

**Multi-causal pathways to compliance and non-compliance
with policies for female employees in Vietnam:
Statistical analyses and fsQCA findings**

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List of Abbreviations

COMPLIANCE	The outcome “compliance”
~COMPLIANCE	The outcome “non-compliance”
DISP	The presence of the condition “supportive dispositions of the external norm addressees”
~DISP	The absence of the condition “supportive dispositions of the external norm addressees”
DOLISA	Departments of Labor, War Invalids and Social Affairs
FINA	The condition “the availability of financial resources for policy implementation on the side of the external norm addressees”
~FINA	The absence of the condition “the availability of financial resources for policy implementation on the side of the external norm addressees”
fsQCA	Fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis
ILO	International Labor Organization
INFO	The presence of the condition “information level of the policy targets about policies”
~INFO	The absence of the condition “information level of the policy targets about policies”
LATI	The presence of “latitudes of interpretation within the respective legal norm”
~LATI	The absence of “latitudes of interpretation within the respective legal norm”

LESA	The presence of “legal sanctions within the respective legal norm”
~LESA	The absence of “legal sanctions within the respective legal norm”
MOLISA	Ministry of Labor, War Invalids and Social Affairs
PUBLIC	The characteristic of the external norm addressees as being in public ownership.
~PUBLIC	The characteristic of the external norm addressees as being in private ownership.
P1	Policy of periodic health check-ups for female employees
P2	Policy of maternity leave
P3	Policy of childcare support for female employees
VND	Vietnam Dong
UNION	Interest groups of supporting effective compliance
~UNION	Interest groups of obstructing effective compliance

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Chapter I: Introduction

1.1. Statement of the research problem, purposes of the study, and research questions

With very few exceptions (Makinde 2005) implementation research is dominated by approaches derived from and set up for modern western societies. Respectively, analytical frameworks with the help of which the scope of implementation deficits should be explained are largely adapted to western contexts. In conclusion, implementation research in developing countries is suffering under having to employ analytical frameworks based on concepts that do not fit the special circumstances to be found in their particular environment (cf. Van Meter and Van Horn 1975: 462-478; Sabatier and Mazmanian 1980: 545; O'Toole 1986: 184-189; Matland 1995: 153; Wandersman et al. 2008: 177-178; Robinson 2009: 237-252; Weaver 2009: 5; Meyers et al. 2012: 14; Mthethwa 2012: 42; Winter 2012: 258; Sætren and Hupe 2018: 561, etc.). For instance, most developing countries are still challenged by building an effectively functioning public administration (see below). However, since public administration is an important prerequisite for employing legal provisions and even negative financial incentive programs (Dose 2008: 252, 296) an important prerequisite for success – or in terms of an analytical framework to – explanatory factor is not given. Given this, standard western type analytical frameworks of implementation research have a hard time to explain successful policy implementation. Conversely, they are also unable to validly explain implementation deficits because inevitably they point out the ineffective public administration as causing these deficits. Doing this they might cover the real reasons for non-compliance with analyzed policies given the different circumstances. Thus, this study has to start to develop an analytical framework that fits better the real situation of the implementation question in

developing countries. If this endeavor should be successful respective, empirical studies might help to single out those factors that contribute to successful implementation in the context of developing countries.

Here, the concept of ‘compliance’ is understood as target group behavior consistent with a given policy’s objective (Weaver 2009: 2). Conversely, ‘non-compliance’ is conceptualized as behavior inconsistent with or contravening a given policy’s objective (Gofen 2015: 4). The degree of compliance is operationalized by the gap between the objective of the policy and the actual outcome of implementation status. Different case studies might show different degrees of compliance. Although implementation deficits are occasionally mentioned, this simply means the same phenomenon that has just been mentioned as non-compliance¹.

While Vietnamese scholars strive to contribute to the respective discussion, it must be seen that public policy and implementation research are new scientific fields of interest in recent years in Vietnam. Vietnamese scholars have gradually approached the main schools of thought on public policy from international scholars. Many Vietnamese scholars also discussed the various aspects of public policy in their studies (Dam 2009, 2011, 2012; Hai 2010; Tho and Nhat 2014; Thanh and Hoa 2017, etc.). Toward the theme of policy implementation, in spite of having different statements in detail, most Vietnamese scholars agree with a general standpoint that policy implementation is an important stage through which policy decisions are translated into action to address raising problems of the society in accordance with the government’s goals (Tho and Nhat 2014: 24-29). Vietnamese scholars are also aware of the complex nature of policy implementation and have various discussions on the

¹ Overall, the double term compliance and non-compliance fits better with the fsQCA used in the empirical main part, which explains compliance and non-compliance with different configurations of conditions.


factors that influence the outcome of policy implementation. However, so far studies for setting up a theoretical system of policy implementation with Vietnamese identities are still developing. More concrete, no theory building on policy compliance and non-compliance can be observed so far in the respective Vietnamese scientific literature.

Derived from the observation that each country has unique characteristics, compliance and non-compliance of external norm addressees in different countries might follow different patterns (Dose et al. 2018: 1). As stated by Peter deLeon and Linda deLeon (2002: 471), “there is, under a contingency theory model, little reason to require one shoe to fit all situations”, i.e. there is no general comprehensive framework to explain policy implementation effectiveness all over the world. This is also in line with the standpoint of Mthethwa (2012: 36): “Policies are influenced by the contexts in which they are developed. Such contexts include historical, cultural, social, economic and diverse conceptual dimensions operating at international, regional, country and local levels (spheres). These forces influence policy development as well as policy implementation”. By concentrating on the implementation program as well as the initiation, realizing policy promises might be increased (Pressman and Wildavsky 1984: 6). Nevertheless, in fact, vague and contradictory policies are difficult to implement (Paki and Ebienna 2011: 5). Also, many brilliant policies are debased to mere rhetorics because they only exist on paper and are never implemented (Paki and Ebienna 2011: 6). In many ways implementation is a slippery subject (Majone and Wildavsky 1979: 164). Obviously, the formulation of policies is not the only major issue but rather their effective implementation which is influenced by varying factors. To conclude, different contexts denoted by different characteristics ask for adapted analytical frameworks to discern the relative importance of different explanatory factors. In other words, analytical frameworks can contain the same independent variables however the latter are of differing importance in different

countries. In order to keep the analytical frameworks parsimonious and thus manageable for empirical research, only those independent variables of expected relevance should be included.

Thus, the research objective is to contribute to the discussion on the appropriate analytical framework and to ‘test’ it on the example of the Vietnamese female labor law. This test includes finding answers to the following questions. Admittedly, they are – with the exception of the third research question – rather common in the contest of implementation research (*Figure 1*).

Figure 1: Research questions



Start with the first research question “What is the degree of compliance with some selected policies for female employees in Vietnam?” the aim of answering this question is to identify the outcome of policy implementation which is necessary to acquire data on the scope of the implementation deficit. Dealing with the second research question “What makes external norm addressees comply?” will be the focus of this empirical study. The “What” stands for the independent variables of the analytical framework. By making

use of statistical analyses and fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis (fsQCA), it will be detected which of the independent variables contribute to explain the dependent variable. While statistical analyses allow me to conduct simple bivariate tests, employing a fsQCA gives some insights into the combinations of conditions – which stands in the terminology of QCA for independent variables – that cause the analyzed outcome – which stands in the terminology of QCA for the dependent variable. In regard to the third research question “Are there similarities and differences in policy compliance and non-compliance between the public sector and private sector, and if so, what are their characteristics?” I will employ the analytical framework to re-test in each sector separately. By using the fsQCA approach, I will compare the necessary and/or the sufficient (combination of) factors for policy compliance and non-compliance between the public and private sectors in Vietnam. The aim of answering this question is to strengthen the common results identified in the general scope as well as to identify the typical characteristics of each sector in the policy implementation process.

1.2. From a theoretical foundation to an analytical framework

In order to explain the implementation outcome of policy, it might be helpful to consider factors from different theoretical approaches. The literature on policy implementation mentions three main approaches: top-down, bottom-up, and synthesis. In the debate between the top-down and the bottom-up approach², scholars have different arguments in explaining the outcome of policy implementation.

On one side, the top-down perspective is denoted by hierarchical control themes (Mthethwa 2012: 39), which emphasizes policy designers as the

² The comparison between top-down and bottom-up approaches will be discussed in more detail in chapter 2.1.2 of this study.

key actors and focuses on factors that can be manipulated at the central level (Matland 1995: 146-148). Some classic policy implementation models, which are based on the top-down approach, set up factors that are hypothesized to influence the outcome of policy implementation such as a clear ranking of legal objectives, available resources, the characteristics of the implementing agencies, hierarchical integration within and among implementation institutions, the disposition of the implementers, etc. (Van Meter and Van Horn 1975: 483; Sabatier and Mazmanian 1980: 545).

On the other side, the bottom-up theorists have their point in arguing that the outcome of a policy might be more dependent on the interaction among actors at the local level (Mthethwa 2012: 42). They emphasize target groups and service deliverers as potential actors that can influence the degree of policy compliance. To drive policy targets into the implementation process, policy programs must be in accordance with their dispositions, interests, desires, and perceptions (cf. Sætren and Hupe 2018: 561). Under the bottom-up approach, policy targets need a certain level of autonomy in the implementation process. Giving latitudes of interpretation within the respective legal norms is an indicator for designing arbitrary regulations. This might be a way to “leave room for implementers to exercise their creativity and adaptability where and when the need arises” (cf. Makinde 2005: 63), but it is only “appropriate when the goals of the policy formulators and implementers are the same” (Matland 1995: 150). Commonly, giving arbitrary regulations might “create the appearance at least of favoritism in its application, and result in lack of uniformity in the treatment of cases arising under it” (Dawes 1906: 191).

In my study, factors from both theoretical approaches will be incorporated into the theoretical foundation on which the analytical framework will be built. Thus, I will follow the synthesis approach combining theoretical thought from both top-down and bottom-up approaches to consider factors that might influence the implementation outcome.

Owing to the current regulatory system of Vietnam, it is possible to identify factors in accordance with the top-down approach: (1) the presence or absence of latitudes of interpretation within the respective legal norms, which is denoted by mandatory regulations (2) the severity of legal sanctions against violations, (3) the availability of financial resources for policy implementation on the side of the norm addressees. As I will demonstrate, including these factors into a respective analytical framework might make a difference in explaining the behaviors of policy compliance and non-compliance. Some other factors in line with the top-down approach are excluded because of the already mentioned widespread lack of an effectively functioning public administration. Instead, my study will take the other possible factors in line with the bottom-up approach into account: (4) the role of interest groups (such as trade unions) supporting or obstructing effective compliance, which might be considered as a kind of equivalent to public administration to control the degree of compliance, (5) the information level of the policy targets about policies (the content of the legal regulations). Furthermore, my analytical framework calls for factors that are at the intersection of the top-down and the bottom-up approach including (6) the dispositions of the norm addressees towards the policy at stake, and (7) the characteristic of the norm addressees as being in public or private ownership. From this analytical framework, some directional expectations will be laid down in assumptions that will contribute to direct the research.

1.3. Relevance of the study

Like many other developing countries as well as developed countries, Vietnam suffers from implementation deficits or expressed in a slightly different theoretical perspective of compliance theory from non-compliance with many policies. This diagnosis will be made more concrete for the example of the implementation of the Vietnamese female labor code. Lately, the topic

and the implementation shortcomings are recognized and discussed by high-level political institutions of Vietnam.

In the fourth plenary session of the 14th Vietnam National Assembly which took place in Hanoi on 9th November 2017, many representatives reported to the Minister of Ministry of Labor, Invalids, and Social Affairs (MOLISA) about the outcomes during five years of implementing the female labor code. One of the most notable reports is about the result of the national labor inspection campaign which took place in 152 enterprises from May - September 2015³. It is reported that there were more than 55 enterprises violating female labor law (accounting for 36%) and half of the twelve inspected localities⁴ showed violating enterprises⁵. Thus, the outcome of policy implementation is quite often unsatisfactory. Truong Thi Bich Hanh - a chairwoman of the Provincial Labor Federation - stated that the formulated policies for female employees should be implemented, but in fact, there were still many enterprises that do not comply with given regulations. Nevertheless, nobody had to suffer any penalty⁶. This problem seemed widespread, affecting the legal rights of female workers and undermining the rule of the law. Many labor law experts were not surprised by these statements. It might be the

³ Tuan Dung. 2015. "*Kỳ lục*" sai phạm tại doanh nghiệp dệt may Việt. Retrieved from <http://vneconomy.vn/doanh-nhan/ky-luc-sai-pham-tai-doanh-nghiep-det-may-viet-20151018050145127>

⁴ 12 inspected localities are Hanoi, Ha Nam, Hai Duong, Vinh Phuc, Thanh Hoa, Thua Thien Hue, Da Nang, Binh Dinh, Ben Tre, Dong Nai, Ho Chi Minh city, Can Tho.

⁵ Ngan Anh. 2015. *Gần 600 triệu đồng xử phạt vi phạm pháp luật lao động ở ngành dệt may*. Retrieved from <https://www.nhandan.org.vn/phapluat/item/27726002-gan-600-trieu-dong-xu-phat-vi-pham-phap-luat-lao-dong-o-nganh-det-may.html?PageSpeed=noscript>

⁶ Báo Bình Dương. 2017. *Đại biểu Quốc hội Trương Thị Bích Hạnh (Đoàn Bình Dương): Cần có giải pháp chấn chỉnh việc thực thi pháp luật đối với lao động nữ*. Retrieved from <http://baobinhduong.vn/dai-bieu-quoc-hoi-truong-thi-bich-hanh-doan-binh-duong-can-co-giai-phap-chan-chinh-viec-thuc-thi-phap-luat-doi-voi-lao-dong-nu--a171167.html>

consequence of a loose legal system and an ineffectively functioning public administration.

At present, the regulatory system for female workers is complex with a 242-article-Labor Code⁷ and a host of related legal documents, including two Ordinances, over 30 Decrees and hundreds of Circular/Decisions. In regards to Decree 85/2015/ND-CP stipulating in detail a number of articles of the Labor Code on the labor policy for women, as stated by the politician Ha Dinh Bon, “there are mandatory regulations to implement, while there are arbitrary regulations that provide room for discretion”⁸. Along with that, some regulations lack sanctions⁹. Indeed, under the given institutional conditions in Vietnamese, it seems not to be easy to make external norm addressees obey a law. According to an older study already conducted 10 years ago, the quantity of labor inspectors in Vietnam is extremely insufficient (Wheeler and Murtagh 2010: 14). Thus, implementation deficits might be caused by the poor design quality of the respective legal provisions and an understaffed public administration in this policy field¹⁰. What could be the reason for the implementation deficits in the Vietnamese context will be analyzed in the further course of this study. Therefore, the emphasis here is on clarifying the

⁷ The Labor Code (amended) 2012 was adopted by the National Assembly of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, term XIII, at the third session, on 18th June 2012 and takes effect as of 1st May 2013.

⁸ Sang, Hoang, and Thanh Lan Nguyen. 2015. *Chính sách đối với lao động nữ: Nhiều quy định gây khó cho doanh nghiệp*. Báo Diễn đàn Doanh nghiệp. Retrieved from <https://enternews.vn/chinh-sach-doi-voi-lao-dong-nu-nhieu-quy-dinh-gay-kho-cho-dn-93659.html>

⁹ Pham Tho. 2018. *Chính sách đối với lao động nữ: Nhiều quy định vẫn nằm... trên giấy!* Retrieved from <http://baobaohiemxahoi.vn/vi/tin-chi-tiet-chinh-sach-doi-voi-lao-dong-nu-nhieu-quy-dinh-van-nam-tren-giay-409f5237.aspx>

¹⁰ As already indicated pointing at the obvious explanatory factors that only hardly can be changed is too pessimistic and too defensive. Therefore, I strive for innovative solutions that are taught by empirical reality.

importance of respective research. As has been shown, it is highly relevant both for Vietnam and for the further development of implementation research that is also adapted to the conditions of developing countries.

1.4. Design and structure of the study

This study follows a comparative case study design. Compliance and non-compliance of external norm addressees were observed in 28 implementation units through 84 not representative case studies on the implementation of three selected policies in different cities/ provinces of Vietnam at the end of 2016/ beginning of 2017 (after five years of implementing the female labor code 2012). The policies of the female labor law under this study include the policy of periodical health check-ups for female employees (P1), the policy of maternity leave (P2), and the policy of childcare support (P3). The sample size for each sector is equal (42 cases in the public sector and 42 cases in the private sector). Each case study was conducted with a structure determined by a given questionnaire guide containing open and closed questions for face-to-face interviews. The questionnaire again followed in its content an analytical framework derived from the theoretical literature and in-depth knowledge of the respective situation in Vietnam. For analyzing the collected data, a combination of statistical analyses and fsQCA was employed to explain the complex causality of compliance and non-compliance with the selected policies. By the application of statistical analyses, it is tested whether there are statistically significant relationships between the selected independent variable of the analytical framework and the dependent variable, and if so, what are their directions. Since detecting bivariate relationships between variables is in the end not convincing and to further validate the results, a fsQCA is also conducted to explore the necessary and/or the sufficient (combinations of) factors for policy compliance and non-compliance. These results can open up “the black box” to understand why external norm addressees comply or not comply and


how the factors contribute to the implementation outcome. Also, the study will link the results back to the referred theory to examine the applicability of such theories.

My results can provide valuable in-depth insights into managing the complexity of policy implementation. It is aimed at being a useful contribution to the development of the implementation theory under the conditions of a developing country in general as well as fine-tuning policies for female workers in Vietnam in particular. The study will provide recommendations on how to improve the effectiveness of policy implementation in accordance with the actual development conditions of Vietnam. These recommendations might be applied to the process of policy implementation in developing countries that regularly lack an effective public administration.

Explaining the structure of this study, it can be outlined that it consists of altogether eight chapters: Chapter I introduces the research problem, purposes of the study, and research questions. Moreover, the theoretical foundations are sketched out and the relevance is argued for before, here the design and the structure are laid down. Chapter II reviews theories and models that explain policy implementation effectiveness. An understanding of policy compliance and non-compliance is stated through common definitions and differentiations. This chapter also refers to some previous studies in the field of implementing employment policies for female workers in Vietnam and in some other countries. In connection with the existing literature, chapter III develops an analytical framework giving the 84 small case studies a common structure so that they are comparable. Subsequently, the research design, data collection, and methodology are addressed in chapter IV. Chapter V starts with descriptive statistics to deal with the first research question and then employs statistical methodologies to answer the second research question. Chapter VI is the most important chapter to dig deeper into the second research question which aims at explaining the multi-causal pathways to compliance and non-compliance with

some selected policies for female employees in the research context of Vietnam by using the fsQCA approach. Furthermore, chapter VII answers the third research question by working out a comparison of policy implementation between the public and the private sectors. Finally, in chapter VIII, conclusions are drawn and linked back to the research questions. Policy recommendations are proposed in light of the conclusions. Lastly, the study discusses its limitations and gives some suggestions for further research. The outline of the study is presented in *Figure 2*.

Figure 2: The outline of this dissertation



Chapter II: Literature Review

2.1. An overview of the implementation and compliance literature

2.1.1. Definition of policy implementation

Public policy is “anything a government chooses to do or not to do” (Dye 1972: 2) to manage the state. A policy, no matter how it is sound on paper, will become nothingness if it is not implemented in practice. Policy implementation is seen as the core of the discipline of public administration. In literature, the concept “policy implementation” has been defined by many scholars under various views (Pressman and Wildavsky 1973: xv; Van Meter and Van Horn 1975: 447; Sharkansky and Meter 1975: 71-81; Kerr 1981: 352; Mazmanian and Sabatier 1983: 20-21; Elmore 1978: 195; Hill and Hupe 2002: 75; O’Toole 2003: 266; Howlett and Ramesh 2003: 13; Paudel 2009: 38).

Two of the pioneers in implementation research, Pressman and Wildavsky offered already a fairly complete definition: “Policy implementation is the process of carrying out, accomplishing and completing a policy” (Pressman and Wildavsky 1973: xiii). More precisely, it is the way to forge subsequent links in the causal chain to obtain the desired results (Pressman and Wildavsky 1973: xv). Van Meter and Van Horn (1975: 447) wrote that “policy implementation encompasses those actions by public and private individuals (or groups) that are directed at the achievement of objectives set forth in prior policy decisions. This includes both one-time efforts to transform decisions into operational terms, as well as continuing efforts to achieve the large and small changes mandated by policy decisions”. In a somewhat different view, Sharkansky and Meter (1975: 71-81) stated that the process of policy implementation refers to the implementing organization, the socio-political and economic environment, the policy target group, the policy objectives, the

enumerated methods of implementation, and the policy resources. Referring to the political aspect, Bardach (1980: 30) views policy implementation as a struggle among interest groups. As such, policy implementation is a process of interaction between the goals and actions (Pressman and Wildavsky 1984: xxi-xxiii) and is an action involving many stakeholders. Adding to the development of implementation theory, Mazmanian and Sabatier (1983: 20-21) offered another concept emphasizing the more technical aspect of the way how to control impulse is programmed: “Implementation is the carrying out of a basic policy decision, usually incorporated in a statute but which can also take the form of important executive orders or court decisions”. Howlett and Ramesh (2003: 13) stated quite abstractly that policy implementation concerns how governments put policies into effect. Similarly, Paudel (2009: 38) expressed that “implementation can be defined in terms of output or extent to which programmatic goals have been satisfied”. From a different view, policy implementation can be understood as a stage of the policy cycle¹¹ through which policy decisions are translated into action to address the raising problems of the society in accordance with the government’s goals.

An enormous set of studies demonstrated that the success or failure of a policy depends on various factors (Dick 2003; Ikelegbe 2006; Nweke 2006; Nwankwo and Apeh 2008). The success of the policy means the effectiveness of policy implementation. As defined by Matland (1995: 154), successful implementation requires compliance with the directives of the statutes, the achievement of specific indicators of success, the achievement of the statute’s goals, the achievement of local goals, and the improvement of the political climate around the program. The outcome of policy implementation also implies some measurable change in the problem addressed by the policy decision

¹¹ The policy cycle, based on the historical work of Lasswell (1951: 3-15), is a four- basic - stage model: 1. Problem Definition/ Agenda setting, 2. Policy formulation, 3. Policy implementation, 4. Evaluation.

(Lester et al. 1995: 87). Differently speaking, the level of successful implementation can be measured by the gap between stated policy goals and actual outcomes. The better compliance with the policy is, the closer is the gap between policy goals and outcomes.

2.1.2. Theories and models that explain policy implementation effectiveness

In the past, policy implementation used to be downplayed by scholars for a long time. During the period from the 1930s to 1960s of the twentieth century, the policy literature mostly focused on aspects of policy-making and did no significant analytic work dealing with policy implementation (Pressman and Wildavsky 1973: 166). Some former researchers had a passive view that once a policy decision was made, the implementers would simply translate it into action and automatically attain the desired results (Smith 1973: 197-198; Hill and Hupe 2002: 42; Najam 1995: 8). This argument proves flawed when it comes to the later policy researchers. It is since the early 1970s that many researchers started paying attention to policy implementation and explored the different aspects of this field. The theories of policy implementation are seen as having evolved through three generations of approaches (Paudel 2009: 38). Despite, so far, the literature has not yet clearly distinguished the difference between the three generations, in the following I try to organize my overview of the respective discussion around this distinction. Being mostly chronological it helps to work out the lines of development and locate my own approach.

- *First generation of implementation research*

The period from the mid-late 1970s to the early-mid 1980s was seen as “the golden era of implementation research associated with great enthusiasm, and excitement” (Sætren and Hupe 2018: 555). According to the data collected by Sætren and Hupe (2018: 557), the studies of the first generation mainly made use of qualitative data (84%) and non-statistical methods of analysis (97% of the studies). Policy implementation in this period was described and

conceptualized as “a complex and dynamic process that involved multiple participants with a wide range of interests and interpretations regarding authoritative decisions” (Sætren and Hupe 2018: 557). In general, the first generation of implementation research was concerned about how a single authoritative decision was carried out (Goggin et al. 1990: 13).

The book titled “Implementation: How Great Expectations in Washington Are Dashed in Oakland” by Pressman and Wildavsky (1973) is a stark example of the first generation (Hill and Hupe 2002: 66). This is a single-case study of an economic development program in Oakland (California, USA) that failed to reach its goals due to reasons relating to both policy-making and implementation, in which the complexity of joint action among multiple actors is a key factor (cf. Winter 2012: 265-266). Derived from the conceptualization of implementation given by Pressman and Wildavsky (1973: xv), the study of Eugen Bardach (1977) developed the notion of “games” to understand the nature of the implementation (the involvement of players, rules, resources, and unpredictable outcomes). He pointed out that “the character and degree of many implementation problems are inherently unpredictable” (Bardach 1977: 5). He emphasized the complex relationships among actors in the implementation process and offered several strategies for adjusting certain elements of the system of games so as to lead to a more preferred outcome (Bardach, 1977: 274). Also, another study by Sabatier and Mazmanian (1981) referred to factors that facilitated or constrained the policy implementation such as relationships, commitment, capacity, and institutional complexities (McLaughlin 1987: 172). Accordingly, the success of policy implementation was perceived as being significantly dependent on the cooperation among actors at multiple levels. If this cooperation is fractured, the policy implementation may suffer from “implementation deficits” and the accumulation of small deficits can create a big shortfall in outcomes (McLaughlin and Gail Krantzberg 2011: 390).

In common, the studies above were denoted by a qualitative, explorative, a-theoretical character and a focus on a single case (Hupe and Sætren 2015: 94). Most of them focused on the complexities of the implementation process, implementation problems, barriers, and failures; however, they did not say much about “the intervening transformative process between policy objectives and program outputs and outcomes: the implementation part of the policy process” (Sætren and Hupe 2018: 555). Although implementation studies of the first generation remained non-comprehensive and showed pessimistic views about the implementation process (Pülzl and Treib 2006: 89), they contributed to opening the black-box of the policy process (cf. Sætren and Hupe 2018: 555) and help us to understand the factors that facilitate or constrain policy implementation.

- *Second generation of implementation research*

The second wave started with an increase in empirical studies and advances in the research methodology. In the 1980s, approximately 50% of the studies had a comparative research design, and 12% of the studies employed statistical methods of analysis (Sætren and Hupe 2018: 558-559). While the first generation of implementation studies was not really interested in theory building, the second generation began to put forward formulating the analytical frameworks and testing hypotheses (Pülzl and Treib 2006: 89). Noticeably, this period made an epoch of implementation studies associated with different approaches (top-down and bottom-up) to explain the success and failure of policy implementation. Each approach is followed by a group of policy scholars whose standpoints, at first sight, are contradictory on some conceptual and methodological issues (*Figure 3*). Sabatier (1986: 33) illustrated the characteristics and the difference between the “top-down” approach and the “bottom-up” approach to policy implementation as shown in *Table 1*.

Table 1: Comparison between top-down and bottom-up approaches

	<i>Top-Down</i> (Sabatier & Mazmanian)	<i>Bottom-Up</i> (Hjern et al.)
<i>Initial Focus</i>	(Central) Government decision, e.g. new pollution control law.	Local implementation structure (network) involved in a policy area, e.g. pollution control.
<i>Identification of major actors in the process</i>	From top-down and from the government out to the private sector (although importance attached to causal theory also calls for an accurate understanding of target group's incentive structure).	From bottom (government and private) up.
<i>Evaluative criteria</i>	Focus on the extent of attainment of formal objectives (carefully analyzed). May look at other political significant criteria and unintended consequences, but these are optional.	Much less clear. Basically, anything the analyst chooses which is somehow relevant to the policy issue or problem. Certainly does not require any careful analysis of official government decision(s).
<i>Overall focus</i>	How does one steer the system to achieve (top) policy-makers intended policy results?	Strategic interaction among multiple actors in a policy network.


Source: Sabatier (1986: 33)

- *Top-down approach:*

As can be seen from *Figure 3*, Pressman and Wildavsky (1973), Van Meter and Van Horn (1975), Bardach (1977), Sabatier and Mazmanian (1980, 1981), Mazmanian and Sabatier (1983) are basically scholars following the top-down school in implementation research. These scholars lay their emphasis on the ability of policy-makers to design good policies as well as controlling the implementation process. The top-down approach often starts analytically with

a policy decision by governmental officials (Sabatier 1986: 22). The actors of the central level play an exclusive role in the implementation stage in order to ensure that they could do their job more effectively and achieve the original intent of policy-makers (Howlett et al. 2009: 164).

Figure 3: Top-down, bottom-up, and hybrid theories: key contributions




Source: Pülzl and Treib (2006: 91)

The top-downers, as stated by Sabatier (1986: 22), often give questions such as: To what extent did target groups comply with the policy decision? To what extent were the programmatic goals satisfied? What were the principal factors influencing policy outputs? How should the policy be reformulated on the basis of experience? In a common trend, the classical policy implementation models, which are based on the top-down perspective, tend to emphasize the statute framers as key actors (Matland 1995:148). Moreover, not only the actors have looked upon as explanatory for the outcome, but also other independent variables have been incorporated in respective explanatory models.

As a prime instance of the top-down school, the conceptual work of Van Meter and Van Horn (1975) proposed a model with six independent variables that might explain policy performance (*Figure 4*). It contains the characteristics of policy standards and objectives, available resources, inter-organizational communication and enforcement activities, the characteristics of the implementing agencies, the economic - social - political conditions, and the disposition of the implementers for the delivery of policy decisions (Van Meter and Van Horn 1975: 483).


Figure 4: A model of policy implementation of Van Meter and Van Horn



Source: Van Meter and Van Horn (1975: 463)

Also, under the top-down perspective, another notable top-down model was offered by Sabatier and Mazmanian (1980: 545). They identify three broad categories of independent variables to policy implementation including tractability of the problems, ability of statute to structure implementation, and non-statutory variable affecting implementation (*Figure 5*). To specify, the first group of independent variables refers to technical difficulties, diversity of proscribed behavior, size of the target group as a percentage of the population,

Figure 5: A model of policy implementation of Sabatier and Mazmanian



Source: Sabatier and Mazmanian (1980: 545)

and extent of behavioral change required. In regards to the second group, there are factors such as precision and clear ranking of legal objectives, the validity of the causal theory, the initial allocation of financial resources, hierarchical integration within and among implementation institutions, decision rules of implementing agencies, officials' commitment to statutory objectives, and formal access by outsiders. The third group includes socio-economic conditions

and technology, public support, attitudes and resources of constituency groups, support from sovereigns, commitment and leadership skill of implementing officials. In this model, five stages of policy implementation are seen as five dependent variables, respectively (1) policy outputs of implementing agencies, (2) target group compliance with policy outputs, (3) actual impacts of policy outputs, (4) perceived impacts of policy outputs, and (5) major revision in statute or policy.

In comparison to the previous model of Van Meter and Van Horn (1975: 463), the model of Sabatier and Mazmanian (1980: 545) specified more variables. It appears that the latter is better for reflecting the nature of implementation; however, it is not suitable for guiding multiple-case studies and applying for instance the methodology of qualitative comparative analysis. The “too few cases/too many variables” problem in implementing research is seen as one of the perennial challenges existing for implementation case studies at that time (Goggin 1986: 329).

- *Bottom-up approach:*

In contrast to the top-down theorists, the bottom-up theorists such as Lipsky (1971, 1980), Elmore (1980), Hjern and Porter (1981), Hull and Hjern (1982, 1987) argued that the success or failure of a policy is more dependent on the compromises of specific individuals directly involving in day-to-day implementation than on the attempts of government officials to govern from the top. As stated by Winter (2012: 267), the bottom-uppers paid attention to the influence of front-line staff or field workers on the delivery of policies such as providing social services and enforcing legal regulations in relation to citizens and firms.

Lipsky (1980) is seen as the pioneer of the bottom-up perspective. His book lays an emphasis on the role of street-level bureaucrats and their expectations in the implementation process (Hill and Hupe 2002: 53). These

street-level bureaucrats often have to meet many demands and work with limited resources. It is assumed that “successful policy programs must be compatible with desires, wishes, interests, and behavioral dispositions of lower-level political-administrative bodies and target groups” (Sætren and Hupe 2018: 561). Notably, target groups (citizens or firms) also play an important role in affecting the performance of street-level bureaucrats through positive or negative actions in the policy implementation process (Winter 2003: 209).

The empirical research of Hull and Hjern (1982, 1987) is also a good example of the bottom-up tradition. By studying a policy problem and asking actors at multiple levels about their goals, activities, problems, and contacts, Hull and Hjern mapped a network that helps to identify the local, regional, and national actors involved in service delivery (Matland 1995: 149). Owing to working in grassroots environments and close to particular groups, the local service deliverers are seen as having expertise and knowledge of the true problems. Therefore, their adaptability and responsibility are expected to thrive better and can make policies meet the demands and expectations of local people. Bottom-uppers tend to focus on actor interaction in a specific policy sector (Sabatier 1986: 36). Thus, it would be worth pursuing policy initiatives coming from multiple levels. This can lead to the implementation process to adapt to the behavior of a wide range of actors to achieve goals. It is argued that street-level implementers should have discretion in how they implement policies, and such scholars find favor in cases where there is no dominant piece of legislation or where there is the dynamic of different local situations (Sabatier 1986: 37).

Through using different approaches, the studies of the second generation focused on explaining the success or failure of implementation on the basis of an explicit or implicit model of the implementation process (Goggin et al 1990: 183). They helped us to understand the complex and dynamic nature of policy implementation. However, both top-down and bottom-up approaches have not escaped criticism.

Obviously, each approach has its pros and cons. On one hand, the top-down approach is better able to record the central actor's role in controlling and coordinating policy implementation and to suggest corrective actions if needed. It also allows for a better comprehension of the efficient usage of public resources in the nationwide sphere. It is not only suitable for understanding the implementation of difficult policies but also enables a systematic analysis of a more consistent interpretation of the law. On the other hand, the top-downers are criticized for overestimating the role of the central actors while neglecting other actors from the local level or other subsystems and ignore their policy initiatives (Sabatier 1986: 30). In comparison between top-down and bottom-up approaches, it appears that the merit of one approach is the shortcoming of another and vice versa. The bottom-uppers view implementation as a negotiation with policy-makers (Pülzl and Treib 2006: 90). Thus, in their view implementers need a certain level of autonomy. Certainly, this is more often given than might be expected because "in reality, government intentions can emerge from bargaining, accretion, and other processes and thus result in often vague, unclear, or even contradictory goals and direction" (Howlett et al. 2009: 165). However, as criticized by Matland (1995: 150), "flexibility and autonomy might be appropriate when the goals of the policy formulators and implementers are the same, but if they differ greatly, flexibility and autonomy may lead to policies which result in lower performance on official goals". Overemphasizing the level of discretion may result in a lack of uniformity in the treatment of cases arising under it (Dawes 1906: 191). According to Mthethwa (2012: 45), policy implementation can be studied from different perspectives and no one can be singled out as better than the rest because each perspective tries to explain the factors influencing policy implementation.

- *Synthesis approach:*

The debate between top-down and bottom-up perspectives might have been necessary for the development of implementation theory "but in the long

run this battle between the two approaches was not fruitful” (Winter 2012: 134). A group of researchers attempted to find an alternative model that could be more appropriate under specific conditions than trying to build a combined model (Dunsire 1978; Berman 1980; Sætren 1983). It is suggested that scholars should depend on different periods in the implementation process to opt for an appropriate approach.

