $\mathbf{L^{\theta}_{i,t}}$ that references the dynamic spatial equilibrium and the exogenous structural fundamental $\bar{A}^{\theta}_{i,t}$ simultaneously. The intuition is as follows. We start from guessed values of $\bar{A}^{\theta}_{i,t}$, and $\mathbf{L^{\theta}_{i,t}}$. Implicitly, these guesses determine vectors of guessed wages $\mathbf{w^{\theta}_{i,t}}$ and rents $\mathbf{p_{i,t}}$. For these *guesses*, we can solve the model to obtain *forecasts* of $\{\mathbf{L^{\theta}_{i,t}}, \mathbf{w^{\theta}_{i,t}}, \mathbf{p_{i,t}}\}$. Using these forecasts, we obtain *inverted values* of $\bar{A}^{\theta}_{i,t}$. An internally consistent model solution requires that a) our guesses of $\mathbf{L^{\theta}_{i,t}}$ correspond to the forecasts and b) our guesses of $\bar{A}^{\theta}_{i,t}$ correspond to the inverted values. Importantly, we impose the additional constraint that the first element of the vector $\mathbf{L^{\theta}_{i,t}}$, $L^{\theta}_{i,t}$, must correspond to the values observed in the data. This constraint also disciplines the first elements of $\{\mathbf{w^{\theta}_{i,t}}, \mathbf{p_{i,t}}\}$. Under these conditions, we can treat the solutions for $\bar{A}^{\theta}_{i,t}$ and $\mathbf{L^{\theta}_{i,t}}$ as joint fixed points that pin down region-group QoL and the TSE-SSE transition path conditional on observed TSE values. Indeed, Monte Carlo experiments confirm that our solutions do not depend on our guesses of $\bar{A}^{\theta}_{i,t}$ in Appendix Section X. For a description of the numerical solution algorithm to which we refer as *dynamic solver*, we refer to Appendix Section K.3.

With this approach, we rely on observed values of bilateral migration probabilities, $\chi^{\theta}_{ij|i,t}$, for the initial period, t. We do not require any data for future periods $t+s$, which has several advantages. First, the model can be inverted using cross-sectional data. Second, we can project the adjustment path into future periods for which realizations are not yet observed in the data. Third, we can use future realizations that are already observed in data to overidentify the model's ability to forecast the TSE-SSE adjustment path as discussed in Section D.5.

D.4 Transition into the stationary spatial equilibrium

Figure 3 exemplarily illustrates the transition path from the TSE observed in our data into the SSE found by the dynamic solver introduced in Section D.3. For Berlin, Germany's largest local labour market, the model forecasts that employment would grow by 14% as the economy transitions into the SSE if there were no further shocks to fundamentals. The average wage

would increase by about 0.8%. This would be more than the agglomeration-induced productivity effect and driven by a 5.4%-increase in the high-skilled share. The increase in housing demand would map to a higher house price and lower housing consumption for all skill groups.

While it takes more than 700 years for group-region employment to become stationary, almost all of the adjustment in Berlin takes place within the first 100 years. Zooming out, we find that the sum of the absolute difference between TSE and SSE values across all groups and regions shrinks by about 35% within the first 10 years, and by about 65% within the first 30 years, with some variation depending on the outcome (see Figure A9 in Appendix K.4).

Figure 3: Transition from TSE into SSE in Berlin



Notes: Model-based forecasts using the dynamic solver introduced in Section D.3. 2017 starting values. Yearly gross wage, skill shares and housing consumption are weighted by group shares.

The main takeaway from the aggregate outcomes in Table 1 is that during the transition into the SSE workers of all skill groups relocate to local labour markets with higher QoL, but lower density, on average. This tendency is strongest for the unskilled. The effect of relocating to lower-density labour markets dominates the QoL-effect on housing cost, resulting in a slight increase in housing consumption. In contrast, the high-skilled tend to remain in denser labour markets, so that the effect of sorting into higher QoL labour markets dominates and housing consumption decreases. The reduction in the weighted average density by 4% leads to a mild reduction in aggregate output owing to lower agglomeration economies. A comparison of the TSE to the SSE at the regional level reveals an increase in employment in the eastern states by nearly one million workers (at the expense of the western states), partially offsetting domestic migration during the first 25 years after the end of the Cold War era. This increase in employment in the eastern states drives rents, but does not map to higher average wages due to a moderate decrease in the high skilled share (see Appendix Section K.4).

Table 1: TSE vs. SSE

Outcome	TSE	SSE	Ratio
Output in bn.	1.058	1.056	0.998
QoL index	1.616	1.639	1.014
Weighted average density (emp./km^2)	150.710	144.462	0.959
QoL index, unskilled	2.169	2.272	1.048
QoL index, skilled	1.412	1.414	1.002
QoL index, high-skilled	2.149	2.218	1.032
Weighted density, unskilled	167.221	161.940	0.968
Weighted density, skilled	143.493	136.149	0.949
Weighted density, high-skilled	170.666	168.040	0.985
Yearly wage (€), unskilled	23222	23239	1.001
Yearly wage (€), skilled	33804	33722	0.998
Yearly wage (€), high-skilled	50784	50773	1.000
Yearly housing cost (€/m^2), unskilled	132.364	133.601	1.009
Yearly housing cost (€/m^2), skilled	121.136	120.420	0.994
Yearly housing cost (€/m^2), high-skilled	150.365	152.752	1.016
Housing consumption m^2, unskilled	43.353	43.656	1.007
Housing consumption m^2, skilled	70.165	70.489	1.005
Housing consumption m^2, high-skilled	86.407	85.577	0.990

Notes: TSE values observed in the data except for QoL which is inverted using the dynamic solver introduced in Section D.3. All SSE values are model-based forecasts of the dynamic solver. QoL index is normalised within-group measure $\bar{A}^{\theta}_{i,t}$, weighted by group-region employment $L^{\theta}_{i,t}$

D.5 Overidentification

To subject the model-derived structural parameters and fundamentals to a reality check, we correlate fundamental labour productivity $\psi^{\theta}_{i,t}$, fundamental housing productivity $\eta_{i,t}$ and migration costs τ^{θ}_{ij} with observable characteristics not used in the quantification of the model. The results are generally plausible. As an example, fundamental labour productivity is lower in the eastern states, likely a legacy of the Cold War era, and where tradable services are over-represented. Housing productivity is low in the mountainous region near the Alps where the geography is less favorable for development. Migration costs increase in geographic and social distance, consistent with greater costs of rebuilding social capital. Since the structural fundamental $A^{\theta}_{i,t}$ is the focus of our analysis, we explore the correlation with observable characteristics more extensively in the next section.

Inverting the model from the TSE observed in $t = 2007$, we find that the model-based forecasts of employment $L^{\theta}_{i,t+s}$ over the 2007-2017 period are positively correlated with observed employment data. Conditional on region and year effects, a log-point increase in the out-of-sample forecast of regional employment is associated with a 0.75-log-point increase in observed employment, with a standard error of just 0.03. Hence, the model successfully captures a mean reversion tendency that is a feature of the data. We refer to Appendix Section K.5 for estimation results and a detailed discussion.

E Quality of life

In this section, we illustrate the spatial variation in the within-group measure of QoL, $\bar{A}^{\theta}_{i,t}$, inverted from the DSM (DSM-QoL) and how it correlates with a range of amenity measures typically employed in the literature as well as a composite amenity index derived from 'big data'. We provide a comparison to a Rosen-Roback type QoL measure $\mathcal{A}^{\theta}_{i,t}$ (RR-QoL) and evaluate how the migration elasticity γ^{θ} moderates the relationship between the two QoL measures.

E.1 Spatial variation in quality of life

Two important stylised facts arise from a comparison of the two QoL measures in Figure 4. First, the spatial distribution of QoL is similar, which is arguably reassuring. In particular, there is a positive urban QoL premium. Large labour markets in Germany are not only good places to work, but also good places to live. Second, there is significantly more variation in DSM-QoL than in the canonical RR-QoL. This is consistent with our theoretical analysis in Section C.7 and substantiated by Figure 5 which correlates the two QoL measures across regions allowing for inter-group heterogeneity. For all 18 groups, RR-QoL increases less than proportionately in DSM-QoL, confirming our theoretical prior that the canonical framework understates QoL differentials if the migration elasticity γ^{θ} is low. The bias is quantitatively large as group-specific regressions of $\ln \mathcal{A}_{i,t=2017}$ against $\ln \bar{A}_{i,t=2017}$ yield point estimates in the range of 0.16-0.45, with an unweighted mean of 0.27 (see Table A15 in Appendix L).

E.2 Determinants of quality of life

Since Roback (1982), it is conventional to regress inverted QoL measures against regional amenity variables to infer the value of amenities. In Table 2, we illustrate how the larger variation in the DSM-QoL leads to larger utility effects of regional amenities. We use the number of geo-tagged photos shared in social media as a composite amenity index similar to a framework that was originally proposed by Ahlfeldt (2013) and has gained popularity recently (Gaigné et al., 2017; Saiz et al., 2018; Carlino and Saiz, 2019). This measure assumes that social media users share visually appealing content (e.g. distinctive architecture or scenic views) or interesting activities (e.g. hiking tours or restaurant visits) that are related to a location's endowment with amenities (see Appendix K.1.8 for details). For the purpose of overidentification of our DSM-QoL, the appealing feature of this social media amenity index is that it does not rely on an arbitrary selection of observable characteristics that are more or less readily available. A simple bi-variate log-linear pooled cross-sectional regression (excluding group, region, or year effects) of the DSM-QoL on the amenity index explains almost 60% of the variation (Column 1). This high correlation simultaneously lends support to the DSM-QoL and suggests that big data can be a similarly powerful predictor of QoL as lights at night are for GDP (Henderson et al., 2012). The point estimate in Column (1) has a structural interpretation in that it is the inverse of the QoL elasticity in the photo production function

Figure 4: Spatial variation in quality of life



(a) Dynamic model ($\bar{A}_i$)

(b) Rosen-Roback ($\mathcal{A}_i$)

Note: Unit of observation is 141 labour market areas as defined by Kosfeld and Werner (2012). Group adjustment in auxiliary regressions of ln(QoL) against group and region fixed effects, the latter being shown on the maps.

($1/0.356 = 2.81$), but it seems fair to assume that this large estimate is to some extent driven by high QoL regions being more populated (see Appendix L.2 for further discussion).

In the next two columns, we use DSM-QoL in 2007 (Column 2) and 2017 (Column 3) as dependent variables and add traditional amenity measures as explanatory variables, taking inspiration from a literature that has been concerned with the role of city size (Albouy, 2011), climate (Roback, 1982), crime (Linden and Rockoff, 2008), air pollution (Chay and Greenstone, 2005), as well as natural and consumption amenities (Glaeser et al., 2001). We use three supra-regional dummy variables to capture the effects of fresh and rainy summers (near coast), cold winters (near Alps), and the legacy of the Cold War era (East), none of which exhibits precisely estimated effects. There is no persistent QoL effect of World War II bombings, consistent with rapid mean reversion in city size documented by Brakman et al. (2004). We also do not find significant effects for crime or bodies of water, likely because of limited variation across German regions.

In contrast, the positive urban QoL premium suggested in Figure 4 is substantiated by a precisely estimated employment elasticity of QoL of about 0.45 (Columns 2 and 3). The

Table 2: Quality-of-life determinants

	(1) $\text{Ln}(\bar{A}_i^\theta)$	(2) $\text{Ln}(\bar{A}_i^\theta)$	(3) $\text{Ln}(\bar{A}_i^\theta)$	(4) $\text{Ln}(\mathcal{A}_i^\theta)$	(5) $\text{Ln}(\mathcal{A}_i^\theta)$	(6) $\text{Ln}(\mathcal{A}_i^\theta)$
	All	2007	2017	All	2007	2017
Ln social media amenity	0.356^{***}	0.114^{***}	0.129^{***}	0.054^{**}	0.064^{***}	0.058^{**}
(residualised)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Ln employment		0.409^{***}	0.455^{***}		0.096^{***}	0.123^{***}
		(0.04)	(0.05)		(0.02)	(0.02)
Near Alps (dummy)		-0.068	-0.016		-0.009	0.054
		(0.06)	(0.08)		(0.05)	(0.06)
Near coast (dummy)		-0.090^{+}	-0.050		-0.007	0.011
		(0.06)	(0.06)		(0.04)	(0.04)
East (dummy)		-0.025	-0.024		0.037	0.008
		(0.06)	(0.06)		(0.03)	(0.04)
Ln crime per capita		0.027	-0.032		-0.032	-0.063
		(0.06)	(0.07)		(0.04)	(0.04)
Ln pollution		-0.302^{*}	-0.402^{**}		-0.148	-0.223^{+}
concentration (pm10)		(0.16)	(0.19)		(0.10)	(0.13)
Housing stock destroyed		-0.001	-0.001		-0.000	-0.001
in WWII (%)		(0.00)	(0.00)		(0.00)	(0.00)
# Opera houses		0.059^{**}	0.051^{*}		0.009	0.010
		(0.02)	(0.03)		(0.01)	(0.02)
Ln water area		0.063^{*}	0.064^{+}		0.024	0.030
		(0.03)	(0.04)		(0.02)	(0.02)
Ln area		-0.072^{+}	-0.085^{+}		-0.005	-0.035
		(0.05)	(0.05)		(0.03)	(0.04)
Group effects	-	Yes	Yes	-	Yes	Yes
Observations	27918	2538	2538	27918	2538	2538
R^2	.593	.737	.721	.0379	.458	.459

Notes: Unit of observation is group-region. OLS estimation. $\text{Ln}(\bar{A}_i^\theta)$ is the region-group amenity shifter in the DSM developed in this paper. $\text{Ln}(\mathcal{A}_i^\theta)$ is the region-group amenity shifter implied by the Rosen-Roback framework (see section C.4). Standard errors clustered on regions in (1) and (4) and on regions and groups in all other columns. Social media amenity is the log of the number of geotagged photos shared on social media (flick and picasa) residualised in regressions against all other covariates reported in a column. $^{+}$ $p < 0.15$, * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Figure 5: Rosen-Roback vs. DSM QoL estimates



Notes: 2017 values. Unit of observation is region-group. Thick dashed line is the 45-degree line. Model-based amenity inverts QoL from a TSE assuming that agents have perfect foresight. Rosen-Roback assumes that the economy is in a SSE without spatial frictions. We tabulate the slope parameters of the log-linear fits in Table A15 in the appendix.

employment effect on the DSM-QoL is about four times as large as on the RR-QoL (Columns 5 and 6), the latter being larger than found by Albouy (2011) for the U.S., but close to the residential spillover effect found by Ahlfeldt et al. (2015) for Berlin. This comparison highlights how in a quantitative model with preference heterogeneity, a high fundamental QoL is required to rationalise why, for example, Berlin has almost 10 times the employment of the average labour market. For Germany, the urban QoL premium is much larger than even the unadjusted urban wage premium (see Figure 1, panel a), let alone the skill-adjusted urban wage premium (see Section D.2).

The pollution effect illustrates how the same logic extends to non-marketed goods of immediate policy interest. Descriptively, the DSM-QoL decreases in the concentration of particulate matter at an elasticity of -0.4 (we turn to causal effects in Section F). For the RR-QoL the estimated elasticity is not even half as large. Hence, the case for preserving clean air is significantly stronger if we account for frictional migration. This finding is consistent with previous evidence by Luechinger (2009), who finds larger pollution effects on life satisfaction than on house prices, and Bayer et al. (2009), who show that the willingness to pay for clean air is larger in a discrete choice model allowing for mobility cost than in a conventional hedonic model. The same conclusion extends to cultural amenities as opera houses are more strongly positively associated with the DSM-QoL measure than with the RR-QoL measure.

To ensure that the social media amenity index captures the effects of unobserved QoL determinants, exclusively, we residualise the measure in auxiliary regressions against all covariates in Columns (2-3) and (5-6). While the point estimate drops, in particular in the DSM-QoL models, it remains statistically and economically significant, highlighting the role social media

can play in controlling for QoL determinants that are difficult to observe.

E.3 The role of the migration elasticity

To evaluate how sensitive the relationship between DSM-QoL and RR-QoL is to the choice of the migration elasticity, we quantify the model under varying group-independent values for γ. The left panel of Figure 6 confirms the theoretical expectation that DSM-QoL approaches RR-QoL for large values of γ (see Section C.7). If one is willing to believe that $\gamma \geq 3$, the elasticity of RR-QoL with respect to DSM-QoL exceeds 0.8. The R^2 of a log-linear regression then exceeds 0.9. For smaller values suggested by the empirical literature, however, a small change in the set or estimated value of the migration elasticity can have large effects on inverted QoL.

Since for observed migration probabilities, migration resistance $\gamma^\theta \times \tau_{ij}^\theta$ is exactly identified by the migration gravity Eq. (10) (see Appendix K.2.4 for the empirical counterpart), an increase in γ^θ implies a proportionate decrease in migration costs τ_{ij}^θ. Lower $\tau_{ij,j\neq i}^\theta$ relative to $\tau_{ij,j=i}^\theta = 0$ imply larger between-city migration flows, with implications for the speed of spatial adjustments. The right panel of Figure 6 illustrates the negative relationship between γ and the years it takes until 80% of the transition to the SSE are completed. In terms of rents, which are log-proportionate to city employment, the adjustment period shrinks from more than 65 years to 30 years. In terms of group-region wages, we observe a decrease from close to 75 years to less than 55 years.

Figure 6: The role of the migration elasticity (γ)



(a) Fit of Rosen-Roback with model QoL

(b) Years until 80% convergence to SSE

Notes: Elasticity estimates and within-R^2 are from regressions of ln RR-QoL ($\mathcal{A}$) against ln DSM-QoL (A), controlling for group fixed effects. An increase in γ implies a decrease in migration cost $\tau_{i,j\neq i}^\theta$ since the migration resistance $\gamma \times \tau_{i,j}^\theta$ is exactly identified by the gravity migration equation. Convergence to the SSE is measured in terms of a reduction in the sum of the absolute difference between TSE and SSE values. In all iterations, the model is quantified using 2017 values observed in the data.

F Policy evaluation

In this section, we outline how to use the quantified model for the evaluation of policies that seek to improve regional QoL. The first step is to establish a causal relationship between the structural fundamental $A^{\theta}_{i,t}$ and some QoL determinant that is amenable to policy-induced change. This challenge is shared with a reduced-form literature exploring capitalisation effects of QoL determinants in house prices or inverse real wages. The second step is novel to the QoL literature. Starting from the SSE, we use the causal estimate from the first step to update $A^{\theta}_{i,t}$, and then re-solve for a counterfactual SSE. A comparison between the initial and the counterfactual SSE delivers general equilibrium comparative statics. Our procedure differs from the evaluation within a CSE framework in three important respects. First, the valuation of QoL determinants will be larger as we account for worker heterogeneity in recovering fundamental QoL. This increases the *aggregate* welfare effect. Second, migration costs break the utility equalization at the migration origin. Therefore, place-based policies can affect the spatial *distribution* of welfare. Third, our model predicts a *temporal* pattern because migration-induced spatial arbitrage is not immediate.

Our case in point is an improvement in air quality. Air pollution causes 400 thousand premature deaths per year in the EU and is by far the number one environmental factor driving disease (European Environment Agency, 2020). Negative effects of dirty air on health (Deryugina et al., 2019), property prices (Chay and Greenstone, 2005; Bayer et al., 2009) and self-reported life satisfaction (Luechinger, 2009; Levinson, 2012) are well established. Our policy counterfactual is a reduction in PM^{10} concentration in the most polluted regions to the 75th percentile in the distribution across all regions. Since this application is intended to serve as an illustrative example, we keep the estimation strategy and the policy experiment simple and transparent. For future applications, researchers are, of course, invited to expand on our application, e.g. by exploiting natural experiments or randomised policies for identification, or considering more sophisticated policy interventions in the counterfactuals. Naturally, the procedure outlined below can be applied to any other QoL determinant or, more generally, any determinant that affects any of the structural fundamentals $\{\psi^{\theta}_{i,t}, \eta_{i,t}, A^{\theta}_{i,t}\}$ in the model.

F.1 Procedure

Transition to counterfactual SSE. Adopting the conventional *exact hat algebra* notation where hats represent ratios of counterfactual values over initial values (Dekle et al., 2007),[13] we model a policy as an exogenously induced relative change in QoL $\widehat{A^{\theta}_{i,t}} = \widehat{A^{\theta}_{i,t}}(b^{\theta}\widehat{\mathcal{X}_{i,t}})$ that results in a counterfactual QoL $A^{\theta^C}_{i,t} = \widehat{A^{\theta}_{i,t}} A^{\theta}_{i,t}$. $\widehat{\mathcal{X}_{i,t}}$ is a relative change in an exogenous QoL determinant and b^{θ} is a group-specific parameter that describes a causal relationship between $A^{\theta}_{i,t}$ and $\mathcal{X}_{i,t}$.

Starting from the initial SSE, we use a simplified version of the dynamic solver introduced in Section D.3 that takes ${A^{\theta}_{i,t}}^{C}$ as given to solve for a counterfactual SSE. As with the initial SSE,

[13] See Heblich et al. (2020) for a recent application.

the counterfactual SSE is referenced by stationary employment ${L_{i,t}^{\theta}}^{C}$ that maps to the other endogenous variables as discussed in Section C.4. The transition into the counterfactual SSE is moderated by a sequence of migration flows that restore the SSE through the model-endogenous agglomeration and dispersion forces. The comparison of the initial and the counterfactual SSE delivers a policy effect that is causal in the sense that it is not confounded by the mean-reversion tendency of a spatial economy in the TSE. Hence, our approach yields results that are comparable to the comparative statics employed for economic policy evaluation in static models.

Welfare. Consider a social planner that extrapolates the expected indirect utility of stayers in the SSE into the infinite future to create a group-region welfare measure:

$$\mathcal{R}_{i,t}^{\theta} = \frac{V_{i|i,t}^{\theta}}{\rho} = \frac{(1-\iota)}{\rho} \frac{w_{i,t}^{\theta}}{p_{i,t}^{1-\alpha}} A_{i,t}^{\theta} \exp\left[\ln B_{ii,t}^{\theta} - \tau_{ii}^{\theta}\right] = \frac{(1-\iota)}{\rho} \frac{w_{i,t}^{\theta}}{p_{i,t}^{1-\alpha}} A_{i,t}^{\theta} \tag{16}$$

Since unlike in the canonical CSE framework utility is not equalised across regions in our DSM, it is particularly important to specify the social welfare function when aggregating group-region-specific welfare. We define a social welfare function in the tradition of Atkinson (1970) as

$$\mathcal{W}_t(\varepsilon) = \frac{1}{1-\varepsilon} \sum_i \sum_\theta \left(\mathcal{R}_{i,t}^{\theta}\right)^{1-\varepsilon} \frac{L_{i,t}^{\theta}}{\bar{L}_t} = \mathcal{R}_t \left(1 - \mathcal{I}_t(\varepsilon)\right), \tag{17}$$

where $\mathcal{R}_t$ is the weighted average of group-region utility and $\mathcal{I}_t \in [0,1]$ represents the Atkinson measure of inequality (see Appendix M.1 for derivation details). This formulation separates social welfare into a scale-dependent part (average utility) that enters positively into social welfare and a scale-independent inequality measure that imposes a penalty on inequality. The strength of the penalty is governed by the inequality aversion parameter $0 \leq \varepsilon \neq 1$. If $\varepsilon = 0$, $1 - \mathcal{I} = 1$, such that social welfare is solely determined by the aggregate (utilitarian case). The inequality penalty increases in ε, with $\varepsilon \to \infty$ representing the limiting Rawlsian case in which the penalty is entirely determined by the weakest region-group.

Based on $\mathcal{W}$ for the baseline $(*)$ and the counterfactual (c) SSE, we obtain the change in social welfare from the initial to the counterfactual SSE for a given level of inequality aversion as

$$\widehat{\mathcal{W}}_t(\varepsilon) = \frac{\mathcal{R}_t^c}{\mathcal{R}_t^*} \frac{1 - \mathcal{I}_t(\varepsilon)^c}{1 - \mathcal{I}_t(\varepsilon)^*}. \tag{18}$$

With this formulation, we acknowledge the efficiency-equity trade-off that is inherent to many spatial shocks and policies. If there is a positive effect on aggregate welfare accompanied by an increase in inequality, the effect on social welfare qualitatively and quantitatively depends on inequality aversion.

F.2 Application

Estimation. The descriptive results reported in Table 2 point to a negative effect of particulate matter air pollution (PM^{10}) on QoL. To obtain a causal estimate of the effect of air pollution on group-specific QoL, we require an identification strategy that addresses the obvious concern that air pollution may be correlated with unobserved QoL determinants. As an example, a more extensive road network may induce traffic and increase air pollution while having a positive QoL effect due to reduced travel times. The potential for a downward bias in the air pollution effect on QoL is significant as transport accounts for 20% of particulate matter emissions in Germany, on average, with a greater share in urbanised regions (Umweltbundesamt, 2020).

Therefore, we use an instrumental variable approach which exploits that the spatial diffusion of air pollution is shaped by winds (Deryugina et al., 2019; Heblich et al., 2021). To this end, we compute black coal and brown coal exposure measures that aggregate over black or brown coal deposits in surrounding regions, weighted by wind-adjusted distance. Intuitively, we scale down the crow-flight distance from region j to i if winds typically blow from j to i and scale the distance up if the opposite is true. We normalise these exposure measures by the naive spatial aggregate of coal deposits and exclude any coal deposits in the own region. Hence, when we use the resulting (log) coal exposure measures as instrumental variables for air pollution, identification stems from exogenous variation introduced by wind directions, exclusively. The rationale for using coal fields in the exposure measures is that, historically, energy-intensive industries and coal power plants co-located with coal fields as shipping costs were high until the mid 20th century (Fernihough and O'Rourke, 2021; Mohammed and Williamson, 2004). Unlike for industries and power plants, we can rule out reverse causality from QoL to the locations of coal fields. Since we exclude the own region ($j = i$) in the exposure measures, the instrumental variables exclude localised disamenities, for example due to unpleasant views. For a more detailed discussion of the construction, the relevance and the validity of the instruments as well as the underlying mechanisms, we refer to Appendix M.2.

In Figure 7, we display the estimated pollution effects from group-specific instrumental variable regressions in which we also control for all covariates used in Table 2. In keeping with intuition, the point estimates are negative for all 18 groups. On average, the effect is larger than in Table 2, suggesting a role for unobserved confounders that are positively correlated with QoL and negatively correlated with pollution, such as transport. There is a notable age gap, with the QoL of younger workers being more sensitive to air pollution.

Regional effects. To generate an exogenous change in QoL $\widehat{A^{\theta}_{i,t}}$, we combine the group-specific estimates of the air pollution effect on QoL from Figure 7 with a hypothetical region-specific policy. Specifically, we reduce the regional PM^{10} concentration to the 75th percentile in the distribution of pollution levels across regions where the levels exceed that threshold. While we choose the threshold arbitrarily with no particular policy in mind, the general design vaguely resembles the US Clean Air Act. Panel (a) in Figure 8 illustrates the simulated policy

Figure 7: Quality-of-life effect of air pollution by group



Note: Elasticity estimates are from group-specific regressions of the log of DSM-QoL ($A^{\theta}_{i,t}$) inverted as discussed in D.3 against the log of particular matter (PM^{10}), controlling for the remaining covariates listed in Table 2. We use the log of the wind-adjusted-distance-weighted aggregates of black and brown coal deposits in surrounding regions (excluding the self-potential) as instrumental variables for pollution. These coal exposure measures are normalised by the non-wind-adjusted spatial lags of black and and brown coal deposits, so that identification is driven by wind direction exclusively.

effect on the weighted (by group employment) average regional QoL. Three broader regions stand out as being treated owing to relatively high air pollution levels: The west, home to black coal fields; the north, home to various seaports; the east, home to brown coal fields. The QoL effects are sizable, with the largest increase in average QoL of 7.7% in Bochum (in the west).

The policy-induced positive change in regional QoL naturally creates incentives for workers to relocate. As workers move to the treated regions, they congest the housing market, leading to higher rents as illustrated in panel (b). Unsurprisingly, we find the largest increase in rent of 6.3% in Bochum where QoL increased the most. There are small decreases in rent in the range of -0.9% to -0.7% throughout the non-treated regions as these lose workers to the treated regions. Accounting for relocation effects is a natural strength of quantitative models compared to reduced-form settings, where indirect treatments represent a challenge for the identification and interpretation of treatment effects.

Since we quantify the model for 18 age-gender-skill groups, our model-based counterfactuals deliver rich sorting effects. Panel (c) shows how the policy leads to an increase in the high-skilled share in the urbanised treated regions in particular. This increase is driven by a combination of the high-skilled having a relatively large valuation of air quality (b^{θ}) and a relatively large migration elasticity (γ^{θ}) while facing relatively low migration costs ($\tau^{\theta}_{ij\neq i}$) and net-costs of agglomeration ($\beta \times (1-\alpha) - \kappa^{\theta}$).

A distinctive feature of our DSM is that there is no exogenous reservation utility that anchors the spatial economy. Because of migration costs, spatial differences in expected group-

Figure 8: Counterfactual analysis: Regional effects



(a) QoL

(b) Rent

(c) High-skilled share

(d) Expected utility (stayers)

Note: We aggregate the model solutions for the initial and the counterfactual SSE from the region-group level to the region level using the respective SSE employment shares as weights. We then display the ratio of the counterfactual regional aggregates over the initial regional aggregates.

specific utility are not arbitraged away, not even in the SSE. Hence, while migration leads to capitalisation of a change in QoL into rents (see panel b), capitalisation remains imperfect so that we see persistent effects on regional utility in panel (d). Since $1 - \alpha = 33\%$ of the income is spent on housing, the 6.3% increase in rent in Bochum, for instance, implies a $6.3\% \times 0.33\% = 2.1\%$ decline in utility, ceteris paribus, compared to the 7.7% QoL-induced utility gain. In other words, only about one fourth of policy-induced QoL increase capitalises into rents. The remaining fraction boosts utility persistently. Note that the net-effect on expected indirect utility of 7.1% in Bochum does not amount exactly to the difference between the equivalent utility effects of the QoL and rent increases due to agglomeration-induced wage effects and sorting (see panel c).

Temporal effects. While there are sizable utility gains in the positively treated regions in the SSE, utility increases even more during the transition period. In Figure 9, we plot the evolution of wages, rents, and indirect utility during the first 100 years of the SSE-to-SSE transition. We show group-specific wage and indirect utility effects for middle-aged, middle-skilled men and women separately. In Bochum, the selected group of female workers receives an 8.5% increase in QoL which maps one-to-one to an indirect utility effect in the initial period. The respective male group receives a smaller gain due to a lower valuation of clean air. Over the subsequent years, the heightened QoL attracts workers from other regions, increasing rent (due to inelastically supplied land) and wage (due to agglomeration economies) levels. Since the effect of the former dominates that of the latter, indirect utility decreases over time, and so does the incentive for workers from other regions to relocate to Bochum. Since women enjoy greater returns to agglomeration, spatial arbitrage neutralises a smaller fraction of their utility gain, which adds to the long-run benefits they experience relative to men. Munich is not directly treated by our simulated policy. The city is indirectly affected by the policy, however, as it loses workers to the positively treated regions. Rents and wages decrease and since the effect of the former dominates the latter, indirect utility increases. Hence, there is a positive policy spillover effect that operates through migration and a de-congested housing market. Net benefits to women are lower since they take a greater wage cut due to larger returns to agglomeration.

Aggregate effects. We aggregate the SSE-to-SSE region-group effects delivered by the model simulations to relative changes in aggregate outcomes in Table 3. In doing so, we distinguish between treated regions where the policy bites and the remaining non-treated regions which are only indirectly affected through displacement. Although our estimated migration elasticity parameters (γ^{θ}) are relatively small, we observe a sizable worker flow, increasing employment in the treated regions by almost 10% in total. GDP increases more than proportionately compared to employment in the treated area since agglomeration economies and sorting raise wages. Rents naturally increase in the treated area due to more congested housing markets. Since the non-treated area accounts for about twice as many workers (20M) as the

Figure 9: Counterfactual analysis: Temporal effects



(a) Treated: *Bochum* (positive QoL effect)

(b) Not treated: *Munich* (relocation effect)

Note: Model-based numerical simulation of the SSE-to-SSE transition. Pre-policy values in all variables normalized to one. Policy is a region-group-specific increase in QoL due to a hypothetical reduction in air pollution in the most polluted regions. f: female, m: male, m-skill: middle-skilled (apprenticeship), m-age: middle-aged (31-50).

treated area (10M) in the initial SSE, the relative decline in employment in the non-treated area is about half as large (-4.5%). The displacement effect naturally leads to adjustments in wages, rents and group composition in the opposite direction of those in the treated area.

Table 3: Counterfactual analysis: Aggregate effects

Outcome	All regions	Treated area	Non-treated area
Population	1.0000	1.0949	0.9536
GDP	0.9991	1.0996	0.9515
Average wage	0.9991	1.0043	0.9978
Average rent	1.0021	1.0175	0.9911
High-skilled share	1.0000	1.0109	0.9946
Skilled share	1.0000	1.0118	0.9976
Average utility	1.0219	1.0350	1.0003
Social welfare (inequality adjusted)	1.0191	.	.
Monetised average utility (bn. €)	23.1	.	.
Monetised social welfare (bn. €)	20.2	.	.

Notes: Results from model-based numerical simulations. Treated regions are those where a hypothetical policy improves QoL via lower air pollution. Non-treated regions are affected indirectly through displacement. All outcomes except for the last two are given in ratios of counterfactual (SSE) values over initial (SSE) initial values. Social welfare deflates average utility in group-region inequality using the Atkinson (1970) measure ($\epsilon = 0.5$). Monetised average utility and social welfare are yearly flow measures obtained by multiplying the utility and welfare ratios by initial GDP.

The employment-weighted group-region utility increases by 2.2% across all regions. This increase is driven primarily by the treated area where the group-weighted average utility increases by slightly more than 3.5%. There is a small positive effect within the non-treated area owing to lower real living cost. The spatially differentiated utility effect once more highlights that, unlike in the canonical CSE framework, spatial policies can help targeted regions if there are mobility frictions. The effect on social welfare $\mathcal{W}$ is about 13% lower if we aggregate group-

region utility $\mathcal{R}_i^\theta$ using an inequality parameter $\varepsilon = 0.5$, which is towards the lower end of the range considered by Atkinson (1970). If we use $\varepsilon = 2$ (towards the higher end of the considered range), the discount increases to 35%. Since we obtain virtually the same inequality-adjusted social welfare effect if we discount on inter-regional inequality, exclusively, we can conclude that the cost of the policy comes in the form of increased spatial inequality.

A simple way to monetise the welfare effect is to multiply the relative change in welfare by the total wage bill in the initial SSE. If we abstract from inequality aversion, a proportionate increase in yearly region-group wages that totals €23.1 bn would achieve the same utility effect as the policy. If we adjust for the policy effect on inequality using $\varepsilon = 0.5$, a fully equitable increase in the total wage bill of €20.2 bn would suffice. With $\varepsilon = 2$, the monetised welfare effect drops to €15.0 bn. In this application of the model, we abstract from the cost of the measures used to achieve the pollution reduction. Yet, it is clear from the example that once we move beyond the canonical CSE framework, the result of a cost-benefit test of a spatial policy will critically depend on the social welfare function.

F.3 Other applications

The Covid-19 pandemic has spurred a debate about the future of big cities (Nathan and Overman, 2020). A typical argument brought forth is that the pandemic erodes the main comparative advantage of big cities: economic and social benefits of proximity. We apply the procedure developed in this section to quantitatively evaluate three apocalyptic scenarios: a) a reduction in productivity due to an elimination of all agglomeration benefits arising from density; b) a reduction in QoL due to a loss of amenities that relate to social interaction (captured by our social media amenity index); c) the combination of a) and b). The headline findings for the scenarios a)/b)/c) are as follows: Large labour markets (>250k employed workers) lose 8.2%/36.7%/37.9% percent of their workforce to small labour markets; aggregate GDP decreases by 10.5%/1%/10.9%; rents fall by 3.1%/9.3%/11.1% in large labour markets whereas they increase (decrease) by (0.4)%/6.7%/5.1% in small labour markets; despite a larger reduction in the urban wage premium, the high-skilled are more likely to remain in large cities due to their amenity preference. While these simulated effects on big cities are large, they are not nearly as devastating as predicted by a frictionless CSE model. We refer the interested reader to Appendix M.3 for details.

G Conclusion

DSMs are rapidly gaining popularity in economics research. An important feature of DSMs is that they account for spatial frictions on goods and factor markets. Using a fully quantified DSM, we show that spatial frictions have important implications for the economics of QoL that are of academic and policy interest alike.

A key insight from our analysis is that differentials in QoL across regions are much larger once we quantitatively account for idiosyncratic taste heterogeneity. While the existence of an

urban wage premium that reflects productivity advantages of cities is by now uncontroversial, the evidence for an urban QoL premium is weak at best. Our results show that accounting for idiosyncratic tastes that reduce mobility, the consumption value of cities is key to rationalising why more than 50% of the world's population lives in cities. CSE models have been the workhorse tool for the evaluation of non-marketed goods such as clean air, education, safety, or transport, just to name a few. Our results show that consensus estimates of the value of such local public goods are likely lower bounds, implying a stronger case for policies that seek to improve QoL.

The existence of localised place-based policies such as Enterprise Zones or broader regional redistribution schemes such as the EU Cohesion Fund suggests that spatial equity matters to policy makers and voters. There is an obvious tension between such spatial policies and the workhorse spatial equilibrium models which rule out spatial effects of spatial policies by assumption. We provide a quantitative framework for the evaluation of the aggregate and distributional welfare consequences of place-based policies that allows for spatial incidence and relocation effects. This framework closes the gap between QSMs that assume perfect spatial arbitrage and the reality of spatial policy-making where trading efficiency against equity is the order of the day. We show that even a moderate spatial inequality aversion can have a sizable impact on the social welfare effect of a spatially targeted policy. As the literature on spatial policy evaluation moves beyond the canonical framework in the tradition of Rosen-Roback, the spatial aggregation of welfare effects will require an explicitly defined social welfare function.

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APPENDIX

This section presents an online appendix containing complementary material not intended for publication. It does not replace the reading of the main paper.

H Stylised facts

Complementing Figure 1 in the main paper, Figure A1 visualises causes and consequences of migration in three illustrative maps. Panel (a) plots the spatial distribution of nominal wages. In keeping with intuition, wages tend to be higher in agglomerated areas such as Rhine-Ruhr, Rhine-Main or the metropolitan areas of Hamburg, Munich or Stuttgart. Panel (b) shows the spatial distribution of net-migration over the 2007 to 2017 period. High-wage areas tend to experience positive net-migration, suggesting that workers respond to economic incentives when making migration decisions. Panel (c) shows a strong correlation between net-migration and changes in rents, in line with housing markets representing a congestion force.

Figure A1: Wages, migration and rents



(a) Wages 2007

(b) Change in employment 2007-2017

(c) Change in rent 2007-2017

Note: Data from the IAB and Immobilienscout24 accessed via FDZ Ruhr.

I Literature appendix

Table A1 summarizes the recent literature on DSM and QSM that explicitly model migration. The distinctive feature of our model is the invertability of all structural fundamentals under perfect foresight from a TSE.

Table A1: Dynamic and quantitative spatial models

Authors	Model type	Expectations	Inversion		Counterfactual
Ahlfeldt et al. (2020), WP	DSM, GE, MC	PF	P,H,A,bMC	TSE	SSE to SSE
Allen and Donaldson (2020), WP	DM, GE, MC	Static	P, A, bMC, MA	TSE	TSE to ED
Balboni (2019), R&R AER	DSM, GE, MC	PF	P,MA	TSE	TSE to ED
Bryan and Morten (2019), JPE	QSM, MC	Static	-	-	-
Caliendo et al. (2019b), Ecta	DSM, GE, MC	PF	-	-	TSE to ED
Caliendo et al. (2019a), R&R JPE	DSM, GE, MC	PF	-	-	TSE to ED
Conte et al. (2020), WP	DSM, GE, MC	Static	P,A,uMC	TSE	TSE to SSE
Desmet et al. (2018), JPE	DSM, GE, MC	Static	P,A,uMC	TSE	TSE to SSE
Heise and Porzio (2021), WP	QSM, GE, MC	Static	-	-	SSE to SSE
Fan (2019), AEJ: Macro	QSM, GE, MC	Static	bMC, TC	SSE	SSE to SSE
Monras (2020), JPE	DSM, GE	PF	P,H,A,MR	SSE	TSE to SSE
Schubert (2020), WP	DSM, GE, MC	PF	-	-	SSE to SSE
Tombe and Zhu (2019), AER	QSM, MC	Static	-	-	-

Abbreviations:
Model type: QSM = Quantitative spatial model; DSM = Dynamic spatial model; GE = General equilibrium; MC = Migration cost
Expectations: PF = Perfect foresight
Inversion: P = Exogenous productivity; H = Exogenous housing supply; A = Exogenous amenity; uMC = Unilateral migration costs; bMC = Bilateral migration costs; MR: Migration rate; MA = Market access; TC: Trade costs;
SSE = Stationary spatial equilibrium; TSE = Transitory spatial equilibrium;
Counterfactual: ED = Given end date

J Theory appendix

This section complements Section C in the main paper which develops our model.

J.1 Housing market

In this appendix, we derive the housing market equilibrium condition Eq. (8). Developers produce housing according to the Cobb-Douglas housing production function in Eq. (7) and seek to maximise profits:

$$\pi^h_{i,t} = p_{i,t}\eta_{i,t}\left(\frac{\bar{T}_i}{\beta}\right)^{\beta}\left(\frac{K_{i,t}}{1-\beta}\right)^{1-\beta} - r^T_{i,t}\bar{T}_i - K_{i,t}, \tag{19}$$

where we have normalised the internationally competitive interest rate for capital to unity and $r^T_{i,t}$ is the local rental rate for developable land. From the first-order conditions, we obtain:

$$r^T_{i,t} = \frac{\beta}{1-\beta}\frac{K_{i,t}}{\bar{T}_i}. \tag{20}$$

Using Eq. (20) in Eq. (19) and assuming zero-profit delivers

$$p_{i,t} = \frac{(r^T_{i,t})^\beta}{\eta_{i,t}}. \tag{21}$$

Using Eqs. (21) and (20) in Eq. (19), we can express housing supply as

$$H^S_{i,t} = \eta^{\frac{1}{\beta}}_{i,t} \left(\frac{\bar{T}_i}{\beta}\right) p^{\frac{1-\beta}{\beta}}_{i,t}, \tag{22}$$

where $\frac{1-\beta}{\beta}$ is the housing supply elasticity. From Eq. (2), housing demand in region i is given by

$$H^D_{i,t} = (1-\alpha)(1-\iota)\sum_\theta L^\theta_{i,t}\varphi^\theta_{i,t} = (1-\alpha)(1-\iota)X_{i,t}. \tag{23}$$

Housing market clearing implies that $H^D_{i,t} = H^S_{i,t}$, which leads to Eq. (8). Alternatively, we can express the regional housing rent as a function of structural parameters, structural fundamentals, and employment density:

$$p_{i,t} = \left(\frac{(1-\alpha)(1-\iota)\beta}{\eta^{\frac{1}{\beta}}_{i,t}}\right)^\beta \left[\sum_\theta \frac{L^\theta_{i,t}}{\bar{T}_i}\left(\frac{L_{i,t}}{\bar{T}_i}\right)^{\kappa^\theta} \psi^\theta_{i,t}\right]^\beta. \tag{24}$$

The first term in the sum captures the direct effect of employment density on the supply of housing: inelastically supplied land generates a congestion force in the form of higher rents when immigration into i raises employment. The second term in the sum captures the indirect effect of employment density: Density increases productivity and in turn wages via agglomeration economies, which further increases housing demand. While our model can provide the microfoundations for a regression of the log of housing rents against the log of employment density as in Combes et al. (2019), the estimated elasticity of that regression would not directly correspond to β in our model. Using employment (or population) density instead of output density as a regressor (see Eq. (31) below), we would underestimate the land share, the housing supply elasticity, and the congestion force generated by the housing market.

