Nationalism versus multilateralism: International Society 2.0 and the diffusion of power in complexity - Europe and NE Asia in a world of issues

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Moreover, my “practical” experience as a European diplomat in China and Korea contributed to reconcile academic analysis and international relations practice. Practice benefits from academic depth but also nourishes the scepticism of ‘one size fits all’ theories. A Chinese scholar Zhao Xihu (Southern Song, active circa 1195 to circa 1242) has expressed it more poetically: ‘One’s mind should contain thousands of books. One’s eyes should have read hundreds of great books and scriptures of previous ages and generations. And the wheels and footprints of one’s wagon and horse should have been to half of the entire world. Only then, one can pick up his brush.’ Later during the Ming dynasty rephrased by Dong Qichang (1555-1636) into ‘travelling thousands of kilometres and reading thousands of books’ address the importance of experience and study to understand ‘how the world works’ before one starts writing one’s own books. That is what I set out to do and that is why I waited more than twenty years after my Masters degree to do a doctorate.
Nationalism versus multilateralism: International Society 2.0 and the diffusion of power in complexity

Europe and NE Asia in a world of issues

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**Bibliography**
List of acronyms

ADB Asian Development Bank
ADIZ Air Defence Identification Zone
AIIB Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank
AMRO ASEAN Macro-economic Research Office
APEC Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation
ASEAN Association of South East Asian Nations
AU African Union
BAU Business as usual
BRI Belt and Road Initiative (Chinese initiative also known as OBOR)
BRICS Brazil Russia India China South Africa
BWI Bretton Woods Institutions
CBM Confidence Building Measures
CCP China Communist Party
CMI Chiang Mai Initiative
CMIM Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralization
COP Conference of Parties
DPJ Democratic Party of Japan
DPRK Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
EC European Commission
ECB European Central Bank
ECJ European Court of Justice
ECSC European Coal and Steel Community
EEZ Exclusive Economic Zone
EFSM European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism
EMU Economic and Monetary Union
EP European Parliament
EPA Economic Partnership Agreement
ESM European Stability Mechanism
ESS European Security Strategy
ETS Emissions Trading System
FM Foreign Minister
FSB Financial Stability Board
FTA Free Trade Agreement
GATT General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GDP Gross Domestic Product
GGGI Global Green Growth Institute (Seoul)
GHG Green House Gases
GSOMIA General Security of Military Information Agreement
IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency
ICAO International Civil Aviation Organisation
ICC International Criminal Court
ICG International Crisis Group
IL International Law (as field of study)
IMF International Monetary Fund
INDP Intended Nationally Determined Contribution
IO International Organisation
IPCC International Panel on Climate Change
IR International Relations (as field of study)
KORUS FTA Korea US Free Trade Agreement
KP Kyoto Protocol
MEF Major Economies Forum on Energy Security and Climate Change
MEM Major Emitters Meeting
MRV Measuring, Reporting and Verification
NAFTA North American Free Trade Area
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NDB New Development Bank (‘BRICS Bank’)
NE Asia North East Asia
NLL Northern Limit Line
NPT Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
NSA Non State Actors
OBOR One Belt One Road (Chinese initiative also known as BRI)
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OSCE Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PM Prime Minister
PRC People’s Republic of China
ROK Republic of Korea
TCS Trilateral Cooperation Secretariat
TEMME Tripartite Environment Ministers’ Meeting
TFEU Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
TTIP Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership
TPP Trans-Pacific Partnership
UK United Kingdom
UN United Nations
UNEP United Nations Environment Programme
UNESCAP United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific
UNFCCC United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
UNGA United Nations General Assembly
UNHRC United Nations Human Rights Council
UNSC United Nations Security Council
WB World Bank
WIPO World Intellectual Property Organisation
WTO World Trade Organisation
WW I First World War
WW II Second World War
International Society 2.0 Nationalism versus multilateralism in a world of complexity

Europe and NE Asia in a world of issues

‘The greatness of the idea of European integration on democratic foundations is its capacity to overcome the old Herderian idea of the nation state as the highest expression of national life’ (Vaclav Havel quoted in Pinker 2011:258)

‘Assemble congress after congress, multiply treaties, conventions, arrangements and all that you will do will end only in war... In all reunions of peoples, you must have common institutions, an organization.’ (Comte de Saint-Simon (1760-1825) quoted in Mazower (2012:96).

‘Mankind has only one earth, and it is home to all countries. Common development, which is the very foundation of sustainable development, serves the long-term and fundamental interests of all the people in the world. As members of the same global village, we should foster a sense of community of common destiny, follow the trend of the times, keep to the right direction, stick together in time of difficulty and ensure that development in Asia and the rest of the world reaches new highs.’ (Chinese President Xi Jinping addressing the BoAu Forum in 2013)

Introduction

The EU and NE Asia can both be considered success stories of the late twentieth/early twenty-first centuries. The ‘miracle’ of European integration, rewarded with the Nobel Peace Prize and forming the biggest economic bloc in the world, stands next to the ‘Asian miracle’, the most dynamic economic region in the world over decades that has propelled hundreds of millions from ‘rags to riches’. But in science there are no ‘miracles’. We must look for explanations. In both regions order is starkly different: Europe, peacefully integrated, working as a (often squabbling) team, its success stemming from constitutionalised multilateralism (European integration). NE Asia, conflicted, hardly integrated, countries competing with each other, its success stemming from nationalism (development state). Yet, before the 19th century it was the other way around – Europe was conflicted while NE Asians lived in a peaceful and stable international society – the ‘Confucian’ international society until both of them clashed in the age of imperialism. How to

explain these paradoxical evolutions?

The contrast in the EU’s and North East Asia’s respective pathways over the *longue durée* challenges the prevailing paradigmatic (often euro-centric or US-centric) one-size-fits-all approaches such as realism, but also liberal globalism and regionalism. Realism too easily predicts conflict in NE Asia and even in Europe and has no explanation for the security community or regionalist phenomena like the EU or the past Confucian world in East Asia. Liberalism, especially globalism too easily contests the relevance of states and through its focus on universal and instrumental rationality and individual (cosmopolitan) agency has difficulties coming to grips with politics of nationalism, emotions and value diversity. ‘New’ Regionalism is searching for elusive regions while the ‘Old’ Regionalism focussed too much on the specific example of the EU and is itself venturing into more interdisciplinary approaches, but regionalism on its own offers few clues to explain the ‘conflicted regionness’ of NE Asia today. A new analytical concept is needed to make sense of Europe’s and NE Asia’s paradoxical pathways. These pathways lead us back to critical junctures in a distant past when – in contrast to today – it was NE Asia that was a tightly knit, peaceful, culturally and politically integrated community while Europe was defining itself through conflict.

This thesis is examining this puzzle as a process of international society development, investigating the contrasting logics of multilateralism and nationalism in international relations in a world that seems increasingly competitive, complex and chaotic. To understand how these two principles shape international society I analyse and compare these two globally important, very different and very successful regions, Europe and NE Asia. Each has long and strong traditions of civilisation and statehood. Europe has transformed statehood through integration and created a new international legal order (the European way of international law). The EU’s multilateralist security community has replaced the old balance of power system. Deep regional economic and political integration has made ‘Team Europe’ a major collective player in globalisation, but its multilateral constitution has been under threat after the sovereign debt crisis wrecked havoc across the EU, followed by bitter feuds over migration and refugee policy and the UK referendum on leaving the EU (Brexit) in June 2016.

The NE Asia region stands in almost total contrast to the European Union: no integration project, an only fledgling and institutionally speaking weak process of trilateral cooperation, one country – North Korea (DPRK) - completely marginalised, but aggressively pursuing a nuclear missile programme that could spark a nuclear arms race in the region. Nationalism pervades political life and consequently there is no product of regionalism apart from loose association with or membership in larger regional organisations (APEC, ASEAN, EAS etc.) and a very limited functional trilateral cooperation. Perplexingly, at the beginning of the 21st century, countries locked in nationalistic disputes about insignificant islets, about schoolbooks and even menus at state banquets exchange recriminations about the past, while they form the dynamic centre of...
today’s global economy. Prospects for regional community formation look faltering and unpredictable (Jo 2012) if not outright implausible even if some of those disputes have calmed down. At the same time these two regions – alongside others – are getting along well with each other and have steadily deepened their political and economic ties. Both the EU and North East Asian countries are active shapers of global governance.

This paradoxical situation of nationalist NE Asia and its co-existence on the global stage with multilateralist, integrated Europe, raises a series of questions on fundamental issues in IR – that one-size-fits-all theories cannot capture. I will show that socialisation into an international society and the evolution of norms and institutions is a complex – and long-process that opens a Pandora’s box of debates. These debates concern essential concepts such as the role of the state, of sovereignty, of power, of interdependence, of conditions for international cooperation, of community building or integration, of regional order and hierarchy in international relations. The contrast between the EU and NE Asia is also a challenge to students of regionalism who grapple with similar quests: state, institutional architecture, inter-dependence (Murray 2010:310). This is in particular so, as globalisation and emerging global governance, such as the G20 or the UNFCCC where we find the key players of both regions engaged, have created a new context. Finally, this contrast also prompts the question whether there could be a contest over the future of global governance: Will nationalism with at best functional multilateralism as in NE Asia or EU-type multilateralist constitutionalisation determine the forms of global governance (or a future world society)? Or could there be radical alternatives such as a revived Confucian order in Asia?

Will the Western liberal order survive the rise of nationalist powers, like China, Korea and others? Will the EU continue to shape multilateral global governance or be marginalised in a new world order of competing nationalism?

Nationalism and multilateralism are considered here as ideological institutions of international society that have largely been determining the other institutions and the organisation of international society and order since the 19th century (assuming with Saint-Simon that all “reunions of peoples” are aiming at order in international society). But it is not an either-or distinction; in the global International Society 2.0 in which ‘nationalist’ NE Asia and ‘multilateralist’ Europe co-exist and are densely interrelated both principles are seen as competing, but co-existing and not antagonistic as they both build on a society of nation states that shares constitutive institutions like sovereignty, international law and the market economy. This co-existence of two principles then clearly has consequences for global governance in which both regions play major roles for instance in global economic governance or the global response to climate change. The question is if in a logic of agonism (Mouffe 2010) these two principles can be made to work for global order beyond a logic of polarity.

There are important political centres of resistance to traditional international society such as ISIL/Daesh but paradoxically they also claim statehood based on ancient or imagined traditions.
My analytical concept of today's International Society 2.0 is rooted in and develops further the traditional, part realist, part liberal, part constructivist approach of the English School of an anarchic international society which I refer to as International Society Mark I. Building on this larger concept, this thesis proposes new ways to conceive of International Society 2.0: First, it is no longer built on anarchy as merely the absence of higher authority, but on an anarchy conceived of as complexity. Second, power as authority and capability to get desired outcomes is not its defining principle – I argue that power is diffusing in complexity in several ways. Third, complexity and chaos dynamics affect international society both in how it works and how it changes (institutions). Fourth, the thesis is proposing a new classification of institutions of international society and fifth it examines how the two arguably most successful regions – Europe and NE Asia embodying the two competing principles of multilateralism and nationalism in global governance – are shaping and are being shaped by International Society 2.0.