Elmore (1985: 68) recommended applying two strategies ‘forward mapping’ and ‘backward mapping’ into policy analysis. Basically, the former strategy is based on the top-down perspective, the latter is based on the bottom-up perspective. Accordingly, policy-makers should consider the policy instruments and available resources (forward mapping) as well as identify the incentive structure and target groups (backward mapping).

In another effort, O’Toole (1986: 184-189) reviewed more than 100 studies to construct a list of variables that authors tended to include in an analytical framework to explain the outcome of policy implementation. This is a great effort in combining the best features of top-down and bottom-up approaches to develop an analytical model. By and large, it partly sheds light on the question “why specific tools and policy mechanisms are used in specific circumstances, and not others, to carry out governmental tasks, and why implementers behave the way they do in carrying out their tasks” (Howlett et al. 2009: 165).

Even so, the implementation literature remained many challenges such as the conceptual disagreement on implementation, the mushrooming of different analytical-theoretical frameworks, and the analytical-theoretical divide between top-down and bottom-up approaches (Hupe and Sætren 2015: 94). Many problems with the different degrees of implementation and their causal patterns still remain unsolved, particularly the problem of “too few cases/too many variables” (Goggin 1986: 329). To cope with the domination of

single case studies which did not allow any control of third variables, Goggin (1986: 342) called for the application of three strategies: reducing the number of variables, increasing the number of cases, and selecting cases on the basis of similarity and comparability to test theories. As stated by Goggin (1986: 334-335), “the next generation of implementation studies must give priority to the provision of more reliable information about the full range of outcomes and the cause patterns that are associated with them, their incidence, and the weighting of the various variables that have been proposed in multivariate models to explain implementation performance”. Accordingly, many scholars were looking forward to a new generation of implementation studies that could conquer existing problems and call for a more parsimonious theory.

- *Third generation of implementation research*

The third generation attempted to move beyond the debate between top-down and bottom-up schools and have been calling for an advance in the frameworks and theories of policy implementation. They tried to incorporate elements of both top-down and bottom-up approaches to set up their analytical models. Along with using the synthesis approach, the studies of the third generation started appearing with more systematic tests based on comparative and statistical research designs (Winter 2012: 265).

Goggin et al. (1990) are the most distinctive forerunners of the third-generation approach. The chief traits of the third generation studies, as defined by Goggin et al. (1990: 19) are “an explicit theoretical model; operational definitions of concepts; an exhaustive search for reliable indicators of implementation and predictor variables and the specification of theoretically derived hypotheses with analysis of data using appropriate qualitative and statistical procedures as well as case-studies for testing them”. With these traits, the literature on policy implementation became more abundant. Goggin et al. (1990: 15-19) propose six key elements for the third-generation research

paradigm: Firstly, key concepts and related variables must be clearly defined and operationalized. Secondly, hypotheses derived from theoretical constructs should guide empirical analysis. Thirdly, the study should make more use of statistical analyses using quantitative data to supplement qualitative analysis. Fourthly, it should be more comparable across different units of analysis within the same policy sector. Fifthly, it should be more comparable across different policy sectors. Last but not least important, there should be more longitudinal research designs.

Another well-known study of the third generation is the ambiguity-conflict model of Matland (1995) which reconciled both top-down and bottom-up approaches and met some of the key elements mentioned by Goggin et al. (1990: 15-19). Matland provided a description of certain variables that might affect policy implementation. According to Matland's standpoint (1995: 155-159), there are mainly two key factors that can explain the success or failure of policy implementation: the degree of policy ambiguity and the degree of policy conflict. The policy ambiguity implies policies having unclear goals or means, while the policy conflict refers to actors whose interests regularly diverge. Matland argued that policy ambiguity was seen as a variable affecting directly the implementation process in significant ways. Matland differentiated policy ambiguity into two categories: ambiguity of goals and ambiguity of means. Both of them can cause misunderstanding and uncertainty, and as a consequence, lead to implementation failure. However, to some extent, ambiguity can have positive effects on the legitimation at the formulation stage. Along with that, the level of policy conflict also had important effects on policy implementation. As argued by Matland (1995: 156), policy conflict might happen when more than one organization sees the policies as affecting directly their organizational and personal interests and if the organizations have inhomogeneous dispositions towards policy implementation. Such differences might arise in terms of either the stated goals or the programmatic activities of a policy, causing disputes

about policy means for attaining the goals. Binding these thoughts together, the model of Matland identified four policy implementation situations, based on a policy’s conflict and ambiguity level (*Table 2*).

Table 2: Ambiguity-conflict matrix: Policy implementation processes

		CONFLICT	
AMBIGUITY		<i>Low</i>	<i>High</i>
<i>Low</i>		Administrative Implementation	Political Implementation
<i>High</i>		Experimental Implementation	Symbolic Implementation

Source: Matland (1995: 160)

Accordingly, in cases of low ambiguity, the implementation is either “administrative” or “political”. With low conflict, the presence of normative mechanisms is sufficient for compliance while the provision of sanctions becomes unnecessary. Its success mainly depends on available resources. With high conflict, policy compliance is consistent with the power of coercive and remunerative mechanisms. Based on the top-down models, the situation “administrative implementation” can call for the administrative factors; while the situation “political implementation” needs factors such as the involvement of civil servants and the support of stakeholders. For the situation “experimental implementation”, which is denoted by the feature low conflict-high ambiguity, the contextual factors such as the actors and resources at the local levels should be considered under the bottom-up approach. The process of implementation becomes more complex with high conflict-high ambiguity, and so the situation “symbolic implementation” needs an alliance of local actors and available resources. As such, by providing the “ambiguity-conflict” matrix, Matland did not only apply both top-down and bottom-up approaches to implementation research but also limited the number of variables in the analysis. With such a

reduced model, it should not be very complicated to explain the outcome of policy implementation.

Goggin et al. (1990) were followed by many other scholars who made significant endeavors to bring the chief traits of the third-generation research paradigm to the implementation literature. One of the most typical traits is a research design with an explicit theoretical model: the study of Makinde (2005) set up an analytical framework by using the synthesis approach. He presented a general overview of policy implementation problems in both, developed and developing countries. From that, he pointed out critical factors to guarantee implementation success, namely the relevance and adequacy of information in communication, the availability of resources, the positive disposition or attitude towards policy implementation, and an efficient bureaucratic structure (Makinde 2005: 63-64). He argued that some policy problems that appear as typical in developing countries can be traced back to the policy-making and the policy environment (Makinde 2005: 64). With the focus on a case study of Nigeria, his study referred to some native factors such as corruption, lack of continuity in government policies, inadequate human and material resources, that often lead to an implementation gap (Makinde 2005: 63). Thus, this study attempted to explain the deficits of policy implementation in developing countries through an explicit theoretical framework. To some extent, the author clarifies some concepts and provided convincing arguments based on a great number of examples taken from the Nigerian experience. Yet, the author did not analyze the data by using qualitative and statistical methods.

In another effort to examine why some policies failed to achieve their intended impacts, Robinson (2009: 237) provided three possible explanations for policy failure: the complexity of the policy problem, the quality of policy design, and the quality of implementation. Robinson focused on the impact of policy design on both implementation and policy outcomes. 'Policy Design' is seen as part of policy formulation (Sidney 2006: 79), which involves identifying

a policy problem, moving it onto the policy agenda, drafting a set of policy alternatives, and then select the final decision to address the policy problem. A well-designed policy often refers to means in accordance with experience and knowledge, while a poorly-designed policy often gives incorrect principles or causes for unclear understandings (cf. Howlett and Mukherjee 2014: 57). In Robinson’s view, the quality of policy design can be a powerful determinant of the success or failure of policy. His study proposed an explicit theoretical model on the contribution of the policy design and implementation to impact (*Table 3*).

Table 3: The contribution of policy design and implementation to policy impact

		<i>Quality of policy implementation</i>	
		High	Low
<i>Quality of policy design</i>	High	A – High impact	B – Low to moderate impact
	Low	C – Moderate to high impact	D – Low impact

Source: Robinson (2009: 239)

Robinson pointed out that “the high-quality implementation can be achieved with policies that are of either high (cell A) or low (cell C) quality design” (Robinson 2009: 239). It means that a policy still can make a strong impact if it is vigorously implemented, no matter how if it is designed well or poorly. In contrast, a well-designed policy will be getting ineffective if it is implemented in an inappropriate way to address the policy problem, as stated by May (2003: 231) “well-designed policies are necessary but not sufficient for improving implementation prospects”. Perfect implementation is seen as a function of perfect policy design without flaws and the modernizing view of policy-making is very much centered on the implementation gap (Butcher and Massey (2001: 1-3). Many scholars had a consensus on policy design flaws as


the cause of policy failure (Keiser and Meier 1996: 337). Sidney (2006: 80) suggested that “scholars should look further back in the causal chain to understand why policies succeed or fail, because the original policy formulation processes, and the policy designs themselves, significantly contribute to implementation outcomes”.

Another notable representative of the third generation is Soren Winter (2003, 2011, 2012). Based on a critical examination of the development and status of the research field, he suggested that implementation research can be improved by (1) accepting theoretical diversity rather than trying to reach one common theoretical framework, (2) developing and testing partial theories and hypotheses rather than looking for a utopia general implementation theory, (3) having more conceptual clarification and specification of causal relations in order to increase the understanding of implementation, (4) adding studies of implementation outcomes besides outputs¹² and considering the implementation output as a dependent variable, and (5) employing more comparative and statistical research designs in implementation research to shed light on the impact of different independent variables (Winter 2012: 265). Winter (2012: 258) incorporated top-down and bottom-up perspectives and integrated some of the most important and promising variables in implementation research into a framework of analysis (*Figure 6*). Accordingly, the first set of factors in line with the top-down perspective, which is seen as the root of implementation problems, is the policy design decided upon during the policy formulation process (Winter 2012: 258). In accordance with the bottom-up perspective, Winter (2012: 259-260) also pointed out the set of factors belonging to the implementation process which is characterized by organizational and inter-

¹² The term ‘outputs’ refers to the actions that the government actually performs. The term ‘outcomes’ refers to the level of achievement or performance that is caused by those outputs (Grumm 1975: 441-448).

organizational implementation behaviors, street-level bureaucrats' behaviors, and target group behavior.

Figure 6: An integrated implementation model



Source: Winter (2012: 258)

While with the first and the second generations there remained challenges in offering solutions for successful implementation, the third generation sought to provide such solutions on the basis of rigorous empirical research. For instance, a study by Dragos et al. (2012) on the status of implementation of Law No. 52/2003 on transparency in decision-making in Romania was conducted in the context of the third paradigm. Their study

focused on typical questions such as: “Where are the weaknesses in the implementation? Why do they occur? What could be changed to alleviate these weaknesses?” (Dragos et al. 2012: 141). They set up a framework for the analysis that referred to the barriers to implementation such as the limited administrative capacity at the central and local levels (e.g. inadequate number of trained civil servants, sparse financial resources), existing cultural and social characteristics of public participation and communication in communities as well as the relationship between central and local tiers of the government (Dragos et al. 2012: 139-140). To answer the research questions, they used a mixed-method approach which included a quantitative survey, direct observation, and follow-up interviews. Along with identifying both macro-level and micro-level variables for implementation, they recommended how to manipulate these variables to enhance the success of the implementation.

In general, the appearance of noteworthy models and frameworks in this period improved the understanding of implementation. During many recent decades, scholars have attempted to develop a general theory for the field of policy implementation, but it seemed to be an impossible task because of the complex nature of the implementation (Winter 2003: 205; Winter 2011: 24). Certainly, it is undeniable that in the course of three generations, implementation research has made impressive progress in both theories and practice over the past decades. By bringing structure to implementation research with hypotheses tested by qualitative and statistical procedures, the studies of the third generation are more scientific than the previous two generations. Also, the studies of the third generation do no longer assume that implementation is an ‘automatic’ policy adoption and seldomly having concerns with specific cases of implementation ‘failure’. In contrast, they are interested in how implementation works and how to improve its quality.

2.1.3. A nuanced understanding of policy compliance and non-compliance

Closely related to implementation research is the concept of “policy compliance”. According to the view of a policy scholar of this approach, Weaver (2009: 2) described compliance as target group behavior consistent with the policy’s objectives that have been clearly articulated (though perhaps not effectively communicated). This compliant behavior is seen as a purposive action (whether willing, grudging, or coerced), an effort of the external norm addressees or the policy targets in translating the policy decisions into practice. In common, compliance is a positive response of the external norm addressees in the course of the policy implementation process. Targets of policy compliance are those persons or organizations, at which a policy is directed. They might be individual citizens, civil servants, state agencies, private companies, non-governmental organizations, states, and countries, etc. (cf. Gofen 2015: 4).

In contrast to the unique significance of compliance, non-compliance is conceptualized as “behavior inconsistent with or contravening a given policy’s objectives” (Gofen 2015:4), which shows the negative reaction of the external norm addressees or the policy targets to the decision of policy-makers. In spite of being a widespread phenomenon in policy implementation, so far non-compliance has been ambiguously conceptualized in the compliance literature. Non-compliance might be active or passive (Gofen 2015: 6). On the active side, non-compliance is portrayed as aware behavior like “disapproval or disregard” (e.g. in case the employers do not organize the periodic health check-ups for female workers as ruled by law). On the passive side, non-compliance is seen as an unaware behavior. Both two forms of non-compliance contribute to making the policy fail to desired objectives and pose a challenge to policy-makers and implementers. The non-compliant behaviors often derive from the misunderstanding or ignorance with respect to policy regulations; sometimes it

is the consequence of regulatees' incapacity, ignorance, or misunderstanding of regulatory prescriptions (Etienne 2011: 307).

For both compliant and non-compliant behaviors, some of them can be "automatic" or "planned" (Etienne 2011: 307). While the former one is done as the product of habits and routines, the latter is done under the impact of factors such as cost-benefit calculation, moral obligations, or the power of sanctions. Although there are a few publications on compliance and non-compliance, so far, the literature has still lacked a consistent and comprehensive compliance theory (Etienne 2011: 305). Compliance theorists have struggled with multiple frameworks because of the complexity of compliant and non-compliant behaviors (Etienne 2011: 306). As stated by Weaver (2009: 2), most policies are not self-implementing to reach the desired results. In the literature, compliance studies mainly focus on purposive behaviors (Hutter 2001; Winter and May 2001; Simpson 2002; Haines and Gurney 2003; May 2004, 2005; Wenzel 2004, 2005; Parker 2006; Tyler 2006; Fisman and Miguel 2007; Weaver 2009; Gofen 2015). By and large, compliance theorists point out two general perspectives: First, compliance is the result of cost-benefit calculations; second, compliant behavior is decided on the basis of moral norms (Ayres and Braithwaite 1992: 22). It is assumed that multiple factors need to be considered during the policy-making and implementation processes. They are not only factors toward an effective deterrence (e.g. the possibility of a tough sanction) but also factors contributing to self-commitment. Both deterrence and self-commitment approaches are useful for motivating compliance with policies. While the former is necessary for compliance with regulatory directives, the latter is suitable for implementing an implicit regulation. Accordingly, many scholars provided various material, emotional, and normative factors, which are likely to be associated with compliant behavior. These factors can be classified into two groups 'motivations' and 'barriers' to compliance.

Regarding the aspect of ‘motivations’, Winter and May (2001) conducted a study to examine Danish farmers’ compliance with environmental regulations. From the result of multiple regression analyses of survey data of 1562 farmers, they pointed out that the combination of calculated, normative and social motivations, awareness of rules, and ability to comply is important for enhancing compliance (Winter and May 2001: 675). To specify, calculated motivations make targets consider the likelihood of detection, the likelihood of fine and the cost of compliance (Winter and May 2001: 677). Non-compliant behavior can bring about financial risks that the target must suffer after being inspected and the cost of non-compliance is higher than the costs of compliance. It is favorable for the targets to comply with regulations if they have a high level of awareness of rules. However, willingness to comply is not enough if the financial capacity to comply is not there (Winter and May 2001: 680). It is shown that some strategies might have an indirect impact on farmer’s compliance, i.e. the application of deterrence as frequent inspections to prevent farmers from violating regulations, or the provision of information for regulatees to increase their awareness. Furthermore, third parties such as interest groups, trade unions, professional organizations, or consultants, play an important role as intermediaries in affecting policy outcomes (Winter 2012: 139). Another attempt at this approach was also made by May (2004). His study provided a better understanding of affirmative and negative motivations for regulation compliance. According to May (2004: 61), affirmative motivations come from good intentions and a sense of obligation to comply, and negative motivations derive from fears of the consequences raised in violations.

Recently, a study by Howlett (2016: 2) proposed a new research and practice agenda focused on matching policy tools to compliant behavior (*Table 4*). Howlett (2016: 24) assumed that “designing for a different set of motivations of policy targets and linking these to specific tools choices is complex but realizable”. These choices do not only depend on utilitarian cost-benefit

calculations but also on many other factors such as the level of legitimation and competence; the capacity of financial manipulation; the credible extent of government information; and the beliefs and attitudes among target groups and their membership (Howlett 2016: 24). The fact has reflected that many targets show policy compliance because of the coercion from legal sanctions (May 2004: 41-42). Howlett (2016: 21) also pointed out that giving a high level of coercion and monitoring sometimes can lead to negative impacts on the willingness and likelihood of targets to comply.

Table 4: Nature of compliance of policy targets

		Likelihood of compliance	
		<i>High</i>	<i>Low</i>
Willingness to comply	<i>High</i>	<i>Model Subjects</i> Require little coercion, education, or persuasion	<i>Reluctant Subjects</i> Require education and persuasion
	<i>Low</i>	<i>Resistant Subjects</i> Require incentives to comply	<i>Combative Subjects</i> Require a high level of coercion and monitoring to compel compliance

Source: Howlett (2016: 21)

On the other side, the study of Weaver (2009) analyzed barriers on the basis of a model of compliance problems (*Figure 7*). As illustrated by Weaver (2009: 5), policy-makers and program implementers should think comprehensively about the problems which can hardly ensure compliance, such as insufficient incentives and sanctions, difficulties in monitoring, lack of the resources from the targets to comply even when they want to, lack of autonomy in making decisions to comply, lack of information, and lack of support from the targets.

Figure 7: Weaver's model of compliance problems

- Incentive and sanction problems where positive and/ or negative incentives are insufficient to ensure compliance;
- Monitoring problems where target compliance may be difficult or costly to monitor;
- Resource problems where targets lack the resources to comply even if they want to;
- Autonomy problems where targets do not have the power to make decisions that comply with the policy even if they want to;
- Information problems where targets lack information that would make compliance more likely; and
- Attitude and objectives problems where targets are hostile/ mistrustful toward providers or programs.

Source: Weaver (2009: 5)

A recent study by Daniel Berliner (2017), that refers to the particular case of local government compliance with South Africa's Promotion of the Access to Information Act (PAIA), stated that "the major barriers to implementation - at the national and provincial levels as well as the local level - can be summarized as pertaining to a lack of awareness, a lack of resources and capacity, and a lack of political will or "buy-in" from senior management. Resources are a major barrier" (Berliner 2017: 645). Based on data of 234 case studies of PAIA compliance over a decade, his empirical research concludes that the combination of factors including the weak institutional design of the law, insufficient resources, a missing sanctioning authority, the local government context of weak capacity, and numerous pressing challenges made widespread compliance unlikely (Berliner 2017: 657-658). This study applied the synthesis perspective in implementation research as well as partly met the

requirements of rigorous data analysis to consider the impact of potential factors on implementation outcomes.

2.2. Some previous studies in the field of implementing employment policies for women

For a few recent decades, the policy problems regarding women have become a topic of an enduring debate within both academic and policy fields. With respect to the rights and benefits of female workers, some researchers discussed policies for them at work. Notably, the book “Gender and Development: Critical Concepts in Development Studies”, one of the well-known publications edited by Janet D. Momsem (2008), collected a range of academic and practitioner papers with the major policy documents that enabled the ideas to be implemented for women. As can be seen from these documents that each country is applying different policies for female workers in accordance with the context. A study by Giannelli (2015) analyzed some employment policies for women in developing countries. In this study, Giannelli provided a look at women’s status of employment across developing regions and the experiences of some countries in implementing policies to improve women’s access to paid work. Giannelli also illustrated the pros and cons of policies.

Nowadays, in many countries worldwide, especially in developed countries, female employees have been duly cared for, particularly the employment policies for them. International organizations such as the European Social Fund, IZA World of Labor, ILO, UNICEF, and World Bank, etc., always monitor, encourage and give support to the gender equality policies in general and employment policies for female employees in particular. For example, under the support of the European Social Fund, Fox et al. (2006) worked out qualitative research on “Innovative social policies for gender equality at work”. The research asked about the constraints of the female labor policies in England and referred to innovative policies available in the international arena that

enable women having children to access better quality, more continuous employment. Another example is a recent report of the Employment Policy Department of ILO in 2017. The report on “Gender in employment policies and programs: What works for women?” reviewed the impetus created by the Sustainable Development Goals, examined emerging good practices of effective gender-responsive policies, as well as suggested policy areas for moving forward on gender equality in developing countries.

Along with the studies of the international arena, it is also worth to mention some studies conducted by Vietnamese authors on this topic. A study by MOLISA (2007) pointed out causes affecting female employee’s employment in the industrial parks and processing areas in Vietnam and recommended some policy solutions to improve the fact. Another study by Huong (2009) also helped policy-makers to consider adjusting the retirement age of female employees, reducing the negative impacts of the adjustment, ensuring the financial sustainability of the pension fund as well as improving gender equality in Vietnam. Especially, a paper by Vu (2013) pointed out that after 18 years of implementation of the Labor Code (amended in 2002, 2006, 2007, and 2012), some policies for female employees remain controversial. The author criticized that those policies are unreal and not feasible. This paper referred to causes and solutions so as to improve the employment policy for female employees in Vietnam. Moreover, some studies paid attention to the policy problems in terms of earnings, social protection, or labor union for female workers in Vietnam (e.g., Anh and Hung 1997; Lich 1997; Tuan Anh and Van Anh 1997; Ngo et al 2011; Thuy 2004; Nguyen et al 2011; Vu 2013; Nguyen et al 2014; Nguyen et al 2015). By and large, previous studies partly reflected the implementation of employment policies for Vietnamese women and considered some causes under different research methodologies, but the reasons underlying implementation deficits have been not completely addressed by the existing theory and empirical analyses. As can be seen from previous

studies, the common objectives that most of the authors offered in their studies are policy evaluation and recommendations for policy fine-tuning. Nevertheless, the authors failed to this objective because they only focus on explaining the content of the policies rather than how they are being implemented. Previous studies are often not subjected to empirical testing, which “demonstrates little connection between theories and case studies, and rarely critiques existing theories or proposes alternative explanations” (Scott and Kim Chuyen 2007: 250). The heterogeneity of explanatory variables could make them “impossible to see the forest for the trees”. As evaluated by Scott and Kim Chuyen (2007: 249), “there have been many macro-social and descriptive studies, based on nationally aggregated data, but sophisticated quantitative and qualitative analyses are less common. At the other end of the spectrum is a plethora of descriptive village or community-level studies that tend to lack comparative perspective or analysis of the broader significance beyond the individual case”. Clearly, depending on sources of secondary data resulted in a lack of analytical rigor or innovation in studies. None of the previous studies could make a policy impact assessment (PIA). Hence, the conclusions and solutions proposed by the authors are often self-deduced and rambling. So far studies remain the limitations of research tools and methods. This indicates the need to link quantitative and qualitative analyses.

2.3. Conclusion from the literature review and the author’s research orientation

This chapter has provided an overview of the implementation literature around three generations: the first generation denoted by explorative case studies; the second-generation studies with top-down, bottom-up, and synthesis approaches already relying on sets of independent variables explaining the scope of implementation; and the third generation that adds more systematic statistical tests based on rigorous comparative research designs. Moreover, the

compliance literature debate was reflected on. While also referring to some elaborated sets of explanatory factors the respective scholars take into consideration that the factors explaining compliance and non-compliance might be different from each other. A brief discussion of the literature on labor law implementation underlines the lack of systematic and rigorous studies in this field of research emphasizing the relevance of this study.

The theories and models that explain policy implementation effectiveness in general and policy compliance in particular build a comprehensive theoretical foundation to serve the objective of this study. Although current literature identifies a wide range of factors that influence policy (non)compliance, this study will only focus on seven key factors. I will do empirical research based on an analytical framework incorporating both top-down and bottom-up approaches to explain multi-causal pathways to compliance and non-compliance with some selected policies for female workers in Vietnam.

On one hand, my analytical framework will make use of some factors mentioned by some of the scholars. Under the top-down perspective, part of the implementation success is explained by clearly defined policy objectives. As stated by Winter (2003: 208), “the first set of factors, which affects implementation results, is the policy formulation and the policy design”. The framework will be applied to my study to learn whether a policy with clearly formulated regulations and substantial sanctions, and the availability of financial resources can make the external norm addressees comply, and vice versa, whether a policy containing latitudes of interpretation and not providing legal sanctions and lacking financial resources is likely to lead to non-compliant behaviors. The analytical framework will also employ part of the bottom-up theories to check how the level of intervention and the perception of the stakeholders affect the outcome of policy implementation. Furthermore, at the intersection of the two approaches, my analytical framework calls for some

other factors such as the dispositions of the external norm addressees towards the policy at stake, and the characteristic of external norm addressees as being in public or private ownership. The analysis mainly refers to the stakeholders directly involved in policy implementation (employers, unionists, female employees).

Along with the analytical framework's setup, I intend to meet the chief traits proposed by Goggin et al. (1990: 15-19). My study will proceed in working out operationalizing the concepts and specifying theoretically derived assumptions. In order to overcome the current limitations of methodology in policy implementation literature in Vietnam, my study will conduct a case study design with analysis of data using statistical procedures and qualitative comparative analysis. As such, this study can be seen as a follower of the third-generation approach.

Chapter III: Analytical framework and assumptions

3.1. Analytical framework

The level of success of the public policy depends on the compliant behavior of external norm addressees in the implementation process. Policy compliance is an indispensable part of the governance of a rule-of-law state. The main purpose of this study is to identify the factors contributing to external norm addressees' compliance and non-compliance in the context of a developing country. After reviewing carefully the literature on policy implementation and compliance, it is found that the different theories and models have their specific shortcomings but also merits. Depending on the context, this study should apply parts of these models. In the following, I will identify factors deemed suitable to develop an analytical framework for explaining the multi-causal pathways to compliance and non-compliance with some selected policies for female employees in Vietnam. The factors that are proposed and selected for the analytical framework of this study are partly different from those of other studies documented in the literature. This part will detail sets of factors contributing to policy compliance and explain why these factors are selected while some others are excluded from the analytical framework.

3.1.1. Factors influencing the policy implementation for female employees in Vietnam

a. Latitudes of interpretation within the respective legal norms

As already indicated in the literature review, the quality of policy design can be a powerful determinant of the outcome of policy implementation (Robinson 2009: 239). Edwards and Sharkansky (1978: 295) pointed out that “the first requirement of effective implementation is that those responsible for

carrying out of decision must know what they are supposed to do". Hence, a policy must meet the standards with respect to clarity, accuracy, and consistency (Pressman and Wildavsky 1979: 39, Van Meter and Van Horn 1975: 447, Edward 1980: 10). Some classic policy implementation models, which are based on the top-down theory, assumed that the clarity of the policy contributes to the success of policy implementation (Van Meter and Van Horn 1975: 447-448, Bardach 1977: 85, Ingram and Mann 1980: 19-20; Sabatier and Mazmanian 1980: 542, Rein 1983: 131; Voradej Chandarasorn 2005: 130).

For example, the model of policy implementation of Sabatier and Mazmanian (1980: 545) referred to the precision and clear ranking of legal objectives as the ability of statute to structure implementation. Also, many scholars had a consensus on policy design flaws as the cause of policy failure (Keiser and Meier 1996: 337). If orders to implement policy are vague, ambiguous, inconsistent, or distorted in transmission, they may make the implementers confused and misunderstood what they are directed to do. Obviously, a well-designed policy can help implementers to have a clear understanding and a good orientation to carry out the policy to a realistic outcome; in contrast, a poorly-designed policy can lead to distortions in the implementation process. Being a well-known scholar of implementation research, Goggin (1986: 331) argued: "If the legislative decision that triggers the implementation process is based on sound theory and spells out internally consistent program objectives with clarity and specificity [...], then the policy is more likely to succeed in its implementation. For the sake of theoretical parsimony, the policy itself, its form and content, is the first critical independent variable".

Regarding the quality of policy design, the first sign that should be taken into account is the provision of latitudes of interpretation within the respective legal norms. A legal norm containing latitudes of interpretation is a dispositional norm that implies some room to react flexibly to situated conditions. Thus, the

provision of latitudes in law can bring about both negative and positive impacts. In a negative aspect, giving latitude and/or discretion may “create the appearance at least of favoritism in its application, and result in lack of uniformity in the treatment of cases arising under it” (Dawes 1906: 191). In fact, the external norm addressees can exploit the ambiguity of statements or the blockage of information somewhere in law to avoid having to perform their obligations if the respective regulation puts some burden on them (Dose et al. 2018: 6). According to the view of Chayes and Antonia (1993: 188), the ambiguity and indeterminacy of legal language might be considered a ‘cause’ of non-compliance. To specify, “the broader and more general the language, the wider the ambit of permissible interpretations to which it gives rise” (Chayes and Antonia 1993: 189). Matland (1995) classifies ambiguity into two types: ambiguity of goals and ambiguity of means. While the ambiguity of goals might cause misunderstandings and therefore often is an important independent variable leading to implementation failure, the ambiguity of means often appears when there is no existence of the technology towards the policy goals, or when there are uncertainties about the roles of various organizations in the implementation process, or when the complex environment makes it difficult to identify the kinds of the tools, the usage and its effects (Matland 1995: 157 – 158). Thus, policy-makers should ensure that policy standards and objectives are clearly written. As stated by Davis (1971: 4) “whenever the effective limits on his [the public official's] power leave him free to make a choice among possible courses of action or inaction”, latitudes and/or discretion which are granted for the norm addressees can be identified to be the drivers for non-compliant behaviors. However, there goes an argument that giving latitude or discretion sometimes is to “leave room for implementers to exercise the creativity and adaptability where and when the need arises” (Makinde 2005: 63). Although it might be argued that the provision of latitudes is a notion of modern and flexible law, this might not be the case in developing countries

denoted by a partly corrupt public administration with low levels of qualification and administrative ethics on the side of the personnel. Moreover, it is well-known that also in developed countries civil servants ask for clear regulations to foster implementation. Stricter regulations without any soft regulatory components shall be activated when processes of interest intermediation are not successful; in contrast, those denoted by more open provisions, do not provide a good basis for asserting a claim (cf. Schmidt-Aßmann 2002: 551; Dose 2008: 247-250).

Generally, latitudes of interpretation are part of important provisions of a policy, which should be included in the analysis because they are likely to make a difference. With the focus on the latitudes of interpretation within the respective legal norms, I will consider if a policy meets the requirement of goals and means' clarity. Transferring this aspect into a clear-cut query amounts to the following "Does the law contain any latitudes of interpretation that can provide room for discretion?" The possibility is that the provision of latitudes might contribute to non-compliance with the policy.

b. The severity of legal sanctions

The severity of legal sanctions is one of the most important signs to evaluate the quality of policy design. Sanctions that are officially imposed punishments aimed at enforcement of legal obligations (Schwartz and Orleans 1967: 274) serve as an important means for policy implementation. As stated by Goggin (1986: 331), if there are provisions for certain punishments for non-compliance, then the policy is more likely to succeed in its implementation. Likewise, it will be hard to ensure compliance if there is no provision of sanctions in regulations (cf. Weaver 2009: 5). The threat of sanctions is to prevent people from non-compliant behaviors. However, if a sanction is too low, it will not be effective, even might resist compliance with the law (Schwartz and Orleans 1967: 300). In case the external norm addressees take

the costs and benefits of compliance into the account (cf. Winter and May 2001: 676-677), they will tend to repudiate a policy if the costs of compliance are higher than the costs of non-compliance. Therefore, high rates of compliance are plausible if the external norm addressees understand that the penalties weighted with perceived risks of getting caught for illegal behaviors are higher than the benefits that they can receive from breaking the law (Sabatier and Mazmanian 1981: 22). There is no doubt that the presence of strict sanctions contributes to effective implementation.

Normally, a regulation will be more effective if the sanctions are accompanied by sufficient control of the target group's behavior (cf. Dose 2008: 251; Dose et al. 2018: 7). Conventional wisdom says that the deterrence effect of sanctions rests among others upon the likelihood of getting detected (cf. Winter and May 2001: 676-677). When there is no administrative unit in charge of monitoring the implementation of a policy, the likelihood of getting detected is fairly low (cf. Dose 2008: 252). As illustrated by Weaver (2009: 5), policy-makers and program implementers should think comprehensively about the problems which can hardly ensure compliance, such as insufficient sanctions and difficulties in monitoring. A missing sanctioning authority can be an obstacle that makes widespread compliance unlikely (Berliner 2017: 657-658).

Knowing that the Vietnamese government has no effectively functioning public administration in the area of labor law (see below 3.1.2.a) on the first view it does not seem to make any difference if the sanctions are high or not. If there is no chance to get detected, external norm addressees might not care about the severity of legal sanctions. Although the risk of getting detected violations is low, I predict that the severity of these sanctions might still make a difference. For instance, the high severity of legal sanctions might signalize the high importance of a legal provision that is equipped with it.

c. The availability of financial resources for policy implementation on the side of the norm addressees

Dose (1997: 91) considered the presence of adequate resources as a basic prerequisite for compliance. Likewise, many scholars of implementation research identified the availability of resources as an important independent variable that has an impact on effective implementation. In the same view, Berliner (2017: 645) pointed out that one of the major barriers to implementation - at the national and provincial levels as well as the local level – might be a lack of resources. Indeed, no matter how clear the policy orders are, if the policy implementers lack resources for implementation, policy-makers will be disappointed with the results (Edwards and Sharkansky 1978: 12,303; cf. Makinde 2005: 64). While some scholars referred to resources for the administration to be able to implement a policy (Van Meter and Van Horn 1975: 463; Cheema and Rondinelli 1983: 299; Sabatier and Mazmanian 1980: 545), some others mentioned explicitly about resources of the external norm addressees to be able to bear the brunt of implementation (Durlak and DuPre 2008: 336; Mthethwa 2012: 42). Holding the same standpoint as the latter ones, Weaver (2009: 5-6) argued that lacking the necessary resources will be a big challenge for the external norm addressees even when they want to comply or recognize the advantages of doing so.

Generally, resources include financial resources, human resources, infrastructure resources, however, in the field of policy implementation for female employees in Vietnam, I consider the availability of financial resources as a fundamental prerequisite for successful policy implementation, while the presence or absence of other resources is excluded from the analysis. Here, the availability of financial resources is understood that the side of the norm addressees is having financial resources from the state budget or from their own funds. Willingness to comply is not enough if the financial capacity to comply is not there (Winter and May 2001: 680; Weaver 2009: 5-6; Dragos et al. 2012:

139-140). That means that the norm addressees can hardly comply with the policy if their financial resources are sparse. In other words, the availability or unavailability of financial resources might make the outcomes of the implementation process vary tremendously across policies.

d. Interest groups supporting or obstructing effective compliance

The support or the obstruction of interest groups can constitute a very broad set of influences on target compliance (Dose et al. 2018: 8). On one hand, the support of interest groups might “intervene actively [...] to supplement the agency’s resources” (Sabatier and Mazmanian 1981: 22). On the other hand, the obstruction of interest groups can put an organization or an individual under pressure (cf. H eritier 1993: 262). As such, interest groups can play a crucial role in the policy implementation process, even when they are not in the center of the implementation game (Rein and Rabinovitz 1978: 314).