J.2 Net present value of utility

This section complements Section C.3 in which we introduce the migration net present value.

Strictly monotonic transformations of utility functions still represent the same underlying preferences. We follow the conventions in the DSM literature (see e.g. Caliendo et al., 2019b) and employ a logarithmic formulation of the net present value of utility, which allows to derive simple closed-form solutions for expected utility in Appendix J.3.

This net present value of a worker of type θ currently living in region i, and who lived in region k at time period $t-1$ depends on current period utility and the maximal discounted future utility, which in turn is a function of bilateral utility between all other (potentially)

different regions $j, m, ..., n, h$ in all future periods $t+1, t+2, ..., (t+T)+(t+1+T)$. Workers expect to stay at their final destination $h \in J$ from time period $(t+1)+T$ onward, such that the net present value of utility is given as

$$\begin{aligned}
\ln NPV^{\theta}_{i|k,t}(\omega) = & \ln \left[\frac{(1-\iota)w^{\theta}_{i,t}}{p^{1-\alpha}_{i,t}} A^{\theta}_{i,t} \exp\left(a^{\theta}_{ki,t}(\omega) - \tau^{\theta}_{ki}\right) \right] \\
& + \max_{\{j,m,...,n,h\}^{J}_{j,m,...,n,h=1}} \Bigg\{ \frac{1}{1+\rho} \ln \left(\frac{(1-\iota)w^{\theta}_{j,t+1}}{p^{1-\alpha}_{j,t+1}} A^{\theta}_{j,t+1} \exp\left(a^{\theta}_{ij,t+1}(\omega) - \tau^{\theta}_{ij}\right) \right) \\
& + \left(\frac{1}{1+\rho}\right)^2 E\left[\ln \left(\frac{(1-\iota)w^{\theta}_{m,t+2}}{p^{1-\alpha}_{m,t+2}} A^{\theta}_{m,t+2} \exp\left(a^{\theta}_{jm,t+2}(\omega) - \tau^{\theta}_{jm}\right) \right) \right] + \ \ldots \\
& + \left(\frac{1}{1+\rho}\right)^{T+1} \left[E\left[\ln \left(\frac{(1-\iota)w^{\theta}_{h,(t+1)+T}}{p^{1-\alpha}_{h,(t+1)+T}} A^{\theta}_{h,(t+1)+T} \exp\left(a^{\theta}_{nh,(t+1)+T}(\omega) - \tau^{\theta}_{nh}\right) \right) \right] \right. \\
& \left. + \sum_{s=(t+2)+T}^{\infty} \left(\frac{1}{1+\rho}\right)^{s-(t+1+T)} E\left[\ln \left(\frac{(1-\iota)w^{\theta}_{h,s}}{p^{1-\alpha}_{h,s}} A^{\theta}_{h,s} \exp\left(a^{\theta}_{hh,s}(\omega)\right) \right) \right] \right] \Bigg\},
\end{aligned}$$

where $\frac{1}{1+\rho} \in (0,1)$ is the time discount factor. Combining with the definitions of utility (1) and demand functions (2) these results lead to the net present value of utility in Eq. (9).

J.3 Expected utilities and migration probabilities

This section complements Section C.3 in which we introduce the migration gravity Eq. (10).

J.3.1 Expected utility

We are interested in the expected net present value of workers of type θ when migrating from region i to j at the end of time period t. Taking the expectation over idiosyncratic Gumbel-distributed amenity shocks involves solving both the unconditional expectation over current shock realisations as well as the expectation of future shocks, conditional on some region $n \in J$ offering the highest expected utility in future time periods to these workers.

J.3.2 Unconditional expectation of current period utility

Random amenity shocks are distributed according to a Gumbel distribution with the following cumulative distribution and density function:

$$F^{\theta}_{ij,t}(a) = \exp\left(-\tilde{B}^{\theta}_{ij,t} \exp\left\{-\left[\gamma^{\theta} a + \Gamma\right]\right\}\right)$$

$$f^{\theta}_{ij,t}(a) = \gamma^{\theta} \tilde{B}^{\theta}_{ij,t} \exp\left(-\gamma^{\theta} a - \Gamma - \tilde{B}^{\theta}_{ij,t} \exp\left\{-\left[\gamma^{\theta} a + \Gamma\right]\right\}\right)$$

We first solve for the unconditional expectation over current the component of log-transformed net present value of utility :

$$
\begin{aligned}
E\left[v^{\theta}_{i|k,t}(\omega)\right] &\equiv E\left[\ln\left(\frac{(1-\iota)w^{\theta}_{i,t}A^{\theta}_{i,t}\exp\left(a^{\theta}_{ki,t}(\omega)-\tau^{\theta}_{ki}\right)}{p^{1-\alpha}_{i,t}}\right)\right] \\
&= E\left[\ln\left((1-\iota)w^{\theta}_{i,t}\right)+\ln A^{\theta}_{i,t}-\ln\left(p^{1-\alpha}_{i,t}\right)+a^{\theta}_{ki,t}(\omega)-\tau^{\theta}_{ki}\right] \\
&= \int_{-\infty}^{\infty}\left[\ln\left((1-\iota)w^{\theta}_{i,t}\right)+\ln A^{\theta}_{i,t}-\ln\left(p^{1-\alpha}_{i,t}\right)+a^{\theta}_{ki,t}(\omega)-\tau^{\theta}_{ki}\right] \\
&* f\left(a^{\theta}_{ki,t}(\omega)\right)da^{\theta}_{ki,t}(\omega) \\
&= \int_{-\infty}^{\infty}\left[\ln\left((1-\iota)w^{\theta}_{i,t}\right)+\ln A^{\theta}_{i,t}-\ln\left(p^{1-\alpha}_{i,t}\right)+a^{\theta}_{ki,t}(\omega)-\tau^{\theta}_{ki}\right] \\
&* \gamma^{\theta}\tilde{B}^{\theta}_{ki,t}\exp\left(-\gamma^{\theta}a^{\theta}_{ki,t}(\omega)-\Gamma-\tilde{B}^{\theta}_{ki,t}\exp\left\{-\left[\gamma^{\theta}a^{\theta}_{ki,t}(\omega)+\Gamma\right]\right\}\right)da^{\theta}_{ki,t}(\omega),
\end{aligned}
$$

where we substituted the density function for bilateral amenity shocks from above. We then re-define the following variables:

$$
\begin{aligned}
x_t &\equiv \gamma^{\theta}a^{\theta}_{ki,t}(\omega)+\Gamma \\
\lambda_t &\equiv \ln\tilde{B}^{\theta}_{ki,t} \\
y_t &= x_t-\lambda_t
\end{aligned}
$$

Substituting into the integral above yields:

$$
\begin{aligned}
E\left[v^{\theta}_{i|k,t}(\omega)\right] = &\int_{-\infty}^{\infty}\gamma^{\theta}\tilde{B}^{\theta}_{ki,t}\left[\ln\left((1-\iota)w^{\theta}_{i,t}\right)+\ln A^{\theta}_{i,t}-\ln\left(p^{1-\alpha}_{i,t}\right)-\tau^{\theta}_{ki}+\frac{1}{\gamma^{\theta}}\left(x_t-\Gamma\right)\right] \\
&* \exp\left(-x_t\right)\exp\left(-\exp\left(\lambda_t\right)\exp\left(-x_t\right)\right)\frac{1}{\gamma^{\theta}}dx_t
\end{aligned}
$$

$$
\begin{aligned}
E\left[v^{\theta}_{i|k,t}(\omega)\right] = &\int_{-\infty}^{\infty}\tilde{B}^{\theta}_{ki,t}\left[\ln\left((1-\iota)w^{\theta}_{i,t}\right)+\ln A^{\theta}_{i,t}-\ln\left(p^{1-\alpha}_{i,t}\right)-\tau^{\theta}_{ki}+\frac{1}{\gamma^{\theta}}\left(x_t-\Gamma\right)\right] \\
&* \exp\left(-x_t-\exp\left(-\left[x_t-\lambda_t\right]\right)\right)dx_t
\end{aligned}
$$

Then note that the derivative of $\exp\left(-\exp\left(-y_t\right)\right)$ is $\exp\left(-y_t-\exp\left(-y_t\right)\right)$ and $\int y_t\exp\left(-y_t-\exp\left(-y_t\right)\right)=\Gamma$. This allows to evaluate the integral at its boundaries:

$$
\begin{aligned}
E\left[v^{\theta}_{i|k,t}(\omega)\right] &= \int_{-\infty}^{\infty}\left[\ln\left((1-\iota)w^{\theta}_{i,t}\right)+\ln A^{\theta}_{i,t}-\ln\left(p^{1-\alpha}_{i,t}\right)-\tau^{\theta}_{ki}+\frac{1}{\gamma^{\theta}}\left(y_t+\lambda_t-\Gamma\right)\right] \\
&* \exp\left(-y_t-\exp\left(-y_t\right)\right)dy_t \\
&= \left(\ln\left((1-\iota)w^{\theta}_{i,t}\right)+\ln A^{\theta}_{i,t}-\ln\left(p^{1-\alpha}_{i,t}\right)-\tau^{\theta}_{ki}+\frac{1}{\gamma^{\theta}}\left(\lambda_t-\Gamma\right)\right) \\
&* \int_{-\infty}^{\infty}\exp\left(-y_t-\exp\left(-y_t\right)\right)dy_t+\frac{1}{\gamma^{\theta}}\int_{-\infty}^{\infty}y_t\exp\left(-y_t-\exp\left(-y_t\right)\right)dy_t
\end{aligned}
$$

Furthermore note that $[\exp(-\exp(-y_t))]_{-\infty}^{\infty} = 1$. This yields

$$E\left[v_{i|k,t}^{\theta}(\omega)\right] = \left(\ln\left((1-\iota)w_{i,t}^{\theta}\right) + \ln A_{i,t}^{\theta} - \ln\left(p_{i,t}^{1-\alpha}\right) - \tau_{ki}^{\theta} + \frac{1}{\gamma^{\theta}}\lambda_t\right)$$
$$= \ln\left(\frac{\exp\left(-\tau_{ki}^{\theta}\right)(1-\iota)\, w_{i,t}^{\theta} A_{i,t}^{\theta} B_{ki,t}^{\theta}}{p_{i,t}^{1-\alpha}}\right).$$

In line with the definition of per-period utility in Eq. (1) we subsequently define the average per-period welfare for workers of type θ as

$$V_{i|k,t}^{\theta} = \exp E\left[v_{i|k,t}^{\theta}(\omega)\right] = \frac{\exp\left(-\tau_{ki}^{\theta}\right)(1-\iota)\, w_{i,t}^{\theta} A_{i,t}^{\theta} B_{ki,t}^{\theta}}{p_{i,t}^{1-\alpha}}.$$

J.3.3 Migration option values

Assume that all workers expect to stay infinite time periods at their final destination $h \in J$ after $(S+1)$ moves between regions, and incorporate expectations about future amenity shocks up to time period $(t+1)+T$ for all bilateral region pairs already when deciding on destinations at the end of time period $t+1$.

We solve this dynamic problem by backwards induction, that is we first solve for the conditional expectation over idiosyncratic bilateral amenity shocks, given that region $h \in J$ offers the highest life-time utility compared to all other regions $l \neq h$ from time period time period $(t+1)+T$ onward. Let
$\ln \mathcal{V}_{h,(t+1)+T}^{\theta} \equiv \left[\frac{\ln A_{h,(t+1)+T}^{\theta}}{\rho} + \frac{E(a_{hh,(t+2)+T}^{\theta}(\omega))}{\rho(1+\rho)} + \sum_{s=(t+1)+T}^{\infty}\left(\frac{1}{1+\rho}\right)^{s-((t+1)+T)} \ln\left(\frac{(1-\iota)w_{h,s}^{\theta}}{p_{h,s}^{1-\alpha}}\right)\right]$
be the discounted infinite sum over future utilities at time period $(t+1)+T$, then it holds that

$$\begin{aligned}
E\left[v_{n,(t+1)+T}^{\theta}(\omega)\right](1+\rho)^T &\equiv E\left[\max_{h\in J}\left(\frac{1}{1+\rho}\right)\left[a_{nh,(t+1)+T}^{\theta}(\omega) - \tau_{nh}^{\theta} + \ln \mathcal{V}_{h,(t+1)+T}^{\theta}\right]\right] \\
&= \sum_{h\in J}\int_{-\infty}^{\infty}\left(\left(\frac{1}{1+\rho}\right)\left[a_{nh,(t+1)+T}^{\theta}(\omega) - \tau_{nh}^{\theta} + \ln \mathcal{V}_{h,(t+1)+T}^{\theta}\right]\right) \\
&* f\left(a_{nh,(t+1)+T}^{\theta}(\omega)\right) \\
&* \prod_{h\neq l} F\left[\tau_{nl}^{\theta} - \tau_{nh}^{\theta} + \ln\frac{\mathcal{V}_{h,(t+1)+T}^{\theta}}{\mathcal{V}_{l,(t+1)+T}^{\theta}} + a_{nh,(t+1)+T}^{\theta}(\omega)\right] da_{nh,(t+1)+T}^{\theta}(\omega) \\
&= \sum_{h\in J}\int_{-\infty}^{\infty}\left(\left(\frac{1}{1+\rho}\right)\left[a_{nh,(t+1)+T}^{\theta}(\omega) - \tau_{nh}^{\theta} + \ln \mathcal{V}_{h,(t+1)+T}^{\theta}\right]\right) \\
&* f\left(a_{nh,(t+1)+T}^{\theta}(\omega)\right)\prod_{l\neq h} F\left[\Omega_{nhl}^{\theta} + a_{nh,(t+1)+T}^{\theta}(\omega)\right] da_{nh,(t+1)+T}^{\theta}(\omega),
\end{aligned}$$

where we define the compound parameter $\Omega_{nhl}^{\theta} \equiv \tau_{nl}^{\theta} - \tau_{nh}^{\theta} + \ln\frac{\mathcal{V}_{h,(t+1)+T}^{\theta}}{\mathcal{V}_{l,(t+1)+T}^{\theta}}$. In a next step, we

substitute the cumulative distribution and density function for idiosyncratic amenity shocks from above:

$$
\begin{aligned}
E\left[v^{\theta}_{n,(t+1)+T}(\omega)\right](1+\rho)^T = &\sum_{h\in J}\int_{-\infty}^{\infty}\left(\frac{1}{1+\rho}\left[a^{\theta}_{nh,(t+1)+T}(\omega)-\tau^{\theta}_{nh}+\ln\mathcal{V}^{\theta}_{h,(t+1)+T}\right]\right)\gamma^{\theta}\tilde{B}^{\theta}_{nh,(t+1)+T}\\
&*\exp\left(-\sum_{l\in J}\tilde{B}^{\theta}_{nl,(t+1)+T}\exp\left\{-\gamma^{\theta}\Omega^{\theta}_{nhl}-\gamma^{\theta}a^{\theta}_{nh,(t+1)+T}-\Gamma\right\}\right)\\
&*\exp\left(-\gamma^{\theta}a^{\theta}_{nh,(t+1)+T}(\omega)-\Gamma\right)da^{\theta}_{nh,(t+1)+T}(\omega)
\end{aligned}
$$

Similar to the proofs above we re-define variables:

$$
\begin{aligned}
x_{(t+1)+T} &\equiv \gamma^{\theta}a^{\theta}_{nh,(t+1)+T}(\omega)+\Gamma\\
\lambda_{(t+1)+T} &\equiv \ln\sum_{l\in J}\tilde{B}^{\theta}_{nl,(t+1)+T}\exp\left(-\gamma^{\theta}\Omega^{\theta}_{nhl}\right)\\
y_{(t+1)+T} &= x_{(t+1)+T}-\lambda_{(t+1)+T}
\end{aligned}
$$

If we substitute for the re-defined variables we get:

$$
\begin{aligned}
E\left[v^{\theta}_{n,(t+1)+T}(\omega)\right](1+\rho)^T = &\sum_{h\in J}\int_{-\infty}^{\infty}\left(-\frac{\tau^{\theta}_{nh}}{1+\rho}+\frac{\ln\mathcal{V}^{\theta}_{h,(t+1)+T}}{1+\rho}+\frac{1}{(1+\rho)\gamma^{\theta}}\left(x_{(t+1)+T}-\Gamma\right)\right)\\
&*\tilde{B}^{\theta}_{nh,(t+1)+T}\exp\left(-x_{(t+1)+T}\right)\\
&*\exp\left(-\sum_{l\in J}\tilde{B}^{\theta}_{nl,(t+1)+T}\exp\left(-x_{(t+1)+T}\right)\exp\left(-\gamma^{\theta}\Omega^{\theta}_{nhl}\right)\right)dx_{(t+1)+T}
\end{aligned}
$$

$$
\begin{aligned}
E\left[v^{\theta}_{n,(t+1)+T}(\omega)\right](1+\rho)^T = &\sum_{h\in J}\int_{-\infty}^{\infty}\tilde{B}^{\theta}_{nh,(t+1)+T}\left(-\frac{\tau^{\theta}_{nh}}{1+\rho}+\frac{\ln\mathcal{V}^{\theta}_{h,(t+1)+T}}{1+\rho}+\frac{1}{(1+\rho)\gamma^{\theta}}\left(x_{(t+1)+T}-\Gamma\right)\right)\\
&*\exp\left(-x_{(t+1)+T}-\exp\left(-x_{(t+1)+T}+\lambda_{(t+1)+T}\right)\right)dx_{(t+1)+T}\\
&=\sum_{h\in J}\tilde{B}^{\theta}_{nh,(t+1)+T}\int_{-\infty}^{\infty}\left(-\frac{\tau^{\theta}_{nh}}{1+\rho}+\frac{\ln\mathcal{V}^{\theta}_{h,(t+1)+T}}{1+\rho}+\frac{y_{(t+1)+T}+\lambda_{(t+1)+T}-\Gamma}{(1+\rho)\gamma^{\theta}}\right)\\
&*\exp\left(-\lambda^{\theta}_{(t+1)+T}\right)\exp\left(-y_{(t+1)+T}-\exp\left(-y_{(t+1)+T}\right)\right)dy_{(t+1)+T}\\
&=\sum_{h\in J}\tilde{B}^{\theta}_{nh,(t+1)+T}\exp\left(-\lambda^{\theta}_{(t+1)+T}\right)\\
&*\Bigg[\left(-\frac{\tau^{\theta}_{nh}}{1+\rho}+\frac{\ln\mathcal{V}^{\theta}_{h,(t+1)+T}}{1+\rho}+\frac{\left(\lambda_{(t+1)+T}-\Gamma\right)}{(1+\rho)\gamma^{\theta}}\right)\\
&*\int_{-\infty}^{\infty}\exp\left(-y_{(t+1)+T}-\exp\left(-y_{(t+1)+T}\right)\right)dy_{(t+1)+T}\\
&+\frac{1}{(1+\rho)\gamma^{\theta}}\int_{-\infty}^{\infty}y_{(t+1)+T}\exp\left(-y_{(t+1)+T}-\exp\left(-y_{(t+1)+T}\right)\right)dy_{(t+1)+T}\Bigg]
\end{aligned}
$$

Note that the derivative of $\exp\left(-\exp\left(-y_{(t+1)+T}\right)\right)$ is $\exp\left(-y_{(t+1)+T}-\exp\left(-y_{(t+1)+T}\right)\right)$ and furthermore $\int y_{(t+1)+T}\exp\left(-y_{(t+1)+T}-\exp\left(-y_{(t+1)+T}\right)\right)=\Gamma$, such that, similarly to the proofs above, we can evaluate the integrals at their boundaries:

$$
\begin{aligned}
E\left[v^{\theta}_{n,(t+1)+T}(\omega)\right](1+\rho)^T &= \sum_{h\in J}\tilde{B}^{\theta}_{nh,(t+1)+T}\exp\left(-\lambda^{\theta}_{(t+1)+T}\right)\left(-\frac{\tau^{\theta}_{nh}}{1+\rho}+\frac{\ln\mathcal{V}^{\theta}_{h,(t+1)+T}}{1+\rho}+\frac{\lambda_{(t+1)+T}}{(1+\rho)\gamma^{\theta}}\right)\\
&= \sum_{h\in J}\tilde{B}^{\theta}_{nh,(t+1)+T}\exp\left\{-\ln\sum_{l\in J}\tilde{B}^{\theta}_{nl,(t+1)+T}\exp\left(-\gamma^{\theta}\Omega^{\theta}_{nhl}\right)\right\}\\
&* \left(-\frac{\tau^{\theta}_{nh}}{1+\rho}+\frac{\ln\mathcal{V}^{\theta}_{h,(t+1)+T}}{1+\rho}+\frac{1}{(1+\rho)\gamma^{\theta}}\ln\sum_{l\in J}\tilde{B}^{\theta}_{nl,(t+1)+T}\exp\left(-\gamma^{\theta}\Omega^{\theta}_{nhl}\right)\right)\\
&= \sum_{h\in J}\exp\left\{-\ln\sum_{l\in J}\tilde{B}^{\theta}_{nl,(t+1)+T}\exp\left(-\gamma^{\theta}\left(\tau^{\theta}_{nl}-\tau^{\theta}_{nh}+\ln\frac{\mathcal{V}^{\theta}_{h,(t+1)+T}}{\mathcal{V}^{\theta}_{l,(t+1)+T}}\right)\right)\right\}\\
&* \tilde{B}^{\theta}_{nh,(t+1)+T}\Big[-\frac{\tau^{\theta}_{nh}}{1+\rho}+\frac{\ln\mathcal{V}^{\theta}_{h,(t+1)+T}}{1+\rho}+\frac{1}{(1+\rho)\gamma^{\theta}}\ln\sum_{l\in J}\tilde{B}^{\theta}_{nl,(t+1)+T}\\
&* \exp\left(-\gamma^{\theta}\left(\tau^{\theta}_{nl}-\tau^{\theta}_{nh}+\ln\frac{\mathcal{V}^{\theta}_{h,(t+1)+T}}{\mathcal{V}^{\theta}_{l,(t+1)+T}}\right)\right)\Big]
\end{aligned}
$$

Re-arranging terms and simplifying we thus get:

$$
\begin{aligned}
E\left[v^{\theta}_{n,(t+1)+T}(\omega)\right](1+\rho)^T &= \sum_{h\in J}\tilde{B}^{\theta}_{nh,(t+1)+T}\exp\Big\{\gamma^{\theta}\left[\ln\mathcal{V}^{\theta}_{h,(t+1)+T}-\tau^{\theta}_{nh}\right]\\
&\quad -\ln\sum_{l\in J}\tilde{B}^{\theta}_{nl,(t+1)+T}\exp\left(\gamma^{\theta}\left[\ln\mathcal{V}^{\theta}_{h,(t+1)+T}-\tau^{\theta}_{nl}\right]\right)\Big\}\\
&\quad * \frac{1}{(1+\rho)\gamma^{\theta}}\ln\sum_{l\in J}\tilde{B}^{\theta}_{nl,(t+1)+T}\exp\left(\gamma^{\theta}\left[\ln\mathcal{V}^{\theta}_{l,(t+1)+T}-\tau^{\theta}_{nl}\right]\right)\\
&= \frac{\sum_{h\in J}B^{\theta}_{nh,(t+1)+T}\exp\left\{\gamma^{\theta}\left[\ln\mathcal{V}^{\theta}_{h,(t+1)+T}-\tau^{\theta}_{nh}\right]\right\}}{\sum_{l\in J}B^{\theta}_{nl,(t+1)+T}\exp\left\{\gamma^{\theta}\left[\ln\mathcal{V}^{\theta}_{l,(t+1)+T}-\tau^{\theta}_{nl}\right]\right\}}\\
&\quad * \frac{1}{(1+\rho)\gamma^{\theta}}\ln\sum_{l\in J}\tilde{B}^{\theta}_{nl,(t+1)+T}\exp\left(\gamma^{\theta}\left[\ln\mathcal{V}^{\theta}_{l,(t+1)+T}-\tau^{\theta}_{nl}\right]\right)\\
&= \frac{1}{(1+\rho)\gamma^{\theta}}\ln\sum_{l\in J}\tilde{B}^{\theta}_{nl,(t+1)+T}\exp\left(\ln\mathcal{V}^{\theta}_{l,(t+1)+T}-\tau^{\theta}_{nl}\right)^{\gamma^{\theta}}\\
&= \frac{1}{1+\rho}\ln\Big[\sum_{l\in J}\Big\{\exp\left(-\tau^{\theta}_{nl}\right)B^{\theta}_{nl,(t+1)+T}\mathcal{V}^{\theta}_{l,(t+1)+T}\Big\}^{\gamma^{\theta}}\Big]^{\frac{1}{\gamma^{\theta}}}
\end{aligned}
$$

where we denote as $\mathcal{O}^{\theta}_{n,(t+1)+T}=\frac{1}{1+\rho}\ln\Big[\sum_{l\in J}\Big\{\exp\left(-\tau^{\theta}_{nl}\right)B^{\theta}_{nl,(t+1)+T}\mathcal{V}^{\theta}_{l,(t+1)+T}\Big\}^{\gamma^{\theta}}\Big]^{\frac{1}{\gamma^{\theta}}}$ the migration option for region $n\in J$ and with $\ln\mathcal{V}^{\theta}_{l,(t+1)+T}$ as defined above.

When deciding on a migration destination at time period $t+T$ all workers incorporate

expectations about future amenity shocks and time paths of wages, prices and amenities in their decisions as well as their (discounted) migration option values. The expected utility of workers of type θ and who were living in region o one period before is then given as

$$E\left[v^{\theta}_{o,t+T}(\omega)\right](1+\rho)^{T-1} \equiv E\left[\max_{n\in J}\left(\frac{1}{1+\rho}\right)\left[a^{\theta}_{on,t+T}(\omega) - \tau^{\theta}_{on} + \ln \mathcal{V}^{\theta}_{n,t+T}\right]\right],$$

with $\ln \mathcal{V}^{\theta}_{n,t+T} \equiv \ln\left[\frac{(1-\iota)w^{\theta}_{n,t+T}A^{\theta}_{n,t+T}}{p^{1-\alpha}_{n,t+T}}\right] + \mathcal{O}^{\theta}_{n,(t+1)+T}$.

With a proof similar to the one above (and a slight change in notation) it is straightforward to show that

$$E\left[v^{\theta}_{o,t+T}(\omega)\right](1+\rho)^{T-1} = \frac{1}{1+\rho}\ln\Big[\sum_{m\in J}\Big\{\exp\left(-\tau^{\theta}_{om}\right)B^{\theta}_{om,t+T}\mathcal{V}^{\theta}_{m,t+T}\Big\}^{\gamma^{\theta}}\Big]^{\frac{1}{\gamma^{\theta}}}.$$

By backwards induction we thus obtain expected worker utility at time period t, as a function of wages, prices and amenities at the destination as well as migration option values

$$\ln \mathcal{U}^{\theta}_{i|k,t} = E\left[v^{\theta}_{i|k,t}(\omega)\right] + \frac{1}{1+\rho}\left[E\left(v^{\theta}_{j|i,t+1}(\omega)\right) + \mathcal{O}^{\theta}_{j,t+2}\right] \tag{25}$$

$$\text{and} \quad \mathcal{O}^{\theta}_{j,t+2} = \frac{1}{1+\rho}\ln\Big[\sum_{m\in J}\Big(\exp\Big\{E\left[v^{\theta}_{m|j,t+2}(\omega)\right] + \mathcal{O}^{\theta}_{m,t+3}\left[\mathcal{O}^{\theta}_{l,t+4}...\mathcal{O}^{\theta}_{n,(t+1)+T}\right]\Big\}\Big)^{\gamma^{\theta}}\Big]^{\frac{1}{\gamma^{\theta}}}.$$

J.3.4 Conditional migration probability

Let $\ln \mathcal{V}^{\theta}_{j,t+1} \equiv \ln\left[\frac{(1-\iota)w^{\theta}_{j,t+1}A^{\theta}_{j,t+1}}{p^{1-\alpha}_{j,t+1}}\right] + \mathcal{O}^{\theta}_{j,t+2}$ be the discounted life-time utility at destination j starting from time period $t+1$ onward. This allows to derive the share of workers $\chi^{\theta}_{ij|i,t}$ who are located in region i and for whom region j offers the highest life-time utility among alternatives $n \in J$ when incorporating forward-looking expectations:

$$\begin{aligned}\chi^{\theta}_{ij|i,t} &= Pr\left\{-\tau^{\theta}_{ij} + \tau^{\theta}_{in} + \ln\frac{\mathcal{V}^{\theta}_{j,t+1}}{\mathcal{V}^{\theta}_{n,t+1}} + a^{\theta}_{ij,t+1}(\omega) \geq a^{\theta}_{in,t+1}(\omega)\ \forall\ \ n \in J\right\} \\ &= \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} f\left(a^{\theta}_{ij,t+1}(\omega)\right)\prod_{n\neq j} F\left[\Omega^{\theta}_{ijn,t+1} + a^{\theta}_{ij,t+1}(\omega)\right] da^{\theta}_{ij,t+1}(\omega),\end{aligned}$$

where we define the compound parameter $\Omega^{\theta}_{ijn,t+1} \equiv -\tau^{\theta}_{ij} + \tau^{\theta}_{in} + \ln\frac{\mathcal{V}^{\theta}_{j,t+1}}{\mathcal{V}^{\theta}_{n,t+1}}$. Substituting the cumulative distribution and density function we get:

$$\begin{aligned}\chi^{\theta}_{ij|i,t} = &\int_{-\infty}^{\infty}\gamma^{\theta}\tilde{B}^{\theta}_{ij,t+1}\exp\left(-\gamma^{\theta}a^{\theta}_{ij,t+1}(\omega) - \Gamma - \tilde{B}^{\theta}_{ij,t+1}\exp\{-\left[\gamma^{\theta}a^{\theta}_{ij,t+1}(\omega) + \Gamma\right]\}\right)* \\ &\prod_{n\neq j}\exp\left(-\tilde{B}^{\theta}_{in,t+1}\exp\{-\gamma^{\theta}\Omega^{\theta}_{ijn,t+1} - \gamma^{\theta}a^{\theta}_{ij,t+1}(\omega) - \Gamma\}\right)da^{\theta}_{ij,t+1}(\omega)\end{aligned}$$

$$\chi^{\theta}_{ij|i,t} = \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} \gamma^{\theta} \tilde{B}^{\theta}_{ij,t+1} \exp\left(-\gamma^{\theta} a^{\theta}_{ij,t+1}(\omega) - \Gamma\right) *$$
$$\exp\left(-\sum_{n\in J} \tilde{B}^{\theta}_{in,t+1} \exp\left[-\gamma^{\theta}\Omega^{\theta}_{ijn,t+1} - \gamma^{\theta} a^{\theta}_{ij,t+1}(\omega) - \Gamma\right]\right) da^{\theta}_{ij,t+1}(\omega)$$

To solve this integral we re-define variables. In particular, we define the following variables:

$$x_{t+1} \equiv \gamma^{\theta} a^{\theta}_{ij,t+1}(\omega) + \Gamma$$
$$\lambda_{t+1} \equiv \ln \sum_{n\in J} \tilde{B}^{\theta}_{in,t+1} \exp\left(-\gamma^{\theta}\Omega^{\theta}_{ijn,t+1}\right)$$
$$y_{t+1} = x_{t+1} - \lambda_{t+1}$$

Substituting in the re-defined variables delivers

$$\begin{aligned}
\chi^{\theta}_{ij|i,t} &= \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} \gamma^{\theta} \tilde{B}^{\theta}_{ij,t+1} \exp\left(-x_{t+1}\right) \exp\left\{-\exp\left(\lambda_{t+1}\right)\exp\left(-x_{t+1}\right)\right\} \frac{1}{\gamma^{\theta}} dx_{t+1} \\
&= \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} \tilde{B}^{\theta}_{ij,t+1} \exp\left(-y_{t+1} - \lambda_{t+1}\right) \exp\left\{-\exp\left(\lambda_{t+1}\right)\exp\left(-y_{t+1} - \lambda_{t+1}\right)\right\} dy_{t+1} \\
&= \tilde{B}^{\theta}_{ij,t+1} \exp\left(-\lambda_{t+1}\right) \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} \exp\left(-y_{t+1} - \exp\left(-y_{t+1}\right)\right) dy_{t+1}
\end{aligned}$$

Then note that the derivative of $\exp\left(-\exp\left(-y_{t+1}\right)\right)$ is $\exp\left(-y_{t+1} - \exp\left(-y_{t+1}\right)\right)$, such that we can evaluate the integral at its boundaries:

$$\chi^{\theta}_{ij|i,t} = \tilde{B}^{\theta}_{ij,t+1} \exp\left(-\lambda_{t+1}\right) * \Big[\exp\left(-\exp\left(-y_{t+1}\right)\right)\Big]_{-\infty}^{\infty} = \tilde{B}^{\theta}_{ij,t+1} \exp\left(-\lambda_{t+1}\right)$$

Re-substituting for λ_{t+1} and $\Omega^{\theta}_{ijn,t+1}$, we derive the probability of workers of type θ to migrate from region i to region j between time periods t and $t+1$ as

$$\begin{aligned}
\chi^{\theta}_{ij|i,t} &= \frac{\tilde{B}^{\theta}_{ij,t+1}}{\sum_{n\in J} \tilde{B}^{\theta}_{in,t+1} \exp\left(-\gamma^{\theta}\Omega^{\theta}_{ijn,t+1}\right)} \\
&= \frac{\tilde{B}^{\theta}_{ij,t+1}}{\sum_{n\in J} \tilde{B}^{\theta}_{in,t+1} \left[\exp\left(-\tau^{\theta}_{ij} + \tau^{\theta}_{in} + \left[\ln \frac{\mathcal{V}^{\theta}_{j,t+1}}{\mathcal{V}^{\theta}_{n,t+1}}\right]\right)\right]^{-\gamma^{\theta}}}.
\end{aligned}$$

The share of workers of type θ who migrate from region i to region j is increasing in utility at j, the migration option value and bilateral amenities, but decreasing in bilateral migration costs:

$$\chi^{\theta}_{ij|i,t} = \frac{\left(m^{\theta}_{ij} B^{\theta}_{ij,t+1} \mathcal{V}^{\theta}_{j,t+1}\right)^{\gamma^{\theta}}}{\sum_{n\in J} \left(m^{\theta}_{in} B^{\theta}_{in,t+1} \mathcal{V}^{\theta}_{n,t+1}\right)^{\gamma^{\theta}}}, \tag{26}$$

where $\mathcal{V}^{\theta}_{j,t+1} = \exp\left[\ln\left(\frac{(1-\iota)w^{\theta}_{j,t+1}A^{\theta}_{j,t+1}}{p^{1-\alpha}_{j,t+1}}\right) + \mathcal{O}^{\theta}_{j,t+2}\right]$ and $m^{\theta}_{ij} = \exp\left[-\tau^{\theta}_{ij}\right]$.

J.3.5 Expected utilities and sequential moves

In what follows, we derive expected worker utility and migration probabilities under differing worker expectations. We refer to the correct anticipation of future prices as *perfect foresight* and to anticipated future moves subsequent to an initial migration decision as *sequential moves*. We treat regimes with with restrictive assumptions as special cases of a general case in which workers are fully informed. Concretely, we consider the following four cases: The general case with perfect foresight and an arbitrary number of sequential moves ($S \geq 2$); the special case with perfect foresight and exactly one sequential move ($S \geq 1$); perfect foresight and no sequential moves ($S = 0$); static expectations with no sequential moves. For a detailed discussion of the assumptions underlying each of the four cases and a case-by-case comparison of results we refer the interested reader to Section N.

General case with perfect foresight and several sequential moves (S $\geq$ 2). In the general case, workers anticipate to migrate at least $(S+1) \geq 3$ times over their employment history. When comparing life-time utility at destinations $j \in J$, workers correctly anticipate the whole time path of wages and prices in all regions and build sophisticated expectations about future bilateral amenity shocks. Note that the migration option value in Eq. (26) entails two components: the value of being able to move to any high-utility region $m \in J$ following stochastic amenity shocks one period forward as well as their migration option values, that is the migration option value $\mathcal{O}^{\theta}_{j,t+2}$ will itself be a function of the option values in time period $t+3$. Furthermore under the assumption of perfect foresight the option value $\mathcal{O}^{\theta}_{m,t+3}\left[\mathcal{O}^{\theta}_{l,t+4} \dots \mathcal{O}^{\theta}_{n,(t+1)+T}\right]$ in turn necessarily depends on the whole forward time path of migration option values and is given as

$$\mathcal{O}^{\theta}_{j,t+2} = \frac{1}{1+\rho}\ln\left[\sum_{m\in J}\left(\exp\left\{E\left[v^{\theta}_{m|j,t+2}(\omega)\right] + \mathcal{O}^{\theta}_{m,(t+3)}\left[\mathcal{O}^{\theta}_{l,(t+4)}\dots\mathcal{O}^{\theta}_{n,(t+1)+T}\right]\right\}\right)^{\gamma^{\theta}}\right]^{\frac{1}{\gamma^{\theta}}}.$$

Special case with perfect foresight and one sequential move (S=1). In this special case we assume that workers expect to relocate from their destination $j \in J$ only once. Under this assumption the migration option value in $t+2$ will only depend on the ease at which the discounted time path of wages, prices and amenities in all regions can be accessed from $j \in J$, but not on the forward time path of migration option values. The migration option value in expected worker utility Eq. (25) and migration probabilities in Eq. (26) then simplifies to

$$\mathcal{O}^{\theta}_{j,t+2} = \frac{1}{1+\rho}\ln\left[\sum_{m\in J}\left(\exp\left(-\tau^{\theta}_{jm}\right)B^{\theta}_{jm,t+2}\mathcal{V}^{\theta}_{m,t+2}\right)^{\gamma^{\theta}}\right]^{\frac{1}{\gamma^{\theta}}}$$

$$\text{with}\quad \ln\mathcal{V}^{\theta}_{m,t+2} \equiv \frac{\ln A^{\theta}_{m,t+2}}{\rho} + \frac{E(a^{\theta}_{mm,t+3}(\omega))}{\rho(1+\rho)} + \sum_{s=t+2}^{\infty}\left(\frac{1}{1+\rho}\right)^{s-((t+2)}\ln\left(\frac{(1-\iota)w^{\theta}_{m,s}}{p^{1-\alpha}_{m,s}}\right).$$

As discussed in detail in Section N.2, quantifying the model under the assumption of an arbitrary number of sequential moves creates a dimensionality problem. Guided by the empirical observation that almost 90% of workers switch local labour markets at most twice over their employment history, we solve and quantify the model for this special case of one sequential move.

Special case with perfect foresight and no sequential move (S=0). In this special case we assume that workers do not expect to relocate from their destination $j \in J$. We can therefore set $\mathcal{O}^{\theta}_{j,t+2} = 0$ in Eqs. (25) and (26), such that workers only incorporate the infinite time paths of wages, prices and amenities in j when making their migration decisions. The formulation of expected worker utility and migration probabilities then simplifies further to

$$\ln \mathcal{U}^{\theta}_{i|k,t} = E\left[v^{\theta}_{i|k,t}(\omega)\right] + \frac{1}{1+\rho} \ln\left[\exp\left(-\tau^{\theta}_{ij}\right) B^{\theta}_{ij,t+1} \mathcal{V}^{\theta}_{j,t+1}\right],$$

$$\text{and} \quad \ln \mathcal{V}^{\theta}_{j,t+1} \equiv \frac{\ln A^{\theta}_{j,t+1}}{\rho} + \frac{E(a^{\theta}_{jj,t+2}(\omega))}{\rho(1+\rho)} + \sum_{s=t+1}^{\infty} \left(\frac{1}{1+\rho}\right)^{s-((t+1)} \ln\left(\frac{(1-\iota) w^{\theta}_{j,s}}{p^{1-\alpha}_{j,s}}\right).$$

Special case with static expectations and no sequential move (S=0) In this last special case we assume that workers have *static expectations*, that is they extrapolate the current realization of wages and prices into the future. Under the assumption of an infinite time horizon and constant real wages as well as amenities, this special scenario yields the simplest formulation of expected worker utility and migration probabilities:

$$\ln \mathcal{U}^{\theta}_{i|k,t} = E\left[v^{\theta}_{i|k,t}(\omega)\right] + \frac{1}{1+\rho} \ln\left[\exp\left(-\tau^{\theta}_{ij}\right) B^{\theta}_{ij,t+1} \mathcal{V}^{\theta}_{j,t+1}\right]$$

$$\text{and} \quad \ln \mathcal{V}^{\theta}_{j,t+1} \equiv \frac{1}{\rho}\left(\ln \frac{(1-\iota) w^{\theta}_{j,s} A^{\theta}_{j,t+1}}{p^{1-\alpha}_{j,s}} + \frac{E(a^{\theta}_{jj,t+2}(\omega))}{1+\rho}\right).$$

J.4 Uniqueness

This appendix section complements Section C.4 in the main paper and provides a discussion of equilibrium properties.

Our model features a direct mapping from group-region employment to local wages and rents conditional on structural parameters according to Eqs. (6) and (8). Further, applying the condition that adding one worker to a location raises expenditure more than income ensures mean reversion of the model and all locations will be populated. With respect to income, an immigrating worker exerts a positive production externality on a θ-type worker in the destination region measured by the elasticity κ^{θ} according to Eq. (6). Individual expenditure changes due to responses in housing rents. Combining demand and supply effects and building

on Appendix J.1, we obtain

$$(1-\alpha)\frac{\partial p_{i,t}}{\partial L^{\theta}_{i,t}} = (1-\alpha)\beta p_{i,t}\left[\sum_{\theta}\frac{L^{\theta}_{i,t}}{\bar{T}_i}\psi^{\theta}_{i,t}\left(\frac{L_{i,t}}{\bar{T}_i}\right)^{\kappa^{\theta}}\right]^{-1}\frac{L^{\theta}_{i,t}}{\bar{T}_i}\psi^{\theta}_{i,t}\left(\frac{L_{i,t}}{\bar{T}_i}\right)^{\kappa^{\theta}}\left[\frac{1}{L^{\theta}_{i,t}}+\frac{\kappa^{\theta}}{L_{i,t}}\right].$$

For the SSE to hold, Eq. (14) has to be satisfied for all region-group pairs. Conditional on primitives and given the mean-reversion tendency of the model, we find in Monte Carlo simulations that there is a unique employment vector to which the economy converges in the long run. Figure A2 illustrates this insight.

