

The Effect of Personal Integrity on International Cooperation: A Mixed Methods Approach to Human Behaviour in International Relations

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List of Abbreviations and Acronyms

BBC	British Broadcasting Cooperation
CEO	Chief Executive Officer
CINC	Composite Index of National Capability
COSO	Committee of Sponsoring Organisations of the Treadway Commission
CPI	Corruption Perception Index
DV	Dependent variable
ECOSOC	Economic and Social Council
IV	Independent variable
KMO	Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy
n.d.	no date
NGO	Non-governmental organisation
OLS	Ordinary least squares
p.	page
P-5	Five permanent members of the UNSC
PCA	Principal component analysis
PhD	Doctor of philosophy
pp.	pages
SDGs	Sustainable Development Goals
UN	United Nations
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

UNSC United Nations Security Council

US United States

WTO World Trade Organisation

1 Human behaviour in international cooperation: an introduction

Recently, two radically different personalities – the head of the Catholic Church, Pope Francis, and Academy Award-winning actor Leonardo DiCaprio – spoke out in favour of the same goal. Both identified climate change as one of the greatest challenges currently faced by global society and urged the international community and civil society to address it (Olivia Blair 2016; BBC 2018).

The danger of increasing climate change, as well as the need to control it, has not only been acknowledged by prominent members of society, as it has been widely recognised as one of the greatest contemporary challenges faced by civil society globally and has become one of the top issues on the international agenda (e.g. Fuelner 2015; Victor 2006, p. 91). However, climate change is not the only pressing issue that humanity faces. Human disasters brought about by conflict, famine, economic crises or public health issues have recently led to around 70 million people leaving their home countries (UNHCR 2019). Furthermore, there is a need to end poverty, promote gender equality and foster peace and security – to name only a few of the global challenges facing the contemporary world.

Solving these problems is not just in the interest of one country or region but is instead important to the entire international community. Climate change, for example, concerns everyone; it does not consider borders. The same holds true for the current refugee crisis. Even though developed countries have largely lived in peace and enjoyed stable economies for most of recent history, they are affected by displacement of people from afflicted regions through waves of refugees seeking asylum within their borders, which has led to a rise in right-wing populism. Consequently, many current challenges are global in nature or international, to say the least, and solving them is a common aim of many countries. As such, solving them will require global and international cooperation.

With regards to climate change, for example, the international community has taken several actions to address it, starting with the Stockholm

Conference in 1972 through to steps taken in more recent years, such as the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol or the consensus on the Paris Agreement. However, realising the agreed-upon goals seems to be difficult. Few countries have achieved the aims set out in the Paris Agreement to reduce global warming, and the United States of America (US), under the Trump administration, has even withdrawn from the Paris Agreement entirely (Erickson 2018). Climate change is not the only issue that requires international cooperation to solve. The European Union (EU), for example, has struggled for years to agree on a much-needed quota to manage the number of refugees taken in by each member country (Kirchner 2019). To summarise, the international community needs to cooperate in order to address urgent problems and achieve common aims; however, such international cooperation has seemed difficult to achieve in recent history.

When considering international cooperation in the light of international relations theory, most approaches predict difficulties in international cooperation. Classical international relations theory (e.g. Morgenthau 1948; Waltz 2010) finds only limited room for international cooperation by focusing on the state and system levels of international dynamics. These approaches paint a rational picture of foreign policy, emphasizing the importance of power and security, which, according to them, each state seeks to maximise. The consequence of this leviathanian view of the international political arena is that international cooperation intended to produce mutual benefits and achieve common goals does not exist. Currently, it is possible to observe some dynamics in international politics that support the arguments made by classical scholars in the field of international relations. The politics of the current President of the US, Donald Trump, for example, revert to embracing the demonstration of power, extortion and increasing security, for example, when regarding the wall that Trump plans to build on the U.S.-Mexican border or the current tensions between the US and Iran on the subject of nuclear weapons. When one considers right-wing populists in Europe, it becomes clear that they do not perceive that international cooperation towards common goals is advantageous for them, and they are therefore in favour of isolation.

Perhaps, then, realistic and neorealist views on international politics are accurate in some respects. However, they have one flaw: They fail to account for states' willingness to cooperate in pursuit of a common goal intended to solve problems faced by the global community, which can be observed today. Furthermore, they cannot explain the existence of the current international agenda for cooperation, as conducted by international organisations such as the United Nations (UN) and its Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), to name but one example.

Leaving the political level, when we consider our daily lives, cooperation seems to be common and not exceptional in friendships, relationships, work, the arts or sports. There is evidence from several academic disciplines that supports the claim that humans are skilled at cooperating and that cooperation towards a common aim has led humans to success over the course of history (e.g. Tomasello 2017; Melis 2016). Consequently, such findings are quite the opposite of what the classical theory on international relations claims. I argue that, in order to contribute to research on international politics in general and international cooperation for mutual advantage in particular (which is omitted by the classical approaches to international theory), it is important to include this individual level and the knowledge about humans' ability to cooperate that can be obtained from the research. This thesis does so by first investigating the effect of human behaviour in international relations; thereafter, it seeks to determine how human behaviour can influence international cooperation. Thus far, this approach has not been adopted in the academic field of international relations. Current research on international politics and international cooperation should be extended by the addition of a behavioural dimension, as Messner et al. (2016, p. 48) have argued. Following the suggestion that human beings are skilful co-operators and the call that Messner et al. make for further research this study aims to determine whether the individual characteristics (i.e. the human factor) of the people representing states in international negotiations and cooperation have an influence on the outcomes of cooperative endeavours in the international political arena. As such, it shifts the focus of the research on international politics away from the state or system level and

instead examines the level on which representatives act on behalf of states. I argue that this approach can contribute to explaining how international cooperation can emerge (as opposed to the explanation offered by the classical theory on international politics) and how it can be fostered. Consequently, the research questions that this work poses and seeks to answer are as follows: Does the human factor influence international political cooperation and if so, how?

Investigating the human factor can be difficult because human behaviour is highly complex. In order to reduce this complexity and make the subject easier to approach, this study mainly focuses on one attribute of human behaviour, namely integrity. The personal integrity of political actors can shape politics. A recent and prominent example of this is the case of Heinz-Christian Strache, the former Vice-Chancellor of Austria, who resigned from all of his positions in May 2019 after a video was made public in which he discussed unethical and partly illegal practices with the supposed niece of a Russian businessman. The disclosure of Strache's practices, which left much to be desired in terms of integrity, led to the collapse of the entire Austrian government (Pörksen 2019). This is an extreme example of how the personal integrity of a single political actor can shape politics. Although most cases are less severe and this example is not related to international politics, it demonstrates the need to investigate the behavioural dimension of politics with regards to the personal integrity of actors. This study does so by focusing on international politics and international cooperation in order to contribute to the fulfilment of one desideratum of international cooperation research.

To summarise, the paper is based on the following argument: In the classical theory of international relations, power and security are the systematic reference points of analysis. Therefore, the behavioural side plays no role or only a subordinate one. There is no room in classical theory for multilateral cooperation towards a common goal. This leads to explanation deficits with regards to the development of the agenda for global cooperation in the international arena, which has come to play an increasingly important role

globally because there are an increasing number of challenges that can only be overcome via collective and cooperative efforts to achieve common goals. However, the traditional view systematically excludes this. Therefore, this work takes into consideration the ability of actors to cooperate on common goals, since, as I argue, that represents a more fruitful point of reference for research on international politics than focusing on systemic approaches in times when multilateral cooperation to achieve common goals plays a prominent role in international politics. By using such an approach, the actors' behavioural level becomes important. Therefore, this thesis examines this behavioural level based on the findings of other academic fields, such as anthropology, which hold that people are skilled co-operators and that cooperation has been a basis for success and development throughout the history of mankind. Two questions arise when adopting this perspective: First, does the human factor influence international political cooperation? Second, if so, how does this mechanism work? This thesis seeks to answer these questions.

This study employs a mixed methods approach to attempt to answer the research question in the form of the use of both quantitative measures (statistical analyses) as well as qualitative tools (interviews and case studies). The empirical example is the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) because it is an important body for fostering international peace and security and facilitating international cooperation.

This thesis is structured as follows: The second chapter reviews the literature on the subject of international politics, focusing on the room it provides for international cooperation as well the space it leaves for investigating the human factor in international relations. It further examines game-theoretical approaches to cooperation and discusses contributions to human cooperation from academic disciplines other than international politics. The aim of this chapter is to situate this study within its academic context and to develop the research questions.

The third chapter describes the research strategy and presents the mixed methods approach adopted in this thesis. Moreover, it includes a description,

explanation and justification of the design of the empirical analyses conducted in this work.

The fourth chapter presents the quantitative empirical analyses. It establishes the null hypothesis and describes the methodological approach, the data used and the results of the statistical analyses. Moreover, this chapter discusses the results of the statistical analyses and draws related conclusions.

The fifth chapter presents the qualitative analyses; these are comprised of expert interviews with five current or former permanent representatives to the UN who also served on the UNSC at some point. Furthermore, the qualitative analyses include three brief case studies drawn from UNSC meetings.

The sixth chapter discusses the results of the empirical analyses (both quantitative and qualitative) and situates them in the context of the academic debate on international politics as well as international and human cooperation, as has been outlined in the literature review.

The last chapter provides a conclusion and highlights some limitations to the approach adopted, as well as potential avenues for future research.

2 International relations theories over time: the human factor in international politics

This chapter reviews and analyses the existing literature on international politics. It focuses on the extent to which previous research has considered the human factor in international politics. First, it analyses both the classical approaches and more current theories on international politics. It describes these approaches and then examines them with regards to the possibility they predict for international cooperation to emerge and the role the human factor plays in their depictions of international politics. Even though some of these theories are several decades old, such an analysis is important because they remain prevalent today and dominate the academic debate around international politics (Legro and Moravcsik 1999, p. 5).

As with all theories, those theories that attempt to explain international politics are based on assumptions about behaviour. Some of them refer to the behaviour of individuals, while others refer to the behaviour of states and other actors. This study focuses on the behaviour of individuals in international relations. For this reason, at this point, it is necessary to address the discussion of classical approaches to international politics to determine which contributions with regard to behavioural assumptions the classical theories have made and to what extent these also include assumptions about individuals' behaviour.

This first part of the literature review shows that the classical theories of international politics only take the human factor into consideration in a limited manner, if at all. The underlying behavioural assumptions are pessimistic and do not allow for an analysis of the impact of personal characteristics, which are the focus of this study. Furthermore, only a limited number of classical theories consider the possibility of international cooperation occurring. In contrast, this thesis is based on the assumption that actors demonstrate both the ability and the willingness to cooperate, that actors exhibit a collective intentionality and that human beings have idiosyncratic characteristics. In addition, it takes into

account the behavioural option of moral conduct and focuses on the different roles of ambassadors in international relations.

In the second part, game theoretical approaches to cooperation and international politics are assessed; here as well, the underlying behavioural assumptions are considered. The reason for this analysis is that game theory is a classic tool in explaining cooperation in many different academic fields, including international politics. In the second part, I also develop a game theoretical model that uses the tool to establish to what extent game theory can account for international cooperation on the *meso-level* of international cooperation. At this point, I introduce the term *meso-level* of international cooperation because it is employed several times in the following chapter and in this work as a whole. It was first introduced by Messner et al. (2013, p. 23), who defined it as the level of human beings (individuals or small groups) who negotiate on behalf of states. The game theoretical model reveals that the behavioural assumptions underlying game theory with regards to rationality and its narrow definition of self-interest or egoism are too one-sided to explain interactions between individuals on the meso-level of international cooperation.

Therefore, in the third part of this literature review, I consider research from other academic fields, such as behavioural science and anthropology, to establish how they assess the emergence of cooperation between human beings. This discussion shows that human beings are skilled in cooperating and that cooperation is even part of human nature. It is a practice that even primates use to promote common benefit and welfare. Furthermore, these disciplines acknowledge that humans vary in their ability to cooperate. These findings lay the basis for the behavioural assumptions used in this study, which state that humans, as a result of evolutionary development, are skilled at cooperating for mutual advantage and that actors can take the interests of others into account while pursuing their own. Personality and individual differences in human behaviour may also play a role in shaping international cooperation.

With these findings from other academic disciplines in mind, it is puzzling why international cooperation is so difficult to achieve when it is people, with their bias for cooperation, who act in international politics. The

need to scientifically examine this behavioural aspect of international cooperation and the interplay between the personal and the state levels of ambassadors was established by Messner et al. (2016, p. 60). This study responds to this call for research in its later chapters, but it first establishes the theoretical basis upon which the rest of this work is based and provides the academic context for the empirical sections that follow.

2.1 International cooperation and the human factor in classical international relations theory

In 1932, Reinhold Niebuhr published his work *Moral Man and Immoral Society*, in which he states that, even though individuals can act on a moral basis, this is less likely when they are members of groups (e.g. national, economic). He states that ‘it is important to point out that men do possess, among other moral resources, a sense of obligation toward the good, as their mind conceives it’ (Niebuhr 1960, p. 37). He thus acknowledges the existence human morals as such. However, in his view, the morals of individuals are subsumed within the behaviour of social groups. The reason for this is that, in groups, there is

less reason to guide and to check impulses, less capacity for self-transcendence, less ability to comprehend the needs of others and therefore more unrestrained egoism than the individuals, who compose the group, reveal in their personal relationships.
(Niebuhr 1960, xii)

As such, he sees nations as selfish and incapable of taking into account interests other than their own (Niebuhr 1960, pp. 87–90). He identifies ‘one of the tragedies of the human spirit: its inability to conform its collective life to its individual ideals’ (Niebuhr 1960, p. 9).

Niebuhr devotes a significant part of his work to the behaviour and morals of human beings. As noted previously, he grants a certain degree of morality to individuals; however, this is lost when they form social groups. He consistently speaks of *the individual* and a moral basis or nature that every individual possesses. His underlying assumption concerning individual behaviour does not acknowledge the possibility that individuals might differ in nature and the extent to which they live by a moral code. As such, it does not

allow for the investigation of the impact of differences in human behaviour on political outcomes.

Based on this stance, he makes an assumption about groups and how they lose the ability to evaluate and understand the needs of others. However, he does not provide an answer to the question of what happens when a person acts on behalf of a group. He does not provide any insight into the fact that personal relationships (which he claims exists at an individual level) between individuals can also develop in international politics (e.g. on the meso-level of international cooperation), and how such relationships and the moral codes that they are based on then influence the international political arena.

Niebuhr's work was widely acknowledged, and many of the later realist scholars referred to his ideas and further developed them. However, the foundation of the realist school was laid many years before by Niccolò Machiavelli's *The Prince* (1513) and Thomas Hobbes' *Leviathan* (1651). Max Weber also contributed with his work, for example through his speech *Politics as a Vocation* (1919) (Jacobs 2010, pp. 40–41).

In Machiavelli's *The Prince* (1513), the concept of power is central; its acquisition and preservation are the focus of all state activity. However, Machiavelli does include the individual, the Prince himself, and his statesmen. The Prince himself must be able to show his inner beast whenever necessary, but he must also be able to show (even if it is only a pretence) his virtue, humanity and religiousness in order to assert his power over those whom he leads (Machiavelli 1513, pp. 98–101). Machiavelli also considers the importance of the choice of the Prince's statesmen and acknowledges that there are certain qualities that make a statesman effective. However, he also claims that the statesmen must not act in their own interest but should instead always act in accordance with those of the Prince. Considering Machiavelli's work in the context of the argument formulated in this thesis, it can be seen that he assigns a role to the human individual in politics and acknowledges that different individuals have different qualities.

Hobbes' *Leviathan* draws a pessimistic picture of man and the world in which he lives, as he is driven by desire, fear and reason. This leads to the world

being in a natural state of 'war of all against all' (Hobbes 1651, p. 115), which can only be overcome by a central power (the 'Leviathan'), under whose protection every individual can live in peace (Hobbes 1651, p. 155). It is obvious that Hobbes' underlying behavioural assumption is based on a pessimistic and egoistic understanding of human nature. More importantly, like Niebuhr, he also fails to acknowledge that individuals may have different characteristics, which may influence interactions and encounters. Indeed, he states that nature has gifted mankind more or less equally with respect to both physical power and intellectual abilities (Hobbes 1651, p. 112). This is the perspective from which, for Hobbes, the war of all against all becomes inevitable as a competition among equals. However, there is no acknowledgement of the fact that each human being has been gifted different attributes and characteristics. On the basis of these behavioural assumptions, an investigation into the roles of individuals and their personal attributes in and their contributions to international cooperation is not possible; therefore, they are not a suitable basis for the goal of this thesis.

In his speech *Politics as a Vocation*, Max Weber states that everyone involved in politics seeks power; therefore, his definition of politics is the pursuit of power. He considers rulership due to tradition, charisma and legality as concepts of legitimate government. He considers leadership through charisma to be when a leader has followers who believe in him based only on his personality and qualities (Weber 1958, pp. 495–496). Considering this type of rulership, it is important to note that while Weber considers power the centre of all political activities, he also admits that the individual personality of a leader can shape politics. In the context of this work, it becomes clear that, to a certain extent, Weber does include the human factor in his considerations.

Furthermore, Weber identifies three characteristics a politician should have: an objective passion, a sense of responsibility and a sense of proportion. He considers vanity the worst enemy of every politician because it works against the necessary characteristics of objectivity and proportion (Weber 1958, pp. 533–534). This again shows that Weber recognises that politicians' personalities are important and have the potential to shape politics. By defining three qualities that every politician should have, he inherently admits that not every person possesses these characteristics. Therefore, the behavioural

assumption he makes is a normative one. He does this while positioning the struggle for power at the centre of all political activities. Thus, he considers power crucial but takes politicians' characteristics into account.

Many scholars have addressed Hobbes' behaviour assumption about the selfishness of human nature and the anarchical nature of society that results, as well as Machiavelli and Weber's notions with regards to power, in the academic stream of realism. In general, realism explains international politics via the selfishness of human nature and the anarchic context in which the international political system functions, as there is no overarching regulatory power such as a government. Consequently, gaining power and maintaining security are the main objectives in any political activity (Donnelly 2013, p. 32). To put this into historical context, the realist school of thought developed shortly after World War II; its scholars disagreed with the so-called 'idealist view', which focused on promoting peace and cooperation after World War I but was abandoned only a few years later by the beginning of World War II.

For example, in his work *A Twenty Years' Crisis*, which was first published in 1939, Edward H. Carr demonstrates how the prevailing ideas of peace and cooperation among states after World War I were less attractive due to the chaos and insecurity that characterised the international arena in the following years. He describes the existence as well as the importance of power, competition and survival in international politics (Carr and Cox 2001), and also of morality (pp. 135–153). He believes that a state is built on two differing aspects of human nature: egoism on the one hand and sociability and good will on the other. Consequently, for him, politics is built on interests, as opposed to morals (Carr and Cox 2001, pp. 91–92).

The behavioural assumption he makes regarding human nature is more elaborate than Hobbes or Niebuhr's because it grants human nature both self-interest on the one hand and morals and altruism on the other. As such, his assumption is more nuanced than those of the authors discussed previously and does not simply acknowledge one of the two sides. However, it also does not find

room for the fact that individuals act on behalf of states, for example with regards to his claim regarding morality.

According to Carr, the days of monarchy and personal rule were the only times in which there was no need to differentiate between personal morality and state morality, as a ruler such as a monarch was also the state. In his eyes, this situation changed after state mechanisms became more complex and the state as an abstract actor developed its own morality. From this point on, individuals played less of a role. He acknowledges that it is possible to think of a basic state that consists of a group of individuals; however, political development required consolidated responsibility in the form of a state (Carr and Cox 2001, pp. 136–137). For theory-building, this seems to be a plausible and useful assumption to make; however, Carr neglects the fact that day-to-day international politics is managed by people acting on behalf of nations, and such people inherently differ in their personal interests, morals and backgrounds. As a result, he also does not make room for the potential impact of personality traits on the meso-level of international policy-making.

It is probably fair to say that Hans J. Morgenthau, along with his work *Politics among Nations*, is the most prominent representative of the realist argument. He aligns his view on human nature with Hobbes' and sees human beings as self-interested and power-seeking, with these attributes being rooted in their nature. Not only does he imply that human nature has negative attributes, he also considers it to be fixed: 'Human nature, in which the laws of politics have their roots, has not changed since the classical philosophies of China, India, and Greece endeavoured to discover these laws' (Morgenthau 1948, p. 4). Therefore, he describes human behaviour as being fixed in nature and over time. This assumption leaves no leeway for human behaviour in international politics and no room for personal relationships within international politics that might shape international relations since human nature, according to him, does not change.

Morgenthau's view of the nation is similar to what Carr describes. The following quotation, although somewhat lengthy, illustrates Morgenthau's argument quite clearly:

A nation as such is obviously not an empirical thing. A nation as such cannot be seen. What can be empirically observed are only the individuals who belong to a nation. Hence, a nation is an abstraction from a number of individuals who have certain characteristics in common, and it is these characteristics that make them members of the same nation. Besides being a member of a nation and thinking, feeling and acting in that capacity, the individual may belong to a church, a social or economic class, a political party, a family, and may think, feel, and act in these capacities. Apart from being a member of all these social groups, he is also a human pure and simple, and thinks, feels and acts in that capacity. Therefore, when we speak in empirical terms of the power or of the foreign policy of a certain nation, we can only mean the power or the foreign policy of certain individuals who belong to the same nation. (Morgenthau 1948, p. 97)

Here, it is interesting to note that Morgenthau recognises that a nation is comprised of a certain number of individuals, and only these individuals can be considered empirically. He states that individuals live and act in different groups. At this point, I wish to highlight that this is also the case for individuals who act in the international political arena. They are ambassadors, members of a family, and so forth. Thus, in his considerations, Morgenthau includes the view that people and ambassadors involved in international relations assume different roles, which is also one focus of this thesis. Morgenthau continues in this vein:

For a nation pursues foreign policies as a legal organisation called a state, whose agents act as representatives of the nation in international affairs. They speak for it, negotiate treaties in its name, define its objectives, choose the means for achieving them, and try to maintain, increase and demonstrate its power. They are the individuals who, when they appear as representatives of their nation on the international scene, wield the power and pursue the policies of their nation. It is to them that we refer when we speak in empirical terms of the power and of the foreign policy of a nation. (Morgenthau 1948, p. 98)

As the above quotation illustrates, he clearly notes the fact that the people who represent a nation are its “face” in the international arena, and he grants them the power of a nation. This is generally in line with the argument of this dissertation, which aims at investigating this meso-level of international politics. However, his pessimistic assumption regarding behaviour and human nature differs from the assumption made in this dissertation, which was mentioned in the introduction and is further elaborated upon in Chapter 2.3. Furthermore, this thesis does not argue that the statesmen representing nations are those who wield power, as the system works in such a manner that decision-making power is shared among different statesmen from one nation; this is true

not only between diplomats but also among public officials in their home countries.

Morgenthau transfers his leviathanian assumption concerning human nature to states and endows them with the same attributes (Morgenthau 1948, p. 53). Consequently, the main actors in international politics are states, and they constantly struggle to increase their power. As a result, international cooperation does not exist. For him, power is the key to understanding international politics (Morgenthau 1948, p. 33). He defines power as ‘the mutual relations of control among the holders of public authority and between the latter and the people at large’ (Morgenthau 1948, p. 26). From his perspective, the influence of one party over another can generally be derived from three sources: anticipation of benefits, fear of disadvantages and ‘the respect or love for men or institutions’ (Morgenthau 1948, p. 27). With respect to the last source, he then states:

Yet without taking into account the charisma of a man, such as Napoleon or Hitler, or of an institution, such as the Soviet Government or the United Nations, evoking trust and love through which the wills of men submit themselves to the will of such a man or institution, it is impossible to understand certain phenomena of international politics which have been particularly prominent in modern times.
(Morgenthau 1948, p. 27)

In contrast to the assumption regarding the fixed nature of human behaviour in his theory, at this point, Morgenthau allows for leaders who exert power over others through the use of their charisma. This is similar to one of the forms of rulership that Weber described (rulership due to charisma). Inherently, therefore, Morgenthau allows for differences among human beings and even acknowledges that individuals have had a remarkable influence on international politics in the past. His statements are therefore inconsistent within themselves and point towards the usefulness of investigating the human factor in international politics.

As discussed previously, Morgenthau strongly emphasises the concept of power in international politics. However, he not only aims to highlight the overarching role of power in international politics but also to explore the possibilities with regard to containing power. Therefore, he dedicates a large part of his *magnum opus* to balancing the power (Morgenthau 1948, 161 ff.).

Since power cannot be measured and calculated exactly and therefore cannot be compared, balancing power in the sense of two powerful opposing nations cannot lead to peace and stability by itself (Morgenthau 1948, pp. 201–205).

Furthermore, one prominent argument in Morgenthau's work is his negligence of a common will, the 'world public opinion', as a tool for balancing power. According to him, a common interest cannot exist because people live in different conditions and consequently must have different interests (Morgenthau 1948, pp. 250–60). This is contradictory to what can be observed in the world and in international politics today, which is a quest for cooperation in certain areas. In contrast to Morgenthau's assumption, we currently find several issues, such as the fight against global climate change and addressing the causes of refugee flight, that are concerns for all or many peoples and nations of the world. Therefore, it is also in the interest of all, or at least many, to address them. Even though one cannot refute academic theory and approaches with practical examples, we can see that Morgenthau's views do not include certain important aspects of international politics, above all efforts to cooperate via institutions, rules, standards and common goals.

For Morgenthau, morality is the element which keeps power at bay because it restrains certain actions and therefore leads to international stability and peace (Morgenthau 1948, p. 225). Consequently, Morgenthau views diplomacy, which is based on morals and a certain set of rules, as the only way to contain the struggle for power and maintain international peace: 'The continuing success of diplomacy in preserving peace depends [...] upon extraordinary moral and intellectual qualities that all the leading participants must possess' (Morgenthau 1948, p. 549). Thus, to maintain international peace, it is important to carefully select diplomatic personnel. In this regard, he acknowledges the importance of the human factor, at least in the maintenance of peace. This is in line with the aim of this thesis, which argues that, for international cooperation to be successful, it is necessary to investigate the impact of the human factor. If we equate international cooperation with peace, the empirical chapters of this study can to a certain degree contribute to an empirical analysis of Morgenthau's statement that diplomats possessed of high

moral standards and great intellectual qualities are key to maintaining international peace.

I have shown that the realist approach draws a rather pessimistic picture of international politics. The key message that can be derived from this observation is that international cooperation does not happen because nations constantly struggle for power to maintain their own security. Therefore, none of the approaches discussed above consider the establishment of international organisations to be valuable. Underlying this view is a pessimistic assumption regarding human behaviour, which is then transferred to the state level. The realist school is a rational approach to international politics, and, as such, it is a powerful tool with which to understand certain mechanisms within the international arena. However, considering the current need for international cooperation to solve global problems, the tools offered by realism are not entirely helpful.

Kenneth Waltz, the most prominent representative of the neorealist school of thought, considers Morgenthau and realist scholars in general as traditionalists who focus more on the 'units' that interact within the political system than on the system itself (Waltz 2010, p. 63). He developed a theory that shifts the focus away from the units towards the system in which they act. His theory is thus a system-focused approach to international politics; it states that outcomes in international politics cannot be theoretically explained by reducing them to the interacting units; instead, one must focus on the structure of the system (Waltz 2001, p. 62).

He argues for the usefulness of a system theory as follows:

By leaving aside the personality of actors, their behavior, and their interactions, one arrives at a purely positional picture of society. Three propositions follow from this. First, structures may endure while personality, behavior, and interactions vary widely. [...] Second, a structural definition applies to realms of widely different substances so long as the arrangements of parts is similar. Third, because this is so, theories developed for one realm may with some modification be applicable to other realms as well. (Waltz 2010, p. 82)

This quotation clearly notes that the personalities of actors, as well as their behaviour and interactions with each other, should be omitted when creating a system theory. One of the reasons for this omission is that personalities and

behaviours vary. Thus, he acknowledges that individuals might have different personalities, but he does not provide a basis for investigating the impact thereof on international politics. He further develops his argument and arrives at the assumption that states are 'like-units', and that, for the system theory, what distinguishes them from each other is not important (Waltz 2001, pp. 95–97, 2010, pp. 95–97). The only way in which they differ is in their capabilities, which also determine their place within the system (Waltz 2010, p. 99). All of the above, and especially the quotation above, is key in terms of relating Waltz's theory to the argument made in this dissertation, which advocates for the inclusion of personality and behaviour in academic research on international politics; to that end, it insinuates different behavioural assumptions. Waltz completely neglects to take the individual into account, and the two arguments are thus fundamentally opposed. However, they also have different goals. Waltz's goal is to establish a general theory of international politics, and, according to him, theories need to be abstracted in order to be universally applicable (Waltz 2010, pp. 1–3). This is not the purpose of this dissertation, which instead aims to determine the effect of human behaviour on international politics empirically.

With his neglect of the human factor, Waltz also contradicts Morgenthau and other realist scholars who see humanity's evil nature as the origin of all evil in international politics. Waltz had already argued that human nature cannot explain international politics some years earlier in his 1959 work *Man, the State, and War*. Here, he described approaches that attempt to explain the origins of war on the individual level as 'first images'.¹ Within that context, he presents what he calls the 'first-image optimists', who believe in the goodness of human nature and that this goodness can lead to international peace. He condemns them as naïve (Waltz 2001, p. 29). In contrast, he presents the 'first-image pessimists', such as Niebuhr and Morgenthau, who define human nature as evil. Waltz opposes them by arguing that the assumption of the evilness of human nature cannot explain periods of peace (Waltz 2001, p. 29). He claims that both optimists and pessimists attribute the emergence of conflict to a few

¹ The other two approaches are the structure of states (the second image) and international anarchy (the third image). I only discuss his views on the first image, as these relate to the purpose of this paper.

behavioural factors, and he does not see a way in which human nature or human behaviour can shape international politics. He considers this approach inductive (Waltz 2001, pp. 40–41). In this context, I advance two arguments: First, as Wieland states (2018, p. 47), one cannot per se assign people fixed positive or negative behavioural assumptions because much depends on an individual's framework conditions. Furthermore, since these framework conditions change over time, one's behavioural options must change as well. Briefly stated, people are neither wholly evil nor wholly good; rather, their behaviour changes. The frequency of these changes might also vary over a lifetime, resulting in someone exhibiting both moments of 'good' behaviour and moments of 'bad' behaviour. The degree to which one has more good or more bad moments varies among individuals. As such, a black-and-white view of human nature is not sufficient. Human behaviour is rather a tendency, an individual mark on the whole spectrum for every single person, which is also affected by external influences. This individuality could impact the way in which international politics is shaped on a personal level. Therefore, international relations theory should not disregard humans and their individual natures.

Second, I agree with Waltz on the inductive nature of the 'first image' and that one cannot draw conclusions about the impact of human nature on international politics because they cannot explain periods of war (first-image optimists) and peace (first-image pessimists). However, the behaviour of the players who act within the international political scene (as opposed to society in general) should be investigated with regards to the magnitude of their influence on international relations.

Returning to his *Theory of International Politics*, Waltz (2010, p. 88) further argues that the system in which the units act is anarchical, as there is no governing body. In this anarchical setting, states wish to maintain their security, and, to do so, they seek to increase their power. Therefore, imbalances in power, that pose a potential threat to the weaker parties, are levelled out, for example by the building of alliances (Waltz 2001, 118 & 166). This, according to Waltz, is the only form of international cooperation because the 'condition of insecurity works against their cooperation' (Waltz 2001, p. 105). As a whole, this assumes that military power and security are the main issues in the international order

and that all other topics are subsumed under these issues. This is not the case in the current global order, and there are indeed pressing issues on the agenda of international politics that go beyond power and security.

Waltz's underlying assumption of behaviour is the quest for power and security. This assumption solely includes the behaviour of states, not that of individuals. The conclusions he draws based on this assumption cannot explain international cooperation. This criticism has been brought forward also by Keohane and Nye (1977), which is discussed in more detail later in this study.

Waltz's theory is an important and powerful tool for explaining international relations because it abstracts the workings of international politics and therefore represents a deductive approach to analysing the international political scene. However, it places the focus on power and security and does not see any room for cooperation, which not only fails to reflect the real world but is also not helpful in explaining international cooperation. When facing challenges such as climate change, a theory that entirely rules out cooperation cannot provide insight into practitioner's struggle to achieve successful cooperation. As Keohane and Nye put it, 'Academic pens [...] leave marks in the minds of statesmen with profound results for policy' (1977, p.4).

John Mearsheimer further developed realistic theory in his work *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, which was first published in 2001. He argues that countries of great power seek to maximise the same in order to ensure their own security in the international political system. The reason for this pursuit of power is not inherent to states, as traditionalists suggest, but in the structure of the system itself, which is anarchic and lacks an overarching central authority (Mearsheimer 2014, pp. 53–54). In contrast to Waltz, Mearsheimer argues that states do not focus on achieving and maintaining the balance of power in the international system; rather, they continuously seek to increase their power in order to become the hegemon in the system ('offensive realism') (Mearsheimer 2014, p. 21).

Mearsheimer's theory of the international system acknowledges the existence of international cooperation, for example that great powers

sometimes create alliances to defeat a common enemy. However, he does not see international cooperation for shared goals. Furthermore, he makes it clear that cooperation does not cancel out the need for great powers to maximise security. As such, states that have cooperated can still go to war with each other after such cooperation (Mearsheimer 2014, pp. 50–53).

Mearsheimer's argument is based on several assumptions about state behaviour (Mearsheimer 2014, pp. 30–36); however, there are no underlying assumptions about human behaviour. One can therefore state that man does not appear at all in his reflections; individuals simply do not play a role.

Placing Mearsheimer's view in the context of current ideas concerning the emergence of international cooperation, Faust and Messner have acknowledged that it is possible that the focus on power in international politics indeed prevails today. If, however, the tendencies towards competition between states increase, it will become more difficult to address global problems by means of cooperation (Faust and Messner 2008, p. 34). Therefore, Mearsheimer's view is not helpful in analysing and investigating international cooperation intended to achieve common aims and address global challenges today.

(Neo-)Realist approaches are rational and systematic theories that attempt to explain international politics, and they are embedded in the events of their time and useful in explaining those events. In particular, Waltz' system theory, which has the aim of explaining and defining the mechanisms of international politics, is abstracted from reality. From an academic point of view, this is an elegant way of analysing events and outcomes. However, theory in general also has some implications for practitioners, and, with today's ever-increasing need for cooperation in the international arena, such theories are not helpful in investigating the development and existence of cooperation. This is because they ignore the agenda for international cooperation towards shared goals, which does exist in the international political scene. One such example is the UN's SDGs. Therefore, we need to shift our focus towards approaches that can explain cooperation and adapt them to the international political scene. As

such, it is important to consider other academic fields, which is done in Chapter 2.3 of this work. Nonetheless, doing so significantly contradicts Waltz's view:

Many have tried to explain international-political events in terms of psychological-factors or social-psychological phenomena or national political and economic characteristics. In at least some of these cases, the possibly germane factors are explained by theories of somewhat more power than theories of international politics have been able to generate. In no case, however, are those nonpolitical theories strong enough to provide reliable explanations or predictions. (Waltz 2010, p. 19)

Waltz's *Theory of International Politics* has been repeatedly criticised over the years. Points of criticism include his assumption of the state as 'like units', the anarchical setting of international politics and his definitions of structure, to name only a few (Masala 2014). In fact, as Masala has noted, it is common practice in academic work in the field of international relations to distance one's work from Waltz's theory before elaborating one's argument (Masala 2014, p. 21); I also adopt this common practice. However, I do so not because I agree with the general criticism of any of the parameters of his theory but instead because I aim to centre the human factor and the need for cooperation in the international setting and to evaluate it empirically by applying different assumptions about behaviour. The theory that Waltz developed does not allow this, which is why I distance my dissertation from his work.

One important criticism of realist theory has been advanced by scholars researching the idea of the interdependence among nations in international politics. Keohane and Nye, or more specifically their book *Power and Independence*, are considered central to the building of the concept of interdependence (Spindler 2010, p. 102). They advance the systemic approach to international politics, for which Waltz laid the foundation; however, they focus on the need to cooperate as a result of the interdependences that exist among nations. According to them, interdependences are connections and transactions between nations that involve costly effects. If there are no costly effects involved, they use the term interconnectedness (Keohane and Nye 1977, vii& 8–9). To be more precise, they state that the existing interdependences are complex and that power can arise from asymmetrical interdependence. In their

definition of complex interdependences, they criticise the (neo-)realist approach as follows: First (1977, pp.25–26), they state that complex interdependences are characterised by multiple channels, as opposed to interactions between overarching units only. These channels consist of many connections, such as ‘informal ties between governmental elites as well as formal foreign office arrangements; informal ties among non-governmental elites [...]; and transnational organizations’ (Keohane and Nye 1977, p. 24). According to the above quotation, Keohane and Nye acknowledge the fact that personal connections and relationships are part of complex global interdependences. My thesis builds on the interdependence approach, as it asks the question of how the different characteristics of the human beings who form these informal or formal networks shape international politics. However, this is a realm that Keohane and Nye do not address in their work.

Their second point of criticism of the (neo-)realist approach concerns the concept of a hierarchy of issues in the international political system that subsume all issues under military security. Keohane and Nye instead argue that there are manifold important issues, and security is not the most important of these (Keohane and Nye 1977, pp. 26–27). This provides a starting point for the argument developed in this dissertation, which attempts to establish the effect of one factor (i.e. the human factor) on international cooperation. The term ‘cooperation’ itself implies that international politics concerns not only security issues and military strength but also other important issues and shared goals.

Finally, Keohane and Nye criticise realists' emphasis on the prominent role of military force because the use of such force in international relations and the accompanying fear thereof have declined in recent decades. Furthermore, they claim that military force is often not useful in achieving nations' goals (e.g. economic aims). Their approach thus reflects reality more accurately than that of the realists, as most people living in the developed world do not constantly fear attacks from other countries. As Glaser notes, ‘the prospects of war between the globe's major powers is widely viewed as insignificant’ (Glaser 2010, p. 1).

From these three characteristics, the authors develop the ‘political processes of complex interdependence’ (Keohane and Nye 1977, p. 29), which implies that, within the complex interdependences that exist among nations,

states pursue many different goals within the international political arena. Furthermore, for countries with strong military power, it is more difficult to use this dominance because they are not dominant in all areas of international politics. Additionally, several transnational or national actors can pose problems and set agendas (Keohane and Nye 1977, pp. 30–35). Finally, according to the authors, these complex interdependencies and, in particular, the multiple channels within them give rise to the importance of international organisations because such institutions help to set the international agenda, identify priorities and build a framework in which state representatives meet and build alliances (Keohane and Nye 1977, p. 36). Keohane (2002, p. 34) also highlights the importance of international institutions. Considering this observation in the light of the present research and developing the argument of this thesis, it again becomes clear that Keohane and Nye state that international organisations bring together representatives; however, they do not make any statements about how the individual characteristics of and personal relationships among these representatives may shape the outcomes of encounters between them and therefore international politics as a whole.

Keohane (2002, pp. 34–35) clarifies that, in international institutions, it is the technocratic elites of national governments who act, lead and bargain; this is therefore not a democratic endeavour, as the public voice does not play a prominent role. In this context, Keohane acknowledges that there are individuals in charge of and acting on behalf of nations in international organisations, and, according to him, this is an important part of international politics. However, it is clear that he categorises them all as elitist technocrats and does not take individual attributes into account. He goes as far as to state the following:

If the terms of multilateral cooperation are to reflect the interests of broader democratic publics rather than just those of narrow élites, traditional patterns of delegation will have to be supplemented by other means of ensuring greater accountability to public opinion. (Keohane 2002, p. 35)

This implies that political elites have their own interests, which is a plausible statement. It also implies that the interests of the political elites are different from those of the broad public of a nation. In this context, it cannot be known whether the interests of every individual representative in international

organisations differ from those of the public and, if so, to what extent. Since representatives are human beings and human beings are inherently different, their interests must also differ somewhat. Thus, there must be some representatives who have the same interests as the broad public and others who do not. Finally, and on a more normative note, a good representative should always have the interests of the people at least at the back of his or her mind.

In summary, it can be said that interdependence theory does not proceed from power as central coding but rather from the pursuit of interests through cooperation. Thus, the corresponding behaviour assumption is based on the interests of individuals and groups. In this context, this study can easily be positioned close to the approach of interdependence because the latter allows for and perhaps even demands the integration of individual behaviour, even though the underlying behavioural assumption only concerns the behaviour of states (as opposed to that of individuals).

The notion of technocratic elites was established much earlier, although in a different context, when David Mitrany first published his work *A Working Peace System* in 1943. The main argument of his book is that the needs of the people of different nations should be the focus of and should be met through cross-border cooperation among experts. This cooperation should focus on different functions, as opposed to territories. To fulfil the aim of meeting the people's goals, questions of security and power need to lose their importance. According to Mitrany, this functions-based approach to cooperation ultimately leads to international peace (Conzelmann 2010, p. 160). Thus, Mitrany sees international cooperation as an important aspect of international politics. With regards to the leadership of the functions, Mitrany has stated that it should be undertaken by technocratic elites who are experts in their field, not by diplomatic or political institutions (Mitrany 1966, p. 63).

Again, Mitrany does see the possibility of and a need for cooperation and to focus such cooperation on urgent needs. This approach can easily be applied to current global challenges (e.g. climate change), as it seems plausible that cross-border cooperation with a common goal led by experts in this field can

foster changes intended to support the environment. In particular, the question of how the fight against global climate change can succeed in the context of international political and economic dynamics has recently been posed many times (Hirschfeld et al., p. 319; Messner and Weinlich 2016, p. 3). Thus, Mitrany contributes to answering this question by using the functional approach to international politics.

In terms of the human factor in international politics, Mitrany does not provide any insight into the role played by the individual. He states that people with technical expertise in their fields should work within their functions. Thus, for him, the pivotal characteristic of an individual within this framework is his or her competency and proficiency in the respective subject area; thus, Mitrany recognises that differences in human behaviour and competencies can shape international cooperation. However, he considers the only important difference between people to be whether or not one is a technical expert. Differences between individuals in terms of technical expertise are most likely due to education and experience. He disregards any other differences that are part of being a human and that can shape international politics in the international political arena, such as communication skills and trustworthiness.

Furthermore, one notes that the technical experts who lead the functions in international politics do act at the level of 'on behalf of'. Therefore, the notion of the meso-level exists in Mitrany's functionalism. However, it is not presented in the context of acting on behalf of states but rather on behalf of functions. The meso-level is therefore present in Mitrany's approach, although in a different setting than that identified by this thesis and that suggested by Messner et al. (2013, p. 23).

Functionalism, as Mitrany himself has stated, came into being when World War I and the Great Depression in the US led scholars of politics to the view that the underlying mechanisms of war and catastrophe were similar throughout the course of history (Mitrany 1976, 1975, p. 136). Considering this historical setting, it is not remarkable that scholars felt the urge to identify an approach that could lead to peace and prosperity. As such, it is a normative approach and in sharp contrast to that of Morgenthau, whose approach is normative only in part, and Waltz, who presents a fully deductive theory.

Considering this observation, functionalism in general and Mitrany's work in particular are progressive and forward-thinking. However, in view of recent history, in which the Western world has almost exclusively enjoyed peace but is now confronted with global problems that require international cooperation, the goal is less to bring about peace between Western countries and more about achieving common goals and defeating common threats through cooperation. For that purpose, Mitrany's functional approach is useful to a certain extent; however, one must take into consideration the time that has passed and the changes in the goals of the international community that have occurred since he first developed his approach. Therefore, this thesis finds it necessary to empirically investigate another level, namely that of the individual acting on behalf of nations in international organisations.

Mitrany's functionalism was further developed and refined by Ernst B. Haas, most prominently in his work *The Uniting of Europe* (1958). This concept of neofunctionalism, in contrast to its predecessor, does not seek to present a normative analysis of international integration but rather to disassemble the de facto process of integration and then draw conclusions. For this purpose, Haas examines actual integration and cooperation processes within Europe (Haas 1958, xii). The conclusion he draws is that cooperation in one functional subject area (e.g., economic development) acts as a starting point that triggers cooperation and integration in other functional and political areas ('spill-over effect') (Haas 1958, p. 292; Conzelmann 2010, pp. 164–170). Haas' empirical analysis of integration and cooperation does not create a picture of international politics as it should be but rather as it is. Therefore, it also does not include any underlying assumptions about behaviour. It considers the major interrelations and processes of European integration; consequently, it omits Mitrany's view of functional organisations as being led by individuals with high levels of technical expertise. As a result, although Haas illustrates how cooperation occurs in international politics, he does not provide any insight into how the people involved in these processes shape international cooperation. Since his approach focuses on an examination of the macro-level, the human factor as such does not play a role in his analysis.