An interest group that might influence the implementation of the female labor law could be a union. In Vietnam, trade unions are legally registered as “mass organizations” under the Vietnam General Confederation of Labor (VGCL) and are closely tied to the Communist Party (Schweisshelm 2014: 1, Dose et al. 2018: 6). They exist in interrelation with employers, workers, and governmental officials, of which “the strength of labor unions strongly influence whether such labor unions are able to protect the welfare and interests of workers and promote fairness and impartiality among them” (Napatthorn 2011: 113). As ruled by law, trade unions are one of the indispensable stakeholders in implementing policies for workers¹³. Since trade unions have to perform their role as genuine representatives of the interests of workers, they are taken into consideration as a factor that can make a difference in implementing policies for female workers. A certain role is played here by the idea that trade unions,

¹³ According to Article 1, Law on Trade Union 2012 No. 12/2012/QH13.

as bodies representing workers' interests, could play the role of the lower state enforcement administration which is absent in the Vietnamese context in the implementation of policies that are in the interests of workers.

e. The information level of the policy targets about policies (the content of the legal regulations)

There is no doubt that one of the possible barriers to compliance is the information problem. If targets lack information about the policy to be implemented, they can hardly comply with that policy (cf. Weaver 2009: 5-7; Winter and May 2001: 679 - 680). Even with well-designed policies, if there is an unclear transmission of the policy content, policy targets will not know what to implement (cf. Winter and May 2001: 679 - 680). Certainly, it is advantageous for policy targets to equip themselves with knowledge of rules. However, it cannot be expected that they find enough time to always do so or have the ability to understand the full meaning of a legal provision.

In this study, the information level of policy targets about the policies implies the perception, cognition (comprehension and understanding), and knowledge of female employees about the content of legal regulations. A good information level of the labor code can help female workers to directly fight for their own legal rights and benefits in accordance with regulations (Dose et al. 2018: 8). In contrast, if female workers have no knowledge or awareness of labor regulation, they are unable to claim or force their employer to comply with that regulation. By and large, the information level of policy targets about the policies can be seen as an important aspect to be inserted into the analytical framework.

f. The disposition of the external norm addressees

The disposition of the external norm addressees, which is recognized as their acceptance of the regulatory content and insight in its necessity (cf. Hill

1988: 377), seems to be important for compliance. It was pointed out by implementation research scholars that the disposition of the implementers has a direct impact on the outcome of policy implementation (Pressman and Wildavsky 1979: 47; Edwards 1980: 34).

In regards to the compliant behavior of the implementers, Van Meter and Van Horn (1975: 472 – 473) pointed out three elements of response, including their cognition (comprehension, understanding) of the policy, the direction of their response toward it (acceptance, neutrality, rejection), and the intensity of that response. While the first aspect of cognition is attributed to the information level in this study, the two remaining aspects (direction and intensity) of dispositions also play a crucial role in this study. With respect to impact, Marume et al. (2016: 91) argued that the disposition of implementers can influence policies in three ways: (1) accept selectively if policies are not in line with their own predisposition, (2) frustrate if they do not agree with policies, and (3) oppose purposively. As such, public policy implementation might be negatively or positively affected by the disposition of the implementers (Paki and Ebiensa 2011: 7). If they are negatively disposed to a policy, there will be a lack of commitment to the implementation process and successful implementation may fail, even if the external norm addressees know exactly what they are supposed to do and have enough resources to do so. Indeed, it is hard to force someone to obey regulations that contradict his/her own benefits (Petrick 1968: 7; Sabatier and Mazmanian 1981: 22; Dose 1997: 77).

As argued by Matland (1995: 156), policy conflict might happen when more than one organization sees the policies as affecting directly their organizational and personal interests and if the organizations or individuals have inhomogeneous dispositions towards policy implementation. This holds true with the employers as the external norm addressees in implementing policies for their employees. Naturally, in the perception of the employers, the production factors necessary to run the business are of utmost importance and

implementing policies under the law may be less important. As evidenced by the fact of implementing policies for female employees in Vietnam, if there is a trade-off between the necessities of the market and the regulations of the Labor Code, then the employers may react against the regulations of the Labor Code (Vu 2013: 40-42). To drive the external norm addressees into the implementation process, policy programs must be in accordance with their dispositions, interests, desires, and perceptions (cf. Sætren and Hupe 2018: 561). To some extent, “compliance is likely to be higher when non-compliance is seen as socially unacceptable” (Weaver 2009: 7), even when the regulations violate the economic interest of the external norm addressees (Dose et al. 2018: 8). Without their support, policy compliance can be hardly ensured (Weaver 2009: 5). Under consideration, the disposition of the external norm addressees shall be included in the analytical framework as a powerful factor in making a difference.

g. The characteristic of the external norm addressees as being in public or private ownership

The characteristic of the external norm addressees as being in public ownership differs from being in private ownership already by definition. In a study by Ian (2011: 183-197), ‘public’ is defined as an objective, neutral term for the collective membership to a state, and the feature ‘public’ coupling with ‘ownership’ can be taken into account to explore the structure and dynamics of state activity and modes of governance. As outlined by Ian (2011: 183), ‘public ownership’, which can embrace a diverse array of interests, incentives and commitments, is usually much more encompassing and of wider policy consequence than its legal form and prescriptions suggest. Furthermore, ‘ownership’ is mentioned in a study by Stanisław (2016) to distinguish the difference between a public organization and a private organization. Accordingly, “the most public organizations are those that are owned by the

state, funded by the state and are subject to public scrutiny exclusively by the state. This group includes all government agencies, e.g. ministries and central offices. The most private organizations are those owned and funded by private entities and controlled by market forces” (Stanisław 2016: 400). In fact, there are also organizations owned and funded by the state but must compete with private organizations in providing goods and services to the public, e.g. public universities, state-owned enterprises. Besides, there are organizations owned and financed by private entities but are still under the control of the state, e.g. private universities, telecommunication companies.

The characteristic of the external norm addressees as being in public ownership is also different from being in private ownership in terms of ways of achieving their goals. From the standpoint of Ian (2011: 183), ‘ownership’ is considered as an instrument of policy, by which governments can pursue policy goals and objectives. Particularly, a private organization often has a single goal of profit maximization, while a public organization might have multiple goals such as efficiency, fairness, humanity, public accountability, and responsiveness to policy (cf. Stanisław 2018: 79). Under public ownership, the government can support/facilitate or oppose/restrict the external norm addressees to implement innovations through the usage of public assets, while under private ownership the norm addressees can self decide the implementation of innovations with their own assets (Eva and Patrick 2010: 259). This argument provokes a prediction that the characteristic of the external norm addressees as being in public or private ownership might make a difference in policy compliance. However, it is not clear which difference it makes. One might expect that in some states organizations under public ownership are the factor exempted from complying with legal provisions, or on the contrary, are strictly bound to follow all regulations.

3.1.2. Factors that have not been incorporated into the analytical framework although this is usually the case: reasons and explanations

Social – economic – political – administrative characteristics differ from country to country, which might affect the policy implementation process in many ways. According to the third generation approach of implementation research, governmental staffs play a crucial role in policy implementation. However, in the field of policy implementation for female employees in Vietnam, I recognized that the public administration of Vietnam has some characteristics different from western-style highly developed countries.

a. The distribution of competence within the internal organization and between units of the external organization

The distribution of competence within the internal organization and between units of the external organization is mentioned in many studies on policy implementation as being crucial for the implementation success (Sabatier and Mazmanian 1980: 546; Goggin 1986: 330; Dose 1997: 85-89; Dose 2002: 669; McLaughlin and Gail Krantzberg 2011: 390; O’Toole 2012: 293). For instance, a study done by O’Toole (2012: 293) pointed out that when public programs need to be executed through inter-organizational settings, the implementation task becomes more complicated. It is not only the number of units involved in implementation but also the way they are linked to each other. This situation often happens in fact when two or more ministries and their subordinate authorities of a single government are involved in handling a common problem. The big number of actors calls for effective coordination or clear distribution of competence. Therefore, there is a good reason to argue here that the distribution of competence within the internal organization and between units of the external organization is a powerful determinant affecting the policy implementation process and its outcome.

With respect to defining the most important terms, the internal organization refers to the organizational structure of a single public administration unit being part of the whole public administration of a jurisdiction or a country (cf. Becker 1989: 192). Typical dimensions of the internal organization are the regulation of the internal distribution of labor, and complementary to this the arrangements for coordination and integration. In contrast, the external organization refers to the organizational structure among different units of the whole public administration of a jurisdiction or a country.

In order to implement any policy of the government, it is necessary to have sufficient collaboration among separated jurisdictional units involved. The units involved can be ministries or governmental departments, and subnational agencies. Each unit can have a certain competence to perform its own functions and duties. If the distribution of competence is clear and well set, this might have a positive impact on the policy implementation process. Among others, this factor has the potential to explain the implementation outcome (cf. Dose 2002: 669); however, it should only be considered in countries having an effectively functioning public administration.

Noteworthy, implementing the female labor code in Vietnam is not affected by this explanatory factor, as revealed by a study by Jeff Wheeler and EJ Murtagh (2010). They conducted an assessment of Vietnam's labor inspection system and identified some problems regarding the public administration in implementing the female labor code. As ruled by law, the Ministry of Labor, War Invalids and Social Affairs (MOLISA) takes responsibility before the Government for performing the state management of labor at the central level; under MOLISA, there are 63 Departments of Labor, War Invalids and Social Affairs (DOLISA) at the provincial level, performing the state management of labor within their respective localities (Wheeler and Murtagh 2010: 4-5). The DOLISA offices provide technical support and monitoring services to 697 district divisions within each district overseen by a

People's Committee. In MOLISA and DOLISA, there are Departments of Labor Inspections with different functional divisions. The civil servants, who are in charge of labor administration, have to take responsibility for inspecting compliance with the labor law and handling violations in accordance with their competence and the law. The labor law refers to many different policy areas, while there is no clear distribution of competence within the internal organization and between units of the external organization. In fact, the civil servants of DOLISA have to work in different domains, not only labor matters (Hang 2018: 28). Normally, they often only inspect the problems regarding tax, financial complaints, big strikes, or serious labor accidents rather than the policy problems of female workers. Most of the specialized inspectors are working at the central level and in a few big cities as Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh city, while there are very few specialized inspectors in the local DOLISA offices (Wheeler and Murtagh 2010: 5). In provinces, towns, and rural areas, the appearance of labor inspectors is very seldom. "It appears that there is no regular process through which labor inspectors are engaged in identifying problems and potential solutions in the labor inspection procedures and operations" (Wheeler and Murtagh 2010: 19). Obviously, the role of public administration in implementing the female labor code in Vietnam is extremely small.

To some extent, the trade unions are functioning as a kind of equivalent to public administration to control the degree of compliance. The unionists are expected to be able to replace the civil servants to join in state management, inspection, examinations, supervision of activities of organizations in the policy implementation process. Notwithstanding the intervention of unionists, it is hard to apply the common deterrence approach and the success of policy implementation mainly depends on the self-commitment of norm addressees.

b. The quantity and quality of civil servants involved in policy implementation

Many scholars see the quantity and quality of the civil servants as a potential factor in explaining the outcome of policy implementation (Smith 1973: 199; Van Meter and Van Horn 1975: 471; Van Horn 1979: 15; Sabatier 1986: 23; Dose 1997: 82; Makinde 2005: 64; Dragos et al. 2012: 139-140). A sufficient quantity of staff may be deemed necessary for the successful implementation of policy (Makinde 2005: 64). In contrast, a lack of qualified personnel may be one of the factors contributing to the emasculation of any government policy (Smith 1973: 199; Dragos et al. 2012: 139-140). As argued by Berliner (2017: 657-658), the local government context of weak capacity can make widespread compliance unlikely. This is in line with the assumption that if the quality and quantity of the civil servants are inadequate and insufficient, they are hardly able to perform programs and services in a way that the desired outcomes will be achieved.

Nevertheless, this factor seems not to be of utmost importance for the implementation of the female labor code in Vietnam. As identified by the study of Jeff Wheeler and EJ Murtagh (2010) in the area of labor inspection there is a substantial lack of qualified personnel. According to Article 10 of the ILO Convention No. 81 which calls for a sufficient number of inspectors in comparison with the size of the workforce¹⁴, Vietnam needs at least one labor inspector for 15.000 – 20.000 workers. Nevertheless, the current number of labor inspectors in Vietnam is extremely insufficient (Wheeler and Murtagh 2010: 14). As reported in the Statistical Yearbook of Vietnam (2015: 58), the

¹⁴ The ILO has taken benchmarks about the number of labor inspectors per worker: 1/10.000 in industrial market economics, 1/15.000 in industrializing economics, 1/20.000 in transition economics, and 1/40.000 in less developed countries. As surveyed by the ILO, many countries did not reach these benchmarks, including Vietnam (ILO 2006: 4).

total number of inspectorates of MOLISA and DOLISA in 2014 was 484 people and there were only 160 civil servants in charge of labor inspections for the entire country. With about 60.000.000 employees working in both formal and informal economic sectors, as recommended by the ILO, Vietnam should have about 1500 labor inspectors (Hang 2018: 37). It is a big challenge for Vietnam because of the small number of labor inspectors comparing to the huge number of inspection objects. With such an insufficient quantity (lack of 1340 labor inspectors), the labor inspection system of Vietnam could hardly cover their workload. Plus, the inadequate capacity is also an obstacle for the inspectors at work, as pointed out in the study of Hang (2018: 11-12) that “lack of cooperation of social partners of labor inspection such as representatives of employers and employees, and other conditions (for example equipment, means of transport and facility, expenses) prevent labor inspectorates in conducting their mandates”. In fact, many policy problems regarding female workers are out of the control of inspectors. Undeniably, with a labor inspection system having insufficient quantity and inadequate quality, the labor inspectors are not likely to frequently monitor the implementation of the female labor code (Dose et al. 2018: 5). This holds true for all cases of this study. By including this factor in the analytical framework, the respective empirical work would not provide any variance of this factor. Therefore, it is useless to include it in my analytical framework. The goal now is to explain compliance and non-compliance under the condition of a deficient public administration.

3.1.3. Degree of policy compliance as the implementation outcome

As should have been seen in the course of my argument, many studies on policy implementation have elaborated theoretical frameworks working with a wide range of explanatory variables. With reference to these factors, many scholars tried to explain imperfect policy implementation, i.e. implementation deficits which has become known as the ‘implementation gap’, and refers to the


difference between the evidence of what works in theory and what is delivered in practice (Burke et al. 2012: 2). In other words, the implementation gap is the problem of the widening of the distance between the results we expect and the realities we have (Makinde 2005: 64). Many scholars also assumed that policies would only partially achieve the expected results and the implementation of these policies would suffer from unpredicted consequences. For any analysis in the field, the degrees of implementation success and failures are crucial. Goggin (1986: 331) sorted out various degrees of implementation success and failures, in which the biggest implementation failure is “no implementation at all”; the second implementation failure is “paper implementation” where policy implementation does not meet any expectation of policy-makers; the next one is “adjusted implementation” where the original intent is modified considerably, and the most successful implementation is “coordinated implementation” where actors have to try their best to achieve their goals. This means that compliant behaviors of the norm addressees serve as a key component to successful implementation. In this study, full compliance is defined as target group behavior consistent with a given policy’s objective. The degree of compliance can be comprehended as the gap between the objective of the policy and the actual outcome of implementation status. The result of interest is the extent to which an organization is complying with legal regulations.

3.1.4. Conclusion with respect to the analytical framework

After having detailed various sets of factors from different implementation models, I considered some most promising factors to explore the complex causality of policy outcomes in the context of Vietnam. Regarding implementing policies for female employees, I looked at the openness of the policy design with respect to latitudes of interpretation and legal sanctions, the characteristics of external norm addressees (employers), interest groups (trade

unions), and policy targets (female employees) to identify factors that might influence the outcome of policy implementation.

Figure 8: Analytical framework of the possible causal conditions leading to compliance or non-compliance with some selected policies for female employees in Vietnam



As mentioned before, among others the role of governmental staff is extremely insignificant in implementing policies for female workers because of the limitations of Vietnamese public administration. Hence, developing the analytical framework (*Figure 8*) focuses on the following factors: (1) the provision of latitudes of interpretation within the respective legal norms, (2) the

severity of legal sanctions against violations, (3) the availability of financial resources for policy implementation on the side of the norm addressees, (4) the role of interest groups supporting or obstructing effective compliance, which is considered as a kind of equivalent to public administration to control the degree of compliance, (5) the information level of policy targets about policies, (6) the dispositions of the external norm addressees towards the policy at stake, and (7) the characteristic of the external norm addressees as being in public or private ownership. My analytical framework can be seen as a synthesis of both top-down and bottom-up approaches in policy implementation. From this analytical framework, some directional expectations are laid down in assumptions.

3.2. Assumptions

Policy compliance depends on the variants of the factors. A factor might be an enabler or a barrier, relying on the way it acts (Adame-Sánchez et al. 2016: 5520). Indeed, if a factor can force or facilitate the norm addressees to comply with a policy, that factor is an enabler. In contrast, if a factor restrains or discourages the norm addressees from policy compliance, that factor is a barrier. As can be seen from the analytical framework, the degree of policy compliance is likely to be affected by seven factors. These factors are called ‘independent variables’ in the statistical analysis approach or ‘causal conditions’ in the fsQCA approach. From the international literature and substantive knowledge about the Vietnamese context, I propose the assumptions about the relationship of the given phenomenon. The assumptions are given as follows:

***Assumption 1:** There is a relationship between the provision of latitudes of interpretation within the respective legal norms and the degree of policy compliance. If the provision of latitudes of interpretation is not given, the degree of policy compliance will be better.*

***Assumption 2:** There is a relationship between the severity of legal sanctions and the degree of policy compliance. If the severity of legal sanctions is given, the degree of policy compliance will be better.*

***Assumption 3:** There is a relationship between the availability of financial resources for policy implementation on the side of the external norm addressees and the degree of policy compliance. The more the financial resource capacity, the better is the degree of policy compliance.*

***Assumption 4:** There is a relationship between the intervention of interest groups and the degree of policy compliance. If there is the intervention of interest groups, the degree of policy compliance will be better.*

***Assumption 5:** There is a relationship between the information level of policy targets about policies and the degree of policy compliance. The higher the information level of policy targets about policies is, the better is the degree of policy compliance.*

***Assumption 6:** There is a relationship between the dispositions of the external norm addressees towards the policy at stake and the degree of policy compliance. The more supportive the disposition of the external norm addressee is, the better is the degree of policy compliance.*

***Assumption 7:** There is a relationship between the ownership characteristic of the external norm addressees and the degree of policy compliance. If the external norm addressees are being in public ownership, their degree of policy compliance will be better.*

As stated by Ragin (2008:23), an outcome may derive from several different combinations of causal conditions, even an outcome may come from the presence or absence of a condition. Accordingly, my study is looking forward to directional assumptions about the complex causality between possible causal conditions and the interested outcome.

Assumption 8: *The absence of latitudes of interpretation within the respective legal norms might be a necessary but not sufficient condition for policy compliance. It is expected that the absence of latitudes must combine with other conditions to foster policy compliance.*

Assumption 9: *The severity of legal sanctions might be a necessary but not sufficient condition for policy compliance. It is expected that the severity of legal sanctions must combine with other conditions to foster policy compliance.*

Assumption 10: *The availability of financial resources for policy implementation on the side of the norm addressees might be a necessary but not sufficient condition for policy compliance. It is expected that the availability of financial resources must combine with other conditions to foster policy compliance.*

Assumption 11: *The intervention of interest groups like the active fight of the trade union might be a necessary but not sufficient condition for policy compliance. It is expected that the active fight of the trade union must combine with other conditions to foster policy compliance.*

Assumption 12: *The good perception of policy targets about the policies might be a necessary but not sufficient condition for compliance. It is expected that their good perception of the policies must combine with other conditions to foster policy compliance.*

Assumption 13: *The supportive disposition of the external norm addressees towards the policy at stake might be a necessary but not sufficient condition for policy compliance. It is expected that their supportive disposition must combine with other conditions to foster policy compliance.*

In order to have a more comprehensive understanding of the factors under which the outcome occurs, I will give other assumptions in an asymmetrical view:

Assumption 14: *It is likely that the presence of latitudes of interpretation within the respective legal norms is part of a complex configuration linked to policy non-compliance.*

Assumption 15: *It is likely that the absence of legal sanctions is part of a complex configuration linked to policy non-compliance.*

Assumption 16: *It is likely that the unavailability of financial resources is part of a complex configuration linked to policy non-compliance.*

Assumption 17: *Lacking the intervention of interest groups is likely to be part of a complex configuration linked to policy non-compliance.*

Assumption 18: *Lacking information is likely to be part of a complex configuration linked to policy non-compliance.*

Assumption 19: *It is likely that the obstructive disposition of the external norm addressees towards the policy at stake is part of a complex configuration linked to policy non-compliance.*

Furthermore, some assumptions will be examined in the comparison of separate analyses for the public sector and the private sector. Empirically analyzing how the different combinations of conditions interplay and affect implementing policies for female workers is a contribution of this study.

Assumption 20: *It is likely that the multi-causal pathways to policy compliance between the two sectors are the same.*

Assumption 21: *It is likely that the multi-causal pathways of policy non-compliance in the private sector are more complex than in the public sector.*

Chapter IV: Research Design, Data Collection, and Methodology

4.1. Research design and data collection

The subject of the study is the implementation of a range of rules of the Vietnamese Labor Code. More specifically the implementation of rules which are laid down in Chapter X of the Vietnam Labor Code 2012 for female employees will be analyzed by making use of a comparative case study design. Thus, the core of the study is empirical research; it is guided by an analytical framework that was constructed based on a thorough literature review and given knowledge of the policy field. The case study method according to Yin (2014) was chosen to instruct the design as well as at least in parts the analysis of the data. However, different from Yin's approach also more rigorous methods have been applied for data analysis. In a triangulation approach next to the implicit content analysis of the cases, statistical analyses will be employed to explore the relationship between variables and a fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis (fsQCA) will be made use of to explain the scope of compliance and non-compliance with some selected policies for female workers in Vietnam.


4.1.1. Research design

In order to systematically acquire knowledge about the implementation success or failure of some selected provisions of the labor code for female workers in Vietnam as well as understand the factors affecting compliance and non-compliance with these provisions, this study will employ a comparative case study design. Since all cases are located in the same institutional setting of the political system of Vietnam, a Most Similar Systems Design is used.

For answering the question "What is a case?", Beach and Pedersen (2016: 5) defined a "case" as a unit in which a given causal relationship plays out, from the occurrence of a cause (or set of causes) to an outcome. Like other designs, case study research is a way to investigate an empirical topic by following a set

of systematic procedures. Particularly in social sciences, the case study design has been regarded as a valuable method to explore, describe or explain a phenomenon in context using multiple sources of evidence such as documents or records, interviews, or field observations (Baxter and Jack 2008: 544). The case study design is often the best choice when the research needs to provide a rich description or an insightful explanation about issues or events which the researcher can hardly manipulate (Yin 2014: 9-16). Doing a case study is pertinent to answer descriptive or explanatory questions. Yet, the case study design is relevant for an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon (the “case”) in its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between the phenomenon and context are not clear (Yin 2014: 9-16). Therefore, most implementation research employed the case study method to conquer the dynamics of implementation (Goggin et al. 1990: 182). In fact, case study research is in favor of evaluating public programs, as argued by Rogers (2000: 209) that “not whether programs work, but how they work”. As such, the selection of the case study design is purposeful for the needs of this study. Cases of implementation deficits of policies for female employees in Vietnam are observational in a real-life context. These case studies are also monitored in hardly controlled environments. The presented study calls for an embedded multiple-case design (cf. Yin 2014: 63). Indeed, for case studies to be conducted, firstly, different subunits of analysis need to be incorporated for extensive analysis. As has been illustrated by *Figure 9* these subunits are the female employee, the employer, a unionist (if present), and a civil servant in charge (if present). Secondly, choosing multiple case studies instead of a single case study can be explained by the aspiration to carefully try to generalize across cases without never forgetting that the sampling was not done randomly. At least, studying multiple cases of the same phenomenon might corroborate, qualify, and make the findings and interpretations more compelling (cf. Theiler 2012: 28-30).

Figure 9: Embedded multiple-case study procedure



As a rule, the higher the number of cases is, the higher is the scientific value of the respective research. Writing this it has to be acknowledged that also single case studies denoted by thick description can be of tremendous scientific value. However, since I strive for careful generalization across cases while employing at the same time a model containing from six to seven predicting factors, a sufficient number of cases should be available for analysis. This holds especially true since it is planned to apply statistical analyses and fsQCA for data analysis. Considering the outlined needs a moderately large-N should be sufficient; more concrete, 84 cases have been analyzed.

Figure 10 represents an embedded multiple-case study strategy with the analytical models. The outcome and all factors are coded in capital abbreviations. Specifically speaking, the first factor is LATI, reflecting the provision of latitudes of interpretation within the respective legal norms. The second one is LESA, indicating the severity of legal sanctions against violations. Next is FINA, denoting the available financial resources for policy implementation on the side of the norm addressees. Besides, UNION is the abbreviation for the interest groups (trade unions) supporting effective compliance, INFO reveals the information level of the policy targets about policies, DISP stands for the dispositions of the external norm addressees towards the policy at stake, and PUBLIC denotes the characteristic of the external norm addressees as being in public ownership. In this study, the dependent variable respectively the interested outcome is the extent to which an organization is complying with legal regulations, namely COMPLIANCE. In order to make use of the fsQCA approach, I will perform another model with the negation of the outcome (~COMPLIANCE). Based on the results of data analysis, findings will be given to demonstrate if which assumption is true or false. These findings are finally to serve the key research questions of this study.

Figure 10: Embedded multiple-case study strategy

<p>An embedded multiple-case study: “Multi-causal pathways to compliance and non-compliance with policies for female employees in Vietnam: Statistical analyses and fsQCA findings.”</p> <hr/> <p>(n = 84)</p>	<p><u>Research question 1:</u> What is the degree of compliance with some selected policies for female employees in Vietnam?</p> <p>COMPLIANCE ~COMPLIANCE</p>	<p><u>Research question 2:</u> What makes external norm addressees comply?</p> <p>(1) Are there relationships between variables, and if so, what are their directions?</p> <p>(2) What are the necessary conditions for policy compliance and non-compliance? What are the sufficient (combinations of) conditions for policy compliance and non-compliance?</p> <p>For the question (2), the study performs two following models: COMPLIANCE = f(LATI, LESA, FINA, UNION, INFO, DISP) ~COMPLIANCE = f(LATI, LESA, FINA, UNION, INFO, DISP)</p> <p><u>Research question 3:</u> Are there similarities and differences in policy compliance and non-compliance between the public sector and private sector, and if so, what are their characteristics?</p> <p>For the third question, the study performs two following models: COMPLIANCE = f(LATI, LESA, FINA, UNION, INFO, DISP, PUBLIC) ~COMPLIANCE = f(LATI, LESA, FINA, UNION, INFO, DISP, PUBLIC)</p>						
		LATI	LESA	FINA	UNION	INFO	DISP	PUBLIC
Case 1	data	data	data	data	data	data	data	
Case 2	data	data	data	data	data	data	data	
Case 3	data	data	data	data	data	data	data	
...	data	data	data	data	data	data	data	
Case 84	data	data	data	data	data	data	data	
Generalization of 84 cases	<p>↓ Analysis ↓ Findings</p>	<p>↓ Analysis ↓ Findings</p>						

Notes: ~ indicates the absence of the outcome (non-compliance).

4.1.2. Data Collection

In order to develop an in-depth understanding of how the policies for female employees are being implemented in Vietnam, it is necessary to seek data from insiders of policy implementation through personalized interviews on each of the conditions and the respective outcome. The reason explaining why interviewing is ideally suited to collect data is because it can get at the nitty-gritty of policy implementation, examining how policies were put into day-to-day operations. According to the fieldwork guide for evaluators and policy analysts, the selection of interviewees based on the research questions (Murphy 1980: 78). Because the questions of this research center on policy implementation and impacts, so the subjects who are selected to interview are individuals involving in the policy implementing process. The research used the “snowball sampling” technique where subjects refer to others from among their acquaintances.

The analytical framework serves the function to structure 84 not representative case studies on the implementation of three different policies being part of the labor code, including the policy of periodic health check-ups for female employees (P1), the policy of maternity leave (P2), and the policy of childcare support for female employees (P3). The interview instrument is a guideline including both Vietnamese and English versions, which is determined by a given questionnaire guide containing open and closed questions. For each key question, there may be a series of detailed questions to elicit the information.

The face-to-face interviews were carried out in contexts of agencies, organizations, companies, enterprises, and factories in various fields in both the public sector and the private sector in Vietnam (*Table A.1 in the Appendix*). The sample size of each sector is equal (42 cases in the public sector and 42 cases in the private sector). Within each case, the study refers to specific individuals involving in the policy process to ask about the implementation outcome and the independent variables, including both female employees and employers (see above

chapter 4.1.1). The questionnaires for the employer and employee have been mostly mirror-inverted in order to gain a better understanding of the case. If the interviewees provided contradictory answers, the interviewer can ask some sub-questions and decide on this base which value to work with. In terms of logic, the female employees are often the most reliable informants, with the willingness, to provide information freely and candidly. To secure the confidentiality, details of factories/companies and interviewees have been made anonymous by for instance deleting or changing the names. Under favorable conditions, the interviewer could also approach additionally a representative of the trade union and a civil servant to contribute to the data full impression of the respective case. Where civil servants were present, they have also been interviewed on the general topic. Since civil servants have not been actively involved in most cases, communication with them had to be restricted to more general information gathering. This experience again underlines the corresponding assessment made earlier in chapter 3.1.2.

The interviewer is a native speaker and a citizen of Vietnam who is very well familiar with the cultural context of Vietnam and could communicate open-mindedly with interviewees. The collection of primary data has been accomplished within three months in various cities and provinces of Vietnam at the end of 2016/beginning of 2017 (*Figure 11*). All in all, the case studies are based on the insiders' opinions and no one's voice was privileged. All interviews have been coded with a number from 1 to 84 (*Table A.2, A.3, and A.4 in the Appendix*). The responses to questions are then transferred from the questionnaire into digital files for further analysis. The documented data are part of the findings for each case and are used to interpret the implementation processes and their outcome.

Figure 11: Surveyed areas in Vietnam



4.2. Methodology

This study employs both the statistical analysis approach and the fsQCA approach to test assumptions. Each approach has its own functions and using different approaches is one of the chief traits of third-generation studies, as defined by Goggin et al. (1990: 19).

4.2.1. Statistical analysis as an effects-of-causes approach

Numerous statistical approaches to the analysis and interpretation of data are discussed and presented by experts (Shavelson 1981; Foster 1998; Bryman and Cramer 2009; Noriss et al. 2012; Pallant 2016). In statistical terms, selecting parametric tests versus non-parametric tests rests upon the assumptions regarding the data type, distribution, and variance (Bryman and Cramer 2009: 144; Foster 1998: 16 – 17; Pallant 2016: 152). Popularly, non-parametric tests are employed with the nominal or ordinal dependent variable and free from assumptions, while parametric tests are applicable with the interval or ratio dependent variable but data must meet the normality and homoscedasticity of residuals. Generally, the statistical approach provides many different techniques to explore the differences between scores as well as to allow exploring the relationships among variables. Based on the research question and the analytical framework presented in chapter III, I will apply some statistical techniques into exploring the relationships among variables and their directions. Moreover, in order to evaluate whether the given independent variables account for the dependent variable, they should be analyzed to ensure the accuracy and statistical significance of the research model.

A question is given if which theory statistics can be performed with my dependent variable? It can be said that the dependent variable in my study is a special case. The outcome of policy implementation is originally categorized into two groups: compliance (denoted with the value 1) and non-compliance (denoted with the value 0). Making use of the detailed responses to the degree of policy

compliance, then this variable is measured with the values numbered from 1 to 4¹⁵. For the latter measurement, my dependent variable can be considered as an ordinal variable because it has a clear ordering. In the view of Clogg and Shihadeh (1994: 140), “perhaps most of the variables specified as dependent variables in social research are of this general kind [ordinal variable].” There has been an over-50-year controversy among many researchers on whether ordinal data can be treated as interval data (Carifio and Perla 2008: 1150 - 1151).

On one hand, Harwell and Gatti (2001: 105) warned that employing ordinal-scaled dependent variables in statistical procedures that assume that these variables possess an interval scale of measurement may produce biased statistical results that threaten the validity of inferences; hence, it is recommended that researchers should carefully consider rescaling ordinal data to interval data using item response theory (Harwell and Gatti 2001: 127). On the other hand, Geoff Norman - one of the world’s leaders of medical education research methodology, provided a lot of convincing evidence to demonstrate that parametric statistical tests can be used to analyze the ordinal responses and they are even more robust than nonparametric tests (Norman 2010: 627-631). As emphasized by Sullivan and Artino (2013: 542), “parametric tests tend to give ‘the right answer’ even when statistical assumptions - such as a normal distribution of data - are violated, even to an extreme degree. Thus, parametric tests are sufficiently robust to yield largely unbiased answers that are acceptably close to ‘the truth’ when analyzing Likert scale responses”.

In general, concerns with analyzing ordinal data have still been the subject of considerable debate in the methodological literature. So far researchers faced with analyzing categorical data have often had two options (Harwell and Gatti

¹⁵ In detail, the degree of policy compliance is measured on a Likert scale: 1 - Full out compliance, 2 - More out than in compliance, 3 - More in than out compliance, 4 - Full in compliance.

2001: 113). One is to employ such categorical data to work out non-parametric procedures (Marascuilo and McSweeney 1977; Conover 1980; Agresti 1990; Clogg and Shihadeh 1994; etc.) A second option, in certain conditions, is to treat ordinal data as interval data to perform parametric procedures (Bollen and Barb 1981; Russell et al. 1991; Embretson 1996; Grolnick et al. 1997; Rowan et al. 1997; etc.) For this study, I will follow both trends.

Firstly, my dependent variable, when is labeled with the values 1 and 0, can be seen as a pure example of nominal data which permits me to use a kind of non-parametric statistical test, namely Pearson's chi-square test (written as the χ^2), to check the association between variables. Compared with other statistical techniques, using the Pearson chi-square test has many advantages such as "its robustness with respect to the distribution of the data, its ease of computation, the detailed information that can be derived from the test, its use in studies for which parametric assumptions cannot be met, and its flexibility in handling data from both two group and multiple group studies" (McHugh 2013: 143). As a rule of thumb for using the Pearson chi-square test, each observation belongs to only one category, and data are collected in a one-way design or in a two-way design (in which each independent variable may have two or more values, and a dependent variable are in the form of a frequency count) (Shavelson 1981: 516-547; Noriss et al. 2012: 183). Normally, the two-way chi-square test is a contingency-table analysis to determine whether an association exists between two variables by comparing the observed frequencies to the expected frequencies. In this study, I use a two-way chi-square test to explore the relationships among variables.

