

**“How one fights determines what one wins” – (Non)violent
resistance in revolutionary situations and its prospects for
sustainable democratization**

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Table of content

Abbreviations	4
List of tables and figures.....	5
Acknowledgement.....	6
Preface: The purpose of this synopsis.....	9
1.) Introduction.....	10
2.) Overall research question.....	15
3.) Research design.....	17
4.) Resistance and revolutionary situations: The question of (non)violence.....	26
4.1.) Revolution and violence: An inseparable duo?.....	26
4.2.) Revolutionary situations	33
4.3.) Why events matter: Critical junctures and path dependency	37
5.) Nonviolent resistance: A “dangerous idea” whose “time has come”?.....	40
5.1.) The many names of nonviolence	42
5.1.1.) Pacifism: Nonviolent opposition against war.....	43
5.1.2.) Civil disobedience: Moral philosophy of Henry Thoreau	44
5.1.3.) Satyagraha: Gandhi’s approach to nonviolence	45
5.1.4.) NVR as “strategy for imperfect people in an imperfect world”: The strategic approach..	47
5.1.5.) Defining the X: A working definition of NVR.....	50
5.2.) How NVR is assumed to work	53
5.2.1.) Mechanism of change	53
5.2.2.) NVR and democracy.....	60
5.2.3. Discourse on NVR and urban space.....	62
6.) NVR and democratic endurance: The democratic dividend of nonviolent resistance	65
7.) The democratizing effect of nonviolent resistance.....	68
8.) How violent resistance hinders democratic development	71
8.1.) Avoiding unequal citizenship	72
8.2.) Avoiding one-party dominance	75
9.) On consolidation	80
10.) Discussion.....	82
12.) Literature.....	89
12.) Appendix	103
12.1.) Overview: Publications within the dissertation	103
12.2.) Paper I: Bayer, Markus (2018 b): Hacia la consolidación: La lucha no violenta como medio para la ciudadanía democrática, Relaciones Internacionales, 39, 37-58.	104

12.3.) English Translation of Paper I: Bayer, Markus (2018 b): On consolidation: Nonviolent struggle as resource for democratic citizenship, <i>Relaciones Internacionales</i> , 39, 37-58.	129
12.4.) Paper II: Bayer, Markus (2018 a): The democratizing effect of nonviolent resistance. How nonviolent resistance featured democratic consolidation in Benin, <i>Swisspeace Working Paper</i> , 3/2018.	155
12.5.) Paper III: Bayer, Markus (2017): Swapo forever? Prospect for liberal democracy or prolonged one-party dominance in Namibia, <i>Journal of Namibia Studies</i> , 21, 27-54.....	178
12.6.) Paper IV: Bayer, Markus and Andrea Pabst (2018): Heroes and victims: The economies of entitlement after violent past, <i>Peacebuilding</i> , 6 (1), 49-64.	208
12.7.) Paper V: Bayer, Markus; Bethke, Felix S. and Daniel Lambach (2016): The democratic dividend of nonviolent resistance, <i>Journal for Peace Research</i> , 53(6), 758–771.	233
12.8.) Paper VI: Bayer, Markus and Jante Kursawe (2016): Gewaltfreier Widerstand und urbaner Raum, <i>Wissenschaft und Frieden</i> , 34 (2), 29-32.	241
12.9.) Avowals of the Co-Authors	249

Abbreviations

ANC	African National Congress
BTI	Bertelsmann Transformation Index
CSO	Civil Society Organization
DAD	Democracy/Autocracy Dataset
INC	Indian National Congress
LNA	Large N-Analysis
MENA	Middle East and North Africa
MoR	Mode of Resistance
NAVCO	Nonviolent and Violent Conflict Outcome Dataset
NLM	National Liberation Movement
NoR	No Resistance
NVR	Nonviolent Resistance
PLAN	People's Liberation Army of Namibia
SIDA	Swedish International Development Cooperation
SNA	Small N-Analysis
SWAPO	South West People's Organization
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
VR	Violent Resistance

List of tables and figures¹

Table I:	Forms of nonviolence and their differences	p. 50
Figure I:	Success rates of NVR and VR campaigns 1940-2006	p. 13
Figure II:	Empirical narratives and black box mechanism	p. 18
Figure III:	Overall research question	p. 18
Figure IV:	Research question “The democratic dividend”	p. 19
Figure V:	Research question “The democratizing effect of nonviolent resistance”	p. 21
Figure VI:	Disaggregation of quality of democracy	p. 22
Figure VII:	Research question “SWAPO forever” and “Heroes and victims”	p. 23
Figure VIII:	Revolutionary situations and possible outcomes	p. 35
Figure IX:	Violent and nonviolent resistance movements	p. 42
Figure X:	Conversion, accommodation, coercion, and political change	p. 54
Figure XI:	How conversion works	p. 57
Figure XII:	How coercion works	p. 60
Figure XIII:	Modes of resistance and democratic endurance	p. 66

¹ Please use the hyperlinks to skip directly to the respective table or figure.

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Writing a cumulative dissertation offers the advantage to be able to widen the view and investigate a topic from different angles instead of focusing on a narrow part. For a cluttered mind like mine, finding nearly everything interesting, this is a huge advantage. However, an even bigger advantage is that a cumulative dissertation officially allows collaboration. This means that one is able to share his or her ideas, to convince others and to work with and learn from them. I had the luck and the pleasure to meet some brilliant and supportive people who believed in my ideas and had plenty to offer to advance them. I am therefore in the enviable situation to have the “obligation” to thank all of them:

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Preface: The purpose of this synopsis

This is the corresponding synopsis for the cumulative dissertation “How one fights determines what one wins — (Non)violent resistance in revolutionary situations and its prospects for sustainable democratization”. The dissertation consists of six independent but connected papers with several co-authors. This synopsis outlines the overall research question that links all the six individual papers. Furthermore, it provides a short introduction into the research topic of *Nonviolent Resistance (NVR)*, critically examines the existing theoretical approaches and develops a consistent framework for analysis. Additionally, it sums up the key results of the papers and integrates them into a larger debate on the effects of NVR.

List of contributing publications

No.	Paper
1	Bayer, Markus (2018 b): Hacia la consolidación: La lucha no violenta como medio para la ciudadanía democrática [On consolidation: Nonviolent struggle as resource for democratic citizenship], <i>Relaciones Internacionales</i> , 39, 37-58. → skip to article
2	Bayer, Markus (2018 a): The democratizing effect of nonviolent resistance. How nonviolent resistance featured democratic consolidation in Benin, <i>Swisspeace Working Paper</i> , 3/2018. → skip to article
3	Bayer, Markus and Andrea Pabst (2018): Heroes and victims: The economies of entitlement after violent past, <i>Peacebuilding</i> , 6(1), 49-64. → skip to article
4	Bayer, Markus (2017): Swapo forever? Prospect for liberal democracy or prolonged one-party dominance in Namibia, <i>Journal of Namibian Studies</i> , 21, 27-54. → skip to article
5	Bayer, Markus; Bethke, Felix S. and Daniel Lambach (2016): The democratic dividend of nonviolent resistance, <i>Journal for Peace Research</i> , 53(6), 758–771. → skip to article
6	Bayer, Markus and Janet Kursawe (2016): Gewaltfreier Widerstand und urbaner Raum, <i>Wissenschaft und Frieden</i> , 34(2), 29-32. → skip to article

1.) Introduction

“Civilisations as yet have only been created and directed by a small intellectual aristocracy, never by crowds. Crowds are only powerful for destruction. Their rule is always tantamount to a barbarian phase.” Gustave le Bon (2001 [1896]: 10)

The year 2011 marked the end of one of the oldest autocracies in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA)-Region, namely the regime of Ben Ali in Tunisia - a regime sometimes betokened as a “mafia dictatorship” (Ayeb 2011). No one expected a revolution. Yet it happened. And it happened fast and surprisingly peaceful, at least from the side of the opposition. It became what is now considered as the first nonviolent revolution of a wave of contention in the MENA region.

The revolutionary situation was triggered by the self-immolation of Mohamed Bouazizi in Sidi Bouzid on 17 December 2010. An act that, according to Nouri Gana, has to be understood not as suicide but as a “suicidal protest” (Gana 2013: 11). This symbolic protest against inhuman treatment by the police and a life without dignity roused the whole country by acting as a “rallying point for different types and forms of protest to converge into a national uprising” (Zemni 2013: 128). Like prior protest movements in Tunisia, “it initially focused on social issues but, unlike them, it quickly changed from a timid political movement into a radically non-violent movement to overthrow first the head of the regime and second its intractable system” (Kahlaoui 2013: 147). All over the country, people went to the streets to claim the end of humiliation and marginalization by shouting: “khoubz ou maa we Ben Ali laa”² (Ayeb 2011: 472 f.), “Ben Ali dégage”³ and “Ash-sha‘b yurīd isqāṭ an-nizām”.⁴

² “We may live by only eating bread and drinking water, but never more with Ben Ali.” (Ayeb 2011: 472 f.)

³ “Ben Ali get lost” - Own Translation.

⁴ “The people demand the downfall of the regime” (Schmidt 2014: 74).

These demands were underlined by mass rallies and a general strike “breathing life into the Tunisian revolution in late 2010” (Pickard 2015: 25) and becoming a “turning point in the Tunisian Revolution” (Pickard 2015: 9). According to the British Journalist Peter Beaumont, “A threshold of fear has been crossed” and the structure of the Tunisian police state “ha[s] been challenged and found, to the surprise of many, to be weaker than imagined” (Zunes 2011: 401). On 27 January 2011, six weeks after the beginning of the protests, Ben Ali and his family left the country. Approximately 300 protesters lost their lives during the revolution, and 700 others were injured (Danahar 2013: 48). According to Khatib and Lust, the commitment to nonviolence “played an important role in the uprising” (2014: 9).

Tunisia – a country where “[r]evolutionary change [has] never been part of” its history (Alexander 2016: 4) – became the country to “wake” the “dormant region” (Khatib and Lust 2014 : 1) and finally started what was later labeled as the so-called Arab Spring (Anderson 2011), Arab Awakening (Danahar 2013), or Arab uprising (Achcar 2013).⁵

Besides the widespread skepticism about the outcomes of the Tunisian revolution, the story highlights three important aspects about revolutions:

First, revolutions seem to have changed their appearance. Instead of heralding a socialist era with a violent defeat of the bourgeoisie, present-day revolutions are more likely nonviolent

⁵ Neither of these notations is very felicitous. According to Whitehead, the “spring terminology” has an extended political genealogy. It is a “throwback to the events following the assassination of Premier Hariri in Beirut in February 2005”, leading to the withdrawal of the Syrian forces but not to national reconciliation. Furthermore it is a reference to earlier “springs” like the Spring of the Nations in 1848 and the “Prague Spring” in 1968 which were all “followed within a year or two by autumns or even winters” (Whitehead 2015: 17) The term “Arab Awakening” was also “used before, to describe the surge of Arab nationalism in the 1950s” (Danahar 2013: 17) which can lead to confusions. Therefore, some use the term “second Arab Awakening” (Muasher 2014; Dawisha 2013). As Roy points out, the prefix “Arab” is generally misleading as the upheavals had nothing about them that was particularly Arab or Muslim. Instead, the demonstrators were calling for dignity, elections, democracy, good governance, and human rights (Roy 2012: 5).

processes ending in a Copernican change of mind-sets⁶ and condensing in new and more inclusive institutions and procedures.

Second, and more importantly, activism of the masses is far more constructive than Gustave le Bon, the founder of the psychology of the masses and author of the famous book on “The crowd” (2001), assumed. In Tunisia, the revolution did not just depose a dictator. It brought the people together and created a short moment of solidarity and infinity. Khatib and Lust reported “growing patterns of cooperation among different segments of society” prior to the Arab Spring (Khatib and Lust 2014: 4). The revolution “drew on the participation of nearly every social stratum — thus warranting to a certain extent the temporary use of the collective noun ‘the people’” (Zemni 2013: 128).

Third, a moment can matter. The Tunisian writer and activist Mlek Sghiri, depicts the so-called Cedar Revolution in Tunisia in the following romantic words:

“Everyone was on a high: the President’s flight abroad, the rapid revolutionary changes imposed by an enthusiastic public, the thundering roar of the people who had risen from beneath the ashes of misery and fear like a phoenix. It was pure romance.” (Sghiri 2013: 43)

Schielke even describes the uprising not just as “protest against an oppressive regime and a demand for freedom”, but as freedom in itself, as “real, actual, lived moment of the freedom and dignity that the pro-democracy movement demands” and believes that the revolution “will be an experience that [...] will mark an entire generation” (Schielke 2011).

According to Aristide Zolberg (1972: 183), we can call these moments of political enthusiasm where the boundaries of established politics are crossed and “politics bursts its bounds to invade all of life” magical moments or moments of madness. During these moments, “all is possible” or at least seems possible. Against the norm of politics as the “art of the possible”

⁶ The term Copernican change is a metaphor to illustrate that an important shift of existing paradigms is taking place. It is based on Nicolaus Copernicus’ discovery of the heliocentric model that questioned the then prevalent world view (Floridi 2012).

(Zolberg 1972: 183),⁷ these moments of madness, or in the more analytical terms of Charles Tilly, revolutionary situations (Tilly 1994: 1978), are rare moments in history. Nonetheless they exist. Like the famous American researcher on social movements, Frances Fox Piven puts it: “history is dotted with those occasions when people without wealth or coercive resources did exercise power, at least some power, at least for a time” (Piven 2006: 20).

Although the idea for this dissertation was inspired by the described events that unfolded in the MENA region from 2010 onwards, it is not limited to it.⁸ It covers more broadly the phenomenon of nonviolent resistance (NVR)⁹ in revolutionary situations and its effect on sustainable democratization.

Recent research shows that NVR has a remarkable track record in achieving political goals, a fact that challenges the long-kept belief in the effectiveness of political violence. As figure 1 below illustrates, NVR campaigns have outperformed VR campaigns in achieving their goals since the 1950s (Chenoweth and Stephan 2013).




Figure 1: Success rates of NVR and VR campaigns 1940-2006

⁷ Zolberg, who was mainly concerned with the commune in Paris, argues that these magical moments are the antipole to conventional politics which he defines as the “art of the possible”.

⁸ Peaceful and mass-based revolutions had happened before: President Marcos of the Philippines was deposed by “people’s power” in 1986 (Mendoza 2009). Similarly, it happened afterwards. After the ousting of President Ben Ali in Tunisia, Egypt’s President Hosni Mubarak was brought down in 2011. Three years later, in 2014, President Blaise Campaoré was peacefully forced to step down in Burkina-Faso.

⁹ Alternatively, others speak of satyagraha (Gandhi 2001), People’s Power (Mendoza 2009), nonviolent action (Sharp 1973a; 1973b; 1985), civil resistance (Roberts and Garton Ash 2011), unarmed resistance (Zunes 1999), or unarmed insurrection (Zunes 1994; Schock 2005). I will introduce and discuss some of these terms in part 5.1. more closely.

Between 1989 and 1990 alone, thirteen nations underwent such peaceful transitions driven from below (Wink 2000: 1). These velvet revolutions were followed by two further waves of nonviolent revolutions, namely the so-called colour revolutions in Serbia (2000), Georgia (2003), the Ukraine (2004), and Lebanon (2005), and the aforementioned Arab spring which brought down President Ben Ali in Tunisia and President Hosni Mubarak in Egypt. Three years later, in 2014, President Blaise Compaoré was peacefully forced to resign in Burkina-Faso.

However, as Gene Sharp, one of the pioneers of academic research on NVR, critically notes: a transition towards democracy is often only the first step and “[n]o one should believe that with the downfall of the dictatorship an ideal society will immediately appear” (Sharp 2008: 63). Nevertheless, several studies found evidence that NVR is not only more effective in achieving democratizations but also has a positive effect on the following democracy (Gleditsch and Celestino 2013; Chenoweth and Stephan 2013; Johnstadt 2010; Ackermann and Karatnycky 2005). Hitherto, these studies have only analyzed short-term effects of NVR. To date, there is no study that explores how NVR affects democracy in the long run. Furthermore, it is unclear how these positive effects come about.

Thus, this dissertation first aims to investigate the long-term effects of NVR and second to highlight the causal links of NVR in revolutionary situations to sustainable democratization. Thereby this dissertation follows Welzel, who understands sustainable democratization as the merger of the formally distinct phenomena of survival and deepening of democracy, comprising not only the emergence of democracies, but also their endurance and quality (Welzel 2009: 75).

2.) Overall research question

This section presents the overarching research question, breaks it down into three subsidiary questions and links them to the six publications of this dissertation. The overall question is *if and how different modes of resistance¹⁰ applied against authoritarian regimes in so-called revolutionary situations have different prospects for a sustainable democratization.*

This dissertation starts with the general hypothesis that NVR is not only more successful in achieving political change but is also conducive to the consolidation of democracy. This hypothesis is tested in the paper “The democratic dividend of Nonviolent Resistance”¹¹ (paper 5) which tries to answer *if NVR contributes to the survival of democracy.*

The findings lead to the subsequent question how the democratic dividend of NVR comes to term. This topic is addressed in a two-step approach:

First, it is elaborated *which causal mechanisms link NVR and the survival and consolidation of democracy.* (Paper “The democratizing effect of nonviolent resistance. How nonviolent resistance featured democratic consolidation in Benin”; paper 2).¹²

Second, it is analyzed *how violent resistance affects democracy.* This approach complements the part on positive effects of NVR and is dealt with in two papers. The first one, “Swapo forever? Prospect for liberal democracy or prolonged one-party dominance in Namibia”¹³ (paper 4), traces the party dominance in Namibia back to the role of the Southwest African Peoples Organisation (SWAPO) during the liberation struggle. The second paper, “Heroes

¹⁰ Karl and Schmitter (1991) and Munck and Leff (1997) coined the term modes of transition which captures alternative ways in which transitions occur. These modes of transition are understood as critical juncture and are hypothesized to have long-lasting effects on the stability and quality of the subsequent democracy. In this dissertation I argue that the mode of resistance causally predetermines the mode of transition.

¹¹ Bayer, Markus; Bethke, Felix S.; Lambach, Daniel (2016): The democratic dividend of nonviolent resistance, in: *Journal for Peace Research*, Vol. 53(6), 758-771.

¹² Bayer, Markus (2018 a): The democratizing effect of nonviolent resistance How nonviolent resistance featured democratic consolidation in Benin, Swisspeace Working Paper, 3/2018.

¹³ Bayer, Markus (2017): SWAPO forever? Prospect for liberal democracy or prolonged one-party dominance, *Journal of Namibia Studies*, Vol. 21, 27-54.

and victims: The economies of entitlement after violent pasts”¹⁴ (paper 3), discusses one specific obstacle to sustainable democratization and peacebuilding after armed struggles and civil wars, namely feelings of entitlement (either as hero or as victim) which eventually undermine the democratic idea of equal citizenship.

The results of these papers are fed back into the paper “On consolidation: Nonviolent struggle as resource for democratic citizenship”¹⁵ (paper 1), developing a theoretical model which links NVR and sustainable democratization.

¹⁴ Bayer, Markus and Andrea Pabst (2018): Heroes and Victims: The economies of entitlement after violent pasts, *Peacebuilding*, 6 (1), 49-64.

¹⁵ Bayer, Markus (2018 b): En la consolidación: La lucha noviolenta como recurso para la ciudadanía democrática, *Relaciones Internacionales*, Special Issue “On resistance: Discussions in International Relations”, 37-58.

3.) Research design

As outlined above, this dissertation tries to answer the **overall question** *if and how different modes of Resistance (MoR) against authoritarian regimes in so-called revolutionary situations have different prospects for sustainable democratization*. Thereby this dissertation follows Welzel, who understands sustainable democratization as the merger of the formally distinct phenomena of survival and deepening of democracy, comprising not only the emergence of democracies, but also their endurance and development (Welzel 2009: 75). The basic hypothesis is that contrary to violent resistance, nonviolent resistance offers far better prospects, not only for the survival, but also for the quality of democracy.

In trying to explain the effects of NVR on sustainable democratization, the analysis generally follows a process tracing approach. Beach and Pedersen distinguish between three kinds of process tracing studies: theory testing, theory building and such forms that try to explain a certain outcome (Beach and Pedersen 2016: 13). Whereas the first one is used to verify whether a theoretically developed mechanism is present, the second aims at detecting these mechanisms in an inductive way. The last variant is a case-centric design which tries to explain a specific outcome. All variants either focus on the input, e.g. the starting point of the mechanism (x) or the outcome (y) or try to detect the links between both. Figure II below depicts a typical PT design consisting of a theoretical and an empirical level. In both cases X and Y are linked by a causal mechanism.

This dissertation uses a theory building logic which aims at contributing new value to the understanding of the mechanism connecting the mode of resistance with a special focus on NVR (the X) and sustainable democratization (the Y).




Figure II: Empirical narratives and black box mechanism (Beach and Pedersen 2016: 34)

Nevertheless, this study is theoretically informed since there already exist assumptions how NVR works. However, these mechanisms are generally too unspecific to test them (see 5.2.) and a rigid theory-testing approach is therefore not suitable. Taking up the PT logic of Beach and Pedersen (2016), the overall research question can be graphically displayed as follows:




Figure III: Overall research question

Since the positive effect of NVR on the emergence of democracy has already been addressed by several studies (Chenoweth and Stephen 2013; Gleditsch and Rivera 2013; Johnstadt 2010; Ackerman and Karatnacky 2005) and is meanwhile seldom contested, this dissertation focuses on the latter two.

To answer the overall question, this dissertation uses a multi-method research design. The design generally follows a nested analysis approach (Lieberman 2005: 436), combining a Large N-Analysis (LNA) with a Small N-Analysis (SNA). However, contrary to Lieberman, who

argues that the preliminary LNA is either followed by a model testing or a model building SNA,¹⁶ the SNA in this study serves the purpose to discover the underlying causal mechanism.

To answer the “if”-part of the question and to establish a clear correlation between NVR as MoR and sustainable democratization this dissertation first applies a LNA, more precisely a survival analysis of democratic regimes. This analysis, which is the core of the paper “The democratic dividend” (see section 6), tests if the independent variable X_{MoR} has an effect on the dependent variable $Y_{Sust. Democ.}$, i.e. if the mode of transition affects subsequent democratic survival. For X_{MoR} I distinguish three types of transition: Nonviolent resistance (NVR), violent resistance (VR) and no resistance, e.g. top-down transitions (NoR). To operationalize the dependent variable “sustainable democratization”, more precisely its endurance aspect, the survival of democracy, defined as the time from the installation of democracy to its breakdown, is used. This is expressed by the dependent variable $Y_{Democ. Endurance}$ in the following figure III which displays the logic of the paper.




Figure IV: Research question “The democratic dividend”

For pragmatic reasons this paper uses a minimal definition of democracy. This benchmark, so to say, defines the minimum requirements of participation which must be fulfilled in order to be able to speak of democracy. Additionally, it sets a benchmark when democracy breaks down.

¹⁶ Lieberman proposes a model testing SNA if the LNA produced robust and satisfactory results and a model building SNA, if the if the LNA produced inconclusive results (Lieberman 2004: 248).

For this purpose, I use Dahl's concept of polyarchy. According to Dahl the key characteristic of a democracy is its continuing responsiveness to the preferences of the people which are considered to be political equals (Dahl 1971: 1). As minimum requirements Dahl states that the control over governmental decision must lie in the hands of elected officials, which have to be elected peacefully in frequent, open and fair elections. Furthermore, a democracy is based on the inclusive right to vote and the passive right to be elected as public official. Finally, the freedom of expression and the freedom of association have to be guaranteed by the polity (Dahl 1989).

The second part of the research question, i.e. "how" the democratic dividend of NVR comes to terms, is empirically addressed by an explorative process-tracing case study (paper "The democratizing effect of nonviolent resistance"). The PT case study uses Benin and its *Rénouveau Démocratique* in 1989 as a typical case (Seawright and Gerring 2008: 297) of a transition induced by "strong" civic forces (see Ackermann and Karatnycky 2005: 22), leading to one of the most stable democracies in Africa.¹⁷ This is especially remarkable since Benin's development level was "well below the levels commonly associated with democratic success" and thus was perceived as democratization "against all odds" (Gisselquist 2008: 790). Furthermore, the transition took place before the influential declaration of La Baule in June 1990, when the French President Mitterrand declared that future financial support would depend on conditionalities, namely liberalization and democratization. Given that the democratization and stability of Benin can neither be explained by modernization theory nor by diffusion, the influence of NVR should be high. Finally, while most campaigns are mixed

¹⁷ As laid out in the respective paper „The democratizing effect of nonviolent resistance“ (paper 2), „[t]he latest presidential elections in 2016 were the sixth of its kind and resulted in the fourth peaceful political turnover. Benin had already passed Huntington's "two turnover-test" in 2006 when the first President after the "democratic renewal", Nicéphore Soglo, was voted out and former President Mathieu Kérékou was re-elected. Since 1991, all elections have been rated as mostly free and fair“ (Bayer 2018 a: 16).

campaigns including both nonviolent and violent tactics (Ackerman and Kruegler 1994: 9), the resistance movement in Benin did not show much diversity in this regard.

Since the focus is on explaining the effect of a specific MoR, namely NVR, on sustainable democratization, the independent variable is X_{NVR} . The Y, or the dependent variable, has two dimensions in this part of the dissertation: First, it is operationalized as democratic endurance ($Y_{Endurance}$) to discover the mechanisms linking NVR to democratic survival and to explain the democratic dividend discovered in the first part. Second, it is operationalized as $Y_{Development}$ to assess the effect of NVR on the consolidation of democracy – the development aspect of Wetzel’s concept of sustainable democracy.




Figure V: Research question “The democratizing effect of nonviolent resistance”

Similar to the paper “The democratic dividend”, $Y_{Endurance}$ is understood also in this analysis as the mere survival of what Dahl calls polyarchy (1971; 1989). The first part focuses on critical events which potentially could have led to a democratic breakdown or at least a severe democratic backlash and tries to trace the effects of NVR in overcoming them. In a second step, the study on Benin analyzes the effect of NVR on the development of democracy. For this purpose, the concept of “embedded democracy” (Merkel 2004) is used to guide the analysis. Contrary to the minimal definition of democracy used to measure the endurance/survival, Merkel’s concept is more suitable to assess the quality of a democracy. Its analytical framework allows disaggregating democratic enhancement on four levels of consolidation, namely constitutional consolidation, representative consolidation, behavioral

consolidation and the development of a culture of citizenship. *Constitutional consolidation* here describes the consolidation of the central democratic institutions anchored in the constitution like government, parliament and elections. It takes place on the macro level and is a necessary condition for the second level. On the second level, *representative consolidation* is given when a territorially and functionally differentiated system of representation is established via existing parties, unions and organizations. Third, *behavioral consolidation* means the acceptance of the democratic rules by potential powerful veto players like the military, traditional elites and the political and economic elites. Finally, the fourth level is the establishment of a *culture of citizenship*, which can immunize the other three levels if fully developed (for details see paper “The democratizing effect of nonviolent resistance”). Thus, Y_{Quality} can be visualized as follows:




Figure VI: Disaggregation of quality of democracy.

The paper “The democratizing effect of nonviolent resistance” assesses the effect of NVR on each of these aspects of consolidation separately with a PT approach. For this purpose, it uses a combination of BTI data and expert interviews.

Finally, this dissertation tackles as third question *how violent resistance affects democracy*. This question is intended to complement and to challenge the results of the empirical study on the effects of NVR. Although recent research has shown that a democratic transition is unlikely after violent resistance (Chenoweth and Stephen 2013), it nevertheless happens, thus making the additional question relevant. To explore the effect of violent transitions on the following democracy, I use an in-depth case study of Namibia’s transition to democracy. Contrary to Benin, Namibia won its independence and its transition to democracy in 1990 after nearly three decades of armed struggle and soon became “one of the few to be only one step away from the 'consolidation' of democracy” (Bauer 1998: 1). Being as similar as possible to the case of Benin¹⁸ but offering variation of the independent variable, Namibia was best suitable to serve as a deviant case (Seawright and Gerring 2008: 297) and offer additional insights in the effect of the MoR on sustainable democratization.

The basic assumption was that VR might induce stable democratic regimes which, however, exhibit certain weaknesses in terms of quality and development. More precisely, I assume that these regimes have severe limitations in terms of political competition and are more prone to be dominated by a single party. This study was based on a similar design logic as the PT study on Benin (see Figure IV)




Figure VII: Research question “Swapo forever” and “Heroes and victims”

¹⁸ Benin witnessed the democratic transition in 1989, Namibia in 1990. In 2012, Benin was rated by the Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI) democracy scale with 7,7 out of 10 possible points. Namibia reached 7,6 points on the same scale. While In 2017 Benin had roughly 11 million inhabitants and a per capita income (in current USD) of 829 US Dollar (USD), Namibia had roughly 2,5 million inhabitants and a significantly higher per capita income of 5,227 USD (World Bank n.d.).

However, contrary to the study on Benin, the results are presented separately in the two papers “Swapo forever?” and “Heroes and victims” (see section 8.1. and 8.2.). The case study revealed two closely-linked mechanisms leading to phenomena which seriously limit the quality of democracy, namely feelings of entitlement after violent pasts and one-party dominance.

Structure of the synopsis

The synopsis begins with a critical review of the literature on revolutions and their link to violence (4.1.) before providing a definition of so-called revolutionary situations in section 4.2. This is followed by a short elaboration on critical junctions and path dependency – i.e. the question why events matter (4.3.).

Chapter 5 acts as a theory chapter. It is devoted to introducing the phenomenon of NVR (5.1.) and several assumptions about how NVR works and how it is linked to democracy (5.2.). Therefore, section 5.1. first presents and demarcates the resembling concepts of pacifism (5.1.1.), civil disobedience (5.1.2.), Satyagraha (5.1.3.), and the strategic approach by Gene Sharp (5.1.4.) before developing a working definition of NVR (5.1.5.). Subsequently, section 5.2. introduces two mechanisms of change explaining how NVR works (5.2.1. and 5.2.2.), summarizes some theoretical assumptions how NVR is linked to democracy (5.2.3.), and excurses on one intervening variable: the urban space (5.2.4.). This last section (5.2.4.) refers to the results of paper 6, “Gewaltfreier Widerstand und urbaner Raum”.

The following chapters (6-8) present the empirical results of this dissertation. These follow the heuristic outlined in chapter 3, “research design”. Thus, chapter 6 focuses on the effect of NVR on the endurance of democracy. The chapter, in short, presents the results of the

paper “The democratic dividend” (paper 5) and the conducted survival analysis. Chapter 7 builds upon the paper “The democratizing effect of NVR” and introduces several effects of NVR on both, endurance and development of democracy. The following chapter 8 focuses on two effects of violent resistance on the development of democracy, namely unequal citizenship and feelings of entitlement (8.1.) and one-party dominance (8.2). Each mechanism is laid out in a separate paper. The paper “Heroes and victims” (paper 3) elaborates on the feelings of entitlement after violent pasts and their effect on (un)equal citizenship. The paper “Swapo forever?” (paper 4) introduces the problem of one-party dominance after violent resistance which hinders democratic development.

Chapter 9 feeds the empirical results back into the theoretical model which links NVR and participation. It builds on a neo-Tocquevillean understanding of democracy and conceptualizes NVR as a resource for democratic citizenship. These resources can induce a self-enforcing circle of democratic demands, resistance, liberalization, and renewed demands which in turn drives democratic deepening. This model is laid down in the paper “On consolidation: Nonviolent struggle as resource for democratic citizenship” (paper 1).

Finally, chapter 10 critically discusses the results and points out some avenues for future research.

4.) Resistance and revolutionary situations: The question of (non)violence

In this section, relevant concepts of the dissertation will be explained to provide the theoretical background which informed the analysis. To do so, I will first briefly review the literature on revolutions and critically examine the often unchallenged assumption that revolutions and violence go hand in hand. In a second step, I will define the term revolutionary situations to describe the setting in which NVR is assumed to play a role for democratization. In a third step, this section reviews the literature on events and why they can matter for the long-term development of society.

4.1.) Revolution and violence: An inseparable duo?

“A nonviolent revolution is not a program of seizure of power. It is a program of transformation of relationship ending in peaceful transfer of power.” Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi

Until the end of what Goldstone (1980, 2001) calls the third generation of revolutionary theory, which consisted of famous writers like Theda Skocpol (1979) and Shmuel Eisenstadt (1978), there had been a remarkable and persistent consensus on the essence of revolutions. Most studies had in common that first and foremost they were structuralist in essence. Second, most of them used a Marxist class conflict approach to explain revolutions. Third, they focused on a narrow definition of revolutions and a limited number of cases – usually the great revolutions in England (1640), France (1789), Russia (1917) and China (1949) (Goldstone 2001: 140).

Based on the predominantly Marxist approach¹⁹ of antagonistic class conflict, there was widespread consensus that revolutions are violent processes and that revolutionary political and social change can only be achieved by the means of violence. Marx himself once described violence as “the midwife of every old society pregnant with a new one” (Marx 1887: 535). This belief in violent means was echoed by Marxist revolutionaries around the world like Mao Zedong who stated that „A revolution is not the same as inviting people to dinner, or writing an essay, or painting a picture [...] it cannot be anything so refined, so calm and gently, or so mild, kind, courteous, restrained and magnanimous. A revolution is an uprising, an act of violence whereby one class overthrows another [...]” (Zedong 1927: 3f.).

This reading was supported by the limited number of cases studies used as empirical basis. With the great French Revolution becoming the archetype of a revolution, violence was inscribed into the definition of it. As Arendt (1972) argues, it was the terror of the Jacobins that led the following scholars to assume that a real revolution can only be achieved by violent means. This resulted in to the self-perpetuating problem of a narrow definition being grounded on a limited empirical basis on, leading to the exclusion of other cases and therefore contributing to the definitional status quo.

Even apart from the socialist rhetoric of the great revolution, until the 1990s most scholars on revolutions followed Huntington’s definition of revolutions as “rapid, fundamental, and *violent* domestic change in the dominant values and myths of a society, in its political institutions, social structure, leadership, and government activity and policies” (Huntington

¹⁹ Although Marx himself admitted that revolutions – understood as historically specific phenomena - can possibly be nonviolent (Panitch and Leys 1998, fn. 15), the understanding of class conflict as antagonistic conflict can maybe partly explain this theoretically assumed link between revolution and violence.

1968: 264; emphasis by the author).²⁰ In 1982, Johnson still claimed that “non-violent revolution [...] is a contradiction in terms” (Johnson 1982: 7).

To sum up, revolutions and violence have been understood as an inseparable duo. However, this link has seldom been theoretically justified by critically elaborating the social function of revolutionary violence. Most theorists of revolutions only tried to explain why people return to violence during revolutions.

Robert Ted Gurr (1970), for example, refers to relative deprivation as explanation for revolutionary violence. Relative deprivation is defined as the discrepancy between what people think they deserve and what they get under given circumstances. According to Gurr, the question of violent or nonviolent rebellion “varies strongly with the intensity and scope of relative deprivation” (Gurr 1970: 24), meaning that the more deprivation is perceived, the more likely the rebellion becomes violent. Furthermore, Gurr found out that if the given leadership is perceived as illegitimate, the chances for violent rebellion are high as well. However, Gurr’s research does not address the question of the function and long-term effects of violence in revolutionary situations or revolutions.

Charles Tilly also tried to explain the relation of revolutions and violence. He claims that revolutions are very likely violent processes, since the subaltern lack other resources (Tilly 1973). He argues that “[i]f violence and revolution go together to some extent, it is not because violence is the essence of revolution, but because men turn to unlimited means of coercion in the fluidity of a revolutionary situation, as in a number of other fluid situations.” (Tilly 1973: 33). As for Tilly the process of building the modern nation state was intrinsically violent, it seems logical to assume that those in command of the state monopoly of violence

²⁰ Similar definitions are provided by John Dunn (1972), Wilbert Moore (1963) and Skocpol (1979).

would withdraw without a fight. Tilly admits, however, that nonviolent revolutions are possible in principle.

Lewis Coser (1966) is one of the few scholars who explicitly addressed the social function of revolutionary violence. According to Coser, revolutionary violence can be compared to the violence of the excluded and marginalized African-Americans who resort to violence since all other channels to self-regard and self-enhancement are blocked. This is close to Gurr's argument on relative deprivation as driver for violent behavior. For Coser, however, revolutionary violence has the function to pave the way for political participation as it "offers the chance for the first act of participation in the polity, for entry into the world of active citizenship" (Coser 1966: 11). It is, however, not a convincing argument for the necessity of violence in the process of large scale political and social change.

Another function of violence in revolutionary situations lies in its symbolic effect. With reference to Frantz Fanon (1963), Coser claims that "participation in acts of violence symbolizes commitment to the revolutionary cause" (Coser 1966: 11). As violence (against the state) is usually sanctioned, transgressing this line is seen as a symbol of ultimate commitment and sacrifice to the cause of the revolution; it creates a community of fate. As we will see in the next part on nonviolence, NVR is also transgressive in nature, meaning that the activist has to fear repression. Additionally, since NVR movements tend to be larger and typically do not operate in life and death-scenarios, the factor of ultimate cohesion of the group is not as decisive as for violent rebel groups. Consequently, this argument cannot explain why revolutions necessarily need to be violent.

In the course of the 1970s and 80s, this narrow definition of revolutions was challenged by several developments. Particularly the so-called Saur Revolution in Afghanistan (1978) and

the revolution in Iran (1979) challenged existing concepts, as they were mainly driven by urban intellectuals rather than the peasants (Goldstone 2001). Furthermore, these revolutions were more motivated by religious beliefs than Marxist doctrine. It became clear that the drivers of and motivations for revolutions are more diverse than expected. This led Lawson to conclude that there is no magic formula covering the essence of revolutions over time and space since revolutions have been conducted by “nationalists in Algeria, communists in Afghanistan, and radical military groups in Egypt and Ethiopia” (Lawson 2005: 53).

Existing definitions were further challenged when revolutionary movements appeared during the 1980s and 90s that were remarkably nonviolent, such as the so called Peoples Power Movement in the Philippines (Foran 2005: 216) and the Zapatistas in Mexico (Weinberg 2000).²¹ Similarly, the anti-apartheid struggle in South Africa and the anti-communist revolutions in Eastern Europe “seemed to offer a new model in which the revolutionary collapse of the old regime was coupled with a relatively nonviolent transition to democracy” (Goldstone 2001: 141). These developments, together with the end of the Cold War, led to a bifurcation of the literature on revolutions and its relationship to the question of violence.

Some predicted the end of the revolutionary period (e.g. Nodia 2000; Snyder 1999). With the global victory of democracy, they assumed that the ballot box would be the “coffin of revolutionaries” (Goodwin 2003: 67). Others argued that “[t]he collapse of the Soviet Union also marked the end of Marxist-Leninist revolution as a historical form” (Paige 2003: 27) and

²¹ Zunes argues that armed struggle decreased since most states increased their counter-insurgency capabilities and capacities, making armed uprisings less effective. Furthermore, there was an increased recognition of the effectiveness of nonviolent forms of struggle. Last but not least, growing concerns about the militarized mode of struggle which fails to establish democracy and liberty led to a widespread disillusionment with violent liberation struggles (Zunes 1994: 406 ff.; similar Schock 2005).

thus pressed for conceptual openness and the redefinition of the term. One of the pioneers in this regard was Charles Tilly who already proposed in 1978 to understand revolutions as one specific form of collective action (Tilly 1978). This line of thinking was taken up by Goldstone, who suggested to define a revolution as “effort to transform the political institutions and the justifications for political authority in a society, accompanied by formal or informal mass mobilization and noninstitutionalized actions that undermine existing authorities” (Goldstone 2001: 142).²² Similarly, Lawson criticized that conceptually overloading revolutions with these “objective” criteria such as violence, class-based etc., reduces them to “static objects of analysis rather than seeing them as dynamic process with features that change according to their historical and social context”. Consequently, he argued that there “is no universal quality, characteristic or image that encapsulates a revolution: they may be velvet or violent, reactionary or progressive” (Lawson 2005: 4).

This move towards a broader conception of revolutions resonated in the new framework on contentious politics and was complemented by the increasing importance of social movement studies (McAdam et al. 2001; Tilly and Tarrow 2015). Contentious politics is understood as “interactions in which actors make claims bearing on someone else's interest, in which governments appear either as targets, initiators of claims, or third parties.” (Tilly 2008: 5). Thereby the basic assumption of the framework is that there are similar mechanisms and processes underlying such “widely varying forms of contention – from nonviolence to confrontational conflict to outright violence, from social movements to revolutions” (McAdam and Tarrow 2000: 149). However, the field has often been criticized for its bias towards the study of Western-style reform movements within democratic

²² This is quite close to the definition of other phenomena like regime change or democratic transitions. However, what makes revolutions distinctive is the aspect of mass mobilization. Since I assume that mass mobilization plays a crucial role for both NVR and democratic consolidation, I adhere to the term revolution instead of using the more fashionable alternatives.

settings and therefore neglecting contention in authoritarian contexts (Glenn 2003). This is a serious constraint as modern social movements are struggling for reform within the system and not against the system itself.

This dissertation follows a broad definition of the term revolution as suggested by Goldstone (2001) and Lawson (2005). It further integrates the findings of contentious politics that provides tools for analysing political collective activism.

However, beside the historical reasons to include nonviolent upheavals into the definition of revolutions, there are also functional reasons to do so. Interestingly, violence during revolutionary situations has rarely produced revolutionary outcomes. Especially for the African context, scholars have argued that the “military mindset” (Melber 2009) and the political culture of the so-called “movement governments” (Salih 2007) is replicated within the new state (Gumende 2017: 29) and leads to severe democratic deficits. Typically, such “movement governments” are marked by a high degree of centralism of decision-making, leadership cult, and the fusion of party and state (Gumende 2017; Nuvunga and Salih 2013; Southall 2013; Melber 2009). Due to the fact that these liberation movements perceived themselves as the embodiment of the people, the idea of opposition was never properly rooted within the liberation movements (Gumede 2017; Melber 2009).²³

As shown above, few scholars ever tried to explain the effect of violence contributing to or even producing a revolutionary outcome/political change. Those who did, used arguments that do not exclusively apply to violence. Contrary to this, evidence from transition and conflict studies offer good reasons to believe that it is more conducive for a revolutionary outcome and successful and lasting political change if the opposition refrains from using

²³ According to Salih (2007: 667), differences in democratic performance between decolonization movements and those of the “second liberation” are minor. Nevertheless, governments resulting from armed movements which struggled for the second liberation performed slightly better – however, often at the cost of ethnic factionalism.

violence (in more detail in section 6.2. and the related paper on the democratic dividend of nonviolent resistance).²⁴ This line of thinking is inspired by the idea of the unity of ends and means, an idea being quite common in the literature on nonviolence. The main argument advocates that “fair means alone can produce fair results” (Ghandi 2001: 13) or, in other words, “how one chooses to fight determines what one wins” (Ackerman and Rodal 2008: 119). If the goal is revolutionary change, it is thus functional to refrain from violence. De Ligt argues that a violent revolution would perpetuate the violence of the previous regime, finally provoking new resistance. It would be “doomed to safeguard the fruits of victory by a system of force which would always be developing and therefore grow less human” (De Ligt 1972: 81). In other words, armed conflicts are not easy to end (let alone to win) and normally create new problems such as disarmament, reintegration of former combatants, transitional justice and reconciliation. Therefore, de Ligt concludes that “the more of violence” normally means “the less of revolution” (De Ligt 1972: 162).²⁵

4.2.) Revolutionary situations

The term revolutionary situation originally goes back to Lenin, who described situations in which a revolution becomes possible as revolutionary situations. In his studies, Lenin identified two basic and necessary conditions for the emergence of a revolutionary situation: “It is only when the ‘lower classes’ do not want to live in the old way and the ‘upper classes’ cannot carry on in the old way that the revolution can triumph.” (Lenin 1974 [1920]: 85).

²⁴ Research from the field of NVR supports this assumption that nonviolent action is more suitable for achieving political goals (Chenoweth and Stephen 2013). Similarly, studies from the field of transitology widely share the same assumption that peaceful transitions do create more stable regimes (Linz and Stephen 1996; Guo and Stradiotto 2010).

²⁵ Similarly, Huxley states that “A violent revolution cannot achieve anything except the inevitable results of violence, which are as old as the hills.” (Huxley 1946: 25) Huxley therefore labels violent revolutions as “hopelessly unrevolutionary” (Huxley 1946: 25).

Trotsky, building upon Lenin, adds that one has, first, “to distinguish between the economic and social premises of a revolutionary situation” and second between the preconditions and the revolutionary situation itself (Trotsky 1931: 4). According to Trotsky, the occurrence of a revolutionary situation was bound to the economic crisis of capitalism. The occurrence of a revolution was furthermore bound to a political crisis beginning with a loss of legitimacy when “the proletariat [...] lose[s] its confidence not only in the conservatives and liberals, but also in the Labor Party” and begins to “concentrate its will and its courage for revolutionary aims and methods”. Furthermore, “the middle class must lose its confidence in the big bourgeoisie, in the lords, and turn their eyes to the revolutionary proletariat” and the ruling class itself “rejected by the masses, lose confidence in themselves” (Trotsky 1931: 4).

However, since these early thoughts the term itself underwent a broadening. It was adopted by Charles Tilly, who made it useful for a general academic study of revolutions beyond its former scope on communism and defined it as a situation in which at least two rival groups are competing for the power in a state (1978; 1999). A revolutionary situation is marked by high polarization, mass-mobilization of the population and two blocks which voice exclusive and incompatible claims to represent the state (Tilly 1999: 31 ff.). Similar to Trotsky, Tilly distinguishes between revolutionary situations and revolutionary outcomes, meaning that in a revolutionary situation a revolution is possible but not the mandatory outcome. Revolution occurs when the political power is transferred from the former incumbent to a new ruling alliance (Tilly 1999: 38). However, counterrevolution and repression are also a possible outcome of a revolutionary situation (see figure II).




Figure VIII: Revolutionary situations and possible outcomes

In this dissertation, I follow Tilly’s approach and define revolutionary situations in a broad sense. Instead of only focusing on full-blown *social revolutions* in the sense of a total transformation of the social, political and economic structure of a society, the concept used here also includes so-called *political revolutions*²⁶ (Skocpol 1979) and regime change as possible revolutionary outcomes. In the context of this work, a revolutionary situation therefore represents a political crisis that can generally be called a loss of vertical state legitimacy (Holsti 1996; Buzan 2009).²⁷ Vertical legitimacy encloses the population’s belief in a state’s moral and instrumental rightfulness to govern. Consequently, the loss of vertical legitimacy means that a given political system is challenged by an opposition which aims to replace the system or its leadership.

²⁶ Skocpol distinguishes between social and political revolutions. While the former changes the social structure and the political system, the latter only alters the political system but leaves the social structure of the society untouched. However, social revolutions are rare phenomena: Skocpol herself identifies only three cases, namely the French, the Russian, and the Chinese revolution. All three are described as “peasant revolutions”, ending in the liberation of the peasants and a loss of control of aristocratic rulers.

²⁷ Both differentiate between two sorts of political crises – the loss of vertical and the loss of horizontal state legitimacy.

Revolutionary situations – no matter whether they are driven by the desire to change the political system or to induce social change – can be defined as situations in which established regimes and linked power-formations begin to totter.²⁸

During revolutionary situations, the loss of legitimacy approaches an essential stage, or, in other words, there is manifest resistance against the given regime. In this stage of conflict escalation, resistance goes far beyond what Scott (1985) calls the “everyday” forms of resistance. These forms can be found in power relations where the powerless are obliged to adopt a strategic pose (Scott 1990) in the presence of the powerful. Although early forms of resistance might start that way (cf. Havel 1978), the focus of this research is on open, collectively organized and mass-based resistance which expresses itself in (mostly) nonviolent acts. Thus, nonviolent resistance, instead of being part of barely visible *infra-politics* (Scott 1990), becomes the weapon of choice and part of regular politics in these situations. Whereas the focus of this work is on nonviolent forms of resistance, it is important to mention that resistance in such heated stages of conflict is not necessarily nonviolent; it can also be expressed by violent means. On the contrary, many theories of conflict and social change would assume that conflicts of such scale and with such huge difference in the positions of the stakeholders are prone to violence. Theories of revolutions go even further in claiming that for revolutions to be successful and to bring about social and political change, they have to be violent (see section 3.3.). Against this conventional wisdom, there is empirical evidence that NVR not only contributed to large scale political change but – in avoiding most negative consequences of armed uprisings and violent revolutions – also

²⁸ Halliday argues that “revolutions are, above all, projects that claim to introduce something ‘new’ and which legitimate themselves by this.” (Halliday 1999: 140). Similarly, Hanna Arendt argues that a revolution is always preceded by a disintegration of the political system. Thereby the telling symptoms of disintegration “is a progressive erosion of governmental authority” (Arendt 1972: 69), preventing the government from functioning properly.

has a better track record of producing revolutionary outcomes (see for example Gumende 2017; Southall 2013; Holloway 2010; Melber 2009, Salih 2007).

4.3.) Why events matter: Critical junctures and path dependency

As revolutionary situations have been defined as particular situations or moments in which revolutionary change is possible, it is useful to consider the literature on critical junctures and path dependency to better understand their long-term effects.

According to Sewell, “historical events” can have “momentous consequences” or can even “change the course of history” (Sewell 1996: 842). Admitting that “most social practices [...] tend to be consistently reproduced over relatively extended periods of time” (Ibid: 842), Sewell argues that dynamics of social and political change are induced by historical events that can “reshape history” (Ibid: 843) by disrupting and altering previous social structures and practices. These historical events consist of “(1) a ramified sequence of occurrences that (2) is recognized as notable by contemporaries, and that (3) results in a durable transformation of structures” (Ibid: 844). Sewell backs his argument with the history of the French Revolution which can be traced back to a financial crisis in 1786 that led to a crisis of social stratification, a crisis of the political institutions, of the constitution of the political regime and finally of the social and political order. Similar to Aristide Zolberg’s “moments of madness” (Zolberg 1972), Sewell recounts the structural dislocation of historical events, but also the creativity and energy incorporated in them, as so “pervasive and deep” that “virtually everyone lives on the edge” (Sewell 1996: 845). The storming of the Bastille became a “major turning point” (Ibid: 850) and had such a “heavy symbolic significance” (Ibid: 851) that it was soon perceived as the founding action of the French Revolution.

In the same way, historical institutionalism understands institutions and their development as outcome of a dual dynamic of “relatively long periods of path-dependent institutional stability and reproduction that are punctuated occasionally by brief phases of institutional flux — referred to as critical junctures — during which more dramatic change is possible” (Capoccia and Kelemen 2007: 341). Critical junctures can be understood as “formative or founding moments” (Munck and Leff 1997: 343) and as periods of “significant change”, which typically occur in distinct country-specific ways (Collier and Collier 1991: 29). They represent events which allow the development of a society in one or another direction. The potential of the study of critical junctures and political crises has thus been used to explain political change (cf. prominently Moore 1966).

On the contrary, path dependence most generally simply means that contemporary decisions and events depend on earlier decisions and events (i.e. historical dependency). More specifically, path dependency means that, although originally several causal paths were available (causal possibility), once a particular path has been taken, other causal paths become less possible or impossible (closure) while specific processes keep actors on the chosen track (constraints) (Bennett and Elman 2006).

There are different explanations of the reasons why particular historical events can have such long-lasting effects for the further development of a society. From a social psychological stance, it is argued that important historical events matter, since they can be translated into widely shared collective narratives of a society. Such narratives incorporate “particular historical symbols that define rights and obligations for the group” and can gain a “charter status” (Liu and Gastardo-Conaco 2011: 171), coining the particular political culture of a society for a long time.

Therefore, social movement studies took an interest in events. According to Hess and Martin, so-called “transformative events” can represent turning points for a social movement “that dramatically increase or decrease the level of mobilization” (2006: 249).²⁹ Similarly, Della Porta (2008) takes up the concept and discusses the transformative capacity of “eventful protest” to shape a whole movement. Via individual relational, cognitive and affective mechanisms, “emotionally charged events” (Della Porta 2013: 68) can act as collective “turning points” for the organizational structures and strategies of a whole movement (Della Porta 2008: 24). While Della Porta understands these turning points as moments supporting and enhancing mobilization, Heaney and Rojas (2011) discuss events in the opposite, rather demobilizing way. Today, McAdam and Sewell argue that “no narrative account of a social movement can leave out events” (2001:101).

In sum, revolutions represent critical junctures in their purest form. They embody a radical break with the past and set a society on a certain path towards the future. They represent a collective change in mindset, tear down old social and political structures and set up new ones. Path dependency then prevents easy deviation from the once chosen track.

²⁹ Lee and Chan (2011) use the term “critical events” instead.

5.) Nonviolent resistance: A “dangerous idea” whose “time has come”?³⁰

This chapter acts as a theory chapter to this synopsis. It introduces the independent variable (NVR), demarcates it from other related concepts (section 5.1) and provides an overview of the assumptions how NVR works (5.2.1) and how it is related to democracy (5.2.2). Furthermore, it introduces the urban space as an intervening variable conducive to NVR (5.2.3). Section 5.2.3 thereby refers to the paper “Gewaltfreier Widerstand und urbaner Raum” (paper 6).

Although the phenomenon of nonviolent resistance has been “part of political life for millennia” (Zunes et al. 1999: 1),³¹ its academic history is a rather short one. “History, so diligent at recording disasters” has largely silenced the numbers of “courageous acts by individuals challenging authority and defying death” (Zinn 2009: 664).

One of the first modern reflections on NVR was published by the French philosopher Etienne de la Boétie as early as 1549. In his oeuvre “Discourse on the voluntary servitude”, de la Boétie, who had witnessed the bloody absolute rule of Henry the Second in France, tried to find an answer to the question “how it happens that so many men, so many villages, so many cities, so many nations, sometimes suffer under a single tyrant who has no other power than the power they give him?” (Boétie 1975 [1549]: 14). He concluded that is the voluntary servitude of the people which enables absolute monarchy – an idea that should have substantial impact on later concepts like non-cooperation and civil disobedience.

³⁰ Mark Kurlansky (2006) calls it a dangerous idea since it gives the citizen adequate means to resist. Given the rising numbers of nonviolent protests, Erica Chenoweth (2014) labelled it as an idea “whose time has come”.

³¹ Probably the first reported act of NVR can be dated back to 494 B.C, “when plebeians withdrew cooperation from their Roman patrician master” (Sharp 2002:19) and camped outside the city. This withdrawal of cooperation disrupted life in Rome and forced the consuls to yield to many of their demands.

Nearly three hundred years later, Percy Bysshe Shelley's poem "The Masque of Anarchy" (Shelly 1832), recounting the actions of the so-called Peterloo Massacre in St Peter's Field, Manchester on 16 August 1819, became another influential source for modern writers elaborating the ideas of nonviolence. On that day, a demonstration of 60 to 80 thousand people who demanded parliamentary representation was forcefully dispersed by a cavalry attack killing people and leaving many wounded. Shelley raised three essential thoughts of modern theories on nonviolence: to refrain from violence (even if the opponent uses violent means), the readiness to suffer, and what Gregg (1966) later called "moral jiu-jitsu". The poem itself gained an important place in the history of nonviolent resistance since it is said to have influenced famous thinkers like David Thoreau, Leo Tolstoy and Mahatma Gandhi and their vision of civil disobedience and nonviolent resistance (Weber 2003: 28 f.). However, despite these early and popular notions of the phenomenon, it took another century until NVR was first applied in a large-scale modern campaign - Ghandi's Salt March in 1930.

Despite Ghandi's success, and although NVR played a huge role in ending colonialism, establishing democracy and challenging racial discrimination (Roberts and Garton Ash 2011; Duduoet 2008; Atack 2012), it remained a neglected phenomenon in political science.³²

Instead of acknowledging NVR's role, historians and political scientists mainly focused on the

³² As a reaction, several attempts have been undertaken to re-evaluate history and shed light on the role of nonviolence in it. In their book on "Resistance, politics, and the American struggle for independence", Walter Conser, Ronald M. McCarthy, David J. Toscano, and Gene Sharp, for example, argue that most historians perceived the time between 1765 and 1775 as mere "prelude" to the war of independence, although the time was marked by "diverse" forms of resistance—"primarily nonviolent ones". These nonviolent forms of resistance – such as the resistance against the Stamp (1765) and Townshend Acts (1767) "were of fundamental importance [...] for the outcome of the struggle for independence, shaping the growth of new political, economic, and social institutions which could sustain truly independent self-government" (Conser et al. 1986: IX). Similarly, Maciej Bartkowski (2013) recently undertook an attempt to recover nonviolent history in liberation struggles since these often "have been misinterpreted or erased altogether from collective memory, buried beneath nationally eulogized violence, commemorative rituals of glorified death, martyred heroes, and romanticized violent insurrections" (Bartkowski 2013: 2).

more violent episodes of history. This contributed to the widespread and persistent belief that social and political change is mostly a matter of violence. Academic research on NVR slowly began in the early 20th century, boomed in the 1970s and reached a more or less constant level of attention from the 1990s onwards (Dudouet 2008).

As illustrated by table II, the phenomenon was empirically constantly on the rise from 1945 onwards. It took, however, until the decade from 1980-1990 until NVR campaigns first surpassed the number of violent conflicts around the globe.




Figure IX: Violent and nonviolent resistance movements 1945-2006 (Source Bethke 2015)

With the so-called “colour revolutions” in South Eastern and Eastern Europe (Dudouet 2008: 245; Schock 2003: 705) and the Arab Spring in the MENA region, the phenomenon recently gained wider attention by academic scholars and the media again.

5.1.) The many names of nonviolence

Most people would recognize NVR when they see it or read about it. Nevertheless, it is not easy to define it, since the phenomenon of nonviolence is conceptually covered by a whole family of related concepts – a fact that might have contributed to its neglect (Clements 2015:

2). As Ryan (2002: 6) points out: “Nonviolent philosophy comes in many shapes and sizes, from simple opposition to war, to belief systems encompassing a total way of life.” Concepts related to nonviolence such as pacifism, civil disobedience, people’s power and nonviolent action/resistance each use different terms to express certain specific foci and became popular during different times. In order to provide a working definition for this dissertation, this section will outline the main characteristics of NVR and demarcate the concept from the other related concepts.³³

Very basically, what unites all approaches is that they challenge the state (or single policies) and its monopoly of violence without using violence (Atack 2012). Beside this “minimal consensus on the lack of an intent to harm or injure another” (Bond 1988: 81), the approaches differ in the motivation that drives them, the goals, the context, the sort of violence they oppose and the number of participants.

5.1.1.) Pacifism: Nonviolent opposition against war

The first concept that is often mentioned with reference to nonviolence is pacifism. Pacifism became a reaction to the forceful conscription into national armies and, generally, a reaction against war as a mode of inter-state conflict-resolution. The term was coined by Emile Arnaud at the beginning of the 20th century (Haspel 2006: 527). In Europe, it emanated from various Christian churches which perceived their religion as being opposed to any form of violence and, thus, militarism (Brock 2015). Similarly, pacifism in the US has its origins predominantly in the tradition of the so-called peace churches (Quakers, Mennonites and Brethren). For decades, conscious objectors from these churches saw pacifism as an

³³ I will further elaborate on the limitations of the definition developed here in the discussion part.

individual, religious rather than a collective, political act. Besides these religious motivations, pacifism was also advanced by anarchists and other critics of state centralism which tried to move beyond single acts of conscious objection. However, these positions never became dominant (Mollin 2013: 9 f.). Similarly, especially the atrocities of the First and later the Second World War led to a proliferation of pacifist ideas. Pacifism was in vogue in large parts of the population and existed in various more or less radical forms, ranging from the objection of forceful conscription to the principal rejection of war. However, most acts of pacifism still consisted of acts of individual protest, omission and self-suffering. Contrary to nonviolent resistance, pacifism is therefore often seen as “an ethical principle that does not necessarily involve political action” (Dudouet 2008: 4).

5.1.2.) Civil disobedience: Moral philosophy of Henry Thoreau

Another closely-related concept is civil disobedience which goes back to the American Philosopher Henry David Thoreau’s essay “On the Duty of Civil Disobedience” (1849). Based on the insight that not all laws issued by a representative government must be morally right and that no citizen can assign his conscience to his government, Thoreau develops the idea of a duty “to refuse allegiance to, and to resist, the government, when its tyranny or its inefficiency are great and unendurable” (Thoreau 1849: 3). In contrast to pacifism, it is not a religious belief but individual moral considerations that drive the resistance. Like pacifism, civil disobedience is at first an individual action. It shares the same logic of acting ethically, assuming responsibilities and bearing the consequences.³⁴

³⁴ According to legend, Thoreau spent a night in jail since he refused to finance the American-Mexican war (1846-48) with his taxes (Richardson 1986: 175). Later he should write that “Under a government which imprisons any unjustly, the true place for a just man is [...] the prison” (Thoreau 1849: 13).

