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The Rise and Fall of European Democracies

Recent Trends in the Support of Right-Wing Populism among the Citizens of Europe

By Wiebke Breustedt and Susanne Pickel

Since the mid-1980s, right-wing populist parties have established themselves as a new type of party family in many Western European countries¹. After the breakdown of Communism, right-wing populist parties also successfully participated in the elections in several Central Eastern European countries². It may well be that these right-wing populist parties have not enjoyed a consistent level of support among the population³. However, recent events as in the case of Hungary indicate that these parties can cause irreparable damage to democracy both at national and European level even if they only have a majority for a single term in office. The question is, then, who elects right-wing populist parties and why?

Maybe the people vote for them out of protest or a diffuse sense of

dissatisfaction. However, it could also be that an increased sense of national pride and the accompanying disapproval of foreigners, immigrants and people of different faith is currently evolving among the citizens of Europe. The events in Oslo on July 24, 2011 show that even a single perpetrator who seeks to protect 'his' country and 'his' society from being 'swamped' by people of different origin or different faith suffices to severely harm 'his' society. Consequently, we need to ask ourselves: has Europe's swing to the right – which has been quoted so frequently since the beginning of last year – been induced by ideological convictions or one-off protest votes?

So far, there have been few comparative analyses of voters' support of right-wing populism in Europe.

In addition, they mostly focus on Western European countries⁴. Very few studies analyse the support of populist parties in Central Eastern Europe⁵. In order to be able to counteract the spread of right-wing populist ideas and the concomitant election of the respective parties, we need to determine the decisive causal factors of right-wing populist votes in the European Union in general⁶.

Previous research on right-wing populism in Western Europe identifies an entire range of determinants on the individual as well as the system level, including socio-economic status and the political opportunity structure respectively⁷. Based on previous analyses, this article sets out to provide an insight into some of the main causes of right-wing populist voting in the Member States of the European Union, i.e.

political values, social and political trust and social disintegration.

In order to do this, we will first begin by defining what constitutes a right-wing populist party and right-wing populist attitudes and values. Second, based on this theory-driven selection of political parties and description of their main phobias, we will provide an overview of right-wing populist votes in ten European countries. Third, using European Social Survey data from 2002 to 2008, we will compare to what extent the relationships between individual-level factors and right-wing populist votes that have been found to be important in Western Europe also hold in Member States of the European Union in general. We will conclude with a theory-driven argument as to why the European Union should become more active in curbing the spread of right-wing populism in its Member States.

What is right-wing populism? An individual- and party-level definition

Even though many scholars address the terminology issue⁸, there is no widely accepted definition of what constitutes right-wing populism. Given that the goals of right-wing populist, right-wing extremist and radical right parties and the behaviour of their political leaders often resemble one another, it is difficult to distinguish between these concepts⁹.

The term “extremist” refers to the scope of the parties’ goals and is conceptually related to authoritarianism. Extremist parties strive to abolish the democratic order. Right-wing extremist parties seek to establish a mono-cultural “völkisch” (racial) authoritarianism, i.e. an “anti-democracy”¹⁰. In terms of differentiating between radical right parties and right-wing populist parties, it is difficult at times to draw a conceptual line. According to the German Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution, “right-

wing extremism” is unconstitutional whereas “radical right” opinions are (still) in line with the constitution¹¹.

Stöss¹² differentiates between the following types of right-wing parties: 1) moderately nationalist and xenophobic, more or less in line with the political system, 2) nationalist and neo-racist, more critical of the political system, and 3) (neo-)racist and (neo-)fascist, rather hostile to the political system. Based on this distinction, we will analyze the first type of parties which we refer to as “right-wing populist”. This label is in line with Mudde’s definition¹³. He defines populism as “an ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, ‘the pure people’ versus ‘the corrupt elite’, and which argues that politics should be an expression of the *volonté générale* (general will) of the people”¹⁴. Elitism and pluralism do not fit into the concept – Mudde¹⁵ refers to them as “the opposite” of populism. Populism is a “thin-centered ideology”, and “moralistic rather than programmatic”. Charismatic leadership and direct communication between the leader and ‘the people’, which are often included in the definition of populism, “facilitate rather than define populism” (original emphasis). In our analysis, we will focus on those Western and Eastern right-wing populist parties that are described to be of primary importance in Jesse and Thieme¹⁶. Their ideological profiles may differ slightly but they belong to the same party family nonetheless¹⁷.

