

**The Ideological Transformations of Islamic Social Movements in Egypt – The
Cases of the Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafist Call between 1981-2013.**

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von

Obaid, Hasan

aus

Abha, Saudi-Arabien

1. Gutachter: PD Dr. Jochen Hippler
2. Gutachter: Prof. Dr. Andreas Blätte

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ABSTRACT

Revolutions offer exceptional opportunities for knowledge because they provide a unique chance to contemplate power, societies, and social movements and to observe changes as well as their underlying reasons. Revolutions thus challenge prevailing knowledge production assets and present alternatives to them. The uprisings that started on 17 December 2010 in Tunisia and overthrew dictatorships there and in Egypt, Libya, and Yemen were representative of major crises that required grassroots changes. The Islamic movements played a crucial role in the Arab uprisings and the period thereafter. This has increased interest in Islamic social movements (ISMs) and the impact of the six years following the Arab spring on their ideology.

The present study aims to explore and examine the effect of the regime's power network on the ideological transformation of the Islamic social movements in Egypt. My thesis argues that the political structure is only partially able to explain that transformation and "single-factor" explanations alone are not sufficient for its interpretation. My thesis stretches our analytical framework and expands it to include ideological, economic, military, and political networks. According to Michael Mann's theory of social power, each of these networks "is centered on a different means of organization and social control" (Mann, 1986a, p. 3). Mann's theoretical framework helps to highlight some of the interconnected networks that contributed to changes within the Egyptian regime, as well as to understand the transformations in the regime's power networks that led to the 2011 uprisings. In addition, the thesis will address how such transformations were the basis of the ideological transformation of the Islamic social movements in Egypt. Besides Mann's theory, the thesis will use Hakan Yavuz's typology of Islamic social movements (2003) to link between the regime's power network and the ideological

transformation of Islamic social movements. Yavuz has developed a typology of Islamic social movements to explain why some Islamist movements became society-centered or state-centered.

This combination between Mann's theory and Yavuz's typology has contributed to the formulation of the hypotheses in this thesis; surpassing the limitations of the "Inclusion-moderation hypothesis," the thesis explains that changes undergone by the ISMs are not a result of changing political opportunities alone. Instead, the ideological transformation of ISMs is a product of and response to changes in the interrelationships between the regime's power networks (ideological, economic, military, and political). This combination model explains the structural transformation under which Islamic movements shift from societal to state-oriented movements or vice versa.

The thesis compares the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) and Salafi Call (SC), using cross-case analysis techniques including case-ordered effects and causal networks. It considers the time span between 1981 and 2013, which is shaped by the rule of Hosni Mubarak until the ousting of the Islamist president Mohamed Morsi on 3 July 2013. This period of time is appropriate to provide an objective view of the transformation of the regime's power network that caused the 2011 uprisings that in turn opened up a political opportunity for Islamic movements. The main question in this analysis asks how changes within the regime's power networks affected the ideological transformation of Islamic movements in Egypt. The aim of comparison between the MB and SC is to identify differences and similarities and to understand the factors behind them.

ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AOI	Arab Organization for Industrialization
CA	Constituent Assembly
CSOs	Civil Society Organizations
DRI	Democracy Reporting International
EAF	Egyptian Armed Forces
EGX	Egyptian Stock Market
EGIS	Egyptian General Intelligence Service
EMC	Egyptian Movement for Change
ERSAP	Economic Reform and Structural Adjustment Program
ETUF	Egyptian Trade Union Federation
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
FJP	Freedom and Justice Party
IAF	Islamic Action Front
ICG	International Crisis Group
IEMP	Ideological, Economic, Military, and Political
IFES	International Foundation for Electoral Systems
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IPO	Initial Public Offering
ISMs	Islamic Social Movements
LCPS	Lebanese Centre for Policy Studies
MB	Muslim Brotherhood
MENA	Middle East and North Africa
NASCO	El Nasr Automotive Manufacturing Company
NDP	National Democratic Party
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NSF	National Salvation Front
NSPO	National Service Project Organization
POS	Political Opportunity Structure
SC	Salafist Call
SCAF	Supreme Council of the Armed Forces
SCC	Supreme Constitutional Court
SIS	State Information Service
SMs	Social Movements
SMT	Social Movement Theory
SSI	State Security Investigations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION AND JUSTIFICATIONS

Ideology, and its relationship to politics, is a topic that has dominated the debates of politicians and thinkers since ancient times. The debate regarding the role of ideology in political orientation was present during ancient Greek times, and since then the concept of ideology has gained multiple and complex definitions. The concept of ideology resembles a sponge that can absorb numerous meanings, including beliefs, ideas, perceptions, visions, and doctrines. How it is defined is closely tied to the individuals, groups, sociopolitical movements, and ruling regimes that formulate it.

Understanding the ideologies and perceptions of social movements, including Islamic movements, will aid in understanding these groups' reactivity to various complex and interrelated issues within the State, among them governance, democracy, equality, minority rights, as well as issues related to socioeconomic programs and orientations. Additionally, grasping the ideology of social movements will aid in understanding the orientation of these movements with regard to international relations, foreign and domestic policies, as well as socioeconomic programs.

Over the past decade, Islamic movements have carved out a position for themselves as one of the major political actors in the Middle East. Taking other factors into consideration, Islamic movements – both moderate and radical – will determine the political conditions in their respective countries, and the Middle East as a whole, in the near future. Some of these movements have demonstrated the ability to formulate programs that have garnered broad public consensus and to a certain degree contributed to the stability of their countries, such as the Al-Nahda Movement in Tunisia and the Justice and Development Party in Morocco. In contrast, some

Islamic parties failed to govern or shape the future and stability of their countries, as was the case of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt.

Going back in time to the past century, it becomes apparent that the fall of the Ottoman Empire and the subsequent distribution of its territories among western countries was a crucial step in the formation process of political parties, elites, regimes and, ultimately, Islamic movements, who took upon themselves the responsibility of defending the idea of an “Islamic caliphate” or the “Islamic nation” to confront “colonialism”. The Muslim Brotherhood was among the first and most prominent Islamic movements to foster the Islamic Caliphate idea. It later established several branches worldwide; however, it is clear that the Muslim Brotherhood’s ideology and perceptions – on many issues – has also fragmented and changed since its inception 88 years ago.

Despite the diversity of Islamic movements, certain turning points in modern history affected their ideological transformations of them all. The most prominent of these are:

The 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran

To some Islamic movements, the Iranian Revolution presented the possibility of establishing an Islamic state or caliphate and restored the significance of people’s movements and the international conflict between “the weak and the powerful”. To many movements, the Revolution became a representation of religious and political expression, particularly following its adoption of several slogans that appealed to the Islamic community’s common sense, namely: “Social Justice”, “Islam Is the Answer”, and the “Palestinian Cause”.

The Al Nahda Party leader, Rached Ghannouchi, who many researchers and academics consider to be one of the symbols of moderate Islamists, wrote in his book *From the Experience of the Islamic Movement in Tunisia* (n.d) about how the Iranian Revolution affected the Islamists’

ideology and he added analytical tools that clarified certain social conflicts left unsolved by those traditionally applied by Islamists. In his book, *The Islamic Movement and Modernization* (1984), Ghannouchi said that “The success of the Islamic revolution in Iran initiated a new Islamic cultural cycle” (p.17). He also stated that the term “Islamic movement” applied to three major factions, namely: “The Muslim Brotherhood, The Islamic State Group of Pakistan, and Imam Khomeini movement in Iran” (1984, p.17). Ghannouchi certainly was not the only one influenced by the Iranian Revolution to call for others to follow in its footsteps and learn from its example. In fact, a group of Islamic movement leaders, including Omar Al-Tilmisani – the third General Guide of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood; Fathi Yakkani – former Secretary General of the Islamic Group in Lebanon; Hassan al-Turabi – a Sudanese Islamic and clerical thinker and leader; and Ismail al-Shatti – former leader in the Muslim Brotherhood in Kuwait, were all in favor of the Iranian Revolution and viewed it as a model to be followed and adhered to.

The collapse of the former Soviet Union in 1991

The fall of the Soviet Union weakened social and political movements with socialist ideologies, particularly in Arab countries, which resulted in their decline and limited their impact. This contributed to the revival of Islamist movements, expanding the reach of their ideology and the claim that their ideologies and perceptions – towards the State and society – stood victorious. Islamic movements, riding on the euphoria of victory, made no advance toward revising their ideologies. They made numerous mistakes due to their inability to read the sociopolitical reality – both domestic and international – and consequently failed to provide practical alternatives that accommodate variables or to propose solutions to various issues.

The September 11th Terrorist Attacks.

This historical event was a major turning point for Islamic movements, and although it was claimed by Al-Qaeda and received backing from some radical Islamic movements that espouse violence as a means to achieve their objectives, most moderate Islamists denounced the September 11th attacks. Dictatorships in the MENA region exploited the September 11th attacks to their advantage and, under the pretext of combating terrorism, tightened the grip on their Islamist opponents, failing to distinguish between the extremists and the moderates.

Previous events unveiled three basic classifications of Islamic movements in terms of political views. First, Islamic movements that tend to work within the existing sociopolitical systems; these movements aim to introduce change through reformist ways, and via any available platforms, and include the Muslim Brotherhood and its branches as well as some Salafist movements, particularly those in the Arab Gulf States; they condemned the September 11th attacks and reject violence as a means of change. Second, apolitical Islamic movements that do not participate in politics, like the majority of the Salafi and Sufi movements; they focus on Islamic teachings and avoid opposing the policies of governing systems. Third, extremist fundamentalist movements who adopt an extremist ideology that justifies the use of violence as a means to reach their goals.

The Islamic movement scene evolved into a complex landscape, encompassing countries influenced by the ideologies of Islamic movements, such as Saudi Arabia, Iran, Sudan, and – during the reign of the Taliban – Afghanistan, and parties with experience of ruling and political participation, such as the Welfare Party and the Justice and Development Party in Turkey; the Islamic Salvation Front, the Movement for the Society of Peace, and the Movement for National Reform in Algeria; the Yemeni Congregation for Reform; and the Islamic Action Front in Jordan,

in addition to Islamic movements that emerged as a result of the Arab-Israeli conflict, such as Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and Hezbollah. The Islamic movement scene also includes Islamic institutions such as international and regional organizations, universities, banks and corporations, relief organizations, research institutions, newspapers, magazines, as well as radio and television stations.

Certain Islamic movements that adopt violence and extremism as a means for Islamic work and change emerged on the scene. They included the Islamic Group in Egypt (prior to reevaluating its ideologies and renouncing violence in the 90s) and the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) in Algeria, in addition to Islamic networks and cells – spread worldwide – suspected of having ties with Al-Qaeda and believed to be responsible for a wide range of violent acts, most notably, of course, those of September 11th. There are other groups that were linked to specific events or a series of political positions, including the Kurdish Ansar Al-Islam, and Salafist jihadist groups that are believed to be responsible for a series of violent incidents in Yemen, Saudi Arabia and Indonesia. Armed groups linked with demands for independence or secession can also be found in the Philippines, Chechnya, and Kashmir.

The fourth historical juncture includes the shifts and protests of the so-called “Arab Spring” that began in 2010. The shifts that occurred during the Arab Spring are, without a doubt, a vital historical period for the MENA region and for studying Islamic movements and changes in their ideology. These Arab Spring shifts prompted consequent ideological shifts in the majority of MENA-based Islamic movements and steered them in two prominent ideological directions. The first is represented by Islamic movements that recognize the primacy of making change from within the existing state, through political and electoral participation, and lean towards specialized political action to become a part of the modern national state, such as the Tunisian Al-Nahda

Party. What is notable about this particular direction is how the Arab Spring shifts thrust the Salafist movement towards a new phase, when Salafist groups and blocs decided to become involved in political action and the partisanship experience. For decades, the movement's primary faction remained adamant about prioritizing *da`wa*, social and educational work, refusing to play the political game and citing various excuses and reasons. The second are movements that do not believe in national borders and seek to establish a caliphate, through violence. The great majority of these movements are of an extremist fundamentalist orientation and do not follow a single model. Al-Qaeda represents one model and its competitor, the Islamic State (ISIS), represents another. This is in addition to some local armed radical movements, as in the Syrian case.

The Arab Spring transformations brought about regional interventions, part of which were for sectarian reasons, and led to alignments of Islamic movements on a sectarian and doctrinal basis. This was evident in the Syrian war, where Sunni and Shiite Islamic movements clashed. The same can be said in the case of the Yemeni conflict, where the Shiite Ansar Allah (Houthis) clashed with the Sunni Congregation for Reform movement. In Iraq, the clash occurred between the Shiite People Mobilization Force (PMF) and the Sunni Islamic State. Arab Spring shifts have also affected some Shiite Islamic movements, like the Lebanese Hezbollah, who displayed enormous shifts following the Arab Spring, particularly after taking part in the Syrian civil war. It was accused of being a model of a sectarian party that is linked to Iranian ambitions in the region and heads a number of foreign sectarian militias in Syria, Iraq and Yemen. Likewise, Sunni Islamic movements also underwent change, as was true in the case of the Palestinian Hamas Movement that rescinded its alliance with Syria and diminished its relations with Iran.

Social movements in general and the Islamic movement in particular still require serious study to elucidate the reasons for the changes to them, their means, objectives, and impact on their

countries and on reflection about the Middle East .It is not possible to talk about “Islamists” as a single bloc when discussing Islamist attitudes towards the Arab revolutions, democracy, and equality. A vast number of intellectual and political movements exist among Islamic movements. A division based on the degree of moderation makes it easier for many thinkers and researchers exploring the impact of political participation on behavior, attitudes, and the ideology of Islamic movements (Wickham, 2004a; Schwedler, 2006; Tezcür, 2010). Indeed, some researchers argue that there is an inevitable relationship between participation and moderation in Islamic movements. However, Wickham (2013) argues that such a relationship is not necessarily mechanical or linear but rather subject to many variables, most notably the nature of the internal balances in Islamic organizations and the relationship between the centers of power and the organizational hierarchy.

The Arab Spring reintroduced the academic debate regarding the impact of political participation on the ideology of Islamic movements. Thus it became necessary to utilize new methods of analysis when studying the ideological transformations of Islamic movements. Prior to the Arab Spring, Islamic movements were under the control of autocratic regimes. They were either suppressed or they operated within a margin allowed by said regimes. In order to adapt to these conditions, moderate Islamic movements embraced perceptions that would enable them to exist, and impact on the state and society, as much as possible. After the Arab Spring, several Arab regimes collapsed, leaving the door wide open for Islamic movements to govern. What is more, the context of the question concerning the ideological shifts in the Islamic movements was quite different from what was prevalent before the Arab Spring. This led to the questions of how Islamic movements were to govern and what their ideologies and perceptions of governance are.

Examining the ideologies of Islamic movements after the Arab Spring will aid in understanding their role – or lack thereof – in the stability of their countries and, ultimately, the region. It is beneficial to evaluate the various types of Islamic movements in terms of religious denomination and ideological discrepancies so as to have a clear vision during the debate, as they are diverse entities that can take on various forms and are non-homogeneous at times. Recognizing this diversity will produce a more thorough analysis and classification of these movements. It will make it possible to determine whether they are extremists or moderate, introverted or open to the views of the other, whether they interpret religious text using traditional tools – which cannot be shaped or molded to suit the current reality and its developments –, or whether they are movements that are constantly evolving to meet any current reality or future developments.

This dissertation endeavors to become a part of the academic contributions towards understanding the ideologies of Islamic movements, both before and after the transformations brought about by the Arab Spring. Furthermore, it aims to contribute to an understanding of the ideological transformations of Islamic movements within Egypt, particularly following the protests of 25 January 2011. Although the Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafist Call are Egyptian movements, their ideologies reach far beyond Egyptian borders. The dissertation aims to enrich the academic field by:

- 1- Contributing to the study of Islamic movements as social movements, and identifying their prevalent ideologies, through which the process of recruitment and mobilization, as well as the framing of democratic issues, civil society, and governance visions are carried out. This is a continuation of the study of Islamic movements as social movements that was reflected in the writings of many scholars, such as (Eisinger, 1973; Tilly, 1978; Gamson &

Meyer, 1996; Ibrahim, 2002; Goldstone, 2003; Koopmans, 2004; Hafez & Wiktorowicz, 2004; Meyer, 2004; Della Porta & Diani, 2006; Tarrow; 2011).

1. Paving the way for studying non-jihadist Salafist movements, as it is critical to comprehend these movements and to decipher their ideologies. The dissertation attempts to study a particular type of Salafism as a social movement – the Salafist Call, whose orientations are contradictory to those of more traditional Islamic movements such as the Muslim brotherhood; it also differs from the jihadist Salafis.
2. Comparing the two major Islamic movements in Egypt, stressing the significance of comparison between Islamic movements as a means to understanding their differences and to avoid addressing them as if they shared one unified ideology.
3. Attempting to widen the research framework for studying the impact of shifts in the political structure on Islamic movements to include economic and military factors.

Egypt Context: Egyptian Revolution and the Process of Change

The Muslim Brotherhood came out of the 25th of January uprising as the largest opposition party, gaining tremendous attention both in Egypt and internationally (Wickham, 2013). It began to reconsider its position, in particular asking whether it should take a risk in the hope of reaping more gains or slow down and pursue a prudent strategy. The economic problems and political instability caused splits within the Muslim Brotherhood, which, exacerbated by the diverse character of the Muslim Brotherhood, were not very homogenous. When a group of youths started calling for change and reform inside the party and subsequently withdrew after their demands were rejected, they began to form other political parties, such as *A-Tayyar Al-Mesry*, or joined other political movements. In addition, some leaders left the Brotherhood, for

example Abdel Moneim Abul Fotouh, Mohamed Habib, and Hamid Al-Defrawi (El Sherif, 2012, January 12).

After the January 25 revolution, the Muslim Brotherhood officially founded the Freedom and Justice Party on 6 June 2011 in order to participate in the parliamentary elections. Due to the FJP's clear domination of the Democratic Alliance for Egypt, The Democratic Alliance won a large majority, with 47 percent in the parliamentary elections of 2012 (BBC, 2012, January 21), amounting to 235 seats.¹ The presidential elections were held in two phases and contested by a number of candidates; the Muslim Brotherhood candidate Dr. Mohamed Morsi won 51.7 percent of the votes (Hussein and Borger, 2012, June 24). The constitution referendum in 2013, which was supported by the Brotherhood, garnered the support of 64 percent of the voting public (BBC, 2012, December 23).

Nevertheless, the Muslim Brotherhood's attempts to strengthen its power came at the expense of its relationship with the other political and revolutionary forces. It is worth mentioning here that Morsi's attitude towards restructuring the Constituent Assembly and his insistence on supporting Islamist allies created a gap between him and the secular and liberal parties that partially supported him in the second round of the presidential election. Furthermore, the Muslim Brotherhood's brief spell in power was not sufficient to enable it to solve practical problems, such as relieving congestion or reviving the economy. Unable to make ideological concessions for fear of being accused by its supporters of abandoning its principles and ideas, the Muslim Brotherhood was also unable to introduce any real reforms to the agencies and institutions of the state and therefore lost the confidence and support of the revolutionary forces. Over time, it sided with its

¹ The Democratic Alliance for Egypt, or the Democratic Alliance, was a coalition of political parties in Egypt, formed in the wake of the 2011 Egyptian revolution. The largest party in the group was the Muslim Brotherhood's Freedom and Justice Party (Jadaliyya & Ahram Online, 2011, November 18).

social and religious base, as is clearly reflected by the issue of the constitution, one of the major disputes with the other political forces and a milestone on the road to the Muslim Brotherhood's subsequent loss of power. Elements from the old regime also conspired to make Morsi fail.

Morsi attempted to implement some economic changes by distributing supply allowances, increasing retirement and social insurance pensions, and increasing the wages of government and university employees (Schmidt, 2013, February 27). He also tried to introduce some open procedures by appealing to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in order to encourage investors and investments inside Egypt. He additionally endeavored to implement tangible economic measures that would be noticeable to the Egyptians, similar to those introduced by the Justice and Development Party in Turkey. He also suggested reconciliation with many businessmen who were accused of corruption and tax evasion (Paciello, ۲۰۱۳, p. 8). However, many economic problems remained unsolved, and it was to be expected that Morsi would be unable to solve all the issues he inherited from the previous regimes in one year. In addition, he was faced with the military's predominant influence over existing power networks. The armed forces made use of their broad influence and control over the bureaucracy and economy to prevent Morsi or any subsequent presidents from exercising true power and to overthrow any unfavorable future government (Sayigh, 2012b, p. 3).

The role of the armed forces in Egypt continued after the January 25 revolution. They too were striving to protect their economic interests and showed political ambition. On 12 August 2012, Mohamed Morsi, issued a group of bold and surprising resolutions, ordering the retirement of Field Marshal Mohamed Hussein Tantwai and Chief of Staff General Sami Anan and the cancelation of the complementary constitutional declaration. The importance of these resolutions

reflected Morsi's strong desire to put an end to the interim phase and to end the role of the Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF) (Schmidt, 2013, February 27).

Egypt's ruling power networks were made up of a triangle of the armed forces, the economy, and politics. The MB managed its interests and was influenced by this triangle through strategies and alliances that gave it no assistance in ruling Egypt. This raises the question of what impact the transformations of these three power networks had on the ideological transformations of the MB.

On the other hand, the surprising results achieved by Salafists in the first post-Mubarak parliamentary elections (2011-2012) have raised numerous questions on the nature of these parties, their political program, and their social visions. Furthermore, their electoral performance reflects the existence of a regulatory mechanism within the Salafist groups, although their work at the beginning of the revolution showed some confusion, which was also reflected in the statements made by the Salafis.

After the January 25 revolution and the decision of the Salafis to participate in the parliamentary and the Shura Council elections, despite their former reluctance they were forced to provide details of their vision for the future of Egypt. They had to define the shape of the state and the nature of its governance, describe social life, and move from preaching or religious discourse to developed political thought concerning democracy, or to a combination of the two. The Salafists had problems forming policies on many issues that emerged after the revolution. It faced difficulties in adapting some areas of its ideology for several reasons, but in particular because its huge inheritance of past religious provisions based on religious texts was incompatible with many concepts such as democracy and political pluralism. In addition, a seamless ideological adjustment needed to be made in a short period of time.

Despite the non-participation of the Salafist Call in the revolution, it was one of the largest Salafist movements on the scene in terms of presence and organization. On 21 March 2011, Salafist Call made a statement announcing that it had decided to engage in political action (Al-Anani, 2012, p. 26), and called upon its members to found the al-Nour Party, which became the second-largest Islamic party represented in the People's Assembly. Because it was the first Salafist party to emerge after the revolution, its supporters were not solely members of Salafist Call, and it expanded to include Ansar al-Sunna and its supporters from Cairo and a large support base formed in mosques over the years (Fayed, 2012, p. 4).

The ideological transformation of the Salafist Call is controversial and worth observing by researchers, as it has embraced many shifts in its stance on difficult issues, especially those related to democracy, the ruling regime, and social values. The political pragmatism shown by the Al Nour Party is not reflected in the party's approaches to citizenship, the economy, and some social issues. For example, the party has adopted the concept of "mandate," which restricts the participation of women and Christians in senior state positions. There are very few studies of the Salafist Call in particular as a new player after the January 25 revolution, or of its role in Egypt or its new ideological and political trends, which require thorough understanding and contemplation.

The SC accepted democratic processes but rejected its philosophy (Abdel-Latif, 2012, p.13). This attitude within the SC caused controversy over the fundamental democratic concept and distracted it from focusing on how democratic transformation should take place in Egypt. This is reflected in the SC's attitude to the role of the state in organizing freedom and allowing citizens to participate in it.

The changing political dynamics in Egypt led the SC, including the Al Nour Party, charity and infrastructure networks, to find religious justification for some of the decisions that

contradicted some of its political views prior to the military coup of 3 July 2013. The controversial support provided by SC to the army led to an increase in internal divisions. However, even now SC is still attempting to present itself as an alternative to the MB. This, at least for the time being, had the blessing of the state (Youssef and Hashem, May 9, 2014). By supporting the actions of the army, the SC hoped to acquire political privileges in the future. This raises the question of how and why changes within the regime's power networks led to an ideological transformation within the SC.

In the Egypt context, After Mubarak was deposed and power assumed by the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), the armed forces attempted to gain a pivotal role in Egypt's future, politically, constitutionally, and economically. It delayed the transfer of power to the civil authorities and tried to establish a framework for future politics that would preserve its institutional interests (Sayigh, 2012b, pp. 7–8). In April 2012, the International Crisis Group (ICG) summarized the armed forces' policy during the revolution as follows:

“Eager to remove itself from the political limelight, [SCAF] nonetheless has worked hard to ensure its concerns and interests would be protected once it stops ruling. Its ensuing efforts to manage the outcome of the transition undercut the trust it enjoyed. And, finally, its inability to achieve its goals led it to prolong its stay in power, which further eroded its credibility and thus ability to promote its objectives” (ICG, 2012, p. 17).

The Supreme Council of the Armed Forces made clear its ambition to preserve vast powers during the era after Mubarak. A number of supra-constitutional principles supported by the Military Council were announced in November 2011. These aimed at strengthening military power and autonomy, indicating that the army – as was the case in Turkey – was the guarantor of the civil state. The supra-constitutional was dropped under public pressure (El Feghery, 2012, p.

2). The Military Council attempted to preserve and explicitly defend its interests, entrenching the exceptional status it has retained. Such developments gave rise to many worries and concerns. The Military Council attempted to include articles in the 2013 and 2014 Egyptian constitutions that would grant it permanent military guardianship, including the right of cassation in all military affairs. This would limit the ability of civil powers to introduce policies for Egypt in the future. Under such circumstances, any democratically elected government would suffer chronic instability (Sayigh, 2012, p. 3).

After the January 25 revolution, the situation in Egypt was difficult on both the political and economic level. Economic growth was very slow and the budget deficit increased. Low growth rates posed a threat as they led to social unrest due to the lack of job opportunities. Unemployment rates exceeded 13% in June 2013. Most importantly, three-quarters of the unemployed were aged between 15 and 29 years (The World Bank, 2014, March 17). The African Development Bank Group Report in 2014 summarized the Egyptian economic status after the January 25 revolution as follows:

“The unemployment rate has climbed to 13.4% during the quarter ended December 2013, and is expected to remain at this level in 2014. Public debt indicators are worrisome, with total debt of 99% of GDP in June 2013, pushed up by domestic debt of about 80% of GDP. And inflation pressures are at double-digits—January 2014 annual inflation headline stood at 11.4%—fuelled by higher food prices in the backdrop of the central bank’s expansionary monetary stance. This is as Gulf support has boosted Egypt’s foreign reserves, from USD 14.9 billion in June 2013, to USD 17.3 billion in February 2014” (AFDB, 2014).

It is clear that economic, political, and military factors played a role in the January 25 revolution and the subsequent protests. However, the mixture of such components differs at

different times. The main aim of the protests was to overthrow the Mubarak regime, yet the deterioration in economic conditions, uneven distribution of wealth, spread of corruption, and abuse of power played a major role in the outbreak of the revolution.

Based on the above, I have noted that there are many dimensions to the changes in Egypt: the economy, armed forces, and political regime, as well as the relation between them. These will serve as the theoretical basis of my argument. I began by expanding and stretching the theoretical frame of understanding to incorporate the changes within the regimes. I found that theories giving “single-factor” explanations are not sufficient for interpreting the ideological transformation of the Islamic movements within the Egyptian state and for answering the study’s underlying question of how and why change in the regime led to ideological transformations within the Muslim Brotherhood and Salafist Call? In order to answer this question, I have referred to Michael Mann’s theory of social power in order to understand the changes within the Egyptian regime and their impact on the ideological transformation of the Islamic movements.

This thesis considers the time span between 1981 and 2013, which is shaped by the rule of Hosni Mubarak until he stepped down on 11 February 2011, a period of almost three decades. It is therefore appropriate to provide an objective view of the shifts in sources of social power (the regime's power networks) that caused the outbreak of the revolution that opened up a political opportunity for social movements, including the Islamic movements. It is important to understand the relationship between the sources of social power at a historic turning point in order to explain the ideological transformation of Islamic social movements (ISMs) in Egypt.

CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW: CONCEPTUALIZING THE IDEOLOGICAL TRANSFORMATION OF ISLAMIC SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

Significantly, researchers differ in explaining the ideological transformation of ISMs; There are three main theoretical currents in the study of ideological transformation of ISMs and politics: essentialist, contextualist, and political opportunity structure. Interactions between these three approaches have been multifarious and by no means always conflictual. This section takes a brief look at the main theoretical approaches that discuss the relation between Islamist movements and their political, cultural, and social contexts. However, in order to organize the vast body of Islamic activism literature on this subject, it is useful to demarcate these three broad conceptual categories. And identify the gaps in these categories.

2.1 Essentialism

Essentialism seeks to reduce complex social processes to a few “essential” causes, fixed and unchanging essential traits. It focuses on texts to understand Islam, Muslim societies, and various religious and social movements. The “Essentialist” reading of Islam presupposes an inherent immutability in its nature, which necessarily renders it incompatible with modernity, democratic norms, liberal values, industriousness, fine arts and modern cultural codes (Lewis, 2003). Bernard Lewis (1990, 1991, 2003) argues that Islam is a fixed and enduring tradition and cultural system. In *The Political Language of Islam* (1991), Lewis wrote that “Among Muslim theologians there is as yet no such liberal or modernist approach to the Qur'an, and all Muslims, in their attitude to the text of the Qur'an, are in principle at least fundamentalists. Where the so-called Muslim fundamentalists differ from other Muslims and indeed from Christian

fundamentalists is in their scholasticism and their legalism. They base themselves not only on the Qur'an, but also on the Traditions of the Prophet, and on the corpus of transmitted theological and legal learning.” (p. 117).

Bassam Tibi's book *Islam and the Cultural Accommodation of Social Change* (1990) is another example of this tendency. Tibi viewed Islam as a cultural system, arguing that the cultural patterns in Islam hinder its ability to absorb rapid social change. Tibi argues that Radical Islamism emerged as a response to structural changes in the global political and economic system. He claims that Islam has hampered the progress of Islamic countries. Similarly, Emmanuel Sivan (1990) claims that “Islamic revival—while activist and militant—is thus essentially defensive; a sort of holding operation against modernity.” (p. 3)

Edward Said's *Orientalism* (2003) was a pioneering work against the Orientalists' essentialist and textual approaches to Islam and the Middle East. Said criticizes the work of writers, thinkers and politicians who have contributed to the West's creation of its East. He concludes that Orientalists share a number of constants in their view of the East, most notably generalization, or the assumption that to know the part is sufficient to understand the sum; profiling, which assigns to a whole group any one of the group's innate properties; and inertia, portraying the Eastern world and its lifestyle as rigid and unchanging, disregarding the elements of time and history (pp. 24-48).

It is difficult to adopt the essentialist approach in the study of Islamic social movements in the Middle East, as it disregards the significant differences between the Islamic movements in the Middle East and North Africa region (MENA), where many of these movements have become open to discussion with regard to the democratic civil state, as well as to building constructive

relations with the West. Thus, we certainly need a more precise and thorough understanding of ISMs and the contexts affecting them, which most definitely will not be explained through rigid interpretation of the scriptures of Islam.

2.2 Contextualism

The second approach which emerged to fill the gap left by essentialism is known as contextualism. Contextualism seeks to understand and contextualize collective action in SMs by studying the influence of external factors. Yavuz (2003) discusses three different branches of contextualism: The first, deprivation theory, emphasizes how sociopolitical, economic, and organizational problems shape Islamist movements, and it argues that Islamic movements are modern reactions against corrupt regimes, overpopulation, and massive unemployment. The second branch focuses on organization and the characteristics of the masses of Islamic movements. The third branch stresses the dominant role played by the processes of state-building and nation formation during colonial rule (pp.18-19).

The contextualist approach may be an improvement on essentialism, yet many scholars and intellectuals (see e.g. Munson, 2001, pp. 493-494; Yavuz, 2003, pp. 18-20; Kuru, 2005, pp.255-256;) are critical of it for failing to explain the power of contextualized collective action over believers and for ignoring the dynamic changes that have occurred within Islamic movements over time. Yavuz (2003) says: “By focusing on institutions and leaders, this approach fails to explain how the modern cognitive framework provided by Islam is formed and how it guides the actions of individual believers.” (pp.9). Kuru (2005) argues that contextualism attempts “to understand Islamic movements through an interpretivist methodology, rather than to explain the causes of their transformation” (pp.256).

2.3 Political Opportunity Structure (POS)

The concept of political opportunity structure (POS) is central to studies of SMs and to contentious politics in general. Theories of POS have been developed primarily to understand SMs, but the idea that dynamic changes in state weakness or political opportunities can encourage mobilization also has clear relevance for the risk of civil war (Gleditsch and Ruggeri, 2010). Many researchers have benefited from the process of linking the concept of the social movement to the POS, whereby the POS has become a good tool for monitoring, analyzing, and understanding the internal structure and dynamics of SMs (Tilly 1978, pp. 98–142; McAdam et al., 1996; Tarrow, 1998).

The POS approach is a political process approach which “stresses the crucial importance of expanding political opportunities as the ultimate spur to collective action” (McAdam, McCarthy, & Zald, 1996, 1996, p. 7) and pays “systematic attention to the political and institutional environment in which SMs operate” (Della Porta & Diani, 2006, p. 16). It involves analyzing the POS constraints under which movement actors seek to acquire and allocate resources for collective action and the constraints on the political environment that help shape intramovement considerations and transformation of social movements’ ideologies (Hafez, & Wiktorowicz 2004, pp. 65–66). In this sense, political opportunity is the mediator between the social forces and political change in societies.

The POS theories tend to highlight the role of specific changes or events that may provide windows of opportunity for protesters to achieve collective action or capitalize on weaknesses or gaps on the regime side (Meyer, 2004; Tarrow, 1994). For Robinson (2004), the opportunity “must show how specific changes in the external environment led to specific changes in the

opportunities available to the SMs” (p.123). Scholars using the POS approach recognize that other factors, such as resources, identities, framing, organizational forms, networks, and tactics affect SMs (McAdam et al., 1996, Tarrow, 1998, Della Porta, & Diani, 2006).

Sidney Tarrow (2011) argues that informal networks facilitate the work of SMs, especially in the context of state repression. She says: “Informal associational networks provide a space for movement organization that is outside of the political arena and therefore cannot be infiltrated by a state's repressive forces with the aim of lessening the impact of the movement's message. In highly authoritarian contexts, informal associations are necessary for covert movement organization” (p. 17). But in other cases, the state's increased reliance on the "channeling" of protest may have produced both a decline in repression means and a shift on the part of protesters to quieter forms of contention (ibid., p. 174). Gamson and Meyer (1996) discuss how the dynamic aspects of political opportunity fluctuate over time. They include public policies and elite instability that affect a specific movement's emergence and decline. For them, the institutional and dynamic aspects of political opportunity should be emphasized in the shifting political context in which SMs struggle rather than in the internal dynamics of movements.

Some POS writers emphasize the mobilization of resources that are external to SMs. In addition, they postulate that factors may vary depending on the level of analysis and emphasize mechanisms in the immediate environment that trigger mobilization. McAdam identifies four dimensions of political opportunity: The relative openness or closure of the institutionalized political system; the stability or instability of that broad set of elite alignments that typically undergird a polity; the presence or absence of elite allies; and the state's capacity and propensity for repression (1996, p. 27). Sidney Tarrow agrees with McAdam, determining visible POS factors as the following:

- 1- Opening of access to participation for new actors;
- 2- Availability of influential allies;
- 3- Emerging splits within the elite; and
- 4- Evidence of political realignment within the polity (2011, pp. 163–165).

This theory is distinguished by adopting several levels of analysis. It shares the interests of the theory of resource mobilization, in addition to its interest in the organizational aspect of SMs, which should be – according to this theory – organized to affect the construction of power. It also has an interest in the cultural facet, which can be a uniting point among the different SMs, thus creating common goals that everyone seeks to achieve. In addition, it studies the structure of society interactively, from two perspectives: First, political opportunities "influence the choice of protest strategies and the impact of SMs on their environments" (Kitschelt, 1986, p. 58). Second, the concept of political opportunity deals with opportunities that are derived from interaction between SMs and political actors or institutions (Koopmans, 2004, p. 65). According to SMs scholars, SMs can generate their own opportunity (Jenkins and Klandermans, 1995, p. 4; Tarrow, 1998, p. 72).

Key areas of concern regarding political opportunity include the level of state repression, which depends on the opportunity available to the opponents to change the structure of power and the opportunities for mobilization to take on particular forms (McAdam, 1996, p. 23). In other words, political opportunity can be found in SMs that use their resources, capabilities, and societal conditions to make a change.

Some scholars stress the open/closed understanding of the POS; they consider state structures to be either "open" or "closed". Eisinger (1973, p. 15) writes that protest is most likely "in systems characterized by a mix of open and closed factors." In an open POS, collective action is

likely to result in change and will incur few negative costs, because of the easy availability of influence through formal channels, thereby increasing an individual's incentive to identify with a collective entity (Tarrow, 1994, p. 17).

A closed POS, however, limits the movement's ability to organize itself in formal spaces. Closed systems are more likely to push actors outside formal channels and onto the streets into informal networks, increasing levels and degrees of unconventional political action. Although the existence of informal networks may act as alternative spaces for mobilizing support, the movement will encounter many more obstacles than in an open POS (*ibid.*). Some researchers have argued that the use of coercion reduces protest participation by increasing its costs. Others propose that coercive methods increase the costs associated with protest, leading to the radicalization of individuals and, thus, increasing the amount and severity of protests (Opp and Roehl, 1990, p. 523). Other writers meanwhile argue that the relationship between protests and POS is not linear but curvilinear; it is neither full access nor its absence that produces the greatest degree of protest (Eisinger, 1973, Lichbach & Gurr, 1981; Francisco 1995).

The concept of POS was developed in order to explain the "when" of social movement mobilization, identifying the conditions that facilitate or account for mobilization. It also explains the "how" of social movement action; and "why" collective actions and protests occur and under which conditions (Tarrow, 1994, p. 83; Kitschelt, 1986). However, some SM scholars argue that the POS is insufficient to explain and understand the ideological transformation of ISMs. They argue that ISMs are a product of and response to socio-economic transformation (Ibrahim, 2002). As Koopmans and Statham (2000) and Huntington (1993) point out, non-political external constraints that SMs face should be treated as social, cultural, economic, and geographic opportunities, which include discursive opportunities.

Political opportunity structure is only partially able to explain the ideological transformation of ISMs in Egypt. POS theories need to be stretched and expanded to explain the changes of non-political external factors such as ideology, the economy, and the military. Michael Mann's theory of social power is therefore incorporated in the theoretical framework in order to better grasp the changes within the Egyptian regimes and to understand how such changes affect the ideological transformation of ISMs. I claim that POS does not sufficiently explain the ideological transformation of ISMs in Egypt and therefore does not sufficiently answer the questions of this study.

2.4 Inclusion-Exclusion Hypothesis

Much work has focused on the effect of political participation on the conduct, trends, and ideology of Islamist movements. Some researchers argue that there is an inevitable relationship between participation and becoming more moderate, and accordingly they focus on the ability of these movements to adapt to the political context and on the extent to which they are prepared to change their ideological and intellectual vision during their involvement in the political field (see, e.g. Wickham, 2004; El-Ghobashy, 2005; Della Porta, & Diani, 2006). Other studies have emphasized the effect of political opportunity on the ideological development of Islamist movements (see, e.g. Awad, 2014; Hamid, 2014).

In his book *Inside the Muslim Brotherhood: Religion, Identity, and Politics* (2016). Khalil al-Anani seeks to answer a set of questions: How can a social movement change the vision of its members and their perceptions of the world? " how one becomes an ikhwani"? and "How this affiliation manifests itself in everyday" (p.4)? In his study, al-Anani depends on Social Movement Theory (SMT), especially the theory of Mobilization Resources, and he also adopts Collective Identity theory. He discusses the mechanisms of the Muslim Brotherhood's organization in

building the identity of its members, including recruitment, identification, networking, and mobilization.

Al-Anani discusses the effects of internal and external environments on the organizational cohesion of the Brotherhood. Despite the circumstances of exclusion and political repression that the Brotherhood has suffered from successive Egyptian regimes, the internal environment of the Brotherhood along with the processes and interactions involved (such as the processes of socialization, indoctrination, recruitment, identification, networking, and mobilization) has reflected positively on its cohesion for more than eighty years. He also discusses the differences within the Brotherhood, but he does not expand on the study of splits within the Brotherhood and its causes, nor does he explain new political and ideological trends of dissident members of the Brotherhood. Moreover, he does not explain how the Brotherhood's mechanisms have failed to prevent them from splitting their affiliations and loyalties. This may also open important questions regarding whether the Brotherhood is still able to control their members and keep their loyalty, especially after the overthrow of the Brotherhood in 2013 by the army.

Along the same line of argument, Hazem Kandil in his book *Inside the Brotherhood* (2015), answers the following question: "Who are the Muslim Brotherhood and what kind of relations do they think they have with God?" (P. 2). To answer this question, Kandil focuses on three issues: the cultivation of brothers, their interaction, and "what goes on inside their head" (p. 4). Kandil discusses the recruitment process and the "long disciplinary period" that precedes the official membership of the MB. He argues that one cannot choose to join the MB, but instead that the organization of the Brotherhood chooses the member based on specific criteria. Kandil argues that the Brotherhood's choice of members based on specific criteria creates harmony between members. This is the reason behind the lack of dissent or great opposition within the MB over the

course of 85 years. In this context, he explains the mechanisms followed by the Brotherhood toward its members, calling it "the MB's cultivation practice". The mechanisms are summarized as follows: "pre-emption," "disinformation," "organisational pressure," and "marginalization" (pp. 22-28). According to Kandil, the "cultivation process" prevents any intellectual activity within the MB, which leads to the MB's lack of potential public intellectuals creating thinking mechanisms for emerging issues.

Al-Anani (2016) and Kandil (2015) try to shed light on the intellectual and ideological characteristics of the members of the MB. However, their study lacks an understanding of the role of the Egyptian state's policies towards the Islamists and how the transformation of the Egyptian state and its non-democratization affects the ideology of the MB.

Following social movements (SMs) and political opportunity structure (POS) theories, various social movement scholars focus on the bilateral relationship between the nature of the political environment and the emergence and development of the SMs (Eisinger, 1973; Tilly, 1978; Lichbach and Gurr, 1981; Kitschelt, 1986; Opp, & Roehl, 1990; Tarrow, 1994; Jenkins, & Klandermans, 1995; Francisco, 1995; McAdam, McCarthy, & Zald, 1996; Gamson, & Meyer, 1996; Tarrow, 1998; Ibrahim, 2002; Goldstone, 2003; Koopmans, 2004; Hafez, & Wiktorowicz, 2004; Meyer, 2004; Della Porta, & Diani, 2006; Tarrow; 2011). They also explore the impact of the POS on SMs, arguing that under authoritarian rule, the closure of the political opportunity structure, and intensified repression, SMs are forced to find informal, perhaps even secret, channels through which to achieve their goals. Democratic regimes meanwhile open the door for SMs to participate in government through formal channels, allowing them to pursue their activities freely. As Mohammed Hafez and Quintan Wiktorowicz (2004) point out, the POS may play a stronger role in shaping the strategy of political actors and the ideology of ISMs by

radicalizing or moderating their strategies and activism; participation by ISMs in the political process causes even the radical ones to become more moderate. Their growing desire to participate in government leads them to make efforts to become more palatable to the masses (Wickham, 2004a; El-Ghobashy, 2005).

Based on this analysis, a range of ISMs scholars have focused on the effects of inclusion and exclusion of diverse ISMs within a range of regime types and in both formal and informal institutions (Hafez, 2003; Wickham, 2004; Clark, 2006; Schwedler, 2006; Turam, 2007; Ashour, 2009; Browsers, 2009; Tezcür, 2010; Clark, 2010; Yadav, 2010; Dalacoura, 2011; Schwedler, 2011; Karakaya, & Yidirim, 2013; Cavatorta, & Merone, 2013; Schwedler, 2014; Hamid, 2014). The inclusion-moderation and exclusion-radicalization hypothesis argues that ISMs may become more moderate as a result of their inclusion in pluralist political processes in order to gain support among a wide variety of popular sectors (Wickham 2004a, p. 205), while exclusion and state repression leads to the radicalization of ISMs (Kubikova 2009, p.140). In this context, Schwedler (2006) and Dalacoura (2011) use the term ‘moderate’ to refer to Islamist movements that attempt to achieve their goals through bottom-up, non-violent methods. Schwedler (2006) defines ideological moderation as the gradual transformation of a movement’s values and beliefs from rigid to tolerant (p. 3).

Some scholars criticize the hypothesis that the relationship between the POS and moderation of ISMs is linear. They argue that the ideological transformation of ISMs is not produced by the POS alone, but that several other additional factors also play a role. For example, in her book *Faith in Moderation*, Jillian Schwedler (2006) discusses the relationship between the Islamic Action Front (IAF) in Jordan and the Islah Party in Yemen. According to Schwedler, despite the similarity of constraints and opportunities in both countries, the IAF was more

moderate than the Islah Party, although both countries had authoritarian systems and limited political openness. Also according to Schwedler, three factors that must be taken into account here: First, the system's relationship with the public political sphere and the amount of control over it; second, the internal structure of the movement; and third, the political justifications for their participation and their objectives. These three factors are associated with both the foreign political infrastructure of ISMs and their internal structure.

Carrie Rosefsky Wickham (2013) and Mona El-Ghobashy (2005) discuss the ideological transformation of ISMs and the challenges they have faced in trying to moderate their ideology, they found that the ISMs' ideological transformation and moderation was not a reaction to inclusion within the political process but rather a response to the repressive political environment. Wickham and El-Ghobashy point out within the Egyptian authoritarian context that the MB is willing to change ideology in order to fend off state repression and be integrated into the existing political order. Wickham argues that the MB's strategy was based on "Self-Assertion" and "Self-Restraint" during Mubarak's era². She considers MB's attitude in syndicates to reveal a new type of self-restraint and suggests that an authoritarian context did not drive the MB towards extremism:

"The Brotherhood's campaign in the parliamentary elections of 2005 demonstrated the tension between its impulse toward self-assertion and its ingrained habits of self-restraint. Seeking to capitalize on the political opening created by external pressure, the Brotherhood ran 161 candidates, more than double the number it had run in 2000. Yet the brotherhood also announced that it would not contest seats in districts where senior government candidates were running and, most important, would not contest more than one-third of the seats so as not to challenge the NDP's two-thirds majority. That this restraint was a strategic choice is suggested by

² El-Ghobashy calls this strategy on which the MB depended "self-preservation". (2006, p.394)

a brotherhood study conducted at the time that showed the group could have run as many as 250 successful candidates. With inputs from the group's Central Elections Commissions, which oversaw the nomination of the candidates through the brotherhood's regional administrative office, the Guidance Bureau selected 161 candidates, with a list of alternates including members on the security establishment's 'black list'." (2013, p.117).

Along the same line of argument, Wickham (2004a); Hatina (2010), and Hamid (2014) point out that an evaluation of the Wasat Party's origin and evolution clearly challenges the inclusion-moderation hypothesis. In the Egyptian context, repression and exclusion from politics prompted a number of middle generation members of the MB in 1996 to announce their resignation from the MB. Wasat criticized the MB's slogan "Islam is the Solution" and distinguished politics from religion (Wickham, 2002; Takayuki, 2007).

In the same vein, the Egyptian al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya (Islamic Group – IG) declared a unilateral cease fire in June 1997. This turned into a comprehensive (de-radicalization) process in 2002, including re-evaluation of the Group's ideology, behavior and organizational structure. It is well known that the IG is a former "Al-Qaida" ally that adopted violence as a means to achieve its objectives. According to Ashour (2009), the IG's de-radicalization process was successful, with the IG leadership producing 25 publications in support of the Group's new pacifist approach, relying on Islamic jurisprudential evidence and steering clear of the inclusion-moderation hypothesis. Ashour argues that repression by the government, interactions with non-jihadis, and selective inducements from the state and other actors can lead jihadists to abandon jihad and de-legitimize violence.

Shadi Hamid (2014) additionally discusses how state repression affects the political agendas of Islamist parties. He argues that repression and exclusion can force Islamist parties to

become more moderate; this is the origin of the “exclusion-moderation hypothesis. As observed in Egypt throughout the 1990s and 2000s, Islamist groups were repressed and forced to defer their dream of an Islamic state. Under such conditions, Islamists often altered their organizational structures, opened new channels of cooperation with secular parties, and moderated their ideology, including their position towards the application of Sharia law, political pluralism, and minority and women’s rights (p. 5).

Carvatora and Merone (2013) in their study of the evolution of the Tunisian Islamist movement Ennahda advance the exclusion-moderation hypothesis, arguing that “[Ennahda] has been [the subject of] exclusion through repression and social marginalization that has led the Islamist party Ennahda to move from its extreme anti-systemic position of the 1970s” (p.857).

While most of the works on Islamist moderation describe the process through which radical ISMs develop their ideology on electoral competition, political pluralism, human rights, and electoral politics, many case studies analyze the forms of moderation towards political process. In his book, *Muslim Reformers in Iran and Turkey; The Paradox of Moderation (2010)*, Güneş Murat Tezcür criticizes and re-evaluate the moderation theory. Through a structured comparative study of two Islamic groups, Tezcür discovers that the Reform Front (RF) in Iran and the current Turkish ruling Justice and Development Party (JDP) prioritized organizational interests over their ideology. According to Tezcür, behavioral moderation does not necessarily lead to ideological moderation: “[B]ehavioral moderation may actually hamper democratic process in ways that are not anticipated by moderation theory” (p.213). He analyzes (in parallel) the two forms of moderation towards democratic transformation. Tezcür concludes that political openings and participation in the electoral process alone do not lead to ideological moderation,

and he cautions that the moderation hypothesis should not be immediately associated with democratization³, because both of these movements represent conflict with unelected adversaries who attempted to block their agendas.

In the same line of argument, Karakaya and Yildirim (2013) introduce a two-stage framework to explain variation in Islamist party moderation, which is both tactical and ideological. They define tactical moderation as “the kind of moderation where radical parties make a decision on whether to accept electoral democracy as a means to achieve ideological goals without compromising their platforms” (p. 1322). Structural factors such as political liberalization, international factors and state repression are causes of tactical moderation. According to the authors, an Islamic party that adopts tactical moderation can attain the ultimate goal via popular support, and does not imply a change of ideological platform. Ideological moderation “shifts in a platform from a radical niche to more moderate lines to respond to societal changes (economic liberalization, economic growth, electoral loss and changing voter preferences) to gain greater popular support” (Ibid.). This transformation is a clear indication that the ideological movements have moved towards becoming “vote-seeking” rather than “policy-seeking”. The authors present two case studies. The first is the process of moderation in the Italian Communist Party (PCI) up to the 1990s. The PCI leaves the revolutionary path and adopts the “Popular Front” strategy, believing that armed struggle would not succeed since such attempts had failed in other parts of the world. The second case study considers the Moroccan Party for Justice and Development (PJD) and the process of moderation it underwent from its origins in the 1970s until the early 2000s. The PJD decided to participate in the political system and recognized the legitimacy of the monarchic regime, particularly after the radical Islamist groups had been

³ For this line of argument, see. e.g. Toprak, 2005.

banned. Karakaya and Yidirim conclude that “The moderation processes of the PJD and the PCI indicate that similar paths of moderation can occur in autocratic and democratic systems” (p. 1341), and they consider the fear of repression, the failure of the armed struggle in other parts of the world, the failure of nondemocratic alternatives, and the international context to have been the driving force behind tactical moderation.

Much of the academic literature criticizes the inclusion-exclusion hypothesis⁴ and considers moderates and radicals no longer as concepts that facilitate understanding, especially after the Arab uprisings that began in 2011 (see, e.g. Wickham, 2013; Schwedler, 2014). The academic literature that examined the inclusion-exclusion hypothesis were primarily concerned with explaining ideological and organizational transformation from one position to another (Schwedler, 2014). Schwedler (2014) argues that the inclusion-moderation hypothesis is insufficient. The inclusion-exclusion work needs to be expanded in order to incorporate an understanding of the unstable and changing institutional contexts.

Mahmoud Jaraba (2013) discusses the changes within the Turkish and Egyptian regimes depending on Mann's theory, Jaraba argues that “the Turkish JDP [was] able to transcend its ideology and mobilize the Turkish people in support of its agenda, the MB did not succeed in constructing a new consensus among Egyptians in favor of a new order or type of regime” (p. 286). Despite of relying on the inclusion-moderation hypothesis in his thesis, he considers the Inclusion- moderation hypothesis is insufficient to explain the ideological transformations for the ISMs in Turkey and Egypt. However, he did not provide an alternative hypothesis. In addition, Jaraba considers the ideological transformations for the ISMs are the same ideological moderation, he was not clear in the standards or factors of moderation which can depend on to

⁴ According to Schwedler (2006), “the inclusion-exclusion hypothesis conflates a variety of hypotheses about the causal relations between repression, inclusion, radicalism and moderation.” (p. 21).

examine if the ISMs are moderation or not. Wickham (2013) refuses to use the moderation standard to measure the changes in the conduct and thought of Islamist movements; instead, she finds it important to monitor the changes in their wider context, and not to give them a standard judgment. So, instead of considering the conduct of a political group like MB in Egypt and its counterparts as an indicator of moderation or lack thereof, Wickham adopts an “open-ended approach” (2013, p.6) to study the change in conduct of Islamist movements. She seeks to determine whether and to what extent Islamists have adjusted their worldviews and values, in multiple dimensions.

In conclusion, the inclusion-exclusion hypothesis created a widespread debate after the “Arab Spring” revolutions, especially after most Salafi movements became involved in the political process. Shadi Hamid, in his book *Temptations of power; Islamists and illiberal democracy in a new Middle East* (2014), argues that the moderation of the MB when they were excluded under dictatorship before the revolution and their intemperance after the revolution contrasts with the Salafists, who under Mubarak’s authoritarian rule were driven by “textual literalism” and “ultraconservatism” and were politically quiescent. After the ousting of Hosni Mubarak, what was forbidden suddenly became permissible. As Stephane Lacroix (2012) concludes, the Salafist Call sought a more realistic attitude to help them achieve greater gains in the future.

With regard to political openness steering the MB towards a more conservative approach than it had previously adopted – and although, according to Hamid, Salafists have become more open –, the question must be: How could two different criteria be used to interpret the ideological transformation of two ISMs (MB and Salafist) within the same political context? There is no single logic to the inclusion-moderation hypothesis. Furthermore, the inclusion-exclusion

hypothesis does not explain why the Salafists took part in the political process. At the same time, the inclusion-exclusion hypothesis does not discuss nor analyze the deep structural changes that countries where the unrest took place underwent during 2011. The debate has also overlooked the moderation or exclusion of ISMs into a political regime, as some ISMs have indeed assumed power following the collapse of the existing political systems, as was the case in Egypt and Tunisia.

2.5 Methods of Analysis of the Egyptian Regimes (1952-2011)

This thesis aims at understanding the Egyptian Regime and its transformations that led to the outbreak of protests in January 2011. Many studies and research endeavors have adopted diverse methodologies when analyzing the Egyptian regime and its transformation; however, the historical methodology proves distinctive in helping the researchers collect the required data relating to the stages of establishing the modern Egyptian Regime and in comprehending its formation and development.

Steven A. Cook argued in his book *The Struggle for Egypt: From Nasser to Tahrir Square* (2012), argues that having a clear image of Egyptian political history since the military coup, which occurred in 1952, is necessary to understand the political tensions that exist among the military, Islamists, and Democrats, which continue into present day. In this context, Cooks focuses on the significance of understanding the political form of the Egyptian regime between 1952 and 2012, and he attempts to clarify the reasons behind the authoritarian form of the regime in the specified period, along with pointing out how the Muslim Brotherhood takes advantage of it. Furthermore, Cook argues that authoritarianism is recorded as one of the key causes of militancy and one of the leading factors that led to the revolution of 25th January 2011, along with other economic and social factors.

As for describing the structure and the formation of the Egyptian political regime, Bruce K. Rutherford in his book *Egypt after Mubarak: Liberalism, Islam, and Democracy in the Arab World* (2008), seeks to analyze the authoritarian regimes in the Arab and Middle Eastern countries, including Egypt. He describes the Egyptian Regime as a "hybrid" regime that combines authoritarian institutions represented by a powerful governor, and democratic institutions that restrict the governor. Rutherford contends that, "[t]his emphasis on elections is largely the product of scholars assuming that hybrid regimes are transitioning toward democracy" (p. 23), when those hybrid regimes "are not necessarily in transition" but "occupy a stable middle ground between democracy and autocracy" (p. 24).

One of the weaknesses in Rutherford's book has to do with the concept of the "hybrid regime", which he adopts to explain the Egyptian regime, for it does not identify the role or the influence of the Egyptian army in the political regime and the process of democratic transformation. The role of the Egyptian army and its relation to politics cannot be underestimated.

Samer Soliman in his book *The Autumn of Dictatorship: Fiscal Crisis and Political Change in Egypt under Mubarak* (2011), has not agreed with Bruce K. Rutherford (2008) in considering Mubarak's regime as a hybrid one. Soliman argues that Mubarak's regime has maintained itself and re-asserted its authority for 30 years. In his book, Soliman discusses the relationship between the financial crisis and the political transformation in Egypt. The Egyptian state, on one hand, has given its citizens more money, but fewer social benefits, while on the other hand, it demands more taxes. This is due to its weaknesses, the deterioration of public services, low levels of law enforcement, and poor employment and economic development. Soliman also

argues that the security service under Mubarak's regime has been inflated and has the upper hand in the country.