Although Thoreau was later described by Emma Goldman as “the greatest American anarchist” (Harbert Petrulionis 2006: 70), he rejected neither state nor laws in principle, but only certain policies he perceived as morally wrong. According to Hannah Arendt, Thoreau’s main concern was therefore to live a morally good life or at least to wash his hands of any evil. Consequentially, Thoreau would not believe that his actions “would make the world better” and that man had “any obligation to do so” (Arendt 1972: 60 f.). Summing it all up, Arendt argues that civil disobedience is not revolutionary since “the civil disobedient accepts, while the revolutionary rejects, the frame of established authority” (Ibid. 77).

5.1.3.) Satyagraha: Gandhi’s approach to nonviolence

Although Gandhi himself first used the term passive resistance for his approach, he later switched to the term Satyagraha, which translates as holding to the truth.³⁵ The first notion means objecting to violence to achieve one’s own goals; the second is diametrically opposed to violence since it means refraining from violence in any form and further allegorizes an honest attempt to transform the conflict engaged in (Gandhi 2001: 6). In this notion, Satyagraha is nothing less than an attempt to moralize politics, “fighting injustice and tyranny, solving social, political and economic disputes” and “establishing effective democracy [...]” (Chakrabarty 2006: 48 f.).

Since human beings are not capable of “knowing the absolute truth”, they are, according to Gandhi, not competent to punish (Gandhi 2001: 3). Violence cannot be legitimate means to solve political and social conflict since every death means a loss of a part of the godly truth.

³⁵ In western contexts, this term was typically translated into “non-violent resistance” or “non-violent action”, expressions that indicate the difference between passive suffering and active nonviolent resistance (Carter 2011: 27).

Instead, nonviolence becomes an essential part of every struggle. In Gandhi's understanding, nonviolence goes beyond a passive rejection of violent means and also includes active elements of love and charity (Chakrabaty 2006: 59 ff). Furthermore, violence is not limited to physical violence. In a truly nonviolent campaign, the activist "avoid[s] all intentional injuries to the opponent in thoughts, words and deeds" (Shanker Rai 2000: 59). According to Galtung, Gandhi's "whole theory of non-violence" is therefore "based on the idea of recognizing the human being in the other, appealing to that human being not only for compassion with one's own plight, but also for self-interest in a better future, to be enjoyed together" (Galtung 1989: 3). Gandhi saw it as the foremost duty of the resister to "liquidate the antagonism, not the antagonist" (Bose 1948: 221). Beyond this, Gandhi understands the adversary as someone "whose sense of humanity could be awakened through the use of non-violence" (Dalton 2012: 96). In other words, Gandhi believes in the human being behind the role of the opponent who can be reached by human action – especially by human suffering.

Thus, Gandhi saw the necessity to address conflicts on the individual and systemic level. While the individual resister should, on a personal level, "constantly seek to persuade his opponent" and never lose sight of the possibility of reconciliation during the conflict (Nagler 2014: 6 ff.), the Satyagraha campaign should be complemented on a collective level by a constructive program reducing structural mechanisms of submission (Dalton 2012: 46). During his campaign in India, for example, Gandhi aimed to overcome the structural problems of unemployment and the monopolization of the Indian cotton industry by Britain. In the course of this campaign, Gandhi supported the production of home-made cotton with the help of spinning wheels (Crane and Agustin-Panareda 2007: 13). Nevertheless, Gandhi was far from being a nationalist concerned with national economic development. In fact, he

was more a “religious anarchist” or a “religious pacifist” (Pasricha 2010: 25), since he always shared Tolstoy’s and Thoreau’s skepticism towards the state. According to Pasricha (2010: 5), Gandhi, having fought state discrimination and repression for his whole life, “could hardly avoid sharing the rebels’ deep suspicion and biased view” of the state. This represents a key difference between Gandhi the anarchist and Sharp the realist (Clements 2015: 3). To express his opinion on the state, Gandhi echoed Thoreau in stating that the state is closest to being nonviolent “where the people are governed least.” He further claimed that civil disobedience wouldn’t be necessary anymore in a perfect democracy. Even more, it would be illegitimate since such a democracy would provide multiple “lawful means for vindicating justice” (Mukherjee 1993: 282).

5.1.4.) NVR as “strategy for imperfect people in an imperfect world”: The strategic approach

Although there had been scholars of nonviolence before, especially Gene Sharp’s research became influential and established him as pioneer in the field. Sharp has been a scholar of Gandhi and had written his dissertation on Gandhi’s normative concept (Sharp 1960). Over time, however, he more and more distanced himself from Gandhi’s normative and demanding approach.³⁶ Instead, he tried to popularize the concept and developed a more pragmatic approach to nonviolence (Weber 2003).³⁷

Sharp no longer assumes that refraining from violence has to be an irrevocable principle in life, rooted in a religious “belief-system of individuals” (Roberts and Garton Ash 2011: 7), but

³⁶ Stiehm (1968) originally used the terms “conscientious” and “pragmatic” to describe both camps.

³⁷ Proponents of the strategic approach typically argue that principled nonviolence is rather the exception than the rule. According to Ackerman, 85 % of all nonviolent acts are motivated by strategy and not by principle - mostly because a military option does not seem a viable option under the given circumstances (Ackerman and Krueger 1994: 4). McIntosh (2010) therefore uses terms like “consequentialist” and “utilitarian”.

perceives nonviolent action as a “pragmatic choice” which is selected due to its “anticipated effectiveness” (Sharp 2005: 19 f).³⁸ In this thinking, nonviolent action becomes a technique or even a weapon system (Sharp 1973a; 1990; 2005) that can be applied in asymmetric conflict scenarios where it does not make sense to fight “on the opponent’s own terms and with weapons where most advantages lie with him” (Sharp 1985: 601). According to Sharp, nonviolent *action* (Sharp 1973a; 1973b; 1985, 2005, own emphasis) thereby is an “alternative to both, passivity and violence” (2005: 3). Thus, nonviolent action diverges significantly from popular assumptions about conflict, “in particular the assumption that violence can be effectively met only with violence” (Sharp 1973b: 109). It questions as well the belief that violent struggle is always faster and more effective in producing the wished political outcome (Sharp 2000: 9). This approach fundamentally challenges Weber’s dictum that “[t]he decisive means for politics is violence” and that “who lets himself in for politics” necessarily contracts with the diabolic means of power and force (Weber cited by Wolin 1981: 407). Nevertheless, Sharp’s approach to nonviolence differs from the other approaches as it is based on different understandings of conflict as well as motivation for nonviolence.

While for Gandhi, constructive conflict transformation and the conversion, not the destruction of the opponent should be the result of conflict resolution, proponents of the strategic approach understand conflict mainly on basis of a rational choice zero-sum logic (Nagler 2014: 14). In this reading, resistance (or sanctions) is respectively are conceptualized as a “tool” that raises the costs for the enemy (Ackerman and Kruegler 1994: 3f.). Additionally, proponents of strategic NVR typically follow a rather minimal definition of violence, meaning that the principle of doing no harm is limited to acts of physical violence

³⁸ According to Sharp, “Nonviolence is what people do, not what they believe” (1973: 110).

and leaves out aspects of cultural and psychological violence (Clements 2015: 9). Thus, Ackerman and Rodal state that "[c]ivil resistance is not about melting hearts but about developing power" (Ackerman and Rodal 2008: 119). Similarly, Sharp states that nonviolent action should not be equated with "purely psychological persuasion". Although Sharp mentions conversion as one of the strategic ways to "influence the opponent and its capacity for action" (Sharp 1985: 706), he stresses that nonviolent action should particularly be understood as the use of economic, social and political power (Sharp 1973a: 70). Consequently, accommodation and nonviolent coercion are the more important mechanisms of change behind nonviolent action.³⁹

Finally, the strategic approach is characterized by a less ambivalent relation to the state. Although Sharp first developed the concept as a nonviolent defense strategy against foreign occupation (Sharp 1985; Sharp and Jenkins 1990), the concept more and more became a blueprint for nonviolent rebellion and revolution against authoritarian rulers (Sharp 2011) and a measure to "precede, abet, and defend the democratizing process" (Ackerman and Kruegler 1994: XXIII). As will be explained in more detail below (5.2.1.), pragmatic nonviolent action aims at the dispersion of formerly centralized power. However, it does not include a "fundamental rethinking of state institutions or the nature of the relationships between civil society and the state" (Clemens 2015:12). It is therefore criticized for being "state oriented" (Chabot and Sharifi 2013: 219) or "reformistic" since it aims at a "temporary separation of the current head of state from the pillars of support, not an entire restructuring of the state system" (Braatz 2014: 6; similar Johnstad 2008).

³⁹ These mechanisms should not be conflated with mechanisms in the understanding of process tracing (Beach and Pedersen 2016), since these are usually far more elaborate and more fine-grained. Additionally, the term might be misleading as these mechanisms described by Sharp do not only describe the causal effect inducing the political and social change, but also a certain intensity of conflict and, lastly, different conflict outcomes.

The following table summarizes the main differences between the concepts introduced above.

	Pacifism	Civil Disobedience	Satyagraha	Nonviolent Action
Level	Individual (collective)	Individual	Collective	Collective
Motivation	Religious/ conscientious	Conscientious/ ethics	Religious	Strategic/ political
Object	War	Immoral laws	All forms of violence	(Political) violence
Context	Interstate war/conscription	policy change	All forms of conflict	Political conflict (policy and polity)
Goal	Upholding principles	Reformistic/ acting morally	Maximalist/ changing men and society	Every type of political struggle

Table I: Forms of nonviolence and their differences

5.1.5.) Defining the X: A working definition of NVR

As I have shown, there are several approaches to nonviolence that are all closely linked but nevertheless differ in important aspects. In the following, I will develop a working definition of nonviolent resistance that guides the research of this dissertation. As outlined above, pacifism and civil disobedience both describe phenomena mainly located on the individual level. Furthermore, both do not adequately grasp either the context of revolutionary situations or the goal of revolutionary political change. On the contrary, Gandhi's and Sharp's concepts both understand resistance as collective phenomena. As described above, they however, differ in the context and the goal. In this dissertation, I will mostly stick to the narrower reading of Sharp's strategic approach.

In contrast to Sharp, I will use the term nonviolent resistance (NVR) instead of the term nonviolent action. The term nonviolent action has often been criticized for being too unspecific, since anything that is not violence can be considered as nonviolent action (Schock

2003: 705).⁴⁰ Thus, in consequence, “action without violence is so broad that it becomes a trivial concept” (Vinthagen 2015b: 13). Most authors would agree that it is not just action, but specific political action; an action that aims to resist a certain policy or form of polity and/or aims to introduce another one (Ackerman and Duval 2001; Schock 2003, 2005; Dudouet 2008). To make this clear, the use of the term resistance seems more appropriate. Although the term resistance has also been used in a broad and sometimes meaningless way, Hollander and Einwohner (2004) identified two core components. They clarify that resistance is, first, necessarily a political act and, second, an act which somehow includes opposition to someone or something. Starting from these core principles, Hollander and Einwohner (2004) identify seven types of resistance, varying according to the degree of intent and the recognition by the opponent or outside observers.⁴¹ Given the focus on nonviolent resistance in revolutionary situations, this dissertation excludes unintended (e.g. “unwitting”, “target defined” or “externally defined”) forms of resistance.

This dissertation follows the definition of Gene Sharp that nonviolent resistance is “socio-political action for applying power in a conflict without the use of violence” (Sharp 1999: 567). This definition is limited to the use of physical violence and does not include psychological, structural (Galtung 1969), and cultural (Galtung 1990) violence. Since resistance is a term linked to opposition, nonviolence only refers to the actions and intentions of the opposition within the conflict. Furthermore, as in reality no mass movement will ever follow this clear-cut dichotomy between violence and nonviolence (Ackerman and Kruegler 1994: 9), I follow Chenoweth and Stephen’s (2013) pragmatic

⁴⁰ Garver (1974: 267) for instance criticized that the term is so broad that “anything that is neither exclusively verbal nor directly harmful to others seems to be a method [of NVR]”.

⁴¹ Both differentiate between the intended versions of “overt” and covert resistance, unintended “unwitting”, “target defined” and “externally defined” resistances, and forms which are not recognized; either “missed” or “attempted” resistance (Hollander and Einwohner 2004: 544).

empirical approach which defines movements as nonviolent when they are “predominantly nonviolent”.

To conclude: Nonviolent Resistance is understood as an intentional and recognizable collective act that takes an oppositional stance against certain politics or form of polity. Its goal can be defensive or offensive in nature and can comprise “acts of commission” as well as “acts of omission” (Gletdisch and Rivera 2017; Sharp 2005). It differs from both violent resistance and institutional politics (McCarthy 1990; Schock 2003), is transgressive and may be either legal or illegal.

5.2.) How NVR is assumed to work

This section focuses on existing theoretical assumptions of how NVR works (5.2.1.), how it is assumed to affect democracy (5.2.2.) and how it depends on the urban space (5.2.3.).

5.2.1.) Mechanism of change

“The power of civil resistance comes not from hammering away at an opponent through direct armed assaults or asymmetric wars of attrition; rather, it inheres in its ability to undermine the power of the opponent through collective action [...]” (Schock 2013: 283)

As outlined in the section on the strategic approach to NVR (see section 5.1.4.), Sharp (1973 b) distinguishes three different potential mechanisms through which NVR can contribute to political change: conversion, accommodation, and coercion.⁴² This section discusses these mechanisms, but will also go beyond them since Sharp’s conceptualization is theoretically less rigid.⁴³ Generally speaking, Sharp assumes that all mechanisms share one commonality: they operate by “producing power changes” (Sharp 2000: 14).

The first mechanism is described as *conversion*. In this mechanism, the political opponent is “inwardly changed so that he wants to make the changes desired by the nonviolent actionists” (Sharp 1973b: 706). To achieve this change, activists typically use protest and persuasion techniques which are “mainly symbolic acts [...] extending beyond verbal expressions but stopping short of non-cooperation or nonviolent intervention” (Sharp

⁴² During his lifetime scholarship, Sharp collected 198 different nonviolent techniques categorized in three groups: protest and persuasion, non-cooperation and nonviolent intervention (Sharp 1973b). These groups correspond to his mechanisms of change discussed in this paragraph.

⁴³ The term mechanism as introduced by Sharp to describe how NVR affects political change should not be conflated with mechanisms in the understanding of process tracing (Beach and Pedersen 2016). The latter are usually far more elaborated and more fine-grained.

1973b: 117) and aim at influencing the opponent and the public (Sharp 1973b: 118). The outcome of conversions is an amicable solution and a change of polity or policy.

The second mechanism, *accommodation*, is understood as a process in which the “opponent does not agree with the changes” but, although he could pursue the conflict, “concluded that it is best to grant some or all of the demands” (Sharp 1973b: 706). This means that most accommodations end in a compromise. They are achieved by the means of non-cooperation involving “the deliberate discontinuance, withholding, or defiance of certain existing relationships – social, economic or political” (Sharp 1973b: 183). Non-cooperation may operate negatively or positively, meaning that “they may disrupt, and even destroy, established behavior patterns, policies, relationships, or institutions” or they “may establish new ones, “which are preferred” (Sharp 1973b: 357).

Third, in processes of *nonviolent coercion*, “the opponent has not changed his mind on the issues and wants to continue the struggle but is unable to do so” (Sharp 1973b: 706). Nonviolent coercion is usually achieved by techniques of nonviolent intervention which “pose a more direct and immediate challenge” to the opponent (Sharp 1973b: 357). They include practices like hunger strikes, sit-ins and blockades, developing a high degree of psychological pressure.




Figure X: Conversion, accommodation, coercion, and political change

Conceptually, this is not very convincing. First, power changes which are used to explain the outcome of political change are more of an outcome in itself, since all mechanisms produce them and there are no more mechanisms separating power changes and political change. Second, Sharp's differentiation between the mechanisms, particularly between accommodation and the other two mechanisms, is not fully consistent. Accommodation and coercion both depend on social, economic, and political pressure, whereas accommodation and conversion both rely on the principle that the power of the opponent is not broken. Consequently, only coercion and conversion differ fundamentally in the way the outcome is achieved while accommodation is more a mixed type combining aspects of conversion and coercion. In the following, I will therefore focus on the ideal-types conversion and coercion. Since both are not further developed by Sharp, I recur to the wider literature on NVR to spell out the connection between NVR and power changes in more detail. Nevertheless, these assumed effects are far from consistent.

5.2.1.1.) How conversion comes to terms: Conflict transformation, utopian enactment, and the role of suffering

"It is not violence that makes the slave an equal."
(Vinthagen 2015b: 207)

The first function of NVR can be described as the transformation of a latent conflict into a visible and manifest one. This transformation means that conflict parties become aware of the different conflicting positions, begin to develop conflict-induced emotions and, finally, show an observable conflict behavior (Pondy 1967: 300-1). This manifestation of conflict might lead to a conversion if the opponent becomes aware of his/her misconduct or proactively tries to avoid conflict. In asymmetric conflicts where conflict parties are not

equal or not perceived as equal, however, this outcome is unlikely. In this case, the opposition can react with disobedience. The power holders will respond to this either with (violent) sanctions to enforce compliance and obedience, or just ignore the demands of the opposition.

In case of violent repression, an effect occurs that was labelled “moral jiu-jitsu” (Gregg 1936: 380) and was later reinterpreted as “political jiu-jitsu” (Sutton et al. 2014; Sharp 1985).⁴⁴ This effect is based on two factors, which are the moral high ground of refraining from violence and the self-sacrificing human suffering. This combination “yields a tremendous hidden power to transform conflict” since nonviolent activists share with soldiers their “willingness to die for their values, the pacifist refuses to kill for them” (McIntosh 2010: 46). Thus, the activist shows ultimate compassion, underlining the importance of his/her goals without presenting a threat to his/her opponent. As Galtung states, NVR is based on the idea “of recognizing the human being in the other, appealing to that human being not only for compassion with one's own plight, but also for self-interest in a better future, to be enjoyed together” (Galtung 1989: 3). Some therefore argue that “[t]here must be some sense of unity even with our opponents, some confidence that they can be reached, no matter how hostile their present state of mind” (Nagler 2014: 14).

Two aspects of NVR thereby help to achieve the goal of a shared better future as mentioned by Galtung. The first one is what Vinthagen (2015b) calls utopian enactment. Since hostility and violence are based on negative emotions and attitudes against as well as prejudice towards the “opponent”, utopian enactment focuses on the “individual’s relationship to the other, the opponent, and its attempts to counter prevailing images, emotional dispositions and attitudes towards the activist” (Vinthagen 2015b: 209). In this line of thinking, for

⁴⁴ Martin (2007) calls this the backfire-effect through which repression can fall back onto the regime.

instance, the act of disobeying segregation laws by going to a “whites only” beach or restaurant with a mix of white and coloured activists not only expresses opposition, but also plainly depicts that another future is possible and that all humans have similar needs and dreams. Thus, NVR addresses hostility and dysfunctional human relations and aims to transform or repair them (King 2007: 106) by suffering and utopian enactment.

The second one is the “principle of reversibility” (Galtung 1996: 271). Contrary to violent actions, NVR has the advantage that it is relatively easy to transition from the conflict to the post-conflict mode (see section 8). In other words, NVR has a dual character: it works by ending cooperation on unequal terms but provides the ability to renew cooperation on more equal terms without having to go through the process of post-conflict reconciliation. In this sense, NVR has the ability to decrease social distance (Schock 2013: 284) and to facilitate dialogue on more equal terms (Vinthagen 2015b).

Building upon these theoretical assumptions, the mechanism of conversion can be depicted in the following way:




Figure XI: How conversion works

Nonviolent conversion counters the given hegemony and authoritarian power (a power that does rely on command and obedience) (Mann 1990) by using soft power resources (Nye 1990; 2004). Contrary to hard power, which relies on economic and military potential, soft power aims to influence and create mutually binding norms. The result might be described as diffuse power (Mann 1990) – a sort of power that spreads spontaneously and produces

similar social practices. Diffuse power relies on compliance since the social practices are rooted in mutual interest or moral high ground.

5.2.1.2.) *Coercion: Breaking and undermining power*

“[N]obody can rule over dead men.” (Arendt 1958: 201)

As we have seen, conversion aims to change the attitudes of the political opponent and tries to repair or transform the relationship between the activists and their contenders. Nevertheless, according to Sharp, most struggles are won through accommodation, as for example in smaller labour conflicts, or coercion. Thereby, accommodation and coercion mostly rely on methods of non-cooperation, such as boycotts, general strikes etc. By denying the regime obedience and support (Martin 1989: 213), both undermine or even break the power of the opponent by forcing the opponent into accommodation.⁴⁵ Consequently, three factors are essential for the success of NVR.

First, NVR operates by polarization (Engler and Engler 2016) and “create[s] such a crisis and foster[s] such a tension that a community which has constantly refused to negotiate is forced to confront the issue. It seeks so to dramatize the issue that it can no longer be ignored” (King 1963). According to Sharp, “individuals may protest or resign and barely be noticed, but if all persons in a government department refuse to implement a policy, their actions can create a major crisis” (2005: 35). This means that non-cooperation and disobedience must be widespread in order to be able to successfully control or undermine

⁴⁵ In some rare cases which Sharp labels disintegration, “[...] noncooperation and resistance become so complete that the opponents now lack even a semblance of control [...]. The opponent’s bureaucracy refuses to obey its own leadership. The opponent’s troops and police mutiny. The opponent’s usual supporters or population repudiate their former leadership, denying that they have any right to rule at all [...]”. In other words, the “disintegration of the opponent’s system is so complete that they do not even have sufficient power to surrender.” (Sharp 2002: 36).

the rulers' power (Sharp 2000: 6). To muster such numbers, the opposition needs to mobilize wide parts of the population.⁴⁶ As outlined above, regime repression and the suffering of the activists can backfire (Martin 2007) and help to alienate former bystanders and supporters of the regime.

Second, while the repression might be important for polarization and consequentially mobilization, the success of NVR depends on more than that. As outlined above in the discourse on power, NVR relies on disruptive power. This kind of power depends more on the degree of interdependences between the opposition and the regime (Summy 1994; Schock 2013) than on pure numbers only. Thus, it is important that such interdependences exist and that defections from the government side (Nepstad 2013) take place and weaken the so called "pillars of support" (Helvey 2007), namely the economic basis, the bureaucracy and the security apparatus. The military Junta in El Salvador, for example, was able to survive several general strikes during the 1980s since its budget was mainly financed by the United States. Thus, dependence on the obedience and the income generated by the own population was low (Zunes 1994: 421).⁴⁷

Third, if there are no or little interdependences between government and the opposition or the dehumanization of the political enemy is at an advanced stage, the latter has to "extend the battlefield" and to mobilize international support via the "great chain of nonviolence" (Galtung, 1989 see also Schock 2013; Chenoweth and Stephan 2011). In this case, international advocates who are "sufficiently close to the oppressors" and "still seen as human beings by them, to touch the human nerve in them" (Galtung 1989: 21) or who

⁴⁶ According to Kuran (1989), the cost of collective action decreases when the size of a protest movement increases. When the political opposition to a regime reaches a critical level, regime change is likely (similarly Schock 2013). As a rule of a thumb, Chenoweth (2017) states that no regime could survive if 3,5% of a population are engaged in NVR. Empirically, the median size of non-violent campaigns is around 100,000. In contrast to this, the average size of violent campaigns is only about 4000 (terrorist groups tend to be smaller) (Skreke Gleditsch and Rivera 2016).

⁴⁷ See also the literature on the stability of so-called rentier states (for example Abulof 2015; Smith 2004).

possess the leverage to undermine or to break the power of the government, have to advocate on behalf of the powerless. Building on these theoretical insights, the way how coercion works can be depicted in the following way:




Figure XII: How coercion works

In processes of nonviolent coercion, the power relation is changed by two developments. First, it is changed by the empowerment of acting together (Sharp 2005: 28; Burrowes 1996: 117), and second, by developing a power of refusal or non-cooperation (Clark 2009: 5). In other words, the opposition first builds up collective power (Parsons 1960), a form of power that evolves from and enables collective action (see also Arendt 1970).⁴⁸ Second, by disobeying collectively, the opposition gains further disruptive power (Piven 2006) or the “power of veto” (Gregg 1936: 160). This undermines the power of the regime (Sharp 2000). – at least for some time - and forces it into concessions or resignation.

5.2.2.) NVR and democracy

As highlighted above, NVR is often seen as a tool for inducing democratic transitions and democratic practice per se. Consequently, Ackermann and Kruegler state that “[n]onviolent action may be the prevailing means by which civil society first asserts, and then defends

⁴⁸ On the contrary, authors like Mills (1958), Weber (1978), and Jouvenel (1949) propose a distributive approach towards power in which power is a zero-sum game. In this reading, a gain in power of one group is, necessarily and by definition, at the expense of the other group.

itself from counterattack” (1994: XXIII). Similarly, Sharp assumes “significant long-term-effects” (2000: 18) of NVR on democratic stability and quality.

Additionally, NVR is often thought to create important preconditions for democracy as it redistributes power within society in breaking the power of the incumbent leaders and empowering the broader population (Ackerman and Rodal 2008: 119; Sharp 2000: 7). Furthermore, after successful NVR people gain “enhanced self-confidence in their ability to influence the course of events” (Sharp 2000: 17 f.), which is essential for further democratic participation.

The argument goes that the power gained by the population is preserved in so-called “loci of power” (Sharp 2000: 7; 2005: 35). Loci of power are independent civic organisations and associations like clubs or unions which can “provide a countervailing force against the power of the ruler, especially when the loci are numerous and widely distributed throughout society” (Martin 2001: 215). When these loci of power can act independently and wield effective power, the ruler’s power “is most likely subjected to controls and limits”, a condition that can be associated with freedom (Sharp 2000: 7 f.). Thus, in dichotomous thinking, the power of the ruler (central government) is controlled by the independent loci of power, providing a kind of non-institutionalized checks and balances. This concept of democracy clearly corresponds with a Tocquevillean tradition.

If this complete disintegration of the whole oppressive system is achieved through nonviolent interventions, even social revolution seems thinkable. Like Ina Atack states, the “creative” methods of nonviolent intervention are used by the grievance group “to build alternative political institutions and forms of social organization to replace those of the old,

oppressive society” (Atack 2012: 115) and resemble what Gandhi (2001) calls a “constructive programme”.

Beyond these theoretical links between NVR and democracy, there is a widespread consensus in the empirical research on NVR, democratic transitions and the stability of autocratic regimes that NVR is indeed more effective in challenging autocratic regimes and bringing about democratic transitions than violent uprisings (Kim 2017; Kadivar and Caren 2016; Chenoweth and Stephen 2013, Gleditsch and Celestino 2013, Ackerman and Karatnycky 2005; Ulfelder 2005). Some of these studies further indicate a short-term effect of NVR on the quality of democracy (Kadivar and Caren 2016; Bethke and Pinckney 2016; Chenoweth and Stephan 2013; Ackerman and Karatnycky 2005).⁴⁹

5.2.3. Discourse on NVR and urban space

The rising numbers of NVR campaigns around the globe led to some speculation what might drive this increase. While some argued that this can be explained by diffusion and learning processes (Gallagher Cunningham et al. 2017; Gleditsch and Rivera 2017), others argued that globalization might be the driver since it increases international interdependences and therefore provides more leverage. This leverage can be used by internal dissidents to pressure their own governments into democratic reforms (Karakaya 2016).

However, there are also explaining factors on the national, sub-national or regional level. As Gleditsch and Rivera (2017: 1124) found out, campaigns which adopt nonviolent direct action as their main tactic usually take place in urban environments and are typically supported by the educated middle class, composed mainly of students who can assemble

⁴⁹ For a more detailed discussion see the papers on “The democratic dividend” and “The democratizing effect”.

bigger support networks and resources. Thus, nonviolent movements differ from other uprisings not only in their social basis but also in their spatial occurrence.⁵⁰

This short excursus introduces the urban space as intervening variable which is conducive for NVR. It builds upon the paper “Nonviolent Resistance and Urban Space”⁵¹ (paper 6) co-authored with Prof. Dr Janet Kursawe. The paper theoretically discusses why urban space is conducive for NVR. The review led to two explanations: First, NVR works by using interdependences as leverage in political conflict. The urban space with its high division of labour is therefore predestined for campaigns based on disobedience, non-cooperation and public protest. Historically, it was not a result of coincidence that the rise of capitalism, urbanization and the increase of NVR as a “consistently consequential political force” (Schock 2013: 278) both took place in the 19th century. Furthermore, the concentration of significant quantities of people in relatively small areas is conducive for mass mobilization which, in turn, is needed for NVR campaigns. Second, since NVR is mainly a symbolic struggle, the urban environment with its many symbolic places like government buildings, public monuments, transport axes and the like, provides many possibilities for spectacular symbolic protest events. In addition to this, the urban environment provides better conditions for national and international media coverage which is essential for the mobilization of internal as well as external support.

The paper therefore adds value to the debate on the prerequisites for a nonviolent struggle by highlighting the close connection between NVR and the urban space. This close connection also points out a hitherto neglected field of research, namely the problematic relationship between NVR and the rural space. Questions like “how can NVR be waged

⁵⁰ Consequentially, the typical and more structural risk factors for civil wars (such as terrain) do not feature well in explaining the occurrence of NVR campaigns (Chenoweth and Lewis 2013).

⁵¹ This paper was originally published in German as “Gewaltfreier Widerstand und Urbaner Raum”.

successfully in rural areas?” or “how can urban and rural campaigns be linked effectively?” have not been addressed by the literature on NVR so far and display promising potential for future research.

6.) NVR and democratic endurance: The democratic dividend of nonviolent resistance

This chapter briefly summarizes the findings of the paper “The democratic dividend of nonviolent resistance” (co-authored with Daniel Lambach and Felix S. Bethke) and puts it into the context of the overall research interest of this dissertation. In the wider framework of this dissertation, the purpose of the paper is to establish the correlation between X (NVR) and Y (sustainable democratization). Studies on NVR were hitherto either based on relatively few cases (Ackerman and Karatnycky 2005; Johnstad 2010) or focused on a comparatively short period of democratic improvement directly after the transitions (Chenoweth and Stephan 2013; Chenoweth and Lewis 2013). Furthermore, the existing studies differentiated only between such transitions that were either driven by NVR or by violence, leaving out top-down transitions. The paper overcomes these limitations by building a unique dataset based on the Nonviolent and Violent Conflict Dataset (NAVCO 2.0) (Chenoweth and Lewis 2013) and Ulfelder’s (2012) democracy/autocracy dataset (DAD) and subsequently applying a survival analysis. The results of this analysis reveal a strong effect of NVR on democratic survival. As depicted in figure 3 below, this effect is especially strong during the first 20 years of the new democratic regime. While the general median survival time for all democratic regimes experiencing a transition is 11 years, it is shorter (5 years) in the case of violent transitions and top-down transitions (9 years). In contrast to this, NVR-induced regimes survive substantially longer with a median survival time of 47 years.




Figure XIII: Modes of resistance and democratic endurance (Bayer, Bethke, Lambach 2016: 765)

Therefore, we conclude that there is something like a democratic dividend of NVR. During the first ten years after the transition, the survival rate of both top-down and violent transitions decreases drastically. Thus, regimes which witnessed such a transition seem to struggle with this initial period of consolidation, e.g. the period until the institutional checks and balances are put in place and become fully accepted and effective.

The findings of the paper “The democratic dividend” add value to the existing literature in two ways. First, it challenges the conventional wisdom within the literature on democratic transitions and democratic consolidation that “an active, militant, and highly mobilized popular upsurge may be an efficacious instrument for bringing down a dictatorship but may make subsequent democratic consolidation difficult” (O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986: 65). Second, it complements the existing literature on the topic by focusing on the long-term effects of NVR on democratic survival.

The main purpose of this paper was to establish a correlation between NVR (the X) and sustainable democratization ($Y_{\text{Sustainable}}$). For this aim, the paper uses democratic survival as a proxy for one aspect of sustainable democratization (namely the endurance aspect

$Y_{\text{Endurance}}$). Thus, the papers do not explain the effect of NVR on the quality of democracy ($Y_{\text{Development}}$). We can only infer that a democracy which has been able to survive at least satisfies the demands of a majority of the population and, thus, can be regarded as being qualitatively superior to those having failed due to internal resistance and authoritarian backlashes. However, the paper on “The democratizing effect of nonviolent resistance” analyzes this more deeply effect of NVR on the quality of democracy.

7.) The democratizing effect of nonviolent resistance

“Revolutions are just the beginning of a long process. Even after a peaceful revolution, it generally takes half a decade for any type of stable regime to consolidate.” (Goldstone 2011: 336)

This part focuses on the actual effects of NVR applied during the revolutionary situation which are dealt with in the paper “The democratizing effect of nonviolent resistance: How nonviolent resistance featured democratic consolidation in Benin”. The findings are based on a single case process-tracing approach which is complemented with results of other studies.⁵²

The analysis of democratic consolidation in Benin showed that the NVR in Benin had a clearly positive effect on the survival of the democracy ($Y_{endurance}$). Several presidential attempts to change the constitution in order to circumvent presidential term limits were prevented through mass-based nonviolent interventions by the vibrant civil society of Benin. This vigilant civil society and its support for the constitution can be traced back to the nonviolent resistance against the previous authoritarian regime. First, the civil society gained the ability to mobilize larger parts of the population during this phase. Second, the nonviolent struggle established civil society interventions as a legitimate instrument of participation. Third, due to the participatory and consensual approach of the National Assembly, the constitution has been widely accepted as binding and is generally highly valued.

The findings further suggest, however, that the effects of NVR on the different dimensions of consolidation (institutional, representational, behavioral, and civic culture) are rather mixed and less clear than its above-mentioned effect on the survival of democracy itself.

⁵² So far only two more studies are available (Pinckney 2018; Chandler 2018).

The main mechanism that links NVR and democratic consolidation ($Y_{\text{development}}$) of democracy in Benin is the internalization of democratic norms by large sections of the population and, hence, the ability to prevent authoritarian backlashes by elites. The paper further revealed the importance of a founding narrative for the development of civic culture. This founding narrative of a peaceful, people-induced transition had two effects in Benin: first, it perfectly symbolizes the sovereignty of the people and leads to a high sense of agency among citizens. Second, it emotionally links the individual citizen to the existing democracy and thus can be used to remobilize democratic forces in defense of it. This is supported by Pinckney (2018: 18), who finds that NVR “spreads norms of political engagement and increases civil societies’ capacity to pressure political elites long after the nonviolent resistance campaign that overthrew the old regime has ended”. As a restriction, one has to consider that movements tend to demobilize over time. This aspect – however rarely studied (one exception being Heaney and Rojas 2011) – plays an important role for the effect of NVR on democratic consolidation, since this effect depends on the movement’s ability to hold representatives accountable (Chandler 2018) and to press for new reforms.

Beside the positive effect on the development of a culture of citizenship, the paper also identifies positive effects on the institutional dimension of consolidation. The open and inclusive process of the nonviolent transition leads to a high acceptance of the constitution and of institutions like the constitutional court. Similarly, Pinckney (2018: 71) states that the active and constructive engagement in the constituent assembly, where the future basis of the democracy is negotiated, is one effective way to avoid the pitfall of “street radicalism” which can lead to a failure of the movement. This positive effect of constructive engagement is further supported by Bethke and Pinckney (2016), who find statistical evidence that NVR exerts a positive influence on the quality of democracy, foremost on certain freedoms like

the freedom of association and expression. In a similar vein, Cervellati et al. (2014: 226) argue that “[p]eaceful transitions lead to a social contract that provides all groups with political representation and leads to better protection of civil liberties than violent transitions.”

However, the effects of NVR on the dimension of representative and behavioral consolidation proved to be less clear. The assumed effect of NVR on the behavioral consolidation, which is understood as bringing former activists into important positions to advance their ideals and the checks and balances provided by a mobilized public, were only short-lived in Benin. Additionally, a positive effect on representational consolidation could not be confirmed. Despite the existence of a generally inclusive institutional setting, few parties emerged from the public mobilization. The field of institutionalized party politics was taken over by strong businessmen and local leaders at a very early stage of the transition process. Today, the political system is influenced by patronage parties, a fact that seriously constrains representational consolidation.

Generally, the paper contributes to the yet very limited debate on the mechanism of change linked to NVR campaigns. Furthermore, its findings highlight some areas for future research, namely processes of demobilization and post-revolutionary frustration. Nevertheless, the assumption that successful NVR leads to a higher feeling of agency or political efficacy has still to be tested systematically.

8.) How violent resistance hinders democratic development

“The practice of violence, like all action, changes the world, but the most probable change is to a more violent world.” (Arendt 1969: 80)

In contrast to violent transitions, nonviolent resistance spares the post-conflict and transitioning society many negative consequences. A lot has been written about problems like disarmament and reintegration (McMullin 2013), economies of violence that have to be overcome or transformed (Jean and Rufin 1999; Ruf 2003) or post-conflict reconciliation (Bloomfield et al. 2003) and transitional justice (Kritz 1995; Teitel 2000) in order to avoid conflict traps and renewed violent conflict (Collier et al. 2003; Johnstad 2010). Due to these challenges, many violent conflicts have the tendency to re-escalate into violence (Collier and Sambanis 2002), directly challenging democratic development.

Nonviolent resistance avoids many of these pitfalls since it is based on the principle of reversibility (see section 5.2.) and is by nature “a self-limiting style of struggle” (Dudouet 2008: 256). This means in short that reconciliation after a strike is much easier than after mass killing⁵³ as it does not produce so much humiliation, hatred and desire for revenge – emotions that may be seeds for future conflicts (Randle 1994). Furthermore, there will be no war economy to transform and no fighters to disarm and to reintegrate. However, these challenges are no democracy-specific challenges which threaten the persistence of democracy per se but more the persistence of peace.

This section of the synopsis focuses on two papers of this dissertation. Each one of these elaborate on one obstacle for democratic consolidation ($Y_{\text{Development}}$) which arise from violent

⁵³ In this line (McCarthy 1990, 115) argues that “[n]o one can take back the wounds of violence, the lost years of imprisonment, or the pain of exile – but workers can return to the factory after a strike, boycotters can begin trading at shops again, and mass meetings and marches can be called off.”

conflict during democratic transition/revolutionary situations. Both obstacles address the problem of equality and fair political competition in the new emerging democracy:

The first paper takes a micro-level perspective and explores the role of an individual's perception of being either a hero or a victim of violent conflict in democratic transition/revolutionary situations. This perception is linked to the feelings of being entitled to either reward or redress which can undermine the idea of equal citizenship.

The second paper takes a meso-level perspective and analyzes how violent revolutions lead to one-party dominance. This phenomenon is closely related to the first one since one-party dominance frequently results from feelings of entitlement (normally as heroes) and derives a claim to rule from the heroic role during the violent struggle.

8.1.) Avoiding unequal citizenship

There is widespread consensus that societies always have to tackle the problem of post-conflict justice in one or the other way after violent conflict (UN GA/RES/40/34 1985). To secure the peace, perpetrators have to be brought to justice and victims have to be compensated to satisfy their feeling of redress (Hamber 2003; Mani 2005). To allow equal participation, it further might be necessary to empower victims to overcome trauma and to participate freely in the new and democratic society. However, victims are not the only group that might develop specific feelings of entitlement. As argued in the paper "Heroes and victims: Economies of Entitlement after Violent Pasts" co-authored with Andrea Pabst, violent conflicts also 'produce' heroes, a category that tends to develop feelings of entitlement as well. While victims tend to develop feelings of entitlement aiming at redress for past suffering, heroes have the disposition to feel entitled to some kind of reward. Being a hero in this context typically means having fought and risked one's life in order to dispose

a dictator or to liberate the country. The article shows that exclusive 'hero' entitlements on the basis of merit are a common phenomenon in settings of victorious transitions or 'victors' peace'. The cases of Rwanda and Namibia suggest that such entitlements tend to create a morally, politically and economically superior group that negates democratic principles as it feels determined to rule. In both cases entitlement processes were based on both the role of the hero and the victim.

In the highly internationalized Rwandan context, marked by the genocide and widespread transitional justice measures, we find elements of entitlement claims grounded in both, feelings of reward and redress. While the government feels that it deserves to rule due to its performance as saviour of the country and defends this right with reference to its past merit, various victims' groups struggle to get recognition for their particular suffering – ending up in a circle of bitter competition.

On the contrary, Namibia represents an example of an economy of entitlement that strongly bases on the feeling of merit and performance – or the role of the hero. Lacking any measures of transitional justice and victim's compensation, the victim plays an underpart. Thus, the heroic political culture and the difficult economic conditions in Namibia put an economy of heroes' entitlement in motion so that both, the current government and different social groups, constantly refer to their role in the liberation struggle and their hero status to get access to resources and acknowledgment.

Interestingly, the role of the hero plays a more significant role in claiming the right to rule than the role of the victim which originally dominated the debate on post-conflict peacebuilding and transitional justice. Both the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) and the South

West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) successfully transformed into political parties and were able to dominate post-conflict politics in their respective countries.⁵⁴

Since research on feelings of entitlement in post-conflict settings is still in its infancy, there is no comparative analysis juxtaposing feelings of entitlement veterans of armed struggles to those activists who were involved in nonviolent resistance campaigns. Thus, it is plausible that NVR activists can also develop feelings of entitlement and therefore can claim the right to rule. Nevertheless, it is less likely for different reasons: First, nonviolent movements tend to be more open and participatory (Bond 1988; Randle 1994; Schock 2013) than their more secretive and hierarchical violent counterparts. In consequence, single individuals seldom rise above the average participant, reducing the likelihood to develop feelings of deserving particular rights and advantages. Second, NVR movements are generally much larger (Skreke, Gleditsch and Rivera 2016), meaning that many people could claim heroic deeds. Consequently, the title hero would lose its appeal since a hero is usually understood as a moral agent "who characteristically go[es] beyond the call of duty" in contexts which "would prevent most people from doing so" (Flescher 2003: 109). Third, having fought an armed struggle means having risked one's own life for a higher cause. This pattern of sacrifice is widely recognized as a deed that the society has to repay.

Thus, entitlement claims made by activists of armed struggles can often claim great legitimacy and become difficult to challenge. As nonviolent resistance normally does not include risking one's life, it is more robust against such narratives of sacrifice demanding particular rewards.

⁵⁴ These results are backed by findings of Henning Melber and colleagues, who showed in their analysis of Namibia's post-transition cabinets that former leading activists of SWAPO and proponents of the armed struggle in exile dominated government posts even 20 years after the transition (Melber et al. 2017).

With these first insights in the dynamics of entitlement processes, the paper contributes to different strands of literature. First, by identifying important dynamics – namely the economies of entitlements – it explains certain challenges to democratic regimes after violent transitions and therefore adds to the literature on democratization and democratic consolidation. Second, it adds some first knowledge to the literature on the long-term effects of (non-)violent resistance. Third, it also contributes to the field of transitional justice and peacebuilding in introducing the hero as an important figure in post-conflict situations. Nevertheless, more comparative studies on both feelings and economies of entitlement after nonviolent and violent struggle would be important to draw more reliable conclusions.

8.2.) Avoiding one-party dominance

According to the literature on democratic transitions, many regimes never completely manage the transition from clear-cut authoritarian regimes to full-fledged democracies. Instead, they remain in the stage of a hybrid regime (Karl 1995) or take mixed forms like competitive authoritarianism (Levitsky and Way 2002; 2010). In other regimes, democratic competition – one cornerstone of democratic regimes (Dahl 1971) - is seriously limited by the dominance of a single party (Sartori 1976).⁵⁵ The difference between both – one-party dominance and competitive authoritarianism – is a thin red line and depends on the question whether the ruling party employs state funds and government agencies to gain advantages in the elections or changes the rules of the competition in their favor.

⁵⁵ According to Van de Walle and Butler (1999), a party can be classified as dominant if it wins at least 60% of the votes. Sartori (1976) defines a party as dominant if it won an absolute majority in three or more consecutive elections.

In this section I show that the MoR during the revolutionary situation influences subsequent party competition. Violent forms of transition tend to produce party systems in which one party that is linked to the revolutionary situation evolves into a clearly dominant position.

The paper “Swapo forever? Prospect for liberal democracy or prolonged one-party dominance in Namibia” took a closer look at SWAPO’s development towards a dominating party and the prospects for a more “levelled”⁵⁶ party system in future.

The paper showed that although the political landscape in Namibia is dominated by the former liberation movement SWAPO, it can still be regarded as a democracy. There is no evidence that state funds or resources are used to rig elections or to hamper the freedom of elections. Nevertheless, the dominance of the SWAPO Party seriously limits democratic competition and perpetuates itself due to this limitation.

Generally, the phenomenon of National Liberation Movements (NLM) which transform into dominant parties is well-known. Other examples like Rwanda, Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Angola and Cape Verde support the observation: In all these cases, the former fighters formed strong parties that dominate the political system, to some extent even with oppressive means that violate fundamental political and civil rights.

The reasons why armed movements tend to produce dominant party systems are manifold. However, referring to the case of Namibia one can say that feelings of entitlement is one of them. Fighters and members of violent movements tend to develop feelings of being entitled to rule due to the hardship of the struggle and the merits they have eked out for the society. As a National Liberation Movement (NLM), SWAPO earned the credit of having

⁵⁶ Levitsky and Way (2010 a; 2010 b; 2002) argue that a levelled playing field – or an equal chance in democratic elections - is a necessary condition for democracy. In contrast to this, if a regime allows free elections but uses state funds and resources to rig the game in their favor, Levitsky and Way speak of competitive authoritarianism.

liberated the country. In contrast to NVR movements, NMLs are typically able to monopolize these credits. In the case of SWAPO, the NLM was able to force other former independent organizations like Namibia Women's Voice or the Labor Movement under the umbrella of its own organization. Second, on a more societal level, societies tend to perceive these entitlement claims made by heroes as justified. Consequentially, the broader population often votes for the heroes and their organizations – at least in the first years after the transition. In the case of Namibia, this translated into high voter shares during elections. Third, SWAPO constantly upheld this dominant position by referring to its historical role and by rejecting criticism and demands from the political opposition.

Additional factors for one party dominance

Beside these factors highlighted in the paper, the literature on one-party dominance and the transformation of rebel movements into political party mentions some other determinants. To begin with, armed “movements” have some organizational features that distinguish them from an NVR movement and a social movement in general and which highly affect their chances and willingness to monopolize power in a state.⁵⁷ The need to operate in clandestine and mostly in remote areas generally separates the armed movement from broader parts of the movement. Thus, upholding communication or even processes of democratic consultation is hard to accomplish. Armed groups are further typically structured by a clear hierarchy and the principle of command and obedience, and not characterized by democratic deliberation and compromise. Furthermore, the more demanding requirements for armed struggle, for example in terms of physical fitness, typically lead to relatively homogeneous groups made up of young men (Zunes 1994). In contrast to this, NVR

⁵⁷ In my opinion, the term National Liberation Movement (NLM) is a bit misleading. NLM might start as a national movement or be connected to a broader movement; however, with the beginning of a serious armed struggle it tends to develop organizational structures which separates it from the broader population. Thus, it loses the ability to represent the population.

movements are generally more diverse since a) they rely on mass participation and b) they need to diversify their support and power base. Thus, balancing and integrating such diverse movements as for instance the labor movement, women's movements, or churches requires consultations and compromises or, in short, forms of democratic consensus finding. In such heterogeneous movements, not all actors are equally powerful; nevertheless, none of them is powerful enough to be regarded or perceive himself or herself as *primus inter pares*. Thus, in case of a victory it is very unlikely that one single actor of the broader NVR is able to claim or to enforce his or her leading role in moulding the transition process and the very important process of drafting and adopting constitution.⁵⁸ Armed movements, however, always possess the ultimate veto-power stemming from the barrel of the gun (Cunningham, 2011) and are thus able – and more often than not, willing – to dominate the resistance campaign and the subsequent transition period. These trajectories of new democracies stand in strong contrast to a) the process and b) the outcome of the transition in Benin that was driven by non-violent forces (see chapter 9).

However, it must be said that the comparability and thus the generalisability of the results might be limited since the armed struggle in Namibia was fought by a National Liberation Movement (NLM). Although SWAPO's proclaimed goals were to reach independence and establish democracy, it was first and foremost a struggle against foreign occupation. Furthermore, there are some examples that challenge the conclusions drawn here and require closer examination. First, there are few armed resistance movements with much less ambitious goals than to obtain the state power. The Mexican Zapatistas, for example, have been remarkably successful in establishing and upholding democratic procedures in their controlled territory (Weinberg 2000). However, the armed struggle never played a major

⁵⁸ Some scholars of modes of transitions assume that transitions marked by unclear power relations produce more liberal results (see Guo and Stradiotto 2014; 2010).

part in their campaign, which to a high degree centred on raising awareness for the situation of the native Mexican population. Second, there are NLMs with a history in NVR which were able to dominate successive democratic regimes. Empirically, the Indian National Congress (INC) might be the only clear case that evolved from a nonviolent struggle and that permanently gained political dominance in the following democratic period. The ANC with its hybrid strategy of broad-based NVR and violent resistance is a less clear case.

9.) On consolidation

The pivotal aspect of the concept of democracy used here and outlined in the paper “On consolidation: Nonviolent struggle as resource for democratic citizenship” is the focus on the role of the masses in establishing, defending and deepening democracy. Referring to the communitarian tradition (Tocqueville 2014; Putnam 2000), I argue that participation and democratic citizenship are the core of functioning democracies. In this reading, a regime is democratic “to the degree that political relations between the state and its citizens feature broad, equal, protected and mutually binding consultation” (Tilly 2007: 13 f.). Consequently, democracy can be understood as a constant process of widening and deepening participation by the “inclusion of more groups and categories in the polity” (Tilly 2007: 13f.). Importantly, however, “[d]emocratization never just happens: Someone has to take action to install, or protect, democratic institutions” (Teorell 2010: 100). Thus, my understanding of democracy focuses on one important actor – the demos.

I assume that the process of sustainable democratization is driven by a circle of pro-democratic values, demands for participation as well as democratic experiences and resources that potentially lead to new demands. This understanding borrows from Tocquevillean thinking on the one hand and Welzel and Inglehart’s research (2009) on the other. While the latter highlight the importance of pro-democratic values for the introduction of institutions and rules that enable participation, the first emphasizes the importance of citizens’ participation as “school for democracy” (Tocqueville 2014), which is crucial for the consolidation of democracy. Both show that democratic values and attitudes of the masses matter, Welzel and Inglehart even argue that “causal arrow apparently runs from values to institutions, rather than the other way around” (2009: 138). Or, in other

words: it would be inconsistent to achieve democracy by undemocratic means, such as violence or orders from above. NVR as a mass-based, participatory form of collective action is per se informed by democratic ideas so that in NVR-induced transitions, democratic values tend to lead the way to the institutions.

Ideally, NVR can be a resource to level power disparities and to enable a free political discourse (Vinthagen 2015b) which comes close to fulfil the discourse ethics defined by Habermas (1991). Each act of successful resistance and participation thereby has an empowering effect, encouraging new participation (Klandermans 1997, Cocking and Drury 2004) – be it in the stage of transition or consolidation. However, the circle might be disrupted by shrinking political opportunities for participation, by state repression or negative experiences, diminishing the feeling of political efficacy (Campbell et al. 1954; Bandura 1977). I use the term of “sustainable democratization” (Welzel 2009), a term covering the emergence, endurance and enhancement of democracy to indicate that NVR plays a role in every part of this process.

10.) Discussion

This dissertation analyzed the effects of different MoR on the survival and quality of subsequent democratization processes. Therefore, this synopsis first provided a detailed literature review and discussion of the phenomenon of NVR, a definition of so-called revolutionary events and a discussion of the question why these short historical moments can matter for the development of a whole society. Furthermore, it shed light on several assumed mechanisms of change and important prerequisites for the emergence and success of NVR in discussing the effect of the urban space ("NVR and urban space"). The general take-home message of this dissertation is that "how one fights" indeed "determines what one wins" (see chapters 6-8). Below, I first discuss the empirical findings which corroborate this claim. Afterwards I will discuss the policy implications of this dissertation before highlighting some avenues for further research.

Summary of findings

Empirically, this dissertation first established the correlation between NVR and democratic survival. As demonstrated in the paper "The democratic dividend", democratic regimes that came to turn by peaceful transitions proved to have a substantially increased lifespan compared to those resulting from VR or top-down transitions. These results suggest that, in the words of Ackerman and Rodal, it is indeed right that "how one fights determines what one wins" (2008: 119). Apart from this key finding, the paper yielded another interesting result: most democracies break down during the first decade of their existence. Although it was beyond the scope of this study to trace these breakdowns, the findings of this dissertation suggest that important factors for democratic disintegration are the lack of will

and the lack of ability to defend the democracy within the broader population (see also Bermeo 2003). However, to answer this question more research on democratic breakdown and authoritarian backlashes is needed.

The following PT-analysis of Benin's *Rénouveau Démocratique*, condensed in the paper "The democratizing effect of nonviolent resistance", revealed different mechanisms of how NVR contributes to democratic endurance and democratic development. It showed that the NVR against the regime of President Kérékou resulted in a negotiated transition and what the fathers of the new constitution called a *libéralisme intégral* – an inclusive liberalism – with few hurdles for democratic participation and party foundation. Furthermore, due to the involvement of the population in the process of liberalization, the commitment to basic constitutional principles is remarkably high. Finally, the peaceful transition is still seen as a symbol of the sovereignty of the people in Benin. In line with the theoretical argument, Benin saw several campaigns that used the symbolic value of the constitution and the people's commitment to successfully mobilize large parts of the civil society in defense of democratic principles.

Beyond that, the case study on Benin pointed out some shortcomings of NVR. In Benin, as in some other cases (for example the Serbian *Otpor* movement), NVR movements contributed little to the representative consolidation or development of a stable party system. This raises two questions. First, is the representative democracy the most suitable outcome after NVR-induced transitions, or would a more direct form of democracy be more promising? Second, under which circumstances and preconditions can NVR movements successfully breed democratic parties?

In addition, the two corresponding papers “Heroes and victims” and “Swapo forever” identified two mechanisms of VR, namely unequal citizenship due to feelings of entitlement and dominant party systems, blocking or hindering democratic development. In doing so, the findings of this contrasting case support the argument that NVR has positive effects on the endurance and especially development of democracies. Although in principle NVR activists could develop feelings of entitlement as well, they empirically seldom convert these feelings into power positions. However, as outlined in this synopsis and the paper “Swapo forever”, one-party dominance is one central problem of democracies resulting from armed struggles. Again, more research - and especially comparative research - is needed to test how generalizable these findings are. Nevertheless, the fact that NVR movements rarely transform into dominant parties might already give us some hints in this regard.

Based on the findings of the case studies, this dissertation finally developed a concept of democracy based on mass participation and NVR (paper “On Consolidation”). This concept theoretically links nonviolent activism during the transition phase to the ability to defend democracy in case of authoritarian backlashes in the following democracy. This ability to intervene in political process gained by civil society is not only necessary to defend but also to advance or to deepen democracy.

Policy implications

In general, the survival analysis conducted in the paper “The democratic dividend” suggests that peaceful transitions induced by mass-based NVR are more resilient than those installed after elite negotiations and armed rebellions. Beyond this, the paper “the democratizing effect of NVR” showed that a “founding act of sovereignty of the people” can have long-

lasting effects on a) the institutional setting and b) the role of the citizen in the new democracy.

This has strong implications for democracy promotion as well as for our understanding of democracy. First, it shows that democracy follows democratic attitudes of the people and not the other way around. This idea was already proposed by Welzel (2009) and Welzel and Inglehart (2009; 2006). It turns the conventional wisdom upside down that democratic institutions will parent democratic citizens (for example Almond and Verba 1963). In this sense, NVR for democratic change becomes a litmus test for the proliferation of democratic attitudes. In other words, a people being prepared to struggle non-violently for democratic change is more than prepared for democracy (similarly Welzel 2007).

Furthermore, this means that democracy promotion should be understood as a bottom-up approach. Attempts to support democratic change should aim at the grassroots-level with a two-fold goal: to support the development and proliferation of pro-democratic attitudes and to build civil society capacities for non-violent action to achieve a higher grade of political participation. So-called civil society hubs, as provided for instance by USAIS and SIDA, can provide space, information, networks etc. for the nucleus of an emerging civil society. Independent political foundations can provide further support in form of training for activists and international lobbying, or issue student visas to foster international exchange. Furthermore, in some countries educational federalism (for example Germany) allows state institutions like universities to use their leeway to cooperate with the education system and individual agents of change. As last resort, democratic governments can officially harbor political dissidents, pressure authoritarian regimes to comply with human rights and sanction repression against the opposition.

Critique and avenues for further research

The following discussion part aims at taking up and reflecting some critique that was revealed during the writing on the one hand, and pointing out possible areas for future research on the other.

This study showed that the most known and widely used strategic approach to nonviolence has serious (theoretical) limitations. Based on the insights of this dissertation, I object to the conceptualization of NVR as strategic action. Instead, I generally understand NVR as a normative action. It is normative since the very logic of its mode of action is based a) on a normative stance towards violence of the activist (and possible bystanders) and b) on a normative regulation of violence against the perpetrator. Thereby, the definition of nonviolence and the application of nonviolent means always depend on the social situation. In this line of thinking, violent and nonviolent action/resistance build a continuum (Coy 2013) of possible human social actions. These social actions can be interpreted and thereby give “a causal explanation of the way in which the action proceeds and the effects which it produces” (Weber 1991: 7). This idea of developing a sociology of nonviolence, which was also proposed by Vinthagen (2015b), would mean establishing a “third way” (Coy 2013) and could overcome the old discussions between proponents of a principled and a strategic approach to nonviolence. A sociology of NVR should further be linked to studies focussing on human predisposition towards violence and nonviolence, or, in other words, on peace psychology (e.g. Cohrs and Boehnke 2008; Christie 2006; Blumberg et al. 2006) and the psychology of nonviolence (e.g. Mayton 2009; Kool 1993a, 1993b; Pelton 1974; Gregg 1966). Against this background, I suggest understanding NVR as a learning or socialization process (King 2007) which might start with “the willingness to use nonviolence as a technique” (King cited by Blakely 2001: 21) and might lead to more principled nonviolence. However, this

process is not necessarily always straight-lined or irreversible. This leads us to an interesting avenue for future research.

As some scholars already pointed out, “campaigns which use nonviolent methods do not guarantee that a spirit of nonviolence will prevail once the cause is won” (Dudouet 2008: 258). Similarly, and as outlined in section 9 of this synopsis, post-revolutionary periods typically see demobilization since the population wants to return to “normal” life (Preuß 2001) or is demoralized by the shrinking spaces for public participation in representative democracies (Merkel 2010: 91 f.). However, studies on demobilization processes of (social) movements are scarce.⁵⁹ Thus, further research is needed on political demobilization in general, but more particularly on the causes that lead to the frustration with nonviolent means. Here, it would be interesting to analyze individual factors, such as attitudes to norms of nonviolence, as well as collective factors, such as political events. More research would also be needed on the interplay between the mentioned frustrating and demobilizing events and the positive, long-term effect of collective memory and founding narratives based on successful NVR, which was introduced in the paper “The democratizing effect of nonviolent resistance”.

Finally, most studies on NVR (this dissertation included) implicitly follow the positivist idea that we can define violence and consequently nonviolence in objective terms. Hence, the term violence is mostly understood in the sense of physical violence only; a fact that has rightly been criticized since Galtung’s famous reflection on structural violence. Alternatively, Pressmann (2017) and others proposed “unarmed insurrections” to indicate that some

⁵⁹ One rare exception are Heaney and Rojas (2011).

movements include acts that are violent but still lack weapons.⁶⁰ This, however, only solves a part of the problem, since the social context and the perceptions of the targeted political “opponent” might be decisive in defining what is perceived as violence. Importantly, however, it is exactly this definition or perception (violent or nonviolent) that some of the effects coming along with NVR depend on. In this line, Cobb (2014) argues that self-defense groups within the civil rights movements mattered significantly for their persistence and did not hinder but rather contributed to its successful outcome. Similarly, Martin Luther King (1968) argued that self-defense is something different than violence to achieve political goals.⁶¹ In a study on the “Lessons from resistance movements: Guerrilla and non-violent”, Sir Basil Liddell Hart (1968) already pointed out that one has to see the act of resistance through the eyes of the opponent and put it into the context of the given situation to fully understand its effects. In this sense, even the act of sabotage (for example blowing up a bridge *before* a troop-train can pass it) might be perceived as a relative nonviolent act in contrast to what a combatant would expect his opponent to do (blowing up the bridge *while* the train passes the bridge). Thus, it is time to study violence and nonviolence through the eyes of the other and to initiate a constructivist turn in NVR research.