In order to define the individual right-wing populism and to identify potential voters of right-wing populist parties, it is useful to combine where they place themselves on the ideological left-right scale with their socio-political attitudes. On a scale from 0 (left) to 10 (right), the socio-political attitudes of supporters of right-wing political parties correspond to the value of 8. The scale value of 5 marks the ideological

midpoint, the values of 6 and 7 refer to the ideological position of moderately conservative or Christian political attitudes, the value of 8 reflects the attitudes of potential voters of populist parties and the values of 9 and 10 denote radical right and right-wing extremist attitudes. Of course, these ideological positions are not clear-cut but blurred. However, the correlations between self-placement on the left-right scale and socio-phobic attitudes support the assumption that the scale value of 8 marks the populists’ ideological position. Our definition is also substantiated by the fact that the extent of agreement falls severely between the values of 8 and 9 on the left-right scale (see Fig. 3). Very few citizens actually support the abolition of democracy and place themselves accordingly on the left-right scale.¹⁸ In conclusion, in our analysis we refer to the scale value of 8 to denote right-wing populist attitudes.

Explanatory factors of right-wing populist votes

Even before the new millennium, right-wing populist parties had become popular in France (Front National, NF), Austria (Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs, FPÖ) and Denmark (Dansk Folkeparti, DF). Consequently, they have established themselves more or less firmly in the national parliaments. In other Western and Eastern European Member States of the European Union, right-wing populist parties are a more recent phenomenon and have attracted attention only fairly recently in the countries’ parliaments.

What determines their success? The 9/11 terrorist attacks cannot be the only reason as Le Pen and Haider had already gained a notable share of votes before then¹⁹. Islamophobia or a fear of terrorism are therefore only part of the possible explanation of the electoral success of right-wing populist parties alongside other factors. Analyses of

right-wing populist votes draw on a number of different explanations on different political and analytical levels.

Arzheimer and Carter²⁰ distinguish between a) socio-demographic factors and b) short-, medium- and long-term political opportunity structures. Among other things, the political opportunity structure refers to a structural and ideological weakness of the established parties and to the aim of maintaining a society's level of prosperity. Furthermore, a general sense of dissatisfaction with the multilevel system of the European Union, which is perceived as opaque by many citizens, and a fear of free migration within the EU and social disintegration encourage the willingness to vote for right-wing parties.

In his analysis of the extreme right vote in Western Europe, Arzheimer²¹ summarizes the main theoretical accounts for extreme right support as follows: a) personality traits and value orientations; b) social disintegration; and c) group conflicts²². Using 'intention to vote for a European Right Party' as the dependent variable, he finds that immigration and unemployment rates are important while they also interact with other political factors such as the welfare state. His analysis focuses on the Member States of the EU before the Eastern enlargement and Norway.

Other authors stress the effect of charismatic leadership²³, the issue of social class specific voting behaviour²⁴, different kinds of grievances (immigration, political mistrust, dissatisfaction with the national economy), the immigration issue²⁵ or supply-side and demand-side theories referring to opportunities and institutional frameworks as well as grievances and ethnic competition, respectively²⁶. Eatwell²⁷ among others refers to the protest vote thesis (people vote for right wing parties once only and because they are dissatisfied with the established parties) as well as the single issue theory (right-

wing parties focus on a single issue and are therefore able to vehemently promote this issue) as explaining factors.

In a multi-level comparative analysis, Lubbers et al.²⁸ show that public opinion on immigration and democracy, party characteristics of extremist parties and the number of non-Western residents matter to extreme right-wing voting behaviour in Western Europe. They address the sociological model (social background characteristics), public opinion, economic country conditions, political country conditions, characteristics of extreme right-wing parties, as well as the relationships between the explanatory levels.

As we cannot test the effects of all the explanatory factors in our current analysis, we will focus on the micro level of citizens' feelings of political trust, generalized trust, social deprivation, and attitudes towards immigrants and the EU using European Social Survey data. The choice of explanatory factors is justified by previous research results as well as the main phobias of European right-wing populist parties.