The novelty of my approach lies in conceiving of nationalism and multilateralism as (competing but compatible) moral beliefs and principles of order in international society, forming contrasting (agonistic) ideological institutions. These beliefs have become organising principles of international society by shaping constitutive institutions such as sovereignty, international law and the economy and by influencing role and power relationships between states. Nationalism and multilateralism like other ideological institutions before (such as colonialism/imperialism or Confucianism) or potential ones (such as cosmopolitanism) - are also closely entwined with different concepts of anarchy and hierarchy that need to be elucidated. I am taking the English School's approach beyond its euro-centrism and beyond the division of the 'West and the rest' (Suzuki e.a. 2014). I take on the historical complexities that show other international society norms than just European or liberal internationalist ones and open up a newly researched discussion over cross-civilisational and cross-regional interdependence and complexity. I believe it is important not to take these beliefs for granted and static, but to understand their evolution. Researching how these ideological beliefs change is a second novelty of my approach to international society: how was Confucianism replaced by nationalism in NE Asia and nationalism by multilateralism in Europe?

The English School and the intellectual baggage that comes with it (Bellamy 2005; Suzuki e.a. 2014) is not the only way to use the term international society as it can be found in policy-makers' statements today as well as in centuries past (Mazower 2012: 72, 95). The concept of international society is often used in a more or less similar meaning by policy makers when they refer to the 'international community' (Dunne 2005: 65). The term international society occurs frequently in policy documents and has thus the advantage of being intuitively understood outside academic framework debates. The EU's Security Strategy (ESS) of 2003 for instance used the term 'international society' normatively: 'In a world of global threats, global markets and global media, our security and prosperity increasingly depend on an effective multilateral system. The development of a stronger international society, well functioning international institutions and a rule-based international order is our objective'. And: 'The quality of international society

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4 I would just for the sake of curiosity point out that what is known in English as the League of Nations was known in French as the Société des Nations (Society of Nations) whilst in German it was the Völkerbund (Federation of peoples). The names already reveal very different concepts then, but at least in French the notion of an international society was clear.
depends on the quality of the governments that are its foundation. The best protection for our security is a world of well-governed democratic states. Spreading good governance, supporting social and political reform, dealing with corruption and abuse of power, establishing the rule of law and protecting human rights are the best means of strengthening the international order.' This second – cosmopolitaniast - sentence hints at the basic problem of commonality of values and norms as it postulates certain domestic norms rather than just norms for ‘good’ international behaviour and the legitimacy of international institutions. In such usage, however, the concept of international society is strongly normative – and contested, perhaps closer to what is usually implied by "international community". Haass (2013) even argues that there is no "international community" for lack of any mechanism for the world to come together. The ESS and Haass – representing policy makers and analysts - are thus taking up one of the key problems of the international society approach – how to come to terms with (or even define) commonality and solve differences (or draw boundaries) in international society. The EU and NE Asia are great starting points for addressing this problem as they are so different, yet there are elements of cross-over commonality between NE Asia's past and Europe today and vice versa between Europe's past and NE Asia today.

International Society 2.0 is not easily compatible with system-focused theories. Using the word ‘society’ rather than ‘system’ intuitively speaks to the need to account for the complexity of human organisation and the need to factor in emotions and contradictions or more broadly politics. This is different from the assumptions of rational system-logic in which actors often seem reduced to 'programmed robots'. Perhaps it needed the election of D. Trump to demonstrate to structuralist US scholars the simple lesson from Quentin Tarantino's 'Pulp Fiction': personality goes a long way – even in shaping international relations. I introduce moralisation gaps, critical junctures and historical pathways as explanatory variables into this analysis of transformations in international society. In particular different long-term regional dynamics are becoming more visible in this way. In some areas (like the EU) sovereignty and international law are in transition from national to multilateral. On a farther horizon even the contours of a cosmopolitan world society could be discerned. In International Society 2.0 – paradoxically - sovereignty and international law co-exist in two versions – the nationalist 'Westphalian' one of NE Asia (and in much of the rest of the world including the US which is an important player in NE Asia) and the multilateralist, 'syndicated' one of the EU. And there are international organisations and regimes somewhere in between with features derived from both principles (for instance WTO with dispute settlement mechanisms have supranational character).

International Society Mark I was based on the premise that states can co-operate despite anarchy by committing to explicit or implicit rules, international institutions and limited forms of co-operation such as rules for the use of violence, balance of power, diplomacy and respect for property rights/territorial integrity. International Society 2.0 is still built on key institutions like sovereignty and international law, but no longer mainly on the exercise of state monopolies on violence, the balance of power or a fight for survival in an anarchy of power relations. Instead it is premised on dealing with an environment of complex anarchy, with a globalised market economy

Note Song N. (2012:177): “it is almost impossible to see the pre-modern order in East Asia as a system, either in terms of discourse or level of practice.”
and with shifting power dynamics and relationships among a multitude of states and non-state actors (NSA) that call into question the existing rigid state-based multilateral structures with Western values at its core. Whereas traditionally international society was defined as an ‘anarchic society’ simply because of the absence of a higher authority, I re-define the meaning of anarchy as one characterised by the presence of complexity and chaos. This opens up new avenues to theorise about international society and hierarchy in IR as well as about the role of the economy, global risk and global governance in international society and what their non-linear, deterministic and unstable network characteristics mean for international society’s development.

International society is evolving unevenly. That should not be astonishing in an age of transition and uncertainty. The vigorous re-assertion of nationalist great power politics – or the return of geo-politics - can raise its ugly head (like Russia’s annexation of Crimea in March 2014 or the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 or North Korea's vigorous pursuit of its nuclear programme), but it does so in an environment that probes and measures such policies against high standards of international law, legitimacy, stability and peaceful order. Characteristically, the almost immediate thought of European policy makers faced with Russia’s nationalist power politics against Ukraine in spring 2014 was that such behaviour does not fit into the 21st century. Elsewhere reactions were much less clear-cut mixed with unease over what many countries saw as Western interference in Ukraine's regime change. However, and to an extent the conflict between Russia and Ukraine corroborates the impression that not all liberal or cosmopolitan norms promoted after the end of the Cold War are accepted universally and at face value (Thakur 2014). This lays bare the ‘great global illusion’ of the post-Cold War liberal belief ‘that the world was opening up to a new form of interconnectedness, that a multi-layered, multilateral system of ‘global governance’ was emerging, which was set to transform the very nature of international politics’ (Rosenberg 2005:3). It would thus be mistaken to consider international society as a community based on a homogenous set of shared values (such as ‘the West’). Only the EU has come close to such a transformation of the nature of international politics, but crises about money and migrants laid bare old nationalist instincts even there (chapter II.4.6).

Conflicts about sovereignty over rocks in the ocean, school textbooks and past events in NE Asia even between the liberal democracies there (Japan and South Korea) also show that we are not yet in a new world of international politics, but we are no longer in the old world either when such issues sparked major wars. We are nowhere close to the 'end of history' (Fukuyama 1992). Rather, this is an age of complexity, uncertainty and chaos in which the international society operates with much of its familiar institutions adapting more or less to dynamic, non-linear and non-cyclical change and to a plurality of world views and beliefs beyond Western liberal values which were at the core of English School ideas about international society and have frequently been criticised as euro-centric (Suzuki e.a. 2014; Hobson 2012). It is therefore necessary to deal with euro-centrism in international society literature beyond the attempts to list different past international societies like in a museum collection. My concept of International Society 2.0 can deal better with the plurality of cultures, values, norms and historical grievances within a consistent, albeit complex, framework.

International Society 2.0 can best be described as a complex world of issues which, however, far
from homogeneising or diluting the international state system brings into the limelight distinct national and regional pathways shaped by sometimes obscure historical junctures and narratives which have created specific beliefs and role-relationships for countries in these regions. The world of issues also shapes the world of regions. In this complex world it may be tempting to look for simple explanations such as geopolitics, the rise and decline of great powers etc. But digging deeper, many conflicts reveal underlying moral and emotional positions: historical grievances, new grievances, justice and demands for recognition which are expressed through nationalism (Gustafsson 2015). Nationalism is therefore not just a domestic issue - it is an ideological belief that structures international relations alongside other factors such as power. Multilateralism, most visibly in the EU, has emerged as a key principle to rein in the zero-sum world of nationalism. Both are principles of an international society, like the dualist Yin-Yang diagram of interwoven white and black shapes. These important explanations have hitherto been largely missing in international society literature.

This world of issues (in particular the economy and climate change) seems to require global responses (advocated in particular by cosmopolitan and globalist literature), but the observable responses tend to be fragmented national, regional or functional responses to globalisation. Globalisation can work as an engine of change with a potential for cooperation and multilateralism (as it has in some parts of the world), but can also be de-stabilising, producing new grievances, disorder complexity and collective action dilemmas (as can also be observed in other parts of the world, most notably the Muslim world, but also the growing outrage over stark inequalities and elite greed). At this stage International Society 2.0 therefore looks messy, sometimes dangerous and it is unlike previous power transitions from one hegemon to the next. In fact putting developments in a larger (historical and comparative) dynamic perspective allows detecting a trend away from war and violence (Pinker 2011).

1. Thesis and key claims

My main thesis is to explain my observations on Europe's and NE Asia's paradoxical developments and current situation through an – uneven - evolution from International Society Mark I as essentially defined by H. Bull’s seminal work on the anarchical society and the English School7 (Viotti and Kauppi 2012:239-74; Zhang and Busan 2012; Hurrell 2007; Bellamy 2005; Suzuki e.a. 2014) to contemporary International Society 2.0, which is no longer an anarchical society in the conventional sense (cf. part II). Hence my definition of International Society 2.0 adapts Bull's definition as follows (with my changes underlined): “In International Society 2.0 most states (or, more generally, a group of independent political communities) alongside a multitude of non-state actors do not merely form a system, in the sense that the behaviour of each is a necessary factor in the calculations of the others, but also have established by dialogue and consent common rules and institutions (in particular international law) for the conduct of their

7 H.Bull and A.Watson (quoted in Viotti and Kauppi 2012:240): “a group of states (or, more generally, a group of independent political communities) which not merely form a system, in the sense that the behaviour of each is a necessary factor in the calculations of the others, but also have established by dialogue and consent common rules and institutions for the conduct of their relations, and recognize their common interest in maintaining these arrangements” . The reference list contains a number of other works that can be linked to the English School.
relations, and recognize their common interest in maintaining these arrangements. States in International Society 2.0 articulate their value differences and moralisation gaps and pursue status recognition. States accept to deal dynamically with the interdependence of the global economy, networks including non-state actors and the complex challenges of the world of issues. They recognize the need to subscribe to common but differentiated global responsibilities and to negotiate responses to challenges without resorting to war as a means of politics.”

International Society 2.0 is less euro-centric, less organised around institutions managing violence and power, but more around institutions managing the mounting complexity and an increasingly challenging world of issues (both opportunities and risks). It is characterised by diffusion, dilution and dispersal of power (cf chapter II.3.).