Furthermore, by rescaling my dependent variable to the order, I intend to apply some other statistical techniques to evaluate the strength and direction of their relationships. The fact is that when I present an ordinal scale (from 1 to 4) to my respondents for their answers, they might think automatically that there is an equal distance between each value. In this case, my dependent variable has the quality of interval one, and if so, normal theory statistics such as Pearson

correlation or regression can be used. As a trial step for further research, I will try doing parametric procedures by treating my dependent variable as an interval variable. On the ground of this treatment, I will perform a Pearson correlation analysis and multiple regression analysis (MRA). To prevent statistical results that can threaten the validity of inferences, I will consider carefully the results of the Pearson correlation analysis and MRA in comparison to the results of the Pearson chi-square test. If the former supports the latter, they will help me to give more detailed information about the relationships between variables as well as to robust the validity of inferences. Commonly, the Pearson correlation analysis is used to evaluate the strength and direction of the relationship between two variables. This technique is connected to an MRA which is a statistical approach for modeling the association between a dependent variable (Y) and one or more independent variables (X_1, X_2, \dots) (Franzese and Iuliano 2019: 706). In other words, performing an MRA¹⁶ is a way to know how a dependent variable will vary with a set of independent variables. Based on the output from MRA, it is possible to adjust the overall fit of the model and the relative contribution of each independent variable in explaining the variance.

In summary, in this study, I will treat my dependent variable in different manners, which leads to applying various statistical procedures to shed light on the relationships between variables. On one hand, I identify my dependent variable as typically categorical data that permits me to perform the Pearson chi-square test so as to check the relationships between variables. On the other hand, I treat my dependent variable as interval data to try doing a Pearson correlation analysis and MRA to explore the direction of their relationships. It may bring two possibilities:

¹⁶ The expression about Y constructed by MRA is a multiple regression equation (\dots, X_k) which can be described as follow: $Y = a_0 + a_1 X_1 + a_2 X_2 + \dots + a_k X_k$ (where Y represents the value of the dependent variable, X_1, X_2, \dots, X_k represent respectively the values of independent variables, the constants $a_0, a_1, a_2, \dots, \text{ and } a_k$ are calculated by the successive regression).

the results of two different statistical methods (non-parametric versus parametric) may be either corroborative or contradictory. In order to confirm or negate assumptions regarding the relationship between variables, if the results of two methods are corroborative, I will use both of them to validate inferences; if the results of the two methods are contradictory, I will only use the results of the Pearson chi-square test which are always valid with my data.

4.2.2. Fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis (fsQCA) as a causes-of-effects approach

The methodology of QCA¹⁷, which bases on the set-theory and uses Boolean algebra, is an analytical technique used popularly by scholars in recent years (Ragin 2000; Ragin 2008, Schneider and Wagenmann 2012, Legewie 2013). This methodology originates from the research strategies of John Stuart Mill (1806-1873), a British philosopher, political economist, and civil servant. In his “A System of Logic: Ratiocinative and Inductive” (1843), Mill presented two methods to establish a logical foundation for case-oriented investigations: the method of agreement and the method of difference (Ragin 1987: 36). As demonstrated by Mill (1843: 390) the method of agreement illustrates that: “If two or more instances of the phenomenon under investigation have only one circumstance in common, the circumstance in which alone all the instances agree is the cause (or effect) of the given phenomenon”. Conversely, the method of difference refers to the principle: “If an instance in which the phenomenon under investigation occurs, and an instance in which it does not occur, have every circumstance in common save one, that one occurring only in the former, the circumstance in which alone the two instances differ, is the effect, or the cause, or an indispensable part of the cause of the phenomenon” (Mill 1843: 391). Both methods establish causal relationships through systematic comparison (Tierno et




¹⁷ While QCA is already a well-established methodology it is not yet well known enough to assume that everybody is familiar with it. Therefore, a short introduction to this powerful methodology is given.

al. 2017: 16). The combination of these methods, which Mill called “the joint method of agreement and difference”, contributed to laying the foundation for the applications of QCA (Vassinen 2012: 37). One of the talented scholars having a great devotion to the development of QCA is Charles C. Ragin, an American social scientist. His book “The Comparative Method: Moving beyond Qualitative and Quantitative Structure” (1987) firstly introduced QCA as a synthetic approach that can “integrate the best features of the case-oriented approach with the best features of the variable-oriented approach” (Ragin 1987: 84). From that, Ragin has conducted many studies to robust the applications of set theory for the interpretation analysis of social science data (Schneider and Wagemann 2012: 9). In the late 1980s and early 1990s, QCA was employed in political science and historical sociology with “small-N” research designs (10 to 50 cases). During this period, the applications of QCA were mostly based on case studies. Initially, QCA remained limitations in generalizing the results from similar cases (Tierno et al. 2017: 16). However, in recent years, the QCA techniques have been improved and successfully applied in “intermediate -N” research designs as well as in “large-N” ones. Currently, the QCA techniques can analyze empirical data for generalization (Tierno et al. 2017: 16). That is why QCA is seen as a powerful research methodology that can combine both qualitative (cased-oriented) and quantitative (variable-oriented) techniques to conduct a systematic comparison of case studies (Ragin 2008: 30; Ragin 2014: xix).

One of the main differences between QCA and statistical techniques is its set-theoretic nature. In terms of set theory, as can be seen in *Figure 12*, there are three main operations that can be applied to complex logical expressions in fsQCA, including intersection, union, and negation (Schneider and Wagemann 2012: 55). To specify, a set intersection refers to the combination of conditions that forms a sufficient pathway for an outcome (Schneider and Wagemann 2012: 44; Legewie 2013: 5). This operation is based on the logical AND by using the sign “*” to denote the combination of elements. The membership score of a case in an

intersection is calculated by the minimum value across the single components (Schneider and Wagemann 2012: 44). Conversely, a set union is used to access different combinations of conditions for a given outcome, that is based on the logical OR by using the sign “+” to express alternative pathways (Schneider and Wagemann 2012: 45-46; Legewie 2013: 5). Here, the membership score of each case is determined by the maximum value across the single components (Schneider and Wagemann 2012: 46). Besides, a set negation refers to the portion excluded from a set (Legewie 2013: 5). This operation is based on the logical NOT and uses the sign “~” to denote the absence of a condition or outcome. The membership score of a case in the negation of a set is calculated by subtracting the original membership value from 1 (Schneider and Wagemann 2012: 46).

Figure 12: Boolean operations relevant for QCA

	<p><i>Set intersection (logical AND)</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Refers to the shared part of sets A and B. - Denoted as $A*B$ or often simply as AB. - Computed with $A*B = \min(A, B)$; i.e. if $A = 0.33$ and $B = 1$, $A*B = \min(0.33, 1) = 0.33$ - Main use in QCA: combinations of conditions that form sufficient conditions for an outcome. A and B together lead to outcome Y.
	<p><i>Set union (logical OR)</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Refers to the combination of sets A and B. - Denoted as $A+B$. - Computed with $A+B = \max(A, B)$; i.e. if $A = 0.33$ and $B = 1$, $A+B = \max(0.33, 1) = 1$ - Main use in QCA: alternative pathways (i.e., combinations of conditions) to an outcome. Pathway X or Z lead to outcome Y.
	<p><i>Set negation (logical NOT)</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Refers to the portion excluded from a set. - Denoted either as $\sim A$ or a. - Computed with $\sim A = 1-A$; i.e. if $A = 0.33$, $\sim A = 1-0.33 = 0.67$ - Main use in QCA: looking at how the absence or opposite of a set works as a condition or outcome.

Source: Legewie (2013: 5)

The QCA studies must rely on in-depth case knowledge with a combination of detailed within-case analysis and formalized, systematic cross-case comparison (Legewie 2013: 2-3). Like other methodologies, the QCA process sequence calls

for some basic steps such as defining a research question, case selection, data analysis and result interpretation. However, different from other set-theoretical approaches QCA operates with truth tables to analyze the features of causal complexity and makes use of the principles of logical minimization to produce complex, parsimonious, and intermediate solutions (Schneider and Wagemann 2012: 13). The aim of QCA is to explain the complex causality of a given phenomenon (Schneider and Wagemann 2012: 13). In QCA terms, factors that are considered as causes of a phenomenon are called “causal conditions”, while the status of the phenomenon is called “outcome”. From a QCA logic, if in one case $X \rightarrow Y$ ¹⁸, then it is not assumed that $\sim X \rightarrow \sim Y$; or if in one case $X \leftarrow Y$ ¹⁹, then it is also not assumed that $\sim X \leftarrow \sim Y$. With respect to the complex causality perspective, it is essential to distinguish between necessary²⁰ and sufficient²¹ conditions. Taking into account the complex causality, in QCA is assumed that different conditions

¹⁸ $X \rightarrow Y$ denotes that X is a sufficient condition for the outcome Y. $\sim X \rightarrow \sim Y$ denotes that the negation of X is a sufficient condition for the negation of Y.

¹⁹ $X \leftarrow Y$ denotes that X is a necessary condition for the outcome Y. $\sim X \leftarrow \sim Y$ denotes that the negation of X is a necessary condition for the negation of Y.

²⁰ In QCA, a condition is necessary, if whenever the outcome is present, this condition is also present ($X \geq Y$ for all cases) (Ragin 2000: 91; Schneider and Wagemann 2012: 76). To pass the test of necessity, such a condition should simultaneously have a high coverage of more than 0.5 and a high consistency of more than 0.9 as a superset of the outcome (Ragin 2000: 132-133; Schneider and Wagemann 2012: 278; Legewie 2013: 11). However, while low values of coverage indicate trivialness, high values might or might not indicate relevant conditions (Schneider and Wagemann 2012: 148).

²¹ A condition is sufficient if whenever the condition is present, the outcome is also present” (“ $X \leq Y$ for all cases”) (Schneider and Wagemann 2012: 76). To pass the test of sufficiency, a configuration of conditions should have a high consistency of more than 0.75 as a subset of the outcome (Schneider and Wagemann 2012: 129). The values of very low coverage only show a little part of the outcome represented by that condition but they still might be of great theoretical and substantive interest (Schneider and Wagemann 2012: 148). The sufficiency analysis involves the construction of a truth table that lists all 2^k rows or vector space corners (where k is the number of causal conditions). Each row of the truth table represents one logically possible combination of causal conditions, recording the number of cases with the same configuration, and whether or not the outcome happened.

can lead to the same outcome (equifinality causation), like “many ways may lead to Rome”. Put differently, the presence and absence of conditions might contribute to different outcomes (Ragin 2000: 106; Schneider and Wagemann 2012: 89). With asymmetrical relationships, the explanation of the positive outcome does not automatically imply the explanation of the negative outcome (Schneider and Wagemann 2012: 81). For example, the lack of financial resources might be associated with policy non-compliance, but it does not mean that all cases of having financial capacity comply with the policy. Therefore, it is impossible to use the analysis result for the presence of the phenomenon to give inferences “vice versa” for the absence of the same phenomenon under examination (Schneider and Wagemann 2010: 12). Lately, QCA has been more and more widely used because of the advantages it offers for conducting comparative research (Legewie 2013: 1-2). Many scholars tend to apply this methodology for public policy analysis and evaluation (Rihoux et al. 2011; Brans and Pattyn 2017; Pattyn et al. 2017; Gerrits and Verweij 2018; Thomann 2019). So far QCA has been developing with many variants such as crisp-set (csQCA), fuzzy-set (fsQCA), multi-value (mvQCA), or temporal-QCA (tQCA) (Schneider and Wagemann 2012: 16). Each variant has its own functions in analyzing data, of which csQCA and fsQCA are considered the two main variants. While csQCA only operates with perfect non-membership and perfect membership in a set that is calibrated crisply (0 and 1), fsQCA can work with cases with gradations of set membership (between 0 and 1). Thus, it is assumed that fsQCA is an extension of csQCA (Schneider and Wagemann 2012: 15-16). Owing to the flexibility in usage, the number of studies using fsQCA tends to be higher than other variants (Schneider and Wagemann 2012: 14; Tierno et al. 2017: 17). In most of the studies, employing fsQCA data are analyzed with the help of the different software packages such as the fuzzy package for Stata (Longest and Vaisey 2008), the QCA package for the R environment (Huang 2011), Kirq (Reichert and Rubinson 2013), fsQCA (Ragin and Sean Davey 2017), and Tosmana 1.6 (Cronqvist 2018).

4.2.3. Why should both statistical analyses and fsQCA be used for this study?

As mentioned above, the basis of statistical analysis is “quantitative” while the foundation of configurational comparative analyses like fsQCA is “qualitative” (cf. Vis 2012: 171). In my study, the purpose of statistical analysis is to explore the relationships between variables, while the QCA analysis objective is to account for a particular outcome (Schneider and Wagemann 2010, Vis 2012). Herewith the question of complementarity arises: *Is it possible to use both statistical analyses and fsQCA approaches in this study? If possible, why should they be used?* In general, each methodology has its own merits. Using simultaneously both statistical analyses and fsQCA in this study is meaningful for the following reasons:

Firstly, combining statistical analyses and fsQCA can give a better understanding of the second research question than using only one (cf. Schneider and Wagemann 2010: 400). On one hand, using statistical analyses helps to make clear: *Are there relationships between variables, and if so, what are their directions?* Based on the statistical analysis findings, the study can evaluate the net impact level of the independent variables on the dependent variable and adjust the overall fit of the model. On the other hand, the study employs fsQCA to clarify: *What are the necessary factors, and what are the sufficient (conjunctions of) factors for policy compliance and non-compliance?* As an asymmetrical test, the fsQCA helps to shed light on two sides of the problem “policy compliance and non-compliance”. This characteristic of fsQCA deems to be highly relevant because this study strives for a comprehensive explanation of the complex causality configuration underlying the compliance and non-compliance of the selected legal provisions. In other words, using fsQCA is especially helpful when the study “does not assume the idea of uniformity of causal effect” (Pattyn et al. 2017: 3). Moreover, configurational analyses like fsQCA can conduct separate tests to search for a condition (or combination of conditions) that is necessary or/and sufficient for a certain outcome. (Vis 2012: 175). It is undeniable that “regression analysis can also accommodate multiple conjunctural causation, but

doing so comes less natural than in fsQCA” (Vis 2012: 173). Owing to the typical features, fsQCA is effectively suitable to analyze the complex causality and the logical relationship between possible causal conditions and a certain outcome, in which an outcome may derive from several different combinations of causal conditions (Ragin 2008: 23), an outcome may even come from the presence or absence of a condition.

With respect to technical requirements for employing both methodologies (statistical analyses and fsQCA), all of them are met. The in-depth knowledge of 84 cases of policy implementation acquired during the empirical stage is an excellent basis to apply fsQCA in a content-based manner. Moreover, data on the different cases have been collected making use of a Likert scale as often as possible. This does not only allow to employ test-statistics but also fsQCA. Thus, an excellent chance to produce meaningful results is given. To some extent, fsQCA could even be “an alternative of regression analysis for samples of any size” (Schneider and Eggert 2014: 323). As recommended by Legewie (2013: 2) “QCA is strongest and most adequately used when studying the social phenomenon of complex causality that can be formulated in set-theoretic terms”. Clearly, fsQCA leads to a more comprehensive understanding of the factors under which the outcome occurs than does statistical analyses.

In summary, using simultaneously both statistical analyses and fsQCA is a prudent way to test assumptions under different lenses. They complement rather than invalidate each other. The combination of the two approaches can make research more systematic and transparent.

4.2.4. The statistical analysis and fsQCA procedures

a. Operationalization of concepts

Both statistical analyses and fsQCA ask for the operationalization of the basic concepts being part of the analytical framework that guides the empirical

work. As mentioned in 4.1.1, seven factors are coded in capital abbreviations, respectively LATI, LESA, FINA, UNION, INFO, DISP, PUBLIC, and the interested outcome is labeled COMPLIANCE.

In this study I will analyze some policies for Vietnamese female workers with a focus on labor law regulations, it is advisable on the background of my analytical framework to analyze these policies for the first three factors (LATI, LESA, and FINA). The features of these factors are detailed in *Table 5* as follows:

- As indicated by the highlighting texts, latitudes of interpretation can be identified in the policy on childcare support (P3) which implies some room to react flexibly to situated conditions. In contrast, the policy on periodical health check-ups (P1) and the policy on maternity leave (P2) have clear and specified objectives. In other words, the P1 and P2 have no latitude, while the P3 contains latitudes of interpretation that provide room for discretion.

- The respective legal norms also show that the employer will be put under the pressure of a fine if they fail to implement the policy of periodical health check-ups (P1) and the policy of maternity leave (P2), but so far there is no sanction for non-compliance with the policy of childcare support (P3).

- Regarding the availability of financial resources for policy implementation on the side of the external norm addressees, as ruled by law, the Vietnamese government allocates state funds to facilitate the norm addressees to comply with some of the policies such as the policy of periodical health check-ups (P1) and the policy of maternity leave (P2). To specify, the cost of implementing the P1 is accounted as deductible expenses upon the determination of taxable incomes and as recurrent business expenditures in administrative agencies and non-business units with no service activities. Also, the cost of implementing the P2 is covered by Vietnam's State Social Insurance Fund. In contrast, the state budget is not provided for furthering the implementation of the policy on childcare support (P3). So far, implementing the P3 depends on the discretion of using the internal budget of the norm addressees.

Table 5: Features of three policies for female employees in Vietnam

Legal norms of three policies for female employees in Vietnam	Latitudes of interpretation are given	The severity of legal sanctions	The availability of financial resources for policy implementation on the side of the norm addressee
<p>(P1) Policy of periodic health check-ups for female employees</p> <p>- “Each year, the employer <u>must</u> organize periodic health check-ups for the employee, including the trade apprentice, trainee; female employees must receive the gynecologic and obstetric care <u>at least once for every 6 months</u>” (Clause 2 of Article 152 of the Labour Code No. 10/2012/QH13).</p> <p>- “The employer shall be liable to <u>a fine of from 10.000.000 VND to 15.000.000 VND when failing to provide periodic check-ups for workers as prescribed</u>”(Clause 3 of Article 17 of the Decree No. 95/2013/ND-CP).</p>	No ²²	Yes ²³	Be accounted as deductible expenses upon the determination of taxable incomes and as recurrent expenditures business in administrative agencies and non-business units with no service activities.
<p>(P2) Policy of maternity leave</p> <p>- “The time the female employee is <u>entitled</u> to take leave before and after birth is <u>06 months</u>. In case the female employee gives birth of twin or more, from the 2nd child onwards, every child, the mother is entitled to 01 month leave additionally” (Article 157 of the Labour Code No. 10/2012/QH13).</p> <p>- “The employer shall be liable to <u>a fine of from 10.000.000 VND to 20.000.000 VND when failing to re-employ female workers to do the same jobs after the maternity leave</u>” (Clause 2 of Article 18 of the Decree No. 95/2013/ND-CP).</p>	No ²⁴	Yes ²⁵	Be covered by Vietnam’s State Social Insurance Fund ²⁶ .
<p>(P3) Policy of childcare support for female employees</p> <p>- “<u>Depending on specific conditions, the employer shall build up plans on assistance, establishment of kindergartens/nursery schools, or provision of subsidies on fees for kindergartens/nursery schools with cash or items. Level and time of provision of subsidies shall be agreed between the employer and the female employee.</u>”(Article 9 of the Decree No. 85/2015/ND-CP)</p>	Yes ²⁷	No	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - No legal regulations for using the state budget. - The financial capacity for policy implementation depends on the discretion of using the internal budget of the employers.

²²According to Clause 2 of Article 152 of the Labour Code No. 10/2012/QH13

²³According to Clause 3 of Article 17 of the Decree No. 95/2013/ND-CP

²⁴According to Article 157 of the Labour Code No. 10/2012/QH13

²⁵According to Clause 2 of Article 18 of the Decree No. 95/2013/ND-CP

²⁶According to Article 39 of the Law on Social Insurance No. 58/2014/QH13

²⁷According to Article 9 of the Decree No. 85/2015/ND-CP

Followed by *Table 5*, I have a summary of all factors and their operationalization. In order to operationalize these factors, I formulated a question for each factor and sorted the answers into different levels (as can be seen in *Table 6*). For conducting the interviews, my questionnaire was converted into the Vietnamese language. For the first two factors (LATI, LESA) the question was basically answered by the researcher by analyzing the respective legal provision. Moreover, the interviewees were asked about their perception of whether the legal provision was clearly written or not. For the other five factors (FINA, UNION, INFO, DISP, PUBLIC) the questions were totally answered by the interviewees basing on their own knowledge, experience, and evaluation. In case the employer and employee provided contradictory answers, I could raise some sub-questions and decide on the base of the answers which value to work with.

Regarding the dependent variable namely COMPLIANCE, the interested outcome is the extent to which an organization is complying with legal regulations. The operationalization of COMPLIANCE is detailed in *Table 7*. It should be noted that each policy has different regulations on compliance. The obligation of the employers is to base on such specified regulations to comply with the policies. To determine the degree of policy compliance, female workers have been asked about the scope of implementation of each selected policy in their organization. By then, it has been referred to the answers ‘Yes/No’ (compliance or non-compliance) and the specificity of the answers by sorting them into four different levels:

- Full in compliance: The employers comply strictly with regulations.
- More in than out compliance: The employers comply moderately.
- More out than in compliance: The employers almost do not comply.
- Full out compliance: The employers do not comply at all.

Table 6: Operationalization of the independent variables/ causal conditions

Concepts	Label	Operationalization		
		Question for collecting data ²⁸	Answer	
1. Latitudes of interpretation within the respective legal norms	LATI	Q1. Does the respective regulation contain latitudes of interpretation?	Yes	
			No	
2. The severity of legal sanctions within the respective legal norms	LESA	Q2. Is the threatened legal sanction severe?	Yes	
			No	
3. The availability of financial resources for policy implementation on the side of the norm addressees	FINA	Q3. To what extent are financial resources for policy implementation on the side of the norm addressees available?	Policy implementation is covered by the state health insurance fund or the state social insurance fund; <i>or</i> the internal budget of the employer is totally sufficient.	
			The internal budget of the employer is moderately sufficient.	
			The internal budget of the employer is insufficient.	
			The internal budget of the employer is totally insufficient.	
4. Interest groups supporting or obstructing effective compliance	UNION	Q4. Does the Trade Union fight for the respective legal rights of female employees?	Yes	
			No	
5. The information level of the policy targets about the policies	INFO	Q5. Are you informed about the respective legal provision, and if so, to what extent? (Example of a question to the employee.)	Yes	High
				Moderate
			No	Low
				No information given
6. The dispositions of the external norm addressees towards the policy at stake	DISP	Q6. Do you agree with the respective legal provision, and if so, to what extent? (Example of a question to the employer.)	Yes	Strong
				Moderate
			No	Little
				No supportive disposition
7. The characteristic of the external norm addressees as being in the public sector	PUBLIC	Q7. Is your organization/ company publicly owned? (Example of a question to the employer.)	Yes	
			No	

²⁸ During the interviews, these questions have been raised in the Vietnamese language.

Table 7: Operationalization of the dependent variable/ the outcome

Concept	Operationalization		
	Question for collecting data	Answer	
Degree of policy compliance	Policy 1: Periodic health check-ups for female employees Does the employer organize periodic health check-ups (including gynaecologic and obstetric care) for you, and if so, how often? (Example of a question to the employee.)	Yes	At least once every 6 months (=Full in compliance)
			Once a year (=More in than out compliance)
		No	Once every two years (=More out than in compliance)
			No check-ups for more than 2 years (=Full out compliance)
	Policy 2: Maternity leave Can or could female employees take maternity leave with full allowance, and if so, how long?	Yes	6 months or more (=Full in compliance)
			From 4 to less than 6 months (=More in than out compliance)
		No	From 3 to less than 4 months (=More out than in compliance)
			Less than 3 months (=Full out compliance)
	Policy 3: Childcare support for female employees Does the employer provide childcare services or support the partial cost of childcare for the female employees, and if so, to what extent?	Yes	High (=Full in compliance)
			Moderate (=More in than out compliance)
		No	Low (=More out than in compliance)
			No provision/support (=Full out compliance)

b. Measurement, data analysis, and interpretation of the results for making use of the statistical analysis approach

In this study, I will perform different statistical techniques. Depending on the data requirements of each statistical technique, I will proceed with the process of measurement in a suitable manner. As mentioned previously, the outcome of policy implementation is originally categorized into two groups: compliance (denoted with the value 1) and non-compliance (denoted with the value 0), which is suitable for performing the Pearson chi-square test. With respect to the independent variables such as INFO and DISP, in order to avoid the expected small frequencies problem, I will prioritize the answers “Yes/No” to transform in binary data. The purpose is to have a 2 x 2 contingency table for the chi-square test and be able to use Fisher’s exact test as an alternative to more robust data. The operationalization and measuring of COMPLIANCE are illustrated in *Table 8* and that of the independent variables in *Table 9*. The study gained a data matrix for using Pearson chi-square tests, as attached in *Table A.2 in the Appendix*.

Table 8: Operationalization and measuring of the dependent variable standing for COMPLIANCE for making use of the Pearson chi-square test

Operationalization		
Question regarding policy compliance	Answer	Transform in categorical data
Policy 1: Periodic health check-ups for female employees	Yes	1
	No	0
Policy 2: Maternity leave	Yes	1
	No	0
Policy 3: Childcare support for female employees	Yes	1
	No	0

Table 9: Operationalization and measuring of the independent variables for making use of the Pearson chi-square test

Label	Operationalization		
	Question	Answer	Transform in categorical data
LATI	Q1	Yes	1
		No	0
LESA	Q2	Yes	1
		No	0
FINA	Q3	Policy implementation is covered by the state health insurance fund or the state social insurance fund; <i>or</i> The internal budget of the employer is totally sufficient.	4
		The internal budget of the employer is moderately sufficient.	3
		The internal budget of the employer is insufficient.	2
		The internal budget of the employer is totally insufficient.	1
UNION	Q4	Yes	1
		No	0
INFO	Q5	Yes	1
		No	0
DISP	Q6	Yes	1
		No	0
PUBLIC	Q7	Yes	1
		No	0

On the ground of treating the dependent variable as interval data, I will perform a Pearson correlation analysis and MRA to evaluate the direction and strength of relationships among variables. To serve these statistical techniques, the operationalization and measuring of the variables are a little bit different. Here, I make use of the detailed responses to the degree of policy compliance measured on an ordinal scale. To specify, the operationalization of the dependent variable COMPLIANCE is presented in *Table 10*. The operationalization of the independent variables is provided in *Table 11*. The data matrix for making use of a Pearson correlation and MRA is attached in *Table A.3 in the Appendix*.

Table 10: Operationalization and measuring of the dependent variable standing for COMPLIANCE for making use of a Pearson correlation and MRA

Operationalization		
Question	Answer	Transform in interval data
Policy 1: Periodic health check-ups for female employees	Full in compliance	4
	More in than out compliance	3
	More out than in compliance	2
	Full out compliance	1
Policy 2: Maternity leave	Full in compliance	4
	More in than out compliance	3
	More out than in compliance	2
	Full out compliance	1
Policy 3: Childcare support for female employees	Full in compliance	4
	More in than out compliance	3
	More out than in compliance	2
	Full out compliance	1

Table 11: Operationalization of the independent variables for making use of a Pearson correlation and MRA

Label	Operationalization		
	Question	Answer	Transform in data
LATI	Q1	Yes	1
		No	0
LESA	Q2	Yes	1
		No	0
FINA	Q3	Policy implementation is covered by the state health insurance fund or the state social insurance fund; <i>or</i> The internal budget of the employer is totally sufficient.	4
		The internal budget of the employer is moderately sufficient.	3
		The internal budget of the employer is insufficient.	2
		The internal budget of the employer is totally insufficient.	1
UNION	Q4	Yes	1
		No	0
INFO	Q5	High	4
		Moderate	3
		Low	2
		No information given	1
DISP	Q6	Strong	4
		Moderate	3
		Little	2
		No supportive disposition	1
PUBLIC	Q7	Yes	1
		No	0

As can be seen from *Table 12*, my analytical model has three independent variables measured with four categories, i.e. FINA, INFO, and DISP, that cannot be directly entered into a multiple regression analysis; hence, I need to convert them into dummy variables.

Table 12: Converting independent variables with four categories into dummy variables

Label	Catagories	Transform in data
FINA3	The internal budget of the employer is moderately sufficient.	1
	Otherwise.	0
FINA2	The internal budget of the employer is insufficient.	1
	Otherwise.	0
FINA1	The internal budget of the employer is totally insufficient.	1
	Otherwise.	0
INFO3	The information level of the policy targets about the policies is moderate.	1
	Otherwise.	0
INFO2	The information level of the policy targets about the policies is low.	1
	Otherwise.	0
INFO1	No information given.	1
	Otherwise.	0
DISP3	The supportive dispositions of the external norm addressees towards the policy at stake is moderate.	1
	Otherwise.	0
DISP2	The supportive dispositions of the external norm addressees towards the policy at stake is little.	1
	Otherwise.	0
DISP1	No supportive disposition.	1
	Otherwise.	0

The number of dummy variables always depends on the number of categories of the original variable. For a variable having k categories, a researcher will have $k - 1$ dummy variables. As such, to represent the variables FINA, INFO, and DISP that have four categories, I need to create three dummy variables for each. The categorical variables are converted into dummy coding by assigning the values of 1 and 0 to levels of categorical variables. Hence, instead of the original four-category variables (FINA, INFO, and DISP), I can enter dummy variables in regression analysis (respectively FINA3, FINA2, FINA1, INFO3, INFO2, INFO1, DISP3, DISP2, DISP1).

Followed by the process of operationalization of items, the process of statistical analyses of this study will be outlined as follows:

Step 1: Descriptive statistics for preliminary analyses

Descriptive statistics are used to manage and synthesize data. (Noriss et al. 2012: 4). They are considered preliminary analyses that need to be performed prior to doing the statistical tests (Pallant 2016: 53).

Step 2: Statistical test of the association between categorical variables

Statistical analysis has many applications for analyzing categorical variables. The first option of this study is to test the association between categorical variables. Because the dependent variable is originally categorized into two groups ‘compliance’ and ‘non-compliance’, the two-way chi-square test (χ^2) will be employed (with the data matrix in *Table A.2 in the Appendix*). This statistic allows me to assess whether an association exists between two variables by comparing the observed frequencies to the expected frequencies. The null and alternative hypotheses for the two-way χ^2 test are:

H_0 : variable A and B are independent in the sample.

H_1 : variable A and B are related in the sample.

The computational procedures and interpretation of output from the χ^2 test can follow the manual using SPSS (Norris et al. 2012: 176-196). The output shows the observed and expected frequencies of cases and the difference (residual) between them for each cell. Also, the output displays the chi-square value²⁹, its degrees of freedom³⁰, and its significance level. To make a conclusion about the hypothesis with the 95% confidence interval, the p-value of the chi-square statistic (labeled *Asymp. Sig.*) should be less than 0.05. The small p-value (less than 0.05) implies that the null hypothesis should be rejected.

Noticeably, in case the chi-square test is invalid since any one of the expected frequency is less than 5, it may be possible to have alternatives. As suggested by Shavelson (1981: 516-547), for the variables with more than two levels leading to a complex contingency table (2 x 4, 3 x 4, or more), the alternative is to collapsing levels of a variable. Collapsing can be achieved by combining the categories of data together if this is appropriate. This way can boost the expected frequencies and have a 2 x 2 contingency table for using the χ^2 test. Even when the low expected frequencies are still in such a 2 x 2 or a 2 x 3 contingency table, Fisher's exact test can be used instead of the chi-square test because this test does not rely on the χ^2 distribution in the same way (Norris et al. 2012: 195). This is also a statistical measure of association based on a factorial formula (VanPool and Leonard 2011, Norris et al. 2012: 189). The result of Fisher's exact test can be found in the chi-square test table. The p-values for this test are displayed in the exact significance (exact Sig.) columns for one-tailed and two-tailed tests. If the two-tailed significance level is less than 0.05, then the null hypothesis is rejected.

²⁹ Chi-square involves calculating the overall disparity between the observed frequencies and the expected frequencies over all the cells in the table. The formula for the Pearson chi-square is defined as:

$$\chi^2 = \sum \frac{(\text{Observed} - \text{Expected})^2}{\text{Expected}}$$

³⁰ In the two-way χ^2 statistic, the degrees of freedom depend on the number of rows (r) and the number of columns (c) in the design. It is calculated under the formula: $df = (r-1)(c-1)$.

It also means that variables are not independent of each other and that there is a statistical relationship between them.

In general, the χ^2 test is based on the squared differences between the observed frequencies and the expected frequencies. Obviously, the greater the disparity is, the less likely is the null hypothesis to be true. Also, the bigger the value of chi-square is, and the more are the findings statistically significant (Norris et al. 2012: 179).

Step 3: Statistical techniques of the direction and strength of the relationships among variables

As mentioned earlier, the second option of this study is to rescale the categorical dependent variable into interval data to try doing parametric procedures. The two other statistical techniques that are used to explore relationships among variables are a Pearson correlation analysis and MRA (with data matrix in *Table A.3 in the Appendix*). In this study, if the results of the Pearson correlation analysis and MRA support the results of the Pearson chi-square test, they will facilitate me to give more information about the relationships between variables.

To specify, the Pearson correlation analysis can help to determine the direction and strength of the relationship among variables (Pallant 2016: 107). The procedure and interpretation of output for the Pearson correlation analysis follow the manual of Pallant (2016: 132 – 139). To determine whether the correlation between variables is significant, I will base on the p-value to the significance level (*Sig.* value). If the p-value is greater than the significance level at 0.05, then the correlation is not statistically significant. Conversely, if the p-value is less than or equal to the significance level at 0.05, then I can conclude the correlation is statistically significant. The size of the value of the correlation coefficient ranges (denoted by *r*) from -1 to 1 (Cohen 1988: 79-81). The closer the absolute value of the correlation coefficient approaches -1 or 1, the stronger is the relationship

between the variables. The sign of the correlation coefficient indicates the direction of the relationship. To specify, negative coefficients with the “-” (minus) sign indicate the negative correlation between two variables (when the value of one variable increases, the value of the other variable tends to decrease). In contrast, positive coefficients represent the positive correlation between two variables (when the values of both variables tend to increase or decrease together). From the output of the Pearson correlation analysis, I can identify which of the independent variables is correlated with the dependent variable and is likely to be retained in the model to account for the dependent variable.

