The job transition schemes in none of the four countries reviewed can be seen merely as another 'instrument' of active labour market policy, such as continued vocational training, direct job creation or job brokering. Whatever the technical content of job transition support may be, the framing of the schemes is primarily derived from industrial relations and concerns a negotiated exit from a company's workforce.

Restructuring and Occupational Mobility

Support for Job Transitions in European Comparison

By Matthias Knuth, Johannes Kirsch, and Gernot Mühge

Restructuring operations, value chains, business areas and corporate governance is no longer a matter of transient sectoral adjustment crises but has become a more or less permanent process. For employees, restructuring creates opportunities, but it also poses threats and challenges, the most striking of which are redundancy and involuntary mobility. Since the decline of what were once 'core' industries during the 1980s, some European countries have developed measures and practices that address such situations beyond the mainstream provisions for the unemployed[1]. Such 'job transition' schemes take into account an employee's usually long-standing attachment to his or her previous employer and the resulting loss of self-marketing skills. Although the support measures in use are technically very similar between countries, their implementation varies greatly. Depending on industrial relations structures, regulation of dismissals, the role of the Public Employment Service (PES), and social protection

Matthias Knuth. Foto: Timo Bobert

in cases of unemployment, the constellation of actors involved can be very different; the same is also true of the sources of funding, the regulation and justification of access to job transition support, the status of participants, and the steering of the process[2].

In Germany, job transition schemes were never designed 'from scratch' but grew out of struggles on the ground to 'stretch' existing provisions, the amendments to which were only subsequently and incompletely codified in law. Such practices built on a corporatist consensus encompassing the Federal Employment Agency (the German PES) and its management of the unemployment insurance fund. However, the 'Hartz' reforms enacted between 2003 and 2005 largely destroyed this consensus. As a consequence, there seems to have been a breakdown in coordination between the multiplicity of actors involved in the German schemes, producing rising tensions and the risk of deadlock. For this reason, other countries' models will be reviewed in comparison in order to generate ideas as to how the perils of the German job transition model might be overcome.

Germany: a multi-actor model in danger of deadlock

In Germany, support for job transitions originated and still is embedded in Germany's particular model of co-determination (Mitbestimmung), the legally regulated system of representative labour relations at company and workplace level. As early as the 1950s, worker representatives on the supervisory boards of coal mining and steel companies exerted their exceptional legal voting powers in order to coerce management into negotiating social plans (Sozialpläne) for pit closures. In those days, structural change could still be conceived as taking place within the secondary sector (e.g. shutdown of coal mines compensated by opening oil refineries), and social plans worked as a lubricant for job transitions between declining and expanding sectors of production. The 1972 amendment of the Works Constitution Act (Betriebsverfassungsgesetz) universalised the legal provision of the social plan for the entire private sector in companies employing at least 20 people. If a works council has been elected and an employer intends to restructure operations (Betriebsänderung) in ways that imply 'considerable' risks for relevant parts of the workforce, the works council has the legal power to negotiate a social plan.

From the mid-1970s, employment in manufacturing began contracting, service jobs started to outnumber manufacturing jobs, job transitions within manufacturing became less likely, and unemployment began to rise. Social plans consequently became financially more generous but less effective in supporting job transitions. This regression was completed when the government, in its attempts to contain unemployment, opted for shorter working lives rather than shorter working weeks, offering older workers extended periods of eligibility for unemployment benefits that led into premature pensions. Social partners, unemployment insurance and pension funds worked together in producing what developed into the specifically German pathway to early retirement[3]. Reacting to the steel crisis of 1987, the legislature allowed these pathways to begin even earlier by granting short-time allowances – traditionally an instrument for bridging cyclical underemployment – for extended periods to workers who were already technically redundant and not working 'short' but rather zero hours. In order to prevent misuse of this provision as a general wage subsidy, companies were obliged to transfer their redundant but still formally employed workers into a separate payroll subunit, from which an organised return to the active workforce was not permitted. Thus the social plan, originally a mobility support created within a bi-partite framework (negotiations between workers' representatives and the employer), became universalised and embedded in a tri-partite arrangement (an understanding between employers' organisations, trade unions and the state) for deactivating surplus labour. This was facilitated by the corporatist governance of the social insurance funds[4] and may be seen as part of Germany's 'coordinated economy'.