Empirical analysis

The main phobias of European right-wing parties

The main phobia²⁹ of right-wing populist parties is their fear of anything "foreign". However, Western and Eastern European parties differ significantly with respect to their perspective on what constitutes "foreign": Western European Parties focus on their countries' future and their ideal of a Western occidental culture, which results in the following main phobias: Islam, non-Western foreigners and immigrants. Eastern right-wing populist parties gear their political demands towards the past. In doing so, they reach as far back as the late processes of nation-building³⁰ which they glorify in their party manifestos. This results in the following main phobias:

loss of former national territory, non-national peoples (such as the Roma or Jews).

So far, Western European right-wing populist parties have largely relied on a more or less deprived citizenry. In their opinion, these citizens have not received their fair (financial) share compared to immigrants and therefore they resist changes in their familiar social environment. Islamophobia is able to thrive in this social context and threatens to spread to mainstream society. By way of comparison, Eastern European right-wing populists are supported by all social classes, quite frequently including intellectuals.

Overall, Western European right-wing populist parties represent anti-Islamic, racist, anti-immigrant sentiments, i.e. they strive to "protect" against the changes in their culture, whereas Eastern European right-wing populists are more nationalistic and reject social groups who, in their opinion, are not part of their nation, such as the Roma or the Jews. This is also reflected in their main phobias.

Right-wing populist votes

If citizens' voting behaviour to the benefit of the European right-wing parties were to reflect more than mere a protest vote – for example because they oppose the state's saving almost all of the revenue from the oil sector in the state pension fund as in Norway, because they object to European legislation as in Finland or because they disapprove of the scandals involving Sarkozy as in France – then there should be a perceivable ideological shift to the right in the Member States of the European Union. This would indeed be a worst-case scenario: a shift to the right in Europe expressing a change in political ideological values would then be firmly rooted in society, resulting in a support of right-wing parties by committed voters from the mainstream of society.

Right-wing populist parties have already gained a firm foothold in

many Western and Eastern European party systems already since the beginning of the new millennium. Their share of the vote has steadily increased (with a few exceptions, see Fig. 1). For example, since Marine LePen has taken over the leadership of the FN in France from her father, Jean-Marie LePen, support of the party has increased significantly. According to a survey conducted in April 2011 on the presidential elections in 2012, Marine LePen is actually leading over Nicolas Sarkozy³¹.

Right-wing populist parties are becoming increasingly prominent in Scandinavia and the Netherlands. Until now, these societies were considered to be particularly social and liberal. Right-wing populist parties have had an impact on national legislation, limited civil rights and influenced the election manifestos of established parties either by becoming part of a coalition or by tolerating the minority government. In the Netherlands, allegedly, the right-wing liberal prime minister Mark Rutte (Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie, VVD) virtually censored one of the Queen's speeches³² so as not to displease right-wing populist Jan Wilders (Partij voor de Vrijheid, PVV), who is tolerating the minority government coalition with the CDA (Christen Democratisch Appèl).

On July 5, 2011, the Danish government³³ succumbed to pressure from the right-wing populist DF and re-introduced border controls despite protests from the European Commission, even though the country has ratified the Schengen agreement to remove border controls. This measure marks the culmination of the tightening of Denmark's alien laws.

Support for the Fremskrittspartiet in Norway is thought to mainly result from economic pragmatism, fear of a descent down the social ladder and an outright rejection of the prevailing social democracy. In addition, the party promotes free-market policies as well as ultra-con-

	Country	Party	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
Western Europe	Austria	Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs	10.00				11.00		17.50			
	Denmark	Dansk Folkeparti				13.30		13.90				
	Germany	Republikaner	0.6			0.6				0.4		
	Finland	Perussuomalaiset		1.60				4.10				19.00
	France	Front National	11.30					4.30				
	Netherlands	Partij voor de Vrijheid					5.90				15.50	
	Norway	Fremskrittspartiet				22.10				22.90		
Central Eastern Europe	Hungary	Jobbik Magyarorszáért Mozgalom					2.20				16.70	
	Poland	Prawo i Sprawiedliwość				27.00		32.10				
	Slovakia	Slovenská národná strana	3.30				11.70				5.10	

(1) Electoral success of right-wing populist parties in Europe (in %).