⁶⁰ After an analysis of 80 democratic transitions between 1980 and 2010, Kadivar and Ketchley (2018) argue that these were often associated with riots and other forms of violence (like stoning police stations etc.). Thus, they argue that these forms of violence should be labeled as collective unarmed violence.

⁶¹ During the Montgomery bus boycott (1955/56) and after his house was bombed by a radical segregationist, Martin Luther King requested a gun license at the local Sheriff’s office. This was, however, declined (Roberts 2011: 13).

12.) Literature

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12.) Appendix

12.1.) Overview: Publications within the dissertation

Autor/s	Titel	Year	Published in	PR	Own Contribution
Bayer, Markus	The democratizing effect of nonviolent resistance. How nonviolent resistance featured democratic consolidation in Benin	2018	<i>Swisspeace Working Paper</i> , 3/2018.	Yes	100 %
Bayer, Markus	Hacia la consolidación: La lucha no violenta como medio para la ciudadanía democrática [On consolidation: Nonviolent struggle as resource for democratic citizenship]	2018	<i>Relaciones Internacionales</i> , 39, Special Issue "On resistance: Discussions in International Relations", 37-58	Yes	100 %
Bayer, Markus	Swapo forever? Prospect for liberal democracy or prolonged one-party dominance in Namibia	2017	<i>Journal of Namibia Studies</i> , 21, 27-54.	Yes	100 %
Bayer, Markus/ Pabst, Andrea	Heroes and victims: The economies of entitlement after violent past	2018	<i>Peacebuilding</i> , 6 (1), 49-64.	Yes	50 %
Bayer, Markus/ Bethke, Felix S./ Lambach, Daniel	The democratic dividend of nonviolent resistance	2016	<i>Journal for Peace Research</i> , 53(6), 758–771.	Yes	33 %
Bayer, Markus/ Kursawe, Janet	Gewaltfreier Widerstand und urbaner Raum	2016	<i>Wissenschaft und Frieden</i> , 34 (2), 29-32.	No	50 %

12.2.) Paper I: Bayer, Markus (2018 b): Hacia la consolidación: La lucha no violenta como medio para la ciudadanía democrática, Relaciones Internacionales, 39, 37-58.

Hacia la consolidación: la lucha no violenta como medio para la ciudadanía democrática

MARKUS BAYER*

RESUMEN

Tras las Revoluciones de Colores y la Primavera Árabe, las investigaciones que vinculan la resistencia no violenta (RNV) y la democratización se incrementaron notablemente. Sin embargo, los estudios sobre su efecto en la consolidación democrática siguen siendo escasos. A través de una interpretación neotocquevilleana de democracia, este artículo desarrolla que las protestas de RNV contra gobiernos autoritarios proporcionan recursos importantes para el desarrollo de una ciudadanía democrática y pueden afectar positivamente a la democratización. Como consecuencia de estas luchas, la agencia individual de cada ciudadano aumenta, lo que les permite participar y resistir las represiones si es preciso. A nivel colectivo los activistas participantes sobrepasan sus límites, y la agencia colectiva de toda la población se ve influenciada de forma sostenible al crear una narrativa común sobre el éxito de la lucha. El triunfo de estos hitos simbólicos brinda la oportunidad de reconectar con un movimiento de masas renovado. Por último, estas movilizaciones están integradas en un contexto internacional: las olas de protestas como la Primavera Árabe generan redes internacionales de activistas y simpatizantes.

PALABRAS CLAVE

Resistencia no violenta; supervivencia de la democracia; ciudadanía; agencia; memoria colectiva.



TITLE

On consolidation: Nonviolent struggle as resource for democratic citizenship

ABSTRACT

After the Colour Revolutions and the Arab Spring the research, linking nonviolent resistance (NVR) and democratisation increased drastically. Nevertheless, research focussing on the effect on democratic consolidation remains scarce. Based on a neo-Tocquevillean understanding of democracy, I argue that NVR against authoritarian rule provides important resources for the development of democratic citizenship and can positively affect democratisation. Because of the struggle for democracy, the individual agency of each citizen rises, enabling him/her to participate and to resist backlashes if necessary. On a collective level and transgressing the circle of the participating activist, the collective agency of the whole population is sustainably affected in creating a collective narrative of the successful struggle of the people. These successful and iconic events provide opportunities to reconnect renewed mass mobilization. Finally yet importantly, such movements are embedded into an international context. Waves of contention like the Arab Spring leave international networks of activists and supporters.

KEYWORDS

Nonviolent resistance; democratic survival; citizenship; agency; collective memory.

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ABELLÁN LUCAS

Introducción

Con una mezcla de entusiasmo y asombro, la mayoría de los académicos de las transiciones democráticas siguieron cómo la Primavera Árabe arrastraba –en su mayoría pacíficamente— algunos de los regímenes autocráticos más persistentes en una región que generalmente no se considera propensa a las transiciones democráticas¹. Estas transiciones se vieron acompañadas por el entusiasmo de los medios de resistencia no violenta (RNV) que provocaron estos cambios; algunos incluso advertían que por fin había llegado la hora de la RNV² o que estos eventos anunciaban una era sin violencia³. Aunque la mayor parte de la emoción inicial se haya desvanecido debido a las represiones en Egipto o Siria, estos cambios de régimen y transiciones democráticas reavivaron algunas cuestiones de la agenda. ¿Qué hace que una democracia sea buena? ¿Qué factores les permiten sobrevivir y consolidarse? Investigaciones recientes sobre RNV y democratización muestran en general una imagen positiva. Varios estudios comparativos encontraron pruebas contundentes de que la resistencia no violenta no solo parece ser más efectiva para generar un cambio social y político⁴, sino que también mejora la calidad de la democracia resultante⁵ y sus posibilidades de supervivencia y consolidación⁶. Sin embargo, el mecanismo que vincula ambos —la resistencia no violenta y la supervivencia con consolidación democrática— aún no se ha dilucidado⁷.

En este contexto y contra el actual pesimismo sobre el futuro de la democracia, este artículo sostiene que los países con un legado de transición democrática enraizada en la resistencia no violenta tienen buenas razones para ser optimistas. Las razones para ello es que la resistencia no violenta de masas no solo juega un papel relevante en producir cambios democráticos, sino que también favorece la “democratización sostenible”⁸, un término que engloba el surgimiento, el desarrollo y la resistencia de la democracia. A través de una interpretación neotocquevilliana de democracia, se discute que la RNV contra los

¹ En enero de 2010, aproximadamente un año antes del estallido de la Primavera Árabe, Larry Diamond seguía sintiéndose obligado a discutir “¿Por qué no hay democracias árabes?” Véase DIAMOND, Larry, “Why are there no arab democracies?” en *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 21, No. 1, 2010, pp. 93-104.

² CHENOWETH, Erica “Civil Resistance: Reflections on an Idea Whose Time Has Come. Global Governance” en *A Review of Multilateralism and International Organizations*, Vol. 20, No. 3, 2014, pp. 351-358.

³ HASTINGS, Tom H., *A new era of nonviolence: the power of civil society over civil war*, McFarland & company, Jefferson, 2014.

⁴ CELESTINO et al., “Fresh carnations or all thorn, no rose? Nonviolent campaigns and transitions in autocracies” en *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol 50, Issue 3, 2013, pp. 385-400; TEORELL, Jan, *Determinants of Democratization. Explaining Regime Change in the World, 1972-2006*, Cambridge Univ. Press, Cambridge, 2012; CHENOWETH et al., *Why civil resistance works: The strategic logic of nonviolent conflict*, Columbia University Press, Nueva York, 2011.

⁵ ACKERMANN et al., *How Freedom is won. From Civic Resistance to Durable Democracy*, Freedom House, 2005; JOHNSTAD, Petter G., “Nonviolent Democratization: A sensitive Analysis of how Transition Mode and Violence Impact the Durability of Democracy”, *Peace and Change*, Vol. 35, No. 3, 2010, pp. 465-482; CHENOWETH et al., *Why civil resistance works: The strategic logic of nonviolent conflict*, Columbia University Press, Nueva York, 2011; BETHKE, Felix S. and Jonathan PICKNEY, “Nonviolent Resistance and the Quality of Democracy”, *V-Dem Users Working Papers*, 2016.

⁶ BAYER, et al., “The democratic dividend of Nonviolent Resistance” en *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol 53 No 6, 2016, pp. 758-771

⁷ Los primeros intentos de descubrir tales mecanismos fueron desarrollados recientemente por CHANDLER; Mathew J, “Civil Resistance and Disrupted Democratization: The Ambiguous Outcomes of Unarmed Insurrections in Egypt, 2011-2015” en *Peace and Change*, Vol 43, Issue 1, pp. 90-114 y BAYER, Markus, “The democratizing effect of nonviolent resistance. How nonviolent resistance featured democratic consolidation in Benin” en *Swisspeace Working Papers*, 2018. Sin embargo, hasta ahora solo se basan en estudios de caso.

⁸ WELZEL, Christian, “Theories of democratization”, en HARPFER et al. (Eds.), *Democratization*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2009, pp. 74-90.



gobiernos autoritarios proporciona recursos significativos para el desarrollo de la ciudadanía democrática y puede afectar positivamente a la democratización sostenible. Para ello, se desarrollan tres mecanismos a través de los cuales la RNV afecta a la democratización. En primer lugar, a nivel individual, la agencia de cada ciudadano aumenta gracias a la lucha por la democracia y, por lo tanto, generalmente lo empodera para participar en procesos democráticos o resistir represalias llegado el caso. Segundo, en un nivel más colectivo los activistas participantes sobrepasan sus límites y la RNV tiene la capacidad de influenciar de forma sostenible en la agencia de toda la ciudadanía. Las narrativas sobre el triunfo de una lucha, como Solidarność en Polonia o la Renouveau Démocratique en Benín, quedan inscritas como “narrativas maestras” en la memoria colectiva de una sociedad, y brindan la oportunidad de reconectar los movimientos renovados de masas con el éxito de estos eventos icónicos y por ello, enmarcarlos. En tercer lugar, en tiempos de globalización, los movimientos pro-democráticos están integrados en un contexto internacional. Las olas de protestas como las Revoluciones de Colores en Europa del Este o la llamada Primavera Árabe en Oriente Medio no solo producen un efecto llamado regional y transnacional, sino que también dejan atrás redes internacionales bien conectadas de activistas democráticos y simpatizantes.

Para desarrollar este argumento, primero se expondrán las teorías de democracia que destacan el papel de la participación civil —o la ciudadanía democrática— para la consolidación y la sostenibilidad de la democracia. Sobre estos hallazgos, se elaborará cómo la RNV contribuye a la ciudadanía democrática explorando cada uno de los tres mecanismos mencionados. Para apoyar la premisa, el estudio se basará en evidencias empíricas de diferentes casos y finalmente, se discutirán los hallazgos y se señalarán líneas de investigación futuras.

1. Democracia y el papel de la ciudadanía democrática

Desde la “invención” de soberanía popular de Rousseau en su Contrato Social⁹ y sobre todo después del análisis de Tocqueville sobre la democracia estadounidense¹⁰, el ciudadano ha jugado un papel crucial en la teoría democrática. Sin embargo, en la teoría política encontramos una serie de ideas sobre qué es la democracia y cómo se puede lograr y mantener mejor. Para desarrollar el objeto de estudio, se presentarán las teorías sobre democracia que respaldan la importancia de la ciudadanía y su participación en las democracias sostenibles y se compararán con algunas obras clásicas literarias sobre democratización —una línea de literatura que normalmente se centra en élites e instituciones políticas en lugar de la agencia popular, ya sea en el proceso de democratización o durante la consolidación.

En general, se puede distinguir las teorías de democracia de acuerdo con el alcance de sus principios inherentes¹¹. Los enfoques centristas, liberales y conservadores están más bien orientados a los resultados (*output-oriented*); es decir, tienden a enfatizar la gobernabilidad, las estructuras estables, los gobiernos eficientes y subrayan la importancia de las elites políticas para los primeros —a costa de la participación directa. Los enfoques izquierdistas y

⁹ ROUSSEAU, Jean Jacques, *The Social Contract*: www.constitution.org/jjr/socon.htm [consultado el 13 de septiembre de 2018].

¹⁰ TOCQUEVILLE, Alexis de, *Democracy in America*, A Penn State Electronic Class Series Publication, 2002: www.seas.elte.hu/coursematerial/LojkoMiklos/Alexis-de-Tocqueville-Democracy-in-America.pdf [consultado el 13 de septiembre de 2018].

¹¹ SCHMIDT, Manfred G., *Demokratiethorien: Eine Einführung*, VS Verlag, Wiesbaden, 2010, p. 251.

progresivos, sin embargo, están más orientados hacia los procesos (*input-oriented*) y resaltan la participación directa y cómo se puede garantizar de la manera más completa¹².

Esta investigación aplica una perspectiva deliberativa de democracia. El objetivo de la democracia deliberativa es, en resumen, “pasar de la negociación, la consolidación de intereses y el poder” —a menudo asociado a la democracia liberal y representativa— “a la lógica común de ciudadanos iguales como fuerza dominante en la vida democrática”¹³. Mientras que las teorías de democracia liberal representativa consideran las encuestas como un método de toma de decisiones en el que las personas delegan su voz y las decisiones futuras en los representantes, los enfoques de la democracia deliberativa plantean que las decisiones deben tomarse después de un proceso de discusión descentralizado y un intercambio colectivo de argumentos. Comprender así la democracia depende de la orientación hacia los procesos, de la toma de decisiones descentralizada y del escepticismo hacia la centralización del poder asociado con la dominación. Las teorías deliberativas comparten estos principios con el republicanismo. Para Tocqueville, la fortaleza de la democracia estadounidense estaba anclada en las asociaciones cívicas que podían resistirse a la centralización del poder y, por ello, a la tiranía. Citando a Tocqueville: “Las reuniones populares son para la libertad lo que las escuelas primarias para la ciencia”¹⁴.

Asimismo, los defensores modernos de la deliberación como Colin Crouch enfatizan que la democracia solo puede prosperar si la masa popular tiene la oportunidad real de participar activamente, de dar forma a la sociedad democrática y si hacen uso de estas libertades¹⁵. En una línea similar, Charles Tilly¹⁶ relaciona la democracia *per se* con la consulta ciudadana. En su opinión, un “régimen es democrático en la medida en que las relaciones políticas entre el estado y sus ciudadanos se caracteriza por una consulta amplia, igualitaria, protegida y mutuamente vinculante”. En este sentido, la democracia se puede describir como el proceso de “inclusión de más grupos y categorías en la política”¹⁷.

Sin embargo, esto requiere un ciudadano a) dispuesto y b) capaz de participar activamente en su sociedad y en los debates políticos. De acuerdo con el enfoque neotocquevilleano presentado por Putnam, es el capital social y especialmente la confianza lo que hace que una democracia sea estable y próspera, con una gran proporción de asociaciones cívicas y participación democrática. En primer lugar, según Putnam, el capital social ayuda a los ciudadanos a superar el problema de acción colectiva más fácilmente. Segundo, cuando las personas confían entre sí y “están sujetas a interacciones repetidas con

¹² SCHARPF, Fritz, *Demokratiethorie zwischen Utopie und Anpassung*. K Univ. Verlag, Constanza, 1970; SALZBORN, Samuel, *Demokratie. Theorien, Formen, Entwicklungen*, Nomos, Baden-Baden, 2012.

¹³ COHEN et al., “Radical Democracy”, *Swiss Political Science Review*, Vol. 10, 2004, p. 24.

¹⁴ TOCQUEVILLE, Alexis de, *Democracy in America*, p. 78.

¹⁵ CROUCH, Colin, *Postdemokratie*, edition suhrkamp, Berlin, 2008, p. 8. Habermas abordó la cuestión de la deliberación “real” sin poder en su ética discursiva (Véase HABERMAS, Jürgen, *Moral consciousness and communicative action*, MIT Press, Cambridge, 1991.). Por lo tanto, los enfoques deliberativos a menudo se consideran intentos de “democratizar la democracia” (véase SOUSA SANTOS, Boaventura De (Ed.), *Democratizing Democracy: Beyond the Liberal Democratic Canon*, Verso, Nueva York, 2007).

¹⁶ TILLY, Charles, *Democracy*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2007, p. 13 f.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*



sus conciudadanos, las actividades cotidianas y sociales son menos costosas¹⁸. Esto aumenta aún más la cooperación ya establecida. Finalmente, el capital social amplía la conciencia “de las muchas formas en que nuestros destinos se alinean¹⁹. Joiners, como Putnam llama a aquellos que están profundamente comprometidos con la interacción social, se vuelven “más tolerantes, menos cínicos y más empáticos²⁰.”

Esta idea neotocquevilleana de ciudadanía democrática —arraigada en una asociación cívica capaz de organizar intereses colectivos— está en consonancia con la mayoría de las ideas de resistencia no violenta.

La mayoría de las teorías de resistencia no violenta se basan en una “teoría de consentimiento del poder²¹. La premisa de esta teoría es que los gobernantes autoritarios poseen, apuntan o aspiran a concentrar el poder en unas pocas manos. No obstante, su poder depende de la sumisión e incluso de la cooperación de los ciudadanos. Por lo tanto, básicamente, la forma de poner fin a los gobiernos autoritarios y establecer la democracia comienza acabando con la sumisión y la obediencia²². Aquí, los partidarios de la RNV se basan en la idea de “servidumbre voluntaria” planteada por el filósofo francés renacentista Etienne de la Boétie en el siglo XVI como crítica de la monarquía absoluta²³.

En cambio, la RNV se basa en una comprensión Arendtiana del poder, lo que significa que “Cuando decimos que alguien está ‘en el poder’, en realidad nos referimos a que un cierto número de personas se apoderaron de él para actuar en su nombre. En el momento en el que el grupo, del que se originó el poder al principio desaparece, ‘su poder’ también desaparece²⁴.”

Por lo tanto, el proceso de resistencia va de la mano con un proceso de empoderamiento del individuo que decide retirar el consentimiento, la obediencia y la sumisión —ver el mecanismo a continuación. Para acabar con el gobierno autoritario y avanzar en la democracia, la gente tiene que superar el grave problema de la atomización y la profunda desconfianza que prevalece en la mayoría de las autocracias. De este modo, y de acuerdo con Putnam, las experiencias colectivas de resistencia no violenta pueden y deben servir como prueba definitiva de que se puede confiar en las personas y se pueden superar los problemas de acción colectiva. En este sentido, Yousef Abduljalil describe sus sentimientos después de la

¹⁸ PUTNAM, Robert D., *Bowling alone: the collapse and revival of american community*, Simon & Schuster Nueva York, 2001, p. 288.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 288.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 289.

²¹ SHARP, Gene, *Politics of Nonviolent Action. Part one: Power and Struggle*, Porter Sargent Publishers, Boston, 1973 a; SHARP, Gene, *The Role of Power in Nonviolent Struggle*, Albert Einstein Institution, Boston, 1990; SHARP, Gene, *From Dictatorship to Democracy A Conceptual Framework for Liberation*, Albert Einstein Institution, Boston, 2010.

²² SHARP, Gene, *The Politics of Nonviolent Action. Part three: The Dynamics of Nonviolent Action*, Porter Sargent Publishers, Boston, 1973 b; VINTHAGEN, Stellan, “Power as Subordination and Resistance as Disobedience: Nonviolent Movement and the Management of Power” en *Asian Journal of Social Science*, Vol. 34, No. 1, 2006, pp. 1-21 y VINTHAGEN, Stellan, *A Theory of Nonviolent Action: How Civil Resistance Works*, Zed Books, Londres, 2015.

²³ DE LA BOÉTIE, Etienne, *The Politics of Obedience: The Discourse of Voluntary Servitude*, Black Rose Books, Montréal/Nueva York/Londres, 1997 [1553].

²⁴ ARENDT, Hannah, *On Violence*, A Harvest Book Harcourt Inc., Orlando, 1970, p. 44.

primavera árabe en Yemen en 2011:

“Por primera vez, me sentí como si estuviera en un país completamente diferente, un país en el que su gente ama trabajar, disfrutar la libertad, y expresaban y escribían lo que sentían sin temor o restricciones: era el país en el que siempre había soñado vivir, y sentía que pertenecía a él y a su gente de forma natural”²⁵.

Una vez que se logra la democracia, argumenta Sharp²⁶, esta puede asegurarse mejor mediante los llamados *loci of power* independientes, que son organizaciones cívicas como clubes deportivos, sindicatos, asociaciones o lo que también se denomina sociedad civil, que estructura intereses comunes. Nuevamente, esto está totalmente en consonancia con el argumento de Putnam presentado anteriormente.

2. Hacia una democracia estable: el papel de las “masas”

Como se ha discutido anteriormente, la participación civil y la ciudadanía democrática son grandes impulsores de la democracia. En la década de los sesenta, Almond y Verba²⁷ descubrieron que es una actitud específica, a la que denominaron “cultura política democrática” lo que permite a las personas hacer uso de sus libertades y responsabilidades como ciudadanos democráticos. Mostraron que era la diferencia en la cultura política —democrática o no— lo que marcaba la diferencia entre países como Alemania e Italia, que se convirtieron en regímenes fascistas y otros como Inglaterra que se mantuvieron democráticos.

Básicamente, Rosenau reconoció el papel de la cultura y la ciudadanía democrática como medios de apoyo y estabilidad al referirse al respaldo político como “la divisa de las políticas democráticas”²⁸. Sin embargo, cómo evoluciona este apoyo democrático y la ciudadanía es una cuestión controvertida. La teoría más influyente de la modernización simplemente presupone que una cultura democrática deduciría “automáticamente” las instituciones democráticas y que son las democracias las que producen los ciudadanos que necesitan²⁹. Siguiendo un enfoque institucionalista, la mayoría de los académicos consideraba que una vez que las “reglas del juego” se habían asentado en la constitución, y se habían establecido leyes electorales e instituciones como partidos, parlamentos y tribunales constitucionales, la democracia se convertiría en la “única alternativa”³⁰ o, en otras palabras, se habría consolidado. En resumen, la cultura cívica y la ciudadanía democrática se “concibieron como un producto de la democracia en lugar de sus creadores”³¹. El papel de las masas se entendía, a lo sumo, como un soporte pasivo del sistema representativo.

²⁵ ABDULJALIL, Yousef, “Killing the Rose but not the Spring”, Al Saleh, Assad (Ed.), *Voices of the Arab Spring. Personal Stories from the Arab Revolutions*, Columbia Univ. Press, Nueva York, 2015, p. 177.

²⁶ SHARP, Gene, *Politics of Nonviolent Action. Part one: Power and Struggle*, Porter Sargent Publishers, Boston, 1973 a.

²⁷ ALMOND, Gabriel A. y VERBA, Sydney, *The Civic Culture. Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations*, Princeton Univ. Press, Princeton, 1963.

²⁸ ROSENAU, James N., *Citizenship between elections: An inquiry into the mobilizable American*, Free Press, Nueva York, 1974, p. 1.

²⁹ EASTON, David, A., *System Analysis of Political Life*, John Wiley and Sons, Nueva York, 1965.

³⁰ LINZ, et al., *Problems of democratic transition and consolidation*, John Hopkins Univ. Press, Baltimore, 1996, p. 5.

³¹ SCHMITTER, Philippe C., “Twenty-Five Years, Fifteen Findings”, *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 21, No. 1, 2010, pp. 17-28, p. 18.



Frente a esta "corriente elitista" que destaca el papel de las élites políticas en las transiciones democráticas³² y su posterior consolidación, los académicos de los estudios sobre movimientos sociales impulsaron el denominado "enfoque populista" de la democracia³³. Según este enfoque, los movimientos sociales y la democratización avanzan en paralelo y se presuponen mutuamente, ya que los movimientos sociales pueden crear espacios públicos para la democratización y "la democratización como tal fomenta aún más que las personas formen movimientos sociales"³⁴. Este giro hacia las protestas políticas en países no democráticos y en procesos de democratización constituyó una novedad. La mayoría de los estudios hasta entonces habían descuidado el vínculo entre movimientos sociales, resistencia no violenta y democratización y se habían enfocado en democracias consolidadas —occidentales— donde la protesta no violenta se había convertido en un "procedimiento operativo normalizado"³⁵ y una "parte de la política cotidiana"³⁶. No obstante, este nuevo estímulo influyó la literatura sobre democratización.

Tomando más en serio el papel de las masas en la democratización y la consolidación, Teorell sostiene que la "democratización nunca acaba de suceder: alguien tiene que tomar medidas para implantar o proteger las instituciones democráticas"³⁷. Asimismo, Welzel e Inglehart³⁸, —partidarios de una teoría de la modernización "modernizada"— reconocen que "las confianza populares son de vital importancia para las posibilidades de que un país se convierta y permanezca en una democracia". Pero, ¿de dónde proviene la confianza, si —como argumentan los defensores de este pensamiento— los ciudadanos comienzan a desarrollar actitudes democráticas durante el proceso de consolidación? Welzel e Inglehart³⁹ demostraron que en países del antiguo Bloque del Este como Polonia, Hungría y Estonia, el gran apoyo intrínseco a la democracia ya surgió antes de la transición a la democracia. Por tanto, supusieron que la "flecha causal va aparentemente de los valores a las instituciones, y no a la inversa"⁴⁰. La aparición de valores emancipatorios se ve como el producto del aumento

³² O'DONNELL et al., *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies*, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1986; PRZEWORSKI, Adam, "Democracy as a Contingent Outcome of Conflicts" en ELSTER, Jon et al. (Eds.), *Constitutionalism and Democracy*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1988, pp. 59-80.; LINZ, Juan J., "Transition to Democracy" en *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 13, No. 3, 1990, pp. 143-162; DIAMOND, Larry J., "Towards Democratic Consolidation" en *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 5, No. 3, 1994, pp. 4-17.; LINZ, Juan et al., *Problems of democratic transition and consolidation*, 1996; MERKEL, Wolfgang *Systemtransformation. Eine Einführung in die Theorie und Empirie der Transformationsforschung*. Springer VS., Wiesbaden, 2010.

³³ El enfoque elitista fue desafiado previamente por enfoques centrados en las clases que apuntan que la clase trabajadora siempre había sido el motor de la democratización (véase BERINS COLLIER, Ruth, *Paths towards democracy. The working class and elites in Western Europe and South America*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1999 y BERINS COLLIER, Ruth y MAHONEY, James "Labor and Democratization: Comparing the First and Third Waves in Europe and Latin America" en *IRLE Working Paper*, No. 62-95, 1995: <http://irle.berkeley.edu/workingpapers/62-95.pdf> [Consultado el 13 de septiembre de 2018]).

³⁴ TILLY, Charles, *Social Movements, 1768–2004*, Paradigm, Boulder, 2004, p. 131. (véase también TARROW, Sidney G., *Power in Movement*, Cambridge Univ. Press, Cambridge, 1994.)

³⁵ PUTNAM, Robert D., *Bowling alone*, 2001, p. 165.

³⁶ RUCHT, Dieter, "The Structure and Culture of Collective Protest in Germany since 1950" en MEYER, David et al. (Eds.), *The social movement society. Contentious politics for a new century*, Rowman and Littlefield, Lanham, 1998, p. 52.

³⁷ TEORELL, Jan, *Determinants of Democratization*, 2012, p. 100.

³⁸ WELZEL, Christian et al., "Political Culture, Mass Belief, and Value Change", en HAEPFER, Christian et al (Eds.), *Democratization*, Oxford Univ. Press, Oxford, 2009, p. 126.

³⁹ INGLEHART, Ronald et al., *Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy*, 2005.

⁴⁰ WELZEL, Christian et al., "Political Culture, Mass Belief, and Value Change", 2009, p. 138.

de los ingresos, la educación superior y otros recursos que aumentan la capacidad de acción de la gente corriente.

Investigaciones recientes del campo de estudios de resistencia civil o no violenta también muestran la importancia de la participación popular en la democratización. La primera contribución la realizaron Ackerman y Karatnycky⁴¹, quienes analizaron 67 transiciones democráticas violentas y no violentas utilizando datos de *Freedom House*. El resultado mostró que las transiciones no violentas tienen un efecto positivo sobre las libertades civiles en la democracia resultante. Esto fue confirmado más tarde por Johnstad⁴² en un estudio repetido que reemplazó los datos de *Freedom House*. Sobre una nueva base de datos que compila 323 campañas violentas y no violentas —*Nonviolent and violent Conflict Outcomes (NAVCO)*— Chenoweth y Stephen⁴³ realizaron una contribución significativa al estudio. Sus resultados sugieren que las campañas no violentas tienen una mayor probabilidad de éxito que otras formas de resistencia y contribuyen a potenciar la calidad de la democracia. Esta mayor efectividad de las campañas no violentas⁴⁴ y su efecto en la calidad⁴⁵ o en la duración de la democracia resultante⁴⁶ se comprueba en otros estudios. Sin embargo, el mecanismo que vincula ambos —resistencia de masas no violenta, supervivencia y consolidación democráticas— permanece en gran parte en la sombra.

3. RNV y “democratización sostenible”: tendencias empíricas

Considerando detenidamente los enfoques deliberativos, la democracia no es un estado alcanzado a través del mero momento de la transición. La democracia es más bien el proceso constante de “democratización sostenible”⁴⁷, un término que abarca su surgimiento, supervivencia y fortalecimiento. Como se ha indicado anteriormente, algunos estudios sugieren que existe una relación evidente entre el nacimiento de democracia y la RNV. Además, estos estudios señalan que hay lazos entre la supervivencia y la calidad de la democracia resultante y un modo de transición caracterizado por la resistencia no violenta de las masas. Dicho de otro modo, y contrariamente a los fundamentos de la teoría de la modernización, las masas no solo tienen importancia durante el momento de la transición, sino también durante la fase de consolidación.

Nancy Bermeo⁴⁸ también defiende esta percepción de un papel más activo de las masas, y argumenta que pocas democracias se vinieron abajo porque los ciudadanos detuvieron el apoyo electoral. Las democracias desaparecieron cuando se producía una combinación de dos fenómenos: la polarización de las élites políticas y que los ciudadanos no pudiesen defender su democracia frente a estas élites.

⁴¹ ACKERMANN, Peter et al., *How Freedom is won*, 2005.

⁴² JOHNSTAD, Petter, “Nonviolent Democratization”, 2010.

⁴³ CHENOWETH, Erica et al, *Why civil resistance works*, 2011.

⁴⁴ CELESTINO, Mauricio et al., “Fresh carnations or all thorn, no rose?”, 2013; TEORELL, Jan, *Determinants of Democratization*, 2012.

⁴⁵ BETHKE, Felix et al., “Nonviolent Resistance and the Quality of Democracy”, 2016.


⁴⁶ BAYER, Markus et al, “The democratic dividend of Nonviolent Resistance”, 2016.

⁴⁷ WELZEL, Christian, “Theories of democratization”, 2009.

⁴⁸ BERMEO, Nancy, *Ordinary People in Extraordinary Times: The Citizenry and the Collapse of Democracy*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2003.

Además, como apunta un análisis de supervivencia de 112 nuevas democracias entre 1955 y 2006, la primera década postransición ha demostrado ser la más importante para la resistencia de la democracia⁴⁹. Como se refleja en el siguiente gráfico, la media de supervivencia de una nueva democracia es de once años. Durante estos primeros once años, la función de supervivencia es muy pronunciada, lo que indica que hay un alto riesgo de retornar al gobierno autoritario. Posteriormente, la función se aplana, lo que indica un riesgo mucho menor de reacciones violentas⁵⁰.

Imagen I: Supervivencia de nuevas democracias⁵¹.



Como ya se ha explicado, es más que discutible si las instituciones democráticas son las únicas responsables de defender la democracia, especialmente durante los decisivos diez primeros años. El proceso de institucionalización requiere tiempo. Además, si las instituciones democráticas deben ser responsables de fomentar las actitudes democráticas a través de la educación cívica dentro de la población en general, no se puede esperar un resultado positivo en los primeros años posteriores a la transición. Un lapso de varias décadas sería un plazo más realista para que tal efecto fuese visible.

En otras palabras, si la institucionalización, como exponen los teóricos de la modernización y los institucionalistas, conduce a la consolidación a largo plazo, ¿cómo puede explicarse la supervivencia de la democracia durante los primeros años posteriores a la transición? Al igual que Inglehart y Welzel⁵², en mi opinión esto se debe a las actitudes emancipadoras y pro democráticas de los ciudadanos, que ya existían antes de la democratización⁵³. Yendo más allá, si estas actitudes emancipadoras y pro democráticas se ponen en marcha y originan una resistencia no violenta colectiva contra el liderazgo autoritario, las probabilidades de una

⁴⁹ BAYER, Markus et al, "The democratic dividend of Nonviolent Resistance", 2016.

⁵⁰ Por lo general, el lapso de tiempo de diez años abarca dos períodos legislativos o períodos presidenciales. Como la mayoría de las constituciones limitan la presidencia a dos mandatos, diez años marcan una encrucijada crítica para las nuevas democracias. Como regla general, Huntington (HUNTINGTON, Samuel, *The Third Wave. Democratization in the late twentieth century*, Univ. of Oklahoma Press, Oklahoma, 1991) sugiere que hayan dos reemplazos como punto de referencia para la consolidación. Si una democracia ha presenciado dos tomas de poder pacíficas, puede considerarse consolidada. En el mejor de los casos, estas dos tomas se encuadrarían dentro de la primera década. De lo contrario, las democracias deberían haber presenciado al menos el primer cambio en los primeros diez años.

⁵¹ BAYER, Markus et al, "The democratic dividend of Nonviolent Resistance", 2016.

⁵² INGLEHART, Ronald et al., *Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy*, Cambridge Uni. Press, Cambridge, 2005.

⁵³ Los valores emancipatorios no son necesariamente un producto de ingresos y recursos materiales. La lucha prodemocrática en Benín desde 1985 en adelante, por ejemplo, muestra que puede darse una democratización contra todo pronóstico en países con poco desarrollo económico.

democratización sostenible se intensifican.

Existen dos razones para ello. Primero, un número significativo de ciudadanos ya posee actitudes emancipadoras. Dado que estas personas se atrevieron a correr el riesgo de protestar por la democratización, estas actitudes son más que simples palabras vacías y ya reflejan alguna forma de cultura o valores democráticos. En segundo lugar, la participación en la lucha no violenta por la democracia proporciona algunos recursos viables para la ciudadanía democrática, lo que les permite tomar parte activamente en las democracias y contrarrestar las reacciones autoritarias. Dentro del ámbito de los estudios de movimientos, se ha objetado con frecuencia que los movimientos de protesta no solo tienen consecuencias políticas, sino que también tienden a tener consecuencias sociales y culturales⁵⁴. Sin embargo, estos no han sido abordados sistemáticamente hasta la fecha⁵⁵. En el siguiente apartado se destacan los mecanismos a través de los cuales la RNV se vincula con la ciudadanía democrática y la democratización sostenible. Estos mecanismos se ubican en diferentes niveles: el nivel individual, el nivel colectivo nacional y la esfera internacional.

4. Agencia individual y eficacia política interna

Anteriormente se ha formulado la hipótesis de que las diferentes transiciones democráticas dan lugar a legados distintos⁵⁶, y que la resistencia no violenta de las masas afecta positivamente a la resiliencia de una democracia⁵⁷. En mi juicio, una característica distintiva de las democracias que nacieron por la resistencia no violenta de las masas es una mayor sensación de agencia enraizada en partes de la población más amplias. Esta agencia individual más elevada proviene de experiencias de lucha no violenta y conforma el primer nexo de la RNV y la ciudadanía democrática.

Mientras que los estudios de movimientos se centraron principalmente en factores como recursos colectivos que podrían movilizados por estos⁵⁸, los procesos y las oportunidades políticas⁵⁹, o en las identidades colectivas⁶⁰ para explicar políticas no rutinarias como las protestas públicas y la política contenciosa; la investigación sobre la participación en

⁵⁴ GIUGNI, Marco, "Political, Biographical, and Cultural Consequences of Social Movements" en *Sociology Compass*, Vol. 2, No. 5, 2008, pp. 1582-1600; GIUGNI et al. "The biographic impact of participation in social movement activities: Beyond highly committed New Left activism", en BOSI, Lorenzo et al. (Eds.), *The consequences of social movements*, Cambridge Univ. Press, Cambridge, 2016, pp. 85-105.

⁵⁵ La mayoría de los estudios se centraron en las consecuencias personales y biográficas para los activistas y, por lo tanto, se centraron en el activismo de extrema izquierda durante los años 60 y 70. (GOLDSTONE, Jack et al. "Contention in Demographic and Life-Course Context", AMIZADE, Ronald et al. (Eds.), *Silence and Voice in the Study of Contentious Politics*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 2001, pp. 195-221.; McADAM, Doug, "The Biographical Consequences of Activism", *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 54, 1989, pp. 744-60.)

⁵⁶ COLLIER BERINS, Ruth y David COLLIER, *Shaping the political arena*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1991.

⁵⁷ CHENOWETH, Erica et al., *Why civil resistance works*, 2011; BAYER, Markus et al, "The democratic dividend of Nonviolent Resistance", 2016.

⁵⁸ McCARTHY, John et al., "Resource Mobilization and Social Movements: A partial Theory" en *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 82, 1977, pp. 1212-1241.; TILLY, Charles, *From Mobilization to Revolution*, McGraw-Hill, Nueva York, 1978.; GAMSON, William A., *Power and Discontent*, Dorsey, Homewood, 1968.

⁵⁹ TARROW, Sidney, *Power in Movement*, 1994; EISINGER, Peter, "The Conditions of Protest Behavior in American Cities" en *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 81, 1973, pp. 11-28.; McADAM, Doug, *Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 1930-1970*, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1982

⁶⁰ FRIEDMAN, Debra et al., "Collective Identity and Activism: Networks, choices and the life of Social Movement" en MORRIS et al. (Eds.), *Frontiers in social Movement Theory*, Yale Univ. Press, New Haven, 1992, pp. 156-173; KLANDERMANS, Bert, *The social psychology of Protest*, Blackwell, Oxford, 1997.



democracias consolidadas ayudó a aclarar factores individuales como la eficacia política. En otras palabras,

“Los participantes de los movimientos son personas que creen que pueden cambiar su entorno político [...] Se da por hecho que están ofendidos, pero no son tanto los agravios en sí, sino la fe de que la situación puede cambiar por un coste asequible lo que les hace participar. Tienen los recursos y perciben las oportunidades para impactar”⁶¹.

La eficacia política se puede entender como “la sensación de que el cambio político y social es posible, y de que un individuo puede formar parte en lograr este cambio”⁶². Por un lado, describe la autopercepción de los “individuos: son capaces de entender la política y lo suficientemente competentes como para participar en acciones políticas como votar”⁶³, lo que se etiqueta como eficacia política *interna*. Por otro lado, la eficacia política *externa* mide la confianza en las instituciones políticas carentes de eficacia externa y denota que “la sociedad no puede influir en los resultados políticos” debido a la irresponsabilidad de los líderes políticos⁶⁴. En esta segunda lectura, la eficacia puede verse homóloga a la estructura de oportunidad política (EOP), definida por Tarrow como una dimensión “coherente —no necesariamente formal o permanente— del entorno político que brinda incentivos para que la gente emprenda acciones colectivas al ver afectadas sus expectativas de éxito o fracaso”⁶⁵. En la primera lectura de eficacia política interna, se refleja más o menos el grado de autoestima de una persona para entender la política. Como expone Gene Sharp, uno de los principales académicos de la resistencia no violenta, la participación en la RNV conduce a cambios psicológicos que pueden entenderse como una mejora de la eficacia política interna de los participantes⁶⁶.

No solo superan su miedo y su deseo de ser dominados, sino que también obtienen un mayor respeto por sí mismos y aprenden a convertirse en agentes activos capaces de cooperar en tareas comunes⁶⁷. Principalmente, son los estudios sobre movimientos sociales y participación política los que defienden estos efectos. El hecho de superar la atomización y la apatía ganando nuevos aliados ya puede derivar en cambios en la percepción individual de eficacia. De este modo, los psicólogos sociales Drury y Reichert⁶⁸ evidenciaron que la mera expectativa de mutuo apoyo de un grupo más grande puede conducir a realizar la sensación de eficacia política individual interna⁶⁹. Con el inicio de las primeras acciones colectivas del

⁶¹ KLANDERMANS, Bert, “The Demand and Supply of Participation: Social-Psychological Correlates of Participation in Social Movements” en SNOW et al. (Eds.), *The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements*, Blackwell Publishing Ltd, Blackwell, 2004, pp. 360-379.

⁶² CAMPBELL, Angus et al., *The Voter Decides*, Row, Peterson and Company, Evanston, 1954.

⁶³ MILLER, Warren et al., *American National Election Studies Data Sourcebook, 1952-1978*, Harvard Univ. Press, Cambridge, 1980, p. 273 f.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, p 273 f.

⁶⁵ TARROW, Sidney, *Power in Movement*, 1994, p 85.

⁶⁶ SHARP, Gene, *The Politics of Nonviolent Action. Part three*, 1973.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, p.778.

⁶⁸ DRURY, John et al., “The intergroup dynamics of collective empowerment: Substantiating the social identity model of crowd behavior” en *Group Processes and Intergroup Relations*, Vol. 2, 1999, pp. 1-22.

⁶⁹ En consecuencia, podemos suponer que la eficacia política individual es incluso mayor si el individuo realmente experimentó un apoyo real y solidario.

grupo —y el activismo individual— se inicia un proceso positivo porque la eficacia percibida por los activistas aumenta con las acciones políticas⁷⁰.

Esto se puede ejemplificar con la descripción de Adel Abdel Ghafar, un activista de El Cairo que participó en las protestas contra el régimen de Mubarak en 2011:

“Nací en 1979, y en 1981 Mubarak ocupó la presidencia. A lo largo de mi vida, no he conocido a ningún otro presidente. Su foto adornaba las oficinas, aulas, murales y carteles de todo el país. Se aceptó que Mubarak es Egipto y Egipto es Mubarak. Todo esto cambió en dieciocho días en 2011. Pasé por una experiencia que dio un giro a mi vida el 25 de enero, y fue increíble compartirlo con miles de compatriotas”⁷¹.

Del mismo modo, Yousef Abduljalil, profesor de Sanaa, en Yemen, describe las consecuencias de participar en las protestas contra el régimen de Ali Abdullah Saleh mediante estas palabras:

“Ahora la vida ya no es lo que solía ser: no hay miedo, ni desesperación, ni sumisión, ni rendición [...] Sería imposible regresar al pasado oscuro e igualmente imposible aceptar más un régimen como el de Ali Abdullah Saleh”⁷².

Este proceso puede entenderse como un ciclo de activismo autoejecutable, ya que una alta eficacia afecta positivamente a la participación renovada⁷³. En otras palabras, “cuanto mayor es la participación, mayor es la sensación de eficacia⁷⁴”. Esta conciencia no solo puede conducir individualmente a un activismo más renovado, sino que también puede legarse a las generaciones futuras. Como recoge Sarah Hany, una activista feminista de Alejandría, Egipto:

“Viví para presenciar este día —el día de la renuncia de Mubarak; M.B.— y saborear la victoria y la dignidad y contarles a mis hijos todo al respecto! Para mí, es solo ... el comienzo ...”⁷⁵

El hecho de que esto origina consecuencias en el mundo real está demostrado por un experimento de Pellicer et al.⁷⁶. En un esfuerzo por manipular la eficacia percibida de los participantes de un experimento en Sudáfrica, Pellicer et al. pidieron a los ciudadanos que recordasen una acción colectiva exitosa. Al examinar este tipo de acción, Pellicer et al.

⁷⁰ DIAMOND, Larry “Towards Democratic Consolidation”, 1994, p. 7, STEKELENBURG, Jacquelin et al., “The social psychology of protest” en *Current Sociology Review*, Vol. 61, No. 5-6, 2013, p. 892.

⁷¹ GHAFAR, Adel A. I., “The Moment the Barrier of Fear broke down” en Al Saleh, Assad (Ed.), *Voices of the Arab Spring. Personal Stories from the Arab Revolutions*, Columbia Univ. Press, Nueva York, 2015, p. 59.

⁷² ABDULJALIL, Yousef, “Killing the Rose but not the Spring”, 2015, p. 180.

⁷³ Para la eficacia individual, véase BANDURA, Albert, “Self-Efficacy: Towards a unifying Theory of Behavioural Change” en *Psychological Review*, Vol. 84 No. 2, 1977, pp. 191-205.; para la eficacia grupal véase MUMMENDEY, Blanz et al., “Strategies to cope with negative social identity: Predictions by social identity theory and relative deprivation theory” en *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, Vol. 76, 1999, 229-245.

⁷⁴ COCKING, Christopher et al., “Generalization of Efficacy as a Function of Collective Action and Intergroup Relations: Involvement in an Anti-Road Struggle” en *Journal of Applied Social Psychology*, Vol. 34, No. 2, 2004, p. 419.

⁷⁵ HANY, Sara, “It is just...the beginning” en AL SALEH, Assad (Ed.) *Voices of the Arab Spring. Personal Stories from the Arab Revolutions*, Columbia Univ. Press, Nueva York, 2015, p. 70.

⁷⁶ PELLICER, Miquel et al., “Preferences for the scope of protests”, *SALDRU, UCT, SALDRU Working Paper Number 223*, 2018.



descubrieron que la mayoría de los participantes recordaban la lucha contra el apartheid. Las personas a las que se les pidió recordar una protesta victoriosa y una acción colectiva tenían más probabilidades de creer que las protestas son efectivas y que los políticos pueden rendir cuentas. Además, era más probable que “se sintieran empoderados en un sentido personal”⁷⁷.

5. Agencia colectiva, “mito fundacional” democrático y eficacia externa

La RNV no solo afecta al sentido individual de eficacia. El “legado” de un mayor sentido de eficacia también puede traspasar los límites de implicación de los activistas y extenderse a otras partes de la ciudadanía, recreando exitosas historias de resistencia y movilización. Si los medios y la sociedad comparten y recuerdan tales historias, esto puede afectar a la percepción de eficacia externa de toda la ciudadanía.

Si la RNV prospera, puede producirse lo que Aristide Zolberg⁷⁸ llama “momentos de locura”, es decir, situaciones de entusiasmo colectivo donde se cruzan los límites de la política establecida y “la política explota para invadir toda la vida” y todo se vuelve posible, o al menos, lo parece. A este respecto, el escritor y activista tunecino Mlek Sghiri, retrata patéticamente la Revolución de los Cedros en Túnez como:

“rápidos cambios revolucionarios impuestos por unos ciudadanos entusiasmados, el rugido de la gente que se había levantado de debajo de las cenizas de la miseria y el miedo como un fénix. Fue puro romance ...”⁷⁹.

Además, estas imágenes y narrativas de la agencia de las personas están adheridas a la memoria colectiva de una nación y pueden transferirse a las generaciones futuras. Centrándose en el poder de la narrativa, Eric Selbin sostiene que “la historia es accesible para nosotros en la narrativa de los ciudadanos sobre sus vidas y la cultura popular de su sociedad”. Estas narrativas generan la posibilidad —o la carencia— de un cambio fundamental⁸⁰. Desde una perspectiva psicológica, Liu y Hilton lo expresaron de manera muy similar: “La historia nos proporciona la narrativa que nos dice quiénes somos, de dónde venimos y hacia dónde deberíamos ir”⁸¹. En un nivel cognitivo colectivo, argumentan que la historia “como fuente de experiencias y narrativas compartidas [...] puede servir como ‘lección de historia’”⁸². En referencia al ejemplo de la Revolución EDSA en Filipinas, donde el pueblo derrocó al presidente Ferdinand Marcos en 1986 tras la supuesta manipulación de las elecciones, Liu y Hilton mostraron que tales eventos históricos pueden transformarse en una narrativa ampliamente compartida e incorporar “símbolos históricos particulares que definen derechos y obligaciones del grupo”⁸³. A través de este proceso, estos hechos pueden considerarse una

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 17.

⁷⁸ ZOLBERG, Aristide R., “Moments of Madness” en *Politics and Society*, Vol. 2, No. 2, 1972, p. 183.

⁷⁹ SGHIRI, Malek, “Greetings to the Down: Living through the Bittersweet Revolution” en Al-Zubaid et al. (Eds.), *Writing Revolution: The Voices from Tunis to Damascus*, I.B. Tauris, Londres, 2013, p. 43.

⁸⁰ SELBIN, Eric, *Revolution, Rebellion, and Resistance: The Power of Story*, Zed Books, Londres y Nueva York, 2010, p. 9.

⁸¹ LIU, James et al., “How the past weighs on the present: Social representation of history and their role in identity politics” en *British Journal of Social Psychology*, Vol. 44, 2005, p. 537.

⁸² HILTON, Denis et al., “History as the narrative of a people: From function to structure and content” en *Memory Studies*, Vol 10, No. 3, 2017, pp. 97 –309.

⁸³ LIU, James et al., “Theory and Methods of a Representational Approach to Understanding Social Movements: The

“carta fundacional” lo que constituye los cimientos de una ideología legitimadora, justificando la resistencia civil y legitimando la protesta. Además, puede aumentar la percepción de la eficacia grupal y el resentimiento contra la autoridad⁸⁴.

En épocas de crisis, las referencias históricas sobre el éxito del poder popular pueden usarse para volver a movilizar a las personas en defensa de estos logros. En julio de 2017, por ejemplo, miles de ciudadanos polacos salieron a la calle para protestar contra una reforma judicial que, a su juicio, pondría en peligro la constitución democrática del país. La movilización pública fue apoyada por el ex líder de *Solidarność* y <héroe nacional> Lech Walesa. Walesa declaró en una manifestación en Gdansk, desde donde surgió el movimiento pro democrático a finales de la década de los ochenta, que ahora es el momento de defender la democracia por la que lucharon⁸⁵.

Benín es otro ejemplo de reactivación de hechos históricos. Situado en el oeste de África, el país fue una vez conocido como el niño enfermo de África debido a su historia de inestabilidad política e intervención militar en el ámbito político. Desde su independencia en 1960 hasta 1972, el país pasó por once presidentes, seis constituciones diferentes, doce intentos de golpes de estado y cinco logrados⁸⁶. Bajo la presidencia de Kérékou, el país ganó cierta estabilidad e introdujo el marxismo-leninismo como doctrina estatal en 1974. A partir de 1985, sin embargo, la situación económica se deterioró. Las medidas de austeridad provocaron las primeras protestas de los profesores, el personal universitario, los estudiantes y los funcionarios durante los siguientes años. En 1989, estas protestas que no habían sido tomadas en cuenta dieron lugar a un importante movimiento en favor de la democracia que utilizaba la protesta pública y la RNV para presionar al gobierno. El 7 de diciembre, Kérékou anunció oficialmente el fin del marxismo-leninismo en Benín y pidió una *assemblée nationale des forces vives de la nation* —una asamblea nacional de las fuerzas activas de la nación. Lo que se pretendía realizar como un acto simbólico para introducir algunas reformas menores se convirtió en una verdadera asamblea nacional que formó una nueva constitución, instauró un gobierno provisional y marcó el ritmo de las elecciones democráticas. Dado que grandes segmentos de la sociedad participaron en las protestas y huelgas, esto se etiquetó como “Revolución Popular”⁸⁷. Benín se convirtió en el primer país del continente africano en expulsar pacíficamente a un dictador y establecer una democracia.

Orgullosos de su historia de resistencia popular contra el régimen autoritario, los ciudadanos de Benín resistieron en diferentes ocasiones los intentos de los presidentes de cambiar la constitución y de ejercer un tercer mandato. Durante estas ocasiones, utilizaron repetidamente el lema “No toques mi constitución” para expresar tanto su profundo compromiso con los principios básicos de la constitución como con la democracia en general.

Role of the EDSA Revolution in a National Psychology of Protest for the Philippines” en *Social Justice Research*, Vol. 24, 2011, p. 171.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 171.

⁸⁵ THE GUARDIAN, “Poland’s former president Lech Wałęsa joins protest against judicial overhaul”, 22 de julio de 2017.

⁸⁶ BIRSCHENK, Thomas, *Democratization without development. Benin 1989-2009*, Dpto de Antropología y Estudios Africanos, Universidad de Mainz, Working Paper No. 100, 2009.

⁸⁷ KOKO, Jaques L., *National Conference as a Strategy for Conflict Transformation and Peacebuilding. The Legacy of the Republic of Benin Model*. Adonis & Abbey Publishers Ltd, Londres, 2008, p. 43.



Igualmente, los hechos históricos particulares sirvieron como puntos de referencia y factores de movilización en Túnez y Filipinas. Con motivo del séptimo aniversario de la revolución tunecina de 2011, por ejemplo, estallaron nuevas protestas y miles de ciudadanos tomaron las calles para manifestarse contra la austeridad presupuestaria del gobierno. Aunque la protesta iba dirigida hacia un proyecto gubernamental concreto, la fecha en la que ocurrió no fue al azar. De hecho, las protestas “no fueron meramente económicas, sino también políticas” y básicamente surgieron del continuo descuido de las demandas ciudadanas de dignidad, libertad política y liderazgo responsable; demandas que alimentaron la revolución de 2010 y 2011⁸⁸.

En Filipinas, el legado de la resistencia no violenta se puede remontar a la revolución original de 1896. Además, la primera Revolución EDSA se repitió en la forma de una segunda revolución popular contra el presidente Estrada en 2001. En la actualidad, el primer movimiento de la Revolución EDSA es considerado como el evento histórico más importante en la historia de Filipinas⁸⁹.

6. Dimensión local e internacional

Generalmente es más o menos sabido que las protestas se suceden en oleadas⁹⁰, al igual que la democracia⁹¹. Por lo tanto, la cuestión de democratización, consolidación democrática y ciudadanía nunca será una mera cuestión nacional o ni siquiera local; está muy influenciada por factores internacionales. Las olas de protestas como las Revoluciones de Colores en Europa del Este y la llamada Primavera Árabe en Oriente Medio evidenciaron que las protestas nacionales o locales pueden tener efectos indirectos regionales y transnacionales e influirse mutuamente. Asimismo, muchas concepciones de la sociedad civil —que provienen de pensadores tan diferentes como Kant y Marx— ya implican la idea de solidaridad internacional o cosmopolitismo⁹². Algunos objetan que es el mercado global y el capital internacional lo que impulsa el establecimiento de una sociedad civil global⁹³. Por el contrario, otros argumentan que el crecimiento de las interconexiones después de la Guerra Fría facilitó que los activistas se vincularan con personas afines y sobrepasaran las fronteras nacionales que hasta ahora confinaban a la sociedad civil, contribuyendo al desarrollo de una sociedad civil global⁹⁴. En cuanto a esto, desde mi punto de vista la resistencia no violenta, como el levantamiento tunecino contra Ben Ali, ofrece excelentes puntos de partida para la cooperación internacional en forma de movimientos de solidaridad y redes internacionales de activistas. Del mismo modo, Tarrow afirma que las protestas no violentas tienen más probabilidades de asegurarse el apoyo de terceros que las protestas violentas, que a menudo son contraproducentes para

⁸⁸ ABBOTT, Pamela y TETI, Andrea “Tunisia is back on a knife edge – here’s why”, *The Conversation*, 17 de enero de 2018: <https://Theconversation.com/Tunisia-is-back-on-a-knife-edge-heres-why-90245> [Consultado el 13 de septiembre de 2018].

⁸⁹ LIU, James et al., “Theory and Methods of a Representational Approach to Understanding Social Movements”, 2011.

⁹⁰ TARROW, Sidney, *Power in Movement*, 1994.

⁹¹ HUNTINGTON, Samuel, *The Third Wave*, 1991.

⁹² KUMAR, Krishan, “Global Civil Society” en *European Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 48, No. 3, 2007, pp. 413-434.

⁹³ KEANE, John, *Global Civil Society?*, Cambridge Univ. Press, Cambridge, 2003.

⁹⁴ KALDOR, Mary, *Global civil Society: An Answer to War*, Polity Press, Cambridge, 2003.

movilizar apoyo internacional⁹⁵. Estas redes internacionales pueden construir un núcleo para una sociedad civil global, ya que se basan en normas democráticas comunes y en los principios de solidaridad y cosmopolitismo.

Se pueden identificar dos efectos de las redes internacionales: por una parte, posibilitan los flujos de información y permiten que los diversos movimientos nacionales aprendan entre sí y se beneficien de otras experiencias, difundiendo las normas de no violencia, participación cívica y democracia. Por otra parte, al establecer una red de solidaridad global, los activistas locales pueden obtener recursos y apoyo de externos. Estos lazos internacionales se pueden usar para nivelar la desigualdad de poder a nivel nacional al “extender el campo de batalla”⁹⁶. Una estrategia similar, el llamado efecto *boomerang*, es popular dentro del activismo por los derechos humanos⁹⁷. Si no es posible la comunicación directa entre los ciudadanos y su propio gobierno, los activistas a veces usan un *bypass* a través de las llamadas Redes Transnacionales de Defensa (TAN). Las TAN consisten en grupos de investigación y defensa, medios de comunicación, iglesias, sindicatos u otras organizaciones internacionales que se utilizan para atraer a grupos y personas de otros países para presionar a sus respectivos gobiernos y que se sancione el comportamiento del régimen infractor. Como un *boomerang*, la negativa de responder a las demandas de los ciudadanos fracasa a nivel internacional. Tanto el conocimiento sobre cómo librar una lucha no violenta como el apoyo internacional de las TAN puede ayudar a los activistas locales a lograr que su gobierno rinda cuentas en la vía democrática. Sin embargo, en los términos restrictivos de Ackermann y Duval,

“La realidad es que los extranjeros no pueden formular el discurso de un movimiento civil, analizar los pilares de apoyo de su oponente o tomar decisiones tácticas en conflictos acelerados. Las acciones para que se den cada una de las condiciones necesarias para el empoderamiento de la gente solo puede derivar de la experiencia local. Lo que puede venir del exterior son equipos de comunicación, financiación para artículos tangibles como ordenadores o pegatinas para el parachoques, y formación genérica sobre resistencia no violenta —todo lo que acelera el ritmo del empoderamiento popular—”⁹⁸.

Diferentes organizaciones no gubernamentales brindan este apoyo externo a través de estudios, conocimientos técnicos y formación. Para comenzar, la Institución Albert Einstein con sede en Estados Unidos, fundada por Gene Sharp, publicó varios manuales sobre cómo librar estratégicamente un conflicto no violento⁹⁹ o una lucha no violenta¹⁰⁰, cómo convertir las dictaduras en democracias sin violencia¹⁰¹ o cómo prevenir los intentos de golpes de

⁹⁵ TARROW, Sidney, *Power in Movement*, 1994.

⁹⁶ GALTUNG, Johann, *Nonviolence in Israel/Palestine*. Univ. of Hawai'i Press, Honolulu, 1989.

⁹⁷ SIKKINK, Kathryn, “Human Rights, Principled Issue Networks, and Sovereignty in Latin America” en *International Organization*, Vol. 47, No. 3, 1993, pp. 411-441.; KECK, Margaret et al., *Activists beyond borders*, Cornell Univ. Press, Ithaca, 1989.

⁹⁸ ACKERMANN, Peter et al., “People Power Primed Civilian Resistance and Democratization en *Harvard International Review*, 2005, p. 47.

⁹⁹ HELVEY, Robert, *On strategic Nonviolent Conflict: Thinking about the Fundamentals*, The Albert Einstein Institution, Boston, 2004.

¹⁰⁰ SHARP, Gene, *Waging Nonviolent Conflict*, Porter Sargent Publishers, Boston, 2005.

¹⁰¹ SHARP, Gene *From Dictatorship to Democracy*, 2010.