Figure A2: Monte-Carlo simulation - SSE employment



Note: The figure summarises the outcome from 250 Monte Carlo experiments. In each experiment, we hold all primitives constant and use random values of $L^{\theta}_{i,t}$ drawn from a uniform distribution under the constraint $\sum_i L^{\theta}_{i,t} = \bar{L}^{\theta}_t$ to generate a TSE from which we solve for the SSE using the dynamic solver discussed in Sections D.3 and K.3. The histogram illustrates the variation in SSE employment across Monte Carlo experiments within $J \times \Theta = 2,538$ region-groups. The variation is essentially zero, implying that the solver has converged to the same employment values that reference a SSE in all experiments.

J.5 Quality-of-life premiums

In this section, we derive the migration and housing equilibrium loci displayed in Figure 2 in Section C.7 from the structure of our model. Intuitively, the housing equilibrium locus in the real living cost-employment space is a collection of points that satisfy all housing-market-related conditions that must hold in the TSE (and the SSE). Likewise, the migration equilibrium locus satisfies all migration-related conditions that must hold in the SSE. The intersection of both loci is the only point where all equilibrium conditions of the SSE are satisfied and, hence, we can use it to quantify the model and derive QoL premiums.

Housing equilibrium. Inelastically supplied land implies that the cost of supplying housing increases in the regional housing provision. Profit maximisation by developers, perfect competition, and housing market clearing give Eq. (8), which we can rearrange to represent how real

living costs are related to housing demand and exogenous housing productivity in equilibrium (housing markets clear in the TSE and the SSE):

$$\ln\left(\frac{p_{i,t}^{1-\alpha}}{w_{i,t}^{\theta}}\right) = (1-\alpha)\,\beta\left(\ln\left[\beta\,(1-\alpha)\,(1-\iota)\,X_{i,t}\right] - \frac{1}{\beta}\ln\left(\eta_{i,t}\right) - \ln\left(\bar{T}_i\right)\right) - \ln\left(w_{i,t}^{\theta}\right).$$

Regional output is the sum over the wage bill of all groups $X_{i,t} = \sum_{\theta} w_{i,t}^{\theta} L_{i,t}^{\theta}$. Wages $w_{i,t}^{\theta}$ are a function of employment $L_{i,t}^{\theta}$, exogenous labour productivity $\psi_{i,t}^{\theta}$ and exogenous land $\bar{T}_i$ as defined in Eq. (6). Therefore, there is a one-to-one mapping from employment to real living cost under the parametrisation discussed in Section D. For the illustration in Figure 2, we use the structural fundamentals inverted for the city of Essen and the parameters estimated for the group of middle-aged, middle-skilled, male workers to derive the housing equilibrium locus HH_1. To obtain the housing equilibrium locus HH_2, we increase housing productivity $\eta_{i,t}$ by 70%.

Since we are already in the real living cost-employment space, it is straightforward to derive the total differential with respect to (log) employment.

$$d\ln\left(p_{i,t}^{1-\alpha}/w_{i,t}^{\theta}\right) = \sum_{\theta}\left[\frac{(1-\alpha)\,\beta w_{i,t}^{\theta} L_{i,t}^{\theta}}{\sum_{\theta} w_{i,t}^{\theta} L_{i,t}^{\theta}}\left(1+\frac{\kappa^{\theta} L_{i,t}^{\theta}}{\sum_{\theta} L_{i,t}^{\theta}}\right) - \frac{\kappa^{\theta} L_{i,t}^{\theta}}{\sum_{\theta} L_{i,t}^{\theta}}\right] d\ln L_{i,t}^{\theta},$$

where $d\ln L_{i,t}^{\theta}$ denotes the change in group-specific (log) employment $\ln L_{i,t}^{\theta}$. For the special case of $\Theta = 1$ (one worker group), the elasticity of real living costs with respect to employment (the slope of the housing equilibrium locus) simplifies to

$$\frac{d\ln\left(p_{i,t}^{1-\alpha}/w_{i,t}\right)}{d\ln L_{i,t}} = (1-\alpha)\,\beta(1+\kappa) - \kappa.$$

In keeping with intuition, real living costs increase faster in city size the larger the land share β (and hence, the smaller the housing supply elasticity) and the smaller the agglomeration elasticity κ.

Migration equilibrium. The supply of labour $L_{i,t}^{\theta}$ of group θ in city i in period t is the sum over the products of the inbound migration probabilities $\chi_{ji|j,t-1}^{\theta}$ and employment $L_{j,t-1}^{\theta}$ across all migration origins j ($\sum_j \chi_{ji|j,t-1}^{\theta} L_{j,t-1}^{\theta}$) according to Eq. (12).

Intuitively, higher real living costs make a location less attractive as a migration destination, ceteris paribus. In the SSE, migration markets clear in the sense that the region-group employment is stationary. As a result, the prices of labour and housing are also stationary.

To derive the migration equilibrium locus LL_1 in Figure 2, we again use the structural fundamentals inverted for the city of Essen and the parameters estimated for the group of middle-aged, middle-skilled, male workers. We then take a numerical approach and compute LL_1 under varying living costs. To obtain LL_2, we repeat the exercises, increasing the QoL shifter $A_{i,t}^{\theta}$ by 60%.

Since the SSE assumption simplifies the expected wage and rent vectors to an infinite projection of the stationary realisations in t, we can derive an analytical solution for the slope for the migration equilibrium locus when furthermore abstracting from the migration option values. Starting from labour supply defined by Eq. (12), we take logs, and then differentiate with respect to the log of real living costs $\frac{d\ln L^{\theta}_{i,t}}{d\ln(p_i^{(1-\alpha)}/w^{\theta}_{i,t})}$. The inverse of this derivative gives the elasticity of real living cost to employment:

$$\frac{d\ln\left(p_{i,t}^{1-\alpha}/w^{\theta}_{i,t}\right)}{d\ln L^{\theta}_{i,t}} = \frac{\rho}{\gamma^{\theta}}\frac{\ln\left(p_{i,t}^{1-\alpha}/w^{\theta}_{i,t}\right)}{\left(1-\chi^{\theta}_{ii|i,t-1}\right)}\frac{\sum_{j\in J}\chi^{\theta}_{ji|j,t-1}L^{\theta}_{j,t-1}}{\chi^{\theta}_{ii|i,t-1}L^{\theta}_{i,t-1}} < 0.$$

Hence, the migration equilibrium locus establishes a negative relationship between real living cost and city employment, which is intuitive given that the inbound migration probabilities $\chi^{\theta}_{ji|,t-1}$ are positively related to the real wage at i via the migration gravity Eq. (10).

The elasticity of real living cost to employment is governed by the variance of idiosyncratic amenities that captures worker heterogeneity. Intuitively, greater worker heterogeneity implies a lower aggregate migration response to real living cost differentials as economic migration incentives will dominate idiosyncratic factors for fewer workers. In the limit $\gamma^{\theta} \to 0$, labour supply becomes perfectly inelastic (a vertical migration equilibrium locus). If workers are homogeneous $\left(\gamma^{\theta} \to \infty\right)$, marginal differences in real living costs trigger large frictionless migration adjustments, resulting in a horizontal migration equilibrium locus.

K Quantification appendix

K.1 Data

This section complements Section D.1 in the main paper. To estimate the crucial structural parameters and invert the structural fundamentals, we require four sets of data compiled for consistent spatial units: Employment, wages, floor space prices, and bilateral migration. In addition, we collect data on determinants of migration costs as well as various location characteristics for overidentification tests and policy simulations. A detailed description of our data is below.

K.1.1 Spatial unit

As an empirical correspondent to locations indexed by i in the model we choose the 141 German labour market regions defined by **?**. The delineation of these areas is based on combining one or more administrative regions at the county level with the aim of creating self-contained labour markets. The boundary of local labour markets are defined such that commuting within labour market regions is relatively large compared to commuting between regions (subject to an upper limit on commuting time of 45-60 minutes).

K.1.2 Employment

Our measure of employment $L^{\theta}_{i,t}$ is constructed from the Employment History (BeH) covering the years 1993-2018.[14] This dataset is provided by the Institute of Employment Research (IAB) and contains information on the universe of employees in Germany (with the exception of civil servants and the self-employed) on a daily basis. We only select those workers who are employed subject to social security contributions (including apprentices) and who are aged between 16 and 65 years.[15]

Based on this selection we compute the number of employees in each year and labour market region. In addition, we compute region-year-specific employment levels for different groups which are defined according to the interactions between sex, three skill categories (no apprenticeship, completed apprenticeship and tertiary education) and three age categories (16-30 years, 31-50 years and 51-65 years).[16] Employment size varies considerably between labour market regions. While the average number of employees stands at 201,000 in the year 2017, values range from 17,000 in the labour market region *Vulkaneifel* to 1.4 million in *Berlin*.

[14] We use version 10.04.00-190819.

[15] We extract all relevant information from the employment record that contains 30 June of a given year. If a person has multiple employment records, we select according to 1) the average daily wage, 2) the duration of the employment record, 3) at random.

[16] Individuals are assigned the highest qualification level that they achieve over the course of their working life. Consequently, while a person's age changes over time, sex and skill are time-invariant. The educational qualification variable has been processed based on Imputation Procedure 1 described in Fitzenberger et al. (2006).

K.1.3 Migration

We assign workers to labour market regions using their place of employment as reported in the BeH. Bilateral group-specific migration flows are then constructed by computing the number of workers belonging to group θ who used to be employed in region i in year t but who are working in region j in year $t+1$ for every pair of origin region i and destination region j. Based on these bilateral flows we construct group-specific migration probabilities $\chi^{\theta}_{ij,t}$ that are defined as the ratio of the flows from i to j over the level of employment in origin region i in year t. Since labour market regions are designed with the aim of reflecting commuting patterns in a region, we propose that a change in the place of employment across labour market regions is likely to go along with a change of residence.[17]

There are gaps in a worker's employment record in our data, for example if a person was in a different form of employment that is not subject to social security contributions, unemployed or had withdrawn from the labour market. We close such gaps by creating artificial records that duplicate the last available employment record and, in particular, the place of employment. In doing so, we implicitly assume that a person remains in the same labour market region until they find a new regular job in another region, which will be recorded in our data.[18]

K.1.4 Productivity

We use information from the BeH on the universe of workers who are observed as employed subject to social security (including apprentices) on June 30 during the 1993-2018 time period to estimate the group-region-year-specific productivity which maps into the wage. In line with the standard approach in the agglomeration literature (**?**), we assume in Eq. (5) that worker productivity $\varphi^{\theta}_{i,t}(\omega)$ is a multiplicative function of a group-region-year component $\varphi^{\theta}_{i,t}$ and an individual component $\delta^{\theta}_{i,t}(\omega)$. Following the conventions in labour economics (Abowd et al., 1999), we define $\delta^{\theta}_{i,t}(\omega) = \exp(\bar{\delta}_{\omega} S^{L}_{i,t} z^{L} f^{L,\theta}_{i,\omega,t})$ as a function of unobserved time-invariant individual productivity $\bar{\delta}_{\omega}$ (we use ω as a subscript to index workers), observable worker characteristics $S^{L}_{\omega,t}$ (dummies for whether a worker is in an apprenticeship or works part-time, with z^{L} being the marginal effects) and a stochastic residual term $f^{L,\theta}_{i,\omega,t}$. Log-linearisation and setting individual productivity equal to the nominal wage $\varphi^{\theta}_{i,t}(\omega) = w^{\theta}_{i,\omega,t}$ as predicted under perfect competition (see Section C.2) then gives the estimation equation:

$$\ln w^{\theta}_{i,\omega,t} = \bar{\delta}_{\omega} + S^{L}_{i,t} z^{L} + \tilde{\varphi}^{\theta}_{i,t} + f^{L,\theta}_{i,\omega,t}. \tag{27}$$

In estimating Eq. (27), we remove all observations of individuals who never change their place of employment and estimate the model separately by gender-skill groups for computa-

[17] This assumption is backed up by a considerable degree of overlap between the place of employment and the place of residence. For the year 2017, we find that approximately 75% of employees who work in a specific labour market region also live there. Moreover, use of the place of residence would reduce the available data as this information is only available from 1999 onward.

[18] Notice that this procedure is only used for the computation of migration flows. Estimation of individual-level productivity is therefore unaffected. Approximately 19% of the employment records in the data set are constructed in this way.

tional efficiency. Table A2 shows the results of estimating Eq. (27) for each of the six sex-skill groups. As expected, part-time workers and apprentices have lower expected daily wages. In both cases the wage discount is larger for males than for females and it increases in magnitude with the skill level. Moreover, wages are lower on average in periods when the worker has not yet reached the highest skill level. Given the skill group, male regular full-time workers who have reached their highest skill level have higher wages than females. Likewise, within sex groups the expected wage of regular full-time workers at their highest skill level increases with skill.

Table A2: Estimation of group-region-year productivity

	(1) Female No appren-ticeship	(2) Female Appren-ticeship	(3) Female Tertiary	(4) Male No appren-ticeship	(5) Male Appren-ticeship	(6) Male Tertiary
Part-time	-0.331***	-0.351***	-0.441***	-0.437***	-0.455***	-0.559***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Apprentice	-0.798***	-0.854***	-0.953***	-0.933***	-1.017***	-1.039***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Below highest skill	-	-0.162***	-0.167***	-	-0.111***	-0.149***
	(.)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(.)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Constant	3.886***	4.143***	4.415***	4.158***	4.367***	4.689***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Worker effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Group-region-year effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	3,690,790	71,274,252	21,087,352	5,427,142	107,566,946	36,3674,105
R^2	.777	.763	.752	.805	.831	.830

Notes: Units of observation are individual-level employment records. The dependent variable is the log average daily wage. $^{+}$ $p < 0.15$, * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

We recover $\hat{\tilde{\varphi}}^{\theta}_{i,t}$ as a log index of group-region-year-specific productivity which we re-scale such that the group-averages match the group-specific log annual earnings in the raw wage data. We remove a common national trend by running an auxiliary regression of $\hat{\tilde{\varphi}}^{\theta}_{i,t}$ against region and year effects and subtracting the latter (using 2017 as the reference category). Exponentiating the regression-adjusted $\hat{\tilde{\varphi}}^{\theta}_{i,t}$, we obtain our final region-group-year-specific productivity index $\varphi^{\theta}_{i,t}$.

In Table A3, we test for systematic differences in $\ln \varphi^{\theta}_{i,t}$ across age, gender, and skill groups. Results are shown separately for the period 2007-17, which is used in the empirical analysis (as information on housing prices is only available for those years) as well as for the full period, 1993-2018. Ceteris paribus, female worker productivity is 27% (=(exp(-0.315)-1)*100%) lower than male productivity, with no discernible difference between the two time periods. Workers with an apprenticeship have a predicted productivity that is approximately 45% (=(exp(0.371)-1)*100%) higher than among workers without an apprenticeship, while it is almost twice as high for workers with tertiary education. Whereas the difference in productivities between workers with and without an apprenticeship are almost identical in both time periods, it has increased for university-educated workers. Expected productivity increases with age. It is is 46% (=(exp(0.380)-1)*100%) higher among the age group 31-50 and 64% (=(exp(0.495)-

1)*100%) among the age group 51-65 compared to the youngest age group. Compared to the full time period, it appears that the age gradient has become smaller.

Table A3: Productivity differences

	(1) 2007-17	(2) 1993-2018
Female	-0.315***	-0.315***
	(0.00)	(0.00)
31-50 years	0.380***	0.472***
	(0.00)	(0.00)
51-65 years	0.495***	0.624***
	(0.00)	(0.00)
Apprenticeship	0.371***	0.373***
	(0.00)	(0.00)
Tertiary education	0.707***	0.667***
	(0.00)	(0.00)
Constant	9.878***	9.817***
	(0.00)	(0.00)
Region effects	Yes	Yes
Year effects	Yes	Yes
Observations	27,918	65,988
R^2	.916	.898

Notes: Units of observation are group-region-year cells. The dependent variable is a group-region-year-specific log productivity measure that is derived as a fixed effect from an individual-level regression of log daily wages that also controls for individual fixed effects. $^{+}$ $p < 0.15$, * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

K.1.5 Housing costs

To compute mix-adjusted indices of purchase prices for a panel of labour market area-year observations, we use the "Real-Estate Data for Germany (RWI-GEO-RED)" micro data discussed in detail by Boelmann and Schaffner (2019). The data originally come from the internet platform ImmobilienScout24 and have been processed and made available for scientific research by the FDZ (Forschungsdatenzentrum) Ruhr. It covers apartments and houses for sale from 2007 to 2017. ImmobilienScout24 is the leading online platform for real estate listings, with a self-reported market share of about 50% (Georgi and Barkow, 2010).

In line with standard practice in urban economics, we model the cost of housing as a rental price whereas in our data we observe purchase prices. Following conventions, we assume that property markets are competitive and investors and owner-occupiers apply a 0.035 discount rate to future streams of actual or imputed rents over an infinite horizon (Koster and Pinchbeck, 2021). Our empirical measure of rent then is $p_{i,t} = 0.035P_{i,t}$, where $P_{i,t}$ is a location-time-specific house price index following Combes et al. (2019), who in turn build on a long tradition

of urban gradient regressions going back to Clark (1951):

$$\ln P_{s,i,t} = \ln D^P_{s,i} u_i + \tilde{S}^P_{s,i,t} z^P_i + \tilde{P}_{i,t} + f^P_{s,i,t}, \tag{28}$$

where $\ln P_{s,i,t}$ is the log of price per square meter floor area of property s, $\ln D^P_{s,i}$ is the distance from the geographic centroid of the municipality with the largest employment in a labour market area, u_i are the destination-specific gradients, $\tilde{S}_{s,t} = S_{s,t} - \bar{S}$ is a vector of property characteristics $S_{s,t}$ net of the national average $\bar{S}$, z^P_i is a vector of destination-specific implicit prices, $\tilde{P}_{i,t}$ is a location-year fixed effect and $f^P_{s,i,t}$ is an unobserved residual. To remove a common national trend, we run an auxiliary regression of $\tilde{P}_{i,t}$ against region effects and year effects and subtract the latter. From the adjusted location-year fixed effect we infer a property price index $P_{i,t} = e^{\tilde{P}_{i,t}}$, which is mix-adjusted for property characteristics and location and representative for a property with the national average characteristics at the centre of a labour market area. In following Combes et al. (2019), we assume that workers are fully mobile and indifferent between locations within monocentric regions indexed by i. Decreasing prices at greater distances from the regional centre offset one for one increasing within-region transport costs. At any other location within a region, quantifying QoL requires accounting for commuting costs (Albouy and Lue, 2015).

The processed data contain a detailed geo-reference, accurate to the level of 1x1 square kilometer grid cells in the European standard ETRS89-LAEA projection. This makes it straightforward to calculate the straight-line distance from a property to the centre of a labour market area, defined as the geographic centroid of the municipality with the largest employment number. Moreover, the data set contains a wide range of property characteristics. However, the degree of coverage varies significantly, with missing values accounting for the majority of observations for selected variables. We focus on control variables with reasonably wide coverage, which include attributes that are typical in hedonic analyses such as the floor area, the number of rooms, the type of property (house vs. flat), the type of heating system and whether features such a balcony, a garden, or a basement belong to the property. There are a limited number of missing values within these variables. For each variable, we set the missing values to zero and generate an auxiliary indicator variable that identifies all observations with a missing value in the selected variable. The mix-adjusted hedonic index we generate then gives the price of a property with the national average in observable characteristics and the average unobserved characteristics of properties with non-missing values in observables, which is located right at the centre of the labour market area. We report summary statistics of observable characteristics in Table A4. The average property has a floor area of about 140 square meters, approximately five rooms, and a 40-percent chance of being an apartment.

Table A4: House price index: Descriptive statistics

	N	Mean	Stand. dev.	10th pct.	90th pct.
Price per square meter	16,591,919	2,317	225,608	714	3,258
Distance to CBD (in km)	16,591,919	17.45	13.4	2.89	35.98
Living space (in square meter)	16,591,919	141.81	130.13	59	232
Rooms	16,591,919	4.75	2.77	2	8
Type of housing	16,591,919	0.4	0.49	0	1
Balcony	16,591,919	0.28	0.45	0	1
Garden	16,591,919	0.08	0.27	0	0
Basement	16,591,919	0.35	0.48	0	1
Type of heating	16,591,919	7.1	6.14	0	13

Notes: *Type of heating* is a categorical variable between 1 and 13. *Type of housing* is a binary variable with value one for apartments and zero for houses. *Balcony*, *Garden* and *Basement* are also binary variables. Micro data from RWI-Leibniz Institute for Economic Research (Boelmann and Schaffner, 2019).

K.1.6 Price levels of tradable goods

Using consumer price index micro-data provided by the Federal and regional statistical offices, Weinand and Auer (2020) calculate regional price levels separately for goods, services, and the construction sector for all NUTS-3 regions (counties or "Kreise") in Germany. We aggregate their county-level price indices to the level of local labour markets by taking population-weighted averages of counties within the local labour markets defined by **?**.

In Table A5, we report some descriptive statistics of labour-market price indices by goods type. Since Germany is a small, highly integrated country, it is no surprise that the tradable goods price index barely varies in space, with a coefficient of variation below 0.01. While services prices vary slightly more, this variation is mainly driven by non-tradable services (Weinand and Auer, 2020). In contrast, the coefficient of variation in the house price index provided by Weinand and Auer (2020), at 0.141 is orders of magnitudes larger. While as shown in Figure A3, panel b), our house price index is closely correlated with the one provided by Weinand and Auer (2020), the variation in our index is even larger. This is because we measure house prices at the centre of the labour market area to account for spatial variation in commuting costs. In any case, it is fair to conclude that spatial difference in living costs in Germany are not driven by tradable goods prices.

Furthermore, tradable goods prices in Germany are not correlated with our housing price index as highlighted in panel (a) of Figure A3. Hence, even if there was more variation, this would unlikely introduce a bias in the urban QoL premium or the valuation of non-marketed goods that we derive from our inverted QoL measures. This empirical evidence guides our choice of goods prices as the numéraire in our model framework as outlined in Section C.

K.1.7 Migration distance

We first compute the distance between every pair of municipalities in Germany using the delineation that is valid on 31 December 2018. To derive the distance between any two labour market regions, we form the population-weighted geometric mean of the corresponding munic-

Table A5: Price levels: Descriptive statistics

	Mean	Stand. dev.	Coeff. variation
Aggregate price index	97.912	3.239	0.033
Goods prices	100.004	0.893	0.009
Service prices	98.791	3.182	0.032
Housing price	92.640	13.070	0.141
Housing price (Ahlfeldt et al. (2020))	79.931	51.499	0.644

Notes: Where not otherwise indicated, data are from Weinand and Auer (2020). Our (Ahlfeldt et al., 2020) price index is introduced in detail in Section K.1.5.

Figure A3: Price level correlations



(a) Goods and housing prices

(b) Housing prices

Note: Housing rent (ABRS) refers to our measure of mix-adjusted housing costs, which we correlate with the housing rents in cite Weinand Auer (WA). Tradable good price levels are also taken from their paper.

ipal distances. For a cultural distance measure, we use the inverse of the county-based dialect similarity index by Falck et al. (2012), which we aggregate to labour markets regions.

K.1.8 Social media data

Big data amenity. To generate a social media amenity index, we use geotagged photos shared in social media. They originally stem from Eric Fisher's Geotaggers' World Atlas, whose observations are taken from Flickr and Picasa search APIs.[19] We use about 1.5 million photos taken within the boundaries of German labour market regions, most of which are from the early 2010s, roughly in the middle of our core study period (2007-2017). The idea to use geotagged photos to capture the amenity value of locations was originally proposed by Ahlfeldt (2013), with recent applications including Gaigné et al. (2017), Saiz et al. (2018), and Carlino and Saiz (2019).

We follow Ahlfeldt (2013) and assume that there is a photo production function that links

[19] See for details http://www.flickr.com/photos/walkingsf/sets/72157623971287575/).

the amenity value A_i^θ to the number of photos shared on social media:

$$\mathcal{P}_i^\theta = c^{\theta P} A_i^{\theta \zeta^\theta} \prod_n (\mathcal{X}_{i,n}^{b_n^{\theta P}}) \epsilon_i^{\theta P}, \tag{29}$$

where $\mathcal{X}_{i,n}$ is a set of production factors indexed by n to be specified and $\mathcal{P}_i^\theta = \bar{\mathcal{P}}_i \ \forall \ \theta \in \Theta$ with $\bar{\mathcal{P}}_i$ being the total number of photos. As an example, regional employment L_i may be included since more residents may generate more photos at a constant photo propensity. ζ^θ is the amenity elasticity of photo production, which will be positive if social media users share visually appealing content (e.g. distinctive architecture or scenic views) or interesting activities (e.g. hiking tours or restaurant visits) that are related to a location's endowment with amenities. $\epsilon^{\theta P}$ is a residual term and $\{c^{\theta P}, b_n^{\theta P}\}$ are parameters. Under the assumptions made, we retrieve a big data amenity as $\mathcal{D}_i^\theta = \zeta^\theta \ln A_i{}^\theta + \ln \epsilon_i^{\theta P}$ from the following regression:

$$\ln \mathcal{P}_i^\theta = \tilde{c}^{\theta P} + \sum_n (b_n^{\theta P} \ln \mathcal{X}_{i,n}) + \mathcal{D}_i^\theta.$$

The interpretation of the big data amenity naturally depends on the covariates in $\mathcal{X}_{i,n}$. We plot an unconditional version excluding any controls in the left panel of Figure A4. Evidently, large urban labour market regions generate more photos. However, this is not necessarily an amenity effect since we expect more populated areas to generate more photos simply because there are more users. In the right panel, we plot a version where we condition on employment and geographic land area. Now, some regions close to the Baltic Sea in the North and the Alps in the South that are popular holiday destinations are also identified as high-amenity areas. From the large labour markets, only Berlin remains in the top category of amenity value. However, controlling for population not only removes the effect on photo production, but also a potential urban quality-of-life premium. Thus, this conditional version of the social media amenity is best interpreted as capturing amenities such as a favourable geography offering scenic views, or historic buildings, but not a vibrant cultural landscape due to restaurant variety, which are typical for large cities.

Social connectedness. We use the Social Connectedness Index (SCI) to measure the strength of social ties that exist between two regions. The SCI is defined as the ratio between the number of friendship connections that exist between Facebook users of any two regions i and j over the product of Facebook users in each of the two regions:

$$SCI_{ij} = \frac{Connections_{ij}}{Users_i \times Users_j}.$$

The variable is then re-scaled so that it ranges from 1 to $1,000,000,000$. A more detailed discussion of the SCI can be found in (Bailey et al., 2018).

Facebook provides the SCI data at the regional level for a broad range of countries (see Bailey et al. (2020) for an application). Within Europe data are available at the third level of the Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics (NUTS). In Germany, NUTS3 regions

Figure A4: Photo count and big data amenity



(a) Unconditional big data amenity

(b) Conditional big data amenity

Note: Unit of observation is 141 labour market areas as defined by **?**. Conditional big data amenity is the log photo count stripped off the effect of log employment and log geographic area in an auxiliary regression.

correspond to counties, so that the data can be aggregated to the level of the labour market region. We first select all region pairs for which both counties are in Germany. We then proceed to compute a weighted average of the SCI over all county pairs within a pair of labour market regions using the sum of the populations in each county pair as a weight.

K.1.9 Location characteristics

Air pollution. We use the concentration of particulate matter to measure air pollution. According to the German Environment Agency (Umweltbundesamt), particulates with a diameter of less than 10 micrometer (PM^{10}) exhibit a particular health risk. We access raw data at the municipality level from the German Environment Agency for 2019. Since there is a direct mapping from municipalities to the local labour markets defined by Kosfeld and Werner (2012), aggregation of the data is straightforward.

Coal deposits and power plants. To compute the coal exposure measure used in the policy application in Section F, we collect data on the spatial distribution of energy resources, especially brown and black coal, from the Federal Institute for Geosciences and Natural Resources in Germany (www.bgr.bund.de). To explore the mechanisms underlying our identification

strategy for the estimation of pollution effects, we collect the locations of active coal power plants from the Bundesnetzagentur (www.bundesnetzagentur.de, list of power plants from 1 April 2020).

Wind directions. We obtain wind frequencies by 36 directions for all local labour markets from Kasperski (2002), which we use to generate a wind-adjusted coal exposure measure that serves as an instrument for air pollution.

Fundamentals. We compute a comprehensive data set on fundamental first-nature characteristics that potentially affect productivity (e.g. access to navigable rivers), amenity (e.g. climate), and housing TFP (e.g. physical constraints to development).

World War II destruction. We compile a new dataset based on Hohn (1991) documenting the share of living space destroyed during World War II. The data are available for all German cities with more than 2,000 inhabitants in 1939. Combining this information with average destruction rates per state and population weights for each location, we construct the weighted average share of destroyed living space per labour market region.

K.1.10 Summary statistics

Table A6 provides descriptive statistics for the central variables from the year 2017 that are used for the quantification of our model.

K.2 Structural parameters

This section complements Section D.2 in the main paper by formally deriving estimation equations and providing full estimation results. Before we introduce the technical details and full estimation results in the following subsections, we provide an accessible summary of the key parameters of the model in Table A7 and summarise the variation in group-specific parameters by means of regressions against group-dummies in Table A8 for convenience.

K.2.1 Density elasticity of productivity (κ^θ)

Our empirical approach to the identification of exogenous and endogenous productivity effects is inspired by Combes et al. (2008). We use a conventional AKM-regression described in the data section K.1.4 to separate the group-region-year specific component of productivity $\varphi^\theta_{i,t}$ defined in Eq. (5) from the worker-specific component. Next, we define the exogenous group-region-year productivity as $\psi^\theta_{i,t} = \exp(a^{L,\theta}_g + e^{L,\theta}_{i,t})$, where $a^{L,\theta}_g$ is a group-zone specific effect and $e^{L,\theta}_{i,t}$ is a structural residual. Zone effects capture differences in exogenous productivity between former East Germany and West Germany, indexed by g, due to persistent effects of the division period. Log-linearisation yields the following group-specific regression model, which exactly identifies the group-specific density elasticity of productivity κ^θ and the exogenous

Table A6: Summary statistics

	N	Mean	Std dev
Bilateral flows and distances			
Migration flow	357,858	81.12	1,929.79
Ln distance	19,740	5.62	0.60
Ln cultural distance	19,881	0.03	0.01
Ln social connectedness	19,881	-8.99	0.99
Employment variables			
Ln employment	2,538	8.25	1.58
Employment share: Female (%)	141	46.38	2.95
Employment share: Apprenticeship (%)	141	75.79	5.68
Employment share: Tertiary education (%)	141	15.76	4.99
Employment share: 31-50 years (%)	141	46.15	1.64
Employment share: 51-65 years (%)	141	32.48	2.93
Employment share: Agriculture (%)	141	1.09	1.14
Employment share: Construction (%)	141	6.69	1.90
Employment share: Tradable services (%)	141	9.43	4.20
Employment share: Manufacturing (%)	141	25.60	9.06
Employment share: Energy-intensive heavy industry (%)	141	5.37	3.34
Ln employment density	141	4.07	0.79
Wages and rents			
Ln wage	2,538	10.37	0.36
Ln price	141	4.22	0.57
Structural fundamentals			
Ln quality of life (DSM)	2,538	0.53	0.55
Ln quality of life (Rosen-Roback)	2,538	-8.94	0.39
Regional characteristics			
Ln area	141	7.69	0.56
East Germany (dummy)	141	0.23	0.42
Near Alps (dummy)	141	0.02	0.14
Near coast (dummy)	141	0.11	0.31
Ln historic population density	141	4.65	0.68
Ln crime per capita	141	-6.30	0.31
Housing stock destroyed in WWII (%)	141	9.60	9.72
Number of opera houses	141	0.80	1.08
Ln water area	141	17.39	1.00
Big data amenity index (residualised)	141	0.00	0.43
Pollution variables			
Ln pollution (PM^{10})	141	2.62	0.12
Number of active coal plants	141	0.52	1.37
Ln meteorological black coal exposure (net of geographical exposure)	141	-0.11	0.46
Ln meteorological brown coal exposure (net of geographical exposure)	141	-0.24	0.26

Notes: Number of observations differ: 141 regions; 141 regions x 18 groups = 1,551 region-groups; 141 regions x 141 regions = 19,881 region pairs; 141 regions x 141 regions x 18 groups = 357,858 region-pair-groups. Distance is not defined when origin and destination regions are identical.

Table A7: Parameter values

	Parameter	Value	Approach	Source	Appendix
1-α	Share of expenditure on housing	0.33	Set	Statistisches Bundesamt (2020)	-
ρ	Discount rate	0.11	Set	Moore and Viscusi (1988)	-
ι	Tax rate	0.49	Set	OECD (2017)	-
β	Share of land in housing	0.19	Estimated	Combes et al. (2019)	K.2.2
κ^θ	Density elasticity of productivity	0.001-0.042	Estimated	Combes et al. (2008)	K.2.1
γ^θ	Migration elasticity	0.043-0.60	Estimated	Artuç et al. (2010)	K.2.3
$\tau^\theta_{i,j=i}$	Migration cost (iceberg)	0	Set	Assumption	-
$\tau^\theta_{i,j\neq i}$	Migration cost (iceberg)	6.4-68.3	Estimated	OD-FE in migration gravity | γ^θ	K.2.4
$B^\theta_{ij,t}$	Bilateral amenity	0.03-17.84	Estimated	Residual in migration gravity | γ^θ	K.2.5

Notes: If the approach is "set", we borrow a parameter value from the paper given under "source". If the approach is "estimated", we estimate the parameter following the estimation strategy in the paper given under "source". For details, we refer to the section given under "appendix".

Table A8: Parameter estimates: Average effects by group

	Agglomeration elasticity	Migration resistance	Migration elaticity	Migration iceberg cost	Monetised migration cost
	κ^θ	$\ln \tau^\theta_{ij} \times \gamma^\theta$	γ^θ	τ^θ_{ij}	€1000
Female	0.014***	0.284***	-0.141***	9.669***	-51.783***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.04)
31-50 years	0.010**	0.524***	0.153***	-7.963***	32.498***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.05)
51-65 years	0.003	0.839***	0.148***	-8.177***	37.859***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.06)
Apprenticeship	0.016**	0.427***	0.239***	-24.122***	46.342***
	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.08)
Tertiary education	0.012*	-0.256***	0.071^{+}	-16.032***	120.518***
	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.08)
Constant	-0.001	6.436***	0.146***	44.496***	108.045***
	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.08)
Unit	Group	O-D-group	Group	O-D-group	O-D-group
O-D effects	-	Yes	-	Yes	Yes
Observations	18	355320	18	355320	355320
R^2	.86	.971	.935	.936	.944

Notes: O = origin; D = destination. All explanatory variables are binary indicator variables. Standard errors in parentheses. O-D-group-level regressions weighted by O-D-group flows.

group-region-year productivity $\psi^{\theta}_{i,t}$:

$$\ln \varphi^{\theta}_{i,g,t} = a^{L,\theta}_{g} + \kappa^{\theta} \ln \left(\frac{L_{i,t}}{\bar{T}_i} \right) + e^{L,\theta}_{i,g,t}. \tag{30}$$

Unobserved fundamentals correlated with density pose a threat to identification of κ^{θ}. Following Ciccone and Hall (1996), we use the deep lag of log population density (1907) as an instrument for the log of contemporary density, arguing that fundamentals that gave rise to density a century ago are of limited relevance for productivity today. Since the instrumental variable is time-invariant, we cluster standard errors on regions.

The resulting estimates of the density elasticity of productivity are presented in Figure A5. The employment-weighted average estimate for κ is 0.025, close to the consensus of about 0.02 in the literature (Combes and Gobillon, 2015). There is significant heterogeneity across worker groups, with κ^{θ} estimates ranging from close to zero for young male workers to 0.042 for skilled and experienced female workers. In line with skill-biased returns to agglomeration (Baum-Snow and Pavan, 2013), we generally obtain greater κ^{θ} estimates for groups with higher skills. There is also a systematic gender gap in κ^{θ} favouring women, implying a greater gender pay gap in rural areas. Finally, young groups benefit little from agglomeration, suggesting that the productivity advantage associated with urban density materialises through an interaction with experience. An econometric analysis of the conditional variation in κ^{θ}-estimates by group is in Table A8.

Figure A5: Density elasticity of productivity (κ)



Notes: Elasticity estimates from regressions of AKM-adjusted log wages (conditional on worker fixed effects, see section K.1.5) against log density, controlling for zone effects (former East vs. former West Germany) and using 1907 log population density as an instrument. Confidence bands are at the 95% level.

Table A9: Output density elasticity of housing cost

	(1) Log housing costs (region-year-specific)	(2) Log housing costs (region-year-specific)
Log output density (β)	0.189*** (0.02)	
Log employment density		0.195*** (0.02)
Zone effects	Yes	Yes
Observations	1,551	1,551
R^2	.317	.299

Notes: Units of observation are labour market region-year cells. *Housing costs* is the annualised house price index inferred from micro data as described in the data section K.1.5. We use the 1907 log population density as an instrument for log of output density and log employment density. Zone effects distinguish between former East and West Germany. Standard errors in parentheses clustered on labour market areas.* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

K.2.2 Land share in housing (β)

We use a similar approach as in K.2.1 to identify the exogenous and endogenous determinants of housing costs. We define exogenous housing TFP as $\eta_{i,t} = -\exp(\tilde{a}_g^P + e_{i,t}^P)$, where $\tilde{a}_g^P$ captures zone-specific legacy effects from the division period and $e_{i,t}^P$ is a structural residual. Log-linearisation of Eq. (8) then yields the empirical specification:

$$\ln p_{i,g(i),t} = a_g^P + \beta \ln\left(\frac{X_{i,t}}{\bar{T}_i}\right) + e_{i,g(i),t}^P, \tag{31}$$

where $a_g^P = \beta \ln(1-\alpha)\beta(1-\iota) + \tilde{a}_g^P$ collects all scalars in Eq. (8) and the effects of zone-specific housing TFP. Given set values for α and ι and an estimated value for β, exogenous housing TFP is uniquely identified as $\eta_{i,t} = ((1-\alpha)\beta(1-\iota))^\beta (X_{i,t}/\bar{T}_i)^\beta / p_{i,t}$. To address the concern that contemporary productivity shocks may be correlated with output and housing TFP, we use the deep lag of population density as an instrument for output density and cluster standard errors on regions.

In Column (1) in Table A9 we obtain an estimate of the output elasticity of housing costs β of 0.189. Note that because in our framework productivity varies across locations, there is a density-induced demand-side effect on wages in addition to the supply-side effect of employment density on housing costs that arises because of inelastically supplied land (see Appendix J.1 for a formal derivation). Thus, unlike Combes et al. (2019) who model the cost of agglomeration as dependent on population and land area, we have output density $X_{i,t}/\bar{T}_i = (\sum_\theta L_{i,t}^\theta \varphi_{i,t}^\theta)/\bar{T}_i$ on the right-hand side of the structural specification. For comparison, we also estimate the employment density elasticity in Column (2), which takes the value of 0.195. This value is between the average in the literature of 0.15 reported by Ahlfeldt and Pietrostefani (2019) and the predicted value of 0.25 for a country with the urban density of Germany (2,800 residents per km^2, see Demographia (2019)) according to the rule of thumb suggested by Ahlfeldt and Pietrostefani (2019). The value is towards the lower bound of the 0.2-0.27 range reported

for France by Combes et al. (2019), which is consistent with France having a higher urban density (3,100 residents per km^2) than Germany. Notice that the estimated density elasticity of housing expenditure $(1-\alpha)\frac{\partial \ln p_{i,t}}{\partial \ln (L_{i,t}/T)} = 0.066$ substantially exceeds our κ^θ-estimates for all groups, which is necessary for a well-behaved solution for the SSE. Note that our estimate of β implies a housing supply elasticity $(1-\beta)/\beta$ of about 4.3, which is close to existing structural estimates (Epple et al., 2010).

K.2.3 Migration elasticity (γ^θ)

The standard approach to the identification of the migration elasticity is to regress relative (to internal migration) log migration flows against bilateral differences in log wages at migration origins and destinations, controlling for leading relative log migration flows (Artuç et al., 2010).