The Pearson correlation analysis is connected to an MRA that allows exploring the impact level of a set of independent variables on a dependent variable and identifying the strongest explanatory variable (Pallant 2016: 108). Multiple regression analysis can also be used when independent variables are included as categorical variables. In my study, the categorical variables are converted into dummy coding by assigning the values of 1 and 0 to levels of categorical variables (as can be seen from *Table 11* and *Table 12*). The use and interpretation of regression analysis with dummy variables are referred from Hinkle and Oliver (1986: 17-32). As always, the output is represented in the model summary table, the ANOVA table, and the coefficients table. In the model summary table, the values of the multiple correlation coefficient (denoted by R), the coefficient of determination (R^2), adjusted R Square (adjusted R^2), and the standard error of the estimate can be used to determine how well a regression model fits the data and reflect how much of the change in the dependent variable is accounted for by the changes in the independent variables. The R-Square always lies between 0 and 1, with a higher number indicating more explanatory power by the independent variables. It means that the closer R-Square is to 1, the better is the model. Also, in the ANOVA table, the F-ratio and the p-value (*Sig.*) for the regression, on the whole, inform whether the overall regression model is a good fit for the data. Furthermore, in the coefficients table, the p-values and coefficients indicate which

relationships in the model are statistically significant and about the nature of those relationships. The phenomenon of multicollinearity can also be identified through the variance inflation factor (VIF) (Bryman and Cramer 2009: 309). In social science, VIF values above 10 indicate multicollinearity (Pallant 2016: 159). Normally, a good model should call for variables having VIFs less than 5. As such, based on the output obtained from the model summary table, the ANOVA table, and the coefficients table, it is possible to determine the overall fit of the model and the relative contribution of each independent variable in explaining the variance.

c. Calibration, data analysis, and interpretation of the results in the fsQCA approach

For a fsQCA analysis, it is necessary to calibrate the causal conditions and the outcome. This is defined as “the process of using empirical information on cases for assigning set membership to them” (Schneider and Wagemann 2012: 32). The principle of calibration asks the researchers to base the respective activity on theoretical knowledge and empirical evidence (Ragin 2000: 7; Schneider and Wagemann 2012: 41). It is very essential to make all concepts (regarding the conditions and the outcome of interest) become transparent, precise, and measurable. The fuzzy values are used to measure the degrees of membership of a case in a set (Schneider and Wagemann 2012: 28). In line with the standards of fsQCA, raw data need to be calibrated into fuzzy set membership values with gradations between 0 and 1 (cf. Ragin 2008: 30-31). The state of fuzzy set membership scores assigned by Ragin is an example (*Table 13*). The value of 0 indicates full non-membership in the set; scores close to 0 indicate weak but not totally non-membership; the value of 0.5 indicates the crossover point; scores higher than 0.5 but less than 1 indicate strong but not really full membership; the value of 1 indicates full membership in a set (Ragin 2009: 90-91).

Table 13: State of fuzzy set membership scores

<i>Crisp set</i>	<i>Three-value fuzzy set</i>	<i>Four-value fuzzy set</i>	<i>Six-value fuzzy set</i>	<i>“Continuous” fuzzy set</i>
1 = fully in 0 = fully out	1 = fully in 0.5 = neither fully in nor fully out 0 = fully out	1 = fully in 0.67 = more in than out 0.33 = fully out than in 0 = fully out	1 = fully in 0.9 = mostly in but not fully in 0.6 = more or less in 0.4 = more or less out 0.1 = mostly out but not fully out 0 = fully out	1 = fully in Degree of membership is more “in” than “out”: $0.5 < X_i < 1$ 0.5 = cross-over: neither in nor out Degree of membership is more “out” than “in”: $0 < X_i < 0.5$ 0 = fully out

Source: Ragin (2009: 91)

As mentioned before, the combination of both qualitative (cased-oriented) and quantitative (variable-oriented) techniques (Ragin 2008: 30) can convert qualitative data into quantitative values while maintaining original distances (Tierno et al. 2017: 17). Considering the available data resource, this study opts for a four-value fuzzy scale (0, 0.33, 0.67, 1) to express qualitative differences in the degree of membership for the set of causal conditions and the outcome where this is possible (cf. Ragin 2008: 30-31). In cases denoted by a smaller database the scale was reduced (0, 1). The calibration principles of the sets’ categories, that show the values of each condition, can be seen in *Table 14*.

Table 14: Operationalization and calibration of causal conditions in the fsQCA approach

Label	Operationalization		
	Question	Answer	Transform in fuzzy set
LATI	Q1	Yes	1
		No	0
LESA	Q2	Yes	1
		No	0
FINA	Q3	Policy implementation is covered by the state health insurance fund or the state social insurance fund; <i>or</i> the internal budget of the employer is totally sufficient.	1
		The internal budget of the employer is moderately sufficient.	0.67
		The internal budget of the employer is insufficient.	0.33
		The internal budget of the employer is totally insufficient.	0
UNION	Q4	Yes	1
		No	0
INFO	Q5	High	1
		Moderate	0.67
		Low	0.33
		No information given	0
DISP	Q6	Strong	1
		Moderate	0.67
		Little	0.33
		No support	0
PUBLIC	Q7	Yes	1
		No	0

Table 15: Operationalization and calibration of the outcome COMPLIANCE in the fsQCA approach

Operationalization		
Question	Answer	Transform in fuzzy set
Policy 1: Periodic health check-ups for female employees	At least once every 6 months	1
	Once a year	0.67
	Once every two years	0.33
	No check-ups for more than 2 years	0
Policy 2: Maternity leave	6 months or more	1
	From 4 to less than 6 months	0.67
	From 3 to less than 4 months	0.33
	Less than 3 months	0
Policy 3: Childcare support for female employees	Yes	1
	No	0

The outcome of interest is ‘COMPLIANCE’ and ‘NON-COMPLIANCE’. Based on empirical information collected from the cases, the study transferred raw data into fuzzy set membership. As can be seen from *Table 15*, the outcome of interest is assigned as follows: 1 (fully in compliance), 0.67 (more in than out compliance), 0.33 (more out than in compliance), and 0 (fully out compliance). Finally, the study gained a data matrix as attached in *Table A.4 in the Appendix*, which shows the degree of compliance with some selected policies for Vietnamese female workers and the possible causal conditions inducing this outcome. On the basis of assigned set membership, the study will analyze data making use of Boolean algebra.

As already stated above, the goal of fsQCA is to identify causal conditions that are necessary or/ and sufficient for the given outcome. Followed by the process of operationalization and calibration of the items, the process of analysis is performed step-by-step:

Step 1: Analysis of necessary conditions

The first step is the analysis of necessity to examine which single condition is always present (or absent) when the outcome is present (or absent).

Step 2: Analysis of sufficient conditions


Followed by the necessity analysis, the sufficiency analysis is performed to examine whether the outcome always occurs with what condition (or combination of conditions). Talking about the way of interpreting the results of a fsQCA, the value of the truth table must be emphasized. It is an indispensable tool to decide which configuration is sufficient to be included in the analysis, and whether it is a logical remainder or not. The existence of logical remainders leads to limited diversity as an unavoidable issue in the applications of QCA (Schneider and Wagemann 2012: 152-153) and they have to be resolved before the logical minimization process is started (Schneider and Wagemann 2012: 278-279). The option of an appropriate level of consistency and frequency for a sufficient configuration depends on the in-depth case knowledge, the quality of data, the link of theories and hypotheses (cf. Schneider and Wagemann 2012: 279). It is recommended that the analyses should choose the benchmark of 0.75 or choose another benchmark based on the clear gap in consistency thresholds (Schneider and Wagemann 2012: 292). Normally, the truth table is minimized with the Quine-McCluskey algorithm that uses the simplification rules of Boolean expressions. Using the software fsQCA 3.0 developed by Charles Ragin and Sean Davey (2017), the function “Standard Analysis” can automatically produce three solutions: the complex, the parsimonious and the intermediate solution. While the complex solution avoids using any counterfactual cases (remainders), the parsimonious solution permits the use of any remainder that will yield the simple recipes. In the discussion, the intermediate solutions are often recommended over the complex and the parsimonious solutions because the intermediate solution is the main point of reference for interpreting QCA results (Ragin 2008: 160-175).

The intermediate solution uses only the remainders that survive counterfactual analysis based on theoretical and substantive knowledge. As such, depending on different simplifying assumptions, each solution provides different configurational paths to the outcome (Ragin 2008: 144).

The analysis results must be taken into consideration, in terms of cases covered by the pathways and in terms of assumptions. In order to avoid any pitfalls in the analysis, necessary and sufficient conditions are always tested separately, in which the analysis of necessary conditions should be performed prior to the analysis of sufficient conditions (Ragin 2000: 106; Schneider and Wagemann 2012: 89-115). At the outset of an investigation, the analyses often look for single conditions passing the test of necessity and then include these conditions in the truth table algorithm. A single condition, that has high consistency in the necessity analysis but is absent in all the recipes in the solution (intermediate or complex), is not considered as a necessary condition. Certainly, if a single condition passes the test of necessity and only it produces the outcome, then it is confirmed as a necessary and sufficient condition. A condition is necessary but not sufficient if it has high consistency in the analysis of necessity and appears in all the recipes in the solution. A condition is sufficient but not necessary if it itself can contribute to the outcome, but at the same time, other combinations of conditions are also capable of producing the outcome. A condition is neither necessary nor sufficient if it only can produce the outcome in the combination with other conditions. It is useful to examine scatterplots (Venn diagrams or XY plots) of the outcome against the fuzzy set causal conditions (Schneider and Wagemann 2012: 280). This is a visual way to see the consistency, coverage, and number of cases covered in each solution formula, from that the analysis can point out which condition works best. Finally, the presentation of QCA results should link back to individual cases and theoretical knowledge (Schneider and Wagemann 2012). Linking between theory and evidence contributes to the interpretation of QCA results. *Figure 13* illustrates fsQCA as an approach and as an analytic technique. In respect of the procedures,

this study will apply the methodology of fsQCA to explore the alternative paths to compliance and non-compliance with some selected policies for female employees in Vietnam.

Figure 13: QCA as an approach and as an analytic technique



Source: Kane et al. (2014: <https://doi.org/10.1007/s13142-014-0251-6>, accessed August 18, 2020)

Chapter V: Statistical analyses of compliance with policies for female employees in Vietnam

5.1. Descriptive statistics for testing the compliance with policies for female employees in Vietnam

The aim of this part is to answer the first research question: “*What is the degree of compliance with some selected policies for female employees in Vietnam?*” Thus, the extent to which an organization is complying or noncomplying with policies is the interested outcome of this study. As stated earlier, the degree of compliance is operationalized by the gap between the goal of the policy and the actual outcome as the result of implementation.

Accordingly, I review the goals of three selected policies and compare them with the real status of implementing policies. Based on data collected from the answers of my respondents, firstly, I categorize the data into two groups: policy compliance (coded with 1) and non-compliance (coded with 0). *Table 16* gives descriptive statistics of the situation of compliance with the three selected policies. With a total of 84 cases, there are 31 cases (36.9%) of non-compliance, and 53 cases (63.1%) of compliance. Secondly, I make use of the ranked answers from the respondents to classify them according to the value assignment from 1 to 4. *Table 17* provides information that there are 30 cases (35.7%) full out compliance; 1 (1.2%) case more out than in compliance; 19 (22.6%) cases more in than out compliance; and 34 cases (40.5%) full in compliance. The descriptive statistics show that most of the cases denoted by non-compliance fall in the area of the implementation of the policy on childcare support. To answer the second research question: “*What makes external norm addressees comply?*”, it is necessary to perform statistical tests to investigate whether there are relationships among variables, how the directions of their relationships are, how strong the impact level of each predicting factor on policy compliance is, i.e. what is the best predictor.

Table 16: Descriptive statistics of the outcome of policy implementation with the data categorized into two groups: compliance and non-compliance

N	Valid	84
	Missing	0

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid 0	31	36.9	36.9	36.9
1	53	63.1	63.1	100
Total	84	100	100	

Table 17: Descriptive statistics of the outcome of policy implementation with the ordinal data

N	Valid	84
	Missing	0
Minimum		1
Maximum		4

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid 1	30	35.7	35.7	35.7
2	1	1.2	1.2	36.9
3	19	22.6	22.6	59.5
4	34	40.5	40.5	100
Total	84	100	100	

5.2. Pearson chi-square test (χ^2) to explore relationships between variables

With respect to the statistical approach, the submitted study uses the One-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test to examine if scores are likely to follow some distribution in some populations. As can be seen from *Table 18*, the values of *Sig. (2-tailed) < 0.05* informs that the scores for the groups of policy compliance and

the listed independent variables are not normally distributed (cf. Pallant 2016: 63). With an analysis using the nominal dependent variable, the sample size of 84 cases and data having a non-normal distribution, the Pearson chi-square test (χ^2) is used as an appropriate non-parametric test to explore relationships between variables (Bryman and Cramer 2009: 144; Foster 1998: 16 – 17; Pallant 2016: 152). The statistical analysis procedure of the Pearson chi-square test was introduced in chapter IV (see in 4.2.4). Thanks to the support of the SPSS.20 software, my Pearson chi-square tests are run and produced the following outputs.

Table 18: One-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test to examine the distribution of data

		LATI	LESA	FINA	UNION	INFO	DISP	PUBLIC	COMPLIANCE
N		84	84	84	84	84	84	84	84
Normal Parameters	Mean	0.33	0.67	3.76	0.57	2.45	3.43	0.50	0.63
	Std. Deviation	0.474	0.474	0.456	0.498	0.629	0.997	0.503	0.485
Most Extreme Differences	Absolute	0.426	0.426	0.473	0.377	0.312	0.419	0.340	0.407
	Positive	0.426	0.253	0.301	0.303	0.312	0.283	0.340	0.272
	Negative	-0.253	-0.426	-0.473	-0.377	-0.261	-0.419	-0.340	-0.407
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Z		3.901	3.901	4.335	3.453	2.857	3.840	3.115	3.734
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed)		0							

5.2.1. Pearson chi-square test for Assumption 1

Assumption 1 was given that “*There is a relationship between the provision of latitudes of interpretation within the respective legal norms and policy compliance*”. It can be formulated under the null and alternative hypotheses for the two-way chi-square test as follows:

H_0 : LATI and COMPLIANCE are independent in the sample.

H_1 : LATI and COMPLIANCE are related in the sample.

The sample sizes of LATI are 56 for the group ‘no latitudes’ (labeled as 1) and 28 for the group ‘given latitudes’ (labeled as 0). The output of the χ^2 test with the data of the independent variable LATI and the dependent variable

COMPLIANCE is displayed in *Table 19*. As can be seen from the LATI*COMPLIANCE crosstabulation, there is a significant difference between the observed and expected frequency of variables. It shows the preliminary direction that the group ‘no latitudes’ is more associated than the group ‘given latitudes’ with policy compliance (the standardized statistic is -6.993). Since $df = 1$, and the minimum expected count is 10.33, the test gives the chi-square value using Yates' correction for continuity. With χ^2_{observed} exceeds χ^2_{critical} ($49.49 > 46.173$) and the small significant level ($p < 0.05$), there is sufficient evidence to reject the null hypothesis of independence. Alternatively, there is an association between LATI and COMPLIANCE. Using the χ^2 meets the data requirements recommended by Shavelson (1981: 516-547). In conclusion, the results corroborate Assumption 1.

Table 19: The results of the Pearson chi-square test for Assumption 1

LATI*COMPLIANCE Crosstabulation

		COMPLIANCE		Total
		0	1	
LATI	0	6	50	56
	1	25	3	28
Total		31	53	84

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	p = Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	49.49^a	1	0
Continuity Correction ^b	46.173	1	0
Likelihood Ratio	53.415	1	0
Linear-by-Linear Association	48.901 ^c	1	0
N of Valid Cases	84		

a. 0 cells (0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 10.33

b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

c. The standardized statistic is -6.993

5.2.2. Pearson chi-square test for Assumption 2

Assumption 2 was given that “*There is a relationship between the severity of legal sanctions and policy compliance*”. It can be formulated under the null and alternative hypotheses for the two-way chi-square test as follows:

H_0 : LESA and COMPLIANCE are independent in the sample.

H_1 : LESA and COMPLIANCE are related in the sample.

Table 20: The results of the Pearson chi-square test for Assumption 2

LESA*COMPLIANCE Crosstabulation

		COMPLIANCE		Total
		0	1	
LESA	0	25	3	28
	1	6	50	56
Total		31	53	84

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	p = Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	49.49^a	1	0
Continuity Correction ^b	46.173	1	0
Likelihood Ratio	53.415	1	0
Linear-by-Linear Association	48.901 ^c	1	0
N of Valid Cases	84		

a. 0 cells (0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is **10.33**

b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

c. The standardized statistic is **6.993**

The sample sizes of LESA are 28 for the group ‘no legal sanctions’ (labeled as 0) and 56 for the group ‘given legal sanctions’ (labeled as 1). The output of the χ^2 test with the data of the independent variable LESA and the dependent variable COMPLIANCE is displayed in Table 20. The LESA*COMPLIANCE crosstabulation shows a significant difference between the observed and expected

frequency of variables. To specify, the group ‘given legal sanctions’ is more associated than the group ‘no legal sanctions’ with policy compliance. Similarly, with LATI, the chi-square test using Yates' correction for continuity gives the results: χ^2_{observed} exceeds χ^2_{critical} ($49.49 > 46.173$), $df = 1$, $p < 0.05$, and the minimum expected count = 10.33, the null hypothesis is rejected. Clearly, there is an association between LESA and COMPLIANCE, but the direction of LESA to COMPLIANCE is in contrast with that of LATI (the standardized statistic is 6.993). Using the χ^2 also meets the data requirements recommended by Shavelson (1981: 516-547). In conclusion, the results affirm Assumption 2.

5.2.3. Pearson chi-square test for Assumption 3

Assumption 3 was given that “*There is a relationship between the availability of financial resources for policy implementation on the side of the norm addressees and policy compliance*”. It can be formulated under the null and alternative hypotheses for the two-way chi-square test as follows:

H_0 : FINA and COMPLIANCE are independent in the sample.

H_1 : FINA and COMPLIANCE are related in the sample.

The availability of financial resources (FINA) was measured into four levels: totally insufficient (labeled as 1) – insufficient (labeled as 2) – moderately sufficient (labeled as 3) – totally sufficient (labeled as 4), but actual data were recorded with only three levels from 2 to 4. The output of the χ^2 test with the data of the independent variable FINA and the dependent variable COMPLIANCE is displayed in *Table 21*. The FINA*COMPLIANCE crosstabulation shows a difference between the observed and expected frequency of variables. Because of some expected counts less than 5 (in 2 cells), Fisher’s exact test should be used instead of the chi-square test to consider the relationship between two variables (Norris et al 2012: 195). The value of Fisher’s exact test statistic is 44.358, two-tailed Fisher exact $p < 0.05$. It appears that there is an association between FINA

and COMPLIANCE. However, with such a small sample size, Assumption 5 might best be regarded as marginally significant and a strong recommendation made that further studies should be carried out in order to establish with more certainty whether the availability of financial resources for policy implementation on the side of the norm addressees is associated with policy compliance.

Table 21: The results of the Pearson chi-square test for Assumption 3

FINA*COMPLIANCE Crosstabulation

		COMPLIANCE		Total
		0	1	
FINA	2	1	0	1
	3	18	0	18
	4	12	53	65
Total		31	53	84

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	p = Exact. Sig (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	41.979 ^a	2	0
Likelihood Ratio	48.437	2	0
Fisher's Exact Test	44.358		0
Linear-by-Linear Association	39.2 ^b	1	0
N of Valid Cases	84		

a. 2 cells (33.3%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 0.37

b. The standardized statistic is 6.261

5.2.4. Pearson chi-square test for Assumption 4

Assumption 4 was given that “*There is a relationship between the intervention of interest groups and policy compliance*”. It can be formulated under the null and alternative hypotheses for the two-way chi-square test as follows:

H_0 : UNION and COMPLIANCE are independent in the sample.

H_1 : UNION and COMPLIANCE are related in the sample.

Table 22: The results of the Pearson chi-square test for Assumption 4

UNION*COMPLIANCE Crosstabulation

		COMPLIANCE		Total
		0	1	
UNION	0	17	19	36
	1	14	34	48
Total		31	53	84

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	p = Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	2.88^a	1	0.09
Continuity Correction ^b	2.157	1	0.142
Likelihood Ratio	2.874	1	0.09
Linear-by-Linear Association	2.846 ^c	1	0.092
N of Valid Cases	84		

a. 0 cells (0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 13.29

b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

c. The standardized statistic is 1.687

The sample sizes of UNION are 36 for the group ‘trade unions not fighting for the rights and legal benefits of female workers’ (labeled as 0) and 48 for the group ‘trade unions fighting for the rights and legal benefits of female workers’ (labeled as 1). The output of the χ^2 test with the data of the independent variable UNION and the dependent variable COMPLIANCE is displayed in *Table 22*. In the relationship with policy compliance, the UNION*COMPLIANCE crosstabulation shows an insignificant difference between the observed and expected frequency of variables. Since $df = 1$, and the minimum expected count is 13.29, the test gives the chi-square value using Yates' correction for continuity. Although χ^2_{observed} exceeds χ^2_{critical} ($2.88 > 2.157$), the two-tailed significant level is 0.09. Normally this would not be considered significant (given an alpha level of 0.05). Therefore, in this instance, there is insufficient evidence to reject the null

hypothesis of independence. It implies that the intervention of interest groups as trade unions can hardly make the employers comply with policies. Using the χ^2 meets the data requirements recommended by Shavelson (1981: 516-547). In conclusion, the preliminary results contradict Assumption 4.

5.2.5. Pearson chi-square test for Assumption 5

Assumption 5 was given that “*There is a relationship between the information level of policy targets about policies and policy compliance*”. It can be formulated under the null and alternative hypotheses for the two-way chi-square test as follows:

H_0 : INFO and COMPLIANCE are independent in the sample.

H_1 : INFO and COMPLIANCE are related in the sample.

In this study, I asked the female employees the question “Are you informed about the respective legal provision, and if so, to what extent?” To avoid some low expected frequencies when using the χ^2 test, I make use of the answers Yes/No and categorize them into two groups: ‘having information’ (labeled as 1) and ‘no information’ (labeled as 1). Accordingly, the output of the χ^2 test with the data of the independent variable INFO and the dependent variable COMPLIANCE is displayed in *Table 23*. As can be seen from the INFO*COMPLIANCE crosstabulation, there is an insignificant difference between the observed and expected frequency of variables. Since $df = 1$, and the minimum expected count is 14.02, the test gives the chi-square value using Yates' correction for continuity. Although χ^2_{observed} exceeds χ^2_{critical} ($0.216 > 0.057$), the two-tailed significant level is 0.642. Normally this would not be considered significant (given an alpha level of 0.05). Hence, in this instance, the null hypothesis of independence is retained. It means that there is no association between the information level of policy targets about policies and policy compliance. Using the χ^2 meets the data

requirements recommended by Shavelson (1981: 516-547). In conclusion, the preliminary results negate Assumption 5.

Table 23: The results of the Pearson chi-square test for Assumption 5

INFO*COMPLIANCE Crosstabulation

		COMPLIANCE		Total
		0	1	
INFO	0	18	28	46
	1	13	25	38
Total		31	53	84

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	p = Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	0.216^a	1	0.642
Continuity Correction ^b	0.057	1	0.812
Likelihood Ratio	0.217	1	0.641
Linear-by-Linear Association	0.214 ^c	1	0.644
N of Valid Cases	84		

a. 0 cells (0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 14.02

b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

c. The standardized statistic is 0.462

5.2.6. Pearson chi-square test for Assumption 6

Assumption 6 was given that “*There is a relationship between the dispositions of the external norm addressees towards the policy at stake and policy compliance*”. It can be formulated under the null and alternative hypotheses for the two-way chi-square test as follows:

H_0 : DISP and COMPLIANCE are independent in the sample.

H_1 : DISP and COMPLIANCE are related in the sample.

With the question “Do you agree with the respective legal provision?” the dispositions of the external norm addressees towards the policy at stake (DISP) are

categorized into two groups: ‘support’ (labeled as 1) and ‘oppose’ (labeled as 0). The output of the χ^2 test with the data of the independent variable DISP and the dependent variable COMPLIANCE is displayed in *Table 24*.

Table 24: The results of the Pearson chi-square test for Assumption 6

DISP*COMPLIANCE Crosstabulation

		COMPLIANCE		Total
		0	1	
DISP	0	15	0	15
	1	16	53	69
Total		31	53	84

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	p = Exact. Sig (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	31.22^a	1	0
Continuity Correction ^b	28.009	1	
Likelihood Ratio	35.886	1	0
Fisher’s Exact Test			0
Linear-by-Linear Association	30.849 ^c	1	0
N of Valid Cases	84		

a. 0 cells (0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 5.54

b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

c. The standardized statistic is 5.554

The DISP*COMPLIANCE crosstabulation shows a significant difference between the observed and expected frequency of variables. Since $df = 1$, the test gives the chi-square value using Yates' correction for continuity. Here, the minimum expected count is still less than 10, Fisher’s exact test should be taken into account. As a result, the χ^2 test informs that χ^2_{observed} exceeds χ^2_{critical} ($31.22 > 28.009$), and the two-tailed Fisher exact level is statistically significant ($p < 0.05$). As such, the null hypothesis is not accepted. It means that the supportive dispositions of the external norm addressees are associated with policy

compliance. Using the χ^2 is done in line with data requirements and alternatives recommended by Shavelson (1981: 516-547). In conclusion, the results support Assumption 6.

5.2.7. Pearson chi-square test for Assumption 7

Assumption 7 was given that “*There is a relationship between the characteristic of the external norm addressees as being in public ownership and policy compliance*”. It can be formulated under the null and alternative hypotheses for the two-way chi-square test as follows:

H_0 : PUBLIC and COMPLIANCE are independent in the sample.

H_1 : PUBLIC and COMPLIANCE are related in the sample.

Table 25: The results of the Pearson chi-square test for Assumption 7

PUBLIC*COMPLIANCE Crosstabulation

		COMPLIANCE		Total
		0	1	
PUBLIC	0	19	23	42
	1	12	30	42
Total		31	53	84

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	p = Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	2.505^a	1	0.113
Continuity Correction ^b	1.841	1	0.175
Likelihood Ratio	2.522	1	0.112
Linear-by-Linear Association	2.475 ^c	1	0.116
N of Valid Cases	84		

a. 0 cells (0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 15.5

b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

c. The standardized statistic is 1.573

In this study, the characteristic of the external norm addressees is categorized into public and private ownership. The sample sizes are 42 for the 'private' group (labeled as 0) and 42 for the 'public' group (labeled as 1). The output of the χ^2 test with the data of the independent variable PUBLIC and the dependent variable COMPLIANCE is displayed in *Table 25*. The PUBLIC*COMPLIANCE crosstabulation shows an insignificant difference between the observed and expected frequency of variables. Since $df = 1$, and the minimum expected count = 15.5, Yates' correction for continuity is used to make the test more 'conservative'. Although χ^2_{observed} exceeds χ^2_{critical} ($2.505 > 1.841$), the two-tailed significant level is 0.113. Normally this would not be considered significant (given an alpha level of 0.05). Thus, there is insufficient evidence to reject the null hypothesis of independence. It means the characteristic of the external norm addressees as being in public or private ownership is not related to policy compliance. Using the χ^2 meets the data requirements recommended by Shavelson (1981: 516-547). In conclusion, the results negate Assumption 7.

5.3. Pearson correlation analysis and multiple regression analysis (MRA) for identifying the direction and strength of relationships among variables

As mentioned previously, on the ground of rescaling the categorical data back into interval data as originally collected, I will perform parametric procedures. To specify, the Pearson correlation analysis can help to determine the direction and strength of the relationship among variables (Pallant 2016: 107). Followed by the Pearson correlation analysis, all independent variables will be entered into the equation at the same time to be tested by performing an MRA. From the results of this MRA, I can explore the impact level of a set of independent variables on the dependent variable and identify those variables with the highest explanatory power (Pallant 2016: 108).

5.3.1. Pearson correlation analysis

In the Pearson correlation analysis, I will base the p-value on the significance level (*Sig.*) to determine whether the correlation between variables is significant. At the same time, the size of the value of the correlation coefficient which ranges from -1 to 1 (Cohen 1988: 79-81, Ratner 2009: 139-140) is used to identify the direction and strength of the relationships between variables. *Table 26* shows the results as follows:

Table 26: The Pearson correlation among variables

		COMPLIANCE
COMPLIANCE	Pearson Correlation	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	
LATI	Pearson Correlation	-0.727
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0
LESA	Pearson Correlation	0.727
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0
FINA	Pearson Correlation	0.668
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0
UNION	Pearson Correlation	0.135
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.219
INFO	Pearson Correlation	0.018
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.874
DISP	Pearson Correlation	0.496
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0
PUBLIC	Pearson Correlation	0.135
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.22

LATI ($r = -0.727$ and $Sig. < 0.05$): LATI has a strong negative correlation with the dependent variable. It means that the degree of policy compliance tends to increase when latitudes of interpretation are not given.

LESA ($r = 0.727$ and $Sig. < 0.05$): LESA has a strong positive correlation with the dependent variable. It implies that the degree of policy compliance tends to increase when legal sanctions are given.

FINA ($r = 0.668$ and $Sig. < 0.05$): FINA has a moderate positive correlation with the dependent variable. It appears that the better the financial capacity is, the better is the degree of policy compliance.

UNION ($r = 0.135$ and $Sig. = 0.219$): With the p-value being greater than the significance level of 0.05 the correlation between UNION and COMPLIANCE is not statistically significant.

INFO ($r = 0.018$ and $Sig. = 0.874$): With the p-value being greater than the significance level of 0.05 the correlation between INFO and COMPLIANCE is not statistically significant.

DISP ($r = 0.496$ and $Sig. < 0.05$): DISP has a moderate positive correlation with the dependent variable. It means that the higher the supportive disposition of the norm addressee is, the better is the degree of policy compliance.

PUBLIC ($r = 0.135$ and $Sig. = 0.22$): With the p-value being greater than the significance level of 0.05 the correlation between PUBLIC and COMPLIANCE is not statistically significant.

To recap, the results of the Pearson correlation analysis show that the absence of latitudes of interpretation and the presence of legal sanctions tend to foster policy compliance. The same holds true with the availability of financial resources and the supportive dispositions of the norm addressees. Nevertheless, the degree of policy compliance has no significant correlations with the

intervention of interest groups such as trade unions, the information level of policy targets, and the ownership characteristic of the norm addressees. As such, only four variables (respectively LATI, LESA, FINA, and DISP) are significantly correlated with the dependent variable. To extend the understanding of the relationships among the variables in the model, I will perform an MRA.

5.3.2. Multiple regression analysis (MRA)

Based on assumptions about variables that are likely to affect policy compliance, I opted for doing a simultaneous multiple regression analysis³¹ to determine the net effect of each variable on policy compliance and will proceed to construct a fit model.

By the standard method of entry, all independent variables are entered into the equation at the same time. In this analysis, I consider seven independent variables: LATI, LESA, FINA, UNION, INFO, DISP, PUBLIC, and a dependent variable COMPLIANCE. Regarding the four-category-variables which cannot be directly entered in regression analysis, I converted FINA, INFO, and DISP into dummy variables³² (as can be seen from *Table 12*). Once a categorical variable is converted into dummy variables, the dummy variables can be used in regression analysis as quantitative variables.

It is notable that LATI ($r = -0.727$ and $Sig. < 0.05$) and LESA ($r = 0.727$ and $Sig. < 0.05$) have the same strong correlations with the dependent variable (COMPLIANCE) (*Table 27*). This points to a perfect negative linear relationship between them. The coefficient of the correlation between them of exactly -1

³¹ Regression analysis is conducted with the help of the SPSS. 20 software.

³² In this study, the four-category-variable FINA is converted into the dummy variables, namely FINA1, FINA2, FINA3. The four-category-variable INFO is converted into the dummy variables, namely INFO1, INFO2, INFO3. The four-category-variable DISP is converted into the dummy variables, namely DISP1, DISP2, DISP3.

indicates that they have opposite directions in their relationships with the dependent variable (cf. Ratner 2009: 140). As a consequence of multicollinearity, one of these two variables will be automatically removed from the overall model. To examine the specific effect of LATI and LESA, firstly, I perform an MRA with all available independent variables in which LATI is included without LESA (*Model 1 of Table 28*). Besides, I conduct another MRA with all available independent variables in which LESA is included without LATI (*Model 2 of Table 28*).

Table 27: Pearson correlation results between LATI and LESA

		COMPLIANCE	LATI	LESA
COMPLIANCE	Pearson Correlation	1	-0.727	0.727
	Sig. (2-tailed)		0	0
LATI	Pearson Correlation	-0.727	1	-1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0		0
LESA	Pearson Correlation	0.727	-1	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0	0	

As can be seen from the results of both regression analyses (*Model 1 and Model 2 of Table 28*), the summary of each model gives some overall fit statistics by providing the values of R, R^2 , adjusted R^2 , and the standard error of the estimate. The value of R represents the multiple correlation coefficients between the observed and the predicted values of the dependent variable. As the standard regression analysis shows, the model's degree of predicting the dependent variable is found to be $R = 0.863$. The value of R^2 indicates the proportion of variance in the dependent variable that can be explained by the predictors. In this case, the index $R^2 = 0.744 > 0.5$ means that there is a 74.4% variation in policy compliance which is explained, in general, by correlated independent variables. The value of

adjusted $R^2 = 0.705$ whereas the standard error of the estimate is 0.721 . The Durbin-Watson $d = 1.357$ which is between the two critical values of $1 < d < 3$ indicates that there is no auto-correlation in the multiple regression data. Looking at these coefficients, it can be said that the overall model predicts the dependent variable well. Also, the ANOVA shows the F-ratio³³ and the p-value ($F = 19.072$ and $Sig. < 0.05$), which affirms that the model is statistically significant in predicting the dependent variable. In other words, each model is a good fit for the collected data and useful.

Furthermore, based on the Beta value and the p-value shown in the coefficients (*Table 28*), I can determine which of the predictors have significantly contributed to the 74.4% of explained variance in the dependent variable. With $Sig. \leq 0.01$, each model has only four predictors (either LATI or LESA, FINA3, DISP1, DISP2) are determined to have a significant impact on the dependent variable, while other predictors are not correlated with the dependent variable³⁴.

It is also observed in *Model 1 and Model 2 of Table 29* that the predictors LATI, LESA, FINA3, DISP1, and DISP2 have $VIF \leq 2.657$, thereby confirming that the phenomenon of multicollinearity has no significant influence in the regression model. In detail, the value of standardized beta in *Table 29* is used to identify which of the predictors has, in comparison, the strongest effect on the dependent variable, while the value of unstandardized beta in *Table 28* depicts the magnitude and direction of the effects.

³³ The F-ratio measures the probability of chance departure from a straight line, which is used to test whether or not R2 could have occurred by chance alone.

³⁴ Through the Pearson correlation analysis, it can also be seen that the variables FINA2, UNION, INFO1, INFO2, INFO3, DISP3, and PUBLIC are not correlated with the dependent variable because their p-values are greater than the significance level at 0.05.

		FINA2	UNION	INFO1	INFO2	INFO3	DISP3	PUBLIC
COMPLIANCE	Pearson r	-0.140	0.135	-0.002	-0.021	0.023	0.201	0.135
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.205	0.219	0.987	0.848	0.836	0.067	0.220

Table 28: Regression analysis results regarding independent variables

Dependent variable: COMPLIANCE	Model 1	Model 2
LATI	-0.995* (0.272)	---
LESA	---	0.995* (0.272)
FINA2	0.000 (0.806)	0.000 (0.806)
FINA3	-1.115* (0.310)	-1.115* (0.310)
UNION	0.110 (0.221)	0.110 (0.221)
INFO1	-0.015 (0.603)	-0.015 (0.603)
INFO2	-0.389 (0.541)	-0.389 (0.541)
INFO3	-0.598 (0.515)	-0.598 (0.515)
DISP1	-1.618* (0.338)	-1.618* (0.338)
DISP2	-1.572* (0.342)	-1.572* (0.342)
DISP3	-0.091 (0.315)	-0.091 (0.315)
PUBLIC	-0.142 (0.200)	-0.142 (0.200)
Constant	4.003* (0.618)	3.008* (0.681)
R ²	0.744	0.744
N (number of cases)	84	84

Model 1 includes all independent variables without LESA for policy compliance. Model 2 includes all independent variables without LATI for policy compliance.

Each model is reported with $R = 0.863$, Adjusted $R^2 = 0.705$, Std. Error of the Estimate = 0.721, Durbin-Watson = 1.357, $F = 19.072$ and Sig. = 0 ($p < 0.05$)

Unstandardized Coefficients of each model are reported with standard errors in parentheses.