The approach of new liberalism, whose most prominent representative is Andrew Moravcsik, assumes that states are an aggregation of their individuals' interests, and it focuses on the states' resulting preferences (Moravcsik 1997; 2008). New liberalism is based on three assumptions, some of which are behavioural in nature: First, it assumes that individuals and groups are the main actors in international politics and that individuals make rational choices and are risk-averse. The interests of groups and individuals lay the foundation for any political action, including those that occur in the field of international politics (Moravcsik 1997, pp. 516–517). In this context, Moravcsik states that 'political action is embedded in domestic and transnational civil society, understood as an aggregation of boundedly rational individuals with differentiated tastes, social commitments, and resource endowments' (Moravcsik 1997, p. 517). He thus recognises that individuals are inherently different, even though the assumption of bounded rationality and risk aversion generally applies. He then observes the following: 'What is true about people on the average, however, is not necessarily true in every case: some individuals in any given society may be risk-acceptant or irrational.' (Moravcsik 1997, p. 517). Here, he concludes that not every individual acts in a rational and in a risk-averse way, even though the underlying behavioural assumption of his work is that individuals are driven by rational decisions and risk aversion. Therefore, even though his approach is not based on this view, he acknowledges that individuals are inherently different. This contradicts both the (neo-)realistic and the functionalist views as well as interdependence theory. These schools of thought either do not see room for the inclusion of individual actors from nations in their considerations of international politics or, if they do include the individual, make a behavioural assumption that human nature is evil and is true for every individual. New liberalism can be interpreted in such a way that it opens the 'black box' of the state, which is dictated by (neo-)realistic theory, as it also considers what is happening inside of the state by taking society's interests into account.

Moravcsik's assumptions about individuals and their choices and interests differ from what I argue in this dissertation; however; it must be noted

that he does acknowledge that individuals possess idiosyncratic characteristics. Therefore, he provides room for investigating the impact of these differences on international cooperation. Additionally, he includes the individual in his explanations, even though it is at a level that differs from the one explored in this study. He includes the individuals in a 'bottom-up' approach to international politics, in which societal interests are then leveraged onto the agenda of international relations (Moravcsik 1997, p. 517). In this study, the characteristics and choices that are of interest are those of individuals who act on behalf of states in international politics – that is, on the meso-level.

The second assumption that new liberalism makes concerns the state-level; it holds that nations do not have committed strategies regarding security and welfare issues. Instead, they have preferences, which are determined by the most powerful individuals and groups within a state and are then pursued by that state through institutions (Moravcsik 1997, pp. 518–520). The third assumption of Moravcsik's new liberalism, which is again on the state level, is based on the fact that 'each state seeks to realize its distinctive preferences under varying constraints imposed by the preferences of other states' (Moravcsik 1997, p. 520). This suggests that the way in which countries act in the political arena is based on and constrained by 'policy interdependence' (Moravcsik 1997, p. 520), which refers to how states' pursuit of their own goals is affected and constrained by the behaviour of other states.

Based on these three assumptions, Moravcsik develops three theoretical constructs. The first is based on the fact that state preferences are built through social identities within a state. For Moravcsik, if the preferences of nations converge, the possibility of cooperation with other states arises. However, should they diverge, there is the possibility of conflict (ideational liberalism) (Moravcsik 1997, p. 525; Schieder 2010, p. 198).

Second, he develops a theory that argues that the behaviour of states in international politics depends on the economic gains and losses of the actors involved in international economic relationships (i.e. commercial liberalism). The greater the economic gains, the more likely economic cooperation becomes, and vice versa (Moravcsik 1997, p. 529; Schieder 2010, p. 199).

Finally, he considers republican liberalism, which focuses on how the interests of groups are inserted into a country's political agenda. According to Moravcsik, small groups that have the power to insert their interests on the agenda of nations do so. If the preferences of small groups are primarily represented, conflict is more likely. In contrast, if the preferences of a broad spectrum of groups and people are represented, cooperation is more likely (Moravcsik 1997, p. 531; Schieder 2010, pp. 199–201).

New liberalism's understanding of the emergence of cooperation indeed sees a possibility for cooperation in international politics. International cooperation can emerge based on nations' preferences. Even though individuals and groups shape these preferences, the cooperation itself does not concern the individuals living in nations or representing them in international politics. In summary, compared to the other classical theories on international relations, Moravcsik's new liberalism accounts for the individual actors associated with states and uses the assumption of bounded rationality to do so. However, it fails to shed light on the current struggles with regard to promoting global cooperation because it only considers the individuals within a state, not those who are involved in negotiating such cooperation.

For every theory of international politics examined in this section, behavioural assumptions are crucial. All of these theories are based on a certain set of such assumptions, some of which also apply to the individual. However, in most cases, these assumptions about individuals' behaviour are not pursued further in the construction of the argument advanced by a theory, nor are they incorporated into the approach or theory. Traditionalists such as Morgenthau address individual behavioural assumptions by basing analyses of why states start wars based on pessimistic assumptions about human behaviour; only morality and diplomacy can prevent the occurrence of such wars. Neorealists, however, focus only on how the system and behavioural assumptions are formed in relation to states. This shows that the behavioural assumptions that underlie their work are 'lost' in the process of building a theory.

In general, few of the approaches and theories analysed above provide a basis for investigating the effect of human behaviour on the meso-level of

international politics and international political outcomes. Furthermore, the discussion of classical approaches to international politics has shown that these approaches rarely account for the different roles assumed by ambassadors of countries in international politics. Morgenthau briefly touches upon this; however, it is not the main focus of his argument and work. I argue that the reason for this is that the individual and his or her behaviour are not the focus of these approaches and theories. Additionally, these approaches do not include in their considerations the fact that individuals act on behalf of states in facilitating international politics. Consequently, the different roles that individuals who participate in international politics take on are not assessed in classical theories.

Earlier in this chapter, I have quoted Walz (2010, p.19) who states that scholars often try to explain foreign policy with social-psychological factors, however that these approaches will not be able to predict foreign policy. When considering this statement in the context of the work at hand, the approaches which put social-psychological factors into focus at first sight make the impression that they can be a useful tool for the purpose of the present work. It seems like they also put the focus more on the individual level rather than the state or system level. However, when investigating these approaches (e.g. Kahneman, 1982; Simon, 1985; Levy 2013) it becomes clear that these approaches are only useful for the purpose of this study in a very limited manner. They predominantly use the behavioural assumptions of rationality and bounded-rationality, they investigate the effect of psychological factors on the ability to establish probabilities and the decision making resulting from it. They highlight the shortcomings of human decision-making due to heuristics. This focus of research and the behavioural assumptions which underly the social-psychological approaches to international relations is, just as the mainstream approaches to international relations, not helpful when investigating the effect of the human being on international cooperation, within the framework that this dissertation is doing it, since they do not give room to the idiosyncratic differences human existence entails. Consequently, they will be not further elaborated on in nor used as a basis for this work.

When analysing the development of cooperation in international politics, game theoretical approaches must be included. These approaches are considered in the next chapter, which is followed by a section that considers the contributions of academic disciplines unrelated to the subject of (international) politics.

2.2 Cooperation and the human factor in game theoretical approaches

The previous section of this literature review determined which assumptions concerning individual behaviour classic approaches and theories of international politics make. It was noted that these approaches often make pessimistic assumptions regarding human nature and emphasise the use of rational choice. Furthermore, in most cases, these assumptions serve as the basis of the approaches but are not further used to build arguments or develop theories. Additionally, they only rarely account for the different roles that actors in international politics can play. Thus, if they do so at all, these classical approaches account for the human factor in international cooperation in only a limited manner.

In this chapter, I study how game theoretical approaches can contribute to the discussion of cooperation in international politics because they are a commonly used tool for explaining cooperation in the social sciences. This section determines the underlying assumptions concerning behaviour made by game theoretical approaches. To test the practicality of using game theoretical approaches to explain international politics and cooperation on the meso-level, I functionalise this standard tool and apply it to the meso-level of international cooperation. As the empirical analysis of this work focuses on the personal integrity of key players in international cooperation (which is one part of the human factor) and its effects on the outcomes, in this section, I include personal integrity in two game theoretical models. To create a simplified model, only one factor that affects personal integrity is used, namely the act of bribery. First, however, I provide the context.

As Diekmann notes, game theory has become a useful and frequently utilised tool for analysing situations involving strategic decision-making (2016, p. 7). Morrow adds that ‘strategy is the essence of politics’ (Morrow 1994, p. 1). Thus, many scholars of international politics have applied game theory as a tool to explain interaction and strategies since von Neumann and Morgenstern first introduced zero-sum games in their 1944 *Theory of Games and Economic Behavior*. Riker, for example, developed a theory of coalition building using game theory and had concluded that, under certain conditions, ‘only minimal winning coalitions occur’ (1962, p. 32) Brams (1985) studied conflicts between super powers with the help of game theory, while Freedman devoted one chapter of his work to analysing interstate conflict with the help of a chicken game (Freedman 1989). Furthermore, with the help of an iterated prisoner’s dilemma, Keohane (2005) demonstrated how international regimes can emerge (‘regime theory’). His work is discussed in more detail in a later part of this section. First, however, it is important to briefly introduce the main assumptions and mechanisms of game theoretical approaches.

In game theory, different games, such as a one-time prisoner’s dilemma, an iterated prisoner’s dilemma and chicken games, exist. This paper focuses on the two types of prisoner’s dilemma because they are helpful tools in explaining the emergence of cooperation. A prisoner’s dilemma is a two-person, non-zero-sum game, meaning that the gain of one player does not necessarily create a loss of the same amount for the other player. In addition, both players have an interest in competition and cooperation (Morrow 1994, pp. 75–77).

The general behavioural assumption underlying all game theory is that of rationality, meaning that everyone has goals that they pursue and attempt to realise. The actions that a rational individual takes to achieve his or her end are only constrained by the actions of other rational individuals (Morrow 1994, p. 7). Furthermore, in the case of the prisoner’s dilemma, there is always a dominant strategy (i.e. a strategy that, when a rational player uses it, is always better in terms of achieving the goal) (Morrow 1994, pp. 77–78).

The prisoner’s dilemma models the situation of two prisoners accused of having committed a serious crime together. The two prisoners are interrogated separately and cannot communicate with each other. If they both deny the

crime, both will receive a fairly lenient punishment, as, without a confession, the police can only prove that the criminals have committed an offence that is punished less severely. If both criminals confess, both receive a high penalty, but not the maximum penalty, as they collaborate with the police by confessing. If, however, only one of the two prisoners confesses, the one who confessed goes unpunished as a witness, while the other receives the maximum penalty, as police can now prove that the prisoner who did not cooperate committed the felony. The dilemma lies in the fact that each prisoner must decide whether to deny (and to thus cooperate with the other prisoner) or to confess (and thus to defect) without knowing the decision made by the other prisoner. The sentence ultimately imposed, however, depends on how the two prisoners work together and thus depends not only on their individual action but also on the actions of the other prisoner (Diekmann 2016, pp. 29–35).

The payoffs for each situation are presented in Table 1.

Table 1 – Prisoner's dilemma payoff matrix (Axelrod 2009, p. 8)

		Prisoner B	
		Cooperation	Defection
Prisoner A	Cooperation	$R = 3; R = 3$	$S = 0; T = 5$
	Defection	$T = 5; S = 0$	$P = 1; P = 1$

The outcome of the classical prisoner's dilemma is that both prisoners defect (i.e. confess) because doing so would be the dominant strategy for both. If Prisoner A defects, Prisoner B is better off also defecting. If Prisoner A cooperates, Prisoner B is still better off defecting. The same is true for Prisoner A when considering Prisoner B's actions. Hence, both players will defect, even though, together, they would achieve a better outcome by cooperating. This outcome is always the case if $T > R > P > S$, where T is the gain of defecting when the other person cooperates ('temptation'), R is the gain both receive for cooperation ('reward'), P is what both receive when both defect ('punishment')

and S is what the person who cooperates receives when the other person defects ('sucker's payoff') (Axelrod 2009, pp. 7–9).

Thus, the prisoner's dilemma depicts a situation in which rational individuals are better off when defecting; however, both players would do better by cooperating (Axelrod 2009, pp. 7–9). In this case, the defection of both is also a Nash equilibrium, which is the point where neither of the players has an incentive to change his strategy if the other does not (Nash 1951, p. 286).

Many scholars from different fields have investigated such prisoner's dilemma situations (e.g. Rapoport et al. 1970; Axelrod 2009), and they are known to arise in daily life, the arts and international politics. Rapoport (1962, p. 111) uses an example from Puccini's opera *Tosca*, where Scarpia offers a deal to Tosca in order to avoid her lover Cavaradossi being executed: If Tosca spends the night with him, Cavaradossi will live. Tosca agrees to the deal but defects, as does Scarpia. She brings a knife to the meeting with Scarpia in order to kill him, and Scarpia tells the firing squad to execute Cavaradossi without Tosca knowing. The miserable conclusion of the story is that Tosca kills Scarpia, and Cavaradossi is killed by the firing squad. Had they had both cooperated, the ending would have been less bloody and better for all parties involved; however, viewed only from the perspective of the rational individual, defection was the better choice in this situation.

In international politics, one example of a prisoner's dilemma situation is the establishment of trade barriers between two countries. Even if free trade without barriers would be better for both countries, the incentive to defect and introduce trade barriers exists for both states (Axelrod 2009, p. 6).

In an iterated prisoner's dilemma, the assumptions and rules of the game are the same, but the game is repeated. If it is repeated with a specific number of rounds known to the players, cooperation does not arise. This is because, in the final round, it is the best decision for both players to defect because they will not interact with each other in the context of a game thereafter. Thus, both players consider how to play in the penultimate round, and, for both, the best strategy is again defection because they know both will defect in the subsequent final round. This thinking process goes on until the first round. Therefore, with

rational players, cooperation is not expected in an iterated prisoner's dilemma with a known number of rounds. The Nash equilibrium strategy is for both to always defect (Diekmann 2016, pp. 147–148). In contrast, when the number of rounds played is not known to the players (which reflects reality more accurately, as we mostly do not know whether and how many times we will see our counterpart again) cooperation can emerge because, in this context, the players consider experiences and reputation and calculate the worth of gains made in the future compared to gains made now (Diekmann 2016, pp. 147–166).

Axelrod (2009) examined iterated prisoner's dilemma games when he undertook his famous computer tournaments. Here, he asked for different strategies to be submitted, which he would then pit against each other in an iterated prisoner's dilemma. He concluded that cooperation can emerge in a world of rational choice egoists even in the absence of a central overarching power. To achieve cooperation and do well in a tournament of several games, a strategy must fulfil certain characteristics: First, it should be friendly, meaning that it never defects first (Axelrod 2009, p. 30). Second, it should be easy for others to understand and not be too complicated. Third, it should retaliate (if the other player defects, the strategy defects in the next round; if the other player cooperates, the strategy cooperates in the next round). Finally, it should not be envious (meaning it should focus on maximising its own gain, rather than comparing it to the gains of others) (Axelrod 2009, p. 48). Axelrod explicitly states that these suggestions could also be useful for international political practitioners when attempting to foster international cooperation (Axelrod 2009, p. 172).

Having explained the assumptions and mechanisms of some game theoretical models, in the following section, I provide two examples of how game theory has been used to explain cooperation in international politics. Rand and Nowak used the tool of an iterated prisoner's dilemma and argued that the mechanism of reciprocity is the main driver of cooperation among humans. Furthermore, they found that cooperation among groups (as opposed to individuals) can also arise in iterated games if pairwise interactions are

introduced into the game, that is, if a group network is viewed as a system of dyadic associations (2016, p. 121). This is an interesting argument to put into the context of the meso-level of international cooperation. This meso-level seems to qualify as a network of pairwise relationships. Therefore, according to game theory, cooperation within this group should arise. Consequently, the interactions that occur among the players and successful cooperation also shape the international political arena.

As mentioned above, at this point, I discuss regime theory and its underlying behavioural assumptions in more detail as this theory applies game theoretical considerations on the systemic level of international politics. Regime theory was developed by Robert O. Keohane in his work *After Hegemony*, first published in 1984. Keohane bases his theory on both realistic and neorealist approaches using rational choice theory. It thus involves a systemic analysis (Keohane 2005, pp. 25–26). He argues that international cooperation cannot be implemented centrally with an idealist purpose; rather, it emerges if cooperation is in the interest of all stakeholders (Keohane 2005, p. 22). He uses a game theoretical approach to establish when cooperation emerges and when it does not. As in any prisoner's dilemma game with rational players, for Keohane, a one-shot prisoner's dilemma-style game in international politics does not lead to international cooperation since defection is always the preferred strategy for both players (Keohane 2005, pp. 68–69). However, following Axelrod's argument, Keohane acknowledges that cooperation results should the game be played repeatedly and players value future rewards (Keohane 2005, pp. 75–78). If the rational players (i.e. states) involved in international politics share a common interest, it is likely that international regimes will evolve; these are defined as sets of rules, standards and norms. International regimes in this context are thus a means for rational actors in international politics to achieve increasing mutual benefits (Keohane 2005, pp. 57; 79).

Initially, the underlying behavioural assumptions of his theory are of rational egoism and all actors wanting to increase utility (Keohane 2005, p. 67). Nevertheless, in the next step, he relaxes these assumptions and explains that bounded rationality (the idea that individuals or states wish to maximise utility

but do so under certain restrictions, e.g. cognitive) is more useful in explaining international politics. He concludes that under the assumption of bounded rationality, international regimes are even more likely to emerge (Keohane 2005, p. 131).

Keohane's assumptions about behaviour are discussed here from two different angles: First, his assumption concerning the (bounded) rationality of individuals and states is highly limited and leaves no space for the assessment of the role of personality characteristics and different behavioural options of individuals in international cooperation. For his work, this assumption is a tool for theory development through abstraction. By definition, these assumptions are not comparable to the real world; however, Keohane does not intend to make his theory applicable to the real world. Still, when considering how international cooperation occurs, it is also helpful to leave assumptions aside and analyse how individuals actually behave in international relations and how this behaviour influences international relations and cooperation. This leads to the second point I make here: Since his regime theory builds on Waltz's systemic approach to international politics, Keohane fails to include the human factor in his considerations. He only makes assumptions about states and considers the international political system via the units that act in it.

Keohane applied game theory to the systemic level of international politics; in the following, I apply it to the meso-level of international cooperation. For this purpose, I consider a setting similar to the UNSC in which representatives of states negotiate in order to foster international cooperation. This process also includes voting on certain matters, such as resolutions. This model, is simplified such that each country's representative can bring forward one vote. There are no veto rights for any party involved. The assumption of rational actors attempting to maximise their own gain and fulfil their own interests is applied. It is important to note that the interests of the acting individual are not only their own personal interest but also the interests of his home country since the representative acts on the meso-level of international cooperation and therefore on behalf of his or her home country. I also assume that the representatives do not receive directions from their respective home

countries on how to vote. Furthermore, within the notion put forward by Rand and Nowak discussed earlier, I use pairwise interaction among the group of individuals who operate on the meso-level of international cooperation.

Since the empirical section of this work focuses on personal integrity as one idiosyncratic personality trait, the example used for this modelling exercise is bribery, in the form of buying votes. Bribery is a form of mutual gain and therefore a type of cooperation. Let us also assume that both sides of the transaction (money vs. vote) are performed simultaneously, meaning that, upon one party giving his or her vote, the other party transfers the money.

The situation is as follows: Representative A offers representative B a bribe of three value units for representative B to vote in his favour on a resolution representative A brought forward in the name of his home country. By doing so, representative A seeks to maximise the gain of his home country by receiving a higher number of votes on the resolution that has been put forward. He is willing to pay three value units from his personal bank account for that aim; however, he will also have an immaterial personal gain from this, namely an enhanced reputation and better career chances because he managed to secure votes for the resolution. This will reduce his payout to -2 value units. For his home country, a vote is worth three value units, precisely what the representative is willing to pay for it. Thus, in this situation, representative A follows both his home country's interest and his own.

Representative B accepts the deal. He personally gains three value units. His home country's interest, however, is not furthered by voting in favour of the resolution (otherwise, there would be no need to buy votes). A vote is worth three value units to his home country, as well. However, since the home country gave full voting freedom to its representative, it expects some votes against its interest. Therefore, the loss to the home country caused by the 'wrong' vote is only -2. The gain that representative B secures from the deal is entirely personal.

Representative B knows that if he defects and receives the money without giving the desired vote, the situation would be in both his interest and that of his home country; he receives the money units but does not need to vote against his home country's interest. Representative A also knows that he would be better off defecting. He would still receive the vote in the interest of his home

country and would also further his own personal interest in advancing his career without paying the three value units from his personal account. Consequently, if we assume that this is a one-time situation, the game theoretical result would be that both parties defect, and the act of bribery would not take place. The payoff matrix is shown in Table 2, with $T > R > P > S$. The table displays the total payouts (T, R, P, S – sum of the individual's as well as the country's interest) as well as the payouts for the individual (I) and for the country (C).

Table 2 – Prisoner's dilemma payoff matrix: bribery in international organisations (Axelrod 2009, p. 8)

		Ambassador B	
		Bribery	No Bribery
Ambassador A	Bribery	$R = 1; R = 1$ I = -2 I = +3 C = +3 C = -2	$S = -5; T = 6$ I = -3 I = +3 C = -2 C = +3
	No Bribery	$T = 6; S = -5$ I = +3 I = -3 C = +3 C = -2	$P = 0; P = 0$ I = +3 I = +3 C = -3 C = +3

Following the strict rules of game theory, bribery would not occur in international organisations, as both parties would defect, and the deal would therefore be off. This suggests that, on the meso-level of international cooperation, there would be no acts of bribery. This does not reflect reality, as, for example, the oil-for-food scandal, in which UN officials received bribes, shows (Economist 2005).

However, modelling a one-time prisoner's dilemma on the meso-level of international cooperation is likely not as helpful as considering the situation in an iterated prisoner's dilemma. Representatives on international councils such as the UNSC meet each other more than once. Furthermore, they usually do not know when they will meet each other for the last time. If we therefore apply Axelrod's theory that cooperation can emerge in settings involving rational actors, we find a different outcome. The two representatives will cooperate during their first encounter because both know that they will find themselves in

a similar situation in the future and that the other player will remember any defection on the other's part. This leads to the conclusion that, in a setting involving rationally acting representatives who both follow their personal interest and that of their home countries, cooperation will emerge. In the presented case, the act of bribery represents cooperation; the iterated prisoner's dilemma would suggest that bribery spreads over time within endeavours of international cooperation. This result is not compatible with what we experience in the world of international councils and international cooperation, as, even though there are some instances of bribery, it is not prevalent.

The analysis of bribery on the meso-level of international cooperation using the tool of game theory has shown that neither the findings of a one-time prisoner's dilemma situation nor those of an iterated prisoner's dilemma reflect what we observe in the arena of international cooperation. It is not the case that bribery never occurs or that it spreads in the international political arena. I argue that this lack of congruence between the results of the game-theoretical analyses and what can be observed in the arena of international politics is due to the narrow behavioural assumptions underlying game theory, which have been applied to the game theoretical analysis of the meso-level of international cooperation. As Allan and Dupont (1999) state, game theoretical modelling, as well as the choice of its underlying assumptions, should also always consider the empirical robustness of the choice of assumptions and the implications of the model. In contrast to the underlying assumption of game theory, most individuals do not always behave rationally. To refer again to Wieland (2018, p. 47), one cannot one cannot define an individual's behaviour as wholly negative or wholly positive; rather, much of the way in which a person behaves is influenced by the framework in which he or she acts. In the same way, one cannot assume that all individuals are rational. Moreover, game theoretical approaches do not allow for the investigation of the different roles that actors who are involved in international cooperative efforts assume; the only role that they account for is that of the rational player attempting to maximise his or her gains. The model developed for the purpose of this work, which focuses on

actors on the meso-level of international cooperation, includes a second role, that of the agent of the home country. Therefore, it extends the game theoretical approach through the addition of another role. Still, due to their restrictive assumptions regarding people's behaviour, game theoretical approaches do not allow for any investigation of the effects of human behaviour, including the different roles that actors assume, in international cooperation.

Furthermore, game theoretical approaches focus on the moves that players make in a game. Based on this observation, I further argue that, under the assumption of rational players, it is not possible to change the game itself or the moves of the players; one can only change the rules of the game. Hence, a rational player with a moral preference can influence the rules of the game through his or her moral behaviour. Therefore, the impact of individuals' behaviour is not regulated at the level of the moves of the game but rather at that of the rules of the game. Thus, the question becomes whether the impact of individuals is regulated by the rules of the game and whether different personalities result in different outcomes. I investigate this in-depth in the empirical analysis in Chapters 4 and 5.

Game theory has been criticised for its assumptions and its level of abstraction many times as Kuhn (1962, p. 2), for example, explains and as Lebow vividly describes:

A world of autonomous, egoistic individuals [...] when used as a starting point of analysis, fosters the belief that cooperation and commitments should serve purely selfish ends. Working from such an assumption, which rules out social and emotional attachments, commitments and the communities they sustain, it is easy to see why social scientists in the rational choice tradition must resort to the most extreme forms of intellectual prestidigitation to explain how anything beyond the most short-lived and instrumental kind of collaboration ever occurs. (Lebow 2013, p. 5)

Furthermore, a critique Lebow (2013, p. 5) has advanced with regard to Axelrod's prerequisites for a successful strategy in iterated prisoner's dilemma situations is that successful strategies only react to external provocations. This does not provide any insight into the different choices that different actors might make, and it does not take into account the idea of proactive personal or

internal reasons for taking action not only as an individual but also as a state and, as a result, also on the meso-level of international cooperation.

To summarise, in a classical prisoner's dilemma game with no repetition, cooperation cannot be achieved. Both players defect, as mutual defection is the Nash equilibrium. When applying this observation to the model developed on bribery at the meso-level of international cooperation, bribery hence does not occur. Axelrod (2009) established a theory concerning how cooperation arises. He argues that, in two-person games with multiple repetitions (with the players not knowing when the last game will be played), cooperation is the dominant strategy and therefore spreads to the following games. To apply this to the purpose of this dissertation, the first prisoner's dilemma model on bribery at the meso-level of international cooperation was then changed to an iterated prisoner's dilemma game; it showed that Axelrod's theory implies that bribery spreads through international cooperation if iterations are repeated with the same actors. Neither of the observed results reflects the behaviour of representatives in international cooperation because the underlying assumptions of rational choice are too narrow to reflect human behaviour and do not leave room for the impact of different behavioural options.

Additionally, the modelling of the prisoner's dilemma at the meso-level also emphasised that the interests of representatives of countries consist of both their personal interests and those of their home countries. It also shows that these interests sometimes diverge. Since representatives act on behalf of states, it is possible that actions taken in pursuit of their personal interest might be harmful to the interests of their home countries. Neither game theory nor the classical theories of international politics account for such dichotomous interests. Therefore, assumptions of rationality are not necessarily helpful when considering the meso-level of international cooperation because what might be a rational decision for the individual might not be a rational one for the state he or she represents. This context further reflects the different roles that ambassadors can take on: They are both agents acting in the interest of the states they represent and human beings with personal interests and different personality traits.

Finally, I now briefly discuss game theory in the context of (neo-)realism because it is important to note the following: Even if the assumption that (neo-)realists make about humans' greed for power reflects human behaviour to a certain extent, I argue that both people and states have learned from the past and from game theory. Practitioners of international politics as well as members of general society today know that if each participant attempts to play out his power and therefore defects instead of cooperating, everyone loses. When everyone loses, theories and approaches that place power at the centre fail.

Having assessed the extent to which game theoretical modelling can contribute to the discussion of the human factor in international cooperation, specifically on the meso-level, this chapter will be pursued as follows. In the next section, I review the findings of other academic fields concerning human cooperation in order to determine whether and how they allow for different behavioural assumptions and options.

2.3 Contributions to understanding cooperation from other academic disciplines

Messner et al. argue that that the currently prevailing theory on international politics needs to be complemented by insights from research in the field of behavioural sciences in order to understand such political interactions better and refine the instruments used in international cooperation (Messner et al. 2016, p. 48, 2013, p. 31). Therefore, this section of the literature review focuses on what other academic disciplines have found with regards to opportunities and obstacles to human cooperation and also how these findings may provide insight into how to change the behavioural assumptions underlying international political theory.

The game theoretical analysis of the meso-level of international cooperation revealed that state interests and the personal interests of countries' representatives can diverge. This problem has been addressed before in agency theory, which is a subfield of economics. The so-called principal-agent problem has often been used to describe the relationship between the owner of a firm

(the principal) and the executive, such as the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) (the agent). The problem develops because the aims of the agent and the principal differ. The principal cannot know if the agent has acted as agreed. Within this context, two characteristics are presented: The first is the problem of moral hazard, which means that the agent may not commit his full effort to the tasks that he should conduct for the principal. The second aspect is adverse selection, in which the principal cannot fully know the agent's abilities before entrusting him with tasks. In this situation, the principal has two possibilities in terms of working against the problem of uncertainty about the agent's actions: He can either implement information and control mechanisms or enter into an outcome-oriented contract with the agent (Eisenhardt 1989, p. 61).

The principal-agent problem can be applied to the meso-level of international cooperation to explain why the interests of ambassadors and states can diverge. States send ambassadors and representatives to other countries and international organisations to advocate for their home countries' interests. Within this context, the principal (the state) cannot know whether the agent (the ambassador) fully commits himself to the interests of the state or even if the personal interests of the ambassador are always the same as those of the state. In this case, only one of the solutions presented by agency theory to decrease uncertainty for the principal can be applied. The implementation of information mechanisms is likely to remedy the problem; however, I argue that an outcome-based contract cannot be the basis of such a relationship in the diplomatic scene because the outcomes of negotiations in international relations not only depend on the actions of the agent but on many other aspects associated with other stakeholders and developments in the international arena. Therefore, an ambassador entering an outcome-based contract with a state seems implausible.

The underlying behavioural assumptions of the principal-agent problem consider individuals to be self-interested and risk-averse and to have a bounded rationality (Eisenhardt 1989, p. 59). Therefore, it considers humans pessimistically, as do many of the classical approaches to international relations. However, when applying agency theory to international relations and its meso-level, these assumptions are not broad enough. It has been acknowledged that

diplomats need to possess high standards of morality and integrity. Even Morgenthau, who presents a realist view on international relations, has acknowledged this (Morgenthau 1948, p. 549). Consequently, even if agency theory sheds light on why interests between states and representatives can diverge, its underlying assumptions about human behaviour are too narrow to explain the impact of individual actions on the meso-level of international cooperation. However, what agency theory helps to establish is that actors in international relations can take on the role of government agents, acting on behalf of their home countries and the difficulties that might emerge within this role. Nevertheless, it does not consider the other roles that actors in international politics can assume.

In terms of academic disciplines other than economics, Thayer connected the life sciences with the social sciences by applying Darwinism to the realist stream of international politics. He suggests that evolutionary theory provides scientific proof of the assumptions about human nature that these approaches and theories make. He shows why egoism and the will to dominate have prevailed in history of human nature and therefore contributed to evolutionary fitness. He further explains that egoistic behaviour is part of the 'survival of the fittest', as Darwin argued that organisms are only concerned with their own survival in an environment in which resources are scarce (Thayer 2015, p. 70). Furthermore, Thayer states that the basis for the pursuits undertaken by dominating individuals also lies within evolutionary theory. He claims that the quest for domination is solely based on animals' wish to be dominant over other mammals and that this trait contributed to mammals' fitness (Thayer 2015, p. 71). He suggests that evolutionary theory also provides an explanation of the rational choice assumption which underlies (neo-)realist approaches. According to him, rationality refers to animals' ability to understand symbols, signs, cause and effect and other concepts needed to survive in and navigate the world (Thayer 2015, p. 88). To summarise, he combines evolutionary theory and international politics and concludes that Darwinism strengthens (neo-)realistic approaches to international politics because it supports their underlying assumptions.

On a general basis, Thayer's work is similar to mine in that it attempts to apply findings from other academic disciplines to research on international relations. However, the underlying behavioural assumptions made in (neo-)realism, which he attempts to support with the help of Darwinism, differ significantly from the assumptions made in this study: First, he suggests that there is only one human nature and that it is egoistic and dominant and acts on rational choice. He claims that it was formed through evolution. This again leaves no room for investigating the effect of different behavioural options and personality characteristics in international cooperation. Second, the pessimistic assumption about human behaviour advanced by Waltz and confirmed by Thayer is inherently different from what has been advanced by researchers from other disciplines, such as those in anthropology, who have found that humans are skilled at cooperating. These contributions, which suggest that human beings are indeed highly skilled at working together for mutual advantage, are discussed in the following, after a brief presentation of one argument against using evolutionary theory to explain international politics.

Lebow heavily criticises the use of evolutionary biology as a tool to explain international relations. He dismisses the assumptions of evolutionary biologists who claim that the world is ideally positioned concerning the fitness of species. He reasons that such theorists do not consider all of the complexity of the world (Lebow 2013, p. 8). Furthermore, he explains that the mechanism behind evolution varies based on genes and natural selection, neither of which can be found in international relations. Lebow's criticism cannot be applied to this study, as its focus is not on the states acting in international politics but on the human beings who act within that arena. Ambassadors and representatives are human beings; as such, findings about human nature from other academic disciplines apply to them as much as they apply to any other individual.

Considering the findings of other academic disciplines to better understand international politics, as Thayer did, is also the aim of this work. However, I use different and, for the purpose of this discussion, more appropriate assumptions about human behaviour. The argument I advance is based on research from fields such as anthropology and behavioural sciences.

The anthropologist Michael Tomasello (2017) offers insights into human behaviour that are quite dissimilar to most of the assumptions that underlie the approaches often used in international politics. His studies on the behaviour of small children and primates show that human beings are able and willing to cooperate from an early age. For example, he has demonstrated that toddlers often altruistically help adults to accomplish minor tasks. He therefore suggests that helping other individuals is inherent in human nature, and moreover, that cooperation for mutual advantage has facilitated human development over the course of history and has promoted the success of human endeavours (Tomasello 2017, pp. 21–26). Furthermore, he has shown that children, unlike primates, are willing to share information with other individuals to help them and even share precious items with others (Tomasello 2017, pp. 26–35). Melis, a behavioural scientist, has shown that humans have a biological bias for cooperation, which is shared with humanity's closest relatives, chimpanzees. Chimpanzees cooperate to achieve common goals that would not be otherwise attainable. Therefore, human cooperation not only results from social and cultural norms but is biologically inherent in human nature (Melis 2016, pp. 105–107).

The findings of both Tomasello and Melis are diametrically opposed to the behaviour assumptions regarding the evilness of human nature of most classical theory of international relations. They provide an empirical hint at a feeling that many readers of these assumptions might have, which is that these assumptions do not accurately reflect human behaviour. Furthermore, Tomasello and Gonzalez-Cabrera imply that there is no fixed human behaviour; rather, they state that there is variety in human cooperation (Tomasello and Gonzalez-Cabrera 2017, p. 287). Unlike the scholars of international political theory, they account for the view that human beings are different, that is, that some individuals might be better at cooperating and others worse. This provides a solid basis for investigating the effects of different behavioural options for representatives acting at the meso-level of international cooperation.

Tomasello argues that human beings' ability to cooperate is mainly focused on cooperation within an individual's group (Tomasello 2017, p. 81). Applying this to the meso-level of international cooperation suggests that

cooperation at this level should be successful for two reasons: First, individuals interact there and represent their countries and, as Tomasello has shown, humans are skilled at cooperating. Second, the meso-level of international cooperation often involves groups, such as the UNSC or the Doha Round of the World Trade Organisation (WTO). If individuals cooperate better within their own groups, and if representatives who are part of this group consider their group of international negotiators to be one of their own groups (next to their home countries, families, soccer clubs, etc.), cooperation on that level should be successful and therefore also influence international politics.

Tomasello argues not only that human beings are skilled at cooperating from infancy but also demonstrates that they have a second-personal morality; that is, two individuals will come to feel accountable to each other through the development of a 'we' that arises due to a joint commitment. Such second-personal morality is based on the ability that individuals have to understand that ideals regarding roles in cooperation apply to their counterparts in a cooperative venture as much as they do to themselves (2016, pp. 40–41). From this second-personal morality, a joint intentionality develops; it describes how each individual in a dyadic partnership is, on the one hand, an individual who has his own interests and roles and, on the other hand, a member of a 'we' who participates in following a goal common to the partnership. Thus, it is the we-identity that humans develop through evolutionary learning processes and adaption (unlike primates) that enables them to share a common goal and take common action to achieve that goal and communicate with each other about the goals and the underlying activities (Tomasello 2016, pp. 50–51; Tomasello and Carpenter 2007, p. 121). This joint intentionality then develops into a collective intentionality when the we-identity is no longer based on two individuals cooperating but on a group of individuals as co-operators (Tomasello 2016, p. 93). This collective intentionality is grounded in the existence of social institutions such as norms, rules or money (Tomasello 2017, p. 54, 2016, pp. 105–107).

Applying the notions of second-personal morality as well as joint and collective intentionality to the meso-level of international cooperation suggests that representatives acting on behalf of states in international cooperation have

at least two we-identities: First, they have the we-identity within the state they represent, as do other the other ambassadors and public servants who act on behalf of their home country. Second, it suggests they have developed (or at least should develop) a we-identity within the group of ambassadors from other countries with whom they negotiate and discuss, such as those who participate in the Doha Round or the UNSC. Indeed, Tomasello suggests that ‘each individual is both the "we" that is pursuing with his or her partner a joint goal (in joint attention) and at the same time an individual that has her own role and perspective (Tomasello 2016, p. 50).

These two levels of we-identity on the part of ambassadors on the meso-level of cooperation also apply to joint and collective intentionality. If two ambassadors discuss a certain matter in private and agree to take certain actions, they are acting through the we-identity of that encounter. However, the we-identities associated with their home governments remain. The two levels of we-identity that exist in the framework of collective intentionality are established when all of the ambassadors interacting in a group devoted to the pursuit of a common goal through international cooperation successfully negotiate amongst themselves. First, there is the we-identity of the group of ambassadors negotiating, while the second we-identity concerns their home countries. Lastly, a global we-identity can also develop, meaning that the representatives feel that that they are part of human society globally and need to take collaborative action to achieve common goals.² This depicts another role that ambassadors at the meso-level of international cooperation assume, that is, as partners who have the same aim as their colleagues.

Given the observations made in the above literature discussion, my thesis is based on the following behavioural assumptions:

- a) Humans are successful co-operators.
- b) Humans have a joint and collective intentionality.
- c) Personality traits and idiosyncratic diversity exist in human beings.

² The term *global we-identity* was introduced by Messner and Weinlich 2016, p. 21.

First, these behavioural assumptions represent a means by which to investigate the influence of personality in international relations. Second, I do not use equality of behaviour as a basis for this work. On the contrary, I assume that individuals have different behavioural options. Hence, it is not assumed that actors' behaviour is always in accordance with these behavioural assumptions but that they are possible behavioural options, with people opting to use them to different degrees. Consequently, I disregard the assumptions that are commonly made in the field of political science and instead base this work on those identified above. In the following chapters, I empirically analyse the essential parameters of these assumptions to determine if they are applicable to the meso-level of international politics using the example of the UNSC.

Furthermore, based on the discussion of the literature, I argue that ambassadors functioning on the meso-level of international cooperation assume different roles. This has not been accounted for in the classical theory of international cooperation. This work aims to investigate these roles and focuses on the following:

- a) Ambassadors as agents of their home countries, as established by agency theory.
- b) Ambassadors as partners and colleagues within a group of representatives, as advanced by Tomasello in the form of his notions of second-personal morality as well as joint and collective intentionality.
- c) Ambassadors as human beings with different backgrounds and personality traits, as argued by Wieland, as well as Tomasello and Gonzalez-Cabrera.

Based on these assumptions concerning human behaviour, I proceed by placing the human factor at the centre of my empirical research. This approach is based not only on findings from behavioural sciences or anthropology, as Brown also suggests that human nature is always fixed in some aspects and varies in others. He states that research can contribute to an understanding of

humanitarianism (Brown 2013, p. 450), which is one form of international cooperation.

2.4 Conclusion and development of the research question

John Mearsheimer found the appropriate words to describe realism and neorealism in classic international political theory; it ‘paints a rather grim picture of world politics’ (Mearsheimer 1994, p. 9). Power and security are the focus of all considerations, and highly pessimistic assumptions concerning human and state behaviour underlie these considerations. These views argue that humans are egoistic and rational and that states are the same. In this context, the possibilities for international cooperation are quite limited. Functionalism, interdependence theory and new liberalism, however, do perceive room for international cooperation, and the underlying behavioural assumptions they make are somewhat more optimistic. Game theoretical models can shed light on how cooperation emerges; however, their underlying behavioural assumptions concern actors being self-interested and rational. What is striking is that all of these classical theories and approaches are built on a central assumption about human behaviour that does not play a role in the development of their arguments and the discussion of the approaches.

In contrast, I argue that humans can and indeed prefer to cooperate if mutual advantage is feasible, sometimes even for altruistic reasons. This assumption is based on empirical research advanced by other academic disciplines, such as anthropology and behavioural sciences. As discussed above, Tomasello has shown that human beings exhibit pro-social behaviour and a second-personal morality. Consequently, humans develop both a we-identity and a joint or collective intentionality. All of this enables them to cooperate successfully. Furthermore, these observations indicated that human beings have idiosyncratic personality traits.

My thesis not only applies these assumptions about humans as skilled co-operators as the foundation for its argument but also adopts these different possibilities as behavioural options that representatives in international politics have. Consequently, my work focuses its empirical analysis on the behaviour of

key players in international cooperation and how their behaviours shape international cooperation. Additionally, and in line with the literature discussed and the research used as a basis for the argument made in this dissertation, this study aims to shed light on the different roles that representatives at the meso-level of international cooperation assume and the behavioural options that they choose while serving in these varying capacities. It focuses on ambassadors as representatives of their countries (i.e. agents for their countries), as well as colleagues and partners in international cooperation (in the sense of joint and collective intentionality). Furthermore, such representatives are human beings with different personality traits. Consequently, the question arises as to whether the human factor has an influence on international relations and in particular on international cooperation towards common goals, which is the research question that this work addresses.

This research is important because states today focus not only on power and security (as [neo-]realism indicates) but also on a common agenda. Brock (2016, p. 83) sees proof for this in the fact that the UN still exists and operates after the Cold War and during an era of Western hegemony. Therefore, relying on security and power to explain international politics is insufficient. The common interests and the common agenda of the international community must be considered when analysing international politics because the actors in international politics and the UN have committed themselves to this common agenda in the form of fostering international cooperation. For example, Bodenstein et al. (2017, p. 442) acknowledge that the 'global development agenda has itself expanded from discussions centred on economic development and humanitarian aid into an all-encompassing global cooperation arena'. Furthermore, the Preamble of the Charter of the UN states that 'we the peoples of the United Nations, determined to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind' (United Nations 1945, p. 1). This shows that one of the UN's central aims is to foster international cooperation. As such, it is notable that the UN follows a clear agenda for cooperation (e.g. in the form of the UNSC or the initiation of the SDGs) and manages shared interests (Sluga 2019, p. 41). For that

reason, the UNSC is the object of my empirical analysis of the impact of the human factor on international cooperation.

Messner and Weinlich (2016, p. 39) state that research on international cooperation can help identifying the prerequisites for and the possibilities and hindrances associated with global cooperation. My hope is that this study will contribute to the academic discussion on international cooperation by focusing on the human being and establishing the effects of human behaviour on the success of negotiations in international politics. My thesis focuses on the regimes of international cooperation, and it sees international politics as normative, in that they are a form of cooperation politics. Through this empirical analysis, which focuses on the UNSC, I intend to satisfy the desideratum in international political research regarding international cooperation towards shared goals.

3 Research strategy

This chapter describes, explains and justifies the overall research strategy and design of the empirical analyses presented in this work. Detailed descriptions and explanations of the quantitative and qualitative methods applied are provided in the chapters that follow.

The purpose of this doctoral thesis is to establish the extent to which the human behaviour of ambassadors and representatives in international organisations affects the outcomes of negotiation rounds and thus shapes international cooperation. In addition, as has been established in the literature review, it investigates the different roles that actors in international cooperation assume. In this way, this thesis intends to respond to Messner and Weinlich's call to fill this gap in research on international cooperation. As discussed, this response is based on the argument advanced by researchers from academic fields such as anthropology and behavioural sciences, which states that humans are highly skilled at cooperating, a view that is in contrast to the assumptions of classical theory on international politics.

Given that these findings indicate such a bias towards cooperation in human nature, it is puzzling why international cooperation seems so difficult to achieve, even though human beings undertake it. In this vein, my research asks whether differences in human behaviour at the meso-level of international cooperation (the level on which individuals negotiate and discuss on behalf of states) affect the outcome and success of attempts at international cooperation. These differences in behaviour are in this study referred to as the 'human factor'. The need to empirically investigate this topic has previously been noted by Messner et al.:

The interaction between the members of these groups is shaped by how well they know or trust each other. But simultaneously they represent the interests of the countries or civil societies to whom they are accountable, and they are influenced by their sense of obligation to the group itself and by their own personal preference. [...] Understanding how this point of intersection works is a promising area of study for which we currently have very little direct empirical evidence. (Messner et al. 2016, p. 57)

Measuring differences in human behaviour and thus measuring the human factor as a whole is a difficult task. This problem was acknowledged

many decades ago, for example by May (1932), and also more recently by Nesselrode and Molenaar (2016). For this reason, my empirical research mainly focuses on one aspect of the human factor, namely a person's integrity. The reasons for this are as follows: First, high standards with regard to integrity and moral values are a crucial part of human behaviour and personality. For example, Tomasello notes 'the fact that behaving morally is somehow right for the human species, contributing to humans' unparalleled evolutionary success, as well as to each individual's own sense of personal moral identity' (Tomasello 2016, p. 7).

