

The authors recommend a step-by-step approach which sets priorities and combines concrete measures of anti-corruption policies with the adjustment of existing institutional arrangements. Within such an overall concept it may make sense not to immediately aim at decreasing the level of corruption but to first convert the most harmful “corruption syndromes” into less harmful forms.

Corruption as an Obstacle to Development?

Taking Stock of Research Findings
and the Effectiveness of Policy Strategies

By Birgit Pech and Tobias Debiel

Development research and policy consider improvements in transparency, accountability, responsibility and concomitantly the ‘fight against corruption’ to be important factors in promoting socioeconomic progress and ‘human development’, in eradicating extreme poverty as well as in achieving deep participation in the development process.¹

To that extent, external support measures covering these areas of good governance have become an integral part of development cooperation since the 1990s. In the policy field of fighting corruption, reference has even been made to a takeoff.²

Is corruption really an obstacle to development? This question will be addressed in our paper. First of

all, we will define corruption and examine the findings of research on the linkages between corruption, welfare, and the consolidation of statehood. Subsequently we turn to the takeoff in the ‘fight against corruption’ occurring during the 1990s, and draw a first interim balance of efforts made. The results of these policies are sobering. In our opi-



Tobias Debiel. Foto: Timo Robert

nion, this is due to the fact that the common models only inadequately take into account the existing institutional arrangements as well as power constellations and tend to overestimate the capabilities of external actors. Thus, we challenge a consensus that has been reached over the last one and a half decades and which claims that external support for anti-corruption measures is necessarily an essential element of development strategies. The implication of our findings, however, is not to give up the good governance and anti-corruption agenda. But we stress that generalized assumptions oriented at the OECD reference model of liberal market democracies are misconceived. Instead tailor-made measures are needed that fit specific local situations which are embedded in deeply-rooted political cultures and shaped by politico-economic relations that are determined by power and loyalty.

Corruption, welfare and the consolidation of statehood: a synopsis of research results

What exactly is meant by “corruption”? A “classic” starting point is provided by the World Bank, which defines corruption as the “abuse of public office for private gain”³. This focus on formal violation, i.e. the violation of existing rules, which is expressed in the term “abuse of public office” is certainly insufficient considering that rulemaking itself can be influenced by corruption. In the words of Cameron⁴ “one cannot have confidence in the ability of a corrupt legislator to make good laws.” That is why the definition also takes into account whether a certain behaviour can be considered as legitimate or illegitimate measured against context-bound social criteria which can deviate from respective legal norms.⁵

A second part of the definition which seems problematic concerns the “private gain”. The widespread

corruption in the political sphere is often caused less by purely private motives for self-enrichment than by the pursuit and preservation of political power.⁶ Therefore, we define corruption as the abuse of public office in terms of breaching formal rules and social norms about appropriate behaviour, and with the aim of gaining private or political advantages respectively.

Initially, development- and transformation-oriented corruption research focused on repercussions on socioeconomic parameters. Recently other dimensions were added, especially the question of how corruption is linked to the consolidation of statehood and to processes of democratization.

Corruption and welfare

At first glance, econometric studies show a clear result concerning the relation between corruption and welfare: endemic corruption bears immense economic and socioeconomic costs – in fact both regarding the increase or reduction in welfare and in terms of the distribution of income, property and opportunities. As early as 1998, the pertinent study “Does corruption affect income inequality and poverty?”⁷ made clear that a higher degree of corruption goes hand in hand with a higher inequality of income as well as of access to land and education. The follow-up study “Corruption and the provision of health care and education services” proved that corruption is significantly negatively correlated with public expenditure on health and education.⁸ According to Lambsdorff⁹, the attractiveness of a country for national and international investors declines as corruption increases, which causes a chain of reactions:

“This reduces capital accumulation and lowers capital inflows. Also the productivity of capital suffers from corruption. There is equally strong evidence that

corruption distorts government expenditure and reduces the quality of a wide variety of government services, such as public investment, health care, tax revenue and environmental control.”¹⁰

Despite empirical evidence and plausible argumentation for the detrimental effects of high corruption levels, at second glance it is quite controversial to determine the exact directions of causality, and it is unclear how to weight the reciprocal causal relationships.¹¹

Especially with respect to the relationship between per capita income and the corruption level, one can assume simultaneous effects in both directions so that their relation is difficult to identify by statistical means.¹² There also seem to be regional particularities: in East Asia, for instance, countries with a high corruption level and weak formal governance institutions were able to achieve, in contrast to conventional expectations, exceptional growth rates. One reason may be the functionality of a range of informal institutions which can be adequately considered only in small-N studies.¹³

Different institutional arrangements may involve correspondingly different distributional effects of rents obtained through corruption. Thus, the level of corruption may be less decisive for the increase or reduction in welfare than the question of how corruption-induced rents are distributed and used. In South Korea and Taiwan, for instance, corruption primarily meant the “transfer of a percentage of the profits earned by privately owned enterprises to government officials in return for policies and services that allow these enterprises to earn profits.”¹⁴ Hence, in these cases dividends were collected in an informal way in exchange for incentives beneficial to both industrial policy and institutions – a constellation which can indeed be compatible with sustainable economic growth according to Wedeman.