This was the institutional setting in which Germany was taken by surprise by its unification in 1990. The German government inherited responsibility for the East German companies that had been officially owned by 'the people'. Monetary union and western competition caused these companies to abruptly lose most of their markets, and rapid privatisation was pursued as the only strategy to save at least a tiny proportion of their jobs. Long job tenure meant that East German workers enjoyed extended periods of notice and, according to German labour law (now also a European Directive), potential investors were required to buy into existing employment contracts. Under these circumstances, in order to make companies attractive to potential investors, an instrument was needed

that would immediately sever labour contracts and shorten payrolls without compromising workers' rights. The solution arrived at after a considerable struggle was to extend short-time allowances for redundant workers to the East German manufacturing sector as a whole and to accept that the separate payroll subunit to which the workers were to be transferred was actually a separate legal entity (usually a limited company) created for this specific purpose. Thus redundant workers would spend their periods of notice or longer under a fixed-term contract with a substitute employer, whose wage costs were subsidised with short-time allowances paid by the unemployment insurance fund. The former employer (in effect the German government) was required to assume the remaining costs, primarily for holidays and paid leave, for which by definition there can be no loss of work to be compensated by short-time allowances.

This mechanism was universalised throughout Germany after 1994 in response to accelerated structural change in the West following the unification boom. Thereafter, repeated legal amendments and sectoral initiatives by social partners[5] transformed the East German severance instrument into an instrument for supporting job transitions. A small industry of 'transfer companies' emerged as temporary substitute employers and providers of transfer services such as skills profiling, occupational reorientation, re-training, job search training and support, and job brokering. A transfer company will be commissioned by the employer (in consultation with the works council) and formally 'employ' voluntary participants for a limited period of time, their only task being to work on their own career. Wage costs are shared between the former employer and the unemployment insurance fund through short-time allowances, currently granted for a maximum of 12 (previously 24) months. The cost of the services provided to participants must be borne by the former employer as part of the social plan, possibly supplemented by training grants from the European Social Fund (ESF), although these are of uncertain availability. Until recently, this model functioned as an 'activated' version of the traditional corporatist arrangement. Its principle features are its embeddedness in industrial relations at company level and the largely passive role of the Public Employment Service (PES) as a provider of part of the funding. In each individual company case, the precise conditions of a transition scheme (e.g. duration, income supplement to short-time allowances, severance payments, incentives, financial means available for services) depend on the terms of the social plan and thus on the financial strength of the company and the dexterity and wisdom of the negotiators. This makes for very unequal circumstances and outcomes, and the reactive role of the PES has come under criticism in attempts to evaluate the scheme[6].

Paradoxically, recent legislative attempts to strengthen the role of the PES in job transition schemes seem to threaten the established model with deadlock. The social partners now have to involve the PES in their negotiations, advance cost and quality control procedures have been introduced, and participants are required to register with the PES as jobseekers. Criteria for the acceptability of job offers are the same as for the unemployed, even though transfer participants are still formally employed. As the privileged transition status is eroded, acceptance of such a scheme by redundant workers, their works councils and trade unions will diminish if it offers no advantage over straightforward unemployment. As a consequence, companies will find themselves without an instrument that allows them negotiated flexibility in applying employment protection rules.

Lawmakers no longer seem to consider job transition in the context of a corporatist arrangement but now see it as just another instrument of active labour market policy to be controlled by the PES. This can be understood against the backdrop of the drastically diminished role of the social partners in running the PES as a result of the Hartz reforms[7]. Without an overarching corporatist consensus, the German multi-actor model (employer, works council, trade union, PES and transfer companies) of supporting job transitions seems to be in danger of ending in deadlock. It is therefore time to look at other countries' models in search of ideas for a way out of this situation.

Sweden: a two-partite model without public support

Sweden provides an example of a two-partite model for supporting job transitions that avoids conflicts with the PES or with legislation by going without public support. This model originated in the wake of the oil crisis in the early 1970s. The social partners started creating what are known as Job Security Councils, independent non-profit organisations based on sectoral collective agreements and organised in one of two specific legal forms, Trygghetsråden or Kollektivavtalstiftelse[8]. A supervisory board is created in each job security council and is made up of representatives of the social partners. There are now 14 such councils covering approximately 50 % of the Swedish labour force, both white and blue collar. Financial means are collectively provided by employers, who generally pay an annual premium of 0.3 % of the total pay roll, with some sectoral variations. Unlike in Germany, the costs of job transition services thus do not occur suddenly in the middle of a difficult restructuring situation but are accumulated over time, and risks are shared among employers within a sector. Consequently, the means available for supporting an individual worker are independent of

the financial situation of the former employer.