To motivate a similar estimating equation, we start from Eq. (10) and derive the difference in migration propensity between stayers and movers in the special case of no sequential move as (see section J.3.5 for a derivation):

$$\begin{aligned}\ln \chi^\theta_{ij|i,t} - \ln \chi^\theta_{ii|i,t} = \gamma^\theta \left(\ln m^\theta_{ij} - \ln m^\theta_{ii}\right) + \gamma^\theta \left(\ln B^\theta_{ij,t+1} - \ln B^\theta_{ii,t+1}\right) \\ + \gamma^\theta \left(\ln \mathcal{V}^\theta_{j,t+1} - \ln \mathcal{V}^\theta_{i,t+1}\right)\end{aligned} \tag{32}$$

with $\ln \mathcal{V}^\theta_{j,t+1}$ the infinite sum of indirect utilities. This sum can be re-written as a sum of utility in period $t+1$ and the present value of future utilities in the subsequent periods:

$$\begin{aligned}\ln \mathcal{V}^\theta_{j,t+1} = &\underbrace{\ln \left(\frac{(1-\iota)\, w^\theta_{j,t+1} A^\theta_{j,t+1}}{p^{1-\alpha}_{j,t+1}}\right)}_{\text{utility in period t+1}} \\ &+ \underbrace{\sum_{s=t+2}^{\infty} \left(\frac{1}{1+p}\right)^{s-(t+1)} \ln \left(\frac{(1-\iota)\, w^\theta_{j,s} A^\theta_{j,s}}{p^{1-\alpha}_{j,s}}\right) + \frac{\ln B^\theta_{jj,t+2}}{\rho\,(1+\rho)}}_{\text{present value of future utilities in the subsequent periods}}\end{aligned}$$

The infinite sum of indirect utilities in the next period simply corresponds to the present value of future utilities from $t+1$, discounted by one period:

$$\ln \mathcal{V}^\theta_{j,t+2} = (1+\rho) \sum_{s=t+2}^{\infty} \left(\frac{1}{1+p}\right)^{s-(t+1)} \ln \left(\frac{(1-\iota)\, w^\theta_{j,s} A^\theta_{j,s}}{p^{1-\alpha}_{j,s}}\right) + \frac{\ln B^\theta_{jj,t+3}}{\rho\,(1+\rho)}$$

so that we have

$$\ln \mathcal{V}^\theta_{j,t+1} = \ln \left(\frac{(1-\iota)\, w^\theta_{j,t+1} A^\theta_{j,t+1}}{p^{1-\alpha}_{j,t+1}}\right) + \frac{1}{1+\rho} \ln \mathcal{V}^\theta_{j,t+2}. \tag{33}$$

Moreover, $\ln \mathcal{V}^{\theta}_{j,t+2}$ is a determinant of migration probabilities in period $t+2$:

$$\begin{aligned}\ln \chi^{\theta}_{ij|i,t+1} - \ln \chi^{\theta}_{ii|i,t+1} = \gamma^{\theta}\left(\ln m^{\theta}_{ij} - \ln m^{\theta}_{ii}\right) + \gamma^{\theta}\left(\ln B^{\theta}_{ij,t+2} - \ln B^{\theta}_{ii,t+2}\right) \\ + \gamma^{\theta}\left(\ln \mathcal{V}^{\theta}_{j,t+2} - \ln \mathcal{V}^{\theta}_{i,t+2}\right).\end{aligned} \tag{34}$$

Hence, we can use Eq. (34) in Eqs. (33) and (32) to write current relative migration propensities as a function of bilateral wages next period and relative migration propensities one period forward:

$$\begin{aligned}&\ln \chi^{\theta}_{ij|i,t} - \ln \chi^{\theta}_{ii|i,t} - \gamma^{\theta}\left[\ln\left((1-\iota)\, w^{\theta}_{j,t+1}\right) - \ln\left((1-\iota)\, w^{\theta}_{i,t+1}\right)\right] \\ &- \frac{1}{1+\rho}(\ln \chi^{\theta}_{ij|i,t+1} - \ln \chi^{\theta}_{ii|i,t+1}) + \left(1 - \frac{1}{1+\rho}\right)\gamma^{\theta}\tau^{\theta}_{ij} \\ &= \gamma^{\theta}\left(\ln\left(p^{\alpha-1}_{j,t+1}\right) - \ln\left(p^{\alpha-1}_{i,t+1}\right)\right) + \gamma^{\theta}\left(\ln B^{\theta}_{ij,t+1} - \ln B^{\theta}_{ii,t+1}\right) \\ &- \frac{\gamma^{\theta}}{1+\rho}\left(\ln B^{\theta}_{ij,t+2} - \ln B^{\theta}_{ii,t+2}\right) + \frac{\gamma^{\theta}(\ln B^{\theta}_{jj,t+2} - \ln B^{\theta}_{ii,t+2})}{\rho\,(1+\rho)} \\ &- \frac{\gamma^{\theta}(\ln B^{\theta}_{jj,t+3} - \ln B^{\theta}_{ii,t+3})}{\rho\,(1+\rho)^2} + \gamma^{\theta}\left(\ln A^{\theta}_{j,t+1} - \ln A^{\theta}_{i,t+1}\right).\end{aligned} \tag{35}$$

Following Artuç et al. (2010), we estimate our key parameter of interest using GMM. To this end, we collect the terms on the right-hand side of Eq. (35) in a structural residual $\mathcal{E}^{\theta}_{ij,t}$, take α, ι, and ρ as given, and normalise all variables by their geometric within-origin-destination-group mean, which removes time-invariant migration costs τ^{θ}_{ij}. To identify γ^{θ} we make the following identifying assumption:

$$\mathbb{E}(\bar{\mathbf{Z}}^{\theta}_{\mathbf{ij,t}}\bar{\mathcal{E}}^{\theta}_{ij,t}) = 0, \tag{36}$$

where $\bar{\mathbf{Z}}^{\theta}_{\mathbf{ij,t}}$ is a $(n \geq 1) \times 1$ vector of instrumental variables which we require to be uncorrelated with the structural residual and the upper bar indicates normalisation by the geometric mean. Substituting Eq. (35) into Eq. (36) (via $\mathcal{E}^{\theta}_{ij,t}$), we obtain n moment conditions:

$$\begin{aligned}&\mathbb{E}\Bigg(\bar{\mathbf{Z}}^{\theta}_{\mathbf{ij,t}}\Bigg[\ln \bar{\chi}^{\theta}_{ij|i,t} - \ln \bar{\chi}^{\theta}_{ii|i,t} - \gamma^{\theta}\left(\ln\left(\bar{w}^{\theta}_{j,t+1}\right) - \ln\left(\bar{w}^{\theta}_{i,t+1}\right)\right) \\ &- \frac{1}{1+\rho}(\ln \bar{\chi}^{\theta}_{ij|i,t+1} - \ln \bar{\chi}^{\theta}_{ii|i,t+1})\Bigg]\Bigg) = 0.\end{aligned} \tag{37}$$

Eq. (37) excludes rents which are in the structural residual $\mathcal{E}^{\theta}_{ij,t}$. This not only makes the estimation equation similar to the literature, it also avoids an endogeneity problem since our model predicts that amenities in the structural residuals (A and B terms) capitalise into rents.

The conventional approach is to estimate Eq. (37) using lagged values of relative migration probabilities and relative wages as instruments for leading relative migration probabilities and relative wages (Artuç et al., 2010; Caliendo et al., 2019b). This approach addresses the

concern that *contemporaneous* shocks that affect wages and leading migration decisions may also affect components of the structural residual term. A remaining concern is that if there is serial correlation in the instrumented variables and the structural residuals, the identifying assumption will be violated.

Against this background, we consider it worth exploiting an alternative source of identifying variation that is specific to the German context. It is rather uncontroversial that after unification former East Germany had a lower fundamental labour productivity owing to an inferior production technology (Burda and Hunt, 2001). Over time, western technology diffused to the eastern parts of Germany, reducing the differences in fundamental productivity inherited from the cold-war era. To capture the convergence in fundamental labour productivity between the formerly separated parts of the country, we compute for each year, group, and bilateral route a regional relative wage, where we replace the observed wages for labour markets i and j with the average wage in zone $r, s \in East, West$ a labour market falls in. We then use lags of these relative zone wages $\left(\ln\left(\bar{w}^{\theta}_{s,t}\right) - \ln\left(\bar{w}^{\theta}_{r,t}\right)\right)$ as sole (excluded) instruments for the identification of the parameters of interest. Effectively, this approach restricts the identifying variation to changes in cross-border differences in wages over time.

The GMM estimation results are in Table A10. With the canonical instrumental variables we estimate a migration elasticity of about 0.1 (Column 1), which is significantly below the implied value of 0.5 for year-on-year variation reported by Caliendo et al. (2019b). With our preferred identification using the zone wage gap, we estimate a migration elasticity of 0.4 (Column 2), which is closer to the literature. A cause for concern is that the discount parameter is either very large (Column 2) or negative and, hence, theory-inconsistent (Column 1). This is in line with the notion in the literature that the identification of these parameters with the state-of-the-art estimation strategy is weak (Artuç et al., 2010). Hence, we repeat the estimation, setting the discount parameter to our preferred value of 0.11 taken from the literature (Moore and Viscusi, 1988). Once we do this, reassuringly, the migration elasticity estimates using both sets of instruments are close (Columns 3 and 4). Our preferred estimate of the migration elasticity of 0.295 (Column 4) is moderately smaller than the 0.5-estimate for the U.S. by Caliendo et al. (2019b), which implies that workers in Germany are, on average, somewhat less responsive to migration incentives than in the U.S.

To obtain group-specific estimates of the migration elasticity, we build on our preferred specification (Column 4) whose estimation we repeat sequentially, keeping only specific gender, age, and skill groups. Thus, we estimate 2 (gender groups) + 3 (age groups) + 3 (skill groups) = 8 specifications. Compared to the alternative of estimating $2 \times 3 \times 3 = 18 = \Theta$ group-specific models, this approach is less susceptible to producing outlier estimates while still allowing for sizable heterogeneity. We disaggregate our gender- (γ^g), age- (γ^a), and skill- (γ^s) specific estimates to group-θ-specific estimates as follows:

$$\gamma^{\theta(g,a,s)} = w^{\theta,g}\gamma^g + w^{\theta,a}\gamma^a + w^{\theta,s}\gamma^s,$$

where the weights are defined as the size of a specific θ-group relative to the size of the age-, sex-

or skill-group. We obtain standard errors for the resulting $\gamma^{\theta(g,a,s)}$ by means of bootstrapping in 1,000 iterations. The results in Figure A6 reveal sizable heterogeneity in the migration elasticity across groups. In particular, it appears that the migration elasticity is larger for male than for female workers. It is largest for the middle skill and the middle age category.

Figure A6: Migration elasticity estimates (γ) by group



Note: GMM estimates by gender, age, and skill groups, disaggregated to gender-age-skill groups. Bootstrapped standard errors in 1,000 iterations.

K.2.4 Migration cost (τ_{ij}^{θ})

A log-linearised version of Eq. (10) provides the micro foundations for a non-parametric reduced-form migration gravity equation:

$$\ln M_{ij,t}^{\theta} = c^{\theta} + O_{i,t}^{\theta} + D_{j,t}^{\theta} + \tilde{m}_{ij}^{\theta} + \tilde{B}_{ij,t}^{\theta}, \tag{38}$$

Table A10: Migration elasticity estimates (uniform)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Migration elasticity	0.118***	0.443***	0.255***	0.295***
γ	(0.03)	(0.15)	(0.02)	(0.08)
Discount	-0.274***	0.376***	-	-
parameter ρ	(0.01)	(0.03)	-	-
Parameter ρ	Estimated	Estimated	Set to 0.11	Set to 0.11
IV	Canonical	Regional wage gap	Canonical	Regional wage gap

Notes: GMM estimation. Unit of observation is year-group-region-route (origin-destination pair). Weighting. Canonical instrumental variables are lags 1-3 of relative migration probabilities and relative wages. Regional wage gap instrumental variables are lags 1-3 of the year-group-route-specific difference in the regional average wage, where regions are former East- and West-Germany. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

where empirically we use the group-specific flow of workers leaving region i for region j in year t after moving $\ln(L^{\theta}_{i,t})$ into the origin-year fixed effect

$$O^{\theta}_{i,t} = \ln\left(L^{\theta}_{i,t}\right) + \ln\left(\sum_{n\in J}(B^{\theta}_{in,t}\mathcal{V}^{\theta}_{n,t}m^{\theta}_{in})^{\gamma^{\theta}}\right)$$

that also captures multilateral resistance. $D^{\theta}_{j,t} = \gamma^{\theta}\ln(\mathcal{V}^{\theta}_{j,t})$ is a destination-group-year effect capturing migration pull factors while $\tilde{B}_{ij,t} = \gamma^{\theta}\ln B_{ij,t}$ is a structural residual capturing bilateral amenity, and $\tilde{m}^{\theta}_{ij} = c^{\theta} - \gamma^{\theta}\times\tau^{\theta}_{ij}$ is an origin-destination effect identifying migration resistance up to a group-specific constant c^{θ}. We use the theory-consistent restriction $\tau^{\theta}_{ij,j=i} = 0$, which implies that $c^{\theta} = \tilde{m}_{ij,j=i}$ to identify $\tau^{\theta}_{ij} = \frac{\tilde{m}^{\theta}_{ij,j=1} - \tilde{m}^{\theta}_{ij}}{\gamma^{\theta}}$.

We estimate Eq. (38) using a Poisson Pseudo Maximum Likelihood estimator (Head and Mayer, 2014). The non-parametric nature of Eq. (38) implies that we require no identifying assumption other than that group-specific shocks to bilateral amenity $B^{\theta}_{ij,t}$ are random within origin-destination pairs. For selected origin-destination routes, we do not observe any migration flow throughout our observation period. In these cases, we impute $\tilde{m}^{\theta}_{ij}$ using a group-specific higher-order polynomial regression of $\tilde{m}^{\theta}_{ij}$ against bilateral distance.

In Figure A7, we present the distribution of the estimated migration resistance effects $\gamma^{\theta}\tau^{\theta}_{ij,t} = \tilde{m}^{\theta}_{ij}$ by group and geographic distance. These reduced-form effects control for arbitrary migration push and pull factors and provide first evidence on which groups exhibit the largest resistance to migration, either because they face large migration costs (reflected in a large τ^{θ}_{ij}), or because of limited idiosyncrasy in their location choice (reflected in a large γ^{θ}). Migration resistance increases in distance at a decreasing rate. There is a kink at about 100 km. The differences in migration resistance across groups are also quantitatively important as revealed by the results from a regression of the estimated resistance parameters against categorical group identifier variables presented in Table A8. The migration resistance of old workers (age between 51 and 65 years) is 131% (=(exp(0.839)-1)*100%) larger than that of young workers (aged 16-30). Likewise, women have an about 33% (=(exp(0.284)-1)*100%) higher migration resistance than men. Skilled (apprenticeship) and high-skilled (tertiary education) workers' migration resistance is about 53% (=(exp(0.0.427)-1)*100%) higher and 23% (=(exp(-0.256)-1)*100%) lower than for unskilled workers (no apprenticeship).

K.2.5 Bilateral amenity (B^{θ}_{ij})

From Eq. (38), it is straightforward to recover $B^{\theta}_{ij} = \left(\tilde{B}^{\theta}_{ij}\right)^{\frac{1}{\gamma^{\theta}}}$. In a theory-consistent manner, we rationalise zero-migration flows with origin-destination-group-year cells by setting $B^{\theta}_{ij} = 0$.

K.3 Structural fundamentals

This section complements Section D.3 in the main paper. We show how to invert fundamental labour and housing productivity and introduce the dynamic solver used to invert QoL.

Figure A7: Migration resistance by group and distance



Notes: Migration resistance identified as origin-destination-group effects from panel PPML estimation of a migration gravity model controlling for origin-year-group and destination-year-group effects. Confidence bands are at the 95% level.

K.3.1 Fundamental labour productivity

We invert fundamental labour productivity $\psi^{\theta}_{i,t}$ using observed data on mix-adjusted wages $w^{\theta}_{i,t}$, employment $L^{\theta}_{i,t}$, land area $\bar{T}_i$, our estimate of the density elasticity of productivity κ^{θ} and the first-order condition of labour demand using Eq. (6) as follows:

$$\psi^{\theta}_{i,t} = w^{\theta}_{i,t}\left(\frac{L_{i,t}}{\bar{T}_i}\right)^{-\kappa^{\theta}}.$$

K.3.2 Fundamental housing productivity

We invert fundamental housing productivity $\eta_{i,t}$ using observed data on mix-adjusted housing rents $p_{i,t}$, employment $L^{\theta}_{i,t}$, wages $w^{\theta}_{i,t}$, land area $\bar{T}^{\theta}_{i,t}$, our estimate of the land share β and housing market clearing using Eq. (8) as follows:

$$\eta_{i,t} = \left(\frac{(1-\alpha)\beta(1-\iota)\sum_\theta w^\theta_{i,t} L^\theta_{i,t}}{p^{\frac{1}{\beta}}_{i,t} \bar{T}_i} \right)^\beta .$$

K.3.3 Quality of life ($A^\theta_{i,t}$)

The dynamic solver introduced in Section D.3 is a nested dynamic programming algorithm which operates according to the procedure outlined in the programming flowchart in Figure A8. Intuitively, there is an iterative fixed-point algorithm (FP) that solves for $\bar{A}^\theta_{i,t}$ for given guesses of $\mathbf{L^\theta_{i,t}}$, a dynamic programming algorithm (DP) that delivers $\mathbf{L^\theta_{i,t}}$ for guessed values of $\bar{A}^\theta_{i,t}$ and an outer loop (OL) that forwards the inputs of the former to the latter and vice versa until guesses and solutions are consistent. We introduce the three building blocks of the nested structure in more detail below.

Fixed-point programming algorithm (FP). We use a Newton algorithm to obtain numerical solutions for QoL $\bar{A}^\theta_{i,t}$ which we treat as an unobserved structural fundamental. The algorithm finds a numerical solution of $\bar{A}^\theta_{i,t}$ using Eq. (10). It uses the following inputs: Observed data on migration probabilities $\chi^\theta_{ij,t}$, values of the structural parameters τ^θ_{ij} (migration costs), γ^θ (migration elasticity), ι (tax rate), B^θ_{ij} (bilateral amenity), the employment vector $\mathbf{L^\theta_{i,t}}$ which for given fundamental labour productivity $\psi^\theta_{i,t}$ and fundamental housing productivity $\eta_{i,t}$ maps to future wages $w^\theta_{i,t+s}$ and rents $p_{i,t+s}$. The iterative procedure starts from uniform guesses $\bar{A}^\theta_{i,t}{}^{f=1} = 1$. Given the inputs, Eq. (10) delivers predicted migration probabilities $\hat{\chi}^\theta_{ij,t}$ and a multiplicative adjustment factor $\sum_j \hat{\chi}^\theta_{ij,t} / \sum_j \chi^\theta_{ij,t}$ which we apply to $\bar{A}^\theta_{i,t}{}^{f=1}$ before moving into the next iteration $f = 2$. The procedure ends when the adjustment factor approaches one. The FP consists of the processes connected by the red lines in the programming flow chart in Figure A8. Note that in QSMs with static expectations, where data are rationalised assuming a SSE, the FP algorithm alone would suffice to invert quality of life.

Dynamic programming algorithm (DP). Exploiting the dynamic structure of the model, the DP forecasts $\mathbf{L^\theta_{i,t}}$ using the following inputs: structural parameters $\{\alpha, \beta, \rho, \iota, \gamma^\theta, \zeta^\theta, \kappa^\theta, B^\theta_{ij,t}, \tau^\theta_{ij}\}$; inverted labour productivity ψ^θ_{ij} and housing productivity $\eta_{i,t}$; observed employment $L^\theta_{i,t}$ and land area $\bar{T}_i$; guessed values of $\bar{A}^\theta_{i,t}$ and $\mathbf{L^\theta_{i,t}}$, which map into vectors of guessed wages $\mathbf{w^\theta_{i,}}$ and rents $\mathbf{p_{i,t}}$ via the first-order condition of labour demand (Eq. (6)) and housing market clearing (Eq. (8)). The DP begins the iterative procedure in iteration $s = 0$ where it uses the above inputs to forecast migration probabilities $\chi^\theta_{ij|i,t+s}$ using Eq. (10). The labour supply Eq. (12) then delivers employment $L^\theta_{i,t+s+1}$ in the next period. $L^\theta_{i,t+s+1}$ maps to wages $w^\theta_{i,t+s+1}$ via the first-order condition of labour demand (Eq. (6)). $L^\theta_{i,t+s+1}$ and $w^\theta_{i,t+s+1}$ give regional output $X_{i,t+s+1} = \sum_\theta w^\theta_{i,t+s+1} L^\theta_{i,t+s+1}$ which maps into rents $p_{i,t+s+1}$ via housing market clearing (Eq. (8)). Unless the dynamic solver has converged to the dynamic equilibrium, the forecasts of $L^\theta_{i,t+s+1}$, $w^\theta_{i,t+s+1}$, and $p_{i,t+s+1}$ will not equate to the respective (s+1)-th elements in the vector of guessed employment $\mathbf{L^\theta_{i,t}}_{(1,s+1)}$, wages $\mathbf{w^\theta_{i,t}}_{(1,s+1)}$, and rents $\mathbf{p_{i,t}}_{(1,s+1)}$. Hence,

we adjust wage and rent guesses concerning future periods $v > s+1$ by the multiplicative adjustment factors $w^{\theta}_{i,t+s+1}/\mathbf{w}^{\theta}_{\mathbf{i,t}(1,s+1)}$ and $p_{i,t+s+1}/\mathbf{w}_{\mathbf{i,t}(1,s+1)}$. This way, the dynamic solver "learns" from mismatches between guessed and predicted values in every iteration of the DP in every iteration of the OL as opposed to only once per iteration of the OL. This greatly enhances the speed of the solver. Then, the iterative procedure starts over again and continues until in iteration S employment is stationary ($L^{\theta}_{i,t+s} = L^{\theta}_{i,t+s+1}$). The DP consists of the processes connected by the green lines in the programming flow chart in Figure A8.

Figure A8: Dynamic solver



Notes: Programming flowchart that illustrates the procedure of the dynamic solver introduced in Section D.3. Blue lines outline the outer loop. Red lines mark the nested fixed-point algorithm solving for $A^{\theta}_{i,t}$. Green lines mark the nested dynamic programming algorithm that forecasts $\mathbf{L}^{\theta}_{\mathbf{i,t}}$. Bold letters are $(J \times \Theta) \times H$ matrices of for $H = 1,000$ periods into the future. Other letters are $(J \times \Theta) \times 1$ vectors for one period. Letters with *-superscripts indicate solved outputs. Other letters indicate guessed inputs. To ease the presentation we omit all indices $\{\theta, i, t\}$ in the flow chart.

Outer loop (OL). The OL indicated by the blue lines in the flow chart in Figure A8 nests the FP and DP algorithms. It feeds the output of the FP ($\bar{A}^{\theta}_{i,t}$) as input into the DP and the output of the DP ($\mathbf{L}^{\theta}_{\mathbf{i,t}}$) as input into the FP. Intuitively, the OL treats the solutions for $\bar{A}^{\theta}_{i,t}$ and $\mathbf{L}^{\theta}_{\mathbf{i,t}}$ as a fixed point that is found in an iterative procedure when the guessed input into the FP is identical to the output of the DP and vice versa.

Before the dynamic solver enters the OL, the first step is to define initial values for $\{\mathbf{L}^{\theta}_{\mathbf{i,t}}, \mathbf{w}^{\theta}_{\mathbf{i,t}}, \mathbf{p}_{\mathbf{i,t}}\}$ which are critical inputs for the FP. This is the first process in Figure A8

after "Start". Since we do not know a priori the number of years S over which the spatial economy converges to a SSE, we begin with a long time horizon of $H = 1,000$ years over which agents form their expectations. Note that H exceeds S for all applications of the solver we report in this paper. As initial guesses for the employment vector $\mathbf{L}_{\mathbf{i,t}}^{\theta\ \mathbf{0}}$ we use the values we observe in year t for which the model is being quantified:

$$\mathbf{L}_{\mathbf{i,t}}^{\theta\ \mathbf{0}} = \underbrace{L_{i,t}^{\theta}, L_{i,t}^{\theta}, ..., L_{i,t}^{\theta}}_{H\text{elements}}.$$

Given the first-order condition of labour demand (Eq. (6)) and housing market clearing (Eq. (8)), $\mathbf{L}_{\mathbf{i,t}}^{\theta\ 0}$ maps directly to $\{\mathbf{w}_{\mathbf{i,t}}^{\theta\ 0}, \mathbf{p}_{\mathbf{i,t}}{}^{0}\}$ for given parameters and fundamental labour and housing productivity.

With these inputs, the first iteration $l = 1$ of the OL begins. The next processes until the first decision rule ($A = A^*$), including the feedback loop marked by red lines, constitute the FP algorithm. Once the decision rule is satisfied, the OL forwards the solutions for $\bar{A}_{i,t}^{\theta\ l=1}$ to the DP which is represented by the processes up to the next decision rule ($L_{i,t+s}^{\theta} = L_{i,t+s+1}^{\theta}$), including the green loop. Once this decision rule is satisfied, the OL evaluates whether the values $\{\mathbf{w}_{\mathbf{i,t}}^{\theta\ l=1}, \mathbf{p}_{\mathbf{i,t}}{}^{l=1}\}$ solved by the DP correspond to the guessed inputs into the FP. Until this criterion is satisfied, the OL updates the guesses and the procedure starts over gain.

Once the OL converges in iteration $\mathcal{L}$, we crop $\mathbf{L}_{\mathbf{i,t}}^{\theta\ \mathcal{L}}, \mathbf{w}_{\mathbf{i,t}}^{\theta\ \mathcal{L}}, \mathbf{p}_{\mathbf{i,t}}{}^{\mathcal{L}}$ to $S^{\mathcal{L}}$ elements delivered by the DP in the last iteration of the OL. $\bar{A}_{i,t}^{\theta\ \mathcal{L}}$ represent the solution to unobserved QoL. Hence, the model is fully quantified.

Uniqueness. In Section J.4, we use Monte Carlos studies to establish that, given model fundamentals (e.g. QoL or fundamental productivities) the SSE does not depend on the initial employment distribution in the TSE. While the observed employment distribution determines the *dynamic adjustment path* of employment, wages and rents from the observed TSE to the SSE, the long-run SSE outcomes of all endogenous variables are solely determined by the model's primitives. This is akin to the unique mapping from fundamental model variables to endogenous equilibria as formally established in QSMs (Ahlfeldt et al., 2015; Allen and Arkolakis, 2014). That this mapping also holds in a dynamic spatial model is reassuring since it implies that while temporary shocks trigger dynamic responses to migration or real wages and lead to different observable TSE in the data, the mean-reversion tendency of the economy ensures convergence to the same and unique stationary distribution of economic activity. This observation serves as the starting point for our approach to conducting policy evaluations in a spatial general equilibrium under migration frictions (see section F.1 for details).

The dynamic solver, as introduced in Section D.3, relies not only on the observable distribution of employment, wages and prices in the TSE as an input for the inversion of QoL, but also simultaneously solves forward for the stationary distribution of employment. In this section, we establish that, nonetheless, in our DSM there is a unique mapping from observable outcomes in the TSE to all model fundamentals (and in particular QoL). We run several Monte

Carlo experiments where we randomly draw different starting values of QoL from a uniform distribution in the interval $(0, 1)$ as input for the fixed-point algorithm in each iteration. In all experiments, we invert the same spatial distribution of QoL and the same stationary spatial equilibrium. This is reassuring since it implies that the observable distribution of economic activity determines a unique set of model fundamentals even when accounting for forward-looking expectations of agents.

K.4 Transition into the stationary spatial equilibrium

This section complements Section D.4 in the main paper.

Figure A9 summarises how the spatial economy converges from the TSE to the SSE using the sum of absolute deviations between TSE and SSE values across region-groups as a benchmark. Depending on the outcome, about 55%-70% of the spatial convergence occurs after 30 years.

Figure A9: Spatial convergence



Notes: All trends show sum of absolute deviations from SSE values in an outcome across group-regions. 2017 starting values. Model-based forecasts.

Figure A10 scatters the SSE values in selected outcomes against the TSE values. Wages and rents are relatively closely aligned. While there are subtle differences in employment and skill shares, the correlations are still strong.

Figure A11 maps the ratios of SSE values over TSE values in selected outcomes at the regional level. As the economy converges to the SSE, the eastern states gain population at the expense of the western states. As the population increases, congestion on housing markets leads to rising rents. In contrast, there is no obvious spatial pattern in the change in skill composition and wages.

Figure A10: SSE vs TSE values



(a) Employment

(b) Wage

(c) Rent

(d) High-skilled share

Note: Unit of observation is region-group in panels a), b), d) and regions in c). Ratio of model-based forecasts (SSE) over observed data that are perfectly rationalized by the model (TSE).

K.5 Overidentification

This section complements Section D.5 in the main paper. We correlate some of the structural parameters and structural fundamentals obtained from the model quantification with observable characteristics not used in the quantification of the model. Previewing our results, we find that observable characteristics correlate with model-derived fundamental labour productivity, fundamental housing productivity, and migration costs in an intuitively plausible manner. Moreover, the model forecasts changes in employment over time for the transition from the TSE to the SSE that are closely correlated with employment changes observed in data.

Labour productivity. In Table A11, Column (1), we regress fundamental labour productivity $\psi^{\theta}_{i,t=2017}$, inverted as described in Section K.3.1, against a set of dummy variables denoting some German supra-regions. We control for group fixed effects to net out composition effects. We find that fundamental labour productivity is about 7% smaller in the eastern states, likely a legacy of the Cold War era. Fundamental productivity is somewhat higher, on average, near the Alps. In keeping with intuition, a casual inspection of fundamental productivity across regions reveals a greater productivity at peripheral regions where the local economies are dominated by global companies such as Volkswagen in Wolfsburg (see Figure A12). Adding industry sector shares in Column (2) reveals that part of the east-west gap is attributable to industry composition. In keeping with intuition, regions with a high share of tradable services tend to be more productive.

Figure A11: Ratio of SSE over TSE values



(a) Employment

(b) Wage

(c) Rent

(d) High-skilled share

Note: Unit of observation is 141 labour market areas as defined by Kosfeld and Werner (2012). Ratio of model-based forecasts (SSE) over observed data that are perfectly rationalized by the model (TSE).

Table A11: Fundamental productivity

	(1) Labour productivity	(2) Labour productivity	(3) Housing productivity	(4) Housing productivity
	$\psi^{\theta}_{i,t=2017}$	$\psi^{\theta}_{i,t=2017}$	$\eta_{i,t=2017}$	$\eta_{i,t=2017}$
East (0,1)	-0.067***	-0.039***	0.263***	-0.072
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.09)	(0.10)
Alps (0,1)	0.040***	0.051***	-0.517***	-0.639***
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.14)	(0.19)
Coast (0,1)	-0.021***	-0.002	0.007	-0.065
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.15)	(0.12)
Agricultural share (%)		0.002		0.019
		(0.00)		(0.04)
Construction (%)		-0.001		-0.029
		(0.00)		(0.03)
Tradable services (%)		0.005***		-0.083***
		(0.00)		(0.01)
Manufacturing (%)		0.002***		-0.007
		(0.00)		(0.01)
Constant	10.316***	10.220***	-2.278***	-1.045***
	(0.00)	(0.02)	(0.05)	(0.39)
Group effects	Yes	Yes	-	-
Observations	2,538	2,538	141	141
R^2	.982	.985	.0794	.413

Notes: Unit of observation is region-groups in (1) and regions in (2). (1) indicates binary indicator variables. Standard errors in parentheses.

Housing productivity. In Table A11, Column (3), we regress fundamental housing productivity $\eta_{i,t=2017}$, inverted as described in Section K.3.2, against a set of dummy variables denoting the German supra-regions. We find that housing productivity is significantly higher in the eastern states. This is a plausible finding given the country's history. During the division period, former East Germany was governed by a socialist planning regime with an emphasis on the provision of affordable housing. The relatively large quantities of housing provided came at the expense of poor housing quality. Following Germany's unification, favourable tax reliefs to real estate investors led to a construction boom and a rejuvenation of the housing stock (Flockton, 1998). Hence, it is plausible that as of 2017, there is a greater supply of housing services for given levels of geographic land area and demand. Likewise, it is plausible, that there is a negative housing productivity effect near the Alps as mountainous areas are more difficult to develop. Adding industry shares in Column (4) reveals a negative correlation between tradable services and housing productivity. One interpretation that would be in line with anecdotal international evidence is that places with high labour productivity tend to develop restrictive planning systems to protect amenities that are valued by the high-skilled (as, for example, in some Californian cities). Since tradable services are concentrated in cities in the western states (e.g. Frankfurt, Munich, Dusseldorf), the east-west gap is reduced close to zero conditional on the industry controls.

Migration costs. In Table A12, we correlate our parameter estimates capturing migration costs with measures of migration distance which, intuitively, should be positively correlated.

Figure A12: Fundamental labour and housing productivity



(a) Labour productivity $\psi_{i,t=2017}$

(b) Housing productivity $\eta_{i,t=2017}$

Note: Unit of observation is 141 labour market areas as defined by Kosfeld and Werner (2012). Values inverted as described in Sections K.3.1 and K.3.2. Group-region productivities aggregated to regions using TSE sector shares.

Indeed we find that migration resistance increases in distance at an elasticity of 1.74 (Column 1). With a negative sign, this parameter corresponds to the distance elasticity of migration flows that is frequently estimated by reduced-form gravity models. Tombe and Zhu (2019) and Imbert and Papp (2019) estimate similar elasticities for China and India. Bryan and Morten (2019) report a distance elasticity of migration of 0.7 for Indonesia. In our model, migration costs are monitored by the origin-destination-group-specific iceberg migration cost parameter τ_{ij}^{θ}. This parameter increases in distance at an elasticity of 0.245 (Column 3).

To shed some light on the mechanisms through which the geographic distance effect operates, we utilise a social distance measure defined as the inverse of an index that summarises how connected Facebook users in two regions are (see Appendix K.1.8 for further details on the social connectedness index). Figure A13 shows an approximately log-linear relationship between social distance and our estimated migration cost parameters τ_{ij}^{θ}, suggesting that social ties may reduce the cost of rebuilding social capital at a migration destination. As expected, social distance is positively correlated with geographic distance, a well-known feature of social networks (Bailey et al., 2018). The geographic proximity effect is also visible in a measure of cultural distance which is the inverse of historic dialect similarity (Falck et al., 2012). Hence, it

Table A12: Migration costs vs. geographic and social distance

	Migration resistance	Migration resistance	Migration iceberg cost	Migration iceberg cost
	$\tau_{ij}^{\theta} \times \gamma^{\theta}$	$\tau_{ij}^{\theta} \times \gamma^{\theta}$	τ_{ij}^{θ}	τ_{ij}^{θ}
Ln geographic distance	1.740***	0.815***	0.245***	0.148***
	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Ln social distance		0.647***		0.068***
		(0.02)		(0.00)
Group effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
IV	-	Yes	-	Yes
Observations	355,320	355,320	355,320	355,320
R^2	.808	.904	.933	.86

Notes: Unit of observation is origin-destination-group. Ln social distance is the inverse of the log of the Facebook social connectedness index (Bailey et al., 2018). Log historic dialect (Falck et al., 2012) similarity is used as an instrumental variable for log social distance where indicated. Standard errors in parentheses. Regressions weighted by O-D-group flows.

is no wonder that social distance and cultural distance are also positively correlated, implying that regions that are closely connected today usually have had cultural ties in the past.

Figure A13: Migration cost vs. bilateral distance measures



Note: Social distance is the inverse of the Facebook social connectedness index (Bailey et al., 2018). Cultural distance is the inverse of historic dialect similarity (Falck et al., 2012). Geographic distance is the great-circle distance. Observations are grouped into 10^{-6} on the x-axis. All distance and cost measures computed for pairs of German local labour markets.

When adding log social distance as an additional covariate in Columns (2) and (4) in Table A12, we use log cultural distance as an instrumental variable to address reverse causality from

migration cost to social connectedness. We find that migration costs increase significantly in social distance, controlling for geographic distance. Moreover, adding social distance, reduces the geographic distance effect by 53% (Column 2) and 40% (Column 4), suggesting that the cost of rebuilding social capital may be an important component of migration costs.

To summarise how the relationship between migration costs and social distance varies by group, we first regress the estimated migration cost parameter τ_{ij}^{θ} on log social distance and geographical distance by group θ. We estimate the average difference in the estimated coefficients of log social distance between gender, sex and skill groups in a second-step regression reported in Table A13. Our preferred instrumental variable results reveal that the elasticity of migration costs with respect to social distance is relatively large for middle-skilled and high-skilled workers.

Table A13: Migration cost against social distance (by group)

	OLS	2SLS
Female	0.004	0.004
	(0.00)	(0.01)
31-50 years	-0.015***	-0.000
	(0.00)	(0.01)
51-65 years	-0.036***	-0.003
	(0.01)	(0.00)
Apprenticeship	0.071***	0.055***
	(0.00)	(0.01)
Tertiary education	0.051***	0.049***
	(0.00)	(0.01)
Constant	0.084***	0.023**
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Observations	18	18
R^2	.971	.885

Notes: The units of observation are labour market region pairs. The dependent variable is the estimated coefficient of log social distance from separate regressions of the estimated bilateral migration costs τ_{ij}^{θ} on log geographical and log social distance for each θ-group. In the 2SLS specification, cultural distance is used as an instrumental variable for social distance. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses.

Employment (out-of-sample). Our data set contains all critical variables for the inversion of the model from 2007 onward. To compare the TSE to SSE transition path forecast by the dynamic solver to data, we invert the model from a 2007 TSE and regress the model-based employment forecast on values observed in the data in Table A14. This is a demanding out-of-sample over-identification test as we expect all fundamentals to be affected by exogenous shocks, hence the within-region correlation over time is necessarily noisy. We expect a positive correlation to the extent that these shocks are orthogonal to the TSE deviations from the SSE since the model can predict mean reversion and the causal effects of known exogenous shocks, but not the occurrence of future events.

Yet, the within-region elasticity of forecast employment with respect to observed employ-

ment is precisely estimated at 0.775 (t-stat > 25). Weighting by employment, the estimated elasticity increases to 0.852 (t-stat > 25). Hence, the model successfully captures a mean reversion tendency that is a feature of the data, in particular for the larger labour markets. Consistent with a less favourable signal-to-noise ratio the correlation is weaker at the group-region level where cell sizes are much smaller. Nevertheless, if we weight by the size of the region-group cells the elasticity, at 0.493 is still positive and precisely estimated (t-stat > 45).

Table A14: Employment: Model-based forecast vs. data

	Ln employment (2007-2017 in data)	Ln employment (2007-2017 in data)	Ln employment (2007-2017 in data)	Ln employment (2007-2017 in data)
	$L^{\theta}_{i,t}$	$L^{\theta}_{i,t}$	$L^{\theta}_{i,t}$	$L^{\theta}_{i,t}$
Ln employment (2007-2017,	0.775^{***}	0.852^{***}	0.091^{***}	0.493^{***}
forecast from 2007 TSE)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Unit	Region-year	Region-year	Region-group-year	Region-group-year
Time effects	Year	Year	Year-group	Year-group
Location effects	Region	Region	Region-group	Region-group
Weights	-	Region emp.	-	Region-group emp.
Observations	1551	1551	27918	27918
R^2	1	1	.998	.999

Notes: Employment forecast from a 2007 TSE using the dynamic solver. Year and year-group effects capture the effects in changes in the size of the workforce that occur in the data but not in the model-based forecast. Standard errors in parentheses.

L Measuring quality of life

This section complements Section E in the main paper.

L.1 Spatial variation in quality of life

Table A15 presents estimates of the elasticity of RR-QoL with respect to DSM-QoL by worker group that correspond to the log-linear slopes plotted in Figure 5. On average log-point increase in DSM-QoL is associated with a 0.27-log-point increase in RR-QoL. The estimated log slope tends to be somewhat larger for male, old, and skilled workers, but remains below 0.5 for all groups. On average, the DSM-QoL explains almost 60% of the variation in the RR-QoL, with some variation across groups.

Table A15: Elasticity of Rosen-Roback QoL with respect to dynamic model QoL

Gender	Age	Unskilled	Skilled	High-skilled	Mean
Male	16-30 years	0.21***	0.32***	0.22***	0.25
Male	31-50 years	0.22***	0.44***	0.27***	0.31
Male	51-65 years	0.29***	0.45***	0.37***	0.37
Female	16-30 years	0.16***	0.20***	0.17***	0.18
Female	31-50 years	0.16***	0.31***	0.21***	0.23
Female	51-65 years	0.19***	0.38***	0.37***	0.32
	Mean	0.21	0.35	0.27	0.27

Notes: Point estimates from group-specific region-level regressions of ln RR-QoL ($\ln \mathcal{A}_i^\theta$) against ln DSM QoL ($\ln \bar{A}_i^\theta$). All estimates are significant at the 1% level. The last column and row present unweighted row and column means. QoL inverted from 2017 data.

L.2 Determinants of quality of life

Figure A14 shows the correlation between DSM-QoL and the big data amenity index introduced in Appendix D.1 by group. Consistent with the pooled regression results in Table 2, there is a positive correlation between both measures. Moreover, the correlation is similarly well defined across groups. Hence, Figure A14 substantiates the notion that social-media-based big data may serve as a proxy for QoL.

Figure A14: Quality of life (DSM) vs. big data (photos) amenity



Notes: 2017 values. Unit of observation is region-group. Model-based amenity inverts QoL from a TSE assuming that agents have perfect foresight. Big data amenity is the number of geo-tagged photos shared in social media (Flickr and Picasa).

M Policy evaluation

This section complements Section F in the main paper.

M.1 Social welfare

In this section, we derive the social welfare measure introduced in Section F.1. We start with a social welfare function that allows for inequality aversion in a general form. Following Atkinson (1970), we assume

$$\mathcal{W} = \frac{1}{1-\varepsilon} \sum_i \sum_\theta \left(\mathcal{R}^\theta_{i,t}\right)^{1-\varepsilon} \frac{L^\theta_i}{\bar{L}} \tag{39}$$

for both the baseline ($*$) and the counterfactual (c) spatial equilibrium. The degree of inequality aversion is measured by $0 \leq \varepsilon \neq 1$.[20]

It is instructive to transform Eq. (39) into a scale-dependent part $\mathcal{R}$ and a scale-independent part that penalises for inequality $1-\mathcal{I}$. The former is simply the weighted average of location-group utility that for the baseline and the counterfactual is respectively given by:

$$\mathcal{R}^* = \sum_i \sum_\theta \mathcal{R}^{\theta\ *}_{i|i} \frac{L^{\theta *}_i}{\bar{L}} \tag{40}$$

$$\mathcal{R}^c = \sum_i \sum_\theta \widehat{\mathcal{R}^\theta_i} \mathcal{R}^{\theta\ *}_{i|i} \frac{L^{\theta *}_i}{\bar{L}}. \tag{41}$$

Using the "exact hat algebra" approach by Dekle et al. (2007), we express group-region utility in the counterfactual measured at the migration origin as $\widehat{\mathcal{R}^\theta_i} \mathcal{R}^{\theta\ *}_{i|i}$. This way, we account for changes in expected utility and migration costs which enter into $\widehat{\mathcal{R}^\theta_i}$.

To derive the inequality measure $\mathcal{I}$, we search for the *equally distributed equivalent utility* $\mathcal{U}_{EDE}$ (a hypothetical average level of expected lifetime utility across individuals) that leads to the same level of welfare as with the actual distribution of expected lifetime utilities. Eq. (39) implies that

$$\mathcal{W}(\mathcal{R}_{EDE}) = \frac{1}{1-\varepsilon} (\mathcal{R}_{EDE})^{1-\varepsilon}, \tag{42}$$

such that we can solve for $\mathcal{R}_{EDE}$ by equalising Eqs. (39) and (42). This yields

$$\mathcal{R}_{EDE} = \left[\sum_i \sum_\theta \left(\mathcal{R}^\theta_{i|i}\right)^{1-\varepsilon} \frac{L^\theta_i}{\bar{L}} \right]^{\frac{1}{1-\varepsilon}}.$$

Using Atkinson's inequality measure

$$\mathcal{I} = 1 - \frac{\mathcal{R}_{EDE}}{\mathcal{R}} \qquad \in [0,1], \tag{43}$$

[20] We obtain log-utility as a special case for $\epsilon = 1$.

we obtain

$$\mathcal{I}^* = 1 - \Big[\sum_i \sum_\theta \Big(\frac{\mathcal{R}^{\theta\ *}_{i|i}}{\mathcal{R}^*}\Big)^{(1-\varepsilon)} \frac{L_i^{\theta *}}{\bar{L}}\Big]^{\frac{1}{1-\varepsilon}} \tag{44}$$

$$\mathcal{I}^c = 1 - \Big[\sum_i \sum_\theta \Big(\frac{\widehat{\mathcal{R}^\theta_i}\mathcal{R}^{\theta\ *}_{i|i}}{\mathcal{R}^c}\Big)^{(1-\varepsilon)} \frac{L_i^{\theta *}}{\bar{L}}\Big]^{\frac{1}{1-\varepsilon}} \tag{45}$$

for both the baseline and the counterfactual case, respectively. These derivations allow us to reformulate Eq. (39) as $\mathcal{W} = \mathcal{R}\,(1 - \mathcal{I})$ and express changes in social welfare according to Eq. (18).

M.2 Instrumental variable estimates of air pollution effects

This section complements Section F.2 in the main paper. We discuss our wind-adjusted coal exposure instrumental variables in greater detail and provide a discussion of the relevance and the validity of the instrumental variables as well as the underlying mechanisms.

Wind-adjusted coal exposure. To generate exogenous variation in pollution levels, we follow Deryugina et al. (2019) and **?** and exploit that the diffusion of air pollution is shaped by winds and that, historically, coal deposits attracted high-polluting industries (for example steal mills) and power plants. We define wind-induced coal exposure E for region i as follows:

$$E_i^{\mathcal{E}} = \frac{\sum_{i \neq j} \frac{CC_j^{\mathcal{E}}}{WD_{ij}}}{\sum_{i \neq j} \frac{CC_j^{\mathcal{E}}}{D_{ij}}}, \tag{46}$$

where $\mathcal{E} = \{\text{black coal, brown coal}\}$, CC_j is the percentage of the geographic area of region j with coal deposits, D_{ij} is the crow-flight distance between region i and region j and WD_{ij} is the wind-adjusted distance defined as follows:

$$WD_{ij} = \frac{D_{ij}}{\frac{w_{i,r(ij)}}{\frac{1}{R}\sum_{s=r}^{R} w_{s,i(ij)}}},$$

where $w_{r,i(ij)} = \frac{W_{r,i(ij)}}{\sum_{s=r}^{R} W_{s,i(ij)}}$ and $W_{r,i(ij)}$ is the frequency of winds blowing from direction $r \in R$.