Corruption and the consolidation of statehood

Deviations and riddles which confuse the seemingly clear image of obvious negative effects of corruption point to the politico-economic context, which apparently constitutes a crucial intervening variable: what the rents generated by corruption are actually used for and whether they bring benefit or harm, is evidently also determined by institutional arrangements and not least by power relations between politico-bureaucratic policymakers and societal groups. Transformation research has taken a closer look at this relationship and has tried to link the consolidation of statehood with the autonomy of politico-bureaucratic elites: if states are “too weak”, societal actors manage to exploit state institutions for particularistic elite interests and to impose their agenda on them.¹⁵ If states are “too strong”, however, there is a risk that too deep penetration of the state into other societal subsystems (market, civil society) limits their autonomy and functionality as well as that it violates or devalues the legal positions of the citizens. Therefore transformation research favours a semi-autonomous state which does not fully penetrate society.

How are these reflections connected to the extent and effects of corruption? Particularly poorly developed statehood seems to be connected to a high degree of corruption. Already in the mid-1960s, Huntington expressed this pointedly: “Political organizations and procedures which lack autonomy are, in common parlance, said to be corrupt”¹⁶. Powerful societal groups can achieve a particularistic redistribution of resources to their own benefit by corruption (redistributive corruption). Alternatively, socially dominant elites may directly seize and exploit the state in order to extract societal resources (extractive corruption)¹⁷.

Typical examples of weak statehood can be found in postcolonial Sub-Saharan Africa: the neopatrimonial systems¹⁸ are a manifestation of incomplete state- and nation-building, often embedded within ethnically heterogeneous societies. Under these circumstances, securing loyalty through ethno-regional clienteles has come to the fore.¹⁹ Through informal elite networks, some countries developed the practice of hegemonial exchange²⁰, assigning the proportional allocation of public positions and resources to different ethnic groups using patronage and clientelism. In the more successful cases (Kenya, Cameroon and Ivory Coast), this instrument contributed to temporary political stabilization and economic growth in the past.²¹ At the same time, short-term strategies focusing on rent-maximization fostered mismanagement and plain self-enrichment; under these circumstances, a semi-autonomy of the political and societal sphere could not be established.

A totally different situation is presented in rather “strong” states. The East Asian and South-East Asian growth economies indeed exhibited a considerable level of corruption. However, in these cases corruption was used for “[...] integrating political and economic power rather than [upon] giving either a decisive advantage over the other”²². The function of corruption, namely the reduction of political and economic insecurity, has been ‘overfulfilled’ over time: some increasingly sclerotic cartels for the defence against competitors evolved which impeded necessary adaptation performance in terms of economic and political reforms. This became evident not least during the sudden aggravation of the Asian crisis in 1997/1998.²³ Under these circumstances, corruption can be interpreted as an inverted U-curve. At first, due to the particular interconnections between political and economic spheres, growth was promoted, but then the functionality of


corruption decreased and at some point the damaging effects on welfare prevailed.

The following finding might be even more important than the changing functionality of corruption in relatively strong states: if effective leadership is based on sound elite arrangements, a somewhat consolidated statehood can restrict the negative effects of corruption. As a precondition, however, a certain consensus on underlying rules and values is required as Johnston illustrates with the case of Botswana:

“Botswana, by most measures ought to have more corruption, in more disruptive forms, than it seems to experience. Its working political framework was no one’s design for reform or good government, but rather an elite settlement, rooted in society itself, that reconciled important groups and values and provided a coherent basis of effective rule.”²⁴

A third group of countries finally combines the ‘weak’ and the ‘strong’ characteristics of statehood. The three South Caucasian countries Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia are typical for this constellation. Neither has the state been seized by a non-state social group nor does it have autonomy against particularistic societal interests, as Koehler/Zürcher²⁵ argue. According to these authors, the state rather claims its initiative and the monopoly on essential control mechanisms – in a precarious way though. Part of the resources mobilized through informal charges is invested in non-violent, legally safe spheres of enforced state rule which are however only accessible to loyal strategic groups. Instead of connecting civil and political spheres, the resources are channelled only to loyal segments of state and society. Especially under authoritarian or semi-authoritarian conditions, this strategy corresponds to quite a plausible cost-benefit calculation.²⁶ Thus, it is easier to gain loyalty with the help of economic rents than by using repression or by making political concessions.²⁷

THE 2010 CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS INDEX MEASURES THE PERCEIVED LEVELS OF PUBLIC-SECTOR CORRUPTION IN 178 COUNTRIES AROUND THE WORLD



TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL
the global coalition against corruption

©2010 Transparency International. All rights reserved.