In another context, the economic analysis and its impact on the political transformations in Egypt are dominant in the literature and many studies. (Alissa, 2007; Joya, 2011; Farah, 2009; Ikram, 2018.) Khalid Ikram discusses the long-term structural features of the Egyptian economy in his book *The Political Economy of Reforms in Egypt: Issues and Policymaking Since 1952* (2018). Ikram reviews the most important economic resolutions that have affected the Egyptian economy during the period of 1952-2015, along with the accompanying political factors. Some of these reviewed topics are as follows: agricultural reforms, the move towards Arab socialism, the shift towards liberalism, the open market in Sadat and Mubarak's era, financial and monetary policies, the exchange rate, consumer support, external debt crises, negotiations between Egypt and international donors and financial institutions, and privatization and employment. Ikram concludes the analysis with a review of institutional reforms and development strategies to tackle the structural problems of the Egyptian economy and lay the foundation for sustained and rapid growth. However, Ikram in his book does not mention the essential role of the army in the Egyptian economy, the economic structure, and the economic sectors that the army controls. It is vital not to neglect the role of the army in the economy, which has affected political and economic resolutions for the past few decades.

As for the Egyptian army's role in the political regime, Yazid Sayegh's paper, entitled *Above the State: The Officers' Republic in Egypt* (2012), has been a core of focus politically and academically. Yazid argues that the Egyptian Armed Forces have expanded "their thorough penetration of almost every sphere of Hosni Mubarak's crony patronage system", as well as that Mubarak's regime has gained the support of the senior officers after his promise to reappoint

them after their retirement to positions in ministries, government bodies, and state-owned enterprises. The prestigious positions the army has occupied during Mubarak's era drive the army to worry more about its own interests following the protests in January 2011, and, as Sayegh argues, the Egyptian army has sought to consolidate its power over the political regime and to stay above the law and beyond the control of the constitution and elected bodies.

Zeinab Abul-Magd in her book *Militarizing the Nation: The Army, Business, and Revolution in Egypt* (2017), widely discusses the influence of the Egyptian army in the political regime. Abul-Magd argues that the Egyptian army has adapted to the decisive transformations, and benefited from them. The army succeeded in shifting to socialism in the 1960s, to the open market in the 1980s, and to neoliberalism from the 1990s, onwards. All of these transformations are accompanied by the army's attempt to enhance its political sovereignty and expand a large business empire. Abul-Magd also argues that the army's previous security doctrine has adopted an Arab national identity, and a socialist ideology, that is outwardly oriented toward regional affairs; however, its new doctrine focuses on domestic issues in Sadat's era.

Abul-Magd's book applies political economy and Foucauldian Approaches to deconstruct how the Egyptian army has repeatedly saved, and militarized, the nation. According to Michel Foucault's deconstruction of the modern state's mechanisms of power, the army has developed a system of practice for the state to closely watch the society, in order to impart discipline and to keep it under control. Consequently, Abu Magd has concluded that: "the military institution that exercises state power by itself has turned the whole society into an infinite, long-lasting camp where everyday life is subjected to the officer's visible or invisible watch, yet with allegations of achieving security or guarding the nation." (p.7)

Abul-Magd (2017) argues that the army has an almost absolute control over the state and its various institutions, but this is considered an inaccurate description, especially in Mubarak's era. There has been considerable competition among different parties in sharing dominion over the state and its institutions, including the army. The political elite, allied with the economic elites represented by the ruling National Party and the Security Service, have also shared dominion over the state's institutions.

The previous literature aims at understanding the Egyptian regime or one of its components, be it economic, military, or political. Despite the significance of the aforementioned literature, it does not develop an explanatory framework that helps to identify the components, networks of the Egyptian regime, and the relationship between these components: whether competitive, or complementary. The analytical approaches of the previous literature are a useful contribution to understand the transformation of the Egyptian regime; however, they need to be expanded upon in order to incorporate an understanding of the changes within the Egyptian regime.

CHAPTER 3: MICHAEL MANN'S THEORY OF SOCIAL POWER AND HAKAN YAVUZ'S TYPOLOGY

3.1 Introduction

This thesis applies Michael Mann's work on social power to understand causal relationships. It argues that Mann's theoretical framework helps to highlight some of the interconnected elements that contributed to changes within the Egyptian regime and to explain the ISMs as a response to the changes within the regime's power networks. Furthermore, Mann's theory helps us to understand the main ideological transformation within Islamic movements in Egypt. This research applies Mann's theoretical model to the sources of social power to analyze the power networks in Egypt during the period 1981–2013.

For Mann, societies are “constituted of multiple, overlapping and intersecting sociospatial networks of power” (1986a, p. 1). Mann thus criticizes pure or monocausal theories, such as orthodox Marxism, and rejects all claims of “ultimate primacy.” His concept is based on the assumption that one of the dimensions or levels of social space (e.g. the economy, the church) always gives overall character to social formation.

Mann basically starts from the premise that, in order to pursue their goals, human beings create institutions which form the power sources. These goals are an emergent need; new needs emerge in the course of primary need satisfaction. Their primacy does not come from the strength of human desires for power sources (ideological, economic, military, political) but from the particular organizational means an individual possesses to attain human goals (ibid., p. 6).

Mann starts his project by defining power as “the ability to pursue and attain goals through mastery of one’s environment” (ibid.). He defines several organizational types of power. For society, the concept of power carries two dimensions: First, a distributive aspect of power, “power over”, which is restricted to mastery exercised over other people. The structure allows superiors to control the entire organization, and it prevents those at the bottom from sharing this control, since the relationship of power of rulers over people is a “zero-sum game”. The second collective aspect of power, “power to”, is the power of persons cooperating to enhance their joint power over third parties or over nature. As Mann notes, in most relations both aspects of power, distributive and collective, are entwined and at times some forms take precedence over others (ibid.).

Mann also distinguishes between “extensive” and “intensive” power. Extensive power refers to “the ability to organize large numbers of people over far-flung territories in order to engage in minimally stable cooperation” (ibid., p. 7), while intensive power refers to “the ability to organize tightly and command a high level of mobilization or commitment from the participants” (ibid.). Thus, Mann makes the distinction between extensive power networks, which are high in (spatial) scope and therefore combine a low degree of mobilization with control over a large space of territory, and intensive power networks, which combine a high degree of mobilization with control over a smaller area (ibid.).

Mann further distinguishes between authoritative power, which is willed by groups and institutions and comprises definite commands and conscious obedience (ibid., p. 8), on the one hand, and diffused power, which spreads in a more spontaneous, unconscious, decentralized way across a population, on the other. Rather than encompassing obedience and command, the latter typically comprises an understanding that these practices are natural or moral or result from a

self-evident common interest (ibid.). Mann combines these two distinctions of power to give four ideal types or forms of organizational reach, with the following examples:

	<i>Authoritative</i>	<i>Diffused</i>
<i>Intensive</i>	Army command structure	A general strike
<i>Extensive</i>	Militaristic empire	Market exchange

Table 3.1 (Mann, 1986a, p. 9)

Beside Mann's theory, this research will use Yavuz's Typology of Islamic Social Movements to link between structural level analysis (of a regime's power network) and that of the ideological transformation level of ISMs. I will apply case study methodology that provides tools for researchers to examine complex phenomena within their contexts.

3.2 Marx, Weber, and Mann

Michael Mann found common ground between Karl Marx and Max Weber by using his four-dimensional model to understand patterns of social change (Collins, 2006, p. 20). Collins (ibid.) stated that "Mann sets forth that which we have learnt from Marx and Weber that is worth preserving, and displays the state of our knowledge on Marxian and Weberian themes" (pp. 19–20).

Marxists justify the use of economic primacy, based on the need of human beings to pursue economic subsistence, while political and ideological power is described as the means by which surplus labor is extracted from the direct producer (Marx, 1906, pp. 619-634). Marxists

refer to "modes of production", which give overall character to social formations and, therefore, to the individual levels (Mann, 1986a, p. 12). While Mann rejects theories giving "single-factor" explanations, Marxists see the totality as "ultimately" determined by economic production (ibid.).

Mann is in agreement with the Weberian multifactor theory and its focus on the structural power of states (ibid.), while Marxists neglect the fact that states are economic and political actors (ibid., p. 17). Marxists and Weberians tend to see the same three types of power organization as predominant: Class (economic), status (ideological), and party (political). Mann deviates from them by suggesting that there are four fundamental types of power. He considers the "political/party" type of power to actually contain two separate forms of power, political and military power,⁵ while Marx and Weber do not distinguish between the two.

3.3 Michael Mann's Theoretical Work: Four Sources of Social Power

The main model of power, according to Mann, is that with four sources of social power: Ideological, military, economic, and political power. Each of these sources is centered on a different means of organization and social control (Mann, 1986a, p. 3). Mann's overview of the four sources of social power (also referred to as the IEMP model of organized power) is as follows: "A general account of societies, their structure, and their history can best be given in terms of the interrelations of what I call the four sources of social power: ideological, economic, military, and political (IEMP) relationships." He describes these four sources as "overlapping networks of social interaction" and "organizations, institutional means of attaining human goals" (ibid., p. 2). Each has always presupposed the existence of the others. However, that does not mean that the networks are usually equal in their importance; one or two are usually more

⁵ I will explain Mann's justification of separate forms of power, political, and military power later.

dominant than the others. The four networks can fuse and borrow from each other in complex ways. One kind of organizational power can be turned into any of the others, and the way the four power networks is interrelated varies from time to time and from one place to another. My assumption was that this would be a powerful theory for comparing Islamic movements in Egypt. Mann (1986a) suggests that “Pressures toward institutionalization tend to partially merge [the four major sources of social power] in turn into one or more dominant power networks” (p. 30).

The four sources of social power offer an alternative approach to understanding the changes in Egypt and their impact on how Islamic movements achieve their goals.

Briefly, Mann explains the four components as follows:

- 1- He defines the ideology network in terms of those organizations concerned with meaning, norms, and ritual practice (ibid., p. 22).
- 2- The economic network is the set of institutions concerned with satisfying material needs through the "extraction, transformation, distribution and consumption of the objects of nature" (ibid., p. 24).
- 3- There are four historical reasons for distinguishing between political and military powers. First, "military powers are of organized physical force wherever they are organized." Second, most historical states have not controlled all military forces. Third, sometimes the military declares war regardless of the decision of the state. Fourth, "political power structuring" is determined by military power (ibid., p. 11).
- 4- The fourth and final network, "the state," is defined as a political network whose primary function is territorial regulation (ibid., pp. 26–27).

3.3.1 Ideological Power

Both Mann and Althusser are interested in the organizational side of the ideologies in addition to the symbolic content. Mann refers to the theoretical perspective as “organizational materialism” (Gorski, 2006, p. 105). In the same context, Bourdieu’s work explores institutionalized ideologies and the diffuse relationship between ideology and action. Bourdieu explains how an ideology might be deployed without the conscious knowledge or will of the actors (ibid.). There have been many definitions of ideology, but it is not the purpose of this research to present them. Mann does not define ideology, but uses the concept of ideological power to underpin his methodology. In this research I will concentrate on Mann’s concept of ideological power. In Volume II of *The Sources of Social Power*, Mann states: "Ideological power derives from the human need to find ultimate meaning in life, to share norms and values, and to participate in aesthetic and ritual practices" (1993, p. 7).

The organization of Mann’s ideological power comes in two forms: Socio-spatially transcendent power and immanent morale (1986a, p. 23). Socio-spatially transcendent power covers a larger territory in a diffuse manner and transcends the existing institutions of ideological, economic, military, and political power, dealing with the sacred rather than the secular. It develops a powerful autonomy. In other words, any collapse in one of the other power organizations impacts on the transcendent ideological system and does not necessarily result in its own collapse (ibid.).

In contrast, immanent morale serves to intensify power. Immanent ideological power refers to the solidarity or morale of a specific social group and codifies its position within a

society. Immanent ideology is less dramatically autonomous in its impact, and is usually extensive and diffuse⁶ (ibid., pp. 23–24).

Mann (1986a) discusses the extension of social identity, relying on the capacity of ideological power to transcend existing social structures by extending social identity across the genders, classes, and either across state boundaries or in their interstices to become far more extensive, diffuse, and potentially universal (p. 364). This is achieved through the following three main areas of experience: “[T]he fundamental questions of existence”, interpersonal ethics, norms and morality, and the family and life cycle that expand collective power and mutualism (ibid.; Jacoby, 2004, p. 61). According to Jacoby (ibid.), the inherent transcendency of ideological power could, in other words, be immanently employed to mobilize support for new or established social structures (p. 61). When ideology is able to transcend and establish new social structures, it has the capacity to supersede existing structures. It depends on immanently mobilized support for these structures to avoid dedicating absolute meaning outside the existing economic, military, and political structures (ibid.).

3.3.1.1 The Elements of Ideological Power

Jack Snyder (2006) discusses how some ideologies generate a jump in social power that allows them to expand their control over the land and people. He puts forward a key set of mechanisms to explain how ideologies help to increase the effectiveness of the mobilization of

⁶ Tim Jacoby (2004) argues that the control of literacy is imperative in order to have significant ideological influence, to provide civil society with an infrastructure that is universalist, and to increase the decentralized and egalitarian ideological power network (p. 61). This enables messages to be spread without deviation from the original form. Mann says: "This was the two-step infrastructure of literacy that supported the extension of ideological power that now occurred", whereby written messages were carried by individuals within each locality and thence transmitted downward by oral means (1986a, p. 364).

power in the social network. There is a range of mechanisms that help to explain how to become an effective ideological power.

The first of these mechanisms and basic elements is the organizational capacity of the potential for the emergence of such a network. This depends on the available infrastructure, such as the means of communication, schools, houses of worship, and religious institutions subject to the system. Ideas need a means to facilitate them and spread their control over the land and people (ibid., p. 310). The second element is the presence of “suppliers of ideology” suitable for the power networks (ibid.). Mann insists that ideological power is much more than just a matter of manipulating emotions and supporters with money. It is important that suppliers of ideology are able to provide an ideology and meanings that play a major role in the stories of the society in which they resonate (ibid.). The third element is the demand for ideas and ideologies by large social groups, benefiting (ibid.), according to Mann (1993), from the emotions generated by local and family relations, hence creating more extensive and more expanded networks (p. 227). The fourth element is dynamic competition with positive feedback from the three elements mentioned above; this consolidates the grip of ideological power and expands its scope, making it more effective in the organization of collective action than its competitors and attracting positive institutional, discursive, and behavioral feedback (Snyder, 2006, p. 321).

3.3.2 Economic Power

Mann’s economic power derives from "the satisfaction of subsistence needs through the social organization of the extraction, transformation, distribution and consumption of the objects of nature" (1986, p. 24). His concept focuses on the use of available natural resources to meet

human needs and on equally and unequally distributed control over economic resources (Mann, 1993, p. 7). He uses the term “class” in his definition, which he describes as follows:

A class is purely an economic concept. Economic production, distribution, exchange, and consumption relations normally combine a high level of intensive and extensive power, and have been a large part of social development. Thus classes form a large part of overall social-stratification relations. Those able to monopolize control over production, distribution, exchange, and consumption, that is, a dominant class, can obtain general collective and distributive power in societies. (Mann, 1986, p. 24)

Economic power for Mann is particularly powerful because it combines intensive and extensive power, as well as authoritative and diffused power (Mann, 1993, p. 7). As already outlined, these two distinctions provide four ideal-typical forms of organizational reach. He confirms that the “most effective organization would encompass all four forms of reach” (Mann, 1986a, p. 8). Extensive powers are gained through the distribution, exchange, and consumption of goods (Mann, 1993, p. 7). Mann argues that the exchange may occur extensively; in this case, when opportunities are open, exchange may encounter influences beyond its capacity (1986a, p. 25). Intensive power is seen as everyday labor cooperation with an extensive circuit including distribution, exchange, and consumption (Mann, 1993, p. 7).

It is important to talk about the relationship between economic power and other sources of social power. Mann approached this matter by defining three economic terms: Classes, social stratification, and ruling class. He confirms that his definition of “class” denotes a purely economic power grouping, and he distinguishes between “social stratification”, which includes any type of distribution of power, and the term “ruling class”, which denotes “an economic class that has successfully monopolized other power sources to dominate a state-centered society at

large” (Mann, 1986a, p. 25). According to Tim Jacoby (2004), Mann argues that the classes do not emerge as “pure” features of modernity, but that they are divided by other networks of social interaction, both from within the relations of production and through the influence of non-economic forces (p. 94).

Mann distinguishes four phases in class struggles and the development of class relations: Latent, extensive, symmetrical, and political class structures (Mann, 1986a, p. 24; Mann, 1993, p. 8).

- 1- Latent: This level does not reach any very pronounced organizational form because it coexists alongside other power organizations; these other organizations include familial, clientelist, tribal, local, and other relations. These are characteristic of the earliest civilizations and have continued to exist to the present day (Mann, 1986a, p. 216).
- 2- Extensive: “They exist where vertical class relations predominate in the social space in question as against horizontal organizations” (Mann, 1986a, p. 216). There are two types of extensive class organization: “Unidimensional”, if there is one predominant mode of production, distribution, and exchange; or “multidimensional”, when there is more than one mode (ibid., p. 217).
- 3- 3-Symmetrical: This is when extensive classes possess similar organization structures (ibid.).
- 4- 4-Political: When class is organized for the political transformation of the state or the political defense of the status quo, the political organization can be symmetrical or asymmetrical. It is symmetrical when extensive classes possess similar organization structures and asymmetrical when only one class (usually the ruling class) is politically

organized (*ibid.*). In my dissertation I will therefore focus on this phase because of its relationship to economic power.

3.3.3 Military Power

In the context of a relationship between military power and the state, Mann rejects two reductionist theories. He disputes the argument that the militaristic state is supreme over the economic and ideological structures. In other words, he rejects the state as a physical force and as the prime mover in society, as purported by Germanic writers such as Gumplowicz (1899), Ratzehofer, and Schmitt (Mann, 1986b, p. 110). He also criticizes the second reductionist theory that portrays the state as an arena in which military force is mobilized domestically and used domestically and internationally; it merely represents the physical force in society. The state is not an arena where domestic economic/ideological issues are resolved (*ibid.*, p. 111).

Mann defines military power as the “social organization of physical force in the form of concentrated coercion” (2006, p. 351), but in his response to criticism he defines it as “the social organization of concentrated lethal violence” (*ibid.*). He sees military force as focused, physical, furious, and lethal violence. This is what makes it an important experience of power in human societies (*ibid.*). Previous definitions are based on violence, which is the primary concept. Based on these definitions, Mann uses organizational form to identify military power, defining it as follows: “It derives from the necessity of organized physical defense and its usefulness for aggression. It has both intensive and extensive aspects, for it concerns questions of life and death, as well as the organization of defense and offense in large geographical and social spaces. Those who monopolize it, as military elites, can obtain collective and distributive power.” (Mann, 1986a, pp. 25–26)

Contemporary sociology argues that the three powers become the dominant descriptive orthodoxy. While Mann largely agrees with the first two, economic/class and ideology/status, he deviates on orthodoxy in terms of political/party power. Marx, Weber, and their followers consider the state to be the repository of physical force in society and therefore do not distinguish between political and military power (ibid., pp. 11–12).

Mann distinguishes the political powers from the military powers in the state. He justifies this separation with the following four eventualities:

- 1- The historical context played a role in some European countries in the Middle Ages and in Islamic states. Mann notes that most of these states did not possess a monopoly on the organized military. It is useful to analyze political powers characterized by centralized, institutionalized, territorial regulation, while “military powers are of organized physical force wherever they are organized” (Mann, 1986a, p. 11).
- 2- Conquests are made by military groups that may be independent of their home states, and when such a military group conquers, its power increases in relation to its own state; Mann gives many examples, such as military groups in many feudal cases and the barbarians (ibid.).
- 3- Although military organization is usually under state control and is separate from state agencies, historically the military has often overthrown the state political elite in a coup (ibid.).
- 4- In the context of international relations, when the relations between states are peaceful but stratified, Mann refers to the “political power structuring” of the wider international society that is not determined by military power; he cites the examples of Japan and former West Germany, both powerful states but largely demilitarized (ibid.).

Even in modern times, according to Mann, it is not possible to distinguish between political and military power, although militarism is autonomous and beyond the control of civilian

political elites and, when mobilized for war, military power prevails over geopolitical diplomacy (Schroeder, 2006, p. 3). In this context Mann defines militarism as "an attitude and a set of institutions which regard war and the preparation for war as a normal and desirable social activity" (Mann, 1988, p. 124).

Mann sees most of the internal developments in military organization during the nineteenth century as an example of the institutional autonomy of the military from elements of civil society and state control (Mann, 1993, p. 439). To achieve this autonomy, military organization had two functions; the primary function was war, in which the military and the state collaborated with regard to foreign policy and with industrial capitalists, and the military was independent from mass political parties and public opinion (*ibid.*). The second function was the military as entwined with society and the state, embedded in broader political power networks and dominant economic classes. In this case Mann suggests that the military represented the interests of the dominant classes in society, which led to domestic repression (*ibid.*, pp. 439–440). According to Mann, the two functions result in "a dualism within the military crystallization": "[B]ureaucratization, professionalization, military-industrial technology, old regime domination of high command and diplomacy, and insulation of military and diplomatic decision making had recreated an autonomy of military power." This means that military power had power over all other state structures and over military power that its formal incorporation into the state merely masked." (*ibid.*)

Mann suggests that there is no separation in the relationship between economic transformation and the role of the military in the state. Indeed, he argues that capitalism has an effect on the state structure: "[C]apitalism has contained an institutionalized, relatively non-coercive core and an expropriated, militaristic periphery" (Mann, 1988, p. 138). From a wider

perspective, Mann argues that domestic militarism has an important role in contextual diversity in contemporary state societies. Militarism blends with the forces of capitalism and social representation, resulting in four variations: Autocratic militarism, capitalist–liberal militarism, liberal reformist incorporation, and semi-authoritarian militarism.

An example of the first variation, *autocratic militarism*, was in Tsarist Russia, where the policies adopted by the rulers were marked by inequality between citizens; they suppressed workers and polarized class. At the same time, the regime’s forces enforced strike bans and discrimination; the state elites were interested in economic issues and collaborated with security forces (Jacoby, 2004, p. 221). According to Mann (1993), this period “aimed at a state that brought a highly centralized and politicized exploitation into almost every aspect of life” (p. 662). As a result, the regime fought the bourgeois democrats, who moved towards revolutionary socialism (Jacoby, 2004, p. 221).

The second of Mann's ideal types was *capitalist–liberal militarism*. Exemplified by state policy in the United States, domestic repression took on two forms; the first was the firm institutionalization of individual civil and political citizenship (Mann, 1993, p. 683). The regime’s polices tended to favor employers over organized unions. The second restricted and repressed collective civil rights with widespread state militias and regular troops. The response of the workers or unions was sometimes divided because of selective repression (ibid.).

With the third variation, *liberal reformist incorporation*, according to Mann, the police and judiciary conciliate rather than coerce, and militarism is more restrained and controlled. This variation gives the middle classes democratic participation without compromising the interests of workers. Mann describes it (ibid.) as “the necessity and even the advantage in compromising sectionally and segmentally with workers.” A regime of liberal reformist incorporation

“compromised between liberalism and moderate mutualist, and reformist forms of working-class socialism, and between class and sectional forms of worker organization later” (ibid.). This leads to decentralized ideological organization of those previously organized sectionally and segmentally (ibid., p. 669).

The fourth regime strategy, *semi-authoritarian incorporation*, was exemplified by Imperial Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Japan, where the monarchies survived their first encounter with the bourgeoisie, petite bourgeoisie, and farmers (ibid., p. 683). As the monarchies succeeded in absorbing bourgeois calls for greater representation without surrendering to a sovereign party democracy, they successfully split the bourgeoisie, dominated emergent capitalist interests, and remained strongly militarist. "Aided by semiparliamentary constitutions that institutionalized segmental divide and rule strategies and moderate militarism into ritual displays of force", old regimes and monarchies controlled the emergence of a sovereign party democracy, which was prevented from gaining access to the centers of power. This situation led to the failure to institutionalize a party democracy (ibid.).

Mann traced the development of military power throughout the nineteenth century, and observed the important role of the military in state administration, which "embedded the officer corps in broader political power networks and in dominant economic classes" (ibid., p. 438). High levels of military autonomy – from both civilian and state control – generally made the military more difficult to access: “[A]rmy and navy organization had tightened and become more segregated from civil society and state alike” (ibid.). The military absorbed the values of capitalism and cooperated with capitalist interests, particularly in the areas of weapons production, communications, and munitions supplies (Jacoby, 2004, p. 223).

3.3.4 Political Power and State Power

Unlike the social theory of other contemporary schools, with the exception of the “state-centered” school and the classical social theorists, the most complex part of Mann’s IEMP model is political power. According to Mann (1993), “political power means state power” (p. 9), and political power for him is derived “from the usefulness of centralized, institutionalized, territorialized regulation of many aspects of social relations” (1986a, p. 26). Mann devised his own theory of political power (state power) influenced by Weber.

Mann separates political and military power, defining political or state power as follows: “The state is a differentiated set of institutions and personnel embodying centrality, in the sense that political relations radiate to and from a centre, to cover a territorially demarcated area over which it exercises some degree of authoritative, binding rule making, backed up by some organized physical force” (Man, 1993, p. 55). But militarism contributes with states towards determining relations with a different type of power. Mann considers the outward-facing side of political power to be “geopolitical diplomacy” (Schroeder, 2006, p. 2).

Mann assigns political power more weight than any other classical social theorist, with the possible exception of Weber. For him it differs from the other power networks. He highlights the ability of political power to demarcate the boundaries between states and societies thus:

“As here defined, political power heightens boundaries, whereas the other power sources may transcend them. Second, military, economic, and ideological power can be involved in any social relationships, wherever located. Any A or group of As can exercise these forms of power against any B or group of Bs. By contrast, political relations concern one particular area, the center. Political power is located in that center and exercised outward. Political power is necessarily centralized and territorial and in these respects differs from the other power sources.

Those who control the state, the state elite, can obtain both collective and distributive power and trap others within their distinctive ‘organization chart’.” (Mann, 1986a, p. 27)

According to Mann (1986b), most definitions of state contain two different levels of analysis, the “institutional” and the “functional,” or a mixture of the two. In his view, the state has four main components:

- 1- “A differentiated set of institutions and personnel embodying centrality” (ibid., p. 112).
- 2- It is a territorial “centrality,” in the sense that political relations radiate outwards from a centre to boundaries. For Mann (1986a), the state is territorially centralized and territorially bound (p. 27).
- 3- It has a domestic territorially demarcated area, over which it exercises political power.
- 4- It also represents a monopoly of authoritative, binding rule making, backed up by a monopoly of the means of physical violence (Mann, 1986b, p. 112; Mann, 1986a, p. 27).

There are two types of political power. The first type is inward-facing political power; my research will explore this type. The second type is outward-facing; this concerns the relations between states. These relationships have multiple levels of power and varying levels of inequality (Schroeder, 2006, p. 2).

3.3.4.1 Despotic and Infrastructural

Mann divides political power into two types, despotic or power “over” and infrastructural or power “through” society (Mann, 1993, p. 60). Robert Macauslan (2010) argues that Mann applies this classification implicitly to the powers of state elites, who focus on preventing alternative political power structures from developing and on maximizing resources within the

territorially bounded region (p. 23). Mann describes these two types of political power as follows: “The first sense denotes power by the state elite itself over civil society. The second denotes the power of the state to penetrate and centrally co-ordinate the activities of civil society through its own infrastructure”⁷ (Mann, 1986b, p. 114).

With regard to despotic power, Mann argues that the despots of historical empires depended on the aristocratic classes and their infrastructure, especially in the provinces. In these empires, the supreme despot's claim to divinity is generally accepted without "principled" opposition (Mann, 1986a, p. 170). Meanwhile, despotic power is that which state elites use to exercise their will and wishes over their territories without institutionalized negotiation with elements of civil society, because despotic power is the “distributive power of state elites over civil society” (Mann, 1993, p. 59). It drives the state to become inherently territorial. Thus, this definition can be applied to both despotic power and autonomy of power (Mann, 1986b, p. 120).

Mann argues that the state and state elites in "despotic" states work against the power of lower social classes. In contrast to the concept of introducing social legislation, which cannot be achieved by the wielding of despotic state powers over society but by the practice of collective organization and naturalization among the dominant groups in society (Mann, 1986a, p. 473), the despotic state seeks an alliance with the military in order to develop its relations; “Concentrated coercion became unusually effective as a means of social organization” (ibid., p. 174).

⁷ Mann distinguishes between two types of political organization: international and domestic. In a domestic organization, the state is “territorially centralized and territorially-bounded” (Mann, 1986a, p. 27). It can achieve greater autonomous power when "social life generates emergent possibilities for enhanced cooperation and exploitation of a centralized form over a confined territorial area” (ibid.). On the other hand, there are international forms, or what Mann refers to as “geopolitical diplomacy”. He explains the importance of geopolitical organization: “But it is an essential part of social life and it is not reducible to the ‘internal’ power configurations of its component states ... Geopolitical power organization is thus an essential part of overall social stratification” (ibid.).

The second form of political organization is infrastructural power, which refers to the capacity of power organizations to actually penetrate, conquer, and control social spaces, and to implement their logistically political decisions (ibid., pp. 120, 170).

Mann (1986a, 1986b) argues that historical empires were characterized by weak infrastructural powers and strong despotic power, because they depended on the class of aristocrats for the infrastructure they possessed (pp. 170; 114). He suggests that capitalist democratic states are “despotically weak” but “infrastructurally strong”. Mann (1986b, p. 117) lists some logistical techniques that have aided effective state penetration of social life, including:

- 1- The state's main activities, which are centrally co-ordinated activities;
- 2- Literacy, which helps to clearly transfer a message between the state's territories and its agents;
- 3- Allowing the exchange of currency and goods and services under an ultimate guarantee of value by the state;
- 4- Providing effective communication of messages and transport of people and resources;
- 5- Rapidity of communication of messages and of transport of people and resources through improved roads, ships, telegraphy.

Mann (ibid.) says that when states are able to use relatively highly developed forms of these techniques, they are able to increase their infrastructural power and increase capacity penetration. None of these techniques necessarily changes the relationship between a state and its civil society because human beings and parts of society seek to increase their capacities in order to have power (p. 117). Therefore, state power derives from varied techniques of gaining power, of which there are three main types: Military, economic, and ideological. Thus the state adds no fourth means peculiar to itself (ibid.).

The relationship between infrastructural power, despotic power, and civil society is complex. Increasing the state's infrastructural power increases the volume of binding rule making, and therefore increases the likelihood of despotic power over individuals, perhaps also over marginal and minority groups. Increasing infrastructural power does not necessarily undermine or enhance despotic power. Mann says, “All infrastructurally powerful states, including the capitalist democracies, are strong in relation to individuals and to the weaker groups in civil society, but the capitalist democratic states are feeble in relation to dominant groups—at least in comparison to most historical states” (ibid., p. 115). This refers to the relationship between state and society; but for a relationship between infrastructural power and civil society, increasing infrastructural power definitely increases the power of civil society to control the state (Mann, 1993, p. 59).

From these two independent dimensions of state power (despotic and infrastructural), four ideal types can be derived. They are set out in Table: 3.2.

		Infrastructural co-ordination	
		Low	High
Despotic power	Low	Feudal	Bureaucratic-democratic
	High	Imperial/absolutist	Authoritarian

Table: 3.2 (Source: Mann, 1993, p. 60; 1986b, p. 115)

A feudal state in medieval Europe had low infrastructural power (Mann, 1993, p. 60; 1986b, p. 115). Governing a state of this ideal type tended to be low on both infrastructural and despotic power; the feudal government was reliant on the infrastructures of autonomous sub-structures such as lords, the church, burghers, and other corporate bodies. The feudal government could not intervene in social life and only had access to its own private structure, with a limited

capacity to penetrate and coordinate civil society without the assistance of other power groups (ibid.).

Imperial states, by contrast, possess their own governing agents, but have only a limited ability to penetrate and coordinate civil society without the assistance of other power groups. They also have limited capacity to penetrate a large and wide territory, and thus they remain infrastructurally weak (Mann, 1993, p. 60). According to Mann (1986b, p. 115; 1993, p. 60), ancient states such as the Akkadian, Egyptian, Assyrian, Persian, and Roman were similar to this type of imperial state.

The third type of state is the bureaucratic state, which is controlled by capitalists, the democratic process, and by civil society groups. Its decisions are enforced by the state's infrastructures. (ibid.) and "it is restricted within certain institutions such as the media, the market, and the judiciary and thus usually has low despotic power" (Jacoby, 2004, p. 23).

In authoritarian regimes, the competing significant social power groups use the state's infrastructural reach to enforce their decisions or to compete for the direct control of the state. The authoritarian states show an "institutionalized form of despotism" and "have high despotic power over civil society groups and are able to enforce this infrastructurally" (Mann, 1993, p. 60; 1986b, p. 116). Mann mentions the Soviet Union, Nazi Germany, China, and the state of Rome as examples (1993, ibid.). Meanwhile, in capitalist democracies, the capitalist class has the power which penetrates the whole of society, and states generally accept the rules of the capitalist economy (ibid.).

Mann distinguishes between the state elite and power groups whose base lies outside the state, in "civil society". He divides these into three categories: The power of ideological movements, economic classes, and military elites (Mann, 1986b, p. 112). The power of the state

elite over civil society classes and elites enhances the centralization of economic, ideological, and military resources for despotic states. At the same time, the state elite is independent of civil society (ibid., p. 125).

I will use two of Mann's terms that refer to domestic political power, "infrastructural" power and "despotic" power, to identify the ways in which the apparatus of Mubarak's regime or the regime itself acquires and uses centralized power.

3.3.4.2 Interstitial Interaction and Power Capacities

POS scholars focus on a window of opportunity in which protesters can organize collective action and engage in protests. They focus on how SMs create opportunity, either consciously or unconsciously (Kitschelt, 1986), and highlight the role of specific changes or events that provide those windows of opportunity (see, e.g., McAdam, 1988, 1999; Tarrow, 1994). The sources of social power are "impure" or "promiscuous," according to Mann (1993). The IEMP model is multi-faceted and complex, and the sources of social power "weave in and out of one another in a complex interplay between institutionalized and emergent, interstitial forces" (p. 10). Mann argues that there are two sources of interstitial interaction, the four power sources and the dominant configurations. "These two sources of interstitial interaction eventually produce a more powerful emergent network, centered on one or more of the four power sources, and induce a reorganization of social life and a new dominant configuration. And so the historical process continues" (Mann, 1986a, p. 30).

According to Mann, humanity's goals can be attained through regulatory means and the inability of societies to institutionalize sufficiently in order to prevent interstitial emergence. Humanity does not create unitary, coherent, and consistent communities. Due to the diversity in the interaction and intersection networks of social forces in any particular social area, the most

important of these networks remain relatively stable for the four power sources. However, underneath these networks, humans dig a tunnel to achieve their goals; thus the configurations for new power arise and appear through the pores of those existing networks that are institutionally lacking or closed in on themselves. Emerging formations, according to Mann, are clearer and competitive with one or more of the major power sources networks (Mann, 1986a, p. 16). The emergence of alternative practices affecting the core of these networks may lead to institutional change being reflected in new organizational forms, as well as to shifts in the ideologies of the emerging organizations.

Interstices are created by overlapping resource networks not only across organizational fields, but also across rules, identities, and conventional practices, and alternative practices can emerge, especially in the face of perceived institutional failure. Calvin Morrill (Forthcoming) discusses interstitial emergence that occurs via a variety of mechanisms, including “(1) critical masses' abilities to create resonant frames, (2) the mobilization of resources, and (3) the carving out of a professional jurisdiction for alternative practices” (p. 30). And social change results from a dialectic and from the gap between the institutionalization and the interstitial emergence of power networks (Mann, 2006, p. 343).

People are always striving to find better organizational means to achieve their goals. They invent new regulatory techniques to build networks more effectively. These networks enhance the existence of configurations that compete with one or more of the major networks of social power and emerge through the "gaps" in the existing society, to take a place side by side with the existing networks. Ultimately, the new networks become so institutionalized that they overtake the old outdated ones, without necessarily replacing them. (Brenner, 2006, p. 195).

Emerging interstitial networks do not result only in the emergence of alternative networks but also give way to other values which provide different answers and suggestions to problems than those given by the existing regimes to such problems. The importance of ideological crisis visualization becomes apparent here. When a crisis threatens routine behavior within the existing institutional networks, the behavior of elites toward these crises differs. Mann (2006) observes that crises lead to the division of the institutional elite; liberals seek to forge alliances with the emerging dissatisfied group, while conservatives focus on traditional values. While a crisis deepens, radical ideological movements emerge, and a system of values and values that goes beyond the status quo arises out of the conflict. This system has its own ideological perceptions that are capable of finding solutions to the crisis and problems. And it seeks to mobilize people, benefiting from divisions between the elites that occur interstitially at times of revolution and while opposition is interested in its own narrow benefits. Alternative options then emerge that carry ideological perceptions in addition to self-interest and claim to have solutions to overcome the status quo (p. 349). SMs that emerge interstitially are shaped by the nature of the state within which they interact. That is why it is possible to penetrate the divisions between the networks of the emerging power and the classes, races, and regions through transcendent ideologies. The importance of this type of ideology is that it deals with the interstitially emergent groups, which are also able to appeal to the common identity and interests of the emerging entities (ibid., p. 347).

The decline of Mubarak's regime created a structure offering a variety of new opportunities – “social sites and vehicles for activism and the dissemination of meaning, identity, and cultural codes” (Yavuz, 2004, p. 270). New vehicles for meaning production included television, newspapers, magazines, financial institutions, parliament and writing constitution. Yet

despite these new opportunities for ISMs in Egypt to influence ideological orientation, which was tightly regulated by Mubarak's regime, not all Islamic groups responded in the same way to its decline.

3.4 A Typology of Islamic Social Movements

The author of *Islamic political identity in Turkey* Hakan Yavuz has developed a typology of Islamic social movements which divides them along the lines of society-centered and state-centered (Yavuz, 2003). Society-oriented movements, which seek to challenge dominant cultural codes and networks of shared meaning in society, took advantage of the changes, to a large extent because they were supported by religious groups capable of mobilizing to access the state structure (Yavuz, 2003). State-centered Islamic groups, which seek transformation from above through the state, did not fare as well. The latter movements seek to dominate the legislature and the presidential office, and ultimately to moderate its discourse to a certain degree.

3.4.1 Society-Oriented Islamic Movements

Society-oriented Islamic movements pursue their desired change from below – taking a bottom-up approach. They believe that the predicaments of Muslim societies are precipitated by the evils of moral degradation and social and individual corruption. Society-oriented Islamic movements seek to transform society from within by utilizing new opportunity spaces to change individual habits and social relations. In terms of strategies and means (Yavuz, 2003, p. 30), society-oriented Islamic movements are two distinct sub-horizontal movements. First are the *everyday life-based movements*, which are “concerned with influencing society and individuals and use both modern and traditional communications networks to develop new arguments for the construction of new imagined identities and worldviews” (Yavuz 2003, p. 276). The most

prominent example in this category is the SC before the January 25 revolution. The SC was determined to construct new meaning according to an Islamic identity. This Islamic group effectively mobilized and entered state arenas in order to propagate religious values and empower the Muslim community. The SC is described thus: “The Dawa is Egypt’s largest, most organized group of politicized Salafis. Its roots are in the ‘ilmiyya, or scientific, school of Salafism, which is historically characterized by its insistence on a traditional and rigidly scriptural non-violent approach to proselytizing that also generally shuns organized political participation” (Awad, 2014, pp. 5). These groups target the media, economy, and information industry and favor active participation in all facets of life (Yavuz 2003, pp. 30).

In contrast, the second category, *inward contemplative movements*, encourage their activists to disengage and withdraw from their socio-political system into their own private realm and “focus on individuals as the object of change through cultivating the inner self as the inner space in order to construct a reinvigorated Islamic consciousness along very traditional lines” (Yavuz, 2003, p. 276). *Inward contemplative movements* achieve personal transformation and construct a shared moral discourse to critique power relations. The most striking example in this category is of those Sufi orders who believe that if individuals are redeemed, greater societal transformation will become possible. Sufis in Egypt are “seen as ‘moderate’ Muslims, non-violent, harmless mystics more interested in spiritual than political matters” (Brown, 2011a, p. 11).

3.4.2 State-Oriented Islamic Movements

State-oriented Islamic movements consider authoritarian and elitist officials in terms of decision-making to be the root causes of all ills in contemporary Muslim societies. In their view, “the ills of society are best corrected by the control of the state through its enforcement of a

uniform and homogenizing religious ideology” (Yavuz, 2003, p. 28), the structure of the state is important for the study of state-oriented Islamic movements, because state control of power resources can either facilitate or hinder access to them by others. In their view, without the Islamists’ struggle for control of state power and governmental resources, Muslim societies cannot hope for permanent solutions to economic, social and political problems (Yavuz, 2003).

Yavuz (2003) divides the state-oriented Islamic movements into two subcategories on the basis of their strategies for accessing power and shaping society. Reformist-revolutionary movements, which employ legal and democratic processes in the hope of affecting their ideology within the spheres of education, law, the constitution, and political and social networks (pp. 29-30). Reformist-revolutionary movements consider the state to be the object of change; they participate in elections; use legal and democratic means; form alliances; and hold public office in the hope of effecting change from above (Yavuz, 2003). Revolutionary Islamic movements, in contrast, reject the system; they consider the state to be the object of change; believe in a global caliphate; avoid elections and holding public office; and use violence, intimidation, confrontation and militancy (e.g., al-jamā‘ah al-islāmīyah in Egypt). These movements understand democracy and democratic means to be un-Islamic: “Some Islamic groups treat violence as a means to create opportunity spaces; other movements seek a complete overthrow of the current sociopolitical system” (Yavuz, 2003).

As illustrated in table 2.3, the SC offers both a case study of everyday life based Islamic movements before 25th January 2011 and a model of vertical Islamic identity building (see table 3.3). Specifically, I argue that the SC’s engagement within socioeconomic segments of society that are overtly religious in nature –such as the mass media, education, Mosques, and charities – and its continued emphasis on the primary religious purpose of promoting individual piety

constitute an important model for the future of Islam. In relation to the Mubarak regime's state and politics, the SC emphasizes a gradualist, accommodationist program and concentrates its efforts on society in expanding private spheres. After the January 25 revolution, the SC changed from a society-oriented Islamic movement to a state-oriented one.

In the following, Yavuz's typology is adopted for Egypt. It is an ideal type to explain why some Islamist movements turned into society-centered or state-centered one.

Table 3.3. A Typology of Islamic Social Movements adapted from Yavuz

		Strategies and means	
<i>Vertical</i>	State-oriented; social change from above	<p>Reform-revolutionary movements</p> <p>Consider state as the object of change; participation in the hope of controlling the state or shaping policies through forming own Islamic party or in alliance with other parties; use legal and democratic means; form alliances; hold public offices.</p> <p>Target: The state, education, the legal system, social welfare.</p> <p>Outcome: Accommodation</p>	<p>Revolutionary movements:</p> <p>Reject the system and use violence and intimidation; consider state as the object of change; avoid elections and holding public offices.</p> <p>Target: The state</p> <p>Outcome: Confrontation</p>
<i>Horizontal</i>	Society-oriented; social change from below	<p>Societal (everyday life-based movements)</p> <p>Consider society/individual as object of change; use of associational networks to empower community; groups using the media and communications networks to develop discursive spaces for the construction of Islamic identity.</p> <p>Target: Individual/society, media, economy, and private education</p> <p>Outcome: Integration</p>	<p>Spiritual/inward-oriented movements:</p> <p>Withdraw from political life to promote self-purification and self-consciousness; individual as the inner space for social change.</p> <p>Target: Religious consciousness</p> <p>Outcome: Withdrawal</p>

CHAPTER 4: RESEARCH QUESTIONS, ARGUMENTS, METHODS, AND DESIGN

The main goal of this dissertation is to enrich our understanding of the difference between the Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafist Call and the ideological transformations of each of them by focusing on the impact of power networks (ideological, economic, military, and political) on these transformations. This first requires study and understanding of the regime's power networks since Hosni Mubarak's rule and up to 2013, until the removal of Mohamed Morsi. It also involves learning about the relationship between these sources of power and studying the ideological attitudes of both movements to many issues such as political participation, democracy, women's issues, minorities, freedoms, and systems of governance, as well as the impact of changes in sources of social power on such transitions.

My academic journey on this topic dates back to 2012, when I began to pay attention to the two movements, participating in many conferences and workshops and writing many papers and articles on the ideologies of both movements and the sources of social power in Egypt. Under the supervision of Prof. Dr. Jochen Hippler, I then proceeded to formulate the key research questions outlined below.

4.1 Research Objectives and Questions

The main question of my study is as follows: How do changes within the regime's power networks affect the ideological transformation of Islamic movements in Egypt? This leads to questions on three levels. The first explains the structural transformation under which Islamic movements are transformed from societal to state-oriented movements, which in itself raises the following sub-questions:

- What is the role of the armed forces in politics and the economy?
- How did the decline of the old regime open up “interstices” or gaps for new social forces such as SC to emerge?
- Did the Mubarak regime have an ideological power network, and, if so, what was the nature of this network? Was it secular? Was it anti-religious?

The second level represents the link between structure level and explanation of ideological transformation of ISMs. The questions are the following: How and why did the fragmentation of the power networks provide a motivation for the Islamic movement to turn into to state-oriented movements? How are ISMs able to access the state structure? How did the MB and SC gain greater power within the political network?

The last level explains the ideological transformations of ISMs and produces the following question: How do changes in the power networks of regimes facilitate or restrict the trajectory of development of Islamic movements in terms of their ideology, goals and political strategy? This raises the following sub-questions:

- What is the ideological transformation of ISMs towards civil state, women, and minorities such as Copts?
- How did MB and SC deal with the following: State repression, alliances with other movements, state institutions?
- How and why did changes within the regime’s power networks lead to an ideological split within MB and SC?
- How does the SC seek to justify its political participation based on core Islamic values?

Based on literature review, the main theoretical currents in the study of ideological transformation of ISMs and politics: essentialist, contextualist, and political opportunity structure are insufficient for grasping the ideological transformation within Islamic movements in Egypt. These works need to be expanded in order to incorporate an understanding of the changes within the regime power networks: political, economic, military and ideology. No academic work to date has explained the ISMs' ideological transformation in Egypt by using Yavuz's Topology and Michael Mann's theory of social power. Michael Mann's theory of social power is therefore incorporated in the theoretical framework in order to better grasp the changes within the Egyptian regimes and to understand how such changes affect the ideological transformation of ISMs. Yavuz's Topology attempts to identify the ISMs' orientations. It provides an important link between the state structures and the Ideological transformation of ISMs.

4.2 Thesis Argument

The dissertation focuses on explanatory model that rationally links between the state structures and the Ideological transformation of ISMs, considering how the Mann's Theory analyzes the regime's structure rather than the structures of SMs. This study adopts the Yavuz's Topology, which initially attempts to identify the ISMs' orientations (whether they were state orientation, society orientation, or both) and how they have evolved since the Mubarak's rule until the removal of Mohamed Morsi. Yavuz's Topology attempts to provide an important link between the two factors; namely, the power networks' structural shifts, and the ideological transformation of ISMs. This model has contributed to the formulation of the thesis hypotheses, surpassing the limitations of the "Inclusion-moderation hypothesis," which failed to explain the SC's ability to avoid a clash with the power networks, although it does not moderate its ideology in cases involving the freedoms and rights of minorities, and state identity. Whereas the MB was not able

to adapt, ultimately clashing with power networks, although they are more flexible in cases involving the freedoms and rights of minorities, and State Identity than the Salafis. This leads to the following hypothesis:

- 1- The main argument of my thesis is that changes undergone by the ISMs are not a result of changing political opportunities alone. Instead, the ideological transformation of ISMs is a product of and response to changes in the interrelationship between the regime's power networks (ideological, economic, military, and political networks).
- 2- Mubarak did not have ideological power, which leads to the assumption that Islamists (specifically MB and SC) were able to create an ideology with which they tried to resolve society's contradictions, taking advantage of the absence of ideological power in Mubarak's regime.
- 3- The Brotherhood remained oriented towards the state but the decline of the power networks of the old regime led to changes in the MB's strategy for gaining control over the power networks from accommodation to confrontation.
- 4- The decline of the power networks of the old regime led to the creation of a new regime under the MB. After the January 25 revolution, the MB sought to enlarge its access to political power, but the Egyptian military weakened the MB's dominance over the political and economic networks.
- 5- The dominance of conservatives in the Brotherhood's post-revolutionary leadership contributed to the rapprochement with the Salafists.
- 6- The decline of the power networks of the old regime led to a change in the SC from a society-oriented to a state-oriented movement.

- 7- The decline of the power networks of the old regime led to a change in the SC strategy for gaining control over the power networks from withdrawal from political life to accommodating or participating in politics.
- 8- The ideological transformation of the SC was a result of the decline of old political power, as it was the decline of old political power that led the SC to develop from a movement that avoided dealing with the dominant power networks (in the Hosni Mubarak era) to one that was interested in cooperating with them.
- 9- The decline of power networks in the old regime led to the emergence of political positions within the SC that observed regulatory interests and neglected democratic standards, citizenship, and equality between men and women.
- 10- The political positions of the SC have been associated with its organizational interests; religious justifications have been made accordingly, and not vice versa, which shows confused religious attitudes inconsistent with the doctrinal heritage of the SC.
- 11- The MB and SC differ in their attitude towards the implementation of the Islamic Shari'a, the relationship between leadership and individuals, and the attitude towards women, Copts, citizenship, and the civil state.

4.3 Methodology Perspectives

This thesis seeks to analyze the ideological transformation of the MB and SC in Egypt, to understand their perceptions of many issues, and to provide a narrative on the effect of the regime's power network on them. This will be achieved through a systematic search of verbal and written texts from multiple and diverse sources. It is important to approach such information within a framework that enables a deep and systematic analysis and helps to provide an outlook and paint potential scenarios for Egypt and its Islamic movements.

4.3.1 The MB and SC Case Study Perspective

The research was designed empirically to help answer the “how” and “why” questions introduced in the thesis (Yin, 2013) using a case study methodology (see, e.g. George & Bennett, 2005; Yin, 2013). Case studies are suitable for exploratory and explanatory research (Yin, 2013). This methodology incorporates “process-tracing”, which attempts to “trace the links between possible causes and observed outcomes” (George, & Bennett, 2005 pp. 6). Case study methodology seeks to determine the turning points of the cases and which independent variables can explain each step in the causal chain (George, & Bennett, 2005, p.92). The object of this dissertation to explain how/why change in the Egyptian regime’s power networks led to an ideological transformation within the ISMs. In this regard, Michael Mann’s theory of social power is very helpful; he rejects theories giving “single-factor” explanations and develops the IEMP framework as a basis for understanding the major turns of historical development in states over a comparable sweep of time.

Case study methodology has two phases of analysis. Within-case is the phase in which single cases are analyzed and process-tracing is used to examine particular causal mechanisms as an explanation of a particular case. Within-case analysis focuses on whether outcomes differ or are similar within the same context (George & Bennett, 2005). The second phase involves cross-case comparisons within a single study (George & Bennett, 2005). Specific cross-case analysis techniques include case-ordered effects and causal networks (Miles & Huberman, 1994). According to Eisenhardt (1989), this is a process that “allows the unique patterns of each case to emerge before the investigators push to generalize patterns across cases. In addition it gives investigators a rich familiarity with each case which, in turn, accelerates cross-case comparison.” (p. 540).

Case study methodology designs the formulation of general questions to ask of each of the cases and develops explanations for each outcome. It then explains the causal role of a particular independent (and intervening) variable and transforms the specific explanation of each of the cases into the concepts and variables of the general theoretical framework specified in the cross-case phase (George & Bennett, 2005).

By applying this approach to the MB and SC, the questions asked of each case must be of a general nature but address more specific aspects of the case that may be of interest for theoretical perspective. Each case study investigated dependent variables (ideological transformation) and independent variables (the regime's power networks). The data is collected and analyzed to answer the general questions for each case. This is a way of standardizing data requirements to ensure that data obtained from each case can be compared later with other data (George & Bennett, 2005, p.86).




Figure 4.1: Steps in a case study research design⁸.

4.3.2 Data and Sources of Data

The study mostly uses primary sources (original texts, interviews, face-to-face and telephone interviews, audio-visual lectures, and TV talk shows) to investigate the ideas of the MB and SC and works with original texts, most of which are in Arabic. A large number of ideas, information, and situations furthermore originate from TV dialogues and programs in the form of questions and answers.

⁸ Source: Rose, S., Spinks, N., & Canhoto, A. I. (2014). *Management research: Applying the principles* (1st ed.). London: Routledge.

The thesis adopts the "snowball sample" methodology for the interviews, in which non-potential samples are used in the search. This involves collecting data from a small number of members of both movements. Initially, we are unable to identify whether the characters are suitable for an interview and whether they are helpful for the study or not. Hence, such a method is used in the first instance for discovery purposes. By asking these persons to provide necessary information, we find out about other members and leaders of both movements in order to gain access to a more in-depth study at a later stage. The interviews require a limited number of members and leaders of both movements, who are asked to provide information needed to locate other members and leaders they know (Trow, 1980, pp. 290–295; Snijders, 1992, p. 59). In addition to interviews, there are other sources of information and raw data from books, literature, pamphlets, and newspapers as well as the publications and documents of both movements, such as electoral programs and data.

4.4 Research Design

In order to analyze the ISMs in a similar context, the thesis shall benefit from the theory presented in the research design by identifying four independent factors, which are: (1) ideological power; (2) economic power; (3) military power; and (4) political power. The thesis will analyze military force in Egypt and its army's behavior towards the other powers. Including the POS, it will also analyze the authority of the Egyptian state in the light of the methods by which the state acquired its power (whether infrastructural or despotic). Interpretative tools are used to illustrate the changes in political systems, or some aspects thereof, and their impact on the mobilization and ideological shifts of ISMs.

The previous four factors are independent factors, while the other is a dependent factor. It is the result of the transformations that have taken place in the first four factors. The dependent factor is the ideological transformation of both ISMs. Returning to the definition of a moderation in ISMs provided by Wickham, she attempts to specify the multiple dimensions of the ideological transformation of ISMs (2013, pp. 6–7). They are:

- 1- The ability of ISMs to adopt relativistic (not absolute) interpretations of religious texts and not to claim the monopoly of religious truth;
- 2- The ability of these movements to accept the ideas of others and not to impose a specific pattern on individuals, especially with regard to cultural issues and values;
- 3- “[W]hether they have deepened their commitment to the legal guarantee of individual rights and freedoms, including the right to make life choices (with respect to styles of dress, forms of recreation, social interactions, and sexual conduct) that violate Islamic mandates as they define them”;
- 4- The extent to which ISMs have embraced the principle of citizenship and equality, both for Muslims and non-Muslims and for men and women, especially in personal matters such as marriage, divorce, inheritance, or the so-called private sphere of individuals.

Based on the discussion of state-society orientation, it becomes imperative to learn how the ISM shifted in implementing their ideologies through state and/or society. Following the fall of Mubarak, ISMs took the helm of the political regime, displaying variances in their positions on the regime’s power networks. And although some ISMs steadfast held to their core ideologies, others sought to enforce theirs by clashing with the regime’s power networks, while still others chose to implement their ideology by accommodating the regime’s power networks.

In such cases, process-tracing is used in the dissertation to identify different turning points in the regime's power networks and to determine which independent variables explain each step in the causal chain.

According to Mann's theory, the four factors are equally critical but one usually takes precedence over all others (the regime's power networks). In Egypt, shifts were observed in two of the four factors during the study period from 1982 to 2013 (from the beginning of Mubarak's rule until Morsi's dismissal). The first of these was the dominance of (political) power during the Mubarak's rule over all others (the regime's power networks). After the outbreak of protests in January 2011, the capacity of Mubarak's regime to maintain control over the political network declined. When the Mubarak regime collapsed, the Egyptian military was the most powerful force and was able to take over after the revolution. It was in fact the main driver of the new political system.

This dissertation provides two main independent variables (political and military power) which give a systematic account of the main factors that led to the ideological transformation within the MB and SC. This leads to two levels of hypothesis depending on two different kinds of variables for case studies: 1) The relationship between political networks changes and ideological transformation is as follows:

- Dominance of political power leads to MB's state-orientation.
- Dominance of political power leads to SC's society-orientation.
- The decline of political power leads to ISM's state-orientation (both of MB and SC).

2) The relationship between military power changes and ideological transformation is as follows:

Rise of military power leads to MB's confrontation with the regime's power networks.

Rise of military power leads to SCs accommodation with the regime's power networks.

4.5 Organization of the Thesis

This dissertation consists of an integrated eight-chapter plan, including the introduction and conclusion. The first and second chapters deal with the background, and gaps in the literature.

The third chapter discusses the factors and key terms employed in this thesis, these factors are the main foundations on which the thesis is designed. They are based on Michael Mann's theory of social power. The thesis focuses on the definition of the four sources and their clarification in abstract ways so that they serve as effective tools in the dialectical theory I am seeking to prove. My assumption is that the ideological transformations of the Islamist movements were the result of a change in the four sources of social power. However, I have found that SMT does not sufficiently explain ideological transformation in the Egyptian case and therefore does not sufficiently answer the study questions.

The aim was not only to define each source of the four sources of social power but also to address the dynamics of the relationship among them, applying what is known as the IEMP model (ideological, economic, military, and political), and the gaps that result from this relationship, which Mann calls "interstitial emergence." This is the point of convergence with SMT theory.

Chapter four explores research questions, thesis argument, and methodology. The fifth chapter discusses the changes within the Egyptian regime under Mubarak's rule from 1981 until early 2011. It focuses on three interrelated aspects; the first aspect tracks the historical evolution and the power networks of the regime of Hosni Mubarak. It also explores the time before that when Mubarak inherited the regime from his predecessors Mohammad Anwar Alsatat and Gamal Abdul Naser. Mubarak worked on promoting new networks of power to prolong and strengthen the grip of his regime. The chapter therefore also describes the transitions between power

networks that took place under his regime, and how relationships were formed between them, especially the military and the economy. Finally, it shows how the regime used its political power to protect the economic interests of the military.