Note: Germany serves as a point of reference

Source: retrieved from <http://www.parties-and-elections.de/countries.html>, 27 July 2011

servative, xenophobic and nationalistic goals³⁴, which clearly makes it a right-wing populist or even radical right party.

In Eastern Europe, the election results in Hungary particularly stand out. In this case, the Jobbik party gained 16,7 % of the share of votes. The party has at times been referred to as right-wing populist. With respect to the conduct of its members and their demands, it also meets the criteria of a radical right or even right-wing extremist party. The governing right-wing conservative party FIDESZ seems to value its support so much that it included some of Jobbik's main demands in the constitution during the current amendment process. To such an extent, Jobbik's electoral success does not reflect the entire scope of the shift to the right in Hungary. More precisely, it manifests itself in the two thirds majority of FIDESZ and its national conservative programme.

These examples illustrate the impact of the increase in the share of the vote of right-wing populist parties in Europe. While they may originally have been a protest vote, they have now manifested themselves in citizens' attitudes and behaviour, are tolerated by society and have a significant influence on the development of democracy. These assumptions are substantiated both by the ideological profile of the voters in our set of countries and the analysis of voting motives for right-wing populist parties.

European voters' ideological profile

If a shift to the right has actually taken place in Europe, this change in opinion should not only manifest itself in voting behaviour but also in citizens' socio-political attitudes. We should therefore also be able to observe a shift in the electorates' values on the left-right scale. When considering the mean values since 2002 and comparing them with the overall European mean, the following picture emerges (see Fig. 2): the overall European mean has remained fairly stable, i.e. there has not been a general shift to the right in Europe. However, in Western Europe, the values for Finland, Norway and Austria have, in part, shifted significantly to the right. Overall, the mean values for Finland and Norway are almost always further to the right compared to the overall European mean. The values for France and Germany are clearly far to the left of the overall European mean, while the mean value for Denmark is approaching it. In Eastern Europe, Hungary has significantly shifted to the right since 2004. In 2008, it almost reached the Polish mean value. The Slovaks, on the other hand, seem to have turned away from right-wing ideology.

What is interesting to note is that the Polish and Finnish mean values are almost the same. The mean value for Slovakia is approximately the same as the mean value for France. Therefore, initially, there is almost no quantitative difference between the extent

of right-wing ideology among the citizens in different parts of Europe. In order to determine the differences in the distribution of self-placement values on the left-right scale among European voters, it is essential to consider the individual country profiles (Fig. 3).

When considering the value of 8 to represent the realm of right-wing populist party ideology (the first group of parties according to Stöss), and categorising the values of 9 and 10 as the realm of radical right parties (the second group of parties according to Stöss) and right-wing extremist parties (the third group of parties according to Stöss), it becomes clear that the share of citizens who are part of the right-wing populist group is by far the lowest in Germany. In addition, there are very few supporters in the realm of radical right or right-wing extremist parties here. These effects may have been induced by events in Germany's

history, but they may also be due to social desirability effects related to Germany's past.

However, the shift to the right is evident in all countries except for Slovakia: the share of citizens who indicated a value of 8 on the ideological scale has increased almost everywhere. Consequently, the number of potential voters of right-wing populist parties is increasing across most countries. This does not necessarily imply that these people will actually vote for right-wing populists. However, there is a growing chance that they will vote for them out of ideological conviction.


What is particularly striking is the distribution of voters across the ideological spectrum in Norway (in Western Europe) and in Hungary (in Eastern Europe). In Norway, there appears to be a right-wing trend all the way to the ideological realm of the right-wing populists to the detriment of left-wing parties. In line with the electoral success of the

Fremskrittspartiet, it seems justified to assume a change in the attitudes of the Norwegian voters that goes beyond explanations relating to the economy. The ideological position of the Hungarian voters in 2008 forebodes Jobbik's subsequent electoral success in Hungary's parliamentary elections in 2010 which indicates an increase in support for right-wing populism as well as right-wing extremism (value of 10).