The denominator in Eq. (46) is a *geographical* exposure measure that aggregates CC_i across surrounding regions, weighted by distance. This formulation is closely related to the *market potential* by Harris (1954), which has become a workhorse tool in economic geography, international trade, and urban economics. The fact that we exclude the "self-potential" (for region $i = j$) makes our exposure measure similar to spatial lags used in geographic data science where spatial auto-correlation is viewed as a typical manifestation of the *First Law of Geography* (Tobler, 1970). The numerator in Eq. (46) is a *meteorological* exposure measure constructed in exactly the same way as the denominator, except that the spatial weights incorporate wind patterns. Intuitively, we scale down geographic distance ($WD_{ij} < D_{ij}$) if winds typically blow

Figure A15: Wind rose diagrams



(a) Hamburg

(b) Berlin

(c) Cologne

(d) Munich

Note: Own illustration of data provided by Kasperski (2002). Sizes of slices are proportionate to wind frequency. Darker colours indicate stronger winds. Geographic directions (in a polar coordinate system) refer to the directions *from* where winds blow.

from j to i. Likewise, we scale up geographic distance ($WD_{ij} > D_{ij}$) if winds typically blow from i to j. Through the normalisation by the conventional spatial lag, we net out the effects of outcomes that are correlated with CC and auto-correlated in space. Since we exclude region i in the exposure measure $E_i^{\mathcal{E}}$, we also exclude any unobserved variables that determine the QoL and pollution production within the same region. As a result, our exposure measure identifies the air pollution effect from wind-induced variation, exclusively.

We obtain the frequency distribution of winds by direction $r \in R$ for region $i \in J$ from Kasperski (2002). In these data, r is defined in terms of $R = 36$ 10-degree intervals where $r = 0$ if region j is exactly north of region i. Figure A15 illustrates the frequency distribution for the four largest German cities using wind rose diagrams. With this information, it is a matter of simple 2D geometry to compute a radian angle for an ij-route as $atan2(y_j - y_i, x_j - x_i)$ (x and y are coordinates in a projected system) and map it to the wind rose via a standard radian-to-degree conversion.

Relevance. Panel (a) of Figure A16 illustrates the regional differences in the concentration of particulate matter in Germany. With the exception of a few regions along the former inner-German border, pollution levels are generally higher in East Germany. Within West Germany, higher concentration levels are recorded around the Ruhr Valley in North-Rhine Westphalia as well as in parts of the North. Except for *Ludwigshafen*, where chemical industry is located, and *Passau*, pollution levels are considerably lower in South Germany.

Figure A16: Coal cover vs. pollution



(a) PM^{10} concentration

(b) Coal deposits (back and brown)

Note: Unit of observation are 141 labour market regions defined by Kosfeld and Werner (2012). Coal exposure is the wind-adjusted-distance-weighted aggregated of coal deposits in surrounding regions $j \neq i$.

–Figure A15 – continued from previous page



(c) Meteorological black coal exposure



(d) Geographical black coal exposure



(e) Meteorological brown coal exposure



(f) Geographical brown coal exposure

Note: Unit of observation are 141 labour market regions defined by Kosfeld and Werner (2012). Meteorological coal exposure is the numerator in Eq. (46). Geographical coal exposure is the denominator in Eq. (46). Intuitively, both exposure measures are distance-weighted aggregated coal deposits in surrounding regions $j \neq i$ using inverse distance weights. For the meteorological exposure measures, geographic distances are adjusted for wind directions .

These differences in the concentration of particulate matter bear a close resemblance to the spatial distribution of brown and black coal fields which is shown in panel (b). Areas in which large-scale extraction of coal has been taking place are clearly visible in North-Rhine Westphalia and the Saarland in West Germany as well as in parts of Saxony, Saxony-Anhalt and Brandenburg in East Germany.

Panel c) shows a region's log meteorological exposure to black coal which is based on the wind-adjusted distances (the numerator of Eq. (46)). The area with the highest concentration contains the Ruhr Valley as well as the regions to the North-East of the former, because winds typically blow from the South-West (as shown in Figure A15). Panel d) reflects the geographical exposure to black coal that is based on adjusted crow-flight distances (the denominator of Eq. (46)). In contrast to panel c), the iso-exposure lines are approximately concentric, with the Ruhr Valley being the nucleus of the gradient. Panels e) and f) show the same exposure measures for brown coal deposits. Intuitively, we identify from wind-induced exposure to coal deposits, exclusively, by using the log-difference between the two exposure measures depicted

Table A16: Quality-of-life determinants

	(1) $\ln PM^{10}$	(2) $\ln PM^{10}$	(3) $\bar{A}_i^\theta$
Ln wind-adjusted exposure	0.152***	0.105***	
to black coal	(0.02)	(0.02)	
Ln wind-adjusted exposure	0.077*	0.028	
to brown coal	(0.04)	(0.03)	
Ln pollution concentration (pm10)			-1.935***
			(0.69)
East			-0.221**
			(0.09)
Near Alps (dummy)			-0.452***
			(0.17)
Near coast (dummy)			-0.286***
			(0.10)
Ln crime per capita			0.340***
			(0.11)
Ln area			0.112
			(0.09)
Housing stock destroyed in WWII (%)			0.013***
			(0.00)
Number of Opera houses			0.178***
			(0.03)
Ln water area			0.175**
			(0.08)
First-stage F-statistic			24.532
Group-year effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	No	Yes	Yes
Observations	27,918	27,918	27,918
R^2	.508	.673	.504

Notes: Unit of observation is region-group-year. Regional pollution is instrumented using the wind-adjusted log exposure to black and brown coal as described in Section M.2 and are determined net of market access. *First-stage F-Statistic* refers to the Kleibergen-Paap rank LM statistic. Standard errors clustered on regions. $^{+}$ $p < 0.15$, * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

in panels (c) and (d) as well as in (e) and (f) as instrumental variables for air pollution.

Columns (1) and (2) of Table A16 provide a closer assessment of the relationship between the concentration of particulate matter and the coal exposure IVs. While the conditional correlation of the brown coal exposure measure depends on the specification, black coal exposure has a positive effect on air pollution levels throughout.

Mechanism. For much of the 19th and the 20th century, coal was an essential input for energy-intense industries and coal power plants which co-located with coal deposits due to transport costs that used to be much higher than they are today (**?**Fernihough and O'Rourke, 2021). Path-dependency is a well-documented feature of economic geography (Davis and Weinstein, 2002; Redding et al., 2010; Bleakley and Lin, 2012). Polluting industries and power plants are no exception and have remained in close proximity of coal deposits when transport costs fell, making them an indirect source of air pollution. The advantage of using coal deposits in the exposure measure over polluting establishments is that the former is exogenously determined by geology while the location of the latter is to some extent endogenously determined by local economic conditions.

Column (1) of Table A17 shows that there is a strong relationship between brown and black coal deposits on the one hand and the number of active coal plants on the other hand. This association extends to the geographical coal exposure measures, as shown in Column (2). In Columns (3) and (4) we use the number of employees in energy-intensive heavy industry as the dependent variable. A larger share of areas with coal deposits is associated with a larger number of worker in these sectors (conditional on a region's overall employment level) which supports the hypothesis of collocation of black coal deposits and energy-intensive industry. We find no such relationship in the case of brown coal, which is consistent with the greater predictive power of the black coal exposure measure in the first stage of the IV regressions (see Table A16).

Validity. The use of coal exposure as an instrumental variable hinges on the assumption that there are no other channels through which the former might influence QoL. Arguably, we have ruled out many of the causes for concern by excluding region $i = j$ from the exposure measures. Hence, local disamenity effects of coal power plants, for example related to unpleasant views, will not be captured by our instrumental variables. There is also the concern that the presence of heavy industry in regions with coal deposits led to intensive bombing raids during WWII. It is conceivable that the resulting destruction of the housing stock and of infrastructure led to a permanent reduction in QoL in those regions. We control for a potential war-destruction effect in our IV regressions, but even if our control was imperfect, excluding region $j = i$ in the construction of the coal exposure IVs ensures that the IVs will not capture effects of WWII destruction in region i.

However, one may argue that workers travel across regions for leisure. Hence, WWII destruction or any other legacy effect of nearby coal fields on the attractiveness of nearby regions could be captured by our coal exposure measures. This is why we normalise meteorological

Table A17: Collocation of energy-intensive heavy industries and coal plants with coal deposits

	(1) Number of active coal plants	(2) Number of active coal plants	(3) Employees in energy-intensive heavy industry	(4) Employees in energy-intensive heavy industry
Black coal cover (in %)	1.658***		0.288**	
	(0.51)		(0.14)	
Brown coal cover (in %)	3.226***		-1.133**	
	(0.89)		(0.53)	
Ln black coal exposure		1.063***		0.390***
		(0.33)		(0.10)
Ln brown coal exposure		0.869**		-0.336***
		(0.43)		(0.13)
Ln employment			0.789***	0.740***
			(0.06)	(0.04)
Constant	-1.107***	5.966***	-0.369	0.279
	(0.26)	(1.84)	(0.76)	(0.89)
Observations	141	141	141	141
Pseudo R^2	.099	.089	.650	.717

Notes: Unit of observation is region. Poisson estimation. Sector shares are measured in 2017. Robust standard errors. $^{+}$ $p < 0.15$, * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

exposure by geographic exposure in Eq. (46). We argue that all spatial spillover effects that operate independent of wind directions will be net out by geographic exposure in the denominator. Hence, the instrument defined in Eq. (46) provides identifying variation stemming purely from wind-induced patterns in air pollution which we argue to be exogenous.

M.3 Other applications

This section provides a more detailed discussion of the results summarised in Section F.3. We present several counterfactual exercises, which are all motivated by the frequently expressed concern that the Covid-19 pandemic may negatively affect the attractiveness of large cities due to reduced personal contacts that are crucial for productivity (e.g. knowledge spillovers) or the utility derived from endogenous amenities (e.g. pubs).

We would like to stress that we do not wish to take any stance on the likely effect of Covid-19 on productivity and QoL in cities. The below scenarios are hypothetical thought experiments and, if anything, worst-case scenarios. The reduction in the urban wage and QoL life premia will likely be partial and to some extent temporary. Moreover, even if worse comes to worst, our model predicts that it will take 30 years for 75% of the effects in Table A18 to materialise (see Figure A9).

No agglomeration economies. In this counterfactual, we hold all structural fundamentals constant. Instead, we set the agglomeration elasticity parameter $\kappa^{\theta} = 0$ after we solve for the initial SSE and before we solve for the counterfactual SSE. The results are in panel a) of Table A18. Without agglomeration economies, productivity, wages, and GDP decline in all local labour markets (LLMs). The effects are stronger in the large LLMs which lose about 9% of

Table A18: Counterfactual analysis: Other applications

(a) No agglomeration economies	All LLM	Large LLM	Small LLM
Population	1.000	0.912	1.095
GDP	0.895	0.840	0.976
Average wage	0.895	0.893	0.904
Average rent	0.942	0.969	0.996
High-skilled share	1.000	1.032	0.981
Skilled share	1.000	0.981	1.010
Average utility	0.886	0.903	0.905
(b) No social amenities			
Population	1.000	0.633	1.492
GDP	0.990	0.625	1.521
Average wage	0.990	0.988	1.019
Average rent	0.734	0.907	1.067
High-skilled share	1.000	0.999	1.173
Skilled share	1.000	0.967	0.977
Average utility	0.604	0.601	0.781
(c) Scenarios (a) and (b) combined			
Population	1.000	0.621	1.508
GDP	0.891	0.554	1.379
Average wage	0.891	0.893	0.914
Average rent	0.718	0.889	1.051
High-skilled share	1.000	1.008	1.169
Skilled share	1.000	0.961	0.979
Average utility	0.548	0.551	0.707
(d) Scenario (c) with threefold γ^{θ}			
Population	1.000	0.373	1.848
GDP	0.889	0.339	1.690
Average wage	0.887	0.907	0.915
Average rent	0.627	0.794	1.066
High-skilled share	1.000	0.746	1.342
Skilled share	1.000	1.011	0.943
Average utility	0.642	0.653	0.717

Notes: Results from model-based numerical simulations. Large (small) local labour markets (LLM) have a workplace employment of more (less) than 250k workers. All outcomes except for the last two are given in ratios of counterfactual (SSE) values over initial (SSE) initial values.

their workers to smaller LLMs. The reduction in housing demand owing to decreasing wages leads to lower rents in all LLMs. Due to the shift in demand from the larger towards smaller LLMs the effect is quantitatively small in the smaller LLMs.

No social amenities. We start from the assumption that conditional on controls the social media amenity index captures QoL-effects of endogenous amenities (e.g. cafes, concert halls, pubs) where people engage in activities that generate social media content. Solving Eq. (29) for the log of QoL gives the following specification which we take to the data in group-specific regressions:

$$\ln A_{i,t}^{\theta} = \bar{c}^{P} \tilde{\zeta^{\theta}} \ln P_i + \boldsymbol{\mathcal{X}_i'} \tilde{\boldsymbol{b}}^{\boldsymbol{\theta}} + \tilde{\epsilon_i}^{\theta},$$

where $\bar{c}^P \equiv \tilde{c}^P$, $\tilde{\zeta^{\theta}} = \frac{1}{\zeta^{\theta}}$, $\boldsymbol{\mathcal{X}_i'} \tilde{\boldsymbol{b}}^{\boldsymbol{\theta}} \equiv \sum_n (b_n^{\theta\, P} \ln \mathcal{X}_{i,n})$ and $\tilde{\epsilon_i}^{\theta} \equiv -\ln \epsilon_i^{\theta}$. We include all covariates other than the residualised social media amenity index from Table 2 in $\boldsymbol{\mathcal{X}_i'}$. To evaluate an extreme case in which all amenities captured by the social media amenity conditional on covariates become obsolete, we define the counterfactual change in QoL as $\widehat{A_i^{\theta}} = \left(\frac{P^{Min}}{P_i}\right)^{\zeta^{\theta}}$, where P^{Min} is the smallest value in the distribution of the social media amenity index across regions. Otherwise, the procedure is identical to the one outlined in Section F.

The results are in panel b) of Table A18. As with the reduction in agglomeration economies, the QoL shocks hit the larger LLMs harder which is consistent with large cities offering particularly vibrant cultural, gastronomic, and nightlife amenities. The effects are considerably larger than in the no "agglomeration economies" scenario, with population size predicted to drop by almost 40% in large LLMs. The effect on overall GDP is more moderate, though there is a large drop (increase) for large (small) LLMs. The large migration into small LLMs causes rents to rise in absolute terms, whereas they naturally fall in the large LLMs.

No agglomeration economies and no social amenities. In a third scenario, we explore the joint effect of eliminating productivity and consumption benefits of big cities. As expected, the results in panel c) of Table A18 blend the results from panels a) and b). Large LLMs lose slightly more of their population than in panel b). There are large negative effects on wages in both regions and yet rents increase in the small LLMs due to the shift in demand.

No agglomeration economies and no social amenities, with threefold γ^{θ}. The last scenario in panel d) of Table A18 serves the purpose of illustrating how the frictional nature of our DSM anchors the spatial economy in the presence of a major shock. As discussed in Section C, spatial arbitrage in our model is imperfect unless the migration elasticity γ^{θ} is very large. Larger γ^{θ} necessarily imply lower migration costs $\tau_{ij,j\neq i}^{\theta}$ since $\gamma \times \tau_{ij}^{\theta}$ is jointly identified empirically. Tripling γ^{θ} brings the average across groups close to unity after which the DSM-QoL approaches the RR-QoL (see Figure 6).

In panel d) we invert the model using thrice the estimated value of γ^{θ}. We then make the same changes to κ^{θ} and A_i^{θ} as in scenario c) maintaining the large γ^{θ} values. Expectedly,

the larger migration response owing to reduced idiosyncratic attachment amplifies the effects found in scenario c). Large LLMs lose more than 60% of their workers and almost 70% of their GDP. Despite a reduction in wages of about 9%, small LLMs experience rents increasing by 7% due to an increase in employment by about 85%.

The important takeaway is that the effects predicted by our model are not nearly as devastating as predicted by a canonical SSE model. The intuition is that because of idiosyncratic tastes many infra-marginal workers will not leave large LLMs even if the expected group-specific utility is larger in small LLMs. We consider this a realistic feature of our model.

N The role of expectations

In quantifying our DSM, we need to define how agents form expectations. One extreme is to assume perfectly informed agents that anticipate all future changes in goods and factor prices as well as future migration decisions. The other extreme is to assume myopic agents that extrapolate current prices into the infinite future and abstract from future migration decisions. We treat the latter as a special case that can be obtained from the former general case under some seemingly restrictive assumptions (J.3). Other special cases are imaginable in which agents anticipate future prices, but abstract from future migration decisions to varying degrees. As already pointed out by Caliendo et al. (2019b), the general case involves a dimensionality problem when all fundamentals of the model are to be inverted. Within the special cases, the complexity of the computational problem is generally larger, the less restrictive the assumptions regarding expectations are. Our methodological contribution is to develop an approach to the inversion of a QSM under perfect foresight in goods and factor prices. Guided by the stylized fact that the average worker changes the local labour market only once over the employment biography, we assume that workers do not anticipate subsequent moves when making migration decisions in the baseline quantification of our model. The purpose of this section is to compare this baseline case to more or less restrictive special cases that make the quantification of the model computationally less or more burdensome. The main takeaway is that the choice of how residents form expectations has moderate effects on the quantitative predictions of the model. With respect to the key findings in the paper – in particular the greater dispersion in regional QoL in a frictional model – the baseline case delivers the most conservative predictions. Even the fairly restrictive assumption of myopic agents appears to be a reasonable choice in high-dimensional settings.

N.1 General and special cases

We refer to *perfect foresight* as the model-consistent anticipation of all future prices on goods and factor markets. By *sequential moves*, we refer to the anticipation of migration decisions that happen in the future, subsequent to an initial migration decision.

General case with perfect foresight and multiple sequential moves. The general formulation of expected utility and migration probabilities in Section J.3 allows agents to anticipate all future group-region-specific wages and rents and imposes no restriction on the sequence of migration decisions. Two challenges lie in the way of quantifying the model in this general case. First, there is a circularity problem because we can invert $\bar{A}^{\theta}_{i,t}$ for given future wages and rents; however, to forecast future wages and rents, we require $\bar{A}^{\theta}_{i,t}$. We address this problem using the dynamic solver introduced in Section D.3 in the main paper and in Section K.3 in this appendix. Second, with sequential migration, the attractiveness of a potential migration destination j depends on the migration options j offers as a migration origin in subsequent moves. The migration option value $\mathcal{O}_j$ introduced in Eq. (25) depends on migration costs τ_{jm} and the pull factors at m, which include the migration option value $\mathcal{O}_m$. Building on Artuç et al. (2010), Caliendo et al. (2019b) show how to exploit the Bellman principle to implement the general case in a setting where the model does not have to be fully inverted. Intuitively, the migration option value cancels out when the model is solved in first differences. Caliendo et al. (2019b) use this approach to quantify the effects of the China trade shock. Using a similar approach, Caliendo et al. (2019a) evaluate the effects of EU market integration. Similarly, Balboni (2019) analyses the effects of road investments in Vietnam. We adopt a similar approach when estimating the migration elasticity in Section D.2. However, when we invert QoL, we need to solve for a structural fundamental in levels, which requires us to model the migration option value explicitly. Sequential moves imply that migration probabilities depend on migration option values at potential destinations which, in turn, depend on migration option values at subsequent destinations. This creates the dimensionality problem that we discuss in Section N.2.

Special case with perfect foresight and one sequential move. To reduce the dimensionality problem, we can assume that workers, when making their migration decisions, expect to relocate once. The assumption of perfect foresight along with the restriction to one expected sequential move leads to the following definition of the migration option value (see Appendix J.3 for the derivation):

$$\mathcal{O}^{\theta}_{j,t+2} = \frac{1}{1+\rho} \ln \left[\sum_{m \in J} \left(\exp\left(-\tau^{\theta}_{jm}\right) B^{\theta}_{jm,t+2} \mathcal{V}^{\theta}_{m,t+2} \right)^{\gamma^{\theta}} \right]^{\frac{1}{\gamma^{\theta}}} \tag{47}$$

Unlike in the general case in Eq. (11), the migration option value in Eq. (47) no longer depends on the migration option value at m. This restriction solves a dimensionality problem in the inversion of structural fundamentals under perfect foresight that is discussed in Caliendo et al. (2019b). Implicitly, we assume that $\mathcal{O}_m = 0$ in Eq. (25), so that $\mathcal{O}_j$ only depends on future wages, rents, QoL, and migration probabilities in m for which we solve using the dynamic solver. Of course, $\mathcal{O}_j$ includes the option to stay put at j with a high probability. Tracking an entire cohort of West German workers over their entire 40-year employment biographies, we find that almost 90% switch less than twice between local labour markets. Hence, we argue

that it is reasonable to assume that workers do not expect more than one additional future relocation when making a migration decision.

Special case with perfect foresight and no sequential move. In fact, the mean number of moves across local labour markets in the data is close to one. Therefore, one might argue that workers, when making migration decisions, expect to stay put at a potential destination. Abstracting from subsequent moves further simplifies the problem as we can set $\mathcal{O}_j = 0$ in Eq. (25), allowing us to abstract from migration option values altogether. This choice is primarily a matter of taste. It does not reduce the dimensionality as the dynamic solver solves for all ingredients that enter the migration option values $\mathcal{O}_j$. Of course, the restriction still lowers the computational burden in high-dimensional settings (large J and Θ since the migration option value needs to be computed for $J \times \theta$ groups in $H = 1000$ periods in each of the iterations of the outer loop of the dynamic solver (see Figure A8).

Special case with static expectations and no sequential move. The assumption that workers correctly anticipate the transition path to the SSE is standard in a large dynamic macroeconomics literature. In the context of a DSM, the implication is that workers, when making migration decisions, process spatially disaggregated information for J interconnected regions in such a way that they correctly anticipate future demand and supply conditions on all goods and factor markets in all regions. One alternative is to assume that workers are myopic and project observed prices into the infinite future. While we assume perfect foresight in the quantification of the model, we acknowledge that we are expecting a lot from the real-world counterparts to the agents in our model and that the question whether economic agents have perfect foresight or are myopic is a philosophical one. Since myopia features as a special case in our model when wages and house prices are expected to stay constant in real terms (see Section J.3), it is easy enough to provide a comparison to evaluate the consequences of this choice. In fact, myopia greatly simplifies the inversion of the model since QoL $\bar{A}$ can be solved using migration probabilities, wages, and rents that are readily observable using a standard numerical solution algorithm. Therefore, this approach is particularly amenable to high-dimensional settings such as in Desmet et al. (2018) and Conte et al. (2020) who cover the entire planet.

N.2 Dimensionality

Imagine a worker who considers moving from region $i \in J$ to region $j \in J$. Let's further assume that the worker expects to relocate once more in the future. From any possible region j, the worker has the option to migrate to region $m \in J$. These are the J options summarised by the option value $\mathcal{O}_j$. Let's now assume that the worker expects to make yet another move from region m to $n \in J$. While staying in j the worker has then a total of $J \times J$ options that will have to be summarised by the option value. More generally, there are J^S options if the worker expects S additional moves subsequent to the initial relocation.

For the quantification of the model, we compute option values for $J \times \Theta$ region-groups and H forecast periods. Hence, the dimensions of the option value are $J \times \theta \times J^S \times H$. At $J = 141$, $\theta = 18$, $H = 1000$, we obtain close to 360 million migration probabilities that enter option values if we set $S = 1$, i.e. worker anticipate one subsequent move. At $S = 2$, this number increases to more than 50 billion, a dimensionality that is not amenable to the three nested iterative solution algorithms forming the dynamic solver introduced in Section D.3.

N.3 Comparison of special cases

In this section, we compare some of the main results of our quantitative analysis for the three special cases introduced in Section N.1.

Transition into the stationary spatial equilibrium. Figure A18 expands on Figure 3 from the main paper by showing the TSE-to-SSE transition path for the two special cases not reported in the main paper. The projections are fairly similar. The main difference to the baseline scenario is that the share of high-skilled workers drops if we account for one sequential move (OV). The restriction to static expectations has similarly minor effects (SP). Pooling across all region-groups, Figure A17 confirms that the speed of convergence from the TSE to SSE is fairly similar in all three special cases.

Figure A17: Spatial convergence: Alternative special cases



(a) Perfect foresight with one sequential move (OV)

(b) Static expectations (SP)

Note: All trends show the sum of absolute deviations from SSE values in an outcome across group-regions. 2017 starting values. Model-based forecasts. OV replicates the results for the special case with one sequential move (includes option value of migration). SP replicates the results for static preferences. The baseline case with perfect foresight and no sequential moves is in Figure A9.

In Table A19, we compare average SSE outcomes (the PF scenario is identical to the SSE in Table 1 in the main paper). For most outcomes, the SSE is virtually identical across all special cases. There are notable differences in the amenity index, which is the population-weighted QoL inverted using the dynamic solver. Allowing for a sequential move, the model rationalises

the data by a higher weighted QoL. Note that the unweighted average QoL ($\bar{A}^{\theta}_{i,t}$) across regions is one by definition (see Eq. (3)). The weighted average density is almost identical across the special cases, revealing a similar population distribution. Hence, the generally higher amenity index in the special case with sequential moves reveals that the model rationalises the data with a higher QoL in the densely populated areas, i.e. the urban QoL premium is greater than in the other special cases. The intuition is straightforward. The urban QoL premium is positive in Germany, even when assuming a competitive spatial equilibrium (see Table 2). Allowing for sequential moves implies that workers migrating into high-QoL urbanised regions expect to relocate to, on average, lower-QoL regions with an expected probability > 0. This depreciates the expected utility at the migration destination relative to the special case in which workers expect to stay put. Therefore, the model rationalises the larger migration flows into high-QoL urbanised regions via an even larger QoL.

Figure A18: Transition from TSE into SSE in Berlin: Varying expectations



Notes: Model-based forecasts using the dynamic solver introduced in Section D.3. 2017 starting values. Yearly gross wage, skill shares and housing consumption are weighted by group shares. NOV is the baseline result from Figure 3 in the main paper. OV replicates the results for the special case with one sequential move (includes option value of migration). SP replicates the results for static preferences.

Spatial QoL differentials. Figure A19 replicates the left panel of Figure 4 in the main paper for the special cases of perfect foresight with one sequential move and static expectations. The figure substantiates the conclusions from Table A19. The spatial distribution of QoL in the case of static expectations closely resembles the baseline case. There is even more dispersion in the spatial case with perfect foresight and one sequential move. The region-level correlations in Figure A20 further substantiate this impression. We conclude that our central finding that spatial QoL differences are much larger once mobility frictions are accounted for does not depend on how we model expectations. In fact, if workers anticipate a subsequent move in their initial migration decision, the inverted spatial QoL differences become even larger than

reported in the main paper.

Table A19: SSE: Varying expectations

Outcome	NOV	OV	SP
Output in bn.	1.056	1.056	1.056
Amenity index	1.639	2.164	1.553
Weighted average density (emp./km^2)	144.462	143.383	144.437
Amenity index, unskilled	2.272	3.142	2.082
Amenity index, skilled	1.414	1.742	1.363
Amenity index, high-skilled	2.218	3.330	2.043
Weighted density, unskilled	161.940	161.198	161.805
Weighted density, skilled	136.149	135.413	136.134
Weighted density, high-skilled	168.040	165.580	168.020
Yearly wage (€), unskilled	23239	23239	23239
Yearly wage (€), skilled	33722	33721	33722
Yearly wage (€), high-skilled	50773	50742	50773
Yearly housing cost (€/m^2), unskilled	133.601	133.452	133.495
Yearly housing cost (€/m^2), skilled	120.420	120.232	120.420
Yearly housing cost (€/m^2), high-skilled	152.752	151.453	152.748
Housing consumption m^2, unskilled	43.656	43.657	43.684
Housing consumption m^2, skilled	70.489	70.528	70.488
Housing consumption m^2, high-skilled	85.577	86.239	85.578

Notes: All SSE values are model-based forecasts of the dynamic solver. QoL index is normalised within-group measure $\bar{A}^{\theta}_{i,t}$, weighted by group-region employment $L^{\theta}_{i,t}$. OV is the special case with perfect foresight and one sequential move. NOV replicates the results for the special case with perfect foresight without sequential moves (the SSE in Table 1). SP replicates the results for the special case with static expectations.

Figure A19: Spatial variation in quality of life: Varying expectations



(a) $\bar{A}_i$, perfect foresight, one sequential move (OV)

(b) $\bar{A}_i$, static expectations (SP)

Note: Unit of observation is 141 labour market areas as defined by Kosfeld and Werner (2012). Group adjustment in auxiliary regressions of ln(QoL) against group and region fixed effects, the latter being shown on the maps. The baseline case with perfect foresight and no sequential moves is in Figure 4 in the main paper.

Counterfactual analysis. In Figure A21, we compare some key outcomes of the counterfactual analysis of the effects of a regional pollution reduction in heavily polluted regions from Section F across the three special cases. The counterfactual effects on wages, rents, and indirect utility are very similar, both in levels and trends. This is an important insight as it suggests that the computationally much less demanding special case with static preferences represents a reasonable approximation for high-dimensional settings.

Figure A20: Correlation in quality of life across special cases



(a) Perfect foresight and sequential move vs. perfect foresight and no sequential moves

(b) Static expectation vs. perfect foresight and no sequential moves

Note: Unit of observation is group-weighted regional QoL level. OV = perfect foresight, one sequential move, NOV = perfect foresight, no sequential move. SP = static expectations.

Figure A21: Counterfactual analysis: Comparison across special cases



(a) Rent Bochum

(b) Rent, Munich

(c) Wage Bochum

(d) Wage Munich

(e) Utility Bochum

(f) Utility Munich

Note: Counterfactual experiment is a QoL increase induced by a pollution reduction in the most polluted regions. See Figure 8 for an illustration. OV = perfect foresight, one sequential move, NOV = perfect foresight, no sequential move. SP = static expectations.

O Quality-of-life rankings

In Table A20, we provide a ranking of regions according to QoL in the spirit of Blomquist et al. (1988) and Albouy (2011). We use the region-level group-mix adjusted QoL measures displayed in Figure 4. Confirming the evidence presented in Section E, DSM-QoL and RR-QoL are closely correlated at the regional level, in logs and ranks (see also Figure A22).

Figure A22: DSM-QoL vs. RR-QoL



(a) Logs

(b) Ranks

Note: Unit of observation is 141 labour market areas as defined by Kosfeld and Werner (2012). Group adjustment in auxilliary regressions of ln quality of life against group and region fixed effects, the latter being shown in figures. Marker size proportionate to employment in local labour market.

Table A20: Quality of life rankings

Labour market	**DSM-QoL Rank**	**DSM-QoL in logs**	**RR-QoL Rank**	**RR-QoL in logs**	**Rank difference**
Berlin	1	1.648	3	0.393	2
München	2	1.563	2	0.438	0
Hamburg	3	1.549	1	0.478	-2
Frankfurt am Main	4	1.366	4	0.303	0
Köln	5	1.097	5	0.281	0
Düsseldorf	6	1.089	7	0.245	1
Stuttgart	7	1.048	14	0.200	7
Hannover	8	0.855	16	0.192	8
Nürnberg	9	0.702	39	0.096	30
Mainz	10	0.647	12	0.209	2
Leipzig	11	0.588	24	0.149	13
Münster	12	0.581	13	0.203	1
Karlsruhe	13	0.578	41	0.081	28
Heidelberg	14	0.563	25	0.146	11
Dresden	15	0.553	8	0.243	-7
Bonn	16	0.538	30	0.124	14
Bremen	17	0.512	57	0.049	40
Ludwigshafen	18	0.507	64	0.026	46
Essen	19	0.494	92	-0.076	73
Freiburg	20	0.467	9	0.239	-11
Bielefeld	21	0.432	61	0.033	40
Ingolstadt	22	0.430	17	0.184	-5
Regensburg	23	0.430	11	0.215	-12
Würzburg	24	0.397	36	0.103	12
Böblingen	25	0.378	31	0.124	6
Koblenz	26	0.374	49	0.060	23
Erlangen	27	0.359	10	0.231	-17
Heilbronn	28	0.355	55	0.055	27
Ravensburg	29	0.350	43	0.076	14
Darmstadt	30	0.341	21	0.160	-9
Dortmund	31	0.339	87	-0.065	56
Ulm	32	0.329	35	0.104	3
Kiel	33	0.328	33	0.112	0
Aachen	34	0.320	38	0.098	4
Augsburg	35	0.320	28	0.131	-7
Gießen	36	0.307	42	0.076	6
Erfurt	37	0.286	45	0.071	8
Kassel	38	0.274	58	0.046	20
Osnabrück	39	0.273	47	0.068	8
Konstanz	40	0.265	6	0.257	-34
Traunstein	41	0.232	20	0.163	-21
Soest	42	0.225	68	0.021	26
Göttingen	43	0.205	34	0.107	-9
Magdeburg	44	0.205	51	0.059	7
Oldenburg	45	0.192	26	0.145	-19
Braunschweig	46	0.168	40	0.082	-6
Rostock	47	0.158	19	0.179	-28
Landshut	48	0.155	29	0.130	-19
Reutlingen	49	0.152	48	0.061	-1
Halle	50	0.138	74	0.004	24

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Labour market	**DSM-QoL Rank**	**DSM-QoL in logs**	**RR-QoL Rank**	**RR-QoL in logs**	**Rank difference**
Bochum	51	0.132	112	-0.143	61
Fulda	52	0.118	52	0.059	0
Bamberg	53	0.117	15	0.200	-38
Aschaffenburg	54	0.109	27	0.135	-27
Saarbrücken	55	0.078	77	-0.016	22
Trier	56	0.074	22	0.160	-34
Chemnitz	57	0.068	108	-0.131	51
Heidenheim	58	0.044	76	-0.015	18
Kempten	59	0.032	59	0.044	0
Lübeck	60	0.029	66	0.023	6
Ortenaukreis	61	0.029	62	0.032	1
Rottweil	62	0.001	85	-0.052	23
Minden	63	-0.001	97	-0.085	34
Wolfsburg	64	-0.007	54	0.057	-10
Hagen	65	-0.009	111	-0.142	46
Schwerin	66	-0.021	65	0.025	-1
Teltow-Fläming	67	-0.032	37	0.100	-30
Schweinfurt	68	-0.035	75	-0.002	7
Jena	69	-0.037	32	0.112	-37
Weilheim-Schongau	70	-0.066	23	0.153	-47
Bayreuth	71	-0.070	60	0.042	-11
Vechta	72	-0.084	44	0.074	-28
Märkisch-Oderland	73	-0.095	18	0.182	-55
Emsland	74	-0.114	93	-0.077	19
Göppingen	75	-0.114	69	0.020	-6
Wuppertal	76	-0.117	131	-0.200	55
Olpe	77	-0.120	118	-0.169	41
Pforzheim	78	-0.122	84	-0.038	6
Lörrach	79	-0.123	50	0.060	-29
Schwäbisch Hall	80	-0.149	70	0.011	-10
Borken	81	-0.179	67	0.021	-14
Kaiserslautern	82	-0.194	88	-0.066	6
Limburg-Weilburg	83	-0.195	98	-0.092	15
Memmingen	84	-0.197	56	0.053	-28
Potsdam-Mittelmark	85	-0.202	104	-0.106	19
Altötting	86	-0.211	71	0.009	-15
Amberg	87	-0.213	91	-0.074	4
Emden	88	-0.216	126	-0.185	38
Siegen	89	-0.220	103	-0.103	14
Frankfurt (Oder)	90	-0.231	95	-0.082	5
Deggendorf	91	-0.234	53	0.059	-38
Landau	92	-0.239	72	0.009	-20
Oberhavel	93	-0.251	46	0.069	-47
Bad Kreuznach	94	-0.253	83	-0.037	-11
Flensburg	95	-0.258	110	-0.138	15
Waldshut	96	-0.261	63	0.027	-33
Cottbus	97	-0.268	80	-0.031	-17
Passau	98	-0.273	81	-0.032	-17
Bautzen	99	-0.289	132	-0.217	33
Ansbach	100	-0.305	94	-0.082	-6

– Table continued from previous page

Labour market	**DSM-QoL Rank**	**DSM-QoL in logs**	**RR-QoL Rank**	**RR-QoL in logs**	**Rank difference**
Goslar	101	-0.307	120	-0.173	19
Coburg	102	-0.308	73	0.005	-29
Nordvorpommern	103	-0.315	79	-0.031	-24
Pirmasens	104	-0.336	102	-0.101	-2
Elbe-Elster	105	-0.336	107	-0.125	2
Kleve	106	-0.346	100	-0.093	-6
Ostprignitz-Ruppin	107	-0.349	82	-0.035	-25
Celle	108	-0.365	90	-0.074	-18
Donau-Ries	109	-0.367	78	-0.021	-31
Dessau-Roßlau	110	-0.369	124	-0.180	14
Mecklenburgische Seenplatte	111	-0.380	109	-0.136	-2
Bremerhaven	112	-0.392	127	-0.186	15
Stade	113	-0.401	89	-0.071	-24
Gera	114	-0.409	122	-0.178	8
Weißenburg-Gunzenhausen	115	-0.414	101	-0.099	-14
Suhl	116	-0.427	119	-0.173	3
Cham	117	-0.446	86	-0.062	-31
Südvorpommern	118	-0.475	105	-0.107	-13
Hof	119	-0.500	141	-0.413	22
Hameln	120	-0.505	121	-0.178	1
Eisenach	121	-0.508	114	-0.150	-7
Saalfeld-Rudolstadt	122	-0.509	117	-0.165	-5
Wilhelmshaven	123	-0.511	135	-0.239	12
Zollernalbkreis	124	-0.530	123	-0.179	-1
Uckermark	125	-0.533	106	-0.121	-19
Nordhausen	126	-0.537	99	-0.093	-27
Lüchow-Dannenberg	127	-0.544	113	-0.148	-14
Altenkirchen	128	-0.547	125	-0.181	-3
Havelland	129	-0.577	136	-0.241	7
Waldeck-Frankenberg	130	-0.584	139	-0.299	9
Dithmarschen	131	-0.589	96	-0.082	-35
Stendal	132	-0.608	128	-0.191	-4
Sigmaringen	133	-0.621	115	-0.150	-18
Bitburg	134	-0.624	116	-0.156	-18
Freyung-Grafenau	135	-0.655	133	-0.218	-2
Höxter	136	-0.676	134	-0.229	-2
Vulkaneifel	137	-0.688	129	-0.192	-8
Kronach	138	-0.689	130	-0.198	-8
Uelzen	139	-0.701	137	-0.244	-2
Unstrut-Hainich	140	-0.735	138	-0.282	-2
Prignitz	141	-0.777	140	-0.340	-1

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The Role of Local Public Goods for Gender Gaps in the Spatial Economy

Abstract

We assess the role of local public goods provision for gender gaps in the labour market. We find that higher fiscal revenues of local governments are associated with decreasing gender employment gaps in German labour market areas because it decreases labour supply for male workers at a higher rate than for female workers. The results are robust when we include instrumental variables that address the endogeneity of local public goods provision. To assess the impact of fiscal transfers across regions on gender gaps we quantify a spatial general equilibrium model with multiple types of workers, who are differently affected by local public goods provision in their labour supply decision. We find that transfers reduce disparities across regions. This goes along with smaller gender gaps in employment in treated regions because female workers are disproportionately pulled into market work and regions with low productivity.

A Introduction

Despite substantial convergence in labour market outcomes across gender over the last decades, there are still wide discrepancies between male and female workers, especially concerning their labour market attachment (Goldin, 2014). To better accommodate female labour supply, many governments invest massively in their public childcare infrastructure (Blau and Currie, 2006; Olivetti and Petrongolo, 2017). Local governments, however, often lack sufficient fiscal resources to invest in the provision of public goods, such as child care. As a result, many countries shift substantial public resources across jurisdictions (Henkel et al., 2021) to ease budget constraints and provide public goods at the local level. These circumstances raise several important questions: What is the role of local public goods in explaining spatial differences in male-to-female employment rates (henceforth, gender employment gaps)? How does the provision of local public goods affect the distribution of economic activity across space? What are the aggregate consequences of public policies for welfare and gender gaps?

In this paper, we study these issues by investigating the impact of local tax revenues after redistribution (henceforth, fiscal capacities) on gender employment gaps and the distribution of economic activity across German labour markets. Our analysis consists of three parts. In the first part, we develop a quantitative spatial model with heterogeneous workers and intergovernmental transfers. The theoretical model features selective sorting across local labour markets and sectors as well as extensive labour supply decisions of female and male workers. In the second part, we employ individual employment and wage data from social security records, together with unique data on tax revenues and transfers at the local level, to structurally estimate the model parameters. In particular, we use infrastructure investments in local childcare as instruments for local fiscal capacities to assess the effect of local public goods provision on the labour supply decisions of heterogeneous workers in the spatial economy. The third step concerns policy analysis: we use the estimated parameters and the model structure to simulate counterfactual policy experiments. In a scenario without fiscal equalization, there are substantial shocks to fiscal capacities because solely tax revenues at the local level finance the provision of public goods. In doing so, we quantify the aggregate economic consequences from local public goods provision on the employment decisions of female and male workers and characterize the spatial implications of fiscal transfers for gender employment gaps.

Identifying the effects of fiscal capacity shocks on employment rates is challenging. Theoretically, there are different channels through which changes in local tax revenues and public goods provision could affect the labour supply decision of heterogeneous workers. On the one hand, there is a trade-off between public goods provision and labour force participation. Financing local public goods requires higher tax rates, which disincentivizes workers to supply labour by decreasing real wage income (henceforth, the "income effect"). On the other hand, there is a long empirical literature (see "Related Literature" below) that documents how a higher provision of different components of local public goods may increase labour force participation, especially for female workers (henceforth, the "substitution effect"). For example, a higher availability or affordability of public childcare increases the opportunity costs of young parents to raise their children privately and facilitates their return to the workplace (Blau and Currie, 2006). In our theoretical framework, each worker, therefore, faces an individual-specific trade-off between remaining in the home-market sector and supplying labour because employment is costly, or workers dislike to work (Fajgelbaum et al., 2019; Chauvin, 2018). As a shortcut to the substitution effect, we further allow this trade-off to depend on the level of local public goods, such that higher public goods provision pulls workers into employment.

From a theoretical point of view, it is unclear which of these effects dominate such that the total impact of fiscal shocks on local employment rates is ambiguous ex-ante. First, higher tax rates are likely to reduce employment for female and male workers via the income effect. However, when only higher fiscal transfers shift fiscal revenues, local labour force participation rates are not affected as workers in donor regions bear the tax burden. Third, the substitution effect could attenuate the initial negative employment effect. Furthermore,

as long as the substitution effect is substantially higher for female than male workers, higher public good provision is likely to adversely affect female employment to a smaller extent than for male workers, reducing gender employment gaps. Fourth, by affecting the relative attractiveness of a region, fiscal shocks induce workers to move to other locations. In our theoretical model, only employed workers are free to move across space and sectors, whereas non-employed workers receive cash transfers that constrain them to their place of residence. As long as migration responses are higher for male workers (Ahlfeldt et al., 2020), positive fiscal capacity shocks are then likely to increase gender employment gaps. Besides, the spatial economy might be affected by various externalities that individuals do not recognize when making location decisions. For instance, individuals overlook their impact on others via different agglomeration and congestion forces as well as of their labour supply decision on the provision of public goods. By reducing over-congestion in cities and pulling female workers into market work, public policies that are location-specific may therefore actually mitigate rather than exacerbate misallocations and gender employment gaps.