In this context the way the two regions are situated in the globally networked and interdependent International Society 2.0 today can be explained by some key variables which are not easily found in most images (or theories) of IR (for an overview of those and the distinction between images and theories: Viotti and Kauppi 2012):

1) Nationalism and multilateralism

Nationalism and the related quest for (compulsory) power and status recognition is understood as an interaction between social psychology, history, sovereignty and international law often along potentially conflict-prone moralisation gaps. It is a crucial ‘switch’ determining the pathways and institutions of international society in particular at critical junctures. Nationalism can produce conflict and war as in the past or rivalry and competition today (cf. definitions of nationalism and multilateralism in chapter 7 and II.4.2.). Bringing nationalism into the concept of international society sheds new light on the acceptability of norms acknowledging different historical trajectories, cultural and political values (or world views; Hurrell 2007:17) within international society.

The examples of the EU on the one hand, based on the conscious rejection of nationalism (as an ideology not as a layer of identity), its switch to multilateralism in a constitutional form and of reconciliation to bridge the moralisation gaps, and of NE Asia on the other hand with its continuing conflicts along the moralisation gap illustrate that point. Ideational shifts on sovereignty, international law and history are necessary to underpin multilateralism or a cosmopolitan world society as there is no power to impose such ideas despite attempts by the EU to be a normative or ethical power (Kaya 2014; Crookes 2013; Youngs 2013).

2) Moralisation gaps at critical junctures versus power transitions

Historical pathways are characterised by critical junctures or tipping points (Grimm and Schneider

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8 When resorting to war there are immediate reactions over legitimacy such as when the US started the Iraq war in 2003 and there are inevitably new moralisation gaps opening indicating serious legitimacy deficits if war is used as an instrument of politics without a UN mandate.

9 Other examples could be examined such as the moralisation gaps in the crisis between Ukraine, Russia and the West or the moralisation gaps in countries engulfed in civil wars or conflict in the Middle East and Africa for instance. Moralisation gaps also underlie violent extremism.
2011) and resulting moralisation gaps between victims and perpetrators of violent events (Pinker 2011:488-97 cf. chapter I.1.1.) often influence the trajectory of pathways. Critical junctures are often related to ‘power transitions’ such as war and traumatic events such as colonisation, but are more complex than that. They are followed by (astonishingly) long phases of social adaptation and transformation. Yet the process of adaptation differs both regionally and by issue-area with complex and long drawn out ramifications: critical junctures and moralisation gaps from the 19th and 20th centuries and even earlier ones are explanatory variables for some of today's paradoxes that traditional IR has not systematically addressed or confined to strategic foreign policy analysis (such as the rise of China sometimes as if out of nowhere, conflicts in NE Asia etc.). In my tale of two regions we can roughly distinguish four phases: in a first phase (17th – 19th centuries) the 'Westphalian' and 'Confucian' worlds peacefully co-existed and were remotely connected10; in a second phase at the end of the 19th century we witness a clash of civilisations during modernisation spelling the end of the Confucian world; a third phase was characterised by war and Cold War antagonisms; the fourth phase of the post-Cold War (a recent critical juncture) is one of complexity, risk, interdependence (globalisation) and again peaceful coexistence. It is in this latter phase that international society has changed from Mark I to 2.0 and is continuously adapting to the increasing complexity, risk and uncertainty of the world in this era of accelerating globalisation. International society is no longer conceived of as a community within the narrow boundaries of shared liberal values, norms and political systems only. Such a normative commonality (as was the case with the 'West' during the Cold War or in the Confucian world) would restrict diversity among nation states whose sovereignty remains for the time being the most important vehicle for formal policy autonomy and domestic legitimacy (whatever the domestic political system looks like). Phases 2+3 were characterised by high levels of violence, the others by low levels. My thesis innovates by investigating the evolution of international society in two different regions over the longue durée – including before the expansion of International Society Mark I. Order is here seen as a process of relations rather than a static or normative phenomenon.

Explaining these changes through changes in the distribution of power in an international system or through the idea of power transitions (from one hegemon to the next, from the USA to China, or from the West to Asia or to the rest) is not a convincing approach to international society's transformation. For the current situation Messner (2011:22-4) warns about the uncertainties accompanying power shifts and the risks of failure of global governance. Bremmer (2013) sees a dangerous vacuum and every nation fending for itself. Rosenberg (2005) also sees a power vacuum and an ideological vacuum, but focusses more on a crisis of capitalism. This view of power in a context of global uncertainty and risk is very different from building IR theory on just power balancing or power transition models (Hurrell 2007). It is more appropriate to think about this transformation in terms of diffusion of power (cf. chapter II.3.2.). Order remains elusive, but not simply subject to dynamics of power politics (which is an aspect of the old order of International Society Mark I), but subject to chaotic dynamics of power diffusion and critical junctures.

10 Zhang (2014) and Suzuki (2014) offer excellent research on Chinese and Japanese international relations with Europeans before the 19th century, usually on the terms of the Asian states. While this is not the focus of my thesis, this provides interesting background, which also highlights the extent to which the 19th century European nationalism and imperialism stand out as a critical juncture.
The interplay of several types of institutions of international society helps explaining these changes and phases of the historical pathways: ideological (e.g. nationalism, multilateralism, cosmopolitanism, but also in the past Confucianism, imperialism…) produce constitutive institutions such as sovereignty, international law and the (market) economy. Those constitutive institutions conceived in Europe and quickly adopted by others started to dominate international society globally in the 19th century, superseding different institutions of order in other parts of the world. It is crucial to understand that these institutions have not been static and universal, but that they have dominated international politics only since the mid-19th century and have continued evolving since (Suzuki e.a. 2014). They determine the shape of international society: The differences in ways to deal with sovereignty, international law and the economy are visible in and to some extent condition today’s responses to security dilemmas - like the territorial and maritime disputes in East Asia – to financial crises and to climate change governance in each region. The rise of nationalism in the 19th century shaped international society durably. Key institutions then locked nationalism into international society in the 20th century. Consequently even today nationalism, ‘moralisation gaps’ and a fierce contest in NE Asia about the ‘correct’ version of history are feeding current sovereignty and international law disputes in the region and together with competing economic policies of national development states are formidable obstacles to internationalisation and especially to regionalisation (part III). Similar disputes and competition have been addressed and largely overcome in an original multilateralist and more or less cosmopolitan way in Europe largely through an ideology of multilateralism born from the ruins of two world wars (chapter I.2). Through the European integration process sovereignty, international law and the 'national' economies were transformed by a gradual shift from nationalism to multilateralism and the forging of a more and more integrated ‘European’ economy. These transformations were institutionally and legally built up over the last half-century and drawing on intellectual roots of centuries past. Multilateral integration has largely displaced Europe's earlier antagonistic nationalist historic narratives while national identities remain strong. Some antagonistic narratives have re-surfaced during the financial crisis (chapter III.3.1.). Such intellectual roots of a shared past also exist in NE Asia (chapter I.1), but they are not usually drawn upon for a regional project, although narratives of a renewal of a sino-centric regional order have surfaced (French 2017). Nationalist antagonistic narratives undermine attempts at regionalisation. Yet, the EU’s deep constitutionalised integration remains an exception in a world of regions while the EU itself is by no means a post-sovereign or post-national polity and hence need not be treated as a ‘sui generis’ case in international society.

4) Which types of role relationships and hierarchy can we find regionally or globally?

The transformations of constitutive institutions of international society (such as sovereignty, international law and the market economy) lead to different role relationships: Friends and teamworkers in the largely hierarchical EU; Rivals, competitors, victims and perpetrators in predominantly 'anarchical' NE Asia (chapter II.4). How states use power in these relationships is of course of interest in particular for foreign policy analysis, but not the structural variable determining the relationships themselves. These are nationalism and multilateralism (and war or
The kind of hierarchical relationships that characterise multilateralism today are no longer the comprehensive, power-based ordering principles of Empire, but basically four types in a spectrum:

1) a largely consensual or syndicated hierarchy as in the EU

2) the institutional power based hierarchy of the liberal order such as the BWI or the UNSC

3) hierarchical relations that are functionally differentiated: ‘club diplomacy’ (G7, G20).

4) emerging non-hierarchical ones such as BRICS or NE Asia trilateral cooperation

Underlying and occasionally competing with this ‘multilateral order’ is the network society in which role relationships among many different types of actors are fluid and more determined by function and relations than by institutions.

In this sense world politics is neither just anarchic in the traditional sense (absence of central authority) nor hierarchic (leading role of one or several great powers, or multipolarity), but characterised by a spectrum of role relationships in between these extremes and not extending comprehensively to all realms, all networks or all ‘spheres of authority’ (Baumann and Dingwerth 2015). There is additional political space for business, civil society and other more or less informal transnational relationships and networks side by side and in interaction with the international society of states. Hence, in my view, anarchy is not the regrettable absence of central authority, but the sheer impossibility of central authority in a world of complexity and networks. Relations themselves are what creates international society (Qin 2016).

5) How does international society’s constitution affect global governance?

Global governance itself is also affected by its specific hierarchies of institutional, political or economic power on the one hand and moralisation gaps linked to its complex challenges on the other (e.g. global financial crisis, causes and costs of climate change; chapter III.3 and part IV). In the absence of effective ways to bridge moralisation gaps among nations and over inequalities of globalisation a functional concept of multilateralism lends itself to advance global governance short of a new institutionalised or constitutionalised multilateralism (such as the EU one) to supersed the current, ageing post-WWII multilateral order (part IV). I take a state focus in line with the international society approach as research on networks and NSAs needs a different departure point (cf. chapter III). Thus, the world of issues (in chaos patterns) forms the context of international society in my concept. Chaos explanations are not causal explanations. Instead analysts have to focus on qualitative rather than quantitative patterns and not so much on law-like necessity. This implies that ‘holistic’ methodologies are more effective for answering some questions that chaos raises (chapter II.1).

Regional integration as a specific form of international or world society therefore is not the default response to globalisation or a necessary building block – it is merely one possibility
(chapter III.2). States adapt in specific ways to the global and regional context driven less by simple systemic factors than by particular complex development paths and heritages of international relations in the past and in the collective imagination. Those are key variables to determine the character of regionalisation.

The graph below visualises the main logic of my research.

Accordingly, I set out in part I to investigate the drivers of the contrasting evolution of the two regions over time: critical junctures, moralisation gaps and key institutions of international society are my focus in a necessarily very broad and selective comparative interpretation of historical developments over the last 500 years or so with a focus on the critical junctures of the 19th and 20th centuries in Europe and NE Asia. This is new territory as such a systematic comparison has not been made before. In part II I take a critical look at how institutions of international society have been traditionally defined (notably the roles of violence and power balance) and develop a new classification of institutions to better analyse the key developments characteristic of Europe and NE Asia over time. The proposed new taxonomy of institutions of international society comprises ideological institutions or modifiers, constitutive, instrumental and mechanical institutions. Part III investigates how the world of issues both affects the constitution of International Society 2.0 and presents challenges (and opportunities) to the states and regions that make it up in ways that are characteristic of the contemporary (post-Cold War) world of issues, complexity and risk. This context very much presents a potential game changer, but the responses to these profound challenges (rules of the game) still fall short of a cosmopolitan revolution and continue to be conditioned by an uneasy mix of national sovereignty and multilateralism. The EU, albeit itself presenting such an uneasy and at times fragile mix, stands out as a deeply integrated, constitutionalised expression of multilateralism with a rather unique teamplayer approach to regional and global governance. NE Asia stands out as an economically networked region with no political regionalism to speak of and a very national-sovereignty oriented approach to regional and global governance dominated by rivalry and competition. I dub this "conflicted regionness". Part IV turns to the future and to the question of world society, examining not only Western, but also Chinese concepts. It concludes with an outlook on the contradictory development paths of the two
regions and develops the idea of dynamic functional multilateralism and polycentric governance as means for the governance of the world of issues in the current period of uncertain transformation.