Estado¹⁰². Estos libros, especialmente *De la Dictadura a la Democracia* de Sharp, se tradujeron en muchos idiomas y es un modelo en todo el mundo. Aunque originalmente el libro estaba destinado a Birmania, *De la dictadura a la democracia* llegó a Serbia y a los países de la Primavera Árabe¹⁰³. En 2016, tres activistas fueron encarcelados en China por “incitar a la subversión del poder del Estado” y por promover “ideas de desobediencia civil [...] con el objetivo de derrocar al sistema socialista”¹⁰⁴. Dos años antes, una editorial estatal china intentó comprar los derechos lingüísticos del chino para evitar la propagación del libro en el país.

De forma similar, el Centro para la Acción y la Estrategia No Violenta Aplicadas (CANVAS) bajo la dirección del ex activista de Otpor, Srdja Popovic, publicó varios libros basados en sus experiencias¹⁰⁵ y realizó varios talleres y actividades de formación con activistas de todo el mundo. El poder de las redes transnacionales fue visible en Benín. Los militares del país no se atrevieron a intervenir en la política después de la transición, ya que temían perder el apoyo internacional y la posibilidad de enviar parte de sus fuerzas a las operaciones internacionales de mantenimiento de la paz de Naciones Unidas. Se constató que estas misiones eran de interés para los soldados, quienes ganan una prestación adicional por peligro para misiones en el extranjero, como para el gobierno, ya que Naciones Unidas paga a los soldados durante las misiones. Por tanto, las TAN ejercieron un efecto “civilizador” al presionar a cualquier gobierno y especialmente a Naciones Unidas para que detuviera su cooperación con el ejército de Benín si volvía a interferir en la política.

Conclusiones

Se ha expuesto que las democratizaciones representan coyunturas críticas en la historia de un país. También se ha constatado que no solo es decisivo que un país se vuelva democrático sino también *cómo* se introduce en la democracia. En este marco, varios estudios comparativos han demostrado la efectividad de la resistencia no violenta para generar un cambio democrático y su efecto sobre la calidad y la estabilidad de la democracia resultante. Sin embargo, la mayoría de estos estudios omitieron el mecanismo que une a ambos.

Para definir esta relación tan poco investigada, se han explorado tres mecanismos que conectan un modo no violento de transición a través de la participación de masas con la supervivencia de la democracia en estos países. Con referencia a estudios del campo de la psicología social y los estudios de movimientos sociales, se ha presentado que la resistencia no violenta de masas a nivel individual puede conducir a un mayor sentido de eficacia política interna individual. Esta sensación de eficacia interna —o la sensación de que uno es capaz de comprender e influir en la política— tiene un impacto positivo en la posterior participación en

¹⁰² SHARP, Gene et al, *The anti-coup*, The Albert Einstein Institution, Boston, 2003.

¹⁰³ POPESCU, Lucy, “From Dictatorship to Democracy, By Gene Sharp. No fool, this child of the revolution” en *Independent*, 8 enero de 2012.

¹⁰⁴ AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, “China: three people jailed for publishing books on democracy”, 29 de enero de 2016: <https://www.amnesty.org.uk/press-releases/china-three-people-jailed-publishing-books-democracy> [Consultado el 13 de septiembre de 2018].

¹⁰⁵ POPOVIC, Srdja et al., *Making Oppression Backfire*, CANVAS, Belgrado, 2013; POPOVIC, Srdja et al., *Nonviolent Struggle. 50 crucial points. A strategic approach to everyday tactics*, CANVAS, Belgrado, 2007; POPOVIC, Srdja et al., *CANVAS core curriculum. A Guide to effective Nonviolent Struggle*, CANVAS, Belgrado, 2003.

el nuevo sistema democrático. El aumento de la eficacia interna es el primer vínculo directo entre la RNV y la aparición de ciudadanía democrática.

Como se describe en el segundo mecanismo, la RNV también ayuda a construir una cultura política democrática. A nivel colectivo, la narrativa del éxito de una revolución popular puede servir como un símbolo de eficacia política externa y utilizarse como un punto de referencia histórico y una oportunidad discursiva para volver a movilizar a los ciudadanos. También se ha indicado que los modos de operar de la resistencia no violenta favorecen el surgimiento de redes internacionales de apoyo, lo que a su vez tiene un efecto democratizador. Además, al ser un movimiento, la RNV se basa en una amplia participación y redes. En la era de la globalización, estas redes y colaboraciones no se limitan a los límites de los estados nación, sino que tienen un alcance regional o transnacional. Llegado el momento, los activistas pueden recurrir a estas estructuras internacionales de apoyo y redes de solidaridad para presionar a las elites políticas o militares y defender los principios democráticos.

En conjunto, las particularidades de la RNV como modo de transición construyen recursos que tienden a favorecer y apoyar las actitudes democráticas y la participación pública en la vida política o, en otras palabras, contribuyen a crear una ciudadanía democrática. No obstante, dejando de lado los vínculos mencionados anteriormente, los datos empíricos también muestran que la RNV no es un camino seguro para la salvación. Los activistas no lo son para siempre e incluso sociedades donde se originaron movimientos de masas no siempre se mantienen movilizadas políticamente durante mucho tiempo. En cambio, las cifras sugieren que las sociedades se desmovilizan rápidamente después de las transiciones democráticas cuando la gente vuelve a sus vidas "normales", lo que significa que van a trabajar para pagar sus facturas. Igualmente, un alto sentido de eficacia externa por situaciones democráticas y positivas de la RNV no es estático, ya que puede disminuir con el tiempo si los ciudadanos se enfrentan a contratiempos desmoralizadores. El asesinato del primer ministro serbio Zoran Đinđić, que jugó un papel importante en la oposición contra el ex presidente Milosevic en marzo de 2003, representó un hecho tan desalentador para los serbios que finalmente condujo a la frustración y la resignación. Y, cuando los sentimientos de eficacia disminuyen, el resultado es principalmente la desmovilización. Sin embargo, hasta la fecha se sabe relativamente poco sobre las desmovilizaciones de movimientos y las consecuencias de sucesos desalentadores.

Por último, también hay que evaluar críticamente el papel de los sistemas democráticos existentes para la "democratización sostenible", es decir, el proceso de constante mejora de la calidad de la democracia. La eficacia política también puede disminuir debido a la forma de las democracias modernas. En la actualidad, ello normalmente implica hablar de democracia representativa. La institucionalización de la democracia, sin embargo, conduce principalmente a la reducción de espacios para la participación directa fuera del marco institucional del partidismo político. Además, a menudo se acuñan a los períodos postransición por la *realpolitik*, contraria a los románticos objetivos de las revueltas. Por tanto, el limitado espacio para la participación¹⁰⁶ y la *realpolitik* se perciben con frecuencia como una traición¹⁰⁷

¹⁰⁶ MERKEL, Wolfgang, *Systemtransformation*, 2010.

¹⁰⁷ GRODSKY, Brian K., *Social movements and the new state: the fate of pro-democracy organizations when democracy is won*, Stanford Univ. Press, Stanford, 2012.



que también puede llevar a los ex activistas a la frustración. La interacción de eventos y factores de movilización que fortalecen la eficacia política por un lado, y los factores que los disminuyen y conducen al letargo democrático, por otro lado, siguen siendo relevantes líneas de futuras investigaciones.

Para concluir, las transiciones democráticas inducidas por la RNV despiertan cierto optimismo. Aunque Gene Sharp advierte que “nadie debería creer que con la caída de la dictadura aparecerá inmediatamente una sociedad ideal¹⁰⁸”, la RNV de masas en la lucha por la democracia aporta una buena base para los estados recientemente democratizados. Como señalan los casos de Benín, Polonia u otros lugares, las personas con un alto sentido de eficacia interna pueden (re)movilizarse en situaciones críticas en defensa de la democracia. La RNV en sí misma puede sentar los principios fundacionales e inclusivos de una sociedad democrática. ●

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¹⁰⁸ SHARP, Gene, *From Dictatorship to Democracy*, 2010, p. 63.

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**On consolidation:
Nonviolent struggle as resource for democratic citizenship**

Markus BAYER

Abstract:

After the Colour Revolutions and the Arab Spring the research linking nonviolent resistance (NVR) and democratisation increased drastically. Nevertheless, research focussing on the effect on democratic consolidation remains scarce. Based on a neo-Tocquevillean understanding of democracy, I argue that NVR against authoritarian rule provides important resources for the development of democratic citizenship and can positively affect democratisation. As a result of the struggle for democracy, the individual agency of each citizen rises, enabling him/her to participate and to resist backlashes if necessary. On a collective level and transgressing the circle of the participating activist, the collective agency of the whole population is sustainably affected in creating a collective narrative of the successful struggle of the people. These successful and iconic events provide opportunities to reconnect renewed mass mobilization. Last but not least, such movements are embedded into an international context. Waves of contention like the Arab Spring leave international networks of activists and supporters.

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Introduction

With a mix of enthusiasm and astonishment most scholars of democratic transitions followed the Arab spring washing away – mostly peacefully – some of the most persistent autocratic regimes in a region not often considered prone to democratic transitions.¹ These democratic transitions were accompanied by enthusiasm for the means of nonviolent resistance (NVR) that brought about these changes; some even urged that the time of NVR had finally come² or that these events were heralding an era of nonviolence³. Even if most of the initial enthusiasm has vanished in the meantime due to the backlashes in Egypt or Syria, these regime changes and democratic transitions brought some questions back on the agenda. What makes a good democracy? Which factors let them survive and consolidate? Recent studies on NVR and democratisation generally portray a positive picture. Several comparative studies found strong evidence that nonviolent resistance not only seems to be more effective in bringing about social and political change⁴, but also enhances the quality of a resulting democracy⁵ and its chances for survival and consolidation⁶. However, the mechanism linking both – nonviolent resistance and democratic survival and consolidation – remains to be elucidated.⁷

Against this background and contrary to current pessimism regarding the future of democracy, I argue that countries with a legacy of democratic transition rooted in nonviolent mass resistance have good reason to be optimistic. My argument in this article is that nonviolent mass resistance not only plays a substantial role in bringing about democratic change, but is also conducive for “sustainable democratisation”⁸ - a term covering the emergence, development and endurance of democracy. Based on a neo-

¹ In January 2010, roughly a year before the outbreak of the Arab spring, Larry Diamond still felt compelled to discuss the question “Why are there no Arab democracies?” See DIAMOND, Larry, “Why are there no Arab democracies?”, in *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 21, No. 1, 2010, pp. 93-104.

² CHENOWETH, Erica “Civil Resistance: Reflections on an Idea Whose Time Has Come. Global Governance”, in *A Review of Multilateralism and International Organizations*, Vol. 20, No. 3, 2014, pp. 351-358.

³ HASTINGS, Tom H., *A new era of nonviolence: the power of civil society over civil war*, McFarland & company, Jefferson, 2014.

⁴ CELESTINO et al., “Fresh carnations or all thorn, no rose? Nonviolent campaigns and transitions in autocracies”, in *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol 50, Issue 3, 2013, pp. 385-400; TEORELL, Jan, *Determinants of Democratization. Explaining Regime Change in the World, 1972-2006*, Cambridge Univ. Press, Cambridge, 2012; CHENOWETH et al., *Why civil resistance works: The strategic logic of nonviolent conflict*, Columbia University Press, New York, 2011.

⁵ ACKERMANN et al., *How Freedom is won. From Civic Resistance to Durable Democracy*, Freedom House, 2005; JOHNSTAD, Petter G., “Nonviolent Democratization: A sensitive Analysis of how Transition Mode and Violence Impact the Durability of Democracy”, in *Peace and Change*, Vol. 35, No. 3, 2010, pp. 465-482; CHENOWETH et al., *Why civil resistance works: The strategic logic of nonviolent conflict*, Columbia University Press, New York, 2011; BETHKE, Felix S. and Jonathan PICKNEY, “Nonviolent Resistance and the Quality of Democracy”, in *V-Dem Users Working Papers*, 2016.

⁶ BAYER, et al., “The democratic dividend of Nonviolent Resistance”, in *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol 53 No 6, 2016, pp. 758-771.

⁷ First attempts to discover such a mechanism were recently undertaken by CHANDLER; Mathew J, “Civil Resistance and Disrupted Democratization: The Ambiguous Outcomes of Unarmed Insurrections in Egypt, 2011-2015”, *Peace and Change*, Vol 43, Issue 1, pp. 90-114. and BAYER, Markus, “The democratizing effect of nonviolent resistance. How nonviolent resistance featured democratic consolidation in Benin”, in *Swisspeace Working Papers*, 2018. Nevertheless, hitherto, these are based on single-case studies only.

⁸ WELZEL, C. P., “Theories of democratization”, in: HARPFER et al. (Eds.), *Democratization*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2009, pp. 74-90.

Tocquevillean understanding of democracy, I claim that NVR against authoritarian rule provides important resources for the development of democratic citizenship and can positively affect sustainable democratisation. Concretely, I elaborate three mechanisms through which NVR affects democratisation: First, on an individual level, the agency of each citizen rises as a result of the struggle for democracy and thereby generally empowers him/her to participate in democratic processes or to resist backlashes if necessary. Second, on a more collective level and transgressing the circle of participating activists, NVR has the capacity to sustainably affect the agency of the whole citizenry. The narrative of the successful struggle of the people – like Poland’s *Solidarność* or Benin’s *Renouveau Démocratique* – becomes inscribed as “master narrative” in the collective memory of a society, providing opportunities to reconnect renewed mass mobilisation to these successful iconic events and frame them accordingly. Third, in times of globalisation, pro-democratic movements are embedded into an international context. Waves of contention like the Colour Revolutions in Eastern Europe or the so-called Arab Spring in the Middle East not only have regional and transnational signal effects, but also leave behind well-connected international networks of democratic activists and supporters.

To develop my argument, I will first display theories of democracy that highlight the role of civil participation – or democratic citizenship – for democratic consolidation and sustainable democracy. Against the background of these findings, I will elaborate how NVR contributes to democratic citizenship in exploring each of the three above-mentioned mechanisms. To support the argument, I will rely on empirical evidences from different cases. Finally, I will discuss the findings and highlight further fields of research.

1. Democracy and the role of democratic citizenship

Since Rousseau’s “invention” of the sovereignty of the people in his *Social Contract*⁹ and even more after Tocqueville’s analysis of the American Democracy¹⁰, the citizen has played a crucial role in democratic theory. Nevertheless, in political theory we find an array of ideas about what democracy is and how it is best achieved and maintained. To back the argument brought forward in this article, I will introduce theories on democracy which support the importance of citizenship and participation for sustainable democracies and contrast them with some classical works from the literature on democratization – a strand of literature typically focusing on elites and political institutions rather than the agency of the people - be it in the process of democratisation or during consolidation.

⁹ ROUSSEAU, Jean Jacques, *The Social Contract*, 1762, online: www.constitution.org/jjr/socon.htm [accessed 13 September 2018].

¹⁰ TOCQUEVILLE, Alexis de, *Democracy in America*, A Penn State Electronic Class Series Publication, 2002, online: www.seas.elte.hu/coursematerial/LojkoMiklos/Alexis-de-Tocqueville-Democracy-in-America.pdf [accessed 13 September 2018].

In general, we can distinguish theories of democracies according to the range of their inherent *principle of democracy*¹¹. Centrist, liberal and conservative approaches are rather output-oriented; that is they tend to emphasise governability, stable structures and efficient government and stress the importance of political elites for the former - at the expense of direct participation. Leftist and progressive approaches, however, are more input-oriented and highlight direct participation and how it can be guaranteed in the most comprehensive way¹²

This research follows a deliberative understanding of democracy. The aim of deliberative democracy is, in short, "to shift from bargaining, interest aggregation, and power" often associated with liberal, representative democracy "to common reason of equal citizens as a dominant force in democratic life"¹³. While theories of liberal (representative) democracy see polls as method of decision-making in which people delegate their voices and future decisions to representatives, approaches of deliberative democracy assume that decisions should be made after a process of decentral discussion and exchange of arguments by many. This understanding of democracy relies on input orientation, decentralized decision-making and scepticism towards centralisation of power associated with domination. Deliberative theories share these principles with classical republican theory. For Tocqueville, the strength of the American Democracy was anchored in civic associations that could withstand the centralisation of power and, consequently, tyranny. In the words of Tocqueville: "Town-meetings are to liberty what primary schools are to science"¹⁴.

Similarly, modern proponents of deliberation like Colin Crouch emphasise that democracy can only flourish if the masses of ordinary people have a real opportunity to actively participate in and shape the democratic society and if they make use of these freedoms¹⁵. In a similar vein, Charles Tilly¹⁶ ties democracy *per se* to citizen consultation. In his eyes, a "regime is democratic to the degree that political relations between the state and its citizens feature broad, equal, protected and mutually binding consultation". In this sense, democracy can be described as the process of the "inclusion of more groups and categories in the polity"¹⁷.

However, this requires a citizen a) willing and b) able to participate actively in his society and political debates. According to the neo-Tocquevillean approach put forwards by Putnam, it is social capital and especially trust what makes a stable and flourishing

¹¹ SCHMIDT, Manfred G., *Demokratiethorien: Eine Einführung*, VS Verlag, Wiesbaden, 2010, p. 251.

¹² SCHARPF, Fritz, *Demokratiethorie zwischen Utopie und Anpassung*. K Univ. Verlag, Konstanz, 1970; SALZBORN, Samuel, *Demokratie. Theorien, Formen, Entwicklungen*, Nomos, Baden-Baden, 2012.

¹³ COHEN et al., "Radical Democracy", in *Swiss Political Science Review*, Vol. 10, 2004, p. 24.

¹⁴ TOCQUEVILLE, Alexis de, *Democracy in America*, p. 78.

¹⁵ CROUCH, Colin, *Postdemokratie*, edition suhrkamp, Berlin, 2008, p. 8. Habermas addressed the question of 'real' deliberation free of power in his discourse ethics (See HABERMAS, Jürgen, *Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action*, MIT Press, Cambridge, 1991.). Therefore deliberative approaches are often considered as attempts of "Democratizing Democracy" (see SOUSA SANTOS, Boaventura De (Ed.), *Democratizing Democracy: Beyond the Liberal Democratic Canon*, Verso, New York, 2007).

¹⁶ TILLY, Charles, *Democracy*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2007, p. 13 f.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*

democracy with high grades of civic association and democratic participation. First of all, social capital according to Putnam helps the citizens to overcome the collective action problem more easily. Second, when people trust each other, and “are subject to repeated interaction with fellow citizen, everyday business and social transactions are less costly.”¹⁸ This further enhances once established co-operations. Finally, social capital widens the awareness “of the many ways in which our fates are lined”¹⁹. Joiners, as Putnam calls those deeply engaged in social interaction, become “more tolerant, less cynical, and more empathic”²⁰.

This neo-Tocquevillian idea of democratic citizenship (rooted in civic association able to organise collective interests) is in line with most ideas of nonviolent resistance.

Most theories of nonviolent resistance base on a “consent theory of power”²¹. The premise of this theory is that authoritarian rulers concentrate or aim at concentrating power in few hands. Nevertheless, their power relies on submission and even cooperation of the citizens. Thus, basically, the way to end authoritarian rule and to establish democracy starts with ending submission and obedience²². Here, proponents of NVR rely on the idea of “voluntary servitude” that was raised by French renaissance philosopher Etienne de la Boétie in 16th century in critique of absolute monarchy²³.

Instead, NVR draws on an Arendtian understanding of power, meaning that

“[w]hen we say of somebody that he is ‘in power’ we actually refer to his being empowered by a certain number of people to act in their name. The moment the group, from which the power originated to begin with disappears, ‘his power’ also vanished”²⁴.

Thus, the process of resistance goes hand in hand with a process of empowerment of the individual who decides to withdraw consent, obedience and submission (see mechanism below). To end authoritarian rule and to advance democracy, people have to overcome the severe problem of atomisation and deep distrust prevalent in most autocracies. Thus, and in line with Putnam’s argument, the experiences of collective nonviolent resistance can and

¹⁸ PUTNAM, Robert D., *Bowling alone: The collapse and Revival of American Community*, Simon & Schuster New York, 2001, p. 288.

¹⁹ *Ibid*, p. 288.

²⁰ *Ibid*, p. 289.

²¹ SHARP, Gene, *Politics of Nonviolent Action. Part one: Power and Struggle*, Porter Sargent Publishers, Boston, 1973 a; SHARP, Gene, *The Role of Power in Nonviolent Struggle*, Albert Einstein Institution, Boston, 1990; SHARP, Gene, *From Dictatorship to Democracy A Conceptual Framework for Liberation*, Albert Einstein Institution, Boston, 2010.

²² SHARP, Gene, *The Politics of Nonviolent Action. Part three: The Dynamics of Nonviolent Action*, Porter Sargent Publishers, Boston, 1973 b; Similar VINTHAGEN, Stellan, “Power as Subordination and Resistance as Disobedience: Nonviolent Movement and the Management of Power”, in *Asian Journal of Social Science*, Vol. 34, No. 1, 2006, pp. 1-21 and VINTHAGEN, Stellan, *A Theory of Nonviolent Action: How Civil Resistance Works*, Zed Books, London, 2015.

²³ DE LA BOÉTIE, Etienne, *The Politics of Obedience: The Discourse of Voluntary Servitude*, Black Rose Books, Montréal/New York/London, 1997[1553].

²⁴ ARENDT, Hannah, *On Violence*, A Harvest Book Harcourt Inc., Orlando, 1970, p. 44.

must serve as the ultimate prove that people can be trusted and collective action problems can be overcome. Accordingly, Yousef Abduljalil describes his feelings after the Arab Spring in Yemen in 2011:

“For the first time, I felt as if I were in a complete different country, a country whose people love to work, enjoy freedom, and said and wrote what they felt without fear or restriction – it was the country in which I had always dreamed of living in, feeling that I naturally belonged to it and its people.”²⁵

Once democracy is achieved, Sharp argues²⁶, it can be best secured by so-called independent “loci of power”, that means civic organisations like sports clubs, unions, associations or what others call civil society that organise mutual interests. This again is totally in line with Putnam’s argument introduced above.

2. Paving the way towards a stable democracy: The role of the “masses”

As discussed above, civic participation and democratic citizenship are important drivers of democracy. In the 1960s, Almond and Verba²⁷ found out that it is a specific attitude they called “democratic political culture” that lets people make use of their liberties and responsibilities as democratic citizens. They showed that it was the difference in political culture (democratic or not) that made the difference between countries like Germany and Italy that turned to fascist regimes and countries like England that remained democratic. Quintessentially, Rosenau acknowledged the role of democratic culture and democratic citizenship as source of support and stability by referring to political support as “the currency of democratic polities”²⁸. However, how this democratic support and citizenship evolves is a contested issue. The most influential modernization theory simply assumes that a democratic culture would ‘automatically’ follow democratic institutions and that it is democracies that produce the citizens they need²⁹. Following an institutionalist understanding, most scholars thought that once the “rules of the game” have been fixed in the constitution, and electoral laws and institutions like parties, parliament and constitutional courts have been set up, democracy would become the “only game in town”³⁰, or, in other words, consolidated. In brief, civic culture and democratic citizenship

²⁵ ABDULJALIL, Yousef, “Killing the Rose but not the Spring”, in: Al Saleh, Assad (Ed.), *Voices of the Arab Spring. Personal Stories from the Arab Revolutions*, Columbia Univ. Press, New York, 2015, p. 177.

²⁶ SHARP, Gene, *Politics of Nonviolent Action. Part one: Power and Struggle*, Porter Sargent Publishers, Boston, 1973 a.

²⁷ ALMOND, Gabriel A. and Sydney VERBA, *The Civic Culture. Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations*, Princeton Univ. Press, Princeton, 1963.

²⁸ ROSENAU, James N., *Citizenship between elections: An inquiry into the mobilizable American*, Free Press, New York, 1974, p. 1.

²⁹ EASTON, David, A., *System Analysis of Political Life*, John Wiley and Sons, New York, 1965.

³⁰ LINZ, et al., *Problems of democratic transition and consolidation*, John Hopkins Univ. Press, Baltimore, 1996, p. 5.

was “conceived as a product of democracy rather than its producer”³¹. The role of the masses was thought to be a passive support of the representational system at best. Against this “elitist mainstream” that highlights the role of political elites in democratic transition³² and the subsequent consolidation, scholars from the field of social movement studies began to promote the so-called “populist approach” to democracy.³³ According to the populist approach, social movements and democratisation advance in parallel and presuppose each other, since social movements can create public space for democratisation and “democratization as such further encourages people to form social movements”³⁴. This turn towards political contention in non-democracies and democratising countries constituted a novelty. Most studies hitherto neglected the link between social movements, nonviolent resistance and democratization and instead focused on established (western) democracies where nonviolent protest has become a “standard operating procedure”³⁵ and a “part of everyday politics”³⁶. Nevertheless, this new stimulus influenced the literature on democratisation.

Taking the role of the masses for democratization and consolidation more seriously, Teorell argues that “[d]emocratization never just happens: Someone has to take action to install, or protect, democratic institutions”³⁷. Similarly, Welzel and Inglehart³⁸ – proponents of a “modernised” modernisation theory – acknowledge that “mass beliefs are of critical importance for a country’s chances to become and remain democratic”. But where do these mass beliefs come from, when – as argued by proponents of this thinking – citizens only start developing democratic attitudes during the process of consolidation? Welzel and Inglehart³⁹ could show that in countries of the former Eastern Bloc like Poland, Hungary and Estonia, high intrinsic support for democracy emerged already *before* the transition to democracy. Thus, they assume that the “causal arrow apparently runs from values to

³¹ SCHMITTER, Philippe C., “Twenty-Five Years, Fifteen Findings”, in *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 21, No. 1, 2010, pp. 17-28, p. 18.

³² O'DONNELL et al., *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies*, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1986; PRZEWORSKI, Adam, “Democracy as a Contingent Outcome of Conflicts”, in ELSTER et al. (Eds.), *Constitutionalism and Democracy*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1988, pp. 59-80.; LINZ, Juan J., “Transition to Democracy”, in *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 13, No. 3, 1990, pp. 143-162; DIAMOND, Larry J., “Towards Democratic Consolidation”, in *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 5, No. 3, 1994, pp. 4-17.; LINZ, et al., *Problems of democratic transition and consolidation*, 1996; MERKEL, Wolfgang *Systemtransformation. Eine Einführung in die Theorie und Empirie der Transformationsforschung*. Springer VS., Wiesbaden, 2010.

³³ The elitist approach was challenged before by more class-centered approaches arguing that the working class had always been the driver of democratisation (see. BERINS COLLIER, Ruth, *Paths towards democracy. The working class and elites in Western Europe and South America*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1999 and BERINS COLLIER, Ruth and James MAHONEY “Labor and Democratization: Comparing the First and Third Waves in Europe and Latin America”, in *IRLE Working Paper*, No. 62-95, 1995, online: <http://irle.berkeley.edu/workingpapers/62-95.pdf>).

³⁴ TILLY, Charles, *Social Movements, 1768–2004*, Paradigm, Boulder, 2004, p. 131. (see also TARROW, Sidney G., *Power in Movement*, Cambridge Univ. Press, Cambridge, 1994.)

³⁵ PUTNAM, Robert D., *Bowling alone*, 2001, p. 165.

³⁶ RUCHT, Dieter, “The Structure and Culture of Collective Protest in Germany since 1950”, in MEYER et al. (Eds.), *The social movement society. Contentious politics for a new century*, Rowman and Littlefield, Lanham, 1998, p. 52.

³⁷ TEORELL, Jan, *Determinants of Democratization*, 2012, p. 100.

³⁸ WELZEL et al., “Political Culture, Mass Belief, and Value Change”, in: Haepfer, et al (Eds.), *Democratization*, Oxford Univ. Press, Oxford, 2009, p. 126.

³⁹ INGLEHART et al., *Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy*, 2005.

institutions, rather than the other way around"⁴⁰. The emergence of emancipatory values is seen as the product of rising incomes, higher education and other resources increasing the agency of ordinary people.

Recent research from the field of nonviolent or civil resistance studies was also able to show the importance of popular participation for democratisation. The first contribution was made by Ackerman and Karatnycky⁴¹ who analysed 67 nonviolent and violent democratic transitions using data from Freedom House. The result showed that nonviolent transitions have a positive effect on civil liberties in the following democracy. This was later confirmed by Johnstad⁴² in a replication study replacing the Freedom House data. Based on a new compiled Nonviolent and violent Conflict Outcomes (NAVCO) Database including 323 violent and nonviolent campaigns, Chenoweth and Stephen⁴³ made a major contribution to the topic. Their results suggest that nonviolent campaigns have a higher probability of success than other forms of resistance and contribute to an increase of the quality of democracy. These higher effectiveness of nonviolent campaigns⁴⁴ and its effect on the quality⁴⁵ or the durability of the following democracy⁴⁶ are verified by several other studies. However, the mechanism linking both – nonviolent mass resistance and democratic survival and consolidation – remains mostly in the dark.

3. NVR and "sustainable democratization": empirical trends

Taking deliberative approaches seriously, democracy is not a status reached through the mere moment of transition. Democracy is rather the constant process of "sustainable democratization"⁴⁷ - a term covering the emergence, endurance and enhancement of democracy. As stated above, some studies suggest that there is a clear link between the emergence of democracy and NVR of the people. Furthermore, these studies suggest that there are links between the survival as well as the quality of the following democracy and a mode of transition characterised by nonviolent mass resistance. In other words and contrary to the assumption of modernisation theory, the masses matter not only during the time of the transition but also during the phase of consolidation.

This perception of a more active role of the masses is also supported by Nancy Bermeo⁴⁸ who argues that few democracies ever broke down because the masses stopped electoral support. Democracies disappeared when there was a combination of two phenomena: the

⁴⁰ WELZEL et al., "Political Culture, Mass Belief, and Value Change", 2009, p. 138.

⁴¹ ACKERMANN et al., *How Freedom is won*, 2005.

⁴² JOHNSTAD, "Nonviolent Democratization", 2010.

⁴³ CHENOWETH et al., *Why civil resistance works*, 2011.

⁴⁴ CELESTINO et al., "Fresh carnations or all thorn, no rose?", 2013; TEORELL, Jan, *Determinants of Democratization*, 2012.

⁴⁵ BETHKE et al., "Nonviolent Resistance and the Quality of Democracy", 2016.

⁴⁶ BAYER et al, "The democratic dividend of Nonviolent Resistance", 2016.

⁴⁷ WELZEL, C. P., "Theories of democratization", 2009.

⁴⁸ BERMEO, Nancy, *Ordinary People in Extraordinary Times: The Citizenry and the Collapse of Democracy*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2003.

polarisation of political elites *and* citizens who were not able to defend their democracy against these elites.

Furthermore, as a survival analysis of 112 new democracies between 1955 and 2006 suggests, the first decade after transition has proven to be the most important for the endurance of democracy⁴⁹. As the following chart shows, the median of survival of a new democracy is eleven years. During these first eleven years the survival function is very steep indicating a high risk of a return to authoritarian rule. After these eleven years, the function flattens, indicating a much lower risk for backlashes.⁵⁰

[insert here figure1.jpg]

Figure I: Democratic Survival of new Democracies.⁵¹

As elaborated above, it is more than questionable whether democratic institutions alone are responsible to uphold democracy, especially during the decisive first ten years. The process of institutionalisation takes time. Furthermore, if democratic institutions shall be responsible for fostering democratic attitudes via civic education within the broader population, we cannot expect a positive outcome within the first years after the transition. A span of several decades would be a more realistic timeframe for such an effect to become visible.

In other words, when institutionalisation, as argued by modernization theorists and institutionalists, leads to consolidation in longer term, how can the survival of democracy then be explained during the first years after transition? Similar to Inglehart and Welzel⁵², I argue, that this is due to pro-democratic emancipatory attitudes of the citizens that already existed before democratization.⁵³ Going beyond Welzel, I argue that if these pro-democratic emancipatory attitudes are put into action and result in collective nonviolent resistance against authoritarian leadership, they increase the likelihood of sustainable democratisation.

The reason for this is twofold. First, a significant number of citizens already possess emancipatory attitudes. Since these people dared to take some risk protesting for democratisation, these attitudes are more than mere lip services and citizens already

⁴⁹ BAYER et al, "The democratic dividend of Nonviolent Resistance", 2016.

⁵⁰ Typically, the time span of ten years covers two legislative periods or presidential terms. As most constitutions limit the office of the president to two terms, ten years mark a critical crossroad for new democracies. As a rule of thumb, Huntington (HUNTINGTON, Samuel, *The Third Wave. Democratization in the late twentieth century*, Univ. of Oklahoma Press, Oklahoma, 1991.) suggests the two-turnover test as a benchmark for consolidation. If a democracy witnessed two peaceful turnovers of power, it can be considered as consolidated. In the best case, these two turnovers can be reached within the mentioned first decade. If not, democracies should have witnessed at least the first turnover within the first ten years.

⁵¹ BAYER et al, "The democratic dividend of Nonviolent Resistance", 2016.

⁵² INGLEHART et al., *Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy*, Cambridge Uni. Press, Cambridge, 2005.

⁵³ Emancipatory values are not necessarily a product of income and material resources. The pro-democratic struggle in Benin from 1985 onwards, for instance, shows that democratization can occur against all odds in countries with little economic development.

proved some form of democratic culture or values. Second, I argue that the involvement in nonviolent struggle for democracy provides some viable resources for democratic citizenship, enabling the citizenry to actively participate in democracies and counter authoritarian backlashes. Within the field of movement studies it has frequently been argued that protest movements not only have political consequences but tend to have social and cultural consequences as well⁵⁴. However, these haven't been addressed systematically so far.⁵⁵ In the next step I will highlight the mechanisms through which NVR is linked to democratic citizenship and sustainable democratisation. These mechanisms are located on different levels: the individual level, the collective (national) level and the international sphere.

4. Individual agency and internal political efficacy

As stated above, different democratic transitions have been hypothesised to produce distinct legacies⁵⁶ with nonviolent mass resistance positively affecting the resilience of a democracy⁵⁷. I argue that one distinctive feature of democracies that came to turn by nonviolent mass resistance is an increased sense of agency rooted within broader parts of the population. This higher individual agency results from experiences of nonviolent struggle and forms the first link of NVR and democratic citizenship.

While movement studies mostly focused on factors like collective resources which could be mobilised by the movement⁵⁸, political processes and political opportunities⁵⁹, or collective identities⁶⁰ to explain non-routine politics like public protest and contentious politics, research on participation in established democracies helped to shed light on individual factors like political efficacy. In other words,

“Movement participants are people who believe that they can change their political environment [...] It is taken for granted that they are aggrieved, but it is not so

⁵⁴ GIUGNI, Marco, “Political, Biographical, and Cultural Consequences of Social Movements”, in *Sociology Compass*, Vol. 2, No. 5, 2008, pp. 1582–1600; GIUGNI et al. “The biographic impact of participation in social movement activities: Beyond highly committed New Left activism”, in BOSI et al. (Eds.), *The consequences of social movements*, Cambridge Univ. Press, Cambridge, 2016, pp. 85-105.

⁵⁵ Most studies focussed on personal and biographical consequences for activists and thereby focussed on extreme left-wing activism during the 1960s and 1970s (GOLDSTONE et al. “Contention in Demographic and Life-Course Context”, in AMIZADE et al. (Eds.), *Silence and Voice in the Study of Contentious Politics*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2001, pp. 195–221.; McADAM, Doug, “The Biographical Consequences of Activism”, in *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 54, 1989, pp. 744–60.).

⁵⁶ COLLIER BERINS, Ruth and David COLLIER, *Shaping the political arena*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1991.

⁵⁷ CHENOWETH et al., *Why civil resistance works*, 2011; BAYER et al, “The democratic dividend of Nonviolent Resistance”, 2016.

⁵⁸ McCARTHY et al., “Resource Mobilization and Social Movements: A partial Theory”, in *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 82, 1977, pp. 1212-1241.; TILLY, Charles, *From Mobilization to Revolution*, McGraw-Hill, New York, 1978.; GAMSON, William A., *Power and Discontent*, Dorsey, Homewood, 1968.

⁵⁹ TARROW, *Power in Movement*, 1994; EISINGER, Peter, “The Conditions of Protest Behavior in American Cities”, in *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 81, 1973, pp. 11-28.; McADAM, Doug, *Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 1930-1970*, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1982.

⁶⁰ FRIEDMAN et al., “Collective Identity and Activism: Networks, choices and the life of Social Movement”, in: MORRIS et al. (Eds.), *Frontiers in social Movement Theory*, Yale Univ. Press, New Haven, 1992, pp. 156-173; KLANDERMANS, Bert, *The social psychology of Protest*, Blackwell, Oxford, 1997.

much the grievances per se but the belief that the situation can be changed at affordable costs that make them participate. They have the resources and perceive the opportunities to make an impact.”⁶¹

Political efficacy can be understood as “the feeling that political and social change is possible, and that the individual citizen can play a part in bringing about this change”⁶². The first describes the “individuals’ self-perception that they are capable of understanding politics and competent enough to participate in political actions such as voting”⁶³ and is labelled as *internal* political efficacy. The second, the *external* political efficacy, measures the belief about political institutions with a lack of external efficacy indicating the belief “that the public cannot influence political outcomes” due to irresponsive political leader⁶⁴. In this second reading, efficacy can be seen as the counterpiece to the political opportunity structure (POS), defined by Tarrow as “consistent – but not necessarily formal or permanent – dimension of the political environment that provide[s] incentives for people to undertake collective action by affecting their expectations for success or failure”⁶⁵. In its first reading as internal political efficacy, it more or less mirrors a person’s self-esteem to understand politics. As argued by Gene Sharp, one of the leading scholars of nonviolent resistance, the participation in NVR leads to psychological changes that can be understood as enhancement of the internal political efficacy of the participants⁶⁶.

They not only overcome their fear and their desire to be dominated, but also gain an increased self-respect and learn to become active agents able to cooperate in common tasks⁶⁷. These effects are mainly supported by studies on social movements and political participation. Overcoming atomization and apathy by winning new allies can already result in changes of the individual perception of efficacy. Thus, social psychologists Drury and Reichert⁶⁸ showed that the mere expectation of mutual support from a larger group can lead to an enhanced feeling of individual (internal) political efficacy.⁶⁹ With the start of first collective actions of the group (and the individual activist), a positive process is set in motion because the perceived efficacy of activists rises with political action⁷⁰.

⁶¹ KLANDERMANS, Bert, “The Demand and Supply of Participation: Social-Psychological Correlates of Participation in Social Movements”, in SNOW et al. (Eds.), *The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements*, Blackwell Publishing Ltd, Blackwell, 2004, pp. 360-379. 363)

⁶² CAMPBELL et al., *The Voter Decides*, Row, Peterson and Company, Evanston, 1954.

⁶³ MILLER et al., *American National Election Studies Data Sourcebook, 1952-1978*, Harvard Univ. Press, Cambridge, 1980, p. 273 f.

⁶⁴ IBDÍ, p 273 f.

⁶⁵ TARROW, *Power in Movement*, 1994, p 85.

⁶⁶ SHARP, Gene, *The Politics of Nonviolent Action. Part three*, 1973 b.

⁶⁷ IBDI 778 f.)

⁶⁸ DRURY et al., “The intergroup dynamics of collective empowerment: Substantiating the social identity model of crowd behavior”, in *Group Processes and Intergroup Relations*, Vol. 2, 1999, pp. 1-22.

⁶⁹ Accordingly, we can assume that the individual political efficacy is even higher if the individual actually experienced real support and solidarity.

⁷⁰ DIAMOND, “Towards Democratic Consolidation”, 1994, p. 7; STEKELENBURG et al., “The social psychology of protest”, in *Current Sociology Review*, Vol. 61, No. 5-6, 2013, p. 892.

This can be exemplified by the description of Adel Abdel Ghafar, an activist from Cairo who participated in the protests against the regime of Mubarak in 2011:

"I was born in 1979, and in 1981 Mubarak became president. In my lifetime, I have known no other president. His picture adorned offices, classrooms, murals, and posters across the country. It was accepted that Mubarak is Egypt and Egypt is Mubarak. This all changed in eighteen day in 2011. I went through a life-changing experience on January 25, and it was incredible to share it with thousands of my countrymen"⁷¹

Similarly, Yousef Abduljalil, a teacher from Sanaa in Yemen, describes the effects of participating in the protests against the regime of Ali Abdullah Saleh in the following words:

"Now life is not what it used to be – there is no fear, no despair, no submission or surrender [...] It would be impossible to return to the dark past and equally impossible to accept ever again a regime like that of Ali Abdullah Saleh."⁷²

This process can be understood as self-enforcing cycle of activism since a high efficacy has a positive effect on renewed participation⁷³. In other words, "the greater the participation, the greater the sense of efficacy"⁷⁴. This sense of activism can not only individually lead to more and renewed activism, but can also be inherited to future generations. As Sarah Hany, female activist from Alexandria, Egypt, puts it:

"I lived to witness this day [the day of Mubaraks resignation; M.B.] and taste the victory and dignity and tell my children all about it! For me, it is just ...the beginning..."⁷⁵

The fact that this has some real-world effects is proven by an experiment by Pellicer et al.⁷⁶. In an effort to manipulate the perceived efficacy of participants of an experiments in South Africa, Pellicer et al. asked the individuals to remember a successful collective action. Controlling for the kind of action, Pellicer et al. learned, that most of the participants

⁷¹ GHAFAR, Adel A. I., "The Moment the Barrier of Fear broke down", in: Al Saleh, Assad (Ed.), *Voices of the Arab Spring. Personal Stories from the Arab Revolutions*, Columbia Univ. Press, New York, 2015, p. 59.

⁷² ABDULJALIL, "Killing the Rose but not the Spring", 2015, p. 180)

⁷³ for individual efficacy see BANDURA, Albert, "Self-Efficacy: Towards a unifying Theory of Behavioural Change", in *Psychological Review*, Vol. 84 No. 2, 1977, pp. 191-205.; for group efficacy see MUMMENDEY et al., "Strategies to cope with negative social identity: Predictions by social identity theory and relative deprivation theory", in *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, Vol. 76, 1999, 229-245.

⁷⁴ COCKING et al., "Generalization of Efficacy as a Function of Collective Action and Intergroup Relations: Involvement in an Anti-Road Struggle", in *Journal of Applied Social Psychology*, Vol. 34, No. 2, 2004, p. 419.

⁷⁵ HANY, Sara, "It is just...the beginning", in: Al Saleh, Assad (Ed.): *Voices of the Arab Spring. Personal Stories from the Arab Revolutions*, Columbia Univ. Press, New York, 2015, p. 70.

⁷⁶ PELLICER, et al., "Preferences for the scope of protests", in *SALDRU, UCT, SALDRU Working Paper Number 223*, 2018.

recalled the anti-apartheid struggle. People asked to recall successful protest and collective action were more likely to believe that protest are effective and that politicians can be held accountable. Furthermore, they were more likely “to feel powerful in a personal sense”⁷⁷.

5. Collective agency, democratic “founding myths” and external efficacy

NVR not only affects the individual sense of efficacy. Moreover, the ‘legacy’ of a higher sense of efficacy can also transgress the boundaries of the activists involved and spill over to broader parts of the citizenry by producing success stories of resistance and mobilisation. If such success stories are shared and remembered by the media and the public, this can affect perceived external efficacy of the whole citizenry.

If NVR is successful it can lead to what Aristide Zolberg⁷⁸ calls ‘moments of madness’, that is, situations of collective enthusiasm where the boundaries of established politics are crossed and “politics bursts its bounds to invade all of life” and everything becomes possible - or at least seems possible. In this sense the Tunisian writer and activist Mlek Sghiri, for example, pictures the Cedar Revolution in Tunisia pathetically as

“rapid revolutionary changes imposed by an enthusiastic public, the thundering roar of the people who had risen from beneath the ashes of misery and fear like a phoenix. It was pure romance...”⁷⁹.

Furthermore, these pictures and narratives of people’s agency are inscribed in the collective memory of a nation and can be transferred to future generations. Focusing on the power of narratives, Eric Selbin argues that “history is accessible to us in people’s narratives of their lives and the popular culture of their society”. These narratives create the possibility – or lack – of fundamental change⁸⁰. From a psychological stance, Liu and Hilton put it very similarly: “History provides us with the narrative that tells us who we are, where we come from and where we should be going”⁸¹. On a collective cognitive-level, they argue that history “as a source of shared experiences and narratives [...] can serve as ‘lesson of history’”⁸². Referring to the example of the Philippine Peoples Power Movement where the people ousted President Ferdinand Marcos in 1986 after he had allegedly rigged the elections, they showed that such historical events can transform into a widely shared narrative and incorporate “particular historical symbols that define rights and obligations

⁷⁷ Ibid, p. 17.

⁷⁸ ZOLBERG, Aristide R., “Moments of Madness”, in *Politics and Society*, Vol. 2, No. 2, 1972, p. 183.

⁷⁹ SGHIRI, Malek, “Greetings to the Down: Living through the Bittersweet Revolution”, in: Al-Zubaid et al. (Eds.), *Writing Revolution: The Voices from Tunis to Damascus*, I.B. Tauris, London, 2013, p. 43.

⁸⁰ SELBIN, Eric, *Revolution, Rebellion, and Resistance: The Power of Story*, Zed Books, London and New York, 2010, p. 9.

⁸¹ LIU et al., “How the past weighs on the present: Social representation of history and their role in identity politics”, in *British Journal of Social Psychology*, Vol. 44, 2005, p. 537.

⁸² HILTON, et al., “History as the narrative of a people: From function to structure and content”, in *Memory Studies*, Vol 10, No. 3, 2017, pp. 97 –309.

for the group”⁸³. Through this process, such historical events can gain a “charter status” which forms the basis of the construction of a legitimising ideology, justifying civil resistance and legitimising protest. Further, it can increase the perception of group efficacy and resentments against authority⁸⁴.

In times of crisis, these historical references of successful people’s power can be used to remobilise people in defence of these achievements. In July 2017, for instance, thousands of Polish citizens took to the street to protest against a judiciary reform they believed would threaten the democratic constitution of their country. The public mobilisation was supported by the former Solidarność leader and ‘national hero’ Lech Walesa. Walesa stated at a demonstration in Gdansk from where the pro-democratic movement emerged in the late 1980s that it is now time to defend the democracy they fought for⁸⁵.

Another example of such re-activation of historical events is Benin. Located in West Africa, the country was once known as the sick child of Africa due to its history of political instability and military intervention into politics. From its independence in 1960 to 1972, the country experienced eleven presidents, six different constitutions, twelve attempted and five successful coups d’états⁸⁶. Under President Kérékou, the country gained some stability and introduced Marxism-Leninism as state doctrine in 1974. From 1985 onwards, however, the economic situation deteriorated. Austerity measures sparked first protests by teacher, university staff, students, and civil servants, spreading in the following years. In 1989, the once isolated protests had yielded a major pro-democracy movement using public protest and NVR to pressure the government. On December 7th Kérékou officially announced the end of Marxism-Leninism in Benin and called for an “assemblée nationale des forces vives de la nation”– a national assembly of the active forces of the nation. What was meant as a symbolic act to introduce some minor reforms became truly a national assembly, introducing a new constitution, putting a provisional government into place and setting the pace for democratic elections. Since large segments of the society participated in the protests and strikes, it was labelled a “People’s Revolution”⁸⁷. Benin became the first country on the African continent to peacefully oust a dictator and establish a democracy. Proud of their history of mass resistance against the authoritarian regime, the citizens of Benin resisted on different occasions the attempts of incumbent presidents to change the constitution and allow them a third term. On these occasions, they repeatedly used the slogan “Don’t touch my constitution” to express both their deep commitment to one of the basics principles of the constitution and to democracy in general.

⁸³ LIU et al., “Theory and Methods of a Representational Approach to Understanding Social Movements: The Role of the EDSA Revolution in a National Psychology of Protest for the Philippines”, in *Social Justice Research*, Vol. 24, 2011, p. 171.

⁸⁴ IBDI 171)

⁸⁵ THE GUARDIAN, “Poland’s former president Lech Wałęsa joins protest against judicial overhaul”, 22 Jul 2017.

⁸⁶ BIRSCHENK, Thomas, “Democratization without development. Benin 1989-2009”, in *Department of Anthropology and African Studies University Mainz, Working Paper No. 100*, 2009.

⁸⁷ KOKO, Jaques L., *National Conference as a Strategy for Conflict Transformation and Peacebuilding. The Legacy of the Republic of Benin Model*. Adonis & Abbey Publishers Ltd, London, 2008, p. 43.

In a similar way, particular historic events served as reference points and mobilising factors in Tunisia and the Philippines. On the occasion of the seventh anniversary of the 2011 Tunisian revolution, for example, new protests erupted and thousands took to the streets to protest against the government's austerity budget. Even if the protest was directed against a concrete government project, the date on which it occurred was not chosen randomly. In fact, the protests were "not merely economic but also political" and were basically born out of continued neglect of citizens' demand for dignity, political freedom and accountable leadership – demands that fuelled the revolution of 2010/2011⁸⁸.

In the Philippines, the legacy of nonviolent resistance can be traced back to the original revolution of 1896. Further, the first People's Power Revolution repeated itself in form of the second people's power revolution against president Estrada in 2001. Today, the first People's Power Movement is regarded as the most important historical event in the history of the Philippines⁸⁹.

6. The local and the international

It is more or less common wisdom that protest comes in waves⁹⁰ – as does democracy, too⁹¹. Thus, the question of democratisation, democratic consolidation and citizenship is never a mere national or even local question – it is highly influenced by international factors. Waves of contention like the Colour Revolutions in Eastern Europe and the so-called Arab Spring in the Middle East plainly demonstrated that national or local protests can have regional and transnational spill-over effects and influence each other. Furthermore, many conceptions of civil society – stemming from as different thinkers as Kant and Marx – already imply the idea of international solidarity or cosmopolitanism⁹². Some argue that it is the global market and international capital that is driving the establishment of a global civil society⁹³. Contrary, others argue that the enhanced interconnectedness after the Cold War provided opportunities for activists to link up with likeminded people and transgress the national borders hitherto confining civil society and contributing to the development of a global civil society⁹⁴. In line with the latter, I argue that (non)violent resistance like the Tunisian uprising against Ben Ali provides excellent points of departure for international cooperation in the form of solidarity movements and international networks of activists. Similarly, Tarrow argues that nonviolent protest is more likely to secure third party support than violent protest which is often counterproductive

⁸⁸ ABBOTT, Pamela and Andrea TETI, "Tunisia is back on a knife edge – here's why", in *The Conversation*, 17 January 2018, online: <https://Theconversation.com/Tunisia-is-back-on-a-knife-edge-heres-why-90245> [accessed 13 September 2018].

⁸⁹ LIU et al., "Theory and Methods of a Representational Approach to Understanding Social Movements", 2011.

⁹⁰ TARROW, *Power in Movement*, 1994.

⁹¹ HUNTINGTON, *The Third Wave*, 1991.

⁹² KUMAR, Krishan, "Global Civil Society", in *European Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 48, No. 3, 2007, pp. 413-434.

⁹³ KEANE, John, *Global Civil Society?*, Cambridge Univ. Press, Cambridge, 2003.

⁹⁴ KALDOR, Mary, *Global civil Society: An Answer to War*, Polity Press, Cambridge, 2003.

for mobilising international support⁹⁵. These international networks can build a nucleus for a global civil society, since they are based on shared democratic norms and the basis of solidarity and cosmopolitanism.

Two effects of these international networks can be identified: First, they enable a flow of information, allow the different national movements to learn from each other and profit from the experience made by others, thereby spreading the norms of nonviolence, civic participation and democracy. Second, by establishing a global solidarity network, local activists can gain resources and support from outsiders. These international links can be used to level the power disparities on the national level by "extending the battlefield"⁹⁶. A similar strategy, the so-called "boomerang effect", is known within the field of human rights activism⁹⁷. If direct communication between citizens and their own government is impossible, activists sometimes use a bypass via so-called Transnational Advocacy Networks (TANs). TANs consist of research and advocacy groups, the media, churches, unions or other international organisations and are used to appeal to groups and persons in other countries to pressure their respective governments to sanction the behaviour of the offending regime. Like a boomerang, the refusal to respond to the citizens' demands backfires on the international level. Both, knowledge about how to wage a nonviolent struggle and international support via TANs, can help local activists to hold their government accountable and on the democratic track. However, as Ackermann and Duval restrictively state,

"The reality is that foreign nationals cannot formulate a civilian movement's discourse, analyze its opponent's pillars of support, or make tactical decisions in a fast-flowing conflict. Action to produce each of the conditions necessary for people power can be derived only from local expertise. What can come from abroad are communications equipment, funding for tangible articles like computers or bumper stickers, and training in the generic skills of nonviolent resistance—all of which quicken the pulse of people power"⁹⁸.

This outside support with literature, know-how and training is provided by different non-governmental organisations. First of all, the US-based Albert Einstein Institution, founded by Gene Sharp, published several manuals on how to wage a strategic nonviolent conflict⁹⁹

⁹⁵ TARROW, *Power in Movement*, 1994.

⁹⁶ GALTUNG, Johann, *Nonviolence in Israel/Palestine*. Univ. of Hawai'i Press, Honolulu, 1989.

⁹⁷ SIKKINK, Kathryn, "Human Rights, Principled Issue Networks, and Sovereignty in Latin America", in *International Organization*, Vol. 47, No. 3, 1993, pp. 411-441.; KECK et al., *Activists beyond borders*, Cornell Univ. Press, Ithaca, 1989.

⁹⁸ ACKERMANN et al., "People Power Primed Civilian Resistance and Democratization, in *Harvard International Review*, 2005, p. 47.

⁹⁹ HELVEY, Robert, *On strategic Nonviolent Conflict: Thinking about the Fundamentals*, The Albert Einstein Institution, Boston, 2004.

or nonviolent struggle¹⁰⁰, how to depart nonviolently from dictatorship to democracy¹⁰¹, or how to prevent coup attempts¹⁰². These books – especially Sharp’s “From Dictatorship to Democracy” – were translated in many languages and are used worldwide as a blueprint: originally intended for the use in Burma, “From Dictatorship to Democracy” found its way to Serbia and to the countries of the Arab Spring¹⁰³. In 2016, three activists were jailed in China for “inciting subversion of state power” and for promoting “the ideas of civil disobedience [...] with the goal of overthrowing the socialist system”¹⁰⁴. Two years earlier, a Chinese state-owned publisher tried to buy the Chinese language rights to prevent the proliferation of the book within China.

Similarly, the Serbian Center for Applied Nonviolent Action and Strategies (CANVAS), under the lead of former Otpor activist Srdja Popovic, published several books based on their experiences¹⁰⁵ and held various workshops and trainings with activists around the world. The power of transnational networks was visible in Benin. Benin’s military, for example, did not dare to intervene in politics after the transition since they feared to lose international support and the possibility to send parts of their forces on international peacekeeping missions of the United Nations. These missions proved to be in the interest of the individual soldier (since they gain extra danger allowance for foreign missions) as well as for the government (since the soldiers are payed by the United Nations during their mission). Thus, TANs exercised a ‘civilising’ effect by pressuring any government and especially the United Nations to stop their cooperation with the army of Benin, if it would ever again interfere in politics.

Conclusion

I have argued that democratisations represent critical junctures in the history of a country. Furthermore, I have claimed that is not only decisive whether a country becomes democratic but also *how* it enters the democratic path. In this context, several comparative studies have proven the effectiveness of nonviolent resistance to bring about democratic change and its effect on the quality as well as the stability of the following democracy. However, most of these studies left the mechanism linking both omitted.

To shed light on this under-researched relation, I explored three mechanisms connecting a nonviolent mode of transition through mass participation with the persistence of

¹⁰⁰ SHARP, Gene, *Waging Nonviolent Conflict*, Porter Sargent Publishers, Boston, 2005.

¹⁰¹ SHARP, *From Dictatorship to Democracy*, 2010.

¹⁰² SHARP et al, *The anti-coup*, The Albert Einstein Institution, Boston, 2003.

¹⁰³ POPESCU, Lucy, “From Dictatorship to Democracy, By Gene Sharp. No fool, this child of the revolution”, in Independent, 8 January 2012.

¹⁰⁴ AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, “China: three people jailed for publishing books on democracy”, 29 Jan 2016, 01:10pm, online: <https://www.amnesty.org.uk/press-releases/china-three-people-jailed-publishing-books-democracy> [accessed 13 September 2018].

¹⁰⁵ POPOVIC et al., *Making Oppression Backfire*, CANVAS, Belgrade, 2013; POPOVIC et al., *Nonviolent Struggle. 50 crucial points. A strategic approach to everyday tactics*, CANVAS, Belgrade, 2007; POPOVIC et al., *CANVAS core curriculum. A Guide to effective Nonviolent Struggle*, CANVAS, Belgrade, 2003.

democracy in these countries. With reference to studies from the field of social psychology and social movement studies, I have shown that nonviolent mass resistance on an individual level can lead to a higher sense of individual internal political efficacy. This feeling of internal efficacy – or the belief that oneself is capable of understanding and influencing politics – has a positive impact on further participation in the new democratic system. The increase of internal efficacy is the first direct link between NVR and the emergence of democratic citizenship.

As outlined in the second mechanism, NVR also helps to build a democratic political culture. On a collective level, the narrative of a successful people's revolution can serve as a symbol of external political efficacy and be used as a historical reference point and discursive opportunity to remobilise citizens. I have shown as well that the modes of operation of nonviolent resistance favour the emergence of international support networks what in turn has a democratising effect. Further, being movement-based, NVR relies on broad participation and networks. In times of globalisation, these networks and co-operations do not remain limited to the boundaries of nation states but have regional or transnational reach. When necessary, activists can call on these international support structures and solidarity networks to pressure political or military elites and defend democratic principles. Altogether, the particularities of NVR as transition mode build resources that tend to favour and support democratic attitudes and public participation in political life or, in other words, they contribute to build democratic citizenship. However, beside the above-mentioned links, empirical evidence also shows that NVR is not the guaranteed way to salvation. Activists do not remain activists forever and even societies that witnessed mass mobilisation do not always remain politically mobilised over a longer period of time. Instead, figures suggest that societies undergo rapid demobilisation after democratic transitions when people start to turn to their 'normal' lives, meaning they go to work to pay their bills. Similarly, a high sense of external efficacy through positive democratic NVR founding moments is not static but can decrease over time if citizens are confronted with demoralising setbacks. The assassination of Serbia's Prime Minister Zoran Đinđić, who played a huge role for the opposition against the former President Milosevic in March 2003, represented such a daunting event for Serbs, eventually leading to frustration and resignation. And, when feelings of efficacy decline, the result is mostly movement demobilisation. However, up to date we know relatively little about movement demobilisation and the effect of such demoralising events.

Last but not least, we also have to critically assess the role of existing democratic systems for 'sustainable democratisation', that is, the process of constantly enhancing the quality of democracy. Political efficacy can also wane due to the form of modern democracies. Democracy nowadays normally means representative democracy. The institutionalisation of democracy, however, mostly leads to shrinking spaces for direct participation outside the institutional framework of party politics. Furthermore, post-transition periods are often

coined by realpolitik contrary to the romanticised goals of the upheaval. Thus, the limited space for participation¹⁰⁶ and a realpolitik often perceived as betrayal¹⁰⁷ can also lead to frustration of former activists. The interplay of mobilising events and factors that strengthen political efficacy on the one hand and factors that diminish them and lead to democratic lethargy on the other hand remain an important field for further inquiry.

To conclude, I claim that democratic transitions induced by NVR give rise to some optimism. Even though Gene Sharp warns “[n]o one should believe that with the downfall of the dictatorship an ideal society will immediately appear”¹⁰⁸, mass-based NVR during the struggle for democracy nevertheless provides a good basis for newly democratised states. As shown in Benin, Poland and elsewhere, people with a high sense of internal efficacy can be (re)mobilised in critical events in defence of democracy. NVR itself can lay the ground for an inclusive founding moment of a democratic society.

¹⁰⁶ MERKEL, *Systemtransformation*, 2010.

¹⁰⁷ GRODSKY, Brian K., *Social movements and the new state: the fate of pro-democracy organizations when democracy is won*, Stanford Univ. Press, Stanford, 2012.

¹⁰⁸ SHARP, *From Dictatorship to Democracy*, 2010, p. 63.

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Working Paper

The democratizing effect of non- violent resistance

How nonviolent resistance featured
democratic consolidation in Benin

Markus Bayer

Abstract

Nonviolent resistance against autocratic regimes tends to have a democratic dividend. Resulting democracies have proven more inclusive and stable than their competitors coming about by violent means or by top-down liberalization. However, to date, we know little about the mechanisms that seem to link both phenomena, nonviolent resistance and democratic consolidation. Using explorative process tracing, the paper analyzes the case of the lesser known, so-called 'Renouveau Démocratique', the peaceful transition in Benin in 1989. The results show that the nonviolent resistance in Benin led to the establishment of an inclusive national conference, which became the founding narrative for the new democracy and stabilizes the democratic institutions.