(1) The 2010 corruption perceptions index.

Source: Reprinted from Transparency International. Copyright 2010 Transparency International: the global coalition against corruption.

Used with permission. For more information, visit <http://www.transparency.org>

Anti-corruption policies in practice

What did the ‘fight against corruption’ look like during the past one and a half decades? Was it effective after the take off in the 1990s?

Elements of the ‘fight against corruption’ in development policies

As already indicated, the ‘fight against corruption’ was established as one component of the broader good governance agenda which was promoted by the World Bank after the failure of the Structural Adjustment Programmes of the 1980s.²⁸ Against the background of the boom of concepts of institutional economics in development research, corruption was increasingly perceived as an obstacle to economic development; in the wake of the geopolitical upheavals since 1989 corruption was additionally seen as a blocking factor for assumed synergies between economic and political liberalization. Furthermore, the topic gained attention since a growing number of developing economies were inte-

grated into the world market and corruption was therefore seen as a risk to foreign investors. James Wolfensohn took up the question soon after taking office as President of the World Bank in 1995 – knowing that he could rely on the support of international NGOs such as Transparency International.²⁹

In a relatively short time, a range of donors developed packages of measures to support the ‘fight against corruption’ which usually contained the following elements:³⁰

- Monitoring of anti-corruption-legislation;
- Establishment of anti-corruption authorities;
- Increase of transparency and accountability in public financial management (budget planning, tax administration, procurement, internal and external financial control);
- Promotion of independent jurisdiction and of integrity within the judiciary, ensuring access to courts and transparent law enforcement;
- Introduction of clear rules for salaries as well as performance-based mechanisms for selection and promotion in public service;

- Empowerment of controlling institutions such as parliaments, media, civil society organizations with the objectives of transparency, monitoring, participation and awareness-raising.

Apart from these development measures, initiatives for regulation or even juridification in the area of fighting corruption and related topics have been taken at the multilateral level. The OECD convention against bribery in international business transactions of 1997 was an important milestone. It was mainly promoted by parts of the US economy which saw the ‘US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act’ of 1977 as a disadvantage to global competition. Soon, other initiatives followed – initiatives against international money laundering, for the control of small arms and of the trade of ‘blood diamonds’ as well as initiatives concerning the publication of incomes from extractive industries (Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative). The 2005 United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC) contains comprehensive provisions for the prevention and combating of corrup-

tion, including international cooperation on returning assets which had been taken abroad and on improving banking supervision.

Sobering results so far

Is it already possible to assess the contribution to the 'fight against corruption' by development policy and cooperation as well as the multilateral agreements? The policy field is still very young and thus the success or failure is hard to measure. Moreover, there are basic methodological difficulties. For instance, increased transparency and more effective law enforcement might initially even cause an increase in perceived or statistically measured corruption; at the same time, such a 'paradoxical signal' can only partially serve as proof for the success of anti-corruption measures. Even if corruption declined in the long run after the introduction of respective measures, due to multi-causality it would be hard to trace this back to concrete measures.

Despite these reservations, the Independent Evaluation Group (IEG) conducted a comprehensive evaluation of projects and programmes of the World Bank in 2008. Their overall conclusion is disappointing:

"With respect to anti-corruption reforms, we know at present more about what has not worked in the past than what is likely to work in the future. There are many cases of obvious failure, but few cases of unequivocal success."³¹

The IEG identified the programmes of the World Bank as "moderately successful" only in two to three of a total of 17 countries, namely in Bulgaria, India and in a way Sierra Leone³²; partly, Ghana is mentioned positively. A decisive factor for success in India apparently was the government's commitment to reform. Bulgaria made progress in those areas in which local interests were in accord with those of the World Bank, as for instance in tax-

ation and customs; furthermore, the EU candidate status until 2007 may have had a positive impact. More sensitive areas such as the public human resource management or the judiciary were less amenable to reforms. The success in Sierra Leone was limited due to a lack of motivation on the part of the government; a lack of qualified personnel made matters worse. In Ghana, the existence of a vivid civil society provided momentum to the anti-corruption initiatives.