2. Research questions

This thesis aims at making a contribution to IR theory, in particular on international society concepts, building on insights from a comparative case-study of Europe and NE Asia. The puzzle of the two so differently constituted regions, of two so differently constituted world power centres in this complex world of issues prompts a sequence of questions on International Society. The overall question is how nationalism and multilateralism shape and change International Society.

"The point of departure for good research requires addressing two questions: what do we know, and what are we going to learn?" (Nørgaard 2008:1) Part I and the literature references throughout organise what we know – or we believe we know – guided by the research questions. As 'facts without theories are silent, just as theories without facts are empty' (Nørgaard 2008:14) the tale of two regions which I start with focuses on a theoretically informed selection of facts while the theory parts build on the facts gathered and analysed in part I. Parts II-IV cover what we are going to learn trying to develop precise concepts and theories such as a new classification of institutions of international society, a new concept of anarchy, how power diffuses in the current context of international relations and what all that means for global governance in a world in the midst of a complex transformation process.

Nørgaard (2008:7-9) makes a good case arguing that causality between observed phenomena cannot itself be observed and has therefore to be described and argued for, including through a specific statement of a counterfactual situation. This requires a comparison to determine what is distinctive. Therefore, part I, the tale of two regions, lays out the comparison where we find both: integration and non-integration (counterfactual cases) as well as very different ways to deal with moralisation gaps and historical junctures. This comparison allows identifying distinctive factors that map out pathways to the current situation, and possible causes for the effects we can observe in the two regions. Nørgaard (2008:14-5) argues that 'Comparative case studies are normally preferable if we want to investigate causal mechanisms rather than estimating effects', thus I focus on two regions and a few areas of international politics at critical junctures, such as territorial conflicts and history politics, economic crisis and climate change. The introduction thus covers the first research question which is in fact the loose end of the thread that leads us through a labyrinth of bigger questions: Why is it important to compare NE Asia and Europe – and not only post-Cold War, but over such a long time frame? What background information is necessary to understand the issue?

Part I focuses on the puzzle that sparked my quest: Why do countries in NE Asia reject their common history and focus on their differences instead, especially in the contemporary context of globalisation which is often said to force countries together like in the European case? How has a thick regionness in the Confucian past diminished to such a thin regionness today that makes NE
Asia seem like a non-region? And a contrario: How has Europe come such a long way from the proverbial 'Westphalian' anarchy and almost constitutionalised international conflict (balance of power) to become a deeply integrated security community? How to explain the different degrees of integration and the big regional differences and opposite developments (from anarchy to community in Europe, from community to anarchy in NE Asia)? These questions lead to hypotheses about the effects of critical junctures and of the moralisation gaps, the effects of different concepts of anarchy and the role of the ideological institutions.

From this comparative historical case study, a more theoretical series of questions then arises that will be addressed in part II.

Why have Confucian NE Asia and EU-Europe experienced the long (and prosperous) peace? How is/was it organised? On which institutions of international society and which organising principles are/were these peaceful orders based? Are there similar or different explanatory variables in these two different international societies that explain the long peace?

Why is the concept of sovereignty and international law different in Europe and NE Asia today? How were these institutions conceived of in NE Asia’s past? What explains the differences in the two regions especially in terms of integration/non-integration? Are there alternatives to euro-centric ‘Westphalian’ explanations?

Why is power no longer enough to explain these developments? How has the power and violence paradigm changed and how has that change affected the institutions of international society? What are the effects of moralisation gaps and nationalism on sovereignty, international law and the economy? What in turn are the effects of multilateralism on these institutions?

The answers to these interrelated questions lead to doubts whether a static concept of anarchy in the classical definition is still the most suitable way to describe the context of international relations in the 21st century. Therefore I pursue the quest by showing how in past and present NE Asia/Europe that anarchy is not just the absence of central authority. The theoretical section thus enhances our understanding of anarchy today taking account of the dynamic changes in the power and violence paradigm and the chaotic complexity of the world of issues.

After this theoretical part on the institutions of international society, I turn to the further challenge, namely how these different institutions are regionally conceived of and how they affect regional and global governance. Here again I use a comparative case study on the responses of the EU and NE Asia respectively to the financial crisis and to climate change.

Part III empirically illustrates with the help of these cases studies the formulated theses and questions alternative explanations such as regionalism: How do these differently constituted regions respond to the current context of complexity, uncertainty and globalisation? Is the word ‘region’ just a label for states that happen to be geographically close or is there more to it? Why has NE Asia’s response to the Asian and then the global financial crisis been largely without regionally co-ordinated mechanisms and policies? Is regionalism the most promising form of
multilateralism? Is regionalisation an alternative to globalisation? Are trade relations a sufficient indicator to speak of regionalisation? Does regionalism have the potential to transform institutions of international society, or is the EU transformation a special case?

Finally, after examining the interaction between the world of issues and the regions I conclude with an analysis on how all that affects our understanding of global governance, international order and the possible evolution of a world society. Part IV thus raises the following questions:

Which logics of multilateral governance pioneered regionally - integration or functional multilateralism - could work not only regionally, but also globally? What differences do the various concepts of the constitutive institutions of international society today make for global governance? How can international society come to terms with plurality and diversity of values and cultures? Is functional multilateralism the only form of multilateralism compatible with nationalism?

I will now address the puzzle that sparked my research to establish why it is important to compare NE Asia and Europe – and not only during the post-Cold War period, but over a long time frame and what background information is necessary to understand the issues.

3. NE Asia's paradox today: the rise of a conflicted region?

In recent years, fears of war between China and Japan over disputed islets - like the conflict over Crimea and Eastern Ukraine - have been a re-invigorating boost for realists in search of a conflict in the age of interdependence and globalisation. In time for the centenary of the outbreak of World War I some people saw a coming replay of 1914 in 2014, such as former former US Assistant of State for East Asian and Pacific affairs, Kurt Campbell, who wrote on the disputes over islets in the East China Sea in the Financial Times (26 June 2013 p. 7): ‘there is a feel of 1914 in the air’. China and the US were in the paradigmatic Thucydides trap heading for war (Allison 2015). Some Chinese social media commentators pointed out that in the Chinese cycle the year starting in 2014 was in the same zodiac sign as 1895 that saw war between China and Japan. However, most of the analysts drawing parallels between 1914 and today (rising Germany and rising China, a naval arms race etc.) then add that war is an unlikely scenario. China's Ambassador to London was quoted by China's official news agency Xinhua as saying in February 2014 that 'scholars comparing today's Asia to pre-World War I Europe can't see the wood for the trees'. The envoy argued that peace and development were the themes of the times and cooperation in Asia was close and effective allowing Asia to enjoy stable relations, prosperity and solid foundations for regional cooperation. Nevertheless, the territorial disputes about uninhabited islets in the East China Sea have prompted a flurry of media headlines and diplomatic activity to diffuse a crisis that could at least inadvertently degenerate into armed conflict in the heartlands of the global economy (ICG 2013, 2014). At the same time Russia’s annexation of Crimea conjured up fears over major territorial conflicts (such as the 19th century Crimean War), great power geopolitics, or a return of the Cold War to Europe. In 2017 the focus of the prophets of conflict was again on NE

Asia with the DPRK’s accelerating pace of nuclear and ballistic missile tests.

In this context my thesis is about both the wood – convergence in international society in a long-term comparison – and the trees: a closer look at the differences and similarities between Europe’s past and NE Asia now, but also the similarities between NE Asia in ‘Confucian’ times and Europe now.

This investigation leads to a better understanding of a number of paradoxical facts and elucidates a few myths about contemporary and past NE Asia and Europe. These facts are only paradoxical when examined with conventional concepts (about power and about interdependence for instance). In the context of China’s rise, for example, the Financial Times ‘Global Insight’ columnist, Jamil Anderlini, juggles with myths about NE Asia’s past and gets them wrong: ‘More cynical Beijing-based foreign diplomats say that in keeping with the “great rejuvenation” theme, the new administration appears eager to re-establish the ancient tributary system that put China at the centre of the world and required all other nations to tremble and obey the edicts of the emperor’.

Another journalist, French (2017:11), claims: “China’s ultimate goal, however, is not merely to restore a semblance of the region’s old order, an updated kind of tributary system […]. This ambition, evident from behaviour even if still not fully avowed, involves supplanting American power and influence in the region as an irreplaceable stepping-stone along the way to becoming a true global power in the twenty-first century.” Hence it is important to ask whether the tribute system was indeed a hegemonic power system in the first place. I will show below that Anderlini’s and French’s are a flawed ‘realist’ view of the tribute system which did not rely on fear of the emperor (i.e. on violence and power politics). I will show that such ‘templates’ and stereotypes reminiscent of the ‘Yellow Peril’ hype of the early 20th century are mainly reflecting the parochial euro-centrism of most IR theories and are being used to analyse dynamics in NE Asia so as to fit a contemporary realist ‘ideology’. Nevertheless, the question then arises whether re-establishing in a new form of international society something akin to the ancient tribute system could be a real option for the Asian century’s order and whether this is part of the strategy of China’s rise or revival. And here the views in NE Asia are informed by interpretations of history and moralisation gaps that differ from the US-centric/euro-centric approaches (Godement 2015 and chapter IV.7). So it is very timely to examine the old and the current templates and conflicts further. The Confucian international society will thus be compared with the contemporary international society institutions such as nationalism, multilateralism, sovereignty, international law and the economy with a view to the organising principles of hierarchy as opposed to anarchy.