When considering the election results for the right-wing populist parties in Europe, these findings indicate that the share of votes of the right-wing populists does not reflect protest votes after all but is rather a manifestation of political attitudes which are in line with the aims of the right-wing populist parties.

We apply correlation analysis in order to determine whether these findings are mere assumptions based on corresponding results on the country macro level or whether they actually represent latent social phobias. The results show that there is a high correlation between self-placement on the right of the ideological spectrum and the decision to vote for a right-wing populist party in Norway and Poland. This correlation is weaker in Denmark, the Netherlands and in Germany, and even weaker in France and Hungary. In Finland and Slovakia, ideological self-placement is not related to voting behaviour. In these instances, voters must have other reasons to vote for a right-wing populist party, which we will look into in the statistical explanatory analysis below.

Overall, in Norway and Poland, voters of right-wing populist parties were well aware of their actions. In Denmark, the Netherlands and Germany, it also seems that the voters did not cast (one-off) protest votes but rather acted on their ideological convictions. These results show that right-wing populist parties have to be taken very seriously with regard to their impact on the future development of democracy. Established parties need to enhance their performance as well as their representative responsibilities.



(2) Attitudes towards political ideology. Left-right self-placement (2002–2008). Note: 'European Mean' includes all countries available in the ESS in the respective year; The original indicator ranges from 0-10; 0=left 10=right; 5=middle category Source: European Social Survey 2002–2008



(3) Left-right self-placement (2004 and 2008).

Note: Indicator ranges from 0-10; 0=left 10=right; 5=middle category

Source: European Social Survey 2002, 2006 and 2008

Right-wing populist votes in an atmosphere of social phobia

Previous research has shown that feelings of political and social mistrust, generalised trust, social deprivation, and attitudes towards immigrants and the EU are crucial

in explaining right-wing populist votes on the individual level. These indicators are part of the European Social Survey (ESS, see Fig. 4) and we tested their effect by means of a linear regression. Given that Koopmans et al.³⁵ argue that sociological variables do not explain right-wing

votes in Western Europe, we did not include sociological variables in our model.

The ESS is a survey whose sample is representative in terms of demographic criteria of the respective country. In view of the fact that it is not an election survey, the share of voters of right-wing populist parties in Germany and Hungary is too small for an advanced statistical analysis. For the same reason, the regression model does not produce any effects in Slovakia. In 2008, the survey was not conducted in Austria which is why we used data from 2006 in this case (see Fig. 5).

In Denmark and Norway, as expected, voting for a right-wing populist party can be explained by xenophobia and right-wing ideology. Mistrust in parliament as well as euroscepticism are also relevant in Norway and Denmark, respectively. Consequently, the assumptions described above – namely that dissatisfaction with the prevailing social democracy in Norway and the fear of being ‘swamped’ by foreigners in Denmark cause people to vote for right-wing populist parties – seem to hold.

In Finland, France, Austria and the Netherlands³⁶, the results are not as clear-cut. However, in general, they also reflect the assumptions outlined above: euroscepticism, xenophobia as well as right-wing ideology (except for Finland) explain right-wing voting behaviour fairly well. The voting behaviour of Polish voters follows the same pattern. In addition, the (negative) assessment of the current state of the economy and a competitive attitude towards the question of acceptance of income differences also have an impact on the decision to vote for right-wing populist parties.

Overall, the assumption of a well-considered vote for right-wing populist parties based on ideological and xenophobic grounds and a mistrust of established political institutions and politicians holds in all countries except Finland.

The threat of right-wing populist votes to democracies in the European Union

Scheuch and Klingemann³⁷ argue that populism is a ‘normal’ pathology in democracies³⁸. However, based on Abts and Rummens³⁹ it is possible to argue that populism does not “amend the shortcomings and the broken promises of the representative system”⁴⁰ but rather threatens democracy at the national and European level due to the different loci of power that populism and democracy refer to. In populism, the locus of power rests with “a fictitious image of the people as a homogeneous and sovereign political body”⁴¹ whereby populist parties themselves define what constitutes ‘the people’. In democracy, on the other hand, the locus of power is left empty, thus permitting “respect for diversity and for the *individual freedom* of citizens. The openness of democracy refers to the irreducible otherness of all individuals as concrete and particular others, who need to be recognized as such”⁴². It is the acceptance of this ‘otherness’ that is of such significance to the consolidation of a common identity, and the resulting acceptance of multilevel political policies, in the political realm of the European Union. Populists stress the differences among Europeans. The fact that this approach threatens the European Union is substantiated by Chiantera-Stutte and Pető’s case studies of the construction of alternative identities to the European Union by right-wing populist parties in Italy, Austria and Hungary⁴³.