The second aspect discusses the sources of social power separately. It addresses the question of whether there was an ideology for the state and studies the economic aspect in Mubarak's regime, the transformations that took place in the regime, the status of the military in the state, and its relationship with politics and the economy. The third aspect involves reviewing the gaps that emerged in the power networks, leading to the January 25 revolution. The focus is on those gaps in the power networks from which the MB and SC benefited by being able to increase their influence on the new regime.

The sixth chapter will discuss the MB, four aspects of which in particular. The first is the goals it pursued during Mubarak's rule and how it sought to achieve these goals in the context of the POS and power network transformations. This involves focusing on the MB's interaction with Mubarak's regime, and the transformations taking place throughout his time in power. The second aspect focuses on the MB in the post-Mubarak period and the ideological transformations at that time. The MB developed its ideology to reach the parliament, the Shura council, the presidency, and it issued the 2012 constitution, taking advantage of gaps in the power networks to gain power. The third aspect is the period of Morsi's rule, his accession and control of political power, how the relationship between political power and other sources of social power was managed, and finally, the flaw in this relationship which led to his removal. It will additionally address the ideological transformations in the Brotherhood in the period of Morsi's rule, in particular examining the 2012 constitution and how the Brotherhood addressed many issues, such as women, minorities, human rights, citizenship, liberal and secular parties, and the civil state.

The seventh chapter is dedicated to the Salafi Call movement, exploring three interrelated aspects in particular. The first aspect is its regulatory structure and its ideological positions under the Mubarak regime on many issues such as democracy, political parties, political participation, Copts, and the perception of the ruler. The second aspect is the ideological transitions that occurred after Mubarak, the impact of these transitions on the splits within the movement, and the disengagement of the rest of the Salafists from their alliance. The third aspect is its mechanisms for dealing with power networks and the ideology it established to do so, especially the justification it put forward while transitioning from the alliance with the Brotherhood to the alliance with the Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF).

The eighth and final chapter compares the MB and SC before and after Mubarak's rule, using cross-case analysis techniques including case-ordered effects and causal networks in four main areas. First, it examines the transitions and ideological perceptions of many issues such as democracy, citizenship, minorities' rights, women's rights, and the role of Islamic law in politics and the state. Second, it explores the ability of these movements to accept the ideas of others and to not impose a specific pattern on individuals, especially regarding cultural issues and values. Third, it compares the way the two movements deal with the sources of social power, especially the military and political power. Fourth, it discusses the relationship between the MB and SC. The aim of this comparison is to identify differences and similarities and understand the factors behind them.

CHAPTER 5: CHANGES WITHIN THE EGYPT REGIME (1981-2014)

5.1 Introduction

This chapter is structured according to the sources of social power theory developed by Michael Mann. Despite the importance of the discussions concerning the transformation of power networks since the establishment of the modern Egyptian state after Muhammad Ali's rule from 1805, the Egyptian state, as Samer Soliman says (2011), never reflected the model of a successful state; on the contrary, it represented the model of a failed one. The significance of studying the Mubarak era for 30 years lies in the fact that he could have corrected the Egyptian state's path and rebuilt it. However, his time in power contributed effectively to its increasing weakness and failed to facilitate the desired capitalist development. The financial crisis led to a dramatic change in the socio-economic scene and the re-establishment of the country's elite.

The Egyptian protests in early 2011 contained surprises for many analysts, who were driven to reexamine the turbulent situation in the Middle East. The 2011 protests were not new in Egypt, which has witnessed many protest movements such as Kefaya (Enough), as well as workers' and youth protest movements, which have increased significantly over the last few years. While the toppling of Mubarak was a surprise to some, it could perhaps have been anticipated.

This chapter aims at an accurate understanding of the economic, political, and ideological networks, the relations of armed forces officers with such networks, and the strengths and weaknesses in the local networks, as well as at understanding the regime's power network

transformations that led to the January 25 revolution. In addition, the chapter will also tackle how such transformations were the basis of the events that followed, based on the expansion of the theory's classical concepts of political opportunity structures.

I intend to reveal how Mubarak inherited the power networks from his predecessors, Nasser and Sadat, and then to explore the transformations in these power networks during the Mubarak era. The chapter will also focus on how these transformations led to the collapse of Mubarak's regime and the outbreak of the January 25 revolution.

The study of the ideological, economic, military, and political (IEMP) power network model transformations will be carried out in four sections. Section 5.2 attempts to explore Mubarak's strategies to dominate ideological power. Mubarak's regime was not an ideological one, but this did not stop him from monopolizing some of the religious and ideological institutions to support his legality and to quash protests, especially by Islamists.

Section 5.3 deals with how certain global political and economic crises influenced the Egyptian economy during the Mubarak era. Moreover, it will also demonstrate that the measures taken by the regime, particularly privatization, were not enough to deal with the economic crisis Mubarak had inherited from his predecessors. In fact, privatization affected the Egyptian economy negatively, especially after 2000, leading to an increase in external debt, continuation of inflation, and high unemployment rates. Economic failure was one of the most prominent elements of the Mubarak regime and the catalyst for the protests.

Section 5.4 unveils the emerging transformations of the relations of armed forces officers with the other power networks, how the armed forces prospered during the Mubarak era, and how this influenced their attitude after the January 25 revolution.

Section 5.5 analyzes the political openness and closure during Mubarak's regime. It follows the emergence of the different protest movements, such as those of workers, political groups, and youth, as well as the socio-economic political elite, who had full control over the political system, especially during the last decade, and were able to shut down all political protests, after the 2010 elections in particular.

5.2 Ideological Power under Mubarak

Many intellectuals and writers considered the ideology followed by Nasser to be a national socialist ideology; they called it "Nasserism" (see, e.g. Dekmejian, 1971; Perlmutter, 1974; Takrītī, 2000; Cook, 2012). It considered Arab nationalism as the solution to the dependency resulting from "colonialism and imperialism" and enmity to Israel, and expected it to create a common Arab awareness that would be able to achieve political unity and economic prosperity (Takrītī, 2000, pp. 352–353). The socialist path depended on social and economic change, though Nasser was also concerned with finding religious justifications for it; it affected his foreign policy, as he became close to the Soviet Union and was shunned by the United States and the West (Perlmutter, 1974, p. 169).

Abdullah Laroui argues that the search for contemporary Arab ideology should be conducted by associating the current intellectual matrix with the social conditions and historical circumstances; this is because ideology is not only a group of thoughts, it is also a matrix demonstrating the mutual impact of thought and practice (Laroui, 1993, p. 126). Within the understanding of the ideology, it can be said that Nasserism was not a fully fledged ideology, as it was characterized by some general principles and objectives that are difficult to describe. "Nasserism" depended on the experimental nature that Nasser called a "trial and error approach" (Muṣṭafá, 1995, pp. 111–119). Nasser sought to use nationalism and social reforms to legitimize

his actions and justify his exercise of power. Nationalist ideology became a source of hegemony that helped secure his rule; however, nationalist/Nasserist ideology lacked the doctrine of internal change (Dekmejian, 1971, p. 52).

The most apparent features of the ideology of the Sadat era (1970–1981) were economic openness and orientation toward the capital market, which were expressed in a realignment of international relations to include openness and orientation toward the West, as well as the use of religious discourse for mobilization (Khalaf Allāh, 1984, p. 154), a traditional, limited attitude to freedom, democracy, human rights, and some constitutional reforms (Wickham, 2013, pp. 30–32). According to Michael Mann’s standard (see chapter 3), there was no definable ideology, and the ideological context during Sadat’s regime was described as “hybrid” (Obaid, 2014).

Mubarak generally continued the policies that were followed during Sadat’s era; he confirmed peace with Israel, remained in alliance with the United States, and continued market economy expansion. Liberal transition policy continued, especially during the second half of his rule, aimed at the modernization of society. Mubarak depended on the political elite, which gradually took over the country’s resources; additionally, media affiliated to the regime or its business backers led cultural globalization in a direction targeting the religious and moral values of society that were inconsistent with those of the economic and political elites (Roll, 2013, p. 6). Despite a slight move toward democracy, the regime retained its authoritarian nature; that influenced the freedom of political parties, media, civil society, and the spread of corruption and nepotism (Roll, 2013).

5.2.1 Sectarianism and the Manufacturing of Minorities

Nasser, Sadat, and Mubarak all used the Coptic question to increase their domination and control over Egyptian society. The governing elites of the state utilized partial loyalties to

circumvent the laws of equality and citizenship while managing the conflict with their competitors and adversaries, especially the Islamists, by intimidating the Copts through Islamists to make them feel that the regime was their only protector. Moreover, instead of restraining the hostile sectarian discourses of some Islamists, the state used such discourses to describe all Islamists as extremists (Bishārah, 2012a). In 1998 security services succeeded in overcoming *Al-Jama'a Al-Islamiyya*, the regime's main opponent. Mubarak's government could claim, temporarily, that it had saved the Copts from the "Islamist threat". However, peace did not last for long, as the police that had crushed Islamist militants also posed a threat to Egyptian civilians. In August 1998, security officials in Kosheh, Sohag governorate, southern Egypt, tortured hundreds of Copts under the guise of investigating the murder of two Copts; that incident was a grim harbinger of the decade that followed: the last decade of Mubarak's regime (Brownlee, 2013, November 14, p. 11).

Egypt's pre-revolution regimes, especially in the last period of Hosni Mubarak's rule, failed to crystallize a comprehensive national identity around which all Egyptians could rally. This made the Copts retreat into their religious affiliation (Brownlee, 2013, November 14), which in turn, contributed to the formation of sectarianism. According to Burhān Ghalyūn (1979), weak integration of indigenous groups into the wider community as well as poor communication links among segments of society contributed to the emergence of sectarianism (p. 71). He argues that, in the absence of overarching civil standards able to develop a collective identity based on citizenship outside the framework of sub-identities, society becomes prone to conflicts and disputes among social groups.

Even during the January 25 revolution, demonstrators accused Mubarak of using the Coptic question as a means of causing instability in society in order to strengthen his authority

and justify his domination and the behavior of his security forces, particularly toward the Islamists, making them look like a threat to society. Shortly before the revolution, and after the bombing of the Two Saints Church in Alexandria, security services immediately accused the Salafist groups of being responsible and made arrests within their ranks; one of the members arrested, Sayed Belal, died under torture (Cambanis, 2015, p. 45). The regime tried to capitalize on the incident to tighten the siege on Gaza, with Habib Ibrahim El-Adly, former Interior Minister of Egypt, accusing a group of Sunni jihadists in Gaza of being involved in the bombing, which the group denied (al-Ghoul, 2014, January 8).

After the January 25 revolution, some of the media played a major role in using the Islamists in general, and “the advent of the Salafists” in particular, to frighten the Egyptian population and incite them against these groups. According to Fahmi Howeidy (2012, May 22), all Salafists were reduced to a stereotype and depicted as extremists, although there were wise and moderate people among them who were prepared to adapt to a changing political situation.

5.2.2 Non-Ideological Justifications for Domination

Under the rule of Mubarak, the National Democratic Party (NDP) turned from being a political party pursuing a nationalist ideology into a mere network of interests under a bureaucratic leadership. The governing party lost its ability to participate in the ideological debates of the community or to form civil standards to develop a collective identity based on citizenship outside the framework of sub-identities (Obaid, 2014). Cindy R. Jebb (2004) argues that during his first five years in power, Mubarak tried to accommodate moderate Islamists and secularists, giving some space to both the Muslim Brotherhood and secular opposition, while cracking down on radical Islamic movements; failed to promote nationalism as it had been in the Nasser era; and avoided engaging in the ideological discussions that were taking place in

intellectual circles. He restored the legal status and political participation of the Wafd Party, while the challenge posed by the Left Party began to fade (*ibid.*, pp. 43–44). According to Jebb, this atmosphere of “tolerance” embarrassed radical Islamic groups, while at the same time making an appeal to them (*ibid.*, p. 34).

However, this balance did not last; during the late 1980s, Mubarak’s regime began to reconsider its strategy toward the MB and seemed dissatisfied by its political and societal presence. The regime therefore gradually tried to inhibit its activities (*ibid.*, pp. 43–44); for example, a resolution was issued stating that all mosques were to be under the supervision of the Egyptian Ministry of Awqaf, and amendments were made to the NGO Law (Gaffney, 2004, pp.134–136). After many years of Mubarak presenting himself as the sole protector of the Egyptians against political Islam, many secular Egyptians were happy to support him against the Islamists (Ghanem, 2014, p. 9).

Within the framework of their hegemony, the regime and the SCAF sought to use “national security” to justify intervention in all political affairs. The Emergency Law was in force during the whole of Mubarak’s time in power, while the regime claimed that it was limiting its use of the emergency powers to dealing with the dangers of terrorism and drugs. However, the Emergency Law, which included several restrictions on citizens’ rights and freedoms, was often used against political opposition groups and peaceful protest movements (Rutherford, 2008, p. 92). The Emergency Law formed a reference for the increasing dependence of the regime on security measures; thus, an important aspect of the work of the Ministry of Interior and its various agencies was to achieve political security, which came to mean the security of the government (*ibid.*). On the military side, Yezid Sayigh (2012b, pp. 22–23) argues that the military repeatedly called for a national rhetoric based on evoking the “victory” achieved by the armed forces in the

war against Israel in 1973. Anti-civilian rhetoric was used to justify the former officers' takeover of all state agencies; additionally, the armed forces, corporations, and economic military bodies were used to provide social services and other public benefits, as well as a wide range of consumer goods.

5.2.3 Polarization of Ideological Institutions

Article No. 2 of the 1971 Constitution – which was in force during Mubarak's era – states that “Islam is the religion of the state and Arabic its official language. Principles of Islamic law (*Shari'a*) are the principal source of legislation.” This did not mean that the regime had an ideology; at the same time, it did not mean that it refrained from intervening in ideological competition. Mubarak's regime did not depend on administrative and security measures alone to confront ideological competitors; it also sought to intervene between the Islamists and non-Islamists. The Ministry of Culture organized and financed major cultural projects and activities, and it provided liberal and leftist intellectuals loyal to the regime with resources and opportunities to confront Islamists (Lust et al., 2012). Ellen Lust, Gamal Soltan, and Jakob Wichmann (2012) say that secularists' fear of Islamists decreased after the decline of the radical Islamists. The regime tried to strengthen the ideological divisions by continuing to insinuate that the MB posed a major threat to political life; nevertheless, the secular opposition considered the authoritarian regime as more of a threat than the MB and allied with it on more than one occasion (ibid.).

Mubarak's government imposed tight controls over cultural and intellectual fields and activities, subjected them to bureaucratic procedures, and watched them closely; additionally, press, television, and radio were directly controlled by the security services (Elshahed, 2011, April 4). This was not because the regime wanted to impose a particular ideology; on the contrary, there were many religious satellite channels dominated by the Salafists during

Mubarak's time (Fayed, 2012, July 16), but they were not against the regime. Nathan J. Brown (2013a) argues that organizations, movements, and state bodies that all fall under the broad catchall of "Islamic", but which often fundamentally disagree on political, legal, and religious matters, end up competing against each other, as well as against secular elements of the Egyptian body politic, for influence.

Al-Azhar was among the religious institutions that Mubarak's regime sought to dominate. Since 1952, successive Egyptian regimes mobilized religious figures when required by the political circumstances. They tried to dominate the religious institutions (Zeghal, 1999, pp. 381–382), particularly Al-Azhar, to give a certain degree of religious legitimacy to Mubarak's rule. Al-Azhar's political and national role declined as its Sheikhs mostly came to support the authorities. For example, Imam Mohamed Al-Khader Hussein (1952–1954) described the coup of 1952 as "the greatest social coup that Egypt had witnessed for centuries"; Sheikh Abdel Halim Mahmoud, Al-Azhar Sheikh, also supported Sadat's stand toward the leftist forces after the well-known events of January 1977 and described the Communists as "atheists" who do not belong to Muslims (ibid.). "Al-Azhar has emerged as a power in its own right, delicately placed between the government and the Islamist opposition" (Barraclough, 1998, p. 236). From the time that Mubarak assumed the presidency in 1981, his regime, in order to demonstrate its Islamic credentials, assigned major administrative functions to Al-Azhar (ibid.). As for Al-Azhar, it used the powers conferred on it to enhance its power and play a more important role in the decision-making process.

The regime had other flexible and persuasive people; the most important of them was the former Mufti, Mohamed Sayed Tantawi, who was in charge of *Iftaa* in 1986. He offered many facilities to the requests of the Authority (Brown, 2011c, October 3, p.8). Furthermore, he led the

confrontation with the Islamic groups, and issued a number of *fatwas* (legal opinion by an Islamic scholar) which were subject to extraordinary controversy. In 1996, Tantawi became the Grand Imam of Al-Azhar, which deepened the institution's relationship with the state and helped blur the distinction between politics and religion (Barraclough, 1998, pp. 237–238). The regime repeatedly relied on Al-Azhar to issue statements justifying its campaigns against the Islamists. Al-Azhar also supported legislation that aroused the rancor of Islamic movements (*ibid.*). For example, at the end of 2002, Tantawi supported France's right to adopt a law preventing Muslim girls from wearing the veil in French schools. Although this fatwa (legal opinion) provoked widespread rejection by both local and international Islamic institutions, the Egyptian regime supported it (Abdelhadi, 2003, December 30).

One of the main religious groups that the Mubarak regime sought to co-opt was the Sufis. It managed to win over most of the Sufi groups,⁹ participated in their celebrations, and allowed them, to a great extent, to celebrate the anniversaries of their sheikhs' birthdays (*mawalid*) and to gather to praise Allah. This closeness increased to the extent that some Sufi sheikhs considered themselves an important part of national security and of the regime. Mubarak needed Sufis to support his legitimacy as against Islamist groups (Zahran, 2014, May 26). The most obvious manifestations of this support given to the National Democratic Party (NDP) by Sufis was that many Sufi followers and sheikhs stood for parliamentary elections in 2010 on its list, notably

⁹ Contemporary Egyptian Sufi *tariqas* are considered a special case in a varied religious and political environment. Most Sufi *tariqas* in Egypt are characterized by a lack of political participation and a focus on the social dimension; they have a strong presence in popular life through participating in the celebrations of the birthdays of pious people and Prophet Mohamed's birthday, in parallel with a variety of religious events (Zahran, 2014, May 26).

Abdel Hadyel-Kasaby, Shaykh Alaa Abu El-Azayem, and Essam Zaky Ibrahim, Sheikh of the Muhammadiyah clan. (Cesari, 2014, p. 148).¹⁰

5.2.4 Conclusion

Steven Cook (2012, p. 5) argues that “Gamal Abdel Nasser and his two successors, Anwar Sadat and Hosni Mubarak, never developed an appealing narrative of Egyptian society that was shared among the vast majority of Egyptians [...] Mubarak's Egypt was almost totally void of ideological content, instead the regime tried to elicit loyalty to the state through economic development, but fell back on coercion to maintain order. As a result, Egypt became a corrupt police state par excellence”. The use of hegemony and co-optation over some religious institutions did not help Mubarak and the NDP to formulate any ideological or regulatory substitute for the Islamic movements, nor did it help him to legitimize his regime for more time than it lasted. In the absence of ideology and due to widespread corruption, Mubarak’s regime fell.

5.3 The Economics of Liberalization

Gamal Abdul Nasser tried, during his time in office (1956–1970), to implement Arab socialism through rapid economic development and reorganization of the economy (El-Mahdi and Marfleet, 2009, p. 4). Many new organizations, such as the Economic Development Organization and the Supreme Council of National Planning, were established. Through such organizations the state’s

¹⁰ For more information about Sufi *tariqas* in Egypt and their relationship with the successive regimes in Egypt, see the documentary film *Mawalid Al-Mahrousa* (Famous pious people’s birthdays in Egypt) in two parts, produced by Al Jazeera Channel:

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ue2XFHerLcE> (accessed in 2014, January 19)

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ng_hI9-u3zc (accessed in 2014, January 19)

economic policies were developed and economic control was centralized (Dekmejian, 1971, p. 126). However, Sadat discontinued Nasser's economic policy. Shortly after coming to power, in 1973, he launched the *Infitah* policy ("open" economy). He submitted a paper in October 1974 in which he recommended opening up the Egyptian economy to foreign investment and joint investment projects from Arab countries as well as reinforcing the role of the private sector in the economy. To support this, he issued Law No. 43/1974, which granted tax exemptions to foreign companies and lowered the tax on exports and imports (Alissa, 2007, p.3).


Despite Sadat's open economy policy, Egypt was quickly heading toward economic crisis by the end of the first five-year plan, and public sector expenditures rose continuously.¹¹ After food riots in 1977¹², the International Monetary Fund (IMF) put its plan for lending to Egypt on hold, and the government's expenditure on the food commodities subsidy also continued to increase. In 1980 oil prices collapsed, leading to a decrease in oil income, Suez Canal charges due to the decrease in the number of ships, and approved foreign aid and tax revenues (Soliman, 2011,

¹¹ John Waterbury (1983) describes Sadat's five-year plan thus: "Nineteen seventy-six was a crucial year in enracinating (*sic*) Egypt in the inflationary game of printing money. In that year the investment budget of the annual Plan was divided into two tranches of £E 798 million and £E 574.4. When the Plan was drawn up, domestic and foreign funding were in hand to cover the first tranche, but the second would depend on massive infusion of Arab credits. It was announced publicly that these were likely to be forthcoming. At the same time Egypt was negotiating a standby agreement and stabilization plan with the IMF. This would have entailed a substantial reduction in the current account deficit essentially through the elimination of several consumer goods subsidies. The net deficit, which stood at over £E 700 million in 1975, would have been reduced to about £E 150 million. Instead, what transpired was that funding for the second tranche did not materialize, but public sector companies had gone ahead and borrowed from Egyptian public sector banks on the assumption that it would" (pp. 114–115).

¹² Demonstrations on 17 and 18 January 1977, the so-called Bread Demonstrations, broke out to express public objection to the increase in the bread price and Sadat's economic policies. Many students participated in these demonstrations along with factory workers and others against subsidy removal and price increases. Many were shot dead and others were arrested. These demonstrations forced Sadat to revoke his decisions.

pp. 41–42). Figure 5.1 indicates the difference between expenditures and revenues during the Sadat era; it also shows that there was a deficit during the whole of Sadat’s time in power.

Figure 5.1: Public revenues and expenditures as a percentage of GDP in Egypt



Source: (Ahmed, 1984; Soliman, 2011, p. 39)

Both Nasser and Sadat had promised the Egyptian people that they would develop the required conditions to empower Egyptians economically. However, both failed to fulfill their promises. Many Egyptians therefore realized that they had illusions rather than real dreams, and they protested. The most severe protests broke out in 1968 during Nasser’s era and 1977 during Sadat’s era (Pelletiere, 1994, p. 5). Stephen C. Pelletiere describes the country’s economic status when handed over to Hosni Mubarak by his predecessors thus: “Husni Mubarak, was left to pick up the pieces; the bloated bureaucracy, the society that could not produce, and hanging over all, the burgeoning debts to the IMF” (1994, p. 5).

Mubarak’s economic policy became apparent at the economic conference held on 12 February 1982. During this conference, many declarations were made: “The government would revert to central economic and social planning and steer the Open Door Policy towards production” (Soliman, 2011, p. 36). Following this conference, Mubarak’s first five-year plan

(1982–1987) was declared. It included investment plans, which the Planning Ministry was assigned to carry out. Many infrastructure projects were included in the five-year plan, as well as public sector investments. Furthermore, Mubarak implemented policies to foster industrial development, which included customs fees to protect local industries, decreasing the interest rate on industrial loans, and decreasing the taxes on industrial projects. Such measures helped in the growth of the local industrial sector (Soliman, 2011, p. 37). Both public and private sectors benefited from this government intervention. However, these measures took place at the expense of the Egyptian consumer, who had to pay prices higher than those abroad (*ibid.*, p. 38).

5.3.1 Egyptian Privatization

In 1988 Egypt's external debts reached \$50 billion (Ahmad et al., 1990, p. 218), and in 1990 Egypt faced virtual bankruptcy. At this point, Iraq invaded Kuwait. The United States along with its allies declared war on Iraq in 1991. Egypt made use of its strategic importance to Washington and the other Western powers in order to get financial aid from the IMF and the World Bank. In 1991 Egypt signed the Economic Reform and Structural Adjustment Program (ERSAP) Agreement with the IMF, by virtue of which the IMF approved a loan to Egypt of \$300 million in 1991 (Weiss and Wurzel, 1998, p. 23).

For the purposes of supervising the Western aid granted to Egypt, and to enable Egypt to pay the rest of its external debts, the government had to apply free market concepts including encouragement and facilitation of the private sector through a free market economy and privatization of companies owned by the state (Joya, 2011, p. 370). By virtue of Law No. 203/1991, 314 companies affiliated to the public sector that could be privatized were added to the list. The Egyptian Trade Union Federation (ETUF) approved the 1991 legislation despite the fact


that it had rejected privatization since the declaration of the “Open Door” economic policy in 1974 (Beinin, 2010, p.13). An IMF paper described the economic condition of Egypt as follows:

By the standards of recent experience with economic stabilization, Egypt in the 1990s is a remarkable success story. Determined macroeconomic policy, together with some favorable external developments, has brought much reduced inflation, led to improved public finances, a stable currency, and a strengthened banking system, together with a sound balance of payments position. (Handy, 1998, p. 1)

However, ERSAP required the adoption of a comprehensive method that the Egyptian economy could not support. This was for two reasons: first, the huge changes in the international economic environment after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the international trend toward capitalism; second, the increasing social tensions in Egypt and the internal security issues, especially the confrontation between the ruling regime and extremist fundamental groups (Weiss and Wurzel, 1998, p. 24). ERSAP forced Mubarak to decrease the government subsidy, reducing the number of food supply cardholders from 79% of Egypt’s people in 1994 to around 65% in 1999 (Siam, 2003).

The private sector, having been a minor force during the socialist state in the era of Nasser, grew during the eras of both Sadat and Mubarak to become the key driver of economic growth in Egypt. In 2011 the private sector represented 63% of total domestic output and employed 70% of Egyptian labour (Roll, 2013, pp.7–8; Saif and Ghoneim, 2013, June 17, p. 8).

Figure 5.2 shows the importance of the private sector in the Egyptian economy 1985-2011.



Source: (Roll, 2013, p. 7–8)

Table 5.1: The Structure of the Private Sector in Egypt in 2011

Classification of the private sector	The number of employees in the organization	Ratio	In terms of employment rates
Microenterprises	one to four employees	91%	58%
Small and medium enterprises	five to 100 people	8%	25%
large corporations		less than 1%	17%

Source: (Saif and Ghoneim, 2013, June 17, p. 8)

Small and medium-sized enterprises faced numerous obstacles, including limited access to financing, and limited access to financing forced many medium enterprises into the private sector. Large corporations normally had access to decision makers, and may have been skewing policy in their interests (Saif and Ghoneim, 2013, June 17, p. 8).

5.3.2 Socio-Economic Transformation

The privatization policy adopted by Mubarak did not lead to the expected social and economic prosperity in the community. The new liberal policies created more social and

economic problems such as corruption, unemployment, and low per capita income. The state failed to fulfill the increasing needs of the Egyptian people as, for example, the free market economy had a negative impact on workers and peasants. By the end of 1990 the average land rent was 22 times higher than the land tax, which led many peasants, who had previously been tenants, to become overloaded with debt and lose their land (Joya, 2011, p. 370). Furthermore, there was extreme disparity in the distribution of wealth in the Egyptian community, leading to increased costs of living (rent, medical care, education, and food) and unemployment rates as a result of the privatization policy and the decrease in the basic food commodities subsidy (ibid., p. 374).

The poverty ratio in Egypt was 24%, 19%, and 16.7% in 1990/91, 1995/96, and 1999/2000 respectively (El-Laithy et al., 2003, p. 9; United Nations, 2005, p. 21)¹³. Furthermore, in July 2006 the government increased the prices of transportation, electricity, and communication, placing further pressure on workers' limited incomes (Farah, 2009, p. 51).

There is a very long history of strikes in Egypt. Prior to the adoption of the privatization policy, the country witnessed workers' strikes and protests; for example, when the government doubled obligatory deductions of the public sector workers in 1984, tens of thousands of weaving workers and their families in Kafr Dawar staged three days of protests. The protests included cutting off telephone lines, setting fires, stopping various means of transport, and destroying trains before security forces launched a wide crackdown to restore order (Beinin, 2010, p. 13). In the iron and steel company in Helwan the local union committee refused to support the demand of 25,000 workers for an increase in their salaries, which led to protests in July and August 1989.


¹³ This is using the lower poverty line; using the upper one, ratios at the three dates are 39%, 41%, and 24% (United Nations, 2005, p. 21).

These protests were dispersed by security forces, leading to the death of one worker and injury to hundreds (ibid.).

Although the prominent figures in the Egyptian Trade Union Federation complied with the economic transformation, many of the union's grassroots members did not (Beinin, 2012, June 28). During a wave of mass protests in 1984–1989, many alternative newspapers and organizations appeared, giving the workers a way to express themselves away from the state-controlled ETUF. However, they could not escape repression from the Mubarak regime, which reacted very harshly to workers' protests (Beinin, 2010, p. 13).

Growth in employment slowed down due to a lack of public investment, which led to a decrease in job opportunities as a result of ERSAP pressures (Farah 2009, p. 44). Economic liberalization had a negative impact on workers and peasants in general. While investment in the public sector shrank, the private sector did not intervene to bridge this gap. Thus, the economy and the Egyptian community had to depend on the economic infrastructure, which could not bear the load (Ikram, 2006, pp. 74–75). The worries concerning unemployment – the unemployment rate had increased from 8.6% in 1990 to 11.3% in 1995 – and other potential consequences of privatization led to the eruption of more protests and joint actions by the mid-1990s.

Figure 5.3: Unemployment rates in Egypt.



Source: (World Development Indicators (WDI), December 2013)

The period from 1990 to 2005 witnessed a strict policy of structural adjustment, speeding up economic privatization and liberalization, the emergence of a number of new liberals inside the ruling NDP, strengthening trade interests, and parliament and government representation (Farah, 2009). Between 1993 and 2003, 197 public institutions were privatized. As a result, a large number of workers were dismissed (*ibid.*, p. 45). The workers tried to defend their rights and occupations but faced a violent response from the government. For example, in September 1994, 7000 workers were locked out of the Kafr Dawar spinning and weaving factory as a result of their strike. On 2 October state security forces used live ammunition against the strikers, resulting in the death of four workers, 120 injured and arrested, and 90 more arrested (Joya, 2011, p. 373). In the spinning and weaving factory in Helwan in 1998, after the privatization of public sector companies and a wave of protests and strikes, 8700 workers were given a grace period of three weeks to resign, while only 2800 were allowed to return to work (Farah, 2009, p. 46).

In July 2004 Mubarak appointed a new government chaired by Dr Ahmed Nazif. The Nazif government hastened the privatization process and privatized 17 companies during its first year. This figure is deemed a record. Mubarak's son, Gamal, was a supporter of this policy (Beinin, 2010, p. 14). The global financial crisis which erupted in the second half of 2008 led to an increase in unemployment rates, from 8.7% in 2008 to 9.4% in 2009 (World Development Indicators (WDI), December 2013). Some observers believe that the rate may even have been double this (Beinin, 2010, p. 14).

During 2007, strikes moved from heavy industries such as spinning and clothes to include the workers in construction materials, transportation, the Cairo metro, food commodities, bakeries, sewerage, oil in Suez, and many other fields. The strikes also expanded to include civil service employees (Beinin, 2010, pp. 14–15). In 2010 there was a wide array of protests carried

out by workers who demanded an increase in the minimum monthly wage from \$100 to \$240 (Ismail, 2011, February 6). The years 2008–2010 witnessed a dramatic increase in the number of demonstrations, protests, sit-ins, and strikes: approximately 1455 acts of protest (Abdelrahman, 2015, p. 76).¹⁴ Workers’ strikes coincided with the demonstrations organized by Kefaya. However, the links binding the workers’ movement were very fragile, and the democratic opposition in Egypt had very limited capabilities to mobilize people to support “the educated, urban middle classes” (Beinin, 2010, p. 14).

The regime not only violated the laws governing the mass layoff of workers, it also transcended and tried to circumvent these laws.¹⁵ Law No. 203 banned the mass layoffs following a company’s privatization, “but public-sector managers commonly made their enterprises more attractive to buyers by reducing the workforce before the sale” (Beinin, 2010, p.13).

5.3.3 Political-Economic Elite

Dieter Weiss and Ulrich Wurzel (1998) argue that the three key political forces in Egypt were the state bureaucracy, the public sector, and the army. Their relative influence differed at various times during Egypt’s modern history. During the period from 1952 to 1992 the bureaucratic system was deeply rooted in the state. Its employees increased from 350,000 to 4

¹⁴ Nadine Abdalla estimated the number of protest actions against the Mubarak regime between 2008 and 2010 at around 1893 (2012, p. 2). Regardless of the exact figures, however, the dramatic upward trend is irrefutable. Joel Beinin (2010) estimates that there were 1900 strikes and other forms of protest from 2004 to 2008 (pp. 16–18).

¹⁵ Joel Beinin says that “Law 84 of 2002 regulating nongovernmental organizations (NGOs); the Trade Union Law (No. 35 of 1976) and its amendments, Law No. 1 of 1981 and Law No. 12 of 1995; and the Unified Labor Law (No. 12 of 2003) indicates some of the many ways the government uses, manipulates, and ignores the law in order to undermine the rights of workers and all citizens” (2010, p. 26).

million.¹⁶ From 1980 to 1992 the bureaucratic system grew by 240% and continued to grow, leading to the spread of favoritism and corruption (p. 191).

By the mid-1990s a new economic force had emerged. Many businessmen joined the NDP, the number of new members being the highest in Egypt's modern history. Before 2000 the representation of businessmen in the parliament was 8%; following the 2000 elections it increased to 17%, then 34% in 2005. Excluding the businessmen financing the NDP elections (Joya, 2011, p. 370; Loewe, 2013, p. 27), Markus Loewe argues that the most prominent reasons why businessmen stood for parliament before 2000 was to be granted immunity. However, later a network of businessmen was formed, which not only dominated business associations but also the parliamentary committees assigned to develop economic policy (2013, p. 28). The political result was to free the economy to reinforce relations between the NDP and businessmen who enjoyed full monopoly over important economic sectors such as iron and steel, communications, food products, and beverages (Farah, 2009, p. 81), instead of depending on economic competition, investment in research and development, and involvement of people in the economy, wealth and power.

The privatization policy adopted by the government transferred public resources to the hands of a new economic elite, which found allies inside the ruling NDP, including Mubarak's son, Gamal. This strengthened relations between businessmen and bureaucrats and enhanced the role of businessmen in policy development. Businessmen played crucial roles in Ahmed Nazif's government (2005–2011): six important portfolios were assigned to the most prominent

businessmen in Egypt – the Ministries of Trade and Industry, Population, Transport, Health, Agriculture, and Social Insurance (Joya, 2011, p. 370).

Egypt's external debts increased from \$28 billion in 2005 to \$37 billion in 2009, 85% of which was publicly guaranteed by the Mubarak regime. The Egyptian ruling elite, close to Mubarak, benefited to a great extent from these loans, which Adam Hanieh (2011, p. 2) described as “odious debt”, that is to say, the dictator's regime alone benefited from them in blatant disregard for public interest. In an experimental survey conducted for the German Institute for International and Security Affairs, Stephen Roll (2013) estimated that by the end of 2010 there were at least 21 families owning net assets exceeding \$100 million. The most prominent of these were the Sawiris and the Mansours. This elite clearly owned a huge percentage of the Egyptian stock market. In 2008, 100 families owned more than 30% of the market value of the Egyptian Stock Market (EGX). In 2011 there were 490 families whose wealth exceeded \$65 billion (ibid., p. 8).

Among the most prominent examples of this monopolistic capitalism is Ahmed Ezz, who typifies the corruption of the Mubarak era. Ezz monopolized the steel industry, owning two-thirds of the steel market and thus controlling the prices of basic construction materials. His dominance increased through his influence within the ruling NDP: he was a close friend of Gamal Mubarak. He also played an important role in the Egyptian parliament's Budget Committee. It is thus no surprise that protestors set his house on fire during the demonstrations, and one of the key reasons for their request to have him prosecuted during the January 25 revolution (Joya, 2011, p. 371).

The Mubarak regime needed support from private sector leaders to facilitate the transfer of power to Gamal. The leading businessmen offered to provide political support to Gamal in exchange for privileges serving their commercial interests. Examples include land allocation, the

freezing of anti-monopoly laws, and suspicious privatization deals. Such examples of corruption stuck in the minds of the Egyptian people (Saif & Ghoneim, 2013, June 17, p. 10). The protests that erupted, leading to the downfall of Mubarak in 2011, were therefore due not only to political suppression and tyranny but also to social injustice and corruption. The period leading up to the January 25 revolution was full of anger toward the business elite which had benefited so much from the privatization policies of the past decades. The elite, referred to as “Fat Cats”, were accused of gaining their wealth through networking with political power (Roll, 2013, p. 7).¹⁷

Stephan Roll argues that many businessmen tended to avoid political participation, but they also possessed multiple channels of influence to safeguard their interests in the political process (ibid., p. 9). This indirect influence was quite evident in the case of the Copt Naguib Sawiri, a member of one of the biggest Egyptian families. He had commercial relations with senior politicians and had influence over Egyptian policy through media channels affiliated to him, in addition to his membership in business associations and organizations. These organizations enjoyed vast powers and helped the elite’s interests in the political game (Roll, 2013, p. 9). “A particularly important role was played by the Egyptian Center for Economic Studies (ECES), founded in the mid-1990s by a group of influential business figures and granted more than \$10 million in 2001 by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)” (Roll, 2013, p. 9).

¹⁷ “Among the most visible and influential organizations formed before the revolution is the Federation of Egyptian Industries, which comprises sixteen chambers of industry that seek to support Egypt’s manufacturing sectors. It serves as a formal lobby for the interests of its members. Another prominent institution is the Federation of Egyptian Chambers of Commerce. This organization, the member chambers of which represent various governorates, aims to serve the interests of the Egyptian business community in general. These federations are semi-official bodies. The government appoints their chairs and contributes to their financing” (Saif & Ghoneim, 2013, June 17, p. 9).

Another key economic elite is the military elite. This small group was able to widen its networks, gaining more experience, increasing its opportunities to secure important economic structures and for its members to secure lucrative positions after their retirement. High-ranking officers, who were the most loyal to Mubarak, were in positions that enabled them to become board members in commercial companies owned by the state. Such sinecures were a very good source for the military elite to consolidate their wealth (Sayigh, 2012b).

Individual military officers became more powerful than the army itself. Close links and networks developed between generals and businessmen who owned the leading projects. One good example is Shafik Gabr, who was a businessman in international telecommunications, based in Washington. He owned the Artoc Group,¹⁸ which represented a group of global companies in Egypt that provided the armed forces with a wide array of both civilian and military products (Roll, 2013, p. 10).¹⁹ The private sector also depended largely on the army, especially for land deals, for example to establish new factories or resorts. The armed forces had the legal authority to confiscate the public lands at any time for national security purposes (Roll, 2013, p. 9).

5.3.4 Economic Challenges after 25 January 2011

In spring 2008, protests broke out against the increase in food prices. The main incident was a strike by workers in a spinning and weaving factory in Almahalla Alkubra, which started on 6 April 2008. A group of Egyptian bloggers created a Facebook page with the name “April 6

¹⁸ The Artoc Group supplied the military with all kinds of equipment, from ejector seats to equipment for the army’s fitness studios (ARTOC Sports) (Roll, 2013, p. 9).

¹⁹ The army also entered into deals with foreign companies. The Egyptian business elite participated in such deals. For example, after 2001, the Kuwaiti Kharafi group participated in joint ventures with the armed forces inside Egypt. Moataz Al Alfy, who was one of the businessmen with great political influence during the time of Mubarak, supervised such agreements.

Youth Movement”. It is known that this movement played a crucial role in the Egyptian revolution in 2011 (Abdou & Zaazou, 2013, p. 104).


The revolution was a response to many years of neoliberal policies which contributed to a dramatic transformation of the Egyptian community by transferring power to the hands of an elite. Many Egyptians felt that they had been excluded from the privatization process, while the gap between rich and poor increased, and living conditions became harsher for workers and peasants. The neoliberal policies had triggered a deep economic crisis in 1980, characterized by low revenues from oil and the Suez Canal, and low monetary transfers from immigrant Egyptians. The slump lasted until Mubarak stepped down in 2011. All these factors increased external debt and added to the financial burdens on the state (Joya, 2011, p. 370).

Following the resignation of Mubarak, there was a difficult transitional period. It started with low foreign direct investment (FDI), in addition to the budget deficit increase from 8.1% in 2009/2010 to 10% in 2010/2011, a global increase in food and oil prices, an increase in the inflation rate from 11.7% in 2009/2010 to 13.4% by early 2011, an increase in the percentage of Egyptians living below the poverty line from 21.6% in 2009 to 25.2% in 2011 (World Bank, 2015), and an increase in the unemployment rate in Egypt from 8.9% in the last quarter of 2010 to 11.9% in the first quarter of 2011 due to the influence of political unrest (Trading Economics, 2015).²⁰ All these factors influenced the democratic transformation following the January 25 revolution and represented a challenge to any president of Egypt (Abdou and Zaazou, 2013, p. 92), by increasing government expenditure on unemployment benefits, which led to weaker

²⁰ The Center for American Progress says that official estimates suggested that the youth unemployment rate was actually 25%, and that these numbers therefore underestimated the actual scale of joblessness; “These numbers don’t capture the many people that show up in labor statistics as being employed when in reality they are underemployed, sharing low-productivity work, or are in other forms of irregular employment. Such individuals are not gainfully employed” (Dewan, et al., 2012, p. 1).

economic performance, especially given the dominance of the business elite and military officers over the Egyptian economy (ibid., p. 102). Meanwhile, the living standards of the vast majority of Egyptians faced continuous erosion (Hanieh, 2011, p. 2).

Figure 5.4: Egypt unemployment rate (2009-2012)



Source: (Trading Economics, 2014).

The economic transformation after the toppling of Mubarak in February 2011 was slow and distorted; for example, tourism decreased by a third in 2011 and foreign investors were hesitant with regard to investment in Egypt. Meanwhile, the Egyptian consumer was still suffering from the burdens of the increase in food prices, in addition to the ineffectiveness of the tax collection process and a change in the governmental subsidy of goods (Dewan, Hairston, and Bernhardt, 2012, p. 1). At the same time, investments deteriorated badly due to widespread negative sentiment toward the private sector. The media contributed to promoting the negative climate by highlighting the corruption in the private sector and accusing the latter of being reluctant to contribute effectively during the transitional period (Saif & Ghoneim, 2013, pp. 3–4).

During the period of President Mohamed Morsi, the government took some steps to regain the confidence of the private sector in the Egyptian economy. However, Ahmed Ghoneim and Ibrahim Saif (2013) argue that the Muslim Brotherhood failed to provide a sense of security regarding its overall economic policy. Furthermore, many in the private sector were concerned that the MB might have been partly promoting a negative image of the business climate in Egypt (ibid.) (see chapter 4). In the two years after the January 25 revolution, the financial deficit reached more than 10% of total domestic production in Egypt, and growth in 2012 reached 2.2% (ibid., p. 5). “Capital inflows have dried up due to the high risk associated with business investment and a significant drop in tourism. The result has been a plunge in foreign currency reserves from \$24.1 billion in September 2011 to about \$15.04 billion in September 2012, which is equivalent to about 2.6 months of imports” (ibid.).

5.4 The Military–Power Networks Relationship

The significance of the Egyptian army lies in its national importance and its role in affecting the political and economic fields in Egypt and their impact on the political, social, and economic structure through which the social movements work. Compared with the armies of the Arab region in which the revolutions and protests were launched, the Egyptian army is unique, as it does not depend on a sectarian structure, as does the Syrian army, or tribal loyalties, like the Libyan army in the period of Muammar Gaddafi or the Yemeni army. It is also different from the Tunisian army, as the Tunisian president, Habib Bourguiba, banned the military from participating in civil society in order to avoid the occurrence of upheavals. This continued in the time of his successor, Zein El Abidine Ben Ali, who worked on constructing a base of authority around the police force and internal security forces. He also gave the army the duties of keeping borders and defense, so the Tunisian army did not interfere in politics and the economy as did the

Egyptian army, which had political and economic interests to maintain (Barany, 2011, p. 28). Whether the Egyptian army would decide to support the regime, its opponents, or remain neutral, depended on several factors that will be discussed in this section.

After the overthrow of the monarchy at the hands of the armed forces in 1952, Major General Mohammad Naguib was appointed Prime Minister in 1952, then President in 1953. This coup represents a turning point in the history of modern Egypt, especially after the accession of Colonel Gamal Abdul Nasser as president by popular referendum in 1956. He formed a government of which military officers made up 64%, keeping the Council of Ministers in essence a military government (Abdelfattah et al., 2014, p. 238). Under the rule of Nasser, the Egyptian army took control of the political field in Egypt and played the traditional role of kingmaker, as all the presidents of Egypt since then have been from the ranks of the army, until Mohamed Morsi, the first civilian president (Lutterbeck, 2011, p. 25). Nasser's regime lasted from 1956 to 1970 and operated in several directions: socially and economically, it supervised land redistribution and the nationalization of the industrial and financial sectors in the 1950s. Ideologically, it supervised the implementation of socialist policies from late 1961 (Sayigh, 2012b, p. 4). Egypt began military intervention in Yemen in September 1962. The defeat of 1967 in the war against Israel was a turning point, however, and after this disastrous failure Nasser deposed his close ally and chief of the armed forces, Abdul Hakim Amer, and a group of other officers, and began to limit the army's intervention in politics (Silverman, 2012, pp. 24-25).

After Nasser's death, his Vice President, Anwar Sadat, held the reins of power. During his time the foreign and defense policies of Egypt were redirected. The defeat of Egypt in the 1967 war was a blow that prompted Sadat to make efforts to limit the political influence of the army and re-focus it on purely military duties. He blamed the poor performance during the 1967 war on

incompetence and cronyism in the armed forces (Lutterbeck, 2011, p. 25). However, this policy did not continue unchanged; in the wake of the 1979 peace treaty with Israel, the Egyptian army received an aid package from the United States of an average of \$1.3 billion a year. Sadat sought to give the Ministerial Council and the state administration a civil nature (Sayigh, 2012b, p. 11), but the state of peace resulting from the Camp David Accords did not result in a reduction in the size and influence of the Egyptian army as had been expected. Instead, the peace with Israel led to preparation for the expansion of military influence in the local arena. The armed forces grew, military expenditure increased, and the Egyptian commanders created rewarding opportunities for the military bureaucracy to reinforce its role in the local economy. The shift in the Egyptian defense and foreign policies contributed in developing a new set of political and economic interests that guided the conduct of the local army in the following decades (Brumberg & Sallam, 2012, p. 3). In addition, the armed forces were in constant need of senior officers despite the end of the state of war with Israel in 1979. The number of officers in active service was 468,500, 479,000 in the reserves, and 72,000 paramilitary forces associated with the armed forces. The armed forces also provided a huge number of senior executive and administrative officers in the Interior Ministry and the General Intelligence Directorate that followed the President (Sayigh, 2012b, p. 5).

5.4.1 The Military and Political Power in the Time of Mubarak: Influence and Suppression

Sadat was assassinated in 1982 by officers belonging to the Al-Jama‘a Al-Islamiyya, which rejected the Camp David Accords. Once again, the vice president took power after the death of his predecessor, and Hosni Mubarak became president. Robert Satloff (1988) argues that the planning of political and military policies at the beginning of the Mubarak era began from the premise that the Egyptian military regime prioritized three issues: the army’s presence on the

internal front, its relationship with Israel, and its position of the first Gulf War between Iraq and Iran.²¹ This tripartite focus evolved to affect several key decisions concerning the nature of the Egyptian armed forces and its relationship to political affairs. Satloff says: “One of the most important of these is the political choice not to seek quality in manpower at the expense of quantity.” (1988, p. 58).

Mubarak was determined not to risk the rise of another military strongman who could challenge his authority. He dismissed the Defense Minister, Abdel Halim Abu Ghazala, who was thought by many to be more popular than Mubarak, both within the armed forces and among the common people (Sayigh, 2012b, p. 6). Tantawi was appointed Defense Minister in May 1991; according to documents published by Wikileaks in 2008, many officers thought that he would be Mubarak’s successor (Sayigh, 2012b, p. 6).

Many researchers have observed the influence of the huge budgets, salaries, and weapons deals in maintaining the loyalty of the army, although the reinforcing of defense expenditure also increases or decreases the likelihood of the military coups (Collier & Hoeffler, 2007; Leon, 2014). Silverman (2012) argues that the spread of cronyism within the army is an important factor in its loyalty to the political authority. However, the cronyism system changed after the appointment of Field Marshal Mohamed Hussein Tantawi to the Ministry of Defense in 1991. A small group of high-ranking officers still benefited greatly as a result of the incorporation in Mubarak’s regime,

²¹ Satloff says: “Regional circumstances magnify the significance of the resurgent role of the military in Egyptian politics because the growth of the Egyptian army coincides with a vacuum of Arab military strength in the Gulf war. Egypt has been moving tentatively to expand its military role in the Gulf, both in terms of military exports and coordination with Gulf armed forces. At the same time, Egypt has taken steps to rebuild its capability in another regional arena, the Arab-Israeli front” (1988, p. 17–18).

while other officers in the middle and lower ranks lost a lot of small gains and privileges following the amendment of general expenditure in Egypt after that time (Sayigh, 2012b, p. 5)²².

Civilian control and military non-intervention are considered the most controversial issues in the democratization process, and there is some disagreement among scholars about the best way to achieve them. The two main schools of thought are represented by Morris Janowitz (1960) and Samuel Huntington (1957). According to Janowitz, the submission of the military to political authority does not prevent tension between the two. The best way to ensure that the army remains responsive to the demands of the civil authorities is to encourage regular reciprocity and interaction between the two. Huntington discusses this relationship from a different angle; he thinks that “military professionalism” is the best way to ensure civilian control over and cooperation from the army. In other words, the development of a distinct, and independent, professional category of soldiers and officers enhances the military’s professional efficiency, and ensure that the army is politically neutral. However, the two leading experts in Egyptian affairs, Clement Henry and Robert Springborg say: “The Egyptian army is not the tight professional force that many consider it to be. It is bloated and its officer core is indulged, having been fattened on Mubarak’s patronage. Its training is desultory, maintenance of its equipment is profoundly inadequate, and it is dependent on the United States for funding and logistical support.” (2011, February 21).

Yezid Sayigh agrees: “The [Egyptian Armed Forces] appears to have become more closed off without gaining efficiency as a fighting force. Behind the Egyptian military’s outward appearance and self-projection as an institution defined above all by professionalism, it has become amorphous, represented as much by the informal officer networks that pervade the state

²² However, in most regimes in the Middle East the defense budget is still the “black box”, and some items remain outside the budget completely.

apparatus and economy at myriad points as by its formally constituted combat arms.” (2012b, p. 10).

This is consistent with the analysis of Eva Bellin (2004). In contrast to the army, which is characterized by “institutionalization”,²³ there is “patrimonialism”, which means that the internal hierarchy and promotion are determined through political or ideological loyalties as opposed to military professional efficiency or other factors: “Upon retirement, senior officers are given hefty retirement packages and appointed as provincial governors or head of municipalities” (Wang, 2011, February 11). The army is characterized by a high level of cronyism and corruption, which makes it more likely to oppose political reforms and regime change because its fortunes are so closely linked to those of the regime (Bellin, 2004, p. 146).

In the era of Mubarak, Egypt’s army was an essential component of the regime, and much more influential than the army in Tunisia under Ben Ali. It is true that Mubarak was independent of the army in his later decades, but its senior leadership was often consulted on core issues such as the discussions about privatization after 2004 or the succession of Mubarak. Despite the fact that the armed forces were not as involved as the Interior Ministry in everyday crackdowns, it was the last resort for the regime (Droz-Vincent, 2011, November 10). The army and Mubarak shared power in a reciprocal relationship which gave the army influence in many institutions while enabling it to isolate itself from the everyday issues of governance (Brashear et al., 2012, p. 12). The co-optation of the high-ranking officers by Mubarak, while ensuring their loyalty, removed them at the same time from the social and political reality of Egypt and reduced their military professionalism, but it did not limit their desire to protect their acquired powers and accumulated

²³ Bellin defines the institutionalization of security thus: “The more institutionalized the security establishment is, the more willing it will be to disengage from power and allow political reform to proceed. The less institutionalized it is, the less amenable it will be to reform” (2004, p. 145).

privileges (Sayigh, 2012b, p. 8). This may constitute a starting point for understanding the conduct of the SCAF after the January 25 revolution.²⁴

5.4.2 Capitalist–Liberal Militarism in the Mubarak period

The Egyptian army has historically played a role in the economy. Military factories were first constructed in 1820 for the production of uniforms and simple weapons. Its role in the economy expanded from early 1950 (Stier, 2011, February 9). After the coup of 1952, Nasser sought to enable the army in various sectors of the state and involved the armed forces in providing social services and participating in economic activities. He wanted to create a group of technocrats inside the army able to challenge their civilian counterparts (Sayigh, 2012b, p. 22). In general, the Egyptian army was well rewarded by the regime and obtained lucrative benefits through activities that were sometimes disorganized and personal (Silverman, 2012, p. 26).

Economic projects, particularly in the field of tourism, recovered in the era of Marshal Abdel Halim Abu Ghazala, Egyptian Defense Minister during the late Sadat era and the beginning of the Mubarak era (Hassel, 2011, February 12). He sought to direct the armed forces toward self-sufficiency for the benefit of all officers. Mubarak appointed Youssef Sabri Abu Talib as the Minister of Defense, but quickly dismissed him in 1991 because Abu Talib pledged to separate the army from any economic projects not related to defense and competing with the private sector.

²⁴ When it comes to the characteristics of the military regimes in the Middle East and North Africa, it is useful to address the classification proposed by Mehran Kamrava (2000), who identified three types of civil–military regimes in the Middle East and North Africa: “autocratic officer-politician regimes”, “tribally dependent monarchies”, and “dual militaries”. He identifies countries such as Algeria, Egypt, and Syria as examples of autocratic officer-politician regimes. In each of these countries the armed forces exercise political power through complementary relations with the presidency. The army has the right to veto some political decisions. It is not involved directly in politics, but it plays an important role in the background, often through informal channels.

Abu Talib said at the time that he would fight corruption in the army, but he was unable to achieve his aspirations because he was soon discharged, perhaps because of those intentions (ibid.). Abu Talib was replaced by Mohamed Hussein Tantawi, who rejected all attempts to end the economic empire of the army. On the contrary, during Tantawi's period of office the army controlled many of the state-owned companies that had been privatized or worked in partnership with the new owners (ibid.).

There are two turning points in the incursion and expansion of the army into the civil and economic fields in addition to that in 1979; the first was in 1991, when Mubarak launched a major campaign to privatize the projects of the public sector on the back of wiping out a great deal of Egypt's foreign debt and the re-negotiation between Egypt and the IMF. This gave senior officers in the armed forces access to a large portion of the Egyptian economy, which had remained state owned. The second turning point, in 2000, coincided with the intensification of neoliberal economic and social policies and the deepening of privatization (Sayigh, 2012b, p. 4).

The Egyptian army ran its economic empire through four main sections: the military industries that follow the Ministry of Military Production; the Arab Organization for Industrialization (AOI), which is state owned; the National Service Project Organization (NSPO) of the Ministry of Defense; and income-generating projects for the armed forces, including the clubs, military hotels, and contracts of civil works run by the Military Engineering Authority, the Department of Military Works, and the Department of Water (Brumberg, 2012, p. 4; Sayigh, 2012b, p. 17). The army had investments in a wide range of industries: construction, tourism, real-estate investment, electronic industries, shipping, petrochemical production, medicines, and food production (dairies and cattle farms, chickens, fruit and vegetable farms, and canned food) (Marshall & Stacher, 2012, p. 4; Hassel, 2011, February 12). Robert Springborg (Professor, U.S.

Naval Postgraduate School) says: “The reasons for this arrangement go back to the '60s and '70s, when the Egyptian military was very large as a result of the wars with Israel. After the peace treaty with Israel was signed, the need for such a large fighting force disappeared. But leaders worried about all those young men released from military service suddenly flooding the job market.” (Siegel & Norris, 2011, February 4)

At first, Mubarak welcomed the army’s contribution to economic development and its role as the ultimate guarantor of internal stability. He supervised the military partnership in the regime and allowed the army to get an increasing share of central government expenditure, as he understood the importance of the army in maintaining the security of his regime (Satloff, 1988, vii). Sayegh (2012b) argues that there was a shift toward what he calls a “republic of officers” from what it had been in the time of Nasser. He says:

The flip side of incorporation into Mubarak’s crony system for the officers’ republic has been its abandonment of residual attachment to the Nasser-era legacy of state-led redistributive social policies. Instead, it has adopted a paternalistic approach toward the majority of Egyptians who did not benefit from the neoliberal economic reforms of the past decade. Social welfare and development have been transformed into acts of benevolence, favors rather than entitlements, to be bestowed at the discretion of those in command, using funds and assets that they exclusively control. (p. 21)

No one knows for sure the number of hotels, resorts, and companies run by the army. According to various estimates, the army controlled between 5% and 40% of the country’s economy. Joshua Stacher, researcher at Kent State University, says that the army controlled about a third to 45% of the planned economy, but in fact there are no specific documents or data

(Hassel, 2011, February 12). Springborg says that the Egyptian army officers spent “dozens of billions” of dollars (ibid.).

Reasons behind this lack of knowledge of the size of the military economy include:

1- The army kept its economic activities completely secret, under the pretext of “national security”. For example, a large part of the military and economic activities in the Egyptian Stock Exchange were not listed (Chams El-Dine, 2013, p. 3).

2-The army keeps its own commercial banking accounts, and its budget is independent from the national budget (Harb, 2003).