Second, the effect of personal integrity on outcomes has been established in many fields other than political sciences, for example in management and business by Parry and Proctor-Thomson (2002). It thus seems worthwhile to also investigate this concept within the framework of international cooperation.

Third, Messner et al. present a cooperation hexagon that consists of the main facilitators of cooperation, which are reciprocity, trust, communication, reputation, fairness, enforcement and the we-identity (Messner et al. 2016, pp. 52–55). It becomes clear that some of these facilitators are closely linked to personal integrity. Integrity, for example, has been defined as one subset of trustworthiness (Mayer et al. 1995, pp. 719–720). Therefore, trust and integrity are closely related. Furthermore, integrity cannot be attributed by oneself; there is no point in saying 'I am a person of high integrity' to convince others that this is true. Instead, other people attribute integrity to someone. Consequently, integrity is closely linked to reputation, which is another important facilitator of cooperation according to the cooperation hexagon. Gardner, for example, describes the close connection between integrity and reputation (Gardner 2003). When viewing the cooperation hexagon in the light of integrity, it becomes clear that it is worth considering how integrity shapes international cooperation.

Finally, another merit of using personal integrity as one factor of human behavior is that, with the help of a newly developed framework for measuring integrity, as well as background studies conducted on all relevant individuals' integrity, personal integrity can be quantified and used for quantitative empirical analysis.

This study employs a mixed methods research approach in the form of explanatory sequential design (Creswell and Plano Clark 2018, p. 77). I first analyse data quantitatively with the help of multivariate regression analyses, including an examination of interaction effects and a principal component analysis (PCA). Second, I verify the results from the quantitative analysis qualitatively with the help of in-depth analysis of interviews conducted with five permanent representatives to the UN who are currently serving or have previously served on the UNSC. Furthermore, three case studies of meetings of the UNSC are conducted; the results of these studies are analysed with regards to the results of the quantitative research and the analysis of the interviews.

The advantage of this mixed methods approach is that qualitative analysis allows for the validation of the results of the quantitative analysis. Using expert statements and opinions gathered from interviews makes it possible to establish a general indication of whether the quantitative results reflect reality. This is not only true for the results of the analysis but also for the model itself, as the interviews can help to support the applied control variables in the quantitative analyses. Additionally, the interviews can assist in establishing the processes behind the identified effects, thus not only answering the question of the existence of an effect but also how the effect works or why there is no such effect. Furthermore, the study of three cases (i.e. the UNSC meetings) in the light of the results of the quantitative analysis, the interviews conducted and the available documentation on each case is especially useful in identifying the mechanisms underlying the results of the quantitative analysis and combining them with the findings of the interviews. Additionally, qualitative work allows the focus to be extended in terms of time frame, the attendees at UNSC meetings and personality traits other than integrity.

The empirical analyses focus on the UN in general and the UNSC in particular. The reason for this is that, as described before, these bodies create and shape the agenda for international cooperation, which is the focus of this research. Furthermore, the UNSC provides a useful example of the meso-level of international cooperation, as different representatives negotiate with each other, but always do so in view of their home countries' interests.

The following sub-sections describe the research strategies employed for both the quantitative and qualitative analyses. As mentioned previously, detailed descriptions of the methodology, data collection processes, interview partners and selected cases are provided in the respective sub-sections of each chapter.

3.1 Multivariate regression analyses, principal component analyses and interaction effects

The quantitative analyses focus on the final behavioural assumption underlying this work (as formulated in the literature review), namely that human beings have different personality traits and idiosyncratic characteristics. Therefore, the quantitative analyses establish the effect of personal integrity on the success of international cooperation. Furthermore, it aims to establish the importance of the three different roles that ambassadors assume at the meso-level of international cooperation (i.e. agent, partner in cooperation and individual). This analysis focuses on the empirical examples of UNSC meetings held between 1995 and 2012, in which resolutions were discussed and voted on. The personal integrity of the presidents of the UNSC and the duration of the UNSC's meeting, as a measure of its success, are investigated.

Little is known about the effects of the personal integrity of ambassadors and representatives on negotiations in international organisations and, by extension, on international cooperation. Hence, the aim of these quantitative analyses is to establish whether a relationship exists between personal integrity (as part of the human factor) and the success of the negotiations that take place in an international organisation. In order to quantitatively establish the effect of personal integrity on the success of international cooperation, as measured by the duration of UNSC meetings in, five analyses are undertaken: First, a multivariate regression analysis is conducted using Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index (CPI) as a measure of representatives' integrity and controlling for several other potential variables' influence on the dependent variable (DV). Since the representatives of countries in the UN are public officials and the CPI measures the perceived corruption of

officials in various countries, the CPI can be used as a proxy to measure personal integrity, and the analysis allows for the establishment of an initial fundamental relationship between integrity and the success of international cooperation. The DV is the duration of meetings in the UNSC. The argument for this DV is that if meetings in the UNSC take longer, there is more controversy and more need for discussion, and thus less success than a short meeting, in which it can be assumed that representatives came to an agreement quickly.

Second, a newly created measure for personal integrity is regressed against the duration of the meetings of the UNSC, again controlling for other potential effects. When compared to the use of a proxy variable such as the CPI, this has the advantage that the idiosyncratic characteristics of each representative can be considered. Third, each characteristic of the newly created measure of personal integrity is separately regressed against the duration. Subsequently, the characteristics of integrity that show a statistical significance are combined into another measure of personal integrity and again regressed against the duration. This allows for a deeper analysis of those characteristics that are crucial with regard to personal integrity in the context of international cooperation at the meso-level. The fourth step consists of a PCA. In this step, the data of the characteristics underlying the personal integrity variable are analysed. This statistical approach to data reduction allows the interpretation of large quantities of data within a reduced number of components or factors. Last, four potential interaction effects between the independent variable (IV) and some control variables are determined and then tested for. More detailed explanations of these analytical steps are provided in the sections of those chapters that address the quantitative empirical analysis.

Since this work is the first to empirically analyse the effect of personal integrity as a part of the human factor on international cooperation, one important aspect is the collection of data on the DV, the IV and the control variables in order to create a new data set for this purpose. For the DV, which is the duration of the meetings of the UNSC as a measure of success, I drew from the meeting records of the UNSC, which are available online (United Nations Security Council n.d.a). For the IV (personal integrity), background research was conducted on all representatives under consideration, as is described in detail

in the following chapter. The data on the control variables were gathered from several sources, such as existing data sets, UNSC resolutions and meeting records and newspaper archives. Detailed descriptions, explanations and justifications for the selection of the control variables, as well as how data on them were collected, can also be found in the following chapter. Furthermore, detailed descriptions of the null hypothesis and the methodology are presented in Chapters 4.1 and 4.2.

The program IBM SPSS Statistics 24 was used for all quantitative analyses.

3.2 Guided interviews and case studies

In general, quantitative research provides useful insights into effects and relationships. However, it does not provide in-depth information on the underlying processes of the matter at hand, and the possibility for misinterpretation always looms over any statistic results obtained. Therefore, and in order to verify the results of the quantitative analyses, two qualitative research methods were applied: conducting and analysing interviews and conducting and describing three case studies. These methods provide more detailed information on the degree to which the quantitative results provide valuable insights into the causes and effect that have been established. Furthermore, since the quantitative analyses focus on investigating the final behavioural assumption developed in the literature review (in addition to the different roles that ambassadors on the meso-level assume) – that is, that human beings have different personality traits and idiosyncratic characteristics – the qualitative analyses also examine the other two behavioural assumptions made, which are that human beings are skilled co-operators and that they exhibit a joint and collective intentionality. Additionally, as is the case for the quantitative analyses, the qualitative analyses investigate the roles that actors in international cooperation assume and therefore aims to verify the roles established in the literature review (government agents, partners in cooperation and individuals with different backgrounds and personality traits).

First, interviews with five former and current permanent representatives to the UN, each of whom has experience within the UNSC, were conducted. (For a detailed list of ambassadors interviewed, please refer to Chapter 5.1.) All interviews were recorded with the permission of the interviewees and subsequently transcribed; these transcripts can be found in Appendix 4. The interviews were analysed with the MAXQDA 2018 software in order to identify major statements and analyse their content. The content and statements were then examined and discussed in light of the research question at hand and the results of the quantitative analyses.

There are several advantages of using interviews in academic research: For example, they are useful in terms of obtaining detailed information about personal perceptions and opinions of experts who know the research area well. In this way, they help to provide a more detailed view of the processes underlying the established effects (Flick et al. 2007, p. 78). Furthermore, in contrast to the quantitative analyses, they allow for detailed information to be gathered because the questions can be asked in a detailed manner (Flick et al. 2007, p. 79). The analysis of the interviews, as well as the discussion of their results, can be found in Chapter 5.1.1.

Second, three cases of meetings of the UNSC were briefly analysed with regard to the behavioural options chosen by attendees, the duration of each meeting, as well as the integrity and personal characteristics of those who participated. The decision to investigate UNSC meetings as case studies of UNSC in order to add to this research was based on the fact that analysing these meetings can support the effects established in the quantitative analyses and provide concrete examples of how the behaviour of representatives can shape international cooperation. They are thus instrumental case studies and aim to further support the understanding of the effect of human behaviour on international cooperation obtained through the quantitative analyses and the interviews beyond each case study (Salkind op. 2010, p. 116).

As with the interviews, the analysis of the case studies loosens the assumptions made in the quantitative model in order to expand the focus. Therefore, the case studies not only focus on the behaviour and integrity of the

presidents of the UNSC but also include those of other members and guest speakers. Furthermore, this analysis extends the time frame and includes two more recent meetings as case studies. This allows this work to include more recent events in international cooperation in its research. In addition, the case studies not only focus on integrity as a behavioural option but also includes differences in human behaviour in general and the roles that representatives at the meso-level assume.

For a detailed description of which case studies were chosen and why, please refer to Chapter 5.2.

4 Establishing the effect of personal integrity on international cooperation: a quantitative analysis

Next to arguing that actors in international cooperation take on different roles, the literature review conducted for this dissertation led to the formulation of three behavioural assumptions that underlie this work: that people are skilled co-operators, that they exhibit a collective intentionality and that there are idiosyncratic differences between human beings. The quantitative analyses of this work focus on the last point in order to determine to what extent these differences impact the success of international cooperation. To do so, it considers integrity as one aspect of human behaviour. Furthermore, it aims to quantitatively examine the three different roles that ambassadors on the meso-level of international cooperation assume: as agents of their home countries, as partners for cooperation and as individuals with different personality traits.

This chapter presents and discuss the manner in which the quantitative analyses of the effect of human behaviour on international cooperation were conducted, the data acquisition process, the results and the obstacles faced in conducting these analyses. It first explains and discusses the argument and the null hypothesis. Second, it presents and discusses the results of several multivariate regression analyses, first including the CPI as a measure of integrity as the IV and then using a newly created measure of personal integrity as the IV. In order to further verify the results for robustness and investigate whether underlying effects of the exogenous variables on the endogenous variable exist, a PCA and an examination of interaction effects are undertaken. In the last section of this chapter, the results are interpreted and discussed, and some limitations of the model are highlighted.

4.1 Argument and null hypothesis

The empirical examples considered in this analysis are UNSC meetings held between 1995 and 2012 in which resolutions were discussed and voted on. The personal integrity of the presidents of the UNSC is investigated, as is the duration of the UNSC's meetings which is considered a measure of its success.

The UN considers resolutions to be ‘formal expressions of the opinion or will of United Nations organs’ (United Nations Security Council n.d.b). The process of the adoption of a resolution starts with one (or more) members drafting a resolution and presenting it to the Council for a vote. After a discussion, members are asked to vote in favour of or against the resolution. A resolution is adopted when no negative vote (veto) is submitted by one of the five permanent members (P-5) and at least nine affirmative votes from members are submitted. Prior to or after voting, the members discuss the resolution’s content.

In this context, this thesis argues that the personal integrity of the UNSC’s president impacts the duration of the UNSC meeting as follows: When members of the Council are confronted with a president whom they perceive as lacking integrity and potentially corrupt, the discussion takes longer, and it is more difficult to reach a conclusion. The presence of a chair without integrity can lead to a lack of trust on the part of the more compliant members of the Council. This leads to an increase in discussions and consultations among the members of the UNSC and among each member and his or her delegation and home government. This in turn leads to an increase in the time devoted to discussing a resolution voted on in the UNSC. In contrast, a president with a high level of personal integrity leads to less time for discussion and deliberations, as the other members feel less need to discuss and consult.

The presidency of the Council is held by each of the members for one month. The presidency is passed on among the member countries according to the English alphabetical order of the names of the member states (United Nations Security Council 1982). Therefore, each member chairs the Council at least once and is thus included in the data set for the analyses at least once.

Based on the argument that a shorter meeting means less controversy – and thus less discussion and agreement among its members being reached more rapidly – the duration of a UNSC meeting is taken as a measurable reflection of its success. Of course, the duration is also affected by many other factors, such as the number of times that a topic has been discussed in the Council previously and its complexity. In the following analyses, these factors are controlled for. The duration of a UNSC meeting in minutes is the DV.

In the first analysis, the personal integrity of the president is measured by the president's country's CPI³. The CPI reflects how corrupt a country's public officials are perceived to be (Transparency International Deutschland e.V. n.d.). Since the UNSC members are public officials sent as representatives to the UNSC, the CPI can be considered as an indicator of the personal integrity of a Council member, as he or she is a public official. I also argue that the political elite of a country send a representative to the UNSC who thinks and acts as they would and who has a similar moral code. Thus, the CPI acts as a proxy for measuring integrity. The CPI, however, not only measures integrity as a personal characteristic of public officials but also measures the integrity of a representatives with regard to their home political elite, and it is thus also a structural variable. Therefore, it can also account for the role of ambassadors as agents of their home countries, which, as established in the literature review, they take on in international cooperation.

In the second analysis, personal integrity is measured using a newly created data set based on background research and a scoring system defined for the purpose of this research to establish each of the presidents' personal integrity measures. The scoring system consists of six attributes (honesty, following strong moral principles, incorruptibility, consistency, respectfulness and modesty). They have been identified as integral parts of integrity in the literature or are seen as important integrity characteristics for a representative working within the UN system. (For a more detailed elaboration on these attributes, see Chapter 4.2.2.) Therefore, this indicator measures personal integrity, regardless of the moral code of a representative's home institutions. The personal integrity of the UNSC's president (first measured by CPI and then by the newly established indicator in the second analysis) is the IV in the regression analyses.

For the model that regresses personal integrity against the duration of each meeting, more analyses are included that aim at investigating the effects of personal integrity on the duration of a UNSC meeting in more detail (e.g. by establishing whether any of the six characteristics of the integrity measure are

³ As published yearly by Transparency International.

more significant and important than others). This is first done by including all of the characteristics of the integrity variable in the model one by one and removing the personal integrity variable. Furthermore, the integrity characteristics that show a significant influence are combined into a new personal integrity variable and regressed against the duration once again. Thereafter, a PCA is performed in order to establish whether there are underlying factors that are responsible for some of the variance among the characteristics of integrity applied.

Additionally, I assess whether there are statistically significant interaction effects between the IV and some of the control variables that need to be included in the model.

The null hypothesis of this work (for all models) states that the models have no explanatory power and thus that the personal integrity of the presidents has no effect on the duration of UNSC meetings. In broader terms, the personal integrity of key players in international organisations has no effect on the success of international cooperation.

4.2 Quantitative analyses

In the following chapter, the approaches, methodology and data of the statistical analyses are described, and the results are presented. Chapter 4.2.1 an analysis of the effect of human behavior on international cooperation using the CPI as the IV. Second, Chapter 4.2.2 presents the regression analyses using the newly established indicator of personal integrity as the IV. Chapter 4.2.2.4 considers the PCA, while Chapter 4.2.2.5 presents an assessment of some potential interaction effects.

4.2.1 Analysis I: Regressing CPI and the DV

The first analysis uses Transparency International's CPI as a measure of the integrity of the president leading the UNSC at a given time. This is based on different arguments: On the one hand, the CPI is a measure of the integrity of public officials. It is calculated using both different indices and expert opinion

on a country's governance structures and accountability and transparency in the public sector (Transparency International Deutschland e.V. 2015). Since the representatives of countries on the UNSC are public officials, they are part of the group that the CPI focuses on for its estimation. Therefore, this measure should reflect the integrity of the representatives to the Council to a certain extent because it acts as a proxy for measuring their personal integrity. Consequently, this dissertation argues that their personal integrity is likely similar to what the CPI measures and thus uses the CPI as a measure of integrity.

On the other hand, using the CPI as an integrity measure can prove helpful in determining whether representatives on the Security Council who come from countries with low CPI ratings are subject to prejudices regarding their integrity. It seems possible that the other members of the Council may be initially inhibited due to the country of origin of a representative and the related integrity of public officials, and they may therefore assume that a colleague from a country with a low CPI rating also lacks personal integrity. Furthermore, I argue that the CPI measures the integrity of a representative towards his or her home institution, as a government is likely to send someone to the UNSC who has a similar moral basis. Thus, the CPI rating is also an indicator of the governance structures of the country that a president comes from. This is a crucial indicator to include in the model because it also accounts for country-specific structures. Furthermore, as established during the literature review and based on the abovementioned reasons, the CPI can measure the importance of the role of an agent. The following chapter describes and discusses the methodology and data used, as well as the regression model and its results. Last, some conclusions and limitations are discussed.

4.2.1.1 Methodology, data and regression equation

In the first analysis of the impact of the CPI rating of a UNSC president's home country on the duration of the UNSC meetings, I ran two regression analyses in SPSS, one ordinary least squares (OLS) regression and one regression controlling for individual fixed effects. As described previously, this empirical example was drawn from the impact of each president's home

country's CPI rating on the duration of the meetings chaired by that president. I investigate these effects by controlling for multiple other variables potentially associated with the duration of a UNSC meeting to ensure that there is no omitted variable bias.

The data set was created for the purpose of this thesis and includes data on 997 UNSC meetings held between 1995 and 2012 in which a resolution was voted on. It includes those meetings for which data on all variables were available. For example, there is no CPI available for Oman in 1995 or Jamaica in 2001; hence, these observations were excluded from the regression. The 997 UNSC meetings included four with a duration of less than five minutes. These meetings were dropped as outliers because it seems unlikely that a UNSC meeting would be only one or two minutes long. Furthermore, when considering the number of pages of the minutes of these meetings, their content seems longer than what a meeting lasting less than five minutes would have produced. It seems these time designations were caused by human error on the part of the person recording the minutes. Hence, they were dropped from the analyses, leading to $N = 993$.

There is a series of determinants that could influence the duration of a UNSC meeting, and hence they are controlled for in these analyses. First, the gender of the UNSC's president is included as a control variable in the form of a dummy variable. In academia, it has been argued whether there is a (perceived) discrepancy between men and women in leadership and their effectiveness (e.g. Madsen 2015; Paustian-Underdahl et al. 2014). This study is not interested in whether the influence of women leaders is positive or negative with regards to effectiveness; however, it does acknowledge that there might be a difference that should be taken into account and controlled for.

Second, the number of sessions previously held on a certain topic is taken into account in this analysis. The more sessions that have been held on a certain topic before, the more the representatives know about it and its context. Hence, fewer explanations and discussions around general information are needed, which should lead to a shorter meeting duration. The number of sessions previously held on a certain topic is also an indicator of the complexity and

difficulty of that topic; if more meetings are necessary to discuss a topic, this implies that developments or changes have occurred or that new perspectives have emerged with regard to that topic. Furthermore, in general, more sessions imply a more complex topic because there is more need for discussion. With both of these arguments in mind, it is possible that the effect of the number of sessions held on a certain topic could be either positive or negative.

Realist scholars place power at the centre of all international political efforts. In my research, I do not assign power such a prominent place; however, I do argue that it makes a difference if the chief negotiator is from a country that is perceived as powerful. There are several reasons for this. First, it could be intimidating to be led by a person hailing from a powerful nation. Furthermore, it is possible that 'strategic intimidation' (i.e. knowing that a powerful country will be needed as an ally in the future or is an important aid donor) could lead to representatives choosing not to 'act up' in the present (Dreher et al. 2018). Consequently, one would expect a UNSC meeting to be shorter when it is chaired by a president from a powerful country. Additionally, including a measure of the power of a representative's home country also allows for the measurement of the effect of the role of the agent on the meso-level of cooperation because it is a measure of the structure of the country, rather than a measure of the individual characteristics of the representative. Therefore, this role is also included and assessed in the quantitative models.

Within the notion of power, another variable included in the model is whether or not the president of the Council is from a country that is a permanent member of the UNSC. It is known and has been widely discussed in academia that the P-5 possess greater power than that of the non-permanent members (e.g. Malone 2009). This is mainly due to the veto power that the P-5 have and exert when it comes to voting within the Council, which has been subject to a call for reform (Fassbender 1998; Malone 2009). Additionally, it is possible that the representatives from the P-5 countries have attended the Council for longer and therefore know every detail of its functions. For these two reasons, permanent membership is included in the models as a dummy variable. Additionally, including the variable of whether or not a president is from a P-5 country again allows for the inclusion of the role of the agent in the quantitative

analysis and measures its importance at the meso-level of international cooperation. This is because it measures the structure of the country that the president represents.

Furthermore, this work argues that whether or not a resolution was eventually adopted influences the duration of a UNSC meeting. If a resolution is not adopted, the topic can be considered as inherently divisive. This leads to a longer discussion among the members of the Council. This thesis considers it to be irrelevant if the resolution was vetoed or did not reach the required majority.

This study further argues that integrity and trust in international cooperation have an impact on the outcome of international negotiations. Therefore, I include a variable reflecting trust in the assessment. At this point, it is important to note that, as argued previously, trust (as well as integrity) cannot be attributed to oneself; rather, it is a property that must always be attributed to one by others. Furthermore, trust in this context does not always have to be positive. For example, one could trust that someone will disappoint him or her. In this context, I argue that the more often a person has chaired the UNSC as president, the more the other members of the Council trust him or her (either positively or negatively), as they will come to know the president and his or her style of leading sessions and fostering discussion. Therefore, the number of times that a person has chaired the UNSC as president at a given point in time is included in the analysis as a variable of trust. Measuring the impact of this variable on the duration of meetings also allows for the measurement of the effect of the role of partners in cooperation among representatives on the meso-level of international cooperation. I argue that the more representatives interact, the greater the sense of partnership among them is. Consequently, the role of the ambassadors as partners in cooperation is included in the model via the trust variable.

The last variable controlled for in the model is the importance of the topic of a particular resolution to political society. By political society, I refer to those groups of people who are either interested in or actively participate in political world affairs. This includes (international) civil servants, people who are working for non-governmental organisations (NGOs), people in leading positions in the private sector and all individuals with a distinct interest in the

international political world. I argue that greater coverage of a topic in the media leads to longer Council deliberations. The greater the public interest in a topic, the more media coverage there is of the Council's decisions. This is based on an argument that has been made in the past, which states that, since the emergence of the so-called 'CNN effect', referring to the screening of images of brutal human rights violations in international media, the UNSC has strengthened its efforts, especially with regards to human rights violations (Malone 2009). This is used for the purpose of this dissertation in order to argue that Council members are more likely to be careful in their decision-making and therefore require more time in which to make decisions when there is increased media coverage of a particular issue. In contrast, less public interest in an issue leads to shorter deliberations because the UNSC members do not fear significant media coverage of their decision. More extensive media coverage also suggests a more complex topic. As the media feels the need to discuss a topic more often, this suggests that developments and changes related to the topic require more frequent reporting. For these two reasons, the interest of a topic to political society is included as a control variable.

To summarise, the following variables are included in the model:

- Duration of a meeting
- CPI
- Number of times the president chaired the meeting before (i.e. trust)
- Number of times the topic was discussed before
- Importance of the topic to political society
- Power
- Permanent member
- Gender
- Success of the resolution

The applied regression model controls for these determinants and is as follows: Y is the dependent variable, the duration of the UNSC meeting in minutes, and n is the observation:

$$Y_i = \beta_1 X_i + \beta_2 X_i + \beta_3 X_i + \beta_4 X_i + \beta_5 X_i + \beta_6 X_i + \beta_7 X_i + \beta_8 X_i + \varepsilon_i$$

For the fixed effects regression, the model changes because it controls for each president's individual fixed effects using a dummy variable:

$$Y_i = \beta_1 X_i + \beta_2 X_i + \beta_3 X_i + \beta_4 X_i + \beta_5 X_i + \beta_6 X_i + \beta_7 X_i + \beta_8 X_i + \beta_9 X_i \dots \beta_{225} X_i + \varepsilon_i$$

In both models, $\beta_1 X$ is the personal integrity of the president of the UNSC, as measured by the country's CPI in the given year. $\beta_2 X$ is the power of the president's country, while $\beta_3 X$ is the importance of the topic under discussion to political society. $\beta_4 X$ is a dummy variable for the gender of the president chairing the meeting, and $\beta_5 X$ is a dummy variable for the adoption of the resolution. $\beta_6 X$ is the number of times that a topic has been discussed before, and $\beta_7 X$ is the number of times a person has chaired the UNSC previously. $\beta_8 X$ refers to whether the president is from a P-5 country. The variables $\beta_9 X$ to $\beta_{225} X$ (in the fixed effects model) are dummy variables controlling for individual fixed effects of each president. ε_i is the error term. There is no need to control for time fixed effects, as they are accounted for in the number of times a topic has been discussed before and in the number of times a president has previously chaired meetings.

The data set includes data on each variable indicated in the regression model between 1995 and 2012. Data for the regression were gathered from several sources. Each president's name, as well as his or her nationality and gender, were taken from the UNSC meeting records (United Nations Security Council n.d.a). The nationality was then used to determine the CPI in the respective year, which is available from Transparency International starting from 1995.

The president's nationality was also used to determine the perceived power of his or her country. Power is a rather vague term, and it is difficult to quantify. For this analysis, the Composite Index of National Capability (CINC) (Singer 1987; The Correlates of War Project n.d.) was used; it measures national power with reference to the total population of a country, its urban population, its iron and steel production, its primary energy consumption and its military expenditure and personnel. The six indicators in the CINC index may seem outdated because they focus on the military side of power and ignore factors such as economic, digital or educational power. Nonetheless, the CINC index is a widely used indicator to measure power because there is a lack of other indicators that include factors that go beyond military figures. Furthermore, the UNSC's *raison d'être* is to preserve world peace and security. Thus, more often than not, the topics discussed are linked to some kind of military activity. Additionally, the CINC index and its creator, Singer, understand the notion of power much as realists and neorealists do, that is, as the distribution of capabilities (Singer et al. 1972, p. 19). Therefore, by including the CINC index in the statistical analysis, the regression can also test to what extent the assumptions of traditional and neorealist scholars play a role in international cooperation. In this context, it does not seem inappropriate to use a power index that is heavily based on military factors.

Gender, which was determined based on data taken from the names in the UNSC meeting minutes, was used as a dummy variable. The name of each UNSC president was transformed into a dummy variable for the second regression in order to control for each president's specific characteristics (fixed effects).

The meeting records were also the source for the start and end times and the information concerning whether the resolution was adopted. The total duration of each meeting was calculated in minutes based on the start and end times. If a meeting was interrupted and resumed at a later point in time, the total number of minutes from both meetings was used. The success of a resolution, or lack thereof, was included as a dummy variable.

To gauge the importance of a topic to political society, the number of hits obtained when a particular topic was searched for in the archive of the *New York*

Times was used (The New York Times n.d.). The *New York Times* is one of the world's most renowned newspapers, and it is mostly read by people who are interested or active in political and economic world affairs, including those who work for the UN in New York. Furthermore, the geographical proximity of the paper's editorial office to the UN headquarters makes the *New York Times* a valid choice for a medium to determine the importance of the topic to the political society. I argue that the number of articles in the *New York Times* should be higher for topics that are of greater interest to the readers of this newspaper. The name of topic (taken from the meeting minutes) was searched for in the archive of the *New York Times*, with each search being limited to the year in which the respective UNSC meeting was held. The number of articles resulting from that search of the archive was included as an instrumental variable that reflected political society's interest in the topic under discussion.

The topics of the individual meetings (as taken from the UNSC meeting records) were also used to determine the number of times that that topic had been previously discussed in the Council, within the time frame considered in the quantitative analyses. This was done by listing all dates and the respective topics at a given date and then calculating how many times the topic had been discussed previously. For example, for the 10th meeting on a certain topic, the number of times the meeting topic was previously discussed would be nine.


The number of times a particular president previously chaired the UNSC was also determined based on the meeting minutes of the UNSC meetings between 1995 and 2012, by listing all dates and presidents at a given date and then calculating how many times a president had previously chaired the Council meeting. As an example, if a president had chaired a meeting for the 10th time, the number of times the president previously led the meeting would be nine.

Most of the scale and continuous variables were not normally distributed. The DV was transformed using a log transformation, which resulted in a better homoscedasticity of variance, as can be seen in Figure 1. All other variables were not transformed for the following reasons. The variables gender, permanent member and resolution successful were not transformed because they are dummy variables that took the value of 0 or 1. Personal integrity reflects grouping (taking only whole number values between 0 and 18) and was

therefore not transformed. This is also true for the variable number of times president chaired the meeting before, which shows grouping because this variable can only take the form of a whole number. The variable CPI shows a distribution close to normal. This is considered close enough to normal, especially considering that N of the data set is rather large. When transforming the variables, importance of topic to society and number of times topic has been discussed before using a log transformation, the result shows that the normality does not improve for either. Therefore, they were not transformed for the purpose of the multivariate analyses. Furthermore, interpreting results obtained from models using transformed data is known to be much more difficult than with data that are not transformed (Tabachnick and Fidell 2007, p. 86).

The data set was checked for linearity because this is one of the prerequisites for performing a regression (Tabachnick and Fidell 2007, p. 78). Linearity was checked by plotting the unstandardised predicted values against the studentised residuals in a scatterplot; this scatterplot is shown in Figure 1. The graph shows linearity, but it is not very clear. We can observe four distinct lines with a negative slope because the DV (duration of meeting) has the same value in many cases. However, this is not true for all values. The scatterplot also shows that the homoscedasticity assumption is not violated. Homoscedasticity suggests that there is an equal level of variance among the explanatory variables (Salkind op. 2010, p. 581). This was the case for the underlying data, which, as explained above, again show distinct lines.

Figure 1 – Scatter plot: studentised residuals against unstandardised predicted value



Further outliers (other than the four described before) were identified by checking for studentised deleted residuals. However, deleting all outliers was not justifiable because they could be legitimate observations (Tabachnick and Fidell 2007, p. 77). Therefore, the detected outliers in the data set at hand were not deleted because they were valid observations. Another prerequisite to test for before running a multivariate regression is whether the model has a high degree of correlation between the IV and the control variables (i.e. multicollinearity) (Tabachnick and Fidell 2007, p. 89). This model has no auto-correlation because the value of the Durbin-Watson statistic is 2.030 (see Table 7); it should be close to 2 for no multicollinearity to be detected (Auer 2018).

Furthermore, a bivariate correlations table (Table 3) was produced in SPSS and checked for correlations. Table 3 shows the Pearson coefficient r , which measures the simple linear relationships between all variables. The value

of r ranges between -1 and 1, with -1 indicating a perfect negative correlation and 1 a perfect positive correlation. When r is 0 or close to 0, no correlation between variables can be established (Hartung and Elpelt 1999, p. 144). In order to establish the correlation effect, Cohen's effect size (Cohen 1988, pp. 79–80) was used. It states that $r = 0.1$ is a small effect, $r = 0.3$ is a medium effect and $r = 0.5$ is a high effect.

The table shows that a positive correlation ($r = 0.648$) exists between the variables permanent member and power. This seems reasonable because the permanent five members are known to wield both economic and military power. Tabachnick and Fidell (2007, pp. 90–91) established that variables with a bivariate correlation of 0.7 or more should not be included in a regression model. However, this was not found to be the case with any of the variables.

Table 3 – Bivariate correlations for all variables

Correlations

		Personal integrity	CPI	Time president chairing the meeting	Duration of meeting	Time topic is discussed	Importance of topic to society	Power	Gender	Permanent member	Resolution successful
CPI	Pearson correlation	.081*	1	-.087**	.033	-.026	-.067*	-.003	.161**	.187**	-.023
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.011		.006	.304	.405	.035	.933	.000	.000	.465
	N	993	993	993	993	993	993	993	993	993	993
Time president chairing the meeting	Pearson correlation	-.273**	-.087**	1	-.022	.031	-.026	.096**	-.027	.390**	-.015
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.006		.488	.328	.408	.002	.396	.000	.637
	N	993	993	993	993	993	993	993	993	993	993
Duration of meeting	Pearson correlation	-.090**	.033	-.022	1	-.140**	-.007	.002	.017	-.031	-.076*
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.005	.304	.488		.000	.819	.948	.599	.322	.017
	N	993	993	993	993	993	993	993	993	993	993
Time topic is discussed	Pearson correlation	.111**	-.026	.031	-.140**	1	-.025	.058	.056	-.005	.056
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.405	.328	.000		.433	.068	.076	.881	.079
	N	993	993	993	993	993	993	993	993	993	993
Importance of topic to society	Pearson correlation	.033	-.067*	-.026	-.007	-.025	1	-.003	.062	-.024	-.012
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.301	.035	.408	.819	.433		.924	.051	.457	.710
	N	993	993	993	993	993	993	993	993	993	993
Power	Pearson correlation	-.095**	-.003	.096**	.002	.058	-.003	1	.138**	.648**	.010
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.003	.933	.002	.948	.068	.924		.000	.000	.755
	N	993	993	993	993	993	993	993	993	993	993
Gender	Pearson correlation	-.051	.161**	-.027	.017	.056	.062	.138**	1	.036	-.025
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.112	.000	.396	.599	.076	.051	.000		.259	.438
	N	993	993	993	993	993	993	993	993	993	993
Permanent Member	Pearson correlation	-.189**	.187**	.390**	-.031	-.005	-.024	.648**	.036	1	-.013
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000	.322	.881	.457	.000	.259		.675
	N	993	993	993	993	993	993	993	993	993	993
Resolution successful	Pearson correlation	.013	-.023	-.015	-.076*	.056	-.012	.010	-.025	-.013	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.678	.465	.637	.017	.079	.710	.755	.438	.675	
	N	993	993	993	993	993	993	993	993	993	993

*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

** . Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Descriptive statistics for the data set are presented in Table 4. Descriptive statistics for the dummies that controlled for individual fixed effects were not included.

Table 4 – Descriptive statistics for all variables (including log-transformed DV)

Descriptive Statistics

	N	Min.	Max.	Mean	Std. Deviation
Duration of meeting	993	5	765	36.19	75.268
LogDuration	993	.70	2.88	1.1710	.50939
Personal integrity	993	0	18	14.82	4.608
CPI	993	.40	9.50	5.0762	2.35480
Time president chairing the meeting	993	1	45	6.41	6.556
Time topic is discussed	993	1	60	16.43	13.353
Importance of topic to society	993	0	16,001	512.49	1,308.227
Power	993	.0000531	2.218116	.035386461	.0548884128
Permanent member	993	0	1	.36	.479
Gender	993	0	1	.06	.237
Resolution successful	993	0	1	.98	.141
Valid N (listwise)	993				

4.2.1.2 Empirical analysis: the effect of personal integrity as measured by the CPI on international cooperation

Table 5 presents the result of the regression not controlling for individual fixed effects, including all of the control variables described above. The results of the regression not controlling for individual fixed effects reveals no statistically significant relationship between the CPI of the president’s country and the duration of a UNSC meeting. Strong statistical significance is shown when the number in the column ‘Sig.’ is less than 0.05. In some cases, statistical

significance can also be established by a ‘Sig.’ value less than 0.1. The statistical significance value (also called the p-value) shows how likely it is that the results were produced by chance (Tabachnick and Fidell 2007, p. 34; Hartung and Elpelt 1999, pp. 46–47). The only statistically significant variables in the model are whether the resolution was adopted successfully, the importance of the topic under discussion to political society (however, only at the 10% level) and the number of times the topic was discussed before. None of the other variables included in the regression were statistically significant.

Table 5 – Coefficients: regressing CPI against duration (not controlling for fixed effects)

Coefficients^a

	Unstandardised		Standardised		t	Sig.
	Coefficients		Coefficients			
	B	Std. Error	Beta			
(Constant)	1.890	.120		15.745	.000	
Time topic is discussed	-.006	.001	-.158	-5.074	.000	
CPI	-6.870E-5	.007	.000	-.010	.992	
Permanent member	-.071	.051	-.067	-1.394	.164	
Resolution successful	-.619	.112	-.171	-5.521	.000	
Time president chairing the meeting	-.002	.003	-.031	-.878	.380	
Importance of topic to society	2.141E-5	.000	.055	1.773	.077	
Power	.490	.403	.053	1.217	.224	
Gender	-.020	.069	-.009	-.289	.773	

a. Dependent variable: LogDuration

However, the results of the regression controlling for individual fixed effects are of greater relevance because it takes each president’s specific characteristics into account. These characteristics might have effects that should

not be underestimated. However, when we consider those results (presented in Table 6), the relationship between CPI of the president's country of origin and the duration of a UNSC meeting, still shows no statistically significant relationship when controlling for fixed effects. Only whether the resolution was adopted successfully and the variables importance of the topic under discussion to political society and the number of times the topic had been discussed previously were statistically significant at the 5% level.

To interpret the results in a meaningful way, we need to take into consideration that the DV has been log-transformed. The formula applied to interpret the estimated coefficients is $(e^{\beta x} - 1) * 100$ (Benoit 2011). When applying this to the estimated coefficients, we obtain the percentage change in the DV that is explained by the IV. After applying the formula to the estimated coefficients, it is possible to offer the following interpretations: A one-point increase in the number of times that a topic has been discussed previously leads to a 0.03% decrease in the duration of a meeting. A resolution being successfully adopted in a meeting leads to a 48% decrease in the duration of a meeting compared to when a resolution is not adopted. Finally, a one-point increase in the importance of a topic to society results in a 0.0029% decrease in the duration of the meeting discussing that topic.

Table 6 – Coefficients: regressing CPI against duration (controlling for fixed effects)

Coefficients^a

	Unstandardised		Standardised		t	Sig.
	Coefficients		Coefficients			
	B	Std. Error	Beta			
(Constant)	2.187	.465			4.707	.000
Time topic is discussed	-.003	.001	-.083		-2.346	.019
CPI	-.028	.074	-.127		-.371	.711
Resolution successful	-.631	.109	-.174		-5.778	.000
Time president chairing the meeting	-.001	.004	-.017		-.353	.724
Importance of topic to society	2.951E-5	.000	.076		2.449	.015
Power	-3.340	8.379	-.360		-.399	.690

a. Dependent variable: LogDuration

The coefficients table furthermore shows that the variables of gender and for the permanent membership to the UNSC were dropped by SPSS from the model in the fixed effects regressions. This implies that it has no effect on the dependent variable at all, and therefore, it was excluded from the analysis.

The model summary (Table 7) shows that 22% of variance in the dependent variable is explained by the independent variables.

Table 7 – Model summary: regressing CPI against duration (controlling for fixed effects)

Model Summary^b

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate	Durbin-Watson
1	.599	.358	.219	.45022	2.030

b. Dependent variable: LogDuration

4.2.1.3 Conclusion and limitations

The analyses show that the CPI of a UNSC president's country of origin does not have an effect on the duration of the UNSC meetings. From this, it is possible to draw three conclusions: First, with regards to integrity, there seems to be no prejudice towards presidents from countries with low CPI ratings. It seems that the representatives generally assume that they are dealing with capable, professional colleagues possessed of a high level of integrity.

Second, the integrity of a representative towards his or her home country has no effect on the duration of a UNSC meeting. This is linked with the first implication because the ambassador acting as president is now in an international setting, in which other Council members are aware of the shortcomings in terms of the integrity of a representative's home country's institutions but do not judge the representative's personality on that basis. It is possible that governments send representatives to the UNSC that comply with their moral code; however, this does not have an influence on the success of a meeting.

Third, I initially argued that the CPI reflects a president's personal integrity to a certain extent and that it therefore impacts the duration of a meeting. If this is the case, integrity has no statistically significant impact on the duration and hence on the success of a UNSC meeting. However, the CPI can be considered a flawed variable in terms of representing personal integrity, as it seems both broad and inaccurate. Using a collective indicator to draw conclusions regarding individual characteristics is problematic. In this model, two different presidents from the same country chairing the UNSC in the same year are assigned the same CPI. Thus, it is assumed that all public officials from a particular country have the same level of personal integrity, which is certainly incorrect. To overcome this obstacle in the subsequent statistical analyses, I ran a regression analyses using the same DV and control variables but used a truly personal measure of integrity, created specifically for the purposes of this thesis; it relied on background checks. (Please refer to Chapter 4.3 for a more comprehensive and in-depth discussion of the limitations regarding the data analysed and the methodological approach adopted.)

4.2.2 Analysis II: Regressing personal integrity and the DV

In order to overcome the limitations of the first analysis, the second analyses used a newly created measure of the personal integrity of each president of the UNSC during the period between 1995 and 2012 to regress against the DV. The CPI, however, was still used as a control variable in the analyses because it still measures the governance structure of the country a president is from and, as such, also measures the role of the agent the representatives on the meso-level of international cooperation assume. In order to assess and investigate this matter further, I also ran the characteristics that comprise the personal integrity variable separately in order to determine which showed a statistical significance. Additionally, I conducted a PCA and assessed some potential interaction effects. The following chapter describes and discusses the methodology and data used, as well as the regression models and their results.

4.2.2.1 Methodology, data and regression equation

To overcome the limitations of the first analysis (as described above) and assess the impact of the personal integrity of key players in international cooperation on the success of international cooperation, I ran further OLS regression analyses in SPSS. In contrast to the first analysis, these analyses used newly created data on the personal integrity of each president. For this reason, the regressions did not control for personal fixed effects because these are included in the personal integrity variable. I investigated the effects of personal integrity on the duration of UNSC meetings, controlling for the same variables associated with the duration of a meeting as in the first analysis (Chapter 4.2.1). The following variables were included in the model:

- Duration of meeting
- Personal integrity
- CPI
- Time president chairing the meeting (i.e. trust)
- Time topic is discussed

- Importance of topic to political society
- Power
- Permanent member
- Gender
- Resolution successful

It is important to once again emphasise that measuring the personal integrity of each president not only accounts for the behavioural assumption established in the literature review, which states that human beings have different personality traits and idiosyncratic characteristics, but also allows for establishing the effect of one role that ambassadors at the meso-level of cooperation assume (i.e. as individuals with different personality traits and backgrounds). The variables CPI, power and permanent member continue to measure the agent role, whereas the trust variable (i.e. number of times president chaired the meeting before) again measures the role of ambassadors as partners in cooperation.

The model adopted is the following: Y is the DV, the duration of the UNSC meeting in minutes and i the observation:

$$Y_i = \beta_1 X_i + \beta_2 X_i + \beta_3 X_i + \beta_4 X_i + \beta_5 X_i + \beta_6 X_i + \beta_7 X_i + \beta_8 X_i + \beta_9 X_i + \varepsilon_i$$

In this model, $\beta_1 X$ is the personal integrity of the president of the UNSC. $\beta_2 X$ is the power of the president's country, while $\beta_3 X$ is the importance of the topic under discussion to political society. $\beta_4 X$ is a dummy variable indicating the gender of the president chairing the meeting, and $\beta_5 X$ is a dummy variable for the adoption of the resolution. $\beta_6 X$ is the number of times the topic was discussed previously, and $\beta_7 X$ is the number of times an individual has chaired the UNSC before. $\beta_8 X$ is the CPI of the president's country in the given year, while $\beta_9 X$ indicates whether or not the president is from a P-5 country. ε_i is the error term.

The data set includes data on each variable indicated in the regression model between 1995 and 2012. Data for control variables and the DV were

gathered as described in Chapter 4.2.1.1. The only new variable added to the regression was personal integrity.

As argued previously, one cannot attribute integrity to oneself; it is always attributed to an individual by others. Bearing this in mind, for the purpose of this research, a score that estimates personal integrity was assigned to each president of the UNSC based on background research. I argue that what background research reveals about a president's integrity is also known to the members of the Council because they have conversations with each other and read newspapers.