We take our model to the data to investigate the employment effects of local public goods provision and fiscal transfers in practice. The quantification of the model is demanding because it requires us to break down tax revenues from several governmental layers (Federal, States, and local municipalities) to the local level and identify the actual degree of fiscal transfers (within and between the Federal States). To obtain empirical proxies of the average tax and transfer rates, we follow Henkel et al. (2021) to compute for every district local tax revenues before and after redistribution (and hence net transfers). Our approach assigns these aggregate variables to the 141 German local labour markets (*Arbeitsmarktregionen*) and relates them to local value-added. Our numbers suggest that despite substantial redistribution of around 10 percent of aggregate tax revenues per year, there are wide discrepancies of local fiscal capacities per capita across local labour markets. Peripheral regions (especially in former East Germany) have higher fiscal capacities per capita. For example, in Berlin, annual fiscal revenues per capita exceed $12,000$ euros. Rural regions in western and southern Germany comprising the set of net contributors tend to have resources at their disposal that are up to 20 percent smaller (or $2,500$ Euro per annum and inhabitant).

To structurally estimate the gender-specific impact of local public goods on (non-) employment rates, we leverage the time variation within German labour market areas' employment rates induced by fiscal capacity shocks. The German setting is ideal to analyze the effect of fiscal shocks on gender-specific employment since there is substantial remaining variance in gender-specific employment rates across local labour markets. Most importantly, the spatial variation in transfers across the 141 German local labour markets is not affected by gender-specific employment outcomes. Time-varying preference shocks, however, pose a challenge for causal identification. They would shift out local labour supply and correlate with fiscal capacity as well as price level shocks. Building upon Fajgelbaum et al. (2019) and Colas and Hutchinson (2021) we, therefore, construct two

sets of instrumental variables to address these endogeneity concerns: First, we use time variation in the inverse-distance-weighted average of childcare rates in all neighbouring regions to construct an instrument. Furthermore, we leverage the variation in exposure to national tax revenue shocks by tax type (for example, housing, VAT, business, or income tax revenues) across labour market regions to construct Bartik-style instruments.

Our IV estimates imply that a positive fiscal capacity shock affects labour supply of female and male workers differently. The substitution effect almost cancels out the income effect for female workers and is fifty percent larger than the male workers' estimate. In other words, increases in employment rates for male workers are subdued in regions that experience large increases in local fiscal revenues, but female labour force participation is barely affected by fiscal capacity shocks. As a result, the IV estimates predict declining gender employment gaps in response to positive fiscal capacity shocks. Our estimates imply that an increase in fiscal capacity per capita by 1 percent decreases differences in male-to-female non-employment by about 1.22 percent. As a result, the average real tax revenue increase of about 14 percent between the years 2008 to 2014, our main observation period, decreased non-employment gaps in local labour markets by around 1.34 percentage points (relative to an initial non-employment gap of on average 7.86 percentage points in 2008).

In our counterfactual scenario, where we abolish the fiscal transfer system, we observe migration out of the former recipient and towards the former donor regions. In parallel, we find smaller gender employment gaps but larger wage gaps compared to the initial equilibrium. With our baseline specification, our counterfactual simulations imply that gender employment gaps would increase by 2.6% in former recipient regions (mainly in Eastern Germany), and wage gaps increase by 0.1% in the transition to a new long-run spatial equilibrium. The biggest metropolitan areas such as Frankfurt or Munich would see decreases in employment gaps, whereas wage gaps increase for all regions. We find that welfare slightly decreases between the two equilibria. Summing up, our baseline counterfactual suggests that fiscal redistribution of local tax revenues tends to (marginally) widen overall gender employment gaps in employment.

Related literature. Recent empirical literature documents how a higher provision of different components of local public goods increases labour force participation, especially of female workers. Indeed most of the empirical literature tends to find significant positive effects of the availability of public childcare facilities on labour supply decisions, particularly of young mothers (see Blau and Currie (2006) and Olivetti and Petrongolo (2017) for an overview). Besides, public spending on nursing home places for the elderly has positive employment effects for older women since they are more likely to care for their elderly relatives (Bolin et al., 2008; Carmichael and Charles, 2003; Crespo and Mira, 2014). Finally, investments in public transport infrastructure via decreased commuting costs (Le Barbanchon et al., 2021; Black et al., 2014; Liu and Su, 2021), faster broadband internet facilitating working from home and increasing worker productivity (Dettling, 2017; Bloom

et al., 2015; Burstein et al., 2019), health care through improving access to fertility treatment (Moreno-Maldonado and Santamaria, 2021), or access to job centers (Kunze and Troske, 2012) may have higher positive employment effects for female workers. This paper bridges a gap between this empirical literature, which credibly identifies causal effects of public policies on extensive labour supply, and general equilibrium models, which allow making predictions about counterfactual outcomes and welfare in the spatial economy.

In doing so, this paper adds to the literature on quantitative spatial models. It builds upon the class of quantitative spatial models featuring occupational sorting under worker heterogeneity and type-specific comparative advantage (Burstein et al., 2019, 2020; Hsieh et al., 2019; Lagakos and Waugh, 2013; Lee, 2020). But, we extend this framework in two directions: First, we add regional sorting of heterogeneous workers to incorporate recent advances in the quantitative spatial economics literature (Allen and Arkolakis, 2014; Ahlfeldt et al., 2015; Monte et al., 2018; Bryan and Morten, 2018; Heblich et al., 2020). More importantly, in this paper, we model the extensive labour supply decisions of heterogeneous workers. In our setting, female workers disproportionally profit from increases in local fiscal capacities and the provision of local public goods by pulling them into employment. So far, the literature mainly abstracts from non-employment, while incorporating it affects the policy implications drawn from public policies (Bilal, 2020).

Besides the already mentioned literature, our paper also closely relates to the literature on the effect of local taxes and transfers on the spatial sorting of workers (Bastani et al., 2020; Colas and Hutchinson, 2021; Fajgelbaum and Gaubert, 2020) and firms (Fajgelbaum et al., 2019; Serrato and Zidar, 2016). The effect of fiscal capacity shocks on employment is closest to the macroeconomic literature using geographic variation in fiscal expenditures over time to estimate multipliers. Chodorow-Reich (2019) gives a thorough review of the literature, which mainly covers the 2008 crisis and the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act. Another strand of literature has focused on the spillovers of local public employment on private sector employment driven by increases in local expenditures (Faggio and Overman, 2014; Moretti, 2010; Guillouzouic et al., 2021) or local amenity spillovers as in Becker et al. (2021). In this paper, we argue that the employment effects of fiscal shocks may be higher for female than male workers. It has been widely documented in the literature that different selection and sorting of male and female workers account for a large part of the remaining gender gaps across local labour markets and occupations (see Blau and Kahn (2017); Olivetti and Petrongolo (2014) and Black and Spitz-Oehner (2010); Calvo et al. (2021) for Germany). However, the aggregate implication of the allocation of female and male workers across local labour markets and market sectors for the economy remains unclear. We add to this literature by showing how the provision of public goods affects selection and gender convergence in general equilibrium.

The rest of the paper reads as follows. Section B describes the institutional setting of local public goods provision and fiscal equalization in Germany. Further, it presents empirical evidence on a negative relationship between gender employment gaps and fiscal capacities at the local level. We introduce the spatial model with heterogeneous agents

and fiscal transfers in Section C. Section D describes our data Section, while section E explains how we quantify the model for Germany. The counterfactual analysis is presented in Section F and Section G concludes.

B Institutional Background and Motivating Facts

Article 28 of the German constitution provides the legal basis for regulating local public goods provision in Germany. It guarantees cities, municipalities, and districts the right of local self-government. As a result, they care for everything that neither the 16 State governments (the "Länder") nor the Federal government are responsible for. At the same time, federal or state laws regulate that the municipalities have to provide their citizens with specific public goods. These include, for example, childcare, elementary schools, drinking, and sewage supply, energy and waste management, a fire department, municipal elections, and social institutions. More specifically, municipalities have to build and maintain a sufficient number of kindergartens, nurseries, schools and other child care facilities, but how they do this is their own decision. The financial needs of municipalities then depend on the size and demographic composition of their population.

Figure 1: Public goods provision and local fiscal capacities per capita



(a) Public goods provision

(b) Childcare provision

Note: Panel (a) plots an aggregate measure of local public goods provision against fiscal capacity per capita, normalized by the working-age population in 2008 and demeaned by their yearly average. Panel (b) links fiscal capacities per capita to a measure of childcare provision. We use available tax revenues after fiscal redistribution to measure fiscal capacities. Local tax revenues and transfer payments are based on our calculations. We follow the approach in Henkel et al. (2021) to calculate fiscal capacities as the sum of local tax revenues before redistribution and regional transfer payments (that is negative for donors and positive for recipients). Public goods and childcare provision are the outcomes of a first principal component analysis on different measures of public good provision, including, among others, various measures of local public childcare in nurseries and kindergartens, access to fast broadband internet, public transport, and highway infrastructure, as well as investment in retirement homes, local recreational areas, or waste management. See section D of the main paper for details. The size of the marker is proportional to the regional population size in 2008. Data comes from INKAR (2020) and Statistisches Bundesamt (2021b,a); Statistische Ämter des Bundes und der Länder (2021).

Lower fiscal revenues limit municipalities in providing local public goods, whereas larger fiscal capacities allow higher public spending. Panel (a) of Figure 1 highlights this

relationship. Fiscal capacities per capita are normalized by the working-age population in 2008 and demeaned by their yearly average. The positive relationship indicates that a higher budget of local governments allows providing more public goods. When fiscal budgets are tight, there is no alternative but to save on the provision and maintenance of local public goods, like libraries, swimming pools, parks, youth centers, nurseries, and retirement homes.[1] As a case in point, Panel (b) of Figure 1 highlights the importance of sufficient fiscal capacities for local governments to provide public childcare.

Figure 2: Spatial disparities



(a) Fiscal capacities per capita (b) Gender employment gaps

Notes: This figure plots the geographical pattern of fiscal capacities per capita in Panel (a) and of employment gaps in Panel (b) across the 141 German local labour markets (Kosfeld and Werner, 2012) for the years 2008 – 2014. We follow the approach in Henkel et al. (2021) to calculate fiscal capacities as the sum of local tax revenues before redistribution and regional transfer payments (that is, negative for donors and positive for recipients). The gender employment gap measures male-to-female employment rates. The employment rate measures the number of female (male) workers in the labour force relative to the total number of females (males) in the working-age population (15-65 years). Data comes from the INKAR (2020) database. Darker shading indicates higher values.

To ensure that the local jurisdictions have sufficient fiscal capacities the Federal government and States distribute tax revenues across the different government layers and allocate them to the single States and municipalities according to a complicated set of rules. The legal basis provides Article 72 of the German Constitution according to which living conditions should be "equivalent" across the country. But, despite large-scale fiscal

[1] The financial situation of some municipalities deteriorated when Germany introduced the so-called "Schuldenbremse" in 2009. Since then, Article 109 of the German constitution explicitly prescribes the principle of a balanced budget without net borrowing in a given year for the federal and state governments. Moreover, Article 115 of the Constitution limits net borrowing at the federal level to 0.35 % of national GDP; see Busch and Strehl (2019) for an overview.

transfers from the Federal government to the States and local jurisdictions in the size of around 53.5 billion Euro per year (that is 10 percent of the aggregate tax revenue), there are still profound and persistent spatial disparities (see Henkel et al. (2021)). Panel (a) of Figure 2 shows considerable variation in the local tax revenues per capita after redistribution - both across and within States. As can be seen, the fiscal equalization scheme in Germany endows peripheral regions (especially in former East Germany) with higher fiscal capacities per capita. Here, annual local tax revenues per capita exceed 12,000 euros (for example, in Berlin, the nation's capital). By contrast, rural regions in western and southern Germany tend to have fiscal resources that are up to 20 percent smaller (or 2,500 Euro per annum and inhabitant).

Figure 3: Gender employment gaps and local fiscal capacities per capita



(a) Employment gaps

(b) Non-Employment gaps

Note: This figure plots demeaned log (non-)employment gaps (relative to the regional and year specific mean) against the identically demeaned fiscal capacity per capita. Both variables are normalized by the working-age population in 2008. Fiscal capacities measure available tax revenues after fiscal redistribution. Local tax revenues and transfer payments are based on own our calculations. We follow the approach in Henkel et al. (2021) to calculate fiscal capacities as the sum of local tax revenues before redistribution and regional transfer payments (that is, negative for donors and positive for recipients). The gender (non-)employment gap measures male-to-female (non-)employment rates. The employment rate measures the number of female (male) workers in the labour force relative to the total number of females (males) in the working-age population (15-65 years) in the local labour market. The size of the marker is proportional to the regional population size in 2008. Data comes from INKAR (2020) and Statistisches Bundesamt (2021b,a); Statistische Ämter des Bundes und der Länder (2021).

At the same time, as Panel (b) of Figure 2 documents, there are still substantial differences in gender employment gaps across German local labour markets. Female employment rates are higher in the Eastern and Southern parts of Germany. For example, rates exceed 84 percent along the Swiss border leading to lower gender employment gaps. Some cities of the Ruhr Area, on the other hand, have far lower female employment rates and higher gender employment gaps, for example, Bochum with less than 70 % of women in employment.

Besides these profound disparities, there exists a negative (positive) relationship between fiscal capacities per capita and gender (non-)employment gaps across German local labour markets. Figure 5 shows that gender (non-)employment gaps decrease (increase)

in fiscal capacity per capita. It plots the gender (non-)employment gaps against fiscal capacity per capita, normalized by the working-age population in 2008. Both variables are demeaned by their 2008-2014 regional mean and set relative to the yearly average. Figure 1 in the Online Appendix H shows the underlying employment effects for female and male workers separately.

Identifying a causal effect imposes one fundamental challenge: the change in local fiscal capacities must be exogenous to labour supply shocks. In the empirical part of the paper, we address this endogeneity concern by using several instrumental variables on the regional level. In the next section, we move forward and set up a quantitative model featuring heterogeneous workers that react differently to fiscal revenue shocks and local public goods provision in extensive labour supply to motivate our empirical approach and the choice of instrumental variables.

C A Quantitative Spatial Model with Extensive Labour Supply of Heterogeneous Workers

We develop a quantitative spatial general equilibrium model featuring sorting of heterogeneous workers across local labour markets (Diamond, 2016; Rossi-Hansberg et al., 2019), local governments supplying local public goods (Fajgelbaum et al., 2019; Henkel et al., 2021), and extensive labour supply decisions of heterogeneous worker groups (Chauvin, 2018) in a unified framework. We add selection into occupational sectors based on comparative advantage or type-specific preferences (Hsieh et al., 2019; Burstein et al., 2020).

The economy consists of J regions and S sectors (one of which is the home market sector). There is a continuous mass of workers L in the economy with a total number of L^g workers bound to a specific type $g \in G$. After deciding whether to work in any of the M market sectors, employed workers move freely across regions and sectors. They decide on the workplace depending on where to achieve the highest utility given each worker's level of human capital and preferences.

C.1 Workers

Preferences. Each worker ω of type g derives utility from the consumption of local final goods, local public goods, and from working and living in a given region $i \in J$ and sector $s \in S$. To maximize utility the budget-constrained worker chooses consumption bundles $C_{i,su}$ of local final consumption goods at prices $P_{i,u}$ in all market sectors $u \in \{1, ..., M\}$ according to

$$V^g_{i,s}(\omega) \equiv \max_{\{C^g_{i,su}(\omega)\}_{u=1}^M} \eta^g_{i,s} \left(\frac{R_i}{L_i^\chi}\right)^\alpha \left[\prod_{u=1}^M (C^g_{i,su}(\omega))^{\beta_u}\right]^{1-\alpha} \quad \text{s.t.} \quad \sum_{u=1}^M P_{i,u} C^g_{i,su}(\omega) = I^g_{i,s}(\omega),$$

with shares β_u over the consumption of local final goods satisfying $\sum_{u \in M} \beta_u = 1$. $\eta^g_{i,s}$ is

a region-sector-specific preference component varying across worker types. R_i/L_i^{χ} denotes the utility derived from a local public good R_i in region i, where α is the preference weight of the government sector and $\chi \in (0,1)$ governs the extent of public goods rivalry.

Consumption. Denoting as $I_{i,s}^g(\omega)$ the after-tax income of worker ω employed in region i and sector s we solve for the competitive equilibrium allocation for this problem, such that

$$C_{i,su}^g(\omega) = \beta_u \frac{I_{i,s}^g(\omega)}{P_{i,u}}, \tag{1}$$

which is increasing in individual income but decreasing in local prices.

Preference shifters. The preference shifter $\eta_{i,s}^g$ is a function of a component common to workers in all sectors, which we term "amenities" A_i^g, as well as a region-sector-specific part, such that

$$\eta_{i,s}^g = A_i^g \exp\left[-\mu_{i,s}^g\right]. \tag{2}$$

We assume that workers in region i incur positive sector-specific participation costs $\mu_{i,s}^g \geq 0$ in terms of utility units when joining either of the sectors. Staying in the home market sector imposes no participation costs, such that we normalize $\mu_{i,h}^g = 0$ for all regions $i \in J$ and groups $g \in G$. To account for the fact that workers of different gender have varying preferences for regions (Ahlfeldt et al., 2020) and occupations (Wiswall and Zafar (2018)), we allow amenities and participation costs to differ by worker group. Theoretically, this may come from gender-specific differences in the preferences for flexible hours (Erosa et al. (2017); Wasserman (2019), non-convexities of hourly labour supply (Cha and Weeden, 2014; Cubas et al., 2019)), or the possibility of working from home (Dingel and Neiman (2020)).

Substituting the equilibrium values from (1) in the utility function, we can write the indirect utility for a worker ω of type g working in occupation s and living in region i as a function of the real wage, local public goods and the preference parameter $\eta_{i,s}^g$:

$$V_{i,s}^g(\omega) = \eta_{i,s}^g \left(\frac{R_i}{L_i^{\chi}}\right)^{\alpha} \left[\frac{I_{i,s}^g(\omega)}{P_i}\right]^{1-\alpha}, \tag{3}$$

with $P_i = \prod_{u=1}^{M} (P_{i,u}/\beta_u)^{\beta_u}$ the region-specific price index.

C.2 Market sectors

In a first stage, all workers decide on whether to join the labour force or remain in the home market sector, incorporating an optimal choice of employment in any of the $N * M$ heterogeneous region-sector pairs in the second stage. This modelling choice endogenizes the

local number of workers in the home market $L^g_{i,h}$ and the market sectors $L^g_{i,m}$. Aggregate labour market clearing ensures that

$$L^g = \sum_{i \in J} \left(L^g_{i,h} + L^g_{i,m} \right) = \sum_{i \in J} \left(L^g_{i,h} + \sum_{s \in M} L^g_{i,s} \right).$$

Heterogeneous human capital. Employed workers of a given type differ with respect to their individual-specific human capital level. In the following we denote the idiosyncratic human capital level of a worker of type g living and working in region i and sector s as $\Psi^g_{i,s}(\omega) \equiv \Psi^g_d(\omega)$. The human capital level is composed of the individual ability level $a \in \mathcal{A}$ of each worker, and the acquired education level $e \in \mathcal{E}$. The distribution of individual-specific ability a does not differ across workers of different types g. Workers of different types, however, differ with respect to their opportunity costs of acquiring human capital for working in specific sectors. Hence, we model the heterogeneity of employed workers as the result of random human capital draws coming from a type-specific Fréchet distribution:

$$F^g(\tilde{\Psi}_1, ..., \tilde{\Psi}_D) = \exp\left\{ -\sum_{s=1}^{S} \sum_{i=1}^{J} [\tilde{\Psi}_{i,s}]^{-\theta^g} \right\}, \tag{4}$$

with $\theta^g > 1$ and $\tilde{\Psi}_{i,s} = \Psi^{1-\alpha}_{i,s}$. The shape parameter of the Fréchet distribution governs the dispersion of random human capital draws inside each region-sector pair. For high values of θ^g there is low variance in the idiosyncratic draws. The parameter θ^g then governs the size of *within-type comparative advantage* in the spirit of Eaton and Kortum (2002).

Selection and Sorting. After having decided on whether to join the labour force, each employed worker ω of type g receives human capital draws for all market sectors according to distribution (4). Associated with these human capital draws is a level of potential wages in each sector and region. Next, given their human capital draws and the preference shifters for all region-sector pairs $\{i, s\}$ all employed workers jointly and simultaneously decide to move to the specific occupation s and local labor market i that maximizes their utility (3), such that worker ω's indirect utility after selection and sorting is $\mathcal{V}^g_{i,s}(\omega) = \max_{i \in N, s \in S} V^g_{i,s}(\omega)$.

Worker Compensation. The wage income of employed workers is given by

$$W^g_{i,s}(\omega) \equiv \tilde{w}^g_{i,s} T^g_{i,s} \Psi^g_{i,s}(\omega), \tag{5}$$

where $T^g_{i,s} > 0$ governs the average human capital of workers of type g in region i for sector s and $\tilde{w}^g_{i,s}$ is the wage per effective unit of labour. To account for the fact that female and male workers might differ concerning their average educational level in some region-sector pairs, we allow the average human capital levels to differ across gender (Greenwood et al., 2016).

Using the properties of the Fréchet distribution, average wages of employed workers in sector s and local labor market i are given by

$$W_{i,s}^{g} \equiv E\left[\left(W_{i,s}^{g}(\omega)\right)^{1-\alpha}\right]^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha}} = E[\tilde{\Psi}_{i,s}^{g}(\omega)]^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha}} T_{i,s}^{g} \tilde{w}_{i,s}^{g}$$
$$= H_{i,s}^{g} \tilde{w}_{i,s}^{g} = \left(\gamma^{g}\left[\frac{\left(T_{i,s}^{g}\tilde{w}_{i,s}^{g}\right)^{(1-\alpha)\theta^{g}}}{(L_{i,s}^{g}/L_{m}^{g})}\right]^{\frac{1}{\theta^{g}}}\right)^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha}},$$

where $\gamma^{g} = \Gamma\left((\theta^{g}-1)/\theta^{g}\right)$, $\Gamma(\cdot)$ denotes the Gamma function and $L_{i,s}^{g}/L_{m}^{g}$ represents the allocation of employed labour across sectors and local labour markets.

Average wages increase in the average human capital and wages per efficiency unit but decrease in the share of workers. This negative selection effect describes how changes in the within-type composition affect the average human capital level. A higher between-type comparative advantage $T_{i,s}^{g}$ attracts more workers, but also from the lower parts of the human capital distribution. As a result, the average human capital level $H_{i,s}^{g}$ decreases in the share of workers self-selecting into occupation s in region i (see Appendix I.1 for details). Wage income is taxed at the local rate $\mathcal{T}_i$ in region i to finance local public goods as well as transfers, such that after-tax income of employed workers is $I_{i,s}^{g}(\omega) = (1-\mathcal{T}_i)\, W_{i,s}^{g}(\omega)$.

Expected utility. Using the fact that the maximum of a Fréchet-distributed random variable is itself Fréchet distributed, we derive the expected indirect utility of type-g workers in the market sectors as

$$\mathcal{V}^{g} = \Gamma\left(\frac{\theta^{g}-1}{\theta^{g}}\right)\left(\sum_{s\in M}\sum_{i\in J}\left[\left((1-\mathcal{T}_i)\,\tilde{w}_{i,s}^{g} T_{i,s}^{g}\,(P_i)^{-1}\right)^{1-\alpha}\eta_{i,s}^{g} R_i^{\alpha} L_i^{-\chi\alpha}\right]^{\theta^{g}}\right)^{\frac{1}{\theta^{g}}}, \quad (6)$$

which is increasing in real wages, local public goods, and preference shifters in all region-sector pairs. Perfect worker mobility ensures that expected utility in the market sectors is equalized everywhere in the economy.

Labor supply. Given the assumptions on the functional form of the human capital distribution, we get closed-form solutions for labour supply in spatial equilibrium. The

number of workers of type g employed in region i and market sector s is:[2]

$$L_{i,s}^{g} = \frac{\left[\left(\left(1-\mathcal{T}_i\right)\tilde{w}_{i,s}^{g}T_{i,s}^{g}\left(P_i\right)^{-1}\right)^{1-\alpha}\eta_{i,s}^{g}R_i^{\alpha}L_i^{-\chi\alpha}\right]^{\theta^g}}{\sum_{s\in M}\sum_{i\in J}\left[\left(\left(1-\mathcal{T}_i\right)\tilde{w}_{i,s}^{g}T_{i,s}^{g}\left(P_i\right)^{-1}\right)^{1-\alpha}\eta_{i,s}^{g}R_i^{\alpha}L_i^{-\chi\alpha}\right]^{\theta^g}}L_m^g. \tag{7}$$

The attractiveness of region-sector pairs increases in type-specific preferences $\eta_{i,s}^{g}$, local public goods, and real wages, which in turn are a function of average human capital, wages per efficiency unit, and regional price levels.

C.3 Home market sector

In the first stage, all workers L^g decide whether to work in one of the M market sectors or the home market sector. All workers $L_h^g = \sum_{i\in J} L_{i,h}^g$ in the home market sector receive a cash transfer $\bar{I} > 0$ from their local government instead of a market wage. The transfers for non-employed workers are assumed to be constant across labour markets as well as groups of workers and can be used for local consumption. Non-employed workers who switch regions get no cash transfer from local governments and in turn cannot consume, which ensures that it is never worthwhile for them to move across local labour markets.

Extensive labour supply Building upon eq. (3) the indirect utility of home market workers of type g in region i is given as

$$V_{i,h}^{g}(\omega) = \eta_{i,s}^{g}\left(\frac{\bar{I}}{P_i}\right)^{1-\alpha}\left(\frac{R_i}{L_i^{\chi}}\right)^{\alpha}\varphi_i^{g}\left(\omega\right) = A_i^{g}\left(\frac{\bar{I}}{P_i}\right)^{1-\alpha}\left(\frac{R_i}{L_i^{\chi}}\right)^{\alpha}\varphi_i^{g}\left(\omega\right), \tag{8}$$

where we assume that the indirect utility of home market workers is shifted by an individual preference shifter $\varphi_i^g(\omega)$. Workers join the home market sector as long as achievable indirect utility (8) exceeds expected utility in the market sectors (6), such that there exists a unique local cut-off level for preference shocks $\bar{\varphi}_i^g$ below which all workers join the labour force:

$$\bar{\varphi}_i^{g} = \frac{\mathcal{V}^g}{A_i^{g}\left(\frac{\bar{I}}{P_i}\right)^{1-\alpha}\left(\frac{R_i}{L_i^{\chi}}\right)^{\alpha}}. \tag{9}$$

Intuitively the cut-off increases in the size of wages, amenities, and public goods in all regions and sectors of the economy relative to those amenities and public goods achievable in region i. Worker groups with high average wages have higher cut-offs, leading to fewer workers in the home market sector.

Idiosyncratic preferences are drawn from a Pareto distribution with a gender-specific

[2]The probabilities in (7) follow a similar form as the choice probabilities in discrete choice models under Generalized Extreme Value (GEV) distributions (Mcfadden, 1974). See section I.1 in the Online Appendix for details.

cumulative distribution function and gender-region-specific scale parameter $B^g_{i,h}$:

$$G^g(\varphi) = 1 - \left(\frac{\varphi}{B^g_{i,h}}\right)^{-\epsilon^g},$$

with $\epsilon^g, B^g_{i,h} > 0$. Under these functional assumptions, the extensive labour supply of all types of workers in the market sectors is given as:

$$L^g_{i,m} = G^g(\bar{\varphi}^g_i) L^g_i = \left[1 - \left(\frac{\mathcal{V}^g}{A^g_i B^g_{i,h} \left(\frac{\bar{I}}{P_i}\right)^{1-\alpha} \left(\frac{R_i}{L^X_i}\right)^{\alpha}}\right)^{-\epsilon^g}\right] L^g_i. \tag{10}$$

The group-specific shape parameter of the Pareto distribution ϵ^g governs the size of group-specific labour supply adjustments following shifts in the cut-off $\bar{\varphi}^g_{i,h}$ as defined in (9). The elasticity ϵ^g can be decomposed into a group-invariant and an group-varying component, such that $\epsilon^g = \bar{\epsilon} + \tilde{\epsilon}^g \quad g \in M, F$. Finally, we take male workers as the reference group and normalize $\tilde{\epsilon}^M = 0$.

Local public goods and cut-offs. Inspired by the reduced-form evidence highlighted in section B we allow the scale parameter of the preference distribution to be a function of local public goods:

$$B^g_{i,h} = \bar{B}^g_{i,h} \left(\frac{R_i}{L^X_i}\right)^{-\phi^g}, \tag{11}$$

with $\phi^g > 0$. A higher provision of local public goods shifts the preference distribution for the home market sector downwards, thereby increasing the share of workers whose draw will be below the cut-off for home market participation as defined in equation (9). Again, we decompose the elasticity ϕ^g into a group-invariant and an group-varying component, such that $\phi^g = \bar{\phi} + \tilde{\phi}^g \quad g \in M, F$, where male workers are taken as reference group and normalize $\tilde{\phi}^M = 0$. The size of ϕ^g governs the substitution effect, whereby increases in local public goods provision pull workers into market employment.

C.4 Production in the economy

Firms in all market sectors produce many varieties of intermediate goods. The production technology of intermediate goods requires labour and land and structures as well as materials, which consist of inputs from all sectors (Caliendo et al., 2018). Intermediate good producers vary by their productive efficiency, which we denote by $z_{i,s}$ for each variety.

Intermediate goods producers. The output of a producer of an intermediate variety with efficiency $z_{i,s}$ is given by

$$y_{i,s}(z_{i,s}) = z_{i,s} \left[(h_{i,s}(z_{i,s}))^{\kappa_{i,s}} (l_{i,s}(z_{i,s}))^{1-\kappa_{i,s}}\right]^{\delta_{i,s}} \prod_{u \in M} [M_{i,su}(z_{i,s})]^{\delta_{i,su}}, \tag{12}$$

where $h_{i,s}(.)$ and $l_{i,s}(.)$ are the demand for land and structures and labour respectively. $M_{i,su}(.)$ denotes material inputs from sector u, demanded by a firm located in region i and operating in sector s under efficiency $z_{i,s}$ to produce $y_{i,s}$ units of an intermediate variety. $\delta_{i,su}$ is the share of materials from occupation u in the production of occupation s in region i, while $\delta_{i,s}$ denotes the share of total value added in gross output. We assume constant returns to scale technology, such that $\sum_{u\in S}\delta_{i,su} = 1-\delta_{i,s}$. Finally, the parameter $\kappa_{i,s}$ denotes the share of land and structures in value added.

We assume that the different labour types are imperfectly substitutable inputs to the production function

$$l_{i,s}(z_{i,s}) = \left[\sum_{g\in G}\left(H^g_{i,s}L^g_{i,s}(z_{i,s})\right)^{\frac{\sigma^g-1}{\sigma^g}}\right]^{\frac{\sigma^g}{\sigma^g-1}}, \tag{13}$$

where $L^g_{i,s}$ denotes the number of workers of type g employed in region-sector pair $\{i,s\}$. $H^g_{i,s}$ is the average human capital supplied by a worker type and $\sigma^g > 1$ denotes the elasticity of substitution between workers of different types in the production of varieties.

Denoting as r_i the rental price of land and structures in region i we obtain the following formulation for the unit price of inputs $\lambda_{i,s}$ in region-sector pair {i,s} (see Appendix I.2 for details):

$$\lambda_{i,s}(z_{i,s}) = \frac{1}{z_{i,s}}B_{i,s}\left(r_i^{\kappa_{i,s}}\left[\sum_{g\in G}\left(\frac{H^g_{i,s}}{W^g_{i,s}}\right)^{\sigma^g-1}\right]^{\frac{1-\kappa_{i,s}}{1-\sigma^g}}\right)^{\delta_{i,s}}\prod_{u\in M}\left[P_{i,u}\right]^{\delta_{i,su}}, \tag{14}$$

with the constant $B_{i,s} \equiv \left(\delta_{i,s}(\kappa_{i,s})^{\kappa_{i,s}}(1-\kappa_{i,s})^{(1-\kappa_{i,s})}\right)^{-\delta_{i,s}}\prod_{u\in S}(\delta_{i,su})^{-\delta_{i,su}}$.

The unit cost for an intermediate good producer with efficiency $z_{i,s}$ is thus $\lambda_{i,s}/z_{i,s}$. Given constant returns to scale and competitive intermediate goods markets, a firm produces only positive amounts of a variety as long as its price is equal to its unit production cost, where $p_{i,s}(z_{i,s}) = \lambda_{i,s}/z_{i,s}$.

Trade costs are represented by $\tau_{ij,s}$ and are of the 'iceberg' type. One unit of any variety of intermediate good s shipped from region j to i requires producing $\tau_{ij,s} \geq 1$ units in region j. If a good is non-tradable, then $\tau_{ij,s} = \infty$. Final goods producers purchase varieties of intermediate goods from the location j in which the acquisition cost, including trade costs, is the least. Therefore

$$p_{i,s}(\mathbf{z_s}) = \min_{j\in J}\left\{\frac{\tau_{ij,s}\lambda_{j,s}}{z_{j,s}}\right\},$$

where we denote the vector of productivity draws across regions by $\mathbf{z_s} = (z_{1,s}, z_{2,s}, ..., z_{J,s})$.

Final good producers. Intermediate goods demanded from sector s and all regions are combined into a local CES bundle (final good). Local final goods, in turn, are used as

materials for the production of intermediate varieties and final consumption.

In particular, in the following we denote as $Y_{i,s}$ the quantity produced of final goods in region-sector pair $\{i, s\}$ and as $\tilde{y}_{i,s}(\mathbf{z_s})$ the amount demanded of an intermediate good of a given variety from the least-cost producer. Final good production is therefore

$$Y_{i,s} = \left(\int \left(\tilde{y}_{i,s}(\mathbf{z_s}) \right)^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} d\phi_s(\mathbf{z_s}) \right)^{\frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1}}, \tag{15}$$

where $\phi_s(\mathbf{z_s})$ denotes the joint cumulative distribution function for the vector of efficiencies $\mathbf{z_s}$ with marginal functions $\phi_{i,s}(z_{i,s})$ and where σ denotes the elasticity of substitution between varieties. There are no fixed costs or barriers to entry in the production of intermediate and final goods, such that competitive behavior implies zero profits at all times.

Final good producers minimize total production costs. Using the CES assumption, the corresponding demand function for a variety produced in region i and occupation s is

$$\tilde{y}_{i,s}(\mathbf{z_s}) = \left(\frac{p_{i,s}(\mathbf{z_s})}{P_{i,s}} \right)^{-\sigma} Y_{i,s}, \tag{16}$$

where $p_{i,s}(\mathbf{z_s})$ equals the unit cost paid by a final good producer and $P_{i,s} \equiv \left[\int \left(p_{i,s}(\mathbf{z_s}) \right)^{1-\sigma} d\phi_s(\mathbf{z_s}) \right]^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma}}$ is the ideal cost index for final goods.

Sector-specific efficiencies. We assume that across all varieties, market sectors, and regions the idiosyncratic productivity levels $z_{i,s}$ are independently drawn from a Fréchet distribution such that the joint cumulative distribution function is given by

$$\phi_s(\mathbf{z_s}) = \exp\left\{ \sum_{i \in J} (z_{i,s})^{-\nu_s} \right\}, \tag{17}$$

where we normalize the scale parameter to unity, and the occupation-specific shape parameters $\nu_s > 1$ govern the variance of efficiency draws. A larger ν_s implies less variability across varieties and regions.

Inter-regional trade in intermediate goods. Given the properties of the Fréchet distribution, the price of the aggregate good in sector s and region i is

$$P_{i,s} = \Gamma(\gamma_s)^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma}} \left[\sum_{j \in J} (\lambda_{j,s} \tau_{ij,s})^{-\nu_s} \right]^{-\frac{1}{\nu_s}}, \tag{18}$$

where $\gamma_s \equiv \frac{\nu_s + 1 - \sigma}{\nu_s}$ and $\Gamma(.)$ denotes the Gamma function. The functional assumptions on the distribution of efficiencies across regions finally allow to derive the share of total

expenditures in region-sector pair $\{i, s\}$ that accrues to sector-s-goods from region j as

$$\pi_{ij,s} = \frac{X_{ij,s}}{X_{i,s}} = \frac{(\lambda_{j,s}\tau_{ij,s})^{-\nu_s}}{\sum_{n\in J}(\lambda_{n,s}\tau_{in,s})^{-\nu_s}}, \tag{19}$$

with $X_{ij,s}$ the expenditure in market $\{i, s\}$ on sector s goods produced in region j and $X_{i,s}$ are total expenditures on goods from occupation s in region i.[3] The cheaper the cost of production in region-sector pair $\{j, s\}$ or the bilateral trade cots between region j and i, the more producers in region i purchase varieties from region j. Bilateral trade shares finally decrease in the denominator of equation (19), the destination-specific 'multilateral resistance' term.

C.5 Market Clearing and Unbalanced Trade

National portfolio. We follow Caliendo et al. (2019) by assuming that there are a mass 1 of rentiers in each region who don't relocate to other locations. They own the land and structures in all regions, rent them to firms at local rates, and send their after-tax rents to a nationwide portfolio.

In return, rentiers in region i receive a constant share ι_i from the global portfolio, with $\sum_{i\in J}\iota_i = 1$, which creates imbalances between the remittances paid by local rentiers and their income from the nationwide portfolio. In particular, imbalances are given by

$$\Upsilon_i = (1-\mathcal{T}_i)\sum_{s\in M}\mathcal{H}_{i,s}r_i - \iota_i\sum_{j\in J}\left[(1-\mathcal{T}_j)\sum_{u\in S}\mathcal{H}_{j,u}r_j - \bar{I}\sum_{g\in G}L^g_{j,h}\right], \tag{20}$$

where $\mathcal{K} \equiv \sum_{j\in J}\left[(1-\mathcal{T}_j)\sum_{u\in S}\mathcal{H}_{j,u}r_j - \bar{I}\sum_{g\in G}L^g_{j,h}\right]$ are total revenues in the nationwide portfolio. $\mathcal{H}_{j,u}$ denotes the total input of land and structures in region-sector pair $\{j, u\}$. The national portfolio is used to finance payments to non-employed workers and the remainder is re-distributed to rentiers. Rentiers spend their entire income from the national portfolio on local final goods.

Local public goods. Regional governments purchase local final goods from all sectors at market prices as input for the provision of a local public good R_i, which is produced according to a Cobb-Douglas production function under no additional costs with shares β^R_u and where $\sum_{u\in M}\beta^R_u = 1$. Local final goods are used either for private consumption by workers and rentiers or as an input for the local final public good, such that

$$P_{i,u}Y_{i,u} = \beta_u\left[(1-\mathcal{T}_i)\sum_{g\in G}\sum_{s\in M}W^g_{i,s}L^g_{i,s} + \iota_i\mathcal{K} + \bar{I}\sum_{g\in G}L^g_{i,h}\right] + \beta^R_u E_i,$$

[3] See section (I.2) in the Online Appendix for derivations.

where $E_i = R_i P_i^R > 0$ denotes the total expenditure of local governments on final goods and P_i^R is the optimal local price level of regional governments, which differs from worker's local price level as long sectoral expenditure shares differ for private and public consumption [4]. Local governments run balanced budgets and, in the absence of regional re-distribution schemes, could only use local tax revenues to purchase inputs for the provision of the local public good R_i.

In fact, Germany runs a massive redistribution scheme, whereby financial transfers worth more than 53 billion euros are shifted across jurisdictions each year. We, therefore, follow Henkel et al. (2021) and introduce a between-region transfer scheme, which expands local governments' fiscal capacities. Given regional transfers and tax income, the budget available for local public goods provision is given by

$$E_i = (\mathcal{T}_i + \rho_i) \left(\sum_{g \in G} \sum_{s \in M} W_{i,s}^g L_{i,s}^g + \sum_{s \in M} \mathcal{H}_{i,s} r_i \right), \tag{21}$$

where ρ_i denotes the transfer rate, that is proportional to total local value added (and is negative for donor regions and positive for recipients).

Spatial equilibrium. A spatial equilibrium is defined as a set of final good prices $P_{i,s}$, human capital and wages in different market sectors $H_{i,s}^g \tilde{w}_{i,s}^g$, rental rates r_i, intermediate good prices $p_{i,s}(z_{i,s})$, consumption choices $C_{i,su}^g(\omega)$, intermediate variety demand $\tilde{y}_{i,s}(\mathbf{z_s})$, production of intermediate varieties $y_{i,s}(z_{i,s})$, demand for input factors (materials, land and structures, labour of all types) and selection choices of workers, such that

1. Workers optimally choose bundles of final goods from all occupations according to (1), given region-specific price indices P_i and wages $W_{i,s}^g(\omega)$;
2. Employed workers optimally self-select into sectors and locations according to (7);
3. Workers optimally self-select into market employment according to (10);
4. Intermediate good producers demand materials, labour and structures under unit prices (14). These productive inputs are used to produce idiosyncratic intermediate good varieties according to (12) and (13);
5. Final goods producers import intermediates from least cost intermediate producers;
6. Final good producers optimally choose input varieties according to (16) and the price indices $P_{i,s}$;
7. Goods market clearing implies

[4] For the quantification of the model we fit expenditure shares of local governments and rentiers β_s^R to best explain the observable share of housing in *private* consumption. See identification step 5 in online appendix J.2 for details.

$$
\begin{aligned}
X_{i,s} =& \beta_s^R \left[(\mathcal{T}_i + \rho_i) \left(\sum_{g \in G} \sum_{u \in M} W_{i,u}^g L_{i,u}^g + \sum_{u \in M} \mathcal{H}_{i,u} r_i \right) + \iota_i \mathcal{K} \right] \\
&+ \beta_s \left(\sum_{g \in G} \sum_{u \in M} (1 - \mathcal{T}_i) W_{i,u}^g L_{i,u}^g + \bar{I} \sum_{g \in G} L_{i,h}^g \right) + \sum_{u \in M} \delta_{i,us} \sum_{j \in J} \pi_{ji,u} X_{j,u},
\end{aligned}
$$

where the first two terms denote final consumption demand in region i by local governments ,rentiers and consumers respectively and where the third term denotes the demand for goods produced in occupation s and region i as material inputs in all regions and market sectors;

8. Labour market-clearing on the production side implies

$$
L_{i,s}^g = \frac{\delta_{i,s} (1 - \kappa_{i,s})}{W_{i,s}^g} \frac{\left(\frac{H_{i,s}^g}{W_{i,s}^g} \right)^{\sigma^g - 1}}{\sum_{g \in G} \left(\frac{H_{i,s}^g}{W_{i,s}^g} \right)^{\sigma^g - 1}} \sum_{j \in J} \pi_{ji,s} X_{j,s}, \tag{22}
$$

where $\sum_{j \in J} \pi_{ji,s} X_{j,s}$ are revenues from each export market. Labour market clearing for all groups $g \in G$, regions $i \in J$ and market sectors $s \in M$ ensures that labour supply (7) equals labour demand (22). Aggregate labour market clearing for workers of all groups implies that workers are either in one of the M market sectors or the home-market sector, such that $L^g = \sum_{i \in J} \left(L_{i,h}^g + L_{i,m}^g \right) = \sum_{i \in J} \left(L_{i,h}^g + \sum_{s \in M} L_{i,s}^g \right)$;

9. Market clearing for land and structures implies on the production side

$$
\mathcal{H}_{i,s} = \frac{\delta_{i,s} \kappa_{i,s}}{r_{i,s}} \sum_{j \in J} \pi_{ji,s} X_{j,s}. \tag{23}
$$

Land and structures market clearing for all regions $i \in J$ and market sectors $s \in M$ ensures that demand for land and structures (23) equals exogenous supply of land and structures $\bar{\mathcal{H}}_i = \sum_{s \in M} \mathcal{H}_{i,s}$.