Although the actual size of the military economy is not known, indications are that it was very large. After January 25, 2011, the army granted the Central Bank of Egypt \$1 billion due to the dwindling foreign exchange reserves, and previously, in the summer of 2010, after a severe shortage of bread (Azzam, 2012, p. 6) the armed forces’ bakeries had produced and distributed a million loaves for each governorate to resolve the crisis (Hassel, 2011, February 12). In October 2011 Tantawi announced the allocation of 3876 acres of land controlled by the army to build houses for civilians in Assiut; he then issued a decree donating \$333 million from military funds to build “social housing” in the cities for low-income people; the decree was issued at the peak of the protests against the military council, in November 2011. The initiative was to build a million housing units in all of the governorates of Egypt over five years; the armed forces were to build 25,000 units, the army council allegedly investing \$2.33 billion from its own resources during the year ended March 2012 (Sayigh, 2012b, p. 22). This drew attention to the degree to which the army’s economic interests had permeated the community. In a secret cable dated September 2008 and released last December by Wikileaks, the US Ambassador in Cairo described the Egyptian

military as “becoming a ‘quasi commercial enterprise’ itself” (see Simpson and Fam, 2011, February 15).

The Egyptian army had, since 1979, been one of the main beneficiaries of US military aid. Egypt ranked second after Israel, and from 1986 received \$1.3 billion in US military aid annually, which represented 25% of the total annual defense spending in Egypt (Lutterbeck, 2011, p. 26; Alterman, 2012, January 18); from 1998 US military aid increased to \$2.1 billion annually, but in 2010 it decreased to \$1.55 billion due to the gradual decline in economic aid generally. For the 2012 financial year the Obama administration approved \$1.551 billion in aid for Egypt (Sharp, 2011, p. 5).largest in the -As of 2010, Egypt had a defense budget of \$4.56 billion, the third²⁵ Middle East behind Israel and Saudi Arabia (Alterman, 2012, January 18).

Furthermore, the army’s economic empire took advantage of customs facilities, tax exemption, land tenure, and confiscated profits, as these were not paid to the state treasury,²⁶ and had an almost free army of workers (conscripted soldiers). The Defense Minister had taken over the supervision of activities known as the “military economy” and had the power to take decisions over a substantial part of the Egyptian economy (Chams El Dine, 2013, p. 3). All these factors were a major source of military influence, which constituted a thorny issue for many civilian voters along with economic hardship in Egypt (Ashour & Ünlüçayakı, 2006).

Any elected politician after January 25, 2011 who sought to improve the economic situation needed to confront the army's economic empire and subject it to civil censorship by the presidency and parliament. Yet the army did not allow any control over its economic network, or

²⁵ “Since 1979, Egypt has been the second largest recipient, after Israel, of US foreign assistance. In FY2010, Egypt was the fifth-largest aid recipient behind Afghanistan, Israel, Pakistan, and Haiti, respectively” (Sharp, 2011).

²⁶ Under Law No. 32 of 1979, the army maintains its own commercial banking accounts and budget independent of the rest of the government (Harb, 2003).

even its relations with entrepreneurs. In the months that followed Mubarak's resignation, the SCAF avoided taking systematic anti-corruption measures, despite the fact that the security apparatus was already proceeding with investigations, most of which failed because of insufficient evidence.²⁷ By September 2012, after more than 18 months of military rule, the Illicit Profiteering Body located in the Ministry of Justice had referred 29 out of 597 reported cases to courts (Roll, 2013, p. 11). Undoubtedly, the entrepreneurs were the most affected by these events after Mubarak's fall. Yet between February 2011 and August 2012 the SCAF attempted through its assigned governments and in cooperation with certain entrepreneurs to avoid as much economic damage as possible. Major ventures were not safe from political transformations, yet they were able to partially offset their domestic damage via overseas operations (ibid.).

5.4.3 The Army Abandons the Political Elite

Before the January 25 revolution, the army always responded to political authority and interfered to quash many protests and attempted rebellions, for example Sadat's order to deal with the "Bread Uprising" in 1977 (Sachs, 2012). It also answered Mubarak's call on many occasions: the army supported all governmental institutions after the assassination of Sadat in 1981, smothered the rigor of Central Safety Forces in Cairo in 1986, and defeated the Islamic rebellion movements in Upper Egypt in the 1990s. The army was also assigned to conduct the trials of civilians accused in terrorism cases (Droz-Vincent, 2011, November 10).

²⁷ "At the beginning of 2012 the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces amended the investment law, making it possible to escape a conviction for criminal activities such as embezzlement of public funds, corruption or tax evasion through out-of-court settlements. Contracts that have come into being illicitly, for example through corruption, can thus be legalized post facto by means of financial compensation, while embezzled funds may simply be repaid. The first major business figure to make use of this opportunity was Yassin Mansour of the Mansour Group who was able to have several cases dropped by paying the equivalent of more than \$40 million" (Roll, 2013, p. 11).

What, then, prevented the Egyptian military from dispersing the demonstrators in January 2011? Why did it fail to support Mubarak, prompting him to step down? In addition, why did it refuse to obey Mubarak's orders to deal with the demonstrators? Were its reasons democratic or otherwise?

Steven A. Cook (2012) argues that the political transformations before the January 25 revolution did not please the army, especially after Gamal, Mubarak's young son, was raised to prominence. In 2002 Gamal became the general secretary of the policy committee in the ruling party; in 2006 he was promoted to become the Vice General Secretary of the party, which led many to predict that he was being groomed to be president. As he was the driving force formulating "the business government" and other various reforms in favor of the economic elite, which included his friends and relatives, he came to be seen as an enemy by the military because of his lack of loyalty to the army and his adoption of a different perspective.

Since the army owned some of the public sector companies, which enjoyed exceptional advantages that gave it competitive power, such as tax exemptions and depending on employees from the army, the policies of economic liberation espoused by Gamal Mubarak threatened its benefits. A telegraph issued from the American embassy in Cairo in 2008 which was published on the WikiLeaks website refers to the matter, saying: "We see the military's role in the economy as a force that generally stifles free market reform by increasing direct government involvement in the markets."²⁸

It seems that the army regarded the government's privatization programs as a threat to its economic benefits, and thus it opposed the economic reforms. Moreover, Gamal Mubarak was likely to be the first civilian president of Egypt, which would weaken the relationship between

²⁸ Available at https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/08CAIRO2091_a.html (accessed in 2014, May 9)

army and presidency. The leaked telegraph written by the American Ambassador (Francis Ricciardone) said: “A key stumbling block for any effort to bring Gamal Mubarak to the presidency could be the military” (WikiLeaks, 2007, May 14), and the head of Egypt's Higher Military Council, Mohamed Hussein Tantawi, “could play a role in clearing the way for Gamal, if he calculates that is in the best interests of the country; conversely, he could also be a key player in preventing Gamal’s ascendance” (ibid.). And Ricciardone says: “We have heard some limited reports of Tantawi’s increasing frustration and disenchantment with Gamal” (ibid.).

The army saw getting rid of Mubarak as a great opportunity for returning to its previous situation but was aware that public revolutions can get out of control, which might threaten the army’s benefits. At the end of January 2011 the Egyptian military forces declared that the demands of the demonstrators were “legal”, and they promised not to use force against the Egyptian people (BBC, 2011, January 31). The demonstrators and political activists welcomed the soldiers and trusted the army completely: people were chanting, “The people and the army are one.”

The military council made a great effort to preserve the internal unity of the army: it was afraid of potential mutiny from the middle and lower ranks, and this fear was one of the reasons why it decided to abandon Mubarak and disobey his orders to crush the demonstrators (Ashour, 2013, September 3).

Nevertheless, the SCAF confronted a difficult situation, as it thought that its task in the transition phase was to restore stability while maintaining its benefits. The army tried to take advantage of the arising conflicts between social and political movements to impose some of its perceptions about managing the transition phase and the following phases. The SCAF refused to transfer authority directly to a civilian transitional government, and it set conditions for handing

over political power (Droz-Vincent, 2011, November 10). It adjusted some articles of the 1971 constitution on 19 March 2011 and accordingly generated a “road map” toward a transition to democratic civilian rule, consisting of legislative elections followed by elections for the Constituent Assembly and presidential elections (ibid.).

5.4.4 Semi-Authoritarian Militarism

The SCAF appeared on state television a day before Mubarak's resignation to display its force, declare support for the demonstrators' demands, and confirm its role in protecting Egypt in difficult times. The SCAF took over the government directly after Mubarak's resignation, and declared in another statement that its leadership of the country was temporary, and it would work on transferring power to “an elected civilian power” in order to build a free democratic state. The demonstrators appreciated the role of army in protecting them (Egypt State Information Service (SIS), 2011, February 12).

After Mubarak's fall, civilian–military relations changed. After decades of keeping away from playing a direct role in policy, the army redefined its relationship with the country and defended its special position, with the SCAF seeking to maintain its political privileges and resisting major political and economic reforms (Sayigh, 2012b). On February 13, 2011 the SCAF issued a constitutional declaration to the effect that it would “manage the affairs of the country for a temporary period of six months or until the end of elections to the upper and lower houses of parliament, and presidential elections.” (Awad & Zayed, February 13, 2011). But the transition period extended to 18 months.

During its management of the transition period after the fall of Mubarak, the SCAF insisted on keeping its broad powers in taking decisions on military issues, and it expressed that clearly on more than one occasion. An official committee under the leadership of Ali El-Selmi

issued a number of “supra-constitutional principles” which gave the military council the entire responsibility for military-related issues, especially the army’s budget, which was supposed to be classified as a single figure in the annual budget and never to be discussed in parliament.²⁹ Article No. 9 of the supra-constitutional principles document stipulated that only the SCAF had the right to discuss the annual budget of the Defense Ministry.³⁰ These principles were quickly rejected after massive arguments and criticisms from different Islamic and non-Islamic parties and bodies (Chams El Dine, 2013, p. 6); this showed that the ability of civilian leaders to restrain the army was limited but not non-existent.

The attitude of the Egyptian military forces toward the rebel movements calling for reformation remained ambiguous, as sometimes the army took strict measures against the demonstrators who kept taking to the streets to express their rejection of the reforms and the SCAF management during the transition phase. According to Human Rights Watch (HRW), restrictions were imposed on freedom of expression during the transition phase, and many civilians were prosecuted in military tribunals for “contempt of the Army” (2011, August 17).

The SCAF sought to legitimize its interference in politics, as it insisted on having the right to a veto in issues related to high politics, including matters of national security or sensitive foreign policy, especially the relationship with Israel (Ashour, 2013, September 3). On 17 June 2012, before the presidential elections of 30 June 2012, which Mohamed Morsi won, the SCAF issued a constitutional addendum declaration, which gave it power over parliament, including

²⁹ “El Baradei has criticised the current Deputy Prime Minister Ali el-Selmy’s supraconstitutional document, which gives the armed forces exceptional power. He has said that the document should be cancelled and a committee should establish a code of ethics that all Egyptians agree on” (Al-Jazeera, 2011, November 16).

³⁰ The principles became known as the El-Selmi document. See “Draft Declaration of the Fundamental Principles for the New Egyptian State”, constitutionnet, 2011, November 1: http://www.constitutionnet.org/files/2011.11_-_constitutional_principles_document_english.pdf

legislative power, the right of forming a Constituent Assembly, and granting the army and military intelligence officers the rights of judicial police (powers of judicial execution) (Ahrum Online, 2012, June 18). The SCAF sought to keep the veto on any constitutional article undermining its benefits. This arrangement actually ensured that the army would be exempt from any civil and parliament supervision, which is the main characteristic of democratic transformation.

The declaration of Mohamed Morsi as President was presented as a political decision by the SCAF. It was clear that the army preferred Ahmed Shafiq, but it refrained from any election fraud for fear of the popular response, especially after the mistrust between the demonstrators and army due to the SCAF's failure to manage the transition smoothly, and revealing its desire to dominate the political scene. Twelve revolutionary movements and coalitions declared their participation in demonstrations against the constitutional addendum declaration, both in Tahrir Square and nationwide, and they condemned the presidential election committee for delaying the final results, considering it an attempt to cheat in favor of Shafiq, who had been Mubarak's last Prime Minister (Aljazeera Mubasher, 2012, June 22).

After Morsi took over the presidency on 30 June 2012, he attempted to strengthen his powers as an elected civilian president. At first he decreed that parliament be restored, but the SCAF insisted that its original decision must be upheld, and Egypt's military chiefs warned Morsi to respect the constitution. In its statement, the SCAF said it was "confident" that state institutions would respect "constitutional decrees" (Hussein, 2012, July 9). Then, after less than two months, Morsi succeeded in canceling the constitutional addendum declaration issued by the SCAF on 17 June 2012, as well as dismissing Marshal Hussein Tantawi, his deputy Sami Anan, and other

generals (Shkolnik, 2012, June 26). Some of the revolutionary groups celebrated this, considering it a step forward.

In summary, it can be said that the army was not concerned with democracy for its own sake; while its intervention was ultimately the main factor in the downfall of Mubarak, it was done to protect itself. The SCAF thus helped accelerate the ousting of Mubarak, using the popular civilian uprising to gain time and space for its own purposes and depending on the trust of the demonstrators at that time.

5.5 Political Power: The Rise and Fall of Mubarak

This section will describe the Egyptian governmental system during the Mubarak era. This will be approached from three viewpoints: (i) how far the NGOs had infiltrated political power; (ii) the Mubarak regime's strategies for political survival; and (iii) whether the political milieu contributed to the outbreak of the January 25 revolution.

After the assassination of Anwar Sadat on October 6, 1981, Mohamed Hosni Mubarak took over as President of the Arab Republic of Egypt, the Commander-in-Chief of the Egyptian Armed Forces, and head of the NDP. Mubarak inherited the policies of Sadat, who had made vaguely expansive promises as to Egypt's political future, and attempted – at the outset – to proceed with liberalization, which required him to dismantle the structural and institutional foundations set up by the Nasser regime. The culmination of Sadat's liberalization program was the 1976 decree permitting the establishment of political platforms in Egypt (Davidson, 2000, p. 78). Sadat, in his "October Working Paper" (1974), had decided to take this step. Critics claimed that this multi-partisanship was a formality, the aim of which was to improve Sadat's progressivist image in the West, and that the bulk of the parties that were allowed political

participation as a result existed in name only, and were in fact loyal to Sadat. Nevertheless, some generally unrecognized parties, such as the Islamists, benefited from this relative openness (ibid.).

Mubarak inherited all the consequences of this policy, both nationally and internationally, as well as the wrath of the Egyptian people, who were bitterly disappointed by the failures of the open-door economic policy. Egypt's economic troubles increased after the Arab League's resolution to expel Egypt and to relocate its headquarters to Tunisia, after the Camp David Accords in 1979. This had an impact on the pioneering cultural and political leadership role of Egypt within the Arab world (Rabinovich, 2004, p. 224).

5.5.1 Political Hegemony

Mubarak's regime took control of the legislative institutions in Egypt, which propagated laws designed to strengthen the hegemony of the regime. For instance, Article No. 86 set forth the two main functions of the People's Assembly: legislative and regulatory. The passing of laws was to be a vested right of the Parliament, since Article No. 109 of the 1971 constitution set forth that "the President of the Republic and every member of the People's Assembly shall have the right to propose laws" (Lebanese Center for Policy Studies (LCPS) & United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), 2000, p. 8). Nevertheless, it was not the only way of enacting laws in Egypt, as the executive authority was in charge and the basis of legislative authority. A study, conducted in 2000 and rendered by the Lebanese Center for Policy Studies (LCPS), highlights the increasing role played by the executive authority in the realm of legislation, whether on the level of enacting regulations of all kinds or of proposing laws. In a generic assessment of the legislative experience in the Egyptian People's Assembly during the period from 1990 to 2000, the study cited an array of factors, among them the lack of balance between the legislative and executive authorities, which were attributed to the power vested in the President of the Republic by the constitution and

permitted the President to propose laws which do not need to go through the same procedures as draft laws proposed by the members of the legislative authority. Such imbalance between the political powers within the People's Assembly is due to the hegemony of the ruling NDP, which had the majority of seats, and the fact that the draft laws proposed by the government exceeded those proposed by the Members of Parliament (MPs) (LCPS & UNDP, 2000, p. 11). Meanwhile, Mubarak and his ruling party exercised hegemony on the Legislative Authority (i.e., the People's Assembly), as it was unable to submit an interpellation of Mubarak (Davidson, 2000, p. 82). In fact, however, all authorities were obliged to comply with the will of the presidential authorities (Rutherford, 2008, p. 1).

An examination of the proportion of parliamentary seats reveals that the ruling party exercised overwhelming hegemony on the legislative authority.

Table 5.2: Percentage of seats held by the NDP (1979-1995)

Year	Percentage of seats held by the NDP
1979	89
1984	87
1987	69
1990	86
1995	94

(Davidson, 2000, p. 82)

The despotic reign of Mubarak was profoundly deepened in 1990. The government's fundamental strategy was to preserve domestic stability in the face of Islamist threats. As the country endured an escalation of repressive measures on the part of the state and an increase in violent acts by the extremist groups, the state endeavored to tighten strangleholds on the Islamists,

through socio-political and economic countermeasures. The security services also attacked the hideouts of Islamist militants (Koehler & Warkotsch, 2009). In order to legitimize their actions, the state imposed legislative amendments upon the laws regulating the penal codes, such as expanding the scope of military tribunals and enacting the Weapons Act. Not only did such amendments expand the enforcement of capital punishment, but also – and equally importantly – they extended the definition of terrorism to “spreading panic” and forestalling the work of the authorities (Kassem, 2004, p. 155).

In the wake of these legislative amendments, civil and political rights were restricted; the Parties Law was amended; freedom of the press was considerably constrained; and the political opposition, especially the MB, was repressed. As a result of these restrictions and large-scale intervention in the electoral process through fraud, repression, and intimidation—especially in the parliamentary elections of 1990, 1995, 2000, and 2005—the NDP gained an unprecedented majority (Paciello, 2011, pp. 1–2).

The 2000 parliamentary elections witnessed an outright decline for the NDP in the face of the phenomenon of “independent candidates”. The opposition obtained good representation in the People’s Assembly, whilst the NDP gained only 172 (38.7%) seats out of the total of 444 electoral seats, in addition to another ten appointed members, bringing the total number of seats in the Assembly to 454. The NDP was able to salvage something by being able to attract the support of the independents after the elections had finished, bringing their total to 216. This is a significant indication of the NDP’s lack of popularity, especially amongst the grass roots (Alanani, 2005, October 20).

The most surprising result came in the 2005 parliamentary elections, with the unexpected electoral performance of the MB: it put up 150 candidates, and won 88 out of the 454 seats: 20%.

The NDP obtained 73% (Sharp, 2006, January 15, p. 5). These electoral results revealed the MB as a serious political player. Despite the decline in the NDP's parliamentary seats, the regime continued to impose its hegemony, and there was no substantial change to the political status quo; only four women, all of whom were affiliated to the NDP, were elected; one Copt—the former Minister of Finance Youssef Boutros Ghaly—gained a seat. Five Copts were appointed by Mubarak. The secular and liberalist parties obtained 12 seats (2.6%) (ibid.). According to Democracy Reporting International (DRI) and Egyptian Organization for Human Rights (2007):

Even though the Constitution establishes a mixed presidential–parliamentary cabinet system, the President is the dominant political authority. The Parliament (the People's Assembly and the consultative Shura Council), in which the ruling NDP has held a two-thirds majority since the inception of multi-party politics, is a weak institution which rarely acts on its own initiative and is widely perceived as a rubber-stamp body. (p. 2)

In 2005 an unprecedented constitutional and political change took place: Egypt held its first direct presidential election. The process began on February 26, when Mubarak asked the People's Assembly and the Shura Council to amend Article No. 76 of the Egyptian Constitution. This amendment provided for the People's Assembly to nominate the President of the Republic, and introduce the nomination to the citizens in order to facilitate a vote. The nomination needed the backing of at least one-third of the People's Assembly's members.³¹ The proposed amendment allowed for the presidential election to be a competitive process, but within the restrictions built into the nomination process.³² These restrictions were considered by the

³¹ The Constitution of the Arab Republic of Egypt, 1971 (as Amended in 2007): <http://www.constitutionnet.org/files/Egypt%20Constitution.pdf>

³² Article 76, paragraph (1) is amended to read: "For candidature for presidency of the republic to be acceptable, a candidate should be supported by at least 250 elected members of the People's Assembly, the Shura Council and Municipal Councils in governorates, provided that supporters be at least 65 members of the People's Assembly, 25

opposition to be unacceptably incapacitating and to be aimed at getting rid of Mubarak's rivals before the presidential race could begin (Brown et al., 2007, p. 6). The regime had been attempting to create the impression of democratic competition without actually providing it ((DRI) & Egyptian Organization for Human Rights, 2007, p. 3).

Amongst the other impediments to achieving democracy is the inability of the Supreme Constitutional Court (SCC) to influence the passing of laws. Amongst the SCC's powers is to oversee the conformity of the laws with the Egyptian Constitution.³³ However, the SCC requested an improvement in the oversight of elections, including the presence of judges at the polling stations. The outcomes of the 2000 and 2005 parliamentary elections were therefore markedly cleaner and more credible than the 1990 or 1995 elections (Dunne, 2006, p. 5). Nevertheless, Mubarak endeavored to manipulate the SCC's structure (Moustafa, 2003, pp. 893–894). In 2001 he appointed a judge closely associated with his regime (Fathi Naguib) to be the presiding judge of the Supreme Court. Naguib increased the number of judges by 50% by appointing five new ones (ibid., p. 924).

On 7 September 2005, the first direct pluralistic elections since the coup d'état of 23 July 1952 were held in order to elect the Egyptian President. Despite the doubts as to its real democratic viability, it was a new experience in the political arena at that time. There was optimism that the promised reforms would result in a more pluralistic political milieu, and nine candidates, amongst whom the most notable was Ayman Nour, competed with Mubarak. The Presidential Election Commission announced that Mubarak had won a fifth six-year term, with

members of the Shura Council and 10 members of each of the Municipal Councils of at least 14 governorates": <http://www.constitutionnet.org/files/Egypt%20Constitution.pdf>

³³ Law No. 48 of 1979 (Law on the Supreme Constitutional Court, as amended by Law No. 168 of 1998), Al-Jarida Al-Rasmiyya, June 9, 1979, art. 25; see Supreme Constitutional Court, <http://www.sis.gov.eg/En/Story.aspx?sid=472> (accessed in 2015, January 29).

88.6% of the votes. Nour came second, with 7.9%. The Commission declared the turnout to have been 23%. Many criticized the results and considered them to be false (Sharp, 2006, January 15 p. 1).

The regime had needed to show that it was responding to the demands of the opposition. It also needed to maintain a minimum of international legitimacy (Brown et al., 2007, p. 6). It pursued a tactical policy designed to create an impression of transformation toward overhaul and reform. However, it reneged on the bulk of its promises in this regard. Marina Ottaway says: “The challenge is thus not to describe a perfect process that will almost certainly not take place, but to distinguish between partial steps that are significant because they start altering the distribution of power and the character of the political system and those that are only window dressing” (2005, February 28, p. 3).

The decrees and decisions taken by Mubarak later perhaps prove that there had been no substantial orientation toward overhaul and promotion of the rule of law. On 30 April 2006 the Egyptian Parliament voted by a vast majority to renew the Emergency Law.³⁴ This law gave extraordinary powers to the security services to detain citizens and prevent public assemblages.³⁵ The abrupt two-year extension to the Emergency Law, which had been in force in the country for

³⁴ “Egypt has been governed under emergency law almost continuously since 1967, and without interruption since Hosni Mubarak became president in October 1981 after the assassination of president Anwar Sadat. The law has been repeatedly renewed since then.” (Human Rights Watch (HRW), 2008, May 28).

³⁵ In addition to Article 148’s emergency powers and Article 152’s referendum power, Mubarak added Article 179 to the constitution. Article 179 (the Terror Article) provided: “The State shall seek to safeguard public security and discipline to counter dangers of terror. The law shall, under the supervision of the Judiciary, regulate special provisions related to evidence and investigation procedures required to counter those dangers. The procedure stipulated in paragraph 1 of Articles 41 and 44 and paragraph 2 of Article 45 of the Constitution shall in no way preclude such counter-terror action. The President may refer any terror crime to any judicial body stipulated in the Constitution or the law.” See Constitution of the Arab Republic of Egypt, 11 Sept. 1971, as amended, May 22, 1980, May 25, 2005, March 26, 2007, art. 179.

decades, showed a lack of respect for the rule of law, according to Human Rights Watch (May 28, 2008). Egyptian lawyers and human rights groups said that there were about 5000 people in long-term detention without charge or trial in 2006. Some of the prisoners, having been detained under the Emergency Law, had been in jail for more than ten years (ibid.). The emergency authorities could declare a gathering of five or more persons illegal and therefore prohibit freedom of assembly.³⁶

5.5.2 Relations with NGOs

Civil society in the Middle East has no influence on the ruling regimes. Moreover, the security services in the Arab countries often keep control over the activities of civil society in a manner that severely curbs its ability to function freely. In Egypt, all new non-governmental organizations must register and get permission to operate from the relevant authorities (and often from security agencies, such as intelligence, or national security agencies) (Schulz, 2011, p. 171). Egyptian civil society is officially composed of four main bodies: political parties, trade unions, professional syndicates, and non-governmental organizations (Egypt State Information Service (SIS), 2009, September 30).

Between 1950 and 1960, the multifarious professional organizations and trade unions had been very influential, but the Islamic associations also became an important part of civil society in the years before 2011. They comprised several important sectorized services. These sectors were mainly financed by Islamic *zakat*, and partly by donations (Schulz, 2011, p. 171). The state's policies toward NGOs did not undergo any significant change after 1970. Accordingly, it maintained restrictions on civil society through a body of laws that closely monitor the

³⁶ Constitution of the Arab Republic of Egypt, 11 Sept. 1971, as amended, May 22, 1980, May 25, 2005, March 26, 2007, art. 174.

establishment of such organizations. The state, represented by the Ministry of Social Security, permitted and imposed oversight on the NGOs' activities (Hassan, 2010, p. 326). Sean L. Yom (2005) argues that this controlled milieu of civilian life comprised three elements. First, flagrant repression, such as arrests, harassment, and other forms of legalized coercion against opposition groups. Second, "Arab autocracies utilize systematic policies of legal constriction that defuse civic activism long before it becomes threatening." Third, it was the participation of the state in the polarization of and selectivity in dealing with the institutions of civil society that fragmented the opposition and kept the civil sector oriented toward dependence and reliability on the state. For example, the Arab authoritarian regimes often attempted to create shadow organizations in order to simulate the functions performed by the independent civil society organizations (Yom, 2005, pp. 23–24).

Historically speaking, the state has dominated a good part of civil society organizations, especially trade unions, many of which continued to be linked to the state, which undermined their independence. Nevertheless, from 1980 the MB began to gain control of the trade unions, causing the crisis to escalate.³⁷ The crisis within Egyptian trade unions—currently 24 professional syndicates with approximately 6 million members—dates back to 1990, when the trade unions had experienced a crisis with the government after demanding political reforms and calling for the President to step down as leader of the NDP. In 1991, professional unions raised the problem of joblessness following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the return of many Egyptian professionals from Iraq and Kuwait. The government responded by enacting the Union

³⁷ The progress achieved by the Islamists in the unions' and syndicates' elections worried the Mubarak regime; Mubarak's attitudes to the Islamists were no different from those of his predecessors: they considered all of them to favor violence, without distinguishing between the moderates and the extremists. Hence, the Mubarak regime's behavior toward NGOs depended on whether they were Islamist-oriented or not. Nevertheless, civil society in its entirety was impacted by the hardline procedures taken by the regime (Davidson, 2000, p. 85).

Labor Law No. 100 of 1993, which led to the freezing of trade unions and syndicates paralyzing trade union activities. This law stipulates attendance of 50% of members in the first round of elections and 30% in the second, which resulted in many trade unions ending up under receivership, with their affairs entrusted to a receiver appointed by the judiciary (El-Gawhary, 2000, pp. 39–41). This law enabled the NDP to dominate some trade unions and professional syndicates, such as those of the teachers and traders. These unions supported government policies up to Mubarak's ouster in 2011 (Sika, 2012, p. 29).

The process of economic liberalization was continued by the Mubarak regime at the beginning of the 1990s in its dealings with non-Islamist NGOs. It embarked on structural adjustment projects, endorsed by the World Bank and the IMF. In addition, such programs were aided by the conditions imposed by these international institutions—including the NGOs' contribution to development, which was a milestone for the furtherance of the NGOs as partners in the economic liberalization process—without any obligation for the promotion of democracy (*ibid.*). Accordingly, civil society was the subject of Law No. 32/1964, which restricted the freedom of NGOs and remained effective until 2000. It was briefly supplanted by Law No. 153/1999: this was deemed unconstitutional by the SCC, on the grounds that it had not been submitted to the Shura Council to be deliberated before being enacted. The regime then enacted Law No. 84/2002 (Guirguis, 2009, February 3), which set forth that an organization should be duty bound to obtain a license from the Ministry of Social Security, provided that its general assembly shall consist of not less than ten people. It is also stipulated that a prison sentence of six months should be imposed on anyone who does not comply with the provisions of the law. And further, that the Ministry should have the right to interfere in the internal affairs of the

organization, and to confiscate their funds or to merge organizations with each other.³⁸ Thus, the growing civil society sector was effectively at the mercy of an increasingly arbitrary state, especially during the last decade of Mubarak's rule (Stacher, 2011, November 10), in violation of international standards of freedom of assembly. The Mubarak regime was striving, through the promulgation of laws relating to NGOs, to maintain a democratic façade for the regime. However, the truth is that everything was under its control through a combination of authoritarian laws (Hassan, 2010, p. 326).

NGOs increased from approximately 10,000 in 1998 to 30,000 in 2008 (Hassan, 2010, p. 326; Sika, 2012, p. 29); half of these were developmentally and religiously oriented institutions and associations. The rest consisted of those oriented to sports, youth, and social clubs, chambers of commerce and industry, professional syndicates, and trade and labor unions (ibid.). However, this did not reflect the real strength of civil society in Egypt, especially as some organizations may have been ineffective or existed as a matter of formality (Hassan, 2010, p. 326).

5.5.3 An Increase in Protest Movements

The social movements in Egypt are considered an instrumental component of the NGOs, and in the last decade of Mubarak's time in power they proliferated as a result of political isolationism and ahead of an active role taken by the NGOs. After a cabinet reshuffle in July 2004, a constellation of 300 intellectuals and public figures, under the banner of Kefaya and representing the entire political spectrum, drew up a founding document calling for genuine political change, and an end to economic injustice and corruption in foreign policy (Aljazeera, 2011, February 7). The Kefaya movement began in the fall of 2004 and entered the Egyptian

³⁸ New Law for Non-Governmental Organizations, Amendment of Law No. 84, Year 2002, Available at: <http://www.ug-law.com/downloads/new-law-for-ngos-en.pdf> (accessed in 2015, January 3)

political arena after the launch of what is considered the first major demonstration against Mubarak. Mubarak's desire to extend his six-year presidential term, which was to begin in 2005, and the potential succession of Gamal Mubarak to the presidency led to exasperation in Egypt and culminated in the emergence of the Kefaya movement. This was a broad coalition of several political parties. Although it did not have a financial network like that of the Muslim Brotherhood or media platforms such as those available to the state, Kefaya zeroed in on the exasperation felt toward the Mubarak regime. This gave it much sympathy throughout society and provided it with the necessary support (Oweidat, 2008, p. viii).

Kefaya was a success from the outset, for several reasons. First, its mission was simple. It expressed frustration and anger with the Egyptian government. Its slogan, "*la lil-tawrith, la lil-tamdid*" (no to inheritance, no to extension), benefited from the public's concern regarding Mubarak's plans for his succession. Kefaya was also able to unify the diversified groups in its quest for reasonably acceptable democratic overhauls. One of its strong points from the beginning was its ability to work with all parties, including the Islamists, despite being thought of as a secular movement. Kefaya was a variable admixture on a large scale: it unified Communists, nationalists, and Islamists to become the most important movement for the modern political parties in Arab world (Sayyid, 2004).

Kefaya called upon individuals and parties from all social backgrounds and political affiliations to join it. The idea of peaceful demonstrations was attractive, and came within the context of Western calls for democratic transformation (Oweidat, 2008, p. ix). When the movement eventually declined, it was after being exposed to harassment and intimidation by state security officers. Government officials sought to attack it in the international mass media. Mubarak accused it of exploiting international circumstances to put pressure on the regime,

relying on its strength from abroad, and questioning its sources of funding (ibid., p. 32). At the same time, other internal conflicts and attempts by parties within the movement to implement their own agendas also hampered it, leading to a reduction in support of and sympathy for it (Oweidat, 2008).

Amongst Kefaya's main demands were a reduction in the absolute power of the head of state; a separation of powers, including checks and balances; and the right to freely form political parties and publish newspapers, and the right of association. Furthermore, it campaigned to lift state control of the trade unions and to conduct free and fair parliamentary elections under the oversight of the Supreme Judicial Council and the State Council (ibid., p. 3). The regime responded to the growing movement, which extended throughout 22 out of 29 governorates, with arrest campaigns, which prompted many opposition currents to sympathize with them and provoked intensified media support in the opposition newspapers that contributed to raising the issue of freedom. Almost daily, journalists criticized previously unassailable figures, such as the Mubarak family, especially Mubarak's wife and his son and potential successor Gamal (Aljazeera, 2011, February 7).

In view of the Mubarak regime's success in crushing previous opposition movements, the success of Kefaya was largely unexpected (Oweidat, 2008, p. 15). In response to pressure from it, the government promulgated some amendments to the Constitution. However, it soon became evident that these amendments had been manipulated to actually strengthen the ruling party's grip on power (Browsers, 2007, p. 74). For instance, the amendments to the Emergency Law gave power to the security authorities to violate personal freedoms without imposing a state of emergency. And while Article No. 76 was amended to allow multiple candidates to run for president, it prohibited any candidate from participating without the consent of the ruling party

(Oweidat, 2008, p. 31). The International Crisis Group (ICG) described the multi-candidate presidential elections as a fake reform, aimed at diverting attention from the real political changes (International Crisis Group, 2005).

Kefaya was amongst the key co-founders of the National Front for Change, which was a coalition formed in October 2005 to launch a campaign of opposition in the legislative elections of November 2005. The coalition also included members of the New Wafd Party, the Nasserite Party, the Labor Party, Al-Wasat Party and the Karama Party in addition to the independent members of the Muslim Brotherhood. This coalition drew up a joint list of 225 candidates on a platform calling for constitutional reforms and the adoption of anti-corruption measures (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2010, September 22). According to some of the Kefaya leadership, the movement resembled other world movements which support democracy. Nevertheless, it did not last long and did not achieve long-term results. Kefaya embodied a strong desire for democratic reform like many movements in the Middle East. It is one of the key movements that paved the way for the January 25 revolution (Al Jazeera Arabic, 2011, December 16).

One of the emerging youth social movements was the April 6 Youth Movement, which dates back to the demonstrations on 6 April 2008 in the context of the general strike called by all political forces and movements and the NGOs in protest against the deterioration in living conditions. This culminated in the uprising in the city of Great Mahalla, which was harshly suppressed by the security forces, resulting in three deaths, dozens of injuries, and hundreds of arrests. This movement played an important role in mobilization against the Mubarak regime, and is one of the movements that called for the January 25 revolution (Berger, 2013, p. 180). The April 6 movement backed the MB's candidate Mohamed Morsi in the second round of the 2012

presidential elections, ahead of his rival Ahmed Shafiq (Al Bawaba, 2013, December 23), but it protested against his rule later.

In general, and in the aftermath of the January 25 revolution, the NGOs had an opportunity to distance themselves from state authority. New trends had emerged in civil society activities. Since the ouster of Mubarak, roughly 300 independent unions – most notably the independent trade unions, which had intermittently organized protests in various provinces in order to protect the workers’ interests and rights – had conducted sit-ins to protest against their managers or against the government and to obtain their legal rights, such as decent remuneration, the minimum wage, better working conditions, and independence from state control (Sika, 2012, p. 30). Nadine Sika argues that the SCAF was not ready, during the transitional period after the revolution, to move toward a genuine democratic process, which would have expanded the public domain to allow more freedom, civil and political participation, and to conduct free, fair, and regular elections (*ibid.*).

However, civil society’s impact on the transitional period was limited. It seemed to be largely divided, for example along Islamist, secular, and civil as well as rural, elitist, and popular lines, or between the organized and the spontaneous. The resulting vacuum was filled by the various competing political parties. The NGOs subsequently met with increasing restrictions on access to external financing (Ajala, 2013). Maria Cristina Paciello (2011) argues that the NGOs in Egypt were inexperienced and lacking in a clear-cut economic and political strategy as an alternative to the SCAF. They were also so fragmented that they were unable to develop a joint program (p. 19).

The NGOs were not the only entities that had hopes of playing leading roles in the political transformation in Egypt. A number of young people established new NGOs as a means

to implement their reform objectives. These organizations were not necessarily political in nature. They had socio-economic goals, and even the political parties that were headed by young people focused their election campaigns on socio-economic projects.³⁹ Sarah Yerkes discusses the changes that took place within civil society in the aftermath of the January 25 revolution: “Civil society organizations (CSOs) that had previously isolated themselves and refused to share resources and best practices for fear of regime reprisal, joined not one but multiple networks to connect with others as widely as possible across the civil society spectrum.” (2012, p. 10).

Political isolationism increased during the last decade of Mubarak’s regime, resulting in a strengthening of the NDP’s hegemony. The second half of 2000 witnessed the increasing prominence of Gamal Mubarak (Tadros, 2012a, p.7). In 2002, a new group within the NDP was created, called the Policy Committee or the Policy General Secretariat, which was led by Gamal Mubarak. This group consisted of economists, entrepreneurs, and academics, all of whom were aligned with Gamal Mubarak’s policies. These individuals had no political background, but emerged from the economic and cultural elites (Collombier, 2007, p. 97). Gamal Mubarak had appointed to the Policy General Secretariat many of his allies, such as the millionaire Ahmed Ezz, owner of the largest steel plants in Egypt, and Mohammed Kamal, a U.S.-trained political scientist (Aftandilian, 2011, p. 12).

Gamal Mubarak and his businessmen allies formed the “new guard” within the party, in contrast to the “old guard”, who had begun their political careers under the old Arab Socialist Union and whose influence began to decrease in favor of the new guard. However, the old guard

³⁹ See interview with Islam Lotfi, one of the revolutionary youth running for the 2011 People’s Assembly elections in the governorate of Giza: he explains his electoral platform, and is canvassing the population of his own constituency. Lotfi is the attorney-in-fact of the Egyptian Current Party’s founders, and a member of the Executive Bureau of the Coalition of the Youth of the Revolution (Tayar Masry, 2011, December 5).

had not been completely sidelined (*ibid.*, p. 8). This led to shifts within the politico-economic ruling elites, which allowed for a wide variety of new actors to be represented in power, with gradual control by Gamal Mubarak and his allied elites (Tadros, 2012a, p. 20). This was markedly apparent in the Council of Ministers, which was formed by Ahmed Nazif in December 2005 and included a number of ministers who paved the way to strengthening the relationship between the political regime and the business sector⁴⁰ and at the same time supported Gamal Mubarak's policy of economic liberalization (Lampridi-Kemou & Azola, 2012, pp. 138–139; Collombier, 2007, p. 107).

There was a growing concern amongst the opponents of the Mubarak regime that Gamal was being presented as a reform trailblazer in the NDP in order to increase his popularity, which would have helped maintain his strong grip on political life. There were protest movements such as the Kefaya movement, which achieved a major breakthrough in the creation of public protests against Mubarak's succession plans (Zuhur, 2007, pp. 40–41). However, Gamal's road to power was not that smooth. Gregory Aftandilian says: "Gamal was not well-liked by the majority of Egyptian citizens who are struggling to make ends meet amidst growing economic hardships, such as the rise in food prices. In late September 2010, for example, hundreds of demonstrators gathered in Abdeen Square in Cairo to protest against a possible succession of Gamal to the presidency before being cracked down upon by security police." (2011, p. 13).

The 2010 People's Assembly elections exposed Mubarak and his regime to the criticism of the majority of Egyptians. These elections – seen by observers as a major reason for the fall of

⁴⁰ The powers of Gamal Mubarak's oligarchical group of businessmen was expanded and consolidated through the appointment of his businessmen friends to key ministerial posts: Zoheir Garana (Minister of Tourism), Ahmed Maghraby (Minister of Tourism then Minister of Housing), Rashid Mohammed Rashid (Minister of Industry), Adly Mansour (Minister of Transport) and Youssef Boutros Ghaly (Minister of State for the Economy) (Tadros, 2012a, p. 21).

Mubarak – were blatantly rigged after the cancelation of judicial supervision and Egypt's rejection of international monitors. The NDP won 420 out of 518 seats, 90% of the total. The MB won a single seat, and the remaining liberal, secularist, and leftist parties won 15, whilst the remaining seats went to the independents, who mostly joined the NDP (Swelam, 2011, pp. 1–2). The NDP thus confirmed itself as the dominant player with a landslide victory.

Before the January 25 revolution, much attention in Egypt had been focused on the issue of the presidential succession, given that President Mubarak was getting older and had medical problems. He refused to appoint a vice president (Aftandilian, 2011, p. iv). At the same time, most observers assumed that Mubarak's successor would be his son Gamal, which would run counter to accustomed practice, as since 1952 all the heads of state had been from the ranks of the army: Naguib, Nasser, Sadat, and Mubarak (Zuhur, 2007, p. 34). The Egyptian army therefore had strong doubts about Gamal's credentials (Aftandilian, 2011, p. iv). It was reluctant to support him, especially as the military elite were apprehensive about losing their unofficial privileges and interests (Lampridi-Kemou & Azola, 2012, p. 139). Rumors spread both before and after the ouster of Mubarak that Gamal Mubarak and Field Marshal Tantawi, the then Defense Minister, had engaged in a power struggle and sought to sideline each other. Some retired military officers circulated an open letter in August 2010, wherein they censured Gamal Mubarak's would-be candidature (Aftandilian, 2011, p. 14). It was also rumored that Gamal Mubarak was colluding with the security forces, including the State Security Investigations Service in Egypt (the SSI) to reduce Tantawi's influence (Tadros, 2012a, p. 26).

In conclusion, the real power in Egypt rested with the presidency, supported by the military and security services, and with the ruling political party, which was dominated by the so-called business statesmen, who constituted another center of power in Egypt (Aftandilian, 2011,

p. 7). The imbalance resulted from the army's rejection of the succession of Gamal and its discomfort with the new pro-Gamal political–economic elitists (see section 5.3.3). By the end of 2010, the SSI was playing an instrumental role in governing the internal affairs of the country. It served Gamal's interests and controlled almost every aspect of public life in Egypt (with the exception of anything related to the army and the Ministry of Defense, which it was gradually marginalizing) (Tadros, 2012a, p. 22). In addition to the economic and political failures, it created a political environment that played a role in fueling the flames of revolution and in the army's desperate refusal to defend Mubarak and his son.

5.6 Conclusion

The January 2011 protests were not only a result of the regime's power network transformations but also of the transformations in IEMP relations. The economic transformation in Egypt led to an increase in the gap between the social classes. The regime and political–economic elites failed to find solutions to the problems facing the country, while the regime in its later years focused increasingly on marginalizing its opponents and the social movements. This led to the decline of Mubarak's regime control over the power networks.

The Egyptian military did not decline during the time of Mubarak; instead, its economic power grew, and it was not directly involved in the crisis threatening the country. When the Mubarak regime collapsed, it was the strongest and most capable power, able to take over during the interim period after the revolution. It was in fact the main driver of the new political system. Although it had a historic opportunity, which would have won it independence and privileges under an elected civilian regime, it wanted to maintain full control of the governing of Egypt.

There were ideological gaps or interstices that arose as a result of the regime's failure to find a path that would ensure the solidarity of the whole community, unite people, and convince

them to support the new economic policy. These gaps led to competition between the Islamic movements to fill them, and opened the door for the Islamic movements to establish an ideological framework of their own as an alternative, especially with regard to citizenship, minority rights, and civil society (see chapters 6 and 7). Furthermore, after 2000, the Mubarak regime was rapidly losing political control in favor of its opponents, especially the MB.

CHAPTER 6: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD

6.1 Introduction

Islamic movements, such as the Muslim Brotherhood, which was founded in 1928, have witnessed some ideological transformations regarding various issues; it is essential that these transformations are explored in greater detail. In order to understand the ideological changes which have occurred to the MB, it is important to remember that the Islamists do not work in a political, economic, social and military vacuum. This is because, in the Egyptian context, the implications of authoritarian rule in the long term must be considered, in addition to the fact that the Egyptian political regime depends on understandings among political, economic, and military networks which were formed more to serve despotic purposes than as infrastructure and imposed themselves on the social movements and their transformations.

The MB took 85 years to gain access to the summit of power in Egypt when Mohamed Morsi, the MB candidate, became Egypt's first elected President in June 2012. Nevertheless, the MB completely lost that summit of power after 12 months only. The political openness after 25 January 2011 forced the MB to answer several pending questions and problematic issues, such as the introduction of Sharia (Islamic law) and the rights of women and Copts. Moreover, the MB was pushed to clarify its main goals and whether Islamic state-building was still one of its goals or if it was to yield to the opinion of the electorate and the majority. This chapter analyzes transformations of the MB that were repressed during the rule of Mubarak; eventually, it became a major and legitimate political player. Additionally, this chapter analyzes the complicated task

that the MB and its affiliated networks faced to transform itself from a semi-secret opposition movement to a major player and a ruling power.

The January 25 revolution put an end to a regime that dominated the country and suppressed the MB for more than half a century. The MB, repressed during the successive regimes of Nasser, Sadat, and Mubarak, began to rise again and sought to shape the post-Mubarak phase. At first, the MB showed a pragmatic attitude, expressed in its willingness to make concessions in favor of other secular and liberal political forces, and changed its motto “Islam is the solution” to “Liberty is the solution, justice is the application” (Muslim Brotherhood, 2012, April 28). According to Carrie Rosefsky Wickham (2011, 2013), the MB had a new historic opportunity, so it affirmed its willingness to accept democracy and the rule of law and to abandon the state of emergency, in addition to its intention to comply with all the parliamentary procedures. Essam El-Erriani stated that the obligations and perceptions decided on by the Egyptian people were to be much more important than the ideological commitments of the MB (El-Erriani, 2011, February 9).

The keenness of the MB to make its project and economic and social program successful seemed to be greater than its keenness to change the culture, behavior, and norms within society; the MB believes that change through action and practice is better and more influential than theoretical change based on direction and personal observation (Heshmat, personal communication, 2015, March 17). Thus, Morsi, in most of his discourses, emphasized respect for the individual and public freedoms and that a greater focus should be placed on finding a possible way out of the current situation, politically, economically, and socially.

At the same time, the battle between the Islamists (particularly the Salafis) and non-religious orientated parties with respect to the role of religion in public space started early and,

most often, overshadowed the disagreement on service, economic, and social programs. Shadi Hamid (2014) considers that ISMs such as the MB combining the features of both political parties and religious movements led to an inherent tension within the MB. He also argues that the MB can be pragmatic, but its ultimate goal is still to Islamize society. Hamid argues that when the electorate it represents is conservative as well, it can push its own form of illiberal democracy while insisting it is carrying out the popular will. Undoubtedly, that was a key reason for the differences between the MB and other state institutions and liberal and secular movements.

The balance of power within the Islamic movements represents a point of controversy and disagreement, not only among specialized researchers but also within the movement itself, whose leaders often deny the existence of divisions, such as conservatives and reformers. In fact, when approaching a large mass movement like the MB as a broad organization, it is logical that intellectual, ideological, and generational (among generations) varieties will be found (Wickham, 2013).

Section 6.2 historically reviews the foundation of the MB, its surrounding circumstances, and the most prominent ideological transformations until the beginning of Mubarak's period of rule; this study addresses the time span between 1981 and 2014. Section 4.3 shows how the MB adapted to the gaps or interstices available in the regime and what ideological options it adopted to deal with the political opportunity, and, in another context, how political changes from Mubarak's rule to Morsi's removal contributed to composing the internal structure of the MB and caused the ensuing withdrawals. The chapter also sheds light on the balance of power within the MB in Egypt over the past two decades and the details of internal differences and how they were influenced by the political structure. The hypothesis in Sections 6.2 and 6.3 is that the reformists within the MB became stronger during the period of political openness and drew back

during the period of repression and oppression, when the main goal was the organization's survival.

Section 6.4 reveals the MB's perceptions towards many issues such as the role of women within the MB and in society and its perceptions towards the Copts and the civil state. In Section 6.5, the alliances the MB sought to achieve or avoid within the attempt to achieve its interests is illustrated. Additionally, this section clarifies the impacts of power network transformations on the MB's transformation with respect to the alliances built with the elites and other political and Islamic movements. The last section shows the strategies pursued by the MB after the 25 January 2011 to deal with power networks, as well as the challenges it faced. The hypothesis in this section is that the dominance of conservatives in the Brotherhood's post-revolutionary leadership contributed to the rapprochement with the Salafists.

6.2 The Muslim Brotherhood and the Successive Egyptian Regimes

For almost eight decades, the MB was an integral part of the Egyptian political body. Hassan al-Banna founded the Brotherhood in 1928 in Ismailia in order to restore the Caliphate (*Khilafah*) and apply Islamic law (*al Sharia*); after its inception, the Brotherhood sought to stick to the religious awakening of anti-imperialism that is resistant to foreign domination through the glorification of Islam. The MB was different at the beginning of its formation from other religious reformers⁴¹; the Brotherhood combined the theorization of Islamic thought and modern grassroots

⁴¹ The most prominent theorists of Islamic Revivalism were Gamal el-Din al-Afghani (1838-1897), Muhammad Abduh (1848-1905) and Muhammad Rashid Reda (1865-1935). Islamic Revivalism in the 19th century sought to re-open the debate about the sources of Islamic knowledge (Abū Zayd et al., 2006, pp. 21-22). The goal of the Islamic Revivalism School is to enable Muslims to participate in the re-drafting of the meaning of their lives, research on the concept of Sunnah and the meanings of Qur'an (ibid.). According to scholars of this school, this type of "re-think" was essentially motivated by the development of Muslim communities in the direction of modernization on the one hand, and the preservation of the spirit of Islam and its powers on the other hand. They argue that modernity "is a

political activism, achieving an Islamic society through preaching and educating (*tarbiyya*), with the first focus on the upbringing of individuals, then the family, and finally communities (Leiken & Brooke, 2007, pp. 107-111). In fact, the Brotherhood was established in order to pursue a wide reform agenda. The MB has tackled, over time, personal, religious, social, and political aspects (Brown & Hamzawy, 2010, p. 3), and although the Brotherhood's origins were lower-middle class, it soon turned to the Islamization of the local bourgeoisie (Leiken & Brooke, 2007).

The MB spread quickly in Egypt and abroad. Throughout that period, the MB acted as a political and social movement which represented a challenge to the modern Egyptian state, which was founded in 1922. Whether Egypt was a Kingdom (1922-1953) or a Republic (1953-present), the Brotherhood faced all the Egyptian regimes, which led to its repression and jailing of its leaders (Aly, 2007, p. 2). Nedoroscik (2002) argued that twenty years after the MB's inception, the MB was organizing thousands of government employees, students, police officers, lawyers, and soldiers in its group, as well as the poor in urban and rural areas. The MB was calling for an Islamic life as an alternative to Western Marxism and capitalism, while the communists, secularists, and Al Wafd were calling for a more democratic society.

The MB's perception of civil state, citizenship, and its relationship with the Islamic points of reference was not new, and the group discussed this relationship from the early years of its inception. The most famous document that showed this relationship was the MB draft constitution for the Egyptian state in 1952.⁴² The MB presented a draft idea of a national state in which all the

foreign power that is imposed on the Muslim world by the dominant European colonial powers in the wake of the dismantling of the Ottoman Empire ."(ibid.)

⁴² Taha Badawi, a public law professor at the University of Alexandria, drafted the proposed constitution items in 1952, in 103 articles under the supervision of the Counselor Mohamed Kamel, Head of the MB legal branch; he also held the presidency of the Military Court. The group approved this constitution and it was drafted before the fall of the monarchy, so we may find the impacts of that in the Constitution when discussing the regime. Refer to the

people could live, but the document focused on the Islamic reference of the state and that the teachings of Islam were the supra-constitutional principles, and no law contrary to Islam could be issued. Therefore, the proposed constitutional articles stipulated the legislative diligence that was not contrary to Islam. The highlight of the document of the MB constitution draft for the Egyptian state in 1952 was to give an Islamic jurisprudence that converged and came to terms with civil definitions contributing to the achievement of citizenship and integration of the Copts in the state, and to show that Islam was not incompatible with these definitions but was the founder of them.

This document is considered constituent and an important frame of reference for the MB's vision and stance towards the Copts and a starting point for the changes that took place in the perceptions of the group in relation to the issue of sectarianism and the Copts in Egypt. Article 4 of the proposed constitution focused on the parliament membership terms: a member had to "be an Egyptian citizen with good reputation, and at the age of forty years at least, and have a degree of culture determined by the election law" (Muslim Brotherhood, 2010, October 6); no terms relating to the membership of parliament determined that the person should belong to a particular religion, and in the terms of selecting the President of the State, the MB mentioned the same terms.

There is no doubt that political transformations played a role in influencing the ideological transformation of the MB in the years of repression that prevailed at the time of Gamal Abdel Nasser, which reflected the state of political isolation or what the MB calls years of "Mehna narrative" (ordeal). It resulted in two trends in their perceptions of the regime and the relationship of religion and the state. The most famous of these perceptions of the so-called "ordeal" was

following

link:

http://www.ikhwanwiki.com/index.php?title=%D8%AF%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%88%D8%B1_%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AE%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%86_%D8%B9%D8%A7%D9%85_1952%D9%85 (accessed in 2014, April 20).

jurisprudence, which Sayyid Qutb, a prominent thinker in the Egyptian Brotherhood, executed by Nasser's regime in 1966, wrote about in the book "*Ma'alim fi al-Tariq*" (Milestones); the same book became an ideological guide for many of the emerging Islamic movements (Zollner, 2007, pp. 413–414; Nedoroscik, 2002, p.54), which relied on its interpretation of the two concepts of governance (*hakimiyyah*) and ignorance (*jahiliyyah*). In it, he explained governance as follows: "God is the supreme legislator, the justice and the ultimate source of governmental and legal authority. God does not descend to govern, but descended his shari'a to govern." (Khatab, 2002. p. 14)

This grouping embarked on a course of violence in order to change the state and society, and this ended with the establishment of a theocratic religious state. Sayyid Qutb saw that Islam was a comprehensive universal vision that should be adopted or rejected entirely. Qutb argued that Islam could not be integrated into other ideological systems, because it would eliminate its real essence. He also considered that the Islamic state was the carrier of the Islamic ideology (El-Sherif, 2014b, October 21, p. 19, Khatab, 2002). However, Yūsuf Qaraḍāwī (2001) considered that Sayyid Qutb did not mean governance but legitimate governance, and that the political power was chosen by the nation (*il-Ummah*) which evaluates its performance (p. 62). However, the main official stream in the MB, which was led by its second leader, Hassan Hudaybi, refused this trend and explained the position of the MB towards the concept of governance and the consequences resulting from the judgment of the *Jahiliyyah* of society and the unbelief of individuals in the book "*Du'a la quda*" (Preachers, Not Judges), which was published in 1977 (Hudaybi, 1977).

The Brotherhood, a movement that lacked an official legal existence for eight decades, was one of the most successful social and political movements in contemporary Arab history, was able to maintain organizational structure and vision through the most difficult periods (Brown &

Hamzawy, 2010, p. 3), and seized the opportunities available to it and adjusted itself in any gap that appeared in the Egyptian closed political regime in general (Brown & Hamzawy, 2010, p. 3). The Brotherhood used, in its early stages, different organizational techniques such as advertising and programs for physical and ideological training and insisted on discipline and obedience (Zahid and Medley, 2006, p. 694). Members were committed to ethical and personal standards as stipulated by *Sharia* (Zahid and Medley, 2006, p. 694). Its members took part in social activities such as charity work and the establishment and operation of mosques, schools, hospitals, social clubs, crafts, and trade unions as part of social work (Zahid and Medley, 2006, p. 694). Khālid Ḥarūb (2012) argues that the MB enjoyed popularity for two reasons: first, its pedagogic and social approach that was based on gradual and peaceful reform; second, the power of the organization that was pervading the Egyptian society and its various segments, even the most remote areas, in addition to taking advantage of religion and religious practices deeply rooted in the popular mood (p. 130).

The seventies during the time of Anwar Sadat's rule were one of the most important stages of the Brotherhood. The MB considers it the second building stage of the organization in terms of proliferation and reconstruction, whether internal or in the community (Aknur, 2013, p. 7). Sadat released hundreds of leaders and members of the Muslim Brotherhood. He encouraged Islamists to find a balance with the secular, Marxist, and national opposition (Aknur, 2013, p. 7). A limited category of businessmen benefited from Sadat's policies of economic liberalization, and while the gap widened between the rich and the poor, the Brotherhood gave economic aid to the poor. It provided social services that Sadat's regime failed to provide (Aknur, 2013, p. 7). Although the MB remained illegal, Sadat allowed for the participation of independent MB candidates in elections and allowed it to resume the issuance of the newspaper *Al-Da'wa* in 1976. The regime

sought to contain the MB in order to absorb the anger of the streets (Wickham, 2002, p.96), while the Brotherhood took advantage of the relative openness during Sadat's period to reorganize its ranks, and the Islamic student groups became more prevalent in the universities (Aknur, 2013).