The founding narrative also led to an active civil society that till today takes its role as watchdog seriously whenever the political elites tend to deviate from the democratic path. However, the example of Benin also shows that democratization without economic development has some severe limitations. The democratic quality suffers from the persistent culture of patronage and corruption, endangering the democratic spirit and preventing the institutionalization of civic democratic institutions.

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Keywords

nonviolent resistance, democratic consolidation, Benin, democratization

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Table of Contents

1	<u>Introduction</u>	07
2	<u>Democratic Transitions as Critical Junctures</u>	09
3	<u>Nonviolent Resistance and Democratic Consolidation</u>	11
4	<u>Methodology and Case Selection</u>	14
5	<u>Nonviolent Resistance and the Democratic Renewal in Benin</u>	17
6	<u>From Resistance to Democratic Survival: Tracing Causality</u>	18
7	<u>Democratic Consolidation: NVR and Democratic Quality</u>	22
8	<u>Conclusion</u>	32
9	<u>Bibliography</u>	34
10	<u>About the author and swisspeace</u>	39
11	<u>swisspeace Publications</u>	40

List of Acronyms

ABT	Alliance pour un Bénin Triumphant/ Alliance for a Triumphant Benin
ALCRER	Association de Lutte contre le Racisme et le Regionalisme/ Association for the Fight against Racism and Regionalism
ANC	African National Congress
BTI	Bertelsmann Transformation Index
CPO	Causal-Process Observations
CS	Civil Society
FES	Friedrich-Ebert Foundation
FONAC	Front des Organisations Nationales Contre la Corruption/ Front of the National Organizations against Corruption
NC	Conference Nationale des forces vives/ National Conference of the driving/ active forces
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NVR	Nonviolent Resistance
PCB	Parti Communiste du Bénin/ Communist Party of Benin
PRPB	Parti de la Révolution Populaire du Bénin/ People's Revolution Party of Benin
PT	Process Tracing
SNES	Syndicat National des Enseignants du Supérieur/ National Union of Higher Education Employees
UN	Union Fait la Nation/ Unity makes the Nation
UPD	Union Progressiste Dahoméenne/ Progressive union of Dahomé
UGEED	Union Générale des Etudiants et Élèves du Dahomey/ General Union of Students and Pupils of Dohomey
UNSTB	Union Nationale des Syndicats des Travailleurs du Benin/ National Union of the Beninese Workers
UPMB	Union des Professionnels des Médias du Bénin/ Union of Media Practitioners of Benin
WANEP	West African Network for Peacebuilding

1 Introduction

Nearly three decades ago, the “third wave of democratization” (Huntington 1991) swept across the African continent. On February 11th, 1990, Nelson Mandela was released from prison on Robben Island, heralding the end of Apartheid and the mostly nonviolent struggle of the African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa. One week later, on February 18th, the Sovereign National Conference (NC) of Benin began its work to mold the transition to democracy after major nonviolent protests had put an end to the rule of Mathieu Kérékou, which had lasted for 29 years.¹ In the following year, large parts of Francophone Africa, inspired by Benin’s successful transition, introduced NCs in order to pursue successful transitions to democracy.²

However, not every democratization leads to consolidation. Today, a quarter of a century after the “second liberation” (Osaghae 2005), the record of democratic consolidation can at best be described as mixed. The bulk of African states never really transcended the transition period. These “defective democracies” (Merkel 2004) are caught somewhere between democracy and autocracy. Today, only a handful of African states are classified as advanced or at least limited democracies. Along with Ghana, Mauritius, South Africa, and Namibia (BTI 2017), Benin is considered as one of Africa’s most advanced and consolidated democracies.

Hitherto, differing trajectories of democratizing countries are commonly explained by the modes of transition, or by economic development and public education. Recent studies from the field of nonviolent resistance (NVR) also point at the long-lasting effect of successful nonviolent campaigns that enhance the likelihood of success (Chenoweth and Stephen 2011), the degrees of freedom in years following the transition (Ackerman and Karatnycky 2005) and the survival of democracy (Bayer et al. 2016).

However, although NVR is often assumed to spawn a more democratic culture, the mechanisms linking NVR and democratic consolidation hitherto remained in the dark. By looking at Benin, one of the most consolidated democracies in Africa with a genesis in a broad-based nonviolent struggle for democratization, this study tries to uncover possible mechanisms linking NVR and the consolidation of democracy.

Benin, one of the poorest countries in Africa, had been an unexpected candidate for such a development due to its chronic political instabilities, which made it known as “sick child of Africa” (APRM 2008). This analysis shows that NVR had a strong impact on democratic survival and consequently its consolidation. As will be demonstrated, NVR influenced the following democracy in three key aspects: First, it induced a highly inclusive process to draft a new constitution and, second, it spawned an active civil society committed to the constitution and the democratic principles anchored within. Last but not least, it levelled the playing field for an integrative multi-party system. Nevertheless, NVR is not sufficient for consolidation. The lack of economic development and effective parties, and prevailing networks of clientelism still prevent Benin from becoming a consolidated democracy.

¹ The paper resulted from a project on “Nonviolent Resistance and Democratic Consolidation” at the University of Duisburg-Essen and is based on field-research in Benin. I am grateful for the helpful comments of Andrea Pabst, Daniel Lambach, and the two anonymous reviewers of swisspeace. Furthermore, I am indebted to Lena Pohl, Leah Ngaba and Ibrahim Alhadjui for supporting my research.

² Many other countries like Congo/Brazzaville (1990), Gabon (1990), Mali (1990), Togo (1991), the former Zaire (1991), Niger (1992), and Chad (1993) followed the example of Benin, often, however, with limited success.

This paper proceeds as follows: In the first section, the theoretical background, the approach of critical junctures, will be presented. In addition to this, the study will be located within the broad field of democracy studies and transitology and there will be a review of the current state of the art of NVR research and the effects of NVR on democratic consolidation. The second section defines the key concepts of NVR, democracy and democratic consolidation and derives some hypotheses on possible mechanisms linking them with the literature on NVR and social movements. In a third section, process tracing (PT) as a method to assess the effects of NVR on democratic consolidation and discuss the case selection is introduced. Section four contains the empirical analysis elucidating the effect of NVR on the survival and the quality of democracy. Section five discusses the findings and identifies areas for further research.

2 Democratic Transitions as Critical Junctures

Critical junctures can be understood as “formative or founding moments” (Munck and Leff 1997: 343) and as periods of “significant change, which typically occur[s] in distinct ways in different countries (Collier and Collier 1991: 29). Transitional events, like the end of the Marxist regime of Mathieu Kérékou in Benin in 1989, are such critical junctures. Theoretically, critical junctures are hypothesized to produce distinct legacies. The link between both, critical juncture and the distinct legacy, is thereby explained with path dependency.

Most generally, path dependence simply means that contemporary decisions and events depend on earlier decisions and events (i.e. historical dependency). More specific, path dependency means that, although several causal paths were available (causal possibility), some causal paths become less possible or impossible (closure) and that some processes keep actors on the once chosen track (constraints) (Bennett and Elman 2006).

Economists like Page (2006) often assume that path dependency is driven by increasing returns (a steps in a particular direction is assumed to induce further movement in the same direction), self-reinforcement (a certain policy which leads to institutions that encourage to sustain these decisions), positive feedback (positive externalities occur, when that same decision is made by other actors) which finally lead to a lock-in situation in which a decision appears better in relation to other alternatives because a sufficient number of people have already made that choice. According to Pierson (2004), these mechanisms travel to politics as well. Nevertheless, Thelen (1999) states that political, contrary to economic institutions, depend more on power, legitimacy and functionality and less on efficiency. Thus new institutions can be undermined by a loss of power and legitimacy of the actors that maintain them. For political transitions in which the basic political order is renegotiated and new political institutions are installed, this objection seems highly relevant. Nevertheless, with that in mind, positive feedback and self-reinforcement seem to be applicable concepts. Correspondingly, a “lock-in” can, in terms of transitology, be described as democratic consolidation.

Modes of Transition

There are many roads to democracy. Addressing this, Huntington (1991) differentiates between three modes of transitions:

- 1) ‘transitions’ which are mainly driven by the elites of a regime themselves,
- 2) ‘replacements’ which are driven “from below”, represent a rupture in the authoritarian regime and result in a replacement of the prevailing elites, and
- 3) ‘transplacements’ which represent a mixed form in which a democratic reform is negotiated between the regime and the opposition.

3 This paper follows the regime definition of Skaaning (2006: 13), who argues that a political regime can be understood as an “institutionalized set of fundamental formal and informal rules structuring the interaction in the political power center (horizontal relation) and its relation with the broader society (vertical relation)”.

4 Johnstad replicated the study using regime data from Polity IV and the Economist Intelligence Unit and verified its results (Johnstad 2010: 475).

Like Huntington (1991), Munck and Leff (1997) argue that the mode of transition coins the post-transitional regime.³ Depending on the drivers controlling the process, the mode of transition influences the pattern of elite competition, the institutional rules crafted during the period of transition and, finally, the question if key players accept or reject the new “rules of the game” (Munck and Leff 1997: 343). Thereby, in a path-dependent manner, the mode of transition is assumed to predetermine whether and how democracies consolidate.

So far, studies from the field of democratization have only indirectly acknowledged peaceful transitions as conducive for the consolidation of stable democracies. In this vein, so-called elite pacts (Hamann 1997), pacted transitions (Linz and Stephen 1996) or cooperative pacts (Guo and Stradiotto 2010) between elites have been considered to reduce the uncertainty that commonly characterizes transitions and thereby contribute to smooth transitions and stable democracies. However, most studies neglected the role of the masses and the effect of nonviolent contention.

Recently, a growing body of literature on NVR began to address this lacuna. Scholars of NVR generally assume a positive effect of NVR on democracy and democratization since they believe in the unity of means and ends leading to the credo that “how one chooses to fight determines what one wins” (Ackerman 2008: 119). A range of empirical studies support this claim. Ackerman and Karatnycky (2005), for example, find that countries improve their combined Political Rights- and Civil Liberties-Scores more substantially after non-violent transitions, compared to top-down transitions and those driven by violent uprisings. Therefore, they conclude “that the prospects for freedom are significantly enhanced when the opposition does not itself use violence” (ibid.: 8).⁴

Another important contribution is offered by Chenoweth and Stephan (2011). In analyzing 323 resistance campaigns of their Non-Violent and Violent Conflict Outcome database, they conclude that NVR campaigns not only have a higher probability of success than other forms of resistance, but also have a significant and positive impact on the probability of a democratic regime persisting five years after the end of conflict (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011: 213). A study undertaken by Bethke and Pickney (2016) further shows that NVR has a long-term effect on the quality of democracy. Furthermore, Bayer, Bethke and Lambach (2016) emphasize that nonviolent resistance pays out in the long run as “democratic dividend”, significantly reducing the chance of a democratic breakdown.

3 Nonviolent Resistance and Democratic Consolidation

As both NVR and democracy are multi-faceted terms, it is important to introduce the definition used in this study. With regards to NVR, this study follows the definition of Chenoweth and Lewis (2013: 417) who define a resistance campaign as mass-level phenomenon in which multiple actors pursue a common political goal and mobilize at least 1000 supporters in two different events during one year. Furthermore, they distinguish between ‘primarily’ violent and ‘primarily’ nonviolent resistance campaigns by referring to the means of resistance applied during the campaign. A campaign is primarily nonviolent if participants are mostly unarmed civilians who have not directly threatened or injured the physical welfare of their political opponents. All other resistance campaigns that do not meet these criteria are defined as violent (Chenoweth and Lewis, 2013: 418).

Defining democratic consolidation is an even harder task since it depends on the underlining concept of democracy. Authors following a minimalistic definition of democracy therefore tend to use “simpler” concepts where consolidation more or less equates to democratic survival only. Accordingly, Gasiorowski and Power (1998: 747) define a democratic regime as consolidated when it survived a second election including, ideally, a peaceful political turnover. This is assumed to have happened after roughly twelve years. Similarly, Huntington (1991) coined the “two-turnover test” as the most famous rule of thumb for democratic consolidation. It states that a democracy is satisfactorily consolidated if it has witnessed two successful and peaceful transitions of power. However, these definitions do not provide any information about the quality of a democracy.

Since this explorative study aims to elucidate mechanisms linking NVR to democratic consolidation, it seems appropriate to use a more fine-grained concept of democracy to guide the analysis. For this purpose, Merkel’s (2004) concept of “embedded democracy” which claims that a substantial definition of democracy has to go beyond “simple democratic electoralism” (ibid.: 16) will be used. Merkel characterizes democracies by an open access to power, a pluralistic power structure, an exercise of power limited by the rule of law, and a limited claim to power rooted in the sovereignty of the people (Merkel 2000: 23). Beyond this, according to Merkel, democratic consolidation has four dimensions and takes place in an interactive and hierarchical multi-level system:

First, ‘constitutional consolidation’ describes the consolidation of the central democratic institutions anchored in the constitution like government, parliament and elections. Constitutional consolidation takes place on the macro level and is a necessary condition for the second level. Second, ‘representative consolidation’ is given when a territorially and functionally differentiated system of representation is established via existing parties, unions and organizations. Third, ‘behavioral consolidation’ means the acceptance of the democratic rules by potential powerful veto players like the military, traditional elites and the political and economic elites. The fourth level is the establishment of a culture of citizenship which, if fully developed, can immunize the other three levels.

In Merkel's model, these four dimensions are linked logically, but also hierarchically and temporally. In this sense, constitutional consolidation comes first and influences the consolidation of the following dimensions (Merkel 2010: 112). Merkel's concept of consolidation therefore can be described as an elite-centred and legalistic approach. Since the literature on NVR and social movements has shown that the population plays an important role, there is room to argue that a culture of citizenship a) is highly dependent on preexisting pro-democratic attitudes and prevalence's within the broader population (instead of being a product of a top-down process of political education and socialization) and b) might have strong influence on other dimensions – especially the behavioral consolidation. Contrary to Merkel's term "levels" of consolidation, this paper will instead use the term "dimensions" of consolidation, since it does not imply such a strict hierarchy.

Linking NVR and Democracy: Some causal assumptions

The basic mechanism behind NVR is to disperse the power concentrated in the hands of few by refusing obedience, while violent insurrection works by concentrating power (Ackerman 2008: 119). Further, NVR can be used by nearly everyone but also requires the participation of the masses. Due to higher requirements concerning physical fitness, training and equipment (Zunes 1994), armed uprisings are typically smaller in numbers and more homogeneous than NVR-movements.

Additionally, both are assumed to spawn different organizational structures and democratic attitudes; the one being based on a clear structure of order and command, the other based on diversity, flatter hierarchy and the necessity to uphold a consensus of action without the power to sanction deviation (Cunningham 2006). While the smaller armed movements, having payed the blood toll of the liberation and being trained and equipped for war, tend to develop an "ethos of a secret elite vanguard [...] which tends to create less democracy and less tolerance for pluralism" (Müftüler-Baç and Keyman 2012: 419), nonviolent movements are expected to leave nothing but a society having overcome their fears and isolation, having regained self-esteem (Sharp 1973), and being trained to resist deviation from the democratic track in future (Sharp 2008: 53). Thus, we can expect NVR to impact all four dimensions of democratic consolidation:

Constitutional Consolidation: Having been active in the struggle for democracy, we can expect movement activists to occupy influential positions in the state administration of the emerging democratic system. In these positions they can monitor the compliance to democratic standards and procedures (Grodsky 2012: 12) and advance their ideals of participation. Others might stay outside the institutions but create civil society organizations like NGOs and private media, taking over the watchdog function and observing the consolidation process (Della Porta and Diani 2006: 138).

Representational Consolidation: Since NVR per definition consists of a broad coalition of diverse forces, it can nurture a culture of compromise and negotiation which spills over to the post-transition phase (Ackerman and

Rodal 2008: 118; Della Porta and Diani 2006: 21; Sharp 2005: 428). Activists and participants are used to respect internal dialogue and autonomy (Jochheim 1984: 275) and can foster the establishment of multiple parties and organizations. Just as well, NVR is based on cooperation and solidarity, which can help to create "alternative social and political institutions" (Sharp 2005: 426) like unions, solidarity funds, independent media, human rights and legal networks etc..

Behavioral Consolidation: For the dimension of behavioral consolidation, one can assume that NVR spares the post-transition society many of the dysfunctions induced by violent transitions. First, it does not contribute to a polarization of the political spectrum - including violent transgressions - like armed resistance often does. Consequently, it can facilitate reconciliation and rapprochement between former adversaries during the post-transitional phase (Dudouet 2011). Second, none of the participating civic groups gains a potential veto power derived from the advantage of having experiences in armed uprisings and weapons at hands (Cunningham 2011). Lastly, the higher number of participants and the higher diversity of NVR movements makes it unlikely that single persons or groups develop an ethos of elite vanguard (Embaló 2012: 256) and derive claims to rule the country or at least to occupy an elevated position in the new regime.

Culture of Citizenship: Here, the underlying assumption is that an active civil society is an important part of a stable or consolidated democracy. NVR is assumed to have a positive effect on the evolving civil society and a certain culture of citizenship that is required in democracies. First, high numbers of participants are said to make NVR per se more democratic than armed movements (Engler and Engler 2016: 26). Second, according to Sharp (2005: 424), nonviolent struggles have lasting effects on the activists themselves as well as on the broader system. NVR builds on individual and collective action, i.e. it only works when people become active and end submissive behavior (Sharp 1973: 778). Furthermore, the fact that people have previously fought for democracy leads to a stronger commitment to these values (Sharp 2008: 53).

4 Methodology and Case Selection

Suitable to make inferences on structural or macro-level explanations (George and Bennett, 2005: 142, 214), Process Tracing (PT) is frequently applied by “historically oriented social scientists [...] to explain the occurrence of particular events” (Mahoney 2012: 571). PT can be used in different variants either to explain an outcome or to measure the effect of a certain independent variable on a specific outcome. These variants can be described as “X” and “Y” centred approaches with “X” describing the independent variable and “Y” the outcome (Beach and Pedersen 2013).

In this way, PT follows the logic of causality and tries to discover mechanisms linking the independent variable and a certain outcome (and vice versa). According to Glennan (1996: 52), a mechanism can be understood as “a complex system” producing an outcome “by the interaction of a number of parts”. Since a correlation between nonviolent resistance inducing the transition and democratic consolidation in terms of survival (see Bayer et al. 2016) and quality (see Ackermann and Karatnycky 2005; Chenoweth and Stephen 2011) has been established, PT is used in this study in an inductive, theory developing variant (Beach and Pedersen 2013: 16). As opposed to this, theory building on the effects of nonviolent resistance on democratic consolidation is still in its infant shoes. Thus, the above-mentioned hypothesis derived from the literature will serve as guiding line to discover the mechanisms. According to Beach and Pederson (2013: 16), theory-building PT is suitable to build mid-range theory by describing a causal mechanism that is generalizable. Nevertheless, it does not claim that the detected mechanism is sufficient to explain the outcome.


Figure 1: PT-schema according to Beach and Pederson (2013: 34)



The consolidation of democracy is a complex and long-lasting process. Further, since the outcome “democratic consolidation” has a dual meaning (survival and quality) two separate analysis will be conducted. First, I will recount the effect of NVR on democratic survival, before examining its effect on Merkel’s four dimensions of democratic consolidation in a second step.

Figure two shows the PT schema for the analysis of the democratic quality.

Figure 2: The PT schema



Since definite causality is impossible to observe, PT often refers to the work of detectives like Sherlock Holmes to illustrate how the process of finding evidence and assessing its value looks like. The researcher should investigate the given case like a prosecutor in court, linking outcome and independent variable to each other by offering a mechanism or a chain of events supported by different “evidences”. Such pieces of evidence which indicate the causality of a mechanism are called causal-process observations (CPOs). (Collier et al. 2010) evidence, These CPOs can take every form of data, ranging from empirical observations to statements and interviews, historical documents and so forth. In this analysis, CPOs were gathered from expert interviews and historical documents collected during two field trips to Benin between August and November 2016 as well as from secondary literature. Overall, 22 semi-structured interviews were conducted. These interviews have been conducted to assess the current status of democracy and to complement usual democracy indicators like the Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI). Apart from this, they were designed to gain deeper insights in the NVR movement and its legacy. Two different sets of experts were interviewed to achieve both goals. First, party and union representatives, civil society members, national and international scholars on democratization and democratic consolidation and civil society members were used as main informants for the current status of democracy. The interviews with these informants were intended to decipher the current institutional and symbolic meaning of nonviolent transition. Second, historical figures like former members of the resistance movement or the NC served as informants on the movement itself and the following early period of institutionalization and consolidation of democracy.⁵

The case of Benin

To investigate mechanisms linking nonviolent resistance and democratic consolidation, Benin’s “civilian coup d’état” in 1989 and the following democratization serve as an ideal case. After a major nonviolent resistance campaign (Ackerman and Karatnycky 2005) had triggered the abolishment of Marxism

⁵ A complete list of the interview partners can be found in the Bibliography.

6 Contrary, Gazibo (2005: 77) argues that French diplomacy played a key role in pushing the regime to accept political reforms. Similarly, Amuwo (2003: 150) argues that the NC was “a French project”.

7 According to Chenoweth (2013), the average duration of an NVR campaign is between two and a half and three years.

and one party rule and subsequently the introduction of a National Assembly, Benin eventually became democratic in 1991 after adopting a new constitution and holding the first free and fair multi-party elections. It became Africa’s first democracy of “the third wave” (Huntington 1991) and is still one of its most advanced democracies.

The latest presidential elections in 2016 were the sixth of its kind and resulted in the fourth peaceful political turnover. Benin had already passed Huntington’s “two turnover-test” in 2006 when the first President after the “democratic renewal”, Nicéphore Soglo, was voted out and former President Mathieu Kérékou was reelected.

Since 1991, all elections have been rated as mostly free and fair (Houngnikopo and Decalo 2013: 14). This is remarkable since Benin’s development level was “well below the levels commonly associated with democratic success” (Gisselquist 2008: 789–794) so that its democratization was perceived as “against all odds”. With its bankrupt government, its looted banking system and with its civil service on strike, Benin had by any “historical or economic standard [...] a poor prospect for democracy” (Magnusson 2001: 218).

Furthermore, what constitutes Benin an interesting case is that its transition happened before the famous conference of La Baule in 1989 when France declared democratization to be a condition for further loans. External pressure to democratize was therefore less important than in following transitions (Banégas 1997; Bierschenk 2009; Gisselquist 2008).⁶ Having said this, Benin can be considered a deviant case in a double sense (Dorenspleet and Kopecky 2008; Dorenspleet and Mudde 2008) as it can neither be explained by classical theories of modernization nor by democratic spillover.

Additionally, the slightly above average duration⁷ of resistance against the Marxist regime of Kérékou promises to provide insights into the mechanisms, since the duration of a NVR campaign might affect the campaign’s outcome (Wittles 2017) and the quality of the following democracy (Kadivar et al. 2017). In sum, due to the strong nonviolent movement and Benin’s unfavorable conditions for democratization, we can assume a strong effect of the nonviolent resistance, which makes Benin the ideal case to uncover the underlying mechanisms.

5 Nonviolent Resistance and the Democratic Renewal in Benin

The former French colony Benin gained independence in 1960. After a short interregnum as a democratic republic, the small country located between Togo in the west and Nigeria in the east gained a “sad reputation of being famous for successive military coups” (Koko 2008: 4) and was regarded as “the sick child of Africa” (APRM 2008). From its independence in 1960 to 1972, the country experienced eleven Presidents, six different constitutions, twelve attempted and five successful coups d’états (Bierschenk 2009: 13). The last one in 1972 brought Kérékou to power and with him some stability. Kérékou declared himself President and introduced Marxism as official state ideology. From 1974 onwards, Benin became a single party state with Kérékou acting as President of the Politbureau of the newly founded single party, the “Parti de la révolution populaire du Bénin” (PRPB). Kérékou’s moderate socialism helped to align the left with the regime and “provided a way of explaining past failure while promising a viable and effective development path” (Allen 1992: 44). Far from being a dogmatic socialist, Kérékou soon earned the nickname “chameleon” (Claffey 2007) due to his protean approach to politics. Nevertheless, the regime came under attack from the more radical left represented by the Communist Party of Benin.

Rising repression against the communists and widespread dissatisfaction with the economic deterioration led to a growing opposition first led by students and teachers. From 1985 onwards ever growing parts of the population disentangled from the regime: Since wages were payed irregularly, the unions and the urban population joined the ranks of the opposition and eventually forced Kérékou to open the regime and allow a free press and independent unions in 1988/89. However, these appeasement measures proved unsuccessful. Throughout the entire year of 1989, Benin was characterized by massive nonviolent protests and strikes, making it increasingly ungovernable (Bierschenk 2009: 3) and eventually leading to what is known as “renouveau démocratique” – the democratic renewal.

On 7th December, 1989, Kérékou officially announced the end of Marxism-Leninism in Benin. Furthermore, Kérékou called for the appointment of an “assemblée nationale des forces vives de la nation” – a national assembly of the active forces of the nation. What was originally meant as a symbolic act to introduce some minor reforms, turned out to be a serious national assembly that worked out a new constitution, put into place a provisional government and set the pace for democratic elections. Since large segments of the society participated in the protests and strikes, it became known as “Peoples Revolution” (Koko 2008: 43) or – referring to Benin’s history of coups – as “civilian coup d’état” (Seely 2009: 14)


6 From Resistance to Democratic Survival: Tracing Causality

8 According to Collier (2011: 825), many studies using PT in international relations focus on a single event or process which cannot be further disaggregated. Thus, they may refer to plausible alternatives which cannot be observed in the case and consequently represent hypothetical or counterfactual explanations.

To verify the initial assumption that NVR had a causal effect on the democratic transition and the survival of democracy in Benin, I will trace the process of democratization and democratic survival along some critical junctures. For this I will focus on events in which NVR had an effect on the survival of democracy. In order to be in line with the logic of PT, counterfactual scenarios (Collier 2011) of regime failure and autocratic backlash will also be taken into consideration for each event.⁸

As illustrated by the following causal chain and as I will explain below, NVR led to the national conference triggering the transition towards democracy. Furthermore, NVR had an effect on the first and the second peaceful turnover and two attempts to stretch the two-term limit anchored in the constitution. In this context, the role of the Constitutional Court and civil society proved to be vital, an insight which can be traced back to the lasting effect of NVR and the NC.

Figure 3: Survival of Democracy in Benin



6.1 From Resistance to the National Conference

There is relatively little doubt that the "miracle beninois" – the Beninese miracle, as the peaceful democratic transition in Benin is frequently called (Fetton 1995: 83 f.) – was mainly caused by popular protest and NVR. In its final stage, NVR paralyzed ordinary life (Koko 2008: 44 f.) and led to the downfall of the regime (Heilbrunn 1993; Robinson 1994; Gbado 1991; Adamon 1995).

From early on, the Beninese students had been at the forefront and built the "strongest pro-democracy opposition party during the dictatorship" (Gisselquist 2008: 796). First resistance of the Union Générale des Étudiants et Élèves du Dahomey (UGEED) was directed against education reforms. However, when all independent unions were merged into a single trade union (Union Nationale des Syndicats des Travailleurs du Bénin/UNSTB) and the UGEED was consequentially banished, the scope of the protest widened. Student groups soon began to criticize poor working and living conditions and the authoritarian character of the regime. Thereby they joined forces with university and school teachers and the labour movement.

Using the slogan "Rise up to get rid of Kérékou and his clique" (Houngnikopo and Decalo 2013: 12) the students mobilized workers and federal employees to establish autonomous trade unions, starting with the Syndicat National de l'Enseignement Supérieur (SNES) in the late 1980s. Although always connected to economic grievances these protests cannot be dissociated from the democratic demands that were always part of the protests (Nwajiaku 1994: 436). This demand for independent trade unions and media, freedom of speech and association, which were formulated during the protests "constituted an important catalyst of the crisis and, ultimately, the fall of the regime" (Bierschenk 2009: 6). Finally, the opposition comprised students, workers, public employees.

While the liberalization of the media in 1988 was Kérékou's appeasing reaction to a rising internal opposition, the private press did not reduce the pressure on the regime, but contributed to the mobilization against it by speaking out against the rampant corruption (Robinson 1994: 594). As a next step, the regime announced the end of the Marxist-Leninist regime on 7 December 1989. Once again, this did not bring the intended relief. Instead, only four days later, on 11th December, Cotonou, the economic hotspot of Benin, saw one of the biggest demonstrations with 40.000 participants demanding the resignation of Kérékou (Seely 2009: 40). Underestimating the "strength and efficacy of the urban opposition" (Amuwo 2003: 150), Kérékou called for a "Conférence Nationale des forces vives" – a National Conference of the Active Forces (NC). However, Kérékou saw this NC simply as "forum for ideas" (Kérékou 1994: 19) for small reforms.⁹ The pre-conference period, however, already indicated that the "active forces"¹⁰ had other ideas. When on 15th February 1990 the preparatory committee published the list of participants with predominantly PRPB members and affiliates on it, opposition triggered the so called "quota war" to change the composition of the NC. (Seely 2009: 41). The fact that the members of opposition knew each other from the prior years in resistance against Kérékou enabled them to act in concert (Seely 2009: 43) and to muster a great deal of power (Heilbrunn 1993: 278).

9 Kérékou had held a "conférence du cadre", i.e. a conference of political activists earlier in 1979, which had little liberalizing effect. Referring to this experience, many suspected him to have intended the conference in a similar way as an outlet to reduce the internal pressure (Seely 2009: 34 f.; Bierschenk 2009: 4).

10 Overall 488 representatives took part in the NC. Amongst them, representatives from state institutions, civil society, religious groups, the armed forces, the national university, and three former presidents returning from exile.

6.2 From the National Conference towards the Transition

The quota war, however, was only the first victory of the opposition. After the quota had been changed in their favor, the opposition was able to hijack Kérékou's NC. While Kérékou saw the NC as a way to "tackle the objective of structural adjustment" (Kérékou 1994: 15 f.); the opposition turned it into a constituent assembly.

For the whole process it was crucial, however, that the military did not intervene to back Kérékou. Thus, the unity and the strong peaceful mobilization of the opposition, combined with the general amnesty guaranteed for the members of the ancient regime, contributed to the army's return to the barracks (Morency-Laflamme 2018; Houngnikopo and Decalo 2013: 13). Another explanation claims that only a minority of the military personnel had expressed loyalty to Kérékou during the consultations prior to the NC and that the large majority of soldiers took anti-PRPB stances favoring political reforms (Noudjenoume 1999: 166). The first position, however, seems more convincing since there exist records of military representatives who threatened that one could easily close the doors and shoot everybody down during the NC sessions (Seely 2013). Hence, it is more than doubtful whether the military would have accepted its return to the barracks without being challenged by the opposition. Against this background, the counterfactual stories of 1) a transition without a national conference and the quota war and 2) a transitional national conference without nonviolent resistance seem unlikely. Consequently, Allen describes Benin's transition as "collapse brought about by popular mobilisation and mediated through a national conference" (Allen 1992: 42).

Besides these initial events, data analysis reveals three further critical moments for the survival of Benin's democracy.

6.3 First National and Presidential Elections

The first critical event, although it was technically speaking still part of the transition, was the first national and presidential election in 1991. This election became a critical event since both presidential candidates were in possession of state resources (Kérékou as incumbent President and his challenger Soglo as prime minister at this time) (Adjahouinou 1994: 218 f.). Additionally, prior to this event no African President had ever been defeated at the polls and resigned peacefully.

This novelty was made possible because the struggle for democracy had been peaceful on both sides and an amnesty was granted to members of the regime. Furthermore, the mediation by the widely respected archbishop of Cotonou, who had also presided the NC (La Nation 20.2.2018), as well as by France (Hartmann, interview 29.09.2016) contributed to the first political turnover with a remarkable end: Kérékou's confession of guilt and begging for forgiveness for the flaws of his regime in front of the National Assembly which made it "culturally as well as theologically [...] impossible to refuse forgiveness" (Claffey 2007: 98 ff.).

In this sense, NVR forced Kérékou out of office, but still provided the opportunity to compete for the presidency democratically. Five years later, Kérékou returned and became President for another ten years. Today, he is widely acknowledged as respectable statesman.

Counterfactually argued: On the one hand, it is unlikely that Kérékou would have accepted both the elections and his electoral defeat without the gentle but nonviolent push by the opposition that was additionally backed by international actors. On the other hand, more than a gentle push would have made an honourable resignation and reconciliation between Kérékou and the opposition impossible. This in turn would most probably have minimized Kérékou's chances for a renewed presidency through electoral means and would have increased his reluctance to resign peacefully.

6.4 Resistance against the Third Presidential Term

The other two critical events affected by the legacy of NVR were the end of Kérékou's second term and, respectively, the end of Yayi Boni's second term (Oussou, interview 31.10.2016; Dossa, interview 23.11.2016). Both Presidents considered to change the constitution to allow them a third term, but have been stopped by popular uproar and broad, mass-based campaigns in defense of the constitution. A look at other African cases might serve as counterfactual scenario here: In many other African countries like Rwanda, Uganda or Namibia – interestingly, all countries with a legacy of armed struggle, the constitution was adapted or stretched to allow the respective presidents a third term (or more). Uganda's President, Yoweri Museveni, is currently even serving his seventh term.

Contrary to that, Benin's democratic constitution from 1990 remains untouched until today - despite its history of coup d'états in early post-colonial years. This democratic resilience was caused by two factors that will be outlined in more detail in the next section: First, a high respect for the Constitutional Court as the "final arbiter of serious interinstitutional dispute" (Magnusson 2001: 225) and, second, the commitment of the civil society to the constitution and its values.

Generally, the democratic survival in Benin can be described as sound because "there has hardly been any serious threat capable of suggesting democratic recession" (Amuwo 2003: 156). Therefore, the next section takes a closer look at the quality of democracy along the above-mentioned levels of consolidation.

7 Democratic Consolidation: NVR and Democratic Quality

11 Contrary to the BTI scale Merkel only takes the political transformation into account. For a more details on the basis of calculation see Tablet 1 in the appendix.

This section is going to evaluate the quality of democracy in Benin using Merkel's four dimensions of consolidation introduced above. To enhance the quality of the assessment, triangulation is used. Thereby qualitative expert interviews are complemented by BTI data adapted to mirror Merkel's concept of embedded democracy and its dimensions.¹¹

Generally most experts agree that Benin survived several political turnovers and fulfils central characteristics (institutions like parliament or Constitutional Court) (Dossa, interview 23.11.2016). It could thus be formally characterized as a consolidated democracy (Kitty, interview 18.10.2006). Nevertheless, utmost admit, that it is better described "as young but growing up" (Asogba, interview 21.10.2016), "minimal" (Gisselquist 2008: 794) or „democracy under development“ (Asogba, interview 21.10.2016). Commonly, the lack of economic development (Da Silva, interview 07.11.2016) and widespread poverty were seen as most pressing problems and as the biggest danger for democracy (Kitty, interview 18.10.2006). Similarly, Benin, according to Merkel's model of embedded democracy based on the BTI data, reaches an overall democracy rating of 7,9 of ten possible points in 2018. On the original BTI scale, which also includes the economic transformation, Benin only reaches the level of a "limited" transformation.

7.1 Constitutional Consolidation

According to the BTI, the overall constitutional consolidation with 7,3 out of 10 points is considerable in Benin. Some of the indicators like the acceptance of the democratic institutions (10), the rating of the civil rights (8), separation of powers (8) or the performance of democratic institutions (8) are quite high and represent ratings of a consolidated democracy. However, these strong foundations are counteracted by a weakness in the independence of the judiciary (6) and a dangerously low rating for the prosecution of office abuse (4).

Most interview partners agree that the democratic institutions are performing well and that the national conference has given the Beninese democracy all essential democratic institutions (Elias, interview 08.11.2016; Kitty, interview 18.10.2006; Dossa interview 23.11.2016). Similarly, other authors highlight that an effective institutional arrangement including a "highly respected Constitutional Court and an autonomous Election Commission to strengthen the foundations of democratic governance" is in place (Fomunoyoh 2001: 37). In the latest survey of the Afrobarometer in 2017, 93% of the Beninese are in favor of limiting presidential mandates to two terms. Solid 89% are in favor of regular elections to select their representatives and overall 78,2% of the total population support democracy. Similarly, the BTI rated the separation of powers, civil rights and performances of democratic institutions as comparable to democracies in consolidation.

Some of the particularities of the constitutional consolidation in Benin can be traced back to the genesis of this democracy through NVR. As mentioned above, the NV protests enabled the NC to widen its competences and draft a new constitution. Since those people who had protested against the

regime and the members of the NC saw themselves as representatives of the people as a whole, they felt accountable for them and put great effort in consulting the public during the drafting process of the constitution. As Ahanhazo Glele, the then President of the Constituent Assembly responsible for drafting the constitution put it: "We wanted it to be a people's constitution" (Glele, interview 10.11.2016). Due to the consensual, inclusive and participatory process of constitutional drafting, the constitution gained widespread respect. As a result, the constitution, especially the two terms and the age limit for the President, is often seen as the core consensus of Benin's society and has a nearly "sacred character" (Hartmann, interview 29.09.2016). Today, the Constitutional Court is widely perceived as guardian and protector of the constitution and the human rights anchored within (Bado 2014: 34).

Linked to the acceptance of the constitution is a high awareness of civil rights. Since the NC and the resulting constitution had become the "founding myth" for the new nation (Stroh, interview 5.10.2016; Hartmann, interview 29.09.2016), most citizens know the basic civil rights guaranteed in the constitution (Moussou and Deguenonvo, interview 20.10.2016). Considering the high number of individual civil rights cases brought before the Constitutional Court, the citizens are also aware of how to exercise them and trust the institutions in helping them to do so (Mey, interview 18.10.2016).

As mentioned previously, the Constitutional Court played a crucial role for the survival and the quality of the democracy since it "established its independence from executive and legislative authority early on, holding the other branches of government accountable to the new constitution" (Magnusson 2001: 211). This performance can also be indirectly ascribed to the peaceful resistance which led to the NC. Beside the generally high acceptance of the democratic institutions, the reputation of the Constitutional Court was essentially influenced by one person, Archbishop Isidore de Souza, who presided over the National Conference as a representative of the Catholic Church and later became the first President of the preliminary Constitutional Court. De Souza was elected as a neutral arbitrator and prudently and successfully mediated the conflict between regime and opposition.

Counterfactually argued: Without the existence of a strong opposition, the NC would not have been in need of a neutral arbitrator and would not have had elected de Souza as President of the NC and, subsequently, of the preliminary Constitutional Court. De Souza as highly respected personality of integrity successfully limited the power of the then President Soglo, who was said to have displayed some authoritarian tendencies¹² after the first year and also contributed to the image of a neutral Constitutional Court presided by independent figures (Houngnikpo and Decalo 2013: 109). Similarly, like de Souza, many other participants of the NC were also part of the interim government and the first government under Soglo (Da Silva, interview 07.11.2016). This, together with a close monitoring of government actions by the still mobilized civil forces, helped to create an accountable and inclusive government that respected the values of the National Conference during the first years after the transition (Asoba, interview 19.10.2016). Even today, a quarter of a century after the transition, the NC still serves as "important point of

12 A major crisis between Soglo and the National Assembly erupted over the 2004 budget. Soglo, invoking emergency powers, tried to push through a more rigid budget to satisfy international donors. The crisis was only solved by a series of decisions by the constitutional court (Gisselquist 2008: 798).

13 First forerunners of political parties in Benin have existed since 1920. The first real party was founded in 1947 with the „Union Progressiste Dahoméenne“ (UPD) (Engel 2005: 4).

reference” (Dossa, interview 23.11.2016) and Benin’s constitution is still legitimized with the broad consensus it was adopted within 1990 (Stroh, interview 5.10.2016). Especially in times when basic rules of democracy are questioned, e.g. the presidential two-term limit, reference is made to the constitution as consensual national decision to defend these values (Kapotcheme, interview 07.11.2016).

As we have seen, the acceptance of the democratic institutions is the most remarkable feature in the dimension of constitutional consolidation of the Beninese democracy. This stems directly from the fact that the people nonviolently opted for the democratic renewal and thus were already committed to democracy. Beyond this, the members of the NC – and later the provisional government – were seen as legitimate representatives of the people and acted accordingly, drafting a “people’s constitution”, and were endeavored to be inclusive and transparent in their actions. In this way, it is true that some of them occupied important positions and advanced their ideals of participation, as Grodsky (2012: 12) assumed. As we will see later, it is also true that other activists stayed outside the institutions and created civil society organizations which took over a watchdog function and observed the consolidation process. However, this direct effect soon vanished after the end of the provisional government and after the return of Kérékou in 1996. Thus, the symbolic effect of being committed to what is perceived as a national consensus seems to have played a bigger role than the effect which the movement and its participants had on the institutions.

7.2 Representational Consolidation

The assessment of the BTI indicators indicates that the representational consolidation seems to be the Achilles heel of Benin’s consolidation. Reaching only 6 out of 10 possible points, the representational consolidation in Benin is far from being accomplished. Generally, the party system (4 out of 10) seems to perform badly, while organizations outside the party framework perform quite well (8 out of 10).

In the terms of Guo and Stradiotto (2014), one could classify Benin’s transition as a cooperative transition which was driven from below. Since the opposition was heterogeneous and not spearheaded by one oppositional party, the constitutional assembly opted for an “integrative liberalism” without any restrictions to party foundation (Da Silva, interview 07.11.2016; Seibou, interview 25.11.2016). With the collapse of the regime as well as the implosion and delegitimization of the former ruling party PRPB, the political playground was levelled and “provided a political opportunity structure from which robust opposition could emerge” (Dickovick 2008: 1129). Furthermore, conditions for a diverse party system were promising: With a civil society engaged in the struggle for liberalization, a very liberal electoral system and Benin’s previous legacy of democratic parties, Benin was never in danger of becoming a dominant party system.¹³ As a matter of fact, no single party controlled a majority of seats at that time (Magnusson 2001: 219). The flip side of the liberal party system is, however, that officially roughly 230 political parties exist in Benin. Many of them only exist on paper and only a few of them

operate on the national level or regularly participate in the elections (Seibou, interview 25.11.2016; Videgla, interview 29.11.2016). Most of them lack a coherent program and internal democratic structures. Given the fact that the only existing oppositional and “strongest pro-democracy opposition party during the dictatorship” (Gisselquist 2008: 796) – the Communist Party – did not participate in the NC and that the former single party was widely discredited, the transition in Benin was “so complete, dramatic and open” that it left “behind a situation in which parties proliferated based on localised concerns” (Dickovick 2008: 1129). Thus, the downside of the “levelled playground” is a lack of consolidation within the sphere of representational consolidation (Oussou, interview 31.10.2016). Due to the high number of parties, “coalitions remain fleeting and uncertain” (Magnusson 2001: 219).

To sum up, the oppositional civic forces levelled the political playing field by delegitimizing the rule of the single party and paving the way towards multi-party democracy. This theoretically provided a fertile ground for representative consolidation, only the realization proved to be difficult. Dozens of “embryo” parties had participated in the national conference and in the year that followed, approximately 34 were officially registered and allowed to compete in elections (Allen 1992:49). Additionally, many already existing organizations, like for instance the Development Association, transformed into political parties, further contributing to a fragmentation of the party system (Droit de l’Homme, Paix et Développement 2015: 38).¹⁴ Overall however, the nonviolent protest had only little effect on party formation (Allen 1992: 57), respective representational consolidation.

This had different reasons: First, Benin found itself in a severe economic crisis which limited the leeway of the transitional government. Attempts to manage the economy of scarcity by structural adjustments alienated large parts of the student movement and the public servants and led to widespread disillusionment (Moumouni, interview 15.10.2016; da Silva, interview 07.11.2016). This political entanglement of some parts of the movement hampered the foundation of programmatic parties.

Second, the transition was not a revolution. Although the political landscape was levelled, the new democratic system was not able to root out the old clientelistic culture of patronage (Bierschenk 2009). Given the prevailing economic crisis, the population focussed their hopes on economic elites like Nicéphore Soglo who had previously worked for the World Bank and International Monetary Fund, Yayi Boni who was the former deputy director of the West African Central Bank, or influential businessman Patrice Talon known as Benin’s “Cotton King”. Many of the new political parties emerging after the NC were created around economically influential personalities and were consequently characterized as “political companies” (Videgla, interview 29.11.2016), or “political enterprises [...] created to produce political ‘gains’ as well as economic and financial benefits for their founders and active members” (APRM 2008: 55). Since the survival and success of such parties often solely relies on the founder and funder, they can be compared with stock companies and as “private property” of the party president (Engel 2005: 8) with the militants having the status of employed staff members (Dawodoun 2007: 127). Few of

14 Some activist, especially former unionists founded or joined political parties. Emmanuel Golou is one of these examples. Golou was part of the workers movement to protest against the dictatorship of Kérékou and founded the PSD in 1990.

these parties hold regular congresses or general assemblies (Droit de l'Homme, Paix et Développement 2015: 43). The internal organization of political parties is not regulated by law (Engels et al. 2008) and the majority never witnessed a change in their leadership so that in sum the internal democratic nature of Benin's political parties needs to be doubted.

In short, the political playing field was de facto captured by economic elites and influential former politicians and their parties. The practice of "pay-back" job postings for those who had supported his [a president's, MB] candidature means that it is not at all clear whether continued clientelistic practices will allow the recently introduced 'democratic' procedures and institutions to function" (Nwajiaku 1994: 44).

In the end, NVR led to an integrative liberalism and contributed to the foundation of several parties, but it only had a limited effect on the consolidation of the party system. The movement successfully opened the political space and temporarily levelled the political playground, but most political parties never gained significant influence. Similarly, the political culture of compromise and negotiation was transmitted via the individual representatives into the NC and the preliminary government, but did not influence the party system as such.

7.3 Behavioral Consolidation

Benin's behavioral consolidation, measured as the effective power to govern by the BTI with solid 9 points, reaches the level of a democracy in consolidation. In this section, I will show that although elites tried to deviate, from the democratic path from time to time, democratic institutional control mechanism and civilian intervention always prevented such.

One major advantage of nonviolent transitions over violent ones is that no political actor has a veto power based on military potential. Very often, former armed actors inherit a special position within the political system since they can always threaten to return to violent forms of dispute settlement. Furthermore, armed liberators frequently develop a sense of entitlement to rule the country due to their role during the struggle (Zunes 1994; Bayer and Pabst 2018). Contrary to that, during nonviolent transitions, no political actor develops the ability to overpower other actors or to attain a veto position and the state security forces are the only armed actors in the country. Therefore, the commitment of the military is crucial for the behavioral consolidation of the country. This is especially true since Benin has a long history of military interventions into politics.

As stated above, the military forces returned to the barracks in 1990 after having been confronted with a broad coalition of civil forces. International financial and military assistance were contributing factors which influenced the neutral behavior of the military. It appears doubtful whether the military would have received new international financial aid after having quelled a civil pro-democratic movement.

On the contrary, returning to the barracks and sticking to their business guaranteed them not only exemption from punishment but led them to profit from the subsequent "democracy bonus" (Bierschenk 2009: 15). This democracy bonus in form of international military cooperation and the possibility to participate in international peacekeeping missions of the United Nation - options they would lose if Benin deviated from the democratic path - built strong incentives to stay on the democratic track (Brillsauer 2016). Importantly, the army of Benin developed a new ethos as democratic troops through their participation in joint international peacekeeping missions (Brillsauer 2016). Nevertheless, a danger of renewed military intervention was always given or at least feared. Especially the last term of Yayi Boni showed warning signals like tanks patrolling the streets of Cotonou (Asoba, interview 19.10.2016). Due to the mentioned internal developments within the army "and an active opposition and civil society, this has not occurred." (Akindes 2015: 56).

Another factor contributing to the behavioral consolidation is the low political polarization in Benin. In the case of Benin, the return to multi-party democracy was widely supported by the population. Even the Communist Party of Benin (PCB), which had boycotted the NC in 1989 and which still builds the radical flank of the political system, is committed to the democratic order and rejects violent actions against the state to change the system. As PCB activists suffered most under the repressions of Kérékou, they appreciate the existing political freedom. Like Albert Gandonou puts it: "we fought for bread and freedom. We won freedom, the bread is still missing" (Interview 25.10.2016). Thus, in the sense of realpolitik, today's PCB follows a more social democratic line.

Furthermore, another factor that promoted behavioral consolidation in Benin was that the previous Marxist regime, although having been repressive, had no legacy of severe and systematic human rights abuses (Amuwo 2003: 149; Houngnikopo and Decalo 2013: 9). In the end, Kérékou accepted the advance of the NC for a new constitution because he was granted immunity and not asked to resign (Adamon 1993). This, in turn, was acceptable for the NC since the regime's human rights record was not too poor and since the risk that he would stay in power after free elections was relatively low (Houngbedji 2005: 36).

Up to now, the political elites have stayed on the democratic track. However, as mentioned earlier, President Kérékou and Soglo both attempted to change the constitution in order to allow themselves a third term in 2006 and 2016, respectively. These attempts have been successfully countered by the civil society and oppositional politicians. Despite these attempts to change the constitution, political elites ultimately accepted the basic "rules of the game" that are vehemently defended by civil society (Hartmann, interview 29.09.2016; Moumouni, interview 15.10.2016). So the NC and the prior resistance against the regime of Kérékou serve as a reminder that it was the rejection of authoritarian rule which led to democratic renewal; a trap that should be avoided in the future (Asogba, interview 21.10.2016). After four peaceful turnovers until today, the basic idea of an alteration of power through regular open elections can be regarded as consolidated within the political system (Stroh, interview 5.10.2016).

However, rising corruption and widespread clientelism (Watchekon 2003) put Benin's high behavioral consolidation at risk. As a consequence, be it in political offices or in business, the elites are seldom confronted with political restrictions of their interests. These legal double standards and the lacking prosecution of office abuse might represent a form of veto-power: a veto-power stemming from economically-driven clientelism and the willingness to accept double standards and inequality for economic opportunities.

It has become clear that the nonviolent struggle spared Benin some serious dysfunctions within the dimension of representative consolidation. As embraced by Dudouet (2011), NVR did not contribute to a polarization of the political spectrum like violent resistance often does. Furthermore, no political actor was able to credibly claim any special rights or a veto position and also the military – often in a powerful position as they command weapons – contained themselves in the face of nonviolent people's mass mobilization. However, economic actors gained a strong political influence. Widespread corruption and clientelism guarantee “the haves” a dominant position within the system.

7.4 Culture of Citizenship

Beside the good performance in the dimension of behavioral consolidation, Benin's culture of citizenship is another remarkable feature of its democracy (7,5 out of 10 points at BTI). This high rating is driven by an extremely solid approval of democracy (9) and a decent rating for social capital (6).

Most scholars on democratic consolidation admit that democratic consolidation is not only based on the mere acceptance of the rules of the game by elites, but also on a deeper commitment and support for democracy rooted in wider parts of the population (Almond and Verba 2015; Lipset 2004). As stated above, the culture of citizenship is rated quite high with an extraordinary approval of democracy in Benin. Since the civilian ousting of the military-Marxist government in 1990, Benin even “may have become West Africa's most vibrant civil society” (Magnusson 2001: 219). Additionally, there “are many indications that the population has also internalized democracy to a significant extent: high voter turnout, information about most candidates” (Bierschenk 2009: 22). The experience of the repressive Marxist-Leninist regime under Kérékou left a society which highly values the existence of civil rights within the given democratic regime (Moussou and Deguenonvo, interview 20.10.2016). An indicator for these attitudes is a high rate of rejection of single-party and military rule in Benin. Overall, 78,7 % of the population oppose military rule and 81% oppose a one man rule (Afrobarometer 2014). This is coupled with a broad support for democracy in general (78,2%) and a widespread pride in the historical achievement of being the first African country to manage a peaceful transition (Deguenonvo and Moussou, Interview 20.10.2016) and their pioneering role for democratization in Africa (Banégas 2014: 451).

How the democratic transition was achieved plays an important role in the development of the existing culture of citizenship in Benin. As in the other dimensions of consolidation, the emergence of Benin's culture of citizenship

has also been impacted by the fact that the people non-violently opted for a political change and that this change was achieved consensually through the NC.

First, the mode of transition anchored a sense of sovereignty and agency within the people. Citizens in Benin mostly have the feeling that they have the right to interfere in politics and to express their opinion and they feel able to influence politics. As Kombi (cited by Amuwo 2003: 150) states, “the conférence nationale's myth of a radical rupture gives the people the illusion of the total mastery of their destiny and of having reclaimed sovereignty”. Similarly, the former NC member, later prime minister and party leader Adrien Houngbedji stated that “the future is not a blind destiny [...]. In 1990, the Conference of the active Forces of the Nation allowed us to see it.” (Houngbedji 2005: 35). Further, the fact that the NC was able to find a peaceful and consensual solution for the conflict induced a high value for consensus within the political culture of Benin (Asogba, interview 21.10.2016).

Second, rare and unique events “may have extraordinary influence on people and organizations long after the fact”, since “how a community responds to conflict will be, quite simply, how the community has responded in the past” (Schudson 2011: 289). In this line, the transparent and participatory procedure of Benin's NC including radio transmission, public consultation during the drafting process and extra referenda for critical points created a strong sense of ownership and the feeling that the constitution is truly a “people's constitution” (Gisselquist 2008: 797; Glele, interview 10.11.201). Today, the basic principles of the constitution are well-known within Benin (Moussou and Deguenonvo, interview 20.10.2016) and most Beninese feel strongly attached to their constitution and the principles agreed upon (Mey, interview 18.10.2016; Moumouni, interview 15.10.2016).

In general, the resistance against Kérékou mobilized and politicized large parts of the urban population. Today, Benin still has a vibrant civil society interested in politics with roughly 13.000 officially registered NGOs (Bierschenk 2009). In some sectors like education and transport, unions attained remarkable influence (da Silva, interview 07.11.2016). However, formal organization remains weak in most other areas and civil society therefore fragmented (Stroh, interview 5.10.2016). There are some locally grown watchdog NGOs that have been founded by former activists of the anti-authoritarian struggle. As well, former leading figures of the NC started recently to build NGOs in the field of human rights, democracy, peace or anti-discrimination. More influential are, however, international NGOs which became active in the late 1990s and are often more or less local branches of inter- and transnational networks like the West African Network for Peace, Social Watch or Amnesty International. These NGOs have no direct ties to the nonviolent struggle, but their presence in Benin is only possible because of the political legacy of the peaceful struggle that provides them with a stable working environment (Oussou, interview 31.10.2016; Degue, interview 03.11.2016).

Interestingly, there is personal continuity between those having been part of the NC and those now active in the CS. Thus, the organizational link between the activists in resistance and new emerging civil society

organizations is indirectly mediated by the participation in the NC. This might be explained with political demobilization and disillusionment of the pro-democracy movement. As already mentioned, interest in the NC and the interim government was very high from the beginning. During the first year, the interim government - mostly consisting of former NC members - tried to be as transparent and inclusive as possible and was willing to discuss any grievances with the population (Asoba, interview 19.10.2016). However, it lacked the means to satisfy them since “the issues that had undermined Kérékou remained, and strikes began to occur once again, especially under the elected government that followed the interim one” (Allen 1992: 49). The implementation of austerity measures and structural adjustment by the new democratic government disappointed many students and former activists (Moumouni, interview 15.10.2016) and this “generated sentiments that democracy itself was responsible for their loss of influence” (Magnusson 2001: 223). This led to a demobilization of the broader movement. A few years later, “the second national assembly elections in 1995 removed eighty percent of incumbents” (Magnusson 2001: 217) and with them, most members of the NC committed to transparency and public consultation.

Nevertheless, the majority of Beninese remains committed to democracy and the constitution. As already mentioned above, Benin witnessed two prominent cases of mass mobilization against an attempt to deviate from the democratic rules inscribed in the constitution. The first one occurred at the end of Kérékou’s second term in 2006, the other ten years later at the end of Yayi Boni’s second term. Both attempted to change the constitution in order to allow a third term for the acting President. In 2006, the “Don’t touch my constitution” campaign, organized by an NGO called ELAN, gained widespread support from civil society organizations (Asogba, interview 21.10.2016). However, although it became apparent later that the campaign was financially backed by next President Yayi Boni (Asoba, interview 19.10.2016), it gained widespread support and found a fruitful breeding ground in the pro-democratic attitude of the people.

The second event occurred ten years later when Yayi Boni attempted to change the constitution to constitute a new republic which would have allowed him to rule another two terms (Stroh, interview 5.10.2016). In order to prevent that, new organizations like the “Alternative citoyenne” and long established associations like ALCRER organized widespread protests like the “Mercredi Rouge” campaign. On some occasions, the old “Don’t touch my constitution” banners were re-used to protest against Boni’s attempt to gain a third term. Ironically, it was Boni who had “invented” the slogan against his predecessor Kérékou (Asogba, interview 21.10.2016). This clearly shows that the population is in support of their democracy’s basic fundamentals anchored in the constitution and that they are willing and, importantly, also able to defend them. Furthermore, members of the government like Reckya Madougou also supported the resistance against Boni, even though her influence appears to have been rather limited (Oussou, interview 31.10.2016).

However, the nature of the civil society has some negative effects on the dimension of representational consolidation. While the political parties lack funding, many NGOs are financed by international donors and therefore

provide better working conditions. Furthermore, since campaigns like “Don’t touch my constitution” and “Mercredi Rouge” have proven highly effective in gaining publicity and grassroots support, they were often used as a springboard into political offices, transforming social capital into political power. One example is Reckya Madougou, the organizer of the “Don’t touch my constitution” campaign, who became minister of micro-finances in the cabinet of Yayi Boni afterwards. Djogbenou, minister of justice under Thalon, was widely known as civil rights activists, founder of “Droit du l’Homme”, and organizer of the “Alternative citoyenne” and “Mercredi Rouge Mouvement” (Kitty, interview 18.10.2006).

Due to the strong influence of the civil society, political parties are side-lined (Seibou, interview 25.11.2016). On the one hand, civil society organizations with international support often take over the function of political parties. They control the government, observe elections, mobilize and educate the population. On the other hand, and due to the lacking capability of political parties to mobilize support, local civil society organizations sometimes organize support for political leaders and bring them into influential positions. (Dossa 2010). The consequence is that the lines between political society and civil society in Benin are blurred.

As we have seen in the previous analysis tracing the effect of NVR on democratic survival in Benin, civil society played a major role in it. Sharp’s hypothesis that the basis for NVR is the end of submissiveness (1973: 778) and that a society having witnessed mass-based NVR comes along with a “just and democratic (civil) society” (Schock 2015: 111) seems to hold true to some extent. Furthermore, and more importantly, it seems to be true that people having fought for democracy are also more committed to defending it (Sharp 2008: 53). As we have seen, this mechanism works on the symbolic level. Thus, it is not only the veterans of the struggle who defend democracy but also the next generation. However, this effect is a fading one: Missing positive side-effects of democratization like an economic upturn can endanger it in the long run.

8 Conclusion

According to Gene Sharp, “[n]o one should believe that with the downfall of the dictatorship an ideal society will immediately appear.” In this sense, the mode of resistance against the authoritarian regime or the mode of transition to a democratic regime alone is far from sufficient to explain the consolidation of democracy (Sharp 2008: 63).

In the case of Benin, nonviolent protest during the 1980s opened up the space to hold a NC and provided a level of organization within the oppositional camp to take over the NC and pave the way for the transition. It led to a provisional government and the creation of democratic institutions which prevail until today. Without NVR, that bestowed the opposition with a great amount of power within the conflict and at the same time left room for reconciliation, the NC might have ended inconclusive like the “conférence du cadre” ten years before. Similarly, many other NCs like the one in neighboring Togo did not end in a transition because they lacked cohesion within the oppositional movement and eventually left the presidential power base untouched.

Furthermore, Benin has undergone four peaceful turnovers in six presidential elections since 1991. In Sub-Saharan Africa, this is only surpassed by Mauritius, which became a democracy after its independence in 1968, 30 years prior to Benin. Namibia and South Africa, two countries exhibiting similar BTI ratings for democratic quality but higher economic development, both did not witness a single turnover in the same period.