The list of apparent failures, which relate to many of the above mentioned elements of anti-corruption packages, is much longer. Several donor initiatives followed the example of anti-corruption authorities in Hong Kong and Singapore which had been established by their own initiative and which had a huge impact.³³ However, it was found in almost all cases in which corresponding offices were to be created from outside that the mere transfer of such institutional innovations into different contexts is difficult.³⁴ In both semi-authoritarian states, there was a firm and enduring political will, a strong judiciary and a well functioning law enforcement system. In many weak or hybrid states in which the World Bank started operating, these preconditions were missing.

The same applied to attempts to monitor anti-corruption legislation which without appropriate institutional embedding runs the risk of ending up as a paper tiger. In the worse cases such legislation is used to selectively expose prominent corruption scandals in order to damage political opponents.³⁵

Another starting point for international measures was to strengthen parliamentary capacities for controlling, which were not reflected in measurable changes. It is debatable whether such projects were poorly conceived or whether they were simply not carried out in a substantial number.³⁶ Regarding the promotion of civil society and media, there have been few systematic evaluation


results yet.³⁷ It seems that the enhanced availability of information and the possibility of participation can only have any effect if there exist corresponding state capacities and a certain political will which can guarantee responsiveness. In the case of all these measures aimed at improving control of the executive one should bear in mind that all supervisory bodies and watch dogs (such as parliaments, media, civil society) are often highly prone to corruption themselves.

The evaluation of the multilateral initiatives seems even more difficult currently. The UN convention on the 'fight against corruption' is considered too weak by tendency, whereas the OECD convention has achieved some important success; nevertheless, its final impact is hard to assess.³⁸ The recent and voluntary EITI initiative has produced some first implementation progress, although important producing countries (such as Russia and most Arab petrostates) do not yet participate.

Traps for external actors: the limitations of the institutional transfers and of social engineering

In view of the unpromising experiences development cooperation has made with anti-corruption policies, the role of the donors is increasingly being questioned. The failed construction of anti-corruption authorities exemplifies one of the basic problems: "The rationale for many of these initiatives has also been to bypass existing but often corrupted ordinary police and prosecutorial systems. This [...] created the impression that many of the new bodies are in fact donor-supplied and to a large extent beholden to the international community rather than to the local political system, and thus has questionable legitimacy and credibility in the eyes of many local stakeholders."³⁹

The IEG-Evaluation (2008) concludes for Tanzania, Cambodia and Yemen that an unauthorized



(2) Interaction of anti-corruption policies and 'realistic' strategies.

Source: own presentation

approach of the World Bank and other donors which excludes local reform coalitions has negatively influenced their commitment to reform.

From the increasingly self-critical discussion, some principles have been deduced which point in the direction of more modesty⁴⁰. Apart from a thorough analysis of existing needs and local expertise, the focus is on ownership in the partner countries. Besides, it has been pointed out that although some initial success is necessary to gain momentum for reform, sustainable effectiveness can only be reached by building capacities in state and civil society.

As true as these insights may be, there are not many reasons to believe that practice has actually changed.⁴¹ A more profound problem could lie behind this. Despite the ownership rhetoric and ongoing lessons learned, good governance strategies are often based on the OECD reference model of liberal market democracies. The apparent 'gap' which opens up bet-

ween this objective and the realities in most developing countries is supposed to be closed by financially and technically supported institutional transfers.⁴² These institutional transfers are only possible to a very limited degree since power distributions and practices of domination differ from region to region and from country to country.

Some donors have already reacted to these findings and have developed instruments of analysis to gain a better understanding of power constellations between relevant groups of actors, their exchange processes and corresponding resource bases.⁴³ Of course it is a very ambitious goal to embed these analyses into the concrete planning and elaboration of anti-corruption measures. This has hardly happened so far.⁴⁴ And there might be a reason for it: indeed, the question arises whether, with the conception and implementation of such a sophisticated form of social engineering, external actors would not overestimate

their capabilities to understand and be able to influence local politics. Against this background international actors would be well advised if they restricted their anti-corruption measures mainly to continuing local initiatives. In this context, processes involving consulting and capacity development could help to make clear what the political-institutional conditions for a successful 'fight against corruption' are.