** $p \leq 0.01$*

Table 29: The values of the standardized beta of regression analysis

Dependent variable:	Model 1	Model 2
COMPLIANCE		
LATI	-0.356	---
LESA	---	0.356
FINA2	0.000	0.000
FINA3	-0.347	-0.347
UNION	0.041	0.041
INFO1	-0.002	-0.002
INFO2	-0.147	-0.147
INFO3	-0.224	-0.224
DISP1	-0.360	-0.360
DISP2	-0.329	-0.329
DISP3	-0.002	-0.002
PUBLIC	-0.054	-0.054
R ²	0.744	0.744
N (number of cases)	84	84

Standardized Coefficients in bold have $p \leq 0.01$ and VIF ≤ 2.657

On review of the values of the standardized beta, I can determine regression equations to identify the extent of the influence of each factor on policy compliance. To specify, for performing the standard regression analysis with all available independent variables in which LATI is included without LESA (*Model 1 of Table 29*), the overall model depicts the effects of the different independent variables as follows:

$$\text{COMPLIANCE} = -0.356*\text{LATI} - 0.347*\text{FINA3} - 0.360*\text{DISP1} - 0.329*\text{DISP2}$$

Equally, for performing the standard regression analysis with all available independent variables in which LESA is included without LATI (*Model 2 of Table 29*), the overall model depicts the effects of the different independent variables as follows:

$$\text{COMPLIANCE} = 0.356*\text{LESA} - 0.347*\text{FINA3} - 0.360*\text{DISP1} - 0.329*\text{DISP2}$$

From the regression equations obtained, I find that only four main factors are predicted as the most potential explanatory factors for policy compliance, regarding LATI, LESA, FINA, and DISP. On examining the contributions made by such factors, it is found that DISP1 (*standardized B* = -0.360) has the strongest net impact on policy compliance, which is closely followed by other factors such as LATI, LESA, FINA3, DISP2. As can be seen from *Table 28*, the magnitude and direction of the effects are identified as follows:

With the value of *unstandardized B* = -0.995 and *Sig.* < 0.05, LATI has a negative relationship with the dependent variable. It means that the degree of policy compliance tends to increase when latitudes of interpretation are not given. This result corroborates Assumption 1.

Conversely, with the value of *unstandardized B* = 0.995 and *Sig.* < 0.05, LESA has a positive relationship with the dependent variable. It means that the degree of policy compliance tends to increase when legal sanctions are given. This result affirms Assumption 2.

On behalf of the reference group of the financial ability of the norm addressees, the dummy variable FINA3 has *Sig.* < 0.05, illustrating that the financial ability of the norm addressees has a relationship with the dependent variable. Although FINA has a positive correlation (as shown earlier in the Pearson correlation analysis), the MRA output informs that the dummy variable FINA3 has a negative relationship with the outcome (*unstandardized B* = -1.115). It means that the moderately sufficient level of financial resources is less consistent with policy compliance than the totally sufficient level. In this study, the dummy variables FINA1 and FINA2 do not correlate with the dependent variable. That is likely to lead to a biased result. Hence, Assumption3 should be considered by doing further research.

Also, both DISP1 and DISP2 have *Sig.* < 0.05, implying that the supportive disposition of the norm addressee has a relationship with the dependent variable.

The values of unstandardized B of DISP1 (-1.618) and DISP2 (-1.572) indicate negative relationships. It means that a little supportive disposition or no supportive disposition of the norm addressees is less consistent with policy compliance than the high supportive disposition. As such, the higher the supportive disposition is, the better is the degree of policy compliance. This result supports Assumption 6.

5.4. Conclusion with respect to tested assumptions (from Assumption 1 to Assumption 7)

In sum, the results of the Pearson chi-square analysis, Pearson correlation analysis, and MRA are corroborative together. Apart from Assumption 3 that needs more research, so far Assumption 1, 2, 6 are confirmed, whereas Assumption 4, 5, 7 are unconfirmed. The conclusions that are spelled out below contribute to answering the second research question: What makes external norm addressees comply?

- There is a relationship between the provision of latitudes of interpretation within the respective legal norms and policy compliance. If the provision of latitudes of interpretation is not given, the degree of policy compliance will be better. → Assumption 1 is confirmed.
- There is a relationship between the severity of legal sanctions and policy compliance. If the severity of legal sanctions is given, the degree of policy compliance will be better. → Assumption 2 is confirmed.
- The availability of financial resources for implementation on the side of the norm addressees is likely to be associated with policy compliance. The more available financial resources are, the better is the degree of policy compliance. → Assumption 3 should have further studies.
- There is *no* relationship between the intervention of unions and policy compliance. → Assumption 4 is rejected.

- There is *no* relationship between the information level of policy targets about policies and policy compliance. → Assumption 5 is rejected.
- There is a relationship between the dispositions of the external norm addressees towards the policy at stake and policy compliance. The more positive the disposition of the external norm addressee is, the better is the degree of policy compliance. → Assumption 6 is confirmed.
- There is *no* relationship between the ownership characteristic of the norm addressees and policy compliance. → Assumption 7 is rejected.

Chapter VI: A fsQCA analysis of compliance and non-compliance with policies for female employees in Vietnam³⁵

To have a comprehensive understanding of the problem of interest, first of all, the following analysis calls for six possible causal conditions³⁶ for policy compliance and non-compliance in Vietnam generally (not distinguishing the public sector and the private sector), as listed in *Figure 10*. With asymmetrical relationships, the configurations leading to the presence of the outcome might be different from those leading to the absence of the outcome. Accordingly, they need to be analyzed separately. Each analysis requires a consideration of necessary and sufficient conditions (Ragin 2000:106; Schneider and Wagemann 2012: 89-115). For testing the next assumptions (from Assumption 8 to Assumption 19), this study has the following models:

$$\text{COMPLIANCE} = f(\text{LATI}, \text{LESA}, \text{FINA}, \text{UNION}, \text{INFO}, \text{DISP})$$

$$\sim\text{COMPLIANCE} = f(\text{LATI}, \text{LESA}, \text{FINA}, \text{UNION}, \text{INFO}, \text{DISP})$$

By using the methodology of fsQCA, this study performs the analyses of necessary and sufficient conditions for the outcome of interest to test theories and assumptions (Ragin 2000: 106; Schneider and Wagemann 2012: 89). This part is to make clear *What are the necessary factors, and what are the sufficient (conjunctions of) factors for policy compliance and non-compliance?* Obviously, the causal complexity of the social phenomenon is described by three characteristics: equifinal relationship, conjunctural causation, and causal asymmetrical causation; all of them are denoted by the notions of necessity and sufficiency (Schneider and Wagemann 2012: 78). Particularly, the appearance of

³⁵ Chapter VI is a to some extent modified version of parts of the paper that has been done by colleagues and myself (Dose et al. 2018: 12-17).

³⁶ The seventh condition (PUBLIC) will be added to the model to perform analyses in chapter VII.

a sufficient but unnecessary (SUIN) condition implies an equifinal relationship, since various (combinations of) conditions can lead to the same outcome. Likewise, the appearance of an insufficient but necessary (INUS) condition implies conjunctural causation, which means that this condition must be combined with other conditions to bring about the outcome. Moreover, asymmetrical causation implies that the presence or absence of conditions can create different outcomes, and the explanation of the positive outcome does not help much in explaining the negative outcome (Schneider and Wagemann 2012: 81). Analyzing asymmetrical causation is a way to understand both sides of an issue. Thus, the outcome and the negation of the outcome should be analyzed separately (Schneider and Wagemann 2010: 26). All these characteristics are demonstrated by the empirical evidence below. To specify, the asymmetrical causation is showed in the analysis of sufficient conditions for compliance and non-compliance with some selected policies for Vietnamese female employees, in which the conjunctural causation happens with the case of compliance, and the equifinal relationship comes to the case of non-compliance. The plausibility of the analysis results is made clear by linking them back to the cases (cf. Wagemann and Schneider 2010: 16). Before this can be done, firstly, an analysis of necessity has to be carried out; next comes an analysis of sufficiency.

6.1. Analysis of necessity

This part illustrates an analysis of necessary conditions in order to find out how different single conditions contribute to the outcome (COMPLIANCE) and the negation of the outcome (~COMPLIANCE). A necessary condition is seen as a superset of the outcome when it has the consistency benchmark higher than 0.9 and simultaneously the coverage above 0.5 (Ragin 2000: 132-133; Schneider and Wagemann 2012: 278; Legewie 2013:11). According to the minimum recommended thresholds, the analysis explores some conditions deemed to be necessary for the outcome. In reference to the positive outcome (COMPLIANCE),

the left side of *Table 30* indicates that there are only four conditions exceeding the recommended consistency benchmark, consisting of \sim LATI (not containing latitudes of interpretation within the respective legal norms), LESA (legal sanctions are given), FINA (availability of sufficient financial resources) and DISP (positive dispositions of the norm addressees). With the consistency range from 0.93 to 0.95 and the coverage scores at least 0.66, \sim LATI and LESA and DISP are seen as quasi-necessary conditions (cf. Schneider/Wagemann 2012: 123). This implies that these three conditions appear in almost all cases of compliance. In other words, the absence of latitudes of interpretation in combination with given legal sanctions and the positive dispositions of the norm addressees are strong enablers for policy compliance.

Table 30: Analysis of necessary conditions for Compliance and Non-compliance³⁷

Conditions tested	COMPLIANCE		\sim COMPLIANCE	
	Consistency	Coverage	Consistency	Coverage
LATI	0.063748	0.107143	0.676773	0.892857
\simLATI	0.936252	0.786786	0.323227	0.213214
LESA	0.936252	0.786786	0.323227	0.213214
\sim LESA	0.063748	0.107143	0.676773	0.892857
FINA	1.000000	0.608089	0.821061	0.391911
\sim FINA	0.000000	0.000000	0.178939	1.000000
UNION	0.624309	0.612083	0.504061	0.387917
\sim UNION	0.375691	0.491111	0.495939	0.508889
INFO	0.552274	0.639518	0.557390	0.506644
\sim INFO	0.573948	0.622925	0.603411	0.514068
DISP	0.957926	0.662844	0.656470	0.356565
\sim DISP	0.070123	0.206379	0.379264	0.876173

Note: \sim indicates the absence of a condition or of an outcome

³⁷ The right side of *Table 30* provides indexes regarding the absence of the outcome. However, with the consistency scores within a range of less or equal 0.82, none of the single conditions really accounts for non-compliance.

Figure 14: XY Plot of the condition ~LATI and the outcome COMPLIANCE





Figure 15: XY Plot of the condition LESA and the outcome COMPLIANCE



Notes: C1, C2... indicates the label of organizations; P1 indicates the policy of periodic health check-ups for female employees; P2 indicates the policy of maternity leave; P3 indicates the policy of childcare support for female employees.

Figure 16: XY Plot of the condition DISP and the outcome COMPLIANCE





Figure 17: XY Plot of the condition FINA and the outcome COMPLIANCE



Notes: C1, C2... indicates the label of organizations; P1 indicates the policy of periodic health check-ups for female employees; P2 indicates the policy of maternity leave; P3 indicates the policy of childcare support for female employees.

XY plots also denote the relevance of the conditions LATI, LESA, and DISP for the outcome compliance (*Figure 14, 15, and 16*). The preliminary results give some credence to Assumption 8, Assumption 9, and Assumption 13. In connection with empirical evidence, almost all cases characterized by these conditions are organizations complying with the policy of periodic health check-ups (P1) and the policy of maternity leave for female employees (P2). Only in a few cases, the external norm addressees comply with the policy of childcare support (P3) regardless of \sim LATI and LESA (i.e. P3C10, P3C11, and P3C18).

At first sight, FINA looks like a necessary condition because of its consistency at 1; this implies that whenever the financial resource for policy implementation is available, the outcome compliance is always achieved. However, because of having also a high consistency with the outcome non-compliance (*Table 30*), the condition FINA partly indicates its trivialness (cf. Schneider and Wagemann 2012: 146-148). Indeed, the XY plot of the condition FINA shows that almost all the cases are clustering at the right vertical axis (*Figure 17*). It means that FINA is always present almost irrespective of the outcome compliance. This indicates the possible irrelevance of FINA for policy compliance. Nevertheless, it is also impossible to confirm that FINA has no impact on the outcome because the implementation success of some of the policies seems to rely on the financial support of the government. So far Assumption 10 has not been affirmed. So as to have a comprehensive understanding of FINA, more analyses need to be done with cases in which the condition is absent.

While taking account of the role of the trade unions (UNION, \sim UNION) and the level of information about the respective policy on the side of the female employees (INFO, \sim INFO) for the outcome COMPLIANCE, obviously, their consistency scores did not pass the recommended benchmarks of 0.9 (cf. Ragin 2000: 132-133; Schneider and Wagemann 2012: 278; Legewie 2013:11). Accordingly, the level of the fight of the trade union for the legal rights and benefits of the female workers, and the level of information about the respective

policy on the side of the female workers are not necessary conditions for policy compliance. These preliminary results are *not* in favor of Assumption 11, and Assumption 12. The fact has also shown that in many cases³⁸ in spite of lacking the fight of the trade unions and a limited information level of the female workers, the employers still comply with the policies because they have strongly supportive dispositions and sufficient financial capacity for policy implementation.

6.2. Analysis of sufficiency

Along with the analysis of necessary conditions, the study conducts the analysis of sufficient conditions for compliance and non-compliance with three selected policies being part of the female labor code.

6.2.1. Analysis of sufficient conditions for policy compliance

The analysis is started with the construction of a truth table. With the six conditions included in the analytical framework, the truth table yields 64 (2^6) configurations of which there are 49 configurations without empirical cases. These “logical remainders” lead to limited diversity and thus need to be excluded from the minimization procedure (Ragin and Sonnett 2005: 180-184; Schneider and Wagemann 2012: 152-153). Accordingly, the analysis remains 15 configurations assigned with 84 empirical cases (*Table 31*). Based on the empirical gap among the raw consistency values, the analysis opts for the consistency cut-off at 0.916981 to impose configurations deemed to be sufficient for compliance. With the frequency cut-off at 1, the analysis has 4 configurations consistent with compliance while the other 11 configurations are inconsistent. The truth table is minimized by the truth table algorithm (Quine-McCluskey) and with the help of the software fsQCA 3.0 (Ragin and Davey 2017).

³⁸ The respective cases are P1C8, P1C9, P1C10, P1C17, P1C25, P2C8, P2C9, P2C10, P2C16, P2C17, P2C20, P2C22, P2C24, P2C25, P2C26, P3C10.

Table 31: Truth table for the outcome COMPLIANCE

LATI	LESA	FINA	UNION	INFO	DISP	number	COMPLIANCE	raw consist.	PRI consist.	SYM consist
0	1	1	1	1	1	22	1	1	1	1
0	1	1	1	0	1	10	1	1	1	1
0	1	1	0	0	1	15	1	0.945137	0.934328	0.934328
0	1	1	0	1	1	3	1	0.916981	0.889447	0.889447
0	1	1	0	1	0	1	0	0.398792	0.332215	0.332215
0	1	1	0	0	0	5	0	0.282655	0.228111	0.228111
1	0	1	1	0	1	5	0	0.201504	0.201504	0.201504
1	0	1	0	0	1	4	0	0.1675	0.1675	0.1675
1	0	1	0	1	1	1	0	0.110738	0.110738	0.110738
1	0	1	1	1	1	9	0	0.0859375	0.0859375	0.0859375
1	0	1	0	0	0	5	0	0	0	0
1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0
1	0	1	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0
1	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0
1	0	1	1	1	0	1	0	0	0	0

Based on the theoretical knowledge and the preliminary results of the analysis of necessity; this analysis set up the directional expectations about the impact of six conditions on policy compliance as follows: the absence of latitudes of interpretation (\sim LATI), along with the presence of legal sanctions (LESA), the availability of financial resources (FINA), the strength of the trade unions (UNION), the high information level of the employees about the policy (INFO), and the supportive disposition of the employers towards the policy (DISP) may contribute to policy compliance.

The function “Standard Analysis” automatically produces three solutions: the complex solution (*Table A.5 in the Appendix*), parsimonious solution (*Table A.6 in the Appendix*), and intermediate solution (*Table 32*). Depending on different


simplifying assumptions³⁹, each solution produces various pathways to the outcome (Ragin 2008: 144; Ragin 2017: 56). Towards the intermediate solution, *Table 32* presents the findings for compliance. The configuration \sim LATI*LESA*FINA*DISP has a relatively high consistency score of 0.87 and a remarkable solution coverage of 0.89, meaning that this multi-causal pathway alone accounts for much of the outcome COMPLIANCE. It is characterized by the absence of latitudes of interpretation in conjunction with the presence of legal sanctions and the availability of financial resources and positive dispositions of the employers toward the policies. The combination of four conditions is considered as a necessary and sufficient configuration for policy compliance. Significantly, this finding does not apply to the three cases P3C10, P3C11, and P3C18. Here, the childcare support policy (P3) contains a latitude of interpretation and lacks legal sanctions. These cases show a positive outcome because of a financial budget available to implement the policy P3. Moreover, the strongly supportive disposition of the employers for full implementation of this policy P3, as explained by the respective employers supported the positive outcome. In these cases, the positive disposition even enabled to agree on an internal contract with the workers that this policy P3 has to be implemented. Therefore, the not supportive legal design of P3 (existence of latitudes of interpretation and non-existence of legal sanctions) was substituted by the internal regulation.

³⁹ Simplifying assumptions consist of easy counterfactuals and difficult counterfactuals, of which the former is in line with both the empirical evidence and directional expectations, while the latter does not follow the directional expectations mentioned before (Schneider and Wagemann 2012: 168). In an analysis, the complex solution is not vulnerable to any assumptions on logical remainders, while the parsimonious solution involves both easy and difficult counterfactuals. The respective results are shown in *Table A.5* and *Table A.6 in the Appendix*.

Table 32: Findings from the intermediate solution for COMPLIANCE

Model: COMPLIANCE = f(LATI, LESA, FINA, UNION, INFO, DISP)			
Algorithm: Quine-McCluskey			
Assumptions:			
~LATI (absent)			
LESA (present)			
FINA (present)			
UNION (present)			
INFO (present)			
DISP (present)			
Frequency cut-off: 1	Raw	Unique	Consistency
Consistency cut-off: 0.916981	coverage	coverage	
~LATI*LESA*FINA*DISP	0.894178	0.894178	0.876302
Solution coverage: 0.894178			
Solution consistency: 0.876302			
Covered cases: P1C1, P1C2, P1C3, P1C4, P1C5, P1C6, P1C7, P1C8, P1C9, P1C10, P1C11, P1C12, P1C13, P1C14, P1C15, P1C17, P1C18, P1C19, P1C23, P1C25, P1C27, P1C28, P2C1, P2C2, P2C3, P2C4, P2C5, P2C6, P2C7, P2C8, P2C9, P2C10, P2C11, P2C12, P2C13, P2C14, P2C15, P2C16, P2C17, P2C18, P2C19, P2C20, P2C21, P2C22, P2C23, P2C24, P2C25, P2C26, P2C27, P2C28.			
Uncovered cases: P3C10, P3C11, P3C18.			
Note: ~ indicates the absence of a condition; C1, C2... indicates the label of organizations; P1 indicates the policy of periodic health check-ups for female employees; P2 indicates the policy of maternity leave; P3 indicates the policy of childcare support for female employees			

Figure 18: XY Plot of the path \sim LATI*LESA*FINA*DISP and the outcome COMPLIANCE



Note: \sim indicates the absence of a condition; C1, C2... indicates the label of organizations; P1 indicates the policy of periodic health check-ups for female employees; P2 indicates the policy of maternity leave; P3 indicates the policy of childcare support for female employee.

XY plot also shows that the solution term has a highly effective intervention with compliance (*Figure 18*). Obviously, compliance is accomplished not only because of \sim LATI*LESA but also because of FINA*DISP. The empirical evidence demonstrated that the combination of all four conditions \sim LATI*LESA*FINA*DISP was always given in almost every case complying with the policy of periodic health check-ups (P1) and the policy of maternity leave for female employees (P2).

If paying the attention to the consistency score of each condition in the configuration (*in the left side of Table 30*) and linking back to cases complying with the policy of childcare support (P3), it is clear to find that DISP is a substantially strong enabler for the outcome COMPLIANCE, while the impact of FINA remains trivial. In spite of triviality, FINA is an indispensable condition of the configuration leading to policy compliance. In sum, this finding corroborates Assumption 8, Assumption 9, Assumption 10, and Assumption 13, which are expected that \sim LATI, LESAs, FINA, and DISP are necessary but not sufficient (INUS) conditions for policy compliance. In order to foster policy compliance, these conditions must exist in a conjunction relationship.

6.2.2. Analysis of sufficient conditions for policy non-compliance

This analysis will lead to the identification of culprits for non-compliance. The analysis is also performed with six conditions. As mentioned in section 6.1, although no single condition is necessary to produce the outcome NON-COMPLIANCE, a condition is still likely to produce the outcome in the combination with other conditions (Schneider and Wagemann 2012: 280). It holds true with this analysis. The process of data analysis follows the same procedure outlined above.

As can be seen from the truth table (*Table 33*), the 84 cases form 15 different configurations of the conditions of interest. The analysis opts for the frequency cut-off at 1 and the consistency cut-off at 0.788009 to distill those configurations

that can be defined as sufficient for non-compliance. The truth table yields 10 consistent configurations and 5 inconsistent configurations. For the negative outcome NON-COMPLIANCE, the analysis sets up the differently directional expectations about the impact of six conditions as follows: the presence of latitudes of interpretation (LATI), the absence of legal sanctions (~LESA), lack of financial resources (~FINA), the absence of trade unions in fighting for legal rights and benefits of female workers (~UNION), low information level of the employees (~INFO), and negative dispositions of the employers towards the policy (~DISP) are likely to induce policy non-compliance. After the minimizing procedure, the function “Standard Analysis” provides three solutions. The results of the complex and parsimonious solutions are shown respectively in *Table A.7* and *Table A.8* in *the Appendix*. The result of the intermediate solution is presented in *Table 34*.

Table 33: Truth table for the outcome NON-COMPLIANCE

LATI	LESA	FINA	UNION	INFO	DISP	number	~COMPLIANCE	raw consist.	PRI consist.	SYM consist
1	0	1	0	0	0	5	1	1	1	1
1	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1
1	0	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1
1	0	1	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	1
1	0	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1
1	0	1	1	1	1	9	1	0.914063	0.914063	0.914063
1	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	0.889262	0.889262	0.889262
1	0	1	0	0	1	4	1	0.8325	0.8325	0.8325
1	0	1	1	0	1	5	1	0.798496	0.798496	0.798496
0	1	1	0	0	0	5	1	0.788009	0.771889	0.771889
0	1	1	0	1	0	1	0	0.700906	0.667785	0.667785
0	1	1	0	1	1	3	0	0.332075	0.110553	0.110553
0	1	1	1	0	1	10	0	0.322556	0	0
0	1	1	1	1	1	22	0	0.246835	0	0
0	1	1	0	0	1	15	0	0.219451	0.0656716	0.0656716


Table 34: Findings from the intermediate solution for NON-COMPLIANCE

Model: \sim COMPLIANCE = f(LATI, LESA, FINA, UNION, INFO, DISP)			
Algorithm: Quine-McCluskey			
Assumptions:			
LATI (present)			
\sim LESA (absent)			
\sim FINA (absent)			
\sim UNION (absent)			
\sim INFO (absent)			
\sim DISP (absent)			
Frequency cut-off: 1	Raw	Unique	Consistency
Consistency cut-off: 0.788009	coverage	coverage	
LATI* \sim LESA	0.676773	0.559015	0.892857
\sim UNION* \sim INFO* \sim DISP	0.21738	0.099621	0.890244
Solution coverage: 0.776394			
Solution consistency: 0.87787			
Cases covered by the path (1): P3C1, P3C2, P3C3, P3C4, P3C5, P3C6, P3C7, P3C8, P3C9, P3C12, P3C13, P3C14, P3C15, P3C16, P3C17, P3C19, P3C20, P3C21, P3C22, P3C23, P3C24, P3C25, P3C26, P3C27, P3C28.			
Cases covered by the path (2): P1C16, P1C20, P1C22, P1C24, P1C26, P3C16, P3C20, P3C22, P3C24, P3C25, P3C26.			
Notes: \sim indicates the absence of a condition; C1, C2... indicates the label of organizations; P1 indicates the policy of periodic health check-ups for female employees; P2 indicates the policy of maternity leave; P3 indicates the policy of childcare support for female employees.			

The findings from the intermediate solution inform that there are two multi-causal pathways for the same outcome NON-COMPLIANCE, either $LATI^* \sim LESA$ or $\sim DISP^* \sim UNION^* \sim INFO$. Measures regarding the consistency score and the coverage score can be used to compare the importance of each pathway. While the consistency score reflects the degree to which a configuration corresponds to the outcome, the coverage score denotes the proportion of cases that follow a single path and expresses the empirical importance of that path (Schneider and Wagemann 2012: 123 - 139). Comparing two identified configurational pathways, cases denoted by non-compliance are influenced by the former more than the latter, which is indicated by the higher raw coverage score ($0.67 > 0.21$) and the relatively high consistency score (0.89). The solution coverage at 0.776394 means that the entire solution term accounts for about 77.63% of the membership in the outcome. The solution consistency at 0.87787 also indicates a highly effective intervention. Elements are found in this analysis as insufficient but necessary (INUS) conditions for non-compliance, which are themselves insufficient but necessary parts of a sufficient but unnecessary (SUIN) combination of conditions. The results confirmed the directional assumptions mentioned above. To specify:

The first causal pathway, which involves the presence of latitudes of interpretation and the absence of legal sanctions, has a significantly high consistency score of 0.89 and covers the majority of the outcome of interest with the raw coverage score of 0.67. It reveals that the combination of these two conditions plays the main role in inducing a negative outcome. Obviously, empirical data have shown that almost all of the cases with non-compliance are denoted by organizations not complying with the policy of childcare support (P3) due to the poor design of this policy. The XY plot shows that this causal pathway contributes to the outcome NON-COMPLIANCE (*Figure 19*). However, the combination $LATI^* \sim LESA$ is considered as a sufficient but unnecessary (SUIN) configuration because it is not the only pathway for policy non-compliance.

Figure 19: XY Plot of the path $LATI^*\sim LESA$ and the outcome $NON-COMPLIANCE$




Notes: ~ indicates the absence of a condition; C1, C2... indicates the label of organizations; P1 indicates the policy of periodic health check-ups for female employees; P2 indicates the policy of maternity leave; P3 indicates the policy of childcare support for female employees.

The appearance of the second causal pathway $\sim DISP^*\sim UNION^*\sim INFO$ is also associated with the same outcome. Clearly, this second pathway involving the absence of positive dispositions of the employers towards the policy, the absence of the trade unions in fighting for legal rights and benefits of female workers, and the absence of information of female workers about the policy, is seen as an alternative configuration for policy non-compliance. The second pathway has a low raw coverage score of 0.21, meaning that a little part of the outcome is represented by this configuration. However, with a relatively high consistency score of 0.89, it still might be of great theoretical and substantive interest (cf. Schneider and Wagemann 2012: 148). Indeed, the empirical evidence shows that there are five respective cases (P1C16, P1C20, P1C22, P1C24, P1C26) that are characterized by non-compliance with the policy of periodic health check-ups (P1)

where the characteristic LATI*~LESA is not given but there is the existence of the configuration ~DISP*~UNION*~INFO. The XY plot shows that this causal pathway also contributes to the outcome NON-COMPLIANCE (Figure 20).

Figure 20: XY Plot of the path ~DISP*~UNION*~INFO and the outcome NON-COMPLIANCE



Notes: ~ indicates the absence of a condition; C1, C2... indicates the label of organizations; P1 indicates the policy of periodic health check-ups for female employees; P2 indicates the policy of maternity leave; P3 indicates the policy of childcare support for female employees.

As such, the first pathway corroborates Assumption 14 and Assumption 15, while the second pathway supports Assumption 17, Assumption 18, and Assumption 19. It is demonstrated that in an asymmetrical view, the presence of latitudes of interpretation and the absence of legal sanctions are parts of a complex configuration linked to policy non-compliance. The results emphasize the importance of policy design. Besides, the absence of the trade unions in fighting for legal rights and benefits of female workers, a low information level of the employees, and obstructive dispositions of the employers are parts of a complex configuration of sufficient pathways linked to policy non-compliance. Strikingly,

none of the configurations refers to lacking the financial resource as a condition for policy non-compliance. The consistency score of 0.17 and the coverage score at 1 of the condition \sim FINA in the analysis of necessity for the negative outcome show that there are very few cases of policies denoted by non-compliance due to lacking financial capacity. In many cases, despite the sufficient budget from moderately to totally, policy compliance is still not accomplished because of either \sim DISP* \sim UNION* \sim INFO or LATI* \sim LESA. Therefore, the accuracy of Assumption 16 remains unclear.

6.3. Conclusion with respect to tested assumptions (from Assumption 8 to Assumption 19)

Overall, from the results of analyses of necessary/sufficient conditions in the fsQCA, the study tends to confirm assumptions, except Assumption 11 and Assumption 12. The correctness of Assumption 10 and Assumption 16 remains unclear; further studies on the explanatory power of the availability of financial resources should be conducted. The conclusions that are summarized below refigure the complex causal relationships contributing to answering the second research question: What makes external norm addressees comply?

- The absence of latitudes of interpretation within the respective legal norms is a necessary but not sufficient condition for policy compliance. The absence of latitudes must combine with other conditions to foster policy compliance. → Assumption 8 is confirmed.
- The severity of legal sanctions is a necessary but not sufficient condition for policy compliance. The severity of legal sanctions must combine with other conditions to foster policy compliance. → Assumption 9 is confirmed.
- The availability of financial resources for policy implementation on the side of the norm addressees might be a necessary but not sufficient

condition for policy compliance. The availability of financial resources must combine with other conditions to foster policy compliance. → Assumption 10 is trivial and should have further studies.

- The intervention of interest groups like the active fight of the trade union for the rights and the interests of the employers is *not* a necessary condition for policy compliance. → Assumption 11 is rejected.
- The good perception of policy targets about the policies is *not* a necessary condition for compliance. → Assumption 12 is rejected.
- The supportive disposition of the external norm addressees towards the policy at stake is a necessary but not sufficient condition for policy compliance. Their supportive disposition must combine with other conditions to foster policy compliance. → Assumption 13 is confirmed.
- The presence of latitudes of interpretation within the respective legal norms is part of a complex configuration linked to policy non-compliance. → Assumption 14 is confirmed.
- The absence of legal sanctions is part of a complex configuration linked to policy non-compliance. → Assumption 15 is confirmed.
- It is likely that the unavailability of financial resources is part of a complex configuration linked to policy non-compliance. → Assumption 16 remains ambiguous.
- Lacking the intervention of interest groups is part of a complex configuration linked to policy non-compliance. → Assumption 17 is confirmed.
- Lacking information on the side of the policy targets (employees) about the policies is part of a complex configuration linked to policy non-compliance. → Assumption 18 is confirmed.

- The obstructive disposition of the external norm addressees towards the policy at stake is part of a complex configuration linked to policy non-compliance. → Assumption 19 is confirmed.

Chapter VII: A comparison of policy implementation between the public and private sectors

7.1. Degree of policy compliance in comparison with the public and private sectors

In this part, the study describes the real status of implementing policies in the public sector and the private sector. As can be seen from *Table 35* and *Figure 21*, with the same sample size in observation, there are differences in compliance with policies between the public and private sectors. In comparison, the private sector tends to be more vulnerable to implementation deficits than the public sector. As a matter of convenience for the reader in *Table 35*, the results are presented along with the calibration of the dependent variable as already presented in *Table 15*.

Table 35: Degree of compliance with some selected policies for female employees in Vietnam: A comparison between the public sector and private sector

Sample size: 84

Code of Policies	Policies	Total number of cases		0 (full out compliance)		0.33 (more out than in compliance)		0.67 (more in than out compliance)		1 (full in compliance)	
		Public Sector	Private Sector	Public Sector	Private Sector	Public Sector	Private Sector	Public Sector	Private Sector	Public Sector	Private Sector
P1	Periodic health check-ups for female employees	14	14	0	5	0	1	12	7	2	1
P2	Maternity leave	14	14	0	0	0	0	0	0	14	14
P3	Childcare support for female employees	14	14	12	13	0	0	0	0	2	1
Sum		42	42	12	18	0	1	12	7	18	16

Figure 21: Degree of compliance with some selected policies for female employees in Vietnam: A comparison between the public sector and private sector

Sample size: 84

P1	C1	C2	C3	C4	C5	C6	C7	C8	C9	C10	C11	C12	C13	C14	Public sector
	C15	C16	C17	C18	C19	C20	C21	C22	C23	C24	C25	C26	C27	C28	Private sector
P2	C1	C2	C3	C4	C5	C6	C7	C8	C9	C10	C11	C12	C13	C14	Public sector
	C15	C16	C17	C18	C19	C20	C21	C22	C23	C24	C25	C26	C27	C28	Private sector
P3	C1	C2	C3	C4	C5	C6	C7	C8	C9	C10	C11	C12	C13	C14	Public sector
	C15	C16	C17	C18	C19	C20	C21	C22	C23	C24	C25	C26	C27	C28	Private sector

Legend:

	1 (full in compliance)
	0.67 (more in than out compliance)
	0.33 (more out than in compliance)
	0 (full out compliance)

Notes: C1, C2... indicates the label of organizations; P1 indicates the policy of periodic health check-ups for female employees; P2 indicates the policy of maternity leave; P3 indicates the policy of childcare support for female employees.

7.1.1. Policy of periodical health check-ups for female employees (P1)

At first glance, there is a significant difference in implementing the policy of periodical health check-ups for female employees between the public and private sectors. According to Clause 2 of Article 152 of the Labor Code 2012, the employer must organize periodic health check-ups for the female employees, including gynecologic and obstetric care at least once every 6 months. The employers must cover costs of health check-ups for employees, which shall be accounted as deductible expenses upon the determination of taxable incomes according to the Law on Enterprise Income Tax and as recurrent business

expenditures in administrative agencies and non-business units with no service activities⁴⁰. Besides, monthly the employers must pay health insurance premiums for employees and make deductions from the latter's salaries and remuneration for payment of health insurance premiums into the health insurance fund⁴¹. Owning a health insurance card can help a person to be exempted from the costs of using medical care services in the public health system. Depending on different categories, the costs might be covered from 80% to 100% by the health insurance fund⁴². In spite of not putting the financial burden on the employers, organizing periodic health check-ups for the female employees may affect the working timetable of employees and decrease their labor productivity, which can make the employers (especially businesses in the private sector) not want to comply with this policy.

The empirical data in *Table 35* show that only three out of 28 cases met all demands of periodical health check-ups for female employees as prescribed by law (full in compliance). Most of the employers in the public sector accept implementing this policy to a moderate degree. Differently, in the private sector in six out of 28 cases the respective regulation has not been implemented (fully out compliance and more out than in compliance). This shows the lack of care of some private enterprises to the health of female workers. Interviewees revealed potential causes of this phenomenon. Some employers have a good perception of the policy but take the costs and benefits of compliance into the calculation. According to Clause 3 of Article 17 of Decree No. 95/2013/ND-CP, the employer shall be liable to a fine of between 10.000.000 VND and 15.000.000 VND when failing to provide periodic health check-ups for workers as prescribed. However, in fact, if an organization has more than 15 female workers, the employer can pay more or

⁴⁰ According to Article 21 of the Law on Occupational Safety and Health 2015.