According to Thelen (1999), political institutions depend to a higher degree on legitimacy and functionality and less on efficiency so that stability is very much a question of acceptance of these institutions. As was argued above, NVR and the consensual transition led to a generally high acceptance of democracy and its core institutions. Thereby, it foremost contributed to constitutional consolidation and the development of a culture of citizenship:

Eventually, both the generally high approval of democracy leading to repeated interventions by civil society and the Constitutional Court have proven vital for democracy and its survival in Benin. Furthermore, the repeated civil society interventions in defense of the constitution supported the founding narrative of the sovereignty of the people and helped to uphold it over time.

The effects on representational and behavioral consolidation are less clear. Although NVR leveled the political playing field by discrediting the former single party and opening up the space for new political parties, the new playing field was soon dominated by old players. The NVR movement spawned a substantial number of new parties. Due to the economic situation, however, economic elites gained massive influence in the new system and began to enter and dominate the political sphere. More programmatic parties were not able to compete with economic strongmen who reward political loyalty materially. As a result, widespread clientelism prevails, prohibiting democratic consolidation. Whereas basic democratic principles like the citizen’s rights and the alteration of power through election are widely agreed upon, the routine daily essence of democracy like the fact that economic dependence does not mean political dependence, that political debates are guided by

Conclusion

arguments and not by loyalty, or that elites are subordinated to the same laws, is not. Although it currently seems unlikely that the country will deviate from the basic democratic rules anchored in the constitution, it is not consolidated either. A sufficient proportion of the population is still following political leaders for pragmatic reasons. As Olivier Kitty put it, “democracy is not the will of the elites but a commitment of the masses. It was the commitment of the masses that let Kérékou resign in 1990 and forced him to organize the national conference” (Kitty, interview 18.10.2006). However, this commitment to democracy shown in 1990 does not seem to be able to counterbalance the urgent material needs. Thus, the democracy of the everyday life is sacrificed to satisfy urgent needs while the basic principles of democracy agreed upon are untouchable.

Against this background, NVR provided a good basis for the consolidation of a democracy against the odds. Benin’s democracy proves to be stable against backlashes, at the same time the quality of “doing” democracy is constrained by economic inequalities. In this sense, NVR positively affected institutional consolidation and the development of a culture of citizenship but proved unable to induce an economic transformation, creating more favorable preconditions for a “deeper” democracy. This raises the question, if NVR is suitable for inducing fundamental social change or if it is reformistic in its essence, like some claim. Another interesting result of this study is that the founding narrative of “people’s power” was relevant for the renewed remobilization of civic forces. Still, there is more to learn about the power of these founding narratives and their effect on political culture. This is of particular importance as it seems that the effect of NVR is fading. What helps to upkeep it, what contributes to its further dismay?

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Table 1: Conceptualization of Merkel's (2010) concept of embedded democracy, based on BTI Indicators.

Levels of Consolidation	Indicators of the BTI
Constitutional Consolidation	„Rule of Law“: Separation of powers / Independent judiciary / Prosecution of office abuse / Civil rights „Stability of democratic institutions“: Performance of democratic institutions / Commitment to democratic institutions
Representative Consolidation	„Political and social Integration“ Party system / Interest groups
Behavioral Consolidation	„Political Participation“: Effective power to govern
Culture of Citizenship	„Political and social integration“: Approval of democracy / Social capital

Table 2: Interview partners

Nr.	Name	Organization	Date
1	Alexander Stroh	University of Bayreuth	05.10.06
2	Christof Hartmann	University of Duisburg-Essen	29.09.16
3	Olivier Kitti	Amnesty international	12.10.16
4	Gulianne Moumouni	University of Abbomey Calavy	15.10.16
5	Elyda Mey	Attachée des Coopération Ambassade de France Bénin	18.10.16
6	Nathanael Kitti	University of Abbomey Calavy	18.10.06
7	Simon Asoba	Chargé de Programmes FES	19.10.16
8	Alfred Deguenonvo	GIZ, consultant for civil participation	20.10.16
8	Comlan Théonas Moussou	GIZ, consultant for civil participation and decentralization	20.10.16
9	Martin Asogba	ALCRER	21.10.16
10	Angélique Voisin	Ambassade de France Bénin, RADEB	24.10.16
11	Albert Gandonou	PCB	25.10.16
12	Julien Oussou	WANEP	31.10.16
13	Alphonse da Silva	SNES	02.11.16
14	Jean Pierre Degue	Social Watch	03.11.16
15	Alphonse da Silva	SNES	07.11.16
16	Franck Kapotchème	UPMB	07.11.16
17	Jean Baptiste Elias	FONAC	08.11.16
18	Ahanhanzo Glele	National Conference member, drafted the constitution, president Constitutional Court	10.11.16
19	André Dossa	Chanal trois	23.11.16
20	Arsane Seibou	ABT	25.11.16
21	Augustine Videgla	Union Fait la Nation	29.11.16
22	Colonel Thomas Brillisauer	German military attaché for Nigeria, Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Mali, Togo	05.09.16

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


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12.5.) Paper III: Bayer, Markus (2017): Swapo forever? Prospect for liberal democracy or prolonged one-party dominance in Namibia, *Journal of Namibia Studies*, 21, 27-54.



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21

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Swapo forever? Prospect for liberal democracy or prolonged one-party dominance in Namibia

Markus Bayer*

Abstract

Like most other National Liberation Movements (NLM), the Namibian South West African People's Organization (SWAPO) was transformed after independence and went on to become Swapo party (Swapo) and take power in 1990. Since then, Swapo has ruled Namibia with its support growing and its position as dominant party unchallenged. Following on from Roger Southall's prediction of the slow death of liberation movements, this article investigates whether SWAPO as a movement is dying and, if so, what this means for Swapo. Will Namibia soon take the road towards a more liberal democracy or will Swapo continue to dominate? Recurring to the literature on dominant party systems and competitive authoritarianism and based on expert interviews, the article finds Swapo's dominance to be Janus-faced: On the one hand, its electoral dominance and consequently its control of state resources is ensuring its further dominance. On the other hand, its clientelistic use of its power is alienating growing sections of society, especially the younger generation, and is contributing to its slow death as an NLM and dominant party.

Introduction

As was the case with most other National Liberation Movements (NLM) in their respective countries, the South West Africa People's Organisation (SWAPO), which was transformed into Swapo Party (Swapo) in 1989, has dominated domestic politics in Namibia since independence.¹ On the occasion of the last national and presidential elections in 2014 it won stunning 80% of the total votes. This result was the highest election result Swapo has ever achieved and clearly illustrates its hegemony within the political system. Due to the pressing dominance of the leading party during the last

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The paper is the result of two field-trips to Namibia in November 2015 and February to April 2016, generously funded by the German Research Foundation (DFG). I would like to thank Andrea Pabst, Felix S. Bethke, Daniel Lambach and the anonymous reviewers for commenting and editing.

¹ In the following I will use the spelling SWAPO in capital letters to indicate the liberation movement while the spelling Swapo indicates the Swapo Party evolving from the liberation movement during the transition.

decades, Namibian politics have often been classified as a dominant party system² or as competitive authoritarianism.³ However, according to Southall, the ‘death’ of Liberation Movements as harbingers of hope might lead to authoritarianism, but could just as easily pave the way for changes towards a less dominant system.⁴ One example for such a development is the SWAPO’s ‘big brother’, the African National Congress (ANC), which fell to its lowest level of voter support since 1994 after the constant scandals dogging its president Jacob Zuma, opened up space for political opposition.

This article examines the current challenges facing Swapo as a dominant party and the prospects for a more pluralistic political system in Namibia. It argues that current developments point to a possible liberalisation of the political system – despite Swapo’s dominance. Firstly, the heroes of the liberation struggle are reaching retirement age and with them Swapo is losing its struggle credentials. Secondly, the intensive self-entitlement, the old guard’s lack of accountability and poor level of service delivery have led to a conflict of generations.⁵ This conflict is threatening Swapo’s ability to mobilise the generation of so called ‘born frees’, or, as Southall puts it – Swapo as an NLM is slowly dying. Younger Namibians seem increasingly unwilling to accept the old tunes of the liberation war as an excuse for corruption and clientelism and demand a more accountable and inclusive government. As a consequence, the government is increasingly coming under fire from opposition groups such as the Affirmative Repositioning (AR) and the Landless Movement, which demand solutions to urgent social problems involving, for example, housing and land. The violent escalation of protests in 2016 is a sign of the seriousness of the conflict between the government and sections of the population. Thirdly, Swapo seems to be riven by internal power struggles between the old elites on the one hand and sections of the youth around Job Amupanda on the other. With current president Geingob in the middle of and increasingly attacked by both sides, the situation is threatening party cohesion in the future.

To provide theoretical guidance, this article reviews and combines literature on dominant parties and competitive authoritarianism and, starting from these findings, analyses the potential for a possible end of Swapo’s electoral dominance and a move towards a more competitive political system. The empirical analysis is based on expert interviews with political elites and civil society members, conducted during field research in 2016, as well as document analyses of newspaper articles and social media posts.

² Matthijs Bogaards, “Counting parties and identifying dominant party systems in Africa”, *European Journal of Political Research*, 43, 2004: 173-197; Lise Rakner and Lars Svåsand, “From dominant to competitive party system: The Zambian experience 1991–2001”, *Party Politics*, 10 (1), 2004: 49-68.

³ Henning Melber “Post-liberation democratic authoritarianism: the case of Namibia”, *Politikon. South African Journal of Political Studies*, 42 (1), 2015: 45-66; Henning Melber, Daniela Kromfrey and Martin Welz, “Changing of the guard? An anatomy of power within SWAPO of Namibia”, *African Affairs*, 116 (463), 2017: 284-310.

⁴ Roger Southall, *Liberation Movements in Power. Party & State in Southern Africa*, Pietermaritzburg, University of KwaZulu-Natal Press, 2013.

⁵ Markus Bayer and Andrea Pabst, “Heroes and victims: economies of entitlement after violent pasts”, *Peacebuilding*, 2017: 1-16, <<http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/21647259.2017.1303868>>.

The paper proceeds as follows: the first section discusses the phenomenon of so-called NLMs in office and Southall's prediction of the 'slow death' of NLMs to contextualise the case of Swapo in Namibia. The second section reviews two important theoretical debates, namely dominant party systems and competitive authoritarianism, to derive indicators for the analysis of the current Namibian system. This is followed by a brief genesis of Swapo's dominance and a detailed analysis of different stabilising and altering factors within the current political system. In a last step, the results are discussed, thereby fathoming the prospects for democratisation or persistent dominant party rule in Namibia.

The slow death of liberation movements: from harbinger of hope to dominant parties

In 1996, only two years after the ANC took power in South Africa, Wallerstein commented that this "may mark the end of a world-systemic process", i.e. that of "national liberation movements".⁶ In Africa, the capture of power by NLMs like the ANC in South Africa, the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU-PF) in Zimbabwe or the SWAPO in Namibia in the course of the so-called third wave of democratisation was at first a source of great hope.⁷ These movements claimed to represent "the new nation" and were hailed as "harbinger of hope and freedom".⁸ The main hope was that they would be able to bring about genuine people's democracies and not 'only' mere liberal democracies. In reality, however, they "normally gave rise to single-party systems rather than pluralist democracies".⁹ The new emerging field of political 'transitology' labelled these regimes dominant party systems. Most authors assumed that the status of a dominant party would be temporary and that these regimes would develop either in the direction of liberal democracies or more authoritarian regimes. According to O'Donnell, the "installation of a democratically elected government facilitates a 'second transition'", meaning the passage from "a democratically-elected government to a democratic regime" or "to an institutionalized, consolidated democracy".¹⁰ However, this 'second transition' to a more pluralistic democratic system has often failed to take place. For sub-Saharan Africa, Van de Walle concluded at the beginning of the new millennium that most parties which had won the founding elections were still in power.¹¹ Typically, the

⁶ Immanuel Wallerstein, "The ANC and South Africa: Past and future of liberation movements in world-system", *Economic and Political Weekly*, 31 (39), 1996: 2695-2699 (2695).

⁷ Samuel Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*, Norman, OK, University of Oklahoma Press, 1991.

⁸ Hermann Giliomee, "South Africa's emerging dominant-party regime", *Journal of Democracy*, 9 (4), 1998: 128-141 (129); Southall, *Liberation Movements*: 327.

⁹ Roger Southall, "The South African elections of 1994: the remaking of a dominant party state", *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 32 (4), 1994: 629-655 (653).

¹⁰ Guillermo O'Donnell, "Delegative democracy", *Journal of Democracy*, 5 (1), 1994: 55-69 (56).

¹¹ Nicolas Van de Walle, "Presidentialism and clientism in Africa's emerging party systems", *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 41, 2003: 297-322.

emerging party system consisted of a dominant party and a number of smaller and unstable parties. As a consequence, academics argued that these regimes should be understood as hybrid regimes, that is, an own regime-type that has to be distinguished from liberal or representative democracies on the one hand and authoritarian regimes on the other. In 2002, Carothers claimed that the so-called 'transition paradigm' had "outlived its usefulness".¹² Similarly, Southall concluded that the hope that NLMs in power would establish true democracies was largely betrayed:

[W]hereas they had projected unity, they had been at times bitterly divided; they had proclaimed human rights, but had been guilty of terror and atrocities; they incorporated women, yet were overwhelmingly patriarchal; and while declaring themselves democratic, they were in many of their practices deeply authoritarian [...].¹³

This scepticism concerning further democratic consolidation was reflected in academia by the turn towards hybrid regimes, competitive authoritarianism or delegative democracies.¹⁴ However, despite the various attempts to categorise these regimes, the question as to how they will develop in the future remains open.¹⁵ Southall, for example, claims that organizationally NLMs will survive in one way or another. This, however, allows for many political options, among them prospects for a more liberal democracy based on political competition. As the recent examples of uprisings during the so-called Arab Spring have shown, erosion of political legitimacy can occur rapidly and unexpectedly.

¹² Thomas Carothers, "The end of the transition paradigm", *Journal of Democracy*, 13 (1), 2002: 5-21 (6).

¹³ Southall, *Liberation Movements*: 327. In search of an explanation, Southall is referring to Frantz Fanon who sees a new national bourgeoisie taking power in the wake of the national independencies. Lacking economic power and intellectual resources, this new bourgeoisie transforms the liberation movements into party-machines and engages in scandalous enrichment.

¹⁴ Larry Jay Diamond, "Thinking about hybrid regimes", *Journal of Democracy*, 13 (2), 2002: 21-35; Terry Lynn Karl, "The hybrid regimes of Central America", *Journal of Democracy*, 6, 1995: 72-86; Steven Levitsky and Lucan A. Way, "The rise of competitive authoritarianism", *Journal of Democracy*, 13 (2), 2002: 51-65; eadem, *Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes after the Cold War*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2010; O'Donnell, "Democracy". This debate led to a massive increase of new and diverse theoretical concepts. Fareed Zakaria coined the term "illiberal democracies", Diamond, Linz and Lipset spoke of "semi democracies" and Merkel of "defective democracy" (Fareed Zakaria, "The rise of illiberal democracy", *Foreign Affairs*, 76 (6), 1997: 22-43; Larry Diamond, Juan J. Linz and Seymour Martin Lipset, *Democracy in Developing Countries*, Boulder, Rienner, 1989; Wolfgang Merkel, "Embedded and defective democracies", *Democratization*, 11 (5), 2004: 33-58). To counter this proliferation of concepts, Collier and Levitsky already stated in 1997 that "if research on democratization degenerates into a competition to see who can come up with the next famous concept, the comparative study of regimes will be in serious trouble", cf. David Collier and Steven Levitsky, "Democracy with adjectives. Conceptual innovations in comparative research", *World Politics*, 49, 1997: 430-451 (446).

¹⁵ Some authors even point out possible positive factors for democratic consolidation induced by dominant parties. Arian and Barnes and Pempel argue that dominant party-systems, in contrast to fragmented systems, are better suited to support the consolidation of democratic institutions (Alan Arian and Samuel H. Barnes, "The dominant party system: A neglected model of democratic stability", *The Journal of Politics*, 36 (3), 1974: 592-614; T. J. Pempel, *Uncommon Democracies: The One-Party Dominant Regimes*, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1990).

Dominant party rule and competitive authoritarianism

The term 'dominant party' generally refers to a party which establishes electoral dominance for a prolonged time, and enjoys dominance in the formation of government and in determining the public agenda.¹⁶ More specific definitions mostly vary in setting different thresholds for dominance, the inclusion or exclusion of opposition features, and the time-span taken into account.¹⁷ Van de Walle and Butler analyse illiberal democracies in Africa and distinguish between 'one-party dominant systems' and 'fragmented systems'. According to their definition, a party is classified as dominant if it wins at least 60% of the votes.¹⁸ Sartori uses a more sophisticated concept to describe different African polities, distinguishing between 'dominant authoritarian', 'dominant', 'non-dominant' and 'pulverised' party-systems.¹⁹ As outlined above, the scepticism about the democratic potential of some regimes 'in transition' spurred research on hybrid regimes. In this regard, Levitsky and Way introduced the term competitive authoritarianism to describe regimes in which

formal democratic institutions are widely viewed as the principal means of obtaining and exercising political authority", but incumbents "violate those rules so often and to such an extent [...] [t]hat the regime fails to meet conventional minimum standards of democracy."²⁰

The regimes in power are likely to use bribery and the tax authority to co-opt or compliant judiciary to "legally harass" upcoming opposition and to "stack the cards in their favour". The phenomenon is closely linked to presidentialism – or regimes and situations which are dominated by the president. As a rule of thumb, Levitsky and Way regard regimes in which the president is re-elected with more than 70% of the votes as 'noncompetitive' and therefore as clear cases of authoritarianism.²¹ As a consequence, such regimes tend to be very persistent. However, even if these regimes try to upset the balance in the field of political competition, they are not immune against political contestation. More concretely, Levitsky and Way identify four arenas – electoral, legislative, judicial, and the media – in which such regimes can be challenged.²²

¹⁶ Hermann Giliomee and Charles Simkins, "The dominant party regimes of South Africa, Mexico, Taiwan and Malaysia: A comparative assessment", in: eadem, (eds.), *The Awkward Embrace. One Party Domination and Democracy*, Amsterdam, Harwood, 1999: 1-46.

¹⁷ Bogaards, "Parties": 174f.

¹⁸ Nicolas Van de Walle and Kimberly Smiddy Butler, "Political parties and party systems in Africa's illiberal democracies", *Cambridge Review of International Studies*, 13 (1), 1999: 14-28.

¹⁹ Giovanni Sartori, *Parties and Party Systems: A Framework for Analysis*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1976: 260. Systems in which there is a balance of power between a few parties are described as non-dominant, whereas systems in which one party won an absolute majority in three or more consecutive elections are described as dominant. Furthermore, systems without party competition on an equal basis are called dominant authoritarian, and systems with a high number of weak parties are defined as pulverised.

²⁰ Levitsky and Way, "Rise": 52.

²¹ *Ibid.*: 55. In these cases Levitsky and Way consider the death or violent overthrow of the president as more likely as his or her electoral defeat.

²² Levitsky and Way, "Rise"; eadem, *Authoritarianism*.

The following review summarises the findings of literature from both theoretical fields in order to identify factors which influence the trajectory of democratisation. The main factors are internal cohesion, material resources and international support.

Internal cohesion

According to Dahl's minimal definition, a democracy is characterised by the existence of inclusive suffrage, free and fair elections to determine officials, and civil liberties such as the right to run for office, freedom of expression, alternative information and associational autonomy.²³ Both strands of literature under review are bound to this definition: they perceive one-party domination as a special phenomenon in 'de facto' democratic regimes or understand it as a 'de jure' prevailing type of governance, which, however, is 'de facto' undermined and therefore nullified by the incumbents. However, in both cases internal (party or national) cohesion represents a decisive factor for one-party dominance and competitive authoritarianism.

One important element for internal party cohesion is corporatism. Different studies of transitioning democracies showed that it was the absence of a strong corporatist system to foster economic development, the emergence of a middle class and, eventually, serious political opposition (e.g. Taiwan) or, on the contrary, that it was the existence of a corporatist consensus between business and organised labour that stabilised party domination (e.g. Mexico).²⁴ Importantly, Gyimah-Boadi points out that the strength and cohesion of dominant parties also always reflects the weakness of counter-powers and challengers.²⁵ Gyimah-Boadi argues that in African democracies, most civil society organisations and/or political opposition are/is too weak to hold their governments accountable. Additionally, the factor ethnicity can also play an important role in providing necessary internal cohesion and in countering the "middle class effect".²⁶

A third factor for strong party cohesion can be found in the historical roots of a party. In this sense Huntington states that strength and durability of a party "derives more from its origin than from its character".²⁷ This concurs with Lyons' argument that the organisational structure of armed movements produces leadership coherence, discipline, and hierarchies which are conducive to strong party cohesion later.²⁸ Levitsky and Way came to a similar conclusion, stating that the cohesion of dominant parties can be rooted in

²³ Robert Alan Dahl, *Democracy and its Critics*, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1989: 222.

²⁴ Giliomee, "Dominant-party regime": 135.

²⁵ E. Gyimah-Boadi, "Civil society in Africa", in: Larry Diamond, Marc F. Plattner, Yun-han Chu and Hung-mao Tien, (eds.), *Consolidating the Third Wave Democracies*, Baltimore, MD, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997: 278-92.

²⁶ Hermann Giliomee and Charles Simkins, (eds.), *The Awkward Embrace: One Party Dominance and Democracy*, Amsterdam, Harwood, 1999.

²⁷ Samuel Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies*, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1968: 424.

²⁸ Terrence Lyons, "From victorious rebels to strong authoritarian parties: prospects for post-war democratization", *Democratization*, 23 (6), 2016: 1026-1041 (1027).

“solidarity ties forged in a context of violent struggle such as war, revolution, or liberation movements”.²⁹ In this sense a transition to democracy in societies with a historical background of an armed liberation struggle “requires the break-up of that movement into a variety of organisations, representing the different interests and conflicts of a real country rather than of an idealised 'oppressed nation'”.³⁰ Not surprisingly, it is especially parties emerging from NLMs and armed struggle that often transform into dominant parties.

Therefore, cohesion plays a double role in the measurement of the organisational power of a competitive authoritarian regime. Firstly, a recent history of military conflicts such as successful revolutions or anti-colonial struggles can provide non-material sources of cohesion for officials if they are drawn from the generation which participated in the conflict.³¹ Secondly, internal party cohesion can be bolstered if it achieved power via violent conflict.³² However, in a recent comparison between Namibia and South Africa, Cooper concluded that dominant party cohesion and dominance can be challenged when marginalised minority factions within the party feel confident of their mobilisation capacity.³³ Furthermore, if competitive authoritarianism is not backed by a strong majoritarian party in parliament, the legislative can become a critical arena to challenge the regime.³⁴

Material factors

Next to cohesion, most theories highlight the importance of the material basis of a dominant party or a competitive authoritarian regime since it represents the ability to uphold neo-patrimonial and clientelistic relationships. Greene, for example, identifies the ability to turn public resources into patronage goods as one central explanation for the persistence of dominant parties.³⁵ As long as these resources are concentrated in the hands of the dominant party, oppositional parties are condemned to remain niche parties. Similarly, Levitsky and Way assume that the ability to stack the cards in one's favour is closely linked to material factors.³⁶ However, once the political economy of dominance erodes, the way is open for a more competitive system. Likewise, dominance based on clientelism and corruption can also backfire and pave the way for political

²⁹ Levitsky and Way, *Authoritarianism*: 60f.

³⁰ Marina Ottaway, “Liberation movements and transition to democracy: The case of the ANC”, *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 29 (1), 1991: 61-82 (82).

³¹ Levitsky and Way, *Authoritarianism*: 376)

³² *Ibid.*: 377.

³³ Ian Cooper, “Dominant party cohesion in comparative perspective: evidence from South Africa and Namibia”, *Democratization*, 24 (1), 2016: 1-19.

³⁴ Levitsky and Way, “Rise”: 57.

³⁵ Kenneth F. Greene, *Why Dominant Parties Lose: Mexico's Democratization in Comparative Perspective*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2007.

³⁶ Levitsky and Way, *Authoritarianism*.

change. According to Solinger, “a very high and ultimately intolerable level of corruption” can turn into a threat to prolonged party dominance as it can lead to increasing dissatisfaction among the population.³⁷ If combined with charismatic oppositional leaders, both aspects may seriously challenge prolonged one-party domination.

International factors

Whereas party cohesion and economic resources are internal elements for party domination, there are also international factors such as globalisation which can indirectly affect party dominance. So far, these factors have mostly been neglected in the debate on dominant party systems since they have not been perceived as controllable factors of democracy promotion. Within the debate on competitive authoritarianism, Levitsky and Way, however, identify two international factors that can play a key role for the prolongation or the end of a competitive authoritarian regime: linkages (to the West) and leverage (of the West). While the former “serve[s] as a transmitter of international influence” and “has a powerful impact on actors’ interests, incentives, and capabilities”, the latter can be defined as “governments’ vulnerability to external democratizing pressure”.³⁸

Namibia after independence: emergence of a dominant party system

Swapo’s dominance as a party is closely linked to its legacy as a liberation movement. SWAPO was founded in 1960 and transformed itself from a nationalistic movement “concerned with the internal political mobilisation” into an NLM “engaged in a military struggle against the regime” and performing “the function of a government in exile”.³⁹ With the recognition of the UN General Assembly “as the sole and authentic representative” in 1976, SWAPO gained an exclusive status which was later be converted into a political monopoly. With independence, SWAPO became the Swapo Party (Swapo) and secured 56% of the total votes in the constituent assembly. In 1989, the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance (DTA) became the main opposition party securing 28% of the votes. Since then, the main opposition parties’ shares of the votes have been in a steady decline while in every election since in 1994 Swapo has managed to win a two-thirds majority.

The first real threat to Swapo’s domination was the formation of the Congress of Democrats (CoD) – a breakaway party founded by former Swapo member Ben Ulenga in 1999. Political observers attested the CoD’s “potential to attract a meaningful number of frustrated Swapo followers” and a potential to challenge the two-thirds majority of

³⁷ Dorothy J. Solinger, “Ending one-party dominance: Korea, Taiwan, Mexico”, *Journal of Democracy*, 12 (1), 2001: 30-42 (31).

³⁸ Levitsky and Way, *Authoritarianism*: 44f.; 40.

³⁹ Peter K. Katjavivi, *The Rise of Nationalism in Namibia and its International Dimension*, Ph. D. Thesis, Oxford, St. Antony’s College, 1986: 262.

Swapo.⁴⁰ The campaign for the 1999 national and presidential election became an exercise in mudslinging. Acting President Nujoma and then Minister of Home Affairs Ekanjio labelled Ulenga a traitor and a spy, accused him of orchestrating “rebellious activities” against the ruling party, and denounced his collaboration with South Africa during the days of Apartheid.⁴¹ Furthermore, Hamutenya, then Minister of Trade and Industry, voiced the famous warning: ‘It’s cold outside Swapo’, meaning that everybody leaving Swapo will have to face the consequences of social and economic exclusion. The CoD’s performance at the polls was, however, well below the expectations of most observers, but it still became the strongest opposition party by earning 9.9% of the total votes. In any case, this did not weaken Swapo as the CoD gained its votes not from frustrated Swapo followers but largely from former DTA supporters.⁴²

The second threat to Swapo predominance was posed by another Swapo breakaway in 2007. This time, long-standing leading Swapo official Hamutenya left the party after losing out in the battle for the party’s presidential nomination to the later president Pohamba in May 2004.⁴³ Hamutenya formed the Rally for Democracy and Progress (RDP) and stood against Swapo in the national and presidential elections, securing 11% of the votes for the RDP and becoming the main opposition party. But again, the opposition was not able to challenge Swapo’s two-thirds majority. In the 2014 elections, the DTA became the main opposition party again. This result was not due to the good performance of the DTA, but due to its status as the most promising alternative compared to the other oppositional parties. With a meagre 4.8%, the lowest share of votes ever for the main oppositional party, the DTA is currently the strongest oppositional party in the National Assembly. Since 2014, all in all nine oppositional parties share 19 seats while Swapo holds 77 seats. The status of the party system in Namibia is therefore often described as a “steady drift toward a one party-dominant political system” and the “consolidation of single party-dominant rule by the ruling party Swapo” leading to a “de facto one-party state”.⁴⁴

By van de Walle and Butler’s definition of party dominance Swapo gained dominance in 1994 by winning more than 60% of the vote.⁴⁵ According to Sartori’s more demanding

⁴⁰ Henning Melber, *Understanding Namibia. The Trials for Independence*, London, Hurst, 2014: 41.

⁴¹ Lesley Blaauw and Sydnes Letsholo, “Namibia”, in: Denis Kadima und Susan Booysen, (eds.), *Compendium of Elections in Southern Africa 1989–2009. 10 Years of Multiparty Democracy*, Johannesburg, Electoral Institute of Southern Africa, 2009: 347-384 (371); Tangeni Amupadhi, “Namibia: Nujoma worried about new party”, *The Namibian*, 31 March, 1999, <<http://allafrica.com/stories/199903310142.html>> [accessed 11 June, 2017].


⁴² David Simon, “Namibian elections. SWAPO consolidates its hold on power”, *Review of African Political Economy*, 27 (83), 2000: 113-115 (114).

⁴³ Blaauw and Letsholo, “Namibia”: 352.

⁴⁴ Gretchen Bauer, “Namibia in the first decade of independence: how democratic”, *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 27 (1), 2001: 33-55 (42); Melber, *Namibia*: 38.

⁴⁵ Van de Walle and Butler, “Parties”.

Figure 1: Voters' shares in national and presidential elections (1989–2014)



Source: Own compilation based on Data of the Electoral Commission of Namibia (ECN)

definition, Namibia has become a dominant party system since the national elections in 1999.⁴⁶ However, the classification as a competitive authoritarian regime is far more complex. In their main publication on the topic, Levitsky and Way do not list Namibia as a case.⁴⁷ Furthermore, even if the electoral dominance of Swapo can be linked to the fact that ‘the cards are stacked in Swapo’s favour’, it is not true that the regime fails to meet conventional minimum standards of democracy. “Vote rigging or other manipulations seem not to have had any significant impact”, nor did political violence and repression occur.⁴⁸ In general, Namibia is labelled free with a media that enjoys a relatively open environment.⁴⁹ Moreover, although up to now every Namibian president has been elected with at least 76% of the votes,⁵⁰ Swapo has always proved willing to comply with the democratic procedures of succession, meaning that no president – except ‘founding father’ Nujoma – served more than two terms. This contradicts the tendencies of ‘presidentialisation’ observed in most competitive authoritarian regimes. On the contrary, however, one can argue that Swapo clearly makes widespread use of “public finances, employees, or infrastructure in a way that limits the opposition’s ability to

⁴⁶ Sartori, *Parties*.

⁴⁷ Levitsky and Way, *Authoritarianism*.

⁴⁸ Melber et al., “Changing”: 286.

⁴⁹ Freedom House, “Freedom in the world”, 2016, <<https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world-2016>> [accessed 11 July, 2016]; Freedom House, “Freedom of the Press Index, 2016”, <<https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press/2015/namibia>> [accessed 11 July, 2016]; interview Gwen Lister, former Chief Editor of *The Namibian*, Windhoek, 07 March, 2016.

⁵⁰ Therefore, Namibia can clearly be classified as ‘noncompetitive’ system according to Levitsky and Way, “Rise”.

compete on reasonably equal footing” or it “uses public policy instruments in a discretionary way to skew access to private-sector finance”.⁵¹ This, in absence of all other indicators would make it a case on the margins – “If at all”.⁵²

Pillars of domination: stabilising factors of Swapo dominance

There are multiple reasons for the persistent electoral dominance of Swapo. However, most of them seem to be linked to its status as an NLM in office, that is, they seem to be grounded in Swapo’s past. This paragraph analyses Swapo and the status of Namibian democracy against the background of the identified factors of party dominance (internal cohesion, material basis and international influence).

Internal cohesion: the legacy of the liberation struggle

The armed struggle for independence left Namibia and Swapo with strong nationalism and party cohesion. Over the last 26 years, only two secessions from the mother-party occurred – and both represented only minor threats to Swapo’s dominance. Swapo was successful in presenting itself as the embodiment of the people and labelling and sidelining the oppositional forces as traitors. Furthermore, party-internal hierarchies are strict and sustained by personal loyalties and social control. Post-independence politics in Namibia have mainly been dominated by ex-SWAPO activists from the first and second generation, especially close friends of founding father Nujoma.⁵³ Generally, internal criticism is a very rare phenomenon since all Swapo members perceive themselves as comrades and deviation from the party line is often seen as betrayal. Additionally, the struggle for independence forged close ties between the party leadership and its followers. To illustrate the status of Swapo it is, for example, not uncommon in Namibia for Swapo to be compared with a church.⁵⁴

Due to its legacy as an NLM, Swapo also has historic links to the trade unions; an indicator which can be characterised as corporatist. Under South African occupation, the

⁵¹ Levitsky and Way, *Authoritarianism*: 368.

⁵² Melber et al., “Changing”: 286. For the Namibian context, the concept of competitive authoritarianism does not seem to provide substantial theoretical advantages compared to the concept of dominant parties. Thus, I will use the theoretical assumptions about possible challenges for these regimes for the analysis, but refer to problems of one-party dominance or hegemony instead of using the term competitive authoritarianism.

⁵³ Interview Ignatius Shiwaxmeni, Chairman of the All Peoples Party (APP), Windhoek, 2 March, 2016.

⁵⁴ Interview Kanaana Hishoono, Former presidential advisor of president Sam Nujoma, Windhoek, 25 February, 2016. During the latest 2015 regional council and local authorities’ elections, in total 26 constituencies remained uncontested and were won by Swapo candidates. Nearly all of them were situated in the North (Electoral Commission of Namibia, “Regional Councils Elections 2015 – Uncontested constituencies and local Authorities, 2015, <<http://www.ecn.na/uncontested-constituencies> > [accessed 28 September, 2016]. As stated earlier, none of the Swapo splinter-parties was ever able to win a majority in these constituencies.

labour movement subordinated their goals of internal development “for the final push” under the broader goal of independence.⁵⁵ Since SWAPO proclaimed a nationalistic and socialistic post-independence policy from the 1960s to the late 1980s, the trade unions and SWAPO movement were united in the goal of achieving independence and ideologically closely aligned. Although some attempts were made “to move the federation away from the ruling party” in the early years of independence, this alliance between the Labour Movement and Swapo still exists today, 27 years after independence.⁵⁶ The biggest Namibian union, the National Union of Namibian Workers (NUNW), for example, is still affiliated with the ruling party. This affiliation, blurring “the distinction between trade union and political party”, can be described as a special kind of corporatism as other non-affiliated unions like the Trade Unions Congress of Namibia (TUCNA) are permitted but side-lined by the government.⁵⁷ In using nationalist rhetoric, Swapo was able to uphold an ideology that binds NUNW to the party of liberation although it had adopted neo-liberal ‘realpolitik’ after independence. Cohesion is therefore ensured by traditional links and clientelistic structures rather than by a shared socialist ideology. Although Namibia is frequently complimented for its successful economic policy by the World Bank, the union members are “caught in a dilemma of loyalty to the ruling party [...] and dissatisfaction with the slow process of social change”.⁵⁸

On a broader basis, Namibians in general also seem to support their leading party. According to the 2014 Afrobarometer, 74% of the Namibians rate the current status of their country as ‘fairly’ or ‘very good’.⁵⁹ Swapo is mostly given the credit for this. As one can see in the following figure, the trust in the ruling party has increased steadily over recent years.

Another factor playing an important role for one-party dominance is identity and ethnicity. Namibian society is multi-ethnic and consists of 10 sub-groups with each having its own language. However, Namibians have generally developed a strong sense of nationalism over the last decades. From 2009 until the latest survey of Afrobarometer, the percentage of the population that perceived itself as solely Namibians (without any ethnic identity) rose from 24 to over 50%. Importantly, Swapo is not perceived as an ethnic party, even if the biggest ethnic group, the Ovambo, plays a crucial role within the history of SWAPO. They built the support base of the movement and the movement grew from the so-called Ovamboland People’s Organisation (OPO).

⁵⁵ Interview Ndumba Kamwanyah, Lecturer at the Department of Human Sciences-Social Work at the University of Namibia (UNAM), Windhoek, 15 November, 2015.

⁵⁶ Bauer, “Namibia”: 49.


⁵⁷ Gretchen Bauer, *Labor and Democracy in Namibia: 1971–1996*, Athens, Ohio University Press, 1998: 8.

⁵⁸ Herbert Jauch, “Trade Unions in Namibia: Defining a new role?”, 2004: 28, <<http://vivaworkers.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/Trade-Unions-in-Namibia-2004.pdf>> [accessed 11 July, 2016].

⁵⁹ Survey Warehouse, Summary of Results: Afrobarometer Round 6 Survey in Namibia, Windhoek, 2014, <<http://afrobarometer.org/publications/namibia-round-6-summary-results-2014>> [accessed 28 September, 2016].

Thus, it was mainly the Ovambo in the North who bore the brunt of the liberation war. This, in turn, affected the attitude of many Ovambos. In contrast to the Afrikaans-speakers, they are mainly strong supporters of the new regime and of Swapo as the party who brought it.⁶⁰ Swapo is, however, more than an Ovambo party. This was clearly demonstrated when Geingob, a non-Ovambo, became president.

Figure 2: Trust in the ruling party 2002–2014



Source: Own compilation. Data provided by Afrobarometer.

Material factors

As outlined above, some studies on one party-dominance stress the ability to uphold clientelistic relationships as a cornerstone for their electoral dominance. The last 26 years in power have left Swapo in a favourable financial situation, enabling it to reward compliant behaviour such as party membership and support and to punish deviant behaviour. These sanctions or the menace of sanctions are reflected by the well-known saying that ‘it is cold outside Swapo’. Party funds in Namibia are allocated according to the Electoral Act of 2014. Therein, section 155b states that party funds are assigned “based on the principle of proportional representation as contained in Article 49 of the Namibian Constitution”. In contrast to the largest oppositional party, the DTA, which received N\$ 5.7 million in 2015, Swapo obtained N\$ 97 million for their 101 seats in

⁶⁰ Antonie Nord, *Die Legitimation der Demokratie in südlichen Afrika. Eine vergleichende Analyse politischer Einstellungen in Namibia und Botswana*, Münster, LIT, 2004: 125.

parliament.⁶¹ In addition to the 'per seat increase' provided by the Minister of Finance, Swapo profited most from the enlargement of the parliament introduced in 2014 with the third constitutional amendment bill.⁶² This bill increased the seats in the National Council from 26 to 42 and in the National Assembly from 72 to 96. Although all parties in the parliament profited from this enlargement, Swapo, still occupying most seats in both chambers, gained most in terms of finances.⁶³

Furthermore, Swapo was able to establish various close ties to the business community in Namibia, enabling it to allocate additional funds. Since Swapo controls government expenditure, good connections to the party are essential for government contracts, playing a huge role in the Namibian economy. As Max Weiland, research associate with the Institute for Public Policy Research, puts it: "Little country, little economy, big party".⁶⁴ In 2012, for example, the then-president Pohamba hosted an exclusive fundraising dinner to generate additional funds. Some 20 influential business people were offered a seat at the president's table for a donation of N\$ 100,000.⁶⁵ With these 'good relations' to the business community, Swapo funding is guaranteed.⁶⁶ This financial advantage over the oppositional parties cannot be underestimated. To put this in context: the estimated additional funds of approximately N\$ 2 million, allocated at this single event, exceed the total party funds of the Republican Party (RP), the South-West African National Union (SWANU) and United People's Movement (UPM) – all receiving in total N\$ 958,000 for the single seat they hold in the National Assembly – by the factor of two. However, these material advantages are a product of the electoral dominance and will disappear if it is challenged.

Beyond this, Swapo is also involved in business activities in Namibia. In 1989, the year of independence, Swapo formed Kalahari Holdings, its first own holding.⁶⁷ According to some commentators, since then Swapo has developed its own "capitalistic empire",

⁶¹ Staff Reporter, "Party funding balloons to N\$116 million", *The Namibian*, 29 April, 2015, <<http://www.namibian.com.na/index.php?id=136392&page=archive-read>> [accessed 28 September, 2016].

⁶² Republic of Namibia, Namibian Constitution third Amendment Bill, 2014, <www.lac.org.na/Pdf/B9-2014-Nam-Constitution-3-Amend.pdf> [accessed 28 September, 2016].

⁶³ All representatives of oppositional parties identified problems of financing their party activities as a key problem (interview Reggie Diergardt, Democratic Turnhalle Alliance (DTA), Windhoek, 22 February, 2016; interview Ignatius Shiwaxmeni, Chariman of the All Peoples Party (APP), Windhoek, 2 March, 2016).

⁶⁴ Interview Max Weilandt, Research Associate, Institute for Public Policy Research (IPPR), Windhoek, 18 February, 2016.

⁶⁵ Melber, *Namibia*: 69.

⁶⁶ Immanuel Shinovene, "Opposition parties struggle with funding", *The Namibian*, 29 January, 2014, <<http://www.namibian.com.na/index.php?page=archive-read&id=119086>> [accessed 28 September, 2016].

⁶⁷ Christof Malatsky, "Swapo's business empire: a profile", *The Namibian*, February 10, 2010, <<http://www.namibian.com.na/index.php?id=62662&page=archive-read>> [accessed 28 September, 2016].

transforming itself into “Swapo (Pty) Ltd”.⁶⁸ Since business reports of these holdings and shares are infrequent, it is hard to assess the real assets of Swapo. The homepage of Kalahari Holdings provides no business reports but “prides itself in the ability to fund SWAPO Party activities and services throughout the country” for the general and presidential elections in 2014.⁶⁹

International factors: linkages and leverage

Namibia’s independence was a product of international negotiations. It was negotiated between the Western Contact Group (WCG) and South Africa on the one hand and Cuba on the other, without any direct involvement of SWAPO representatives. Furthermore, according to today’s President and then-Chairmen of the Constituent Assembly, Hage Geingob, “the important provisions of the constitution” were based on the constitutional principles proposed by the WCG and were “imposed on the Constituent Assembly” in order to ensure “that the liberation movement did not opt for socialism that might compromise the interests of the settlers”.⁷⁰ In this sense, international leverage set the preconditions for the internal settlement and predetermined the democratic outcome⁷¹ – an outcome “far more democratic [...] than might readily have been predicted from the movement’s own prior record”.⁷² Since then, Swapo has not deviated from the democratic path. The leverage of the West is high since Namibia neither possesses important raw materials nor is of strategic importance. Indeed, the country is highly dependent on international aid. In his Vision 2030 published in 2004, Sam Nujoma declared the goal “to promote the creation of a diversified, open market economy” in order to attract international investment.⁷³ This goal also reflects the importance of close ties to ‘the West’ for Namibia’s wellbeing. Although relations to the ‘historical allies’ Cuba, South Africa and North Korea are still close, they cannot substitute western leverage and reduce Namibia’s dependency. On the contrary, Swapo has always been careful not to risk any conflict that might endanger the flow of international aid. For example, the Namibian government has thus far avoided pressing claims against Germany for a

⁶⁸ Immanuel Shinovene and Tileni Mongudhi, “Swapo (Pty) Ltd: A troubled capitalist empire”, *The Namibian*, 11 December, 2015, <<http://namibian.com.na/dedi33.cpt4.host-h.net/index.php?page=archive-read&id=145340>> [accessed 28 September, 2016].

⁶⁹ Kalahari Holdings, “SWAPO Party Funding”, <http://www.kalahariholdings.com/social-responsibility/swapo_funding/> [accessed 28 September, 2016].

⁷⁰ Hage G. Geingob, “Drafting of Namibia’s constitution”, in: Anton Bösl, Nico Horn and André du Pisani, (eds.), *Constitutional Democracy in Namibia. A Critical Analysis after two Decades*, Windhoek, Macmillan Education Namibia, 2010: 83-107 (85).

⁷¹ Lauren Dobell, *Swapo’s Struggle for Namibia, 1960–1991. War by Other Means*, 2nd ed., Basel, Schlettwein, 2000: 76ff.

⁷² Colin Leys and John S. Saul, “Liberation without democracy? The Swapo crisis of 1976”, *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 20 (1), 1994: 123-147 (146).

⁷³ Government of the Republic of Namibia, “Vision 2030”, Windhoek, 2004, <http://www.wisis.unam.na/hivdocs/unicf/namibia/Vision%202030/NPC_2004_Vision%202030_policy%20of%20ramew_pg%2001-50.pdf> [accessed 11 June, 2017].

genocide reparation payment despite a campaign by significant sections of the Herero and Nama communities. Furthermore, the Namibian government has never tried to influence the work of international political foundations such as the German Konrad Adenauer Foundation (KAS) and Hanns Seidel Foundation (HSF) even if they are exclusively working with oppositional parties. Thus, these international factors seem to speak against a move towards authoritarianism. However, they also do not speak clearly for democratisation since Swapo has never been officially accused of deviating from democratic procedures and no western power has ever pushed for deeper democratisation or a more competitive party system in Namibia.

The wind of change?

So far, most indicators speak for prolonged one-party domination in Namibia. However, some developments have begun to undermine these stabilising factors. Most of them are challenging internal party cohesion. In the following section, I will focus on three issues which indicate recent developments that might have the potential to weaken Swapo's dominance: the land question, the conflict of generations and Swapo's seesaw policy between reform and conservation of the status quo.⁷⁴

The land question: the death of Swapo's ideals

The access to land has always been a pressing problem in Namibia. However, after independence the land conference in 1991 only addressed the issue of commercial farm land and left out issues of urban housing. Since prices in larger cities and towns are constantly rising, affordable accommodation is nowadays a pressing problem, leading to informal settlements with poor living conditions. Namibia's stable annual increase in GDP of 5% over recent years camouflages one of the highest levels of income inequality in the world. An estimated 30% of the population of Windhoek is currently living in informal settlements, mostly in the former township of Katutura.⁷⁵ Based on the assessment of a "substantial imbalance between the demand for and the supply of land and housing units in Namibia", the three Swapo Youth League members Amupanda, Kambala and Nauyoma founded the AR movement in 2014 to address the problem.⁷⁶ They formulated the "right to access to adequate housing" and, to underline their claim, performed a

⁷⁴ As outlined above, the material factors are more or less linked to electoral dominance and will diminish with it since its main sources, the official budget support for political parties and its close links to the business community will diminish should the Swapo lose seats in parliament and consequently the control over government expenditure. In addition, there is no clear indication of a change in western linkages or leverage.

⁷⁵ Tjitemisa Kuzeeko, "30% of Windhoekers live in informal settlements", *New Era*, November 28, 2013, <www.newera.com.na/2013/11/28/30-windhoekers-live-informal-settlements/> [accessed 28 September, 2016].

⁷⁶ Affirmative Repositioning, "AR Housing Charter 31", 2015: 3, <<http://www.namibian.com.na/public/uploads/documents/55bb181cd9821/AR%20HOUSING%20CHARTER%2031a.pdf>> [accessed 28 September, 2016].

symbolic act in occupying land at Windhoek Kleine Kuppe on 9 November 2014.⁷⁷ This led UNAM lecturer Kamwanyah to announce the “start of a new protesting youth generation”.⁷⁸ Since then, AR has developed into a hybrid between an internal party faction and a social movement. One year after the (symbolic) land occupation, however, AR seemed to run out of steam.⁷⁹ This changed in April 2016 when a spontaneous land grab in Walvis Bay escalated into violence.⁸⁰ Additionally, AR tried to move away from the single issue of land and widened its agenda, also covering issues of corruption and misuse of government resources. In 2016, for example, they started to mobilise against the plans to build an expensive government building, organized ‘AR universities’ to educate the people and lobbied against the destruction of illegally erected shacks. AR works closely with the so-called Landless Movement, which supports it in the more rural areas of the North. The recent destruction of illegal settlements by the Windhoek city authorities and the ensuing legal actions by AR lawyers led the acting Swapo Party Youth League secretary, Veikko Nekundi, to express his concerns that such acts by Swapo-controlled institutions “are oppressing the voting masses, as their actions are leading the majority of our people to hate the party, thereby weakening our party”.⁸¹ The land question is essential for Swapo and anything that tarnishes its reputation gained in the fight for liberation, which was essentially a struggle for the control of land and for the prospects of a better future, damages its legitimacy as an NLM. Moreover, the land question stands as a general symbol for the dissatisfaction with public service delivery. According to the 2014 Afrobarometer, 78% of the population agree that too much emphasis is placed on rewarding party loyalty at the expense of general service delivery. The above statement by Nekundi clearly shows that some Swapo officials, especially the younger ones without struggle credentials, are aware of a possible loss of legitimacy due to clientelism and mismanagement. AR and the Landless Movement, in contrast, are opening up so-called ‘invented space’ through popular mobilisation led ‘from below’.⁸² This represents a new form of mobilisation of civil society outside the

⁷⁷ Ibid.: 14.

⁷⁸ Interview Ndumba Kamwanyah, Lecturer at the Department of Human Sciences-Social Work at the University of Namibia (UNAM), Windhoek, 15 November, 2015.

⁷⁹ Interview Phaniel Kapaama, Lecturer for Political and Administrative Studies at the University of Namibia (UNAM), Windhoek, 09 March, 2016.

⁸⁰ Nampa, “Land invaders clash with cops at Walvis”, *The Namibian*, 04 April, 2016, <<http://www.namibian.com.na/Land-invaders-clash-with-cops-at-Walvis/39006/read>> [accessed 28 September, 2016].

⁸¹ Ndanki Kahiurika, “Do not sabotage Swapo votes, says Nekundi”, *The Namibian*, 30 March, 2017, <<http://www.namibian.com.na/163014/archive-read/Do-not-sabotage-Swapo-votes-says-Nekundi>> [accessed 01 April, 2017].

⁸² To describe state-society relations, Cornwall differentiates between invited space “initiated by the local state” looking to draw “local communities into processes of consultation, deliberation and sometimes joint decision-making” and “invented space” claimed from below, (Andrea Cornwall, “Locating citizen participation”, *IDS Bulletin*, 33(2), 2002: 49-58 [55]). According to Miraftab (2004: 1) this invented space is claimed by the grassroots and their collective action and is “directly confronting the authorities and the

party framework and hitherto unknown in Namibia and challenges Swapo's image as the sole embodiment of the people and harbinger of hope. Furthermore, since the Landless Movement calls for "agrarian reform" and "for restorative justice", they address the sensitive issue of ancestral land.⁸³ Thereby, the land question has the potential to reignite old conflicts between the different Namibian ethnic groups, each mobilising for their particular agendas. As illustrated, AR is an interesting phenomenon since it represents a movement 'inventing' space for political contestation; it is, however, still linked to Swapo and can also be seen as party faction, representing a conflict of generations within the ruling party.

Conflict of generations

As outlined above by Ottaway, the democratic consolidation of an NLM in office requires a break-up of the movement into "a variety of organizations, representing the different interests and conflicts of a real country rather than of an idealised 'oppressed nation'".⁸⁴ To date, Namibia has been ruled in an authoritarian manner by big men, who derived their right to rule from their "struggle credentials".⁸⁵ Former president Pohamba's two cabinets, for example, consisted exclusively of former SWAPO activists. However, the big men with struggle credentials are reaching the retirement age so there have never been so few SWAPO activists in a cabinet as there are in Geingob's current cabinet.⁸⁶ According to Melber et al., this tendency is likely to prevail since the "generation of those 'born free' [...] feels less attached to former freedom fighters. Therefore, the old guard and its legitimacy based on former struggle credentials are on the decline."⁸⁷ However, the generation of the now 30–40 years old, which did not fight but grew up in exile or under oppression, acts as generational gatekeeper. Swapo Youth League spokesperson Neville Itope, for example, highlights the existing good cooperation between the older generation and the younger one.⁸⁸ However, beside or behind these gatekeepers, the conflict between the generation of freedom fighters and the so-called born frees – the generation born after independence – is growing.

With an average age of currently 22.8 years, the majority of Namibians never witnessed apartheid or the struggle for independence and are increasingly upset with the prevalent clientelism, corruption and entitlement of the older generation. Attacking the Swapo

status quo" (Farana Miraftab, "Invited and invented spaces of participation: Neoliberal citizenship and feminists' expanded notion of politics", *Wagadu*, 1, 2004: 1-7 [1]).

⁸³ New Era, "Just who are the Landless People's Movement?", *New Era*, 17.02.2017, <<https://www.newera.com.na/2017/02/17/just-who-are-the-landless-peoples-movement/>> [accessed 01 April, 2017].

⁸⁴ Ottaway, "Liberation Movements": 82.

⁸⁵ Melber et al., "Changing": 287.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*: 301. They nonetheless continue to hold three-quarter of all ministerial offices.

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*

⁸⁸ Interview Neville Itope, Spokesperson of the Swapo Party Youth League, Windhoek, 22 March, 2016.

leadership's "cheap politics created by poverty of ideas" and the "cheap propaganda of peace and stability"⁸⁹ and delivering the "clear message that youth will no longer eat bones in their country while even dogs of elites are eating better"⁹⁰, AR became the first harbinger of an inter-generation conflict between the 'freedom fighters' and the so-called 'born frees'. The trump of the old generation, the critique-silencing reproach 'where were you when we were fighting in the trenches?' is no longer silently accepted and furthermore not available to the gatekeepers within Swapo. Current Swapo Secretary General Mbumba explains the growing split between the party and the younger generation by pointing out that "this generation has not seen all this credit for Swapo leading the fight against colonialism against Apartheid against South Africa".⁹¹ In February this year, this conflict culminated with leading AR figure Amupanda announcing his intention to stand against current president Geingob during the Swapo internal nomination for the upcoming presidential elections. Amupanda thus expressed his unwillingness to accept "that only pensioners should run for president".⁹² Moreover, he declared his desire to put the balance of power to the test in claiming that he already had the support of 50% of politburo members, 60% support of the Swapo Party Women's Council and 40% of the elders' council.⁹³

However, the final assessment of the threat posed by AR outside and inside of Swapo is very complicated at this stage since we know little about its support base. On Facebook, AR currently has 110,000 followers, which is an enormous figure compared to the 30,000 followers of the Swapo Youth League (as of April 10, 2017). For the mass mobilisation against the new government building that was scheduled for 16 June 2016, AR expected 5,000 supporters, but only roughly 1,000 showed up. Even if this turnout was far less than expected, it was at the same time the largest manifestation of civil forces outside the Swapo framework in the post-independence era. What can be stated is that AR's support base seems to be extremely diverse, ranging from the well-educated urban bourgeoisie of Windhoek to landless and illiterate dwellers of the northern regions.⁹⁴

⁸⁹ Job Shipululo Amupanda, "Rebutting falsehood of anti-AR Armchair critics", in: Nauyoma Dimbulukeni, George Kambala and Job Shipululo Amupanda, (eds.), *AR Foremost Perspectives. Towards Knowledge & Confidence of Self*, Windhoek, AR News and PPC Press, 2015: 11-13 (12).

⁹⁰ George Kambala, Nauyoma Dimbulukeni and Job Shipululo Amupanda (2015a), "Affirmative repositioning – A conceptual framework", in: Nauyoma Dimbulukeni, George Kambala and Job Shipululo Amupanda, (eds.), *AR Foremost Perspectives. Towards Knowledge & Confidence of Self*, Windhoek, AR News and PPC Press, 2015: 3-7 (6).

⁹¹ Interview Nangolo Mbumba, Secretary General of the Swapo Party, Windhoek, 10 March, 2016.

⁹² Sonja Angula-Smith, "Job eyes SWAPO presidency", *Windhoek Observer*, 10 February, 2017, <<http://www.observer.com.na/index.php/business/item/7639-job-eyes-swapo-presidency>> [accessed 01 April, 2017].

⁹³ Ibid.

⁹⁴ Interview Max Weilandt, Research Associate, Institute for Public Policy Research (IPPR), Windhoek, 18 February, 2016; interview Naita Hishoona, Director of the Namibian Institute for Democracy (NID), Windhoek, 30 March, 2016.

Internal party frictions

According to Swapo party tradition, the party president is normally also Swapo's presidential candidate. The presidential candidate is typically nominated on the occasion of the party congress, which takes place every four years and two years in advance of the next national and presidential elections. As a result, the congress is traditionally the locus for rivalries, conflicts, and splits. In 1999, the CoD was founded after the party decided to grant the founding father a third term in office. Accordingly, Hidipo Hamutenya left to form the RDP after losing the internal nomination process against Pohamba during the 2004 congress. The succession problem, which normally occurred at the end of the second/third term of a Swapo presidency, arose after the first term in these cases and thereby indicated serious infighting.

According to political analyst Joseph Diescho, the current president Geingob will no longer be accepted as party president, thus making it unclear if he will stay at the helm of the party after the upcoming party congress at the end of the year.⁹⁵ Geingob is being challenged from two sides: The first challenge comes from the younger generation. Amupanda's declaration that he would stand against Geingob carried the conflict of generations into the party's own ranks. The second challenge comes from the old guard who wish to preserve the status quo and oppose Geingob's reforming position.

It seems that the Swapo leadership is well aware of the first problem and is trying to tackle it in different ways. The conservative wing of Swapo is trying to safeguard its own ideology with the establishment of a party-school in order to

produce Party cadres of high calibre who will be able to articulate the Party ideology and provide leadership to the broad membership of the Party. We want them to be groomed into serious leaders who will ensure the long-term survival of the Party.⁹⁶

The Swapo cadre school should, according to the current Secretary General of the Party Nangolo Mbumba, also help to "correct wayward members and contain the growing incidences of rebellion within its ranks".⁹⁷ In other words, the school is an attempt to preserve the ideology of the founding generation of Swapo and guarantee the status quo against the wind of change. In the sense of Melber et al., they are trying to 'produce' loyal gatekeepers.⁹⁸

⁹⁵ The Patriot, "Namibia's 2017 agenda", *The Patriot*, 20 January 20, 2017, <<http://thepatriot.com.na/index.php/2017/01/20/namibias-2017-agenda/>> [accessed 12 February, 2017].

⁹⁶ Asser Ntinda, "Party School coming soon – SWAPO wants cadres to be moulded into serious leaders", no date, <http://www.swapoparty.org/party_school_coming_soon.html> [accessed 28 September, 2016].

⁹⁷ Toivo Ndjebela, "Swapo approves module for party school", *Namibian Sun*, 07 August, 2013, <<https://www.namibiansun.com/news/swapo-approves-module-for-party-school>> [accessed 28 September, 2016].

⁹⁸ Melber et al., "Changing".

More progressive elements within Swapo, on the contrary, are trying to balance the increasing diversity and to end the “culture of submission” which presents a “stumbling block” for Swapo’s final transformation from an NLM to a responsive democratic political party.⁹⁹ The case of the three AR leaders Amupanda, Kambala and Nauyoma is somehow exemplary of the two different approaches. All three activists were expelled by the Politburo after the land-grabbing at Kleine Kuppe. President Hage Geingob, however, announced that there should be talks with the expelled ex-Swapo Youth League leaders. This raises some questions, since the President is also a member of the Politburo. Geingob’s ‘inclusive’ strategy might be a typical case of the carrot and stick strategy; or it might indicate a deeper split between two different factions within Swapo and its Politburo. This, however, would mean that Geingob does not have the upper hand in the Politburo and is trying to appease the hardliners. As the former chief editor Gwen Lister put it: “if he [Geingob] is going to make a mark on the presidency, it is going to be to break the mould. Whether he has the courage to do so is one of the most critical questions for the next years of his presidency.”¹⁰⁰

However, this is the reason why rumours spread early in the last year that the old guard would try to unseat Geingob as the acting president of Swapo at the next party congress in order to prevent his second term as President of Namibia. At first, the current Minister of Safety Namoloh was linked with the planned coup against Geingob. Namoloh, however, denied his participation in any attempt to unseat Geingob, though he claimed to have heard of a group discussing this option. Despite confirming the rumours indirectly, Namoloh did not mention names.¹⁰¹ After that, Swapo tried to cover up the whole affair and declared that there were no internal frictions. A few weeks later, however, other rumours spread that President Geingob had accused the acting Secretary General Mbumba of “allegedly not doing much to take the party forward despite him receiving a ‘huge salary’ every month from Swapo”.¹⁰² Furthermore, anonymous sources claimed that the alleged revolt against Geingob was a mere rumour that was intentionally spread to alienate the President from functionaries such as Namoloh, current Swapo Secretary for Information Helmut Angula or former Prime Minister Nahas Angula.

The reason for this conflict between Geingob and the old guard lies in the past. Geingob was part of the so-called Lusaka faction, named after the location of the United Nations Institute for Namibia where the intellectuals in the ranks of SWAPO were mainly based.¹⁰³

⁹⁹ Interview Gwen Lister, former Chief Editor of *The Namibian*, Windhoek, 07 March, 2016.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid.