'Realistic' strategies: embedded in local context, but also aiming at the transformation of statehood

The point of departure for our paper was the insight that the transformation and overcoming of corruption has played a crucial role within development research and policy-related debates for one and a half decades. As has been rightly argued, the rents obtained through corruption are not subject to political accountability and are generally not used to pursue the goal of human

development. A look at the results of quantitative research on corruption and underdevelopment initially confirmed the basic assumption that the level of corruption is significantly negatively correlated with determining socioeconomic parameters. At the same time, examples from East and South-East Asia showed that corruption temporarily had functional effects. Therefore we included formal-informal institutional arrangements into the analysis, since they evidently influence the use of rents. Especially under conditions of weak statehood, corruption causes dysfunctional effects, which does not only hinder economic growth but also political transformation. With a somewhat consolidated statehood, chances are better that the level and damage of corruption can be kept under control.

What did the interim balance for development policy's 'fight against corruption' since the mid-1990s look like? The respective packages of measures contained the following elements among others: the monitoring of anti-corruption legislation, the attempt to transfer successful foreign anti-corruption authorities, reforms in financial management, judiciary and public service, and last but not least – with an impetus from democratic theory – the strengthening of supervisory authorities in parliament, media and civil society. The impact of the measures has remained low so far. As has been shown in the research overview, legislative and institutional innovations are embedded in a politico-economic context. Whether the implementation of reform initiatives is successful depends on the power relations between state elites and societal groups, but also on the type of political domination. External engagement – especially in the case of sensitive issues such as the 'fight against corruption' – can even have a counterproductive impact.

Do these correlations and experiences imply that external actors should take back the good gover-

nance agenda, and that they should not take into account the misuse of public offices for private or political gains any more? Probably not. However, it seems necessary to correct exorbitant expectations and to realign existing approaches. As already mentioned, only those efforts promise to be viable which take into account local needs, legitimation discourses, interests and actor constellations. A local demand requires that there are actors in the private sector who have a genuine self-interest in an improved legal and institutional protection of their investments as well as in public goods and services.⁴⁵ Before specific measures are conceived and implemented, it is crucial to bring together actors with such converging ideas and to collectively identify and agree on possible instruments and procedures.

Still, there remains a risk that many of the existing measures to reduce corruption do not address underlying causes – such as issues of access to and maintenance of power as well as exchange processes between different elites involving clientelism and patronage. Hence, anti-corruption measures will only succeed in the medium term if they are accompanied by structural measures which strengthen the autonomy of the state, and simultaneously build societal counterweights and establish checks and balances. Such a transformation process should be based on a differentiated understanding of corruption, which does not place under taboo those forms of corruption which can temporarily have a stabilizing effect and which can foster cooperation, but which makes corruption acceptable on a temporary basis.⁴⁶ Especially where fragile institutional and structural frameworks coincide with extremely high political risks, elites need a certain kind of reliability of expectations. In such constellations, radical strategies will prove counterproductive, since the motive of securing power and loyalty "at any price" can

quickly gain the upper hand. In line with Johnston⁴⁷, we thus recommend a step-by-step approach which sets priorities and which combines concrete measures of anti-corruption policies with the adjustment of existing institutional arrangements. Within such an overall concept, it may make sense not to immediately aim at decreasing the level of corruption but to first convert the most harmful "corruption syndromes" into less harmful forms.

Zusammenfassung

Seit Mitte der 1990er Jahre hat sich in Entwicklungsforschung und -politik ein breiter Konsensus mit Folgewirkungen herausgebildet: Korruption ist ein Entwicklungshemmnis. Doch sind die Grundannahmen und die darauf aufbauenden Anti-Korruptions-Politiken wirklich stimmig? Diesen Fragen geht der vorliegende Beitrag nach. Zunächst definiert er Korruption und befragt die bisherige Forschung zu den Verbindungen von Korruption, Wohlfahrt und der Konsolidierung von Staatlichkeit. In einem zweiten Schritt untersucht der Artikel Maßnahmen der Korruptionsbekämpfung, deren Bilanz ernüchternd ausfällt. Ein wichtiger Grund hierfür: Gängige Politikmodelle beachten nur unzureichend bestehende institutionelle Arrangements und Machtverhältnisse. Zudem werden die Möglichkeiten externer Akteure, lokale Prozesse zu beeinflussen, tendenziell überschätzt. Daraus folgt jedoch nicht, dass externe Akteure die Good-Governance-Agenda aufgeben und Korruption ignorieren sollten. Allerdings sind statt blaupausenartiger Maßnahmenpakete, die sich am OECD-Modell liberaler, marktwirtschaftlich verfasster Demokratien orientieren, Politiken erforderlich, die auf konkrete Gegebenheiten vor Ort zugeschnitten und nicht blind sind für die dort herrschenden polit-ökonomischen