Conflicts in NE Asia

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12 For example: 
http://thehill.com/opinion/international/358789-odds-of-full-blown-war-go-up-if-trump-threatens-north-korea

And

(accessed on 14-12-2017)

13 Financial Times 5 June 2013 p.2

14 Song (2012:178) contends that the theory of the Chinese world order and tributary system “started to prevail in the Cold War era US, where ‘area studies’ dominated most fields of research on the non-Western world.”
North East Asia\textsuperscript{15} and in particular China is widely seen – in an approach of power transition or in cyclical views of history such as Kennedy’s (1987) or Arrighi’s (2010) - as the rising power centre of the world not only economically but increasingly also politically and militarily as the title of the Australian Defence White Paper of 2009 ‘Defending Australia in the Asia Pacific Century’ or the so-called ‘US pivot to Asia’ (Clinton 2011; Manyin e.a. 2012) show. However, NE Asia is also on the radar screen of military officials mainly for its multitude of security challenges: North Korea’s nuclear and ballistic missile programmes and military provocations, cyberattacks, an ongoing arms race in the region and the territorial conflicts among China, Japan and Korea as well as tensions in the maritime domain and airspace. Events in NE Asia over the last years – especially dramatic since the DPRK’s missile and nuclear tests since 2009 – have even raised concern that the region could descend into military conflict that no one may intend, but could arise from miscalculations and lack of communication:

Firstly, in 2010 DPRK submarines allegedly sank a ROK\textsuperscript{16} warship (the Cheonnan) – 46 sailors died – and a few months later DPRK artillery shelled a South Korean island (Yeongpyeong) lying in waters claimed by the DPRK killing four ROK military staff and civilians (International Crisis Group 2010). Should such provocations occur again, ROK has indicated it will retaliate on targets in DPRK. The DPRK is pursuing a nuclear weapons programme despite UN sanctions and has been testing both nuclear warheads and delivery systems (missiles\textsuperscript{17}). Conflict on the Korean Peninsula would certainly draw in the US and China – the ‘established’ and the ‘rising’ power that already fought each other there in the Korean War (1950-3).

Secondly, the stand-off and sabre rattling between China and Japan over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islets in 2012-3 sparked a flurry of diplomatic activity fuelled by concern that this could get out of control and draw the US into a conflict between the two Asian powers (International Crisis Group 2013 & 2014). Despite a return of calm since, this conflict can flare up again any time.

Thirdly, and perhaps more astonishingly, tensions have run high between fellow US allies Japan and South Korea over history and territorial issues. In 2012 the unprecedented visit of South

\textsuperscript{15} I take NE Asia as China, Japan, North and South Korea. Russia is a special case, as part of its territory is in NE Asia and it has important interests and territorial issues in the region, however, Russia has long been politically speaking a European power and domestically rather neglected its Far East region. I look at it as an outside power in NE Asia, not least because its capital and elites are firmly based in the European half of the country. However, Russia is involved in territorial disputes in NE Asia with Japan (South Kuriles/Northern territories) and has historically played an important role in the region. This role was similar to other non-Asian imperial powers and mainly in Central Asia – Treaty of Nerchinsk 1689 the first treaty between a European power and China Kuhn (2014:522) – Manchuria and in wars with Japan in 1905 and 1945. The US is a major player in the region, but far across the Pacific and with a very different culture. The US is present in NE Asia (alliances with and troops in Japan and ROK), but not a country of the region. NE Asia corresponds roughly to the concept of ‘Eastern Civilisation’ or Toyo as an identity-creating concept in the Japanese usage of the 19th century before the European word Asia was adopted (Korhonen 2014). It also corresponds largely to the ‘pre-modern’ Sinosphere or Confucian world which I will analyse later on. Kuhn (2014:17-23) similarly considers East Asia as consisting of China, Taiwan, Korea and Japan and emphasises that none of these civilisations in the pre-19th century had a term for what is now called Asia and that their commonality is based on usage of Chinese script and the Chinese cultural sphere.

\textsuperscript{16} Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK, North Korea) and the Republic of Korea (ROK, South Korea)

\textsuperscript{17} http://www.38north.org/topics/wmd/ provides regular updates and analysis on North Korea’s weapons of mass destruction programme. See also: https://www.cfr.org/background/north-koreas-military-capabilities?utm_medium=email&utm_source=public&utm_content=120117&sp_mid=55482782&sp_rid=6XdILdpc3NILbmJHyY2hAzwvecz5ldXJveGFuZXUS1 (accessed on 14-12-2017)
Korea’s outgoing President Lee to the islet of Dokdo, Korea’s easternmost island also claimed by Japan (as Takeshima) and the strengthening of Korea's military capacity to defend the islet marked an escalation of a long-simmering territorial dispute between the two liberal democracies in NE Asia which both have a military and political alliance with the USA. Would conflict between South Korea and Japan force the US to take sides? President Lee’s call on the anniversary of the liberation from colonial rule on 15 August 2012 for the Japanese Emperor to apologise for colonial rule over Korea drew the ire of Japanese right-wing politicians and diplomats. A bit earlier a draft military intelligence sharing agreement (GSOMIA, General Security of Military Information Agreement allowing the military of both sides to share technology, information and code-decyphering systems etc.) between Korea and Japan created such uproar in the Korean public that literally at the last hour the Korean Foreign Minister had to call his Ambassador in Tokyo to cancel the signature ceremony which he had already arrived in the Gaimusho for (Moon 2012)\(^{18}\). The conflict over wartime use of ‘comfort women’ by the Imperial Japanese Army remains a major obstacle in bilateral relations.

Fourthly, the three countries China, Japan and South Korea basically stopped high level talks of their trilateral cooperation framework between 2012 and 2015, while the Six Party Talks to resolve the DPRK’s nuclear issue have been in limbo since 2008\(^{19}\). Thus the dearth of Churchill’s “jaw jaw” has prompted fears of “war war”.

Can all these tensions including between liberal democratic US allies be explained by shifting power balances in the region? Quite clearly at best such realist approaches only yield partial (superficial) answers. From a liberal perspective, can we just stand by and wait until interdependence produces trust and some kind of security regime to defuse conflict? Maybe, but interdependence has not produced much trust or any institutionalised or even informal security mechanisms (apart from talk shops) since the end of the Cold War among NE Asian countries despite exponential increases in intra-regional trade and investment. Trilateral cooperation remains functional and fragile and cannot be classified as ‘regional integration’. These increases in economic exchanges are attributed by Hahm (2017) to a period of pragmatism in the 1960s and 1970s when the leaders of Korea and China decided to “normalise” relations with Japan (despite protests notably in South Korea) in order to obtain development aid and trade with the region’s then leading economy. The “abnormal” US security guarantees and the liberal order in NE Asia allowed the countries to reduce defence spending and to focus on economic development. In 1992 China and South Korea also normalised relations, despite bitter memories of the Korean War and economic relations increased spectacularly. The failure of the liberal order since the turn of the millennium is due in Hahm’s view to the concurrent desire in all countries to become “normal” i.e. a country that has a powerful military and controls its national destiny. This tense but prosperous non-integrated region therefore constitutes a paradox for many conventional IR and IPE/regionalism approaches defying not only predictions that Asia was ripe for conflict (Friedberg

\(^{18}\) The agreement was quietly signed late in 2014, but as an indirect, trilateral one, involving the US. It doesn’t require ratification as it is not legally binding and contains no direct Japan-ROK sharing of intelligence cf. http://thediplomat.com/2015/04/korea-and-the-new-regional-paradigm/ accessed on 27.4.2015

\(^{19}\) The DPRK (North Korea) with its poverty on the one hand and its nuclear weapons and missile programme, its military first and aggressive foreign policy on the other hand stands out in poor self-isolation and is a big obstacle to cooperation in NE Asia. It is hard to imagine the Six Party Talks – a diplomatic conference addressing North Korea’s nuclear programme stalled since 2008 - as part of a regional integration process.
1993), but also liberal predictions that economic interdependence (especially of integrated production chains) produces security (Brooks 2005) and institutionalised cooperation. It is also an example of difficult and fragile (dis)order and mere co-existence. That seems to spell doom for cooperative regional and global governance, which is basically about agreeing rules of the road on political, diplomatic and economic issues to facilitate cooperation, to solve collective action problems and to address global risks. Lieber (2014) examining the role of the so-called BRICS countries in the international order asks a question that could equally apply to NE Asia (China is one of the BRICS): ‘if they have been reluctant to adopt the kinds of reciprocity and a willingness to cede some forms of sovereignty to regional or global institutions in the manner of the Europeans, can the existing forms of international order be sustained?’ For Lieber the (typically realist) answer is the need for hegemonic stability, US primacy and an activist US foreign policy (note he doesn’t call on the US to cede sovereignty in the manner of the Europeans). The ambiguity of US policy towards China and Asia does not help building trust between countries locked in multiple rivalries or trust in the US providing security of last resort. At the same time the US can also not act as an arbiter of territorial or historical conflicts, despite its own role in leaving them unresolved after WWII and the Korean War. The countries' economic relations have suffered from the political stand-off. If anything the conflicts have become more pronounced even as the countries in question have become more democratic, more deeply embedded in the international liberal order and more interdependent in the global economy. A ‘globalist’ or ‘regionalist’ narrative of interdependence does not explain why NE Asia is where it is much better than the realist scenarios. On a liberal-institutionalist account North East Asia today is a ‘political non-region with dense economic networks’ compared to the EU or even ASEAN. Yet, NE Asia is the powerhouse of the global economy and the alleged heavyweight in a global power shift towards an ‘Asian century’, a ‘Pacific century’ or the ‘New Asian Hemisphere’ (Mahbubani 2009).²⁰

In contrast to Europe (which has the EU, NATO and the OSCE) NE Asia has no regional mechanism to tackle security issues effectively. NE Asia has none of the multi-level governance, none of the supranational institutions and none of the pooling of sovereignty that the European Union (EU) has. In NE Asia there is not even a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) in place despite important and growing intra-regional trade and investment flows. Saint-Simon, whose enthusiasm for institutions I quoted above, would have been very sceptical about NE Asia’s prospects for peace in the absence of institutions and organisations. Even diplomatic talks (ministerial meetings or summits) have often been postponed or cancelled over political issues.

Given the dead end of these two conventional approaches – realism and liberal institutionalism

²⁰ Wilkins (2010) in his article on the Pacific century and the rise of China traces the discourse of the coming Pacific century back to… the 1890s (sic) when a Japanese diplomat predicted the 20th century would be a Pacific Age. Ninety years later the Japanese and East Asian economic miracles were believed once more to herald a Pacific century, a belief shattered by the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997/8. The concept experienced yet another comeback in the early 2000s when everyone became obsessed with China’s rise as Wilkins also shows. In 2012 the mood of the China-watchers has turned more sober yet again and it is currently all the rage to focus on China’s unsustainable growth, economic slowdown and domestic challenges (World Bank and Development Research Center 2013). Perhaps, the parochial rivalries in NE Asia may yet forestall an Asian century (as South Korea’s President also seemed to suggest in her speech to the US Congress (cf footnote 33) and the emergence of a new world power centre (Arrighi 2010:371–86). Even Arrighi (2010) – not a friend of US hegemony - has doubts that Asia can replace the US capitalist hegemony although he diagnoses it as in its terminal crisis. The current gloomy economic mood in the USA and Europe feeds an exuberant story of Western decline and Asia’s rise. But, as we can see from this brief digression, this is not the first time such predictions have remained a fantasy (Jørgensen 2013).
unable to convincingly explain NE Asia's paradox – I turn to an international society approach which builds on both these theories, but is more interested in context and social relations, rather than systemic or mechanical approaches. But before I do that, I turn to Europe because it is not only NE Asia which is puzzling.