¹⁰¹ Tileni Mongudhi, “Never so close”, *Insight Namibia*, 2 May 2, 2012, <<http://www.insight.com.na/never-so-close/>> [accessed 28 September, 2016].

¹⁰² Confidante Reporter, “Geingob puts Mbumba in his place”, *Confidante*, March 10, 2016, <<http://www.confidante.com.na/2016/03/geingob-puts-mbumba-in-his-place/>> [accessed 28 September, 2016].

¹⁰³ Interview Heiner Naumann, Resident Representative, Friedrich Ebert-Foundation Namibia, Windhoek, 17 February, 2016.

Arrested in Zambia and accused of being a spy by the 'securocrats' of the movement (the so-called Lubango-faction) shortly before the independence, he only narrowly escaped being sent to the Lubango dungeons in Angola where SWAPO imprisoned hundreds of its allegedly disloyal members. Therefore, Geingob claims that his mistreatment and humiliation by the party had already started in exile. Acknowledging this mistreatment, Nujoma "decided to compensate Geingob by putting him in charge of Swapo's election campaign in 1989", bringing him back into the party hierarchy and thereby into a potential conflict with the Lubango-faction.¹⁰⁴ In 2012, Geingob surprisingly tabled the topic of the Lubango dungeons at a "meeting of the Swapo top-four leaders, to the chagrin of those in attendance".¹⁰⁵ Since this incident, some of the old guard fear that Geingob might address the problem in the one way or another. Furthermore, as outlined above, Geingob stands for a more inclusive leadership style than the more obedience-focused Lubango-faction. While it is not possible to verify any of these rumours with regard to the attempted coup, they are nevertheless a clear sign that all is not well with Swapo and that serious infighting is ongoing.

All in all, the future of the party will depend largely on who wins the internal power struggle. If Geingob is selected as the party's candidate for the next presidential elections, which is the most likely scenario, the chances are very high that he will serve his second term as president of Namibia. This would, however, further alienate the youth around Amupanda from the 'zombies' – as they are calling the cohort of the freedom fighters. If Geingob is unseated by the old guard or his young contender Amupanda, he might decide to try his luck outside Swapo relying on his high profile in Namibia.¹⁰⁶ This would mean a serious threat to Swapo and leave two antagonistic factions – the youth and the old guard – within the party.

Namibia at the crossroads?

So far the narrative of being the successor of the NLM that brought Namibia independence has provided Swapo with a solid support base for claiming political power. However, after 27 years of independence, SWAPO is showing clear signs of 'a slow death' as an NLM, just as predicted by Southall.

In the last decades a large floating class and small but respectable middle class, with degrees from the National University or from universities abroad has emerged in Namibia. This educated middle class is willing to initiate a social struggle since even they cannot afford housing in the capital. This pressure group is complemented by the so-called Landless Movement, which organises the rural population for action on the land

¹⁰⁴ Mongudhi, Tileni, "Never so close", *Insight Namibia*, 2 May 2, 2012, <<http://www.insight.com.na/never-so-close/>> [accessed 28 September, 2016].

¹⁰⁵ Toivo Ndjebela, "Swapo approves module for party school", *Namibian Sun*, 07 August, 2013, <<https://www.namibiansun.com/news/swapo-approves-module-for-party-school>> [accessed 28 September, 2016].

¹⁰⁶ Interview Rosa Namises, former activist of the Namibian Women's Voice, Windhoek, 5 March, 2016.

issue. By taking up the land issue, both groups are aiming at a Swapo weak spot, namely its failure to significantly enhance the living conditions of the majority of the population. The rising material expectations of the upcoming generation cannot easily be silenced any longer by referring to the accomplishments of SWAPO in bringing independence and peace or by resorting to putdowns such as 'Where were you while we fought in the trenches?' Furthermore, the 'born frees' cannot any longer be excluded from political power. Comments posted by AR supporters in various social media make it quite obvious that the reputation of the NLM is beginning to fade. This provides political opportunities within, but also outside Swapo. Up to now, AR has used these opportunities cleverly, linking up with other movements, inventing space outside the party framework and mobilising the youth within and outside the party.

On the other side, Swapo has been able to uphold its alliance with the NUNW and the strongest union, the Mineworkers Union of Namibia (MUN). In contrast, the unions organised in the non-affiliated Trade Union Congress of Namibia (TUCNA), which represent the better educated workers in the service sector, (teachers, cabin crews etc.) might be the 'more modern' unions, but they are at the same time less important in terms of numbers of members and economic potential. Furthermore and most importantly, Swapo has not yet lost its capability to uphold its clientelistic and opportunistic networks. These networks are bound to state resources. As the Namibian economy remains highly dependent on the mining and agrarian sector and has not seen any significant diversification over the last decades, they are very vulnerable to external shocks.

Last but not least, one-party dominance always stands in relationship to the weakness of counter-powers.¹⁰⁷ In the Namibian case this is largely true. Most observers describe Namibian civil society as weak but growing, a status that can be explained by Swapo's liberation struggle and its consolidation of power, superseding and suppressing any organisation outside the Swapo framework.¹⁰⁸ However, according to a report by the African Development Bank published in 2010, Namibia's middle class, including the so-called floating class (47.4% of the total population), is ranked as the seventh largest out of the 48 African countries.¹⁰⁹ The explosiveness of this middle class effect is shown by the case of Tunisia. Tunisia, in 2010, took the lead with 89.5% of the population officially belonging to the middle and floating class and witnessed the so-called Jasmine Revolution one year later.

Furthermore, recent developments show that Swapo's clientelistic patronage policies are proving to be Janus-faced: On the one side they are the basis of Swapo's dominance; on the other side they cause growing grievances. Therefore, according to the 2014

¹⁰⁷ Gyimah-Boadi, "Civil Society".

¹⁰⁸ Blaauw and Letsholo, "Namibia": 348.

¹⁰⁹ African Development Bank (AfDB), "The middle of the pyramid: dynamics of the middle class in Africa", *Market Brief*, 20 April, 2011, <http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Publications/The%20Middle%20of%20the%20Pyramid_The%20Middle%20of%20the%20Pyramid.pdf> [accessed 28 September, 2016].

Afrobarometer data, 78% of the population agree that too much emphasis is placed on rewarding party loyalty at the expense of service delivery. As stated above, unacceptable corruption can, in combination with a charismatic oppositional leadership, become a pitfall for a dominant party.¹¹⁰

The AR movement under Job Amupanda might represent such an opposition. Either Geingob will be nominated by Swapo and consequently elected as the last Namibian president with struggle credentials, as is likely, or he will lose the contest to Amupanda. In the first scenario, AR could either build a strong opposition within and outside Swapo, or transform itself into an oppositional party. This could push Geingob further to inclusivity leading to rhetorical entrapment and enhanced accountability. This turn towards accountability might be strengthened by recent setbacks in regional elections for Swapo's 'big brother', the South African ANC. Developments in the neighbouring country might have a warning effect on the Swapo leadership that the credit of past merit is used up and that people will assess the party by its current performance.

If Swapo fails to integrate the new educated elite and to fulfil the material expectations of broader strata of Namibian society, this will sooner or later lead to a polarisation of the political landscape. Until then, the current party-internal factions and power struggles are more important for Swapo's strength. The party would be well advised to follow the path of inclusion proclaimed by Geingob. However, as the example of AR shows, there are still many people in the party who react to challenges and criticism with exclusion and animosity.

Nevertheless, the initial euphoria and the "independence hangover" which followed the feast of independence "is over".¹¹¹ The absence of a potent political opposition in parliament, capable of controlling, monitoring and holding the government accountable is increasingly being compensated for by an emerging and critical civil society. This civil society, at present mainly represented by AR and the Landless movement, is neither 'drunken' from the euphoria of independence nor suffering from the following hangover and is critically assessing government policies and achievements. SWAPO as an NLM, however, is dying as it has lost its "essence as 'liberation movement' [and] as harbinger of hope and freedom".¹¹² As an accountable, inclusive, and democratic party, Swapo might be on the verge of being born again. This however, will also depend on which political faction dominates the party in future.

¹¹⁰ Solinger, "Dominance".

¹¹¹ Interview Reginald Kock, acting Secretary General of the Trade Union Congress of Namibia TUCNA, Windhoek, 7 March, 2016.

¹¹² Southall, *Liberation Movements*: 327.

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12.6.) Paper IV: Bayer, Markus and Andrea Pabst (2018): Heroes and victims:
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Heroes and Victims: Economies of Entitlement after violent Pasts

Markus Bayer and Andrea Pabst

Abstract:

This article analyses economies of entitlement after violent conflicts and the challenges for post-conflict peacebuilding and democratic transition arising from them. Based on two case studies of post-genocide Rwanda and post-independence Namibia, the study shows that entitlement claims premised on heroism or victimhood are important phenomena after political violence that confront peacebuilding efforts with serious dilemmas. Examining the psychological roots of entitlement and their manifestations in the wake of political violence, this article argues that entitlements targeting only particular groups of victims or heroes challenge democratic principles such as equality and citizenship and, eventually, undermine peace and social justice. The contribution tries to enrich the peacebuilding debate by, first, considering feelings of entitlement as an element of post-conflict dynamics, second, introducing the ‘hero’ as important actor in post-conflict settings, and third, discussing some effects of the rise of victimhood as core category in internationalised post-conflict contexts.

Keywords: economies of entitlement, heroes, victims, social justice, peacebuilding

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Introduction

One of the central questions in the literature on post-conflict peacebuilding is how to process the severe traces that past violence has left on individual psyches, culture and society. In this context, justice became an important part of the policy frameworks to strengthen and solidify social peace and cohesion. Justice has different meanings and comprises personal, collective as well as social dimensions. For peacebuilding purposes, especially the notion of social justice is important as it, simply put, aims at a condition in which chances in a society are appropriately distributed and there is equal access to liberties, rights, and opportunities.¹ Within the conception of (social) justice, entitlement is a crucial element – if not the ‘essential ingredient’.² The paper claims that after political violence there are two categories that tend to develop specific entitlement claims based on their past experiences: victims and heroes. Their specific feelings of entitlement, however, confront peacebuilding efforts with serious dilemmas. On the one hand, reward for ‘heroes’ and redress for victims can represent important elements of post-conflict justice measures; on the other hand, the exclusive nature of these status-based entitlements contradicts equality and ‘fair’ allocation of community resources, thereby challenging fundamental democratic principles such as equal citizenship.

Based on the case studies of post-genocide Rwanda and post-independence Namibia, this article shows that entitlement claims deprived from heroism or victimhood provide valuable resources leading to moral and political economies of entitlement. These are situations in which victims and heroes struggle for exclusive entitlements based on their feeling of deserving something as just and deserved redress for past suffering or as reward for glorious deeds. This article argues that entitlement dynamics in form of the continuous expansion of victims’ and heroes’ claims

¹ John Rawls, *A Theory of Justice* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999), 53.

² Melvin J. Lerner, ‘Integrating Societal and Psychological Rules of Entitlement: The Basic Task of Each Social Actor and Fundamental Problem for the Social Sciences’, *Social Justice Research* 1(1), (1985): 107.

to gain access to state resources can, in the long run, undermine the goal of peacebuilding, which is to solidify social peace and cohesion.

To do so, this paper combines research on peacebuilding and history politics on the one hand, and social-psychological findings on entitlement and justice on the other. Thereby, the investigation aims at enriching the existing peacebuilding debate by, first, considering feelings of entitlement as an important element of post-conflict dynamics, second, introducing the ‘hero’ as relevant actor in post-conflict settings, and third, problematizing some effects of the global rise of victimhood as core category in internationalised post-conflict processes. The phenomenon of entitlement in post-conflict situations is approached in an explorative, theory-building manner. The paper uses the case studies to add illustration and empirical depth to its theoretical claims. Both cases represent post-conflict settings in which one conflict party clearly won and entitlement processes took place, albeit in very different ways. Thus, both cases represent ideal research basis for theory building. However, they were not chosen in a rigorous case selection aiming at a systematic comparison. The findings of the Namibian case are based on qualitative interviews with representatives of Namibian political parties and civil society organisations as well as analyses of secondary data such as news reports.³ The study of entitlement in Rwanda draws on analyses of primary documents of the government and diaspora organisations in Europe, especially in Belgium, as well as secondary data.

The paper proceeds as follows: Section one highlights the importance of justice after political violence. It also traces existing links between peacebuilding, post-conflict justice measures and entitlement processes, especially with regard to victimhood and the often overlooked figure of the hero. Section two refers to psychological theories of entitlement and their socio-political dimensions and effects. Drawing on these findings, section three outlines the exclusive

³ The article draws on interviews with Reggie Diergaard (Director of Operations, ‘Democratic Turnhalle Alliance’), Hopelong U. Ipinge (Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Veteran Affairs) and Pauline Dempers (Coordinator, ‘Breaking the Wall of Silence’), all conducted by the author in March 2016 in Windhoek.

character of status-based entitlements with regard to social justice and peace. Section four illustrates different dynamics of entitlement in Rwanda and Namibia. The last section summarises the findings and points out implications for further research.

Peacebuilding, Justice and Entitlement: Situating Heroes and Victims in the Debate

To reach stable peace, ‘peacebuilding must [...] address issues of justice arising from the commission of political violence’.⁴ As a consequence, after political violence or the end of authoritarian regimes with gross human rights violations, the entitlement of victims is today an essential ingredient for building new societal structures based on an idea of justice. *The moral argument to legitimise post-conflict justice measures is the fate of the victims.*⁵ Internationally, every person is a victim

who, individually or collectively, [has] suffered harm, including physical or mental injury, emotional suffering, economic loss or substantial impairment of [its] fundamental rights, through acts or omission that do not yet constitute violations of national criminal laws but of internationally recognized norms relating to human rights.⁶

The entitlement of victims is grounded on legal, human rights-related and psychological arguments. From the legal point of view, every human being is a bearer of human rights and thus entitled to them. If a state or any other actor violates these rights, victims are entitled to legal proceedings, ranging from criminal prosecution and punishment of the perpetrators, measures of material reparation to symbolic acts of apology.⁷ From a psychological point of

⁴ Erica Bouris, *Complex Political Victims* (Bloomfield CT: Kumarian Press, 2007), 16.

⁵ Thorsten Bonacker, ‘Global Victimhood: On the Charisma of the Victim in Transitional Justice Processes’, *World Political Science Review* 9(1) (2013); Kieren McEvoy and Kirsten McConnachie, ‘Victims and Transitional Justice: Voice, Agency and Blame’, *Social & Legal Studies* 22(4) (2013): 490.

⁶ General Assembly resolution 40/34. *UN Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power*, A/RES/40/34 (29 November 1985).

⁷ Elazar Barkan, *The Guilt of Nations – Restitution and Negotiating Historical Injustices* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2000); Kahtryn Sikkink, *The Justice Cascade. How Human Rights Prosecutions are Changing World Politics* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2011).

view, mass atrocities and gross human rights violations are deeply traumatising events that shatter the complete inner and outer world of victims and survivors. A range of psychological research on trauma has concluded that victims and survivors of traumatic events first and foremost need the feeling of a caring social environment that helps re-establishing the feelings of worthiness, self-esteem and subjectivity.⁸ For this reason, the entitlement of victims in form of material compensation and symbolic acknowledgment is considered to be of significant importance for the recovery of both the individual and the collective.⁹ In this respect, the growing diffusion of Transitional Justice (TJ) programs and the institutionalisation of victim rights are considered a great achievement in terms of post-conflict justice and, not surprisingly, recent peacebuilding research and practice has been characterised by empathy towards victims.

10

It is essential to consider that the very notion of ‘victim’ is neither objective nor fixed. Who is considered as legitimate victim and, thus, entitled to reparations, is bound to political decisions and often contested. With the growing importance of the victim, the politicisation of collective victimhood has become a widespread phenomenon in post-conflict societies.¹¹ Importantly, the claim of victimhood can be put forward to restore power, legitimise political claims or seek moral acceptance for very divergent projects.¹² Bar-Tal found out that in the wake of intractable political violence, the sense of collective victimhood can become a mind-set that dominates a group’s behaviour and perception of reality.¹³ Amongst others, such a sense of victimhood is

⁸ Brandon Hamber, ‘Healing’, in *Reconciliation after Violent Conflict. A Handbook*, ed. David Bloomfield, Teresa Bornes and Luc Huyse (Stockholm: IDEA Handbook Series, 2003): 77-88; Rama Mani, ‘Reparation as a Component of Transitional Justice: Pursuing ‘Reparative Justice’ in the Aftermath of Violent Conflict’, In *Out of the Ashes. Reparation for Victims of Gross and Systematic Human Rights Violations*, ed. Koen De Feyter et al. (Antwerp: Intersentia, 2005).

⁹ Hamber, ‘Healing’; Mani, ‘Reparation and TJ’.

¹⁰ Cherif Bassiouni, ‘International Recognition of Victims’ Rights’, *Human Rights Law Review* 6(2), (2006): 278.

¹¹ Cheryl Lawther, ‘The Construction and Victimisation of Victimhood’, in *Victims of Terrorism*, ed. Orla Lynch and Javier Argomaniz (London: Routledge, 2015), 10-30.

¹² Masi Noor et al., ‘When Suffering begets Suffering: The Psychology of Competitive Victimhood between Adversarial Groups in Violent Conflicts’, *Personality and Social Psychology Review* 16(4), (2012).

¹³ Daniel Bar-Tal et al., ‘A Sense of Self-perceived Collective Victimhood in Intractable Conflicts’, *International Review of the Red Cross* 91(874), (2009): 236.

characterised by beliefs that focus on the ‘*deservingness* of apology, competition or punishment of the perpetrator and the *entitlement* to empathy, support and help from the international community’.¹⁴ In some cases, victim groups enter a harsh competition about who suffered more and who is the more deserving victim. Victim groups may also compete over material resources, the exclusiveness or the ‘legitimacy and injustice’ of their suffering.¹⁵ Volkan states that victimised collectives tend to develop an ideology of ‘exaggerated entitlement’ which ‘provides a belief system that asserts that the group has a right to own what they wish to have’.¹⁶ One example for such a belief system is the Serbian collective trauma of the Battle of Kosovo in the 14th century that ‘has metamorphosed throughout the centuries from idealizing victimhood to a fervent nationalism’.¹⁷ Moreover, different peacebuilding processes have shown that various groups struggle for the recognition of their suffering and want to be part of the officially acknowledged victims.¹⁸ The extension of the current victim-centred TJ framework to more and more contexts also suggests the possible attractiveness of victimhood to justify specific claims, get a position of ‘moral superiority’ or gain international support.¹⁹

On the side of the ‘heroes’ entitlement, despite being a well-known phenomenon, much less has been written with regard to peacebuilding and justice. According to Flescher, ‘heroes’ can be understood as moral agents ‘who characteristically go beyond the call of duty’ in contexts which ‘would prevent most people from doing so’.²⁰ Others stress the necessity that heroes ‘have given his or her life’.²¹ These differentiations open up the field for different forms of heroism and sometimes blur the boundaries between heroism and victimhood as, for example,

¹⁴ Ibid., 239 (own emphasis).

¹⁵ Noor et al., ‘When Suffering begets Suffering’, 356-7.

¹⁶ Vamic Volkan, ‘Chosen Trauma, the Political Ideology of Entitlement and Violence’, 2004. <http://vamikvolkan.com/Chosen-Trauma,-the-Political-Ideology-of-Entitlement-and-Violence.php> (accessed April 27, 2016).

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ McEvoy and McConnachie, ‘Victims and Transitional Justice’, 502.

¹⁹ Bouris, *Complex Political Victims*, 42; Bar-Tal et al., ‘Collective Victimhood’, 244ff.

²⁰ A. M. Flescher, *Heroes, saints and ordinary morality* (Washington DC: Georgetown University Press, 2003), 109.

²¹ J. Campbell and B. Moyers, *The Power of myth* (New York: Doubleday, 1991), 151.

in the case of martyrs.²² In post-conflict settings with a clear military victory like in Namibia and Rwanda, or where combat and military tradition are part of the society's official values, being a hero mostly means being a veteran.

Peacebuilding literature addresses the topic of veterans by pointing at the ambivalent role of war veterans' groups, being both active supporters as well as potential spoilers of peace processes.²³ Generally, veterans are mostly seen as spoilers since they accumulated resources of violence, lack other economic opportunities and capabilities and very often have a clear interest to prevent post-conflict transitional justice measures and judicial prosecution of war crimes.²⁴ There is little literature explicitly addressing the feeling of entitlement of heroes and veterans themselves. However, some works indirectly point to a moral dimension of veterans' entitlement since not caring for the veterans who fulfilled their duty is perceived as immoral and a form of betrayal.²⁵ There are only few works directly bringing together veterans, their feeling of heroism and political demands derived from both. One rare exception are Crotty and Edele, who understand veterans as an entitlement group considering themselves as 'deserving of special benefits not available to other citizens'.²⁶ Referring to Australian World War I veterans, Garton describes that the returning soldiers, driven by war propaganda, were encouraged to think that they had achieved a special citizen status above those who had not

²² Eranda Jayawickreme and Paul Di Stephano, 'How can We Study Heroism? Integrating Persons, Situations and Communities', *Political Psychology* 33(1), (2012); Laetitia Bucaille, 'Armed Resistance and Self-Esteem: Ex-Combatants in Palestine and South Africa', *International Political Sociology* 5 (2011): 52-67; on martyrdom see Joyce Pettigrew, *The Sikhs of the Punjab: Unheard Voices of State and Guerrilla Violence* (London: Zed Books, 1995); Lawther, 'Construction and Victimisation', 12.

²³ Martina Fischer, 'Dealing with the Past from the Top Down and Bottom Up – Challenges for State and Non-state Actors', in *Transitional Justice and Reconciliation: Lessons from the Balkans*, ed. Martina Fischer and Olivera Simić (New York: Routledge, 2016), 25-60.

²⁴ Fischer, 'Dealing with the Past'; Klaus Schlichte, *In the Shadow of Violence. The politics of Armed Groups* (Frankfurt: Campus Verlag, 2009).

²⁵ Bruce Scates and Melanie Oppenheimer, "'I Intend to Get Justice": The Moral Economy of Soldier Settlement', *Labour History* 106 (2014): 229-253; Benjamin Fleury-Steiner, 'Disposable Heroes: The Betrayal of African American Veterans', *Contemporary Sociology: A Journal of Reviews* 44, (2015): 198-9.

²⁶ Martin Crotty and Mark Edele, 'Total War and Entitlement: Towards a Global History of Veteran Privilege', *Australian Journal of Politics and History*, (2013): 15-32.

served. In their eyes 'it was the turn of (implicitly lesser) citizens to bear the brunt of hardship'.²⁷ Soldiers of Zarian Russia formulated their feeling for entitlement similarly:

The time will come, when [...] the grey hero will return to his native villages, settlements, and towns, and he will present a bill, a long bill, written in blood of millions of his brothers, and the workers in the rear will have to pay that bill.²⁸

A more recent example for entitlement feelings after a so called intra-state war are the veterans of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) who claim to have built 'the new Kosovo'.²⁹ These KLA veterans became 'moral entrepreneurs' and successfully claimed material rewards for their duty that are higher than any other form of social expenditure in the country.³⁰ Veterans not only seek material benefits, but also acknowledgment, esteem and social respect. Although the Palestinian Shebab fighters of the second Intifada were far less successful in mobilising material support, they are mostly comfortable with their situation as they feel that their duty is valued and recognised by the society.³¹ Another entitlement claim linked to heroism is the claim to power by victorious conflict parties. After a transition that has been initiated by the victory of one party, this demand is often grounded on the deep feeling of deserving the rule due to the role as fighter, liberator, saviour and the like. The feeling of deservingness of ex-fighters is often linked with the notion of sacrifice and the belief that the society now owes them preferential treatment, special rights or other rewards.

This brief review on the relation between peacebuilding, justice and entitlement with regard to victims and heroes shows that feelings of entitlement of both groups play an important role in

²⁷ Stephen Garton, *The Costs of War: Australians Return* (Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 64.

²⁸ Crotty and Edele, 'Total War and Entitlement', 18.

²⁹ Isabel Ströhle, 'Kosovo Liberation Army Veterans' Politics and Contentious Citizenship in Post-War Kosovo', in *Transcending Fratricide: Political Mythologies, Reconciliations, and the uncertain Future in the former Yugoslavia*, ed. Srda Pavlovic and Marko Zivkovic (Wiesbaden: Nomos, 2013).

³⁰ *Ibid.*, 251.

³¹ Bucaille, 'Armed Resistance and Self-Esteem'.

post-conflict justice concepts. To understand the underlying dynamics, the next section examines the social-psychological roots of feelings of entitlement and their consequences.

Understanding the Rules of Entitlement

Feelings of entitlement are closely related to the concept of justice and based on two important sources: psychological and social rules of entitlement.³² Psychologically, rules of entitlement follow cognitive principles working on a subconscious level. They are characterised by the principle of requiredness and deservingness that is, ‘good things happen to good people’,³³ patterns that are learned and internalised from early childhood on. The feeling of deservingness also applies in a reverse sense – similar to nemesis, meaning the deeply rooted belief that unjust or undeserved suffering in life must be compensated one day. Psychological studies highlight that the perception of ‘being wronged increases individuals’ sense of entitlement to avoid further suffering and to obtain positive outcomes for themselves’.³⁴ Generally, having suffered unfair treatment can lead to a sense of entitlement to equal the score. Thereby, the feeling of entitlement can be transferred from the ‘original’ area of performance or suffering to completely different areas.³⁵ This is in line with Volkan’s observation of ‘exaggerated entitlement’ of victimised collectives raising claims for their own group regardless of the costs and consequences for others.³⁶ Importantly, the feeling of being wronged can also emerge from a comparison with reference groups.³⁷ If, for example, after large scale political violence some societal groups are eligible for entitlements and others are not, or if the deeds or pain of some

³² Lerner, ‘Rules of Entitlement’.

³³ Ibid., 110.

³⁴ Emily Zitek et al., ‘Victim Entitlement to Behave Selfishly’, *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 98(2), (2010): 245.

³⁵ Ibid., 247.

³⁶ Volkan, ‘Chosen Trauma’.

³⁷ Ronnie Janoff-Bulman and Hillary J. Morgen, ‘Victims’ Responses to Traumatic Life Events: An Unjust World or an Uncaring World?’ *Social Justice Research* 7(1), (1994): 52.

groups are honoured but those of others are not, the neglected groups may feel victimised and develop a sense of entitlement from this feeling.

This phenomenon links to the second source of entitlement, namely the socially determined rules of entitlement. Social rules of entitlement can be described as the prevailing normative context of a given situation. It is the social structure which provides ‘more or less explicit normative prescriptions defining who is entitled to what from whom’.³⁸ The social structure also determines the institutional norms which shape ‘status-role-based expectations’.³⁹ The social position of the father, the boss, the king etc. contains qua its accepted social function (providing food and security etc.) some entitlements and conventionally accepted ways of applying them. Since the norms of a society also build the ground for the ‘decisions’ which victims and heroes are legitimately entitled and which are not, entitlements will only be accepted when the demands of the relevant groups find resonance in the broader society.

The social structure consists of more than the political system; it refers to different layers and levels of political culture, collective frames and social patterns of behaviour – all entangled with global, domestic and local norms and practices. It can be described as the ‘political’ and ‘discursive opportunity structure’. These concepts stem from research on collective mobilisation and describe the structural limitations and opportunities for a successful political mobilisation within a given society and time.⁴⁰ Within post-conflict settings and political transitions, victims and heroes place their entitlement claims within the existing social rules or, if necessary, try to challenge and re-shape them.

At the beginning of every entitlement process is the psychological feeling of deserving compensation or reward for one’s fate as hero or victim. If these feelings lead to collective

³⁸ Lerner, ‘Rules of Entitlement’, 108.

³⁹ Ibid., 109.

⁴⁰ Sidney Tarrow, *Power in Movement* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011); Myra Marx Ferree et al., *Shaping Abortion Discourse: Democracy and the Public Sphere in Germany and the United States* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002).

mobilisation and are voiced publicly, we speak of an entitlement claim. Once these claims are met by state and society,⁴¹ we speak of heroes' or victims' entitlement. Political and moral economies of entitlement emerge when there is a politicisation of heroism and victimhood, leading to a competition between entitlement claims and resulting in 'the favouring of certain groups of victims [and heroes] over another'.⁴² The entitlement of particular hero or victim groups may raise expectations of other groups that consider themselves to be in a comparable position and start demanding entitlements, too. Likewise, some claims for entitlement will probably never be successful since they do not resonate with social structure and/ or are actively excluded by political rules and power structures. Such experience of non-recognition can lead to a (perceived) exclusion by the rejected groups.

Entitlement and Social Justice: Prospects for Peace

As previously mentioned, feelings of entitlement are intrinsically linked to feelings of deservingness and, therefore, justice. Taking a look at post-conflict settings like in Rwanda and Namibia, it might seem logical at first glance that the groups having ended the violence and liberated the country earn a reward and that victimised groups get compensation. In post-conflict and transitional contexts, however, justice must be thought of not only individually but also socially. As stated elsewhere, social justice emphasises equal rights and opportunities of all citizens.⁴³ The claims of heroes and victims do not necessarily correlate with the perceptions of social justice and adequacy of non-involved citizens.

Generally, entitlement based on both heroism and victimhood is linked to a certain status, which can only be claimed by particular groups. As illustrated above, the logic of deservingness has

⁴¹ In international(ised) contexts the target audience of entitlement claims is often the international community.

⁴² Heidy Rombouts, *Victim Organisations and the Politics of Reparation: a case study on Rwanda* (Antwerp: Intersentia, 2004), 87.

⁴³ Rawls, *Theory of Justice*, 53.

psychological roots and, under certain circumstances, exclusive entitlements based on status can be considered as just within the broader society. Philosopher David Miller, for example, explicitly identified reward based on merit and performance ('desert') as an important element of social justice.⁴⁴ According to him, it is the appropriate balance of equality, need and desert that leads to social justice. Meritocratic systems, however, tend to process social closure. Once the favourable context changes and the entitlements based on past merit are no longer judged as fair by the broader society, the rewarded elite develops mechanism to protect and defend their power and privileges. The consequence is a society in which rights and access to state resources depend on belonging and group membership rather than on standards of fairness and equality.⁴⁵

Instead, democratic societies are built on the idea of citizenship. This means that citizens are related through the fact of being members of a political community, each having a set of rights and obligations. In democratic political entities the

primary distributive principle of citizenship association is equality [...]: each person enjoys the same set of liberties and rights [...]. Someone deprived of this equal enjoyment is a "second-class citizen".⁴⁶

Post-conflict peacebuilding efforts are confronted with a dilemma when it comes to entitlement and social justice and their prospects for peace. The idea of reward as basis for social justice proves to be at best a double-edged sword as meritocratic thinking has, in principle, antidemocratic elements. However, the idea of redress is also Janus-faced. On the one hand, victims' entitlement can be seen as compensation and a positive discrimination to create social cohesion and equity. On the other hand, researchers found that victimhood as moral claim can be exploited for particular political and economic ends. In this sense, status-based rewards

⁴⁴ David Miller, *Principles of Social Justice* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999), 31.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 200; Rawls, *Theory of Justice*, 91.

⁴⁶ Miller, *Social Justice*, 30.

contradict the idea of equality of opportunities and fair allocation of community resources. Following this argument, justice only based on the feeling of deservingness – be it as redress or reward – is not an adequate source for building a just post-transition society. It is exclusive and - if it is not complemented with other inclusive measures qua citizenship - it tends to produce economies of entitlement, setting in motion circles of new claims.

Evidence from the Field: Heroes' and Victims' Entitlement in Rwanda and Namibia

Large-scale political violence tends to produce two categories being specifically prone to entitlements: heroes and victims. The paper argues that in the aftermath of political violence, moral and political economies of entitlement evolve around these moral claims. This section illustrates how different (moral) economies of entitlement have formed in post-conflict Rwanda and Namibia. It demonstrates how, due to their exclusive character, the economies of entitlement tend to create new injustices instead of contributing to social justice and peace.

Victim Competition in Post-genocide Rwanda

In Rwanda, the former rebel movement Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) that stopped the genocide has been in power since its victory in 1994. Since 2000, the former rebel commander Paul Kagame is president of the country.⁴⁷ The positive in-group of the Rwandan society is constructed around heroes and victims.⁴⁸ Till today, the RPF feels entitled to rule due to its role as saviour that ended the genocide and overthrew a genocidal government. Whereas this claim was early recognised internationally, it had to gain acceptance inside Rwanda at the beginning. On the occasion of the annual Heroes Day on 1 February and the Liberation Day on 4 July, the

⁴⁷ Kagame was officially elected during the first presidential elections in 2003, and re-elected in 2010.

⁴⁸ The Constitution of the Republic of Rwanda, *Official Gazette n° Special*, December 14, 2015, Preamble.

government honours the soldiers who fought for freedom. Although there are different recognised forms of heroism, the commemoration focuses on the fallen RPF soldiers and currently only they can become first category heroes.⁴⁹

To what extent the RPF considered itself the deserving ruler became apparent when critical voices began to rise. ‘Claiming a virtual monopoly of virtue’,⁵⁰ the government reacts especially tetchy when confronted with human rights violations and war crimes that have been allegedly committed by RPF troops during and after the war and genocide. This represents a real threat to the entitlement to power entirely based on the narrative of deservingness as saviour and is aggressively confronted through a strategy of blaming: ‘I don’t think anybody out there in the media, UN, human rights organisations has any moral right whatsoever to label any accusation against me or against Rwanda’.⁵¹ The government mixes elements of heroes’ and victims’ entitlement claims to maintain power. Externally, the government plays what is sometimes called the ‘genocide card’. When international actors point out the poor human rights record of the country, the government rejects the critique in blaming the international community for its failure in 1994. Here, the RFP hero-based claim to rule is supported by entitlement claims stemming from a sense of collective victimhood demanding empathy, support and help from the international community. The latter claim is expressed by the official narrative according to which the ‘West’ is responsible for the tragic fate of Rwanda. According to that narrative, Rwandans have always lived in harmony and unity under the king until the colonial powers arrived. Likewise, there haven’t been any conflicts between Hutu and Tutsi in precolonial Rwanda until the colonial powers invented them as racial groups, incorporated them in their system of indirect rule and, thus, sowed the seed of ethnic hatred within the Rwandan nation. The current critique from international actors who push for deeper democratisation is

⁴⁹ ‘Heroes: Cabinet to Vet 14 Nominees’, *New Times Rwanda*, January 31, 2015; Danielle Beswick, ‘The Risks of African Military Capacity Building: Lessons from Rwanda’, *African Affairs* 113(451), (2014): 226.

⁵⁰ Helen Hintjens, ‘Post-Genocide Identity Politics in Rwanda’, *Ethnic Studies* 8(1), (2008): 26.

⁵¹ ‘Lunch with the FT: Paul Kagame’, *Financial Times*, May 13, 2011.

perceived as remake of colonial interference.⁵² Both claims provide moral authority and the RPF-government uses this moral high ground to stay in power and mobilise continued support in the country.

As Rwanda is a post-genocide society, victims are the central category next to the liberation heroes. The leitmotiv of Rwanda's post-genocide politics is 'Never Again' and honouring and remembering the victims and survivors of the genocide is one of its central pillars. However, identifying the victims eligible for reparation and commemoration is highly politicised and contested. Generally speaking, the victims of the 1994 genocide are unquestioningly identified as the Tutsi and the so-called 'moderate Hutu'. Their suffering is officially recognised so that they are entitled to reparations and symbolic acknowledgment in national memorials and annual commemoration ceremonies. However, these official politics leave many Rwandans upset, as the genocidal killings from April to July 1994 were not the only political violence in Rwanda. There has also been violence in the context of the preceding civil war between the government and the RPF, which was already fought under ethnic signs, and in the aftermath of the genocide. Beside the Tutsi, the violence left many victims, such as 'ordinary' war victims and Hutu that were killed 'simply on the basis of a denunciation'⁵³ or in acts of revenge. These victims, however, have no place in official memory so they feel abandoned and unjustly treated.⁵⁴ They are deprived of moral recognition and material support. This uniform denial and neglect of the suffering of parts of the population leads to bitterness and victim competition.⁵⁵ Many Hutu

⁵² Paul Kagame, President of the Republic of Rwanda, Speech on Liberation Day, July 4, 2009, Kigali/ Rwanda.

⁵³ Commission on Human Rights, *Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Rwanda*, E/CN.4/1995/7 (28 June 1994), § 49.

⁵⁴ Anne-Marie Brandstetter, 'Contested Pasts: The Politics of Remembrance in Post-Genocide Rwanda', *Ortelius Lecture 6*, Antwerp, Netherlands Institute for Advanced Study in the Humanities and Social Sciences (2010); Claudine Vidal, 'La commémoration du génocide au Rwanda', *Cahier d'études africaines* 175 (2004).

⁵⁵ Susanne Buckley-Zistel, 'Between Pragmatism, Coercion and Fear: Chosen Amnesia after the Rwandan Genocide', in *Memory and Political Change*, ed. Aleida Assmann and Linda Shortt (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012); Jennie E. Burnet, 'The Injustice of Local Justice: Truth, Reconciliation, and Revenge in Rwanda', *Genocide Studies and Prevention* 3(2), (2008): 173-93; Human Rights Watch, *Justice Compromised: The Legacy of Rwanda's community-based Gacaca Courts* (2012).

feel like second-class citizens due to an assumed collective guilt.⁵⁶ In this way, acknowledgment of victimhood is the only alternative that frees from guilt, provides first-class citizenship and moral superiority. Not surprisingly, Hutu exiles around the globe are mobilising around their self-perceived collective victimhood and frame their demands in the language of human rights, suffering and international justice. Articles in diaspora media are, for example, headed ‘Rwanda: The ordeal of Hutu’⁵⁷ and one prominent diaspora organisation declares the ‘fight against impunity and injustice’ as its mission.⁵⁸ They claim acknowledgment of their suffering during the war and feel continually victimised by the denial of the RPF to investigate its crimes and by the unwillingness of the international community to recognise these incidents as serious international crimes. By pointing to victimhood caused by the RPF, the political opposition activates a moral economy of entitlement to question the entitlement of the RPF government. Diaspora groups in Brussels organise annual ‘inclusive’ commemorations and declare that ‘deniers are those who negate the existence of non-Tutsi victims of the genocide committed in Rwanda’.⁵⁹ In 2011, the diaspora in Belgium for example launched ‘Mpore – memory and justice’, a project ‘aiming at commemorating *all* victims of the horrors that have been committed in the Great Lakes region during the last twenty years’.⁶⁰ In 2014, on the 20th anniversary of the genocide, they initiated the twitter campaign ‘#I, too, Am A Victim’ where Rwandans and supporters around the globe shared their personal experiences of victimisation ranging from having survived massacres to being deprived of having a mother country.⁶¹ This

⁵⁶ Pacifique Kabalisa et al., ‘Le programme “Ndi Umunyarwanda”: Une opportunité d’expression vraie pour les Rwandais ?’, (Statement by the ‘Group for an Inter-Rwandan Dialogue’ of Pax Christi Wallonie-Bruxelles, 2013), 2.

⁵⁷ ‘Rwanda: Le calvaire des Hutu’, *Jambonews.net*, Mai 9, 2013, <http://www.jambonews.net/actualites/20130509-rwanda-le-calvaire-des-hutu-2/> (accessed August 14, 2015).

⁵⁸ CLIIR, ‘Notre mission et nos objectifs’, <http://www.cliir.org/le-cliir/notre-mission-et-nos-objectifs.html> (accessed April 1, 2014).

⁵⁹ CLIIR, ‘Commémoration de toutes les victimes du génocide Rwandais’, April 6, 2016, <http://www.cliir.org/detail/06avril-le-droit-et-le-devoir-de-commemorer-toutes-les-victimes-declaration.html> (accessed January 15, 2017).

⁶⁰ ‘Jambo ASBL lance Mpore.org’, *Jambonews.net*, November 25, 2011, <http://www.jambonews.net/actualites/20110225-jambo-asbl-lance-mpore-org/> (accessed August 14, 2015, own emphasis).

⁶¹ <https://twitter.com/hashtag/itooamavictim> (accessed October 8, 2016).

competition over the deservingness of victim status makes victimhood a scarce but attractive resource that can be used for political and economic ends.

Although victimhood experienced a continuing ‘upgrading’⁶² through the international community, in case of conflicting interests, the Rwandan heroes and their project of national development is valued higher than the interests of victims. Genocide victims have to put aside their interests when they are not in line with government ideas. On several occasions, the relations between RPF and victim organisations have reportedly been tense and ‘victim organisations and the rescapé community is well aware of their low status with the government’.⁶³ When tensions between IBUKA, the biggest victim organisation, and the government rose, the leadership of the organisation was replaced by more government-friendly personalities in 2000. Since then, IBUKA and the government have been working together and the organisation did not protest publicly against government initiatives which were not well received by the survivor community as, for example, the early release of approximately 25.000 prisoners in 2003.⁶⁴

In the Rwandan context, one finds elements of entitlement claims grounded in both, feelings of reward and redress. The government, for example, feels that it deserves to rule due to its performance as saviour of the country and defends this right with reference to its past merit and moral high ground. The globalised field of TJ and peacebuilding, however, makes victimhood and entitlement as redress an important resource in the Rwandan context. Through a global opportunity structure favouring human rights, victims got ‘the sacral aura that before was the mark of heroes’.⁶⁵ An international community generally sympathetic towards trauma and suffering invites to politicise and activate victim identity in order to get entitled. In the

⁶² John Torpey, ‘Victims and Citizens: The Discourse of Reparation(s) at the Dawn of the New Millennium’, in De Feyter et al., *Out of the Ashes*, 41.

⁶³ Rombouts, *Victim Organisations*, 369.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, 370.

⁶⁵ Bernhard Giesen, *Triumph and Trauma* (Boulder: Paradigm Publishers, 2004), 7.

internationalised Rwandan context, victimhood became 'profitable', bringing along moral authority, political legitimacy or possible economic benefits in form of allocations by, for example, aid agencies. We can see the attractiveness of the victim status when looking at the attempts of various Rwandan groups to get recognition for their particular suffering – ending up in a circle of bitter competition.

Heroes and Self-entitlement in Post-independence Namibia

Although having a legacy of political violence in form of a protracted war of liberation, the Namibian government has never implemented any official mechanism to deal with past violence. Instead, Namibia's government opted for a 'silent reconciliation'⁶⁶ through a blanket amnesty for all crimes committed during the war of liberation. Therefore, economies of entitlement in Namibia focus on the role of the hero and the moral claim of having liberated the country.

Already before independence in 1990, the leaders of the national liberation movement SWAPO⁶⁷ claimed power for the possible post-independence period. In an interview with the German newspaper 'Der Spiegel' in 1978, Sam Nujoma, then SWAPO president and later first president of Namibia, announced that SWAPO is entitled to rule after independence and expressed his unwillingness to share the power, since they fought for and consequently deserved it.⁶⁸ This feeling of entitlement already affected the movement's internal structure long before independence as holding a position in SWAPO was regarded 'as an inherited right'⁶⁹ by the old

⁶⁶ Godwin Kornes, 'Negotiating 'silent reconciliation' The long struggle for transitional justice in Namibia', *Working Papers of the Department of Anthropology and African Studies of the Johannes Gutenberg University Mainz* (2013).

⁶⁷ The spelling 'SWAPO' in capital letters indicates the liberation movement while the spelling 'Swapo' refers to the Swapo Party after independence.

⁶⁸ Sam Nujoma, 'Wir werden die Macht nicht teilen', *Der Spiegel*, July 31, 1978.

⁶⁹ John S. Saul and Colin Leys, 'SWAPO: The Politics of Exile', in *Namibia's Liberation Struggle. The Two-Edged Sword*, ed. Colin Leys and John S. Saul (London: James Currey, 1995), 44.

guard. In relations to other parties and movements, democracy was refused by constantly emphasising SWAPO's role 'as the party of liberation'.⁷⁰ Swapo's attempt to rewrite Namibia's past as a 'patriotic history'⁷¹ in which it 'sought to ground the nation's identity as well as its own political legitimacy in the liberation war'⁷² has to be seen in this light. According to Swapo's own Election Manifesto from 1994, 'it was SWAPO that was exiled, it was SWAPO-members who were imprisoned and it was SWAPO-members who sacrificed their lives for the liberation of the country'.⁷³ Other parties were either discredited as 'boers',⁷⁴ 'puppets' and collaborators with the colonial regime or, if they came from Swapo's own ranks, as 'traitors'. Furthermore, oppositional members of parliament were often asked 'where were you while we fought in the trenches'⁷⁵ – a discursive tactic to blame these people for inaction and, as a consequence, deny them the right to participation.

While the political elite – taking positions in the new government – was quickly entitled as liberators and heroes, the actual fighters of the Peoples Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN) had a harder stand. Although the leadership promised during the struggle 'that after independence each and every one would be accommodated and would find employment'⁷⁶ 66% of PLAN-fighters returned home 'without skills or opportunities' after independence.⁷⁷ This discrepancy between the official rhetoric of the heroic struggle for independence on the one hand and the neglect of the actual veterans on the other led to widespread grievances and even

⁷⁰ Roger Southall, *Liberation Movements in Power. Party & State in Southern Africa* (Pietermaritzburg: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press, 2013), 124.

⁷¹ Christopher Saunders, 'History and the Armed Struggle: From Anti-Colonial Propaganda to "Patriotic History"?'', in *Transitions in Namibia: Which Changes for Whom?*, ed. Henning Melber (Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 2007), 13-29.

⁷² Henning Melber, *Understanding Namibia. The Trials for Independence* (London: Hurst and Company, 2014), 26.

⁷³ Swapo Election Manifesto, *Better Opportunities for all Namibian* (Windhoek, 1994), 5.

⁷⁴ Referring to the South African settlers.

⁷⁵ Reggie Diergaard (Director of Operations, 'Democratic Turnhalle Alliance'), author's interview, February 22, 2016, Windhoek/ Namibia.

⁷⁶ Jeremy McMullin, *Ex-Combatants and the Post-Conflict State. Challenges for Reintegration* (New York: Pannave Books, 2013), 93.

⁷⁷ William A. Lindeke, 'Transformation, Hegemony and Reconciliation in the Education and Security Sector in Namibia's Transition from Prolonged Collective Violence', in *The Long Aftermath of War – Reconciliation and Transformation in Namibia*, ed. Andre Du Pisani, Reinhart Kössler, and William A. Lindeke (Freiburg: Freiburger Beiträge zur Entwicklungspolitik, 2010), 88.

violence. During the late 1990s, the veterans took to the streets on several occasions to protest and to express their perception of unfair and unjust treatment. The protests even culminated in hostage-taking of government officials. Instead of being punished, many were integrated into the Namibian Defence Force (NDF) or the police since the government saw them as a potential threat to national security and stability.

Furthermore, a Ministry for Veterans Affairs was founded to provide 'social and economic support to veterans'.⁷⁸ With the 2008 Veterans Act, the Namibian government tried to limit the group entitled to veteran's pensions by defining a veteran as

any person who- (a) was a member of the liberation forces; (b) consistently and persistently participated or engaged in any political, diplomatic or under-ground activity in furtherance of the liberation struggle; or (c) owing to his or her participation in the liberation struggle was convicted, whether in Namibia or elsewhere.⁷⁹

This intentionally left out all members of the so called South West African Territorial Forces (SWATF) who were conscripted since the 1980s and who fought 'on the wrong side', as well as everybody who defected SWAPO. In 2009, the circle of entitled persons widened again, including former 'detainees'. These former SWAPO-members were accused of being spies and detained by SWAPO. Although perceiving themselves as SWAPO and freedom fighters, these detainees had been branded as traitors and subsequently socially and materially marginalized. In 2009, however, due to constant lobbying by the organisation 'Breaking the Wall of Silence', they were recognized as 'veterans of the liberation struggle'⁸⁰ and thereby entitled to a pension. This policy shift became possible after Reinhard Gertze, former SWAPO-member and then president of 'Breaking the Wall of Silence', became Member of Parliament as a representative

⁷⁸ Ministry of Veterans Affairs, <http://www.mova.gov.na> (accessed June 4, 2016).

⁷⁹ Office of the Prime Minister, 'Promulgation of Veterans Act', *Government Gazette of the Republic of Namibia* (4051), (2008): 5.

⁸⁰ Justine Hunter, 'Dealing with the Past in Namibia. Getting the Balance Right Between Justice and Sustainable Peace?', In Du Pisani, Kössler and Lindeke, *The Long Aftermath of War*, 403-4.

of the Congress of Democrats – a Swapo breakaway party. This gave the detainees the necessary representation and bargaining power.

Twenty years after independence, the former SWATF-fighters, having mostly been unable to get a job, mobilised for being recognized as veterans and being entitled for a pension, too. As former conscripts, they also perceived themselves as having served the country, therefore deserving acknowledgement and pensions as well. However, the Namibian and the South African governments were reluctant to pay pensions for them. According to the permanent Secretary of the Ministry for Veterans Affairs, ‘SWAPO has forgiven but not forgotten’ what they have done. Since ‘you cannot turn around history’⁸¹, a veteran’s pension never came and will never come into consideration. This rejection of entitlement claims not only means an economic misery for many of the claimants, but also social exclusion. Since they are denied the honourable official veteran status, they are collectively branded as perpetrators and are, instead, socially marginalised.

Another group began to mobilise under the banner of the ‘Children of the Liberation Struggle’⁸² and formed the ‘Namibian Exile Kids Association’ (Neka) in 2008. These so-called ‘struggle kids’, now mostly in their early 30s, were born in exile during the liberation struggle and raised by SWAPO in refugee camps, or they grew up abroad in other socialist countries and returned in 1989. While ‘Neka’ was originally intended to collect information about the ‘struggle kids’ and document their fate, some of them began to perceive themselves as socially disadvantaged group and started to claim entitlements; especially after former Prime Minister Nahas Angula labelled them as the true heirs of Namibian independence and Lieutenant General Martin Shalli described them as a special ‘category of people deserving a special treatment’ in 2012.⁸³ Today, over 10.000 descendants of former SWAPO-fighters in exile are recorded. While the majority

⁸¹ Hopelong U. Ipinge (Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Veteran Affairs), author’s interview, March 15, 2016. Windhoek/Namibia.

⁸² ‘“The Children of the Liberation Struggle”: A Story from Tanzania’, *The Namibian*, April 18, 2013.

⁸³ ‘“Special children” receive mixed reaction’, *The Namibian*, June 28, 2012.

of them, especially those having been raised abroad, are quite well-educated and quickly found jobs, others trace their current misery back to missing opportunities in exile and developed feelings of unjust treatment and social neglect. The relative deprivation of some of the ‘kids’ and the entitlement culture of Swapo amalgamate into a perceived victimhood, based on which they demand preferential government employment. So far, roughly 1.000 ‘struggle kids’ were integrated in the national Police and the Defence Forces and some 500 others were housed at a Swapo-farm outside the capital.⁸⁴ As mentioned above, the entitlement claims of the ‘kids’ found support from within the party itself. This support can be understood as the logical consequence of the official narrative of the national independence rooted in the heroic armed struggle. In this sense, the ‘struggle kids’ and the former fighters currently in power share common interests – to uphold the narrative and their special role in it and to claim a preferential treatment today.

Interestingly, the justification for their entitlement claim not only builds on the argument of being a victim but also on the argument of being a descendant of heroes of the liberation struggle. This became evident when hundreds of the ‘kids’ used the ceremonies on ‘Cassinga Day’ – the official remembrance day for the victims of a South African attack on a SWAPO camp in Angola – to protest and demand government jobs. While the government jobs are seen as compensation for the hardship the ‘struggle kids’ had in exile and after independence, the claim is framed as a deserving right stemming from their family ties to national heroes. As one of them explains: ‘We were treated badly when we arrived in Namibia. Our parents are [buried] at Cassinga, while we are here suffering’.⁸⁵ According to the newspaper ‘The Namibian’, President Geingob recently approved the transfer of N\$11,3 million - roughly 830.000 USD - from the Social Security Commission, meant to benefit economically disadvantaged and jobless

⁸⁴ “‘Struggle kids’ moved to Brakwater’, *The Namibian*, December 14, 2015.

⁸⁵ ‘Struggle kids feel left out of Cassinga Day commemorations’, *The Namibian*, May 4, 2016.

Namibians, to a special fund to support the ‘struggle kids’.⁸⁶ These developments are signs of the steady expansion of feelings of entitlement, probably unleashing new claims of descendants of non-exiled Namibian liberation activists who also had to suffer hardship and repression inside the country.

In contrast, victims’ entitlement is no issue in Namibia. Even if there is the ‘Breaking the Walls of Silence’ movement, there have been no investigations till today. Instead, all crimes committed during the liberation struggle are covered by a blanket amnesty. It is very unlikely that this will ever change since high-ranking Swapo-members promised to take their knowledge about these incidences into their graves.⁸⁷ Nevertheless, as mentioned above, the ‘detainees’ have been entitled to veterans’ pensions since 2009 – a government move that indirectly recognises that they did not betray SWAPO. However, an official acquittal of the accusation of having been a spy would be very important for most detainees to reconcile with their families and the broader society.

Namibia represents an example of an economy of entitlement that strongly bases on the feeling of merit and performance. The fighters for independence felt rightfully entitled to rule the country and to earn key positions in government because of their past deeds. This heroic political culture and the difficult economic conditions in Namibia put in motion an economy of heroes’ entitlement so that both, the current government and different social groups, constantly refer to their role in the liberation struggle and the hero-status in order to get access to resources and acknowledgment. Claims to any form of entitlement have centred on past merit, thereby constantly widening the circle of entitlement feelings. This becomes clear when looking at the situation of the ‘detainees’ whose claims to victimhood failed but who found entitlement as

⁸⁶ ‘Geingob signs off N\$11m from SSC’, *The Namibian*, October 21, 2016.

⁸⁷ Pauline Dempers (Coordinator, ‘Breaking the Wall of Silence’), author’s interview, February 25, 2016, Windhoek/Namibia.

former war veterans; or the ‘struggle kids’ who try to knit endless generational ties to the liberation heroes to legitimise their claim for preferential treatment.

Conclusion

The examples of Rwanda and Namibia have shown that in the aftermath of political violence, feelings of entitlement are an important concept for understanding the demands and the behaviour of particular groups. Particularly experiences of heroism and victimhood seem to produce mind-sets that pave the way for moral and political economies of entitlement with either victims or heroes becoming first-class citizens. Whereas Namibia’s national context of a ‘victors’ transition’ fuelled extensive forms of heroes’ entitlement, the context of internationalised peacebuilding provided the discursive space for a moral economy closely linked to victimhood in Rwanda.

While criticising such economies of entitlement, we want to emphasise that we do not think that entitlement per se is problematic. If it compensates loss or balances inequalities, it can be an important contribution to justice. However, we problematize the increasing extension of exclusive entitlements of particular identity-groups after violent pasts. The trend to entitle specific groups ‘reflects a [...] challenge to the idea of citizenship as an expectation of equal treatment’.⁸⁸ For many post-conflict countries, however, equal citizenship represents a worthwhile goal and an important step for social peace and cohesion. The Rwandan case clearly demonstrates the necessity of citizenship as a shared social identity beyond ethnic cleavages.

The article attempts to show that exclusive ‘hero’ entitlements on the basis of merit are a common phenomenon in settings of victorious transitions or ‘victors’ peace’. The cases suggest that such entitlements tend to create a morally, politically, and economically superior group that

⁸⁸ Torpey, ‘Victims and Citizens’, 35.

negates democratic principles as it feels determined to rule. The cases of Rwanda and Namibia could be complemented by several other liberation movements in power, like the African National Congress in South Africa or the Zimbabwean African National Union, none of which spawned the particularly democratic governments and societies.

Favouring entitlement claims of some groups over those of others and entitlements that are only accessible for specific parts of society, fuels feelings of injustice and not of fairness and justice. Against the background of the current ‘memory boom’ in transitional contexts favouring past-oriented identities, this presents a serious danger. Scholars of the field of memory studies stated that ‘identities can now be forged [...] through an embrace of erstwhile victimization of one’s own group’,⁸⁹ or, in the case of heroes, through the feeling of deservingness by sacrifice. Both can lead to a ‘sense of separateness from the larger polity and an embrace of “imagined communities” [with specific rights] below the level of citizenry’.⁹⁰ When – as demonstrated in the examples – such imagined communities of victims and heroes are provided with entitlements and therefore gain a special status within state and society, this may lead to the creation of a political entity with some perceiving themselves as second-class citizens.

Post-conflict programmes aiming at breaking with cycles of past violence should be aware of these dynamics. This also means looking beyond the dichotomy of perpetrators and victims which currently determines the thinking about past-related injustices and politics of dealing with the past. While it is of substantial importance to bring the perpetrators to justice and to compensate the victims, peacebuilding should not lose sight of other societal groups and their agendas in the process of transition. If not, there is the risk that structural inequalities and hierarchies will already be incorporated in the emerging new societal order.

⁸⁹ Torpey, ‘Victims and Citizens’, 44.

⁹⁰ Ibid., 43 (authors’ amendment).

12.7.) Paper V: Bayer, Markus; Bethke, Felix S. and Daniel Lambach (2016):
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The democratic dividend of nonviolent resistance

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Abstract

Research suggests that nonviolent resistance (NVR) campaigns are more successful in deposing dictators than armed rebellions. However, ousting dictators is only the first step in the process of democratization. After deposing an autocratic regime, societies enter a transition phase where they must learn to consolidate the gains of democracy and bargain about the new rules of the democratic regime. But even if free, fair, and competitive elections are held, indicating a successful transition to democratic rule, uncertainty about its stability remains salient. In the period that follows, either democracy survives and proves to be resilient, or an autocratic backslide occurs. In this article, we analyze the effect of NVR campaigns on the survival of democratic regimes. Building on the literature on modes of transitions and nonviolent resistance, we argue that those democratic regimes that come into being as a result of a NVR campaign are less prone to democratic breakdown. The main mechanism which produces this effect is that the organizational culture of NVR campaigns spills over to the subsequent democratic regime fostering conditions favorable for democratic survival. We test the effect of NVR campaigns on democratic regime survival using survival analysis and propensity score matching. The results show that democratic regimes that experience NVR during the transition phase survive substantially longer than regimes without NVR.

Keywords

democracy, democratization, nonviolent resistance, political violence, social movements

Introduction

Since the so-called Arab Spring, there has been a growing interest in the causes and consequences of nonviolent resistance (NVR) campaigns. These campaigns mainly involve unarmed people, using a combination of peaceful tactics such as strikes, sit-ins, and demonstrations to achieve political goals. Resistance campaigns associated with the Arab Spring considerably differed with regard to their use of violence. Whereas the Jasmine Revolution in Tunisia and the Egypt Revolution are usually considered as predominantly nonviolent, the initially nonviolent protests in Libya and Syria soon evolved into armed rebellions, which led to thousands of deaths. In terms of successful transition to democracy, the record of these cases is mixed. Uprisings in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya led to the ousting of long-term dictators, but at the time of writing, the Syrian uprising did not manage to depose

the regime of Bashar al-Assad.¹ Furthermore, ousting dictators is only the first step in the process of democratization. After deposing an autocratic regime, societies enter a transition phase where they must consolidate the gains of democracy and bargain about the new rules of the democratic regime. But even if free, fair, and competitive elections are held, which indicate a successful transition to democratic rule, uncertainty about its stability remains salient. In the period that follows, either democracy survives and proves to be resilient, or an autocratic backslide occurs.

¹ For a more detailed description of these cases see Chenoweth & Stephan (2014) and Nepstad (2013).

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In this article, we build on the literature on modes of transitions (e.g. Munck & Leff, 1997) and on the literature on nonviolent resistance (e.g. Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011) to analyze the effect of NVR campaigns on the survival of democratic regimes. Whereas the former assumes that the characteristics of the transition process can have long-lasting effects on the stability of the resulting democracy, the latter argues specifically that the recourse to nonviolent means is superior in challenging autocratic regimes and increases the odds of democratic consolidation down the line. We argue that those democratic regimes that come into being as a result of a NVR campaign are less prone to democratic breakdown compared with democracies that were the result of violent resistance or those which were installed without any kind of resistance movement. The main mechanism which produces this effect is that the organizational culture of a NVR campaign spills over to the subsequent democratic regime fostering conditions favorable for democratic survival.