⁴¹ According to Article 15 of the Law on Health Insurance 2008.

⁴² According to Article 22 of the Law on Health Insurance 2008.

less 15.000.000 VND for organizing periodic health check-ups, however, his/her employees can be absent in working time. Based on the given legal sanction, the employer can accept a fine of between 10.000.000 and 15.000.000 VND to avoid a loss of labor productivity. However, this assumes that there is full control so that a violation of the respective provision of the law will be detected for sure. Certainly, a 100 percent detection rate is unrealistic. Thus, the severity of the sanction has to be set into perspective by the probability to get uncovered. This reveals that – given the circumstances – the legal sanction of this policy is not strict enough to force the employers to comply.

7.1.2. Policy of maternity leave (P2)

In comparison with other policies, it appears that the policy of maternity leave is being implemented in full compliance with the respective legal provision in 100% of the cases in both the public and private sectors (*Table 35*). During the 6-month-maternity leave, female workers can receive a lump-sum allowance and monthly allowances. A lump-sum allowance must equal two times the basic salary for each child in the month of childbirth. A monthly allowance must equal 100% of the average of salaries of 6 months preceding the leave on which social insurance premiums are based⁴³. In Vietnam, all allowances of maternity regimes are covered by the state's social insurance fund. Different from many nations in Southeast Asia, the employers in Vietnam are not responsible for the payments when a female worker takes maternity leave. This might be one of the causes that motivate them to implement this policy because it does not put them under the pressure of costs. Plus, the policy of maternity leave is one of the big concerns of many women when they are engaged in paid employment.

⁴³ According to Article 39 of the Law on Social Insurance 2014.

7.1.3. Policy of childcare support for female employees (P3)

Caring for children is one of the maternal responsibilities of women. The struggle to balance work commitments and family responsibility may be very hard for women with children. A recent study pointed out that in developing countries, many women are often engaged in unpaid work or low-paid wage employment due to the pressure of childcare, thus, “access to free or subsidized public childcare can increase women’s labor force participation and improve children’s well-being” (Giannelli 2015: 1). The Vietnamese government offered a policy to support female employees having children. However, translating this policy into practice in Vietnam is not simple at all. Regarding the costs and benefits of possible interventions, it remains controversial whether it is compulsory or not for the employers to comply with the policy. As stated in Article 9 of Decree No. 85/2015/ND-CP, depending on specific conditions, the employer shall build up plans on assistance, the establishment of kindergartens/ nursery schools, or provision of subsidies on fees for kindergartens/ nursery schools with cash or items. The level and time of provision of subsidies shall be agreed upon between the employers and the female employees. This means that policy compliance mostly depends on the dispositions of the employers and the discretion of using their internal budget. With the presence of latitudes of interpretation and the absence of legal sanctions, this policy leaves ample room for employers to neglect regulations. Nonsurprisingly, the policy of childcare support is very seldomly implemented in both the public and the private sector. In fact, only three out of 28 cases in full compliance have been reported. They all stem from education organizations where facilities were available, while in 25 cases this policy was not implemented (*Table 35*). This is a stark example of a policy that has good intentions but fails in implementation. Obviously, this policy would be beneficial for female workers having kids, but most employers do not care. Explaining this phenomenon, the employers stated that it was hard for them to comply with the policy due to the vague regulations on accountability, the financial burden, and the

complex administrative procedures. Implementing this policy would require efforts of not only the employers but also the stakeholders.

As such, although the Labor Code of Vietnam stipulates many regulations to facilitate female employees to access their rights and benefits better, due to various causes, some regulations are not consistently complied with by the employers. This outcome may depend on the variation of the independent variables in different cases. As mentioned in chapter VI, the necessary conditions and sufficient conditions for the diagnosed outcomes are investigated in a nationwide scope. In the next part of this study, the status of policy implementation will be analyzed separately in the public sector and the private sector to find the similarities and differences in their multi-causal pathways to policy compliance and non-compliance between them.

7.2. The similarities in the multi-causal pathway to compliance with policies for female employees in the public and private sectors

Regarding the analysis of necessary conditions for the outcomes COMPLIANCE and ~COMPLIANCE, the results are presented for the separate sectors (*Table 36* and *Table 37*). At first glance, there are some similarities between the public and private sector as follows:

Firstly, for the positive outcome COMPLIANCE, as can be seen from the left side of *Table 36* and *Table 37* based on the recommended consistency and coverage thresholds usually employed for QCA (cf. Ragin 2000: 132-133; Schneider and Wagemann 2012: 278; Legewie 2013:11), both sectors have the same four conditions passing the necessity analysis, of which ~LATI, LESA, and DISP are considered as quasi-necessary conditions, while FINA is trivial because of its appearance almost irrespective of compliance or non-compliance. Secondly, for the negative outcome ~COMPLIANCE, from the right side of *Table 36* and

Table 37, both analyses point out the same feature that none of the single conditions is deemed to be necessary for policy non-compliance.

Table 36: Analysis of necessary conditions for policy compliance and non-compliance in the PUBLIC SECTOR

Conditions tested	COMPLIANCE		~COMPLIANCE	
	Consistency	Coverage	Consistency	Coverage
LATI	0.076805	0.142857	0.751880	0.857143
~LATI	0.923195	0.858571	0.248120	0.141429
LESA	0.923195	0.858571	0.248120	0.141429
~LESA	0.076805	0.142857	0.751880	0.857143
FINA	1.000000	0.667179	0.813910	0.332821
~FINA	0.000000	0.000000	0.186090	1.000000
UNION	0.769201	0.606970	0.812267	0.393030
~UNION	0.230799	0.667778	0.187343	0.332222
INFO	0.576421	0.692343	0.624687	0.459871
~INFO	0.550307	0.705217	0.582080	0.457185
DISP	0.974654	0.650602	0.895363	0.366316
~DISP	0.050691	0.441472	0.145990	0.779264

Table 37: Analysis of necessary conditions for policy compliance and non-compliance in the PRIVATE SECTOR

Conditions tested	COMPLIANCE		~COMPLIANCE	
	Consistency	Coverage	Consistency	Coverage
LATI	0.047574	0.071429	0.619638	0.928571
~LATI	0.952426	0.715000	0.380362	0.285000
LESA	0.952426	0.715000	0.380362	0.285000
~LESA	0.047574	0.071429	0.619638	0.928571
FINA	1.000000	0.547967	0.826501	0.452033
~FINA	0.000000	0.000000	0.173499	1.000000
UNION	0.444814	0.623333	0.269304	0.376667
~UNION	0.555186	0.432222	0.730696	0.567778
INFO	0.522360	0.579114	0.506196	0.560127
~INFO	0.603235	0.550347	0.619638	0.564236
DISP	0.937203	0.679310	0.474738	0.343448
~DISP	0.094196	0.152308	0.556721	0.898462

Note: ~ indicates the absence of a condition or an outcome.

In regard to the sufficient conditions for the positive outcome COMPLIANCE, *Table 38* and *Table 39* give information for each sector. Two sufficiency analyses are conducted with the same analytical model $COMPLIANCE = f(LATI, LESA, FINA, UNION, INFO, DISP)$. The same directional expectations are given that the absence of latitudes of interpretation, along with the presence of legal sanctions, the availability of financial resources, the strength of the trade unions, the high information level of the employees, and the supportive disposition of the employers could contribute to policy compliance. The truth table for the public sector indicates three consistent configurations and five inconsistent configurations for compliance (frequency cut-off at 1, and the consistency cut-off at 1) (see *Table A.9 in the Appendix*), while the truth table for the private sector produces four consistent configurations and nine inconsistent configurations for compliance (frequency cut-off at 1 and the consistency cut-off at 0.889447) (see *Table A.10 in the Appendix*).

In comparison, both analyses of sufficiency attain the same multi-causal pathway $\sim LATI * LESA * FINA * DISP$ for the outcome COMPLIANCE. The solution consistency and solution coverage in each analysis are nearly the same and meet the recommended threshold to pass the test of sufficiency, meaning that the conjunction of these four conditions has a high relevance and accounts for more or less 89% of the membership in the outcome. As such, after performing two analyses of sufficiency for the public sector and the private sector (with the sample size of 42 cases for each sector), the results show that their multi-causal pathways to policy compliance are similar. The similarities in these two separate analyses also contribute to robust the results explored in chapter VI. It implies that the absence of latitudes of interpretation in combination with given legal sanctions, the availability of financial resources, and the positive dispositions of the employers are strong enablers for policy compliance.

Table 38: Analysis of sufficient conditions for policy compliance in the PUBLIC SECTOR

Model: COMPLIANCE = f(LATI, LESA, FINA, UNION, INFO, DISP)			
Algorithm: Quine-McCluskey			
Assumptions: ~LATI (absent), LESA (present), FINA (present), UNION (present), INFO (present), DISP (present)			
Frequency cut-off: 1	Raw	Unique	Consistency
Consistency cut-off: 1	coverage	coverage	
~LATI*LESA*FINA*DISP	0.89785	0.89785	0.876312
Solution coverage: 0.89785			
Solution consistency: 0.876312			
Covered cases: P1C1, P1C2, P1C3, P1C4, P1C5, P1C6, P1C7, P1C8, P1C9, P1C10, P1C11, P1C12, P1C13, P1C14, P2C1, P2C2, P2C3, P2C4, P2C5, P2C6, P2C7, P2C8, P2C9, P2C10, P2C11, P2C12, P2C13, P2C14.			
Uncovered cases: P3C10, P3C11.			

Table 39: Analysis of sufficient conditions for policy compliance in the PRIVATE SECTOR

Model: COMPLIANCE = f(LATI, LESA, FINA, UNION, INFO, DISP)			
Algorithm: Quine-McCluskey			
Assumptions: ~LATI (absent), LESA (present), FINA (present), UNION (present), INFO (present), DISP (present)			
Frequency cut-off: 1	Raw	Unique	Consistency
Consistency cut-off: 0.889447	coverage	coverage	
~LATI*LESA*FINA*DISP	0.889629	0.889629	0.876289
Solution coverage: 0.889629			
Solution consistency: 0.876289			
Covered cases: P1C15, P1C17, P1C18, P1C19, P1C23, P1C25, P1C27, P1C28, P2C15, P2C16, P2C17, P2C18, P2C19, P2C20, P2C21, P2C22, P2C23, P2C24, P2C25, P2C26, P2C27, P2C28.			
Uncovered cases: P3C18.			

Notes: ~ indicates the absence of a condition; C1, C2... indicates the label of organizations; P1 indicates the policy of periodic health check-ups for female employees; P2 indicates the policy of maternity leave; P3 indicates the policy of childcare support for female employees.

By not distinguishing the public – private sectors, I also can combine two sectors into one analysis and adding “the characteristic of the norm addressees as being in public ownership” as a possible condition (PUBLIC) into the model. In this way, I have a “moderate-N” research design (84 cases) to robust the result. The analytical model COMPLIANCE = f(LATI, LESA, FINA, UNION, INFO, DISP, PUBLIC) is used to perform the analysis of necessity and the analysis of sufficiency. The results of these analyses are also in line with the results explored in the separate analyses of the public sector and the private sector. As can be found in *Table 40*, the analysis of necessity informs that \sim LATI, LESA, and DISP are quasi-necessary conditions, while FINA is trivial. Strikingly, by adding the condition PUBLIC into the analytical model, the analysis of necessity gives the result that the characteristic of the external norm addressees as being in public ownership is not a necessary condition for policy compliance. This result corroborates Assumption 7 that there is no relationship between the ownership characteristic of the norm addressees and policy compliance (as demonstrated by the Pearson chi-square test and Pearson correlation analysis in chapter V). Also, adding the condition PUBLIC into the analytical model does not make the result of the analysis of sufficiency be changed (*Table 41*). Accordingly, the combination of four conditions \sim LATI*LESA*FINA*DISP is a necessary and sufficient configuration for policy compliance.

Looking at cases covered by this pathway, it is found that the same trend in both sectors is that the employers tend to implement the policy of periodic health check-ups (P1) and the policy of maternity leave (P2) better than the policy of childcare support for female employees (P3) (as mentioned in 7.1). In general, policy compliance in the public and private sectors is influenced by the same multi-causal pathway \sim LATI*LESA*FINA*DISP (*Table 38*, *Table 39*, and *Table 41*). To conclude, Assumption 20 is confirmed.

Table 40: Analysis of necessary conditions for Compliance and Non-compliance⁴⁴ with adding the condition PUBLIC

Conditions tested	COMPLIANCE		~COMPLIANCE	
	Consistency	Coverage	Consistency	Coverage
LATI	0.063748	0.107143	0.676773	0.892857
~LATI	0.936252	0.786786	0.323227	0.213214
LESA	0.936252	0.786786	0.323227	0.213214
~LESA	0.063748	0.107143	0.676773	0.892857
FINA	1.000000	0.608089	0.821061	0.391911
~FINA	0.000000	0.000000	0.178939	1.000000
UNION	0.624309	0.612083	0.504061	0.387917
~UNION	0.375691	0.491111	0.495939	0.508889
INFO	0.552274	0.639518	0.557390	0.506644
~INFO	0.573948	0.622925	0.603411	0.514068
DISP	0.957926	0.662844	0.656470	0.356565
~DISP	0.070123	0.206379	0.379264	0.876173
PUBLIC	0.553336	0.620000	0.432052	0.380000
~PUBLIC	0.446664	0.500476	0.567948	0.499524

Table 41: Analysis of sufficient conditions for policy compliance with adding the condition PUBLIC⁴⁵

Model: COMPLIANCE = f(LATI, LESA, FINA, UNION, INFO, DISP, PUBLIC)			
Algorithm: Quine-McCluskey			
Assumptions:			
~LATI (absent), LESA (present), FINA (present), UNION (present), INFO (present), DISP (present), PUBLIC (present)			
Frequency cut-off: 1	Raw	Unique	Consistency
Consistency cut-off: 0.889447	coverage	coverage	
~LATI*LESA*FINA*DISP	0.894178	0.894178	0.876302
Solution coverage: 0.894178			
Solution consistency: 0.876302			

⁴⁴ The right side of Table 40 provides indexes regarding the absence of the outcome. However, with the consistency scores within range under 0.82 so none of the single conditions really accounts for non-compliance.

⁴⁵ The truth table of this analysis is presented in Table A.11 in the Appendix.

7.3. The differences in the multi-causal pathway to non-compliance with policies for female employees in comparison to the public and private sectors

Although the analysis of sufficiency for the positive outcome (COMPLIANCE) in each sector offers the same result, that for the negative outcome (NON-COMPLIANCE) might be different between them. To demonstrate this assumption, firstly, I will employ the analytical model $\sim\text{COMPLIANCE} = f(\text{LATI}, \text{LESA}, \text{FINA}, \text{UNION}, \text{INFO}, \text{DISP})$ to perform separately sufficiency analyses for the public and the private sector. The directional expectations are given that the presence of latitudes of interpretation, the absence of legal sanctions, the lack of financial resources, no union, a low information level of the employees, and negative dispositions could lead to policy non-compliance. The truth table for the public sector indicates four consistent configurations and four inconsistent configurations for compliance (frequency cut-off at 1, and the consistency cut-off at 0.844907) (see *Table A.12 in the Appendix*), while the truth table for the private sector produces seven consistent configurations and six inconsistent configurations for compliance (frequency cut-off at 1 and the consistency cut-off at 0.788009) (see *Table A.13 in the Appendix*). The findings from the intermediate solution are shown in *Table 42* for the public sector and *Table 43* for the private sector. In comparison, the results show that there is only one pathway to policy non-compliance in the public sector ($\text{LATI}^* \sim \text{LESA}^* \text{UNION} \rightarrow \sim \text{COMPLIANCE}$), while there are three different pathways to policy non-compliance in the private sector ($\text{LATI}^* \sim \text{LESA}^* \sim \text{UNION} + \text{LATI}^* \sim \text{LESA}^* \text{INFO} + \sim \text{UNION}^* \sim \text{INFO}^* \sim \text{DISP} \rightarrow \sim \text{COMPLIANCE}$). Particularly in the private sector, the appearance of a sufficient but unnecessary (SUIN) configuration implies an equifinal relationship, since various (combinations of) conditions can lead to the same outcome. Obviously, the multi-causal pathway of policy non-compliance in the private sector is more complex than the one in the public sector.

Table 42: Analysis of sufficient conditions for policy non-compliance in the PUBLIC SECTOR

Model: \sim COMPLIANCE = f(LATI, LESA, FINA, UNION, INFO, DISP)			
Algorithm: Quine-McCluskey			
Assumptions: LATI (present), \sim LESA (absent), \sim FINA (absent), \sim UNION (absent), \sim INFO (absent), \sim DISP (absent)			
Frequency cut-off: 1	Raw	Unique	Consistency
Consistency cut-off: 0.844907	coverage	coverage	
LATI*\simLESA*UNION	0.626566	0.626566	0.909091
Solution coverage: 0.626566			
Solution consistency: 0.909091			
Covered cases: P3C1, P3C2, P3C3, P3C4, P3C5, P3C6, P3C7, P3C12, P3C13, P3C14.			

Table 43: Analysis of sufficient conditions for policy non-compliance in the PRIVATE SECTOR

Model: \sim COMPLIANCE = f(LATI, LESA, FINA, UNION, INFO, DISP)			
Algorithm: Quine-McCluskey			
Assumptions: LATI (present), \sim LESA (absent), \sim FINA (absent), \sim UNION (absent), \sim INFO (absent), \sim DISP (absent)			
Frequency cut-off: 1	Raw	Unique	Consistency
Consistency cut-off: 0.788009	coverage	coverage	
LATI*\simLESA*\simUNION	0.42898	0.157769	1
LATI*\simLESA*INFO	0.28551	0.111535	0.947785
\simUNION*\simINFO*\simDISP	0.382745	0.175405	0.890244
Solution coverage: 71592			
Solution consistency: 0.919217			
Cases covered by the pathway LATI* \sim LESA* \sim UNION: P3C15, P3C16, P3C17, P3C20, P3C21, P3C22, P3C24, P3C25, P3C26.			
Cases covered by the pathway LATI* \sim LESA*INFO: P3C15, P3C19, P3C21, P3C23, P3C27.			
Cases covered by the pathway \sim UNION* \sim INFO* \sim DISP: P1C16, P1C20, P1C22, P1C24, P1C26, P3C16, P3C20, P3C22, P3C24, P3C25, P3C26.			

In another way, I will not separate the public – private sectors and combine two sectors into one analysis by adding “the characteristic of the norm addressees as being in public ownership” as a possible condition (PUBLIC) into the analytical model $\sim\text{COMPLIANCE} = f(\text{LATI}, \text{LESA}, \text{FINA}, \text{UNION}, \text{INFO}, \text{DISP}, \text{PUBLIC})$. Regarding the condition PUBLIC, the assumption is given that the characteristic of the norm addressees as being in private ownership could lead to a negative outcome. *Table A.14 in the Appendix* shows a truth table with eleven consistent configurations and ten inconsistent configurations (frequency cut-off at 1 and the consistency cut-off at 0.788009). The findings from the intermediate solution are shown in *Table 44*.

Table 44: Analysis of sufficient conditions for non-compliance with adding the condition PUBLIC

Model: $\sim\text{COMPLIANCE} = f(\text{LATI}, \text{LESA}, \text{FINA}, \text{UNION}, \text{INFO}, \text{DISP}, \text{PUBLIC})$			
Algorithm: Quine-McCluskey			
Assumptions: LATI (present), $\sim\text{LESA}$ (absent), $\sim\text{FINA}$ (absent), $\sim\text{UNION}$ (absent), $\sim\text{INFO}$ (absent), $\sim\text{DISP}$ (absent), $\sim\text{PUBLIC}$ (absent)			
Frequency cut-off: 1	Raw	Unique	Consisten
Consistency cut-off: 0.788009	coverage	coverage	cy
(1) $\text{LATI}*\sim\text{LESA}*\text{UNION}*\text{PULIC}$	0.270709	0.270709	0.909091
(2) $\text{LATI}*\sim\text{LESA}*\sim\text{UNION}*\sim\text{PUBLIC}$	0.243638	0.0896047	1
(3) $\text{LATI}*\sim\text{LESA}*\text{INFO}*\sim\text{PUBLIC}$	0.162155	0.063346	0.947785
(4) $\sim\text{UNION}*\sim\text{INFO}*\sim\text{DISP}*\sim\text{PUBLIC}$	0.21738	0.099621	0.890244
Solution coverage: 0.677315			
Solution consistency: 0.915143			
Cases covered by the pathway (1): P3C1, P3C2, P3C3, P3C4, P3C5, P3C6, P3C7, P3C12, P3C13, P3C14.			
Cases covered by the pathway (2): P3C15, P3C16, P3C17, P3C20, P3C21, P3C22, P3C24, P3C25, P3C26.			
Cases covered by the pathway (3): P3C15, P3C19, P3C21, P3C23, P3C27.			
Cases covered by the pathway (4): P1C16, P1C20, P1C22, P1C24, P1C26, P3C16, P3C20, P3C22, P3C24, P3C25, P3C26.			

As can be seen from *Table 44*, the fsQCA analysis reveals only one configuration $LATI^* \sim LESA^* UNION^* PUBLIC$ leading to the outcome of policy non-compliance in the public sector (with the consistency at 0.909091 and the coverage at 0.270709). The appearance of UNION in the pathway (1) reflects a real status that “trade unions in Vietnam have yet to find their role as autonomous representatives of the interests of workers” (Schweisshelm 2014: 1). Although most organizations in the public sector have an impressive coverage with unions, they still act under the supervision of the union leaders who often are part of the organization management (Torm 2014: 208). Furthermore, the unionists hardly put pressure on the employers if the regulations are denoted by latitudes of interpretation and foresee no sanctions. As such, the conjunction $LATI^* \sim LESA$ can be accepted as a necessary and sufficient conjunction to induce policy non-compliance in the public sector, no matter how the trade union is.

Different from the public sector, the sufficiency analysis for the private sector produces three different solution formulas to the outcome of policy non-compliance. The prominent feature comes with the pathways (2) and (3) when both of them involve the conjunction $LATI^* \sim LESA^* \sim PUBLIC$ with a differing condition (respectively $\sim UNION$, INFO). It demonstrates that the presence of latitudes of interpretation in combination with the absence of legal sanctions is mainly responsible for policy non-compliance in the private sector.

Besides, the condition $\sim UNION$ in the pathways (2) shows that the absence of trade unions contributes to the non-compliant behaviors of private employers. Also, the pathway (4) shows that the lack of unions ($\sim UNION$), combined with the lack of sufficient information on the policy ($\sim INFO$) and the resistant dispositions of the employers ($\sim DISP$) contribute to non-compliance. It appears that the lack of unions is part of a complex configuration linked to policy non-compliance in the private sector.

Regarding the impact of the information level of female workers, the study proposed a directional assumption that lacking information is predicted to be part of a complex configuration linked to policy non-compliance. However, the appearance of INFO in the pathway (3) and ~INFO in the pathway (4) is a paradox that needs to be shed light on. During the study female employees have been interviewed about cases covered by these pathways to explain this matter. In particular, this was done about cases covered by the pathway (3). Here, female employees stated that they had a good perception of the policy but they did not dare to fight with the employers about policy implementation. This is a sensitive matter because the conflict of interest between the employers and employees might lead to risks of unemployment. Obviously, it is harder for female employees than male ones to have a stable job, especially in rural areas. In these cases, female employees mostly care for their salary payments. Thus, although the employers did not implement the regulations, female employees still have to accept to maintain their jobs. Referring to cases covered by the pathway (4), female employees said that they were not equipped with information on policies. Because of lacking information about the respective legal provisions, employees cannot fight for their legal rights and benefits; thereby employers continue ignoring policy implementation.

As such, adding the condition PUBLIC into the analytical model can help to identify the differences in the multi-causal pathway to non-compliance with some selected policies for female employees in comparison to the public and private sectors. The appearance of the single condition UNION or INFO in some pathways to policy non-compliance is only meaningful to some extent in a certain sector, which does not affect the results demonstrated in chapter VI. Overall, the multi-causal pathways of policy non-compliance in the private sector are more complex than in the public sector. With this result, Assumption 21 is accepted.

7.4. Conclusion with respect to tested assumptions (Assumption 20 and Assumption 21)

In this chapter, I have performed analyses in two ways to test Assumption 20 and Assumption 21. First, I tested the analysis of necessity and the analysis of sufficiency in separate sectors. In another way, I combine two sectors into one analysis by adding the condition PUBLIC into the analytical model. Thanks to using the fsQCA approach, this study provides a more comprehensive understanding of (the combination of) factors affecting the implementation of the female labor law in comparison to the public and private sectors in Vietnam. The results showed that the conditions leading to compliance are different from those that are sufficient for non-compliance. Particularly, the private sector tends to be more vulnerable to deficits than the public sector in implementing policies for female workers. The multi-causal pathways to policy non-compliance in the private sector are more complex than in the public sector, while the multi-causal pathways to policy compliance are the same in both sectors. In general, the absence of latitudes of interpretation and the presence of sanctions still make a difference in policy implementation. Also, the supportive disposition of the norm addressees and the availability of the financial resources of the employers are consistent with policy goals and they are seen as quasi-necessary conditions for compliance. In contrast, the existence of latitudes of interpretation and the absence of sanctions are major attributes of non-compliance. To some extent, the results with respect to the information level of female employees and the engagement of the trade unions in policy implementation remain ambiguous. It reflects the current fact in the private sector of Vietnam that the lack of trade unions and the insufficient information level of female workers contribute to the non-compliant behaviors of the employers. To conclude, from the results of analyses of necessary/sufficient conditions in each sector, the study tends to confirm Assumption 20 and Assumption 21.

- The multi-causal pathways to policy compliance in the public and the private sectors are the same. → Assumption 20 is confirmed.
- The multi-causal pathways to policy non-compliance in the private sector are more complex than the one in the public sector. → Assumption 21 is confirmed.

Chapter VIII: Conclusion and recommendations

8.1. Conclusion

This dissertation has described the success and failure of the implementation of three selected policies for female employees in Vietnam as well as traced the multi-causal pathways to compliance and non-compliance. Besides, the dissertation has made a comparison between the public sector and the private sector in policy implementation. Referring to the literature on compliance and implementation research as well as on the basis of given knowledge on the policy field and introductory reflections an analytical framework was set up. It contained the most plausible explanatory factors – in the terminology of statistical analyses ‘variable’ or in the QCA terminology ‘conditions’ – which are likely to lead to the outcome of policy implementation (respectively compliance or non-compliance). Conceptually, policy compliance is taken into consideration through broader approaches: the top-down approach, the bottom-up approach, and the synthesis approach.

In accordance with the top-down approach, my study referred to the following factors: (1) the presence or absence of latitudes of interpretation within the respective legal norms, (2) the severity of legal sanctions against violations, and (3) the availability of financial resources for policy implementation on the side of the external norm addressees. Moreover, the relevant literature suggests studying the effectiveness of public administration in policy implementation being an important prerequisite for success within the top-down approach. However, as shown in chapter III, there is no effectively functioning public administration for implementing the female labor code in Vietnam. In such a situation, it does not make any sense to include factors usually referred to like the external and internal distribution of competence in public administration and the characteristics (quality and quantity) of civil servants involved in policy implementation in the analytical

framework. Instead, my analytical framework looked for a kind of the equivalent of the civil service for implementing the female labor code, particularly the role of the trade unions. Although trade unions are not active in most of the public and private organizations, wide ranges are unionized, thus having the chance to enhance the degree of policy compliance. That the trade union as a potential interest organization of workers might strive for the legal rights of female members is supported by the idea that the female labor code is in the interest of the employees. Therefore, in line with the bottom-up approach, my study called for some possible factors such as (4) the role of interest groups supporting or obstructing effective compliance, and (5) the information level of policy targets (female workers) about the selected policies. Furthermore, some other factors which are at the intersection of two approaches, are taken into account, including (6) the dispositions of the external norm addressees towards the policy at stake, and (7) the characteristic of the external norm addressees as being in public or private ownership. From this theoretical framework, some directional expectations are drawn which are laid down in 21 assumptions.

The main purpose of this analytical framework is to direct empirical work. Considering the key elements of the third-generation research approach recommended by Goggin et al. (1990: 15-19), a comparative case study design was chosen. Since all case studies are characterized by basically the same institutional, cultural, and political setting within one country, it can be concluded that a Most Similar Systems Design was taken. The analytical framework serves the function to structure 84 not representative case studies on the implementation of three different policies being part of the Labor Code 2012 in Vietnam, of which each case study is conducted along a structure determined by a given questionnaire guide containing open and closed questions. The face-to-face interviews are performed by a native speaker with both employers and employees in agencies, organizations, companies, enterprises, and factories in various fields. Under favorable conditions, the study approaches furthermore a representative of the

trade union and a civil servant to acquire reliable data. With respect to data analysis, statistical procedures and qualitative comparative analysis have been employed. This is the first study in Vietnam, which uses two different approaches to examine whether there is an association between variables as well as explore whether the presence/ absence of a specific condition or combination of conditions is necessary and/ or sufficient for compliance or non-compliance with some selected policies for female workers in Vietnam. Across the 84 small case studies that were conducted in different cities/ provinces of Vietnam in late 2016/beginning of 2017, the study provides a description of the degree of policy compliance and points out the different minimized configurational paths to both policy compliance and non-compliance.

To sum up, in 40.5% of the cases in which compliance with policies could be observed, in 35.7% of the cases non-compliance had to be observed, and others vary in the extent to which they meet the requirements (*Table 17*). It appears that the policy of maternity leave is being implemented very well; nevertheless, this was not the case for the other two policies, more concrete the policy of periodic health check-ups for female employees and the policy of childcare support (*Table 35 and Figure 21*). In comparison, the private sector tends to be vulnerable to more deficits than the public sector in implementing policies for female workers. All in all, it could be observed that although the Labor Code of Vietnam stipulated many regulations, due to various causes, these regulations are not consistently complied with by the employers.

As can be seen from *Table 45* and *Table 46*, the findings that emerge from statistical analyses and fsQCA are well-matched. According to the results of the Pearson chi-square tests, there are four factors having statistically significant relationships with policy compliance: (1) the absence of latitudes of interpretation in the policy under study, (2) the possibility of imposing effective sanctions, (3) the availability of sufficient financial resources on the side of the employers, and (4) supportive dispositions of the employers towards the content of the policy. The

Pearson correlation and MRA also point out that the degree of policy compliance will be better if no latitudes of interpretation are given, the legal sanctions in the respective regulation are severe, the capacity of financial resources, and the supportive dispositions of the external norm addressees are of a high level. Under recourse of the employed statistical analyses, only bivariate analyses have been possible. In contrast, with the help of fsQCA, the multi-causal pathways to compliance and non-compliance could also be analyzed. Similar to the results of the bivariate tests, the same factors or in the terminology of QCA ‘conditions’ for compliance could be identified: $\sim\text{LATI}*\text{LESA}*\text{FINA}*\text{DISP}$. Different from the statistical analyses, fsQCA indicates that a combination of these four conditions is critical to foster policy compliance. What strikes most is the fact, that effective compliance seems possible despite the widespread lack of an effective public administration usually seen as a prerequisite for effective implementation of legal norms. Moreover, the findings regarding the role of interest groups provide a different perspective than that of parts of the literature. This study finds no significant proof for the influences of the respective factor upon compliance under the political and institutional context of Vietnam. Quite interestingly, in an asymmetrical view, the study also points out that the factors leading to compliance are different from those for non-compliance. To specify, the outcome NON-COMPLIANCE can be caused either by $\text{LATI}*\sim\text{LESA}$ or $\sim\text{DISP}*\sim\text{UNION}*\sim\text{INFO}$. It means that the presence of latitudes of interpretation and the absence of legal sanctions are parts of a more complex configuration of sufficient pathways linked to policy non-compliance. Besides, the obstructive disposition of the employers, the helplessness of the trade unions, and the low information level of the policy targets about the respective regulation are associated with non-compliance. One more striking finding of this study is that the multi-causal pathways of policy non-compliance in the private sector are more complex than in the public sector, while the multi-causal pathways to policy compliance are the same in both sectors.

Table 45: Conclusion of testing assumptions

Assumptions	Approaches	Conclusions		
Assumption 1	Statistical analysis	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Confirmed	<input type="checkbox"/> Rejected	<input type="checkbox"/> Ambiguous
Assumption 2	Statistical analysis	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Confirmed	<input type="checkbox"/> Rejected	<input type="checkbox"/> Ambiguous
Assumption 3	Statistical analysis	<input type="checkbox"/> Confirmed	<input type="checkbox"/> Rejected	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Ambiguous
Assumption 4	Statistical analysis	<input type="checkbox"/> Confirmed	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Rejected	<input type="checkbox"/> Ambiguous
Assumption 5	Statistical analysis	<input type="checkbox"/> Confirmed	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Rejected	<input type="checkbox"/> Ambiguous
Assumption 6	Statistical analysis	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Confirmed	<input type="checkbox"/> Rejected	<input type="checkbox"/> Ambiguous
Assumption 7	Statistical analysis	<input type="checkbox"/> Confirmed	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Rejected	<input type="checkbox"/> Ambiguous
Assumption 8	fsQCA analysis	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Confirmed	<input type="checkbox"/> Rejected	<input type="checkbox"/> Ambiguous
Assumption 9	fsQCA analysis	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Confirmed	<input type="checkbox"/> Rejected	<input type="checkbox"/> Ambiguous
Assumption 10	fsQCA analysis	<input type="checkbox"/> Confirmed	<input type="checkbox"/> Rejected	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Ambiguous
Assumption 11	fsQCA analysis	<input type="checkbox"/> Confirmed	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Rejected	<input type="checkbox"/> Ambiguous
Assumption 12	fsQCA analysis	<input type="checkbox"/> Confirmed	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Rejected	<input type="checkbox"/> Ambiguous
Assumption 13	fsQCA analysis	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Confirmed	<input type="checkbox"/> Rejected	<input type="checkbox"/> Ambiguous
Assumption 14	fsQCA analysis	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Confirmed	<input type="checkbox"/> Rejected	<input type="checkbox"/> Ambiguous
Assumption 15	fsQCA analysis	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Confirmed	<input type="checkbox"/> Rejected	<input type="checkbox"/> Ambiguous
Assumption 16	fsQCA analysis	<input type="checkbox"/> Confirmed	<input type="checkbox"/> Rejected	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Ambiguous
Assumption 17	fsQCA analysis	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Confirmed	<input type="checkbox"/> Rejected	<input type="checkbox"/> Ambiguous
Assumption 18	fsQCA analysis	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Confirmed	<input type="checkbox"/> Rejected	<input type="checkbox"/> Ambiguous
Assumption 19	fsQCA analysis	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Confirmed	<input type="checkbox"/> Rejected	<input type="checkbox"/> Ambiguous
Assumption 20	fsQCA analysis	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Confirmed	<input type="checkbox"/> Rejected	<input type="checkbox"/> Ambiguous
Assumption 21	fsQCA analysis	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Confirmed	<input type="checkbox"/> Rejected	<input type="checkbox"/> Ambiguous

Table 46: The findings from statistical analyses and fsQCA about factors

Factors	Statistical analysis findings	fsQCA findings
LATI	There is a relationship between the provision of latitudes of interpretation within the respective legal norms and the degree of policy compliance. If the provision of latitudes of interpretation is not given, the degree of policy compliance will be better.	The absence of latitudes of interpretation within the respective legal norms is a necessary but not sufficient condition for policy compliance. The absence of latitudes must combine with other conditions to foster policy compliance. In contrast, the presence of latitudes is part of a complex configuration linked to policy non-compliance.
LESA	There is a relationship between the severity of legal sanctions and the degree of policy compliance. If the severity of legal sanctions is given, the degree of policy compliance will be better.	The severity of legal sanctions is a necessary but not sufficient condition for policy compliance. The severity of legal sanctions must combine with other conditions to foster policy compliance. In contrast, the absence of legal sanctions is part of a complex configuration linked to policy non-compliance.
FINA	There is a relationship between the availability of financial resources for policy implementation on the side of the external norm addressees and the degree of policy compliance (however, the impact of this factor should have further studies).	The availability of financial resources is a trivial condition but it is indispensable in the multi-pathway to policy compliance. There is no evidence to prove that the unavailability of financial resources is part of a complex configuration linked to policy non-compliance. The impact of this condition should have further studies.