Some job security councils are professional service organisations providing "in-house" services to redundant workers through regional branches; TRR, the job security council for white collar workers in the private sector, is one such example. By contrast, others simply collect and manage the funds and commission services to private outplacement providers, as in the case of TSL, the job security council responsible for blue collar workers in the private sector. Both approaches are conducive to universalising experience and quality standards throughout the sector in question, which contrasts with the German approach of negotiating each company scheme individually.

Like comparable schemes in other countries, job security councils provide active support for employees who have lost or are about to lose their job through collective redundancies. As a rule, job security councils – or the providers commissioned by them – will begin to work with workers who are being made redundant after they have been given notice; for this purpose, most of the applicable collective agreements guarantee extended periods of notice to those who choose to participate. If necessary, services will continue even during unemployment. Under the stable and reliable framework of the collective agreement, job security councils are in a position to provide very flexible and tailored support to each employee, taking his or her specific interests and needs into consideration.

As in Germany, the role of the social partners in the restructuring process is underpinned by legislation. The Swedish Co-Determination Act (Medbestämmandelagen – MBL, 1976/77) stipulates the co-determination of trade unions when important changes within the company are to take place. Consultations must be held with the trade union representatives for each individual dismissal. Bergström[9] concludes that the trade union representatives are involved "from the very beginning whenever there are collective redundancies at stake"[10], and they also take part in decisions regarding a company's restructuring strategy, since trade unions are represented at board level, where strategic decisions are taken. In addition, and again comparable to Germany, Swedish employment protection legislation (Lagen om anställningsskydd LAS, 1973) provides a strong implicit incentive for employers to negotiate redundancies. The selection criteria are less complex than in Germany and can be summarised by the Last In, First Out principle (LIFO). LIFO implies that workers with higher seniority – who tend to be the older members of the workforce – enjoy greater protection, which might leave companies with

an even older workforce after staff cuts. However, deviation from LAS is possible if the social partners arrive at an agreement on different criteria. In other words, the company must offer something that makes leaving the company acceptable to workers who would otherwise be protected.

Several evaluation studies confirm a high level of effectiveness and success of the Swedish job security councils. On average around 80 per cent of participants end up in a new job, in further education, or start up a business of their own. The percentage of participants who have to make wage concessions in their new job seems to be relatively low (i.e. for TRR 30 per cent in 2007[11]).

The Swedish model of supporting job transitions clearly demonstrates the advantages of a sector-based model or, more generally, an institutional framework above the company level. Even though the service is tailored to individual needs, the general framework is stipulated by collective agreements. The stability of that framework provides some advantages and addresses some important aspects of social security in critical job transitions. These include a high level of reliability concerning means and services, the validity (and comparability) of results, and not least a high level of fairness between employees across companies and restructuring events. The PES does not interfere because it is not part of this model, which is self-sufficient within an industrial relations framework. It should be noted, however, that the model rests on the strength of the Swedish trade unions and employers' organisations, with coverage by collective agreements still accounting for 91 per cent of the total workforce, and on their mutual willingness to maintain the sectoral institutions they once created.

Wallonia: public services on demand

Within the federal political system of Belgium, the regions have considerable margins for shaping and implementing their specific models of managing the consequences of collective lay-offs and restructuring. The functions of the Public Employment Service have been devolved to them, but they are still required to observe the relevant national legal

framework. A relatively successful model that deserves closer attention on account of its specific constellation of actors involved are the "reconversion units" (cellules de reconversion), a support mechanism for workers affected by collective dismissals. This approach emerged during the large company restructurings in Wallonia from the late 1970s and was institutionalised by a regional legislative act in 2004 (amended in 2009).

Under this framework, when an employer in Wallonia proceeds to collective redundancy, the workers' representatives (generally trade unionists) are entitled to ask the Walloon Public Employment and Professional Training Service (FOREM) to implement a reconversion support plan (plan d'accompagnement des reconversions). The first draft of such a plan will be elaborated by the responsible department of FOREM in collaboration with the workers' representatives and presented to the management committee (the highest decision-making authority) of FOREM. If the plan is approved, FOREM concludes a partnership agreement with the workers' representatives of the company to that effect.