Our article advances the literature on NVR and democratization in three ways. First, previous studies either analyzed how democracy changed after a resistance campaign occurred or looked at the outcome of different transition modes without considering how resistance campaigns influenced transitions to democracy. By contrast, our approach is based on a systematic data collection that links resistance campaigns to events of democratic transitions. Second, in contrast to previous studies that look at a snapshot of the level of democracy, we analyze the whole process of democratic survival. Third, we use multiple statistical methods (i.e. survival analysis and propensity score matching) to account for confounding factors and alternative measurement of key variables to ensure the robustness of our findings.

The results of our empirical analysis indicate that democratic regimes that experienced NVR during the transition phase survive substantially longer than regimes without this characteristic. NVR during the transition process reduces the hazard of democratic breakdown by more than 50%. This research may inform the policy debate about whether it is useful for external actors to support resistance campaigns. As noted by Chenoweth, 'The nature of the struggle [for democratic change] can often give us a good idea of what the country will be like after the new regime takes shape' (Chenoweth, 2011).

The rest of the article is organized as follows. In the second section, we review related literature on democratic consolidation and nonviolent resistance campaigns. We build on these previous studies to develop our own theoretical approach to the relationship between

NVR campaigns and democratic survival, which we describe in the third section. In the following section we describe our research design for the empirical analysis. Results are presented, and then in the final section we discuss the findings of the empirical analysis and highlight areas for further research.

Related literature on nonviolent resistance and democratic survival

Although the study of NVR has a long tradition – its intellectual history can be traced back to Etienne de la Boétie (1975 [1574]) in the 16th century – its explicit link to democratization is relatively new. The academic debate about NVR was initially dominated by Gene Sharp (1973) and focused on resistance against foreign occupation (Sharp, 1959). Historical events such as the (partly nonviolent) struggle against apartheid in South Africa (Zunes, 1999), the first Palestinian Intifada (1987–93; Crow, Grant & Ibrahim, 1990; Stephan, 2003) and the mostly peaceful transitions in Eastern Europe after the end of the Cold War (Hadjar, 2003) spurred a rethinking of resistance, not only against foreign occupation, but also against authoritarian rule.

The empirical investigation of the effects of NVR on democratization was initially confined to descriptive and historical case studies. Practical lessons learned from these cases were compiled as guidelines for implementing NVR strategies (Helvey, 2004) or bringing down dictators (Sharp, 2008). The first large-scale comparative study was conducted by Ackerman & Karatnycky (2005) who analyzed 67 nonviolent and violent democratic transitions using data from Freedom House. They find that countries improved in terms of political rights and civil liberties more substantially after nonviolent transitions compared with violent transitions. Johnstad (2010) replicated the study of Ackerman and Karatnycky using different data to measure the level of democracy. His results support those of Ackerman and Karatnycky, showing that 'nonviolent mass action' more often leads to an increase in the level of democracy than violent strategies (Johnstad, 2010: 475). However, in their empirical analysis neither Ackerman & Karatnycky (2005) nor Johnstad (2010) account for confounding factors that influence both the form of transition and the level of democracy after the transition. Furthermore, these studies only analyzed the level of democracy at a fixed point in time after the transition or looked at whether democracy persisted for a given time period.

Chenoweth and colleagues (Chenoweth & Lewis, 2013; Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011) have made an

important contribution that systematizes research on NVR and provides more accurate data. The authors compiled detailed data on 323 resistance campaigns in their Non-Violent and Violent Conflict Outcome (NAVCO) database. The main result of their analysis is that nonviolent campaigns have a higher probability of success than other forms of resistance. Campaign success refers to whether the campaign is able to achieve its goals, which often include regime change and transition to democracy (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011: 39–40). Using NAVCO data, Celestino & Gleditsch (2013) also found that NVR campaigns increase the odds of transition towards democracy in autocratic regimes.

The main mechanism for the success of NVR campaigns is that these campaigns attract a greater number of participants than any form of violent resistance. As argued by Chenoweth & Stephan (2011), NVR campaigns are more attractive to large segments of the population compared with violent forms of resistance, due to their less extreme means. They offer ‘an opportunity to people to participate with varying levels of commitment and risk tolerance’ (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011: 37). Related to the question of democratic survival, Chenoweth & Stephan (2011: 213) found that NVR campaigns have a significant and positive impact on the probability of a democratic regime persisting five years after the end of conflict. However, Chenoweth & Stephan (2011) only compared the level of democracy in a country after nonviolent and violent campaigns, respectively. Thus, they do not link resistance campaigns with events of democratic transitions and correspondingly also do not consider those cases where democratization was initiated without the influence of a resistance campaign. Furthermore, similar to the empirical studies by Ackerman & Karatnycky (2005) and Johnstad (2010), their analysis only captures the presence of democracy during a short time period after the end of a campaign and therefore does not address the whole process of democratic survival.

As this review of NVR literature shows, previous research largely ignored the long-term repercussions of resistance campaigns. We suggest that research on democratic consolidation provides material to systematically address this issue. There is a growing literature in comparative politics seeking to explain the quality and durability of democratic regimes. While research on the quality of democracies essentially compares existing empirical manifestations of democratic regimes to an ideal type of democracy (e.g. Diamond & Morlino, 2004; O’Donnell, Cullel & Iazzetta, 2004), studies on the durability of democracy address the question of how

newly established democracies manage to survive (e.g. Linz & Stepan, 1978; Svoblik, 2008; Ulfelder, 2010).

In this article, we focus on explaining the durability of democratic regimes, which we refer to as democratic survival. Conversely, this also refers to explanations of how democracies break down. In general, scholars distinguish three forms of democratic breakdown: (1) executive coup, where a democratically elected government or a faction of the government extends its rule via unconstitutional means and begins to govern autocratically, (2) coup d’état, where actors from within the armed forces depose the elected government, and (3) popular rebellion, where the elected government is toppled by the masses (e.g. Ulfelder, 2010: 3). The main mechanisms that lead to these kinds of democratic breakdown are the erosion of the regime’s democratic legitimacy (Diamond, 1999) and a decreasing commitment of the political elite towards the maintenance of democracy (Linz & Stepan, 1978).

Regarding the causes of democratic breakdown and survival, previous empirical studies focused on socio-economic factors such as economic conditions (Aleman & Yang, 2011; Boix & Stokes, 2003; Svoblik, 2008) and redistribution (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2006; Boix, 2003; Reenock, Bernhard & Sobek, 2007) as well as institutional arrangements such as presidential or parliamentary systems of government (Limongi et al., 1996; Stepan & Skach, 1993) and the legacy of the preceding autocratic regime (Cheibub, 2007). In addition, researchers stressed the importance of political instability in the past (Maoz, 1996: 202; Sing, 2010: 445), demographic factors like the overall size of the population (e.g. Gurses, 2011: 173) and urbanization (Przeworski & Limongi, 1997: 158), and the geographic diffusion and spillover of democratic ideas and norms (Boix, 2011; Gleditsch & Ward, 2006).

Notably, research on democratic survival also emphasizes the relevance of the mode of transition. The transition process is interpreted as a founding moment of a democratic regime which strongly influences its prospects of survival (e.g. Guo & Stradiotto, 2010; Munck & Leff, 1997). This argument draws on the idea of path dependence, suggesting that different modes of transition ‘set a society on a path that shapes its subsequent political development’ (Munck & Leff, 1997: 343). However, there is only limited empirical evidence on whether different modes of transitions actually influence the survival rates of democratic regimes in a path-dependent way. The only quantitative study on this subject is by Guo & Stradiotto (2010). Using data on 57 regimes, the authors distinguish four different transition modes: conversion, cooperation, collapse, and foreign

intervention. The results of their empirical analysis suggest that a cooperative transition process increases both the quality (measured in terms of the Polity score) and the duration of the democratic successor regime. However, their categorization of transition modes does not account for how resistance campaigns influenced the transition process. Although analytically the literature on modes of transition highlights the relevance of opposition movements and resistance campaigns (e.g. Munck & Leff, 1997), empirical studies that systematically measure this phenomenon are lacking.

This review of related literature suggests that there is promising theoretical and empirical work on the consequences of NVR for democratization as well as the relationship between modes of transition and democratic survival. However, no study explicitly links the two phenomena and systematically tests with comprehensive data whether a transition that was achieved by the means of a NVR campaign is beneficial for the long-term survival of a newly established democracy.

Theoretical approach: How nonviolent resistance benefits democratic survival

We conceptualize the relationship between NVR campaigns and democratic survival as a path-dependent process. Our unit of analysis is the political regime, which refers to the system of government in a state. As specified by Skaaning, a political regime is an ‘institutionalized set of fundamental formal and informal rules structuring the interaction in the political power center (horizontal relation) and its relation with the broader society (vertical relation)’ (Skaaning, 2006: 13). Since our main interest is the survival of democratic regimes, we use a categorical classification of regime types, only distinguishing between democratic and autocratic regimes. Our definition of democracy is drawn from Ulfelder (2010) who elaborates on the theoretical work of Robert Dahl (1971). Ulfelder defines democracy as a regime type where ‘citizens freely and fairly choose and routinely hold accountable their rulers’ (Ulfelder, 2010: 4). He distinguishes four dimensions that characterize a democratic regime, namely representation, contestation, freedom, and inclusion. Representation is present when elected officials rule the regime. Contestation means that elections are fair and competitive. The dimension of freedom relates to the respect for civil liberties and inclusion means that citizens are able to participate in government (Ulfelder, 2010: 4–5). We consider all regimes meeting these criteria as democratic regimes and those not meeting them as autocratic regimes.

When switching between these two categories, regimes experience a transition event, that is, a change of regime type. The transition phase is a period of radical change, where the design of the political order is being renegotiated. With regard to the direction of the transition events, we consider two different forms. First, democratic transition refers to the transition from an autocratic regime to a democratic regime. As described by Siaroff (2008: 274–277), these democratic transitions may come about in different ways. The ruling elite of an autocratic regime may intentionally decide to democratize (e.g. when a military government returns to the barracks), or the process of democratization is initiated by negotiation between the autocratic regime and opposition groups. Autocratic regimes may also collapse because of external or internal pressure, for instance if a dictator goes into exile because of mass protest, losing a civil war or when foreign powers conquer an autocratically ruled state and impose a democratic system. Second, events of democratic breakdown or autocratic backslide refer to the transition from a democratic regime to an autocratic one. The focus of our analysis is on the survival of democracy after a democratic transition occurred, that is, how long a regime remains a democracy and avoids democratic breakdown.

For the definition of resistance campaigns we follow Chenoweth & Lewis (2013: 417), who specify resistance campaigns as an enduring mass-level phenomenon where multiple actors pursue a common political goal. To qualify as a resistance campaign, a movement has to organize at least two different collective action events with at least 1,000 participants within one year. To distinguish between ‘primarily’ violent and ‘primarily’ nonviolent resistance campaigns Chenoweth and Lewis refer to the participants in the campaigns and the means of their resistance. They code a resistance campaign as nonviolent if participants are mostly unarmed civilians who have not directly threatened or injured the physical welfare of their political opponents. All other resistance campaigns that do not meet these criteria are defined as violent (Chenoweth & Lewis, 2013: 418). With regard to the influence of resistance campaigns on democratic transitions, we assume that either democracy came about without the influence of a resistance campaign or that democratic transitions were the results of either violent or nonviolent resistance campaigns, respectively. We assume that transitions that were shaped by NVR systematically differ from transitions that were shaped by violent resistance or occurred without the influence of a resistance campaign.

To specify the causal relationship between transitions shaped by NVR and democratic survival, we build on the concepts of path dependence and critical junctures. Political transitions can be seen as critical junctures, which inaugurate a new path for the political system of a society. Seeing the transition phase as a critical juncture implies that societies are in a historical situation where the choices of political actors will have a lasting impact (Capoccia & Kelemen, 2007: 341; Soifer, 2012: 1572–1573). As suggested by the literature on modes of transition (Guo & Stradiotto, 2010; Munck & Leff, 1997), decisions taken by political actors in the course of the transition process shape future political development. NVR campaigns, by shaping the mode of transition, set the subsequent democratic regime on a path which is favorable for democratic survival.

To express our understanding of path dependence in formal terms, we follow Page (2006: 88) and consider democratic survival to be a dynamic process, which is observable at discrete time periods (i.e. years). These time periods are indexed by integers, $t = 0, 1, 2, 3$ (...). At each time period the dynamic process produces an outcome, which can take two different values, D or A . Either democracy survives (D) or a democratic breakdown occurs (A). The initial outcome at t_0 , the starting point of the process, is D , representing the transition event. After the transition event, we observe a sequence of D s until the outcome is A (e.g. $D_{t1}, D_{t2}, D_{t3}, A_{t4}$), which indicates democratic breakdown. Whether we observe D or A in each time interval is determined by a probability distribution, that is, a random variable that takes value D with probability p and value A with probability $q = 1-p$. We argue that if NVR shapes the transition process, it increases the probability of generating the outcome D in each of the subsequent time periods. Thus, we consider two different paths, one with NVR and one without NVR. Let p_{nvr} denote the probability of observing D on the first path where the transition process was shaped by NVR and p_{nonnvr} denote the probability of observing D on the second path where the transition process was not shaped by NVR. We contend that at each time period of the survival process $p_{nvr} > p_{nonnvr}$. Correspondingly, we assume that NVR increases the odds of survival relative to the counterfactual scenario, that is, the odds of survival for the same regime without NVR during the transition process.

We argue that democratic regimes that evolved out of a NVR campaign establish certain constraints and incentives that prevent actors from straying from the democratic path. These constraints and incentives are best expressed in terms of a civic political culture that spills

over from the NVR campaign to the subsequent democratic regime. Civic culture has been demonstrated to have a stabilizing effect on the resilience of democracy (Almond & Verba, 1963; Inglehart, 1997). As noted by Chenoweth & Ulfelder (2015: 3), ‘civil resistance relies on mass mobilization, diverse participation, and opponent loyalty shifts as its primary mechanisms of change’. Therefore, these campaigns develop a culture of compromise to balance their constituent interests. Due to the relative lack of internal sanctioning mechanisms, NVR campaigns constantly need to reaffirm their legitimacy and will be responsive towards signs of discontent among the rank-and-file. This particular organizational culture of NVR movements helps to shape a democratic political culture that values compromise and cooperation after transition (Della Porta & Diani, 2006: 21; Sharp, 2005: 428). We expect NVR campaigns to induce spillover effects on the subsequent regime through three channels: (1) involvement of campaign participants in democratic politics, (2) avoiding political polarization and divisive struggles over the past, and (3) fostering an active civil society.

The first mechanism is that veterans of the NVR movement may get directly involved in politics. Once voted into parliament, or when assuming governmental or administrative posts, they can use these offices to advance their ideals. For example Jerzy Regulski, an activist in the Polish Solidarity movement, became minister of local government reform in the first government after the democratic transition in 1989. Once in power, Regulski advanced major decentralization reforms, which were inspired by Solidarity’s idea of ‘the self-governing republic’. The reforms empowered local councils and communities and led to democratic municipal elections in May 1990 (Regulski, 2003). On an organizational level, a NVR movement can spawn political parties or watchdog institutions like NGOs or media to monitor the state of democracy from the outside (Della Porta & Diani, 2006: 138). This involvement represents a constraint for political elites in that any divergence from the new democratic path would encounter resistance, both within state institutions and from among society. For instance, after leading the protests that contributed to the ousting of Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic in 2000, several leaders of the *Otpor* movement were elected to parliament or took advisory positions in the new government. At the same time, *Otpor* acted as a civil society watchdog of the political class before reorganizing itself as a political party (Joksic & Spoerri, 2011).

The second mechanism refers to how nonviolent transitions induce a culture of cooperation and compromise

and thereby reduce political polarization and power struggles. We assume that NVR-induced transitions produce more inclusive regimes where all relevant groups, even previous elites, are included in the democratic process as long as they commit to the norms and rules of democracy. This reduces the risk of what Goldstone & Ulfelder (2004: 15) refer to as ‘factionalized political competition’ where the political process is dominated by a winner-takes-all logic. One of the most important causes of polarization is the struggle over the past (Gibson, 2002). A NVR movement will not be faced with demands to investigate crimes against humanity perpetrated by its members during the transition phase. Violent revolutions, by contrast, are confronted with the dilemma of whether to put war criminals on trial, thereby antagonizing the movement’s own members, or whether to forego attempts at reconciliation, thus undermining its legitimacy as a representative of the people.

For instance, Namibia’s democratic consolidation process still suffers from the violence conducted during the struggle for independence. After independence in 1990 the SWAPO-government enacted a blanket amnesty covering all crimes during the liberation struggle, including detaining, torturing, and killing in SWAPO prison camps during the so called ‘spy hunt’ between 1983 and 1989. The so called ‘detainees’ from these camps formed the core of the political opposition challenging the SWAPO-created image of the heroic independence struggle still forming the basis of SWAPO’s legitimacy (Metsola, 2010). In the wake of the National Assembly and presidential elections in 2009 the opposition party Rally for Democracy and Progress (RDP) contained several ex-detainees who demanded recognition of these crimes. SWAPO responded to this challenge with serious authoritarian tendencies that underline the burden of its violent legacy. SWAPO members used hate speech and propaganda, denouncing members of the RDP as traitors. Moreover, they restricted the campaigning of the RDP in SWAPO strongholds and initiated attacks on RDP members, rallies, and party centers (Melber, 2010).

A nonviolent transition also avoids several dysfunctions that armed movements bequeath to democratic regimes. First, armed groups are in a de facto veto position relative to civilian political actors after transition (Cunningham, 2011). Second, the former armed groups may see themselves as a revolutionary vanguard that deserves certain prerogatives in the democratic system they brought about. Embaló (2012) recounts how the role of the guerillas in the independence struggle of Guinea-Bissau continues to have a lasting effect by

legitimizing a privileged position of the military in national politics. Third, armed actors accrue conflict-specific skills, which are useless in a peacetime economy. Another example, highlighting the dysfunctions that violent resistance can engender, is the Zimbabwean party ZANU-PF and its leader, Robert Mugabe, who constantly refer to their role in the struggle for independence to legitimize their privileged access to political and economic power (Levitsky & Way, 2012: 874–876). Through keeping ‘violence specialists’ from the levers of power, NVR avoids destabilizing pressure by imposing negative externalities on the threat or use of force in domestic politics.

The third mechanism relates to the positive effect of NVR on the role of civil society in the subsequent democratic regime. NVR publicizes techniques of non-violence and spreads ideals of mass mobilization, which will facilitate peaceful resistance in the future (Sharp, 2008: 53). It also leaves behind an active civil society which will be prepared to defend democracy against signs of erosion – as Tarrow puts it, ‘activism begets future activism’ (Tarrow, 1998: 165). After having ousted President Marcos in the so called ‘people’s power revolution’ – a nonviolent mass movement including one million protesters in 1986 – Philippine civil society was successfully mobilized again in 2001 against President Estrada. Estrada was confronted with corruption allegations and demands to step down. After Estrada rejected the demands, a broad coalition under the leadership of the Catholic Church mobilized up to three million people for a second people’s power movement forcing the president out of office (Landé, 2001). Similarly, Ekiert & Kubik (2001) describe how Solidarity in Poland fostered a ‘rebellious civil society’, whose main features were an increase in the number of civil society organizations and a continuation of protest activity against government policies. After the transition to democracy, protests, organized by civil society organizations, became an institutionalized method for articulating grievances and thereby advanced democratic consolidation in Poland. In sum, these arguments lead us to the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis: Democratic regimes that experienced NVR during the transition phase survive longer than democratic regimes that did not experience NVR.

Research design

Using data from Ulfelder (2012) on political regimes and data on resistance campaigns provided by Chenoweth & Lewis (2013), we created a dataset that combines




Figure 1. Kaplan-Meier survivor function

information on the duration of democratic regimes with information on the presence of NVR during the transition of these regimes. Our dataset consists of democratic regimes that succeeded an autocratic regime between 1955 and 2006. Whereas Ulfelder's dataset on political regimes covers the time period 1955–2010, the dataset by Chenoweth & Lewis (2013) accounts for the period 1945–2006. Accordingly, we only included regimes that began after the year 1955 and our end year for the measurement of regime survival is 2010. Furthermore, we only included regimes which originated before the year 2007 and thus could be coded with regard to the presence of NVR campaigns.

Dependent variable

The dependent variable in our analysis is the survival of democratic regimes, which corresponds to the duration until a democratic breakdown occurred. The respective information on democratic regime survival and the timing of democratic breakdowns is taken from Ulfelder (2012). Our sample consists of 112 democratic regimes out of which 69 experienced a democratic breakdown. Accordingly, 43 regimes are right-censored, which means that they did not experience a failure event until the end of the year 2010.² Figure 1 describes the survival time of all regimes in our sample, using a Kaplan-Meier survivor function.

² Furthermore, among the 43 regimes Yugoslavia (Serbia) and Czechoslovakia experienced another form of censoring. These countries ceased to exist and therefore dropped from the sample although no democratic breakdown occurred.

Figure 1 shows the proportion of regimes that survived at each time period. As shown here, many regimes fail within the first ten years after the transition. This is illustrated by the steep slope of the survival line during this time period. As highlighted by the dashed line, the median survival time is 11 years. Thereafter, the survival function flattens which means that the remaining regimes in the sample fail at a lower rate.

Independent variable

Our hypothesis states that this survival function is substantially affected by the presence of a NVR campaign during the transition phase of these regimes. To measure the existence of a NVR campaign during the transition phase of a democratic regime, we use data from Chenoweth & Lewis (2013). We coded a campaign as relevant for the transition process if it was present in the year of the transition or the year before the transition and aimed at political change of the incumbent autocratic regime.³ We distinguish between (1) regimes whose transition process was induced without a resistance campaign (NoR), (2) regimes whose transition process was induced by a violent resistance campaign (VR), and (3) regimes whose transition process was induced by a nonviolent resistance campaign (NVR). Table I describes the frequency distribution of these categories.

Table I shows that few regimes in our sample experienced violent resistance campaigns during their transition phase. More than half of the sample consists of regimes that came about without any resistance campaign and about one-third of the cases represent transitions from autocracy to democracy that were induced by a NVR campaign. Figure 2 shows the results of a Kaplan-Meier estimation of survivor functions for these three groups of regimes.

³ More specifically, we considered campaigns where NAVCO coded the campaign goal as 'regime change', 'significant institutional reform', or 'policy change'. Correspondingly, we did not consider campaigns where the goal was coded as 'territorial secession', 'greater autonomy', or 'anti-occupation'. Furthermore, to ensure the validity of this coding, we inspected for each case if the form of resistance was violent or nonviolent and also checked whether there was indeed a causal link between the resistance campaign and the transition process. To this end, three coders independently evaluated each case using historical and case-specific information. This procedure identified six cases where either the campaign was not relevant for the transition process or the predominant method of resistance coded in the NAVCO dataset appeared questionable. These six cases entered a problem set, which was then evaluated by all authors in order to arrive at the final coding. See the Online appendix for further details.

Table I. Categorical coding of resistance campaigns during transitions

	Frequency	Percentage
No resistance campaign	66	58.93
Violent resistance campaign	9	8.03
Nonviolent resistance campaign	37	33.04
Total	112	100




Figure 2. Kaplan-Meier survivor functions by campaign type

The logic of Kaplan-Meier estimation matches our theoretical model of path dependence; survival rates for different groups represent the respective path that was chosen. As shown in Figure 2, the survival functions for regimes without resistance campaigns and regimes with violent resistance campaigns are very similar. Furthermore, the lines cross which indicates that there is no significant difference in regime duration between these two groups. However, regimes that experienced NVR during the transition phase survive longer than regimes without this attribute. Regimes with violent resistance campaigns involved in the transition process have a median survival rate of just five years. In regimes where the transition process was not influenced by a resistance campaign the median survival rate is nine years. By contrast the median survival rate of regimes where transition was induced by NVR is 47 years. This result already indicates that NVR during the transition phase substantially increases the survival time of the subsequent democratic regime. For the statistical analysis that follows, we use a binary coding of the presence of NVR during the transition phase, that is, the variable *NVR*, which takes the value 1 if the transition process was induced by a nonviolent resistance campaign and 0 otherwise.

Additional covariates

In order to address the problem of confounding, that is, characteristics which presumably influence the onset and success of NVR campaigns and at the same time affect subsequent democratic regime survival, we include several additional covariates in our statistical models. We focus on those covariates that were identified as most important in previous studies on democratic survival and resistance campaigns. Specifically, we rely on the results of a sensitivity analysis conducted by Gassebner, Lamla & Vreeland (2012) who identified GDP per capita, neighboring democracies, previous instability, and a military legacy as the most robust predictors of democratic survival. Additionally, we add measures of total population and urbanization, because they are featured in numerous studies on the onset of NVR campaigns and democratic survival (Aleman & Yang, 2011; Chenoweth & Lewis, 2013; Gurses, 2011; Maeda, 2016). Furthermore, population size and urbanization also relate to the potential number of participants in resistance campaigns, which is one important mechanism for the success of these campaigns, as the results by Chenoweth & Stephan (2011) suggest.

To account for economic conditions, we use measures of the level of *GDP* per capita. The dataset we use to measure these variables is an updated version of the Expanded Trade and GDP Data compiled by Gleditsch (2002). The variable *Military legacy* indicates whether a military regime was present before the transition to democracy. Using data from Geddes, Wright & Frantz (2014) we created a binary indicator, which takes the value 1 when the respective democratic regime is preceded by a military regime and the value 0 otherwise. To measure *Previous instability* we use a variable counting the number of previous regime changes that occurred in the country since independence. The data are taken from Ulfelder (2012). To measure how widespread democracy is in the geographic environment of a regime, we use the variable *Neighboring democracies*, which is simply the proportion of states that are democratic in the region.⁴ *Total population* refers to the overall size of the population. *Urbanization* is defined as the percentage of the population living in cities with more than 100,000 inhabitants. For the measurement of both variables we use the National Material Capabilities dataset version 4.0 (Singer, 1987). The variables *GDP* per capita, and *Total population* are transformed using natural logarithms.

⁴ To code this variable, we used the regime data from Ulfelder (2012) in combination with a geographic classification of world regions from Teorell et al. (2015).

Estimation of treatment effects

To test our hypothesis, we rely on two alternative estimation procedures. First, we use Cox proportional hazards models with time-varying covariates to estimate how the hazard rate of democratic breakdown depends on the presence of a NVR campaign during the transition phase of a regime. To address problems of selection bias and model dependence, we adopt a second estimation procedure. Using propensity score matching, we pre-process the data in order to match regimes where democratization was induced by NVR with similar regimes where NVR was not relevant. Afterwards, we analyze the matched data with Kaplan-Meier survival curves and Cox proportional hazards models.

Empirical analysis

Cox proportional hazards models with time-varying covariates

For the estimation of models with multiple covariates, we use the Cox proportional hazards estimator, which can be described by the following equation:

$$\log h_i(t) = \log h_0(t) + \beta_1 X_{1i} + \beta_2 X_{2it} + \dots + \beta_N X_N$$

The expression $h(t)$ denotes the hazard rate. The expression $h_0(t)$ represents the baseline hazard which is defined as the hazard for the occurrence of democratic breakdown if all covariates are zero. The values of the covariates are denoted as X_1, X_2, \dots, X_N and the expressions $\beta_1, \beta_2, \dots, \beta_N$ stand for the coefficients which are meant to be estimated by the model. Whereas X_i represents the values of a time-fixed variable (e.g. our measures of NVR campaigns) for a specific regime included in the sample (denoted by i), X_{it} represents the values of a time-varying variable for a regime included in the sample at a specific point in time (denoted by it). The hazard of regime failure thus depends on the values of time-fixed and time-varying covariates. Therefore, we use a pooled data structure. Regime histories are broken down into discrete time intervals (regime-years) which are treated as different observations. Whereas our key independent variable measuring the presence of NVR campaigns during the transition period is time-constant, some of the control variables vary across time periods and thus warrant this data structure. Regarding the confounding variables described above, *GDP per capita*, *Total population*, *Urbanization*, and *Neighboring democracies* are measured as time-varying covariates.⁵ Results from the Cox model are reported in Table II.

⁵ All time-varying covariates are lagged one year to address problems of reverse causality. Summary statistics of all variables are described in the Online appendix.

Table II. Results from the Cox model

	(1)	(2)
GDP p.c. _(log, t-1)	0.682* (0.101)	0.706* (0.111)
Military legacy	1.669† (0.437)	1.533 (0.418)
Previous instability	1.018 (0.080)	0.990 (0.083)
Neighboring democracies _(t-1)	0.982* (0.006)	0.984* (0.006)
Total population _(log, t-1)	0.891 (0.079)	0.922 (0.089)
Urbanization _(t-1)	0.100† (0.130)	0.120 (0.161)
NVR		0.457* (0.116)
Regimes	112	112
Breakdowns	69	69
Observations	1,448	1,448

Hazard ratios; robust standard errors clustered by regime in parentheses; * $p < 0.05$, † $p < 0.1$.

The results from Model 2 show that *NVR* reduces the hazard of democratic breakdown by more than 50%. Among the control variables only *GDP* per capita and neighboring democracies are statistically significant. Increasing the *GDP* per capita by one logarithmic unit leads to an approximate 30% reduction in the hazard rate. Thus, in states with a high level of economic wealth democratic breakdown is less likely. The results for the variable *Neighboring democracies* indicate that each additional percentage point of democratic regimes in the region reduces the hazard of democratic breakdown by almost 2%.⁶

Matching estimates

With matching methods the goal is to compile a balanced sample where regimes with a transition process induced by NVR and regimes without this condition are as similar as possible. The basic idea is that if two subjects are sufficiently similar on observed covariates but differ in terms of treatment assignment, then the selection process of treatment assignment is 'as good as random' (Sekhon, 2009: 495). We use a procedure proposed by Austin (2014), which combines propensity score

⁶ The results of multiple tests indicate that the proportional hazard assumption is not violated for any of the covariates in Model 2 in Table II. We also tested the effect of NVR on democratic survival with a Cox model with shared country/regime frailties. The detailed results of these tests are reported in the Online appendix.

matching with survival analysis to estimate treatment effects. The approach is implemented in three steps. First, we estimate the propensity score, that is, the probability of NVR induced transitions, using a set of observed covariates. The propensity score essentially summarizes all observed factors that influence the probability of treatment assignment (Guo & Fraser, 2010: 132–135). Second, we match cases on the propensity score to create a new dataset consisting of matched pairs of treated and control cases. In order to ensure the robustness of the results, we follow the suggestion by Austin (2014: 1245–1247) to apply multiple different matching schemes, namely (1) greedy nearest neighbor matching, (2) greedy nearest neighbor matching within a caliper, and (3) optimal pair matching. Third, we analyze the effect of NVR on democratic survival using the matched samples.

For the estimation of the propensity score model, we use all covariates shown in Model 2 in Table II. A crucial requirement of propensity score matching is that covariates were measured before treatment assignment and are not influenced by treatment assignment (Stuart, 2010: 5). Therefore, we use a cross-sectional data structure. We analyze spells of democratic survival as a whole and estimate the propensity score of NVR induced transitions with covariates measured one year before the transition process.⁷

Using the estimated propensity score, we created three matched samples. The greedy matching scheme created a sample of 74 observations, that is, 37 treated subjects (NVR) were paired with 37 untreated subjects (no NVR). With the caliper matching scheme, we ended up with a sample of 68 observations. Three treated subjects were dropped because no suitable match was found among the untreated subjects given the restriction imposed by the caliper size. Finally, the optimal matching scheme created a matched sample of 74 observations consisting of all 37 treated and 37 untreated subjects.

Next, we evaluate how well the different matching schemes achieve the goal of creating a balanced sample of treated and untreated subjects with regard to the confounding variables. Figure 3 shows standardized differences between the means of regimes with and without NVR induced transitions for each covariate.⁸




Figure 3. Standardized differences for different matching schemes

As shown in Figure 3, all matching schemes substantially reduced bias among the covariates, when compared to the full sample. The mean bias among covariates in terms of standardized differences is 25.5% in the full sample. With the different matching procedures the average bias was reduced to 6.1% in the greedy sample, 4.1% in the caliper sample, and 6.3% in the sample created with the optimal matching scheme.

In Figure 4 we report Kaplan-Meier survival curves for the three matched samples. As shown, across all samples, regimes with NVR induced transitions on average survive longer than regimes without NVR. This is also confirmed by a log rank test stratified on matched pairs.

The dashed line indicates the treated group of subjects that experienced NVR during the transition phase. The solid line indicates untreated subjects that did not experience NVR.

Next, we estimated Cox proportional hazards models for the three matched samples. In order to account for the matched structure of the data, we use robust standard errors clustered by matched pairs. The results are reported in Table III.

As shown in Table III, the effect of NVR on democratic survival is statistically significant across all samples.⁹ However, the magnitude of the effect differs across the different matching schemes. With the greedy matching scheme the reduction of the hazard rate is estimated as 54%. When caliper restriction is applied the estimated effect is a 50% reduction of the hazard rate and when using the sample created by optimal matching the

⁷ In the Online appendix we provide a detailed description of the matching procedures and summary statistics for the cross-sectional data.

⁸ Additional balancing statistics are described in the Online appendix.

⁹ In the Online appendix, we also report the results of Cox models for the three matched samples that also adjust for time-varying covariates measured after the transition.




Figure 4. Kaplan-Meier survival curves by NVR presence for different samples

The dashed line indicates the treated group of subjects that experienced NVR during the transition phase. The solid line indicates untreated subjects that did not experience NVR.

Table III. Results from the Cox model using matched samples

	<i>Greedy matching</i>	<i>Caliper matching</i>	<i>Optimal matching</i>
NVR	0.456* (0.131)	0.505* (0.146)	0.425* (0.139)
Regimes	74	68	74
Breakdowns	38	36	39

Hazard ratios; robust standard errors clustered by matched pairs in parentheses; * $p < 0.05$.

reduction is almost 58%. However, in all samples the hazard ratio indicates a substantial and significant reduction in the risk of democratic breakdown.¹⁰

Robustness of the results

In order to test the robustness of our findings, we replicated the whole analysis described above using the Automatic Breakdown and Regime Transitions dataset

¹⁰ Because we only match one treated case to one control case the estimated treatment effects reported in Table III should be considered as average treatment effect on the treated. This means the estimated effects only relate to the population of treated subjects and not to the whole population of cases. For all models reported in Table III, we tested the proportional hazard assumption. The results indicate that in the optimal sample the proportional hazard assumption is potentially violated, that is, the effect of NVR may be time-dependent. Accordingly, we re-estimated the model with NVR as time-dependent covariate. The results show that NVR significantly reduces the hazard of democratic breakdown but the effect may be diminishing over time. The detailed results are reported in the Online appendix.

compiled by Geddes, Wright & Frantz (2014) as an alternative measure of democratic transition and survival. The main finding – that NVR induced transitions are beneficial for democratic survival – is robust to the use of alternative measurement. However, our tests indicate that with the Geddes, Wright & Frantz data the effect of NVR on democratic survival diminishes over time.¹¹

Discussion and conclusion

In summary, the results of the empirical analysis support the hypothesis that democratic transitions that were induced by NVR campaigns are beneficial for the survival of democracy. The results of Cox models with panel data and time-varying covariates suggest that there is a substantial and statistically significant positive effect of NVR campaigns on the duration of democratic regimes. Similar results are obtained when using different samples of matched pairs, which were balanced for multiple potential confounding variables. Therefore, we conclude that there appears to be a systematic pattern in the survival of democratic regimes which relates to the presence or absence of NVR campaigns during the transition phase. Accordingly, our results support claims that the mode of transition influences the prospects of democratic consolidation, even in the long term. Or, in other words, there is something that we call a ‘democratic dividend of nonviolent resistance’. This also lends support to the notion of political transitions as critical

¹¹ The detailed results of all robustness tests are reported in the Online appendix.

junctures that lead to new, path-dependent trajectories in a country's political development. NVR campaigns increase the odds of a political system not only transitioning to democracy but also of keeping this democracy alive for a longer period.

These results have important practical implications for democracy promotion. External support for elite-led top-down transitions and support for violent groups to oust dictators appear to be ineffective strategies for long-term democratic consolidation. Sustainable democracy promotion requires support from a broad base of civil society actors, which demand and bolster democratic institutions and rights in a peaceful way.

As always, some caveats are in order. First, some of our tests indicate the potential that the effect of NVR on democratic survival is diminishing over time. Thus, while our results generally show that NVR has a long-lasting positive effect on democratic survival, they are inconclusive regarding the question of how long exactly the effect lasts. Second, we only analyzed regimes which became democratic after 1955, thereby excluding long-term democracies that experienced their transition prior to that year (e.g. France and USA). Therefore, we do not know whether our results are affected by the omission of these long-lived democracies. Third, we have only measured the persistence of democracy, not its level of consolidation. We thus cannot interpret the results with regard to the question of whether democracies with NVR during the transition phase develop a higher quality of democracy than other democratic regimes. We understand these caveats mentioned above as directions for future research in order to substantiate our theoretical arguments further.

Replication data

The data, code, and Online appendix are available at <http://www.prio.org/jpr/datasets>.

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12.8.) Paper VI: Bayer, Markus and Jante Kursawe (2016): Gewaltfreier
Widerstand und urbaner Raum, Wissenschaft und Frieden,
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Gewaltfreier Widerstand und urbaner Raum

Markus Bayer & Janet Kursawe

Antext:

Die Bilder ähneln sich: protestierende Menschenmassen mit bunten Fahnen und Plakaten sammeln sich auf zentralen Straßen und Plätzen. Sie erheben Forderungen gegen Korruption, für ein Leben in Freiheit und Würde, für mehr Mitbestimmung oder gar das Ende eines Regimes. Straßenproteste und Demonstrationen in urbanen Zentren – zumeist Hauptstädten – haben in den letzten Jahren Kontinente übergreifend zahlreiche Länder bewegt. Dieser Beitrag skizziert, warum Städte dabei eine besondere Relevanz und Dynamik als Konfliktraum aufweisen. Anhand der drei von Sharp eingeführten Kategorien gewaltfreien Widerstandes wird deutlich, wodurch die Stadt mit ihren Spezifika diesen Modus der Konfliktaustragung begünstigt.

Die Demonstrationen auf dem Platz des Himmlischen Friedens in Peking und an der Nikolaikirche in Leipzig 1989, Proteste auf dem Platz der Befreiung in Kairo 2011, dem Taksimplatz in Istanbul 2013 oder dem Unabhängigkeitsplatz in Kiew 2013/2014 sind zu Symbolen eines globalen Phänomens geworden: des gewaltfreien Widerstands gegen korrupte und autokratische Regime. An sich ist weder das Phänomen des gewaltfreien Widerstandes noch seine spezifische symbiotische Beziehung mit Städten neu. Bereits die römischen Plebejer sollen ab dem Jahr 494 v. Chr. mehrfach das Mittel der Gewaltfreiheit eingesetzt haben. Sie streikten für mehr Rechte, indem sie die Stadt solange verließen, bis ihre Forderungen erfüllt waren. Geschichten gewaltfreien Widerstandes liegen jedoch allzu oft unter den Erinnerungen an glorreiche Tode, Märtyrer und romantisierte gewaltsame Aufstände begraben. Trotz eines Aufschwungs, den die Forschung nach den überwiegend friedlichen Transitionen in Osteuropa erfuhr und im Zuge des sog. arabischen Frühlings nochmals an Aktualitätsbezug gewann, steht eine systematische Analyse des Verhältnisses von urbanem Raum und friedlichem Widerstand bislang aus.

Die Stadt als Konfliktraum

Seit 2007 leben laut UN-Angaben erstmals in der Geschichte der Menschheit weltweit mehr Menschen in Städten als auf dem Land. Was heute bereits global gilt, wird in 2050 auch auf die vergleichsweise wenig urbanisierten Kontinente Asien und Afrika zutreffen. Dann werden in Asien 60 Prozent und auf dem afrikanischen Kontinent 56 Prozent der Bevölkerung in Städten leben. Weltweit wird der Anteil der urbanen Bevölkerung im Jahre 2050 66 Prozent betragen (United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs 2014, S. 7 und 20f.).

Damit wird auch die besondere Bedeutung städtischer Ballungsgebiete als Konfliktraum wachsen. Städte besaßen schon von Anbeginn an ambivalente Gesichter und sind in mannigfaltiger Weise mit Konflikten und Gewalt verbunden. Zunächst erwachsen sie selbst als Produkt einer konfliktreichen und oft gewaltsamen Geschichte, in der die Landbevölkerung, von ihren Äckern vertrieben, in Massen in die Städte zog. Als dicht besiedelte Räume und

Herberge einer kulturell meist sehr heterogenen Bevölkerung entwickelten sie sich sehr häufig zum Hort sozialer Konflikte und gewaltsamer Revolutionen. Als symbolische Zentren der Macht, als industrielle Produktionsstandorte oder als Verkehrsknotenpunkte wurden sie darüber hinaus häufig zu Schlachtfeldern in Kriegen und Bürgerkriegen. Falludja, Ramadi, Kobane und Aleppo sind dabei nur das Ende einer langen und traurigen Liste. Zugleich gelten Städte als Ort der technologischen und sozialen Innovation, als Zentrum kultureller Zivilisation und als Ursprung der Demokratie. Die Stadt lässt sich daher als Raum beständiger Aushandlungen und Konflikte beschreiben.

Darüber hinaus ist sie eine Ansiedlung mit baulich-symbolischen Zentrum und einer klaren Arbeitsteilung (Benevelo 2000, S. 19). Beide Aspekte sind für friedlichen Widerstand zentral. Als symbolträchtige Orte sind Städte Sitz von Regierungen und Verwaltung; sie spiegeln in ihrer Architektur in Form von Plätzen, Verwaltungsgebäuden und Monumenten die gegenwärtigen Machtverhältnisse wieder und legitimieren diese. Die in Städten herrschende Arbeitsteilung führt zu sozialer Differenzierung der Gesellschaft und zu einer erhöhten Interdependenz zwischen allen sozialen Gruppen – wer selbst keine Nahrungsmittel produziert, ist auf den lokalen Markt angewiesen, wer in der Stadt lebt, braucht städtische Versorgungsbetriebe, Krankenhäuser, Infrastruktur. All dies erhöht die Notwendigkeit für Kooperation und freiwilliger Gefolgschaft und eröffnet Räume für die Verweigerung eben jener.

Wo Macht ist, da ist auch Widerstand

Bis heute gibt es dafür trotz vieler historischer Beispiele keinen einheitlichen Begriff für das Phänomen des gewaltfreien Widerstands. Definitionsversuche beziehen sich häufig auf die Negation von Gewalt (nonviolence). Dies ist insofern problematisch als der Begriff suggeriert, dass Gewalt das eigentliche Phänomen und gewaltfreier Widerstand nur die Abwesenheit derselben. Allen Definitionsversuchen liegt die Annahme zugrunde, dass Macht eines Herrschers oder einer Regierung kein unveränderliches Quantum, sondern auf Zustimmung, den aktiven Gehorsam und das Mitwirken der Bevölkerung angewiesen ist (Sharp 1973, S. 9). Folglich zielen Akte des gewaltfreien Widerstandes auf den Entzug von Gehorsam ab. Seit Gandhi gilt ziviler Ungehorsam als kollektives Mittel in politischen Konflikten. Er grenzt sich von Gewalt und herkömmlicher, legaler Politik ab, die besonders in autoritären Staaten begrenzte Möglichkeiten der Partizipation bietet. Gewaltfreier Widerstand ist in diesem Sinne eine transgressive, deliberative und nicht institutionelle Praxis, die sich überwiegend in rechtlichen Graubereichen oder zuweilen in der Illegalität bewegt, welche bewusst auf den Einsatz physischer Gewalt gegen die politischen Gegner verzichtet (Chenoweth/Cunningham 2013, S. 273). Das kann strategisch motiviert sein oder aus prinzipieller Überzeugung resultieren.

Gewaltfreier Widerstand ist ein Massenphänomen, d.h. größere Menschenmassen müssen mobilisiert und dazu gebracht werden, einem Regime über längere Zeit die Gefolgschaft zu verweigern mit dem Ziel einen Regierungs- oder Politikwechsel zu erzwingen. Partizipation wird damit zu einem Schlüssel des Erfolgs gewaltfreier Bewegungen (Chenoweth/Ulfelder 2015, S. 3). Sie sind massentauglicher als gewaltsamer Widerstand, der eine besondere Ausbildung und Bewaffnung voraussetzt und hohe Anforderungen an die physische Fitness der

Kämpfer stellt. Friedliche Widerstandsbewegungen sind daher in der Regel deutlich heterogener (Zunes 2011, S. 402) und im Durchschnitt etwa viermal so groß wie gewaltsame Gruppen (Chenoweth 2011, S. 32). Da Sicherheitskräfte und Bürokraten des bekämpften Regimes durch gewaltfreie Bewegungen nicht bedroht werden, fällt es ihnen leichter, den Gehorsam zu verweigern und die Seiten zu wechseln (Chenoweth/Ulfelder 2015, S. 3). Dieser Punkt ist insofern für den Erfolg gewaltfreier Bewegungen von Bedeutung, als es ihnen gelingen muss, das bekämpfte Regime empfindlich zu treffen. Dazu ist es erforderlich, eine möglichst große Anzahl von Personen und Netzwerke zu mobilisieren, die über Kapazitäten (Zugang zu Ressourcen, Herrschaftswissen, etc.) verfügen, durch deren Verlust die Existenz des Regime ins Wanken gerät.

Gewaltfreier Widerstand und urbaner Raum

Viele der Mechanismen von friedlichem Widerstand können sich ausschließlich in städtischen Ballungsgebieten effektiv entfalten. Denn zum einen finden sich aufgrund der hohen Bevölkerungsdichte nur hier die benötigten Menschenmassen für eine Mobilisierung. Und zum anderen werden Proteste in (Haupt-)Städten durch die dort vorherrschenden guten Kommunikations- und Informationsmöglichkeiten in der Regel medial schnell „sichtbar“, sodass sie ohne Zeitverluste an anderen Orten im In- und Ausland zu Nachahmungen führen können. Dadurch gelingt es, Menschen in Echtzeit an verschiedenen Orten gleichzeitig zu mobilisieren.

Zu beobachten waren diese Ansteckungseffekte in atemberaubender Geschwindigkeit und geografischer Breite bei der sog. Arabellion. Sie begannen zunächst am 17. Dezember 2010 im tunesischen Sidi Bouzid mit der Selbstverbrennung des Gemüsehändlers Mohammed Bouazizi, der ein Zeichen gegen die Polizeiwillkür unter der Herrschaft Ben Alis setzen wollte. Innerhalb weniger Wochen breiteten sich landesweite Massenunruhen nicht nur in Tunesien, sondern auch in zahlreichen Ländern Nordafrikas und des Nahen Ostens aus. Sie führten unter anderem zur Absetzung und Flucht des tunesischen Herrschers Ben Ali, zum Rücktritt des ägyptischen Präsidenten Mubarak und seines Nachfolgers Mursi. In Jemen erzwangen die Massenproteste den Rücktritt Salehs nach 30-jähriger Herrschaft, während sie in Libyen und Syrien zu Bürgerkriegen führten. Darüber hinaus kam es in etlichen arabischen Ländern zu Regierungsumbildungen und politischen Reformen. Die Massenproteste wurden vorrangig von der Mittelschicht getragen, auffällig war vor allem die exponierte Rolle der Jugendlichen und Frauen.

Die hohe Protestbeteiligung der Jugendlichen und jungen Erwachsenen bei den arabischen Revolten ist exemplarisch für eine Entwicklung in zahlreichen Entwicklungs- und Schwellenländern, in denen Jugendliche zu einer quantitativ und auch qualitativ wichtigen Bevölkerungsgruppe geworden sind. Sie sind Akteure des Widerstands und der Urbanisierung gleichermaßen. In den Städten ist ihr Anteil an der hohen Arbeitslosigkeit und der Ausübung prekärer und/oder informeller Beschäftigungen immens hoch. Die Jungen sind damit von den wirtschaftlichen Folgen neoliberaler Reformen besonders dramatisch betroffen. Gleichzeitig verfügen sie über eine Medienkompetenz und englische Sprachkenntnisse wie keine andere soziale Gruppe. Sie sind deshalb häufig international vernetzt und sich ihrer marginalisierten Position sowie ungleicher Lebensbedingungen sehr stark bewusst. In den urbanen Zentren

stehen die Jungen denn auch in vorderster Reihe bei der Erfindung neuer subversiver Partizipations-, Mobilisierungs- und Protestformen gewaltfreien Widerstands. Sie sind damit Taktgeber und häufig Initiator gewaltfreier Proteste. Eine vernetzte wirtschaftliche Struktur mit organisierter Arbeit und hoher Arbeitsteilung, wie sie in modernen Großstädten vorherrschen, erleichtert zudem die Ausbreitung von Protesten auf andere soziale Gruppen, wie Gewerkschaften und Arbeitnehmerverbände, die ein hohes Mobilisierungspotenzial besitzen und folglich nur dazu gebracht werden müssen, sich an den Protesten zu beteiligen. Moderne Gesellschaften mit arbeitsteiliger, vernetzter Wirtschaft erhöhen damit die Wahrscheinlichkeit für die Entstehung gewaltfreien Widerstands.

Im Versuch gewaltfreien Widerstand begrifflich zu fassen, teilte Gene Sharp mögliche Aktionsformen in drei Kategorien ein: Protest und Überzeugung, Verweigerung und gewaltfreie Intervention (Sharp 1969). Wir zeigen im Folgenden, welche zentrale Rolle der städtische Raum dabei jeweils spielt.

Protest und Überzeugung: Symbolische Politik

Hier handelt es sich überwiegend um symbolische Gesten, die darauf abzielen, den politischen Gegner, die öffentliche Meinung oder die Opposition zu beeinflussen. Sharp zählt hierzu Protest-Techniken, wie öffentliche Reden und Briefe, Karikaturen, Flugblätter, Protestmärsche und Demonstrationen mit Zurschaustellung von Flaggen, Bannern und Symbolen, die genau genommen noch keine Akte des Widerstandes, sondern der Kommunikation sind. Sie dienen dazu, auf Missstände hinzuweisen, Forderungen zu formulieren und Aufmerksamkeit zu schaffen, um Anhänger für weitere Aktionen zu mobilisieren. Sichtbarkeit ist in dieser Phase die wichtigste Bedingung. Forderungen müssen gehört, mobilisierte Menschenmassen müssen gesehen werden. Die Stadt bietet hierfür den Raum und das Forum. Mit ihren dichten Kommunikationskanälen befördert sie einerseits die Sichtbarkeit von Protestbewegungen, erleichtert aber auch Organisation und Mobilisierung der Opposition. Ländliche, weit abgelegene Gebiete mit eingeschränktem Zugang zu Internet und Mobilfunk sowie geringer Bevölkerungsdichte und dem Mangel an internationalen Journalisten, können diese Sichtbarkeit nicht herstellen. Während der arabischen Revolten trat die Bedeutung sozialer Medien für die Mobilisierung der Protestteilnehmer besonders hervor. Zuweilen werden Revolutionen wie in Tunesien 2010/2011 oder auch die Grüne Bewegung in Iran 2009 daher auch als Twitter-Revolutionen bezeichnet.

Verweigerung

Formen der Verweigerung gehen über rein symbolische Gesten hinaus. Sharp unterteilt sie in soziale Verweigerung (wie etwa Boykott von und Rückzug aus sozialen Institutionen, Flucht in unzugängliche Gebiete oder den städtischen Untergrund), Boykotte (Bestreiken von Gütern und Leistungen), Streiks und politische Verweigerung (Boykott des politischen Systems durch Einstellen von Bürgerpflichten wie Steuerzahlung und Ablehnung des Wahlrechts). Auch für all diese Aktionsformen gilt, je sichtbarer umso wirkungsvoller. Da die meisten sozialen und politischen Verweigerungsformen nicht öffentlich sichtbar sind, sondern eher das individuelle Leben betreffen, kommt ökonomischen Boykotten und Streiks eine besondere Bedeutung für die Dynamik gewaltfreier Erhebungen zu. Ihre Sichtbarkeit wird nicht nur durch die

Konzentration in städtischen Ballungsgebieten erhöht, sondern sie können das Regime wirtschaftlich empfindlich treffen bis es ganz an Überlebensfähigkeit verliert. Ein illustratives Beispiel bieten die iranischen Bazarhändler, die während der islamischen Revolution 1978/79 landesweit wochenlang mit der Schließung des Bazars gegen das Shah-Regime protestierten. Da der Bazar eine wichtige wirtschaftliche Säule des Irans ist, schwächte dieser Streik die finanzielle Kraft der Shah-Monarchie dramatisch. Den Todesstoß erhielt diese letztlich durch den Streik der Ölarbeiter in den westiranischen Ölraffinerien, dadurch versiegte der Zufluss der wichtigen ausländischen Gelder.

Gewaltfreie Intervention

Als direkteste Form des gewaltfreien Widerstandes ist sie die größte Herausforderung für ein bestehendes Regime. Hierzu zählen jene gezielten Aktionen von Bürgern, Staatsangestellten oder externen Akteuren, die die Funktionsfähigkeit des Staates bedrohen bzw. seine Legitimität offen in Frage stellen. Die Bandbreite reicht von der Besetzung öffentlicher Räume und Plätze, über die Etablierung alternativer ökonomischer Praktiken wie Landnahme, Schaffung neuer Märkte und Transportsysteme bis hin zu politischen Interventionen wie der gezielten Überlastung staatlicher Behörden oder der Errichtung paralleler Regierungen. Diese alternativen Praktiken sind an eine kritische Masse unzufriedener Menschen gebunden. Sie entstehen oft nur dort, wo ein oppositioneller Austausch von Ideen möglich ist – vorrangig in städtischen Ballungsräumen.

Friedlicher Widerstand nutzt vorrangig symbolträchtige Mittel zur Protestverdeutlichung. Proteste werden daher auf öffentliche Plätze und Symbole der Herrschaft getragen. Sie werden zu Sammelpunkten der Opposition, zum Ausgangspunkt von Bewegungen. Werden solche Protestorte auch nach Aufforderung der Sicherheitskräfte nicht geräumt und am Ende gar dauerhaft besetzt, öffnen sie mit dem gegebenen Freiraum die Möglichkeit zu neuen gewaltfreien Interventionen. So öffneten die Proteste vor der Nikolaikirche in Leipzig etwa Freiräume zur Organisation der Opposition. Ähnlich entstand auf dem Kiewer Platz der Unabhängigkeit eine eigenständige parallele Versorgungsstruktur für die Protestteilnehmer.

The good the bad the ugly? Potentiale und Grenzen gewaltfreien Widerstandes

Nicht nur aus normativen Gründen ist Gewaltfreiheit der Gewalt vorzuziehen, auch ihre demokratisierende Langzeitwirkung spricht für friedliche Mittel des Widerstands. Denn die Revolte selbst führt zu einer Machtverteilung an Viele, statt an einzelne Wenige, da sich große Massen und damit in der Regel breite Koalitionen aus unterschiedlichen Gruppen zu gemeinsamen Aktionen zusammenfinden. Die aus diesen Bewegungen hervorgehenden Institutionen und Gesellschaften sind daher von Grunde auf pluralistischer und demokratischer als jene, die eine gewaltsame Geschichte aufweisen (Zunes 2011, S. 402).

Oft gelingt es gewaltfreien Bewegungen aber auch nicht, ihr Mobilisierungspotenzial von urbanen Räumen zu entkoppeln, zu verbreitern und zu verstetigen. Die Bilanz der arabischen Proteste zeigt zudem, dass friedlicher Widerstand von gewaltsamen Akteuren vereinnahmt und zu gewaltsamem Konfliktaustrag und Krieg führen kann.

Dass von gewaltfreiem Widerstand nicht unbedingt nur Friedfertigkeit ausgeht, zeigt sich an den Ereignissen des Tahrir-Platzes in Kairo. Die scheinbar herrschaftsfreien Räume und Plätze, die sich Bewegungen erkämpfen, sind in sich nicht immer so herrschafts- und gewaltfrei, wie sie von außen erscheinen. Die Vergewaltigungen und sexuellen Nötigungen junger Frauen durch Dutzende in einer Gruppe auftretende Männer gehörten spätestens seit Januar 2011 zu den hässlichen Geschehnissen auf dem revolutionären Tahrir-Platz. Vermeintliche Friedfertigkeit nach außen ist daher nicht immer ein Indiz für eine Friedfertigkeit nach innen.

Die Proteste auf dem Kiewer Maidan machten zudem klar: Die überwiegende Zahl der friedlich Protestierenden verzichtete meist nur aus strategischen und nicht aus prinzipiellen Gründen auf Gewalt. Gewaltfreiheit bleibt damit an ganz bestimmte situative Faktoren gebunden, sind diese nicht gegeben, setzen Protestierende nur allzu schnell Gewalt ein wie viele der ehemaligen Teilnehmer der Maidan-Proteste heute in den diversen ultra-nationalistischen Freiwilligenverbänden der Regierung.

Das volle Potential friedlicher Bewegungen zeigt sich im Gegensatz dazu meist, wenn größere Gruppen eine gesellschaftliche Transformation anstreben und dabei ein konstruktives Programm zur Veränderung der Gesellschaft verfolgen und dabei aus Überzeugung auf gewaltsame Mittel verzichten.

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12.9.) Avowals of the Co-Authors

The democratic dividend of nonviolent resistance (Bayer/ Bethke/ Lambach)

Own contribution: The paper "The democratic dividend of nonviolent resistance" was written in collaboration with PD Dr Daniel Lambach and Dr Felix S. Bethke. It was initiated by the candidate who was in charge of the evaluation of the literature review on NVR. Furthermore, the candidate single-handedly identified the research gap on the long-term effects of NVR. The survival analysis was conceptualized in cooperation of all authors. The candidate took a leading role in compiling the necessary dataset. The data analysis was conducted by Dr Felix Bethke. The own contribution of the candidate can be pictured as follows:

Paper Section	Own Contribution
• Introduction	50%
• Related Literature	80%
• Theoretical approach	30%
• Research design	30%
• Empirical Analysis	20%
• Discussion and Conclusion	30%

Both co-authors hereby confirm the contribution of the PhD candidate outlined above.



PD Dr. habil. Daniel Lambach



Dr. Felix S. Bethke.

Heroes and victims: The economies of entitlement after violent pasts (Bayer, Pabst)

Own contribution: The paper “Heroes and victims: The economies of entitlement after violent pasts” was co-authored with Andrea Pabst. Both authors yielded different expertise which complemented each other. While the PhD candidate brought in his expertise on the literature on heroes and his case knowledge on Namibia, the co-author provided the case knowledge on Rwanda and her expertise on victims and victimization. This led to more or less equal contributions in Part II (the literature review) and Part V (Evidence from the field). Similarly, the Introduction and the Conclusion (Parts I and VI) were written to equal parts. On the theoretical side, the co-author brought in her bigger knowledge on post-conflict peacebuilding and transitional justice and therefore owns a bigger share on part IV (Entitlement and Social Justice). In return the candidate had a slightly bigger share in the development of part III (Understanding the rules of entitlement). Overall, the own contribution of the candidate can be pictured as followed:

Paper Section	Own Contribution
• Introduction	50 %
• Peacebuilding, justice and entitlement: situating heroes and victims in the Debate	50 %
• Understanding the rules of entitlement	60 %
• Entitlement and social justice: prospects for peace	40 %
• Evidence from the field: heroes’ and victims’ entitlement in Rwanda and Namibia	50 %
• Conclusion	50 %

The co-author hereby confirms the contribution of the PhD candidate outlined above



Andrea Pabst (M.A.)

Gewaltfreier Widerstand und urbaner Raum

Own contribution: The paper "Gewaltfreier Widerstand und urbaner Raum" was co-authored with Prof. Dr. Janet Kursawe. The paper was written on the initiative and the lead of the candidate who brought in his expertise on nonviolent resistance. The co-author brought in her expertise on different cases of the MENA Region. Overall, the own contribution of the candidate can be pictured as followed:

Paper Section	Own Contribution
• Die Stadt als Konfliktraum	50 %
• Wo Macht ist, da ist auch Widerstand	70 %
• Gewaltfreier Widerstand und urbaner Raum	80 %
• Protest und Überzeugung: Symbolische Politik	70 %
• Verweigerung	70 %
• Gewaltfreie Intervention	70 %
• The good the bad the ugly? Potentiale und Grenzen gewaltfreien Widerstandes	50 %

The co-author hereby confirms the contribution of the PhD candidate outlined above



Prof. Dr. Janet Kursawe

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