Macht- und Loyalitätsbeziehungen. Um die tieferliegenden Ursachen der Korruption anzugehen, müssen sowohl die staatliche Handlungsautonomie als auch gesellschaftliche Gegengewichte gestärkt werden. Ein politisch informiertes Verständnis von Korruption, das sich an jeweils spezifische politische Kulturen anpasst, muss gegebenenfalls auch anerkennen, dass Korruption unter Bedingungen fragiler Staatlichkeit und krisengefährdeter Transformation zeitweise durchaus stabilisierende und kooperationsfördernde Wirkungen haben kann. Dieses kann insofern vorübergehend durchaus als notwendig akzeptiert werden, solange differenzierte Anti-Korruptions-Politiken parallel die graduelle Änderung bestehender institutioneller Arrangements im Blick behalten.

Notes

The authors would like to express their gratitude to Patricia Rinck for her assistance in preparing this contribution.

- 1) UNDP 2002
- 2) von Alemann 2005: 15
- 3) World Bank 2007: 3, Bardhan 1997: 1321
- 4) Cameron 2007: 4
- 5) von Aleman 2005
- 6) Rose-Ackerman 2006: 45; Fritz 2006: 1
- 7) Gupta et al. 1998
- 8) Gupta et al. 2001
- 9) Lambsdorff 2005
- 10) Lambsdorff 2005: 27
- 11) e.g. Khan 2006
- 12) Lambsdorff 2005: 27; compare to respective efforts Kaufmann/Kraay 2002
- 13) Grindle 2007
- 14) Wedeman 1997: 460
- 15) Merkel et al. 2003; Croissant 2001
- 16) Huntington 1965: 402
- 17) Amundsen 1999
- 18) Bratton/Van de Walle define neopatrimonialism as: "[...] those hybrid political systems in which the customs and patterns of patrimonialism co-exist with, and suffuse, rational-legal institutions" (1997: 62).
- 19) Englebert 2000
- 20) Rothchild 1986
- 21) Hartmann 1999, Chazan 1999
- 22) Johnston 2005: 90
- 23) Faust 2000
- 24) Johnston 2005: 218
- 25) Koehler/Zürcher 2004

- 26) Ghandi/Przeworski 2006
- 27) Acemoglu/Robinson 2006
- 28) The World Bank nowadays defines governance as: "[...] the manner in which public officials and institutions acquire and exercise the authority to shape public policy and provide public goods and services" (World Bank 2007: i).
- 29) Doig/Marquette 2005; Fjeldstad/Isaksen 2008
- 30) World Bank 2000, 2007; Bailey 2003; Kolstad et al. 2008
- 31) Fjeldstad/Isaksen 2008: 17
- 32) Fjeldstad/Isaksen 2008: 62
- 33) Fjeldstad/Isaksen 2008; Bailey 2003
- 34) Mungiu-Pippidi 2006; Doig et al. 2005; Heilbrunn 2004
- 35) Norad 2008
- 36) Fjeldstad/Isaksen 2008; Norad 2008
- 37) Chêne 2008; Foresti et al. 2007
- 38) Heimann/Dell 2008, 2009; Bailey 2003
- 39) Norad 2008: 23–24
- 40) Unsworth 2007; Bailey 2003
- 41) Unsworth 2007
- 42) Unsworth 2007
- 43) To name but a few examples, there are the "Drivers of Change-Analysis" of the British Department for International Development (DFID), the "Political Economy Studies" of the World Bank or the "Power Analysis" of the Swedish Development Agency (SIDA).
- 44) Norad 2008; Leftwich 2006
- 45) Johnston/Kpundeh 2004
- 46) Johnston 2005
- 47) Johnston 2005

References

- Acemoglu, Daron/Robinson, James A. (2006): De Facto Political Power and Institutional Persistence, in: *American Economic Review*, Vol. 96 No. 2: 325–330.
- Amundsen, Inge (1999): Political Corruption: An Introduction to the Issues, CMI Working Paper 7/1999, Bergen: Christian Michelsen Institute.
- Bailey, Bruce (2003): Synthesis of Lessons Learned of Donor Practices in Fighting Corruption, Paris: OECD DAC Network on Governance.
- Bardhan, Pranab (1997): Corruption and development: A review of issues, in: *Journal of Economic Literature*, Vol. 35 No. 3: 1320–1346.
- Bratton, Michael/Van de Walle, Nicolas (1997): Democratic Experiments in Africa: Regime Transitions in Comparative Perspective, New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Cameron, Maxwell (2007): Corruption, Encroachment, and the Separation of Powers, Paper prepared for the Workshop on Corruption and Democracy, University of British Columbia, 8–9 June 2007.
- Chazan, Naomi et al. (1999): Politics and Society in Contemporary Africa, 3rd Edition, Boulder.
- Chêne, Marie (2008): The impact of strengthening citizen demand for anti-corruption reform, U4 Anticorruption Resource Centre, U4 Expert Answer, July 2008.
- Croissant, Aurel (2001): Staat, Staatlichkeit