Originally, the employer had no direct role in such a scheme. Since 2006, however, a national legal provision (pacte de solidarité entre les générations, amended in 2009) has obliged employers proceeding to collective redundancy to provide a support mechanism (known as a cellule pour l'emploi) for the dismissed workers based on negotiations with the workers' representatives. Since the Walloon reconversion unit is officially recognised as a cellule pour l'emploi, establishing a reconversion unit serves as proof that the employer is fulfilling his obligations. The introduction of a reconversion cell has consequently been subject to negotiations on a social plan since that time[12]. The workers, too, fulfill their legal obligation to participate in support measures after dismissal by joining a reconversion unit, so that participation is no longer entirely voluntary[13].

When at least 100 employees are affected by redundancy (for smaller numbers see below), FOREM will establish a specific reconversion unit (cellule de reconversion) as an outpost on or close to the company premises, normally for a period of one year (maximum two years). These premises are open five days a week as a meeting place where dismissed workers can collectively overcome the shock of losing their jobs and exchange information on job vacancies, training courses, etc. The unit provides free access to job search facilities (internet, computers, fax, phone etc.) as well as structured individual and collective support, all free of charge. There are two different types of counsellors to complement each other. The social counsellor, usually recruited from the former company's trade union delegates, provides support with social and administrative problems. The social counsellors are paid by FOREM, but their selection and appointment, remuneration and training is the subject of the aforementioned partnership agreement between FOREM and the workers' representatives. Career counselling is provided by FOREM advisors with knowledge of the regional labour market. They assist in writing up CVs, select suitable job offers, provide job interview training and arrange professional training courses where appropriate – an offer which is made use of quite extensively[14]. The two types of counsellors often collaborate in assessing clients' competencies, since the social counsellors are more aware of the informal skills of their former colleagues. Two advisors from each category are provided for every 100 participants, making for caseloads of between 25 and under 50.

In order to run these services, FOREM receives an annual earmarked budget from the Walloon Ministry of Economy and Employment, with per capita spending limits which may, however, be topped up by the ESF where applicable. Within the framework of the social plan, the employer may contribute by providing on-site premises for the reconversion unit. For each unit, an advisory board (comité d'accompagnement) is formed with representatives from the Walloon government, the respective regional directorate of FOREM, the trade unions, the employers' organisation of the respective sector and – if involved in the process through the social plan – the former employer.

The ad-hoc structure of the company-related reconversion units is completed and backed up by a struc-

ture of nine permanent reconversion platforms managed by FOREM and covering the entire Walloon region. Beyond their function as the umbrella for the company-related reconversion units in the respective region, these platforms support redundant workers from companies where fewer than 100 workers are affected.

Participants in a reconversion unit are considered neither employed nor unemployed; their particular legal status is inscribed in an individual 'reconversion contract' (contrat d'accompagnement socio-professionnel), which is concluded between the participant and FOREM. This contract entitles them to the complete range of services rendered by the reconversion unit and obliges them to actively take part. Participants receive a special allowance (calculated as unemployment benefits plus 1 euro per hour of active participation), reimbursement of travel expenses for job search or training, and child care if necessary.

The remarkable feature of the Walloon model for supporting job transitions is first of all the strong role played by the company trade union delegates vis-à-vis the PES. Regardless of negotiations with the employer, they may call for a legally guaranteed set of appropriate resources and measures. Being directly involved in the job transition process, the trade union can directly contribute to the success of the support measures in a way that corresponds to its original interest as workers' representatives. The clear and stable framework, not least in terms of financing, makes this job easier. More strongly than the Swedish and even the German approach, the Walloon approach emphasises the former collective of the workers affected by redundancy (the reconversion unit as a 'club of the dismissed') and the active involvement of former worker representatives (who are hired as social counsellors). In an appropriate setting, the cohesion of former workforce collectives does not appear to impede re-orientation towards new jobs, as might be suspected, but contributes to the success of job transition processes.

Austria: corporatism still alive and kicking?

'Labour foundations' (Arbeitsstiftungen) originated in 1987 in Austria's nationalised steel industry, borrowing their wording from the German steel industry where a 'Stahlstiftung Saar' had been created in 1986[15]. In 1988, the Austrian legislature adapted the Unemployment Insurance Act (Arbeitslosenversicherungsgesetz) to the concept of the labour foundation, thus preparing the ground for its subsequent proliferation and differentiation[16].