The MB renounced violence and formally distanced itself from the more radical Islamic groups such as *Al-Jama'at Al-Islamiyya* (Al-Arian, 2014, pp. 18-49) at a time when members of the MB began to acquire more political consciousness through their interactions with the trade and student unions. The group generally adopted a pragmatic political strategy to avoid confrontation with the regime (Al-Arian, 2014, pp. 18-49). Given the relative openness in the seventies, the MB tried to highlight itself as a moderate and democratic movement. Robert S. Leiken and Steven Brooke (2007) said, "The Brotherhood is a collection of national groups with differing outlooks, and the various factions disagree about how best to advance its mission. But all reject global jihad while embracing elections and other features of democracy. There is also a current within the Brotherhood willing to engage with the United States." (p. 108)

Carrie Rosefsky Wickham (2013) classified the Brotherhood into three trends. The first is the "old guards", which according to Wickham refers to the Senate generation within the MB who maintained the organization from the Nasser era to the present day. This trend focuses on advocacy, religious and social activities of the group, and not just the political side. The second trend is the "Pragmatic Conservatives", which means the leaders that represented the Brotherhood group in parliament or those that were involved in the political game and became more capable of practicing politics, such as Mohamed Morsi, Saad Katatni and Khairat El-Shater. Wickham (2013) indicated that the ideological transformations that occurred to these leaders were because of their involvement in politics, although these transformations did not find their way to the rest of the MB body. The third trend is the "reformist movement", meaning the MB middle

generation, which was active in universities throughout the seventies and then became influential in the eighties and nineties, such as Abdel Moneim Abul Fotouh, Essam el-Erian, Helmy El Nagar and Abou el Ela Madi before leaving the group in the mid-nineties. According to Wickham, the “reformist trend” declined from the end of the nineties until January 25, and this was in favor of the more conservative trend.

When Hosni Mubarak came to power in 1981, succeeding Sadat, he faced the difficult task of dealing with the Islamic movements. Mubarak dealt with the extremist and moderate Islamic groups differently. While he suppressed radical Islamic movements such as *Al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya* with the help of security entities and the army (Davidson, 2013, p. 89), Mubarak to an extent allowed the more moderate MB to participate in the parliamentary and trade union elections, despite the fact that the Mubarak regime did not allow the Brotherhood to establish a political party. Therefore, the Brotherhood was forced to contest the elections under the banner of other political parties, but they were unable to win large numbers of seats in the elections of both 1984 and 1987. Mubarak's government ordered the arrest of the prominent members of the Brotherhood during the elections of both 1995 and 2000 (Albrecht and Wegner, 2006, p. 125). However, and despite limiting the opportunity for the Brotherhood to participate in the parliamentary elections, the Brotherhood was still able to participate in the trade union elections and transform the unions to political platforms (Albrecht and Wegner, 2006, p. 125).

In theory, it was the arrival of Morsi to power on 30 June 2012 that marked a turning point in the course of the MB. But Morsi practically did not have the ability to re-organize relations among the regime's power networks, to accelerate the gap between the political power networks and the rest of the power networks. This opened up the debate on the beginning of tension between Morsi and state institutions which refused to cooperate with him, particularly the military

establishment. As part of the special historical circumstances experienced by the Brotherhood after the coup of 3 July 2013, especially the fierce security campaign to which the MB was exposed, it no doubt put the MB, their organization and their ideology at stake. Its failure to stay in power on the one hand and the security campaign against it on the other open a discussion as to whether these circumstances will push the MB to make significant changes to its ideology and organization, driving it to follow open peace strategies and tactics, or end in violence.

6.3 The Brotherhood under Mubark

Based on what was presented in the second chapter of this thesis about the political power of the Mubarak regime, the regime was far from being an “infrastructure power”. There was no participation by political parties and civil society institutions in governance, and the few available areas for political participation remained limited and marginal. The MB tried to expand steadily in the Mubarak era by participating in the parliamentary and trade union elections and providing social services. Hesham Al-Awadi (2013) argued that the Mubarak period represented a clear struggle for legitimacy between the regime and the MB, charting a cycle of accommodation and coercion. The Brotherhood failed to secure the recognition of the state, and the MB failed to get recognized officially by the regime. The Brotherhood adapted themselves to the opportunities that were made available to them; they built alliances and networks in a manner adapted to the reality; and they benefited from the available opportunity in a way that would not threaten the regime. In this context, the Brotherhood made many “reform” initiatives (reform initiative in 2004, and the electoral program in 2005, and the draft party program in 2007), which acknowledged and recognized the regime on one hand and sought to provide its own perspective, on the other, through proposals to enable the legislative and judicial authorities to confront the executive authority, and reformulate the roles of some state institutions (Hamzawy, Brown, 2010, p. 17).

This section seeks to explore the MB's adjustment to the areas made available to them by the Mubarak regime and the MB's orientation on the political system and engagement, by moving between the center and the periphery. my hypothesis is that the reformist stream within the Brotherhood was growing further in the periods of openness and deminishing during the periods of repression and oppression, when the primary goal was the survival of the organization.

6.3.1 Fluidity and Mobility between the Centers and the Peripheries

Syndicates were the most prominent non-central organizations that were targeted by the MB. Despite their professional and service basis, most Egyptian syndicates were under the control of the government or some of the liberal forces until 1980. After Sadat's assassination, the government changed its policy towards syndicates by easing the restrictions imposed on these syndicates. Additionally, the government allowed a small degree of independence without granting them absolute autonomy from the Egyptian regime. The Egyptian bar association was allowed to resume its activity after its dissolution in Sadat's reign because of criticizing the Egyptian–Israeli Peace Treaty. It continued criticizing the Camp David Accords with Israel. Unlike Sadat, Mubarak did not take any action against the bar association at the beginning of his reign (Zahid, 2007. pp. 113–114).

In the early 1990s, a number of trade unions reached 24 syndicates with a number of 3.5 million members (Fahmy, 1998, 2002). The aim of these syndicates was to protect their members' professional interests, including wages, pensions, and work conditions, and organizing the enrollment and accession of proficiency. Involvement of the MB in syndicates led to the rise of middle-class professionals within Tenants' and Trade associations. The MB opened up towards other various political parties and trends as well as starting to forge alliances with non-Islamic parties. They provided services for their electors resulting in later inauguration of bigger political

alliances, such as “Kefaya”, which constituted the largest political umbrella that included secularists, liberals, nationalists, and leftists, as well as the MB (Leiken and Brooke, 2007).

The MB focused heavily on trade unions (Fahmy, 2002). It depended on syndicates in addition to student unions as a political and mobilization platform and for the establishment of alliances with political parties. After 1990 and Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, the MB’s power in syndicates, student unions, and teachers’ clubs was strengthened and promoted. It established a network within these organizations. Hisham Al-Awad (2004) named this network *Tansim’s* Network. For the first time in the syndicates’ history, syndicates under the MB started to form coalitions to coordinate their work. With the establishment of the coordination committee of trade union action (*lagnat tanseeq al-’amal al-niqabi*) (p. 129), it was capable of transferring these syndicates into a unified political front against Egypt’s official status. The committee strongly condemned the Egyptian interference in the Gulf War in 1990 and called for the return of the Egyptian forces. Subsequently, the Egyptian government forced a group of syndicate members, who did not belong to the MB, to pull out of the committee and comply with the official policy used in the Egyptian government’s administration and leadership towards Iraq’s war (Al Awadi, 2004, Zahid, 2007, pp. 126-127).

The syndicates’ leaders mobilized resources of relief efforts successfully after the Cairo earthquake in 1992 and the flash floods in Upper Egypt in 1994, in addition to other services provided by the syndicates, such as increasing the wages of trade union members, improving medical care services, and providing job opportunities for members. The MB’s performance appeared to be better and more successful than the performance of the Egyptian government, leading to the embarrassment of the government in the public eye. The influence of the MB was

strengthened and promoted in the periphery and extended to reach the center. Wickham (2002) called this network “the corresponding Islamic Sector”, and defined it as:

“[A] broad network of Islamic institutions [which] had begun to coalesce in the interstices of Egypt’s authoritarian state. These institutions had different functions, served different constituencies, and varied in geographic reach. Yet despite their diversity, they can be thought of as forming a loose network, given the ties of family and friendship, resource flows, and ideological commitments that bound them together. . . . That is, a sector largely independent of—and competitive with—the cultural, religious, and service-oriented arms of the Egyptian state” (p. 95).

Through syndicates, the MB was capable of proving its political weight at the expense of the Egyptian regime. Syndicates proved their capability to handle urgent social and economic issues, which annoyed the Egyptian government, which tended to adopt policies that obstructed the MB’s action in syndicates. The MB’s strong performance in parliamentary elections and trade unions is an indicator of its strong mobilization force. But its attitude in syndicates revealed a new type of self-restraint. This suggests that suppression did not drive the MB towards extremism. On the contrary, its leaders manifested their determination to avoid clashing with the regime and to present themselves as a moderate and responsible opposition (Wickham, 2002, pp. 224-225). Nevertheless, after the MB’s members’ success in the elections in 1992, the bar association suffered many issues after some non-Islamist lawyers obtained a judicial judgment to put the syndicate under sequestration for four years (Abdo, 2000, pp. 102-105). In 1999, security authorities arrested 20 MB members in the bar association, most notably Mukhtar Nouh, former member of the People’s Assembly and the Secretary of the board of the bar association. Before

putting it under sequestration, they were referred to a Military Tribunal. Fifteen of them were sentenced to prison in 2000 for periods ranging from three to five years, charged with attempting to penetrate syndicates (Abdo, 2000, pp. 102-105). The MB called for removing the restrictions imposed on syndicates. In 2001, the Egyptian government ended the censorship on the bar association and provided the opportunity of holding free elections after being exposed to serious pressures. The Egyptian government continued adopting its policy of interfering in the trade union affairs in order to limit the MB's powers (Zahid, 2007, pp. 133-134).

The MB avoided a clash with the Egyptian regime. After the parliamentary elections in November 2000, the MB sought the establishment of a legitimate party using their popularity. It confirmed their continued participation under the framework of constitution and rule of law, even if they were not granted the approval or license to do so (Wickham, 2002, p. 225). Additionally, it avoided embarrassing the regime and raising the concern of secular opposition to win the elections of the bar of association on 24 February 2001, as 20 of their candidates won the membership of the board of association, which consisted of 24 members. However, they were concerned that none of the members belonged to the MB, as the list included at least eight representatives of the MB, in addition to those of other parties, such as the National Democratic Party (NDP), Al-Wafd, nonconformists of the Nasserist Party, as well as a Coptic lawyer. The list included four candidates who did not have a clear political affiliation (Shehata, 2010, p.55; Wickham, 2002, p. 225). The moderation in the MB's strategy raises the question of whether the motive behind this strategy was a mere tactic to gain the public's support or reflected a real ideological transfer. However, this tendency towards moderation did not grant the MB the license, and their political participation remained limited only to the extent allowed by the regime.

6.3.2 Emerging Splits within the MB

The seventies' generation played a major and important role in the MB. They were university activists during the seventies, and later they played an important role in many trade unions. Among them were Abou Elela Mady, Salah Abell-Karim, Essam Sultan, Abdel Moneim Aboul Fotouh, Essam El-Erian. This generation differed from the Brotherhood's so-called old guard, most of the leaders of which were imprisoned under Gamal Abd El-Nasser (Takayuki, 2007, p. 150). The difference between generations led to a gap emerging in political policies between them. The middle generation accused the leaders of dominating the Guidance Office (*Maktab al-Irshad*), as well as accusing them of autocracy, autarchy, and anti-political trends resulting in decreasing the opportunity of potential alliances from other political trends (Wickham, 2002, p. 217). According to the middle generation, the Brotherhood's old guard did not show any change in these policies. Younger members expressed their dissatisfaction and disappointment of the MB's organizational form and the dominance of their preserved points of view. Essam Sultan expressed his discontent, as he believed that "organized unemployment" was widespread in the MB. Many MB junior professionals found that their role in participating in the MB was marginalized (El-Ghobashy, 2005, p. 386).

Carrie Wickham (2002) argued that the peak of increasing tensions between the Brotherhood's old guard and middle generation was in 1996, after the death of the fourth General Guide, Muhammad Hamid Abu al-Nasr, in January of the same year. Ma'mun al-Hudaybi, the MB's official spokesperson, announced 76-year-old Mustafa Mashhur to be the new General Guide. This infuriated the middle generation, who refused the elections through which Mashhur was appointed as a General Guide (pp. 217-218). Subsequently, the MB's younger generation was disappointed. In 1996, Abou Elela Mady and his colleagues announced the establishment of a

new party, the Al-Wasat Party, with the consideration of preparing this party as the MB's political wing. The Brotherhood's old guard opposed the establishment of the Al-Wasat Party. Al-Hudaybi ordered the MB members who joined the new party to pull out immediately or be subject to expulsion. Thus, Mady and another twelve of the leaders of the middle generation announced their resignation from the MB. Authorities rejected the new party, and its license was not granted (Wickham, 2002, p. 218; Human Rights Watch, 1999).

Abou Elela Mady criticized the slogan "Islam is the Solution" held by the MB for a while. Mady stated in his interview with Yokota Takayuki (2007):

Al-Bannā's *da'wa* is important because it developed Islamic movements in the first half of the twentieth century. But the problem is that al-Bannā's *da'wa* did not develop after his death, especially in political issues. His *da'wa* dealt with both religion and politics. It met the demands of his era. But, of course, the present situation in our society is different from that of al-Bannā's era. It is not suitable for us to directly apply al-Bannā's idea to our society, especially with regard to issues about Christians and political parties. The Wasat Party, therefore, distinguishes politics from religion, and our *da'wa* specializes in politics. Thus, we acknowledge ourselves as a successor of al-Bannā's *da'wa*, especially in the political field. (p. 152)

Some of the middle generation leaders chose to remain in the MB, most notably Abdel Moneim Aboul Fotouh and Essam el-Erian. Both are members of the Guidance Office (*Maktab al-Irshad*), in good relations with the Brotherhood's old guard, and are also respected by younger members. Abdel Moneim Aboul Fotouh was the Assistant Secretary-General of the Arab Medical Union, and was the prominent candidate to be Mustafa Mashhur's successor. On the other hand, Essam el-Erian played a pivotal role in the MB after being discharged from prison in 2000 (Wickham, 2002, pp. 221-222). Wickham (2006) argues that Essam El-Erian managed a

successful campaign for the MB in the parliamentary elections in November 2000 (p. 221). As a commentary in response to the formation of the Al-Wasat Party, Aboul Fotouh and El-Erian denied the presence of any generational and ideological divisions in the MB, stating that any internal disputes were only limited to non-core issues (Wickham, 2002, pp. 221-222). After being discharged in 2000, Aboul Fotouh called for the return of the MB as an open and transparent political party, accepting opinions and differences. He considered the governmental procedures to be the reason preventing granting of the license. He asked the government to grant the MB the license in order to exercise their activity in public and take advantage of others' criticism (Wickham, 2002, pp. 221-222). They attempted to pursue policies contrary to the MB's trends; for example, both intended to run for the presidential election in 2005, but they refrained from doing so, and El-Erian was arrested with the charge of intending to run for election (Hussein, personal communication, 2015, January 6).

Another change took place in the MB when Mohammed Mahdi Akef announced his decision to step down in January 2009. Guidance Office (*Maktab al-Irshad*) elections were held during the same year, resulting in Mohammed Habib and Abdel Moneim Aboul Fotouh leaving the Guidance Office. Mohammed Habib (Former Deputy General Guide) criticized the elections and stated that his advice as the Deputy General Guide was not sought regarding running the elections. He added that running elections so quickly was aimed at enabling a team against another and not only his exclusion, but also encroaching the powers of the Guidance Office. El-Erian admitted that "elections revealed flaws in some regulations and some of the officials in the Guidance Office" (Al Jazeera, 2009, December 21). Hussam Tammam (2012) argues that the results of the elections to the Guidance Office showed the dominance of the "conservative

current” within the MB, and the “reformists”⁴³ were overthrown with their most notable representative Aboul Fotouh. Thus, changes of the MB’s structure were a result of these elections, whereby the MB believes that there is no evidence of a “conservative current” or “reformists” within the MB. It was stated that the dispute with Aboul Fotouh was back in the 90s, when Aboul Fotouh believed that the MB should converge with the United States and Mubarak’s regime, and the MB refused this convergence⁴⁴ (Hussein, 2015, January 6).

As far as the revolution of January 25 was a political opportunity to win power and exercise its social activities without the suppression in previous ruling regimes, however, it constituted a threat on its organizational level. Suspending Aboul Fotouh’s MB membership in May 2011 was remarkable. After announcing his intention to run for presidential elections (El Sherif, 2012a, January 12), however, the MB made a formal decision for him not to do so. Afterwards, Aboul Fotouh established the Strong Egypt Party (Ahran Online, 2012, November 21). Mubarak’s fall and the political openness that followed encouraged members and leaders opposing the MB’s policies to pull out and establish new parties that expressed their thoughts and aspirations. The establishment of new parties was not possible before the revolution of January

⁴³ Ashraf El Sherif (2012a, January 12) defines MB Reformists as “Reformists (as a term relevant to the Brotherhood) emerged around 2004, and the Egyptian media initially used it as a relatively hazy category to refer to those who were disgruntled with the authoritarianism of the organization’s guidance bureau; MB Reformists demanded greater freedom of debate and accountability within the movement, greater participation for women and the young, and a set of transparent guidelines to decision-making. Since then, the term has only gotten hazier and Reformists in the Brotherhood are known to come from all walks of life: the term now embraces a group diverse in age (from 20 to 50), profession (political pundits, student leaders, activists, and social media entrepreneurs), socio-economic status, and place of residence (both small towns and big cities).

⁴⁴ Gamal Heshmat argues that the MB managed to strike a balance between the old generation’s trends, which aim at protecting the organization, and the middle generation, which was opened to the other. This balance was believed to be successful with the evidence that the MB did not face any major divisions, and the pullout that took place was not of great importance, as the MB sectors did not pull out (personal communication, 2015, March 17).

25, as the Al-Wasat Party's experiment, which was rejected from the Parties Affairs Committee, did not encourage other opponents to follow its example.

In June 2011, amid the tensions between youth and the MB's leadership, Mohamed Kassas –Head of the MB's Youth Wing – refused to join the MB's official Freedom and Justice Party (FJP), announcing his intention to form the Egyptian Current Party. Shortly after his announcement, the MB expelled him and other members who joined the Egyptian Current Party (Bradley, 2011, June 23). Mohammad Affan, one of the MB's expelled youth, believes that one of the most important reasons to leave the MB and establish the Egyptian Current Party was to get away from ideological polarizations that appeared between Islamic and non-Islamic parties. He refused to join the FJP, as it did not contain any new ideologies as being a true copy of the MB's concepts and ideologies. He stated that the participation of non-MB members in the FJP was limited. Kassas added that the MB also refused their participation in many events and demonstrations after Mubarak's fall, leading to increased tension with the MB. Gamal Heshmat believes that the Egyptian Current Party's youth did not accept other views, as well as being refused by the MB. He says that the media played an important role in increasing the conflict, (personal communication, 2015, March 17).

Ibrahim Zafarani, one of the historical MB leaders, resigned after the January 25 revolution. He was a member of MB's Shura Council. He explained his resignation by the absence of real change in MB, as well as his opposition to choosing mechanisms in the FJP leaders that revealed the lack of separation between the advocacy, pedagogic, and social aspects (Egypt Independent, 2011, April 2). Zafarani and Mohammed Habib established a Renaissance party. Another political party was established, which was the Pioneer Party. It was located in Alexandria and headed by Khaled Dawood, from the seventies reformation generation. This party

included well-known key figures who formerly belonged to MB, such as Haitham Abu Khalil, Amr Abu Khalil, and Khaled Zafarani. It appeared that Renaissance and Pioneer parties included members older in general than the members of the Egyptian Current Party. The Egyptian Current Party had the preference of MB youth who were activists during the revolution (El Sherif, 2012, January 12). Mohammed Badie invited the MB's nonconformists more than once after 25 January 2011 to rejoin the MB, stating, "There are no huge conflicts between us and we can understand your claims and demands" (Heshmat, personal communication, 2015, March 17). It was clear that these invitations were not successful in returning the nonconformists.

6.4 Changes in the MB's Ideological Perspectives

This section seeks to pick up on other approaches illustrating MB ideology shifts, as they are concerned with the ability of these movements to adapt to the political context and the extent of its willingness to change the intellectual and ideological vision, while political participation was not the sole criterion for evaluation and study, based on the open-ended approach of Carrie Rosefsky Wickham (2013). There are other criteria for measuring ideological transformation of Islamic movements, including first, the ability of ISMs to adopt relativistic (not absolute) interpretations of religious texts and not claim the monopoly of religious truth; second, the extent to which the Brotherhood accepts the concept of citizenship; and third, equality between women and men or between Muslims and non-Muslims, especially in their political rights (p. 6). This section also makes a connection between MB ideology transformations in previous positions and its vulnerability to transformations in power networks.

6.4.1 The Copts

The Copts are one of the largest religious minorities in Egypt and the Arab world⁴⁵, numbering up to 6-10 million people. Most Copts in Egypt belong to the Orthodox Mark Church based in Alexandria (Flinn, 2007, pp. 189-190). The Coptic question in Egypt is complex and entangled with two important factors, namely the state and the Islamic movements, in addition to the role played or the position taken by the Copts and their church towards these two factors. Islamic movements played an important role in the formation of religious discourse and in dealing with the subject of minorities and their rights, and this discourse was reflected in society and the state. Islamic movements have varied in dealing with the Coptic question. Trends in some of them came near to civil standards and the concept of citizenship, considering the Copts an original component of Egyptian history, which is derived from the sense of joint historical and cultural heritage of the Egyptian nation and inevitably affected political behavior and thus institutional and societal harmony (Bishārah, 2012a); some Islamic movements meanwhile consider the Coptic people as *Ahl Zema*, who should pay the *jizya* poll tax, levied on non-Muslims in exchange for protection by the state.

The Brotherhood tried to emphasize the concept of citizenship and equality of all Egyptians in their rights and duties on many occasions. In 1994, the MB issued a document entitled “*al moubadra*”. The 1994 *moubadara* stipulates, “We assure that our position towards Coptic brothers is one of principle, stable and a duty on all Muslims, according to texts of noble Qur’an and Prophetic tradition, words and deeds[...] and Copts are a part of the fabric of

⁴⁵ Major-General Abu Bakr al-Guindi, head of the Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics (CAPMAS), announced the official population count of Egypt’s Christians. He said the number is no greater than 5,130,000 Christians out of a current population of 83,150,000 Egyptians. He explained that Copts tend to have the highest emigration rate, the lowest birthrate, and the highest income level (Youssef, 2012, September 30).

Egyptian society. They are partners of the nation and destiny. Our rights are theirs, our duties are theirs” (Ikhwanweb, 2007, June 10). In 2004, the Brotherhood issued a document entitled “MB Initiatives for Reform in Egypt”. It included their stance towards the Copts⁴⁶ (2007, moubadra of 2004, 1994). The same applies for the position stated in the 1994 moubadra and the 2004 moubadra. Such a stance is not new. In addition, its content was not different from that of the 2007 draft party platform or the Freedom and Justice Party platform issued in 2011.

According to the MB, the source of the relationship that bound them with the Copts was religious, built on Muslim-Coptic coexistence. Within the periods that were witnessing relative political openness, the Brotherhood nominated, on their electoral list “Islamic Alliance” (*al-Tahaluf al-Islami*) in 1987, the Coptic MP Gamal Asaad Abdel Malak to be the first Coptic representative after the return of multipartyism in Egypt (Howeidy, 2000, October 11). The Brotherhood vacated certain electoral constituencies for Coptic candidates, as in the El-Waily electoral constituency for the Coptic candidate Mounir Fakhri Abdel-Nour and in the al-Ghorbal constituency in Alexandria for the Coptic candidate Maher Khelah in 2005 (Saad, ٢٠٠٥, October 29).

The first draft of the Brotherhood program in 2007 attracted many comments. Liberal critics referred to a controversial item in the draft party program for the year 2007 as proof that the MB had not yet accepted the concept of equal citizenship for women and Copts. The item provided for the necessity of the exclusion of women and non-Muslims from the posts of the President of State and the Prime Minister in any state governed in accordance with the principles of Islamic *Sharia* (Brown & Hamzawy, 2008). The Brotherhood argued that the Islamic state has

⁴⁶ Cf. the initiative of the MB for internal reform in Egypt on the link: <http://www.aljazeera.net/specialfiles/pages/a7d9e130-0f09-4b77-bbb0-ee07dd61afd3> (accessed in 2015, July 2).

religious functions from which non-Muslims are exempted, and undertaking such functions may cause religious embarrassment to non-Muslims. In this way, they justified monopolizing these two positions. Despite the Brotherhood's amendment to the draft and its statements that this stance may not be binding⁴⁷, the 2007 program raised concerns among many parties regarding the views of the MB regarding women and religious minorities, even after the revolution of January 25 (Brown & Hamzawy, 2008, pp. 1-2).

The electoral program of the Brotherhood in 2010 emphasized fulfilling all Copts' rights and ensuring them full legal equality as Egyptian citizens, reserving their right to be judged according to their divine law regarding their personal and family affairs (Muslim Brotherhood, 2010, July 23). This program also included special items, such as the transfer of licenses for the establishment of churches and houses of worship from the presidential authority to the urban planning authority, which would protect Copts' rights from political exploitation by the state. It is noted in these documents that there is a focus on Islamic Sharia as a starting point for theorization. However, the MB had no objection to the interpretation of the Supreme Constitutional Court of Article II of the Constitution, even if they opposed the ideological perceptions, as this would give reassurance to the Copts that a civilian body would interpret Article II (Muslim Brotherhood, 2007, June 14).

After 25 January 2011, Rafik Habib was appointed FJP Deputy Head; he is Coptic and served as an advisor to former MB Supreme Guide Mahdi Akef. Khalil Anani (2011, June 1)

⁴⁷ The program is described in August 2007 as the "first draft"; the Brotherhood's goal was to get the opinions of a limited group of intellectuals in Egypt to help them in the drafting of the final program, and soon the document spread on a large scale in Egypt and internationally, which attracted media attention and many criticisms which tended to focus on a few of the most controversial points, although the Brotherhood leaders said that this draft was only for discussion and was subject to an internal revision. The Brotherhood amended the most controversial points in its final version, which is found on the following link: <http://www.ikhwanweb.com/article.php?id=822> (accessed in 2014, April 2).

argues that there are question marks about the method of selecting Habib; was it for being a Copt or for his ideas and conviction of FJP principles and objectives? The FJP began to intensify its consultations in order to forge alliances with a number of Coptic forces in the parliamentary elections in 2011. Nagy Nagib Mikhail, a member of the FJP supreme authority representing the Copts, said that the Party held a meeting with the Orthodox Church, headed by Father Basnety, who was a Holy Synod member, Father Begul, and a number of Coptic dignitaries, regarding the nomination of some of their members on the FJP lists. He stated that the Church rejected participation in coalitions and that the FJP asked the church to nominate more than 50 Copts on the Brotherhood lists (Abdel-Moneim, 2012, September 4); in the meantime, the FJP included a Coptic Vice President and more than 100 Copts among its more than 10,000 members. Some argue that this number was very small compared to the number of Copts in other parties (International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES), 2011, p.11).

the isolated Egyptian president, Mohamed Morsi saw that Islamic Sharia preserved good relationships with Copts, as they had equal rights and duties, and the basis of dealing with them was citizenship, as well as that they were free to build their churches legally, and the president was not entitled to determine the order of construction because it was up to an institution of legal competence. Morsi said (2011), "I need to appoint a Coptic vice president, advisor and a minister" (elwasatnewspaper1, 2012, June 12). Morsi appointed a Coptic advisor, Rafiq Habib, and a Coptic assistant, Samir Morcos; the latter resigned from his post following the protests raised by the opposition against the constitutional declaration issued by Morsi on 22 November 2012 (Bayoumi, 2012, December 13).

On 6 June 2013, Morsi issued a republican decree approving the construction of the Church of the Apostles Peter and Paul for the Coptic Orthodox community in New Nubaria City,

and opinions varied among the Copts regarding issuing this decree. Father Makary Habib, the Personal Secretary to Pope Tawadros II, said, “The church conveys thanks to the President for the issuance of the decree to build the church, waiting issuing more decrees in this regard.” He added that the church had submitted a request to build the church seventeen and a half years earlier, and the matter had not been decided, but “now we are surprised by the issuance of the decree” (Abdelmassih, 2013, June 7). However, the Coptic author Kamal Zakher considered Morsi’s issuance of a license to build a church as a political maneuver, intended to escape from the charges made against him of persecuting the Copts, and that the decree was linked undoubtedly to the approach of the June 30 demonstrations, which would witness the participation of Copts and they would claim their rights to citizenship. Zakher emphasized that this maneuver would not succeed (Yasin, 2013, June 7).

The media, some businessmen, and the deep state⁴⁸ played an important role in inducing the Copts against the rule of Mohamed Morsi, and sectarianism was used as a tool for mobilizing against the latter. In his speech before the demonstration of 30 June 2013, Morsi recognized the frosty relations with the Copts and the fears inherited from the Mubarak regime about Islamists; he called for the restoration of citizenship (Al Jazeera Mubasher, 2013, June 26).

⁴⁸ The concept of the “Deep State” is widely used to describe the political structure in Turkey, and it describes the role played by a large portion of the army, in cooperation with judges, government and police, taking place beyond the control of the elected government (Söyler, 2015). This deep state takes the responsibility of securing the secularism of the Turkish state founded by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, as well as fighting back against any movement, ideology, party, or government that threatens the principles of the secular Turkish state. Additionally, deep state networks are usually secret, and they strive to have influence over the state beyond the control of the elected government (Söyler, 2015). The “concept traveling” of the deep state from Turkey to Egypt. The one-year rule of President Mohamed Morsi was undermined by that country’s deep state — the military, the bureaucracy, the media, and the security services — all determined to change the rule of the Muslim Brotherhood.

6.4.2 Egypt's 'Muslim Sisterhood' and women's rights

There are three determinants which constitute the Muslim Brotherhood's position on women: firstly, the ideological determinant; secondly, the compatibility of ideology and practice in empowering women politically and socially; and thirdly, the influence of openness and political closure on the political activity of the MB and its impact on the role of women⁴⁹.

Despite the momentum of the literature of the Muslim Brotherhood addressing multiple issues, the presence of women in this literature remained modest in spite of the pivotal role they played inside the MB, especially in periods of severe repression. This was true even for Zainab al-Ghazali, who represented a significant symbol for "The Muslim Sisterhood", and a lot of MB literature focused on her; in fact, she was not a member of the Muslim Sisters Section at the time of Hassan al-Banna (Tadros, 2012a, p. 115). Al-Ghazali officially joined the Brotherhood in 1965 and was tried by the Nasserite regime on charges of planning to overthrow the regime. She underwent torture during her incarceration. Al-Ghazali emerged as a spiritual guide for The Muslim Sisterhood (Tadros, 2012a, p. 119).

Mariz Tadros (2012a) argues that "The Muslim Sisterhood" was established as one of the MB sections and not as an independent body. It would have been perceived to be a helping hand for the Brotherhood to promote Muslim women's rights themselves, in the sense that the goal of the Brotherhood was to promote women's rights within Islamic reference framework. But what

⁴⁹ Historically, since the emergence of the MB in 1928, shifts in the Brotherhood's vision of women had appeared. Hassan al-Banna discussed, in a document entitled Muslim Women, the role of women in society. The document did not address their political role and it largely restricted their role in public life. Al-Banna said, "Educate the woman with that which she requires to fulfill the mission and duty that God created her for: To take care of her home and her children" (al-Banna, 1927, pp. 9-10). However, al-Banna later changed his first point of view, so he headed towards the engagement of women in society. He formed a special section for women members of the Muslim Brotherhood, and he called it the "Sisters Section". He assigned them several social duties. The Brotherhood then tried to activate the political role of women (Abu Hanieh, 2008, pp. 89-90).

happened during the history of the MB was otherwise. It is an organization intended to advance the MB's mission through women's agency (p.133). Tadros (2012a) points out that there are three indicators suggesting the Muslim Sisterhood was one of the MB's tools. First is the lack of women who held official leadership positions in the movement. Women had no effect on the internal decision-making centers; they may be partly engaged in decision-making through informal channels. Second was the absence of the role of women in the development of religious and political thought of the movement. Women maintained work within the atmosphere of a sharp separation between the two genders, and this was reflected in the role and duties of women that reproduced the form of the patriarchal society and were devoted to the traditional style, without contributing to their emancipation. Third, in general, the Muslim Sisterhood were fully submissive and compliant to the leadership of the Brotherhood (2012a, pp. 133-134).

There was variation in the Brotherhood's attitudes towards women's political participation. There was an old and restricted stream who refused that women assume leadership positions, on religious and social grounds (Hassan al-Banna), while another stream saw the possibility of women's political participation, but only under certain conditions (Mustafa al-Tahan), and the third felt that the matter had nothing to do with Islam and was socially mediated. This latter stance is the one which was greatly strengthened inside the Brotherhood (Farid Abdul Khaliq, Sheikh Mohammed al-Ghazali) (Tadros, 2012a, p. 147). Those people advocating this stance saw no definitive position from the Holy Quran or Sunnah preventing women from occupying leadership positions and that the principle of men's *qawāmah* (guardianship over women) was only in the household. The prohibition of women from occupying positions of leadership in the Islamic societies could not be substantiated on religious grounds, and it did not represent one of the "*thawabits*" (fundamentals) (Tadros, 2012a, p. 147).

From 1994 onwards, the Brotherhood consistently maintained in all their political programs that women were prohibited from assuming the position of the Grand Imamate, and some documents avoided mentioning the issue. The 1994 *moubadra* and the 2004 *moubadra* (initiative) (published 10 June 2007) stipulates, “Woman is entitled to be a member of parliament or the likes in a frame that preserves her decency, neutrality and dignity. And Woman is entitled to hold public posts, except for (the post of) Grand Imam or presiding over the state, given our present conditions” (Muslim Brotherhood, 2007, June 10). In the program “Brotherhood for Parliamentary Elections of 2005 and 2010” (Muslim Brotherhood, 2007, June 10; 2010, July 23), and the draft Party platform of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood issued on 25 August 2007 (Muslim Brotherhood, 2010, February 3), the MB avoided addressing this subject; they just tackled general terms about citizenship and equality, without resolving the situation of women as regards “the Grand Imamate”. Even after 25 January 2011, the FJP also avoided addressing this topic in its program for the parliamentary elections (FJP Parliamentary Elections, 2011). The FJP focused on full equality between women and men in civil and political rights and freedoms without prejudice to the fundamentals (*thawabits*) of Islamic *Sharia* (FJP Parliamentary Elections, 2011, p. 24).

Tadros (2012a) attributes the absence of clarification of the MB’s stance towards women assuming the position of the "Supreme Imamate" to the fact that the Brotherhood had unresolved internal debate among members, such as Gamal Heshmat, Abdel Moneim Aboul Fotouh and Essam el-Erian, who did not object to women assuming all positions in the state and discussed that dedication, sincerity, and integrity were not related to gender or religion (p. 151). However, the MB could not resolve the issue even after the revolution of January 25. The lack of a feminist

circle inside the Brotherhood that could lead to *ijtihad* in order to re-interpret the *Fiqh* intensified the probabilities for change (Tadros, 2012a, p. 155).

One of the prominent arguments of the Brotherhood for not engaging women in the regulatory institutions before 25 January was the security repression exercised by the regime. Mahmoud Ezzat, former Secretary General of the MB, said, "The security factor is a fundamental reason behind not engaging Sisters in group leading positions"⁵⁰ (Muslim Brotherhood, 2011, October 2). After the revolution of 25 January 2011, the political opportunity for Islamic movements opened up and argument of Mubarak suppressing regime for the Brotherhood was no longer able to justify the non-involvement of women. The Brotherhood had to prove its commitment to activating the role of women at three important levels: 1. Women's candidacy in the parliamentary elections. 2. Women should be given a greater role in the public sphere (Tadros, 2012a, p. 135). 3. Women should become active members in the process of decision-making inside the MB and its party, and that they should become active members participating in the senior leadership authorities, such as the Guidance Office or the Brotherhood's Shura Council. At the level of women's nomination for the parliamentary elections, the Brotherhood nominated women in the elections of 2000, 2005 and 2010, such as the participation of Gihan Halafawi, the first Muslim female candidate for Egyptian elections in 2000, on her own initiative; she offered her candidacy to the Brotherhood, and they agreed. In the 2005 elections, one woman was nominated by the Brotherhood to contest parliamentary elections, namely Makarim al-Dairi, who came close to winning the only women's seat for the Brotherhood, but the then-ruling party

⁵⁰ Activity of the Muslim Sisterhood continued dramatically until 1965. The Brotherhood said that the Nasserite regime arrested all those who had been arrested before. The decision did not depend on men only but also included women. Nearly 20 active Muslim Sisterhood members were arrested, some of whom passed away in prison, and some of whom experienced torture, and were sentenced to imprisonment; they included Zainab al- Ghazali , Hamida Kotb , Aliaa Hudaibi and Khaleda Hudaibi (Muslim Brotherhood, 2011, October 10).

announced its candidate as the winner in a move regarded by observers to be part of the fraud that took place in those elections (Bājis, 2013, pp. 35-36).

In 2010, the Brotherhood nominated 13 women to contest the elections, but not one of them got a seat. In 2011, the MB nominated 76 women – among them the youngest parliamentary candidate aged 25 years – to contest the first elections after 25 January 2011, and four of them won (Bājis, 2013, p. 40). Historically, the representation of women in the Egyptian Shura Council was low, as indicated by the percentages in the following table:

Table 6.1: The representation of women in the Egyptian Shura Council (1979-2012)

Year	No. of women elected	No. of women appointed by president	Total % of women in parliament
1979 (11 Nov-21 April)	4	2	1.6%
1979 (23 June-20 March 1984)	33	2	9.7%
1984-1987	35	1	7.8%
1987-1990	14	4	3.9%
1990-1995	7	3	2.2%
1995-2000	9	4	2%
2000-2005	7	4	2.4%
2005-2010	4	5	2%
2010	65	1	13%
2011/2012	7	2	2.2%

(Tadros, 2012b, p.1)

After 25 January 2011, no progress in the presence of women in the Brotherhood senior leadership authorities had been made, and they did not have a presence in either the Brotherhood Shura Council or in the Guidance Office. The Sisters Section was not equal to its male counterparts in organizing the MB, despite the vital role played by the Muslim Sisterhood in parliamentary and presidential elections in 2011-2012, in gathering people, organizing events, and protests, or in the role that women took at the level of associations, institutions, and mosques (Shehata, 2012, p. 28). However, with the formation of the FJP, women had greater representation in the leadership authorities, but the participation of women in decision making remained limited, especially for the significant issues. For example, women did not play a role in making the decision to participate in the presidential elections (Akel, personal communication, 2015, March 20).

6.4.3 Civil State

The Brotherhood was trying to find a democracy that is compatible with their concept of slow Islamization. According to MB theory, the Islamization of society, before the state, by achieving change from bottom to top or any other manner, would automatically lead to the attainment of power. And then, according to the Brotherhood, the Muslim community would naturally follow the Islamic leaders and provide support for them in the elections. Islamization of society remained a dialectic occupying the Brotherhood's thought under Mubarak's rule. (Leiken, Brooke, 2007). However, Leiken and Brooke (2007) also argue that the Brotherhood's way to power was not revolutionary; it relied on "winning the hearts" through gradual and peaceful Islamization.

The Brotherhood focused repeatedly on the compatibility between Islam and democracy. Islam respects equality, individual liberty, and freedom. The MB considers democracy as a way

of managing political affairs. It does not deal with the culture of society or its moral judgements (*ahkamu*). The MB believes in democratic institutions like a written constitution, political parties, the separation of powers, and popular sovereignty. According to the MB, the main difference (with the democratic systems of the West) is the frame of reference (*marja'iyya*). The West advocates liberalism with no limits, but the MB considers the Shari'a to set the upper ceiling which one cannot exceed⁵¹ (Wickham, 2004a).

Nathan Brown, Amr Hamzawy and Marina S. Ottaway (2007) argued that:

“There are other issues that raise some doubts about the Brotherhood’s commitment to democracy. In contrast to most Islamist movements across the Arab world, the Brotherhood has kept its dual identity—religious movement and political actor—under a single organizational umbrella” (p. 7). They argue that the MB sought to clarify its position of Islamic Sharia to start easing doubts. The position of the MB in relation to respecting the legislative and democratic procedures is clear and does not need clarification. Over the years, elected members of the MB have proven their respect for the democratic procedures in the Parliament. But, “the position of the Brotherhood remains unclear on the inviolable higher principles and the process for deciding whether a law violates those principles.” (p. 6)

Two days before Mubarak’s fall, the Brotherhood sent reassurance messages inside and outside the country on their attitudes towards the state and their commitment to a civil state. Essam El-Erriani said that the obligations and perceptions of the Egyptian people were the basis of the ideological obligations of the MB (El-Erriani, 2011, February 9). After 25 January 2011, the

⁵¹ El-Aryan says, “There will be democracy here, sooner or later. It requires patience, and we are more patient because we are, as an organization, seventy-six years old. You have already seen some countries—Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan, Sudan, Iran—describe themselves as Islamic regimes. There’s a diversity of models, even among the Sunni and the Shia. Egypt can present a model that is more just and tolerant” (Remnick, 2004, July 12).

escalation of the dispute over the civil state in discussions relevant to writing the drafts of the constitution took place on several levels and in several forms. In his study, *Constitutionalism in Egypt: A Case Study (2013)*, Mohamed Abdelaal addressed and discussed the interpretations of the Islamists in Egypt for Article II of the Egyptian Constitution, which states, “Islam is the state religion, Arabic is its official language, and the principles of Islamic Sharia are the main source of legislation” (The New Constitution of the Arab Republic of Egypt, 2012, p. 3), which was discussed at the table of the Constituent Assembly 2012 for writing the constitution. Abdelal discussed the point of view of the Islamists, especially the MB. In this article, he argued that the Brotherhood had no objection to the interpretation of the Supreme Constitutional Court of Article II of the Constitution⁵², even if it opposed the MB’s ideological perceptions (p. 4), as this would give reassurance to the Copts that a civilian body had interpreted the Article.

The MB argued that the Egyptian people “consider the religion of Islam the supreme authority and fundamental framework for them in all fields. Therefore, our program relies on religious institutions and expects them to play a prominent role in promoting the various cultural, political, social and other aspects of Egyptian life” (FJP, 2011, p. 41). However, the Brotherhood tried in another part of the program to provide clarification. According to their point of view, Islam was the general framework of the Egyptian people, but this did not mean that the state is religious.

The FJP tried to emphasize the concept of a modern state based on the new and modern management methods in the state institutions that achieve the greatest possible transparency,

⁵² The Supreme Constitutional Court ruling came, under Case No. 119/21 (2004), as an attempt to answer the questions and concerns of the drafting of the text of Article II, explaining that “No legislative text may contradict peremptory and indisputable Sharia provisions”

efficiency, and development, and strengthen civil society⁵³. The MB has defined the relationship between the civil and Islamic state as follows: “The State is civil and civilian, for the Islamic State is civilian in nature. It is not a military state ruled by armed forces who get in power by military coups, and it is not ruled like a dictatorship, nor is it a police state controlled by the security forces, nor is it a theocracy - governed by the clergy or by Divine Right. There are no infallible people who can monopolise the interpretation of the Holy Koran and have exclusive right to legislation for the nation and are characterised by Holiness” (FJP, 2011, p. 11).

6.5 Networks and Changes in Alliances

During the period of Mubarak’s rule, the Brotherhood sought to participate in the parliamentary and trade union elections. At that time, the regime did not recognize the MB as a political party. The MB faced many obstacles that prevented it from reaching political platforms, and because of the judicial restrictions that had prevented the non-party movements from contesting the elections, the MB formed tactical alliances with registered political parties which could nominate candidates in the elections (Mustafa, 1995, p. 168). The MB allied with liberal and secular parties and some Christian figures to ensure legitimacy that could enable them to reach political power. For instance, in 1984, the Brotherhood allied with the secular party Al-Wafd after the two parties recognized the extent of their political and organizational capacities. Al Wafd was also a new player in political life after the decree of the Administrative Court to re-grant the Al Wafd Party its political rights, and it returned to practice its political activity officially in 1984. However, each party still pursued its own interests within the alliance, they did not set out a shared ideology. (Mustafa, 1995, p. 168).

⁵³ The item of Modern State from the chapter: “The Political Program and the System of Governing” of Dr.Mohamed Morsi’s presidential program for the year 2012 (Muslim Brotherhood, 2012, April 28).

After 25 January 2011, the map of political parties changed, and the Salafis became a key and a major player, which made the Brotherhood reconsider its policies again on the issue of alliances. The ideological dimension was not absent in determining the form of alliances, and ideological disputes emerged early between Islamic and non-Islamic parties, especially in determining the shape of the coming state. A call for constitutional amendments and referendum came on 19 March 2011 to form the first seed of polarization and to shape the political and social map according to the position towards those amendments. The result of the referendum on those amendments returned a majority of 77.7% in favor (Al-Arabi, 2014, March 26); most Islamists supported constitutional amendments, while most of the non-Islamist parties rejected them. The Brotherhood after 25 January seemed open in their alliances with everyone, as with the National Democratic Alliance, spearheaded by the FJP, of 11 parties such as the FJP, the Dignity Party (a left-wing Nasserist Party), the Ghad El-Thawra Party, and the Islamic Action Party (Al-Arabi, 2014, March 26). It was after that, especially in the competition for the presidential elections of 2012, that the MB rushed to ally with Islamists. This led to a split vote on the basis of secular religious polarization, which continued after that, especially through Egypt's Constitutional Referendum in December 2012 (El-Sherif, 2014b). This section seeks to explain how changes within the regime's power networks affected the formation of the MB's alliances.

6.5.1 The Salfist Alliance

Unlike the MB, the Salafi movement in Egypt and other places is not a unified hierarchical body, as it varies from organizational, ideological, and intellectual aspects. This diversity played an important role in its relationship with the MB. Before Mubarak's fall, some Salafi movements criticized the MB for their political participation. According to them, this criticism was made because of the opposition to many juridical opinions. However, after

Mubarak's fall, most Salafists participated in various political activities, such as the formation of parties, organizing mass demonstrations, participation in parliamentary elections, and participation in drafting the constitution. Without a doubt, the results Salafists gained in parliamentary elections (2011) were surprising to everybody, especially the MB (Vidino, 2011, p. 3).

Salafists – especially the Salafist Call – rose as a political power and formed a kind of challenge to the MB that was not present on the Egyptian street before the January 25 revolution. Before the revolution, the MB was not used to having any serious Islamic opponents, and the presence of new Islamic opponents would threaten its shares in the elections. The MB stayed ahead of the Salafi movement, yet it lost its traditional precedence over the Political Islam current, and it seemed that the Salafi Call was competing against the MB to gain this precedence (Lacroix, 2012, p. 5; Tadros, 2011, p. 12). The MB had two choices to confront the Salafists: the first was to obtain more of the conservative vote, which meant the conflict centered on adherence to Islamic law, while the second was to move towards liberal trends (Vidino, 2011, p. 3). Lacroix said:

“The electoral campaign created a genuine rift between the Salafis and the Brotherhood. It was as if each group took the election to be a zero-sum game. Every vote gained by the Salafis would have to be taken from the Brothers, and vice versa.” (2012, p. 4)

From another point of view, Lorenzo Vidino (2011) argues the growth of the SC in favor of the MB's interests. Firstly, the presence of violent and extremist Salafi trends allowed the MB to introduce itself internally and externally as the voice of moderate Islam. Secondly, Salafists could be considered as a huge source of votes and support. Vidino argued that the MB believed

that Salafists would vote directly for the FJP and assuming the Salafis' ability to form viable political alliances in the Parliament, Salafists would mostly support the FJP position (p. 3). This conviction increased because of the MB's demand for the Salafis to nominate a candidate for the presidential elections in 2012 (Hussein, personal communication, 2015, January 6). However, things did not turn out as expected by the MB; this will be explained in the thesis.

Despite the strained relations between the SC and the MB before the parliamentary elections, they agreed on many issues. On the 29 March 2011, they launched a campaign to vote in favor of the suggested constitutional amendments that would allow the elections of the Shura Council and the People's Assembly to be conducted early and thus increase their chances to obtain better votes and results than if delayed. The "Yes" vote gained a total percentage of 77% of votes. The MB and Salafists considered this a political victory (Lacroix, 2012, p. 4).

The Egyptian media highlighted the position of some Salafists towards many issues, such as women and Copts' political participation, weekly gatherings and demonstrations in front of the Embassy of the United States of America to call for the release of Sheikh Omar Abd El-Rahman,⁵⁴ and the case of bearded police officers. The MB's worries and tension grew. While the MB scrutinized every word in order not to provoke the moderate Egyptian voters, international observers, and the Army, the Salafists did not have the same concerns and restrictions and openly expressed their views on many issues in a relentless manner (Vidino, 2011).

Before the 2012 presidential elections, the Salafi current lost the mass, which was considered by the SC an added value in the elections of the Shura Council and the People's

⁵⁴ Omar Abdel-Rahman is considered the spiritual leader of al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya. He has a series of publications. He was a political opponent to Sadat's regime. He was convicted in the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center in New York City. He is currently serving his life sentence at the Butner Federal Medical Center in North Carolina. Sheikh Omar Abdel-Rahman denied these charges (Martin, Gus; Kushner, Harvey W., 2011, p. 226).

Assembly, as the Al-Nour Party, which depended on Salafi Sheiks and gathered the seeds of many years of accumulated work of various Salafi visions, was obliged to make a political decision without Salafi consensus. The SC found itself unable to unite the Salafist situation to support Abdel Moneim Aboul Fotouh (Fayed, 2012, July 16). Yasser Burhami, vice president of the SC, justified their support for Aboul Fotouh in the first round with their fear that one Islamist faction only would control the governance process alone (Alarabiya, 2013, April 26). *Al-Gama'at al-Islamiyya* joined the Salafist Call in supporting Aboul Fotouh (altahrirtvchannel, 2012, April 30). Ullama Shura of the Religious Scholars Council, which is the Advisory Council of Jamaat Ansar al-Sunnah, also supported Mohamed Morsi. This council included the most prominent Salafist advocates, such as Mohamed Hassan and Sheikh Abdullah Shakir, in addition to another eight prominent Salafi religious men (Brown, 2013, p. 21), while *Al-Hay'at al-Shariyya lil-Huqūq wal Islāh* (Islamic Legitimate Body of Rights and Reformation (ILBRR)) supported Mohamed Morsi in his presidential election campaign in 2012 (Brown, 2013a, April 23, p. 22).

On 14 April 2012, the High Elections Committee for Presidential Elections excluded Hazem Salah Abu Ismail from the presidential elections in 2012. Later, Abu Ismail led a political alliance with seven Islamic parties, named “Nation Alliance”, which was considered a new political competitor to the SC. This new alliance supported Mohamed Morsi (Brown, 2013a, April 23), the presidential candidate. Most Salafi currents supported Mohamed Morsi against his rival Ahmed Shafik in the presidential run-off elections.

After Morsi took office, the SC became even more apprehensive and suspicious of the Brotherhood's intentions, so the SC was keen to preclude the MB from consolidating its grip on power. The SC's apprehension dates back to the end of the 1970s and beginning of 1980, when both groups attempted to dominate the public sphere, particularly in mosques, universities, and

charity organizations. This competition led to violent clashes between followers on both sides in 1980, when the MB attempted to prevent the Salafists from disseminating their ideology at Alexandria University (Al-Anani, 2013, February 21).

The SC sought to strengthen its political influence and force the MB to respect and take its aspirations for government into account. Burhami argued that “The best way to have a good relationship with the Brotherhood is to have a strong presence, then the relationship will be excellent” (Awad, 2014, p.24). Burhami acknowledged historical and jurisprudential differences between them. Al-Anani (2013, February 21) argues that the deal between both sides to be simple: Salafists had a major role in drafting the Egyptian Constitution, in return for the SC lining up with the MB in confrontation with secular and liberal political forces. This deal helped the MB in getting the constitution of 2013 passed.

The Salafists did not have a share to participate in the Egyptian government formed under Morsi. At the same time, Salafists, and especially the SC, had an important role in forming the religious discourse. The MB allowed the Salafists to have a significant role in the constitution-writing process in 2013, especially as regards the identity of the State. The Salafists passed many of their perceptions without any objection on the MB’s part. For instance, on 1 January 2013, in the sixth session of the National Dialogue, there was a consensus approval of all participants, including the representatives of the parties of Salafists, on the 3rd article of the 5th clause in the proposed amendments of election law of the House of Representatives; this was considered positive discrimination in favor of Egyptian woman by forcing parties to add women in the first half of the list that includes more than four seats (Zaki, ٢٠١٣, January 3). In spite of the approval of the SC in the National Dialogue on this article, the SC refused women’s participation in the

Shura Council on 13 January 2013. Although it was against the MB's beliefs, it passed this decision in order to fix the cracked alliance with the SC against the opposition.⁵⁵

The MB did not succeed in addressing the SC's concerns. The crisis between the MB and the Al-Nour Party continued because of the dismissal of Khaled Alameddine from his post as Presidential Advisor for Environmental Affairs on 17 February 2013 and the subsequent criticism of the presidency, in addition to Bassam Zarqa's resignation from President Mohamed Morsi's Advisory Group (Ahrām Online, 2013, February 18). The Al-Nour Party continued its accusations against the MB of the Ikhwanization (Brotherhoodization) of state bodies, especially the Ministry of Education and Ministry of Awqaf (religious endowments) (altahrirtvchannel, 2013, April 9).

The SC tried to take advantage of the increasing discontent against Morsi and the MB in order to achieve more gains, and, with the Al-Nour Party's involvement, to launch a political initiative to end the crisis between the National Salvation Front (NSF) and MB. This attempt on the SC's behalf was considered an attempt to strengthen its political influence and to restore what it had lost from ending its alliance with other Salafi movements and the divisions that took place within Al-Nour Party. The MB rejected this initiative. Many Salafi movements and leaders criticized it. Mohammed Abdel-Maksoud, vice president of Islamic Legitimate Body of Rights and Reformation (ILBRR), considered the Al-Nour Party's initiative to be opportunism and blandishment (Gabha Salafia, 2013, February 6).

⁵⁵ This step embarrassed Mohamed Morsi and struck the credibility of National dialogue headed by Morsi. The "Egypt Party" announced its withdrawal from the National Dialogue. It was believed to be meaningless, as nobody carried out what was agreed upon in its sessions. Ayman Nour, President of Ghad El-Thawra Party, announced suspension of his party's participation in the sessions of the Dialogue, while Mohamed Anwar Al-Sadat, President of Reform and Development Party, described the presidency situation as a "contradicting" situation. Additionally, he expressed his party's intention to reconsider its situation towards participating in this dialogue as a result of the action taken by Shura Council (Hassanein, 2013, January 18).

The ILBRR became an arena of confrontation between the MB's authority and the SC. The ILBRR includes 119 of the most prominent religious and Islamic figures in Egypt, among them Azhari scholars, figures from various Salafi movements, and Khairat el-Shater, the Deputy Supreme Guide of the MB. Yet the Salafi Current had the upper hand.⁵⁶ The ILBRR was confronted with contradictions that emerged with the Body, as its decisions were not bound to the affiliated parties. Independent figures were the members of other bodies to which they were committed (Mohamed Hassan and Muhammad Hussein Yacoub, members of *Ullama Shura* (Religious Scholars Council). This resulted in the failure of the Body's main goal to unite Islamists (Fayed, 2012, July 16, pp. 7-8). This was apparent in the first round of the presidential elections, as neither the SC nor the independent members, such as Hazem Abu Ismail, were compelled to abide by its decision, in addition to Sheikh Mohamed Hassan and Sheikh Muhammad Hussein Yacoub adopting the *Ullama Shura's* position. The Body created tensions between the MB and SC. Despite the limited representation of MB figures, the Board of Trustees included members who were known for their loyalty to the MB (Mohammed Abdel-Maksoud; Safwat Hegazi; Abdul Sattar Sa'ed, resigned member of the Guidance Office from the 1980s), in addition to Dr. Mohamed Yousry (Fayed, 2012, July 16, pp. 7-8). The SC considered itself a leading power of the Egyptian Salafism. It believed in its capability of uniting most of these

⁵⁶ Former Grand Mufti of Egypt, Nasr Farid Wasel, who is respected by the majority of Islamic movements, headed the Body. But he resigned and his deputy Sheikh Ali Al-Salous took over. Mohamed Talaat Afifi, Mohammed Abdel-Maksoud, and Mohammed Hassan were chosen as his deputies. Dr. Mohamed Yousri occupied the post of the Body's Secretary-General from its establishment (Fayed, 2012, July 16, p. 7). Borhami and El-Shater were among its members. The ILBRR played an important role in coordinating the situation between the MB and the Salafists. It helped the Islamists in handling some political cases, including the constitution, elections, public gatherings as well as supporting Morsi during the presidential elections. This body is one of the most recent Salafi organizations. It was established in July 2011. It claims to be a moderate and independent body in search of gathering Islamic views and opinions under one banner. It aims at spreading Islamic values in society (Brown, 2013, July 16, p. 22).

trends and currents on one list in the 2011-2012 parliamentary elections. Later “The [SC’s] accusations that ILBRR was a tool of the Brotherhood to provide influence over Salafis came to light following an escalation by the Brotherhood.” (Awad, 2014, p. 26)

Later, however, the relations between the MB and the SC became massively strained after Khaled Alameddine, the Al-Nour Party’s leader, was dismissed from his post as an advisor to the president on environmental affairs. The Presidency stated that Alameddine’s dismissal was a result of oversight reports that indicated an attempt to misuse his post. However, the Al-Nour Party considered that this action was intended to humiliate the Party and claimed an immediate apology on the MB’s behalf. El-Shater refused to apologize, and immediately the SC’s members resigned from the ILBRR. But Saeed Abdel Azim, a Salafist Sheikh, refused the resignations of SC members from the ILBRR and was promoted to vice president of the ILBRR. The SC considered this action humiliating to the SC (Awad, 2014, p. 26). This conflict was no casual issue and created a new shape for the crisis between the SC and the MB, in addition to previous issues, such as the Al-Nour Party’s accusation of the MB’s monopolization of political positions and its responsibility for the divisions that took place in the Al-Nour Party and resulted in the establishment of the “Homeland Party” by Al-Nour’s former president Imad Abdul-Ghafoor.