UNION	There is <i>no</i> statistically significant relationship between the intervention of interest groups and the degree of policy compliance.	The intervention of interest groups like the active fight of the trade union is <i>not</i> a necessary condition for policy compliance. However, lacking the intervention of interest groups is part of a complex configuration linked to policy non-compliance.
INFO	There is <i>no</i> statistically significant relationship between the information level of policy targets about policies and the degree of policy compliance.	A good perception of the policy targets about policies is <i>not</i> a necessary condition for compliance. However, lacking information is part of a complex configuration linked to policy non-compliance.
DISP	There is a relationship between the dispositions of the external norm addressees towards the policy at stake and the degree of policy compliance. The more supportive the disposition of the external norm addressee is, the better is the degree of policy compliance.	The supportive disposition of the external norm addressees towards the policy at stake is a necessary but not sufficient condition for policy compliance. Their supportive disposition must combine with other conditions to foster policy compliance. In contrast, the obstructive disposition of the external norm addressees towards the policy at stake is part of a complex configuration linked to policy non-compliance.
PUBLIC	There is <i>no</i> statistically significant relationship between the ownership characteristic of the norm addressees and the degree of policy compliance.	The characteristic of the norm addressees being in public ownership is <i>not</i> a necessary condition for policy compliance. The multi-causal pathways to policy compliance between the two sectors are the same. However, the multi-causal pathways of policy non-compliance in the private sector are more complex than in the public sector.

In conclusion and surprisingly, although Vietnam is lacking an effectively functioning public administration in the studied policy field, factors that usually rely heavily on an effectively functioning public administration seem to be important for successful, i.e. compliant implementation. Even the assumption that a kind of substitutional organization like unions could fulfill the function of public administrations proved to be wrong. Thus, without any organization in charge of an active implementation, some of the legal provisions have been applied successfully, and this success can partly be explained by clear and sanctioned legal provisions. This finding that is contrary to what we expect from previous studies that have mostly been conducted in the context of western industrialist countries needs further reflection. My study has pointed out that given sanctions and clear legal provisions without any latitudes of interpretation strongly communicate a steering impulse to the compliant behavior of the external norm addressees. My findings strongly support the previously given view of May that “well-designed policies are necessary but not sufficient for improving implementation prospects” (May 2003: 231). It also means that a well-designed policy will be getting ineffective if it is implemented in an inappropriate way to address the policy problem. In this mixed situation, the other factors contributing to success seem to play an important role. While the status of the availability of financial resources on the side of the external norm addressees is unclear (further research needed), positive dispositions of the external norm addressees towards the policy at stake make together with clear and sanctioned legal provisions a difference.

The findings of this study have policy implications in providing an understanding of the multicausal pathways to compliance and non-compliance in developing countries. They can be seen as action models that are meaningful for policy-makers in designing effective regulations and strategies to foster compliance. Finally, the aim to enhance the discussion and development of analytical frameworks that are better adapted to the needs of developing countries than before could be driven a bit further.

8.2. Recommendations

The preliminary results of this dissertation have important consequences for developing countries that regularly lack effective public administration. Accordingly, it should be possible to substitute a lack of effective public administration with alternative factors like the supportive disposition of the norm addressees and probably the availability of financial resources. Equally important, policy compliance needs to be enhanced by giving clearly formulated regulations and substantial sanctions for non-compliance. However, given the current capacity of public administration, these regulations are not the basis for active implementation. Instead, they help to clearly and strongly communicate the will of the legislator. Certainly, the aim should be to build up an effective public administration capable of carrying out the necessary checks on businesses. However, as long as this is not the case, the analysis points to an alternative path: an attempt could be made to promote effective implementation of regulations by encouraging positive dispositions on the part of the external norm addressees. To this end, information and persuasion programs could be used, as discussed in the literature.

As can also be seen from the research results, the trade unions still play a vague role in policy implementation. At first sight, this is surprising and asks for more research on the topic. Trade unions could have a bigger voice in policy implementation because their mission is to fight for the basic rights and benefits of workers. Trade unions could be made more independent from the control of the employers by granting them more rights. If the unions are stronger and more autonomous, they could provide a stronger counterweight against the employers. However, this would require that they always stand up for the interests of the employees and do not allow themselves to be politically appropriated. Since this last condition, in particular, will not always be met, increased recourse to the trade unions remains a dubious undertaking.

The findings and recommendations above can make a useful contribution to fine-tuning policies for female workers. They can help implementers and stakeholders to minimize disruptive tensions associated with implementation deficits so as to match policy expectations, gradually reducing gender inequality in the labor market, enhancing the efficiency of state management as well as meeting the actual development conditions of Vietnam in the context of global integration.

In following the third generation approach, my research provides a theoretical contribution to the field of policy implementation in such a way that the application of any policy implementation schools (top-down, bottom-up, or synthesis) should be based on the context of policy implementation. Furthermore, the research contributes to the literature on the methodology in the social sciences. Using simultaneously both statistical analyses and fsQCA is a way to test assumptions more validly than using only one. Each methodology approach has its own merits and demerits. While the statistical approach that is used as an effects-of-causes approach can help to explore the relationship between variables as well as their direction, the fsQCA approach strives for a comprehensive explanation of the complex causality configuration under which the outcome occurs. This study contributes to affirm the advantages of using the methodology of fsQCA as a case-oriented and set-theoretic approach (Ragin 2008; Schneider and Wagenmann 2012; Pattyn et al. 2017; GerritsandVerweij 2018; Thomann 2019). Clearly, fsQCA leads to a more comprehensive understanding of the factors under which the outcome occurs than does statistical analyses. In summary, using multiple methods in research is a prudent way to test assumptions under different lenses, which can make research more systematic and transparent.

8.3. Limitation and further research

Under the pressure of the given financial budget and the width of the research area, and the partial unwillingness of the actors in the policy field to be

studied systematically, several limitations of this study are inevitable. Firstly, in order to be parsimonious, only a selected number of explanatory factors could be included. While 84 cases are already giving a good empirical basis for analysis “the ‘too few cases/too many variables’ problem” (Goggin 1986: 328) must always be observed. In consideration of the given limitations and the result of my study, the number and the selection of cases seem to be at least not harmful. Admittedly, having done 84 case studies seems to be even a lot but this number is not enough to generalize and to robust the findings. Secondly, with respect to doing the interviews, it has to be indicated that it was not always possible to conduct them with the respective civil servant in charge and/or the unionist. While this is unsatisfactory, it underlines the finding that public administration does in the best of cases seldomly influences the outcome of an implementation process. With respect to the unionist, it indicates that the union has no strong impact on the implementation of the female labor law. Interviewing the employers was most of the time a challenge because they always felt to be in a defensive situation. They deliberately blocked internal information, ignored sensitive questions, or provided digressive answers. Thus, interviewing the employers required a lot of time, effort, and the art of indirectly questioning to delve into information. Anyway, collecting information from the employers is only considered as one in altogether four reference channels. Certainly, in order to get valid data, this study mainly focused on interviewing female employees and aggregated their answers with those of unionists (if given) and employers. Sometimes, the interviewer struggled with contradictions among answers. Thus, finding an accurate answer for some of the questions was not always easy and might have resulted in a disputable answer. However, by and large, the necessary information to reconstruct a case could be gathered partly due to the same cultural background and the same native language of the interviewer and the interviewees.

Thirdly, some of the empirical results ask for further research. According to the current research results, the availability of financial resources for policy

compliance (FINA) is detected as trivial. However, it is impossible to ensure that this is not due to a specific data distribution that might have shown up by chance and not because of a systematic relation. To overcome the limitation further research should be conducted for which cases should be drawn upon with a greater variance of the availability of financial resources. Besides, the sufficient combination of conditions \sim DISP* \sim UNION* \sim INFO leading to a negative outcome indicates that the existence of an active union and given information of the employees about the content of the respective policy have some influence on non-compliance however not on compliance. Also, the existence of the condition UNION in the pathway leading to non-compliance in the public sector and the condition INFO in the pathway leading to non-compliance in the private sector provokes some speculations about the quality of the trade unions and the policy perception of female workers. However, since QCA does not really support any of such speculations, this result asks for more research on the aspects. If this should be verified by further research if a good strategy to support implementation – given the current context – would be to strengthen the positive disposition toward the policies at stake. As already mentioned, this might be done by referring to information and persuasion (cf. Dose 2008: 308-349).

Finally, future studies could conduct similar research on different policies in the same field for validation and also in additional policy fields in order to detect if the findings are also valid e.g. for the equally important area of environmental protection.

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Appendix

Table A. 1. Female employees in 14 organizations in the public sector (labeled C1 to C14) and 14 organizations in the private sector (labeled C15 to C28)

Code of organizations	Sector	Total number of workers (men:women)	Rate of women (%)	Field of work	Location
C1	Public	125 (55:70)	56	Education	Ha Noi
C2	Public	54 (44:10)	19	Construction	Hue
C3	Public	350 (116: 234)	67	Health Service	Da Nang
C4	Public	1270 (700:570)	45	Environment	Da Nang
C5	Public	569 (398:171)	30	Telecommunication	Ha Noi
C6	Public	160 (145:15)	9	Steel Production and Sales	Hai Phong
C7	Public	298 (213:85)	29	Insurance	Ha Noi
C8	Public	>1000 women	60	Confectionary Manufacturer	Ha Noi
C9	Public	40 (0:40)	100	Education	Hai Phong
C10	Public	> 150 women	45	Newspaper Distribution	Ha Noi
C11	Public	85 (7:78)	92	Education	Ha Noi
C12	Public	82 (42:40)	49	Public Media	Ha Noi
C13	Public	11 (0:11)	100	Publisher	Ha Noi
C14	Public	18 (3:15)	83	Library	Ha Noi
C15	Private	43 (28:15)	35	Software Development and Sales	Ho Chi Minh City
C16	Private	48 (28:20)	42	Printing	Hue
C17	Private	20 (7:13)	65	Sport Service	Hue
C18	Private	49 (2:47)	96	Education	Da Nang
C19	Private	474 (328:146)	31	Commerce and Tourism	Ha Noi
C20	Private	15 (2:13)	87	Catering Service	Ho Chi Minh City
C21	Private	27 (3:24)	89	Spa and Comestic Sales	Ha Noi
C22	Private	45 (24:21)	47	Buidling	Ha Noi
C23	Private	857 (457:360)	42	Finance - Securities	Ha Noi
C24	Private	31 (22:9)	29	Metal andOres Sales	Hai Phong
C25	Private	>1000 women	92	Footwear Manufacturer	Hai Phong
C26	Private	17 (15:2)	12	Construction and Consultant	Ha Noi
C27	Private	15 (13:2)	13	Software Development and Sales	Ha Noi
C28	Private	23 (11:12)	52	Medical Equipment Sales	Ho Chi Minh City

Source: Data were collected in the survey at the end of 2016 and the beginning of 2017 in Vietnam.

Table A.2. Data Matrix for making use of the Pearson chi-square tests

N	CaseID	LATI	LESA	FINA	UNION	INFO	DISP	PUBLIC	COMPLIANCE
1	P1C1	0	1	4	1	1	1	1	1
2	P1C2	0	1	4	1	1	1	1	1
3	P1C3	0	1	4	1	0	1	1	1
4	P1C4	0	1	4	1	1	1	1	1
5	P1C5	0	1	4	1	1	1	1	1
6	P1C6	0	1	4	1	0	1	1	1
7	P1C7	0	1	4	1	0	1	1	1
8	P1C8	0	1	4	0	0	1	1	1
9	P1C9	0	1	4	0	0	1	1	1
10	P1C10	0	1	4	0	0	1	1	1
11	P1C11	0	1	4	1	1	1	1	1
12	P1C12	0	1	4	1	1	1	1	1
13	P1C13	0	1	4	1	1	1	1	1
14	P1C14	0	1	4	1	1	1	1	1
15	P1C15	0	1	4	0	1	1	0	1
16	P1C16	0	1	4	0	0	0	0	0
17	P1C17	0	1	4	0	0	1	0	1
18	P1C18	0	1	4	1	0	1	0	1
19	P1C19	0	1	4	1	1	1	0	1
20	P1C20	0	1	4	0	0	0	0	0
21	P1C21	0	1	4	0	1	0	0	0
22	P1C22	0	1	4	0	0	0	0	0
23	P1C23	0	1	4	1	1	1	0	1
24	P1C24	0	1	4	0	0	0	0	0
25	P1C25	0	1	4	0	0	1	0	1
26	P1C26	0	1	4	0	0	0	0	0
27	P1C27	0	1	4	1	1	1	0	1
28	P1C28	0	1	4	1	0	1	0	1
29	P2C1	0	1	4	1	1	1	1	1
30	P2C2	0	1	4	1	1	1	1	1
31	P2C3	0	1	4	1	0	1	1	1
32	P2C4	0	1	4	1	1	1	1	1
33	P2C5	0	1	4	1	1	1	1	1
34	P2C6	0	1	4	1	0	1	1	1
35	P2C7	0	1	4	1	0	1	1	1
36	P2C8	0	1	4	0	0	1	1	1
37	P2C9	0	1	4	0	0	1	1	1
38	P2C10	0	1	4	0	0	1	1	1
39	P2C11	0	1	4	1	1	1	1	1
40	P2C12	0	1	4	1	1	1	1	1
41	P2C13	0	1	4	1	1	1	1	1
42	P2C14	0	1	4	1	1	1	1	1
43	P2C15	0	1	4	0	1	1	0	1
44	P2C16	0	1	4	0	0	1	0	1
45	P2C17	0	1	4	0	0	1	0	1
46	P2C18	0	1	4	1	0	1	0	1
47	P2C19	0	1	4	1	1	1	0	1
48	P2C20	0	1	4	0	0	1	0	1

49	P2C21	0	1	4	0	1	1	0	1
50	P2C22	0	1	4	0	0	1	0	1
51	P2C23	0	1	4	1	1	1	0	1
52	P2C24	0	1	4	0	0	1	0	1
53	P2C25	0	1	4	0	0	1	0	1
54	P2C26	0	1	4	0	0	1	0	1
55	P2C27	0	1	4	1	1	1	0	1
56	P2C28	0	1	4	1	0	1	0	1
57	P3C1	1	0	3	1	1	1	1	0
58	P3C2	1	0	3	1	1	1	1	0
59	P3C3	1	0	3	1	0	0	1	0
60	P3C4	1	0	4	1	1	1	1	0
61	P3C5	1	0	3	1	1	0	1	0
62	P3C6	1	0	3	1	0	1	1	0
63	P3C7	1	0	3	1	0	1	1	0
64	P3C8	1	0	4	0	0	1	1	0
65	P3C9	1	0	4	0	0	1	1	0
66	P3C10	1	0	4	0	0	1	1	1
67	P3C11	1	0	4	1	0	1	1	1
68	P3C12	1	0	3	1	1	1	1	0
69	P3C13	1	0	3	1	1	1	1	0
70	P3C14	1	0	3	1	1	1	1	0
71	P3C15	1	0	3	0	1	1	0	0
72	P3C16	1	0	3	0	0	0	0	0
73	P3C17	1	0	3	0	0	1	0	0
74	P3C18	1	0	4	1	0	1	0	1
75	P3C19	1	0	3	1	1	1	0	0
76	P3C20	1	0	4	0	0	0	0	0
77	P3C21	1	0	4	0	1	0	0	0
78	P3C22	1	0	3	0	0	0	0	0
79	P3C23	1	0	3	1	1	1	0	0
80	P3C24	1	0	3	0	0	0	0	0
81	P3C25	1	0	4	0	0	0	0	0
82	P3C26	1	0	2	0	0	0	0	0
83	P3C27	1	0	3	1	1	1	0	0
84	P3C28	1	0	3	1	0	1	0	0

Source: Data were collected in the survey at the end of 2016 and the beginning of 2017 in Vietnam.

Notes: - 28 organizations are respectively coded from C1 to C28; P1 indicates the policy of periodic health check-ups for female employees; P2 indicates the policy of maternity leave; P3 indicates the policy of childcare support for female employees.

Table A.3. Data Matrix for making use of the Pearson correlation analysis and MRA

N	CASEID	LATI	LESA	FINA	UNION	INFO	DISP	PUBLIC	COMPLIANCE
1	PIC1	0	1	4	1	3	4	1	3
2	PIC2	0	1	4	1	3	4	1	3
3	PIC3	0	1	4	1	1	3	1	3
4	PIC4	0	1	4	1	3	4	1	3
5	PIC5	0	1	4	1	4	3	1	3
6	PIC6	0	1	4	1	2	4	1	3
7	PIC7	0	1	4	1	2	4	1	3
8	PIC8	0	1	4	0	2	4	1	3
9	PIC9	0	1	4	0	2	4	1	3
10	PIC10	0	1	4	0	2	4	1	3
11	PIC11	0	1	4	1	3	4	1	3
12	PIC12	0	1	4	1	3	4	1	3
13	PIC13	0	1	4	1	3	4	1	4
14	PIC14	0	1	4	1	3	4	1	4
15	PIC15	0	1	4	0	3	4	0	3
16	PIC16	0	1	4	0	2	2	0	2
17	PIC17	0	1	4	0	2	4	0	4
18	PIC18	0	1	4	1	2	4	0	3
19	PIC19	0	1	4	1	3	3	0	3
20	PIC20	0	1	4	0	2	2	0	1
21	PIC21	0	1	4	0	3	2	0	1
22	PIC22	0	1	4	0	2	1	0	1
23	PIC23	0	1	4	1	3	4	0	3
24	PIC24	0	1	4	0	2	1	0	1
25	PIC25	0	1	4	0	2	4	0	3
26	PIC26	0	1	4	0	2	1	0	1
27	PIC27	0	1	4	1	3	4	0	3
28	PIC28	0	1	4	1	2	4	0	3
29	P2C1	0	1	4	1	3	4	1	4
30	P2C2	0	1	4	1	3	4	1	4
31	P2C3	0	1	4	1	1	3	1	4
32	P2C4	0	1	4	1	3	4	1	4
33	P2C5	0	1	4	1	4	3	1	4
34	P2C6	0	1	4	1	2	4	1	4
35	P2C7	0	1	4	1	2	4	1	4
36	P2C8	0	1	4	0	2	4	1	4
37	P2C9	0	1	4	0	2	4	1	4

38	P2C10	0	1	4	0	2	4	1	4
39	P2C11	0	1	4	1	3	4	1	4
40	P2C12	0	1	4	1	3	4	1	4
41	P2C13	0	1	4	1	3	4	1	4
42	P2C14	0	1	4	1	3	4	1	4
43	P2C15	0	1	4	0	3	4	0	4
44	P2C16	0	1	4	0	2	3	0	4
45	P2C17	0	1	4	0	2	4	0	4
46	P2C18	0	1	4	1	2	4	0	4
47	P2C19	0	1	4	1	3	3	0	4
48	P2C20	0	1	4	0	2	3	0	4
49	P2C21	0	1	4	0	3	3	0	4
50	P2C22	0	1	4	0	2	4	0	4
51	P2C23	0	1	4	1	3	4	0	4
52	P2C24	0	1	4	0	2	4	0	4
53	P2C25	0	1	4	0	2	4	0	4
54	P2C26	0	1	4	0	2	4	0	4
55	P2C27	0	1	4	1	3	4	0	4
56	P2C28	0	1	4	1	2	4	0	4
57	P3C1	1	0	3	1	3	4	1	1
58	P3C2	1	0	3	1	3	4	1	1
59	P3C3	1	0	3	1	1	2	1	1
60	P3C4	1	0	4	1	3	4	1	1
61	P3C5	1	0	3	1	4	1	1	1
62	P3C6	1	0	3	1	2	4	1	1
63	P3C7	1	0	3	1	2	4	1	1
64	P3C8	1	0	4	0	2	4	1	1
65	P3C9	1	0	4	0	2	4	1	1
66	P3C10	1	0	4	0	2	4	1	4
67	P3C11	1	0	4	1	2	4	1	4
68	P3C12	1	0	3	1	3	4	1	1
69	P3C13	1	0	3	1	3	4	1	1
70	P3C14	1	0	3	1	3	4	1	1
71	P3C15	1	0	3	0	3	4	0	1
72	P3C16	1	0	3	0	2	2	0	1
73	P3C17	1	0	3	0	2	4	0	1
74	P3C18	1	0	4	1	2	4	0	4
75	P3C19	1	0	3	1	3	3	0	1
76	P3C20	1	0	4	0	2	2	0	1
77	P3C21	1	0	4	0	3	2	0	1
78	P3C22	1	0	3	0	2	1	0	1
79	P3C23	1	0	3	1	3	4	0	1

80	P3C24	1	0	3	0	2	1	0	1
81	P3C25	1	0	4	0	2	1	0	1
82	P3C26	1	0	2	0	2	1	0	1
83	P3C27	1	0	3	1	3	4	0	1
84	P3C28	1	0	3	1	2	4	0	1

Source: Data were collected in the survey at the end of 2016 and the beginning of 2017 in Vietnam.

Notes: - 28 organizations are respectively coded from C1 to C28; P1 indicates the policy of periodic health check-ups for female employees; P2 indicates the policy of maternity leave; P3 indicates the policy of childcare support for female employees.

Table A.4. Data Matrix for making use of the fsQCA approach

N	CaseID	LATI	LESA	FINA	UNION	INFO	DISP	PUBLIC	COMPLIANCE
1	P1C1	0	1	1	1	0,67	1	1	0,67
2	P1C2	0	1	1	1	0,67	1	1	0,67
3	P1C3	0	1	1	1	0	0,67	1	0,67
4	P1C4	0	1	1	1	0,67	1	1	0,67
5	P1C5	0	1	1	1	1	0,67	1	0,67
6	P1C6	0	1	1	1	0,33	1	1	0,67
7	P1C7	0	1	1	1	0,33	1	1	0,67
8	P1C8	0	1	1	0	0,33	1	1	0,67
9	P1C9	0	1	1	0	0,33	1	1	0,67
10	P1C10	0	1	1	0	0,33	1	1	0,67
11	P1C11	0	1	1	1	0,67	1	1	0,67
12	P1C12	0	1	1	1	0,67	1	1	0,67
13	P1C13	0	1	1	1	0,67	1	1	1
14	P1C14	0	1	1	1	0,67	1	1	1
15	P1C15	0	1	1	0	0,67	1	0	0,67
16	P1C16	0	1	1	0	0,33	0,33	0	0,33
17	P1C17	0	1	1	0	0,33	1	0	1
18	P1C18	0	1	1	1	0,33	1	0	0,67
19	P1C19	0	1	1	1	0,67	0,67	0	0,67
20	P1C20	0	1	1	0	0,33	0,33	0	0
21	P1C21	0	1	1	0	0,67	0,33	0	0
22	P1C22	0	1	1	0	0,33	0	0	0
23	P1C23	0	1	1	1	0,67	1	0	0,67
24	P1C24	0	1	1	0	0,33	0	0	0
25	P1C25	0	1	1	0	0,33	1	0	0,67
26	P1C26	0	1	1	0	0,33	0	0	0
27	P1C27	0	1	1	1	0,67	1	0	0,67
28	P1C28	0	1	1	1	0,33	1	0	0,67
29	P2C1	0	1	1	1	0,67	1	1	1
30	P2C2	0	1	1	1	0,67	1	1	1
31	P2C3	0	1	1	1	0	0,67	1	1
32	P2C4	0	1	1	1	0,67	1	1	1
33	P2C5	0	1	1	1	1	0,67	1	1
34	P2C6	0	1	1	1	0,33	1	1	1
35	P2C7	0	1	1	1	0,33	1	1	1
36	P2C8	0	1	1	0	0,33	1	1	1
37	P2C9	0	1	1	0	0,33	1	1	1
38	P2C10	0	1	1	0	0,33	1	1	1
39	P2C11	0	1	1	1	0,67	1	1	1

40	P2C12	0	1	1	1	0,67	1	1	1
41	P2C13	0	1	1	1	0,67	1	1	1
42	P2C14	0	1	1	1	0,67	1	1	1
43	P2C15	0	1	1	0	0,67	1	0	1
44	P2C16	0	1	1	0	0,33	0,67	0	1
45	P2C17	0	1	1	0	0,33	1	0	1
46	P2C18	0	1	1	1	0,33	1	0	1
47	P2C19	0	1	1	1	0,67	0,67	0	1
48	P2C20	0	1	1	0	0,33	0,67	0	1
49	P2C21	0	1	1	0	0,67	0,67	0	1
50	P2C22	0	1	1	0	0,33	1	0	1
51	P2C23	0	1	1	1	0,67	1	0	1
52	P2C24	0	1	1	0	0,33	1	0	1
53	P2C25	0	1	1	0	0,33	1	0	1
54	P2C26	0	1	1	0	0,33	1	0	1
55	P2C27	0	1	1	1	0,67	1	0	1
56	P2C28	0	1	1	1	0,33	1	0	1
57	P3C1	1	0	0,67	1	0,67	1	1	0
58	P3C2	1	0	0,67	1	0,67	1	1	0
59	P3C3	1	0	0,67	1	0	0,33	1	0
60	P3C4	1	0	1	1	0,67	1	1	0
61	P3C5	1	0	0,67	1	1	0	1	0
62	P3C6	1	0	0,67	1	0,33	1	1	0
63	P3C7	1	0	0,67	1	0,33	1	1	0
64	P3C8	1	0	1	0	0,33	1	1	0
65	P3C9	1	0	1	0	0,33	1	1	0
66	P3C10	1	0	1	0	0,33	1	1	1
67	P3C11	1	0	1	1	0,33	1	1	1
68	P3C12	1	0	0,67	1	0,67	1	1	0
69	P3C13	1	0	0,67	1	0,67	1	1	0
70	P3C14	1	0	0,67	1	0,67	1	1	0
71	P3C15	1	0	0,67	0	0,67	1	0	0
72	P3C16	1	0	0,67	0	0,33	0,33	0	0
73	P3C17	1	0	0,67	0	0,33	1	0	0
74	P3C18	1	0	1	1	0,33	1	0	1
75	P3C19	1	0	0,67	1	0,67	0,67	0	0
76	P3C20	1	0	1	0	0,33	0,33	0	0
77	P3C21	1	0	1	0	0,67	0,33	0	0
78	P3C22	1	0	0,67	0	0,33	0	0	0
79	P3C23	1	0	0,67	1	0,67	1	0	0
80	P3C24	1	0	0,67	0	0,33	0	0	0
81	P3C25	1	0	1	0	0,33	0	0	0

82	P3C26	1	0	0,33	0	0,33	0	0	0
83	P3C27	1	0	0,67	1	0,67	1	0	0
84	P3C28	1	0	0,67	1	0,33	1	0	0

Source: Data were collected in the survey at the end of 2016 and the beginning of 2017 in Vietnam.

Notes: - 28 organizations are respectively coded from C1 to C28; P1 indicates the policy of periodic health check-ups for female employees; P2 indicates the policy of maternity leave; P3 indicates the policy of childcare support for female employees.

Table A.5. Findings from the complex solution for Compliance

Frequency cut-off: 1	Raw	Unique	Consistency
Consistency cut-off: 0.916981	coverage	coverage	
~LATI*LESA*FINA*DISP	0.894178	0.894178	0.876302
Solution coverage: 0.894178			
Solution consistency: 0.876302			

Note: ~ indicates the absence of a condition.

Table A.6. Findings from the parsimonious solution for Compliance

Frequency cut-off: 1	Raw	Unique	Consistency
Consistency cut-off: 0.916981	coverage	coverage	
LESA*DISP	0.894178	0.894178	0.876302
Solution coverage: 0.894178			
Solution consistency: 0.876302			

Table A.7. Findings from the complex solution for Non-compliance

Frequency cut-off: 1	Raw	Unique	Consistency
Consistency cut-off: 0.788009	coverage	coverage	
LATI*~LESA*FINA	0.497834	0.38928	0.859748
LATI*~LESA*~DISP*~UNION*~INFO	0.117759	0.00920415	1
~LATI*LESA*FINA*~DISP*~UNION*~INFO	0.099621	0.099621	0.788009
Solution coverage: 0.606659			
Solution consistency: 0.848864			

Note: ~ indicates the absence of a condition.

Table A.8. Findings from the parsimonious solution for Non-compliance

Frequency cut-off: 1	Raw	Unique	Consistency
Consistency cut-off: 0.788009	coverage	coverage	
~DISP*~INFO	0.262317	0.117488	0.854497
~LESA	0.676773	0.531944	0.892857
Solution coverage: 0.794261			
Solution consistency: 0.863195			

Note: ~ indicates the absence of a condition.

Table A.9. Truth table for the outcome COMPLIANCE in the public sector

LATI	LESA	FINA	DISP	UNION	INFO	number	COMPLIANCE	raw consist.	PRI consist.	SYM consist
0	1	1	1	1	1	16	1	1	1	1
0	1	1	1	0	0	6	1	1	1	1
0	1	1	1	1	0	6	1	1	1	1
1	0	1	1	0	0	3	0	0.333333	0.333333	0.333333
1	0	1	1	1	0	3	0	0.155093	0.155093	0.155093
1	0	1	1	1	1	6	0	0.0658683	0.0658683	0.0658683
1	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0
1	0	1	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	0

Table A.10. Truth table for the outcome COMPLIANCE in the private sector

LATI	LESA	FINA	DISP	UNION	INFO	number	COMPLIANCE	raw consist.	PRI consist.	SYM consist
0	1	1	1	1	1	6	1	1	1	1
0	1	1	1	1	0	4	1	1	1	1
0	1	1	1	0	0	9	1	0.917603	0.905983	0.905983
0	1	1	1	0	1	3	1	0.889447	0.86747	0.86747
0	1	1	0	0	1	1	0	0.398792	0.332215	0.332215
1	0	1	1	1	0	2	0	0.287554	0.287554	0.287554
0	1	1	0	0	0	5	0	0.282655	0.228111	0.228111
1	0	1	1	1	1	3	0	0.123596	0.123596	0.123596
1	0	1	0	0	0	5	0	0	0	0
1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0
1	0	1	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0
1	0	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0
1	0	1	1	0	1	1	0	0	0	0

Table A.11. Truth table for the outcome COMPLIANCE (with adding the condition PUBLIC)

LATI	LESA	FINA	UNION	INFO	DISP	PUBLIC	number	COMPLIANCE	raw consist.	PRI consist.	SYM consist
0	1	1	1	1	1	1	16	1	1	1	1
0	1	1	1	1	1	0	6	1	1	1	1
0	1	1	0	0	1	1	6	1	1	1	1
0	1	1	1	0	1	1	6	1	1	1	1
0	1	1	1	0	1	0	4	1	1	1	1
0	1	1	0	0	1	0	9	1	0.917603	0.905983	0.905983
0	1	1	0	1	1	0	3	1	0.889447	0.86747	0.86747
0	1	1	0	1	0	0	1	0	0.398792	0.332215	0.332215
1	0	1	0	0	1	1	3	0	0.333333	0.333333	0.333333
1	0	1	1	0	1	0	2	0	0.287554	0.287554	0.287554
0	1	1	0	0	0	0	5	0	0.282655	0.228111	0.228111
1	0	1	1	0	1	1	3	0	0.155093	0.155093	0.155093
1	0	1	1	1	1	0	3	0	0.123596	0.123596	0.123596
1	0	1	1	1	1	1	6	0	0.0658683	0.0658683	0.0658683
1	0	1	0	0	0	0	5	0	0	0	0
1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0
1	0	1	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0
1	0	1	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0
1	0	1	0	1	1	0	1	0	0	0	0
1	0	1	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0
1	0	1	1	1	0	1	1	0	0	0	0

Table A.12. Truth table for the outcome NON-COMPLIANCE in the public sector

LATI	LESA	FINA	UNION	INFO	DISP	number	~COMPLIANCE	raw consist.	PRI consist.	SYM consist
1	0	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1
1	0	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1
1	0	1	1	1	1	6	1	0.934132	0.934132	0.934132
1	0	1	1	0	1	3	1	0.844907	0.844907	0.844907
1	0	1	0	0	1	3	0	0.666667	0.666667	0.666667
0	1	1	1	0	1	6	0	0.305556	0	0
0	1	1	0	0	1	6	0	0.246269	0	0
0	1	1	1	1	1	16	0	0.219269	0	0

Table A.13. Truth table for the outcome NON-COMPLIANCE in the private sector

LATI	LESA	FINA	UNION	INFO	DISP	number	~COMPLIANCE	raw consist.	PRI consist.	SYM consist
1	0	1	0	0	0	5	1	1	1	1
1	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1
1	0	1	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	1
1	0	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1
1	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
1	0	1	1	1	1	3	1	0.876404	0.876404	0.876404
0	1	1	0	0	0	5	1	0.788009	0.771889	0.771889
1	0	1	1	0	1	2	0	0.712446	0.712446	0.712446
0	1	1	0	1	0	1	0	0.700906	0.667785	0.667785
0	1	1	1	0	1	4	0	0.354077	0	0
0	1	1	1	1	1	6	0	0.308989	0	0
0	1	1	0	1	1	3	0	0.276382	0.13253	0.13253
0	1	1	0	0	1	9	0	0.205992	0.0940171	0.0940171

Table A.14. Truth table for the outcome NON-COMPLIANCE (with adding the condition PUBLIC)

LATI	LESA	FINA	UNION	INFO	DISP	PUBLIC	number	~COMPLIANCE	raw consist.	PRI consist.	SYM consist
1	0	1	0	0	0	0	5	1	1	1	1
1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1
1	0	1	0	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1
1	0	1	0	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	1
1	0	1	0	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1
1	0	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1
1	0	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1
1	0	1	1	1	1	1	6	1	0.934132	0.934132	0.934132
1	0	1	1	1	1	0	3	1	0.876404	0.876404	0.876404
1	0	1	1	0	1	1	3	1	0.844907	0.844907	0.844907
0	1	1	0	0	0	0	5	1	0.788009	0.771889	0.771889
1	0	1	1	0	1	0	2	0	0.712446	0.712446	0.712446
0	1	1	0	1	0	0	1	0	0.700906	0.667785	0.667785
1	0	1	0	0	1	1	3	0	0.666667	0.666667	0.666667
0	1	1	1	0	1	0	4	0	0.354077	0	0
0	1	1	1	1	1	0	6	0	0.308989	0	0
0	1	1	1	0	1	1	6	0	0.305556	0	0
0	1	1	0	1	1	0	3	0	0.276382	0.13253	0.13253
0	1	1	0	0	1	1	6	0	0.246269	0	0
0	1	1	1	1	1	1	16	0	0.219269	0	0
0	1	1	0	0	1	0	9	0	0.205992	0.0940171	0.0940171

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