Like in Germany, Austrian employees elect works councils that, in the event of redundancies, will negotiate a social plan. Unlike in Germany, however, severance pay (Abfertigung) as such is a legal entitlement that does not have to be negotiated collectively. Since employment protection legislation in Austria is weaker than in Germany (OECD 2006) and is only a collective rather than an individual right[17], modifying the time horizon, sequence of and selection for separations is less of an issue than in Germany or Sweden. All this provides scope for the social plan to extend beyond 'passive' financial compensation by creating a labour foundation and offering the workers who are facing dismissal the opportunity to join it. Unlike their German counterparts, redundant workers in a labour foundation are not 'employed' but receive unem-ployment benefits as their basic means of subsistence. However, active participants in a foundation receive benefits for an extended period of time; normally this would only be 30 weeks for workers under 40, but it may be extended by a maximum of 209 weeks depending on the type of measure a person is taking part in – and only as long as he or she does actually take part. Because of this substantial privilege, the foundation concept must first be approved by the social partners at the sectoral level and then by the PES (Arbeitsmarktservice). The conceptual design, conducting the approval procedure and management of the foundation are normally commissioned to specialised providers similar to the German transfer companies – with the notable difference that they do not act as substitute employers for their clients. Nevertheless, participants still enter into a contract with the provider and are obliged to undertake the daily equivalent of their former working hours and give notice and proof of their incapacity to work if they are sick.

The extra money put into the foundation by the former employer or by third parties (see below) supplements unemployment benefits

with a grant of 370 euros per month and finances the providers' management costs plus the measures taken up by participants. Some collective agreements oblige participants to capitalise their severance pay as an interest-free loan to the foundation, which can thus generate additional funding in the finance market; in other cases, workers who are still employed pay a small solidarity contribution to their company's labour foundation as an automatic deduction from their pay slips. Additional funding may come from the regional government (Bundesland), possibly in combination with the ESF. In consultation with each participant, the provider draws up an individualised roadmap of training and counselling measures that has to be approved by the PES. Unlike recent developments in Germany, the PES expects foundation providers to take full charge of participants and does not interfere with job offers or other activities of its own, thus saving resources and at least partially compensating for the higher expenditure associated with longer periods of benefit in a foundation, which according to empirical evidence average 18 months.

This basic model of company-based labour foundations (Unternehmensstiftungen) is open to legally acknowledged variation. Sectoral foundations resemble the Swedish job security councils in that they are created by the social partners of a sector through collective agreements. Regional foundations, in whose creation public authorities play a stronger role, serve the needs of SMEs that would individually lack the critical mass to set up a company foundation. Insolvency foundations replace what would normally be the financial contribution of the employer with money from the federal regional cohesion fund. In the latter two cases, the PES assumes part of the costs of training and other support measures.

By providing participants with a full-time daily schedule (or part-time to former part-time workers, with proportionally lower benefits), activation by labour foundations is much more intensive than the standard services of the PES, but also more intensive than can normally be expected in German transfer companies[18]. Labour foundations report re-integration rates of 80 per cent or more, which is within the range of their Swedish counterparts and far above the familiar levels for Germany[19].

The Austrian model of supporting job transitions combines a strong tradition of social partnership at regional and company level with a legal framework supportive of occupational mobility (low employment protection but guaranteed compensation). Less preoccupied with job stability (or with selling it in return for compensation), Austria is closer to Scandinavian 'flexicurity'[20] than Germany. However, unlike Sweden but comparable to Germany in the last century, the PES and unemployment insurance are part of a corporatist arrangement, and regional governments are also more heavily involved. There are signs, however, that strong forces within the Austrian PES are no longer willing to accept its passive role in job transitions or the privileges granted to participants in labour foundations.

Outlook

The job transition schemes in none of the four countries reviewed can be seen merely as another 'instrument' of active labour market policy, such as continued vocational training, direct job creation or job brokering. Whatever the technical content of job transition support may be, the framing of the schemes is primarily derived from industrial relations and concerns a negotiated exit from a company's workforce. Tripartite corporatist arrangements have worked (in Germany and Austria) as long as it was accepted that the social partners would decide on the provisions to be made by the PES and the unemployment insurance fund. However, tripartite models risk deadlock if each of the three parties wishes to take the lead. The Walloon example suggests a possible way out, with the PES itself providing the services at the request of the workers' representatives independently of the employer. However, Germany resembles Sweden in that workers have little confidence in the quality of services delivered by the PES. The Swedish bi-partite tradition therefore represents a more straightforward structure by relying on the social partners alone. In the past, German social partners have proved their ability to create stable sectoral institutions through collective agreements, notably in the construction and the chemical industry. However, it is questionable whether social partnership is still strong enough in Germany for it to follow Sweden's lead in consolidating job transition schemes on the whole . Consequently, given the legalistic German tradition, there is no alternative but to redesign job transition schemes from scratch by legislation. In contrast to contemporary attempts at solving problems within the narrow confines of repeated 'instrument reforms', such a redesign would have to simultaneously consider statutory employment protection, redundancy selection rules, severance payments, and the role of works councils in restructuring.