The score of personal integrity was gathered and assigned to each president as follows: First, I developed a weighted scoring system of integrity that includes honesty, following strong moral principles, incorruptibility, consistency, respectfulness and modesty. Yukl and Van Fleet describe integrity as follows: 'Integrity means that a person's behaviour is consistent with espoused values and that the person is honest and trustworthy' (Yukl, G. A., Van Fleet, D. D. 1992), p.151). In addition, the COSO Internal Control Integrated Framework of 2011's definition is used in this research. The Framework defines integrity as follows:

The quality or state of being of sound moral principle; uprightness, honesty, and sincerity; the desire to do the right thing, to process and live up to a set of values and expectations. (p.137)

Both Yukl and Van Fleet and the COSO Framework identify *honesty* as an aspect of integrity, and it indeed seems to be one of the most important attributes that a person can possess in terms of making others trust him or her and giving others the feeling that he or she is reliable and possessed of a high degree of personal integrity. Especially in the UNSC, it is important that representatives can have open discussion during or after meetings and can be sure that their counterparts will tell the truth. The other aspect of integrity that Yukl and Van Fleet identify is 'consistent behaviour with espoused values' (Yukl, G. A., Van Fleet, D. D. 1992), p.151). The COSO framework puts this somewhat differently: 'the desire to do the right thing, to process and live up to a set of values and expectations' (COSO Internal Control 2011), p.137). Both definitions ultimately refer to the same thing, which is inherent in the notion of my attribute of

following strong moral principles, and it means the ability to differentiate between right and wrong and to stand up for what is right. In the UNSC, this is of the utmost importance because many of its discussions concern humanitarian aid and intervention, which always have a strong moral component. Both Yukl and Van Fleet's definition of integrity and that offered by the COSO framework seem too narrow for the purpose of this dissertation. To broaden it, I argue that, especially in a political context involving public officials, *incorruptibility* plays an important role. It is the attribute of not being involved in any corrupt practices, such as accepting bribes or using political power or obtaining exclusive information for personal gain. As UNSC members are public officials, there is a high risk inherent in their positions of corruption and bribery (Johnston 1997, pp. 62–63). *Consistency* is the characteristic of adhering to one point or opinion and being consistent. I interpret this as being close to the COSO Framework's notion of sincerity (COSO Internal Control 2011). In the UNSC, consistency is important because it determines whether colleagues can rely on another representative, particularly when it comes to voting. *Respectfulness* is included in this scoring model to assess whether a person shows respect to others, even when opinions diverge and discussions become heated, which occurs fairly frequently among the members of the UNSC. The research conducted by Lalljee et al. (2009) has shown that disrespect is a significant predictor of negative action tendencies. Therefore, I argue that being respectful is closely connected to having integrity. Last, *modesty* is included in the analyses because it is a form of diverting attention away from oneself and showing that one's primary interests are not financial or based on power.

At this point it is important to discuss Tomasello's findings about human morality and integrity since, his work in large part lays the basis for the behavioural assumptions underlying this dissertation. Tomasello (2016, pp. 111-115) finds that small children already depict integrity (what he calls a moral identity), applying the norms that he or she learnt from the society to him or herself and making judgements about the own or others behaviour within the framework of these norms. For Tomasello, at the basis of integrity lay four sets of concerns (me-concerns, you-concerns, equality-concerns, we-concerns)

(Tomasello, 2016, pp. 112-113). According to him, the you-concerns, equality-concerns and we-concerns are especially crucial to moral decision making.

While Tomasello’s work on integrity and moral identity is very helpful in establishing a general notion about human nature and human behaviour, his assumptions about integrity will not be further discussed in this paper for the following reason: Since most of his work is based on research with small children his findings about moral-integrity are applicable to children. But are they applicable to adults as well? I argue that by no means the integrity human beings depict as children remains when the child grows up to become an adult. Assumptions and findings about the integrity of small children are therefore not helpful when investigating the effect of integrity on international cooperation. Especially not when investigating it in such a specific group like ambassadors (which are adults) acting in international relations. Consequently, Tomasello’s remarks on integrity and moral identity do not find further attention in this dissertation.

Table 8: Personal integrity scoring system

Honesty	Following strong moral principles	In-corruptibility	Consistency	Respectfulness	Modesty
4 points	4 points	4 points	2 points	2 points	2 points


As shown in Table 8 each attribute of integrity as defined above has a maximum achievable score. They add up to a maximum total score of 18 points; should a person achieve such a high score, it would suggest that he or she is possessed of a very high level of personal integrity. The reason for the different maximum points per attribute is that the first three (honesty, strong moral principles and incorruptibility) are more important for a person's integrity as perceived by others. For example, if we consider person A, who has been involved in a major corruption scandal or has lied to the public, he or she will be perceived as having less integrity than person B, who has never been involved in such a scandal and

never lies but wears an expensive watch and owns a private jet. However, if we are confronted with person C, who was involved in a major corruption scandal, lied to the public and, in addition, wears an expensive watch and owns a private jet, we would consider him to have even less integrity than person A. This makes person B the one with the most integrity, followed by person A, with person C being the one with the least integrity. This logic is reflected in the different weighting of the attributes.

The integrity of each of the presidents who chaired the UNSC between 1995 and 2012 was estimated with the help of the above scoring model. In order to gather relevant information, searches were conducted using two sources: first, Factiva, a Dow Jones database for press, corporate and business information was used to search for relevant information; (Dow Jones n.d.); second, both the search engine Google and Google News were used to complement the results of the Factiva search (Google Inc. n.d.). Search strings including various terms that might be associated with integrity problems were developed for both research tools (please refer to Appendix 1 for these search strings). The same search strings were used for each individual, and the same number of results pages (pages 1 and 2 for Factiva, page 1 for Google Search and page 1 for Google News) were considered and investigated for information to be used in the scoring model. In approximately 43% of the cases investigated, this search led to newspaper articles, posts on discussion forums and interviews that were relevant for scoring personal integrity, meaning that around 43% of presidents received a score of less than 18 points. It is important to note that, in the scoring model, it is only possible to score the maximum points for each attribute or 0. Hence, if a newspaper article was found that stated that one of the UNSC presidents had lied in the past, that person immediately scored 0, regardless of the severity of the lie. This reduced the risk of assigning points based on the personal judgement of the researcher.

The data were distributed as shown in the histogram in Figure 2.

Figure 2 – Distribution of data: personal integrity variable




As in the first analyses, in this analysis, most of the scale and continuous variables were not normally distributed. (Please refer to Chapter 4.2.1.1 for information on how this was addressed.)

In this analysis, the data set was again checked for linearity and homoscedasticity of variance by plotting the unstandardised predicted values against the studentised residuals in a scatterplot. This scatterplot is shown in Figure 3. The graph shows linearity; however, as was the case in the first regression analysis, this is not clear, as one can observe four distinct lines with a negative slope. This linearity is similar to that found in the first regression analysis because the DV (duration of meeting) had the same values in most cases. However, this was not the case for all values. The scatterplot also shows

that the homoscedasticity assumption was not violated. Homoscedasticity suggests that there is an equal level of variance among the explanatory variables (Salkind op. 2010). This is the case for the underlying data, which yet again show the distinct lines mentioned above.

Figure 3 – Scatter plot: studentised residuals against unstandardised predicted value, including personal integrity variable



Again, further outliers (other than the four described previously) were identified by checking for studentised deleted residuals. However, not all outliers could be deleted because they can be legitimate observations (Tabachnick and Fidell 2007, p. 77). Therefore, the detected outliers in the data set at hand were not deleted because they are valid observations. Another prerequisite to test for before running a multivariate regression is whether the model has a high degree of correlation between the IV and the control variables (i.e. multicollinearity) (Tabachnick and Fidell 2007, p. 89). This model has no

auto-correlation because the value of the Durbin-Watson statistic is 1.724 (see Table 11); it should be close to 2 if no multicollinearity can be detected (Auer 2018).

Before performing the regression analysis using the personal integrity variable as the IV, another analysis of the correlations was performed because it seemed plausible that the CPI and the personal integrity variables in particular correlate with each other. That is because the CPI measures the perceived integrity of public officials as a group, as well as the underlying structures of a country with regards to the integrity of its public officials. The personal integrity variable measures the personal integrity of a single public official; thus, a correlation between the two seems possible. For this reason, another bivariate Pearson correlation matrix was produced in SPSS (Table 9). It shows that there is no correlation between any of the variables in the model strong enough that they had to be excluded from the model ($r < 0.7$) (Tabachnick and Fidell 2007, pp. 90–91).

Table 9 – Bivariate correlations – including personal integrity variable

Correlations

		Personal integrity	CPI	Time president chairing the meeting	Duration of meeting	Time topic is discussed	Importance of topic to society	Power	Gender	Permanent member	Resolution successful
Personal integrity	Pearson correlation	1	.081*	-.273**	-.090**	.111**	.033	-.095**	-.051	-.189**	.013
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.011	.000	.005	.000	.301	.003	.112	.000	.678
	N	993	993	993	993	993	993	993	993	993	993
CPI	Pearson correlation	.081*	1	-.087**	.033	-.026	-.067*	-.003	.161**	.187**	-.023
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.011		.006	.304	.405	.035	.933	.000	.000	.465
	N	993	993	993	993	993	993	993	993	993	993
Time president chairing the meeting	Pearson correlation	-.273**	-.087**	1	-.022	.031	-.026	.096**	-.027	.390**	-.015
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.006		.488	.328	.408	.002	.396	.000	.637
	N	993	993	993	993	993	993	993	993	993	993
Duration of meeting	Pearson correlation	-.090**	.033	-.022	1	-.140**	-.007	.002	.017	-.031	-.076*
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.005	.304	.488		.000	.819	.948	.599	.322	.017
	N	993	993	993	993	993	993	993	993	993	993
Time topic is discussed	Pearson correlation	.111**	-.026	.031	-.140**	1	-.025	.058	.056	-.005	.056
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.405	.328	.000		.433	.068	.076	.881	.079
	N	993	993	993	993	993	993	993	993	993	993
Importance of topic to society	Pearson correlation	.033	-.067*	-.026	-.007	-.025	1	-.003	.062	-.024	-.012
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.301	.035	.408	.819	.433		.924	.051	.457	.710
	N	993	993	993	993	993	993	993	993	993	993
Power	Pearson correlation	-.095**	-.003	.096**	.002	.058	-.003	1	.138**	.648**	.010
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.003	.933	.002	.948	.068	.924		.000	.000	.755
	N	993	993	993	993	993	993	993	993	993	993
Gender	Pearson correlation	-.051	.161**	-.027	.017	.056	.062	.138**	1	.036	-.025
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.112	.000	.396	.599	.076	.051	.000		.259	.438
	N	993	993	993	993	993	993	993	993	993	993
Permanent member	Pearson correlation	-.189**	.187**	.390**	-.031	-.005	-.024	.648**	.036	1	-.013
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000	.322	.881	.457	.000	.259		.675
	N	993	993	993	993	993	993	993	993	993	993
Resolution successful	Pearson correlation	.013	-.023	-.015	-.076*	.056	-.012	.010	-.025	-.013	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.678	.465	.637	.017	.079	.710	.755	.438	.675	
	N	993	993	993	993	993	993	993	993	993	993

*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

** . Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

It is important to note that three meetings were jointly headed by two or three representatives from a single country. For these cases, the mean of the variable personal integrity was calculated and used as the value for these data points.

4.2.2.2 Empirical analysis: the impact of personal integrity on international cooperation

Table 10 presents the results of the OLS regression in which the CPI was used as an additional control variable and the newly created measure was used to measure the personal integrity of each president. It shows that personal integrity, the number of times a topic had been discussed previously and whether or not a resolution was successful are all statistically significant at the 5% level. As in the regression above, for meaningful interpretation of the results, the fact that the DV has been log-transformed must be taken into consideration. I again apply the following formula to the estimated coefficients: $(e^{\beta x} - 1) * 100$ (Benoit 2011). When applying this to the estimated coefficients, we obtain the percentage change in the DV that is explained by the IV. The results therefore suggest that a one-point increase in personal integrity leads to a 0.1% shorter meeting. Furthermore, the results suggest that a one-unit increase in the number of times a topic has been discussed before leads to a meeting being approximately 0.6% shorter. Additionally, if a resolution is successfully voted on in a meeting leads to a 46.1% decrease in the duration of a meeting compared to when a resolution is not successful. Moreover, the variable reflecting whether a topic is important to political society is statistically significant at the 10% level. A one-point increase in importance to political society (measured by the number of articles mentioning the topic in question in the *New York Times* archive) leads to an increase in time of 0.0023%. None of the other variables included in the regression were statistically significant.

The results show that the null hypothesis can be dismissed. As such, personal integrity has an influence on the success of international cooperation. The results further show that the role of the ambassador as an individual, as established during the literature review, has an impact on the meso-level of cooperation. This is in contrast to the variables that measure the role of the

agent (power, CPI and permanent member), none of which shows a statistically significant impact. This suggests that, on the meso-level of international cooperation, the role of the agent of the home country is not as crucial as the role of the individual. Furthermore, the role of the partner for cooperation (as measured by the trust variable) also does not have a statistically significant impact on the DV.

Table 10 – Coefficients: regressing personal integrity against duration

Coefficients^a

	Unstandardised		Standardised	
	Coefficients		Coefficients	
	B	Std. Error	Beta	t Sig.
(Constant)	2.032	.130		15.581 .000
Personal integrity	-.010	.004	-.089	-2.741 .006
Time topic is discussed	-.006	.001	-.147	-4.691 .000
CPI	.002	.007	.009	.267 .790
Permanent member	-.083	.051	-.078	-1.626 .104
Resolution successful	-.618	.112	-.170	-5.533 .000
Time president chairing the meeting	-.004	.003	-.051	-1.413 .158
Importance of topic to society	2.277E-000		.058	1.890 .059
	5			
Power	.499	.401	.054	1.244 .214
Gender	-.035	.069	-.016	-.511 .609

a. Dependent variable: LogDuration

The model summary (Table 11) shows that approximately 7% of the variance (as shown in R-squared) in the dependent variable is explained by the independent variables. According to Cohen (1988, pp. 412–413), who established interpretation rules for r-squared, the value of 7% of this model is a weak explanation of variance. However, considering that the subject and context

of the analysis focus on human behaviour in international politics, it becomes clear that the R-squared is a reasonable value, as human behaviour is generally difficult to predict. Furthermore, if we consider all of the other aspects that might affect the duration of a UNSC meeting, it would not be expected that integrity would be a contributor to the duration of these meetings. Additionally, the UN and the UNSC are highly complex bodies. Particularly during the UNSC meetings, an ambassador does not always decide on the opinions expressed in discussions and the votes given; rather, there are delegations and instructions from his or her home country's government. This is a system of such complexity that it does seem difficult to model it in such a fashion that it will be possible to obtain a higher value for R-squared.

Table 11 – Model summary: regressing personal integrity against duration


Model Summary^b

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate	Durbin-Watson
1	.267 ^a	.072	.063	.49307	1.724

b. Dependent variable: LogDuration

Figure 4 displays the partial regression plot for the variable personal integrity. It shows the effect of the personal integrity variable on the duration of UNSC meetings after both variables (dependent and independent) were adjusted for the effects of all the other factors in the model.

Figure 4 – Partial regression plot – DV: duration - IV: personal integrity



In order to review the results, I ran another regression, in which the CPI rating was omitted as a control variable, to determine whether the results would change. Table 12 shows the results of this regression. It can be seen that there are no major changes in the model. The personal integrity variable stays statistically significant at the 5% level. Furthermore, the same variables as in the other regressions show a statistically significant impact on the duration of meetings. This again supports the claim made in Chapter 4.2.1 that the CPI of the president's country does not play a role in UNSC meetings.

Table 12 – Coefficients: regressing personal integrity against duration (excluding CPI)*Coefficients^a*

	Unstandardised		Standardised		t	Sig.
	Coefficients		Coefficients			
	B	Std. Error	Beta			
(Constant)	2.041	.126			16.217	.000
Personal integrity	-.010	.004	-.088		-2.730	.006
Time topic is discussed	-.006	.001	-.147		-4.701	.000
Permanent member	-.078	.048	-.073		-1.632	.103
Resolution successful	-.618	.112	-.171		-5.540	.000
Time president chairing the meeting	-.004	.003	-.053		-1.497	.135
Importance of topic to society	2.250E-5	.000	.058		1.875	.061
Power	.474	.389	.051		1.217	.224
Gender	-.031	.067	-.015		-.468	.640

a. Dependent variable: LogDuration

4.2.2.3 Regression of the different attributes of the integrity measures

As described and discussed in Chapter 4.2.2.1, the variable measuring personal integrity was created with the use of six categories (honesty, following strong moral principles, incorruptibility, consistency, respectfulness and modesty). In the following regression models (coefficients and model summaries are presented in Tables 11 to 22), the personal integrity variable was dropped and replaced with the values it was created from (i.e. the set of characteristics defining integrity). As such, the following analyses show whether some characteristics of the integrity scoring system have a higher influence on the DV than others. Within this context, it is important to bear in mind the fact that the characteristics of integrity were weighed differently, with honesty, following strong moral principles and incorruptibility weighing twice what the

other three (consistency, respectfulness and modesty) weighed when determining the overall perceived individual integrity of a person. It is also important to note that three data lines (i.e. meetings) were dropped from the following models, as these meetings were chaired by more than one president, for example, by a team of two or three people. For these meetings, it would not have been suitable to calculate the mean of each integrity characteristic for each team (as was done in the first model) because they would then no longer fit the ordinal scaling of the data.

Tables 13 to 24 show the coefficients of these regressions. It can be seen that honesty, following strong moral principles, respectfulness and modesty, shows a statistically significant impact on the duration of the meeting. This result suggests that there are four characteristics of integrity that appear to have a statistically significant impact on the duration of a UNSC meeting. This finding further supports the view that the role of ambassadors as individuals with different personality traits is important at the meso-level of international cooperation.

Table 13 – Coefficients: regression model using integrity characteristics as variables: honesty

Coefficients^a

	Unstandardised		Standardised		Sig.
	Coefficients		Coefficients		
	B	Std. Error	Beta	t	
(Constant)	2.018	.122		16.508	.000
Time topic is discussed	-.005	.001	-.146	-4.720	.000
CPI	.003	.007	.014	.430	.668
Permanent member	-.088	.050	-.084	-1.751	.080
Resolution successful	-.629	.110	-.176	-5.737	.000
Time president chairing the meeting	-.004	.003	-.050	-1.396	.163
Importance of topic to society	2.347E-5	.000	.061	1.985	.047
Power	.559	.394	.061	1.419	.156
Gender	-.045	.068	-.021	-.671	.502
Honesty	-.042	.010	-.135	-4.214	.000

a. Dependent variable: LogDuration

Table 14 – Model summary: regression model using integrity characteristics as variables: honesty

Model Summary^b

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate	Durbin-Watson
1	.283 ^a	.080	.071	.48390	1.746

b. Dependent variable: LogDuration

Table 15 – Coefficients: regression model using integrity characteristics as variables: following strong moral principles

Coefficients^a

	Unstandardised		Standardised		t	Sig.
	Coefficients		Coefficients			
	B	Std. Error	Beta			
(Constant)	1.916	.121			15.858	.000
Time topic is discussed	-.005	.001	-.143		-4.546	.000
CPI	.001	.007	.004		.127	.899
Permanent member	-.066	.050	-.063		-1.323	.186
Resolution successful	-.625	.110	-.175		-5.656	.000
Time president chairing the meeting	-.002	.003	-.032		-.906	.365
Importance of topic to society	2.352E- 5	.000	.061		1.975	.049
Power	.439	.399	.048		1.101	.271
Gender	-.034	.069	-.016		-.496	.620
Following strong moral principles	-.015	.009	-.054		-1.674	.094

a. Dependent variable: LogDuration

Table 16 – Model summary: Regression model using integrity characteristics as variables: following strong moral principles

Model Summary^b

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate	Durbin-Watson
1	.257 ^a	.066	.057	.48757	1.729

b. Dependent variable: LogDuration

Table 17 – Coefficients: regression model using integrity characteristics as variables: incorruptibility

Coefficients^a

	Unstandardised		Standardised		t	Sig.
	Coefficients		Coefficients			
	B	Std. Error	Beta			
(Constant)	1.936	.124			15.592	.000
Time topic is discussed	-.005	.001	-.145		-4.617	.000
CPI	.002	.007	.009		.280	.780
Permanent member	-.084	.051	-.080		-1.631	.103
Resolution successful	-.628	.110	-.176		-5.684	.000
Time president chairing the meeting	-.003	.003	-.034		-.958	.338
Importance of topic to society	2.376E-5	.000	.062		1.993	.047
Power	.640	.406	.070		1.575	.116
Gender	-.016	.068	-.007		-.233	.816
Incorruptibility	-.019	.012	-.054		-1.617	.106

a. Dependent variable: LogDuration

Table 18 – Model Summary: regression model using integrity characteristics as variables: incorruptibility

Model Summary^b

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate	Durbin-Watson
1	.256 ^a	.066	.057	.48762	1.732

b. Dependent variable: LogDuration

Table 19 – Coefficients: regression model using integrity characteristics as variables: consistency

Coefficients^a

	Unstandardised		Standardised		t	Sig.
	Coefficients		Coefficients			
	B	Std. Error	Beta			
(Constant)	1.910	.156			12.223	.000
Time topic is discussed	-.006	.001	-.150		-4.815	.000
CPI	.000	.007	.001		.031	.976
Permanent member	-.065	.050	-.062		-1.287	.198
Resolution successful	-.624	.111	-.175		-5.642	.000
Time president chairing the meeting	-.002	.003	-.024		-.675	.500
Importance of topic to society	2.305E-5	.000	.060		1.933	.054
Power	.496	.398	.054		1.248	.212
Gender	-.018	.068	-.008		-.258	.796
Consistency	-.018	.052	-.011		-3.44	.731

a. Dependent variable: LogDuration

Table 20 – Model summary: Regression model using integrity characteristics as variables: consistency

Model Summary^b

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate	Durbin-Watson
1	.252 ^a	.063	.055	.48824	1.730

b. Dependent variable: LogDuration

Table 21 – Coefficients: regression model using integrity characteristics as variables: respectfulness

Coefficients^a

	Unstandardised		Standardised		t	Sig.
	Coefficients		Coefficients			
	B	Std. Error	Beta			
(Constant)	1.814	.123			14.720	.000
Time topic is discussed	-.006	.001	-.156		-4.991	.000
CPI	-.001	.007	-.006		-.189	.850
Permanent member	-.065	.050	-.062		-1.295	.196
Resolution successful	-.627	.110	-.176		-5.676	.000
Time president chairing the meeting	-.001	.003	-.010		-.282	.778
Importance of topic to society	2.125E-5	.000	.055		1.779	.076
Power	.627	.403	.069		1.556	.120
Gender	-.024	.068	-.011		-.347	.729
Respectfulness	.039	.022	.060		1.758	.079

a. Dependent variable: LogDuration

Table 22 – Model summary: regression model using integrity characteristics as variables: respectfulness

Model Summary^b

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R	Std. Error of the	Durbin-Watson
			Square	Estimate	
1	.257 ^a	.066	.058	.48750	1.733

b. Dependent variable: LogDuration

Table 23 – Coefficients: regression model using integrity characteristics as variables: modesty

Coefficients^a

	Unstandardised		Standardised		t	Sig.
	Coefficients		Coefficients			
	B	Std. Error	Beta			
(Constant)	2.052	.128			16.021	.000
Time topic is discussed	-.005	.001	-.134		-4.277	.000
CPI	.000	.007	.001		.034	.973
Permanent member	-.051	.050	-.049		-1.016	.310
Resolution successful	-.607	.110	-.170		-5.521	.000
Time president chairing the meeting	-.002	.003	-.020		-.579	.563
Importance of topic to society	2.379E-5	.000	.062		2.007	.045
Power	.486	.395	.053		1.230	.219
Gender	-.007	.068	-.003		-.110	.913
Modesty	-.113	.032	-.111		-3.515	.000

a. Dependent variable: LogDuration

Table 24 – Model summary: regression model using integrity characteristics as variables: modesty

Model Summary^b

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate	Durbin-Watson
1	.274 ^a	.075	.066	.48522	1.729

b. Dependent variable: LogDuration

In the next step, the characteristics that showed a statistically significant impact on the DV at the 5% and 10% levels ($\text{sig.} = < 0.1$) were composed to form a new variable for personal integrity. These characteristics were honesty, following strong moral principles, respectfulness and modesty. Hence, in the next model, the attributes of incorruptibility and consistency were not included in the personal integrity variable. The new variable of personal integrity was calculated by summing the scores of the four statistically significant attributes for each president. This variable was then regressed against the duration of the meeting (log-transformed) using the set of control variables that was included in the analyses run previously.

The results of this regression are shown in Table 25. The results confirm the impact of personal integrity on the duration of a UNSC meeting, which had already been established in the previous analyses. It therefore provides a verification of the robustness of the first analysis. The variable shows a very strong significance ($\text{Sig.} = 0.003$). When interpreting B, we can see that the effect of the reduced personal integrity variable is even stronger. After exponentiation, B shows that a one-point increase in the reduced personal integrity variable leads to a reduction of 1.4% in the duration of a meeting. As the results presented in Table 25 show, the number of times a topic has been discussed previously, whether a resolution was adopted successfully and the importance of a topic to political society were once again statistically significant at the 5% level. For these variables, B does not change drastically after exponentiation.

Table 25 – Coefficients: regression personal integrity reduced

Coefficients^a

	Unstandardised		Standardised		t	Sig.
	Coefficients		Coefficients			
	B	Std. Error	Beta			
(Constant)	2.004	.126			15.951	.000
Time topic is discussed	-.005	.001	-.138		-4.395	.000
CPI	.002	.007	.011		.329	.742
Permanent member	-.072	.050	-.069		-1.437	.151
Resolution successful	-.623	.110	-.175		-5.660	.000
Time president chairing the meeting	-.003	.003	-.045		-1.246	.213
Importance of topic to society	2.436E-5	.000	.064		2.050	.041
Power	.415	.397	.045		1.047	.296
Gender	-.039	.068	-.018		-.573	.567
Personal Integrity reduced	-.014	.005	-.097		-2.980	.003

a. Dependent variable: LogDuration

In order to establish whether there are underlying sets of variables that form components, a PCA was performed in the next step, which is explained and discussed in more detail in the following section.


4.2.2.4 Principal component analysis and regression of principal components

In this step, the data concerning the characteristics underlying the personal integrity variable that were statistically significant in the analyses that regressed the underlying characteristics against the DV (honesty, following strong moral principles, respectfulness and modesty) were subjected to a PCA.

This statistical technique of data reduction allows for the interpretation of large amounts of data within a reduced number of components or factors (Hartung and Elpelt 1999, p. 528). As each integrity characteristic was collected for each president of the Security Council between 1995 and 2012 in order to composite the personal integrity score for each individual, a large data series regarding integrity was used for the previous models. With the use of PCA, I intended to establish whether there is a component (or potentially more than one) that can account for the correlated variance among the characteristics of integrity applied; that is, if a president has a full score in honesty, will another characteristic also score high? If I can establish this across the characteristics, I can reduce the data from four characteristics down to one component. However, there might be more components because one group of characteristics might be closely related to another, and another group of characteristics might be closely related to each other, as well. For example, in the case of this study, it is possible that the characteristics honesty and respect form a component that measures a person's communication capabilities. In addition, the variables consistency, respectfulness and honesty could form a component that measures a person's leadership skills. Generally speaking, this technique of data reduction creates components that allow for the interpretation of a large amounts of data using a smaller number of components. Therefore, it assesses the underlying structure of the data and reduces the variables to a smaller set of independent composite variables (Tabachnick and Fidell 2007).

In the first step of performing the PCA, a scree plot was created (Figure 5) for the four characteristics of personal integrity.

Figure 5 – Scree plot: PCA of four integrity characteristics



The scree plot shows that there are two components with an eigenvalue of one or higher. As the Kaiser criterion states (Kaiser 1960), only factors or components with an eigenvalue of ≥ 1 should be used to perform a PCA. Therefore, the data reduction on the characteristics of integrity was performed using these two components. Note that the second component has an eigenvalue of 0.996; as such, it is close enough to one and was used as a component in the analysis.

The PCA was performed in SPSS using a direct oblimin rotation. Direct oblimin rotations are oblique rotations that are commonly used to analyse factors that could be correlated (Tabachnick and Fidell 2007, p. 609). In addition, Tabachnick and Fidell (2007, pp. 640–641) state that the direct oblimin factor rotation is an oblique rotation method suitable for data with

different degrees of correlations. This seems to be a plausible choice for the PCA of the integrity characteristics because it seems that the underlying components are correlated; however, they also correlate to varying degrees.

Table 26 – Correlation matrix PCA integrity characteristics

Correlation Matrix

	Honesty	Following strong moral principles	Respectfulness	Modesty
Correlation Honesty	1.000	.597	.240	.073
Following strong moral principles	.597	1.000	.398	.102
Respectfulness	.240	.398	1.000	.009
Modesty	.073	.102	.009	1.000

The correlation matrix of the PCA in Table 26 shows that there are characteristics that show positive correlations.⁴

- Honesty and following strong moral principles: 0.597
- Respectfulness and following strong moral principles: 0.398

It seems that when a person exhibits a strong sense of honesty, he or she also follows strong moral principles. Furthermore, when a person is respectful of others, it seems that he or she also follows strong moral principles.

The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) measure of sampling adequacy and Bartlett’s test for sphericity were performed to verify if the underlying data set was useful for performing a PCA. The results are displayed in Table 27.

⁴ A correlation is considered strong when the r value is close to one. When it is close to zero, no correlation is observed (Tabachnick and Fidell 2007, pp. 90–91).

Table 27 – PCA: KMO and Bartlett's test

KMO and Bartlett's Test

Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy		.578
Bartlett's test of sphericity	Approx. Chi-Square	615.605
	df	6
	Sig.	.000

The KMO test displays a value of 0.578. This is higher than 0.5, which is considered to be the least acceptable level. Thus, the data is adequate for PCA (Chetty and Goel 2015). This is also confirmed by the Bartlett's test, which shows a strong significance (Chetty and Goel 2015). Therefore, the PCA could be performed with confidence.

Table 28 – Communalities of PCA

Communalities

	Initial	Extraction
Honesty	1.000	.649
Following strong moral principles	1.000	.771
Respectfulness	1.000	.466
Modesty	1.000	.967

Extraction method: PCA

Table 28 shows the communalities that were the output from the SPSS analysis. The column 'extraction' shows the percentage of variance explained by the PCA based on the extracted component (Tabachnick and Fidell 2007, p. 643).

We can see that the characteristics modesty and following strong moral principles have the highest amount of variance explained by the two-component model (0.771). Generally speaking, all characteristics account for a rather high amount of variance in the one-component model. Only the characteristic respectfulness shows a moderate amount of variance explained by the model.

Table 29 presents the pattern matrix.⁵ As a threshold, only variables with a loading of approximately 0.3 or higher were interpreted (Tabachnick and Fidell 2007, p. 649). The analysis of the characteristics of integrity showed that following strong moral principles, honesty and respectfulness load high on the first component. That means that the variability of these characteristics seems to be connected; that is, when honesty is high, following strong moral principles and respectfulness are also high. The second component establishes one major component loading, which is modesty.

Table 29 – Pattern matrix of PCA

Pattern Matrix^a

	Component	
	1	2
Following strong moral principles	.869	.095
Honesty	.794	.104
Respectfulness	.669	-.163
Modesty	.013	.983

Extraction method: PCA

Rotation method: Oblimin with Kaiser normalisation

a. Rotation converged in three iterations.

The PCA established that there are two principal components that extract a large part of the variance (71.3%) from the data set on the characteristics of integrity, which is shown in Table 30.

⁵ Since an oblique rotation was used in this case, the pattern matrix is the one to analyse (Tabachnick and Fidell 2007, pp. 90–91.).

Table 30 – PCA: total variance explained

Total Variance Explained

Component	Initial Eigenvalues			Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings			Rotation Sums of Squared Loadings
	Total	% of Variance	Cumulative %	Total	% of Variance	Cumulative %	Total
	1	1.856	46.411	46.411	1.856	46.411	46.411
2	.996	24.896	71.307	.996	24.896	71.307	1.020
3	.773	19.323	90.630				
4	.375	9.370	100.000				

Extraction method: PCA

During this analysis, the factor scores for each component were saved as variables in SPSS. In the next step, the regression model described and performed above was run again, this time using the principal components as IV, which thus replaced the personal integrity variables as well as the six characteristics as variables.

The results presented in Table 31 show that only the second factor shows a statistically significant impact on the duration of a meeting (Sig. = 0.000). All of the other control variables that showed a statistically significant impact in the models before also show significance in this model (i.e. number of times topic is discussed, importance of topic to political society and success of the resolution).

Table 31 – Coefficients regression using PCA components

Coefficients^a

	Unstandardised		Standardised	t	Sig.
	Coefficients		Coefficients		
	B	Std. Error	Beta		
(Constant)	1.840	.118		15.628	.000
Time topic is discussed	-.005	.001	-.128	-4.078	.000
CPI	.001	.007	.005	.135	.892
Permanent member	-.054	.050	-.052	-1.083	.279
Resolution successful	-.606	.110	-.170	-5.530	.000
Time president chairing the meeting	-.002	.003	-.030	-.835	.404
Importance of topic to society	2.415E-5	.000	.063	2.042	.041
Power	.470	.396	.051	1.187	.235
Gender	-.024	.068	-.011	-.354	.724
REGR factor score 1 for analysis 1	-.026	.017	-.052	-1.572	.116
REGR factor score 2 for analysis 1	-.063	.016	-.126	-3.992	.000

a. Dependent variable: LogDuration

These results confirm the results of the first model and support the finding that personal integrity has an impact on the duration of UNSC meetings and therefore also on their success. Therefore, these results present a successful check for the robustness of the results of the models run previously.

4.2.2.5 Assessment of interaction effects

The calculation and regression of interaction effects aim to establish whether the impact of one variable on the DV depends on the impact of another variable (Tabachnick and Fidell 2007, p. 157; Hartung and Elpelt 1999, p. 701). The data used in the analyses needs to be assessed for interaction effects (sometimes called moderator variables) because it is plausible that some of the IVs' impact on the DV is caused by different values in the moderator variable (Jaccard and Turrisi 2011, vi). For the presented data analysis, interaction effects are relevant, and it is important to investigate whether there are some variables whose influence on the DV depends on the value of another. For the purposes of this research, the following four interaction effects should be considered.

First, it is possible that personal integrity becomes unimportant when the importance of a topic to political society is high. This position argues that the importance of the topic overshadows integrity because the main focus of the UNSC is on finding a solution to a particular problem because this problem is very much present in the public eye, and therefore the Council and its decisions are of great public interest. In contrast, it is also possible that the more important a topic is, the more important the integrity of the president becomes in terms of a reasonable solution in as short a time as possible. This interaction effect is hereafter called IntegrityXImportance.

Second, it is possible that personal integrity is less important when trust in the president has been developed because he or she has chaired many meetings previously. Thus, it may be the case that the members of the Council know that the current president has some skeletons in his or her closet; however, the more meetings that president chairs, the more convinced the members may become that he or she is actually a trustworthy person and that the questionable incident was perhaps an exception. In contrast, it is also possible that the members may see their initial view of a president with low integrity being confirmed and therefore 'trust' in his or her lack of integrity after he or she has chaired some sessions of the Council. This interaction effect is referred to as IntegrityXTrust.

A third interaction effect to consider in this model is that between integrity and the CPI of the country from which a president is from. It is possible that personal integrity is less important when a president comes from a country with a high CPI. Thus, Council members may generally trust colleagues more when they come from a country with a high CPI and may generally have less trust in colleagues from a country that is riddled with public corruption and therefore has a low score on the CPI. This interaction effect is hereafter referred to as IntegrityXCPI.

The last interaction effect to be assessed is that between the importance of a topic to society and the number of times a topic has been discussed. It is conceivable that topics will be discussed more frequently if society has a greater interest in them. The argument is that it is plausible that the more important a topic is to political society and the more public discussion exists around that topic, the greater the number of Council sessions on that topic is, as the Security Council would presumably wish to identify an appropriate solution to that issue as quickly as possible. This interaction effect is hereafter called ImportanceXNumber of topic discussions. These interaction effects change the model as follows:

$$Y_i = \beta_1 X_i + \beta_2 X_i + \beta_3 X_i + \beta_4 X_i + \beta_5 X_i + \beta_6 X_i + \beta_7 X_i + \beta_8 X_i + \beta_1 X_i 3 X_i + \beta_1 X_i 7 X_i + \beta_1 X_i 8 X_i + \beta_3 X_i 6 X_i \varepsilon_i$$

All the variables are the same as in the model for the regressions on personal integrity and duration; however, the interaction effects have been added. $\beta_1 X_i 3 X_i$ is the interaction effect between personal integrity and the importance of the topic (IntegrityXImportance). $\beta_1 X_i 7 X_i$ is the interaction effect between personal integrity and the trust variable (i.e. the number of times a president has chaired meetings previously) (IntegrityXTrust); $\beta_1 X_i 8 X_i$ is the interaction effect between personal integrity and the CPI of the president's country (IntegrityXCPI), and $\beta_3 X_i 6 X_i$ is the interaction effect between the importance of the topic to political society and the number of times a topic has been discussed (ImportanceXNumber of topic discussions).

Interaction effects are calculated by multiplying the two variables for which an interaction is considered. However, as has been noted by other authors, this approach can cause problems of multicollinearity, (e.g. Tabachnick and Fidell 2007, pp. 157–159). One way to overcome this problem is to centre the interaction effects (Tabachnick and Fidell 2007, p. 158). In this research, this is done by subtracting the mean from each of the independent variables considered in the interaction effects and then multiplying these residuals together to create a centred product term (the interaction effect).

Table 32 shows the correlations for the interaction effects before and after centring the variables. Centred interaction effects are marked with a C after the variable name in the table. It can be seen that the multicollinearity drops to less serious levels after centring. Where the data showed strong correlation without centring (e.g. up to 0.932 for IntegrityXImportance and importance of topic to society), after centring, correlation decreases to acceptable levels (0.031 for the abovementioned example). Using these centred interaction terms, I next ran another multivariate regression analysis to establish whether some of the DV's effect on the IV is based on the effect of another variable.

Table 32 – Bivariate correlations for interaction effects

Correlations


		Personal integrity	CPI	Time president chairing the meeting	Importance of topic to society	Time topic is discussed	IntegrityXImportance	IntegrityXTrust	IntegrityXCPI	ImportanceXNumber ofTopics	ImportanceXImportance_C	IntegrityXTrust_C	IntegrityXCPI_C	ImportanceXTimesofDisc_C	
Personal integrity	Pearson correlation	1	.081*	-.273**	.033	.111**	.144**	.233**	.547**	.066*	-.005	.304**	-.209**	-.003	
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.011	.000	.301	.000	.000	.000	.000	.038	.878	.000	.000	.934	
	N	993	993	993	993	993	993	993	993	993	993	993	993	993	
CPI	Pearson correlation	.081*	1	-.087**	-.067*	-.026	-.054	.031	.840**	-.077*	-.001	.166**	-.013	-.002	
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.011		.006	.035	.405	.088	.333	.000	.015	.968	.000	.684	.951	
	N	993	993	993	993	993	993	993	993	993	993	993	993	993	
Time President chairing the meeting	Pearson correlation	-.273**	-.087**	1	-.026	.031	-.041	.731**	-.146**	-.022	.042	-.579**	.276**	-.007	
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.006		.408	.328	.192	.000	.000	.494	.186	.000	.000	.835	
	N	993	993	993	993	993	993	993	993	993	993	993	993	993	
Importance of topic to society	Pearson correlation	.033	-.067*	-.087**	1	-.025	.932**	-.001	-.026	.634**	-.031	.029	-.001	-.440**	
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.301	.035	.408		.433	.000	.972	.252	.000	.335	.364	.963	.000	
	N	993	993	993	993	993	993	993	993	993	993	993	993	993	
Time topic is discussed	Pearson correlation	.111**	-.026	.031	-.025	1	-.011	.086**	.018	.255**	-.002	.012	-.080*	-.047	
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.405	.328	.433		.718	.007	.575	.000	.944	.697	.012	.139	
	N	993	993	993	993	993	993	993	993	993	993	993	993	993	
IntegrityXImportance	Pearson correlation	.144**	-.054	-.041	.932**	-.011	1	.027	.019	.636**	.314**	.038	-.055	-.360**	
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.088	.192	.000	.718		.399	.540	.000	.000	.235	.083	.000	
	N	993	993	993	993	993	993	993	993	993	993	993	993	993	
IntegrityXTimesPresLeadMeeting	Pearson correlation	.233**	.031	.731**	-.001	.086**	.027	1	.162**	.022	.004	.056	.048	-.005	
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.333	.000	.972	.007	.399		.000	.486	.911	.076	.129	.876	
	N	993	993	993	993	993	993	993	993	993	993	993	993	993	
IntegrityXCPI	Pearson correlation	.547**	.840**	-.146**	-.036	.018	.162**	1	-.045	-.026	.213**	.134**	-.018		
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000	.252	.575	.540		.000	.158	.415	.000	.582		
	N	993	993	993	993	993	993	993	993	993	993	993	993		
ImportanceXNumberofTopics	Pearson correlation	.066*	-.077*	-.022	.634**	.255**	.636**	.022	1	.095**	.038	-.073*	.354**		
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.038	.015	.494	.000	.000	.158	.000		.003	.235	.022	.000		
	N	993	993	993	993	993	993	993	993	993	993	993	993		
ImportanceXImportance_C	Pearson correlation	-.005	-.001	.042	-.031	-.002	.314**	.004	-.026	.095**	1	-.070*	-.087**	.157**	
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.878	.968	.186	.335	.944	.000	.911	.415	.003	.026		.006	.000	
	N	993	993	993	993	993	993	993	993	993	993	993	993	993	
IntegrityXTrust_C	Pearson correlation	.304**	.166**	-.579**	.029	.012	.038	.056	.213**	-.038	-.070*	1	-.324**	.006	
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000	.364	.697	.235	.076	.000	.235	.026			.846	
	N	993	993	993	993	993	993	993	993	993	993	993	993	993	
IntegrityXCPI_C	Pearson correlation	-.209**	-.013	.276**	-.001	-.080*	-.055	.048	-.134**	-.073*	-.087**	-.324**	1	-.057	
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.684	.000	.963	.012	.083	.129	.000	.022	.006	.000		.074	
	N	993	993	993	993	993	993	993	993	993	993	993	993	993	
ImportanceXTimesofDisc_C	Pearson correlation	-.003	-.002	-.007	-.440**	-.047	-.360**	-.005	-.018	-.047	.354**	.157**	.006	-.057	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.934	.951	.835	.000	.139	.000	.876	.582	.000	.000	.846	.074		
	N	993	993	993	993	993	993	993	993	993	993	993	993	993	

*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). **. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

The tables in Appendix 2 show the results of the regression analyses run with all four interaction effects separately and using the centred values of those IVs where applicable (personal integrity, CPI, times the topic has been discussed before, number of times a president has chaired meetings before and importance of topic to society). The results of the regression analysis, which are presented in the coefficient tables in Appendix 2, show that none of the interaction effects are statistically significant in the regression analysis.

In addition, interaction effects were analysed visually by plotting them in graphs. They were plotted one standard deviation above and below the mean. Contrary to the results of the regression analysis on interaction effects, this analysis showed that two interaction effects (out of the four analysed) could be established: IntegrityXTrust and IntegrityXCPI. The graphs are shown in Figures 6 and 7.


Figure 6 – Interaction effect IntegrityXTrust graph



For the interaction effect IntegrityXTrust, the graph in Figure 6 suggests that, generally, there is a negative correlation between the personal integrity of a president and the duration of a meeting. However, when a president has frequently chaired meetings previously (i.e. trust), this negative correlation is even steeper. This means that the personal integrity predicts the duration of a meeting more strongly when a president has chaired UNSC meetings a high number of times in the past. The duration of a meeting is longer when a president has a low degree of personal integrity. This holds true for presidents who have chaired many meetings previously and those who have only chaired a few meetings in the past. However, the duration of a meeting is even shorter when a president has a high personal integrity and has also chaired many meetings. Hence, the effect of personal integrity on the duration of a meeting depends on the number of times a president has chaired meetings previously. This is a plausible result because the other members of the UNSC need some time to become familiar with a president, which includes identifying his or her degree of integrity and moral standards. As soon as the members realise that a president is trustworthy, meetings take less time, as the members realize that they can trust that individual.

This result has another implication: It shows that the role of a partner in cooperation, as argued during the literature review and measured by the trust variable, does indeed impact the success of a meeting at the meso-level of international cooperation through moderating the variable of personal integrity. Thus, the importance of this role at the meso-level of international cooperation could be established quantitatively.

Figure 7– Interaction effect IntegrityXCPI graph



For the interaction effect IntegrityXCPI, the graph presented in Figure 7 also suggests that, generally, there is a negative correlation between the personal integrity of a president and the duration of a meeting. However, at a low CPI, this negative correlation is even steeper. That means that the personal integrity variable predicts the duration of a meeting stronger when the president comes from a country with a low CPI. The duration of a meeting will be longer when a president is from a country with a low CPI and also has a low personal integrity when compared to a meeting chaired by a president from a country with a high CPI and a low personal integrity. However, when a president from a country with a low CPI has a high personal integrity, a meeting that he or she presides over will tend to be shorter when compared to those chaired by presidents from high CPI countries. Hence, the effect of personal integrity on the duration of a meeting depends on the CPI of the president's home country. This is plausible; it seems that integrity is less important when a president comes from a country with a high CPI and more important when a president comes

from a country with a low CPI. This means that Council members generally trust colleagues more when they come from a country with a high CPI and generally trust them less when they are from a country with a high level of public corruption and therefore a low score on the CPI. However, this effect fades when other representatives realise that a president is possessed of high personal integrity, even though his or her country might have a low score on the CPI. As such, there seems to be some prejudice towards representatives from countries with a low CPI. Furthermore, the role that ambassadors assume as agents of their home countries could also be established during the assessment of this interaction effect, since the CPI, as has been argued previously, could be used as a proxy to measure the structures of the home country that an ambassador represents. The impact of the role of ambassadors as agents of their home countries could thus be established quantitatively.