4. The EU puzzle: the decline of an integrated region?

NE Asia's paradoxical economic rise despite its conflicts and its nationalisms seems to be the anti-thesis to the alleged decline of the EU 'region par excellence', the EU ‘model’ security and prosperity community and its normative ambition to promote effective multilateralism and global good governance. It has become quite fashionable to talk Europe into irrelevance. Jørgensen (2013:53) mockingly writes: ‘Europeans (and others) tend to indulge in images of decline, to have a clear preference for being unbound in self-criticism and to look for weaknesses in order to compare with the strengths of others’. And in fact Europe and its multilateralist integration has been rattled to the core in the decade since 2008. From Asia (and elsewhere) Europe looks like a declining group of states that can’t get its act together despite 60 years of integration efforts.

Indeed, in recent years the integration success of the EU needs to be qualified: the failure of the constitutional treaty in two referenda in founding members in 2005, the Damocles sword of Greece leaving the Eurozone amidst concern over the fundamental weaknesses of EMU revealed by the impact of the sovereign debt crisis, the tensions between member states about refugees and migration policy since 2015, and more importantly the UK’s decision to start negotiating its withdrawal from the EU in 2017 (Huberdeau 2017). The tensions of the financial and the sovereign debt crisis have heightened fears of but have not led to disintegration (Dauderstädt 2014). In some Member States questions were raised on the EU as a whole and about the adequacy of the EU’s institutional setup (Piris 2012) and insufficiently democratic constitution (Habermas 2011). The rise of eurosceptic parties has also raised doubts about the EU’s future (Leonard and Torreblanca 2014). Is Europe’s ‘Westphalian’ past finally catching up with the EU as realist pessimists have long predicted? Significantly, the Nobel Prize for Peace was awarded to the EU in 2012 not only for its historical achievements but also to warn Europeans that mounting popular grievances, populism and the growth of anti-EU parties may jeopardise these very achievements. The EU’s foreign policy – still largely intergovernmental although on paper more common than ever since the Lisbon Treaty – has shown few convincing achievements since the first EU High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy took office in 2010: the Libya operations in 2011 were carried out through NATO because of German resistance and revealed the insufficiency of – expensive - European military assets (Fabbrini 2014), the intervention in Mali was carried out by France with Europe largely absent and in May 2013 an arms embargo against Syria ended not because there was a common decision to support the rebels, but because lack of unity pre-empted the embargo decision’s renewal beyond its ‘sell-by date’ of 1 June 2013. Any prospect for success of Europe’s foreign policy priority to stabilise its southern neighbourhood after the ‘Arab Spring’ so far looks uncertain21. The hostile take-over of Crimea by Russia has raised questions about the EU’s policy towards its Eastern neighbourhood and its influence in what Biscop (2014) calls a game of zones. While limited success can be claimed in

21 Oxford Analytica: EU discord threatens its Middle East influence, 6.5.2013
stabilising the Western Balkans, this may have more to do with the membership perspective than with the EU’s foreign policy actions. Elsewhere, for a divided Ukraine, the EU’s attraction has proved fatal and the EU was taken by surprise at Russia’s rogue behaviour to secure its sphere of influence at Europe’s doorstep. Russia’s great power politics seem anachronistic from a Western perspective but show that EU-type cooperation is not a new norm for international relations just yet even inside what M. Gorbachev used to call the ‘common European House’. But this gloomy picture has a brighter side that is in turn challenging for conventional IR approaches.

Realists expected the EU would disintegrate due to the sovereign debt crisis because of the unequal impacts of globalisation on individual member states and a return to a state of anarchy. Some realists predicted already at the end of the Cold War that Europe absent the Soviet threat would break apart and revert back to its old power politics (Mearsheimer 1990). None of this has happened – instead the EU enlarged from then twelve to now twenty-eight member states and with Croatia’s EU membership (in July 2013) even the last European ‘war zone’ in the former Yugoslavia seems set for pacification through EU enlargement. The EU has also deepened its integration through several treaties (Maastricht 1993, Amsterdam 1999, Nice 2001, Lisbon 2009), albeit with some difficulty (Lonro and Murray 2011). In fact during the sovereign debt crisis more countries even joined the Eurozone (Estonia in 2011, Latvia in 2014, Lithuania in 2015). The EU – and the eurozone - have kept growing in membership and new institutions and mechanisms of macro/economic policy have been set up. This does not seem to vindicate the idea that the EU is a sinking ship. The pending exit of the UK – so far at least – has raised more questions about the UK’s than the EU’s future with a closing of ranks among the remaining 27 EU members and even hints at further integration in areas the UK resisted in the past (for instance in the defence field; Fiott, Missirioli and Tardy 2017). Neither does the political confrontation between supranationalist and nationalist approaches to European integration and the rise of eurosceptic parties spell doom for the entire project – it is rather a sign of healthy political debate that is replacing the ‘permissive consensus’ of the democratic deficit with an ‘agonistic’ contest of ideas. Characteristically, the European Commission in March 2017 published a White Paper on the Future of Europe with five scenarios for debate, rather than a blueprint without alternatives. But naturally this comes at the cost of internal cohesion.

With this mixed record, the EU equally constitutes puzzles for IR theory, it operates not in anarchy, and not through power balancing. War has become impossible in the EU not because of some power balance or hegemony, but through a fundamental change in mindsets and institutions. Europe has created with the EU a sophisticated form of constitutionalised hierarchy without hegemony, it has its own system of international law. Despite foreign policy setbacks and ‘the rise of the rest’ especially of China, the EU actively continues to promote multilateralism and its trademark normative foreign policy (Kaya 2014) although it may have to reflect on its changing relationship with the wider world (Youngs 2013) as the international liberal order is in flux and

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22 The EU HR/VP in a speech on 27 March 2014 declared: ‘The EU has been clear in its reaction: There is no place for the use of force and coercion to change borders in Europe in the 21st century.’ http://eeas.europa.eu/statements/docs/2014/140327_05_en.pdf
23 The Russian perspectives on the developments in the run-up to the annexation are well covered in Schneider-Deters e.a. (2008:58-237).
challenged by emerging powers (Transatlantic Academy 2014; EUGS 2016) and since the election of a nationalist and protectionist US President (“America first”) in 2016 even by its erstwhile promoter. The EU has been a difficult nut to crack for IR theories: ‘The problem for IR theory is that we do not have an appropriate concept readily available to categorize the EU. The challenge is to find an appropriate theoretical description of a political entity at a level between the sovereign state and the international system as a whole.’ (Henry 2010:263). Yet, there is a wealth of literature on the European integration process (Hodson and Peterson 2017; Wallace, Wallace and Pollack 2005; Tömmel and Verdun 2009a; Hill and Smith 2005; Milward 1984; Scharpf 1994; Herbst 1996; Moravcsik (1998); Moravcsik 1993; Pierson 1996; Piris 2012; Habermas 2011). My thesis is picking up this challenge through conceiving of the EU as well as of NE Asia as members of a transforming international society. The existing international society concept (Mark I) is promising to reconcile some of the contemporary paradoxes, but it needs to be revised (2.0) in several ways (part II).

5. One more paradox: The past of two regions: Déjà vu or the world upside down?

The paradox of the two regions is even more puzzling when one compares their past. In fact, in the 17th – 19th centuries we almost find a reverse situation of today's: NE Asia was part of a peaceful community of like-minded countries that were trading with each other under the China-centred investiture and tribute system – 彪封朝贡 (Cha 2011)25. Despite rivalry between China and Japan NE Asia was not using power balancing, alliances and war amongst themselves the way European states did from the 17th -19th century. East Asia was until the 19th century an international society with vibrant economic, political and intellectual exchanges among its members built on formal (civilisation and normative Confucian) hierarchy and informal equality with comprehensive rules for international exchanges (Kang 2010, Alagappa 2003c, Moon and Chun 2003:115-7; Cha 2011, Song 2012, Zhang F. 2014; Suzuki e.a. 2014). Schmid (2002:11) calls it a ‘transnational Confucian realm’.

The NE Asia region before the 19th century had the world’s largest GDP and a structural surplus in its trade with countries farther afield (Morris 2011; Finlay and O'Rourke 2007; Kocka 2014) and thriving commercial exchanges amongst its highly organised states. They produced the high-tech and luxury goods for the world like Europe does nowadays. With the investiture and tribute system NE Asia had created its own international society with Chinese characteristics. Even European countries participated in the tribute system with China and Japan (Zhang Y. 2014; Suzuki 2014). It was not a system of power balancing. Japan had an ambiguous place in that international society. Nevertheless, it resembled what today one would call a 'security community' (Deutsch e.a. 1957:5: ‘the attainment, within a territory, of a “sense of community” and of institutions and practices strong enough and widespread enough to assure, for a “long” time,

25 Song (2012:156-7) with good reasons prefers the term ‘zongfan’ (hierarchy) to tributary system as zongfan “is an indigenous expression which reveals the sociological, philosophical and cosmological roots of the political arrangement, whereas ‘tributary’, a term borrowed from the historical setting of the Roman Empire, has its roots in the exchange of wealth”. I tend to concur as will be developed in subsequent chapters, but I use the more established terminology.
dependable expectations of “peaceful change” among its population’; Adler and Barnett 1998) – war among the Confucian states was rare and security issues such as pirates and nomads were handled cooperatively when necessary. Some scholars consider this structure merely as a much looser network of relations (Cha 2011, Zhang 2014) and one that was weak on delivering public goods in terms of security and economy (Gao 2015). But overall, recent scholarship does not support the traditional view of the tribute system as an institution enforced by China on surrounding states that only passively accepted it (Song 2012). While some of these doubts are legitimate in part because historical records do not address contemporary IR scholars’ questions 26 or allow ‘measuring’ the density of ‘regionness’ and in part because the larger global context was very different then, one can call this investiture and tribute system a Confucian international society. Confucianism here not being a term used at the time but a label of convenience for my analysis. Confucianism – itself not a static doctrinal system but a diverse school of thought - was adopted at different periods in time as official state philosophy by China (Han dynasty 141 BC), Korea at a similar time, Japan in the 5th century AD and influential again under the Tokugawa Shogunate from 1603-1868 (Kuhn 2014:55, 103, 113, 139) cf. chapter I.1.3.). Similarly, Kang (2010:54) argues: ‘Chinese civilization had an enduring and transformative effect on the domestic politics and societies of many surrounding states, and those most Sinicized formed a Confucian society with shared norms, values, and agreement on what constituted membership.’