The results of our study support this line of argument: as our analyses show, in almost all of the countries we considered, citizens who vote for right-wing populist parties do so out of conviction and for ideological reasons. The greatest critics of multicultural democracy do not only speak out against immigration or social deprivation. They have also repeatedly shown that they seek to establish a different kind of national

Indicator	Variable
Generalised trust	Most people can be trusted or you can't be too careful
Trust in parliament	Trust in country's parliament
Trust in politicians	Trust in politicians
Attitudes towards immigrants	Country's cultural life undermined or enriched by immigrants
Euroscepticism	European Union: European unification go further or gone too far
Social deprivation I	Satisfaction with present state of economy in country
Social deprivation II	Large differences in income acceptable to reward talents and efforts
Ideological orientation	Placement on left-right scale
Right populist parties	Voted for right-wing populist party in last national elections

(4) Variables in the analysis.
Source: ESS 2008

democracy. In their opinion, democracy should be more closely aligned to their Christian occidental culture, it should rest on the shoulders of new politicians instead of the established elite and it should revolve around their (ethnically defined) nation. Even though the shift to the right in Europe is not as evident as the media suggests, it is not merely a matter of protest votes, let alone one-off protest votes. A few are fiercely determined and many are tempted to defend ‘their’ culture and ‘their’ nation by voting for right-wing populist parties.

According to the representative principle of our democracy, it is imperative that the people’s representatives take their citizens’ worries seriously. By responding to the people’s needs, the democratically elected rulers must enhance the foundations of democratic rule, namely the principles of participation and the adoption of policies in line with the public interest. It is not enough to say that citizens distrust their politicians. It seems as if the voters of right-wing populist parties no longer identify with the goals of the main democratic parties. This in turn leads to the disintegration of the elites and society. The need to openly debate the issues raised by disillusioned citizens is intensified by the fact that the acceptance of national policies in general and EU policies in particular is rooted in the persuasion that the majority of national and European citizens acts in

the interest of the general public. If more and more citizens feel that they are no longer part of this general public, acceptance of the representative principle of our national democracies and the European Union is jeopardised.

Zusammenfassung

Rechte populistische Parteien haben sich mittlerweile in einer Reihe west- und osteuropäischer Länder fest im Parteiensystem etabliert. Angesichts der nationalistischen und ausländergefeindlichen Gesinnung rechter populistischer Parteien gefährden sie die Demokratie auf nationaler Ebene sowie die Bildung einer gemeinsamen europäischen Identität der Bürger Europas. Um jedoch in der Lage zu sein, der Verbreitung rechter populistischer Ideen und der Wahl rechter populistischer Parteien Einhalt gebieten zu können, müssen die Ursachen geklärt werden. Die Frage ist demnach: Wer wählt rechte populistische Parteien und warum? Gegenwärtig gibt es nur wenige vergleichende Analysen der Ursachen der Wahl rechter populistischer Parteien in Europa. Ausgehend von bisherigen Analysen untersucht der Artikel den Effekt politischer Werte, sozialen und politischen Vertrauens, sozialer Integration und Euroskeptizismus in zehn europäischen Ländern auf der Grundlage des European Social Survey von 2002



	Denmark	Finland	France	Netherlands	Norway	Poland	Austria+
R ²	.105	.050	.026	.035	.200	.164	.130
Left-right self-placement	.122***		.080**	.134***	.274***	.322***	.294***
Generalised trust							
Trust in parliament		-.135**			-.166***	-.095**	.010*
Trust in politicians							
EU enlargement	-.189***	-.055*		-.064**		-.092**	
Attitudes towards immigrants	-.140***	-.119***	-.101**		-.155***	-.061*	-.102**
Satisfaction with the national economy						-.123***	-.075**
Income differences acceptable						.113***	--