Any interaction effects other than two mentioned above could not be established visually. As explained previously, when these two interaction effects were included in the regression analysis, no statistically significant impact could be established. Coefficient tables, as well as the visualisation of the interaction effects IntegrityXImportance and IntegrityXNumber of Topic Discussions, are presented in Appendix 2.

The results of the assessment of the interaction effects has some implications for this work: First, it implies that integrity always plays a role, and its effect on the duration of a meeting does not depend on the importance of the topic being discussed to political society. Indeed, it is plausible that Council members' perception of another person's integrity does not change simply because a single environmental factor changes.

Second, the more sessions a president has chaired, the more important his or her integrity becomes in terms of determining the duration of UNSC meetings. Thus, the better the other UNSC members know a president, the better their perception of his or her integrity standards is, and the more important such moral standards become. I argue that one reason for this is the role of

partners for cooperation that ambassadors assume, as they develop a sense of partnership and increased trust to each other over time.

Third, the effect of the personal integrity of a UNSC president on the duration of a session depends on the effects of the CPI of that ambassador's home country. The lower the CPI of the country the president is from, the more important his or her personal integrity becomes. This suggests that UNSC members may have some prejudice towards colleagues from countries characterized by high levels of public corruption with regard to their individual moral standards. This result also suggests that the role of ambassadors as agents of their home countries has some importance on the meso-level of international cooperation.

Finally, there is no statistically significant interaction effect between the number of times a topic has been discussed and the importance of that topic to political society. They both show significant main effects in the model but no interaction occurs between them. Indeed, it is possible that the Council does not let itself be influenced by the way in which political society handles and assesses a topic and that the number of session held on a certain topic is instead impacted by new developments in the relevant situation or new insights from various actors or research.

4.3 Conclusions, discussion and limitations

The empirical analyses show that several factors impact the duration of the UNSC meetings and that the personal integrity of the president chairing a meeting is one of them. This finding indicates that an increase in a president's integrity leads to a decrease in the duration of meetings. Therefore, the results show that human beings have different personality traits and idiosyncratic characteristics which shape international cooperation. This study therefore quantitatively supports the final behavioural assumptions developed during the literature review, which were established to underlie this work. This supports the view that international politics is indeed a human activity and that mainstream scholars in international relations fail to include an important factor into their considerations, namely the human factor. Within this context,

the request made by Messner and Weinlich (2016) that more research be focused on what can foster or hinder international cooperation is emphasised, as it shows that one factor of human behaviour, namely personal integrity, can foster international cooperation. Furthermore, this finding demonstrates that, on the meso-level of international cooperation, the roles that ambassadors assume (as established during the literature review chapter of this work) are important. The roles assumed by ambassadors as of partners for cooperation and individuals with different personality traits and backgrounds were established during the regression analyses, as well as during the assessment of the interaction effects. Moreover, during the assessment of the interaction effects, the importance of the role of an ambassador as an agent of his or her home country was recognised. However, since the other variables that were included to measure the importance of the role of an home country's agent (power and permanent membership in the UNSC) did not show a statistically significant impact, I argue that this role is less crucial for conducting international cooperation at the meso-level. Additionally, the findings show that the pessimistic assumptions that underlie many classical approaches to international politics are not far-reaching enough. As these quantitative analyses have demonstrated, different behavioural options (as established in the discussion of the literature related to this work) have different effects on international cooperation. This aligns with one of the behavioural assumptions used as a basis for this work, which states that different personality traits and idiosyncratic characteristics underlie human behaviour. The results also support this behavioural assumption.

The analyses further showed that the CPI has no significant direct influence on the duration of the UNSC meeting. This leads to two conclusions: First, members of the UNSC generally seem to view their colleagues as capable professionals who demonstrate integrity and they do not let themselves be influenced by the country that a president is from or its CPI score. This is connected to the argument that, in this research, the CPI also implies the integrity of an ambassador towards the home government, which, however, has no direct influence on the success of a UNSC meeting. Second, the CPI does not seem to be an accurate measurement of the personal integrity of a country's

public officials. As I do find a statistically significant impact of integrity when using the newly created measure, the use of this measure should lead to at least approximately similar results if the CPI is an adequate measure of integrity. However, it does not.

The other variables controlled for in the model that show statistical significance were as follows:

- a) Whether a resolution was adopted or not as a result of a veto or not receiving enough votes. This seems plausible because, should a resolution not be adopted, it can be assumed that at least one Council member has diverged from the opinion of his or her peers, leading to a higher need for discussion;
- b) Importance of a topic to political society. This can be interpreted as a form of pressure that political society places on Council members when they take time to identify a comprehensive solution to a particular issue; this was previously introduced as the 'CNN effect'. Furthermore, this result shows that the more complex a topic is (as measured by media coverage), the longer it takes to discuss;
- c) Finally, the more often a topic has been discussed, the shorter the meeting. This seems reasonable because the Council members are already familiar with the subject matter and its context, and thus there is no need for introductions or explanations, which take time.

It should also be noted that, if a resolution is adopted (as opposed to not being adopted), a meeting is 46% shorter, as the results show. This is an extraordinary amount of time. The other variables do not show such a strong degree of change. However, the personal integrity variable shows a higher degree of change in the duration of a meeting for a one-unit increase in the predictor than all of the other statistically significant control variables do (apart

from the resolution adoption success as discussed previously). Personal integrity shows a decrease of up to 1.4%, whereas the other statistically significant variables only show much lower degrees of change. This result makes personal integrity one determinant of the success of UNSC sessions. The effect becomes even more prominent when considering the highly complex context that this research focuses on: First, human behaviour is a highly complex matter to research. Second, the UN in general and the UNSC in particular are highly complex institutions that operate in the complicated environment of international politics and international relations.

The variables used to measure power (the CINC index and whether a country is a P-5 member) did not show any statistically significant impact on the DV. This shows that power does not seem to be an important concept on the meso-level of international cooperation. This result is very much in contrast to what (neo-)realists claim, as they attach considerable importance to power in international politics (as was discussed in the literature review of this work).

Furthermore, interaction effects between integrity and the trust variable, as well as between integrity and the CPI, were established.

Finally, the following paragraphs discuss the limitations of the methodology and data adopted. It is important to address the issues of endogeneity and reverse causality. For the DV and the IV (duration of UNSC meeting and personal integrity, respectively), endogeneity and reverse causality are not problematic because the two are not linked in any way.

In addition, the data set does not include all meetings of the UNSC in the time frame under investigation because, for some countries, data availability (especially with regards to the CPI) was limited. However, the missing data did not present a major obstacle to the analyses because it was still possible to show a general relationship and a broad nexus.

Third, using the number of *New York Times* articles in a given year in order to determine the public interest in a topic is an approach that is not without its flaws. When using the archive of a different newspaper, the number of articles might differ; this is especially true when consulting a newspaper from countries with different political environments, such as Russia or China.

However, there is no such thing as a ‘world newspaper’ that is read globally. As the media in countries such as China or Russia cannot be considered free and unbiased, the *New York Times* is considered a valid choice of medium to identify topics that are of interest to political society. This is particularly true because the UN is headquartered in New York, as is the *New York Times*. However, I also argue that the difference between a Russian or a Chinese newspaper and the *New York Times* has less to do with whether certain topics are addressed and more to do with the manner in which they are covered. Hence, the differences focus on the content and discussion of the information about a topic rather than the general inclusion of the topic in the paper. Moreover, the data considered only use one number of articles on a topic per year. However, public interest on a topic sometimes varies in the short-term more than that. Nonetheless, it seems sufficient to use the yearly numbers because this count presents a close estimate of the importance of a topic to society. Finally, finding a keyword in the *New York Times* archive does not necessarily mean that this hit represents a full article on the topic. For example, a search for ‘Cyprus’ might produce a hit mentioned in an article as the holiday destination of a rock star. However, these irrelevant results are included to a certain extent in the hits of every topic searched for and are therefore considered to be not much of a concern.

Here, it is important to note that the models accounted for structural and personal indicators in order to address both notions, as both are crucial for the purpose of this thesis in terms of taking into account claims that have been made in theories and approaches to international politics. Realists such as Morgenthau have highlighted the special importance of a country’s power, which reflects that nation’s structures. Waltz, for example, focused on the structure of the system of international politics. Therefore, such structural indicators were included in the model, as they take into account the underlying structure of the country a president is from. In an international political context, these structural differences should not be omitted. Two variables take into account the underlying structures, one is a hybrid that measures both structural and personal indicators, while the last variable solely measures personal attributes:

1. CPI: This indicator measures how corrupt the officials of a country are perceived to be. It takes into account the underlying governance structures of a country and its political elite, as it shows how corrupt members of the elite are perceived to be. It thus measures the structures of a country.
2. Power (measured by CINC): The CINC measures the power of a country through several components, such as such as demographic values, military power and economic strength. Power is thus, a structural indicator that measures the underlying structures of a country.
3. Permanent member: I argue that the variable measuring whether a country is a P-5 also measures some country-specific structures. First, the United States, Great Britain, France, Russia and China are among the richest and most powerful countries in the world (US News 2018). It thus seems that there is at least to a certain degree a structural difference between the P-5 and the non-permanent members. However, other economically rich and politically stable countries, such as Germany and Japan (ibid.), are not among the members of the P-5. Therefore, I argue that this variable only partly measures the underlying structures of a country. Second, I argue that some personal attributes are also measured by the P-5 variable. Representatives of permanent members of the UNSC are more used to moving within the space of the Security Council because they have done so for longer; even if they are new, it is likely that they will have a colleague who has been on the Council for quite some time who can explain the environment and provide helpful guidance. Therefore, this dissertation argues that the P-5 variable is a hybrid that measures both structural and personal indicators.

4. Personal Integrity: The personal integrity is a variable that solely measures the personal attributes of the person chairing the Security Council at a given time.

Therefore, the models in this work measure personal as well as structural indicators. As such, they consider both sides of the working realities within the Security Council, which are certainly impacted by an ambassadors' capital and personal integrity.

5 Understanding the effects of personal integrity on international cooperation: a qualitative analysis

The following qualitative analysis first aims at supporting the results of the quantitative analysis. The quantitative analyses consisted of several regression models. As the term ‘model’ suggests, the quantitative analysis only provides an indication of those dynamics within the UNSC that can be measured numerically. For this reason, it is also important to investigate the research question in broader terms beyond numerical considerations, which is the second aim of this qualitative analysis. Thus, the qualitative analysis not only focuses on the timeframe of the quantitative analyses but extends it in order to include more recent debates among the members of the UNSC. In addition, it does not limit its focus to the behaviour and integrity of the UNSC’s presidents; rather, it also extends to the other Council members. Moreover, and in contrast to the quantitative analyses, it not only focuses on those meetings in which a resolution was discussed but also includes other meetings of the UNSC in its analysis.

The quantitative analyses established that the idiosyncratic characteristics of ambassadors in terms of integrity influence international cooperation, which was one of the behavioural assumptions developed on the basis of the literature review. The qualitative analyses that follow are also intended to establish whether the other behavioural assumptions developed are useful for conducting researching on the meso-level of international cooperation. These assumptions are, first, that humans are skilled co-operators and, second, that humans exhibit a joint and collective intentionality. Additionally, the qualitative analyses aim to further determine whether the different roles that ambassadors assume (as formulated in the discussion of the literature) can be verified beyond the results of the quantitative analyses. These roles are ambassadors as agents of their home countries, as partners for cooperation and as human beings with idiosyncratic personality traits.

The following chapter first shows, explains and discusses content from and statements made during interviews that were held with five former or current permanent representatives to the UN. I conducted these interviews

exclusively with the ambassadors for the purpose of this thesis. The analysis of the interviews investigates the behavioural assumptions formulated in this dissertation and also considers the different roles that ambassadors take on. The second section of this chapter uses three case studies of UNSC meetings in order to shed further light on the topic. Among other aspects, these case studies consider the duration of the meetings (as this was the DV of the quantitative analysis) and attempt to determine the factors that led to the differences in the duration of the three case study meetings. Furthermore, they draw conclusions regarding the effect of human behaviour on these UNSC meetings. Finally, they shed more light on the different roles that ambassadors in international cooperation assume.

5.1 Interviewing ambassadors

The quantitative analyses of the matter at hand reveal that the personal integrity of representatives in the UNSC influences the duration of meetings. The effect establishes that meetings chaired by presidents with a high level of personal integrity tend to be shorter than those chaired by an ambassador with a low level of personal integrity. It has been argued that a shorter meeting should be considered as being more successful, as there is less controversy and thus less need for debate. Putting the results of the quantitative analyses in broader terms, the human factor does play a role in international cooperation. This result supports one of the behavioural assumptions underlying this work, namely that human beings have different personality traits.

In order to verify these results, following a mixed methods approach, I interviewed five former or current ambassadors to the UNSC. Details concerning the interviewees, as well as the time and location of each interview and the language in which it was conducted are provided below.

- **Ambassador Dr Christoph Heusgen:** Current permanent representative of the Federal Republic of Germany to the United Nations (since 2017)
Interview date and time: 17th September 2018, 10:30 am
Interview location: Permanent Mission of Germany to the United Nations, New York, US
Interview language: German
- **Ambassador Miguel Berger:** Former deputy permanent representative of Germany to the United Nations (2011–2013)
Interview date and time: 23rd November 2018, 10:00 am
Interview location: German Federal Foreign Office, Berlin, Germany
Interview language: German
- **Ambassador Jan Grauls:** Former permanent representative of Belgium to the United Nations (2008–2013)
Interview date and time: 28th November 2018, 1:30 pm
Interview location: EY Office, Brussels, Belgium
Interview language: English
- **Ambassador Ivan Barbalčić:** Former permanent representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina to the United Nations (2009–2012)
Interview date and time: 13th December 2018, 10:30 pm
Interview location: Interview was conducted telephonically
Interview language: English
- **Ambassador Baso Sangqu:** Former permanent representative of South Africa to the United Nations (2009–2013)
Interview date and time: 28th January 2019, 11:00 pm
Interview location: Embassy of the Republic of South Africa to the Kingdom of Belgium, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg and the Mission to the European Union, Brussels, Belgium
Interview language: English

All interviews were guided; the interview guide can be found in Appendix 3. After the interviews were conducted, they were transcribed. Interviews held in German were translated into English after transcription. The use of the interviews in this thesis was approved by the respective interviewees, who either read the transcripts prior to giving approval or simply gave approval without requesting a copy of the relevant transcript. All transcripts can be found in Appendix 5. All interviews were analysed using the program MAXQDA 2018.

The purpose of the interviews and the analysis thereof was to establish whether statements made by experts reflect the results of the quantitative analyses. Furthermore, the interviews were intended to allow for the identification of processes on the meso-level of international cooperation that cause the effects associated with integrity on the success of international cooperation. In addition, the purpose of interviewing ambassadors from different regions (i.e. Western Europe, Eastern Europe and Africa) was to establish whether there are different views and standpoints on the importance of integrity and human behaviour across different regions, including potential cultural differences. Furthermore, the interviews were intended to support or disprove the behavioural assumptions formulated in this thesis (humans are skilled co-operators, humans depict joint and collective intentionality and humans have different personality traits and idiosyncratic characteristics). In addition, the interviews were used to analyse to what extent the different roles assumed by ambassadors identified in the literature review and supported in the quantitative analyses (agent, partner in cooperation and human being with different personality traits) can be verified further.

The next section provides an overview of the content of the interviews and statements made and discusses them in light of the results of the quantitative analyses, as well as the underlying research question.

5.1.1 Discussing the results of the interviews and the statements

The aim of interviewing experts in the field of international cooperation is to verify and disentangle the results of the quantitative analyses. Thus, the questions asked in the interviews focused on experiences that the ambassadors

had with regards to integrity or the lack thereof of colleagues and how this shaped their work in the UNSC in particular and in the UN in general. However, the following discussion also takes into account the broader human factor; it is not limited to personal integrity but also includes other differences in personality traits.

The results of the first analysis regressing the CPI of an ambassador's home country against the duration of meetings did not show a statistically significant impact of the IV (CPI) on the DV. This result suggests that the corruption or integrity of the governance structures of an ambassador's home nation does not play a role in in the context of the UNSC. In other words, ambassadors have no doubts concerning the personal integrity of their colleagues based on the countries that they represent. It can also be said that the results suggest that ambassadors are not biased in this regard. Some of the interviewees stated that, in general, provided that they have no information that contradicts such an assumption, they assume that their counterparts are people with high integrity. Ambassador Barbalić explained that 'I think that countries would not send someone to the Council as a delegate without sufficient integrity. So, in that group you tend to have diplomats that are able to network and communicate and that are willing to find a compromise, to work together in order to help the group to reach the decisions' (Ambassador Ivan Barbalić 12/13/2018). He further stated that the UNSC is comprised of capable diplomats who have much in common. He even added that 'some of the most interesting and active people in the UN come from countries which are not perceived as champions in good governance' (Ambassador Ivan Barbalić 12/13/2018). Ambassador Sangqu stated that, in his opinion, countries that send representatives to the UN ask themselves how they wish to be represented and which qualities are most important to them in a representative (Ambassador Baso Sangqu 1/28/2019). This suggests that ambassadors to the UNSC generally trust that their colleagues were sent by their home countries because they have high integrity. Thus, there seem to be no concerns about personal integrity simply because a representative is from a country with a low CPI ranking. This was also confirmed by Ambassador Heusgen, who stated that, generally, he would assume that a colleague was professional and possessed of

integrity if he did not have access to any information that indicated otherwise. However, the ambassador also acknowledged that he considers the shortcomings of some countries with regard to corruption and integrity when interacting with their representatives. He added that a good personal relationship with representatives from such countries is therefore important and that such a relationship should not prevent these topics from being addressed openly (Ambassador Dr Christoph Heusgen 9/17/2018).

In contrast to the statements presented above, an interaction effect between personal integrity and the CPI of a president's country could be established in the quantitative analyses. This means that the CPI does not have a direct effect on the duration of a meeting, as the first regression analysis suggested, but that it moderates the effect of personal integrity on a meeting's duration. With regard to this result, in addition, the interviews offered a certain degree of support for this finding. For example, Ambassador Sangqu provided an example in which an appointed representative from a country was supposedly involved in committing war crimes. He further added that, in such a case, there is nothing that the UN or the Secretary-General can do about (Ambassador Baso Sangqu 1/28/2019). He concluded that 'the question about integrity already starts there, and different countries will use different means of determining that' (Ambassador Baso Sangqu 1/28/2019). Another example was provided by Ambassador Berger, who explained that there are some countries on the UNSC whose aim and strategy is to be obstructive and non-cooperative during negotiations. He further elaborated that this always applies to the same group of countries, irrespective of the individuals whom they send as representatives. He continued to note that 'it is no longer a question of whether the colleague from these countries has integrity or not, the effect of the colleague does not depend on integrity, but on destructiveness' (Ambassador Miguel Berger 11/23/2018). In light of this observation, and assuming that these destructive countries are also those with lower scores on the CPI ranking, this observation suggests that it can be difficult for ambassadors from such countries to disassociate themselves from their home countries' poor reputation.

However, if they can do so, their personal integrity plays a more important role, as the interaction effect showed.

This obstructiveness is now discussed with regards to what was established in the literature review. First, this tendency to not cooperate can be considered as a lack of joint or collective intentionality (as defined by Tomasello and used as one of the behavioural assumptions underlying this work), as there is no will to cooperate towards a common aim. From what can be extracted from Ambassador Berger's statement, this seems to occur within the role assumed by ambassadors as agents of their home countries. This becomes clear when Ambassador Berger stated that it is always ambassadors from the same countries who exhibit such behaviour. This behaviour is thus similar to a political strategy. One can conclude from this observation that such a lack of joint or collective intentionality can be observed in the role of the home government's agent.

Ambassador Berger also shared his experience with this phenomenon within the context of the process of elections to membership in the UNSC:

After the election, [...] two countries compared who had promised them votes. And they found out that 90% of the countries of a continent with predominantly developing countries had given their assurances to both countries. In other words, the lack of integrity has spread across the entire continent. [...] While, in the Western countries, the election result actually fully corresponded to the promises.
(Ambassador Miguel Berger 11/23/2018)

He further argued that this issue is known to most people involved in elections to the UNSC, as well as to members of the Council in general. In addition, he explained that sometimes even monetary favours (e.g. donations) are solicited by certain countries in return for their votes (Ambassador Miguel Berger 11/23/2018). This implies that there can be some apprehension regarding countries with a lower CPI and their representatives' behaviour in the context of elections to the UNSC. It does not seem unreasonable to develop this further and conclude that these concerns endure when representatives actually serve on the Council and that they can only be erased after the personal integrity of the representatives from the countries in question have been established within the UNSC, as the established interaction effect suggests.

To continue with the topic of elections to the UNSC, especially based on the responses provided by the interview with Ambassador Berger, it becomes clear that the personality and integrity of a representative are already of great importance during the election campaigning phase because this is the time in which many delegations have no clear instructions from their home governments. Therefore, the personality of a candidate becomes important and can even sometimes be the pivotal reason for or against voting in favour of a candidate. Ambassador Berger explained that, in the past, this phenomenon has even resulted in a rather powerful country that provided ample foreign aid was not elected to the UNSC because its ambassador lacked communication skills and was reserved. He was outperformed by a candidate from a small country who had excellent communication skills and was quite open. Ambassador Berger referred to this as ‘peer review by colleagues’ (Ambassador Miguel Berger 11/23/2018). Ambassador Sangqu confirmed this when he stated the following:

So, for the non-permanent members, the question of integrity becomes an issue again when your country decided to run for a seat in the UNSC and the campaigning takes place. The country and its policies are of course also very important, but so is the personality and the integrity of the ambassador, which weighs in heavily. (Ambassador Baso Sangqu 1/28/2019)

Related, Ambassador Ivan Barbalić noted that ‘ambassadors lobby for their countries’ (Ambassador Ivan Barbalić 12/13/2018). Although, in the example and statements presented above, integrity was not the key personality trait leading to election, they show that the human factor indeed plays a role in international cooperation. In the context of elections to the UNSC, this matter should not be underestimated; I argue that the countries that are eventually represented on the Council do shape international cooperation. Furthermore, in this case, the election of countries is significantly influenced by personality traits, that is, the human factor.

With regard to the issues of personality and integrity, and considering the results of the second regression analyses (which ran the newly created measure of personality integrity against the duration of meetings), the responses provided by the interviews, also confirm the effect of the IV on the

DV. Trust, as measured by the number of times a president has chaired meetings previously, did not show a statistically significant effect on the duration of a meeting. However, when analysing the interaction effects, it became clear that the effect of personal integrity on the duration of a meeting is influenced by the number of times that a president had chaired meetings before. Therefore, the results of the quantitative analyses suggest that trust does affect international cooperation. The importance of trust was emphasised during the interviews, albeit in a slightly different context. Ambassador Grauls explained that trust and personal relationships are important and often developed outside of UNSC meetings, for example during working lunches. According to Ambassador Grauls, these trusting relationships make negotiation easier (Ambassador Jan Grauls 11/28/2018). Ambassador Sangqu also emphasised the importance of trust and being able to rely on colleagues. He explained that, when a trusting relationship exists, ambassadors discuss their views on certain topics before the actual UNSC meetings and hence can prepare better for it. As Ambassador Sangqu continued, this trust consequently makes the final negotiations easier (Ambassador Baso Sangqu 1/28/2019). These observations show that the issue of trust, as presented by Messner et al. as a facilitator of cooperation in the cooperation hexagon, also plays a role in the UNSC and therefore in international cooperation. They also confirm the previously established interaction effect, even though the assumption underlying the trust variable in the quantitative analyses was that trust is built during meetings. Some of the interviews show that this is not necessarily the case, as trust is also built outside of the context of meetings of the UNSC. The manner in which trust influences international cooperation is that it facilitates negotiations and discussions.

Furthermore, during the interview, Ambassador Heusgen noted that it is important to be able to rely on someone. For him, the issues of trust and personal integrity become particularly important when ambassadors do not have clear instructions from their home government since, in these situations, the ambassadors themselves decide what to support and vote for. To him, this importance of trust is particularly significant for topics such as the protection of human rights (Ambassador Dr Christoph Heusgen 9/17/2018).

When addressing personal integrity in general, Ambassador Heusgen confirmed the results of the second regression analysis by stating the following. What follows is a lengthy quotation; however, it is important to make the point clear:

But when you're preparing for the Security Council like I am at the moment, you take a closer look at the people to find out whether you can deal with them or not. And, here, I basically believe [...] that you know which colleagues are reliable. [...] It's clear that you can work together with them more easily than with others. There is certainly also a correlation within the Security Council here. As far as the character is concerned, I only know of one case. [...] It relates to a country in the Security Council, where I can already see how incredibly difficult it will be to work together with: because their representatives can't be pinned down. [...] And then, at the same time, there are rumours that the person concerned has some skeletons in his closet. This is such a concrete case where I would say yes with regard to your research topic, if it is true that he has skeletons in his closet, then this correlation of reliability and cooperation is accurate here.

(Ambassador Dr Christoph Heusgen 9/17/2018)

The quote indicates that, within the framework of the UNSC, it is difficult to work with colleagues who are not reliable or do not have high personal standards with regard to integrity and are therefore not trustworthy. The ambassador confirmed that, in such cases, cooperation is influenced negatively. This observation confirms the results of the second regression analysis. Furthermore, it explains why honesty showed such a strong impact on the DV when regressing the attributes of personal integrity separately. Honesty is closely linked to trust, as trust is built by mutual honesty.

Ambassador Grauls also explained that a lack of integrity can hinder or even aggravate discussions. He further clarified that ambassadors have reputations within the UN network and that one individual's dubious activities are generally known to the other members; Ambassador Sangqu confirmed these observations. The following quotation by Ambassador Grauls illustrates how a lack of integrity can hinder successful cooperation:

But when you know that your interlocutor is a dubious person, it inevitably has an impact on the quality of the conversation. Because there is no human factor, no sympathy, no warmth or friendship. And, therefore, the discussion becomes much more factual and probably also more difficult. And you are less likely to be flexible or to make alternative suggestions. It is more a factual discussion without personal warmth, and in certain circumstances, also less scope for compromise.

(Ambassador Jan Grauls 11/28/2018)

This quote not only verifies the results of the quantitative analysis but also disentangles some of the processes underlying them. For example, a lack of

trust and a poor relationship due to a lack of integrity on the part of an interlocutor lead to less leeway when it comes to making compromises. Furthermore, the fact that such discussions are likely to be restricted to factual matters may also complicate negotiation. Ambassador Grauls also added that he would not reveal his apprehensions concerning a person considered to lack of integrity during the encounters but that they would play a role in his reflections on such encounters (Ambassador Jan Grauls 11/28/2018). This observation also provides insight into the difficulties that may arise in interacting with a counterpart who lacks integrity, as it shows that it is not only the encounters themselves that are hindered but also the reflections of an individual possessed of a high level of integrity on such interactions and their content. Moreover, it supports the result of the regression analysis that regressed the variable of following strong moral principles against the DV and showed a statistically significant impact.

Ambassador Sangqu supported this claim and explained that, when interacting with someone whom he knows negative things about, he would be 'instinctively more sceptical and set the parameters differently' (Ambassador Baso Sangqu 1/28/2019). According to him, this hinders the creation of a relationship characterised by trust and openness and consequently makes working together more difficult. Within regard to this topic, he further added that once a colleague betrays his trust, he instinctively becomes more cautious when engaging with that individual (Ambassador Baso Sangqu 1/28/2019). Ambassador Sangqu continued to note that, even if the misdeeds of colleagues are not openly discussed, there are always rumours within the UN, and these will stick to both the person in question as well as to the country that he or she represents (Ambassador Baso Sangqu 1/28/2019). 'People in the United Nations see the country through its ambassadors, positively and negatively' (Ambassador Baso Sangqu 1/28/2019). The statements made by Ambassador Sangqu confirm that a lack of trust hinders work in international cooperation and thus support the results of the regression analyses. Furthermore, they add to the discussion of the roles that ambassadors assume on the meso-level of international cooperation. In particular, Ambassador Sangqu's observations contribute to the discussion of the role of the agent, as the lack of trust that

ambassadors may have towards a colleague after a negative incident is also projected to the country represented by that individual.

Ambassador Berger also confirmed the importance of integrity by stating that the personality, in terms of reliability and integrity, of a colleague is important, especially when it comes to negotiating resolutions. He added that one must know that an interlocutor is serious and has differentiated, informed and evaluated contributions on the matters discussed. His understanding of personality and integrity also includes a more technical side, as he highlighted the importance of the quality of the contributions that an individual makes concerning a certain topic and whether the other members of the Council believe that such contributions are warranted and valuable. He further added that it is also important that the contribution a colleague makes is in accordance with the policy and propositions of his or her home country. If this is not the case, colleagues may perceive this as odd and indicative of a lack of integrity on the part of that individual. Such an understanding of integrity was not included in the quantitative analyses conducted for this work. Thus, Ambassador Berger's perception of integrity represents an interesting and enlightening contribution to this study since it makes clear that not all representatives leave a favourable impression regarding the content of their contribution. The other ambassadors may consider such behaviour on the part of a representative as indicating a lack of integrity. Ambassador Berger also explained that, even though he acknowledges the great importance of personality and integrity in day-to-day work, when it comes to voting on resolutions, the room for personal integrity and personality is limited, as there are often instructions from representatives' home countries or due to the existence of regional groups that agree on and align their policy with all of the members of that group (Ambassador Miguel Berger 11/23/2018).

The ambassadors highlighted the importance of personality and integrity in successfully facilitating international cooperation at the meso-level. As discussed in the literature review, this was previously addressed by Morgenthau; as he made clear, high moral standards and intellectual quality are of great importance to people engaged in diplomacy. Despite the fact that Morgenthau's work employed a different set of behavioural assumptions to

those adopted in this thesis and developed a very different argument, he supports the ambassadors' views on the importance of high moral standards and intellectual quality to people engaged in international cooperation.

Ambassador Barbalić explained that, within the Council, personal relationships are important and develop due to the extensive amount of time that representatives spend interacting with each other. The Council usually meets daily, sometimes even several times a day, over the course of two years. Furthermore, there are dinners and other events where ambassadors meet. Through these interactions, he states, ambassadors become familiar with each other and build relationships. As a result, negotiating resolutions becomes easier (Ambassador Ivan Barbalić 12/13/2018). Ambassador Sangqu confirmed this observation when he explained that the many informal meetings that ambassadors have are useful in terms of really understanding other representatives and the views of their home countries (Ambassador Baso Sangqu 1/28/2019). This again provides insights into the process behind the effect of personal integrity on the duration of the meeting established in the quantitative analyses. The effect of personal integrity can be deduced from the fact that ambassadors see each other often; therefore, personal relationships develop, which then influence negotiations. This is in line with the argument advanced by Tomasello (2017, p. 81), which states that human beings cooperate more successfully in their own groups. Ambassador Barbalić's statement shows that ambassadors to the UNSC spend ample time together; this leads to and supports the creation of a group, which in turn makes negotiations and cooperation easier.

Ambassador Barbalić added that there are sometimes representatives on the Council who lack communications skills and a high degree of integrity. According to him, this makes networking difficult within the Council (Ambassador Ivan Barbalić 12/13/2018). This statement presents another process by which integrity influences the success of negotiations, as a lack of integrity hinders networking. Furthermore, Ambassador Barbalić's statement also provides some information on the different roles that representatives assume on the meso-level of international cooperation. This example shows that

they perceive each other as partners for cooperation and colleagues with a common aim, among whom personal relationships develop.

Ambassador Grauls highlighted that, on occasion, personal relationships between representatives develop that could be considered peculiar when one considers the countries that these people represent (Ambassador Jan Grauls 11/28/2018). This suggests that relationships exist that go beyond the notion of power and security alliances and that therefore cannot be explained by classical international relations theory. Such relationships also have the potential to shape international cooperation. For example, the ambassador noted that good personal relationships were important when the war in Georgia started in 2008, during which time he was the president of the Council. At the time, Ambassador Grauls and the Russian Ambassador Churkin considered each other friends. However, while the UNSC dealt with the war in Georgia, they were on opposing sides with regard to the statements that they made in the Council. Still, the good relationship between them influenced how they handled the topic. Furthermore, Ambassador Grauls' used his capabilities to influence and shape discussions when presiding over the Council (Ambassador Jan Grauls 11/28/2018). These observations show that personal alliances can help foster negotiations among the members of the UNSC and that such personal alliances are sometimes unrelated to political alliances. Moreover, they support the argument advanced by Tomasello that individuals are indeed able and willing to cooperate, which was discussed in the literature review of this work and established as one of its behavioural assumptions. This is opposed to the assumptions made by classical approaches to international cooperation, which see no room for cooperation. The observations further corroborate an argument that was established earlier in this work, namely that representatives working on the meso-level of international cooperation act within different roles within their respective frameworks. In the case described by Ambassador Grauls, the two ambassadors were friends and colleagues in international cooperation; however, they were also agents acting as representatives of their home governments. Additionally, during that period, Ambassador Grauls acted in his capacity as president of the UNSC by chairing all of the meetings of the Council. Therefore, this example further verifies the roles that ambassadors on the meso-

level of international cooperation assume, that were developed within the review of literature of this doctoral thesis.

In the context of power, Ambassador Berger stated that some individuals within the UN develop leadership skills and become speakers for their region. However, these individuals do not necessarily have to be representatives of important and powerful countries, as even representatives of medium-sized or even small countries can come to wield significant influence: 'You have countries that basically influence the UN above their weight class, and those that should be influential tend to have a lesser effect' (Ambassador Miguel Berger 11/23/2018). The ambassador attributes this to the personality and integrity of these representatives, as well as their communication skills and the way in which they deal with their colleagues (Ambassador Miguel Berger 11/23/2018). This also shows that a country's power does not always play a superordinate role in the UN, which is in clear contrast with the classical approaches and theories of international relations. The (neo-)realistic approaches in particular are very power-centric, as was discussed in the literature review of this work. The ambassador's observation concerning the influence of particular representatives shows that, at the meso-level of international cooperation, power does not always play a prominent role.

Turning towards internal choices within the UN concerning which ambassadors will chair or co-chair special groups and committees, the general perception of the interviewed ambassadors was that personality and integrity play a role when these choices are made. Of course, regional proportional representation is always taken into account, but, within that limitations, personal attributes play a role (Ambassador Miguel Berger 11/23/2018; Ambassador Jan Grauls 11/28/2018; Ambassador Ivan Barbalić 12/13/2018; Ambassador Dr Christoph Heusgen 9/17/2018; Ambassador Baso Sangqu 1/28/2019).

Ambassador Grauls added that, in his opinion, both the former Secretary-General to the UN, Ban Ki-moon, and the current one, António Guterres, tend to select people whom they feel they can trust to occupy important positions

within the UN (Ambassador Jan Grauls 11/28/2018). Ambassador Barbalić added that personal attributes are of particular importance when it comes to electing judges to the International Court of Justice (Ambassador Ivan Barbalić 12/13/2018). Ambassador Heusgen mentioned that, sometimes, candidates from large and powerful countries are passed over for positions in internal UN committees in favour of candidates from smaller countries who are trustworthy and exhibit high integrity. Ambassador Heusgen's observation can also be related to the notion of power discussed previously in this section. (Ambassador Dr Christoph Heusgen 9/17/2018). Ambassador Sangqu elaborated on this issue with regards to the budgeting bodies of the UN:

When they then chose the person to be part of the body, they consider the reputation, the style of communication and the integrity of the representative. It is possible that a person with high integrity would win, irrespective of the country they represent. The decision is based on the performance of the representative in the past. In fact, if a person is dependable, open and trustworthy often counts most within the United Nations. (Ambassador Baso Sangqu 1/28/2019)

These statements show that personal integrity plays a role not only within the UNSC but also in the UN as a whole. Therefore, I argue that such integrity also plays a role in shaping international cooperation, as the UN is an organisation that promotes the international agenda for cooperation. The statements discussed above also provide further support for the results of the second regression analyses.

The interviews also contributed to the verification of the quantitative model and the control variables included. However, it is important to note that this was not the aim of these interviews. Still, however, it is worth elaborating on those variables that were mentioned during the interviews (which means that not all of the variables included in the regression model are discussed in this paragraph).

Ambassadors Berger and Grauls stated that, in their opinion, the importance and urgency of a topic impact the effect of personal integrity on the success of a meeting. This shows that the inclusion of the control variable of importance of a topic to political society, as well as the number of times a topic

has been discussed previously, into the model, was reasonable. Ambassador Berger also explained that, in his experience, the more important a topic, the less crucial the personalities of members of the UNSC:

Basically, it doesn't matter who my counterpart is – I have to find a solution. Then you may have a personal assessment of your integrity, but then the room for manoeuvre for the actors is very small, because every step must of course be coordinated and everyone must work under the instructions of their capital. So I would say that the more important and relevant the issues are, the less leeway there is. (Ambassador Miguel Berger 11/23/2018)

In contrast, Ambassador Barbalić stated that, in his experience, important topics need skilled negotiators, and having high integrity is part of being such a negotiator. In contrast to the viewpoints of both ambassadors, an interaction effect between personal integrity and the importance of the topic could not be established in the research conducted for this thesis. However, the reason for this might be that the control variable, which measures the importance of a topic, does so with regards to political society and not the importance of a topic to the countries represented in the UNSC.

Additionally, Ambassadors Berger and Barbalić stated that the difference between the P-5 and the non-permanent members plays a role in the dynamics of the UNSC because the representatives of the P-5 countries are quite familiar with the proceedings of the UNSC, as they have often served on the Council for periods of between five to 10 years (Ambassador Miguel Berger 11/23/2018; Ambassador Ivan Barbalić 12/13/2018). This difference was included in the quantitative regression as a control variable which, based on the ambassadors' statements, was justified.

Ambassador Berger further added that the power of a country and reciprocity between countries with regards to other topics and interests also play a role (Ambassador Miguel Berger 11/23/2018). Of these three, the power of a country was included in the quantitative analysis as a control variable. Even though interests and reciprocity were not included, as they are difficult to measure empirically, including the notion of power contributes to the completeness of the regression model. Ambassador Barbalić provided an additional insight to the notion of differences in capabilities and power by

stating that there are also differences between the non-permanent countries with regard to how strong their diplomacies are (Ambassador Ivan Barbalić 12/13/2018).

In addition, Ambassador Berger stated that there are occasionally ambassadors from less developed countries who are quite vocal about neo-colonialism and, at the same time, live a very high lifestyle in New York, which, according to Ambassador Berger, not many ambassadors do (Ambassador Miguel Berger 11/23/2018). This justifies including modesty in the measure of integrity. As Ambassador Berger's statement shows, not being modest is perceived as indicating a lack of integrity among the other members of the Council. Indeed, when regressing the characteristics, the component of modesty, which was among those comprising the personal integrity index, showed a strong statistical significance.

Furthermore, Ambassador Baso Sangqu (1/28/2019) highlighted the importance of respect when consulting on topics with colleagues, thus, validating the inclusion of respectfulness in the variable of personal integrity.

Some interviewees addressed the notion of the meso-level of international cooperation. Ambassador Grauls explained that, during his time at the UN, he was often asked for his home country's opinion on a certain topic, as opposed to his personal opinion. He added that good relationships between representatives can be overshadowed by conflicts of interests between their home countries. However, he explained that, in such situations, open communication can help to clarify an issue and how one's counterparts perceive it. Ambassador Barbalić also made this point (Ambassador Jan Grauls 11/28/2018; Ambassador Ivan Barbalić 12/13/2018). Furthermore, Ambassador Sangqu explained that 'the issue of integrity is very important and [is] the cornerstone of what moves diplomacy. I must trust that I am working with a dependable, smart partner that is safeguarding their own interest and also taking my interest into account.' This statement closely connects integrity with second-personal morality and provides another example of second-personal morality at the meso-level of international cooperation, as introduced by Tomasello (2016, pp. 40–41). Second-personal morality defines a 'we' that is

developed as a result of a joint commitment to achieving a particular outcome in which both partners in cooperation understand that the ideals concerning the roles to be played in such cooperation apply as much to their counterparts as they do to themselves. Ambassadors to the UNSC understand that their interlocutors are agents of their home countries, just as they themselves are, and that the overarching interests of countries might differ; however, ambassadors nonetheless cooperate to achieve common goals. They exhibit this second-personal morality by communicating openly with each other about their home countries' interests.

Ambassador Heusgen explained the dynamics on the meso-level of international cooperation vividly by elaborating on his positive relationships with his Russian and American colleagues. He explained that they maintain close, friendly relationships while bearing in mind the standpoints and principles of their home countries. He added that this is an approach that works well within the UN (Ambassador Dr Christoph Heusgen 9/17/2018). This justifies the selection of the UNSC as the subject of the empirical analysis. One example he gave concerned a Russian colleague and friend. He explained that they had had dinner together and discussed their past vacations. The Russian colleague told Ambassador Heusgen that he went home to Russia and visited Crimea for the first time in a long while. Ambassador Heusgen replied: 'Oh, so you did go on a holiday abroad; you were in Ukraine, after all' (Ambassador Dr Christoph Heusgen 9/17/2018). This anecdote provides another example of second-personal morality, as it shows that the two ambassadors were willing to cooperate as members of the UNSC as well as on the basis of friendship. However, they understand both their own roles (in this example, the permanent representative of Germany versus that of Russia) and that of their counterpart, including the interests of all of the governments represented. Ambassador Heusgen also elaborated on this issue further, by stating that even though one may have a good relationship with an individual, one still has to take a clear stand about a subject and be vocal about it (e.g. with regards to good governance and corruption, as discussed earlier in this section). Ambassador Barbalić also touched on the topic and explained that, even when there have been difficult political discussions during the day, everybody sits around the dinner table in

the evening in a friendly atmosphere (Ambassador Ivan Barbalić 12/13/2018). This is in line with the argument made earlier in this work that ambassadors on the meso-level of international cooperation act within several we-identities. In this case, the representatives have both the we-identity towards their home countries (given the difficult political discussion that they were engaged in) and the we-identity towards the members of the UNSC with whom they were sharing dinner in a friendly atmosphere.

Ambassador Sangqu explained that, due to the fact that many informal meetings are held, ambassadors tend to respect each other on the personal level. Thus, even when a resolution sponsored by a certain country is vetoed by a P-5 country, 'at a personal level, ambassadors still respect each other and know that they are partners and that both are trying to successfully represent their countries' (Ambassador Baso Sangqu 1/28/2019). This supports the argument made in this study that ambassadors assume different roles on the meso-level of international cooperation. In the example provided by Ambassador Sangqu, both the roles assumed by representatives as agents of their home countries and as partners for cooperation are highlighted.

The statements presented above provide a degree of insight into the mechanisms at play on the meso-level of international cooperation in the framework of the UN. Ambassadors maintain positive or even friendly relationships with each other, even when the political standpoints of their countries are diametrically opposed. They keep their home countries' principles in mind, take clear stands based on these principles and sometimes even incorporate them into their private relationships. Thus, the observations discussed above also show the different roles that representatives at the meso-level of international cooperation assume. They are agents negotiating on behalf of their home governments, but they are also partners and colleagues who aim to facilitate international cooperation. Furthermore, they are human beings with different personality traits. The statements made by the ambassadors also confirm the need to investigate the meso-level of cooperation, as the statements make it clear that there are certain dynamics on that level that, as I argue, can facilitate shaping international cooperation. Less straightforwardly, the observations support what has been established in the game theoretical

modelling of bribery on the meso-level of international cooperation, namely that, in some cases, representatives' personal interests and state interests can diverge.