During that time Europe was an unstable, sometimes violent state society characterised by rivalry and balancing of power and war as an instrument of politics of the ruling elites who also constantly acquired or lost territories and peoples through marriage and heritage. However, there are some myths, too, in standard IR approaches to Europe’s international politics. Contrary to the ‘Westphalian’ assumption of neatly separated states exercising sovereign control over national territory it was also a region of overlapping jurisdiction and a patchwork of states, statelets, enclaves and exclaves (Erk 2013). The French Revolution and its aftermath changed the monarchic sovereignty to one of national sovereignty, the industrial revolution enhanced state capacity to mobilise and organise resources and people. The industrial revolution and colonial exploitation of the world’s resources propelled European powers to the top of the global economic league (Morris 2011; Kocka 2014) 27. European nationalism, mercantilism and social-darwinism

26 Kuhn (2014:18) on the differences in historiography and sources for historical research in East Asia.
27 There has been a long debate about the reasons why the Industrial Revolution happened in NW Europe rather than in then more advanced China under the title the Great Divergence taken from Kenneth Pomeranz’ book published in 2000. According to O’Brien 2010, who reviews the large literature on the topic, the debate is still inconclusive. He dismisses a widely held view that the diversity and power politics of ‘Westphalian’ Europe favoured the operation of market forces during the early modern era while in united China (or NE Asia) such ‘creative destruction’ didn’t occur. Research according to O’Brien has ‘virtually ‘degraded’ (or at least severely qualified) repetitions of Marxist and Weberian assertions that the political, institutional and cultural frameworks within which economic activities in Asia were embedded for centuries before the Industrial Revolution, differed from Europe in ways that clearly and significantly impeded: the evolution and integration of commodity and factor markets; the development of financial intermediation; the spread of private property rights; the operations of mercantile networks; proto-industrialization; and above all the commercialization of agriculture. What recent but different syntheses of whole libraries of historical research on the economies of Asia (as well as Europe) observe and document are not only a range of advanced and less developed regions across Western Europe, but (to use a now famous phrase by Ken Pomeranz) a ‘world of surprising resemblances’ across Eurasia.’ O’Brien also questions a popular revisionist argument that ‘imperial governmental structures in the Orient became increasingly inefficient and incapable of providing their subject populations and territories with the good order, protection against external aggression and other public goods required to maintain satisfactory levels of private economic activity, market integration and innovation’. For this thesis and a number of other ‘revisionist’ arguments O’Brien is not convinced historical evidence is solid enough. At some point in this thesis there are arguments about Confucianism including on the economy. Those are to be read with the awareness that a lot of research on
reached its high point at the beginning of the 20\textsuperscript{th} century (Raphael 2014:26). Those processes contributed to producing the modern ‘Westphalian’ state system. Not surprisingly then the modern state system was not created in 1648 as in most IR images but in 19\textsuperscript{th} century European national historiography to provide legitimacy to the nation states as opposed to multi-ethnic empires or the patchwork of statelets (Raphael 2014, Erk 2013). Osiander (2001) analyses the Treaties of Westphalia in detail and shows that they actually do not deal with sovereignty and the other key issues that IR attributes to them in what he calls a 'founding myth' of IR. Hurrell (2007:54) also challenges the widespread view of seeing contemporary change in terms of moving 'beyond Westphalia': ‘the endless references to Westphalia betray an intellectual sloppiness that has had damaging consequences. It encourages a misleading view of origins. Westphalia did not mark the beginning of the state system.’

This ‘myth of Westphalia’ was part of a trend to write national histories, create national museums and national literature, opera and arts to document the pedigree, greatness and unity of often fairly recent nation-states. Public national education was created not least to inculcate nationalism. Historical accuracy tended to be a secondary concern in this context as a propensity for citing and popularising legendary heroes and sagas shows\textsuperscript{28}. The 'myth of Westphalia' is one of the examples of ‘chrono-centrism’ and myth-making in IR approaches to history (cf chapter II.1.4). Despite historical inaccuracy the ‘Westphalian system’ is used as a defining paradigm of IR\textsuperscript{29}. This paradigm includes frequent warfare and a supposedly shrinking number of states forming the international society (Osiander 2001). Both the historical events and the history of ideas and concepts, including the invention of the ‘Westphalia myth’ indicate that the 19\textsuperscript{th} century was a critical juncture for international society: It saw a clash of civilisations that led to the demise of (among others) the hierarchical, but consensual Confucian world; it saw the emergence of nationalism into that hitherto peaceful region and a combination of European ideas of power and war that is still lingering in IR, witness the frequent parallels drawn between the rise of China today and the rise of Germany and Japan then. Osterhammel (2011) provides a very comprehensive and global analysis of the 19\textsuperscript{th} century. Today’s international society is still grappling with the moralisation gaps created then around key institutions of international society, nationalism, sovereignty, international law and the modern market economy. Todays tensions don’t announce a new clash of civilisations, they are aftershocks of the last one.

In 19\textsuperscript{th} century Europe a new form of the balance of power was institutionalised through the Concert of Europe’s interventionist hierarchy, an oligarchical hegemony of sorts (Mazower 2012:3-12; Maas 2014). This 'Vienna system' was thrown off balance by the rise of Germany, but also by a widespread sense of nationalism and social Darwinism which suggested that nations were struggling for survival (in a social-Darwinist state of nature, eat and be eaten; Raphael 2014:25-7). Acquiring colonies, resources and Lebensraum were seen as a zero-sum game of

\textsuperscript{28} We find this focus on legends, heroes and myths in nation building both in Europe and in NE Asia.

\textsuperscript{29} I use ‘Westphalia’ like many scholars as shorthand for the international system or society based on sovereign equality, international law and mitigated by balance of power and great power concerts as here is not the place to reproduce all the controversies about that notion. For one comprehensive critique of the key role of the ‘Westphalian system’ in different IR images, including the European big-bang theory of IR and the global extension of it cf. Hobson (2012).
cut-throat competition necessary for survival and war thus conceived of as a necessity (and even glorified). Paradoxically, perhaps, this period of rapid industrialisation and extreme nationalism was also one of free trade and exchanges, so much so that it is now seen as a first wave of globalisation. Kocka (2014:84) emphasises the link between industrialisation and capitalism in the period since the 1860s as an accelerated, expanded and more profound globalisation of capitalism or the market economy compared to the ‘insular’ nature of earlier globalisation phenomena. This paradoxical co-existence of nationalism and more or less liberal economic relations since the 19th century seems to be formative for and characteristic of present-day NE Asia, while Europe today has conceived an international society built on multilateralism as a formative idea that has reconciled these paradoxical tensions.

Europe today has in fact created a new order or international society leaving behind its own past and its 19th and 20th centuries’ systems of power politics. The EU has made a deliberate choice for integration, but seems wavering at times to further go down that path as national sovereignty and interests remain powerful concepts. This new international order in Europe is built on a particular form of hierarchy – I dub it syndicated hierarchy – rather than anarchy (cf. chapter II.3). This ‘Lisbonian’ EU system built around supranational institutions and decision making processes with majority voting and supranational legal review in a large number of policy areas alongside more intergovernmental tracks (Fabbrini 2014) has replaced ‘Westphalian’ anarchy, power balancing and great power hierarchy (the Concert of Europe) but not sovereignty as such (chapter II.3.4.5). The EU is not post-sovereign as Cooper (2004) argues, but national sovereignty has been syndicated and been given an additional European dimension, mainly through legalisation and constitutionalisation. Classical state sovereignty is still at the heart of this international society (otherwise it would probably have to be called cosmopolitan or world society). This point is important for IR and regionalism theorising as it breaks with the widespread tendency to portray Europe as a sui generis exception. Nevertheless, European integration marks a rather dramatic transformation of international society in Europe: after centuries of power balancing and fighting wars with each other European countries went from warlike anarchy and great power domination to build an innovative, consensual form of ‘supranational hierarchy without hegemony’ or an almost anonymous multi-level governance system (with a democratic deficit; Habermas 2011) and

30 Pakenham (1991) in his history of the ‘scramble for Africa’ shows how this scramble actually started with references to humanitarian objectives (abolish slave trade) and ideological aims such as promoting Christianity and civilization beyond commerce. These motives became more and more hypocritical.

31 Hobson (2012:338) cites a liberal analysis by David Starr Jordan from 1919 – still valid a hundred years later - who wrote in a book on Democracy and World Relations: ‘On sea and land, distance has been annihilated and remote peoples are closer together today than were the various parts of a small kingdom a century ago…Furthermore, the extension of [communications] and banking service to all parts of the world has made the whole earth an economic unit. Currents of trade set far beyond national boundaries. Capital goes wherever it sees a profit… Information conveyed almost instantaneously around the world becomes common property… The interrelations of financial adjustment give to the economic world a sort of sensory system. Whatever affects one part of it is instantly felt by all the others’. Hobson (2012:124) also shows how geopolitical writers such as Mackinder and Mahan at the end of the 19th century conceived of globalization or global interdependence in similar ways as we talk today about globalization: Mahan in 1897 wrote: ‘Events which under former conditions would have been distant and of smaller concern, now happen at our doors and closely affect us. Proximity… is a fruitful source of political friction, but proximity is the characteristic of the age. The world has grown smaller…’ Keohane (2002) and O’Rourke (2009) are other authors who insist on globalization being a long process and not a recent phenomenon. However, the word as such has entered the discursive space in the 1980s. Cf also Scheuermann (2010).

32 Lisbonian because it is built on the 2009 Lisbon Treaty, shorthand for two treaties on the EU and its functioning. The consolidated treaties can be found at the EU’s website: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/treaties/index.htm
a security community over the last 70 years. We thus have to revise the list of primary institutions of international society (part II).

Power has not disappeared as a means of policy making and as an analytical category even in EU Europe. But the meanings of both sovereignty and power have been transformed largely through a mindset of non-violence, the 'European Way of Law' and a re-conceptualisation of international relations away from mere power struggles. The ideology of nationalism born in the old Europe has been radically transformed in the new Europe notwithstanding strands of nationalist ideology and parties that have seen a come-back in crisis years. The Brexit debate in the UK had strident nationalist overtones and focussed on a rejection of perceived shackles of the EU hierarchy, but there were few indications of enmity towards other European countries.

Finally, this re-conceptualisation of power in international relations is not only due to the new 'agency' of the Europeans, but also due to a change in context, a different kind of complex anarchy that underlies the 'world of issues'. International Society 2.0 is no longer an anarchic society in the conventional sense of anarchy as just the absence of higher authority – a concept I will explain in chapter III.1.

NE Asia over the last century and a half went the other way from a consensual Confucian form of hierarchy and a security community to ‘Westphalian’ anarchy and conflictual relations. The four countries of NE Asia today\(^\text{33}\) look more like the proverbial billiard balls unable to avoid bumping against each other. I argue that this is less due to an abstract problem of distribution or balance of power as such, but because of the enduring legacy of the Cold War and especially earlier critical junctures linked to the break-up of the Confucian world and 20\(^{th}\) century conflicts. The conflicted constitution of NE Asia today is linked more to factors due to emotions and identity than to system or instrumental rationality. A closer look at the Confucian international society - before the transformation through Western imperialism will show that an earlier international society has disintegrated and that on its ruins the construction of a new one has proved challenging and has so far produced very little in terms of regionness showing how complex and drawn out social adaptation after a tipping point or historical juncture can be (Grimm and Schneider 2011). NE Asian countries currently defend a nationalist, sovereignist model inherited from the 20\(^{th}\) century that has served its countries taken individually rather well even in the 21\(^{st}\) century. At the same time, NE Asia is tempted to exploit its full potential through regional cooperation in particular in the economic realm where global, liberal ideas and the market economy have enlarged common ground (Fukushima 2010). The attractiveness of this (superficial) success contributes to ideas about power shifts away from the US and Europe seen in (relative) decline and the arrival of an 'Asian Century' and thus another pathway to a different sort of multipolar world society characterised by a multitude of rival actors bound by few rules.