Al-Nour officials accused the Brotherhood of trying to weaken it by attempting to co-opt party members and stoke the party’s split. “I wouldn’t say they engineered the split, but they had a big hand in the operation,” said Nader Bakkar, a spokesman for Nour (Daragahi, 2013, January 2). Burhami and al-Nour’s president, Youness Makhoun, began to speak of Brotherhood nepotism and the “Ikhwanization” of the state. In the months before the coup, the mutual hostility only increased (Awad, 2014, p. 26).

Gamal Heshmat stated that what forced them to reach an agreement with the Al-Nour Party was the MB's grassroots and other Islamic movements, who called for the unification of Islamic movements and their project. Yet MB leaders considered that the closeness to the Al-Nour party had only taken place with reluctance (personal communication, 2015, March 17). Notably, the crisis between the MB and the SC was caused by political concerns and acquisition of power, not for religious or ideological reasons (see chapter 5). The Al-Nour Party recognized that the MB owned additional political platforms it had not owned previously in the parliamentary elections of 2010. These platforms included the ministries occupied by MB members, such as Supply and Internal Trading, and Youth, both of which were very successful. Younes Makhoun, Al-Nour Party's president, was the first in the National Dialogue session in February 2013 to demand the change of the Ministers of Supply and Internal Trading, and Youth (El Sharnoub, 2013, June 1). This demand was strange.

The MB did not make any effort to highlight the difference between the MB and the Salafi movements with a new political experiment. The MB prioritized maintaining alliances rather than showing its cultural and social situations to satisfy the Salafists, especially the SC. The MB's opponents took advantage of this situation in sectarian mobilization against Copts to intimidate them (McTighe, 2014, p. 3). Al-Nour and the MB's alliance seemed weak and faulty, and it fell with the Al-Nour Party's support with the coup of July 2013. Afterwards, the Al-Nour Party accused the MB of their failure to rule Egypt and leading to the inception of a civil war, while most of the Salafi movements and currents entered into an alliance with the MB, which was called the "Anti-Coup Alliance" (also known as the National Alliance Supporting Legitimacy) (McTighe, 2014, p. 3).

6.5.2 Alliances with non-Islamic Groups

The MB's middle generation professionals had been compelled to follow a trend of transparency and flexibility since 1980. This generation of the MB learned to enter into alliances and provide their electors with services by working within tenants' and trade associations. Islamists worked in syndicates with seculars and liberals (Leiken and Brooke, 2007); this in turn was reflected afterwards in the political alliances in the parliamentary elections.

The MB entered into an alliance with various non-Islamic parties under Mubarak. In February 1984, the MB entered into an alliance with the Wafd Party according to an agreement between the MB's Guide at the time, Umar al-Tilmisani, and Fouad Serageddin, Head of the Wafd Party⁵⁷. The MB's candidates then entered the elections on Al-Wafd's list. This alliance obtained a total of 57 seats in the People's Assembly, eight of which were specified for the MB. Mona El-Ghobashy said, "The eminently reasonable logic was that the Wafd provided a legal channel while the Ikhwan [Brotherhood] offered a popular base," thereby enabling "both to reclaim their place on the national stage after long years of state-enforced absence." (2005, p. 387)

The MB formed an alliance called the "Islamic Alliance" with the Socialist Labour Party and the Free Liberal Party when the Wafd Party refused to re-enter into an alliance with the MB in 1987. The slogan of the Islamic Alliance was "Islam is the Solution". This alliance obtained 56

⁵⁷ In the elections of 1979, the MB's candidates, Salah Abu Ismail and Hassan Al-Jamal, won. This participation was important, even though it was individual, it was considered an announcement of the birth of the MB and the Islamic movement in general after their previous losses (Rubin, 1990, p. 21). By the same token, the 1976 and 1979 elections were considered the first true elections witnessed in Egypt after the 1952 coup. Additionally, these elections were the first result of party and political multiplicity in Egypt that was acknowledged by Anwar Al-Sadat (Hassan, 2010, p. 321).

seats, 36 of which were specified for the MB (about 8.5% of Assembly's seats), meaning that the MB was ranked first among the political opposition (Wickham, 2013, p. 47).

In the 1984 and 1987 parliaments, the MB called for the application of Islamic Shari'a according to a more "gradual" approach. (Wickham, 2013, p. 54). It believed that some Islamic legislation was not enough, and Ma'mun al-Hudaybi, Head of the MB Parliamentary Caucus, declared that: "State's Officials in charge when conducting state's affairs, no matter small or big, shall abide with what Allah has revealed and Islamic Shari'a. This means that state's official religion is Islam, and official statesmen shall comply with applying Shari'a and Islamic governance." (Al-Khatib, & Radi, 1990, p. 73)

The MB's debates in the 1984 and 1987 parliaments were not limited to the application of Shari'a, and it also addressed many issues by participating in parliamentary committees. The MB called for the abolition of the Emergency Law (Wickham, 2013, p. 55). In 1990, the MB concluded an agreement with the secular and liberal parties to boycott the parliamentary elections, as these parties believed the elections would not be fair (Wickham, 2013, p. 56). In general, the MB was keen to participate in the Egyptian parliamentary election to keep its legitimacy and reach the interim objectives of the MB's vision. This period witnessed the progress of the Islamic current, while secular and national influence decreased with the domination of the ruling party (Mustafa, 1995, p. 310).

The Egyptian Movement for Change (EMC), also known as Kefaya (Enough), was announced in 2004. Manar Shorbagy (2007a& 2007b) argues that Kefaya's significance lay in its transformative potential as a broad political force that was uniquely suited to the needs of the moment in Egypt. It was at once a cross-ideological force that had the potential, in the long run, of creating a new mainstream and a new kind of movement towards a distinctive and promising

form of politics for Egypt. The Kefaya Movement was considered as an experiment to study the relationship between MB and non-Islamists in one political entity.

In many events, Kefaya supported the MB on the level of a broad national front for change, yet direct cooperation between both parties was relatively rare. The MB abstained most often from participating in Kefaya demonstrations, more likely because the MB was subjected to repression or because of the fear of competition from Kefaya in gathering partisans. In previous years, the Kefaya movement criticized the MB and hinted that the MB cooperated with them only to serve its own interests and concerns to achieve more gains in the parliamentary elections (Carnegie, 2010, September 22). Some Islamists pulled out of the Kefaya movement because of the alleged marginalization of the MB and the Islamic Action Party. Islamists in Kefaya accused secular members of trying to monopolize the Kefaya movement, while the secular members in Kefaya accused the Islamist members of seizing the movement (Oweidat, 2008, p. 32).

The Egyptian writer, Fahmi Howaidy, argues that although the MB enjoyed a significant share on the Egyptian street, its presence in Kefaya was not significant enough. The MB's participation in gatherings and events was not significant in a manner equivalent to the MB, which was known for its high organizational efficiency. Howaidy argues that the MB chose to keep at a distance from the Kefaya Movement. On 30 June 2005, the MB called for the establishment of a new political entity called the "National Alliance for Reformation and Change", which adopted the same demands as the Kefaya Movement. The MB preferred to be independent from Kefaya and called others to join it after refusing to participate with Kefaya. This contributed to the fragmentation of political forces calling for the reformation of Mubarak's regime (Howaidy, 2005, July 6).

The MB believed that the alliance with non-Islamists in the Kefaya Movement was not successful because of two main factors. Firstly, the view of Islamists as reactionaries by most political opponents contributed significantly to strained relations between Islamists and the Kefaya Movement. The MB believed that liberals and leftists completely rejected the Islamic movement. The second factor was the imposition of many penalties upon political forces by various ruling authorities in an attempt to defeat any political alliance that would strengthen the performance and situation of the opposition (Muslim Brotherhood, 2011, August 4).

The revolution of 25 January 2011 opened the door for Egyptians into serious discussion between various political forces after many decades under Mubarak's reign. On a broad level, Egyptian youth who participated in the revolution entered into dialogue over a period of 18 days in Al-Tahrir Square and other places where the revolution took place (Al-Arabi, 2014, March 26). On the level of political forces, the first call for democratic dialogue was called directly by the MB's General Guide Mohammed Badie. Most parties and political forces answered this call. This dialogue had borne fruit in the political reference document in the participation of 34 parties, movements, and participants. As a result, an electoral alliance emerged in the form of the "National Democratic Alliance" led by the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) (Al-Arabi, 2014, March 26). However, the alliance did not continue, and many withdrawals from this alliance followed in succession, dividing the alliance into 11 parties, such as the FJP, the Dignity Party (a left-wing Nasserist Party), Ghad El-Thawra Party, and the Islamic Action Party. The FJP remained the dominant political force in the alliance, and its candidates formed about 70% of the alliance candidates' list and 90% on the individuals' list (Jadaliyya & Ahram Online, 2011, November 18). The Egyptian Democratic Alliance is generally considered to be an alliance of the MB. Notably, the MB did not adopt the slogan "Islam is the Solution" (Ibid.), which they had

adopted in the previous elections, especially after it lost hope of cooperating with the Islamic parties in its alliance. The MB did not want to lose the alliance with non-Islamic parties and gave up their slogan “Islam is the Solution”.

Before the end of the second round of the presidential elections after the revolution (17-18 June 2012), delays in declaring the official results of the elections resulted in rising fears and tension among the revolutionaries, including the Islamists and others, that the Armed Forces Council intended to announce Ahmed Shafik, the former Prime Minister under Mubarak, as the new President, although the FJP announced that the winning candidate was Mohamed Morsi. At that point, the MB started working closely with various political movements to confront these fears. Many leading figures of leftist and liberal forces accepted its actions. They held a meeting in the Fairmont Hotel on 20 and 21 June 2012, three days before the official announcement of the electoral results, during which they held a discussion and criticized each other. They ended up drafting a statement of “National Partnership” and called it the “Fairmont Document”. The statement included the importance of participation of all the political forces in the process of government and sought “balance in forming the ‘Egyptian Constituent Assembly’ (CA) for the creation of a new Constitution of Egypt.” (Al-Arabi, 2014, March 26). Interestingly, this document called – in case Mohamed Morsi was the winning candidate – for him to put an end to the military intervention in the political situation. Later, some of these forces supported the military coup in 2013.

On 24 November 2012, senior Egyptian politicians gathered with the political parties opposing Morsi in a political entity called the “National Salvation Front” (NSF) to coordinate their opposition movement against the constitutional declaration issued by Morsi on 22 November 2012. This declaration set up the presidential decrees and the Egyptian Constituent Assembly –the

body responsible for drafting the new Egyptian Constitution – outside the scope of judicial review, which was considered a critical and acute attempt to perpetuate absolute power. The formation of the NSF was the first time on which senior secular, liberal and some leftist politicians in Egypt demonstrated their unity in a climate of political competition with the MB and other political Islamic parties (Carnegie, 2010, September 22).

The NSF adopted a tough position against Morsi's constitutional declaration. Additionally, it stated that it would not hold any meeting with Morsi until he cancelled this declaration. The NSF organized a mass demonstration against Morsi and the MB. After the NSF refused political dialogue with the MB, Morsi chose to proceed with the constitutional referendum instead of making concessions to the opposition. In the constitutional referendum which took place in December 2012, the NSF called its supporters to vote no. The constitution was approved by 64% of voters. The percentage participation was low and reached only 33% of eligible voters (BBC, 2012, December 25). The NSF found itself facing conflict with the MB and the impossibility of participation in joint action,

In summary, it can be said that the conflict between Islamists and non-Islamists started with Mubarak's fall. This conflict started with the electoral competition between "revolutionaries of Tahrir Sq.", with each party claiming to represent the revolution. The MB dealt with the political context as a phase of a state of mature democracy and not as a phase of a "transition to democracy", and failed to make sufficient efforts with its non-Islamic opponents as it approached one-party governance without complying with the Fairmont Agreement (Al Jazeera Arabic, 2013, July 26).

6.6 The MB and Power Networks

This section deals with the period that followed the fall of Mubarak. The Brotherhood was distinguished from others in its ability to regroup quickly, as well as a readiness to enter the parliamentary elections. The Brotherhood sought after 25 January 2011 to control political power by participating in the parliamentary and presidential elections and through the great role they played in the formation of the committee for writing the Egyptian Constitution in 2013, in addition to the formation of governments headed by Hesham Qandil after Morsi won the presidential election. The Brotherhood headed toward a system by which they could subject the rest (power networks such as the economy and the Army) to political power, all at the expense of conformity with state institutions and non-Islamist parties. The MB was unable to form a new stable political system by increasing its influence through political networks. Secularists, socialists, liberals, and Coptic institutions did not trust the rule of the Brotherhood, and many of these groups feared the Islamization or “Ikhwanizing” of the state. The Brotherhood supported the Salafis at the expense of liberals and secularists.

In general, the Brotherhood’s experience in government does not have the objective conditions originally needed for success. The Brotherhood faced a complex net, including the deep state, the Military Council, the economy, and the bureaucratic authority of the state, which did not cooperate with the rule of the MB. At the same time, secular and liberal parties preferred to postpone the parliamentary elections until 2013 because they feared Islamists, as they were the best organized parties, and they wanted a bigger share in the committee for writing the new constitution before the elections (Dunne, 2011, June 21). Most of the Egyptian business elite succeeded after 25 January 2011 in maintaining all its economic power and political influence, despite the Egyptian mass protests that broke out against the Mubarak regime and the corruption

of businessmen. However, a few of those businessmen appeared before the court, and the majority of them benefited from the flexibility of the SCAF, which took office at the beginning of the transitional period (Roll, 2013). Most importantly, the Brotherhood also faced the challenge imposed on any ruling political elite based on public support to stay in power, i.e. the need to improve the economic and living conditions for all citizens. Under Mohammed Morsi's rule, the security situation deteriorated, the infrastructure and public services were further diminished, and power outages and scarcity of fuel were suffered daily by the Egyptian people (Colombo & Meringolo, 2013, pp. 5-6). Meanwhile, the Army was worried when the Islamic parties, including the FJP, swept parliamentary elections in 2011/2012, and when an Islamist president, Mohammed Morsi, also was elected and took office in mid-2012. To reduce the threat of military power, Morsi dismissed senior officers and appointed men like Abdel Fattah al-Sisi in key positions, and turned a blind eye to the military's desire to keep its budget and economic empire away from public scrutiny or oversight (Abul-Magd, 2013, p. 3).

6.6.1 The MB and Economic Policies

During the time of Mubarak's rule, the Brotherhood formed a range of social service networks that mainly aimed to provide services such as food, jobs, and health care to the poor. The government's inability to achieve its commitments towards many of the poorer classes created a good opportunity for the MB to fill the void. The Brotherhood emerged as a competent organization able to provide services in areas where the government had failed (Caromba & Solomon, 2008, p. 120). Laurence Caromba and Hussein Solomon (2008) argued that this presented a positive image of the Brotherhood both within and outside Egypt. The Cairo earthquake in 1992 was an example of the Brotherhood's provision of services at a time of crisis, and the humanitarian response was, then, more effective than the government's. The MB

members rushed quickly to establish shelters and medical tents, provide food, clothing, and blankets to the residents of the city, and donated \$1000 to each family whose home was destroyed. Mubarak's regime felt that the MB was trying to compete with the country's infrastructure. This feeling was deepened after the large popularity achieved by the Brotherhood in the professional associations. Professional association elections not only constituted political platforms for the Brotherhood, they also routinely provided social care services for members and non-members, including loans and insurance and educational programs (Charles, 2000, pp. 85-86). Davidson Charles (2000) argues that the total financial assets of the Egyptian Engineers Syndicate in 1995 amounted to about EGP 60 million, or nearly \$15 million U.S. dollars (pp. 85-86). The Egyptian regime restricted the MB's economic and social activity. In 2006, security forces launched a campaign of arrests specifically against businessmen affiliated with the MB and their economic activities, and many companies and holdings were confiscated. The Brotherhood tried to avoid engaging in the formal economy of the state in order to protect itself from repression practiced by the state (Roll, 2013, p. 15).

In the FJP's electoral economic program for 2011, the FJP relied on the "Islamic economic system", and interpreted it to mean that the economy and market system should not violate certain values such as justice, solidarity, and the fight against fraud, nepotism, and monopoly (The Freedom and Justice Party (FJP), 2011). However, the program remained in its formula for a year and did not specify its attitude towards the international economic system and other economic issues. While the presidential program for Mohamed Morsi (2012) was detailed in how to deal with economic issues, it avoided the issue of theorizing "Islamic economics". Morsi promised in his electoral program to apply the "economic development program", which called for an end to corruption and chronic unemployment, promoting production, activating foreign

investment, and reducing income inequality (Muslim Brotherhood, 2012, April 28). Abdul Hamid Abu Zayd, MB member and an economist at Cairo University, saw that Islam supported market and free trade economy, which is an integral part of Islam as a complete way of life (Glain, 2012, January 24). Stephen Glain argued that this type of solution from a group that has little experience was not enough to gain access to a strong economy (2012, January 24).

Contrary to all expectations, the MB's economic policies were not, after 25 January 2011, moving towards the establishment of an Islamic economy. Morsi dealt realistically with the economic crisis, away from ideology. Egypt's policy towards international donor institutions, especially the IMF, remained fixed under the rule of Morsi. Negotiations with the IMF began under Hosni Mubarak's rule, and hence SCAF sought in 2011 for its completion. Morsi found that, in order to stop the slide toward full economic collapse, there was an urgent need for loans and sources of investment; hence, he completed negotiations with the IMF to get \$4.8 billion. However, the IMF predicated the granting of any such loan on spending cuts, specifically cuts to food and fuel subsidies to the poor. Morsi refused to countenance cuts that would worsen their plight (Wight, 2013, September 7). Following that, negotiations with the IMF stopped; Morsi sought loans from other countries such as Russia and Germany (Wight, 2013, September 7).

The Islamic Sukuk (instruments) Draft Law was one of the huge economic projects that the MB sought to implement. Its idea was to bring \$15 billion per year, and the project complied with Islamic Sharia. Through this draft law, the state would acquire projects for a period of time to enhance the levels of funding. It was approved by the Shura Council. However, a dispute arose between the Islamists themselves on those instruments (Farahat, 2013, November 16). The Al-Nour Party rejected the law in principle for their desire to know the opinion of the senior scholars of Al-Azhar. Al-Azhar rejected the first draft of the law. The Al-Nour Party confirmed its support

for the position of Al-Azhar that the sale of assets to repay the instruments may violate Sharia, while the MB saw it as a political stance based on a desire to achieve political advancement for the state, and Sharia had nothing to do with it (Farahat, 2013, November 16). The Al-Nour Party warned that it involved a risk to the state assets, and the party would challenge the draft law before the administrative judiciary if the MB didn't consider its note. In order to prevent the dispute, Morsi sent the draft law to the senior scholars of Al-Azhar. It was approved by the Authority with some observations; the Shura Council considered these observations and approved the law. To allay fears, the government said it would not use national security assets such as the Suez Canal, and they pledged to amend the draft according to the observations of Al-Azhar. Fayyad Abdel Moneim, the Finance Minister in Qandil's government, said that it was according to consultations with international and Islamic institutions. It was expected that Sukuk issues introduced at \$5 billion in the first year would grow to \$10 billion the following year. He said the government was going to provide infrastructure projects for the investment of Sukuk, which included plans to establish a high-speed train linking the industrial cities and construct silos for storing strategic reserves of wheat (Farahat, 2013, November 16). The Brotherhood believed that Al Nour refused the project to cause bickering and disruption, and not because of Sharia (Al Fiqi, personal communication, 2015, March 16).

As for Morsi's economic policies, he ratified the amendments to income tax, approved by the Shura Council, and a law was passed on 18 May 2013. In addition to the amendments to the income tax structure, low-income earners were exempted from taxes (Hafez, 2012, December 9). The MB considered these amendments as evidence of its commitment to social justice (Al Fiqi, personal communication, 2015, March 16). However, one of the major challenges facing the FJP was to have a comprehensive and unified budget, in the sense that there should be a unified

budget for all sectors and authorities of the state, including the armed forces. Then there was a need to find a compromise formula for civil-military relations, including a military civil economy that would not be exempted from parliamentary oversight (Al Fiqi, personal communication, 2015, March 16). This was in addition to the challenge of subjecting private funds to state control. These funds were spread among all ministries, governorates, and holding companies. The private funds have a special budget outside the state budget and are affiliated to the administrative bodies such as the administrative authority, the local administration, public service and economic authorities, and other public legal entities. The estimated budgets reach billions, and these funds are considered a hotbed of corruption (Manek and Hodge, 2015, May 26).

6.6.1.1 The MB's Economic Elite: Entering into the Formal Economy and Expanding Economic Networks

After the release of a group of businessmen affiliated with the MB after 25 January 2011, MB businessmen sought to restore their confiscated assets and expand their companies (Roll, 2013, p. 15). The establishment of a series of markets owned by El-Shater's family was a good example. The idea was to provide cheap food through an extensive network of branches like the German chain Aldi (Roll, 2013, p. 15). El-Shater is considered a successful businessman, and he has contributed to the financial support of the Brotherhood since 2000. He emerged in the Brotherhood group to become the most prominent player for a long time. The influence of the business wing expanded significantly inside the Brotherhood, including Hasan Malik (El-Shater's trading partner) and some members of the Al-Hadad family (Roll, 2013, p. 13). MB business activities, however, were limited to a large extent to the retail sector. The MB economic elite did not seriously compete with the traditional elites dominating the Egyptian economy (Roll, 2013, p. 15).

Susan Hansen (2012, April 20) argues that businessmen such as El-Shater and Malek formed the nucleus of the MB's effective leadership, and they were described as the "neo-liberal face of the organization"; even though they did not play a role at the time of Mubarak, they were, after 25 January, active in improving the status of the poor and attracting foreign investments, attempting to clone the Turkish Justice and Development experience whereby the religious middle class, with the encouragement of an Islamic government in the country, led to an amazing economic boom. The Brotherhood's entry into the formal economy and the expansion of economic networks was through the establishment of the business elite. These efforts were accompanied by expansion in the formal economy through a business organization affiliated with the Brotherhood, the Egyptian Business Development Association (EBDA), which is along the lines of the business association in Turkey (MÜSIAD) and close to the Islamist Justice and Development Party (AKP) (Roll, 2013, p. 16). The EBDA officially started in March 2012 under the leadership of Malik Hasan, who was responsible for the MB's relations with the private business sector. In November 2012, about 400 companies belonged to the EBDA, and 300 applications were pending. Members were spread all over Egypt, and one-third were small businesses (Daragahi, 2012, November 8). Before February 2013, the EBDA had six hundred members, including some Christians (Roll, 2013, p. 16). The aim of the Association was not only to help MB businessmen to gain access into the formal economy, but to also create a friendly MB business organization that solidified the relationship with the rest of the prominent businessmen and important business sectors in Egypt. The EBDA Board of Directors included members from diverse business groups, such as the agricultural wholesale businessman Samir al-Naggar, who headed the Agriculture Business Association, and Mohammed Moemen, who was one of the Board of Directors of the Chamber of Food Industries (Roll, 2013, p. 16).

One of the most prominent members of the EBDA, who was close to the MB, is Osama Farid, the son of Farid Abdul Khaliq, and one of the founders of the MB, and also a close friend of Hassan al-Banna. Although Farid avoided the path of his father and was busy in his studies as a civil engineer, he embarked on business projects that expanded rapidly over the decades and founded a consulting firm. He then worked in real estate marketing, entered the textile industry and founded a small airline, but he maintained a strong relationship with the MB (Daragahi, 2012, November 8). Farid told the British newspaper the Financial Times, “We need a new programme, new ideas, with our values and ethics. We believe in mixing ethics and values in economic, social and political reforms.” (Daragahi, 2012, November 8)

Other businessmen expressed concerns that Hasan Malik and other businessmen like Mr. Farid, who represented the emergence of a new business class that is linked closely with the Islamists and began to play a role in state institutions, could lead to potential new risks in the economic track after the revolution, and it could become a new channel of favoritism, such as the one that characterized the relationship between Hosni Mubarak and the old business elite. The Brotherhood tried to dispel these fears. Farid said, “I don’t think we can judge one way or the other now if they [EBDA] will be an expression of pluralism in the business or neo-cronyists.” (Daragahi, 2012, November 8)

Farid indicated that they had many proposals for Qandil’s government, but the government considered only a few of those proposals, and that there were other economic bodies greater than the EBDA undertaking their activities without being hurt. Among the most important projects that were planned by the EBDA were developing the Suez Canal area, launching initiatives to build houses, and creating jobs for young people in the country (Daragahi, 2012, November 8).

One of the most important businessmen about whom there was some controversy for his relationship with the MB and with Mubarak businessmen before 2011 was Safwan Thabet. In spite of his family ties with Mamon Hudaybi, the former MB Guide. Thabet succeeded in building a dairy empire during the Mubarak era (Roll, 2013, p. 16). Founded in 1983, his company Juhayna achieved a market share of over 70 percent for dairy products by 2011 and had a market value of about \$770 million. In 2010 Juhayna was named the “Best African initial public offering (IPO)” in the framework of the activities of the summit promoting investment in Africa, organized by the Africa Investor Foundation in cooperation with the New York Stock Exchange. The company’s stock market launch in 2010, for example, was organized by the investment bank EFG-Hermes, in which Gamal Mubarak owned a stake (Roll, 2013, p. 16). This closeness to the regime could also be a reason why Thabet appeared on the public prosecutor’s blacklist in early 2011. His name was removed from the list for a few weeks. From then on, he was officially associated closely with the Muslim Brotherhood. He was one of the founding members of EBDA (Roll, 2013, p. 16).

In July 2012, Morsi established the Tawasul Committee, headed by Hasan Malik, to expand its relations with the business elite. The committee undertakes the coordinating role between business organizations and communicates with the presidency institution to submit problems and propose solutions. It included twenty-three member representatives of the major employers’ organizations. Tawasul sought to achieve the interests of the businessmen by contributing to the economic operation of the government (Roll, 2013, p. 17). Above all, it played an important role in mediating between the government and members of the business elite who were suspected of corruption. Malek rejected the accusations made against Tawasul (which he headed) and reports that it had become a substitute for the policy committee of the dissolved

National Democratic Party, headed by Gamal Mubarak, the son of the former president (Roll, 2013, p. 17).

Qandil's government stepped in, making reconciliation with businessmen who were accused of corruption during Mubarak's era, and took advantage of this opportunity at the investor conference in London, in January 2013, to invite all entrepreneurs abroad to return to Egypt (Roll, 2013, p. 17). In February 2013, the Shura Council approved a new law to facilitate the return of fugitive businessmen in corruption cases. It had previously passed it through the SCAF in January 2012. The aim of MB reconciliation was to achieve a willingness to return state funds at a time when the general budget of the country needed large amounts to reduce the deficit, in addition to expanding a political compromise base and sending a positive signal to investors to return and hence to participate in advancing development.⁵⁸ Confronting the growing criticism of the reconciliations with those accused of corruption, the FJP believed that, "as long as reconciliation will not waste state funds and are in the framework of the law then they are acceptable." (Roll, 2013, p. 17)

6.6.2 Growing Dominance within the Political Network

After the January revolution, the MB adopted the principle of "participation, not domination" in its discourses and electoral platform, and its first position was not to present a presidential candidate; changing such a position only fed resentment among the majority of

⁵⁸ A settlement were made between the Tax Department and the Sawiris family, stating that one of the latter's companies (Orascom Construction Industries) pay taxes of EGP 7.1 billion (\$ 1.02 billion) over five years, including EGP 2.5 billion (\$ 358 million) to be paid immediately. Reconciliation has been made also with Rashid Mohamed Rashid, the Minister of Trade and Industry of the last government in the former era, who paid \$15 million, and the public prosecution announced to lift his name from the travel ban list, which includes those wanted for justice.

political parties, which considered such a change to be an endeavor to seize power. Nevertheless, other determinants affected the orientation of the MB towards power. The political openness after the fall of Mubarak was not the only determinant; the reason the MB strived for such power was the Armed Forces' control over political power.

The MB tried to alleviate fears, announcing that it would not present a presidential candidate and it would not seek to win a majority in parliamentary elections, as it would compete for 50% of the seats in parliament. Emphasizing such a stand, on 19 June 2011, the General Shura (consultative) Council of the MB in Egypt resolved to dismiss Abdel Moneim Abul Fotouh, one of the MB's leaders, after announcing his intention to run in the presidential election in contravention of the Brotherhood resolution that none of its members was to stand as a candidate in this election (Hamid, 2012, August 26). Gamal Heshmat, a member of the Shura Council of the MB, explained that Aboul Fotouh's candidacy was considered to be a dispersion of roles inside the Brotherhood, i.e. the MB officially announced that it would not present any of its members as a presidential candidate; in the meantime, it urged one of its leaders to stand for election in a manner that looked separated from the Brotherhood (El Sherif, 2012, April 13). In June 2011, the FJP founded the Democratic Alliance, which included liberal and nationalist parties, in order to participate in parliamentary elections. It played a principal part in reassuring many Egyptians regarding the movement's orientation and the destiny of the country under its expanding role (Al Jazeera Center for Studies, 2012, April 18).

However, the SCAF's management of the transitional period caused mistrust among the MB for different reasons. One of them was that the SCAF supported the performance of Kamal Ganzouri's government, which sought to fabricate crises and hinder the parliament's legislation and the formation of a national government. Another reason was the candidacy of Omar Suleiman

(Al Jazeera Mubasher, 2012, February 8), who was the chief of the Egyptian General Intelligence Service (EGIS) during Mubarak's regime, in addition to the Constitutional Court's intention to dissolve the People's Assembly, which actually occurred. Thus, the MB was convinced that the situation was moving towards a return of the figureheads of the previous regime; this was known as "the counterrevolution" or "the deep state". The political movements opposing Mubarak's regime could not agree on a presidential candidate to rival Omar Suleiman and Ahmed Shafiq (Obaid, 2014). The MB tried to persuade three non-Islamist figures to run in the presidential election. One was Mahmoud Mekky, one of the judges calling for judiciary reform during the era of former President Hosni Mubarak; he became the Vice President of the Republic during the era of Mohamed Morsi as Egyptian President. Another was Ahmed Mekky, a judge, the former Vice-President of the Court of Cassation and the chairman of the election follow-up committee in the Judges' Club; Mekky was known for being a prominent opponent judge during the rule of Mubarak, so he won great popularity and became Minister of Justice during Morsi's rule. The third figure was Tarek El-Bishry, a retired Egyptian judge and thinker. He served as the former Vice-Premier of the Egyptian State Council; he also gained the acceptance of the SCAF, which appointed him as the chairman of the Egyptian constitution amendment committee in February 2011. Only Mahmoud Mekky agreed to stand as candidate in the presidential election, yet during one of the meetings of the Shura Council of the MB, Mohmoud Mekky phoned and declared he was declining from running for the presidential elections. That confused the MB, and they were forced to present two other candidates, Khairat El-Shater and Mohamed Morsi (Heshmat, personal communication, 2015, March 17; Hussein, personal communication, 2015, January 6). The MB thought that it could present its candidate and win, as it possessed the experience and


organizational capacity and was supported by many disciplined members (Sayigh, 2012b, February 9).

However, facts showed that the MB, especially after the parliamentary elections in 2012, rushed in a way which was not planned. After its overwhelming win in the parliamentary elections, most of its members did not perform well in the People's Assembly, which weakened the MB in the eyes of the government supported by the SCAF. Furthermore, the MB abandoned its allies of the liberal and nationalist parties, leading to the disappearance of the Democratic Alliance, in which fissures were appearing (Al Jazeera Center for Studies, 2012, April 18).

6.6.2.1 Penetrating State Institutions and the Reluctance of the Deep State

The MB denied its attempt to dominate the State's institutions. Two matters should be distinguished: first, the large presence in parliament, which was due to voters' options; second, the MB's behavior, especially after the presidential elections, showed that it did not seek to dominate the managerial and executive positions or the army or to give major positions to MB members (Ikhwanization or Brotherhoodization, "*akhwanh*" as it was called by its opponents). That is apart from the exclusion of the MB during the previous regimes from embassies, army, judiciary, and the administrative machinery. Statistics indicated that, after the MB candidate Mohamed Morsi won the presidential elections, the percentage of MB members in managerial and executive positions was much lower than that of their presence in the parliament. This is illustrated in following chart:

Figure 6.1: the percentage of MB members in managerial and executive positions (2012-2013)



Source: (FJP, 2012, October 17)

In June 2013, Morsi appointed 17 new governors, including seven governors belonging to the MB and FJP, raising the total number belonging to the MB and the Islamic movement to twelve out of 27 governorates. He also appointed seven former army major generals to the coastal governorates, in addition to appointing one former police major general belonging to the Ghad El-Thawra Party as governor of Damietta, and one judge (Kingsley, 2013, June 17).

Khalil Al-Anani (2013a) argued that the MB did not pursue a clear strategy with respect to how to deal with the State's institutions or "the deep state" as it was called by researchers. The depth of this state and how much it permeated society were underestimated (p. 8-9). There were two strategies pursued by the MB; first, "[T]he Brotherhood initially tried to contain and tame this state. For example, it reached reconciliation deals with a number of the deep state's businessmen who rose to prominence during the Mubarak period, including the fugitive tycoon Hussein Salem and the former minister for trade and industry Rachid Mohamed Rachid." (Al-Anani, 2013a, p. 9)

As the containment strategy failed, Morsi resorted to confrontation with the deep state's institutions, but of these institutions he chose the most sensitive to Egyptian public opinion, the judiciary. Although many people recognized the corruption of some Egyptian judges, opponents of the MB objected to the release of the Attorney General, Abdel Meguid Mahmoud, from his functions. The Shura Council sought to issue the Judicial Authority Law without discussing or entering into dialogue with the judges. Thus, Morsi was confronted with one of the most important authorities in Egypt, the Judicial Authority (Al-Anani, 2013a, p. 9), while, with respect to the appointments of the Interior Ministry and Defense Ministry, he pursued containment strategy, avoided conflict, and accepted their nominations (Arafa, personal communication, 2015, March 23).

The structure of state institutions could not be penetrated by the MB. After the January 25 revolution, the State did not disintegrate as in Libya, and the deep state dominated and controlled the State's institutions, so the MB faced difficulty dominating or administrating the State. It was increasingly clear that the MB's rule was beset with obstacles that would preclude its domination of the State, which had been dominated by the deep state for more than 200 years; this would likely create hostility among significant numbers of technocrats (Al-Anani, 2013a, p. 9).

The MB and other political movements participated in the parliamentary elections after 25 January 2011, and they had differing opinions on management in the post-revolution period; such differences increased after the presidential elections in 2012. Morsi wanted to start his rule having the most prominent political movements included in or allied with his rule, wishing to establish stability and avoid obstacles that may hinder the implementation of his program. The MB mentioned that it offered several posts to many personalities, e.g. the post of Vice-President was offered to Hamdeen Sabahi and Abdel Moneim Aboul Fotouh, the 2012 presidential election

candidates, but they refused. Also, the Coptic billionaire Naguib Sawiris was offered the post of Cairo Governor or Minister of Investment, but he too refused. Additionally (Abdel Maksud, personal communication, 2015, March 14), Sayyid Al-Badawi, the President of the Al-Wafd Party, was offered the post of the Prime Minister; he said that “President Mohamed Morsi has twice offered me a post in the presidential staff, but I have refused” (Al-Youm Al-Saba’, 2013, February 20).

After the MB’s failure in forming effective coalitions that were not restricted only to the Islamic mainstream but also extended to include non-Islamic parties, Morsi tried to make up for it in forming his presidential team. On 12 August 2012, Morsi appointed Mahmoud Mekky as a Vice-President before he resigned from his position on 22 December of the same year, recognizing that political work did not suit his previous occupation as a judge. The following table illustrates the nature of the presidential team appointed by Morsi and the successive withdrawals from the team (Bayoumi, 2012, December 13; Ahram Online, 2012, August 27; 2013; Ahram Online, 2013, February 19; Al Jazeera English, 2012, December 6; Russia Today (RT), 2012, December 6; Kortam, 2013, January 7).

Table 6.2: The formation of Morsi's presidential team

No	Name	Office and political position	Continuation in office
Morsi’s presidential assistants			
1	Samir Morcus Abdel-Meseih	Responsible for the democratic transition file	Resigned after president’s controversial constitutional decree
2	Pakinam El-Sharkawi	Responsible for political issues	
	Emad Abdel-Ghafour	Responsible for ‘social	

3		communication'	
4	Essam Ahmed El-Hadad	Presidential assistant for External Relations and International Cooperation	
Morsi's presidential advisors			
5	Ahmed Omran	Computer science professor at Fayoum University	
6	Omaima El-Salamoni	Member of both the FJP and the constituent assembly	
7	Ayman Ahmed Ali	Physician and member of the Muslim Brotherhood	
8	Ayman Amin El-Sayad	The editor in chief of Waghat Nazar magazine	Resigned over Morsi's constitutional declaration
9	Bassem Hassaneen El-Rezqa	Member of the Nour Party's higher committee, and a member of the 100-member constituent assembly	Announced his resignation in a press conference held by the party to clarify the dismissal of El-Din.
10	Hussein Mohamed El-Qazaz	Economic advisor to the FJP and stand-in member of Egypt's 100-member constituent assembly	
11	Khaled Alam El-Din	Leading member of Salafist Nour Party	Dismissed from post as presidential advisor after monitoring reports suggested that El-Din had "attempted to use his position for personal benefits."
12	Rafiq Samuel Habib	An Egyptian Christian thinker and vice-president of the FJP	In December 2012, he announced that he planned to withdraw from political life
13	Sekina Fouad	Leading member of the liberal Democratic Front Party	Resigned over Morsi's constitutional declaration
14	Seif El-Din Abdel-Fattah	A Cairo University political science professor	Resigned on 5 December 2012 in the wake of the clashes that erupted in front of the presidential

			palace between supporters and opponents of Morsi.
15	Essam El-Erian	Member of the MB and the vice-chairman of the Freedom and Justice Party and head of the party's committee in the Shura Council.	El-Erian resigned as adviser to President Mohamed Morsy "El-Erian said the reason was because he is very busy with his tasks as head of the Freedom and Justice Party's committee in the Shura Council, the upper house of parliament. El-Erian added that there is a conflict of interest in him combining the two posts because one of them falls under the legislative authority while the other falls under the executive authority"
16	Emmad Hussein Abdullah	Former head of Egypt's Police Academy	
17	Amr El-Leithi	Prominent Egyptian television presenter, El-Leithy was an active member of Mubarak's NDP	Resigned on 5 December 2012 in the wake of the clashes that erupted in front of the presidential palace between supporters and opponents of Morsi.
18	Farouq Goueida	The famous poet and writer	Resigned after president's controversial constitutional decree
19	Mohamed Selim El-Awa	The famous Islamist lawyer and thinker as well as former presidential candidate	
20	Mohamed Esmat Seif El-Dawla	An Arab nationalist Islamist writer and activist	Resigned after president's controversial constitutional decree
21	Mohei Hamed Mohamed	Member of the Brotherhood's guidance bureau	

Presidential Spokesman Yasser Ali announced on 27 August 2012 the names of the presidential team members that would assist President Mohamed Morsi. The team included four assistants and 17 advisors, six members of the MB – including two from the Brotherhood’s Guidance Bureau – along with two members of the Salafist Nour Party and an Islamist-leaning former presidential candidate (Egypt State Information Service (SIS), 2012, August 28). The presidential team also included two Coptic Christians: the FJP’s Rafiq Habib (see above) and Samir Morcus, presidential assistant for democratic transition. Two women also joined the consulting team.

The presidential team was formed away from real field alliances and had two main components, the first of which was the Islamists and the other the technocrats and experts. Soon, however, the resignations from the presidential team followed in quick succession; most of the second category resigned in protest against the Constitutional Declaration that caused protests to erupt, resulting in deaths and injuries. Ayman Al-Sayyad and two other advisors said that they were forced to resign as they found that their opinions had no influence on Morsi’s decisions (Bayoumi, 2012, December 13). Also, representatives of the Al-Nour Party in the presidential team resigned or were removed from their position. Among those who resigned was Rafiq Habib, who announced his withdrawal from the advisory team of the president and from the post of vice-president of the FJP; he was the closest Christian to the MB. That exacerbated the crisis of Morsi’s rule, the presidency he built seemed incoherent (Bayoumi, 2012, December 13).

On the 24 July 2012, Hesham Qandil was appointed prime minister by Mohamed Morsi. He continued to serve in his post until Morsi was removed from the presidency. Through appointing Qandil, the MB tried to send a message of reassurance to the international community, as Qandil held international posts such as Senior Expert of Water Resources in the

African Development Bank and he contributed to establishing the African Ministers' Council on Water. Moreover, the MB wanted to reassure the armed forces, as Qandil was appointed Minister of Water Resources and Irrigation as part of former Prime Minister Essam Sharaf's second cabinet on 21 July 2011; he stayed in his post within the government formed by Kamal Ganzouri until it resigned. Both governments were under the supervision of and chosen by the SCAF. The third message behind choosing Qandil was to reassure the political parties, as he was one of the technocrats that did not belong to the MB (Abdel Maksud, personal communication, 2015, March 14).

The State's bureaucracies did not cooperate with Qandil's government, and that posed a significant impediment for the MB to implement its economic and social programs. Hence, the MB fell between the hammer and the anvil – the hammer of the promises it made to the Egyptian people through their electoral programs, and the anvil of incapacity due to lack of cooperation on the part of the State's organs. Consequently, the MB pursued the strategy of depending on its grass roots to be the executive bodies of its economic and service projects instead of depending on the uncooperative bureaucratic apparatus of the State. The idea of a volunteer network therefore emerged as a network parallel to the State's institutions. Most of the volunteers were MB members and its advocates and supporters (Abdel Maksud, personal communication, 2015, March 14); that was the most obvious reason for Bassem Ouda's success. On the 10 January 2013, he became Minister of Supply and Interior Trade in a ministerial reshuffle of ten ministries in Hesham Qandil's government. This ministry significantly serves poor and low-income people and distributes the basic needs of food and fuel. The MB stated that Ouda eliminated a large portion of corruption within his ministry and dismissed some of the corrupt officials; also, he went down to the street to follow the bread and LPG cylinders; nevertheless, that was insufficient

action. Ouda was keen to inspect and supervise bakeries himself to ensure production of bread with good specifications for Egyptians and did not hesitate to close bakeries that sold Egyptians flour on the black market. He was assisted by a huge number of volunteers, estimated at 400,000, who were advocates and supporters of the MB; their main task was to transfer the basic needs of food and fuel from the source to the consumer without agents at low prices determined by the government, in addition to monitoring for any breaches by any entity and notifying the Minister of Supply Office⁵⁹ (Abdel Maksud, personal communication, 2015, March 14; Al Fiqi, personal communication, 2015, March 16).

The same strategy was pursued by the MB when Morsi established the Board of Grievances on 4 July 2012. Several offices in a number of governorates were affiliated with the Board, which was linked to a central office in the presidential palace. The Board was allocated to receive complaints and grievances of citizens and to promptly solve them; also, in cooperation with all the State's organs, it examined citizens' issues and problems. Volunteers helped follow up complaints and take them to the presidential office as well as monitor executives in ministries with regard to solving the problems reported to them (Abdel Maksud, personal communication, 2015, March 14).

6.6.3 Dealing with Military Networks

The SCAF's management of the transitional period also affected the options of the MB. The situation between the MB and the SCAF after 25 January 2011 illustrated the deadlock of

⁵⁹ The volunteers of the MB collected/sorted/transferred gas cylinders from the government warehouse to the consumer's home directly for 6 pounds (\$ 0.85 given the exchange rate at the time) (Abdel Maksud, personal communication, 2015), while in the absence of control it reached for the consumer up to 50 pounds (\$ 7 at the then exchange rate) (The World Bank WB, 2014, July 24). It is noteworthy that the price of a gas cylinder after the coup reached \$ 7.50; through the black market it reached \$ 11 (Al-Masry Al-Youm, 2015, March 9).

their visions regarding the role of the armed forces in the new political system on the one hand, and the MB's position in the new political structure on the other (El Sherif, 2012, April 13). The SCAF did not cease in its attempts to direct the drafting of the constitution, which the MB considered a part of its parliamentary competence. The most significant thorny issue was the insistence of the SCAF to keep the presidential system, in the belief that it could induce and influence the next president to use his powers to protect and safeguard the interests of the armed forces as in its earlier days. The MB strongly opposed marginalizing the parliament's role (Sayigh, 2012b, February 9).

After 25 January 2011, there were frequent meetings held by the MB (directed by El-Shater, Morsi and El-Katatni) and SCAF. According to Mahmoud Hussein (personal communication, 2015, January 6), despite the SCAF trying to fawn over the MB, it was convinced that it was not the right time for the MB's rule or "the Islamic project", and such meetings failed to reach understanding about the next phase. On the 10 April 2012, a ruling was handed down by the Administrative Court stating the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly, claiming that it included members of the People's Assembly and the Shura Council, which was considered contrary to Article 60 of the Constitutional Declaration (Rizk, 2013, June 30). The parliament therefore formed another constituent assembly. On 16 June 2012, Chairman of the SCAF, Field Marshal Hussein Tantawi, officially declared the dissolution of the People's Assembly pursuant to the judgment of the Supreme Constitutional Court issued on 14 June 2012; additionally, the SCAF confirmed that the People's Assembly was illegal, as the law on the basis of which it was elected was unconstitutional (Aboulenein, 2012, August 12). The declaration dissolving the People's Assembly was issued a few hours after the beginning of ballots in the second round of the first presidential elections after the toppling of Hosni Mubarak, in which the

competition was between the MB's candidate, Mohamed Morsi, and the last prime minister under the former president, the former commander of the air force, Ahmed Shafiq. Hence, the legislative powers of the People's Assembly were transferred to the SCAF, which disturbed the political system in Egypt. It was like a soft coup against the Islamists, who represented the majority in parliament, and an attempt to restrict the next president. This increased the MB's distrust towards the SCAF (Hussein, personal communication, 2015, January 6).

The MB had no clear vision regarding the future of military-civil relations. In late January 2012, the Supreme Guide of the MB, Mohamed Badie, emphasized that all State's organs, above all the armed forces, were to be held accountable by the parliament; he also referred to the parliament's right to determine, and even reduce, the defence budget. Meanwhile, Mohamed Gamal Heshmat, a member of the leadership of the FJP, stated that "any lootings" committed in any of the State institutions, including the armed forces, had to be stopped (Al Jazeera Center for Studies, 2012, April 18); such a vision did not assure the armed forces of their interests and economic networks. The MB's position toward the armed forces had not been maintained. After Morsi's win in the presidential election, the MB did not object to offering the SCAF "a safe exit", i.e. to ensure that none of its members or any other military personnel was to be brought to justice for offences and criminal acts that might have been committed during its rule, in return for a full and uncontested handover of power, yet such a situation was greatly criticized by several political parties and movements (Sayigh, 2012b, February 9). However, the MB did not compromise with the armed forces on preventing it from participating in constitution-writing, weakening its influence on the The Egyptian Constituent Assembly or disrupting the parliamentary and presidential elections (Ibid.).

In the evening of 12 August 2012, the isolated Egyptian president, Mohamed Morsi, issued a package of bold and unexpected decisions; Field Marshal Mohamed Hussein Tantawi and the Chief of Staff, Lieutenant General Sami Anan's retirement was announced in addition to the cancellation of the supplementary Constitutional Declaration (Aboulenein, 2012, August 12). The importance of these decisions lay in Morsi's strong desire to end this transitional period and the role of the SCAF (Aboulenein, 2012, August 12). Morsi tried not to provoke an angry reaction from the army toward such decisions. General Mohamed el-Assar, who sat on the military council, told Reuters, "The decision was based on consultation with the field marshal, and the rest of the military council." (Blair, 2012, August 12). Sisi was chosen to succeed Tantawi upon nomination by the SCAF (Hussein, personal communication, 2015, January 6).

Many of the policies practiced by the MB did not constitute a threat to the economic activities of the army. The army managed to improve its economic position under the rule of Morsi. For example, the Ministry of Military Production "acquired" El Nasr Automotive Manufacturing Company (NASCO), a company that was immersed in debt. Signs of good will between the army and the MB emerged in April 2013. When Morsi visited Russia, he elicited a promise from Moscow to invest in the above-mentioned automotive company, in which the armed forces acquired its assets completely for free (Marshall, 2015, p. 12; Abul-Magd, 2013, April 29). Shana Marshall (2015) argues that small-scale industrial projects, such as the automobile and electronic tablets industries, was fertile ground for an agreement between the Egyptian army and the MB; however, "the massive Suez Canal Corridor Development Project proved too much for the uneasy alliance." (p. 11)

The Egyptian government plan led by the MB to develop land adjacent to the Suez Canal faced strong opposition in the governorates of the Canal. That was an ignition point, threatening

navigation in this strategic waterway. Historically, the army attaches great importance to the Suez Canal. In addition to the financial returns of the channel, it gave the Egyptian armed forces justification to intervene in the discussions about long-term economic planning, as many of the associated Canal services were provided mainly by companies affiliated with the army. Excluding the armed forces from the decision-making processes related to Canal development plans would harm them (Marshall, 2015, p.12).

A copy of The Suez Canal Region Development Law stipulates that the Egyptian president was right to determine the area of the Suez project and that the authority's board of directors, appointed by the president, "can own land and property, including the sequestering of ownership for public interest". The draft law also stipulated that the Authority funds were considered private funds (Al sharif and Saul, 2013, June 13). That step aimed at marginalizing the role of the army in the largest infrastructure project in decades, a crucial factor in making the FJP lose the support of the armed forces (Marshall, 2015). This resulted in a storm of official statements from the army, which objected to the draft law. Yezid Sayigh (2013) argues that the conflict between the presidency and the SCAF had already begun on many of the issues in December 2012, but it reached its peak in March 2013, after the presidency and Qandil's government prepared a great part of the Suez Canal Authority draft law, which gave the presidency the right to form an independent authority to manage the Canal in order to realize the tenfold of the profits earned by the Canal at that moment (Al Jazeera Arabic, 2013, November 21).

6.7 Conclusion

Throughout the Mubarak era, the MB succeeded in drawing a fine line between enhancing its political profile on the one hand and ensuring it was not a threat to Mubarak's regime on the other. According to Carrie Rosefsky Wickham (2013), the MB's strategy was based simultaneously on "self-assertion" and "self-restraint", i.e. the MB took progressive steps to be integrated into the existing political order but at the same time it was anxious not to take a risk so as not to threaten its survival or pose a serious threat to Mubarak's regime. After 25 January 2011, the SCAF played a role in impeding Morsi's rule, in addition to the role played by the judiciary and in particular the Supreme Constitutional Court, when it dissolved the elected People's Assembly in order to deprive the MB of one of its most crucial strengths during the post-revolution phase.

During Mubarak's rule, the MB could not move ahead on some reform issues, especially within its organization on account of the security factor, and the political closure that did not enable it to achieve such reform. After 25 January 2011, the central leadership of the MB preferred to keep the internal consistency of the organization than to absorb diverse reformist and youth movements; this caused the structure of the MB to be rigid, which contributed to the movement's inability to adapt to the rapidly changing political landscape. In another context, the role of women in the MB's senior leadership was still limited and witnessed no qualitative improvement. The MB implemented some reform issues such as founding the FJP, a political party; however, that did not mean that it was separated from the original organization.

CHAPTER 7: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE SALAFIST CALL

7.1 Introduction:

For many years, the Salafist movement in general and the SC in particular did not factor much in the political equation. On the one hand, it was a non-politically active movement; on the other, there appeared to be a security force in place that was capable of suppressing, containing, or employing it for the benefit of the ruling regime (Fayed, 2012, p.2). The self-imposed political isolation chosen by the majority of Salafists has created a stereotypical image that is not fully representative of Salafists' true diversity. They seemed to be one solid mass, indistinguishable and non-classifiable. Disagreements within the Salafi movement emerged dramatically after 25 January 2011, particularly following the politicization of the SC.

Transformation of power networks in Egypt following the fall of the Mubarak contributed significantly to the SC's ideological transformation; political participation no longer posed the threat of clashing with the regime. This afforded the SC an opportunity to define the state's identity, the political system, the way of living and moral law by becoming an active participant in the political system and turning its focus towards the state in order to trigger bottom-up societal change. This chapter identifies the conditions under which Islamic movements are transformed from societal to state-centric movements: changing power networks, cooperation and alliances of and between movements, and the expansion of discursive spaces. I argue that the decline of the old political power led to ideological transformation of the SC from a society-oriented Islamic movement to a state-oriented Islamic movement.

Section (7.2) of this chapter therefore briefly describes the roots and history of the emergence of Salafists, the evolution of their path throughout Islamic history, and the effects of this historic path on Salafism in Egypt and the SC in particular.

Section (7.3) illustrates the ideological justifications for the SC's lack of political participation and the choices it adopted to avoid clashing with the Mubarak regime. Added to this is the impact of political network shifts on the SC's organizational hierarchy.

Section (7.4) explores the SC's "pre and post January 25th 2011" perceptions regarding a number of issues, such as women's role in the movement and in society, and its perceptions of Copts and the State.

Section (7.5) studies the impact of power network shifts on the strategies adopted by the SC in its dealings – and alliances – with both Islamist and non-Islamist movements and its perception of how to best utilize these alliances so as to expand its interests and magnify its impact on the ruling regime.

Section (7.6) explores how the SC dealt with the power networks (post the January 25 revolution), particularly the military and "deep state" constituents, in order to avoid any clashes with them.

The last section (7.7) includes an analysis of the evolution of the SC, which was formally split between the reformists and the traditionalists over ideology.

7.2 Salafism: Origin and Political Evolution

Mohamed Omara (1994) argues that Salafism is an Abbasid phenomenon. As with the expansion of the Islamic Caliphate, Arab Muslims felt they were applying "simplistic logic" to defend their Islamic faith against scholarly theological institutions that have been well-versed in philosophy and deeply rooted in history since the time of Aristotle. Muslims believed that

referencing Islamic texts was futile when dealing with those who did not believe in them initially (pp.17-20). This led to the formation of a group of “speakers” (*mutakallimūn*), the most prominent of which was the *al-mu‘tazilah* school of thought, which studied the philosophies of the countries conquered by Muslims and applied their intellectual tools to defend Muslim ideologies (Omara, 1994, pp.17-20). However, the *mutakallimūn* behavior – where they neglected Islamic text and authentic tradition – in their intellectual arguments for Islam created a state of mind in which Islamic texts were alienated and unwelcome. As a result, calls were made to adhere to Islamic text, to refer back to the authentic Islamic teachings of the ancestors (*as-salaf aṣ-ṣālih*), and to purify Islam of all intrusions, innovation, and heresy (*Bid‘a*).

The most prominent among those scholars was the Imam (Ahmad Ibn Hanbal 780-855 AD), who inaugurated the first Salafī era. Salafism thrived during the reign of the Caliph (*Al Mutawakkil*), who dismissed *al-mu‘tazilah* from government office, replacing them with pioneers of the Salafi movement. Widespread collection of Islamic Hadith took place during that era. During the Mamluk Sultanate era, between the years 1250-1517 AD, the Salafi movement became more active (on account of what it considered an extensive increase in injustices, innovation, and heresy). Among the most prominent pillars of the “Medieval” Salafi movement were: Ibn Taimiyah (1263 –1328 AD) and Ibn Al Qayyim Al Jawziyyah (1253–1292 AD). Despite this movement’s flexibility regarding analogy *qiyas*⁶⁰ and interpretation, however, it was

⁶⁰ *Qiyās*, is a method that Muslim jurists use to derive a ruling for new situations that are not addressed by the Qur’ān and Sunnah, like many new developments of our age and like the customs of people not encountered in Arabia during the time of the Prophet (Kayadibi, 2010, pp.93-96). *Qiyās* is a method that uses analogy – comparison – to derive Islamic legal rulings for new developments. Here the ruling of the Sunnah and the Qur'an may be used as a means to solve or provide a response to a new problem that may arise (Kayadibi, 2010, pp. 93-96). This, however, is only the case providing that the set precedent or paradigm and the new problem that has come about will share operative causes (علّة, *‘illah*). The *‘illah* is the specific set of circumstances that trigger a certain law into action. *Qiyās* can be defined as taking an established ruling from Islamic Law and applying it to a new case, by virtue of

unable to achieve the success that Ahmad Ibn Hanbal achieved, in making Salafism a doctrine of the state. Rather, it remained as an opposition movement whose members faced imprisonment (Omara, 1994, p.11).

During the 18th century, Salafism flourished in many parts of the Islamic world, including the Arabian Peninsula (Saudi Arabia), where it continues to exist under the title of *wahhabism* to this day (Brown, 2011a, p. 3). The Salafi movement entered Egypt during the early twentieth century through Levant Salafism (Brown, 2011a, p. 3). Current Egyptian Salafism is rooted in the “Modernity Muslim Ideologies” crisis, which, in its most simplistic rendition of Salafism (according to Salafis), is the call to the purist origins of Islam and a rigorous imitation of the actions of Prophet Muhammad and his companions (Awad, 2014, p.7). According to its viewpoint, such a society would be able to focus on the development of the spiritual, economical, and military fronts by “returning to the purest roots of Islam and the strict emulation of its prophet and his companions.” (Ibid.). In general, Salafism is the method of modeling one’s thought and behavior on Muhammad and the first three generations of Muslims, called the “forefathers” (*salaf*). Salafis refused to “exclusively” adopt Islamic Sharia laws (Sharia Provisions) from any of the four Sunni schools of thought, despite their high regard of Imam Ahmad Ibn Hanbal (the founder of the Hanbali sect) during the 9th century⁶¹.

the fact that the new case shares the same essential reason for which the original ruling was applied (see: As‘ad al-Sa‘dī, Abd al-Ḥakīm ‘Abd al-Raḥmān (1986): *Mabāḥith al-‘illah fī al-qiyās ‘inda al-uṣūliyyīn*. Bayrūt: Dār al-Bashā’ir al-Islāmīyah).

⁶¹ During the 14th century, Ahmad Ibn Hanbal’s legacy received a strong ideological push from the Damascus-born scholar, Ibn Taimiyyah. who skillfully elaborated the school’s doctrines and refuted its critics (Haykel, 2009, pp.33-51).