D Data

In this section, we describe our main data sources.

Employment. We restrict our analysis to the years 2008-2014 and the 141 local labour markets of Germany which were originally delineated as commuting zones by Kosfeld and Werner (2012). Our data consists of employment counts per worker type, industry, and local labour market per year derived from detailed administrative data from Germany. To ensure sufficient data coverage across all region-sector pairs, we construct six sectors (four tradable and two non-tradable, based on ISIC Rev. 4). We use this classification throughout our paper and refer to it as the "occupational sectors" (see appendix J.1 for details).

Wages. To calculate the total wage bill per region and sector, we interact average wages per worker-type and industry from the National Accounts (EU KLEMS, see Stehrer et al. (2018)) with region-sector-specific fixed effects. We extract the fixed effects from a standard Mincerian earnings function (with dummies for three education levels, part-time employment, a cubic age and experience term, and person fixed effects) in an approach similar to Card et al. (2013). Individual wage data comes from the weakly anonymous Sample of Integrated Labour Market Biographies (SIAB).[5]

Material inputs. Information on gross output comes from the Growth and Productivity Accounts (EU KLEMS, see Stehrer et al. (2018)) and gross value-added per region-sector pair from the regional economic accounts provided by the Statistical Office of the European Union (Eurostat). We allocate sector-specific gross output across regions according to region-specific shares of value-added. Information on input-output linkages between sectors comes from the World Input-Output Tables (WIOD, see Timmer et al. (2015)).

Trade Flows. To allocate the region-sector-specific gross output from the EU KLEMS database across trading pairs, we use the bilateral trade shares from the Forecast of Nationwide Transport Relations in Germany 2030. It provides information on inter-regional trade volumes in metric tons between German districts in 2010 (Schubert et al. (2014)). To match our empirical equivalents of regions and occupational sectors, we aggregate trade flows to the commuting zone and sector level (see appendix J.1 for details).

Data on taxes and transfers. We use official tax data provided by the German Statistical Office and the Federal Statistical Office (see Statistisches Bundesamt (2021b);

[5]This study uses the factually anonymous Sample of Integrated Labour Market Biographies (version 1975 - 2017). Data access was provided via a Scientific Use File supplied by the Research Data Centre (FDZ) of the German Federal Employment Agency (BA) at the Institute for Employment Research (IAB). The dataset contains information on gross daily wages, education, gender, age, occupation, employment status, as well as the workplace and location of residence of German workers. To address the censoring of wages at the social security maximum, we apply the imputation method proposed by Card et al. (2013).

Statistisches Bundesamt (2021a); Statistische Ämter des Bundes und der Länder (2021)) to break down tax revenues (Federal, States, and local municipalities) to the local level and identify the effective degree of fiscal transfers (within and between the Federal States). We follow the procedure in Henkel et al. (2021) and compute for every district local tax revenues before and after redistribution (and hence net transfers), aggregate these variables to local labor markets i and relate them to these regions' value added to obtain empirical proxies of the average tax and transfer rates $\mathcal{T}_i$ and ρ_i.

Data on rents and non-tradable prices. We use average land prices provided by the Federal Statistical Office (see Statistische Ämter des Bundes und der Länder (2021)) as the empirical counterpart of rental prices in the theoretical framework. To quantify our model, we consider two sectors of non-tradables: Construction and non-tradable services (for example, Finance and Insurance, Public Administration, and Education). Ahlfeldt et al. (2020) provide mix-adjusted regional real estate price indices as panel data for all German labour markets, which we use as a proxy for price levels in the construction sector.[6] For price levels of non-tradable services, we rely on estimates of price level differences by sector in Weinand and Auer (2020). We control for tradable service prices, aggregate them to the commuting zone level, and finally re-scale all price indices $P_{i,ntS}$ such that their output-weighted average sums to unity.

Data on local public public goods provision. We collect information on local public good provision from the INKAR (2020) database. To determine a single measure of local public goods provision, we convert different measures of public goods to a single measure by taking the first principal component. We include measures of childcare provision, the ease of reaching the next elementary school, public transportation, motorway, airport, train station, the share of households with broadband internet access, drinking, and sewage supply, energy and waste management, as well as publicly financed recreational areas. We then standardize to give this variable a zero mean and unit standard deviation.

E Quantifying the Model

We quantify our model for all years (2008 - 2014), to obtain a panel data-set for all model-inverted parameters. We later leverage this time variation to identify the elasticity of labour supply to regional public good provision. The quantification of the model consists of two steps. First, we obtain values of the structural parameters $\{\alpha, \beta_u, \beta_u^R, \theta^g, \epsilon^g, \delta_{i,s}, \delta_{i,su}, \iota_i, \kappa_{i,s}, \phi^g, \sigma_g, \sigma, \tau_{ij,s}, \nu_s, \chi\}$. We estimate the respective values for most parameters using the structure of the model and observed variables in the data. For the remaining parameters

[6] The computation of the regional real estate price indices follows the methodology outlined in Combes et al. (2019). They rely on the micro data-set "Real-Estate Data for Germany" which is described in great detail in Boelmann and Schaffner (2019) and originally comes from the internet platform Immobilien Scout 24. See the Online Appendix of Ahlfeldt et al. (2020) for more details.

$\{\alpha, \sigma^g, \sigma, \nu_s, \chi\}$ we borrow their values from the literature. Second, to identify the preference parameters and productivity sifters $\{B^g_{i,h}, \eta^g_{i,s}, E_i, H^g_{i,s}, P_i, R_i\}$ as the unique values that are consistent with the model in general equilibrium we invert the model using data together with the estimated parameter values.

E.1 Set parameters

For the elasticity of substitution between men and women in production, we follow Olivetti and Petrongolo (2014) and use $\sigma^g = 2.5$ as our benchmark, which is in the middle of other available estimates.[7] Accurate estimates of the elasticity of substitution of varieties across regions are hard to obtain. We therefore borrow estimates from the international trade literature (see e.g. Bernard et al. (2003)) and set $\sigma = 5$ for our main analysis. Finally, as in Rossi-Hansberg et al. (2019) we set the trade elasticities to $\nu_s = 10$ for all sectors, which is well within the range of values considered by Head and Mayer (2014). Lastly, we assume perfect rivalry for local public goods and set $\chi = 1$ for our main analysis. Assuming $\chi = 1$, Fajgelbaum et al. (2019) obtain a value of $\alpha = 0.16$ for the share of local public goods in the USA, which we also borrow for the quantification of our model.

E.2 Estimated parameters

Shape parameters of human capital distribution. We observe individual wages, shift them by the share of consumption goods $(1 - \alpha)$ and decompose them into group-specific average wages and individual-specific human capital levels as the residuals to a wage decomposition according to the following Mincerian wage regression

$$\ln W^g_{i,s}(\omega) = c^g + X(\omega)b^g + d_i + d_s + d_{i,s} + \ln \tilde{\Psi}^g_{i,s}(\omega), \tag{24}$$

where c^g is a constant, $X(\omega)$ are type-specific controls and d_i, d_s and $d_{i,s}$ denote region and sector dummies as well as their interaction respectively. The residuals $\tilde{\Psi}^g_{i,s}(\omega)$ account for idiosyncratic human capital levels as suggested by equation (5). Individual controls $X(\omega)$ include interactions of worker's age, the days in employment, and a dummy for part-time employment. Under the assumptions on the distribution of individual human capital draws $\tilde{\Psi}_{i,s}$ in equation (4) the residuals from the wage decomposition will be Gumbel-distributed with group-specific scale $1/\theta^g$. We, therefore, fit the distribution of log-wage residuals $\tilde{\Psi}_{i,s}(\omega)$ to a Gumbel distribution and identify its scale parameter using maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) separately for each worker group. The inverse of the estimate identifies the shape parameter of the Fréchet distribution and in turn the labour supply elasticity.

Table 1 summarizes our estimates: in columns (1) and (2) we report the MLE values for $\tilde{\theta}^g \equiv \ln(1/\theta^g)$ that provide the best fit to a Gumbel distribution. Columns (3) and

[7] Depending on the occupation of workers Bhalotra and Fernández (2018) estimate the elasticity of substitution between men and women to be between 1.2 and 2.7 in Mexico, whereas Acemoglu et al. (2004) obtain a slightly larger estimate of 3.

(4) show the corresponding values of the shape parameter θ^g. For all years, we find that idiosyncratic human capital draws of female workers are slightly more dispersed, which results in a smaller estimate of θ^g. Furthermore, dispersion in human capital has increased over the last years for female and male workers, which results in smaller labour supply elasticities.

Our preferred estimates of the labour supply elasticities $(1-\alpha) * \theta^g = 1.69/1.55$ for the year 2008 (and 1.57/1.50 for 2014) are close to, albeit slightly larger than, existing estimates: Hsieh et al. (2019) obtain an estimate of 1.52 for the USA, whereas estimates in Burstein et al. (2019) range from 1.81 to 1.26 when accounting for time trends. In sum, our estimates are well in line with the cross-country comparison values of 1.05 to 1.47 in Lee (2020).

Table 1: Maximum likelihood estimates of θ^g

Time period	(1) $\tilde{\theta}$,Male	(2) $\tilde{\theta}$,Female	(3) θ,Male	(4) θ,Female
2008	-0.70	-0.61	2.01	1.84
	(0.002)	(0.002)		
2014	-0.63	-0.58	1.87	1.78
	(0.002)	(0.002)		

Notes: This table displays estimates of the Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE) of the shape parameter of a Fréchet distribution from individual wage residuals and a CDF as outlined in eq. (4). Columns (1) and (2) report the MLE values for $\tilde{\theta}^g \equiv \ln(1/\theta_g)$ that provide the best fit to a Gumbel distribution. Columns (3) and (4) show the corresponding values for the shape parameter θ^g. Standard errors are reported in brackets.

Parameters in production and consumption. To identify model-consistent values for the parameters $\{\delta_{i,s}, \delta_{i,su}, \kappa_{i,s}, \iota_i, \tau_{ij,s}, \beta_s, \beta_s^R\}$ we rely on region-sector-specific data on value-added, gross output, input-output linkages, sectoral trade flows, taxes, and transfers, as well as sectoral wage sums. We calibrate the share of value-added $\delta_{i,s}$ and the share of land and structures $\kappa_{i,s}$ to match their existing data counterparts. Next, to determine the share of sector u goods used in sector s and region i, $\delta_{i,su}$, we rely on national input-output shares δ_{su}, noticing that $\delta_{i,su} = (1-\delta_{i,s})\delta_{su}$. Moreover, observable trade imbalances pin down local shares ι_i of the national portfolio. Using this calibration, there exist unique values of expenditure shares $\{\beta_s, \beta_s^R\}$ which ensure that markets clear for all sectors in the aggregate, given the regional tax and transfer rates. Finally, we derive model-consistent expenditures of all regions that rationalize goods market-clearing (see identification steps 1 - 5 in online appendix J.2 for further details and derivations).

For the non-tradable sectors, we treat trade costs as infinite. For the tradable sectors, we follow the standard gravity literature (Head and Mayer, 2014) and model trade costs as a function of distance

$$\tau_{ij,s} = dist_{ij}^{\zeta_s}, \tag{25}$$

where $dist_{ij}$ is the Euclidian distance between the centroids of locations i and j. Following equation (19), we estimate the combined sector-specific parameter $-\nu_s\zeta_s$ using standard gravity regressions based on bilateral trade flows recovered from the Forecast of Nationwide Transport Relations in Germany 2030. We find that the estimated distance coefficients range between -1.43 and -2.14. They are highly statistically significant and firmly in line with available estimates from the gravity literature Head and Mayer (2014). We then parameterize trade costs according to equation (25), while setting trade elasticities to $\nu_s = 10$ for all sectors. Table 2 summarizes our calibration for these parameters as well the data sets used to calibrate or estimate them.

Table 2: Production and consumption parameters

	Parameter	Value	Approach	Data
$\delta_{i,s}$	Share of value added	$0.30 - 0.65$	Cal.	Trade flows/ value added
$\delta_{i,su}$	Share of material inputs	$0 - 0.35$	Cal.	Input-Output Tables
$1 - \kappa_i$	Share of wage expenditures	$0.06 - 0.95$	Cal.	Value added/ wage income
ι_i	Share of national portfolio	$0 - 0.06$	Est.	Trade imbalances
$\tau_{ij,s}$	Trade cost	$1 - 1.03$	Est.	Trade flows
$\beta_s = \beta_s^R$	Expenditure share	$0.001 - 0.42$	Fit.	Equation (46)
$\mathcal{T}_i$	Regional tax rate	0.15 - 0.33	Cal.	Tax revenues
ρ_i	Transfer rate	-0.11 - 0.27	Cal.	Transfer payments

Notes: If the approach is "calibrated" we calibrate the parameter to fit the observable data outlined under "data". If the approach is "estimated", we estimate the parameter following the estimation steps outlined in appendix J.2 and using the data sets under "data". If the approach is "fitted", we fit parameters to match the model-consistent equations outlined under "data".

Unit costs, prices, and human capital. The cost-minimizing behaviour of producers ensures that bilateral trade flows decrease in the size of unit production costs. The fact that model-consistent trade flows follow a gravity equation (19), therefore, allows us to identify the unit costs from model-consistent expenditures $X_{j,s}$ in all origin regions $j \in J$ demanded by workers in region i. In all tradable sectors, these directly translate into regional price levels.

We consider two sectors of non-tradables: Construction and non-tradable services (that is, Finance and Insurance, Public Administration, and Education). As a proxy for price levels in the construction sector, we use the mix-adjusted regional real estate price indices from Ahlfeldt et al. (2020). For the aggregate price levels in the non-tradable service sector, we rely on price level differences estimated by Weinand and Auer (2020). Since unit costs can only be identified up-to-scale, we normalize them such that the GDP-weighted sum of regional price levels sums to unity for all sectors.

Finally, we use data on price levels and local rents to identify gender-specific human capital levels as the residual to unit costs. Intuitively, we fit gender-specific human capital levels to trade flows and goods expenditures (controlling for differences in wage remuner-

ation, expenditures on materials and land and structures) implied by the model.[8]

Amenities and participation costs. Preferences $\eta_{i,s}$ for all market sectors come from equation (7) as the residual to observable labour supply by gender, region, and sector after controlling for real wages and local public goods. We decompose preferences into an overall "amenity" term common to all sectors and region-sector-specific participation costs, such that $\ln \eta_{i,s} = c_i^g - \mu_{i,s}$ and with c_i^g a gender-region fixed effect. Since we identify amenities only up-to-scale, we re-scale them to ensure that the participation costs are positive for all region-sector pairs. Table 5 presents all model variables, among others the employment rate and public goods provision per capita in 2008 and the corresponding changes between 2008 and 2014.

Table 3: Model-implied Aggregates

Outcome	2008 Overall	2008 Female	2008 Male	Change Overall	Change Female	Change Male
Labour force participation rate	0.771	0.729	0.812	1.048	1.051	1.046
Public good (€), per capita	3304.70	3306.70	3302.90	1.189	1.189	1.190
Unit costs, weighted	1.422	1.357	1.479	0.992	0.991	0.994
Price levels, weighted	3.869	3.871	3.668	0.959	0.959	0.958
Log TFP, weighted	5.186	5.236	5.143	1.059	1.062	1.056
Log human capital, weighted	-	9.209	9.978	-	0.999	1.001
Amenities, weighted	-	2.592	2.050	-	1.032	1.010
Participation costs, weighted	-	1.067	0.780	-	1.029	1.006
(Inverse) participation costs (exp)	-	0.347	0.463	-	0.971	0.995

Notes: Labour force participation costs observed in the data. All other variables are solved within the model framework. Model-implied variables are weighted by group-region employment.

Public good elasticity. To identify the parameters $\{\phi^g, \epsilon^g\}$ we analyze the effect of local public goods provision on gender-specific non-employment rates. We quantify the model for the years 2008 - 2014 to exploit variation in the variables $\{L^g_{i,h,t}/L^g_{i,t}, \bar{I}_t/P_{i,t}, R_{i,t}/L_{i,t}\}$ within German local labour markets across time using the following regression equation derived from a log-linearised version of eq. (10):

$$\begin{aligned}\ln\left(\frac{L^g_{i,h,t}}{L^g_{i,t-1}}\right) =& a_0 \ln\left(\frac{\bar{I}_t}{P_{i,t}}\right) + a_1 \ln\left(\frac{\bar{I}_t}{P_{i,t}}\right) \times \text{Female} + a_2 \ln\left(\frac{R_{i,t}}{L^\chi_{i,t-1}}\right) \\ &+ a_3 \ln\left(\frac{R_{i,t}}{L^\chi_{i,t-1}}\right) \times \text{Female} + c^g_t + c^g_i + u^g_{i,t}, \end{aligned} \tag{26}$$

where the index t denotes the year, and the coefficients $a_0 \equiv \bar{\epsilon}\,(1-\alpha)$, $a_1 \equiv \tilde{\epsilon}^F\,(1-\alpha)$, $a_2 \equiv \bar{\epsilon}\left(\alpha - \bar{\phi}\right)$, and $a_3 \equiv \bar{\epsilon}\left(-\tilde{\phi}^F\right) + \tilde{\epsilon}^F\left(\alpha - \left(\bar{\phi} + \tilde{\phi}^F\right)\right)$ are functions of structural parameters. To estimate the gender-specific components of fiscal capacity and price shocks

[8] See identification steps 6 - 9 in online appendix J.2 for further details and derivations.

on non-employment we include an interaction term of local public goods provision and a *female* dummy in the regression equation (and similarly for price shocks). We control for the terms $c_i^g + c_t^g \equiv \epsilon^g(\ln \bar{A}_i^g + \ln \bar{B}_{i,h}^g - \ln V_t^g)$, with gender-year and gender-region fixed effects, and finally the terms $u_{i,t}^g = \epsilon^g(\ln \tilde{B}_{i,t,h}^g + \ln \tilde{A}_{i,t}^g)$ represent deviations from these gender-region and gender-year fixed effects in regions' amenities and preference shifters in year t. We exploit the time variation *within* German labour market areas' employment induced by local fiscal capacity shocks, under the assumption that no changes in local labour demand had occurred over the time horizon. In other words, we hold local labour demand $L_{i,t-1}^g$ constant at its base level (in 2008) while using only the time variation in tax and transfer rates to identify the parameters $\{\epsilon^M, \epsilon^F, \phi^M, \phi^F\}$.

In columns (1) and (2) of Table 4 we present the OLS estimates of regression (26). Over our observed time periods, average non-employment rates decreased, but to a lesser degree in regions which experienced large increases in fiscal capacities (column (1)). Consequently, following the introduction of time-gender effects, we predict positive deviations from (negative) aggregate time trends in non-employment rates in those regions (column (2)). Workers of both workers react differently to fiscal capacity shocks, such that we obtain an elasticity of fiscal shocks to non-employment that is almost 80 percent ($= a_2^g/a_1$) smaller for female workers than male workers. Higher regional price levels decrease transfer payments in real terms and therefore induce workers to join the labour force. The coefficient estimate of 0.84 is slightly larger for male workers, but not statistically significant.

Taken together the estimates in column (2) would imply that positive fiscal capacity shocks shift the preference distribution *upwards* for workers of both genders, such that both the income and substitution effect work towards pushing workers out of employment in our framework (as $\phi^g < 0$). The effect is, however, much larger for male workers.

Instruments. One fundamental challenge for identifying a causal effect is that shocks to home market preferences would correlate with changes in local public goods provision and affect the decision of workers to join the labour force. The subsequent outward shift in labour supply is likely to increase local tax revenue and, in turn, local public good provision. As a consequence, OLS estimates of the coefficients could be biased downwards if the fixed effects are not sufficient to capture potential labour supply shocks.

We, therefore, construct a vector of distance-weighted regional shares of toddlers in public child care in all neighbouring regions $j \neq i$ as an instrument to obtain consistent estimates of a_2:

$$\text{InstCHILD}_{i,t} = \sum_{j \neq i} \tilde{d}_{ij} \text{Childcare}_{j,t} \quad \text{with} \quad \tilde{d}_{ij} = \frac{\ln(dist_{ij})}{\sum_{j \neq i} \ln(dist_{ij})}.$$

By constructing our instrument, we exploit the introduction of the "Kinderförderungsgesetz" (KiföG) in 2008. The goal was to provide the legal right to a public childcare place for all children over the age of one in Germany. In 2008 the share of toddlers in

public child care varied substantially across regions. While public child care rates of three to six-year-old children were already very high before the reform, attendance by one to three-year-old children was considerably lower, ranging from around 5% in some places in West Germany to 50% in Eastern Germany.[9] To finance the massive investments in public childcare provision, Germany introduced the so-called Sondervermögen "Kinderbetreuungsausbau". This special fund provided 2.73 billion euros of financial aid for the federal states and municipalities between 2008 and 2014.[10] As a result, local investments were mainly financed by intergovernmental transfers. Hence, although the program was national in scope, we can exploit the circumstance that its impact on a given local labor market depended on the already existing number of local childcare places and the size of the female labour force. Moreover, the tax burden associated with the investments fell equally on all residents across local labour markets.

The share of toddlers in public child care in all neighbouring regions impacts local public goods provision via the numerator in equation (10). Higher childcare provision rates in other local labour markets will increase expected indirect utility across all sectors and regions. The preference cut-offs for labour supply will rise in all local labour markets as long as there is free mobility across space. The identifying assumption is that the changes in shares of toddlers in public child care in neighbouring regions are exogenous to omitted local preference shocks for the home market.

To predict gender-specific adjustments to fiscal capacity shocks, we interact the distance-weighted childcare rates in a given year $\widetilde{\text{Childcare}}_{i,t}$ with the female dummy. Depending on the local level of public child care provision, the impact of fiscal capacity shocks on extensive labour supply will differ across female and male workers. The intuition is that females rely more on public child care provision than males, as they are still the primary child-carers. A further problem might be a potential correlation between changes in local price indices and shocks to local preferences.

To circumvent the additional endogeneity concern, we, therefore, construct Bartik-style instruments for price level shocks, which leverage upon within-region variation in national tax-type revenue shocks

$$\text{BtkTAX}_{i,t} = \sum_{k \in K} \frac{\text{Rev}_{i,k,2004}}{\text{Rev}_{i,2004}} \frac{\text{Rev}_{k,t} - \text{Rev}_{k,t-1}}{\text{Rev}_{k,t-1}},$$

where $k \in K$ denotes the tax type and $\text{Rev}_{i,k}$ denotes tax revenues in labour market region $i \in J$ from tax type k. National revenue shocks (2008-2014) are weighted by revenues shares that pre-date the observation period.[11] The identifying assumption is that the initial revenue shares from a particular tax type (for example, housing, VAT,

[9] See Figure **??** in the online appendix.

[10] See "Kinderbetreuungsfinanzierungsgesetz vom 18. Dezember 2007 (BGBl. I S. 3022), das zuletzt durch Artikel 3 des Gesetzes vom 14. Juli 2020 (BGBl. I S. 1683) geändert worden ist".

[11] The year 2004 is the earliest year for which information on tax revenues are available to calculate tax revenue shares. In the Online Appendix we show that our results do not depend on the year for which we calculate the initial tax revenue shares due to its high persistence over time.

business, or income tax revenues) are exogenous to omitted shocks to local preferences. Suppose housing tax rates are initially high in region i then the local government would strongly depend on housing tax revenues for fiscal capacities. Our instruments, therefore, would predict higher effects of national house price growth on regional house prices in region i relative to all other local labour markets. The first stage results are reported in Table 2 in section J.3 of the Online Appendix. All instruments have considerable power.

Column (4) of Table 4 presents the IV estimates of regression (26), using the Bartik instruments and distance-weighted childcare rates, as well as their respective interactions with the female dummy. Estimates of the elasticity of fiscal shocks to non-employment slightly increase when we include our instruments. Furthermore, the estimated IV effect on real payments to non-employed workers is significantly higher than under OLS. In our model framework, these estimates imply that a positive fiscal capacity shock shifts the preference distribution *downwards* for workers of both genders, such that the income and substitution effect work now in opposite directions (as $\phi^g > 0$). The model-consistent substitution effect is, however, 50 percent higher for females than for males and almost cancels out the income effect.

The estimates imply that an increase in fiscal capacity per capita by 1 percent is associated with a decrease in non-employment gaps, that is male-to-female non-employment rates, by about 1.22 percent. Given the average increase in fiscal capacities per capita by around 14 percent at the local level - that is, around 1433 Euro - between 2008 and 2014, this corresponds to a decrease in employment gaps of roughly 17 percent, which corresponds to a reduction of around 1.34 percentage points.

Table 4: The effect of public goods provision on non-employment: OLS and IV estimates

	OLS (1)	OLS (2)	IV (3)	IV (4)
$\ln(R_{i,t}/L_{i,t-1})$	-0.68 ***	1.26 ***	-1.21 ***	1.40 ***
	(0.09)	(0.21)	(0.09)	(0.49)
$\ln(R_{i,t}/L_{i,t-1}) \times$ Female	0.23 **	-1.00 ***	0.53 ***	-1.22 **
	(0.10)	(0.23)	(0.11)	(0.54)
$\ln(\bar{I}_t/P_{i,t})$	-2.51 ***	0.84	-1.42 ***	11.56 ***
	(0.32)	(0.69)	(0.17)	(3.01)
$\ln(\bar{I}_t/P_{i,t}) \times$ Female	1.01 ***	-0.30	0.01	-7.42 **
	(0.35)	(0.74)	(0.20)	(3.37)
ϕ^M	-0.10	-4.44	-0.71	0.06
ϕ^F	-0.12	-0.12	-0.32	0.12
ϵ^M	-2.82	0.27	-1.43	13.76
ϵ^F	-1.71	0.94	-1.49	4.93
Region-gender fixed effects	yes	yes	yes	yes
Year-gender fixed effects	no	yes	no	yes
Observations	1974	1974	1974	1974

Notes: This table shows the OLS estimates in columns (1) & (2) and the IV estimates of the second-stage in columns (3) & (4) for the structural parameters entering the extensive labour supply equation (26), as well as model-consistent values for the elasticities $\{\phi^g, \epsilon^g\}$ implied by these estimates given the parameter restriction $\alpha = 0.16$ and $\chi = 1$. Variables in columns (3) & (4) are instrumented by distance weighted leave-one-out shares of toddlers in public child care, and Bartik-style tax-class instruments, as well as their interactions with a female dummy. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the level of 141 local labour markets. $^{+}$ $p < 0.15$, * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

F Counterfactual analysis: Abolishing fiscal transfers

To investigate the employment effects of local public goods provision and fiscal transfers in practice, we simulate a counterfactual scenario without fiscal transfers across regions. In that scenario, there are substantial shocks to fiscal capacities because solely tax revenues at the local level finance the provision of public goods. In doing so, we quantify the aggregate economic consequences from local public goods provision on the employment decisions of female and male workers and characterize the spatial implications of fiscal transfers for gender employment gaps.

Procedure of the counterfactual analysis. In the baseline version of our counterfactual analysis, we assume fixed values of all structural parameters and use inverted exogenous components of preference shifters, amenities, and human capital levels as in the initial equilibrium (that is, in the year 2014). We then set the fiscal transfer rate to zero for all local labour markets $\rho = 0 \; \forall i \in J$ and solve for the new equilibrium values of wages, employment, and prices, which rationalize a spatial equilibrium in the absence of fiscal transfer re-distribution. The new (counterfactual) equilibrium values of real wages, employment gaps, and rents ensure that all goods and factor markets clear in the new equilibrium (see section K.1 in the Online Appendix for details).

Regional effects. The abolition of the fiscal transfer system implies massive fiscal re-distribution, in particular from East- to West-Germany. As highlighted in panel (a) of Figure 4, fiscal budgets decrease by up to 20 percent in terms of local value-added in some rural Eastern German labour markets. There is also a clear tendency to redistribute funds to the largest metropolitan areas in West Germany (for example, Hamburg, Frankfurt, or Munich) since these regions currently contribute the most to the fiscal transfer system. Negative fiscal revenue shocks directly affect the capacity of governments to supply local public goods, which in turn triggers workers to re-consider their initial residence and labour supply decisions. Workers relocate to regions with higher public good provision, as highlighted in Panel (b) of Figure 4. As workers move to the positively treated regions, they impose downwards pressure on local wages per efficiency unit determined by the interplay of labour supply and demand. Changes in the within-type regional and sectoral composition magnify this effect via changes in average human capital levels. Panel (d) of Figure 4 depicts declining real wages in previous donor regions such that regional utility is again equal across space in the new counterfactual equilibrium. Finally, labour force participation rates decrease in former donor regions, while recipient regions in Eastern Germany are predicted to experience higher rates (Panel b).

Aggregate effects and gender gaps. To highlight the aggregate effects of fiscal transfers, we compute the relative changes in aggregate outcomes as highlighted in Table 5, using employment shares as weights. In doing so, we distinguish between initial *recipient* regions

Figure 4: Counterfactual analysis: Regional effects



(a) Size of fiscal transfer shock



(b) Population change



(c) Change in participation rates



(d) Real wage change

Notes: Panel (a) displays changes in fiscal transfer rates, which are defined as fiscal transfers over local value-added. The Panels (b) to (d) display percentage changes in total population, employment, and real wages. Real wages are defined as employment-weighted wages over model-consistent regional price levels.

(where $\rho_i > 0$) and *donor* regions. We observe a sizable worker outflow, with *recipient* regions losing 6 percent of their total population and with displacement effects being even larger for male workers. Out-migration decongests local labour markets in *recipient* regions, thereby increasing real wages by almost 3 percent. Worker employment, especially of male workers, increase in former *recipient* regions, since the income effect outweighs the substitution effect. This result is, however, attenuated by endogenous preference shifter increases.

Average welfare (of employed workers) decreases marginally for both worker groups after abandoning the fiscal transfer scheme. *Recipient* GDP, meanwhile, decreases and falls by around 2 percent due to out-migration. Aggregate decreases in labour force participation explain the slight fall of GDP also in the aggregate.

In Panel (a) of Figure 5 we highlight how the existing fiscal re-distribution system has amplified regional differences in gender employment gaps. We find that a one percentage point larger fiscal transfer rate decreases employment gaps between female and male workers by 0.44 percent when incorporating all general equilibrium effects. This, however, comes at the expense of larger gender wage gaps by 0.5 percent for each 10 percent increase in transfer rates (see Panel (b)). Gender differences in average wages decrease in all regions, while this effect is slightly more pronounced in initial donor regions.

Table 5: Aggregate effects of fiscal transfers

Outcome	Overall All	Overall Female	Overall Male	$\rho > 0$ All	$\rho > 0$ Female	$\rho > 0$ Male
Population	1.000	1.000	1.000	0.942	0.957	0.928
Labour force participation rate	0.991	0.993	0.989	1.012	0.999	1.025
Price levels	1.002	1.002	1.002	0.998	0.998	0.998
Average wages, weighted	-	1.001	1.002	-	1.026	1.027
Preference shifter, weighted	-	1.005	1.004	-	1.022	1.012
Welfare (employed)	-	0.997	0.997	-	0.997	0.997
GDP	0.994	-	-	0.978	-	-
Gender employment gap	0.996	-	-	1.026	-	-

Notes: This table reports changes in aggregate outcomes (using group-region-specific employment shares as weights) when fiscal transfers between locations are abolished. All numbers in the table represent counterfactual values over initial values (in 2014). Initial donors have a negative transfer rate, $\rho < 0$, while recipients have a positive transfer rate.

Figure 5: Changes in gender gaps



(a) Changes in employment gaps



(b) Changes in wage gaps

Note: This figure displays the changes in gender gaps when fiscal transfers between locations are abolished. Panel (a) shows the counterfactual changes in employment gaps (defined as male-to-female employment rates) against the initial transfer rate. Panel (b) plots changes in gender wage gaps (defined as male-to-female average wages) against the initial transfer rate. Average wages are the employment-weighted sum across sectors. Note that donors have a negative transfer rate, $\rho < 0$ marked by crosses (in blue). Recipients with positive transfer rates are marked by circles (in red).

G Conclusion

Gender differences in labour market outcomes declined substantially across many industrialized countries over the last decades. Nevertheless, there has been relatively little work on the equilibrium effects of local public goods provision (in general) and childcare provision (in particular) for this development. In this paper, we investigate the impact of fiscal capacities on differences in male-to-female employment rates and the distribution of

economic activity across space.

In our empirical part of the paper, we find that a higher local public goods provision increases the non-employment of male workers, but barely affects female workers. We thereby exploit the time-variation in local fiscal capacities, proxied by trends in childcare rates in neighboring regions. Using this strategy, we estimate a negative effect of local public goods on gender employment gaps, since male workers react stronger to fiscal shocks. Our estimates imply that a one percent increase in fiscal capacities per capita lowers gender employment gaps by about 1.22 percent.

Because higher local fiscal revenues create externalities for other regions via labour mobility and trade linkages, the implied aggregate effects of transferring fiscal revenues across local labour markets are unclear ex-ante. In the theoretical part of the paper, we set up and quantify a spatial equilibrium model featuring costly trade and labour mobility to isolate the effects of local public goods provision and fiscal transfers on the aggregate economy in general and gender gaps in particular. In a counterfactual scenario, where we shut down current fiscal transfers in Germany, massive fiscal resources are shifted from poor (low-productive) to rich (high-productive) locations, thus raising average labour productivity. However, male workers experience greater increases in employment induced by changes in local fiscal capacities than female workers, such that the abolition of transfers leads to larger differences in male-to-female gender employment gaps.

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ONLINE APPENDIX

This section presents an Online Appendix containing complementary material.

H Motivation appendix

Figure 1: Gender-specific employment rates and local fiscal capacities per capita



(a) Employment

(b) Non-Employment

Note: This figure plots demeaned log (non-)employment rates (relative to the regional and year specific mean) against the identically demeaned fiscal capacity per capita. Both variables are normalized by the working-age population in 2008. Fiscal capacities measure available tax revenues after fiscal redistribution. Local tax revenues and transfer payments are based on own calculations. We follow the approach in Henkel et al. (2021) to calculate fiscal capacities as the sum of local tax revenues before redistribution and regional transfer payments (that is, negative for donors and positive for recipients). The employment rate measures the number of female (male) workers in the labour force relative to the total number of females (males) in the working-age population (15-65 years) in the local labour market. The size of the marker is proportional to the regional population size in 2008. Data comes from INKAR (2020) and Statistisches Bundesamt (2021b,a); Statistische Ämter des Bundes und der Länder (2021a).

I Theory appendix

I.1 Worker side

I.1.1 Distribution of utilities in market sectors

From (3) indirect utility for working in region i and working in sector s is given as:

$$V_{i,s}^{g}(\omega) = \eta_{i,s}^{g}\left(\frac{R_i}{L_i^{\chi}}\right)^{\alpha}\left[\frac{I_{i,s}^{g}(\omega)}{P_i}\right]^{1-\alpha} = \eta_{i,s}^{g}\left((1-\mathcal{T}_i)\,T_{i,s}^{g}\tilde{w}_{i,s}^{g}\Psi_{i,s}^{g}(\omega)\right)^{1-\alpha}(P_i)^{\alpha-1}R_i^{\alpha}L_i^{-\chi\alpha}.$$

There are $d = 1,..,D$ possible region-occupation pairs $\{i,s\}$ (with $D = JxM$) where workers can self-select and sort into. Workers choose the region-occupation pair d that maximizes idiosyncratic utility.

We then define as $F^g(v_1, ..., v_D)$ the cumulative distribution function of indirect utilities for workers of type g:

$$
\begin{aligned}
F^g(\mathbf{v_d}) &= \mathbb{P}\left(V_1^g(\omega) \leq v_1, ..., V_D^g(\omega) \leq v_D\right) \\
&= \mathbb{P}\left(\frac{\eta_1^g\left((1-\mathcal{T}_1)\,\tilde{w}_1^g T_1^g \Psi_1^g(\omega)\right)^{1-\alpha} R_1^\alpha}{P_1^{1-\alpha} L_1^{\chi\alpha}} \leq v_1, ..., \frac{\eta_D^g\left((1-\mathcal{T}_D)\,\tilde{w}_D^g T_D^g \Psi_D^g(\omega)\right)^{1-\alpha} R_D^\alpha}{P_D^{1-\alpha} L_D^{\chi\alpha}} \leq v_D\right) \\
&= \mathbb{P}\left(\tilde{\Psi}_1^g(\omega) \leq \frac{v_1 L_1^{\chi\alpha}\,(P_1)^{1-\alpha}}{\eta_1^g R_1^\alpha\left((1-\mathcal{T}_1)\,\tilde{w}_1^g T_1^g\right)^{1-\alpha}}, ..., \tilde{\Psi}_D^g(\omega) \leq \frac{v_D L_D^{\chi\alpha}\,(P_D)^{1-\alpha}}{\eta_D^g R_D^\alpha\left((1-\mathcal{T}_D)\,\tilde{w}_D^g T_D^g\right)^{1-\alpha}}\right).
\end{aligned}
$$

Under the functional assumptions on the distribution of idiosyncratic human capital draws (4) the joint distribution of utility is

$$
F^g(\mathbf{v_d}) = \exp\Big\{-\Big[\sum_{s=1}^{M}\sum_{i=1}^{J}\Omega_{i,s}^g\,(v_{i,s})^{-\theta^g}\Big]\Big\}, \tag{27}
$$

where $\Omega_{i,s}^g = \left[\left((1-\mathcal{T}_i)\,\tilde{w}_{i,s}^g T_{i,s}^g\,(P_i)^{-1}\right)^{1-\alpha}\eta_{i,s}^g R_i^\alpha L_i^{-\chi\alpha}\right]^{\theta^g}$ is a function of group-specific preference components, wages per efficiency unit, human capital, local public goods and regional price levels for region-occupation pair $\{i, s\}$.

I.1.2 Expected utility

We are interested in the expected utility of individuals of a group g if employed workers choose region-sector pairs to maximize utility. The expected utility is given as:

$$
\begin{aligned}
E^g\left[v_{i,s}\Big|_{u=v_{i,s},\forall i,s\in M}\right] \equiv E^g[u] &= \int_0^\infty v_{i,s}\frac{\partial}{\partial v_{i,s}}\exp\Big\{-\Big[\sum_{s=1}^{M}\sum_{i=1}^{J}\Omega_{i,s}^g\,(v_{i,s})^{-\theta^g}\Big]\Big\}\Big|_{u=v_{i,s},\forall i,s\in M}du \\
&= \int_0^\infty \theta^g u^{-\theta^g}\left[\sum_{s\in M}\sum_{i\in J}\Omega_{i,s}^g\right]\exp\Big\{-\Big[\sum_{s=1}^{M}\sum_{i=1}^{J}\Omega_{i,s}^g\Big]u^{-\theta^g}\Big\}du.
\end{aligned}
$$

Re-defining variables

$$
z^g = [\sum_{s\in M}\sum_{i\in J}\Omega_{i,s}^g]u^{-\theta^g} \quad \text{and} \quad dz^g = -\theta^g[\sum_{s\in M}\sum_{i\in J}\Omega_{i,s}^g]u^{-\theta^g-1}du,
$$

we get

$$
\begin{aligned}
E^g[u] &= \int_0^\infty \exp\Big\{-z^g\Big\}\left[\sum_{s\in M}\sum_{i\in J}\Omega_{i,s}^{gt}\right]^{\frac{1}{\theta^g}}(z^g)^{-\frac{1}{\theta^g}}\,dz^g \\
&= \left[\sum_{s\in M}\sum_{i\in J}\Omega_{i,s}^{gt}\right]^{\frac{1}{\theta^g}}\Gamma\left(\frac{\theta^g-1}{\theta^g}\right),
\end{aligned}
$$

where $\Gamma(.)$ denotes the Gamma function. The expected utility of workers is then equalized across all regions and sectors in the absence of bilateral migration frictions or sector-specific switching costs:

$$E^g[u] = \Gamma\left(\frac{\theta^g - 1}{\theta^g}\right)\left(\sum_{s\in M}\sum_{i\in J}\left[\left((1-\mathcal{T}_i)\,\tilde{w}^g_{i,s}T^g_{i,s}\,(P_i)^{-1}\right)^{1-\alpha}\eta^g_{i,s}R^\alpha_i L_i^{-\chi\alpha}\right]^{\theta^g}\right)^{\frac{1}{\theta^g}}. \quad (28)$$

I.1.3 Region-sector shares

We are interested in the probability that a choice of region-occupation pair d is the maximum among all alternatives:

$$\begin{aligned}
\frac{L^g_d}{L^g_m} &= Pr\{V^g_d(\omega) \geq \max_{n\in D\setminus d} V^g_n(\omega)\} \\
&= \int_0^\infty \exp\Big\{-\Big[\sum_{s=1}^{M}\sum_{i=1}^{J}\Omega^g_{i,s}\Big]u^{-\theta^g}\Big\}\Omega^g_{i,s}\theta^g u^{-\theta^g-1}du \\
&= \frac{\Omega^g_{i,s}}{\sum_{s=1}^{M}\sum_{i=1}^{J}\Omega^g_{i,s}}\int_0^\infty \exp\Big\{-\Big[\sum_{s=1}^{M}\sum_{i=1}^{J}\Omega^g_{i,s}\Big]u^{-\theta^g}\Big\}\Big[\sum_{s=1}^{M}\sum_{i=1}^{J}\Omega^g_{i,s}\Big]\theta^g u^{-\theta^g-1}du \\
&= \frac{\Omega^g_{i,s}}{\sum_{s=1}^{M}\sum_{i=1}^{J}\Omega^g_{i,s}}.
\end{aligned}$$

Equation (7) follows directly.

I.1.4 Average human capital under selection and sorting

Finally, we derive the average human capital supplied by workers of type g in all region-sector pairs under sorting and selection:

$$E\left[\tilde{\Psi}^g_{i,s}(\omega)\right] = E\left[\frac{v_1 L_1^{\chi\alpha}\,(P_1)^{1-\alpha}}{\eta^g_1 R^\alpha_1\left((1-\mathcal{T}_1)\,\tilde{w}^g_1 T^g_1\right)^{1-\alpha}}\right] = \frac{L_1^{\chi\alpha}\,(P_1)^{1-\alpha}}{\eta^g_1 R^\alpha_1\left((1-\mathcal{T}_1)\,\tilde{w}^g_1 T^g_1\right)^{1-\alpha}}E^g\left[v_{i,s}\Big|_{u=v_{i,s},\forall i,s}\right].$$

Using equations (7) and (28) and the definition of $\mu^g_{i,s}$ we get:

$$E\left[\tilde{\Psi}^g_{i,s}(\omega)\right] = \left(L^g_{i,s}/L^g_m\right)^{-\frac{1}{\theta^g}}\Gamma\left(\frac{\theta^g-1}{\theta^g}\right),$$

from which we derive average wages under selection and sorting.