(5) Explaining right-wing populist votes.

bis 2008. Die Analyse zeigt, dass die Wähler rechter populistischer Parteien keine Protestwähler sind, sondern dass ihre Wahl in der Mehrheit der Länder aus ideologischer Überzeugung resultiert. Dies stellt eine Herausforderung für das Prinzip der demokratischen Repräsentation und der Akzeptanz mehrheitlich getroffener Entscheidungen auf nationaler und EU-Ebene dar.

Notes

- 1) Mudde 1996: 232ff.; Decker 2006: 9; Rydgren 2005: 414; Betz 2002: 252
- 2) Bachmann 2006: 216f.; Bayer 2002: 268ff.
- 3) for Western Europe, see Arzheimer/Carter 2006; Arzheimer 2009
- 4) Arzheimer/Carter 2006: 419; Decker 2006
- 5) see for example Bachmann 2006; Jesse/Thieme 2011
- 6) While our analyses and interpretations focus on the Member States of the European Union, we have included Norway due to the current events.
- 7) Arzheimer/Carter 2006: 421ff.
- 8) see Arzheimer 2009, Footnote 1; Bachmann 2006: 218; van der Brug/Fennema 2007: 474; Eatwell 2000; Mudde 1996; Mudde 2000; Mudde 2004
- 9) For example, the French Front National is referred to as either right-wing populist, radical right or right-wing extremist in the literature. We have included it as an example of a right-wing populist party even though we are aware of its radical right tendencies.
- 10) Mudde 2008: 12
- 11) Priester 2010: 34
- 12) Stöss 2008: 4
- 13) Mudde 2004
- 14) Mudde 2004: 543
- 15) Mudde 2004: 543ff.
- 16) Jesse and Thieme 2011
- 17) Arzheimer/Carter 2006: 426
- 18) The only exception is Hungary in 2008.
- 19) In 1986, FN already received 9.9 % of

the votes. In 1999, FPÖ received 27 % and in 1998, DF received 7.4 %. Overall, an upward trend is apparent.

- 20) Arzheimer/Carter 2006: 421ff.
- 21) Arzheimer 2009
- 22) Arzheimer 2009: 260ff.
- 23) Brug and Mughan 2007
- 24) Derks 2006
- 25) Ivarsflaten 2008
- 26) Koopmans et al. 2005
- 27) Eatwell 2000
- 28) Lubbers et al. 2002
- 29) This is not a comprehensive list of all the goals of the European right-wing parties. We focus in our article on the main aims of their party manifestos in order to provide a general overview.
- 30) Priester 2010: 36
- 31) Bamat 2011
- 32) See respectively www.welt.de/politik/ausland/article12606021/Beatrix-Rede-angeblich-Wilders-zuliebe-zensiert.html; www.focus.de/politik/ausland/niederlande-beatrix-rede-angeblich-wegen-wilders-zensiert_aid_601978.html.
- 33) Since November 20 2001, Denmark has had a minority government comprising the right-wing liberal party Venstre and the conservative party Konservative Folkeparti (Det Konservative Folkeparti, KF). The minority government is tolerated by the right-wing populist Dansk Folkeparti (DF).
- 34) See www.zeit.de/politik/ausland/2011-07/norwegen-fortschrittspartei-brevik.
- 35) Koopmans 2005 et al., 27
- 36) While there is no immediate effect of negative attitudes toward foreigners in the regression, right-wing ideological attitudes are closely associated with xenophobia. Since the voters' ideological position has an effect on their voting behaviour, it is reasonable to assume that xenophobic attitudes influence voting behaviour as well by means of a causal mechanism.
- 37) Scheuch and Klingemann 1967: 28
- 38) see Mudde 2004
- 39) Abts/Rummens 2007: 30
- 40) Abts/Rummens 2007: 405
- 41) Abts/Rummens 2007: 415
- 42) Abts/Rummens 2007: 417f.; original emphasis
- 43) Chiantera-Stutte/Pető 2003

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