First and Medieval period Salafism agreed upon the “scriptural approach” (textualism)⁶²; however they differed on this point from the modern Salafis. Some modern Salafi scholars, such as Muhammad Ibn Abdul Wahhab, maintained the scriptural approach, while others raised the argument that the mind is above explicit Islamic text (Omara, 1994, pp. 23-39). Jamal Uddin Al Afghani (1838-1897 AD) argues that political matters could only be resolved through political channels, while Muhammad Abdo (1849-1905 AD) argues that political problems are only resolved through the correction of one’s creed and Islamic teachings (Bennabi, 1986, pp.41). During the 1920s, Salafis in Egypt took the form of groupings. They shunned the reformist Salafi school of thought that preceded it by a few years and was pioneered by Jamal Uddin Al Afghani and Muhammad Abdo (Fayed, 2012, p. 2).

Dietrich Jung (2012) argues that the ideologies of the MB and Salafists date back to the 19th century Islamic reformation movement and that key Islamic reformers (such as Afghani and Abdo) reinterpreted Islamic practice within the “colonial dominating” context. According to them, political freedom and social development in the Islamic world were closely tied to religious

⁶² Ibn Hanbal established the “Scriptural Salafism Approach” (*Salafist Nasusi*) that teaches Islam (on the root and branch levels of the religion (*Uṣūl wa furū‘ ad-dīn*) according to Islamic “texts/scripture” (*Nass*) and dictums. This method was adopted to safeguard Islam against the ideologies of *al-mu‘tazilah*, who studied the philosophies of the countries conquered by Muslims and the intellectual tools that were widely spread in those countries (prior to Islamic reign) in order to defend the Islamic beliefs they embraced. Ahmad Ibn Hanbal – and his followers – believed that the method used by *Al-mu‘tazilah*, in neglecting Islamic scriptures/dictums during their intellectual debates, created a state of mind where Qor`anic text was neglected. As a result, calls to refer back to text appeared. Applying “textualism” when dealing with scripture and dictum peppered Islamic texts with holiness that continued to an era in which text and the exaltation of times past – especially during the era of the Prophet’s “companions” (*as-sahaba*) – were cast aside. This affected Hanbali Salafis and drove them to adduce the teachings of scholars (closer to the time of the *as-sahaba*) over the teachings of “later” scholars, the teachings of “Al-Tabi’un” (Ṭābi‘ūn are the generation of Muslims who were born after the passing of the Islamic prophet Muhammad but who were contemporaries of the *as-sahaba*) over the teachings of followers of the followers, and the teachings of the *as-sahaba* over the teachings of “followers” and so on (Omara, 1994, pp.23-39).

reformation. The Islamic reformist group strongly criticized the religious institution, its scholars, and its monopolization of the interpretation of Islamic dictums. Calling for the return to the “Golden Islamic Age” by following the example of the Prophet and his companions (*al salaf*) and offering new interpretations of original Islamic materials: Qor`an and Sunnah. Moreover, they utilized the Islamic Sharia concept (as an educated method to reform Islamic societies), by initiating the “subsequent juridification” of Islamic principles and values that had characterized Islamic Sharia over the centuries, within the framework of building the Islamic-state during the 20th century (p.2).

In the early 20th century, and under the guise of competition between Salafism and the modernization movement, Salafism sought to Islamize Egyptian society according to the same principles followed by the MB. Democracy was criticized particularly by the Salafi movement. In addition, most Salafis viewed democracy as artificial and negating Islamic principles, as it gave humans the divine power of legislation. Salafis like Ahmad Shakir and Muhammad Nasir al-Din al-Albani had a different opinion. They felt that it was possible to elect a righteous God-fearing person who could apply the Sharia and seek to establish an Islamic state (McCants, 2012, p.1). However, following WW1, Salafis lost interest in competing against the modernization movement (McCants, 2012, p.1).

A number of Salafi books and bookstores appeared for the first time in Egypt in the early 20th century. Moreover, Salafi groups such as al-Jam’ya al-Sharia and Ansar al-Sunnah al-Muhammadiya were founded in 1912 and 1926 respectively. Such groups felt threatened by the decreased Sharia role in society and by the predominance of mysticism at the height of British rule (Awad, 2014. p.7). Salafism in Egypt grew as a new social movement. Rather than rely on organization, as was the case with the MB, it relied on a multi-faceted network of Muslim

preachers (El-Houdaiby, 2012, p.134). Subsequently, its communication with Saudi Arabia became stronger. This led to the solidification of Salafism in Egypt through the direct influence of Saudi scholars, as well as through the ideas conveyed by expatriate workers returning home from Saudi Arabia (Brown, 2011a, p.4).

Ansar al-Sunnah al-Muhammadiya centers were established and flourished under local guidance in medium-sized cities such as Mansura and Damanhur in the delta of Egypt, and Alexandria (Egypt's second largest city), which ultimately became the most active Salafism centers. In general, Salafism became very popular among the lower middle-class in Cairo; in it, Salafi attire (Islamic dress) and bookstores were abundant. Conversely, Salafism was relatively rare in Upper Egypt, where shrines and Sufi practices were predominant (Brown, 2011a, p.4). Upper Egypt cities such as Luxor, Assiut, and Sohag were previously considered strongholds for violent Islamic groups that carried out terrorist attacks on civilians and tourists during the 1980s and 1990s. Despite this fact, in 2002 the Islamic group leadership denounced violence, rendering its ideologies and practices – at times – very similar to those of the Salafi movement. Nonetheless, some of the group's experiences continued to distinguish it from other Salafi networks, especially in the Cairo and Delta regions. (Brown, 2011a, p.4).

The Salafist Call (*Al-Da`wa Al-Salafiyyah*) was among the most prominent of the Salafi movements and better known as the Salafist School⁶³ since its inception during the 1970s in Alexandria. It has become one of the most powerful Salafi movements in Egypt over the past three decades. Although it shares the general characteristics of the Salafi approach, however, it holds many differing viewpoints from those upheld by other Salafi sub-schools. For example: it

⁶³ Since its inception, the SC has had varying titles; in 1972 it was known as “the Religious Group” and as “the Islamic Group” in 1973. In 1977/78 it became “the Salafist School” and in 1982 it took the title of “*Al Da`wa Al Salafiyyah*” (Mohamed, 2014, January 5).

disagrees with *madkhalis* on matters of submission to rulers and rejecting opposition; it disagrees with the “*at-Takfir wa-l-Hiġra*” (Excommunication and Exodus) movement on the conditions of expiating the “other” (renouncing one removed from the fold of Islam); it differs from the Cairo Haraki Salafists in matters of religious sovereignty and teamwork; it differs from Jihadist groups on matters of creed and using violence against the state; and finally it disagrees with the MB on methods of change. The SC agenda focuses on the following three key stages (El-Sherif, 2015, p.8):

1. The call for faith, in all its meanings and pillars; determining the methodology of inference on questions of theology and law; adherence to the Islamic religion and “upholding the word of God on earth”.
2. Identifying the “Muslim group” that fully adheres to Islamic teachings, i.e. those who steer clear of prohibitions and who are committed to disciplined collaboration on performing “*al-farḍ wa al-wājib*” (Islamic ordainments and obligations) decreed by Sharia. This group shall see to the fulfillment of the poor and underprivileged needs, it shall care for orphans, encourage the rich to give *al-zakāt* and charity, and provide them with guidance on how to administer these funds in accordance to *Qor`an* and *Sunnah* laws.
3. The application of the law and the rule of Islam when conditions become favorable, as a natural result of the previous phases.

Actual activity of the Salafist School began in the early 1970s, where medical student Mohamed Ismail Al-Muqaddam gave a weekly sermon in Omar Ibn Abdul Khattab Mosque in Ibrahimyyah, Alexandria. This became a nucleus for a small gathering of no more than 10 “religiously committed” students, most notably Ahmad Farid, who were influenced by the

teachings of Al-Muqaddam on monotheism and creed (Ammar, 2012, pp.4-5, Lacroix, 2012, p.2). Soon after, in 1972, the group began its very first activity (preaching) Islamic teachings in universities and became one of the fastest growing Islamist groups across all Egyptian universities. Salafi students were becoming fed up with the current Islamist movements such as “*Ansar Al sunnah*” and the MB, as well as with the values and social ethics of Egyptian society. They felt that Islamist groups – on the ground – were unable to care for or rehabilitate the cadres of youth according to their vision or to achieve their goals (Awad, 2014. pp. 7-8). Under these conditions, the group’s networks expanded beyond the boundaries of Alexandria, through the work of students who had come to receive Islamic knowledge from their scholars prior to returning to their hometowns. Within a very short timeframe, the Salafi School was able to form the core foundation of an organization that encompassed several divisions and branches, in addition to a board of directors. Moreover, it established a social services division within residential neighborhoods. This allowed the SC to form strong ties with the Egyptian common man (Lacroix, 2012, p.2; Awad, 2014. p. 8). The SC refused to join the MB’s ranks, stating that El-Moqadem and other Salafi students were unable to trust the MB. They believed that MB sought to destroy their emerging movement in order to control the Islamic movement and its message. Moreover, the identity of the MB’s spiritual guide was not openly revealed at the time, therefore Salafi students refused to pledge their allegiance to a man who was unbeknown to them (Awad, 2014, p. 8; Ammar, 2012, pp.4-5).

The SC is considered one of the biggest and most organized Salafi groups in Egypt, with roots traced back to *Salafiyyah ilmmyiah* or Scientific Salafism. It is historically characterized by its insistence on the scriptural non-violent approach and utilizes the traditional approach *Da`wa* in Islamic teachings. Although it avoided political participation, however, the Salafi movement has

adopted the “organized work” approach to spread its message, which has facilitated the *Da`wa* movement’s entry into organized politics and the establishment of a political faction post the 2011 Egyptian revolution (Awad, 2014, pp.5-6).

During 1977, a number of future *Da`wa* sheikhs underwent a formative experience. While the SC was laying the building blocks for its “Islamic call”, a group called *at-Takfir wa-l-Hiğra* was formed by Shukry Mustafa and attracted a vast amount of Salafi youth. The latter group planned and executed the abduction of the Minister of Awqaf Sheikh Muhammad Al Dhahabi and brutally killed him (Rubin, 1990, p.18; Blaydes& Rubin, 2008, p.465). In response, the Salafi students took to the streets denouncing the assassination of Al Dhahabi, in keeping with the SC’s denouncement of violent jihadism (Jung, 2012, p.2; Awad, 2014, p. 8). Their refusal to join the violence fed the conspiracy theory that the SC’s movements were at the request of the State Security Investigation (SSI)⁶⁴. Although Burhami recognizes that the interests of the SC may intersect with the SSI, however, he asserts that the confrontation with the jihadists began long before due to the barbaric methods pursued by violent Egyptian jihadists (Awad, 2014. p. 8).

During Sadat’s reign, the SC did not have a strong political presence. Its role was limited to social and religious fields, avoiding controversial issues and focusing on religious devotion, individual worship and advocacy issues. Post the 11 September 2001 attacks, its relationship with the Egyptian regime changed. The ideological ties with Salafi Jihadists were thoroughly investigated by the regime, leading to a series of aggressive interrogations and repeated imprisonment of the Salafi leadership (El-Houdaiby, 2012, p.134).

⁶⁴ Ashraf El-Sherif (2015) argues that the Egyptian regime used the SC to counter the Jihadist movement and the influence of factions that fall under the Qotby (related to Sayyid Qotob) movement (p. 9).

7.3 The Salafist Call in the Mubarak Era

Under Mubarak's regime, the opportunity spaces were limited, and the repertoire of action was full withdrawal to create inner spaces safe from the penetration of state power. In the following sections, consequently, I will illustrate the ideological justifications for the SC's lack of political participation and the choices it adopted to avoid clashing with the Mubarak regime. This is added to the impact of political network shifts on the SC's organizational hierarchy.

7.3.1 Avoiding Conflict; Ideological Justifications

During the reign of Mubarak, the SC was keen to avoid conflicts with the regime and its networks. Its priority was to ensure the survival and continuity of the movement, forfeiting any actions that might weaken or lead to its disintegration and collapse. It felt that political participation during that period would place it in a position of conflict with the regime; thus, it stayed completely away from this option. Instead, it adopted several religious *fatwas* that justified its lack of political participation.

The SC gave three key justifications for its lack of political participation during the Mubarak reign. First: Political participation requires compromise and relinquishing of the principles and beliefs espoused by the SC. Nathan Field and Ahmed Hamam (2009) argue that the SC refrained from political participation out of necessity, not a lack of desire, and that it demonstrated interest and an ability to engage in politics – but chose not to participate, as participation required it to compromise on its principles, something likely to cost it its popularity (pp. 3-4). According to Mohamed Ismail Al-Muqaddam, political participation necessitates compromise and the forgoing of principles and beliefs. He said: “Political participation will force Salafists to relinquish their principles, which will shake their integrity” (Al-Muqaddam, n.d_a). Al-

Muqaddam argues that political action is not exclusive to governance; rather, it expands to encompass all religious and worldly Muslim affairs “protecting the religion, maintaining Sharia law, safeguarding the heritage, protecting Islamic creed, and spreading Islamic knowledge” (Al-Muqaddam, n.d_a), and that governance and matters of the state are only one part of the equation (Al-Muqaddam, n.d_a).

Second: For the sake of the SC’s survival and to avoid any security raids that might hinder its expansion, all in accordance with the jurisprudence rule of “bringing benefits and warding off evil” (Al-Muqaddam, n.d_a). While the MB clarified its position on governance and the issue of succession (showing political reformation initiatives, in addition to offering detailed criticism of political and economic matters they deemed religiously unnecessary), the SC’s focus was turned towards core beliefs (Aqida – creed) rather than *Sharia*, as to show interest in Sharia would inevitably lead to questioning of the government’s policies, making this the key disparity between Salafists and non-Salafists. In fact, this was one of the reasons the Egyptian government allowed Salafi stations to operate, despite the fact that most of their activities remained clandestine. During the nineties, the regime allowed a number of Salafi preachers, some of whom were associated with the SC, to launch Salafi TV channels via Egyptian satellites. From then on, Salafi discourse became accessible to all, garnering a large audience beyond the “original” Salafi movement circles. Very quickly some of the Salafi preachers, including Mohammed Hassan and Mohamed Hussein Yacoub, became well known all over the country. (Lacroix, 2012, p.2; Field & Hamam, 2009, p.4).

Third: The SC deemed political participation during the rule of Mubarak and those who preceded him to be fictitious and Islamists’ experiences, both inside and outside of Egypt, to be discouraging. Al-Muqaddam critiqued the MB’s experience saying: “The Brotherhood spent the

past 70 years attempting to join the parliament and inflict change, to no avail” (Al-Muqaddam, n.d.a). Furthermore, the December 1991 victory of the Islamic Salvation Front (ISF) in parliamentary elections in Algeria was denied (both by Western countries as well as the rulers of Algeria). The SC felt that other Islamist groups were able to reach their objectives only after compromising and sacrificing much of their Islamic identity and were willing to relinquish Sharia without the slightest political gain (Al-Muqaddam, n.d.a). Leading member of the SC Sheikh Said Abdul-Azim argues that political participation prior to the revolution had absolutely no value and was fictitious, set to enhance the ruling regime’s image (Islamic Media, 2011, April 10). The SC was open to any political changes that necessitated a change in the approach to political participation (al-Muqaddam, n.d.a).

7.3.2 Society-Oriented Explanation

The SC refused to work within religious institutions controlled by the state. It was therefore keen to establish its own independent organization commensurate with its surrounding circumstances (El-Sherif, 2015. p.9). Since its inception, the SC built its structure in a manner that best suits its function⁶⁵. As the majority of its work is focused on educational and religious *Da`wa* work within mosques, Salafist work did not require a significant amount of organizational depth, nor did it require political or economic branches, as is the case in other political parties. The nature of the Salafist work, which distanced itself from politics, was mainly focused on individuals’ education and elevating their “religious” merit. Its effort was primarily focused on spreading the Salafi approach through sermons, seminars, and scholarly sessions (Abdel-Al, 2011,

⁶⁵ What distinguishes the SC from other Salafi movements, particularly *Madkhalis*, is its organizational work and careful planning for its sheikhs’ frequent visits to mosques and communities. The Mubarak regime was suspicious of these activities, and the SSI continually tried to limit the SC’s work in Alexandria. But most SC activities took place in secret, especially in areas of *Da`wa* and the development of young cadres (Awad, 2014, p.10).

May 2). In organization management and branch supervision matters, the SC is heavily reliant on its scholars and affiliate preachers. It worked through a General Assembly – comprised of Salafi preachers who are selected according to specific criteria, summarized by Abdul Mun`im Al-Shahaat as: “Scholarly, *da`wa* educational, behavioral and ethical efficiency and integrity” (2011, April 3). The Assembly selects the president, two deputies, and a new Board of Directors (Al-Shahaat, 2011, April 3). The relationship between the leadership and followers is more “spiritual” than “regulatory or institutional” (El-Sherif, 2015). Al Shahaat explains: “During a few centuries, the SC was able to lead its members without the need for organizational or weak frameworks. This confirms the strength of the ties between the Salafi call and its followers” (2011, April 3). Ashraf El-Sherif (2015) says “unlike the murshid (supreme guide) in the Brotherhood—no oaths of allegiance to top leaders. Also, decisions are to be justified through rigorous religious decision making, rather than elite command; respect must be shown to sheikhs while keeping legitimate disagreements” (p.9).

Another reason as to why the SC avoided the organizational issue in its beginnings was to avoid clashing with the regime’s security forces. It felt that the Mubarak regime was intolerant of any form of Islamic movements, and the experiences of other Islamic movements were not very encouraging. Some of these movements were banned, their leaderships persecuted, and they were forced to shutdowns their headquarters. During the mid-eighties, the Salafi movement grew throughout Alexandria⁶⁶, and there were several attempts to legalize the organization – in 1985-

⁶⁶ It formed an Executive Council with the following members: Mohamed Abdel Fattah, commonly known as Abu Idris. Of the five other founders, Muhammad Ismail al-Muqaddim and Yasser Burhami act as deputies, and Said Abdel-Azim, Ahmed Farid, and Ahmed al-Houtaiba are members of the board. (A seventh founding father of the Call, Emad Abdel-Ghafour, left the country in the late 1980s). Most of them remain in office until today (El-Sherif, 2015, pp.10).

1986 – by establishing the “Al-Furqan” institute⁶⁷. So as to qualify new preachers, who adhere to its ideology in a very short period of time, the SC saw to it that a number of preachers – who upheld its beliefs – graduated from the institute (El-Sherif, 2015, pp.8-9; Abdel-Al, 2012, p.44; Fayed, 2012, pp.4-5). However, it followed a curriculum that is dissimilar to those being taught in formal and informal religious institutes (Abdel-Al, 2011, May 1). These graduates were deployed in several provinces and later set the stage for the SC’s proliferation. Moreover, the SC published “Sawt Al-Dawah” (the voice of the Call), a monthly magazine that continued to be issued irregularly until it was completely terminated in 1994 (El-Sherif, 2015, p.9). The magazine shed a light on all matters related to the Salafi ideology thorough a series of articles written by “Salafi scholars” (Awad, 2014, p.9; Abdel-Al, 2012, p.44). In Alexandria, Salafi work went beyond *Da`wa* and educational activities to include social and relief efforts, such as financial aid for orphans and widowed women, and medical aid for the sick. This is in addition to other activities, provided for by the “Zakat Committee” that had throughout Alexandria. Social committees became increasingly active after the 1992 Cairo earthquake (Abdel-Al, 2012, p.44).

The regime continued to deny the SC the right to become a centralized organization with a structure that extended outside of Alexandria. In fact, in 1994 the SSI discovered organizational structures that belonged to the SC and were determined to prevent the formation of an organized SC group (El Ashwal, 2013, p.4). The regime attacked the SC for security reasons, closing the scholars’ institute as well as their magazine, and arrested a large number of their sheikhs and activists. They were denied traveling privileges without prior authorization and were no longer allowed to appear on religious television channels. Some sheikhs were not allowed to give religious sermons, barring in a few mosques in Alexandria. Following this, some scholars

⁶⁷ See <http://www.elfurqan.org/> (accessed in 2015, May 24).

requested the suspension of the Salafi movement's organizational structure (El-Sherif, 2015, p.9; Awad, 2014, p.9).

7.4 State-Oriented Explanation and the Solidarity of the SC's Structure

The politicization of the SC and its transformation from a missionary religious movement (society-oriented) during the Mubarak regime into a political Islamist movement (state-oriented) after 25 January 2011 threatened its organizational unity and heightened the odds of fragmentation among its ranks. In the following sections, I will argue that the splits within the SC played a key role in the strengthening of the Egyptian MB-Salafi alliance, especially in the parliamentary elections, which were scheduled to be held prior to the coup d'état (as approved by the 2012 constitution).

7.4.1 The Official Organization after 25th January 2011

In a distinctive step towards the normalization of relations with State institutions, and following the issuance of the Social Associations National Law, the SC was finally able to acquire a permit as a "*Da`wa* Organization" in Alexandria during April of 2011. However, the SC's structure and budget were subject to legal supervision. The restructuring of the SC and the ratification of its official record included many local charitable institutions that functioned under it (El-Sherif, 2015, p.9). These institutions managed, in a short period of time, to become investment projects that fund the movement. At this time, the SC flourished in several locations and relied upon a large-scale network of mosques that played a major role in mediating and in local conflict resolution (El-Sherif, 2015, p.10).

The SC's organizational structure is formulated to suit each province, area, neighborhood and mosque. It has three major official bodies, namely: the "Board of Trustees" which is

comprised of the six founders and presides over the SC. Although decisions are to be taken unanimously, the Board of Trustees has vast control over the rest of the structure and has the ability to demote or fire members. The second body is the “Executive Council”, which is comprised of 16 Salafi sheiks who supervise administrative matters as well as local executive councils. Finally, the “Shura (Consultative) Council” is comprised of 200 sheiks from different provinces and is chosen by the “Board of Trustees”. This body (which later became an elected body) is the SC’s General Authority. It has the power to elect the “Executive Council”, approve annual budgets, and take final decisions regarding strategic matters such as providing support for the presidential candidate via a unanimous vote (El Ashwal, 2013, p.4; El-Sherif, 2015, p.10).

During the 2011/2012 parliamentary elections, the SC’s Shura Council introduced its members, who generally enjoy vast spiritual and social power within their constituencies, to the parliament. It provided candidates from the Nour Party with moral support by telling citizens how they will apply Sharia law and solve social and economic problems (El Ashwal, 2013, p.4; El-Sherif, 2015, p.10). By contrast, the handling of doctrinal matters that are likely to involve new interpretations or amendments, falls within the jurisdiction of the “Board of Trustees”. Such decisions call for a unanimous vote or for the matter to be delegated to the Shura Council (El Ashwal, 2013, pp.4-5).

Although the role of the original founders continues to be strong, the SC has adopted semi-democratic elements so as to introduce a degree of dictatorship in the decision-making process, which in turn helps maintain the followers’ loyalty. In spite of this, these structures were incapable of influencing individual sheikhs who refused to implement decisions of Shura Councils in their home provinces. For example, in the period prior to the military coup in July 2013, some of Sheiks challenged the decision taken jointly by the Salafist movement and the

Nour Party to refrain from demonstrations for or against Morsi. They called on their followers to take to the streets in support of Morsi (El Ashwal, 2013, p.5).

Figure 7.1: The Organizational Structure of the SC




Figure 1. The Organizational Structure of the Salafi Dawaa

Source: (Awad, 2014, p. 19)

7.4.2 Internal Divisions

The politicization of the SC, which took place after the January 25 revolution caused major disagreements within the movement. Most of the SC scholars were convinced when they took the decision of forming the Al-Nour party that as long as the concessions they had to make were limited, the benefits of political participation would far outweigh the disadvantages. During the 2011–2012 parliamentary elections, the Al-Nour party quickly proved to be a key player, receiving the support of the largest Salafist network in the country. However, tensions soon emerged, and Al-Nour lost most of the Salafi support. That was not all, with disagreements

spreading within the SC for a number of reasons, including the influence scholars had on the party, geographical competition, and personal rivalry and conflicts. There were also disagreements over the nature of the future relationship between the SC and the MB, and whether the SC would support its government (Brown, 2013a, p.11).

Further politicizing of the SC widened the gap between the movement's scholars and the leaders of its political arm, the Al-Nour party. Moreover, disagreements emerged following the commencement of the parliament in January of 2012, as some decisions were taken by party leader Imad Abdul Ghafoor without prior coordination with the SC scholars, the same scholars who stressed – on several occasions – that Al Nour had deviated from “the right path”. Confrontation became more palpable between the Al-Nour Party chairman Imad Abdul Ghafoor on the one hand and the vice president Ashraf Thabit and the vice president of the SC Yasser Burhami on the other. Disagreement intensified when Ahmad Shafik (the losing presidential candidate) disclosed his secret meetings with the leaders of the SC, headed by Burhami, and Thabet. It turned out that this meeting was held without Abdul Ghafoor's knowledge, who in turn reprimanded Thabet (Youssef & Mostafa, 2014, May 9). On the heel of these events, disagreements erupted within the Al-Nour Party between Abdul Ghafoor and members of Al-Nour's supreme body. Some of the SC leaderships intervened to end the dispute, but were unsuccessful. The two deputy chairmen of the party Al-Sayyid Khalifa and Ashraf Thabet – backed by the majority of the Supreme Body members – insisted on conducting new internal elections to choose a new chairman for the party. Abdul Ghafoor rejected this idea and decided to cancel the results of the elections that had already been held in several provinces. He requested their postponement till the upcoming parliamentary elections. Faced by the escalation of dispute between the two parties, the SC leaderships intervened and kept Abdul Ghafoor as president.

However, they still recognized the aforementioned internal election results. Elections were to continue in all other provinces so that the SC's General Assembly may reevaluate Abdul Ghafoor remaining in office. The disputes erupted again following the adoption of the results of the internal elections – boycotted by Abdul Ghafoor's followers – as most of the winners were Ghafoor's opponents, which indicated that he would inevitably lose his seat (El Ashwal, 2013, pp.5-6).

Disputes between the SC and Al-Nour were not only administrative or, as described by the media, a power struggle between two factions within the Nour party, one that stood in support of the scholars and another that opposed them. In fact, there is a real ideological disparity between the two factions within the Nour party. For example, in December 2011, a huge dispute broke out between Burhami and Abdul Ghafoor when the latter was questioned, during a television interview, about the reasons behind Al-Nour's refusal to encompass Christian candidates. He replied that he regretted this fact and hoped to include Christians in the party's future electoral lists (Al Jazeera Mubasher, 2011, November 6). This statement garnered him severe criticism from Burhami, who stressed through a statement on his website that only Muslims were to occupy “positions linked to the objectives (*maqasid*) of the Muslim state” (Lacroix, 2012, June 11, p.6)⁶⁸. Shortly after, Abdul Ghafoor announced that he was considering allying with non-Islamic parties, including the “Free Egyptians” party founded by the business tycoon Naguib Sawiris (Ansari, 2011, December 5). This elicited severe reactions from Burhami, who insisted that “any alliance entered with parties that denounce the Shari`a is completely prohibited” (Lacroix, 2012, p.7). In February 2012, a new argument between Burhami and Abdul Ghafoor erupted when Muhamad Nour, one of the Al-Nour party's official spokespeople, accepted an invitation to attend the

⁶⁸ Also available at: <http://www.anasalafy.com/play.php?catsmktba=31836> (accessed in 2013, January 26).

“annual celebrations in memory of the Iranian revolution” in the Iranian Embassy in Cairo. This was a controversial decision, in terms of the Salafists sectarian enmity towards the Iranian regime, and was viewed by Burhami as a step towards “normalizing” relations with the Shiite Iranian State (El Ashwal, 2013, p.5; Lacroix, 2012, p.7). What could be deduced from these events is Abdul Ghafoor’s attempt to push towards Al-Nour’s growing independence from the SC, which made it necessary to give precedence to the party’s political interests over the scholars’ religious logic.

These disputes forced Abdul Ghafoor and 150 active leadership members of Al-Nour Party to submit their resignation and to form a new party called the Homeland Party. Homeland received additional significant support from Sheikh Muhamad Abdul Maksoud – deputy chair of the (ILBRR) and prominent Sheikh in the Cairo Salafist faction (the official opponent of the Alexandria Salafist movement and the SC). Abdul-Maksoud called upon the leaders of the Homeland Party to overcome the shortcomings that marred their experience in Al-Nour (Zaki, 2013a, January 2). Founders of the Homeland Party were keen to emphasize that their party would be “more moderate” than Al-Nour. However, Nader Bakkar – spokesman for Al-Nour – scoffed at this, and mocked: “They would be more moderate, evidenced by the support of Hazim Salah Abu Ismail.” Abu Ismail was one of the most stringent Salafi preachers and was to run for the elections in coalition with the new Homeland party (Abdel-Raheem, 2013, January 4). Mohammed Almslaoui, Legal Counsel for the Homeland Party, justified the coalition with Abu Ismail and his newly formed Al-Rayah Party as an alliance that acknowledges the ideological disparity between the two parties. But at the same time, there was an agreement on the application of Shari`a, which was what would make the alliance possible and real (AlMasry AlYoum, 2013, January 20). However, the alliance began to expand under the name of “The Free Homeland

Coalition”, which intended to compete on 100% of the parliament seats during the scheduled 2013 elections. The coalition was comprised of the Homeland Party, the Building and Development Party, the Authenticity Party, the Reform Party, and the Change and Development Party. The ILBRR – among several others scholars – backed this coalition, which encompassed most of the Salafist movements and parties (Mohamed, 2013, March 5). This was a real blow to the SC, as it no longer had the MB as its sole opponent; rather, new competitors were making a crack in its voter base⁶⁹.

7.5 Changes in the SC's Ideological Perspectives

Under Mubarak, the SC’s attitudes toward women, Copts, and civil state were formed in its private space and were limited to sermons delivered in mosques and statements given to the media. Following the fall of Mubarak and the political openness that ensued, the SC took to the public sphere to relay its ideological perceptions during the parliamentary elections and constitution writing. The transformation of power networks in Egypt following the fall of the Mubarak regime contributed significantly to the SC’s ideological transformation; this afforded the SC an opportunity to define the state’s identity, political system and way of living, and turn its focus towards the state in order to trigger top down societal change.

The SC considers the “Islamization” of the state, the constitution, and the community an essential component of its ideological project. Therefore, and although it is in line with the spectra of the Islamic movement (which regards Article II of the 1971 constitution – providing for the fact that the principles of Islamic Sharia are the main source of legislation – to be a red line that must not be crossed); however, it does not consider this as the end of the road, rather a starting

⁶⁹ Nour officials accused the Brotherhood of trying to weaken it by attempting to co-opt party members and stoke the party’s split. “I wouldn’t say they engineered the split, but they had a big hand in the operation,” said Nader Bakkar, a spokesman for Nour (Daragahi, 2013, January 2).

point to reach further more comprehensive goals. This was quite clear in the discourse of the SC scholars, albeit not to the same degree of clarity in the literature and discourse of the Salafist parties. This disparity can be attributed to political alignment considerations and the adaptation to political realities. The SC scholars' discourse revolved around converting the text of Article II of the 1971 constitution to read "the provisions of the Islamic Shari'a are the main source of legislation". This shift had its own significant connotation, as the talk about "Sharia provisions" meant to dedicate certain doctrinal provisions of designated scholars as a source of legislation. This would lead to the establishment of institutional entities that would be responsible for the issuance of said jurisprudence provisions, considered – in practical analysis – as a form of religious theocratic rule.

This section seeks to build on other approaches illustrating the ideological transformation of the SC and explores the SC's perceptions pre and post the January 25 revolution regarding a number of issues, such as women's role in the movement and in society, in addition to its perceptions towards Copts and the State.

7.5.1 The SC and Women

Entering the political arena has forced the SC to make significant concessions. For example, when the party prohibited women's political participation before the 25 January revolution, it later changed its position and justified women's participation (according to the popular jurisprudence opinion they observe) as: "There is no harm in female participation in politics as long as it falls within the rule of consultation" (Anasafy Channel, 2011, October 18). Nevertheless, parliaments give their members powers greater than those of the president, such as the power of legislation. This falls under the governance jurisdiction, a power Islam forbids women and non-Muslims from possessing. However, if the party was forced to allow women in

their ranks, it would choose the lesser of “two evils”. The greater evil would be if Muslim women who uphold Sharia were forced to step aside in favor of those who reject its application (Anasalafy Channel, 2011, October 18). Moreover, the Nour Party does not believe that women are qualified candidates for the presidency. Apart from this, a few women hold senior positions within the party (Davis-Packard, 2014, p.5).

In its 2011 electoral program, the Al-Nour party focused on women’s social and equality rights, emphasizing a number of woman-centric issues such as: violence, poverty and discrimination. However, they failed to explain women’s role in politics and democratic change (Hizb al-Nour Political Party Platform Project, 2013, June 19). Despite their rigid stand on female political participation, electoral laws forced them to include women in their electoral lists. Nonetheless, they avoided publishing female candidates’ photos in electoral propaganda, replacing personal photographs (in the election campaign) with flower images or the party logo. And in some instances, female candidates’ names were replaced with their husbands’ names (Lacroix, 2012, p.6). Indeed, female candidates’ names were listed at the bottom of the candidate list, because the party believed they had a very limited chance of winning (Lacroix, 2012, p.6). Davis-Packard (2014) argues that “Cultural, rather than explicitly religious, norms have dictated Salafi views on women’s participation in politics” (p. 5)

7.5.2 The SC and Copts

Copts were used similarly during the reign of the last three Egyptian presidents (Abdul Nasser, Sadaat, and Mubarak) to increase their command and control over Egyptian society. On the one hand, ruling elites within the state used partial loyalties to evade the Law of Equality and Citizenship. On the other, these loyalties were used to manage conflicts with their rivals and opponents, particularly Islamists. They used Islamists to intimidate Copts, convincing them that

the government was their only protector. Rather than contain the sectarian incitement (delivered by some Islamists), they used these speeches to brand all Muslims as extremists.

On January 1 2011, the Saints Church in Alexandria was the target of a New Years Eve bombing. Security agencies were fast to name Salafist groups as primary suspects, launching wide arrest campaigns among their ranks and in which Sayyid Bilal, one of their members, died at the hands of Egyptian security services as a result of the torture he received (Awad, 2014, p.10). At that time, the SC was put under strict security surveillance, being an easy target of incitement due to their hardline rhetoric towards Christians (Awad, 2014, p.10). The Egyptian government did not stop there, using this incident to justify the need to tighten the siege over Gaza. Habib Adli, former Egyptian interior minister, accused the Gaza-based “Palestinian Islamic Army” of being involved in the bombing, which was denied by the group (Day Press, 2011, January 23).

The Copts’ relationship with the Salafists is majorly tied to each group’s perception of the other. Many Egyptians including Salafis believed that Copts had a special status within the Mubarak regime, where they enjoyed special privileges and powers that put them – at times – above the law. The critique directed towards Copts could be attributed to two issues: First, some believed that Copts suffered isolationism from the Arab and Islamic world, as well as from Egyptian society. On other hand, some statements given by Coptic Church leaderships contributed to fueling worry among Egyptians. Coptic Orthodox Archbishop Bishoy said: “The Copts are the origin of this country [...] we treat the guests who came and lived here nicely [...] but we are ready to die as martyrs if anyone touches our Christian message” (Ashour, 2011, January 12). These statements incited Egyptians’ resentment and fear of the concept of citizenship being replaced by the concept of sectarianism (Ibid.). The second issue was that some dreaded the

formation of “political Christianity”, in the sense of the church's spiritual and theological role being transformed into one of political leadership (Omara, 2001, p.15).

After the 25 January revolution, Coptic voices such as Naguib Gabriel and Naguib Sawiris began to emerge, demanding the abolition of Article II of the constitution and the imposition of a fixed quota in various state positions for Copts. They called for positive discrimination in their favor, in return for what they called “years of oppression, humiliation and persecution” (Abdel-Al, 2014, November 6). This call spread to Coptic groups residing outside of Egypt under the name “Copts in the Diaspora”. Some went to the extent of calling for the division of Egypt into five states, including a Coptic state, and named Esmat Zaklamah as its president⁷⁰; who, along with a group of expatriate Copts and in cooperation with extremist American Pastor Terry Jones, produced a film insulting Prophet Muhammad.

Media played a major role in intimidating Egyptians and inciting them against Islamists in general and “the advent of Salafis” in particular. Fahmi Howeidy argues that a stereotypical image was broadly applied to all Salafis, tarnishing those who were moderate amongst them, and that there were those amongst them who were wise and willing to develop their ideas and interact with the variables of the political reality (Howeidy, 2012, May 22). Furthermore, Salafis were framed for many criminal incidents, such as the case of cutting the ear of a Copt in Qina; an incident that was later found to be unrelated to Salafis, and they were cleared of the charge. The crime occurred as a result of a quarrel amongst neighbors regarding an apartment (with suspicious immoral activities). Islamic thinker Jamal Sultan argues that if the owner of the apartment had been a Muslim, the same incident would have taken place. He argues that the media spread

⁷⁰ Esmat Zklmh declared himself the Coptic head of state - through a television program - in response to the Al-Azhar Sheikh’s call to maintain the second article of the constitution, which states that “the principles of Islamic Sharia are the main source of legislation” (Abomaryam, 2011, July 11).

rumors to frame Salafis for the incident, claiming that it was an act of applying “*hadd*” (Islamic law) to a Coptic citizen (Moawad & Kamal al-Din, 2011, March 26). In the same context, Islamic speaker Khalid Al Jundi spoke against the attempt to put an Islamic stamp on every criminal activity that occurred at the time, deeming it “a failed attempt to eliminate Islamists”. (Ibid.)

Though Copts took views that met with Salafist criticism and resentment, in the same vein Salafis did not react in a manner that was reassuring to Copts. In fact, some of their statements raised concerns and fear of their political participation. Some of the Salafist jurisprudence legislations have majorly influenced their vision and attitudes towards Copts, expanding the gap that already exists between them. Many of these fatwas did not take into consideration the mutual history and coexistence of Muslims and Copts, giving Copts a feeling of being “second-class citizens”. Among these fatwas were those decreeing that Muslims should not begin by greeting non-Muslims, that they should not extend them a “welcome”, as these fall under acts of exaltation of non-Muslims. Muhammad Al Moqadem, a SC leader, justified this fatwa as “giving Muslims pride and humiliating infidels” (Al-Muqaddam, n.d(b)).

The SC considers Copts as infidels, essentially. In a television interview, Yasser Burhami stressed that this was inevitably the case, but he tried to mitigate Copts’ fears when he elaborated that, “though they are considered infidels, this does not negate the need to treat them by gentle persuasion”⁷¹. Coptic intellectual Kamal Zakher considered these opinions to signify a return to terrorism and were not valid to rule a multi-religious society (2012, July 5). Despite the MB’s efforts to congratulate Copts on the new Gregorian year, by hanging flyers and sending a high-level delegation to the Coptic cathedral to extend their good tidings to Pope Shenuda before the New Year mass service, the SC refused to take part in any of the previous activities, deeming it

⁷¹ Interview with Salafist Vice president, Yasser Burhami, on the Dream channel: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dpvndzB74ZO> (accessed in 2014, May 1).

unlawful to congratulate non-Muslims on their religious festivals. However, this prohibition excludes personal celebrations, such as weddings and national holidays (Lacroix, 2012, p.6).

The Al-Nour party's 2011-2012 parliamentary elections program did not have a clear stance on Copts. It explained that "sharia guarantees religious freedom for Copts" and "they have the same rights and duties as Muslims" (Hizb al-Nour Political Party Platform Project, 2013, June 19). At the same time, the SC tends to uphold the traditional Islamic system (*Dhimma* or Protection) that was prevalent during the Islamic Caliphate. According to this system, Christians and Jews living under the rule of an Islamic state are not obligated to serve in the army; they are extended protection from the authorities, in return they are required to pay a special tax called "*Al Jizyah*" (Davis-Packard, 2014, p.5; Lacroix, 2012, p.5).

The SC refused to allow Copts to hold authoritarian positions, on the grounds that only Muslims were allowed to hold positions pertaining to the "interests of the Islamic state". Authoritarian or governing positions include presidential, parliamentary councils, and ministries. In fact, if the SC were to implement the full scope of the Islamic mandate, which deems it unlawful for non-Muslims to occupy public positions that entail having authority over Muslims, more positions may be included in that list (Almasry, 2011, December 8). Yosry Hammad, former Al-Nour party leader, stated that Copts may not hold any ministerial position that gives them power over Muslims (Sarhan, 2011, December 3). These interpretations are inconsistent with the concept of citizenship, which calls for the treatment of Copts as an integral part of Egyptian society and guarantees their participation in public positions and their inclusion, like others, in power and wealth sharing, preventing them from falling into deprivation and surrendering to the wishes of the majority.

Additionally, fatwas issued by the SC faced criticism from Al-Azhar and a large number of intellectuals, including Muhammad Salim Al-Awa, who criticized the fatwas relating to the non-Muslim mandate and considered the evidence cited in this regard to be “in need of reevaluation” (Shamsalhakeka, 2012, March 18). Author Fahmi Howeidy describes these fatwas as “ambush fatwas” that are offensive to Islam and do not represent the purposes of Sharia law, which calls for justice and equality (Howeidy, 2012, January 9).

Ahmed Zaghoul Shalata (2013) argues that Al-Nour did not offer any new diligence, especially with regard to the position of Copts and women. Moreover, and due to the law on political parties, which states that parties are not to be formed on the basis of religion, caste, or gender (a matter criticized by the SC), Al-Nour was forced to incorporate Coptic and female representation. They reluctantly accepted this limitation, as a matter of “necessity”, while continuing to uphold the same Islamic opinion and hoping to change such conditions later (p.18). Nonetheless, the Coptic representation within the Nour Party was insignificant and synthetic (Shalata, 2013, p.18).

7.5.3 The Civil State

Prior to the January 25 revolution, the SC rejected democracy, deemed it blasphemous, and considered anyone who accepted it as a forfeiter of the doctrine of monotheism, since it may place an atheist or an infidel president in power, leaving the implementation of Sharia law to public opinion, a matter totally unacceptable to the SC. Nonetheless, it did not decline political participation and elections entirely, in principle. And it justified its distance from the political arena, prior to the January 25 revolution, as being a result of what Burhami deemed as: “deviant power scales that force participants to abandon Islamic doctrines and principles that no Sunni Muslim can sacrifice”. Therefore, the SC chose to refrain from political participation until the

scales of power were reset (Fayed, 2012, pp.4–5). The SC deemed the right to political participation (which does not uphold or preserve Islamic principles) as *haram* (unlawful)⁷². Likewise, instead of becoming politically active, Salafis chose to become more involved in *Da`wah* (preaching or proselytizing) as well as religious and social reform (Hamming, 2013, p.5). However, after the January 25 revolution, the SC felt that it was able to dictate its ideology in the form of a political system and Sharia role in the constitution.

One of the main debates that polarized the Egyptian political scene after the January 25 revolution was the nature of the upcoming state. The SC, through its issued statements, was vehemently against the civil state “*dawla madaniyya*” concept, a term which it viewed as a rhetorical trick, invented by its liberalist opponents, to make the idea of a “secular state” more acceptable (4starnews, 2011, September 20). At the same time, Salafis also criticized the concept of a “civil state with an Islamic reference” (*dawla madaniyya bi marja'iyya islamiyya*) that is promoted by the MB⁷³ (Lacroix, 2011, p.5).

In the 2011-2012 parliamentary election program, the Al-Nour party rejected the “theocratic” model that calls for a state claiming a divine right to rule, as well as the non-religious model that aims to uproot the nation and absolve it from its origins. In its electoral campaign, the party focused on the message “Egyptian identity is Islamic and Arabic”. It justified this by stating that: “Islam is the doctrine and religion of the vast majority of the Egyptian people, the Arabic language is the primary language of the people, and the nation (in all its spectrum) exhibited a great public consensus to adopt Islam as the state religion, and Islamic Sharia as the main source of legislation” (Debesh, 2011, May 30), stressing that “These fundamentals are supra-

⁷² See Burhami, Y. (2006). *Al-wala' wa Al-bara'* [Loyalty and Enmity]. Alexandria: Dar Al-Khulafa' Al-Rashidīn.

⁷³ The SC translates the “civil state” as “secular state” and defines it as a hostile and anti-religion state. (Sabry, 2011, March 7; [4starnews, 2011, September 20](#)).

constitutional principles, and must be provided for in any constitution for the country” (Ibid.). Muhammad Al Moqadem declared: “We approve of the civil state that translates into a non-military state, we also approve of the civil state that translates into a non-theocratic state. However we do not approve of a civil state that excludes the application of the Islamic Sharia law” (Elmoqadem, 2011, November 26).

With regard to the political system, the Al-Nour party can distinguish between “procedures of democracy” which they can accept and the “philosophy of democracy” which they reject. According to them, absolute sovereignty is a divine matter that may not be transposed to the people. This means that there is no doubt or debate with regard to whether Sharia law is enforceable or not. This explains why Al-Nour Party figures have advocated changing Article II of the constitution from “the principles (*mabadi*) of the sharia are the main source to law” to “the rulings (*ahkam*) of the sharia are the main source of law”. (Lacroix, 2011, p.5). The SC ties political participation with the concept of “monotheism” and deems Allah as the sole legitimate legislator. According to them, democracy if not governed by and leading to the arbitration of God’s *Sharia* will stand in violation of God’s oneness and sovereignty (supremacy). Wiktorowicz (2006) says: “Qur’an mentions God as the supreme legislator, and humans are obliged to follow the Shari’a in its entirety. To do otherwise is to imply that humans can legislate, a power clearly reserved for God alone” (pp. 208-209).

The Al-Nour Party sought to promote its view of the state through its participation in the Egyptian Constituent Assembly of 2012: “The Nour Party worked hard (and successfully) to have three specific articles included in the 2012 constitution: article 2 defining sharia as the main source of law, article 219 tying that principle to Sunni doctrine, and article 4 giving al-Azhar University a consultative role in the legislative process” (El Ashwal, 2013, p.3).

The severe limitation strategy can be clearly observed in the Al-Nour electoral program, which does not include any definite legal obligation towards citizenship, human rights, or the civil state. The term “citizenship” was never mentioned in the program, whereas the term “civil” was only mentioned once, in reference to civil industries versus military industries (El-Sherif, 2014a, February 24).

7.6 Networks and Changes in Alliances

Under Mubarak, the SC’s perceptions of other Egyptian parties were formed in its private space and limited to sermons delivered in mosques and statements given to the media. However, following the fall of Mubarak and the political openness that ensued, the SC took to the public sphere (during the parliamentary elections and constitution writing phase) to relay its ideological perceptions of other Egyptian parties. The SC’s view of these parties – during the reign of Mubarak – influenced its alliances with them post the 25 January 25 revolution, suggesting a shift in the SC’s ideological perception from its private space to public space. It was therefore initially forced to form alliances with the Salafist parties with perceptions that closely matched its own, in an effort to achieve its goal of “society Islamization”. However, later transformation of power networks greatly influenced the shape of its alliances. This was during a time when the military and the deep state were both in hiding. However, when the influence of the deep state (coupled with the alliances it forged with the military, media, and the economic elite) later appeared on the scene, the SC retreated and rearranged its alliances to avoid confrontation with these forces.

7.6.1 Relationship with Salafist Movements

Salafis were traditionally preoccupied with matters of “*Aqida*” (creed) rather than Sharia and politics. Despite their differences, Salafi groups were united in creed, which “provides

organizing principles, guiding precepts, and procedures for constructing religious legal positions on contemporary issues” (Wiktorowicz, 2006, p.208). Based on a literal understanding of the Holy Qor`an and prophetic Sunnah, Salafis tried to enforce the tradition of Prophet Muhamad and the rightly guided caliphs. They argued that, for any religious rule to be accurate, it must be entrenched in the teachings of Qor`an and Sunnah or ijma (consensus among religious scholars of the pious forefathers)⁷⁴.

Theoretically, this description of Salafism in Egypt is not comprehensive, as it does not take into account variances in the Salafi movement, particularly with regard to the issue of political participation. Bernard Haykel (2009) analyzes the Salafi movement according to three distinct elements: “Aqida – Creed, Shari`a – Legislation, and Manhaj – Approach”. “Manhaj – Approach” refers to means of engaging with the outside world and their impact on political participation. Haykel argues that matters of creed are focused on the comprehensive definite Islamic perception of God on the universe, humanity and life. Salafis agree on matters of creed, however, but disagree on those of Shari`a, although most Salafis believe that Ijtihad is a prerequisite to legislation. Therefore, and based on Salafi teachings related to political life and matters of power (i.e. according to the variances in each approach), Salafism could be divided into three groups Salafi-Jihadis, Salafi activists, and the al-Jami and al-Madkhali (Mneimneh, 2011; Hamming, 2013, p.6; Awad, 2014, p.3).

⁷⁴ Bernard Haykel (2009) argues that Salafis’ insistence on “Ijtihad – Independent reasoning” is a true paradox: when “Ijtihad” called for employing reason in the translation of Qor`anic text, the majority of Salafis chose to follow the principles of the Hanbali school (p.43) and were influenced by Ibn Taymiyyah, who still serves as the central frame of reference for most contemporary Salafist Sheiks (Hamming, 2013, p.5). This is contrary to what they claim to support, i.e. rejecting “Taqlid – imitation” and adopting “Ijtihad – Independent reasoning”. (Lacroix, 2014, p.60)

Shari`a is based on the attitudes of Salafist groups towards Arab regimes who – they feel – do not apply Islamic *Shari`a*⁷⁵. The approach of Al-Jami, Al-Madkhali as well as followers of Nassir Eddin Al-Albani in Jordan are not of the opinion that Arab rulers are “infidels”, as to do so, the condition of “*Istihlal*” – to permit what Allah forbids or forbid what Allah permits – must be fulfilled. That is, Arab rulers must publicly state that they do not wish to implement Islamic *Shari`a*. Followers of this approach clarified that rulers must be obeyed as long as they are Muslim, and it sufficed to ask them to fix all matters that do not comply with Islamic *Shari`a*. However, they may deem some rulers to be “infidels” on the grounds that they embrace a declared blasphemous doctrine (Abu Rumman, 2014, p.78).

The second approach activist Salafis: According to this approach, Arab rulers as a group and not as individuals are deemed infidels, because they fail to rule according to Islamic *Shari`a*. Deeds are therefore judged, not the people who commit them; they are labeled “blasphemous” as they negate Islamic teachings. The activist Salafis seek to remove all conditions of blasphemy through change and reform. The third, Jihadist, approach deems all Arab rulers infidels. It necessitates revolting against them and changing the status quo – even by force – as long as the rulers are not Muslims (Abu Rumman, 2014, p.78). Mokhtar Awad (2014) argues that deep ideological divisions existed between most Salafist groups. Although the SC – at its inception – was rather close to *Al-Jama`a Al-Islamiyya*, however, the two movements diverged “historically” on the issue of violence and jihad.

From time to time, intellectual battles and debates between the two most prominent contemporary Salafi schools, the Alexandrian “scientific” Salafist group and its Cairo counterpart the “dynamic” Salafist group, rose to the surface. The latter had lesser means and was less

⁷⁵ Wiktorowicz also introduced such a division of Salafis into three factions, although he labels them “Purists”, “Politicos”, and “Jihadis” (Wiktorowicz, 2006, p. 208).

popular than the SC. However, it enjoyed a strong support base, particularly within Cairo, putting it in close range to the political commotion launched by the January 25th revolution. Naturally, it was based in Cairo; its Sheikhs, Mohammed Abdel-Maksoud, Fawzi Al-Saeed, and Nash`at Ahmed, belonged to the activist Salafi group in Cairo (Awad, 2014, p.3). Following 25 January 2011, they were represented by the Authenticity and Virtue Parties, in addition to new youth Salafi movements such as the Salafi Front and Hazim Abu Ismail campaign (later forming the Al-Rayyah party)⁷⁶.

After 25 January 2011, most Salafist parties changed from society-oriented Islamic movements to state-oriented ones, which in turn played a significant role in reshaping the relationships between Salafist movements. On 22 October 2011, a new Salafist coalition was formed and encompassed three partners, who were not equal in terms of proliferation. The key partner was the Al Nour Party (which won 111 seats in the parliament) in addition to two smaller-scale partners, the Salafi Building and Development party (with 31 seats), and the Authenticity Party (with 3 seats). As such, most electoral promotional materials carried Al-Nour Party slogans, and the coalition was – at times – introduced as Al-Nour Party Coalition. One of the factors that united the three Salafist parties was their belief that supporting amendments to the referendum on constitutional amendments (which took place on 19 March 2012) was a religious obligation towards the implementation of Shari`a, and that those who reject constitutional amendments are in contempt of Shari`a and wish to reduce the influence of the Islamists (Bizri, 2011, p. 151). Mohamed Hussein Yacoub, one of the most prominent Salafist Sheikhs, called for the

⁷⁶ Some Cairo Salafists did not support Abu Ismail's nomination for the 2012 presidential election. Among the naysayers was Sheikh Mohammed Abdul-Maksoud; he criticized the behavior of Abu Ismail followers for shutting down streets and declaring his opponents infidels. Abdul-Maksoud felt that these followers were practising "intellectual terrorism". (Mido, 2012, April 11)

preservation of Article II of the constitution as is. He stated that any law opposing the article must be banned, and that to compromise this article is to compromise Islam. He referred to the referendum as the "Battle of the ballot boxes" (Saleh, 2011, April 4).

However, this coalition did not last long. The disagreement began when the SC rejected the nomination of Salafist leader Hazim Abu Ismail and Khyarat Al-Shater, deputy to the MB's spiritual guide, while the majority of the Salafist movements were in favor of either of the nominees. Moreover, the SC was regarded as the cause of Egypt's electoral commission's refusal to allow Abu Ismail and Al-Shater from running on its behalf. Khalil Al-Anani (2012, May 2) argues that this decision was in the best interests of the SC. The elimination of Abu Ismail reduced its organizational and ideological burdens, as there were disagreements – within the SC – about extending support for Abu Ismail⁷⁷. However, the elimination of Al-Shater from competition would prove in favor of Morsi, who was a less formidable candidate. The SC feared that if either Al-Shater or Abu Ismail succeeded, this would bolster the MB's position at the expense of the SC. The SC did not allow the Salafi base to choose a candidate and considered it a grave risk that would jeopardize the solidarity of its structure. Likewise, it would risk losing an excellent bargaining chip in the game of politics. Thus, to nominate Abu Al-Fotooh was the only way out of this dilemma, although it had real concerns regarding his secularist tendencies (Anani, 2012, May 2).

Within the preparations for the parliamentary elections, which were scheduled to be held at the end of 2013 as approved by the 2013 constitution but did not take place due to the 2013 coup d'état, new alliances began to take shape. These alliances did not appeal to the Nour Party,

⁷⁷ Sheikh Ahmad al-Naqib, one of the most prominent SC Sheikhs, wondered how the SC – which calls for the application of Sharia – refused to nominate Abu Ismail (who had promised to enforce Shari`a) for the presidential elections. He felt that the SC put its partisan interests ahead of its ideological principles (Qutb, 2013, March 1).

as it was no longer the big home that housed all Salafis. Old allies such as the Building and Development Party and the Authenticity Party began to form alliances away from Al-Nour. This was due to the SC's criticism of Morsi and the MB, and its close connections with the NSF. Muhamad Abdul Maqsood, a key figure in the Salafist Authenticity Party, believed that the Nour Party tore Islamic unity, had left the Islamic fold, and sold out their religion. He further criticized their proximity to the NSF (Sheikh Muhamad Abdul Maksoud – Official Account, 2013, April 18). Moreover, an alliance between Al-Rayah Party led by Hazim Salah-Abu Ismail and the Homeland Party led by Emad Abdel Ghaffour (the former leader of the Al-Nour Party) was formed, and also stood in support of the MB. Al-Nour expected this to impact on its tributary voter base (Obaid, 2013, January 8).

A new Salafist map was drawn, with Al-Nour standing alone while all other Salafi parties sided with the MB. It is not possible to remove this map from its historical context, which justifies the Salafist movements' tendency to ally with the MB vs. allying with the Nour Party. This leads us to other differences that exist among Salafi groups and lie in the degree of influence the MB and their ideologists have on these groups. The first of these was the Jihadist group, whose members were primarily influenced by the ideologies of Sayyid Qotob and in favor of committing acts of violence against State institutions. The Salafi Activists came next; they adopted a political reformation approach and were influenced by the general MB stream, also known as the Banaeeun/Bannaist (Hamming, 2013, p.6). The "Quietists" group was particularly influenced by the Salafist scholar Nasir Al-Din Al-Albani, who stood against public political participation. By virtue of this⁷⁸, the group was led to form a truce with current rulers (Brown, 2011a, p.3).

⁷⁸ Stéphane Lacroix (2011) argues that the reason for the emergence of political Salafism is the influx of MB from Egypt and Syria, who influenced the Salafis in Saudi Arabia, prompting the rise of the "Awakening". In the following decades, political Salafism in Saudi Arabia acquired its characteristics through the continuous and

7.6.2 Alliances with Non-Islamists

During the Mubarak regime, the position the SC held towards non-Islamist movements took three routes. First, it snubbed political participation and focused on creating change within society; it was isolated from the political polarization that some nationalist, secular, as well as some Islamist movements – like the MB – engaged in. Second, the SC refused the remonstrations movements organized by the Mubarak opposition. It refused two calls for mass strikes that took place across the country during 2008 and were organized by political forces in protest at the deteriorating political, economic and social conditions. The SC criticized these calls and condemned the organizers. Burhami described these remonstrations thus: “They do not follow the guidelines of Islamic Sharia. The good resulting from taking such actions is nowhere near the amount of resulting harm and ‘Fitan – seditions’” (Mansour, 2013, January 2).