Ambassador Barbalić also provided an enlightening statement that demonstrates that, on the meso-level of international cooperation, both a we-identity and a collective intentionality as described by Tomasello (2016) exist:

You don't only perceive diplomats as representatives from certain countries – even when you disagree with the policy and the governance in certain countries – but you see them as colleagues and partners, and you try to work together in order to create some common value. (Ambassador Ivan Barbalić 12/13/2018)

Within regard to the same topic, Ambassador Sangqu contributed the following:

It is important to be a dependable partner in the negotiations. This becomes an important factor in reaching agreements/deals, in terms of balancing various interests and agreeing on what can be accommodated to bring all interests together in a solution. (Ambassador Baso Sangqu 1/28/2019)

According to these statements, in the UNSC, there is both a we-identity and a sense of working together towards a common goal among the members of the UNSC. This shows that international politics is not mainly about power and security, as many of the classical theorists in international politics suggest, but that there also is an agenda for international cooperation, as has been argued in this thesis. Furthermore, this observation supports two of the behavioural assumptions underlying this work, namely that human beings display a collective intentionality and we-identity and are also skilled co-operators, as established by Tomasello (2017, pp. 26–35) and Melis (2016, pp. 105–107). Furthermore, the findings confirm one of the roles that representatives play in international cooperation as identified in the literature review of this thesis, namely that of partners for cooperation

During the discussion of game theoretical approaches to cooperation, I made the argument that, under the assumption of rational players, it is not possible to change the game itself or the moves of the players; one can only change the rules of the game, for example, through a player who has a moral preference. Ambassador Grauls provided an anecdote that has the potential to

support this argument. He described how, shortly after he arrived at the UN, the Secretary General to the UN at the time, Ban Ki-moon called him and asked him to become the chairman of the Peace Building Commission of the UN for the Central African Republic. Within this role, Ambassador Grauls had to speak to an important political figure from the African continent. What follows here is a rather long quotation; however, it captures the point well:

And then you sit there, talking to a person you know almost anything about, including all the negative and controversial things. What do you do? In the African tradition, representatives of state receive foreign visitors with at least four or five people attending and never alone. At a certain point, I had to convey a message to him on behalf of the United Nations. So, I asked him if he would mind if we had this conversation one to one and without other persons attending. He was surprised because, in Africa, they are not used to these things. But I asked him if I could allow myself to insist. So, we had a conversation one to one in which I conveyed a message to him, clearly implying that his behaviour had made things possible that would later be condemned by the Security Council. I could also have had a more general conversation in the presence of all the persons attending at the beginning, but then the message wouldn't have been conveyed. That was my personal choice. So, I think I took the more difficult path, but it was in the interest of the United Nations to say things as they were and convey the message that the UN and the international community knew about him and that he should stop doing certain things. The result of that was that, during the two next visits, that person refused to meet with me. At a later time, that person was in New York, and I received a call telling me that that person wanted to see me. And the first thing he said during our meeting was: 'Monsieur Ambassadeur, vous êtes pardonné'.⁶ As if I had done something wrong. I didn't reply to that, but I was happy that he had understood. (Ambassador Jan Grauls 11/28/2018)

This anecdote shows how a player in international politics can change the rules of the game by having a moral preference, as Grauls insisted on speaking openly, even though doing so was against political protocol. The game and its moves cannot be changed, but the rules can be altered when one player exhibits integrity. This anecdote further supports the results of the quantitative analysis, as it shows that personal integrity (as Ambassador Grauls insisted on speaking to the individual in question in private and conveying the message openly) does influence international cooperation and international politics.

Before concluding, I would like to provide one concrete example, provided by Ambassador Grauls, of how human behaviour and personality characteristics with regards to integrity and trust can shape international

⁶ Translated into English: 'Mr Ambassador, you are forgiven'.

cooperation. He explained that he was asked to chair the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) alongside a colleague from Guinea. During the time in which they chaired that Council, they introduced a new form of negotiation by providing papers that were designed to be 'shot at' by the other members of the Council, meaning to encourage the Council members to openly criticise the paper. He claimed that this practice, which demonstrates the transparency of his work, his integrity and open-mindedness, was very much appreciated by his colleagues on the ECOSOC and facilitated discussions. This example also shows how behavioural traits and a personal working style can shape international cooperation. Therefore, it also confirms the results of the quantitative analyses.

The above overview and discussion of the statements made in the interviews clearly support the results of the quantitative analyses. The observations shared by the ambassadors first showed that the CPI of a representative's home country, which, in this research, is considered a structural measure of governance and integrity does not influence the success of a meeting directly, as some ambassadors stated that they generally consider their colleagues to be professional and of high integrity regardless of the countries that they are from. However, some interviews confirmed that the CPI moderates the effect of personal integrity on the success of a UNSC meeting. Additionally, the results of the analysis of the interviews support the impact of personal integrity on the success of a meeting and made it possible to identify some of the processes underlying this effect. The discussion reflected the importance of trust, integrity and other personality traits in fostering international cooperation. In particular, the ambassadors verified the characteristics of the personal integrity measure that showed a statistical significant impact on the DV (i.e. honesty, following strong moral principles, respectfulness and modesty) as being crucial for the successful conduct of international cooperation at the meso-level. Furthermore, through this part of the qualitative analysis, many of the control variables included in the model could be confirmed, thus increasing the value of the regression model. Moreover, the interviews strengthened the argument that representatives assume different roles, namely as agents, partners and colleagues, as well as

individual human beings. Therefore, they ultimately warranted the investigation of the meso-level of international cooperation and supported the arguments made in this dissertation about human behaviour, an international agenda for cooperation and the narrowness of game theoretical assumptions. Additionally, it provided examples of joint and collective intentionality on the meso-level of international cooperation and second-personal moralities (as displayed in the behaviour of ambassadors), as well as the fact that different we-identities can be identified on the meso-level of international cooperation.

Furthermore, the interviews showed that there are no differences in the assessment of the importance of integrity and human behaviour among representatives from different regions. All of the ambassadors interviewed highlighted the importance of personality, integrity and human behaviour, regardless of the regions or the states that they represent.

5.2 Case Studies

This subchapter takes a closer look at three UNSC meetings, their duration and the factors that led to differences in their duration in order to extend the investigation into the extent to which human behaviour can shape international cooperation beyond the quantitative analyses. Furthermore, it considers the different roles ambassadors assume on the meso-level of international cooperation, as established in the literature review and the quantitative analyses, with regard to UNSC meetings. In addition, it investigates the behavioural assumptions established as underlying this work, which are that humans are skilled co-operators, that they depict joint and collective intentionality, and that they have different personality traits and idiosyncratic characteristics. Since the following analyses are not intended to identify new mechanisms underlying the effect of human behaviour on international cooperation but instead to contribute further to what was established based on the quantitative analyses and interviews, they are fairly brief.

The case study analyses shift the focus away from the behaviour of the presidents of the UNSC, as the influence of their behaviour on international cooperation was previously established in the quantitative analyses and was

further addressed during the analysis of the interviews. Instead, this analysis focuses on the behaviour of Council members who do not preside at a meeting, as well as guest speakers. Furthermore, it does not only focus on personal integrity as a behavioural option but rather considers all forms of behaviour and personality traits.

The first case study to be examined is meeting number 8,506 of the UNSC, which was held on Wednesday, April 10th, 2019, and concerned the situation in Venezuela. It was chosen first because it provides a useful example of the roles that state representatives assume when addressing the Security Council. Additionally, it provides an example of a meeting in which it is not an ambassador who spoke on behalf of his or her country but another state representative, namely Mike Pence, the vice president of the US. Therefore, this meeting also makes it possible to examine the role of a representative of a powerful P-5 on the Security Council. Furthermore, the meeting was held recently, and therefore it can also be used to consider contemporary dynamics on the meso-level of international cooperation.

The second case study under investigation is the 6,627th meeting of the UNSC, which was held on October 4th, 2011. The reasons for the selection of this meeting are as follows. First, it was held in 2011 and is therefore included in the data set used for the quantitative analyses, thus allowing for one of the previously considered meetings to be further investigated. Second, it provides an example of the behaviour not of the president or other members of the UNSC but instead of a representative who was invited to attend a meeting due to the fact that it concerned events in his country. This extends the analysis away from the behaviour of the president, on which the quantitative analyses focused, but allows the inclusion of the behaviour of an external party attending the UNSC for a specific session. Furthermore, the case study depicts behaviour that can be considered as indicative of a lack of integrity. Therefore, the case study allows for the further establishment of the effects of this behavioural option on international cooperation.

The last case study investigated is meeting 8,489 of the UNSC, which was held on March 26th, 2019. The first reason it was chosen as a case study for the purposes of this dissertation is that it was held relatively recently. Therefore,

like the first case, this case study makes it possible to examine the effect of human behaviour on international cooperation within a recent time frame. Second, it focuses on the behaviour of one UNSC member, as opposed to the president of the UNSC. This again allows extending the findings obtained based on the quantitative analyses and makes it possible to determine whether the behaviour of UNSC members (not presiding the Council) can also influence the success of UNSC meetings. Moreover, this case study depicts the behaviour of a member of the Council who can be considered as having high integrity, including in terms of his personal characteristics. Thus, it is well suited to investigating the effect of a high level of personal integrity on international cooperation, as opposed to the first and second case studies under consideration.

In order to acquire information from the case studies, the minutes of the respective meetings were carefully analysed. Moreover, where available, video recordings of the meetings were analysed. Furthermore, news reports on the meetings and the events discussed therein were also taken into consideration. Finally, for one meeting (no. 8,489), information obtained from the interviews was included.

5.2.1 8,506th meeting of the UNSC on April 10th, 2019

The first case study, which focuses on the different roles state representatives assume on the meso-level of international cooperation, is meeting number 8,506 of the UNSC, which was held on Wednesday, April 10th, 2019. The topic under discussion was the situation and humanitarian crisis in Venezuela. There was no resolution to be voted on; instead, expert opinions from, for example, a public health expert and the Under-Secretary General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator were presented and discussed. The meeting had a total length of 170 minutes (United Nations Security Council 2019g), which is considerably shorter than most meetings on that topic held in 2019 (e.g. United Nations Security Council 2019d, 2019b). However, for this case study, the duration is not of crucial importance, as the focus is on investigating the roles that state representatives assumes on the meso-level of international cooperation. It was the fourth time the topic had

been discussed since January 1st 2019 (United Nations Security Council n.d.a), and, between January 1st of 2019 and April 10th of 2019, when searching for the term 'Venezuela' in the *New York Times* archive, 420 articles can be found (The New York Times n.d.). This shows that, during this time, the situation in Venezuela was of great importance to both political society and the Security Council. The importance of the topic may also explain why the US did not send its permanent representative to the UN to the meeting but was instead represented by vice president Pence.

Pence was late to arrive at the meeting. After the experts gave their statements, the president of the Council asked the attendees to wait for Mr Pence's arrival. Thus, Mr Pence did not listen to what the experts had to say regarding the humanitarian situation in Venezuela. Then, after Mr Pence made his statement, he immediately left the meeting, together with his delegation. Therefore, he not only failed to listen to what the experts presented, he also did not show any interest in what the other members of the Council had to say on the issue. This was perceived as a bitter blow by the other members. As the Russian ambassador stated,

We are both surprised and yet not surprised that the Security Council convened an extraordinary meeting today with the participation of the Vice President of the United States, [...]. It is just a pity, however, that he did not want to listen to the views of the other members of the Council on the situation in Venezuela.
(United Nations Security Council 2019g, pp. 8–9)

I argue that his behaviour in terms of being late and giving the impression of not being interested in other statements was a deliberate behavioural choice on his part in his role as the vice president of the US and thus represents his country and its view on the matter. The behavioural option he chose within this role was possibly intended to demonstrate his country's power, not only in economic and military terms, but also as a P-5 member of the Council. I argue that making others wait and not listening to their statements was intended to convey an impression of the superiority of the country that he represents. Thus, his behaviour is less a personality trait than a behavioural option within his role as a state representative, that is as an agent of his home country. Therefore, it exemplifies the different roles that representatives on the meso-level of international cooperation assume. This is further supported by the fact that the

current president of the US, Donald Trump, has questioned the role and power of the UN in general and the UNSC in particular in the past (Rosenfeld 2016; Die Welt 2017). Pence's behaviour as a representative of the Trump administration could also be interpreted as demonstrating the lack of trust and sympathy that the current US president has towards the UN and its bodies.

In his statement to the Council, Pence strongly criticised the Maduro regime in Venezuela and directly referred to the permanent representative of Venezuela to the UN: 'With all due respect, Ambassador Moncada should not be at this meeting. He should return to Venezuela and tell Nicolás Maduro that his time is up. It is time for him to go' (United Nations Security Council 2019g, p. 8). This was a direct attack on the Venezuelan government and its representative in the UNSC. In his role as a representative of the US, Pence chose to exhibit behaviour characterised by confrontation and personal attacks. This is in line with the messages that the president of the US had conveyed to Venezuela previously, which often consisted of threats (e.g. Der Spiegel 2019). Therefore, the situation suggests that the behavioural option Pence displayed during the 8,506th meeting of the UNSC was chosen as a representative of the US and in line with the behaviour of the administration towards Venezuela. Furthermore, Pence's behaviour indicated that he had no intention of attempting to facilitate international cooperation, as he did not exhibit any collective intentionality, the existence of which has been suggested by Tomasello (2016), and he did not bother to listen to statements from other parties. This behaviour opposes what was learned from the interviews with ambassadors, who clearly indicated that, in general, a collective intentionality can be observed at the UNSC. As such, I argue that the 'solo run' made by the vice president of the US did not contribute to promoting international cooperation.

This example briefly shows how behavioural options are sometimes chosen within the meso-level of international cooperation according to the role a representative takes on and how such choices can potentially fail to foster international cooperation. This was important to show because it supports the argument made earlier, namely that representatives assume different roles in international cooperation. Additionally, it demonstrated how these roles can shape international cooperation. Since this case study did not focus on how

human behaviour can shape international cooperation, the next two case studies do.

5.2.2 6,627th meeting of the UNSC on October 4th, 2011

Shifting the focus to the effect of human behaviour on international cooperation, the second case study to be considered is the 6,627th meeting of the UNSC, which was held on Tuesday, October 4th of 2011, in which a resolution drafted by France, Germany, Portugal and the UK concerning the conflict in Syria was voted on. The draft resolution condemned human rights violations and demanded that Syrian authorities immediately cease engaging in violence and protect the country's population (United Nations Security Council 2011d). It was not adopted by the Council due to negative votes from China and Russia, which are P-5 members and therefore have veto power (United Nations Security Council 2011c, p. 2). According to the minutes, the meeting was 85 minutes long. This is considerably longer than other meetings focused on the conflict in Syria in which in which a resolution or a presidential statement was voted on (two meetings were held between January 2011 and October 2011, which were five minutes and 45 minutes long, respectively (United Nations Security Council 2011b, 2011a)). I argue that the meeting was longer than other meetings on the topic for two reasons: First, since the Council did not adopt the resolution, more discussion was needed after voting. The minutes of the meeting show that a large number of the representatives commented on the outcome of the vote and provided reasons for the votes they had given. When considering meetings in which a resolution or a presidential statement was accepted by the group, this is less common (e.g. United Nations Security Council 2011b, 2011a). Hence, this is likely the first reason why the meeting took longer than other meetings on the subject of the Syrian conflict. This observation confirms the statistical significance of the resolution successful variable in the quantitative analysis.

Furthermore, I argue that the second reason for the meeting being longer is that the topic was important to political society. In 2011, violence and battles in Syria began after the population rose up against the government following the Arab Spring movements (Rodgers et al. 2016). This led to an increased

media coverage of the matter, as, for example, the *New York Times* archive shows, as it features 993 articles including the term 'Syria' between January 1st, 2011 and October 4th, 2011 (The New York Times n.d.). This increased media coverage suggests that there was an increased interest on the part of society in the issue. In addition, the importance of the topic to political society also explains why more discussion was needed within the Council because, as I have argued previously, a topic being of greater importance to political society also leads to more deliberations within the Council because the consequences of any decision will be of greater interest to the media. Furthermore, the events in Syria had been the topics of only three formal UNSC meetings prior to the meeting used for this case study (United Nations Security Council n.d.a). The fact that the topic was discussed by the Council before shows that it was important to the UNSC at the time. However, as the quantitative analyses suggested, the more times a topic has been discussed previously, the shorter the duration of a meeting will be. The argument that explains this suggests that the more frequently the Council has discussed a particular topic, the less basic information will need to be provided. Since the situation in Syria had only been discussed three times previously, I argue that the number of times the topic was discussed before did not significantly impact the duration of the meeting in this case. The findings regarding the importance of a topic to political society as well as the importance of a topic to the Council again confirm, as did some of the interviews, that the choice to control for the importance of a topic using two variables in the quantitative analysis was reasonable.

With regard to media resonance, there was a great deal of media interest in this particular meeting in which the resolution was not adopted (e.g. MacFarquhar 2011; The Guardian 2011). Media reports first addressed the fact that the resolution was not adopted; however, they also covered the behaviour of a particular participant in the Council meeting, the permanent representative of Syria to the UN, Bashar Ja'afari, who was invited to attend. I argue that the behavioural option he chose during that meeting hindered successful international cooperation.

Ja'afari defended the activities of the Syrian government, thanking those members of the Council who vetoed the resolution and sharply criticising some

of the other members (United Nations Security Council 2011c). During his speaking time, Ambassador Ja'afari strongly attacked the US' voting behaviour in the past regarding Israel and the occupancy of Palestinian territories:

A certain State used its veto power 50 times to protect Israel and it continues to threaten to use its veto power. That could be considered taking part in genocide, because that action is tantamount to turning a blind eye to and supporting the Israeli massacres in occupied Arab lands. (United Nations Security Council 2011c, p. 13)

This statement led to the U.S. delegation in the Council, headed by Ambassador Susan Rice, leaving the meeting, as several news reports noted (e.g. The Guardian 2011; Die Welt 2011) and as can be seen in a video recording of the meeting (Al Jazeera 2011). Moreover, several news magazines reported that Ambassador Ja'afari went even further and made a statement in which he claimed that Germany acted as a broker of international peace only several decades after killing millions of Jewish people (e.g. Die Welt 2011). This led the German Foreign Ministry to summon Ambassador Ja'afari's colleague, who was stationed in Germany at the time, to communicate to him that Germany strongly disapproved of such statements and considered them unacceptable (Sueddeutsche Zeitung 2011).

The statement concerning the US fostering genocide and linking Germany's Nazi history to the Syrian crisis could be considered a deliberately provocative act on the part of the Syrian government towards some of the creators and supporters of a resolution condemning its actions. When one reads the entire statement made by Ambassador Ja'afari, it becomes clear that the speech was prepared beforehand, which indicates that the ambassador was potentially aware that the resolution would be vetoed. This is also supported by the fact that he read it aloud, as a video recording shows (Al Jazeera 2011). Therefore, I argue that Ambassador Ja'afari's behaviour can be considered from two different points of view: First, it seems that he took the role of a government agent, in which he pursued the Syrian government's interests and represented the same by provoking other Council members. It was argued earlier in this thesis that ambassadors on the meso-level of international cooperation assume different roles. Ambassador Ja'afari's speech is a concrete example of how one ambassador can assume the role of an agent of a government, in which he

defended the government's actions through a prepared speech that seemed to be intended to provoke other Council members. Thus, in this respect, this case study supports this argument. Furthermore, it supports to a certain extent what Ambassador Berger stated about some countries only attracting attention in the Council through their obstructive behaviour, which is encouraged by their home governments. It seems that the behaviour of the Syrian ambassador in this context could be such a case.

Second, it becomes clear that Ambassador Ja'afari defended his government's actions with the help of provocation by demonstrating behaviour that indicated a lack of respect towards other members of the Council and their representatives. I argue that he purposefully chose this behavioural option, which was aimed at defending his government's actions and that, in this case, hindered international cooperation. The U.S. delegation's choice to leave the meeting can be considered a failure in terms of international cooperation due to the fact that absence from a meeting prevents further discussion. This also holds true for the fact that the Syrian ambassador in Germany was summoned by the German Foreign Ministry. Neither depicts a case of successful cooperation; instead, both examples indicate tensions between the parties involved.

To conclude, this case study not only supports the incorporation of the control variable importance of topic to political society in the quantitative model but also provides an example of how a lack of integrity, which in this case was demonstrated by a lack of respect, can aggravate international cooperation. Therefore, it also validates the inclusion of respect in the measure of personal integrity developed for the quantitative analyses and supports the result of the regression analysis, which regressed the variable of respectfulness against the DV and showed a statistically significant impact. Similarly to the first case study, this case study further supports the argument that representatives on the meso-level of international cooperation assume different roles and exhibit different personality traits. Thus, it supports not only the quantitative model but also the statements made during the interviews with former or current ambassadors to the UN.

5.2.3 8,489th meeting of the UNSC on March 26th, 2019

The third case study to be considered in this section is meeting number 8,489 of the UNSC, which was held on Tuesday, March 26th, 2019. The topic of the debate was the situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question. No resolution was tabled during this meeting. Rather, it was a meeting to present and discuss the report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolution 2334 (2016).

The topics of the Middle East and the Palestinian question have been discussed in the UNSC since the early years of its existence (United Nations Security Council n.d.a) and continue to be prominent within international news (e.g. a search for the term 'Palestine' in the *New York Times* Archive, returns 120 articles published in 2019 alone (The New York Times n.d.)). Thus, I argue that the Palestinian question is an important topic both within the UNSC and to society in general. With regards to the number of times the topic was previously discussed in the UNSC, it is important to note that the many previous sessions concerning the situation in the Middle East and the Palestinian question might have had an effect on the duration of the case study meeting, as, when compared to other meetings held on the matter in the same year, the case study meeting was shorter. According to the minutes, the meeting had a duration of 145 minutes (United Nations Security Council 2019e). Compared to the other meetings held on the topic between January 2019 and June 2019, this is one of the shorter sessions. There was only one meeting that was shorter, that held on February 20th, 2019, which had a duration of 70 minutes (United Nations Security Council 2019c). However, during that meeting, fewer than 10 statements were made, whereas, during the meeting on March 26th, 2019, the attendees made more than 20 statements. All other meetings of the UNSC on the topic were longer than the meeting chosen as a case study (United Nations Security Council 2019a, 2019h, 2019i). I argue that the shorter duration of this meeting was due to a behavioural option that the German permanent representative to the UN, Dr Christoph Heusgen, chose. This behavioural option was one that was indicative of high integrity, openness, authenticity and trustworthiness. This argument is elaborated upon in the following.

During the meeting, the Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process and personal representative of the Secretary-General, Nikolay Mladenov, presented the current situation in Israel and Palestine and provided an update on the implementation of past resolutions intended to address the issue (United Nations Security Council 2019e, p. 2). Thereafter, the representatives of Indonesia, Kuwait, the Dominican Republic, the US, the Ivory Coast, South Africa, Poland, Belgium, Peru, Equatorial Guinea, China, Russia, Germany, the UK, France, Palestine and Israel were given the floor and presented their statements on the issue. This seems to be normal procedure at the UNSC. However, turning to the statement of the German Representative Dr Christoph Heusgen and drawing on the interview conducted with him, it becomes clear that he changed this procedure through his personality.

During the interview that I conducted with Ambassador Heusgen in September 2018, he claimed that the lengthy duration of the UNSC meetings (referring to the DV in the quantitative analyses) is sometimes due to the fact that representatives bring prepared statements and read them aloud. According to him, this is an appalling practice. He added that, in these situations, it also matters whether someone asks his or her colleagues to put their texts aside and speak openly about the issue at hand (Ambassador Dr Christoph Heusgen 9/17/2018). Six months after our interview, he did exactly that. During the debate on the Middle East on March 26th, 2019, that represents the current case study, he asked the other members of the Council to put aside their prepared texts and start discussing the issue addressed in that meeting freely. During his speaking time, he made the following observation: 'I must say that our discussions with Nikolay Mladenov and the briefings he presents belong to the most depressing exercises undertaken by the Security Council' (United Nations Security Council 2019e, p. 16). He continued as follows:

In a few minutes, we will hear our Israeli and Palestinian friends deliver statements that will be full of accusations against one another and how each is violating international law. I would ask them to do as I have done by putting their speeches aside and telling us how they are implementing resolution 2234 (2016). What is the Israeli Government doing to implement that resolution? [...] I would ask our Palestinian colleague to focus his statement on how his Government will end the constant incitements and provocations, the inflammatory rhetoric and, in particular, the missile attacks on Israel (United Nations Security Council 2019e, p. 16)

He made a stand by not reading a prepared statement himself but speaking freely (as can be observed in the video record of the meeting (United Nations Security Council 26th March 2019)) and asking the Palestinian and Israeli attendees to foster a discussion and answer some questions that, for him, needed to be addressed in order to find a solution to the issue.

Before he continued reading out his prepared statement, the Permanent Observer of the Observer State of Palestine reacted to Ambassador Heusgen's call by putting aside his speaking notes, as can be seen in the video recording of the meeting (United Nations Security Council 26th March 2019). He made an emotional speech in which he said the following:

I beg the Council to find a way to implement its resolutions, beginning with resolution 2334 (2016), and I promise that I will not deliver a single statement if the Council finds the political will and methods to bring to account those who are violating the provisions of resolution 2334 (2016). The Council will not see me making statements or objecting to its ruling in that regard, that is, on the implementation of resolution 2334 (2016). (United Nations Security Council 2019e, p. 19)

He then continued and provided his prepared statement; however, he argued that he had to do so in order to 'to defend my people, who live a life of misery under occupation' (United Nations Security Council 2019e, p. 20). Therefore, due to Ambassador Heusgen's request, he set his prepared statement aside, spoke freely and, with a personal touch, explained why he had to continue reading his statement.

In addition, the permanent representative of Israel to the UN, Danny Danon, also reacted to Ambassador Heusgen's push by putting aside his speaking notes, communicating freely (as can be observed in the video record of the meeting (United Nations Security Council 26th March 2019)) and contributing personal experiences to the discussion:

I wish to say to my colleague from Germany that I agree with him that it is about time that we leave statements aside and speak directly. It is really easy to speak about both sides showing restraint; but rockets are flying into our cities. The last rocket that landed in Israel landed in in my community in Israel, where I live, 100 feet from my house and from where I am raising my children. (United Nations Security Council 2019e, p. 22)

The above quotation from Ambassador Danon's statement not only demonstrates how he included his personality and experiences in the

discussions at the UNSC after Ambassador Heusgen's request to do so but also shows the roles that the ambassador assumed in the discussion of the Middle Eastern situation during this UNSC. It is not just the obvious role of the permanent representative of Israel to the UN but also the role of the father of a family who is worried about his children's safety that he incorporated into the discussion during the UNSC meeting, and that is the role of an individual human being.

Even though Germany is a powerful nation and is among the top 10 countries when considering the CINC index (The Correlates of War Project n.d.), I argue that power is not the reason why the representatives from Palestine and Israel began speaking freely; instead, it was Ambassador Heusgen's choice of behavioural option. The ambassador's effort led to an open debate on the matter, which also included the personal experiences of Israeli and Palestinian members of the Council. I argue that behaviour like that demonstrated by Ambassador Heusgen in the above-described situation also indicates integrity and trustworthiness. In an open manner, he asked members to speak freely; they trusted him and did so. Furthermore, the behaviour that he exhibited in the given situation also demonstrated his authenticity. That is because, during the interview with me, which was conducted approximately six months earlier, he explained that he perceived the practice of reading statements aloud negatively. Through the behavioural option that he chose to display on the meso-level of international cooperation, Heusgen contributed to the success of the debate and consequently shaped international cooperation. With a different representative, who may not have made such a valiant effort, the debate that occurred during this meeting would most likely have been different. This observation supports one of the behavioural assumptions used as a basis of this work, which states that human behaviour exhibits different personality traits and idiosyncratic characteristics. It further shows that these differences can shape international cooperation. In addition, the case study shows that human beings are indeed skilled co-operators, as has been suggested by Tomasello (2017) and is used as a behavioural assumption for this work. Both the Israeli and the Palestinian representatives followed Ambassador Heusgen's call to set aside their prepared statements; in that sense, they cooperated with him. Even though they returned

to their prepared statements at a certain point, they reacted to Ambassador Heusgen's exhortation, spoke freely and shared some experiences. They also explained why it was important to return to their statements and read them aloud. I argue that these facts suggest that the situation was cooperative in nature and, as such, supports the argument and behavioural assumption made in this dissertation, which states that humans are skilled at cooperating.

Further, it is interesting to note the following: Only a few days after the meeting discussed in this case study, Germany assumed presidency of the UNSC. In one of the first meetings, Ambassador Heusgen made two innovations to the Council's procedures in his capacity as president. First, he had the curtains of the Council chamber, which had been closed since a 1964 attack, opened in an attempt to symbolise openness and transparency (Borger 2019; United Nations Security Council 2019f, p. 2). Additionally, he introduced an hourglass that gives each speaker five minutes and 30 seconds in which to present his or her statements (United Nations Security Council 2019f, p. 2). Even though the meeting during which these actions were taken is not among the case studies considered in this section, it does support Ambassador Heusgen's authenticity, integrity and transparency when acting on the meso-level of international cooperation. Through his personal characteristics and choice of behavioural options, he provides a useful example of how human behaviour can shape international cooperation directly and sustainably.

6 On the human factor in international cooperation

The empirical analyses demonstrated the effect of human behaviour on international cooperation. In part, these chapters already discussed this result in the framework of the literature in which this work is embedded. Returning to the literature once again, this chapter discusses the results obtained within the context of the findings of the literature review conducted previously and contextualises them within the academic debate on international politics and international cooperation.

The works of Niebuhr, Hobbes, Machiavelli and Weber laid the basis for classical approaches to international politics, and many scholars have built on these writers' works in attempting to explain international relations over the decades. Niebuhr emphasises that individuals act on a moral basis, which is lost when they form social groups. Consequently, for him, nations are selfish, and their actions are focused on fulfilling their interests, which is also reflected in their activities within the international political arena. Hobbes focuses on human beings but describes them as being self-interested and non-cooperative. Machiavelli's work on the state is very power-centric, as is Weber's. As discussed in the literature review of this study, many scholars have applied these pessimistic and power-centric views to the international political arena in order to explain international relations.

The pessimistic views on human behaviour that represented the basis for international political theory are diametrically opposed to the research results of other academic fields, such as those of the anthropologist Tomasello, who found that humans are skilled at cooperating on an individual basis and that they develop both a second-personal morality as well as a joint and collective intentionality when cooperating in pairs or groups. This suggests that human beings are indeed capable of taking into account the interests of others, as opposed to the assumptions made in the approaches of writers such as Hobbes and Niebuhr. Niebuhr applied his assumptions about human behaviour to the level of the state, and many other scholars, such as Morgenthau, have built their arguments on the basis of these views. This study also applies assumptions

about human behaviour to international politics; however, it uses the more recent results obtained by Tomasello and applies them to the meso-level of international cooperation (as opposed to focusing exclusively on state actors). Tomasello's findings were used as the behavioural assumptions that underlie this work as well as to empirically investigate the effects of these behavioural assumptions on international relations. These assumptions underlying this study were, first, that human beings are skilled co-operators; second, that they exhibit a joint and collective intentionality; and third, that they have different personality traits and idiosyncratic characteristics.

The empirical analyses (quantitative and qualitative) revealed that the behavioural assumptions underlying this work are valid. First, the qualitative analyses in particular have shown that humans are skilled at cooperating, as has been suggested by researchers from other academic fields (e.g. Melis 2016; Tomasello 2016, 2017). The interviews with the ambassadors suggested that they form partnerships beyond geographical and political borders and cooperate within these partnerships to pursue common goals. Furthermore, the last case study supported the argument that humans are indeed good at cooperating, as, after Ambassador Heusgen asked the other members of the Council to put aside their statements and speak freely, they cooperated and did so. These results are in contrast with those of (neo-)realist scholars, who do not see any room for cooperation in international politics that goes beyond the building of alliances to increase power and security. Morgenthau attributes this inability to cooperate to the inherent evil of human beings and applies these results to the state level. Waltz does not analyse the individual level, as he focuses only on the system level, and sees no potential for cooperation for common goals to occur. Even though the present study did not scrutinise the system level of international politics but instead focused on the level on which human beings negotiate on behalf of states, these contrasting opinions concerning the importance of cooperation in international politics are interesting. Interdependence theory does acknowledge the emergence of international cooperation but does not shed any light on how human behaviour can shape it. However, as my work has revealed, human behaviour is important

and can provides insights into how international cooperation works, how it is shaped and how it can be fostered.

Why are there such differences in the results presented in some of the works of classical scholars on international relations and that of my thesis, with the latter finding successful cooperation and others finding close to none? I argue that these differences are due to the fact that most classical works on international politics fail to examine human behaviour and its effects in international relations closely and therefore overlook an important aspect of international politics and cooperation. Consequently, they cannot reach the conclusion that human beings are good co-operators and that this cooperation has effects on international politics. Additionally, they focus on different levels of international relations, which are generally the systemic or the state levels.

The second behavioural assumption underlying this work stated that human beings exhibit both a second-personal morality and a joint and collective intentionality, concepts which were originally introduced by Tomasello (2016). This view is rather opposed to what has been argued by, for example, Hobbes and Niebuhr, who see no possibility of human beings (either individually or when acting in groups) exhibiting a we-identity and taking the interests and roles of others into account. Therefore, according to these authors, people are unable to cooperate in groups towards common aims.

The behavioural assumption concerning people being able to exhibit a second-personal morality as well as a joint or collective intentionality has been verified in the course of this study, and it was empirically established on the meso-level of international cooperation. In particular, the interviews showed that there is such thing as joint or collective intentionality on the meso-level of international cooperation. For example, they showed that ambassadors understand their counterparts, including their obligations as representatives of states. The example of the German permanent representative to the UN and his Russian colleague, in which they had dinner together and spoke about their vacation, can, for instance, be closely linked to Tomasello's joint intentionality. Tomasello states that '[w]hen two individuals have experienced things together in joint attention, this shared experience becomes part of their personal

common ground' (Tomasello 2016, p. 52). He continues to explain that '[o]n the epistemic level, each partner in an act of joint attention also has his own individual perspective and knows something of his partner's perspective as well' (Tomasello 2016, p. 52). It becomes clear that, even if a friendly relationship does not seem likely, when considering only political standpoints, the Russian and the German ambassadors shared a common basis, which developed through their work at the UN and the UNSC. This basis turned into a friendship, in which, however, both ambassadors knew and understood both their own perspectives and that of their counterpart. As such, this example verifies the behavioural assumption of second-personal morality, as well as the existence of joint and collective intentionality on the meso-level of international cooperation.

Furthermore, the interviews made it clear that the UNSC members as a group attempt to work together towards common aims. The UNSC thus depicts a partnership between its members. The interviews further established that the existence of such a collective intentionality on the meso-level of international cooperation makes negotiations and fostering international cooperation easier. The case studies showed that a lack of collective intentionality can hinder negotiations and obstruct international cooperation. It can therefore be said that this study has shown that, as suggested by Tomasello, actors on the meso-level of international cooperation exhibit both a second-personal morality and a joint and collective intentionality. This provides a strong counterargument to the behavioural assumptions made in classical approaches to international politics, which claim humans are evil and self-interested (if they consider human behaviour at all). These findings emphasise the need to shift the focus of academic investigations from investigating the system and state levels of international politics to that on which representatives negotiate on behalf of their respective states.

The third behavioural assumption underlying this work stated that human beings have different personality traits and idiosyncratic characteristics. Using the example of personal integrity in the UNSC as a model, the quantitative analyses focused on examining this behavioural assumption and found that

differences in personality impact international cooperation. The results of the quantitative analyses contrast with the arguments of classical theories concerning international politics. Classical scholars in the field of international relations either consider human behaviour as fixed and thus do not take into account potential differences between people (e.g. Morgenthau 1948; Carr and Cox 2001) or do not include them in their considerations at all (e.g. Waltz 2001; Mearsheimer 1994, 2014). Many approaches (e.g. interdependence theory, functionalists or new liberalisms) to international politics acknowledge that there may be differences in human behaviour and skillsets but only use them as a baseline for creating a theory of international politics and do not develop this notion further. Similarly, they also fail to investigate the effects of differences in human behaviour on international cooperation and thus do not include them in their final arguments. Realist approaches, for example, consider international politics starting from the individual level. At first glance, this seems promising, as realist scholars do include individuals in their research. However, when we consider that Morgenthau, for example, states that egoism and aggression are rooted in human nature, we see that this is quite the opposite of what this dissertation finds, namely that human beings have positive attributes (such as integrity) and that these positive properties have an influence on international politics. In Morgenthau's assumption concerning the evilness of human nature, there is no room for the positive characteristics of individuals. As such, it is diametrically opposed to the aims and results of this study.

Game theoretical models that assume rational and self-interested behaviour on the part of human beings also fix the behavioural assumptions of players and leave no room to investigate the effect of differences in human behaviour on the emergence of cooperation. I have argued that, in game theory, it is not possible to change the game or the moves that players make; it is only the rules of the game that can be changed by a player with a moral preference. On the meso-level of international cooperation, this was validated during the interviews and the anecdote of Ambassador Grauls regarding his interaction with the leader of an African country. Nonetheless, it is important to note that game theoretical approaches also consider human behaviour as being fixed.

The present work showed that it is important to not assume that human behaviour is fixed and to investigate differences in human behaviour within international cooperation, the behavioural differences of political actors, as well as to determine whether they influence the outcomes of international cooperation. The quantitative analyses conducted for this study numerically established the effect of different personality traits on the success of international cooperation. This was also confirmed by the interviews, as the interviewees stated that character, integrity, communication skills and behaviour in general are crucial when negotiating on the meso-level of international cooperation. Furthermore, the case studies emphasised the importance of human behaviour in international cooperation point by showing that high integrity and authentic behaviour can foster international cooperation and that behaviour lacking in respect and integrity can hinder it.

Therefore, my study contributes to research on international politics and international cooperation by shifting away from state- and system-centric views and shedding light on a new realm of international cooperation, that is, the meso-level, in which differences in human behaviour play a role. I do not argue that human behaviour in general and personal integrity in particular are the only factors that shape international politics; to the contrary, I argue that approaches that focus on the system and unit levels of international politics have their merits, especially when they aim at the creation of a sound theory of international politics, as in this way, they can provide important insights into international relations on that level. Consequently, I argue that human behaviour is one factor that shapes international relations and cooperation and that it is also important to analyse the meso-level of international politics. This can help to situate it within the context of the academic debate on international relations and obtain a more holistic impression of how the mechanisms of international politics work and how international cooperation can be promoted.

The literature review presented in this work defined three roles that ambassadors and representatives assume as actors in international politics; these roles were identified based on insights provided by the academic disciplines of economics and anthropology. The roles are ambassadors as agents

of their home countries, as partners for cooperation within a group of representatives and as human beings with different backgrounds and personality traits. This study was able to empirically confirm all three of these roles.

First, the interviews provided insight into how ambassadors represent their countries on the meso-level of international cooperation, in which capacity they pursue and act in accordance with their home governments' interests. Moreover, the case studies confirmed this role by showing that, within it, representatives occasionally choose behavioural options that do not necessarily foster international cooperation (e.g. Mike Pence or Bashar Ja'afari). The assessment of the interaction effects during the quantitative analyses also confirmed the importance of the role assumed by an ambassador as an agent of his or her home country, as it showed that the CPI score of an ambassador's country moderates the effect of personal integrity on the duration of a UNSC meeting (the DV). This interaction effect shows that the personal integrity variable predicts the duration of a meeting stronger when the president comes from a country with a low CPI. This implies that ambassadors see their colleagues as a representatives of their home countries, which is inherent in the role assumed by ambassadors as an agent of their home countries.

The role of ambassadors as agents has been briefly touched on by classical scholars in the field of international relations. Morgenthau, for example, states that diplomats represent their countries' power and follow their states' interests in the arena of international politics (Morgenthau 1948, p. 98). Weber identified several characteristics that politicians should possess and exhibit in their capacity as agents of their home countries. However, the roles of ambassadors in general are not at the centre of the works of many other classical scholars of international politics. Waltz (2001, 2010), for example, only considers the system level of international politics, while Mitrany (1966) focuses on the functions that make international cooperation work, and Keohane and Nye (1977) place states' interdependences in international cooperation at the centre of their research; as such, the role assumed by an ambassador as an agent of his or her government is not part of these authors' arguments. This also holds true for the work of Haas (1958), which explains how

cooperation arises but does not include the level on which humans act on behalf of states. The approaches of the abovementioned authors focus on different, higher levels of international politics than that considered in this study.

Second, the role of ambassadors as partners for fostering cooperation was particularly established by the interviews. During the interviews with the former or current permanent representatives to the UN, it became clear that there is a strong will to cooperate on part of ambassadors by advancing topics, negotiating standpoints and discussing opinions. This was also established during the assessment of the interaction effects, which confirmed the existence and importance of the role played by ambassadors as partners for cooperation, since, according to the established interaction effects, the trust variable (i.e. the number of times a president had chaired meetings previously) moderates the effect of personal integrity on the duration of a meeting (the DV).

This role of ambassadors as partners for cooperation is also very much in line with the notion presented by Tomasello, which states that human beings exhibit a joint and collective intentionality (Tomasello 2016, p. 93). Classical approaches to international cooperation do not consider the possibility of ambassadors assuming such a role. Functionalism (e.g. Mitrany 1966, 1976, 1975, 1971) does state that need for technocratic elites who work together in international cooperation; however, it does not provide any insight into how this work is done.

I argue that the reason for the absence of this role in most approaches to investigating international cooperation is the fact that many of them do not expect international cooperation to emerge at all (e.g. Carr and Cox 2001; Waltz 2001, 2010; Mearsheimer 1994, 2014) and thus hold that there is no realm in which ambassadors from different countries work together as partners. Consequently, for advocates of many approaches to analysing international cooperation, there is also no point in investigating this topic. One reason why many classical scholars of international politics ignore international cooperation might be the periods of time in which they developed their theories. The realist Carr, for example, published his primary work in 1939, a time during which efforts at international cooperation and peace were far from successful.

The functionalist Mitrany (1966), writing a few decades later, clearly makes the case for cooperation, especially with regards to urgent needs. In contrast to the realistic view on international cooperation, which does not see any possibility of international cooperation emerging and is more in line with the functionalist view on the issue, today, as was argued in the literature review, we can observe that an international agenda for cooperation has emerged, one which is carried, for example, by the UN. Hence, should international cooperation be excluded from all considerations, a critical part of today's international politics will be omitted, and there will be no space for examining the role of ambassadors as partners in cooperation. Consequently, the present study aimed at closing this gap by investigating the mechanisms that promote international cooperation on a human level.

Third, the role of ambassadors as human beings with different backgrounds and personality traits was developed during the literature review. The existence of such a role was confirmed on the one hand by the quantitative analyses, which indicated that ambassadors have idiosyncratic differences in terms of their personalities and that these affect international cooperation. On the other hand, the interviews further supported the existence of this role, as they, for example, showed that ambassadors assume this role when bringing their personality and experiences to their work, negotiating with colleagues, discussing subjects in committees or encountering their counterparts in private contexts. Additionally, the last case study showed that ambassadors occasionally take on this role when negotiating during Council meetings by incorporating private experiences and concerns in their statements and discussions, as was done by Ambassador Danon when describing the situation in the Middle East. As explained previous, classical approaches to international cooperation do not account for such a role being assumed by ambassadors in their considerations, as they consider human nature as either being fixed or do not address it at all.

The use of personal integrity as an example of human behaviour for the purposes of the empirical section of this study was in part achieved through the

operationalisation of fragments of the cooperation hexagon presented by Messner et al. (Messner et al. 2016, pp. 52–55). The cooperation hexagon consists of seven attributes that foster international cooperation: trust, communication, reciprocity, we-identity, enforcement, fairness and reputation. This study verified many of these attributes empirically. The empirical analyses conducted for this work demonstrated that trust is essential for fostering international cooperation on the meso-level (as established in the interviews as well as by the interaction effects of the quantitative analyses). Furthermore, a we-identity develops on the meso-level of international cooperation among representatives and diplomats through spending time together and forming relationships (also as established in the interviews). The interviews further showed that communication is essential not only when representatives attempt to foster international cooperation (e.g. through the UNSC) but also elsewhere, such as during UNSC elections. Additionally, the attribute of reputation was partially empirically confirmed in this study. On the one hand, during the quantitative analyses, the closely linked reputation and integrity found a statistically significant impact of integrity on the success of international cooperation. On the other hand, during the qualitative analyses and particularly during the interviews, it was repeatedly stated that information about others and their behaviour does influence representatives on the meso-level of international cooperation. As such, the study empirically confirmed a large number of the attributes defined by Messner et al. as crucial for fostering international cooperation. A possibility for further research is to empirically investigate the other attributes that Messner et al. established (i.e. enforcement, fairness and reciprocity) on the meso-level of international cooperation.

Generally, and as discussed in the literature review of this work, most classical approaches to international politics focus on power and security, placing the efforts of nations to increase both at the centre of state activity. One work that does not focus on power and security is that of Keohane and Nye (1977), in which the authors question the importance of power in international political theory. The quantitative analyses of this study did not find a statistically significant impact of the variables representing power (i.e. the CINC index score

of a country and whether or not a country belonged to the P-5 group) on the success of international cooperation (the DV, measured as meeting duration). This finding suggests that, on the meso-level of international cooperation, power does not play a prominent role when representatives engage in international politics and attempt to foster international cooperation, which is in line with the argument advanced by Keohane and Nye. This was also supported by the interviews, which highlighted that, on occasion, UN representatives from countries that are perceived as less powerful and less important in the international political arena become spokespersons for their region or others due to their personalities, communication skills and integrity. These results are very different from what (neo-)realist approaches to international politics claim. I argue that the reason for this is that these approaches focus on a different level of international relations and cooperation than this work does. In a high-level approach to international politics, focusing on power and security when developing a theory seems plausible and helpful in order to identify high-level mechanisms. However, by solely focusing on the state and system levels, (neo-)realists fail to include another important level, namely the meso-level. The findings presented in this study regarding the importance of power on this level are, after all, different. They show that, on the level on which ambassadors negotiate on behalf of states, power does not play a superordinate role and can even be marginalised by actors' personal attributes.