- und demokratische Transformation in Ostasien, Beitrag zur Tagung des Arbeitskreises Systemwechsel der DVPW in Kooperation mit Akademie Franz Hitze Haus, 5.–7. Juli 2001.
- Doig, Alan et al. (2005): Measuring "Success" in Five African Anti-Corruption Commissions. The Cases of Ghana, Malawi, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia, U4 Research Report, Bergen: Christian Michelsen Institute.
- Doig, Alan/Marquette, Heather (2005): Corruption and democratisation: the litmus test of international donor agency intentions, in: *Futures*, Vol. 37 No. 2–3: 199–213.
- Englebert, Pierre (2000): State Legitimacy and Development in Africa, Boulder: Lynne Rienner.
- Faust, Jörg (2000): Informelle Politik und ökonomische Krisen in jungen Demokratien, in: *APUZ* 21/2000: 3–9.
- Fjelde, Hanne/Hegre, Havard (2007): Democracy Depraved. Corruption and Institutional Change 1985–2004, Paper presented to the 48th Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, Chicago/USA, 28 February–3 March 2007.
- Fjeldstad, Odd-Helge/Isaksen, Jan (2008): Anti-Corruption Reforms: Challenges, Effects and Limits of World Bank Support. Background Paper to Public Sector Reform: What Works and Why?, Independent Evaluation Group (IEG) Working Paper 2008/7.
- Foresti, Marta et al. (2007): Voice for accountability: Citizens, the state and realistic governance, ODI Briefing Paper, London: Overseas Development Institute.
- Fritz, Verena (2006): Corruption and anti-corruption efforts, ODI Background Note, London: Overseas Development Institute.
- Ghandi, Jennifer/Przeworski, Adam (2006): Cooperation, Cooptation and Rebellion under Dictatorships, in: *Economics and Politics*, Vol. 18 No. 1: 1–26.
- Grindle, Merilee (2007): Good Enough Governance Revised, in: *Development Policy Review*, Vol. 25 No. 5: 553–574.
- Gupta, Sanjeev et al. (1998): Corruption and the provision of health care and education services, IMF Working Paper.
- Gupta, Sanjeev et al. (2001): Does corruption affect income inequality and poverty? IMF Working Paper.
- Hartmann, Christof (1999): Ethnizität, Präsidentschaftswahlen und Demokratie. Ein Beitrag zur Rolle von politischen Institutionen in den Demokratisierungsprozessen Afrikas, Focus-Papiere No. 13, Hamburg: IAK.
- Heilbrunn, John R. (2004): Anti-Corruption Commissions Panacea or Real Medicine to Fight Corruption?, Washington DC: World Bank Institute.
- Heimann, Fritz/Dell, Gillian (2009): UN Convention against Corruption: Recommendations for Review Mechanism, Berlin: Transparency International.
- Huntington, Samuel P. (1965): Political Development and Political Decay, in: *World Politics*, Vol. 17 No. 3: 386–430.
- Johnston, Michael/Kpundeh, Sahr (2004): Building a clean machine: Anti-corruption coalitions and sustainable reform, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3466,

Washington D.C.: World Bank.