The third route related to the prohibition of partisanship. In a *fatwa* published on Burhami’s website June of 2010, he denounced Partisan political work⁷⁹, saying: “Joining parties, especially secular, communist, or socialist political parties, among others that hold principles contrary to Islam, is impermissible. Muslims may not be affiliated with these parties, as this entails upholding their principles that oppose Islam” (Burhami, 2010, June 28). Burhami criticized the MB’s alliance with non-Islamist parties, pointing that they should not agree with secular beliefs (Burhami, n.d). Following these statements, non-Islamist movements did not wish to be associated with the SC, nor did they deem it a worthy political opponent, since the SC was

mutual influence between the MB and the Salafists. Dominance of the “Quietists” over the Egyptian Salafists continued, especially in the public domain until 25 January 2011. Likewise, the Salafi Activists rose dramatically, drawing close to the MB and took an active part in political life (Hamming, 2013, p.6).

⁷⁹ The SC did not prohibit joining educational and other syndicates that fostered its members (Burhami, 2010, June 28).

politically ineffective and avoided extending its support to any party, including politically active Islamist parties.

In the post-Mubarak era, the SC became a key political presence, especially after the results of the 2011/2012 parliamentary elections, in which the Salafi coalition – led by the SC – won 22% of the seats in parliament. This forced it to deal with all sorts of political parties, both within the parliament as well as the Constituent Assembly for writing the constitution. During its initial political participation phase, the Al-Nour Party avoided forming any political alliances with non-Islamist movements. Abdul Mon`im Al-Shahaat – a leader in the SC – said: “The Partisanship system is imposed on us, however, we do not approve of it” (Saleh, 2011, May 25). Later, the SC bypassed this prohibition on the pretext that, “Secularists and liberals should not be left to pen the constitution alone” (bid.). During the 2011/2012 parliamentary elections, the SC formed alliances with other Salafis only and deemed its dispute with non-Islamist movements one that was “ideological”. Al Moqaddem expressed this matter clearly when he said: “What differentiates us from secularists and liberals is their claim that God ‘Allah’ is only responsible for ‘creation’. We believe that God holds the power of creation as well as legislation.” He accused liberals and secularists of being slaves to Western concepts with regard to the importance of the role religion plays in people’s daily lives (2010aboabdo, 2011a, September 25). Meanwhile, Burhami deemed those who do not wish to apply Sharia law (wholly or partially) to be infidels, which in turn does not allow for any form of cooperation with them or contribution to their political empowerment (Dreamstvchannel, 2011, September 14).

The continued protestation against the MB following the referendum on the constitution during 2012 helped Al-Nour to put pressure on the MB, particularly after gap of differences between them widened (see section 6.5.1). On 24 January 2013, some Egyptian newspapers began

to mention the meetings between the leadership of the Al-Nour and NSF parties. They claimed that both parties might coordinate their efforts in the upcoming House of Representatives elections, or form an alliance within the Council following the elections (Al-Jazeera Center for Studies, 2013, February 11). Al-Nour Party spokesmen began to adopt an opposition stance towards Morsi during their televised appearances on talk shows. For example, they stated, “One political force is incapable of managing the country’s affairs.”, that “Al Nour party is against the trend towards the Brotherhoodization of the State”, and during a press conference held on 29 January 2013, Younis Makhyon, chairman of the Al-Nour party, announced a party initiative to deal with the crisis. What was astonishing about Al Makhyon’s initiative is that it encompassed the exact demands laid by the opposing NSF party (Al-Jazeera Center for Studies, 2013, February 11, p.5).

The close connections between Al-Nour and the NSF represented a jump over many of Al-Nour’s ideological and political parameters and restrictions. The Al-Nour Party began to distance itself from its Islamist allies and bypassed its previous *fatwas* prohibiting alliances with non-Islamists. By doing so, the SC raised a red flag regarding the secret behind this sudden ideological shift, which could be attributed to following three main reasons: first, within the preparations for the scheduled parliamentary elections, new alliances began to take shape. And with the lack of alliance options – with Islamist and religious parties – Al-Nour was faced with the dilemma of losing part of the voter base that may have voted for it. The MB was no longer its sole opponent; rather, a number of new opponents emerged, creating a vertical and horizontal crack in its voter base and prompting the party to seek new alliances that would expand its electoral base (see section 7.6.1). Furthermore, Al-Nour realized that the MB possessed additional political platforms, which it did not have during the 2011/2012 preliminary elections. These

platforms included ministries run by members of the MB, such as the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Youth, which were particularly important in light of their achievements. During the latest discourse session, held in February 2013, Al-Makhyon was the first to call for the replacement of the Minister of Supply and Internal Trade as well as the Minister of Youth. (Al-Jazeera Center for Studies, 2013, February 11).

Second, when the influence of the deep state (coupled with the alliances it forged with the military, media, and the economic elite) later appeared on the scene, the SC retreated and rearranged its alliances to avoid confrontation with these forces. The SC gave priority to its political gains, represented by the survival of its organization, and avoided confrontation with state institutions by sacrificing its previous ideologies. By doing so, Al-Nour has avoided the opposition-led protestations that the MB and their Salafi allies face. In addition, it keeps itself out of the media and the deep state's range of criticism. This is what happened on the ground, as media and MB opponents welcomed the close connections between Al-Nour and the NSF.

Third, there is speculation implying that the Al-Nour Party was subject to extreme pressure from an Arab country known for its connections with Egyptian Salafist groups. Apparently, it forced Al-Nour to extricate itself from its relations with the MB completely and to form an alliance with the NSF. Moreover, Al-Nour was to coordinate efforts with the NSF during the elections, where the parties if joined together could achieve a parliamentary majority. The two parties would jointly approve the configuration of the upcoming government and entrap Morsi for the remainder of his time in office. Bakkar stated that his party did not object to forming a government with the NSF following the parliamentary elections (McTighe, 2014, p.3).

7.7 The SC and Power Networks

Following the fall of Mubarak, the SC had a new political opportunity to bring about change in society according to the group's ideology through state institutions. At this point, they believed that all matters that had once prevented them from becoming politically active during Mubarak's reign, namely the fear of becoming entangled in matters that would force them to compromise their beliefs and principles or involved in confrontations with the regime that might hinder them from spreading their ideas, were now long gone. The SC was transformed from a society-oriented to a state-oriented movement. It began to spread its ideas and ideologies through state networks instead of its own private networks (i.e. the media, mosques, newspapers, institutions, schools). In the following sections I will explore how the SC has dealt with the power networks post 25 January 2011, particularly the military and deep state constituents, in order to avoid any clashes with them.

7.7.1 Economic Policies

In the Al-Nour Party's parliamentary elections program for 2011-2012, it called for the issuance of many economic laws (Al-Nour Party parliamentary elections program, 2013, June 19). However, on the one hand Al-Nour did not wish to infuriate its voter base by calling for the adoption of the Banking and Lending Law, which provides for the expansion of Islamic modes of financing based on profit and production sharing rather than the current banking system that Al-Nour deems "usurious" and is deeply rooted in interest-based transactions. On the other, Al-Nour did not wish to clash with the business and investment sector due to its close relationship with the military. Thus, it realized that the implementation of its economic program could only be achieved after some years and gradually (Kurzman Website, 2013, June 19).

The SC wished to compete with the MB's projects and economic policies, and it was accused of trying to take away the limelight from the MB when it earlier launched a business initiative similar to that of the MB (Abo Alabass & Feteha, 2012, November 18). In March 2012, the MB launched the first Business Development Association and called it EBDA (see section 4.6.1.1), while the SC's similar initiative was called BID`. The SC denied that the purpose behind this move was to compete with the MB or to imitate them (Abo Alabass & Feteha, 2012, November 18). Moreover, the SC did not leave it at its political arm, the Al-Nour Party, but decided to establish an economic arm, "House of Business" in November 2012. It launched its first project aiming to provide the Egyptian economy with millions of dollars through the establishment of SMEs. The House of Business Foundation launched its first program BADER – the Arabic word for Initiator – in the presence of several public figures (Bader Egypt, 2013a, February 23), businessmen and representatives of entrepreneurship institutions and bodies in Egypt (Paciello, 2015, p.8). Bader received support from the Arab Gulf states, with Saudi Aramco offering its support for the project and taking part in its launch ceremony (Bader Egypt, 2013b, April 2).

The House of Business was established by the SC through which to introduce its vision of an Islamic economy. A non-for-profit institution that consisted of 160 businessmen, members of Al-Nour and the SC, among others, who belonged to the Salafist movement but were loyal to the SC scholars and could create effective relationships with politicians and the media (El-Sherif, 2015, p.11). Additionally, these projects provided a permanent source of funding for the management and daily operations of the Salafist movement and the Al-Nour Party (Awad, 2014, p. 17). However, during the period between 2011 and 2013, the House of Business was unable to fulfill its promises (El-Sherif, 2015, p.11).

A rift between the SC and the MB emerged regarding the handling of the Islamic Sukuk. The SC justified its position, as the sale of assets to repay securities could be in violation of the Islamic Shari`a (see section 6.6.1). Conversely, Al-Nour accepted the circulation of the Islamic Sukuk after the coup. They supported Finance Minister Hany Kadry regarding the “re-drafting The Islamic Sukuk” following consultation with and approval from the Egyptian Republic’s Mufti, or high scholar (Hodge & Manek, 2014). It was clear that the issue was political and not religious, and the SC’s position on the securities differed depending on the political context.

7.7.2 After Mubarak: Dealing with Political Networks

With the amplified calls to protest that ultimately led to the events of 25 January 2011, and in the wake of the fall of the Ben Ali regime in Tunisia, the SC denounced the demonstrations on the pretext of giving priority to the goodwill of the people and avoiding sedition. It held steadfast in its opposition to “Angry Friday”, stressing that the only reform needed was the establishment of religion. It laid out general guidelines for economic, social and political reform, without addressing the departure of Mubarak. The SC’s focus continued to be towards creating change in society, with the Islamic identity of Egypt a priority. What was interesting is that, during an SC conference (held in Alexandria on Tuesday, 8 February 2011 and attended by tens of thousands, for the purpose of clarifying the SC’s position on current events), it emphasized its clear demands regarding the identity of the state, cautioned against the infringement of Article II of the constitution, and discussed the state of emergency in the country, all without addressing the activities surrounding the revolution (Fayed, 2012, pp. 6-7). The SC avoided any involvement in the protests that erupted the January 25 revolution. Sheikh Al-Moqaddem praised the “youth of the revolution”, which was interpreted as support for their initiative; Sheikh Burhami issued a

statement indicating that Sheikh Al-Moqaddem's position stopped at praising the youth without calling for participation in the demonstrations (Fayed, 2012, pp. 6-7).

Following the adoption of the constitutional amendments that resulted from the referendum on 19 March 2011, Salafis felt that this vote was in support of Shari`a and thus it decided to participate in politics (Tadros, 2013, p. 10). The SC sought to acquire the largest number of seats in parliament, allowing it to influence the shape of the future state. It moved away from executive positions and disappeared behind legislative positions instead. Nevertheless, Islamists who participated in the 2012 parliament clashed with governments appointed by SCAF – particularly the government of Al-Ganzouri – which disrupted many of the Parliament's decisions. On 14 June 2012, the Constitutional Court dissolved the “House of Representatives” with the Islamist majority (Leyne, 2012, June 14).

In December 2012, the SC sought to achieve effective representation in the constitution drafting committee, aiming to influence the writing of the constitution in line with ideology. Burhami had a major role in the formulation of Article 219 of the constitution⁸⁰. On 22 November 2012 during a meeting with senior Salafi Sheikhs, Burhami stressed that the constitution included unprecedented restrictions in favor of the Sharia for the first time – and in any constitution – in Egyptian history. He added: “The document was signed by Christians and liberals” and that the “Constitutional Court must be cleaned at all costs” (Elbasry, 2012, December 23). By this he meant that all those holding positions in the Constitutional Court must be dismissed. During the closed session, he also suggested the removal of the Sheikh of Al-Azhar. However, the SC had to forgo these decisions for fear of the reaction they would elicit from Al-

⁸⁰ Article 219: The principles of *Sharia* include general evidence, the foundational principles of Islamic jurisprudence (*usul al-fiqh*), the reliable sources from among the Sunni schools of thought *madhahib* (ConstitutionNet, 2012, p. 49)

Azhar, the state institutions, and its Islamists opponents. But it did not forgo its intention to make changes in Al-Azhar and the Constitutional Court, filing it away in a future agenda for when the opportunity should arise (Elbasry, 2012, December 23).

The SC's approach towards state institutions was cautious, as it wished to strike a balance between two matters. The first was to take advantage of the available opportunity to spread its ideology top-to-bottom, and the second to avoid any clash with the core and dominant forces in the state. When the vice-president of the SC Burhami admitted to visiting with Ahmed Shafiq – the losing presidential candidate – on the night the results of the 2012 presidential elections were to be announced, he and key figures in the Al-Nour Party faced a barrage of criticism, especially since he had previously denied, on several occasions, having met with Shafiq. He stressed that they only spoke on the phone prior to the election. Later, Burhami admitted to the meeting and justified it as a way to learn about Shafiq's position – if he were to win the elections – on the constitution, the state identity, and on the MB. He revealed that, prior to the announcement of the presidential election results, they were to mobilize in several directions, including a meeting with representatives of the SCAF (Alrai, 2012, September 28).

7.7.3 Dealing with Military Networks

There are many structural, political, and societal obstacles that make the practical opportunities for achieving the SC project of the Islamization of the state or the constitution difficult and limited. This approach was met with strong opposition from the majority of business and economic powers, as it could threaten the tourism sector. As for the military, it too did not welcome this proposal and upheld its commitments towards international and regional forces that may not wish to see an Islamic republic in Egypt. There was also the issue of the military's commitment to the business sector, not only because it was a key component in the power

alliances in Egypt, but also because of the overlap of the military's interests – as a producer and as an economic and trade partner with this sector (El-Sherif, 2014, February 24).

The military coup of 3 July 2013 has had a significant impact on the SC's structural transformations, in two directions. The first has been to deepen the rift between the SC, as a result of which a number of the SC's fore-founders ceased to attend the movement's organizational meetings. Among them was Said Abdul Azeem, who declared – prior to 30 June 2013 – that he held a biased position towards the “legitimacy of President Mohamed Morsi”, and against Al-Nour's supportive position of the Army (Youssef & Mostafa, 2014, May 9). Accordingly, and since the beginning of the escalated tension with the NB in January 2013, Al-Moqaddem did not attend any of the SC meetings after 3 July, and he refrained from public appearances and political discussion (Youssef & Mostafa, 2014, May 9).

Sheikh Abdul Rahman Abdul Khaliq, one of the SC's founding fathers (Abu Rumman, 2014, pp. 67-68), launched a scathing attack on Burhami for his support of the military coup. He said: “O Sheikh Yasser you are the engineer of this coup and its godfather, you gave them permission – with your fatwa – to mobilize on 30 June 2013. Similarly, you issued a fatwa when you said to me: ‘The larger number of Morsi supporters (those who voted for him) to come out in protest, the larger the odds for the fall of Morsi's legitimacy’. You also said to me: that the Ministry of Internal Affairs has commanded you to come out in protest on 30 June 2013, for which I have warned you. But, it never crossed my mind that you are the engineer and the godfather of the coup, and that you are the author of the road map where the people would begin to demonstrate against Morsi only to have the army intervenes to take power. And with this, all that was built by the Egyptians so far beginning with their revolt, to the elected president, a

constitution written by the elected elite, the Shura Council and the elected institutions has now failed” (Masr Alarabia, 2013, December 8).

The second direction is the call to leave politics, revealing the extent of the split in the ranks of the Salafist leadership. This was the position of Sheikh Said Abdel Azeem (Al-Dweik, 2013, January 12). Sheikh Ahmad Farid, a prominent figure in the SC, called it “returning to our origin”. He added that, “for 40 years, we have wanted to return to missionary work (*al-Da‘wa*) and forget politics” (Youssef & Hashen, 2014, May 9).

7.8 Conclusion

The decline of the old political power led to ideological transformation of the SC from a society-oriented Islamic movement to a state-oriented Islamic movement, as political power brought about a change in the SC from being a movement that avoids dealing with dominant power networks (in the Hosni Mubarak era) to one that has an interest in cooperating with the dominant power. One of the major impacts of the decline of the old political power has been to facilitate the emergence of the SC’s private space, commitments, and lifestyles in the public sphere. The political positions of the SC have been associated with its organizational interests, religious justifications were made accordingly and not vice versa, and that showed confused religious attitudes inconsistent with the doctrinal heritage of the SC.

CHAPTER 8: THE IMPACT OF SOURCES OF SOCIAL POWER TRANSFORMATIONS IN EGYPT ON THE ORIENTATION OF THE MB AND SC TOWARDS STATE AND SOCIETY

8.1 Introduction

The Brotherhood's experience of government does not have the objective conditions needed for success. The Brotherhood has faced a complex net composed of the deep state, the Military Council, the economy, and the bureaucratic authority of the state, which did not cooperate with the rule of the MB. Most importantly, the MB also faced the challenge imposed on any ruling political elite dependent on public support to stay in power, i.e. the need to improve the economic and living conditions for all citizens. The Brotherhood sought to settle up with fugitive businessmen through legal proceedings, and at the same time it sought to create economic elites headed by MB businessmen (Masoud, 2014). Under Mohammed Morsi's rule, the security situation deteriorated, the infrastructure and public services diminished further, and power outages and scarcity of fuel were a daily suffering by the Egyptian people (Colombo & Meringolo, 2013, pp. 5-6). Meanwhile, the Army was worried when the Islamic parties, including the FJP, swept parliamentary elections in 2011/2012, and when an Islamist president, Mohammed Morsi, was elected and took office in mid-2012. The Salafi alliance with the Brotherhood complicated matters further and contributed to the polarization that took place between Islamists and non-Islamists with regard to the identity of Egypt. The Brotherhood made no attempt to bypass this polarization by forming deep social alliances with diverse social groups and Egyptian political parties.

This thesis sheds light on an important historical juncture – that is the January 25 revolution, the shifts that took place within the power networks, and the resulting change in the orientation of the MB and SC towards state and society. Without a doubt, this has contributed to the ideological transformation in the two movements. The MB came to power, after a period of more than 88 years, and is now in opposition. Meanwhile, the SC added new dimensions and components to its ideology, including the key political dimension that was lacking in its original orientation.

Through Mann's theory, the hypotheses and questions presented at the beginning of the dissertation, regarding the impact of sources of social power transformations on the orientation of ISMs towards the state and society, as well as the resulting transformation in other cases, are examined. The following section attempts to link variables through the comparison between the MB and the SC, as in chapters 6 & 7 questions addressed both groups separately. However, in this analytical section and within the context of comparison, the two movements are presented with the same questions simultaneously, so as to uncover the similarities and differences in the transformative paths of both movements.

8.2 The Mubarak Era and the Decisive Political Factor

Michael Mann has classified political power into two categories, the first being despotic power. In this category, the state dominates society and controls the democratically oriented institutions: there are parliaments and legislative councils, but they do not achieve popular participation in governance. On the contrary, these institutions are used as instruments for hegemony and despotism (Mann, 1986, p. 473). This is in contrast to the second category, infrastructural power, which refers to the capacity of organizations to actually penetrate, conquer, and control social spaces, and to implement their decisions (Mann, 1986a, p. 120) (see chapter 3).

From the analysis of political power under Mubarak in the fifth chapter, I argue that political power fails to lead to the formation of proper infrastructure and hence to the absence of participation by ISMs. The process of political liberalization at the beginning of Mubarak's reign differed in that Mubarak allowed peripheral participation and competition under strict control over political competition in the center in order not to affect his own grip on power. Carrie Wickham (2002, 2013) argued that this resulted in the transition of the political dynamic from official organizations and channels to the periphery, which consequently led to the formation of a wide, non-central network of Islamic organizations; this in turn resulted in the formation of optimal points of political and organizational communication, which put the collective actions back on track, as Doug McAdam (1996, 1999) and other social movement scholars have similarly pointed on this topic.

During Mubarak's reign, the MB aspired to have an impact on political power and steered in that direction. In tracing the MB's path during the period between the 1980s up to 25 January 2011, it was evident that they wasted no opportunity to take part in the parliamentary elections; and sought to overcome the obstacles enforced by the regime by:

1. Forming various alliances with non-Islamic movements that would facilitate their access to parliament.
2. Ensuring participation in trade union elections, utilizing them as political platforms. Other than that, however, the MB's race to power was extremely cautious.


The MB transformed the periphery's platforms, such as unions and university student councils, into political platforms. In this context, the MB approached the state with two strategies; according to Carrie Rosefsky Wickham (2013), the MB's strategy was based on "self-assertion"

and "self-restraint". Both strategies aimed to avoid a clash with the regime. The MB's orientation towards the state was clearer after 1994, when it issued a set of political reform initiatives aimed at the Egyptian political system (see e.g. reform initiative in 2004, and the electoral program in 2005, and the draft party program in 2007). These initiatives were adapted to deal with the system, no attempt was made to overthrow or oppose it but rather to repair it.

During Mubarak's rule, the SC considered society/the individual as objects of change, the reconstruction of society as the solution, and sought its transformation with a bottom-up approach. It strived to disassociate itself from the political system by retreating into its sanctuary and private space, focusing its efforts instead on teaching citizens religious worship sacraments and sermons. A movement that was deeply concerned with everyday life, it utilized both modern and traditional communication networks to spread its ideologies. It measured its success by its ability to redefine and transform the inner landscape to focus on the individual rather than having direct influence on political power (Melucci, 1996).

Following the fall of the political regime on 25 January 2011, ISMs underwent a shift in orientations towards the state and society. This shift has played a significant role in the formation of the political order after Mubarak, and the resulting relationships with the sources of social power, accompanied by the formation of new power networks.

Figure 8.1: Egypt's Regime Change from 1981 to 2013



As illustrated in Figure 8.1, before the 25 January 2011 revolution, the real power in Egypt rested with the political power represented by the presidency, supported by the military and economic power. By the end of 2010, the political and economic elites were playing an instrumental role in governing the internal affairs of the country. They served the Mubarak regime and his son Gamal's interests and controlled almost every aspect of public life in Egypt, with the exception of anything related to the military network. Meanwhile, Mubarak and his ruling party exercised hegemony over the legislative authority. After Mubarak's fall, the power networks changed. After decades of keeping away from playing a direct role in policy, the military redefined its relationship with the country and defended its special position, seeking to maintain its political and economic privileges and resisting major political and economic reforms and, by imposing some constitutional articles, to legitimize its interference in politics and economics.

The decline of the old regime's power networks led to the transformation of the SC from a society-oriented to a state-oriented movement. The SC significantly changed its orientation

toward issues related to its political interests and achieving gains, such as participation in parliamentary elections, which was previously deemed religiously unlawful. Political participation played a major role for the SC in the political process, the drafting of the constitution, the formulation of some laws and legislations, and in shaping the country's identity. Shifts in the SC's political orientation brought about gains without any risks or repercussions, such as political crackdowns that would destroy it, its organizational structure, as well as its proliferation in society. Meanwhile, it held on to its positions on other issues, refusing change or the willingness to change with regard to core ideologies, such as its stance on freedom, women, minorities and the civil state. This could be attributed to its fear that any real assessment in this context would lead to the dissolution of the organizational structure and increase defections. The MB, by contrast, drew no red lines in discussions centered on state identity, women's participation, freedom and minority rights, instead dealing flexibly with these topics from their inception through initiatives they introduced after 1994. Nevertheless, post the January revolution, the MB continued in their quest for the state, wasting no opportunity to gain access to power.

After 25 January 2011 and the decline of Mubarak's regime, the MB's quest for power did not waver, it rather increased. Assuming the road to rule was already paved, the MB focused on power acquisition through participation in parliamentary and presidential elections. Following the collapse of the political power, MB priorities regarding the means to gain power shifted as follows:

1. The MB leaned towards forming alliances with ISMs – including Salafists – rather than with non-ISMs, causing the MB to conform to the Salafist ideology, and it

seemed as though the two movements were ideologically compatible despite their evident disparities.

2. The MB abandoned the policy of avoiding confrontation with power sources, instead giving priority to gaining power.

8.3 A Comparison with the Post Mubarak Era and the Decisive Military

Factor

The MB jostled to fill the vacuum of the collapsed power; nevertheless, it would be an exaggerated or maybe even wrong assumption that the Armed Forces actually left power in Egypt. After the 25 January revolution, there was a fundamental difference between the SCAF and MB regarding the next phases of the transitional process; the SCAF did not cease in its attempts to direct drafting of the constitution, which the MB considered a parliamentary privilege. Furthermore, the SCAF tried to keep the presidential system in the belief that it could induce and influence the next president to use his powers to protect and safeguard the interests of the Armed Forces (Sayigh, 2012a, February 9). Eventually, the precise balance of determining the civil-military relations during Morsi's presidency became unstable after a year of his rule and resulted in a military coup.

There were no paved roads to power for the ISMs, although revolutions presented Islamists with an opportunity to take part in the elections without restriction, as was the case during Mubarak's rule. They contributed to the drafting of the constitution as well as shaping the new political system. However, the military had an urgent desire to rein in the Islamists, and this became apparent through many of the actions that preceded Morsi's arrival to power.

Table 8.1: Competition between Egypt's Military and Muslim Brotherhood

Action	Action of Military	Action of MB
Supra-constitutional principles	Under military rule, an official committee under the leadership of Ali El-Selmi issued a number of "supra-constitutional principles" which gives the armed forces exceptional power. The document reveals the military's intentions to control the re-writing of the constitution.	These principles were quickly rejected by the MB.
The formation of the interim governments after the January 25 revolution	The SCAF formed and supported the Kamal Ganzouri and Essam Sharaf governments, which sought to fabricate crises and hinder parliament's legislation and formation of a national government.	The Brotherhood's FJP demanded that the SCAF dismiss the El-Ganzouri government to allow the parliamentary majority to draw up a new one. The SCAF rejected the demand.
Dissolution of the People's Assembly	The SCAF declared the dissolution of the People's Assembly officially pursuant to judgment of the Supreme Constitutional Court issued on 14 June 2012; hence, the legislative powers of the People's Assembly were transferred to the SCAF.	Morsi canceled SCAF's supplementary constitutional decree that was issued before he took office.
The Supreme Constitutional Court (SCC) dissolved the constituent assembly	The SCAF supported the decision.	The Islamist-dominated constituent assembly formed another constituent assembly.
Interim constitutional declaration	On 17 June 2012, the SCAF issued an interim constitutional declaration that gave it all legislative powers until a new parliament was elected.	Morsi revoked the interim declaration issued by the SCAF and transferred the powers the generals had assumed to the presidency.
Presidential election	The SCAF supported the nomination of former Egyptian intelligence chief and vice president Omar Suleiman and former prime minister Ahmed Shafiq to the presidency.	The MB nominated al-Shater and Morsi for presidency. The MB considered the nominations of Omar Suleiman and former prime minister Ahmed Shafiq an attempted to overturn the revolution and reconstitute the Mubarak regime.
Power struggle between the MB and the military command	The military's adamant and unprecedented desire to dominate the power networks.	Morsi ordered the retirement of the powerful head of the country's armed forces, Field Marshal Mohamad Hussein Tantawi, Chief-of-Staff General Sami Annan, and the commanders of the navy, air defence and air force.
Parliamentary oversight of the armed forces	The military fiercely resisted this prospect.	The MB called for various military industries to be placed under parliamentary oversight and added to the national treasury

Source: Chapter 6&7

Table (8.1) demonstrates the military's adamant and unprecedented desire to dominate the power networks. It was clear that the military sought to dominate political power through the following actions:

1. Drafting the constitution to target the post-25 January 2011 phase, as a means to confine the future political power, and protect the interests of the military.
2. Constraining and dwarfing the – post-25 January 2011 – parliament elect. During the transitional period, after the January revolution, the military was determined to dominate the executive power and government, which created a huge gap between the parliament, with the Islamist majority, and the military appointed governments.
3. Restricting the power of the former President Mohamed Morsi.

This determination was met with insistence from the MB to move forward toward a single-handed domination of power networks. The MB's strong desire to end military dominance and the duality of power reduced any chance of understanding or partnership between the two parties and increased the likelihood of confrontation. This is what actually happened, which concurs with the initial assumptions in this dissertation, i.e. that: “The Brotherhood remained oriented towards the state but the decline of the power networks of the old regime led to changes in the MB's strategy for gaining control over the power networks from accommodation to confrontation.” (see chapter ٤). The MB's determined orientation towards the state came at the expense of its orientation towards society, leading to the erosion of the MB's societal alliances, which decreased in scope to include Islamists only.

Notably, the MB met the military's march towards power step for step. However, its orientation towards power differed from that of before 25 January 2011. Previously, the MB avoided inciting the regime and had no desire to clash with it, working instead within available

boundaries. To avoid provoking the Mubarak regime, the MB would abandon any major steps towards power, such as running against Mubarak in the presidential elections; instead, and at times, settling for participations that most likely held the regime's implicit stamp of approval. The MB's desire to access power remained unchanged, however, and the shift came in the abandonment of the policy of avoiding confrontation with the regime.

Table (8.2) illustrates how the SC did not pursue to challenge the military or sources of social power; rather, it had two main objectives: first, the SC attempted to compete for what the MB was seeking to gain in power. Second, it aimed to impose its ideology on the constitution and legislation without confrontation, its priority being to avoid confrontation, while the MB's priority was access to power rather than impose ideology. To some degree, this fed into the military's interest, where the SC seized Islamist representation from the MB and avoided confrontation with power networks. This again coincides with the dissertation's initial assumptions, that: "The decline of the power networks of the old regime led to a change in the SC strategy for gaining control over the power networks from withdrawal from political life to accommodating or participating in politics." (see chapter 4)

This was a key disparity in the paths taken by both the MB and the SC, which were shaped according to the nature of existing power networks dominated by the military. The military was not particularly concerned with the ideological disparities of ISMs, or with those of the Egyptian political movements (in general), as both military (and state) did not have an ideology they wished to protect. Rather, it sought to preserve its vested interests and undisputed domination of the state. Within this context, the SC underwent major shifts after the revolution, powered by the knowledge of what was and was not permissible; the MB, meanwhile, did not adhere to the permissible.

Table 8.2: Transformations on the Orientation of the MB and SC Toward Egypt's Regime

Before the decline of political power		After the decline of political power	
SC	MB	SC	MB
Self-Restraint	“Self-Assertion” and “Self-Restraint	“Self-Assertion” and “Self-Restraint	“Self-Assertion”
Retire from politics completely and avoid critiquing the regime	Accepting and remaining within the spaces afforded to them by the political system, without attempting infringement.	Non-infringement of available spaces	Refusing the spaces provided by the military
Result: withdrawal	Result: accommodation	Result: accommodation	Result: confrontation

8.4 The Ideological Vacuum, and Alternative Ideologies

The decomposition of the consolidated ideology and the resulting vacuum it might create made way for competition between ideological movements, especially ISMs after the 25 January revolution, to fill the vacuum or "interstitial space" arising from the state's failure to achieve solidarity among members of society (Mann, 2006, p. 349). Within this context, the search for meaning becomes the key function of social (and particularly ideological) movements. This is where the significance of the ideological perception of crises is most apparent. For when a crisis threatens the routine functions of state institutions, social movements react to these crises differently. Michael Mann argues that crises lead to the division of institutional elites and as the depth of crisis increases, ideological movements, more than others, demonstrate scalability in providing alternatives. Moreover, they utilize the conflict to develop a system of meanings and values that extends beyond the status quo, and they maintain that they own self-proclaimed ideological perceptions capable of creating solutions to crises and problems (Mann, 2006, pp.

347-349). Thus, the MB and SC's ideological shifts are a result of shifts in the state political structures. The state's weakness in regulating collective action and anchoring the concept of citizenship, presented social movements – including ISMs – with an enormous opportunity to create an ideological framework that deems itself an alternative to the state's failed ideological framework, particularly on the subjects of citizenship, minorities and women's rights, and state identity.

Chapters 6 &7 discussed the two movements' perceptions on many issues, as well as the ideological transformations that resulted from the state's structural shifts post the 25 January revolution. The MB faced several obstacles, within the Egyptian context, regarding its shifts on certain issues. For example, the MB had for years been under a repressive regime, and the issue of equality between men and women had been at the bottom of its list of priorities. However, after the revolution of 25 January, there were other factors that influenced the political involvement of women. The patriarchal societal context did not consider the defense of women's rights a part of its standard culture. Institutional culture within the Brotherhood promoted the traditional approach regarding the study of Fiqh (Tadros, 2012a, p. 155). The social context did not encourage them to rush toward a reform path. The cultural context likewise did not encourage decisive resolution of internal disagreements on women, and many issues remained unaddressed. One in particular was that religious actors, whether Al-Azhar or most of the Salafi movements, which tended to have a very conservative agenda, failed to take steps to reform the role of women. Salafists generally had controversial views on restricting the role of women in society and politics, and after the Brotherhood's alliance with the Salafists, it did not want to cause any disagreements with them. “However, the Brotherhood prefers not to be confused with the other

Islamist factions in order to keep unaltered its reputation of being a moderate movement” (Ruta, 2012, p. 107).

Table (8.3) Illustrates the Ideological Transformation of Both the SC and MB in Some of the Issues Relating to Women, Minorities and the State Identity.

Item	The MB		The SC		
	Prior to the January 25 Revolution	Post the January 25 Revolution	Prior to the January 25 Revolution	Post the January 25 Revolution	Drivers of Change
Political Participation	Does not prohibit political participation	Does not prohibit political participation	Prohibits political participation	Permits political participation	Available political opportunity
Party Formation	Does not prohibit party formation	Does not prohibit party formation	Prohibits party formation	Permits party formation	Available political opportunity
Alliance with non-Islamist Parties	Does not prohibit alliance with non-Islamist parties	Does not prohibit alliance with non-Islamist parties	Prohibits alliance with non-Islamist parties	Prohibition lifted gradually	Alliance against the MB, such as the alliance with the National Salvation Front
Women in High Political Positions	Does not prohibit women from occupying high political positions	Does not prohibit women from occupying high political positions	Prohibits women from occupying high political positions	Prohibition sustained	Jurisprudence reasons

Women Running for Election	Does not prohibit women from running for elections	Does not prohibit women from running for elections	Prohibits women from running for elections	Permissible with limitations	Election laws forced all parties to put women in electoral lists
Alliance with Copts	Does not prohibit alliance with Copts	Does not prohibit alliance with Copts	Prohibits alliance with Copts	Prohibition sustained	Jurisprudence reasons
Copts in High Political Positions	Does not prohibit Copts from occupying high political positions	Does not prohibit Copts from occupying high political positions	Prohibits Copts from occupying high political positions	Prohibition sustained	Jurisprudence reasons
Civil State	Has flexible visions regarding the civil state	Has flexible visions regarding the civil state	Rejects the civil state	Rejects the civil state	Jurisprudence reasons

There continued to be significant differences in the transformations of the MB and SC in many cases. Table (8.۴) illustrates that the Brotherhood did not deem it unlawful for women or Copts to occupy high political positions. It discussed the civil state and citizenship more flexibly and pragmatically than the Salafis, while the SC relied on certain interpretations of religious texts and teachings of the Quran and Sunnah (Bishārah, 2012, pp.37-38). Thus the SC came up against two obstacles: first, those who disagreed with its interpretation of religious texts on the subject of "Islamic mandate"; the party was unable to gain the acceptance of the Al-Azhar institution, as well as of other Islamic movements and personalities on this matter. Second, the revolution stripped the (one-time) political and social order of its holiness, and thus revolted against it.

People were expected to determine their own destiny within the framework of a national state, even if they were to depict it religiously (Bishārah, 2012b, pp.37-38).

Within a short period of time, the SC managed to transform its religious and social capital – deeply rooted in its social, religious and charitable networks stretched across Egyptian cities and villages – into political capital that allowed it to achieve notable electoral successes. However, the transformation of the SC from a “society-oriented” to a “state-oriented” movement forced several challenges upon it. The first of these was its ability to reconcile between meeting its jurisprudence obligations and committing to the concepts of democracy and the rules of the political game whose standards it vastly deviated from. The second was “selective pragmatism”, that is, expanding the parameters of the concept of “necessity” to allow/pass what it deemed contrary to Islamic teachings, such as the elections, joining the parliament, accepting the democratic game, the formation of political parties, and the nomination of women onto its electoral lists. This expansion did not emerge as a result of ideological revisions in which these unlawful matters were now deemed lawful. On the contrary, these matters did in fact remain unlawful; however, they were permitted in the name of “necessity”, although according to the SC’s interpretation they were contradictory to Islam (El-Sherif, 2014, February 24). Third, the politicization of the SC and its transformation from a missionary religious movement (society-oriented) during Mubarak's reign into a political Islamist movement (state-oriented) post the 25 January revolution threatened its organizational unity and heightened the odds of fragmentation among its ranks. This is what actually happened in reality.

The SC was in agreement with representatives of the Coptic churches in their support for the 3 July 2013 coup. However, this did not mean that they were in agreement on motives or vision regarding the shape of the future state. Al Nour justified its participation in the constitution

amendment committee after the coup, as a means of preserving Egyptian identity, particularly Article II and Article 219. This placed it in a confrontational position with many parties, including representatives of Egyptian churches. As a result, Al Nour relinquished its determination to retain Article 219. This relinquishment was not the result of a new ideological stance on the identity of the state as much as a way of preserving political interests and avoiding a clash with the existing regime. This is consistent with the study hypothesis that the transformation of power networks affected the orientations of the SC, ultimately leading it to give precedence to non-confrontation over its beliefs and ideologies.

In its jurisprudential justifications regarding its pro-coup position and approving the abolition of Article 219, the Al-Nour Party relied on the concepts of "permissibility of eating dead meat" and the "tyrannical ruler." Two concepts that are linked to social control and dominance relationships, and reflect the prevailing religious culture within the party, a culture that gives precedence to status quo maintaining factors and provides the political power with support. Following the coup and the resulting political seclusion, the party's ideology became one that focused on legitimizing the rule of the strong and all they decree, and within this context came their relinquishment of Article 219.

8.5 The Economic Factor was not Decisive

Some writers argue that part of the victory of the MB in the first parliamentary elections after Mubarak's fall was not because of ideology; the ideological factor matters little. In Tarek Masoud's book (2014) entitled "Counting Islam: Religion, Class, and Elections in Egypt", he argued that the relative underdevelopment of the Egyptian economy was one of the important factors due to which the Brotherhood was able to reach the poor classes while the left failed to do so (pp.xiii-xiv). Masoud argues that the Brotherhood began as a movement formed from the

educated middle classes that succeeded in establishing economic platforms and penetrating the middle-class lines; however, it faced great difficulty in attracting the more affluent voters. As a result, the Brotherhood achieved a series of victories during the Mubarak era, while its secular and leftist counterparts failed. The electoral successes of the Islamist parties before and after the 25 January revolution does not mean that economic issues were somehow less prominent than ideological issues. Support for the MB in the first parliamentary elections in Egypt after Mubarak's ouster was not due to the MB's position on the application of Islamic Sharia, but because voters believed that the Brotherhood would continue the economic policies for the benefit of the poor, since the development of the economy was its top priority. After the 25 January revolution, it sought to achieve tangible social and economic progress. The Brotherhood did not antagonize old business elites; on the contrary, they tried to win these old economic elites as partners in the transformation process through the establishment and expansion of networks with the business sector and their approach in dealing with the corruption during Mubarak's era.

The most prominent economic challenges to the rule of Morsi were, first, to restore growth momentum and market confidence to bring investors back to practice their business as usual; second, to produce fast, tangible economic achievements for citizens; third, to deal with the military economy; and finally, to attempt to penetrate economic networks that had been established for decades. This thesis argues that, since 25 January 2011, the MB sought to enlarge its access to political and economic networks, but the Egyptian military weakened the MB's dominance over the political and economic networks.

The MB attempted to resolve economic problems in Egypt by coupling the Islamic outlook with modern international economic mechanisms, suggesting the use of the Islamic Sukuk (instruments) as a means to revive the economy. At the same time, it proceeded to borrow

funds from the IMF so as to create an investment-conducive environment. The MB's economic policies were not bound by preset ideologies or certain religious determinants, as was the case with the SC; rather, they were focused first and foremost on reviving the economy. The MB felt that bringing about economic development would be a key factor towards gaining the public's trust and retaining its own popularity, as well as scoring high and favorable votes that would facilitate its ascension to power. It believed that backing the economy, and services, would ensure it winning in various electoral rounds.

Following the revolution of 25 January, the Brotherhood dealt with economic networks carefully, heavily relying on the economic factor to consolidate their power and gain increasing confidence across large sectors of Egyptian society. However, given the short period of time and the obstacles they endured, they were not able to achieve tangible economic development for the people. The same applies to the SC.

8.6 Power Networks Shifts and their Impact on the Internal Structure of the

Two Movements

Undoubtedly, a correlation exists between the ideological shifts and rifts within the ISM organizations and how they affect their choices and orientations. In the case of the MB, during Mubarak's rule, there were shifts in their organizational structure that were centered on the growing influence of conservatives at the expense of reformers. Prior to 1996, the MB did not experience any notable rifts within its ranks. The middle-generation leaders or reformers played an integral role in building strategic alliances with liberals, secularists, and nationalists in order to avoid being denied participation by the regime. This period therefore witnessed many successes in qualitative alliances with non-Islamist movements. These alliances aided the MB in winning some syndicate and parliamentary seats during Mubarak's reign. Reformists paved the way for

openness towards other parties and led political initiatives that reflected the MB's social and political views on various issues. At the forefront, initiatives called for political and constitutional reform, political empowerment of women, and backing democratic systems and fair elections. For many Egyptian parties, reformists offered an acceptable ideological front (reform initiative in 2004, the electoral program in 2005, and the draft party program in 2007).

Conversely, post 1996, conservatives began to slowly dominate the MB's decisions. The organization dominated by conservatives (at the expense of reformists) is the same one that led the MB after the revolution. Conservatives did not grasp the diversities within the MB; instead they drove out reformers and the MB's youth wing. The marginalization of reformers and youth led to an imbalance in alliances with all concerned parties, particularly non-Islamists. Following the January 25 revolution, MB conservatives put alliances with ISMs at the top of their priorities.

Conservative dominance and the marginalization of reformists and youth within the MB created a state of dissatisfaction inside the movement. Perhaps it was the experience of leaders who defected from the MB in 1996, forming the Wasat party (such as Abou el Ela Madi and Essam Sultan), that discouraged similar defections during the Mubarak regime on account of the prohibitions imposed by it on the Wasat Party and the successive arrests of its leaders. Conversely, after 25 January 2011, the chances of defection increased due to conservative dominance within the MB, the available political opportunity, and the elimination of the regime's extortions.

Conservative dominance played a key role in the ideological transformations of the MB, the most notable being its inclination to ally with the SC on account of other Islamic parties, which led to the divisions in Egyptian parties.

With regard to the SC, it did not record any notable cases of defection prior to Mubarak's fall, when it was “society-orientated.” As an organization, it remained cohesive and expanded steadily; however, following the fall of Mubarak, internal splits were rife. Among the key causes of defection was the SC's shift in orientation, from society to state, which in turn resulted in the following three issues: first, the SC's competition with the MB; many of the SC's leaders who considered the MB as potential allies did not welcome this competition. Second, the pragmatic orientations adopted by the SC towards achieving political gain, without any real ideological transformation toward many issues, such as freedom, democracy, citizenship and the civil state. Third, its position on the military coup 3 July 2013 led many Salafist leaders to forgo politics and criticize the SC (see chapter 7).

8.7 Conclusions and Future Research

This thesis sheds light on an important historical juncture – that is the 2011 uprisings, the transformations that took place within Mubarak's regime, and the resulting change in the orientation of the Muslim Brotherhood and Salafist Call towards state and society. Without a doubt, this has contributed to the ideological transformation in the two movements. The Muslim Brotherhood came to power, after a period of more than 88 years, and is now in opposition. Meanwhile, the decline of Mubarak's regime led to a change in the Salafist Call from a society-oriented to a state-oriented movement.

The 2011 uprisings were not only a result of the regime's power network transformations but also of the transformations in economic, military, and political relationships. The Egyptian military did not decline during the time of Mubarak; instead, its economic power grew, and it was not directly involved in the crisis threatening the country. When the Mubarak regime collapsed, it was the strongest and most capable power, able to take over during the interim period after the

revolution. It was in fact the main driver of the new political system. Although it had a historic opportunity, which would have won it independence and privileges under an elected civilian regime, it wanted to maintain full control of the governing of Egypt.

Throughout the Mubarak's' regime, the Muslim Brotherhood was either suppressed or it operated within a margin allowed by said regimes. In order to adapt to its conditions, the Muslim Brotherhood embraced perceptions that would enable it to exist, and impact on the state and society, as much as possible. The Muslim Brotherhood succeeded in drawing a fine line between enhancing its political profile on the one hand and ensuring it was not a threat to Mubarak's regime on the other. The Muslim Brotherhood took progressive steps to be integrated into the existing political order but at the same time it was anxious not to take a risk so as not to threaten its survival or pose a serious threat to Mubarak's regime.

After 25 January 2011, the Muslim Brotherhood found itself in the unfortunate position, as Morsi's access to power on 30 June 2012 was a turning point in the course of the Muslim Brotherhood since its foundation eight decades earlier. Practically, Morsi did not enjoy competence enabling him to be a real president, and tension prevailed between Morsi and the State's institutions that refused to cooperate with him, especially the military and the judiciary; moreover, the old centers of power sought to impede the Muslim Brotherhood's access to power.

The MB assumed that Mubarak's collapse would afford them a tactical position to seize power better than that which existed during his reign. For during that time, the MB battled from the periphery, through syndicates and associations. The collapse of Mubarak provided the MB with space to maneuver, in the parliament, the Constitution Drafting Committee, and the presidency, enticing the MB to believe it was in a position to overthrow other power sources like

the military. This explains the MB's shift from its non-confrontational position, during the Mubarak regime, to refusing to bow down to the system following his collapse.

Prior to 1996, the Muslim Brotherhood did not experience any notable rifts within its ranks. The middle-generation leaders or reformers played an integral role in building strategic alliances with liberals, secularists, and nationalists in order to avoid being denied participation by the regime. The reformists within the Muslim Brotherhood became stronger during the period of political openness and drew back during the period of repression and oppression, when the main goal was the organization's survival. Conversely, post 1996, conservatives began to slowly dominate the Muslim Brotherhood's decisions. The organization dominated by conservatives (at the expense of reformists) is the same one that led the Muslim Brotherhood after 25 January 2011.

After 25 January 2011, and along with the political openness, some problems resurfaced, as the Muslim Brotherhood organization was not able to absorb many "reformists" and youth categories within it; hence, splits followed in quick succession. This indicates that the political openness affected the central authority of the organization, which was unable to dominate on the one hand and to absorb the various orientations inside the Muslim Brotherhood on the other. The central leadership of the Muslim Brotherhood preferred to keep the internal consistency of the organization than to absorb diverse reformist and youth movements;

The growing influence of conservatives at the expense of reformers came at the cost of its relationship with parties, non-religious orientated forces, and youth movements. The Muslim Brotherhood's position toward its alliance with the social movements was different. After 25 January 2011, allying with the Salafi, the Muslim Brotherhood chose to take a different course, as the MB gave priority to its alliance with the Salafis despite the Salafi Al-Nour Party criticizing

and accusing it of giving major positions to Muslim Brotherhood members. The Muslim Brotherhood adhered to its alliance with Salafis to gain the support of the Salafi public mass, as they had the ability of mobilizing. Such rapprochement seemed to be ideological rapprochement at the cost of the reformist discourse that the Muslim Brotherhood called for before 25 January 2011 in several documents issued in 1994, 2004 and 2007.

As for the Muslim Brotherhood, issues such as civil rights, religious and political pluralism, and rights of women and minorities were to be theorized within the framework of Islamic *marja'iyya*, in other words, in compliance with Islamic law. The Muslim Brotherhood also tried to prove that there was a kind of convergence between the democracy and civil concepts with Islamic concepts; additionally, after 25 January 2011, the Muslim Brotherhood's historic motto "Islam is the solution" disappeared from its programs and discourses. The Muslim Brotherhood intended to politicize Islam by turning it into a modern national doctrine.

During Mubarak's rule, the Salafist Call considered society as the object of change. Focusing its efforts on teaching citizens religious worship sacraments. It measured its success by its ability to redefine and transform the inner landscape to focus on society rather than having direct influence on political power. A movement that was deeply concerned with everyday life, it utilized both modern and traditional communication networks to spread its ideologies. It strived to disassociate itself from the political system by retreating into its sanctuary and private space.

The fall of Mubarak has led to an ideological transformation in the Salafist Call, which found an opportunity to influence society through the state without entering into any confrontation. The focus was on the state identity, while the conflict on the constitution was the crutch the Salafist Call used to justify its transformation. This afforded the Salafist Call an

opportunity to define the state's identity, the political system, and the way of living and moral law. At the same time, the Salafist Call continued to avoid conflict with the other power networks and remained cautious in its dealings with the military and the deep state. It did not seek entry in state institutions as much as focused on obtaining the largest number of seats in parliament, which would enable it to influence the shape of the future state and play an active role in the drafting of the new constitution in line with its ideology. Also, it would be able to compete with the Muslim Brotherhood and would prevent it from taking control of the state. Transformation in the power networks led to the politicization of the Salafist Call, creating disagreements within the movement, which later led to qualitative splits.

The Salafist Call movement fluctuated in its alliances. For instance, after 25 January 2011, it entered into alliance with the Salafists in order to cooperate on the drafting of the constitution. And with the increased objections against Morsi, it teamed up with the military and the Muslim Brotherhood's opponents, supporting the 3 July 2013 coup d'état. What seems interesting is that the Islamic texts used to justify the rapid shift of positions are readily available. The Salafist Call disregarded its ideology in favor of political interests. The political positions of the Salafist Call have been associated with its organizational interests; religious justifications have been made accordingly, and not vice versa.

Despite being influenced by the political shifts in Egypt, the SC held steadfastly to its guiding principle of protecting its interests and avoiding any and all harm, at all costs and under any circumstances. Having impacted its discourse to some extent, the shifts never affected its ideological component as it did the political component. The present study demonstrates that the SC rigidly adhered to absolute interpretations of religious texts, unbending and unheeding of the ideas of others, particularly in matters of culture and values, it also rigidly adhered to its own

concepts of citizenship and equality – both between men and women, and Muslims and non-Muslims.

Arab revolutions were extremely significant, as a moment in history when ISMs came to power, in affording researchers and academics the means to study ISMs from different angles and re-examine a great deal of prevalent theories on the topic. The counter-revolutions in Egypt, Yemen, and Syria are just as important to study, whether for Islamists, researchers, academics, or specialists. This dissertation paved the way for future investigation and exploration in some fields, particularly in the following three key areas:

First: a study of the MB post the military coup. This leads to a number of questions regarding the military coup's impact on the MB, namely: how has it affected, and will further affect, the MB's internal structure? Will the Brotherhood be able to maintain structural cohesiveness? Or could defections occur, especially following the differences that surfaced among leadership ranks regarding the management of the current and next phases? Will the MB maintain the peaceful stance it adopted during the anti-coup, or might it be forced to adopt a policy of "armed violence"? How was the MB's relationship with the "sources of social power" shaped following the coup? What is the nature of its current and future relationship with Islamic and non-Islamic movements?

Second: an examination of the Salafis in general and the SC in particular, post the military coup. Many prominent leaders in the SC called for the renunciation of political work and the return to *da`wa* and society; will the SC maintain its state-orientation? How were the relationships between the SC and other Salafi movements shaped post the military coup? How was the SC's relationship with the "sources of social power" shaped, especially following the marginalization it

endured post military coup? How does this affect its popularity and proliferation in Egyptian society?

Third: rivalry between Islamists and its impact on their ideologies. The thesis confirms the existence of an intense rivalry between the MB and SC regarding the representation of Islamists and the access to power. This competition impacted the political choices of both movements, for example, when the MB presented Khairat El-Shater, the deputy chairman of the Brotherhood, to be its initial presidential candidate. El-Shater represented a centre of gravity as well as great organizational and controlling power; he also regulated the Brotherhood's organization through intersecting networks of regional, family, and financing loyalties (El Sherif, 2012, April 13). There were many reasons behind the proposal of Khairat El-Shater as a candidate; it reflected real tension and escalation because of worsening negotiations between the MB and SCAF (El Sherif, 2012, April 13), in addition to another internal reason belonging to the MB itself, i.e. the coherence of its internal organization, the sanctum sanctorum of the MB. Hence, the decision for El-Shater's candidacy emerged because of the desire to continue the monopoly of domination over political Islam. The presidential election battle threatened the MB with losing its historical domination over the moderate Islamic political movement in favor of other Islamic independent activities on the right and left of the MB (Brooke, 2013, pp. 29-30). This organization was exposed to a real test in the shape of Abdel Moneim Abul Fotouh and Hazem Salah Abu Ismail; consequently, various sections inside the MB began to be prejudiced for the two Islamist presidential candidates, regardless of the Brotherhood's decision. Those who were more liberal tended toward Aboul Fotouh, and those who were more conservative toward Abu Ismail. The third reason was the pressure of the Salafi movement. Mahmoud Hussein, Secretary-General of the MB, said that the Salafi movement had pressed hard to present El-Shater in particular; this

may explain why the Salafi movement did not support Morsi after the High Committee supervising the elections disqualified El-Shater (2015, January 6). This poses a question regarding rivalry between Islamic social movements, the various forms it took, and its impact on the ideologies and strategic options of Islamic movements.

Fourth: utilizing Mann's theory in an analysis of the current situation in Egypt, particularly after the military's rise to power, and analysis of the relationship dynamics between power networks. Based on this, scenarios that explore the transitions in Egypt could be projected.

DEUTSCHE ZUSAMMENFASSUNG

Revolutionen bieten außergewöhnliche Möglichkeiten für Wissen, denn aus ihnen erwächst die einmalige Chance, Machtverhältnisse, Gesellschaften und soziale Bewegungen zu betrachten und Veränderungen sowie deren Ursachen zu analysieren. Revolutionen hinterfragen somit die vorherrschende Produktion von Wissen und schaffen Alternativen dazu. Die Aufstände, die am 17. Dezember 2010 in Tunesien ihren Anfang nahmen und dort und in Ägypten, Libyen und Jemen Diktaturen stürzten, waren repräsentativ für große Krisen, die basisdemokratische Veränderungen erforderlich machten. Die islamischen Bewegungen spielten in den arabischen Aufständen und der Zeit danach eine entscheidende Rolle. Dies hat das Interesse an islamischen sozialen Bewegungen (ISMs) und an den Auswirkungen der sechs Jahre nach dem arabischen Frühling auf deren Ideologie gesteigert.

Die vorliegende Studie zielt darauf ab, die Wirkung des Machtnetzwerks des Regimes auf die ideologische Transformation der islamischen sozialen Bewegungen in Ägypten zu erforschen und zu untersuchen. Die Argumente in dieser Arbeit zielen darauf ab, dass die politische Struktur diesen Wandel nur teilweise erklären kann und dass einseitige Erklärungen für dessen Auslegung nicht ausreichend sind. Die Arbeit erweitert den analytischen Rahmen und ergänzt ihn, um auch ideologische, ökonomische, militärische und politische Netzwerke erfassen zu können. Nach Michael Manns Theorie der sozialen Macht konzentriert sich jedes dieser Netzwerke auf eine andere Art von Organisation und sozialer Kontrolle (Mann, 1986a, S. 3). Manns theoretischer Rahmen ermöglicht die Herausstellung einiger der miteinander verbundenen Netzwerke, die zum Wandel innerhalb des ägyptischen Regimes beigetragen haben sowie das Verständnis der Transformationen in den Machtstrukturen des Regimes, die zu den Aufständen im Jahr 2011 führten. Darüber hinaus wird in der Arbeit dargelegt, wie diese Transformationen die Basis der ideologischen Wandlung der islamischen sozialen Bewegungen in Ägypten bildeten. Neben Manns Theorie wird diese Arbeit die Typologie islamischer sozialer Bewegungen (2003) von Hakan Yavuz verwenden, um die Machtstruktur des Regimes und die ideologische Transformation der

islamischen sozialen Bewegungen miteinander zu verknüpfen. Yavuz entwickelte eine Typologie der islamischen sozialen Bewegungen, um zu erklären, warum einige islamistische Bewegungen gesellschaftszentriert oder staatszentriert ausgerichtet sind.

Diese Kombination zwischen der Theorie von Mann und der Typologie von Yavuz hat zur Formulierung der Hypothesen in der vorliegenden Arbeit beigetragen, Durch die Aufhebung der Grenzen der "Aufnahme-Moderation-Hypothese" erklärt diese Arbeit, dass der Wandel der ISMs nicht aus wechselnden politische Möglichkeiten allein resultiert. Die ideologische Transformation der ISMs ist vielmehr Produkt von und Reaktion auf Veränderungen in den Wechselbeziehungen zwischen den Machtstrukturen des Regimes (ideologische, ökonomische, militärische und politische). Dieses kombinierte Modell erklärt den Strukturwandel, unter dem die islamischen Bewegungen einer Verschiebung von gesellschaftlichen zu staatsorientierten Bewegungen oder umgekehrt unterworfen sind.

Die Arbeit vergleicht die Muslim-Bruderschaft (MB) und den Salafistischen Ruf (SC) mit Hilfe von Cross-Case-Analysetechniken einschließlich Case-Ordered-Effekte und kausaler Netzwerke. Es wird die Zeitspanne zwischen 1981 und 2013 betrachtet, die durch die Herrschaft von Hosni Mubarak geprägt wurde, bis hin zur Absetzung des islamistischen Präsidenten Mohamed Morsi am 3. Juli 2013. Diese Zeitperiode ist angemessen, um einen objektiven Überblick über die Transformation der Machtstrukturen des Regimes zu geben, die die Aufstände von 2011 verursacht hat, die wiederum eine politische Chance für islamische Bewegungen erschlossen haben. Die wichtigste Frage in dieser Analyse bezieht sich darauf, wie Veränderungen innerhalb der Machtstrukturen des Regimes die ideologische Transformation der islamischen Bewegungen in Ägypten beeinflusst haben. Das Ziel des Vergleichs zwischen MB und SC ist, Unterschiede und Gemeinsamkeiten zu erkennen und die Faktoren dahinter zu verstehen.

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