Most classical approaches to international politics do not include the meso-level of international cooperation in their considerations. Within these approaches, this level is not addressed, and as such, neither are its working processes. Consequently, no conclusion about the role of this level in shaping international politics has been reached. However, it is also important to consider the meso-level of international cooperation. As Faust and Messner (2008, p. 34) state, even if a notion of power prevails today, it can hinder international cooperation. As has been argued in this thesis, international cooperation is needed to address global challenges. Therefore, focusing on power is misguided when aiming at examining international cooperation. Thus, this study demonstrates that examining the meso-level of international politics and

cooperation, as well as the behaviour of actors on this level, can contribute important insights to the academic discussion of international cooperation and consequently help to close some knowledge gaps concerning the workings of international politics and the promotions of international cooperation.

7 Conclusion

This thesis aimed to contribute to answering the established research questions: Does the human factor influence international cooperation, and if so, how? It did so by investigating the effect of the human factor on the success of international cooperation. More specifically, this work focused on examining a particular aspect of the human factor, namely personal integrity. Three behavioural assumptions formed the basis for the work: first, humans are skilled co-operators; second, humans exhibit a second-person morality and both a joint and collective intentionality; and, third, human beings have different personality traits and idiosyncratic characteristics. Furthermore, three roles that ambassadors functioning on the meso-level assume were defined, namely ambassadors as agents of their home countries, as partners for cooperation and as human beings with different personality traits and backgrounds. Within this framework, the effect of human behaviour on international cooperation was assessed, and answers to the underlying research questions can be proposed.

The thesis found that the human factor in general and personal integrity in particular impact the success of international cooperation. First, in the quantitative analyses, a statistically significant effect of the personal integrity of a president of the UNSC on the duration of a meeting (as a measure of success) was established. When controlling for several other variables that could potentially have an impact, it was found that UNSC meetings are shorter when chaired by presidents of high personal integrity. The quantitative analyses further showed that certain attributes which comprise the integrity variable are of special importance; these are honesty, following strong moral principles, respectfulness and modesty. Furthermore, in the PCA, one factor (which was composed of the attributes of personal integrity) showed a statistically

significant impact on the duration of a meeting. Additionally, interaction effects could be established visually; these showed that the effect of personal integrity on the duration of a meeting depends on the number of times a president has chaired meetings previously, as well as on the CPI of the country a president is from.

All these results were supported by the qualitative analyses. Both the interviews with the ambassadors and the case studies confirmed the importance of the human factor and personal integrity on the meso-level of international cooperation. They provided some insights into the interaction effects that were established and confirmed that honesty, following strong moral principles and modesty are crucial in international cooperation. The importance of respectful interaction, which was established in the quantitative analyses as well, was also supported by the case studies.

Furthermore, both the quantitative and the qualitative analyses supported the behavioral assumptions underlying this study. Proof was found for all three of them. This work showed that humans are indeed good co-operators, even when acting on the meso-level of international cooperation. In particular, the interviews suggested that actors involved in international cooperation exhibit a second-person morality as well as both joint and collective intentionality. Likewise, the assumption that humans have different personality traits and idiosyncratic characteristics was confirmed. This differentiates this work from classical theories on international politics, as, in contrast to them, it not only establishes certain assumptions but investigated them throughout the entire study.

The roles which ambassadors on the meso-level assume were also examined. Once again, the study indicated that all three of these roles exist on the meso-level of international cooperation and, furthermore, provided findings suggesting that all three are of crucial importance. The role of ambassadors as agents of their countries was established in the quantitative analyses, the interviews and the case studies. This also holds true for the role of ambassadors as partners in cooperation. The role of ambassadors as human being with different personality traits and backgrounds was as well established in the quantitative analyses as well as the interviews and the case studies.

The results of the study may have important implications for research on international cooperation. They show that focusing on the state or system level of international politics might be worthwhile when attempting to establish overarching theories on international politics; however, when one attempts to determine what makes international cooperation successful, the level of human conduct, as well as the impact of the human factor, cannot be omitted. Consequently, this study contributes to the academic debate and furthermore has some important implications for academia. Primarily, it highlights the importance of the human factor in international cooperation, as well as the importance of moral conduct between actors. Therefore, academic research on international politics should not fail to include the level of human conduct. It would be worthwhile to consider shifting the focus of the academic debate away from the state and system levels towards the human beings who are involved. This work clearly shows the merits of such an approach, and it holds true as much for international politics and international cooperation as it does for research on local or national governments. Indeed, one area of further research could examine the impact of the human factor on local or national politics. The behavioural assumptions underlying this work and the roles defined for ambassadors, both of which formed the framework for this study, can be applied to both local and national politicians in a fashion similar to that used to apply them to diplomats in this study. Moreover, this work makes the case for strengthening and extending the transdisciplinary academic debate in order to find common grounds, discuss research findings and how they might be applied to new domains. Doing so could produce meaningful results not only within academia but also in the interactions between academics and practitioners. As this study has suggested, politicians and diplomats could learn a great deal from anthropologists and behavioural scientists regarding the factors that can make international cooperation successful.

Beyond the points discussed above, this work also identifies some important implications for practitioners and provides several insights that they may find useful. First, governments sending representatives to states or international organizations can use the results of this work to ensure that they

send the right people. They can consider beforehand whether the person they send has high personal integrity and good communication skills and is trustworthy. I argue that these considerations can contribute to making international cooperation more successful. Second, the schools that train young diplomats could use the results of this work to promote the awareness of trainee diplomats of the importance of the human factor. They could train aspiring diplomats in communication skills and emphasise the importance of always demonstrating high personal integrity. Additionally, such institutions can prepare students to deal with the different roles that they will assume during their diplomatic careers.

There are certainly some limitations to this work. On the one hand, it must be said that the quantitative analyses were based on models that were aimed at establishing causal effects but could not replicate real-world situations. As such, there is the risk that one or more models may have failed to include one or more variables which, in reality, impact the DV. The work attempted to minimize this risk by also including some qualitative analyses in order to support the quantitative model; however, it is impossible to entirely eliminate the aforementioned risk.

With regards to the qualitative analyses, only five interviews and three case studies were conducted. It is possible that, with the consultation of more interview partners or the inclusion of more case studies, different results would have been achieved or additional findings could have been obtained. Consequently, this is a potential avenue for future research, which could include more interviews and case studies; alternatively, research could perhaps be conducted entirely qualitatively. This could prove helpful in identifying additional processes behind the effect of the human factor on international cooperation or developing a more detailed understanding of the effects that have already been uncovered.

Furthermore, due to the lack of previous research on the impact of human factor in international politics, there is no established research methodology. Therefore, this study used a mixed methods approach to examine the topic, as it allowed for several academic research tools to be applied. Another

opportunity for future research within this context could be to conduct a similar study using a different empirical example, such as the WTO or the Doha Rounds or a regional institution such as the EU.

Additionally, this work did not provide research on the interaction between the individual level and the system levels of international politics. This however, is an important topic to address, since power and security are still very relevant even in times of international cooperation for common goals. My work did not elaborate on this but was limited to opening a theoretical and empirical discussion with regard to the dimension of human behaviour and answering new questions. Thus, investigating the interactions between the individual and system levels of international politics and international cooperation represents another highly interesting possibility for further research.

Finally, there is the risk of cultural bias on the part of the researcher, especially with regards to the notion of personal integrity. What is of high personal integrity to a Western researcher may not prove as important to an individual from another part of the world. Within the context of this research, which used the example of the UNSC, however, this does not seem a crucial obstacle, as the UN can be regarded as an organization which represents Western values and standards of integrity. However, should future researchers wish to examine this topic within a different regional and cultural context, for example that of the Arab League, the measures of integrity used should be critically reconsidered and potentially adapted accordingly.

This study does not argue that the human factor is the only or most important factor influencing international cooperation, but instead that it is one factor among others that impacts it. However, the current global situation presents many challenges which require international cooperation to address, including climate change, displacement of peoples and many other urgent topics. Should academic researchers focused on international relations wish to support the global community in making international cooperation successful and ultimately help to combat and avert global crises through cooperation, they should do the following: First, they should broaden their focus by not only considering states and the systems and, on the other hand, foster debate with

other academic fields of research, be open to the findings that they provide and consider how they could be applied to the topic of international cooperation. This will ultimately lead to a more holistic view on what shapes, hinders and promotes international cooperation. This work has in fact begun this process; however, there is room for further efforts.

I would like to close this study with a quotation from Ambassador Grauls that I feel summarises the discussion well, re-emphasises the importance of focusing more research on the human factor in international cooperation and, in general, makes the case for this entire study:

'I have been a diplomat for 40 years, and this human relationship is essential. Well, it is essential in other places as well, but in diplomacy I think that it is even more important than elsewhere' (Ambassador Jan Grauls 28th November 2018).

Appendix 1 – Search Strings

Search String Factiva

(NAME) and (abus\$ or accus\$ or alleg\$ or ambush\$ or apprehend\$ or arraign\$ or arrest\$ or assault or asset freez\$ or bankrup\$ or barred or black hole or blackmail\$ or black market or breach\$ or brib\$ or captive\$ or censur\$ or claimant\$ or class action or conspir\$ or contrab\$ or convict\$ or corrupt\$ or counterf\$ or court case or crime\$ or criminal or drug dealer or deceit\$ or deceiv\$ or deception or defam\$ or defraud\$ or deprav\$ or detain\$ or detention or disbarred or discredit\$ or disgra\$ or dishonest\$ or dismiss\$ or disqualif\$ or dissident or disreput\$ or desrespect\$ or drug abuse\$ or drug addict\$ or drug user or embezzl\$ or expelled or expensive or expulsion or extort\$ or extradit\$ or extremis\$ or fake goods or felon\$ or financial difficult\$ or financial problems or fined or forge or forged or forges or forger\$ or forging or fraud\$ or fugit\$ or guilt\$ or illegal\$ or illicit\$ or immoder\$ or immoral\$ or impris\$ or improp\$ or incarc\$ or incrimin\$ or indict\$ or injunct\$ or (inside\$ near2 (deal\$ or inform\$ or trad\$)) or insolven\$ or investigat\$ or jail\$ or kickback or kidnap\$ or larcen\$ or launder\$ or lawsuit\$ or legal action or libel or libellous or liquidat\$ or litigat\$ or luxur\$ or mafi\$ or malpractice or malicious or manipul\$ or mansion or misappropriat\$ or miscond\$ or misdee\$ or mishandle\$ or mismanage\$ or misled or mislead\$ or misuse\$ or murde\$ or narcot\$ or nefario!\$ or offen?e\$ or parole\$ or penalty or piracy or pirat\$ or plaintiff\$ or police or politically exposed or porn or pornograph\$ or price manipul\$ or price fixing or prison or jail or proceeds of crime or prohibit\$ or prosecut\$ or racketeer\$ or rape? or regulat\$ issues or robbe\$ or sanction or scam or scandal\$ or investigat\$ or sexual or smuggl\$ or steal\$ or stole\$ or strike off or struck off or subpoena* or terroris\$ or theft or traffick\$ or unauthori\$ or unethical or unlawful\$ or unconsisten\$ or untru\$ verdict or villa or violat\$ or violen\$)

Search Strings Google

Note: Search strings for the Google Search had to be split because Google only allows for 32 search terms at a time.

abuse OR abused OR accuse OR accused OR alleged OR ambushed OR apprehended OR arraign OR arrest OR arrested OR assault OR asset freeze OR bankrupt OR bankruptcy

OR barred OR black hole OR blackmail OR black market OR breach OR bribe OR bribes
OR captive OR censure OR censured OR claimant OR class action 'NAME'

convict OR convicted OR corrupt OR corrupted OR counterfeit OR court case OR crime
OR criminal OR drug dealer OR deceit OR deceive OR deceived OR deception OR
defamed OR defamation OR defraud OR depraved OR detained OR detention OR
disbarred OR discredit OR disgrace OR dismiss OR disqualify OR disqualified 'NAME'

dissident OR disrespect OR disreputability OR embezzlement OR expelled OR expulsion
OR extort OR extortion OR extradition OR extradited OR extremist OR extremism OR
expensive OR 'fake goods' OR felony OR 'financial difficulties' OR 'financial problems'
OR fined OR forged OR forgery OR forgeries OR forging OR fraud OR fraudulent OR
fugitive OR guilt OR guilty 'NAME'

illegal OR illicit OR immodest OR immoral OR imprisoned OR improper OR incarcerated
OR incriminated OR indicted OR injunction OR deal OR insolvent OR insolvency OR
investigate OR investigated OR investigation OR jail OR kickback OR larcenies OR
larcenist OR launderer OR laundering OR lawsuit OR legal action OR libel OR libelous
OR liquidate OR liquidation 'NAME'

litigation OR luxury OR luxurious OR mafia OR malpractice OR malicious OR
manipulation OR manipulated OR misappropriation OR misconduct OR misdeed OR
mishandle OR mismanage OR misled OR mislead OR misuse OR murder OR narcotics
OR nefarious OR offend OR offender OR parole OR penalty OR piracy OR pirate OR
plaintiff OR police OR politically exposed OR porn 'NAME'

pornography OR price fixing OR prison OR jail OR proceeds of crime OR prohibited OR
prosecution OR prosecutor OR racketeer OR rape OR regulation issues OR robbery OR
sanction OR scam OR scandal OR sexual OR smuggle OR steal OR strike off OR subpoena
OR terrorist OR terrorism OR theft OR trafficking OR unethical 'NAME'

unlawful OR untrue OR inconsistent OR inconsistency OR untruthful OR verdict OR villa
OR violation OR violent 'NAME'

Appendix 2 – Coefficient tables and graphs on interaction effects

Interaction Effect IntegrityXImportance – Coefficient Tables

Coefficients^a

	Unstandardised		Standardised		
	Coefficients		Coefficients		
	Std.				
	B	Error	Beta	t	Sig.
(Constant)	1.790	.112		16.043	.000
Personal integrity (C)	-.010	.004	-.089	-2.739	.006
CPI (C)	.002	.007	.009	.268	.789
Time topic is discussed (C)	-.006	.001	-.147	-4.689	.000
Permanent member	-.083	.051	-.078	-1.626	.104
Resolution successful	-.617	.112	-.170	-5.522	.000
Time president chairing the meeting (C)	-.004	.003	-.051	-1.404	.161
Importance of topic to society (C)	2.272E-5	.000	.058	1.884	.060
Power	.499	.401	.054	1.244	.214
Gender	-.035	.069	-.016	-.514	.607
IntegrityXImportance (C)	-3.596E-7	.000	-.005	-1.163	.871

a. Dependent variable: LogDuration

Interaction Effect IntegrityXImportance: Graph



Interaction Effect IntegrityXTimePresChairingMeeting: Coefficient Tables

Coefficients^a

	Unstandardised		Standardised		
	Coefficients		Coefficients		
	Std.				
	B	Error	Beta	t	Sig.
(Constant)	1.785	.111		16.011	.000
Personal integrity (C)	-.009	.004	-.081	-2.436	.015
CPI (C)	.003	.007	.014	.420	.675
Time topic is discussed (C)	-.006	.001	-.146	-4.665	.000
Permanent member	-.079	.051	-.074	-1.552	.121
Resolution successful	-.618	.112	-.171	-5.538	.000
Time president chairing the meeting (C)	-.006	.003	-.081	-1.949	.052
Importance of topic to society (C)	2.314E-5	.000	.059	1.921	.055
Power	.494	.401	.053	1.231	.219
Gender	-.034	.069	-.016	-.493	.622
IntegrityXTimePresident chairing the meeting (C)	-.001	.000	-.056	-1.435	.152

a. Dependent variable: LogDuration

Interaction Effect IntegrityXCPI: Coefficient Tables

Coefficients^a

	Unstandardised		Standardised		t	Sig.
	Coefficients		Coefficients			
	B	Std. Error	Beta			
(Constant)	1.784	.112			15.997	.000
Personal integrity (C)	-.009	.004	-.082		-2.501	.013
CPI (C)	.001	.007	.007		.202	.840
Time topic is discussed (C)	-.005	.001	-.144		-4.588	.000
Permanent member	-.076	.051	-.071		-1.488	.137
Resolution successful	-.617	.112	-.170		-5.525	.000
Time president chairing the meeting (C)	-.005	.003	-.064		-1.717	.086
Importance of topic to society (C)	2.262E-5	.000	.058		1.878	.061
Power	.531	.402	.057		1.322	.187
Gender	-.036	.069	-.017		-.526	.599
IntegrityXCPI (C)	.002	.002	.044		1.321	.187

a. Dependent variable: LogDuration


Interaction Effect IntegrityXTimesTopicDiscussed: Coefficient Tables

Coefficients^a

	Unstandardised		Standardised		t	Sig.
	Coefficients	Std. Error	Beta			
(Constant)	1.788	.111			16.047	.000
Personal integrity (C)	-.010	.004	-.090		-2.773	.006
CPI (C)	.002	.007	.011		.329	.742
Time topic is discussed (C)	-.005	.001	-.144		-4.598	.000
Permanent member	-.084	.051	-.079		-1.643	.101
Resolution successful	-.615	.112	-.170		-5.504	.000
Time president chairing the meeting- (C)	-.004	.003	-.050		-1.389	.165
Importance of topic to society (C)	2.956E-5	.000	.076		2.192	.029
Power	.493	.401	.053		1.229	.219
Gender	-.041	.069	-.019		-.601	.548
ImportanceXTimesTopicDiscussed (C)	1.129E-6	.000	.039		1.119	.263

a. Dependent variable: LogDuration

Interaction Effect IntegrityXTimesTopicDiscussed: Graph



Appendix 3 – Interview guide

Interviewee:

Date/Time:

Place:

1.) Introduction – topic of PhD

International political theory creates a negative picture of foreign policy, highlighting the importance of power and security policy. It finds no room for cooperation. However, currently there is a willingness and a struggle to cooperate (e.g. climate change). Other fields in the sciences (e.g. psychology, anthropology and neuro-biology) have found that humans do cooperate with each other successfully. In international organisations, people cooperate on behalf of countries. So, why is cooperation so difficult? Furthermore, is there a 'human factor' to international cooperation? What is the 'human factor' in international cooperation? The 'human factor' in its entirety is difficult to measure; thus, I take an individual's integrity as one attribute of human characteristics.

2.) Current status of dissertation

A.) Theoretical considerations B.) First regression analysis (1995-2012). I ran a fixed-effects regression to determine the relationship between the personal integrity of the Presidents (measured by CPI) of the UNSC and the duration of the respective UNSC's meeting. I imply that a meeting of the UNSC takes longer when it is chaired by a person with low integrity for multiple reasons. The regression analysis finds a statistically significant impact of the personal integrity of the President of the UNSC on the duration of the respective meeting. C.) Second regression analysis (1995-2012). Exchanging the CPI as a measurement of integrity with a newly created measurement, which measures integrity through background research of each individual President of the UNSC (Currently on-going).

Side note: Integrity is not only being corrupt or not but also includes honesty, having strong moral principles, incorruptibility, consistency, respectful to all, modesty.

3.) Questions

- *Have you ever been in a situation where one of your negotiation or committee partners has had a flawed reputation?*
- *Did this influence the discussions/negotiations? (Perceived)*
- *If so, how?*

- *Have you ever heard of a situation where one of your colleagues has been in negotiations or committees with colleagues that had a flawed reputation?*
- *Did this influence the discussions/negotiations? (Perceived)*
- *If so, how?*

- *If you could choose the colleagues of your discussions, would you consider integrity aspects in your decision?*
- *If so, which?*

- *Would you rather choose the person with high integrity or low integrity? (Argument: Might be easier and quicker and hence more efficient to discuss with someone who has a flawed reputation. E.g. he or she might be more willing to*

accept a 'little lie' to reach his/her goal or not fully play by the rules). 'Quick and dirty'. Compared to a person with high integrity, following all the rules, 'pedant'.

- *If you ever experienced a situation in which a person's integrity was an issue of concern, tell me about the details (e.g. concerns about a certain person in advance of a discussion/negotiation regarding his integrity).*
- *Are there certain political topics where the integrity of your partner/ counterpart weights more/is of more importance than others (e.g. financial issues, HR issues, respectfulness when it comes to sensitive topics).*
- *Do you think that, when Germany becomes a member of the UNSC, you will encounter integrity issues with regards to other members of the UNSC?*
- *If, from your perspective, integrity or the 'human factor' in general does **not** play a role in international negotiations, why do you think that is?*

Appendix 4 – Interview Transcripts

Interview with Ambassador Dr Christoph Heusgen, current Permanent Representative of Germany to the United Nations

Location: Permanent Mission of Germany to the United Nations, New York.

Date: 17th September 2018, 10:30 Local Time

Please note: The interview was originally held in German. Therefore, the time stamps used are those of the original German version.

LVM: Ambassador, do you mind if I record our conversation and prepare a transcript after? 00:00:05#

CH: Yes, you can do that. You just have to make sure that you verify the direct quotes you want to use with me beforehand. #00:00:15#

LVM: Yes, of course. I will transcribe the conversation and would then like to attach it in its entirety to my dissertation, if you allow it. #00:00:27#

CH: That is ok. You just have to send the transcript to me beforehand. #00:00:31#

LVM: If you agree, I will translate it into English and then send you the translation in order for you to take a look at it. #00:00:38#

CH: Ok, we can do that. You're doing your doctorate on which topic? #00:00:42#

LVM: I am doing my doctorate in international politics with Prof. Dr Dirk Messner in Bonn as my supervisor. He heads the German Development Institute and had the following idea. International political theory is very negative. There is a strong focus on power and security policy. However, there are currently many efforts to cooperate internationally, for example with regards to climate change and many other areas. However, these efforts seem to be difficult. On the other hand, there are neuroscientists and psychologists who say that people

have actually been cooperating very successfully at the human level for centuries. My doctoral supervisor therefore asked the question why it is so difficult to cooperate in international politics, even though it is humans who act there on behalf of states. This level 'on behalf of states' must change something about the ability to cooperate. Moreover, in this context, the question arises whether the human factor, i.e. character traits and characteristics, have an influence on international politics. The human factor is very difficult, if not impossible, to measure, so I have chosen a small part of it, namely the integrity of the human being. If you assume that it makes a difference who sits, for example, on the UN Security Council for the United States, then these people have different characteristics and possibly also different integrity characteristics.

So far, I have researched this as follows. I have run a regression analysis with fixed effects and, using the example of the UN Security Council, looked at whether it changes the duration of the session if a person with a higher or lower level of integrity presides over the session. The duration of the session is to be understood in this case as a success factor, arguing that a session lasts longer when there is a higher need for discussion. Of course, there are also many other factors influencing the duration for which I have incorporated control variables in the regression, such as the current relevance and importance of the topic, but also various other factors. I measured the President's integrity using Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index. In this analysis, I found a statistically significant correlation, namely that the meeting lasts longer if the President comes from a country with a lower Corruption Perception Index. I am currently verifying this by doing background research on each President of the Security Council between 1994 and 2012 to make the integrity attribute a truly personal variable. I have a certain structure for this, according to which I search and measure integrity. Here, I find many things, for example ambassadors who were involved in the corruption scandal 'oil-for-food' or who were associated with domestic violence – I also classify this as not having high integrity. Here, I am currently running a new regression. However, political scientists don't like to read numbers and calculate things – for them, it is important to hear stories. Therefore, I try to interview as many people as

possible who are active not only in the Security Council, but in international politics in general. I ask the question of whether, as an emissary, ambassador or representative, one believes that it has an influence if someone sits across from you about whom you know there has been an incident. Both positively and negatively. Here, I would be interested to know if you had situations where you knew through the media that there was a lot going on with your counterpart about corruption or other things that might perhaps have a negative interpretation of the character. Or do you say, 'No, that has no influence at all, because politics works quite differently'? These are the questions that interest me to add experience to the statistics of my work. #00:05:09#

CH: Fascinating topic. So, with regard to the correlation between the length of sessions and the question of to what extent the President has integrity or not, I'm not sure whether that works. But that's what you're doing your work for. I have never sat on the Security Council before. #00:05:42#

LVM: But in other committees. #00:05:44#

CH: Yes, in other committees. So, whether the length depends on integrity or not is difficult to say, I would have to think that through first. Here at the United Nations, it is so terrible when many delegations simply read out prepared texts. It could also depend on whether you say, 'Now put your texts aside, we have a proposal for a solution here. Say whether you agree with it or not.' Then, perhaps, there can be a much more intensive discussion which is however shorter. That is why I am not so sure about the duration of the session, but that is your problem in quotation marks. Now, on the topic of one's character. It's not like you always look closely at 193 ambassadors before you meet them to see whether they have a criminal record or not. #00:06:51#

LVM: Yes, I understand. #00:06:53#

CH: But when you're preparing for the Security Council, like I am at the moment, you take a closer look at the people, to find out whether you can deal with them

or not. And here, I basically believe – having been here for over a year now – that you know which colleagues are reliable. An agreement has been reached, the parties rely on it, and they haven't let you down before. It's clear that you can work together with them more easily than with others. There is certainly also a correlation within the Security Council here. As far as the character is concerned, I only know of one case. That now speaks in favour of your theory. You understand that I cannot give any names. #00:07:55#

LVM: Yes, of course. #00:07:56#

CH: It relates to a country in the Security Council, where I can already see how incredibly difficult it will be to work together with: because their representatives can't be pinned down. Or they say, 'we want to go in this direction' today, and then afterwards, they don't want to know anything about it anymore. And then at the same time, there are rumours that the person concerned has some skeletons in his closet. This is such a concrete case where I would say yes with regard to your research topic, if it is true that he has skeletons in his closet, then this correlation of reliability and cooperation is accurate here. This is a single case. Furthermore, it is the case in New York that we as ambassadors try to deal with tensions that exist between governments or tensions that exist because of a dispute or a topic in a reasonable and rational way by making great efforts to establish good relations with our colleagues. To give just one example, Russia is, of course, a country that stands out for its human rights violations and the invasion of Ukraine. We therefore have difficult relations with that country. At the same time, however, I am trying very hard to maintain good relations with the Russian ambassador so that the personal level is right. Without, however, sacrificing one's principles and policy standpoint. That is something that works quite well in New York: the atmosphere with colleagues is quite good, and you separate this atmosphere from the matter at hand. #00:10:19#

LVM: Yes Ambassador, that's exactly what interests me. Whether that plays a role at all or whether you just say, it's the Russians in quotation marks, it's the

Americans, and we and they have our respective political agendas. You just said that it makes a difference who the person is who represents Russia or America. #00:10:40#

CH: Absolutely! Here's a concrete example of the Russian ambassador: Before I came here, I was the Chancellor's foreign policy advisor and worked intensively on the problems in Ukraine, negotiating in the 'Normandy format'. I know exactly how the Russians stand, and I am very principle-bound when it comes to compliance with international law. However, I have such a relationship with the Russian representative that when he recently visited me at home, he brought a bottle of wine with him and said 'Christoph, you don't have to look, I didn't bring you any wine from Crimea.' Because he knows that we are sensitive in that respect. Or in the same conversation, he said that he had been at home in Russia during the summer holidays and then told me that he had been back to Crimea for the first time in many years. That's when I said 'Oh, so you did go on a holiday abroad, you were in Ukraine after all'. So, there you have a relationship where we are true to principles but where you can also make certain 'jokes' at the same time without straining the relationship. Or with our American friend. Nikki Haley is of course someone who represents the American positions in a tough way. We have substantial disagreements: As far as Israel is concerned, where they broke international law by moving the embassy or when they left the Global Compact on Migration or the Paris Agreement. These are all important issues. Nevertheless, we have a good personal relationship. She went with me to a football match and she always says that she likes Germany very much because BMW and other German companies have created thousands of jobs in South Carolina, where she comes from and served as governor. And that makes personal contact easier. But you also have to stick to the matter at hand and be professional in that respect. But the fact is that here in New York as a whole, the atmosphere is usually one in which you can discuss such issues. #00:12:49#

LVM: Is that something specific to New York and the United Nations, or is that similar when you're a representative or ambassador to a country? #00:12:59#

CH: Let's go back to the past, the time you did your research on. Under Bush Junior we had a very, very difficult relationship with America when the USA invaded Iraq. Based on false allegations as we know today about Iraq's violating of restrictions on chemical weapons. I do not want to go into detail now, but that polarised a great deal of course. Some were on America's side and others said, no, that violates international law and that cannot be done. That blew up quite a bit. Such was the situation for Ambassador Ischinger in Washington at the time, who is now the head of the Munich Security Conference. On the one hand, he had to clearly uphold our position, but at the same time, he had to see how he could still embrace the Americans and how he could help to ensure that the relationship did not harden among the German and the American population, as well. That's why he had to follow the line but, on the other side, he had to see how to reach out to the Americans so that the issue didn't escalate any further. This is perhaps also similar in this position today where we have Emily Haber, a very smart woman, as ambassador. She holds that course, arguing that we now have an American government, which is really diametrically opposed to us on many points, but nevertheless her task here is to have good contacts with this government and the departments, so that we have a functioning working relationship and can advance German interests and concerns better. #00:15:01#

LVM: So international relations are human, after all. #00:15:06#

CH: Yes, totally human. The easiest thing would be to come down hard and say, 'You're terrible and we don't work like that', but you can't achieve anything like that. So that is part of diplomacy. #00:15:16#

LVM: If we go back to the United Nations again now. There are countries in the world where corruption is widespread, especially in the public sector. If you sit in a committee with one or more representatives from such countries, do you think about that in advance? Even if that might be a generalisation. Do you consider in advance whether these representatives might choose procedures that you probably would not? #00:15:54#

CH: Yes, you do think about that. We have, e.g. some African countries where corruption is terrible and where there is no good governance. And here, on the one hand, what I said before applies, namely that it is important to have a good relationship with the ambassadors. On the other hand, it is very important that this good relationship should not prevent one from taking a very clear position on the subject. That is not always easy because the country's representatives do not like to hear a clear position. The governments of these countries where there is no good governance and where authoritarian structures prevail, naturally hate to be put in the dock. It is often the main task of their ambassadors to prevent these countries from being blacklisted. So, it is important, despite all sympathy for the colleagues, to take a clear stand in the discussion. If there is corruption in a country or if there is violence against women or no democracy and journalists are imprisoned, then you have to take a clear stand. #00:17:44#

LVM: And is this also taken into account on a personal level? For example, we know that there is a lot of corruption among government officials in Angola. Now, the Angolan representative is a government official and therefore part of this group. Do you then consider whether this very person could also be affected by this and perhaps does not have clear rules for himself and his behaviour? #00:18:14#

CH: Maybe it's sometimes good that I don't know what the background of an ambassador is. Of course, he or she comes from a certain political class, and one generally assumes at first glance that one is dealing with a professional colleague who represents his or her state unless you have concrete information that says something to the contrary. It is also the case that the issues are addressed openly. For example, at the moment in Angola. President Santos's family is now gone, and new politicians are coming. Then I say to the Angolan ambassador how important it is to curb corruption and promote good governance and how important it is to pay attention to these issues. I am getting that message across. I don't know if it has an effect, however. #00:19:19#

LVM: Ok. Yes. I don't know to what extent the following is a realistic scenario. But when committees are put together, the participating states send ambassadors or other staff as representatives. Are such questions of integrity checked here before a delegation takes place? In Germany, I could imagine this happening more than in other countries. #00:20:04#

CH: In Germany, there are procedures when someone is corrupt or the like. This means, of course, that this person will then no longer be considered for such positions. When a UN body is set up, it is the sovereignty of the states to decide whom to send. You have no influence on that. You can, however, make such considerations if you put together informal groups. I am also a member of two or three of these groups here. Then, in the process of formation and especially when you have a leading role, you consider closely whom you include in this group. You choose which state to include but also scrutinise the representative very closely. So, if there is a state that you would like to include in the group, but you know that the ambassador is no good, then you give it a miss and maybe choose a smaller state that does not play a big political role but has a strong ambassador with integrity. Then you take him or her. This also applies to the appointment of chairmen in committees. I have the impression that the UN community generally ensures that the appointed ambassadors are assumed to be competent and have integrity. There are also counter-examples to this. But essentially, these factors play a role in the nomination. #00:21:56#

LVM: To my last question. Regarding the case about the rumour you described earlier, where an ambassador in the upcoming Security Council has skeletons in his closet. How do you deal with this? Do you research whether the rumours are true? And how do you personally deal with them? Do you think this information will influence you in the Security Council and the debates? #00:22:34#

CH: Yes, certainly. And that will be very important, when we as Germany try to stir things up a little in the Security Council with regards to procedural matters. Beforehand, you always keep track of which members you expect to support you. With such a representative, even if he indicates his support beforehand, you

will not be able to rely on it. So, this plays quite a role. In contrast to this, there are representatives who you know are on your side and sometimes even act contrary to the instructions of their home governments when it comes to procedural issues. And with that other person, on the other hand, I know I can write him or her off. #00:23:17#

LVM: That also means that this personality trait can influence the success of the debate, the meeting or the passing of the resolution. #00:23:28#

CH: Certainly. The Security Council is perhaps the most important body in the UN. And thus, the members often have instructions from their governments. However, when there are no instructions or ones with a lot of wiggle room, it does matter whether you trust the ambassadors, whether they are sympathetic and passionate about the same issues as you are. Here a case comes to my mind. An ambassador had received a certain amount of leeway from her government and came up to me beaming with joy and said: 'Now I can vote for you because I think that we have to be consistent and tough here.' It was a human rights issue. So, the personality of the ambassador has some influence, and it depends on whether the person has the same mentality as we do on the rule of law, human rights, etc. Or if someone says, when it comes to human rights we don't have to exaggerate', and although he or she has the leeway of his government in the vote, still says he or she prefers to abstain. So, it does play a role. #00:24:49#

LVM: I had already asked myself the question whether one thinks, in committees in which countries are represented that have a corruption problem, that one prefers to work together with these countries because decisions are possibly made more quickly and better because processes are perhaps not carried out in full. Or because things are arranged backhandedly. #00:25:19#

CH: Yes, it could be. However, this can quickly backfire. Maybe you can get something done quickly with such a person, but it can also turn against you. And that's why it's important to have personal relationships. But from my point of view, there is no alternative for us as Germany to act always straightforward and

predictable. And this by the way may also be recognised as a value in itself by countries that are somewhat different. #00:26:22#

LVM: Thank you very much for your time. I know that this is not to be taken for granted and I appreciate it very much. I can already say that this conversation has helped me a lot and will make an interesting contribution to my dissertation. #00:26:36#

CH: In principle, I like doing such interviews. Unfortunately, time doesn't always allow it. #00:26:40#

**Interview with Miguel Berger, Former Deputy Permanent Representative
of Germany to the United Nations**

Location: Federal Foreign Office, Berlin

Date: November 23rd, 2018, 10:00am

Please note: The interview was originally held in German. Therefore, the time stamps used are those of the original German version.

MB: Maybe you'd like to briefly tell me more about the topic of your PhD.
#00:00:02#

LVM: I'm doing my doctorate with Prof. Dr Dirk Messner as my supervisor, who was the director of the German Institute for Development Policy for a long time and is now at the United Nations University. My second reviewer is Prof. Dr Jörg Faust. He heads the German Evaluation Institute for Development Cooperation (DEval).

It deals with the following topic: The scientific theory of international relations is very negative and focuses on power and security policy, the black box and such things. My supervisor then asked in a paper why international cooperation is so difficult in our time, for example with regards to climate change. And whether these theories may not be sufficient, since there are approaches and insights from other scientific areas, such as evolutionary biology, that people cooperate very well with each other from childhood on. It is the case that, in international organisations such as the UN Security Council, for example, people cooperate with each other on behalf of states. This level 'on behalf of' seems to make cooperation more difficult. Of course, there are many things linked to this. I took up this question as part of my doctorate. It is about whether and how the human factor influences international negotiations and cooperation. The human factor is very difficult to measure, if at all. That is why I have chosen a small part of the human factor, namely the personal integrity of a person. In this context, I focused my research on the UN Security Council and asked how the personal

integrity of the President of the UN Security Council influences the negotiation. Does it make a difference if there is someone sitting there who the other participants know may have skeletons in his closet or someone who participants know, 'I can rely on, he has always been of integrity', and there are no rumours or negative press about that person either? In the first step, I calculated this in a regression analysis and took the duration of a meeting of the Security Council as a sign of success. The argument behind this is that the longer the discussion lasts, the more need for discussion there must be. #00:02:54#

MB: The duration is a factor, but the duration depends very much on the attractiveness and the political importance of the topic. And especially in the Security Council, because there is relatively seldom the opportunity to speak for the total membership – normally it is closed among the 15 members – I would rather tie the duration to the topic. I believe that the success of a Presidency depends on the products it achieves. Normally, each country takes one or two issues during its presidency and tries to make them a success. So, for example, we had the issue of climate and security back at the time. And we said that we wanted to be the first to achieve this as a product of the Security Council. A resolution was too ambitious, so we got a presidential statement. That was really only possible at the last minute and against fierce resistance from one country in particular. For us internally, that was also the measure of success: is it more than just having talked about it, is there anything left of it that can serve as a basis afterwards? #00:04:15#

LVM: You just said that the duration depends on many factors. You can't cover the whole world scientifically, of course, but I did build in several control variables in my statistical analysis. That is, on the one hand, the frequency of the sessions in which the topic was discussed in the past, with regard to the fact that a topic must be very complex if, for example, there are 30 or 40 sessions on a topic, or if topics drag on for years. Then there is the factor of how the topic is taken up by society in the sense of press reports in order to illustrate the importance of the topic for society and its complexity. #00:04:50#

MB: Do you focus your research on the Security Council? #00:04:52#

LVM: The statistical analysis, yes. I extracted the information on the President, duration and topic from the minutes of the Security Council from 1995 to 2012. I measured the information on the importance of the topic for society by the number of articles on the discussed topic in the *New York Times* in the year of the meeting. Was it two or 2,000? Then, the number of sessions of the Security Council that the President has already chaired and various other control variables to limit the complex world of the Security Council and international politics on a statistical-scientific basis. #00:05:31#

MB: It's very hard to pin that on such factors in the Security Council. I think what is very important for the analysis is the difference between the five permanent members and the 10 non-permanent members. Because the difference in power due to the right of veto and the permanent presence and thus of course the perfect knowledge of all tricks makes a big difference. This is hard to imagine from the outside, but in practice, it makes an enormous difference. I think it might be worth considering the 10 non-permanents more than the five permanent ones. Because in their two years, the non-permanents always want to show that they can move topics that are important to them. I don't know now how easy it is to get the information, but my feeling is that if you want a certain measure for a country's influence – which is of course difficult to separate from the integrity of the people involved – then you should look at: what does a country want to do in the Security Council, and what can it do? The personality of the respective representative is very important, but it is also important beforehand, when it comes to the elections. From this point of view, election campaigns are always an interesting factor for the Security Council, because in many countries it is not the case, as it is in our own country, that the Federal Government considers and decides that we elect the countries one and two, but very many countries from different regions have no or only very general instructions from their governments. Then, in the end, it depends on a kind of 'peer review', so how do the colleagues rate the other colleagues? A very blatant example after my time in the Security Council is the case of one of two European

countries competing against each other in the elections. One country, which provides a lot of development aid and has received a great deal of recognition for its policies, had an ambassador who was a person with poor communication, very stiff and reserved. The other was a very small country, which, in contrast to the first candidate country, has nothing to offer to, for example, many African countries. But the country took part with an open, communicative ambassador and with the argument for the election that one is also a small country that is dominated by the big nations. The small country beat the first candidate by far. Here, the ambassador's personality was more important than what the country had achieved. For the country that lost, it was a huge shock. If you look at the Security Council, which is now leaving, then one country, which has taken on issues such as climate and security, was very important to us. There is a resolution on women in conflicts, no 1325, and I have the feeling that they have managed to convey in the media the issues that were important to them, and they have managed to get attention for their issues through appropriate debates and discussions in the Security Council. And that is why I feel that it is useful for you to focus on the 10 non-permanent members and see what is the level of ambition with which the countries enter the Security Council and what are they really achieving and are they able to transport issues and content. In my view, this is the more interesting criterion. #00:09:33#

LVM: That also depends, as you just say, on the personality of the ambassador or the representative. #00:09:40#

MB: Ultimately, this is very difficult to separate. So, the personality is very important in the choice and of course when it comes to building trust. For example, if you negotiate resolutions, that you can trust that you are dealing with a serious opponent. But of course, the daily work, and especially for the permanent members, goes far beyond the individual, it is about the weight of the country, the interests and also sometimes about connections of irrelevant topics between the countries in the sense of reciprocity. #00:10:40#

LVM: Absolutely. It is a very complex subject that is very difficult to grasp, and the doctoral thesis is the attempt to grasp it in a small part. It does not claim to fully explain the Security Council. But I find the question interesting because international political theory has not yet taken up the extent to which personality plays a role. I had already asked Ambassador Heusgen that. It is possible that personality is completely irrelevant, and it only depends on what the home government dictates. But he said that it is by no means the case and that it is important who is there on behalf of a country. Especially with the argument of trust, which you have already mentioned. Have you ever had a situation in which you knew there was someone across from you who had skeletons in his closet or who might have disappointed you by, for example, not giving a promised vote? That then influences the personal procedure in the Security Council, doesn't it? #00:11:53#

MB: Yes, that's clearly the case. Of course, you get an idea of the other person and try to assess him or her. What is important when assessing the work is that there are not too many countries that can really contribute to all the problems in the world on the basis of their own analysis. We sometimes underestimate that, but there are countries in the Security Council that often only know their immediate neighbourhood well and their region but have no opinion on other issues. So, there is one country that is now coming to the Security Council; they probably don't even have a representation in Burundi or an opinion on Burundi. And that's why, beyond the five permanent ones, there are only a few countries like us that are really able to have their own evaluation and analysis. And in the Security Council, it also depends very much on what intellectual and analytical level someone brings to the table. That depends on his country, so what sources of information can he draw on, is he even able to formulate his own policy on a conflict, or does he only read that in the newspapers? This can be assessed very quickly. Does another country have any shares at all in this subject? And then it is measured very much by how the respective country behaves. So, if someone tries to talk about topics that don't really concern him or where he actually has nothing to say. And that's very quickly considered dubious. For example, if a certain South American country tries to make Africa policy, then everyone

would say, what's the point? So, even if nobody says that openly, of course you take a very close look at the countries and their interests, where are they represented and where can they have a say at all. That plays a role. And then it also plays a role from which sources of information the people make use of. If the representatives express some kind of think tank opinion or how they get involved and how constructive they are. I think there are three things that play a role: First, the feeling if that what a person says really has a contribution to the work of the Security Council and an analytical content. And second, does what the representative is trying to represent fit in with the country's capabilities? And third, the reliability, i.e. whether things discussed are adhered to and implemented and whether the person is reliable and has integrity. #00:15:02#

LVM: So, you check first, who the person is sitting across from you? What did the person do before, who is that? #00:15:17#

MB: Yes, you do check that. There is a UN official for every topic, a special representative, who usually tells something about the topic in a closed session. And then there is a round table. Not everybody has to speak but can. What annoys many is that basically everyone has to say something about every topic, so the big ones are annoyed because everyone is talking, even though perhaps only four or five countries have something to say about certain topics. And then you can very quickly see from the discussions what kind of contributions there are and what intellectual level and analysis that has and how serious it is. You can then use this to get an idea of your counterparts of the other countries. If you have the impression that an ambassador's policy differs greatly from the political impressions you have of the country, then that is of course something that is also discussed outside New York. So, the big countries like to pick up the phone and call the relevant foreign minister and say that their ambassador said that and that, is that really the attitude? So that's not something that stays in a closed room, but a lot of what is said goes quickly into the media and has a strong media perception and often leads to political feedback effects. And the big countries in particular are not afraid to complain immediately if they feel that

an ambassador is out of line and, for example, is making inappropriate points. Seen in this light, this is a system of feedback. #00:17:23#

LVM: And during your time in the UN Security Council, did you have experience with an ambassador who knew that he had different standards of integrity than yourself or your German colleagues? #00:17:37#

MB: Yes, nobody really wants to talk about it. #00:17:40#

LVM: Of course, I don't expect names or anything. #00:17:44#

MB: Well, of course there is. And the best example by which integrity can be measured is the election to the Security Council. All countries are engaged in an intensive election campaign and then allow themselves to be assured by the countries as to whether they will be elected. I remember an election campaign before that of us Germans, I no longer know which countries they were, but it was two European countries. After the election, the two countries compared who had promised them votes. And they found out that 90% of the countries of a continent with predominantly developing countries had given their assurances to both countries. In other words, the lack of integrity has spread across the entire continent. One can, of course, say that it is either a lack of integrity or another understanding of politeness and friendliness that one tells one's counterpart that one will certainly vote for him. While in the Western countries, the election result actually fully corresponded to the promises. That is, if a European country tells us, 'Sorry, this time we can't vote for you because we have already promised Japan the vote', then they will stick to it. And vice versa, and it is transparent. While in regions where this is not the case, the impression is immediately created that what is said cannot be taken at face value. So, this is an example of how this is actually done in a relatively dubious way. #00:19:23#

LVM: Yes, that's interesting, because in one step of my statistical analysis I included Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index (CPI) as a

factor to measure the integrity of individuals vis-à-vis their home institutions. So, when you say that an emissary from a country with a poor CPI has integrity and is faithful to his home government and therefore may have similar personal integrity standards. Now, many of the countries you just mentioned in your campaign example rank lower in the CPI. Is it also the case then – even if it might be prejudicial – that if a colleague from one of these countries gives an assurance that they will not trust it and wait and see what happens? Or do you assume that you are dealing with a professional colleague on whom you can rely? #00:20:28#

MB: No, I think it is clear to all those who campaign that certain countries and regions have to cut corners between commitment and final result. And these are often the same countries where there is no clear instruction from the home government, and so the local representatives have a huge leeway. #00:21:02#

LVM: But in such a case, where there is no instruction – if there is a clear instruction, the room for manoeuvre is very small – the personality of the ambassador would have to play a much bigger role, if one knows that the representative has no concrete instruction, that he is trustworthy and that he is reliable. #00:21:24#

MB: Exactly. That plays a role. Basically, the UN is a closed world on its own. There are many bodies beyond the Security Council. Of course, the various forums and the various resolution negotiations, where ambassadors are appointed as chairmen, give you a very good feeling when you are there for two or three years, how you have to assess your personality in each case and who you can trust and how. What I find interesting is the contradiction between a rhetoric that reproaches the West for neo-colonialism and the personal lifestyles of some ambassadors. This is often much higher than what Western representatives in New York do in this context. I find this discrepancy between personal enrichment and anti-colonial rhetoric, for example, an interesting phenomenon that is often very widespread in these countries. But nevertheless, out of this group, there are ambassadors who manage to develop leadership

personalities as speakers of their respective regions. This does not necessarily have to do with the size of the country. That can also be someone from a medium-sized country, more rarely from a small one. There must always be a certain correlation between what the country really represents and the person in question. But nevertheless, representatives from medium-sized countries can succeed in taking leading roles because of their personality and the recognition they receive for their individual work. It is the mixture of integrity and personality that makes this possible. And that can be a very important factor in the UN. So, the size of a country does not automatically mean influence. And for me, the important Asian countries are always a bit of a counterexample, where the ambassadors often have a problem communicating, they give an incredible amount of resources to the UN, they have a lot of staff, but they are not communicative. And a representative from a less important Latin American country can succeed in having a far stronger influence than his colleagues from the Asian countries just mentioned. #00:24:35#

LVM: Because he has the better rhetoric and communication? #00:24:38#

MB: Exactly. Because he has the better communication and rhetoric, because he deals with his colleagues differently and something like that sometimes produces very interesting results. There you have countries that basically influence the UN above their weight class, and those that should be influential tend to have a lesser effect. This is a very interesting phenomenon, and it is also evident beyond the Security Council – although I would say that this feedback, which I have just described, significantly increases control in the Security Council compared with, for example, the General Assembly. So, the big countries will indeed pick up the phone when they are annoyed by initiatives to Syria from countries that do not play such a major role. But they will worry less about it if the same countries are more likely to bring up absurd issues. Then there is a group of countries that are basically building their prestige, their standing, by being destructive, by building hurdles everywhere and by being difficult. And there are also interesting continuities, because it always affects the same group of countries, regardless of the person. That is then somehow the national DNA.