Zusammenfassung

Die Umstrukturierung von Arbeitsprozessen, Betrieben und Unternehmen ist heute zu einem permanenten Prozess geworden, der häufig mit Arbeitsplatzabbau verbunden ist. In mehreren europäischen Ländern finden wir eine Tradition von Begleitmaßnahmen, die an der kollektiven

Gernot Mühge. Foto: Max Greve

Situation des Arbeitsplatzverlustes ansetzen und in ihrem Anspruch über das Standardangebot der Arbeitslosenversicherung und der Arbeitsmarktpolitik hinausgehen. Derartige Modelle des „Beschäftigtentransfers“ setzen an der betrieblichen Verhandlungssituation über Personalabbau an und zielen darauf, die soziale Verantwortung des bisherigen Arbeitgebers statt in bloße finanzielle Kompensation in Unterstützungsmaßnahmen zu lenken, die auf die Erreichung möglichst gleichwertiger beruflicher Perspektiven in anderen Betrieben gerichtet sind. Aufgrund dieser Ausgangskonstellation sind nationale Modelle des Beschäftigtentransfers in die jeweiligen Traditionen der industriellen Beziehungen und des Arbeitsrechts eingebettet; auch wenn Leistungen der Arbeitslosenversicherung oder der aktiven Arbeitsförderung für den Beschäftigtentransfer in Anspruch genommen werden, lässt sich dieser nicht im beschränkten Kontext arbeitsmarktpolitischer Instrumentenreformen wirksam umgestalten.

Nationale Modelle des Beschäftigtentransfers haben ihre Ursprünge in den industriellen Restrukturierungsprozessen der 1970er bis 1990er Jahre. Sie geraten heute unter Druck einerseits durch die Schwächung der industriellen Beziehungen und andererseits durch Reformen der Arbeitsmarktpolitik, die unter anderem mit deren tendenzieller Herauslösung aus dem korporatistischen Konsens verbunden sind. Die Marginalisierung des Beschäftigtentransfers durch den Paradigmenwechsel zur „aktivierenden“ Arbeitsmarktpolitik ist paradox, da beide das gleiche Ziel verfolgen. Daher werden in dem Beitrag die Erfahrungen in Schweden, Belgien und Österreich unter der Perspektive untersucht, welche Ansatzpunkte sie für die deutsche Reformdiskussion bieten könnten.

Notes

1) Knuth 2009
2) Knuth 2008
3) Knuth, Kalina 2002
4) The organisations managing the various branches of obligatory social insurance – pensions, healthcare, elderly care, work accidents – are supervised by elected representatives of employers and workers. In the case of unemployment insurance, by contrast, the representatives are recommended by their organisations and appointed by the minister for labour, and there are also one third of representatives from the federal, regional and local government(s). In other words, the governance of unemployment insurance is tri-partite.
5) BAVC Bundesarbeitgeberverband Chemie e.V. 2003
6) Schneider et al. 2007
7) Klenk 2009
8) Diedrich, Bergström 2006; Voss 2010
9) Bergström 2010
10) Bergström 2010, 43
11) see Voss, 2010
12) Naedenoen 2008
13) Bingen 2010
14) Poncin 2010
15) Bosch 1990
16) Wagner, Lassnigg 2005
17) Atzmüller, Krischek 2010
18) Muth 2001
19) Kühnert 2011
20) For a critical review of “flexicurity” see Viebrock and Clasen 2009, who characterise the concept as follows: “The notion [of flexicurity] indicates a carefully balanced combination of flexibility where it matters for job creation, and protection where it is needed for social security. Flexicurity is based on the co-ordination of employment and social policies.” (p. 6). Since 2007, this concept has been central to the European Employment Strategy (cf. European Commission 2007).

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