- Johnston, Michael (2005): *Syndromes of Corruption. Wealth, Power, and Democracy*, Cambridge et al.: Cambridge University Press.
- Kaufmann, Daniel/Kraay, Aart (2002): *Growth without Governance*, in: *Economia*, Vol. 3 No. 1: 169–229.
- Khan, Mushtaq H. (2006): *Governance, Economic Growth and Development since the 1960s: Background Paper for the World Economic and Social Survey*.
- Koehler, Jan/Zürcher, Christoph (2004): *Der Staat und sein Schatten. Betrachtungen zur Institutionalisierung hybrider Staatlichkeit im Süd-Kaukasus*, in: *WeltTrends*, Vol. 12 No. 45: 84–96.
- Kolstad, Ivar et al. (2008): *Corruption, Anti-Corruption Efforts and Aid: Do donors have the right approach?*, London: Overseas Development Institute.
- Lambsdorff, Johann Graf von (2005): *Consequences and Causes of Corruption – What do We Know from a Cross-Section of Countries?*, *Volkswirtschaftliche Reihe, Diskussionsbeitrag Nr. V-34-05*, Passau.
- Leftwich, Adrian (2006): *Drivers of Change: Refining the Analytical Framework. Part 1: Conceptual and Theoretical Issues*, Paper prepared for DFID, York: University of York.
- Merkel, Wolfgang et al. (2003): *Defekte Demokratie, Band 1: Theorie*, Wiesbaden: VS-Verlag.
- Mungiu-Pippidi, Alina (2006): *Corruption: diagnosis and treatment*, in: *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 17 No. 3: 86–99.
- Norad Evaluation Department (2008): *Anti-Corruption Approaches: A Literature Review*, Study 2/2008, Oslo Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation.
- Rose-Ackerman, Susan (2006): *Political Corruption and Reform in Democracies: Theoretical Perspectives*, in: Junichi Kawata (Ed.): *Comparing Political Corruption and Clientelism*, Hampshire/Burlington: Ashgate: 45–61.
- Rothchild, Donald (1986): *Hegemonial Exchange: An Alternative Model for Managing Conflict in Middle Africa*, in: Dennis L. Thompson/ Dov Ronen (Eds.): *Ethnicity, Politics, and Development*, Boulder: Lynne Rienner: 65–104.
- UNDP (2002): *Bericht über die menschliche Entwicklung 2002. Stärkung der Demokratie in einer fragmentierten Welt*. Bonn: Deutsche Gesellschaft für die Vereinten Nationen (DGVN).
- Unsworth, Sue (2007): *Rethinking Governance to Fight Corruption*, U4 Brief 7/2007, Bergen: Christian Michelsen Institute.
- von Alemann, Ulrich (2005): *Politische Korruption: Ein Wegweiser zum Stand der Forschung*, in: Ders. (Hg.): *Dimensionen politischer Korruption: Beiträge zum Stand der internationalen Forschung*, PVS-Sonderheft 35/2005, Wiesbaden: 13–49.
- Wedeman, Andrew (1997): *Looters, Rent-Scrapers, and Dividend Collectors: Corruption and Growth in Zaire, South Korea, and the Philippines*, in: *The Journal of Developing Areas*, Vol. 31 No. 4: 457–478.
- World Bank (2000): *Helping Countries*

Combat Corruption. Progress at the World Bank since 1997, Washington DC: World Bank.

- World Bank (2005): *Review of World Bank Conditionality*. Washington DC: World Bank.
- World Bank (2007): *Strengthening World Bank Group Engagement on Governance and Anticorruption*, Washington DC: World Bank.
- World Bank (2008): *Global Monitoring Report 2008. MDGs and the Environment. Agenda for Inclusive and Sustainable Development*, Washington DC: World Bank.

The Authors

Tobias Debiel is Director of the Institute for Development and Peace (INEF) and holds the Chair in International Relations and Development Policy at the Institute of Political Science, University of Duisburg-Essen. Before he came to Duisburg, he was Senior Researcher at the Center for Development Policy (ZEF), University of Bonn, where he also served as Acting Professor for Political and Cultural Change from April 2003 to March 2004. Within the last few years he received fellowships at Fudan University, Shanghai, at the Herzliya Interdisciplinary Center (IDC), close to Tel Aviv, at Al-Quds University in Jerusalem and at the Royal Scientific Society, Amman. Professor Debiel is Co-Editor of “Globale Trends” (S. Fischer) and “Die Friedens-Warte” (Journal of International Peace and Organization). Among other functions, he is member of the Advisory Board ‘United Nations’ of the Foreign Office and of the Executive Boards of the German Peace Research Foundation (DSF) and the Development and Peace Foundation (SEF).

Birgit Pech is Research Fellow at the Institute for Development and Peace (INEF). She studied Political Science at the University of Freiburg. From 2003 to 2004 she worked as Project Member and Consultant for the GTZ (Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit) in Eschborn and from 2005 to 2006 as Development Worker for the German Development Service (DED) as Technical Advisor to the Association of Local Government Authorities of Kenya in Nairobi. From 2006 to 2009 she was Research Fellow at the Institute of Political Science, University of Duisburg-Essen, and joined the Institute for Development and Peace in June 2009. Her areas of research include governance and anti-corruption, democratization processes and development politics (with a focus on Sub-Saharan Africa).

DuEPublico

Duisburg-Essen Publications online

UNIVERSITÄT
DUISBURG
ESSEN

Offen im Denken

ub | universitäts
bibliothek

This text is made available via DuEPublico, the institutional repository of the University of Duisburg-Essen. This version may eventually differ from another version distributed by a commercial publisher.

DOI: 10.17185/duepublico/73888

URN: urn:nbn:de:hbz:464-20210204-105517-4

All rights reserved.