It is no longer a question of whether the colleague from these countries has integrity or not, the effect of the colleague does not depend on integrity, but on destructiveness. So, someone qualifies by good work, or someone creates meaning by destructive blocking action. #00:26:48#

LVM: In such cases, is that a political strategy? We are now making quarrels and building hurdles? #00:27:00#

MB: Exactly. For example, we want to make the U.S. go to hell, and then they'll all be happy in our home governments. That's the line. And then it doesn't matter at all whether the colleague is of personal integrity or not, but the value depends ultimately on this destructive behaviour. #00:27:21#

LVM: Well, to sum up: It's like if the strategy or behaviour of the country or delegation is very negative, it overshadows integrity. Then the representative of this country could be personally very honest and open. In this case, it would be completely irrelevant because the basic behaviour does not fit. #00:27:46#

MB: Yes. And that's coordinated and approved with the capital. That's a political line, that you say you behave like that. So, I think the closer the instructions and the leadership from the capital are, the less influence the personality has. It is still important and will always be important, but the more leeway there is in the capital, the more personal behaviour can unfold, both in a positive and negative direction. #00:28:19#

LVM: There are also votes or topics where there is no instruction from the capital. I could imagine that the personal feelings of the ambassador on the subject are important, as are the personality and the basis of trust. If a representative then comes to you and says that I have not received any instructions, I will vote for you. Can you then trust it or not? #00:28:46#

MB: Yes, there are such things very often. However, this is only possible within a very narrow framework. In general, there are established lines on all topics

that are discussed in the UN – the resolutions come in some form every two years. Let us assume that an ambassador would vote differently on a resolution in which his country traditionally voted against, and then of course he would risk his position. The framework he can change because of his personality is sometimes very small. Countries have a traditional voting behaviour. Nor should we forget that there are also group dynamics, for example of regional groups. They coordinate and then nobody will dare to break out. If he does that, it goes straight to his capital. Then the following should not be underestimated. The West is, of course, relatively individualistic in its approach, as is our way of doing things, so each country has its own policy, but we are trying to coordinate as in the EU. The group of 77, two-thirds of the members, agree in great detail on their line at the beginning of each year. That is often the lowest common denominator. And it is difficult to deviate from that, because every country knows that if I am not in solidarity here, others will refuse me solidarity if it is important to me. That, too, of course, restricts the room for manoeuvre. So, I generally believe that the factor of integrity is important in daily work and for trust. But the possibilities of really changing voting behaviour via personalities or integrity are blocked by several factors. This is how I would see it. #00:30:57#

LVM: If we go to other bodies, where it is not the countries that send someone but the internal decision of the UN bodies as to who is to be appointed. The person who then leads the committee and says, 'I'm choosing members now. Are such integrity issues included? #00:31:24#

MB: Yes, that happens very often. Basically, whenever important resolutions need to be negotiated, the presidency of the general assembly selects one or two ambassadors to act as chair and co-chair. And, of course, the proportional representation, i.e. the country group, has to be taken into account. But of course, you look for representatives who are as reliable as possible when you have an important resolution, and what I just said comes into play here again: after one or two years you simply have a feeling for what your colleagues are like. And if, as President of the General Assembly, you have an important resolution, then you will entrust it to a person whom you feel is capable of

implementing it and who also has the personality, integrity and ability to bring others together. If that is someone who offends others, they will not be chosen. Regional proportionality must always be taken into account. But outside of this regional percentage, people are already looking for those who bring this integrity with them. #00:32:32#

LVM: Yeah, that's interesting. In a way, you confirm that it does play a role. Ambassador Heusgen reacted in a similar way. And of course, I find that very exciting. Are there perhaps also certain topics, for example political or humanitarian, where integrity is more or less important? For example, in the case of a topic that is very present in the media and very important, does integrity play no role or a very special role? #00:33:24#

MB: Yes. I think the more political a topic becomes, the less scope there is for the respective ambassador. So, let's take resolution negotiations on Syria or Iran. Basically, it doesn't matter who my counterpart is, I have to find a solution. Then you may have a personal assessment of your integrity, but then the room for manoeuvre for the actors is very small because every step must of course be coordinated and everyone must work under the instructions of their capital. So, I would say that the more important and relevant the issues are, the less leeway there is. That is why the room for manoeuvre of individuals in the Security Council tends to be smaller than in the General Assembly. I believe that the place where the real personalities can develop and also exert influence over their personality and integrity is the General Assembly, because in the Security Council, the issues are so political, unless they are some exotic issues that also occur from time to time. But as a rule, they are so political that there is little room for manoeuvre. #00:34:40#

LVM: In quotation marks, the Security Council is the more intimate body, because it is much smaller and you meet every day, sometimes even several times a day. You know your colleagues much better than at the General Assembly and can therefore assess them much better. #00:35:10#

MB: Yes. That's a completely different relationship again. The Security Council is really a world of its own. In the end, it's like this in the General Assembly: Of these 193 members, of course, everyone is known, of course not so intensively, and not everyone plays a role everywhere. But I think you already have a feeling for the most important 60 or 70 actors. #00:35:35#

LVM: Those were the questions I had. Thanks for your time; I know it's not a given. #00:35:50#

**Interview with Jan Grauls, former Permanent Representative of Belgium
to the United Nations**

Place: EY Office, Brussels, Belgium

Date: November 28th 2018, 13:15

LVM: Thank you, Mr. Grauls, for providing me the opportunity to interview you for the purpose of my PhD thesis. Do you mind if I record our meeting? I will then transcribe it and send it to you for your review before I attached it to my PhD Thesis. #00:00:47#

JG: Yes, of course. There is no problem. Maybe you can explain to me what your PhD Thesis is about. #00:01:13#

LVM: Sure. The scientific theory of international relations is very negative and focuses on power and security policy, the state is a black box and such things. So, there is the question why international cooperation is so difficult in our time, for example with regards to climate change. And whether these theories may not be sufficient, since there are approaches and insights from other scientific areas, such as evolutionary biology, that people cooperate very well with each other from childhood on. It is the case that in international organizations such as the UN Security Council, for example, people cooperate with each other on behalf of states. This level 'on behalf of' seems to make cooperation more difficult. Furthermore, the 'human factor', that is the personality of diplomats is not considered in current research on international politics. I took up this question as part of my doctorate. It is about whether and how the human factor influences international negotiations and cooperation. The human factor is very difficult to measure, if at all. That is why I have chosen a small part of the human factor, namely the personal integrity of a person. In this context, I focused my research on the UN Security Council and asked how the personal integrity of the President of the UN Security Council influences the negotiation. Does it make a difference if there is someone sitting there who the other participants know may have skeletons in his closet or someone who participants know 'I can rely on, he

has always been of integrity', and there are no rumours or negative press about that person either? In the first step, I calculated this in a statistical regression analysis and took the duration of a meeting of the Security Council as a sign of success. The argument behind this is that the longer the discussion lasts, the more need for discussion there must be. #00:04:36#

JG: That's interesting. Every year when the new, young Belgian diplomats start their diplomatic training, I go there and talk to them in order to highlight the importance of the, what you call 'human factor'. Things like honesty, transparency and reliability. On the other hand, I always tell them, as well, that people will approach them and ask for the opinion of their home country on a certain topic – as opposed to his or her personal opinion. This happens in the bilateral field but also in the multilateral field, such as the Security Council. So, therefore, your field of research is very important for diplomacy and sometimes also underestimated. When it comes to the Security Council and what you just described, you must remember the following: I had the presidency in August 2008, when everybody told me beforehand, that August will be a sleepy month at the UN and that there will not be too many meetings of the Security Council. Then on August 5th, the war in Georgia started, and for the rest of the month we worked day and night. That makes you feel very useful, also because many important ambassadors such as the American ambassador or the Russian ambassador come to see you, and they want to see you alone, without your team or counsel. And the reason for that is that they want to make sure that the president of the Security Council knows certain things. Because he is the president and he has to manage the discussions. All of a sudden you feel very important, but you also need to be very prudent about it. You are president for one month. But you are also one element in a chain. You take over from your predecessor, and then at the end of the month, you pass the task on to your successor. So, this element of having a personal influence on the course of action is true, but it also depends a bit on the urgency of the topics. During that time of the Georgia war, we tried hard to issue a statement by the Security Council, but some members were not willing to accept that. So, for example, my Russian counterpart in the council was Ambassador Churkin. He had been ambassador

to the Kingdom of Belgium, so he knew the country. And he had very good memories of his stay here in Belgium. And at the same time, he was head of the Russian mission to NATO. I got on really well with him and we became friends. But during that month of August, we were on opposite sides when it came to statements we made. But I always respected him, and at the end of my Presidency, when I passed over to my successor, he came to see me. And that is something I am very proud of, and I say this in all modesty. He came especially over to the Belgian mission to see me, and he said 'Jan, thank you very much for the way in which you have presided the Security Council. On the substance we were far apart, but when in the chair you always made a clear distinction between you speaking as the Belgian Ambassador and you speaking as President.' And he appreciated that and also the fact that I kept him informed about all kinds of developments that were taking place. And that was a very nice compliment to me and it is the result of a good personal relationship. He felt that I had full confidence in him as a representative of his government and of course he knew that I had my constraints as Belgian Ambassador but also as chairman of the Security Council. #00:07:32#

LVM: So, do you think the good relationship made working easier? #00:07:38#

JG: Yes, it does make it much easier if you have a good relationship. You can also more easily and better rely on informal contacts. So, this is the human factor, and sometimes I didn't understand why some colleagues didn't attach more importance to that, as it makes things easier. That being said, of course sometimes you have to deal with colleagues that are not champions in integrity, honesty and reliability and these things, but in the Security Council and other bodies, you have to work with them. But the informal contacts are very important in the Security Council, and that is something that is often misunderstood in the outside world. For example, people that watch TV and see the Security Council and then they think that this is where it happens. That is not correct. Next to the room of the Security Council is a very small consultation room. And the 15 delegations are sitting there crammed. And that is where the real work is taking place; such as texts are being drafted and positions are being

explained and discussed. But it's only when there is an agreement that the ambassadors go next door, where all the cameras are and hold the meeting. So, what you see on television is only one part of the negotiation process. But the human factor also plays a role there, and outside of the UN building, for example, during working lunches with your colleagues where you develop a personal relationship and trust. And trust is also very important. And because it is personal, you sometimes come to very strange alliances. I for example had a very good relationship with my Indonesian colleague who was also a member of the Security Council at the same time and whom I met last year here in Brussels. This shows that these relationships continue to exist after New York.
#00:11:30#

LVM: In your example, the Georgia war happened, and this was obviously very important. So, based on your experience, do you think that the human factor only plays a role if the topics are not very important and the issues are pressing? Or is it important regardless of what the session of the Council is about?
#00:12:18#

JG: Of course, all colleagues are under instructions from their home government. And the home governments are not aware of the personal relationship you can establish with individuals in New York. And there are colleagues that only do what their home government instructs them to do. And in that sense, a personal relationship does not always produce the result that you would expect on the basis of the quality of a good personal relationship you have. And sometimes you have to say 'Sorry, we know each other very well but what I am going to say in the meeting won't please you, but this is what I get from Brussels'. So personal relationships can be helpful and make the work easier and more pleasant, but it doesn't always work like that in the operational and official actions. #00:13:47#

LVM: Did you ever have the feeling that there are colleagues from countries that maybe don't have a very good reputation concerning their public corruption in these countries; do you always consider them as professional colleagues or do you sometimes think, 'Let us see what happens. Ambassadors from this country

have disappointed me in the past, so I don't fully trust that new Ambassador'.
#00:15:00#

JG: The UN is a greenhouse. Everything is known. So, I had quite a good number of colleagues with a reputation. And, for example, in one circumstance, it was known that a certain Ambassador was involved in suspicious activities while we were working together under the same UN mandate. What do you do? I was working very closely with him and occasionally he asked me to do certain things on his behalf, which I did. But these requests came from a person who does not seem to have much integrity. And that was known at the UN. Another example: After I left New York, the President of the General Assembly had to leave because he was involved in certain activities which were not of high integrity. Last year, he hit the headlines of the international press. And I had known him as ambassador. When all this came out to the open, we knew already and weren't surprised. So, corruption and bad practices do happen. Another example from one of the poorest countries in the world in the heart of Africa – the Central African Republic. I had just arrived in New York, and I received a phone call from Ban Ki-moon, with whom I got on very well. He said: 'Ambassador, you are the Ambassador of Belgium. You know Central Africa quite well, but there is one country which is part of the Great Lakes Region, which gets no attention at all from the international community even though it is one of the poorest countries in the world. Would you accept the Chairmanship of the Peace Building Commission of the United Nations for the Central African Republic?' And I said, 'Secretary-General, if you ask me, then of course I am ready.' And I did this for five years. My interlocutors were representatives of the highest state institutions of the Central African Republic. And there were many allegations towards some of them with regards to bad governance, etc. I flew down there four times a year, and I was received by them. And then you sit there, talking to a person you know almost anything about, including all the negative and controversial things. What do you do? In the African tradition, representatives of State receive foreign visitors with at least four or five people attending and never alone. At a certain point, I had to convey a message to him on behalf of the United Nations. So, I asked him if he would mind if we had this conversation one

to one and without other persons attending. He was surprised because, in Africa, they are not used to these things. But I asked him if I could allow myself to insist. So, we had a conversation one to one in which I conveyed a message to him, clearly implying that his behavior had made things possible that would be condemned later by the Security Council. I could also have had a more general conversation in the presence of all the persons attending at the beginning but then the message wouldn't have been conveyed. That was my personal choice. So, I think I took the more difficult path, but it was in the interest of the United Nations to say things as they were and convey the message that the UN and the international community knew about him and that he should stop doing certain things. The result of that was that, during the two next visits, that person refused to meet with me. At a later time that person was in New York and I received a call telling me that that person wanted to see me. And the first thing he said during our meeting was: 'Monsieur Ambassadeur, vous êtes pardonné.' As if I had done something wrong. I didn't reply to that, but I was happy that he had understood. So, this honesty from my side and this appeal to his integrity had worked. That is one small story to answer your question. #00:24:32#

LVM: And with regards to the other colleagues within the UN who had a bad reputation. If you were dealing with them in debates or councils, would this bad reputation inhibit you? For example, when it comes to voting and promised votes. #00:25:01#

JG: That is a very good example that you mention – the voting within the UN, especially when it comes to votes for non-permanent membership in the Security Council. Yesterday I was talking to a former colleague of mine who was in charge of the Belgian campaign back then. And she said that ambassadors promising to vote in favour of you, and when you then have certain discussions with these colleagues, it is sometimes very strange, as they make you feel in a subtle way that they expect something from you. For example, a colleague who was from the Caribbean Islands promised me to vote for Belgium but then also asked if the Belgium government could fund a project in that person's village. Belgium has never promised money when campaigning for the Security Council.

That is a standard rule. So, I told her that. But it was a kind of hint from her side.
#00:26:44#

LVM: And does that leave an impression with you, when you meet that person again? As you don't forget these things, right? #00:27:01#

JG: Yes. But there are never consequences, because in fact they are embarrassed. We all have a conscience, and when you do these things you don't do that without knowing that you are doing something wrong. #00:27:43#

LVM: And for you? Maybe without mentioning it, but would it change your behavior towards that person? As they have a reputation or as you have a concrete example of their low integrity standards? #00:28:07#

JG: Mentally, you put them in a box. But you know that you have to work with them in certain circumstances. So, you are not going to ignore them, as they represent a country. I have never had this reflex to make people feel that I was inhibited. But in my reflections, it was there. But I never referred to these instances, because these people knew that I hadn't forgotten it. So, there was no need to create embarrassment. #00:29:03#

LVM: But they know that you know. And then maybe in a case when it comes to voting in the Council for a resolution. If someone promised you to vote for you and then they didn't. Does that change your opinion? #00:29:47#

JG: It is sometimes difficult to know who voted for you and who didn't. But in recent years it is becoming more and more difficult and hazardous to rely on promises. Sometimes even written promises. That is a very worrying development. But it is always good to know because of the next time there is a vote. If that same representative has promised you a vote again, before the vote you make sure, by a call, to remind him or her of that in a friendly and diplomatic way. You for example say: 'Thank you, for your verbal promise to vote for us on that next vote.' You put them on notice. And then you ask one of your team to

call his or her colleague at the other mission, saying that my ambassador has just been in touch with your ambassador and it was about the upcoming vote. So, you do draw conclusions from bad experiences. I have always tried to be honest and transparent. And I think I was respected for that. There is a reward for being like that, also within the UN. The Secretary-General asked me to facilitate together with another colleague the reform of ECOSOC. And I told him that I was leaving in six months' time. But he asked me to do it nevertheless. As always, two ambassadors were facilitating the reform, one from the North and one of the South. And I had a good colleague from Guinea to do the job together with me. During that time, we introduced a totally new method of negotiating. And this has something to do with transparency and predictability, as well. As co-facilitators, we always produced a chairman's paper at the beginning of a working session of the negotiation because each meeting was on a special aspect. And when I opened the meeting, I always said that I had distributed the paper and that it was a 'martyr paper', so it was ok to shoot at it. I put it on the table and hoped that it helped the discussion. And the UN membership appreciated this working method very much. Because you show who you are, what you have in mind and discuss it with an open mind. I think that is another example that honesty, or call it openness or transparency, works better than manipulation or plotting. And I am not naïve when I say this, but this is really my experience. #00:36:25#

LVM: And do you think you were chosen to do the reform because of this attribute of being transparent and honest? #00:37:03#

JG: That is difficult to answer, but, in all modesty, I think in New York I had a reputation of being an honest broker committed to the cause of the UN. I don't think I was perceived as an 'arrangeur'. So, I think that helped. I did this ECOSOC reform, and there was a collective trust. #00:37:44#

LVM: And within the UN there are councils or programs implemented and there are ambassadors chosen to lead these; would the choice of who would be leading that also take into account integrity measures or personality measures? So not

only choosing from the perspective of which countries should be included in the council or program, but also which person. #00:38:46#

JG: I think it depends. In certain circumstances, the Secretary-General is free to ask certain people to take on certain jobs. And I think Mr. Ban Ki-moon and also the present Secretary-General Mr. Guterres' first inclination is to say let's take people we can trust. But certain decisions at the UN are taken by regional groups, and candidates have to be proposed from those regional groups. And then the balance of powers plays a role, and these groups sometimes have an internal system where there is a rotation within the group. And then the choice is not personal but more automatic. For example, when countries like Iran or Saudi Arabia become members of the Human Rights Council, that is the result of the regional rotation and who the group chooses to be in the Human Rights Council. The other countries do not necessarily have an open and free choice. #00:41:04#

LVM: I understand. But if it is a personal choice and has nothing to do with the regional rotation, these character traits would be taken into consideration, right? #00:42:38#

JG: Yes. The United Nations in New York is an open house. So, when you know that a group is in the process of selecting candidates, it happened that within the EU, we decided to talk to certain good colleagues we have in that group to encourage them to favor one country over another. So, you can try to influence decisions that are being made in other groups on the basis of integrity, etc. And if you know a colleague in that certain group well enough and know that he or she is a respectful person, you can sort of make a recommendation. And these things happen in New York. It doesn't always produce the expected results, but we as the EU tried to influence certain choices in other groups. #00:44:18#

LVM: And do you have a personal experience in which you were confronted with a colleague who lacked honesty and integrity and you knew about it? And if so how, did that change your behavior in that debate? #00:44:48#

JG: As I said earlier, you have to talk to anybody and recognise that your interlocutor represents a country. But when you know that your interlocutor is a dubious person, it has inevitably an impact on the quality of the conversation. Because there is no human factor, no sympathy, no warmth or friendship. And therefore, the discussion becomes much more factual and probably also more difficult. And you are less likely to be flexible or to make alternative suggestions. It is more a factual discussion without personal warmth and in certain circumstances also has less scope for compromise. #00:46:31#

LVM: Yes, that is interesting. #00:46:34#

JG: Really, your subject is an interesting one. I have been a diplomat for 40 years, and this human relationship is essential. Well, it is essential in other places, as well, but in diplomacy I think that it is even more important than elsewhere. #00:46:59#

LVM: And it is somewhat paradoxical that international relations theory doesn't look at the relationship at all. At least not the mainstream ones, which are taught in most universities. Mainstream international relations theory doesn't propose that there are humans acting on behalf of countries. It is mainly about the maximisation of power in order to stay secure. #00:47:46#

JG: But when you read the memoirs of, for example, Kissinger, is there nothing on this issue? #00:47:58#

LVM: In memoirs, yes, but not theories that are taught in universities. #00:48:07#

JG: But when new attachés or trainees come into training to become diplomats, in Belgium and most probably in other countries too, that is part of the training. #00:48:28#

LVM: In practice, it is. But there is a huge discrepancy between what is practiced and taught to young diplomats and what is taught in university. And don't get me wrong; the theories taught in universities are very helpful and interesting but this discrepancy exists. #00:49:17#

JG: Well that is really interesting. #00:49:25#

LVM: Thank you very much for your time. It was very helpful, and I do appreciate it a lot. #00:50:01#

JG: You are welcome. As I said, I do find your subject fascinating. #00:50:33#

**Interview with Ivan Barbalić, former Permanent Representative of
Bosnia and Herzegovina to the United Nations**

Place: Telephone Call

Date: 13th December 2018, 10:30

LVM: Mr Barbalić, I really appreciate that you are taking the time to speak to me today. Thank you very much. Do you mind if I record our conversation and then transcribe it to paper? This way, you could have a look before I attach it to my PhD thesis and use quotes from it. #00:00:54#

IB: Yes, of course. That is ok. #00:00:57#

LVM: Great. I think I will start by explaining my PhD topic to you first if that is fine for you. #00:01:05#

IB: Sure, of course. #00:01:08#

LVM: The scientific theory of international relations is very negative and focuses on power and security policy. It argues that states will always struggle to cooperate. So, there is the question why international cooperation is so difficult in our time, for example with regards to climate change. And whether these theories may not be sufficient, since there are approaches and insights from other scientific areas, such as evolutionary biology, that people cooperate very well with each other. It is the case that, in international organisations such as the UN Security Council, for example, people cooperate with each other on behalf of states. This level 'on behalf of' seems to make cooperation more difficult. Furthermore, the human factor, that is, the personality of diplomats, is not considered in current research on international politics. I took up this question as part of my doctorate. It is about whether and how the human factor influences international negotiations and cooperation. The human factor is very difficult to measure, if at all. That is why I have chosen a small part of the human factor, namely the personal integrity of a person. In this context, I focused my

research on the UN Security Council and asked how the personal integrity of the President of the UN Security Council influences the negotiation. In the first step, I calculated this in a statistical regression analysis and found a statistically significant impact of integrity on the success of meeting of the UN Security Council. Therefore, I am interested in what your experiences are with regards to this topic, since you have been in the Security Council on behalf of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Therefore, my first question to you would be if you have ever been in a situation where you had to deal with someone who had a flawed reputation and had some skeletons in the closet? Or someone you couldn't trust? #00:03:37#

IB: The thing about the Council is that you spend a lot of time together as you often have two meetings a day. So, there is a permanent interaction over two years, which is a quite significant period of time. Therefore, people create bonds. And the Council is defined by this network. I think that personal relations are the most important part in the Council. I haven't seen during my time in the Council that one person is fully isolated from the rest of the group. And I think that countries would not send someone to the Council as delegate without sufficient integrity. So, in that group you tend to have diplomats that can network and communicate and that are willing to find a compromise, to work together in order to help the group to reach the decisions. But of course, at the same time presenting the views of their home countries. However, there sometimes are ambassadors in the council who might not have the best communication skills or the highest integrity. And from my experiences, these are rarely those representatives from the permanent member countries. There are different aspects to define what is happening in the Security Council, but, in my opinion, the most crucial fact when it comes to the human factor is networking. And integrity is required for networking. #00:06:04#

LVM: That is really interesting. Also, the point you made regarding the permanent members, and them sending someone with less communication skills and less integrity. #00:06:15#

IB: The point is that permanent members have supreme knowledge about the proceedings of the Council, its history and best practices, as they are there permanently. So, in a way, they have ownership over what is going on in the Council. Furthermore, an ambassador of a permanent member can be in the Security Council for five or 10 years. So practically, they almost take the role of the host in that environment. And that is obviously contrary to the non-permanent members, who are only there for two years and have to get used to the proceedings, establish a team and so on. And that takes some time. And the permanent members have the capacity to lead and support you. And therefore, you could distinguish between ambassadors who are permanent representatives and others. And between the other countries, you can further distinguish between countries who have strong diplomacy and are represented in the Council more often than others. And they have the capacity to follow the actions within the Council more closely, even when they are not a member. Other, smaller countries don't have that capacity. Therefore, you sort of have three different groups. The permanent ones, the big countries with large capacities in diplomacy and the other, smaller countries. And that also reflects the positions, the knowledge and the integrity of the people. #00:09:37#

LVM: And if we look at some African countries, for example. Many people associate a lack of integrity with some African governments. When you met a colleague from a country with a bad reputation regarding government integrity – such as some African countries – do you consider him or her a professional colleague, not thinking about the flawed reputation the ambassador's home country has, or do you have second thoughts about this and wonder what integrity standards that person might have because he or she is from that country? #00:10:25#

IB: The UN in general is a very specific place. It is probably the only place in international relations where most representatives and countries acting there have sort of the same status. Because in the General Assembly, every vote matters. So, the model representative that works there carries certain integrity standards and knows how to communicate, also with diplomats from these

aforementioned countries. And in my opinion, there are only a few misfits within the system. But generally, the representatives function there according to certain unwritten rules. And they go there and want to communicate and work together and have an impact on the future with their work. So, you don't only perceive diplomats as representatives from certain countries – even when you disagree with the policy and the governance in certain countries – but you see them as colleagues and partners and you try to work together in order to create some common value. To me, that is the prevailing culture at the UN. And at this point, I would like to underline again the permanent interaction. You meet people regularly in the building or at receptions, meetings or dinners. By meeting each other and knowing each other, you can create resolutions more easily and in the end foster decisions in the Security Council. #00:13:29#

LVM: What you just said suggests that the human factor and the human network and communication are crucially important to the way things are negotiated and decided in the UN in general and the Security Council in specific. Is that correct? #00:13:46#

IB: Yes. #00:13:48#

LVM: Did you have an experience where a colleague had a flawed reputation or you couldn't trust him because he didn't keep his word in the past? #00:14:02#

IB: When I think about the Security Council, then no. It really is a group where members have a lot of things in common and all try hard not to disassociate themselves. They are all very skilful diplomats. And even the countries that politically don't have the best reputation have enough knowledge about that organisation to know what type of diplomat to send to the UN. Some of the most interesting and active people in the UN come from countries which are not perceived as champions in good governance. #00:14:43#

LVM: So, these countries would send people that have the same integrity standards and communication skills as the ones used in the UN, so that the diplomat can fit into the system nicely. #00:15:06#

IB: Yes, because otherwise, it would be a waste of resources to that country to send somebody that would be disassociated. During my time in the Security Council, there were diplomats there who knew how to create a good working atmosphere and an environment for discussion. Even when there were strong political differences during the debate during the day, at night, there would be a dinner where everybody or just certain people would sit around one table in a positive and friendly atmosphere. And I think that is how it works. I don't remember a situation where there was one person that you would not like to have at your dinner table. #00:16:46#

LVM: What about this scenario. What if a person promised you a vote in a certain ballot? And then that person didn't give that vote to you. Would you consider that as something that must have been the decision of your counterpart's home government, or would you also keep that in mind for the next vote, thinking that then you maybe can't count on that person's vote. #00:17:18#

IB: To me, that never happened, and it seems to me that this would be a very special situation in the Council. Often, you have everybody on one side and it's a matter of ensuring the implementation of mechanisms to solve a certain problem. So, division within the Security Council is only on a few topics. Therefore, unexpected votes are rare, and you mostly know beforehand who is going to vote how. I think if it happens, people associate it with an instruction from the home government. And if your counterpart explains the vote with instructions from the home government, you know that it is true. Because that is a reality. In the General Assembly, that is different, and sometimes counterparts don't fulfil your wishes when it comes to voting. But even then, you know that there are reasons for this and that maybe next time you will receive the vote that you and your country wish for. So, you don't necessarily associate it with your counterpart's personality. #00:20:16#

LVM: So, you said that the countries do send people that fit nicely into the system of the UN and the Council. Do you also think when positions have to be filled within the UN, not in the Council but generally within the UN, the decision includes issues like integrity, communication and trust? #00:20:59#

IB: I think a person will be chosen who they are convinced that he or she will do good work at the UN. And they probably will not choose someone who is sort of a misfit. A person that has been good at communication and networking would be chosen instead in my opinion. Because if you want to be successful at the UN, you have to create ties. And countries will not waste their opportunity in the UN by sending someone who cannot do that. #00:22:26#

LVM: And within the UN? If a committee is built and a decision is being made as to who will preside or be part of that committee. Is that decision made only regarding the country that should be included, or is the personality of ambassadors also included in that decision? #00:22:55#

IB: Talking about Security Council bodies, it is more about the countries than about the person representing the country. But the ambassadors of course lobby for their countries. #00:23:55#

LVM: And for other committees that are outside of the Council but within the UN? #00:24:01#

IB: For other positions, the personality is more important, but that depends from election to election. For example, for the judges of the International Court of Justice, the personality of the candidate is very important. But it sometimes is also about the countries that are behind the representatives. And if they have better resources and a bigger team, it is easier to them to support their candidate. So, it is a combination. #00:25:00#

LVM: So, if a powerful country has a weaker ambassador with regards to integrity and communication, it is possible that the position will be filled with a representative from a less powerful country but very high personal integrity and good communication skills? #00:25:17#

IB: Yes, but often, the powerful countries do have very powerful ambassadors with good integrity, good communication and a large network. #00:25:22#

LVM: Yes, sure. On another note, do you think that there might be certain political topics that, when discussed, the behaviour of your counterpart plays more of a role than when other, maybe less important topics, are discussed” #00:25:58#

IB: Yes, for some topics, you need good negotiators. You need competent and insightful people. And these in my opinion are elements of integrity. So yes, I think for important topics you need good negotiators, which is part of the human factor, as well. #00:27:00#

LVM: Ok. Those were all the questions I had. Thank you very much for taking the time to speak to me. I do appreciate it, and I know that you must be very busy, so thank you very much. It was a pleasure speaking to you. #00:27:13#

IB: It was a pleasure for me. #00:27:17#

Interview with Baso Sangqu, former Permanent Representative of South Africa to the United Nations

Place: Embassy of the Republic of South Africa to the Kingdom of Belgium, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg and the Mission to the European Union, Brussels, Belgium

Date: 28th January 2019, 11:00

LVM: Thank you, Ambassador for providing me the opportunity to interview you for of my PhD thesis. Firstly, I would like to ask if you would mind if I record our meeting. I will then transcribe it and send it to you for your review before I attached it to my PhD Thesis. #00:00:11#

BS: Yes, you can do that. How do you know Mr. Grauls? #00:00:19#

LVM: He works for EY these days, just as I do. When I did some research, I found that out. I e-mailed him and he was kind enough to provide me an interview. And he also recommended me to ask you, if you were available for an interview. #00:00:41#

BS: Jan is a good friend and a good colleague. We worked at the United Nations together. I was representing my country in the Security Council. And he was also a very active ambassador, especially regarding issues of peace building for example Burundi and the Great Lakes Region. And I am happy that I found him here, in his beautiful country. So, we keep in contact. #00:01:31#

LVM: For how long have you been here? #00:01:33#

BS: Since September 2016. So, it is almost past the halfway point now as our terms are four years. #00:01:44#

LVM: I understand. #00:01:47#

BS: Before anything else, how did you get to this topic? #00:01:51#

LVM: Let me explain. I did my master's degree in development studies in London and focused on international politics and international political economy. After

that, I decided that I wanted to do a PhD within one of these fields. I read a few scientific articles, and one of them claimed that international relations theory and what is taught at universities is only about countries. The people who represent those countries do not play a role. Theories focus on power and security. That is where I started to develop my idea. These days, international cooperation is going quite well, but there still are some topics where cooperation seems to be difficult, such as climate change. So, I was wondering, if people cooperate really well together – which they do, as studies from psychology or behavioral science show – why is cooperation in international politics sometimes so difficult, if there are people acting on behalf of states. There is no research around that. So, I took the UN Security Council as my research example and did some statistical analysis on how the personal integrity of the ambassadors affects the success of a meeting of the Security Council. I used the personal integrity because I think it must make a difference if for example Jan Grauls sits there on behalf of a country or another person. So, there is a human factor, however this factor is really difficult to measure. So, I just took one part of the human factor, which is a person's integrity. I did my statistics and found a statistically significant impact of the integrity of the President of the Security Council on the success of the meeting. I found that a really interesting result and wanted to interview ambassadors who have been in the Security Council and see what they say regarding this topic, and if they agree on the results of my statistics. So far, I have spoken to Jan Grauls, Miguel Berger, Christoph Heusgen, Ivan Barbalic and now you. So, if you don't mind, I would be really interested in asking you a few questions around this topic and mainly hear whether you think that the human factor and personal integrity makes a difference when acting in the Security Council. #00:06:09#

BS: The reason I was asking you, how you got to this topic is, that it is such a real issue and I was wondering myself why it has taken so long for someone to do some research around it. It is so real, because the process starts long before someone is sitting in the Security Council. I think all countries ask themselves the question, who do we send as representative to the United Nations and the Security Council. Which qualities and face do we want to project our country and

our views in the Security Council? And of course, the decision variables will vary from country to country. The United Nations is such a crucial international organization and the Security Council is an important body within that system. The membership of any country to the UNSC requires that they should aim to represent the views of the majority of the people of the world, especially regarding international peace and security. When in the Security Council you take decisions that impact the lives of people in one way or another, hopefully positively. Therefore, the question of which countries are sitting around that table and who represents the countries who are sitting there becomes important for each country. And I think each country has different means of assessing who that person should be. But it is certainly a question that is in the mind of the person who ultimately decides who is going to the United Nations. The question of integrity immediately arises from that point. There are, of course, other criteria, such as the policies that a country wants to pursue. Also, the United Nations Secretary-General does not have the power or competence to decline any member state representative's appointment. There is no process for application of an agreement as it happens in individual countries. There have been examples from the past, where an appointed representative was alleged to have been involved in war atrocities. The hands of the United Nations were tied in such situations. So, the question about integrity already starts there and different countries will use different means of determining that.

Then after the internal process within your country, you arrive at the United Nations, but if you are not a member of the Permanent Five it is not assured that your country will get appointed a seat at the Security Council. So, for the non-permanent members the question of integrity becomes an issue again when your country decided to run for a seat in the UNSC, and the campaigning takes place. The country and its policies are of course also very important, but so is the personality and the integrity of the ambassador which weighs in heavily. And I am stretching the term a little bit here, so it also includes interpersonal skills, accessibility and how he or she carries herself and the role he or she plays has played in UN negotiations in general. So, this also plays a major role when

ambassadors recommend to their capitals which country/ambassador to support.

After that, when the elections are over the ambassadors are sitting in the Security Council, it becomes clear that they all come from different backgrounds, our countries have different interests, see things differently and are influenced by different experiences. In any negotiation in the United Nations and the Security Council I do believe that it is important to be an effective representative of your country and to have knowledge about the issues that are being debated. Furthermore, it is important to be a dependable partner in the negotiations. This becomes an important factor in reaching agreements/deals, in terms of balancing various interests and agreeing on what can be accommodated to bring all interests together in a solution. The ability of an ambassador to negotiate with a mandate from his/her capital and to be able to successfully relate to your capital the state of play of the different interests and the emerging compromise and recommend to your country what compromise it can live with. So, you need to be able to sell that compromise without leaving your fundamental position compromised and also be able to bring it back to the Security Council and say with authority what your country can live with and what it cannot. So, there is a certain back and forth in the negotiation process. And your integrity is important on both sides. Therefore, the issue of integrity is very important and the cornerstone of what moves diplomacy. I must trust that I am working with a dependable, smart partner that is safeguarding their own interest and also taking my interest into account. You know, it also takes integrity to say that you cannot sell something that crosses the policy red-line to your country. And when an Ambassador does, his/her counterparts must understand that this is his/her best attempt in trying to resolve a problem: if an aspect crosses my policy red-line I need to be able to say this very clearly.

I observed something else. Many decisions that are made within the framework of the United Nations are taken outside the formal negotiation table or framework, through lunches and dinners for example. Informal platforms are important in which you sit down together, relaxed and really engage on issues. And that is where we find each other and find the bottom line for each country,

and try to find compromises. So, there are many of these informal meetings. And you will find that there are situations where ambassadors are hard with each other in official meetings but the bottom line is that they respect each other and be able to work with each other. Sometimes you get respected for rather saying things that are really fundamental to you than being a nice person to everybody. That is integrity and leadership. There are many of these outside meetings and even though we are going to be voting in the Council and one of the P5 might be vetoing a resolution sponsored by another country, at a personal level they still respect each other and know that they are partners and that both are trying to successfully represent their countries.

Sometimes, integrity can easily get compromised by personal or professional issues. That is why you always have to preserve it, as you have worked for it very hard. Like all human beings, ambassadors have personal difficulties in their lives. But that never was an issue or played a negative role, from what I experienced. So, there is always this professional integrity where your word means something and you stay with what you have committed to.

I came to the United Nations right after some Ambassador from a major power and with a reputation of being a bully had just relinquished his post. He didn't care about anything but his own position. He has written books boasting about this. And people were talking about his integrity in that professional sense. And I don't think that anybody spoke very well about him. And I was the successor of someone who had been in the United Nations for ten years, and was well respected in the United Nations across the board, and you could see how people were talking positively about him. There was maybe disagreement on a number of things but what he always kept was his integrity and people would view him as a strong personality, a leader and appreciated the way he handled a number of situations. That shows that you gain a reputation with regards to your integrity. #00:40:11#

LVM: Those are really interesting insights, Ambassador. Thank you very much for sharing them with me. To me, it sounds like when you have a relationship of trust and honesty with your colleagues it makes negotiations easier as well because you know you can trust them. Is that true? #00:40:43#

BS: Yes, there is a lot of that. Because in the pre-negotiations before we get into the Council, we call each other in order to find out the other person's position and the position of his or her country. We prepare ourselves in that way. And therefore, the questions of trust, respect and honesty are very important, as I feel that I can be open to you about my and my capital's view when I consult with a colleague. Also, if necessary you can then go back to your capital and tell them that on a particular issue your country's position does not command support from other members, because some countries have shared their views with me already. And consequently, the openness and trust among ambassadors beforehand helps in the final negotiation. One example here is climate change. For example, if one country signed a big deal on coal mining. They will tell you that they are not doing this because they disrespect the climate change agreements and commitments they have made but that they have a serious problem with regards to foreign exchange reserve for example. And these are things that you would not know if they weren't open to you about it. So, trust and openness help in understanding a country's position and therefore also help the negotiation, its preparation and make them easier in general. #00:43:57#

LVM: Did you have a situation in the past where a counterpart misused your trust or where there were negative rumors about a colleague, so you couldn't fully trust that person? And if so, how did that influence your behavior towards that person? #00:44:20#

BS: Yes, you have a lot of that. Human behavior is such that once your trust has been broken your instinct is to be careful and engage less with that person and maybe not take that person seriously. We are trained professionals, so it is not always personal. But if I had invested my personal trust in someone and that person abused that trust, then that is the way it is. So yes, that happens and if it happens it is like anywhere else in life. #00:45:26#

LVM: Maybe we can switch the focus to the United Nations in general, not just the Security Council. If committees are set-up, are questions of integrity considered in the decision on who to include into this committee? Of course, within the regional decisions that play a role. #00:46:08#

BS: Yes, it does. One example that comes to mind is on one of the budgeting bodies of the United Nations. There is the principle of rotation amongst African countries, and so the countries in any particular committee must change according to a regional framework. When they then chose the person to be part of the body, they consider the reputation, the style of communication and the integrity of the representative. It is possible that a person with high integrity would win, irrespective of the country they represent. The decision is based on the performance of the representative in the past. In fact, if a person is dependable, open and trustworthy often counts most within the United Nations. #00:49:24#

LVM: As an example. What if you had bad experiences with an ambassador from a certain country? Do you also keep these bad experiences in mind when a new ambassador of the same country comes to the United Nations to work? And the same goes for good experiences. Are you always open at first and not let the past experiences influence your way of thinking around the new representative? #00:50:12#

BS: As ambassadors there are practices that we do, in order to avoid exactly that. You must break your personal attachments. Imagine that. If I had a very close relationship to somebody with common interests, and we then sometimes have lunch or do some activities over the weekend together. Maybe the kids go to the same school. By the way, kids play a very big role in the world of diplomacy as they often go to the same school and become friends and then through that, there can also develop a relationship between the ambassador parents. Even if you had a great relationship with a colleague, as soon as a new person comes from that same country you will evaluate him from a neutral perspective first, even though you were very close with his or her predecessor. You create an own opinion about that person, because people are different and the relationship with him develops newly, regardless of the relationships you had before with representatives from his or her country. That is human nature and also important for working together. Friendships happen because people are working together, but it is not a necessity and they don't always develop. It's just important to have a good working relationship. #00:55:01#

LVM: May I ask you one last question, ambassador? What about integrity outside of the United Nations. For example, when a colleague misbehaves outside of his United Nations work. Maybe in his or her private life or he or she is involved in some sort of scandal. Let's say you know about these things, would you keep that in mind and would it influence your behavior when you meet that person? #00:55:39#

BS: Yes, that has an impact as well. That is why I think that the countries' choices of who they send to New York is very important. It's part of the integrity of a person. Abusing women or being corrupt or being a party animal, in a negative way, such as a drug or alcohol abusers, is all part of your integrity and people within the United Nations find out about that. And as a human being you always have a particular position and opinion about the allegations against a certain person. If I knew that one of my colleague is a women abuser, with which I have a fundamental problem, I will still work with him but instinctively I would be more skeptical and set the parameters differently. There will not be a relationship of trust and openness created easily. Also, people within the United Nations will know about the allegations. Even if they don't speak about it openly, there are rumors and they will still stick to the ambassador and as such also to the country that the person is representing. People in the United Nations see the country through its ambassadors, positively and negatively. Therefore, the choice of representative and the persons' integrity is very important in the first place. #01:00:32#

LVM: That was very helpful. Thank you very much for taking the time to speak to me. I appreciate it very much, Ambassador. #01:00:40#

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