I.2 Production side

I.2.1 Derivation of unit costs

In this appendix, we derive optimal unit costs under the imperfect substitutability of labour types. Intermediate good producers minimize costs, which yields the following first-order conditions for input demand

$$\delta_{i,s}\kappa_{i,s} = \frac{r_i h_{i,s}(z_{i,s})}{\lambda_{i,s}(z_{i,s})\, y_{i,s}(z_{i,s})}$$

$$\delta_{i,su} = \frac{P_{i,u} M_{i,su}(z_{i,s})}{\lambda_{i,s}(z_{i,s})\, y_{i,s}(z_{i,s})}$$

$$\delta_{i,s}(1-\kappa_{i,s})\frac{\partial l_{i,s}(z_{i,s})}{\partial L^g_{i,s}(z_{i,s})} = \frac{W^g_{i,s} l_{i,s}(z_{i,s})}{\lambda_{i,s}(z_{i,s})\, y_{i,s}(z_{i,s})},$$

where

$$\frac{\partial l_{i,s}(z_{i,s})}{\partial L^g_{i,s}(z_{i,s})} = \left(H^g_{i,s}\right)^{\frac{\sigma^g-1}{\sigma^g}} \left(L^g_{i,s}(z_{i,s})\right)^{-\frac{1}{\sigma^g}} \left(l_{i,s}(z_{i,s})\right)^{\frac{1}{\sigma^g}},$$

and $\lambda_{i,s}(z_{i,s})$ denotes the Lagrange multiplier of the cost minimization problem, which in our problem corresponds to the unit cost of inputs as well. This allows deriving type-specific labour demand as:

$$L^g_{i,s}(z_{i,s}) = \frac{l_{i,s}(z_{i,s})}{H^g_{i,s}} \left(\frac{\delta_{i,s}(1-\kappa_{i,s})\,\lambda_{i,s}(z_{i,s})\, y_{i,s}(z_{i,s})\, H^g_{i,s}}{W^g_{i,s} l_{i,s}(z_{i,s})}\right)^{\sigma^g}.$$

Substituting into $l_{i,s}$ we obtain optimal labour demand as:

$$l^\star_{i,s} = \delta_{i,s}(1-\kappa_{i,s})\,\lambda_{i,s}(z_{i,s})\, y_{i,s}(z_{i,s}) \left[\sum_{g\in G}\left(\frac{H^g_{i,s}}{W^g_{i,s}}\right)^{\sigma^g-1}\right]^{\frac{1}{\sigma^g-1}}.$$

The first order conditions for workers of all types are then:

$$\delta_{i,s}(1-\kappa_{i,s})\frac{\left(\frac{H^g_{i,s}}{W^g_{i,s}}\right)^{\sigma^g-1}}{\sum_{g\in G}\left(\frac{H^g_{i,s}}{W^g_{i,s}}\right)^{\sigma^g-1}} = \frac{W^g_{i,s} L^g_{i,s}(z_{i,s})}{\lambda_{i,s}(z_{i,s})\, y_{i,s}(z_{i,s})}.$$

Plugging the optimal input factor demands into the production function we derive unit costs of production of an intermediate good produced in region i and sector s with efficiency $z_{i,s}$ as

$$\lambda_{i,s}(z_{i,s}) = \frac{1}{z_{i,s}} B_{i,s} \left(r_i^{\kappa_{i,s}} \left[\sum_{g\in G}\left(\frac{H^g_{i,s}}{W^g_{i,s}}\right)^{\sigma^g-1}\right]^{\frac{1-\kappa_{i,s}}{1-\sigma^g}}\right)^{\delta_{i,s}} \prod_{u\in S}\left[P_{i,u}\right]^{\delta_{i,su}},$$

with $B_{i,s} \equiv \left(\delta_{i,s}(\kappa_{i,s})^{\kappa_{i,s}}(1-\kappa_{i,s})^{(1-\kappa_{i,s})}\right)^{-\delta_{i,s}} \prod_{u\in S}(\delta_{i,su})^{-\delta_{i,su}}$ a region-sector-specific constant.

I.2.2 Derivation of the ideal cost index

In this appendix we derive the ideal cost index $P_{i,s}$, following the steps outlined in Eaton and Kortum (2002). Let $G_{ij,s}(p)$ be the probability that firms located in region j can offer producers in region i an intermediate variety for a price lower than p. Under the assumptions of perfect competition and a Fréchet distribution of productivities it then holds that:

$$\begin{aligned} G_{ij,s}(p) &= Pr\left\{p_{ij,s}(z_{j,s}) \leq p\right\} \\ &= 1 - \phi_{ij,s}\left(\frac{\lambda_{j,s}\tau_{ij,s}}{p}\right) \\ &= 1 - \exp\left\{-\left(\frac{\lambda_{j,s}\tau_{ij,s}}{p}\right)^{-\nu_s}\right\}. \end{aligned}$$

Producers in region i buy intermediate varieties from least cost origins. The probability that producers in region i end up paying a price less than p for the variety is

$$\begin{aligned} G_{i,s}(p) &= 1 - \prod_{n\in J}\left(1 - G_{in,s}(p)\right) \\ &= 1 - \exp\left\{-p^{\nu_s}\Phi_{i,s}\right\}, \end{aligned}$$

where $\Phi_{i,s} = \sum_{n\in J}\left(\lambda_{n,s}\tau_{in,s}\right)^{-\nu_s}$ is a function of unit costs of production and bilateral trade costs.

Substituting the distribution of prices into the ideal cost index yields:

$$P_{i,s}^{1-\sigma} = \nu_s\Phi_{i,s}\int p^{\nu_s-\sigma}\exp\left\{-p^{\nu_s}\Phi_{i,s}\right\}dp.$$

We re-define $x_{i,s} \equiv p^{\nu_s}\Phi_{i,s}$, so with a change of variable we get:

$$\begin{aligned} P_{i,s}^{1-\sigma} &= \int\left(\frac{x_{i,s}}{\Psi_{i,s}}\right)^{\frac{1-\sigma}{\nu_s}}\exp\left\{-x_{i,s}\right\}dx_{i,s} \\ &= \Gamma\left(\frac{\nu_s+1-\sigma}{\nu_s}\right)\left(\Phi_{i,s}\right)^{-\frac{1-\sigma_{i,s}}{\nu_s}}. \end{aligned}$$

The ideal cost index is therefore derived as

$$P_{i,s} = \Gamma\left(\frac{\nu_s+1-\sigma}{\nu_s}\right)^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma}}\left[\sum_{j\in J}\left(\lambda_{j,s}\tau_{ij,s}\right)^{-\nu_s}\right]^{-\frac{1}{\nu_s}},$$

as in equation (18).

I.2.3 Trade shares

We are interested in the fraction of region-i expenditure accruing to region j in all sectors. Define as $\pi_{ij,s}$ the probability that region j is the least-cost provider of a variety for use as intermediate input in region i and sector s:

$$\begin{aligned}\pi_{ij,s} &= Pr\left\{p_{ij,s}\left(z_{j,s}\right) \leq \min_{n\in J\backslash j} p_{in,s}\left(z_{n,s}\right)\right\} \\ &= \int \prod_{n\in J\backslash j}\left(1-G_{in,s}\left(p\right)\right) dG_{ij,s}\left(p\right)\end{aligned}$$

Substituting in the distribution of prices across regions yields:

$$\begin{aligned}\pi_{ij,s} &= \left(\lambda_{j,s}\tau_{ij,s}\right)^{-\nu_s}\int \nu_s p^{\nu_s-1}\exp\left\{-p^{\nu_s}\Phi_{i,s}\right\} dp \\ &= \frac{\left(\lambda_{j,s}\tau_{ij,s}\right)^{-\nu_s}}{\Phi_{i,s}}\left[-\exp\left\{-p^{\nu_s}\Phi_{i,s}\right\}\right]_0^{\infty} \\ &= \frac{\left(\lambda_{j,s}\tau_{ij,s}\right)^{-\nu_s}}{\Phi_{i,s}}.\end{aligned}$$

The expression implies that regions with lower unit costs will comprise a larger fraction of the number of varieties sold to region i. Note that the fraction of *varieties* sold to region i from region j need not generally equal the fraction of i's expenditure spent on region j varieties. Nonetheless, under the assumption that efficiencies follow a Fréchet distribution, it turns out that it does, due to the fact that the distribution of prices for region i is *independent of the origin* (Eaton and Kortum (2002)).

As a result the fraction of varieties that final good producers in region i and sector s purchase from region j equals its fraction of expenditure on goods from region j. Therefore it holds that

$$\pi_{ij,s} = \frac{X_{ij,s}}{X_{i,s}} = \frac{\left(\lambda_{i,s}\tau_{ij,s}\right)^{-\nu_s}}{\Phi_{i,s}},$$

where we denote as $X_{ij,s}$ the expenditure spent by final good producers in region i and sector s on intermediates produced in region j and $X_{i,s}$ are total expenditures.

Finally note that $\Phi_{i,s} = \left(\frac{P_{i,s}}{\Gamma\left(\frac{\nu_s+1-\sigma}{\nu_s}\right)^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma}}}\right)^{-\nu_s}$, which yields a gravity equation for intermediate trade:

$$\pi_{ij,s} = \frac{X_{ij,s}}{X_{i,s}} = \Gamma\left(\frac{\nu_s+1-\sigma}{\nu_s}\right)^{-\frac{\nu_s}{1-\sigma}}\left(\lambda_{j,s}\tau_{ij,s}\right)^{-\nu_s}\left(P_{i,s}\right)^{\nu_s}.$$

I.3 Aggregate equilibrium under selection and sorting

The spatial equilibrium of the model is summarized by the following 12 equations in 12 sets of model-implied variables (prices P_i, $P_{i,s}$, $\lambda_{i,s}$, r_i, $w^g_{i,s}$ as well as quantities $Q^g_{i,su}$,

$M_{i,su}, \mathcal{H}_{i,s}, L^g_{i,s}, L^g_{i,m}$ and expenditures $X_{i,s}$, $\pi_{ij,s}$:

$$L^g_{i,s} I^g_{i,s} = L^g_{i,s} \sum_{u=1}^{M} P_{i,u} C^g_{i,su} \qquad \text{(Worker expenditure: G x J x S eqs.)} \tag{29}$$

$$P_i = \prod_{u=1}^{M} (P_{i,u}/\beta^u)^{\beta^u} \qquad \text{(Regional price level: J eqs.)} \tag{30}$$

$$L^g_{i,s} = \frac{\left[\left((1-\mathcal{T}_i)\,\tilde{w}^g_{i,s} T^g_{i,s}\,(P_i)^{-1}\right)^{1-\alpha} \eta^g_{i,s} R^\alpha_i L_i^{-\chi\alpha}\right]^{\theta^g}}{\sum_{s\in M}\sum_{i\in J}\left[\left((1-\mathcal{T}_i)\,\tilde{w}^g_{i,s} T^g_{i,s}\,(P_i)^{-1}\right)^{1-\alpha} \eta^g_{i,s} R^\alpha_i L_i^{-\chi\alpha}\right]^{\theta^g}} L^g_m \quad \text{(Labour supply: G x J x M eqs.)} \tag{31}$$

$$L^g_{i,m} = \left[1 - \left(\frac{\mathcal{V}^g}{A^g_i B^g_{i,h}\,(\bar{I})^{1-\alpha}\left(\frac{R_i}{L_i^\chi}\right)^\alpha}\right)^{-\epsilon^g}\right] L^g_i \quad \text{(Extensive labour supply: G x J eqs.)} \tag{32}$$

$$L^g_{i,s} = \frac{\delta_{i,s}\,(1-\kappa_{i,s})}{W^g_{i,s}} \frac{\left(\frac{H^g_{i,s}}{W^g_{i,s}}\right)^{\sigma^g-1}}{\sum_{g\in G}\left(\frac{H^g_{i,s}}{W^g_{i,s}}\right)^{\sigma^g-1}} \sum_{j\in J} \pi_{ji,s} X_{j,s} \quad \text{(Labour demand: G x J x M eqs.)} \tag{33}$$

$$\sum_{s\in M} \mathcal{H}_{i,s} = \mathcal{H}_i \qquad \text{(Supply of land and structures: J eqs.)} \tag{34}$$

$$\mathcal{H}_{i,s} = \frac{\delta_{i,s}\kappa_{i,s}}{r_i} \sum_{j\in J} \pi_{ji,s} X_{j,s} \qquad \text{(Demand for land and structures: J x M eqs.)} \tag{35}$$

$$M_{i,su} = \frac{\delta_{i,su}}{P_{i,u}} \sum_{j\in J} \pi_{ji,s} X_{j,s} \qquad \text{(Demand for materials: J x } M^2 \text{ eqs.)} \tag{36}$$

$$P_{i,s} = \Gamma\,(\gamma_s)^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma}} \left[\sum_{j\in J} (\lambda_{j,s}\tau_{ij,s})^{-\nu_s}\right]^{-\frac{1}{\nu_s}} \qquad \text{(Sectoral prices: J x M eqs.)} \tag{37}$$

$$\pi_{ij,s} = \frac{(\lambda_{j,s}\tau_{ij,s})^{-\nu_s}}{\sum_{n\in J}(\lambda_{n,s}\tau_{in,s})^{-\nu_s}} \qquad \text{(Trade shares: } J^2 \text{ x M eqs.)} \tag{38}$$

$$
\begin{aligned}
X_{i,s} =& \beta_s^R \left(\mathcal{T}_i + \rho_i\right) \left(\sum_{g\in G} \sum_{u\in M} W_{i,u}^g L_{i,u}^g + \sum_{u\in M} \mathcal{H}_{i,u} r_i \right) \\
&+ \beta_s \left(\sum_{g\in G} \sum_{u\in M} \left(1-\mathcal{T}_i\right) W_{i,u}^g L_{i,u}^g + \iota_i \mathcal{K} + \bar{I} \sum_{g\in G} L_{i,h}^g \right) + \sum_{u\in M} \delta_{i,us} \sum_{j\in J} \pi_{ji,u} X_{j,u} \quad \text{(J x M eqs.)}
\end{aligned}
$$

$$
\sum_{j\in J} \pi_{ji,s} X_{j,s} = \lambda_{i,s} \left[\left(\mathcal{H}_{i,s}\right)^{\kappa_{i,s}} \left(l_{i,s}\right)^{1-\kappa_{i,s}} \right]^{\delta_{i,s}} \prod_{u\in M} \left[M_{i,su}\right]^{\delta_{i,su}} \quad \text{(Production: J x M eqs.)} \tag{39}
$$

I.4 Total factor productivity

In the spirit of Caliendo et al. (2018) we subsequently define total factor productivity $A_{i,s}$ as

$$
\begin{aligned}
\ln A_{i,s} =& \ln \frac{\sum_{j\in J} \pi_{ji,s} X_{j,s}}{P_{i,s}} - \left(\kappa_{i,s}\delta_{i,s}\right) \ln \mathcal{H}_{i,s} - \sum_{u\in M} \delta_{i,su} \ln M_{i,su} \\
&- \delta_{i,s} \left(1-\kappa_{i,s}\right) \sum_{g\in G} \hat{l}_{i,s}^g \ln L_{i,s}^g,
\end{aligned} \tag{40}
$$

with $\hat{l}_{i,s}^g = \frac{\left(H_{i,s}^g L_{i,s}^g\right)^{\frac{\sigma^g-1}{\sigma^g}}}{\sum_{g\in G}\left(H_{i,s}^g L_{i,s}^g\right)^{\frac{\sigma^g-1}{\sigma^g}}}$, such that group-specific employment is weighted by its relative productivity. Note further that we can express the real cost of the input bundle in terms of own-region trade shares:

$$
\frac{\lambda_{i,s}}{P_{i,s}} = \frac{\left(\pi_{ii,s}\right)^{-\frac{1}{\nu_s}}}{\Gamma\left(\gamma_s\right)^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma}}},
$$

where $\tau_{ii,s} = 1$ by assumption. As in Caliendo et al. (2018), the shares $\pi_{ii,s}$ govern the negative selection effect: if there is a decrease in unit costs in $\{i,s\}$, then this region-sector pair subsequently produces a greater variety of intermediate goods, since the demand for its goods from all pairs $\{j,u\}$ has risen. However, the idiosyncratic productivities associated with those new varieties of intermediate goods are smaller than those of varieties produced before the change, partially offsetting the initial drop in $\lambda_{i,s}$.

From equations (39) we can furthermore express gross output in terms of input factors:

$$
\begin{aligned}
\ln \sum_{j\in J} \pi_{ji,s} X_{j,s} =& \frac{1}{\sigma-1} \ln \Gamma\left(\gamma_s\right) + \ln P_{i,s} - \frac{1}{\nu_s} \ln \pi_{ii,s} + \left(\kappa_{i,s}\delta_{i,s}\right) \ln \mathcal{H}_{i,s} + \sum_{u\in M} \delta_{i,su} \ln M_{i,su} \\
&+ \left(\frac{\sigma^g \left(1-\kappa_{i,s}\right) \delta_{i,s}}{\sigma^g - 1} \right) \ln \left[\frac{\left(H_{i,s}^g L_{i,s}^g\right)^{\frac{\sigma^g-1}{\sigma^g}}}{\hat{l}_{i,s}^g} \right]
\end{aligned}
$$

Combining with equations (40) we derive total factor productivity in all region-occupation pairs only as a function of demand shifters,human capital and the selection effect:

$$\begin{aligned}\ln A_{i,s} =& \delta_{i,s}\left(1-\kappa_{i,s}\right)\left[\ln\left(L^g_{i,s}H^g_{i,s}\right)-\frac{\sigma^g}{\sigma^g-1}\ln\hat{l}^g_{i,s}-\sum_{g\in G}\hat{l}^g_{i,s}\ln\left(L^g_{i,s}\right)\right] \\ &-\frac{1}{\nu_s}\ln\pi_{ii,s}+\frac{1}{\sigma-1}\ln\Gamma\left(\gamma_s\right).\end{aligned} \tag{41}$$

Note that equations (41) nest the expression for total factor productivity in Caliendo et al. (2018) as the special case of with only one group of workers and human capital shifters normalized to unity. Let the relative share of effective human capital units to be denoted as: $\tilde{L}^g_{i,s}\equiv\frac{\ln\left(H^g_{i,s}L^g_{i,s}\right)}{\ln\left(H^f_{i,s}L^f_{i,s}\right)}\quad\forall f\neq g\in G$. In order to derive the group-specific TFP component, we can re-arrange region-occupation productivity such that

$$\ln A_{i,s}-\frac{1}{\sigma-1}\ln\Gamma\left(\gamma_s\right)=\hat{\delta}_{i,s}\ln\left[\sum_{g\in G}\left(\frac{H^g_{i,s}}{\xi^g_{i,s}}\right)^{\frac{\sigma^g-1}{\sigma^g}}\right]-\frac{1}{\nu_s}\ln\pi_{ii,s}, \tag{42}$$

where we denote $\xi^g_{i,s}\equiv\exp\left[\ln L^g_{i,s}\left(1-\hat{l}^g_{i,s}-\hat{l}^f_{i,s}\tilde{L}^f_{i,s}\right)\right]$ and $\hat{\delta}_{i,s}\equiv\frac{\sigma^g(1-\kappa_{i,s})\delta_{i,s}}{\sigma^g-1}$. Region-group-specific TFP is decreasing in the selection effect, but increasing in the weighted sum of group-specific human capital $H^g_{i,s}$ across all groups.

Note that these weights are governed by the between-group distribution of employment: in region-sector cells with a similar number of employed workers (e.g. $\tilde{L}^f_{i,s}\to 1$), the human capital of all groups receives the same weights (e.g. $\xi^g_{i,s}=\xi^f_{i,s}=1$).

Similarly, as long as there are more workers of the *other* group employed in region-occupation pair $\{i,s\}$ (e.g. $\tilde{L}^f_{i,s}>1$), *own-group* productivity $H^g_{i,s}$ is weighted upwards as workers are imperfect substitutes in the production of intermediates.

J Quantification appendix

J.1 Data

This section complements Section E in the main paper. For the model quantification, we require five sets of data compiled for consistent spatial units and sectors: Employment, non-employment, wages, bilateral trade flows, and value-added for each region-sector pair. Additionally, we use data on region-specific land rents and aggregate price levels to derive prices and unit costs of non-tradable sectors.

Employment. To quantify the model, we require information on the number of workers of both genders $L^g_{i,s}$ employed in labour market i and sector s. Employment data is available from the Federal Employment Agency ("Bundesagentur für Arbeit") via their online regional database Statistische Ämter des Bundes und der Länder (2021b) for all

NUTS-3 regions. In our main analysis, we focus on the 141 commuting zones as the empirical equivalent to the regions i, j of the model framework (Kosfeld and Werner, 2012) and use the Standard Classification of all Economic Activities (ISIC, Rev. 4) to construct six "occupational sectors", which we use as the data equivalent to the "sectors" introduced in the model framework. Table A 1 summarizes how we aggregate ISIC 4 Sectors into "occupational sectors". Sectors 1-4 are tradable, whereas sectors 5 and 6 consists of non-tradables.

Table A 1: ISIC Revision 4 Sector Classification

Description	Sector	Classification ISIC Revision 4
Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing	Agriculture	A
Mining and Quarrying		
Electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply	Mining and Quarrying	B,D,E
Water supply; sewerage, waste management and remediation activities		
Manufacturing	Manufacturing	C
Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles		
Transportation and Storage	Wholesale/ Retail Trade	G-J
Accommodation and food service activities		
Information and communication		
Construction	Construction	F
Financial and insurance activities		
Real estate activities		
Professional, scientific and technical activities		
Administrative and support service activities		
Public administration and defence; compulsory social security	Non-tradable and Non-market Services	K-U
Education		
Human health and social work activities		
Arts, entertainment and recreation		
Other service activities		
Activities of households as employers		
Activities of extraterritorial organizations and bodies		

Notes: This table displays the six sectors: Agriculture (A), Mining (B/D/E), Manufacturing (C) Wholesale/Retail Trade (G - J), Construction (F) and Non-tradable and non-market services(K - U). Sectors 1 - 4 are tradable sectors, sectors 5 & 6 are non-tradable sectors.

Trade flows. The identification of bilateral trade costs and gross regional output require information on the entirety of inter-regional trade flows for all tradable sectors to match the expenditures in the model, $\sum_{j \in J} \pi_{ji,s} X_{j,s}$. The Clearing House of Transport Data at the Institute of Transport Research of the German Aerospace Center provides information on the entirety of bilateral trade volumes that went through German territory for the year 2010 in their final report for the Forecast of Nationwide Transport Relations in Germany 2030 ('Verkehrsverflechtungsprognose 2030', henceforth VVP).

As an input to the theoretical model we require trade *values* rather than volumes, so we convert the data by using appropriate unit values. We base our measure of region-sector-specific unit values on actual output data, such that the information on the volume of bilateral trade flows obtained from the VVP directly matches measures of aggregate region-sector-specific output. We aggregate trade data to the level of labour market regions and ISIC Revision 4 to match our classification of region-sector pairs.

J.2 Identification steps

Our strategy for identifying preferences and average human capital builds upon the strategy outlined in Rossi-Hansberg et al. (2019). The identification of model-implied variables

from the data takes places in several steps:

1. **Use data on value added, gross output and input-output linkages to derive model-consistent values $\delta_{i,s}$, $\delta_{i,su}$, κ_i for all region-sector pairs**

   (a) **Share of value added for all region-sector pairs**

   Expenditures on wages as well as land and structures in region-sector pair {i,s} are a fixed share of total expenditures by equations (33) and (35)

$$\delta_{i,s} = \frac{\sum_{g \in G} W^g_{i,s} \mu^g_{i,s} L^g + r_i \mathcal{H}_{i,s}}{\sum_{j \in J} \pi_{ji,s} X_{j,s}}, \tag{43}$$

   such that the parameters $\delta_{i,s}$ can be identified by the fraction of value added over gross regional output in each region-occupation pair.

   (b) **Shares of material inputs $\delta_{i,su}$ for all regions and sectors**

   Note, that in the aggregate economy total trade flows equal aggregate expenditures, such that

$$\sum_{i \in J} \sum_{j \in J} \pi_{ji,s} X_{j,s} = \sum_{i \in J} X_{i,s}.$$

   Summing the demand for materials (36) over all regions yields then

$$\delta_{su} = \frac{\sum_{i \in J} M_{i,su} P_{i,u}}{\sum_{i \in J} X_{i,s}},$$

   where we define as δ_{su} the share of economy-wide material inputs of goods from sector u used in the production of goods from sector s. We observe material inputs in the production of goods from each sector from the World Input-Output Tables (Timmer et al. (2015)) at the aggregate level. We, however, cannot observe material inputs by sectors separately for each region. We therefore assume that in all regions the value of materials $u \in S$ used as inputs, relative to total material inputs, is constant, such that:

$$\delta_{su} = \frac{\delta_{i,su}}{\sum_{u \in M} \delta_{i,su}} \quad \forall i \in J.$$

   The regional share of material inputs is therefore determined as:

$$\delta_{i,su} = (1 - \delta_{i,s})\, \delta_{su}.$$

   (c) **Fraction of value-added accruing to workers**

   Lastly, we calibrate the fraction of value added accruing to workers for each region-occupation pair as

$$1 - \kappa_{i,s} = \frac{\sum_{g \in G} W^g_{i,s} L^g_{i,s}}{\delta_{i,s} \sum_{j \in J} \pi_{ji,s} X_{j,s}}. \tag{44}$$

2. **Derive expenditures on land and structures and trade imbalances for all regions**

   Expenditures on land and structures are a fixed share of total wage expenditures in all region-sector pairs:

$$r_i \mathcal{H}_{i,s} = \frac{\kappa_{i,s}}{1-\kappa_{i,s}} \sum_{g \in G} W^g_{i,s} L^g_{i,s}, \tag{45}$$

   such that total (before tax) income of rentiers in region $i \in J$ is given as

$$\sum_{s \in M} r_i \mathcal{H}_{i,s} = \sum_{s \in M} \frac{\kappa_{i,s}}{1-\kappa_{i,s}} \sum_{g \in G} W^g_{i,s} L^g_{i,s}.$$

   Trade imbalances after re-distribution are finally defined as

$$\Upsilon_i = (1-\mathcal{T}_i) \sum_{s \in M} \mathcal{H}_{i,s} r_i - \iota_i \sum_{j \in J} \left[(1-\mathcal{T}_j) \sum_{u \in S} \mathcal{H}_{j,u} r_j - \bar{I} \sum_{g \in G} L^g_{j,h} \right].$$

3. **Determine regional shares of national portfolio**

   To determine the regional shares of the national portfolio we match the trade imbalances implied by the model Υ^M_i to the observed imbalances Υ^D_i in the data. We search for the respective contribution shares that minimize the sum of squared residuals $\sum_{i \in J} \left(\Upsilon^M_i - \Upsilon^D_i\right)^2$ subject to the constraints $\iota_i \in [0,1]$ and $\sum_{i \in J} \iota_i = 1$.

4. **Calculate model-consistent expenditure shares β_s and β^R_s for all sectors**

   Aggregate goods markets clear for all sectors, which, jointly with the definition of $\mathcal{K}$, implies that

$$\begin{aligned} \sum_{i \in J} X_{i,s} =& \beta^R_s \left(\sum_{i \in J} \sum_{g \in G} \sum_{u \in M} (\mathcal{T}_i + \rho_i) \left(W^g_{i,u} L^g_{i,u} + \mathcal{H}_{i,u} r_i \right) + \mathcal{K} \right) \\ &+ \beta_s \left(\sum_{i \in J} \sum_{g \in G} \sum_{u \in M} (1-\mathcal{T}_i) W^g_{i,u} L^g_{i,u} + \bar{I} \sum_{i \in J} \sum_{g \in G} L^g_{i,h} \right) \\ &+ \sum_{i \in J} \sum_{u \in M} \frac{\delta_{i,us}}{\delta_{i,u}(1-\kappa_{i,u})} \sum_{g \in G} W^g_{i,u} L^g_{i,u}, \end{aligned} \tag{46}$$

   Given aggregate wage data, employment data and parameter values for ρ_i and t_i as well as for $\delta_{i,s}$,$\kappa_{i,s}$ and $\delta_{i,us}$ obtained from identification step 1 we solve for model-consistent expenditure shares $\{\beta_s, \beta^R_s\}$ which imply aggregate sector-specific goods market clearing. We hereby assume that local governments and rentiers do not consume housing, but otherwise distribute expenditures similarly as workers across the remaining sectors. This allows to fit private expenditures shares better

to observable housing expenditures shares in Germany, under the restriction that goods markets still clear in all regions and sectors (46).

5. **Calculate total expenditures on tradables**
Goods market clearing in all regions and sectors implies that

$$X_{i,s} = \beta_s^R \left[(\mathcal{T}_i + \rho_i) \left(\sum_{g \in G} \sum_{u \in M} W_{i,u}^g L_{i,u}^g + \sum_{u \in M} \mathcal{H}_{i,u} r_i \right) + \iota_i \mathcal{K} \right]$$
$$+ \beta_s \left(\sum_{g \in G} \sum_{u \in M} (1 - \mathcal{T}_i) W_{i,u}^g L_{i,u}^g + \bar{I} \sum_{g \in G} L_{i,h}^g \right) + \sum_{u \in M} \delta_{i,us} \sum_{j \in J} \pi_{ji,u} X_{j,u},$$

which we solve for using the model-consistent expenditure shares $\{\beta_s, \beta_s^R\}$ from identification step 4.

6. **Calculate relative unit cost shares $\tilde{\lambda}_{i,s}$ for all tradable goods**
Substituting the expressions for trade shares (38) as well as the calculated values for total expenditure from above into equations (44) yields

$$\sum_{j \in J} X_{j,s} \frac{(\lambda_{i,s} \tau_{ji,s})^{-\nu_s}}{\sum_{n \in J} (\lambda_{n,s} \tau_{jn,s})^{-\nu_s}} = \frac{\sum_{g \in G} W_{i,s}^g L_{i,s}^g}{\delta_{i,s} (1 - \kappa_{i,s})}. \tag{47}$$

For all pairs $\{i, s\}$ we solve for the relative unit costs $\tilde{\lambda}_{i,s} \equiv \frac{(\lambda_{i,s})^{\nu_s}}{\sum_{n \in J} (\lambda_{n,s})^{\nu_s}}$ that are implied by the structure of trade flows. Unit costs can be identified from equations (47) as smaller relative unit costs imply that a region i is the least-cost producer for a larger number of varieties which increases trade shares towards all regions $j \in J$. In all sectors where goods are non-tradable, it holds that $\pi_{ji,s} = 0$ as long as $j \neq i$, such that

$$X_{i,nt} = \frac{\sum_{g \in G} W_{i,nt}^g L_{i,nt}^g}{\delta_{i,nt} (1 - \kappa_{i,s})}.$$

where $nt \in \mathcal{S} \subset M$ denotes sectors from the subset of market sectors that are non-tradable.

7. **Compute sector-specific price levels for all tradable goods**
Substituting relative unit costs $\tilde{\lambda}_{j,s}$ into price equations (37) allows to solve for the ideal region-sector-specific cost indices $P_{i,s}$:

$$P_{i,s} = \Gamma (\gamma_s)^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma}} \left[\sum_{j \in J} \left(\tilde{\lambda}_{j,s} \right)^{-1} (\tau_{ij,s})^{-\nu_s} \right]^{-\frac{1}{\nu_s}} * \left(\sum_{n \in J} (\lambda_{n,s})^{\nu_s} \right)^{\frac{1}{\nu_s}}, \tag{48}$$

where the $\sum_{n \in J} (\lambda_{n,s})^{\nu_s}$ are sector-specific constants to be determined by normalization.

We choose a model-consistent normalization on aggregate sector-specific cost indices: $P_s \equiv \sum_{i\in J} P_{i,s}\pi_{i,s} = 1 \quad \forall s \in TR$, that is we define sector-specific cost aggregates as a weighted average of region-sector-specific costs and normalize them to unity. The weights $\pi_{i,s} = \frac{X_{i,s}}{\sum_{n\in J} X_{n,s}}$ are the share of total spending in occupation s, that accrues to region-i expenditures. Applying the normalization we solve for the occupation-specific constants, such that

$$\left(\sum_{n\in J} (\lambda_{n,s})^{\nu_s}\right)^{\frac{1}{\nu_s}} = \frac{1}{\Gamma(\gamma_s)^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma}} \sum_{i\in J} \pi_{i,s} \left[\sum_{j\in J} \left(\tilde{\lambda}_{j,s}\right)^{-1} (\tau_{ij,s})^{-\nu_s}\right]^{-\frac{1}{\nu_s}}}.$$

We subsequently calculate ideal cost indices relative to a weighted average of costs across all regions, that is

$$P_{i,s} = \frac{\left[\sum_{j\in J} \left(\tilde{\lambda}_{j,s}\right)^{-1} (\tau_{ij,s})^{-\nu_s}\right]^{-\frac{1}{\nu_s}}}{\sum_{i\in J} \pi_{i,s} \left[\sum_{j\in J} \left(\tilde{\lambda}_{j,s}\right)^{-1} (\tau_{ij,s})^{-\nu_s}\right]^{-\frac{1}{\nu_s}}}. \tag{49}$$

Using the normalization for aggregate occupation-specific cost indices once again, we solve for unit costs in levels:

$$\lambda_{i,s} = \frac{\left(\tilde{\lambda}_{i,s}\right)^{\frac{1}{\nu_s}}}{\Gamma(\gamma_s)^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma}} \sum_{i\in J} \pi_{i,s} \left[\sum_{j\in J} \left(\tilde{\lambda}_{j,s}\right)^{-1} (\tau_{ij,s})^{-\nu_s}\right]^{-\frac{1}{\nu_s}}}.$$

8. **Compute price levels in all regions for all non-tradable goods**
   The price levels of non-tradable services are defined as

$$P_{i,ntS} = \beta_{ntS} \left(\frac{P_{i,S}}{(P_{i,tS}/\beta_{tS})^{\beta_{tS}}}\right)^{\frac{1}{\beta_{ntS}}},$$

   where the price level of tradable services $P_{i,tS}$ and the consumption shares of tradable and non-tradable services $\{\beta_{tS}, \beta_{ntS}\}$ follow from the previous steps. In all non-tradable sectors it holds that $\tau_{ij,s} \to \infty$ for all regions $j \neq i$, such that price levels simplify to:

$$P_{i,nt} = \Gamma(\gamma_s)^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma}} \lambda_{i,nt}.$$

   Using regional price data for our choice of non-tradable sectors we subsequently solve also for unit costs in these sectors.

9. **Compute average human capital as compensating differential to unit costs**
   Gender-specific labour demand (33) can be re-written in terms of the aggregate wage

sum:

$$\frac{W_{i,s}^g L_{i,s}^g}{\sum_{g\in G} W_{i,s}^g L_{i,s}^g} = \frac{\left(\frac{H_{i,s}^g}{W_{i,s}^g}\right)^{\sigma^g-1}}{\sum_{g\in G}\left(\frac{H_{i,s}^g}{W_{i,s}^g}\right)^{\sigma^g-1}} \tag{50}$$

Substituting relative human capital $\tilde{H}_{i,s}^g \equiv \frac{H_{i,s}^g}{\sum_{g\in G} H_{i,s}^g}$ into equation (50) and re-arranging terms yields

$$\frac{\left(W_{i,s}^g\right)^{\sigma^g} L_{i,s}^g}{\sum_{g\in G} W_{i,s}^g L_{i,s}^g} = \frac{\left(\tilde{H}_{i,s}^g\right)^{\sigma^g-1}}{\sum_{g\in G}\left(\tilde{H}_{i,s}^g\right)^{\sigma^g-1}\left(W_{i,s}^g\right)^{1-\sigma^g}}$$

Applying the fact that relative human capital $\tilde{H}_{i,s}^g$ sums to unity in all region-sector pairs by construction allows to identify them solely in terms of observable average wages and employment:

$$\tilde{H}_{i,s}^g = \frac{\left(W_{i,s}^g\right)^{\frac{\sigma^g}{\sigma^g-1}}\left(L_{i,s}^g\right)^{\frac{1}{\sigma^g-1}}}{\sum_{g\in G}\left(W_{i,s}^g\right)^{\frac{\sigma^g}{\sigma^g-1}}\left(L_{i,s}^g\right)^{\frac{1}{\sigma^g-1}}} \tag{51}$$

Intuitively, relative human capital is predicted to be larger if, controlling for differences in wages, there is large demand for group-specific employment.
The levels of human capital can be identified from observable values of aggregate production in all region-occupation pairs. Combining equations (39) with labour demand, as well as demand for land and structures and materials yields

$$\left(\sum_{g\in G} H_{i,s}^g\right)^{\delta_{i,s}(1-\kappa_{i,s})} = \frac{B_{i,s}}{\lambda_{i,s}}\left(r_i^{\kappa_{i,s}}\left[\sum_{g\in G}\left(\frac{\tilde{H}_{i,s}^g}{W_{i,s}^g}\right)^{\sigma^g-1}\right]^{\frac{1-\kappa_{i,s}}{1-\sigma^g}}\right)^{\delta_{i,s}} \prod_{u\in M}\left[P_{i,u}\right]^{\delta_{i,su}},$$

where we substituted the definition for relative human capital.
Re-arranging terms yields gender-specific average human capital that is increasing in wages, price levels and rents, but decreasing in unit costs:

$$H_{i,s}^g = \tilde{H}_{i,s}^g\left[\frac{B_{i,s}}{\lambda_{i,s}}\left(r_i^{\kappa_{i,s}}\left[\sum_{g\in G}\left(\frac{\tilde{H}_{i,s}^g}{W_{i,s}^g}\right)^{\sigma^g-1}\right]^{\frac{1-\kappa_{i,s}}{1-\sigma^g}}\right)^{\delta_{i,s}} \prod_{u\in M}\left[P_{i,u}\right]^{\delta_{i,su}}\right]^{\frac{1}{\delta_{i,s}\left(1-\kappa_{i,s}\right)}}. \tag{52}$$

10. **Compute preferences as compensating differentials to labour supply**
Regional price levels are a Cobb-Douglas aggregate of sector-specific prices by equation (30). Given sector-specific unit cost levels (49), as well as data on wages $W_{i,s}^g$,

tax rates, public goods and average human capital $T^g_{i,s}$, preferences $\eta^g_{i,s}$ are recovered as the residual to observable labour supply:

$$L^g_{i,s} = \frac{\left[\left((1-t_i)\,\tilde{w}^g_{i,s} T^g_{i,s}\,(P_i)^{-1}\right)^{1-\alpha} \eta^g_{i,s} R_i^{\alpha} L_i^{-\chi\alpha}\right]^{\theta^g}}{\sum_{s\in M}\sum_{i\in J}\left[\left((1-t_i)\,\tilde{w}^g_{i,s} T^g_{i,s}\,(P_i)^{-1}\right)^{1-\alpha} \eta^g_{i,s} R_i^{\alpha} L_i^{-\chi\alpha}\right]^{\theta^g}} L^g_m.$$

Spatial variation in real income identifies average group-specific preferences up to a group-specific constant for each region-sector pair $\{i, s\}$ as long as there is perfect worker mobility both across regions and sectors, which implies group-specific utility equalization.

11. **Compute preference shifters for the home market**
We use estimates for the elasticities of non-employment to local public good provision ϕ^g and shape parameters ϵ^g to recover the region-group-specific scale parameters of the preference distribution from equations (32):

$$B^g_{i,h} = \frac{\mathcal{Y}^g}{A^g_i \left(\frac{\bar{I}}{P_i}\right)^{1-\alpha} \left(\frac{R_i}{L_i^{\chi}}\right)^{\alpha}} \left(\frac{L^g_{i,h}}{L^g_i}\right)^{\frac{1}{\epsilon^g}}$$

Finally, we split preference shifters into an exogenous and endogenous component such that

$$\bar{B}^g_{i,h} = B^g_{i,h} \left(\frac{R_i}{L_i^{\chi}}\right)^{\phi^g}.$$

J.3 Structural parameters

In this appendix, we highlight the spatial distribution of our model-inverted variables and run several over-identification checks.

Public good elasticity. This section presents the first-stage regression results of regression equation (26). Real non-market earnings only react to the main Bartik shift-share instrument with an estimate of 0.34. Local public goods provision, however, is responsive to both the vector of distance-weighted regional childcare provision rates and the Bartik instrument, with estimates of 0.54 and 0.09 respectively, whereas the interactions of the instruments with the female dummy do not have any predictive power. As expected, the interaction term of real non-market earnings with the *female* dummy only reacts to the interaction of the Bartik instrument and the female dummy, whereas both interaction instruments explain the public good interaction term.

Table 2: The effect of public goods provision on non-employment: First-stage

	$\ln(\bar{I}_t/P_{i,t})$ (1)	$\ln(I_{i,t}/L_{i,t-1}) \times$ Female (2)	$\ln(R_{i,t}/L_{i,t-1})$ (3)	$\ln(R_{i,t}/L_{i,t-1}) \times$ Female (4)
InstCHILD$_{i,t}$	-0.00	-0.00	0.09***	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.00)
InstCHILD$_{i,t}$ $\times$ Female	0.00	-0.00	-0.00	0.09***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.02)	(0.01)
BtkTAX$_{i,t}$	0.34***	0.00	0.54**	0.00
	(0.07)	(0.00)	(0.22)	(0.00)
BtkTAX$_{i,t}$ $\times$ Female	-0.00	0.34***	0.00	0.54**
	(0.09)	(0.07)	(0.30)	(0.22)
Region fixed effects	yes	yes	yes	yes
Year fixed effects	yes	yes	yes	yes
F-statistic instrument	14.75	7.57	53.49	27.72
Observations	1974	1974	1974	1974

Notes: This table reports the first-stage results of the IV estimates. The dependent variable is the log non-employment rate, and the endogenous variables are the log real non-market earnings and the log real tax revenues. These are instrumented with distance-weighted leave-one-out childcare provision rates, Bartik-style tax-class instruments, and their respective interaction with a female dummy. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the level of 141 local labour markets. $^{+}$ $p < 0.15$, * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

K Counterfactual appendix

K.1 Procedure

To implement the counterfactual we hold parameter values $\{\alpha, \beta_u, \beta_u^R, \theta^g, \epsilon^g, \delta_{i,s}, \delta_{i,su}, \iota_i, \kappa_{i,s}, \phi^g, \sigma_g, \sigma, \tau_{ij,s}, \nu_s, \chi\}$ at their level for the year 2014. We then iteratively up-date guesses for wages per efficiency, rents, prices, and the employment as well as non-employment distribution until in the counterfactual equilibrium

1. Wages per efficiency clears all labour markets and ensure that labour supply (31) equals labour demand (33)
2. Rents adjust to clear the market for land and structure
3. Unit cost adjust to ensure that demand equals supply for all input factors in intermediate production
4. Goods markets clear
5. The number of non-employed workers of both genders has endogenously adjusted to fiscal capacity shocks

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Erklärung

Hiermit versichere ich, dass ich die vorliegende Dissertation selbständig und ohne unerlaubte Hilfe angefertigt und andere als die in der Dissertation angegebenen Hilfsmittel nicht benutzt habe. Alle Stellen, die wörtlich oder sinngemäß aus anderen Schriften entnommen sind, habe ich als solche kenntlich gemacht.

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