Is NE Asia stuck in the 19\(^{th}/20\(^{th}\) century great power game as realists would have it? Is Europe out of touch and irrelevant in the 21\(^{st}\) century world (Kaya 2014)? I don't think either is true. Both

\(^{33}\) China, Japan, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK or North Korea) and the Republic of Korea (ROK or South Korea). One could also include Taiwan, but the very specific Taiwan-PRC issue is not my focus here.
regions live in the same present to which they arrived on different, but entwined historical pathways. Simple concepts like the rise and fall of great powers make little sense in the complex world of issues today. NE Asian and European countries exist in the same world of issues and still share the same core institutions of international society, just in quite different regional ways, hence it’s a paradoxical and puzzling world of regions in a world of issues.

6. Comparing the incomparable?
A comparison could be done between NE Asia today and Europe today from a regionalisation perspective for instance. This avenue has been taken before and led to two unsatisfactory outcomes: 1) an almost insoluble n=1 problem for the EU, as it is so differently constituted from Asia and other regions (cf chapter II.3. and IV.1.) and 2) an awkward definition of Asian regionalism as ‘open’ and without institutions with the “ASEAN way” a similarly problematic n=1 unique form of regionalism. This has led to the separation of EU studies both from regionalism studies (the New Regionalism Agenda) and from mainstream IR. These approaches avoid dealing with the paradoxes I have briefly outlined above.

The two intriguingly contrasting developments outlined above have thus been analysed mainly on their own merit producing two different ‘sui generis’ accounts. This allowed maintaining the realist fiction of power politics as the main norm of IR (NE Asia) and the liberal normative and functionalist narratives of step-wise integration (EU) (Balassa 1961; Haas 1958). But a historical comparison blows up these comfortable constructs. This historical comparison is all the more warranted as a number of researchers work with – often false – historical analogies drawing parallels between Europe’s past and Asia’s present, or Europe’s ‘Westphalian’ past catching up with the ‘Lisbonian’ EU. Comparing the two regions’ pathways in the long-term yields more differentiated insights to explain these paradoxes and to challenge paradigmatic and parsimonious IR theories. Such a comparison is particularly insightful because the two regions seem worlds apart and their pathways to regional integration and regional rivalry respectively are so divergent. It is more productive to compare divergent cases than similar ones. Similar cases would look at the ‘smaller’ differences between the EU and a federation for instance, or the Holy Roman Empire (Osiander 2001) or the German Zollverein (Eilstrup-Sangiovanni 2008). But conclusions from similar cases are not particularly useful for generalisations or testing theories (Nørgaard 2008). On the other hand, my cases are not too divergent in initial conditions as to be uncomparable: Both regions have states with a strong tradition and a record of sustained economic development and international trade. Both have had experiences of cooperation and community and of division and nationalism. Both have a deep-rooted and elaborate tradition of state philosophy that nourishes political thought, values and practices including about international order and justice. Both have experiences with hierarchy and anarchy. Both were central theatres of WWII and the Cold War. Finally, both regions have now achieved a similar level of industrialisation and economic development. This shows that both paths have led to somewhat similar results at least in the economic domain. This comes as close as one could hope for to a situation of a ‘scientific

34 Heng (2010) deplores that ‘IR does appear haunted by history’, using simple pre-conceived patterns and myths to understand current events’ i.e. the propensity to see the past repeat itself – like is Asia’s future Europe’s past - rather than to acknowledge the change in circumstances in the present.
experiment. Both the EU and NE Asia have managed the transition from the Cold War overlay of bipolarity into a world of complex issues and challenges without resorting to inter-state violence (unlike other parts of the world including in SE Europe). Where there are differences we can see that they are caused by ideological institutions and moralisation gaps that arose at critical junctures.

In terms of global governance, the outcomes are also mixed, but much less pessimistic than many pundits claim. The EU's institutionalised multilateralism has largely succeeded in dealing with the financial crisis and in formulating a response to climate change in their region, albeit with shortcomings and difficulties. However, it is failing to convince others to follow Europe's example and to build a rule-based multilateral international order. NE Asia's sovereignist and nationalist approach seems largely in line with the approach of most other countries, including the US, but is not very conducive to producing desirable governance outcomes in addressing key trans-national challenges. But countries in NE Asia have managed economic crises (in 1997/8 and 2007/8) rather well and individually also started to tackle climate change. Some have engaged in their own multilateral ventures such as the Global Green Growth Institute (GGGI, Korea), the New Development Bank (BRICS bank), the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB; Renard 2015), or the Shanghai Co-operation Organisation (SCO) or Japan's, China's and Korea's respective forums with Africa. All three are members of the G20 and the MEF. The result is the emergence of a hybrid form of global governance, 'club diplomacy' and functional multilateralism: This goes beyond the quasi-hegemonic order based on compulsory and institutional US power of the post WWII multilateral system but falls short of a institutional teamwork model à la EU with its syndicated hierarchy, constitutionalised international law and multi-level sovereignty.

My comparative story seems to suggest that cooperative hierarchy is producing more stable and peaceful orders than power balancing in 'anarchy'. Crucially, co-operative hierarchy is not the imposed hierarchy of Empire, nor that of hegemonic stability or of great power concerts. It is the consensual variant of the EU, of the Confucian world or perhaps of the club diplomacy of the G20. Moreover, my story seems to indicate that nationalism plus classic anarchy are particularly de-stabilising while consensual multilateral and hierarchical orders are resilient and conducive to produce security and prosperity. The challenge then is to reconcile hierarchy with the (nationalist) desire for autonomy, sovereign equality and with the diversity of norms and beliefs. Such diversity of political identity and political pluralism cannot be mediated just through rational, liberal international principles, but have to be accepted as (productive) conflict in an agonistic view of IR (Glover 2014, Mouffe 2010). Nationalism or multilateralism among states play key roles as ideological modifiers. The challenges inherent in the anarchy of complexity seem to call for such reconciliation and a multilateralist strategy of international relations, or in Havel’s terms (quoted above) ‘overcoming the nation state as the highest expression of national life’. Sovereignty and how it is conceived of is thus a key determining variable to examine. But one has to look not for

35 Pathways of other regions such as Africa, Latin America or South and South East Asia or great powers like the US obviously also have such implications and their distinct pathways. The US role in the international order in particular has been the object of study and it is not obvious to construct a comparator for the unique superpower. In other regions the initial pre-conditions are very different (absence of strong state and philosophical traditions, different roles in the Cold War and in the current global economy etc.). This being said, the ideas of this thesis can also be applied to these regions or powers. The US will be touched upon because of its important role in the two regions under examination and in the international liberal order in general.
black or white, but at shades of grey. As the present international structures seem to owe much to breaks with the past in both regions we need to analyse this situation using an asynchronic comparison of the two regions in their past and present constitutions. Historical institutionalism provides an important prism for such an analysis with its concepts of pathways and critical junctures. Pierson (1996:126) explains historical institutionalism: 'This scholarship is historical because it recognizes that political developments must be understood as a process that unfolds over time. It is institutionalist because it stresses that many of the contemporary implications of these temporal processes are embedded in institutions – whether these be formal rules, policy structures, or norms.' And more specifically on the EU: 'historical institutionalism emphasizes how the evolution of rules and policies along with social adaptations creates an increasingly structured polity that restricts the options available to all political actors.' (Pierson 1996:147).

While Pierson has argued and developed this concept against intergovernmentalist approaches to the EU (Moravcsik 1993), it provides useful insights – especially those in the quotes above and the concept of pathways which are very useful to analyse development pathways in other regions. Historical institutionalism can be applied to Confucian international society (with 'institutions' not simply defined as organisations cf. chapter II.2). Furthermore, for my argument it is not enough to consider IR as statist and structural. Historical context plays a major role and institutions in the wider sense evolve almost permanently adapting to changing contexts (Lewis and Steinmo 2012).

7. Multilateralism versus Nationalism - how to conceive of global governance?

Nowadays the various parts of the world no longer live in the past relatively closed 'worlds' of their own (Enlightenment Europe, Monroe-America, Chinese world, Soviet Empire) nor under the domination of colonial masters or superpowers, but are parts of an interconnected 'globalising world' in a complex, largely economic, logic of anarchy. Despite their different 'regionness' Europe and North East Asia today are rich and 'powerful' and also (highly) interdependent. They are important trading and investment partners, global players and competing power centres, at least economically. Interconnectedness is reflected in trade figures, production chains, global risks (climate change, pandemics…) but also in institutional expressions such as their membership in the UN, WTO, the Bretton Woods Institutions (BWI) or the G20 and a myriad of other organisations or conventions. Some of this leads to interdependence. However, competition is part of this interdependence including the narratives of power shifts, the decline of the West, or 'the rise of the rest' (Zakaria 2008). The rise of the rest reflects the diminishing appeal of the post-war international order and contests the dominance of ‘euro-centric but universalist’ ‘Western’ values and worldviews. There are differences of values and norms (Kaya 2014). This is why these divergent paths are so relevant for the 21st century's uncertain international relations (part IV). The narrative of a coming Asian century suggests the renaissance of the geopolitical or geo-economic logic of domination by great powers or 'great regions', of power transition, or of competition for power in a multi-polar, zero-sum world (Rachmann 2011) and a shift of core and periphery or a world with multiple growth poles (Lin 2010). The story of the EU suggests a normative alternative.

36 For a study of the paradox of particularity and universality of the EU’s discourse see Borg (2014)
of peace, competition and cooperation in an interdependent world of multiple actors (Youngs 2013). An important pre-condition for such deep and comprehensive multilateral cooperation seems to be the reconciliation of moralisation gaps resulting from historical critical junctures. The EU has successfully bridged moralisation gaps through a peculiar and long process of economic and political integration, the setting up of a syndicated hierarchy that combines supranational and national sovereignties with often high transaction costs but generally promoting integration. NE Asia by contrast is struggling with its own past and the divisiveness of moralisation gaps that tore apart an earlier commonality. As a result and absent serious reconciliation NE Asian states only have the national option supplemented by functional multilateralism to deal with regional and global challenges.

The divergent regional pathways should tell us something about the constitution of each region (a world of regions). But beyond that they should tell us something about the range of possibilities for global governance, the different ways to deal with conflict and co-operation and for dealing with challenges and opportunities of globalisation – the world of issues. In other words instead of focussing on conflict over power and ideological enmity we need to consider different views on conflict, competition and cooperation as hallmarks of international society today and perhaps in the next decades. The tale of two regions shows that the contest is really one between two ideologies: nationalism and multilateralism underpinned by different organisation principles, anarchy and hierarchy. They are different but not mutually exclusive. Cosmopolitanism is a more radical departure from nationalism, but for the time being there is little evidence for cosmopolitan politics apart from the very specific, tentative (and contested) areas of humanitarian intervention and international criminal justice (Dunne and McDonald 2013; Clark and Reus-Smit 2013; Thorup 2010). Cosmopolitan concepts are possible and slowly developing as Leggewie and Welzer (2010) show, and there are cosmopolitan networks and elites in both regions (and beyond), but they are hardly structuring international society today as Beck (2010) for instance is claiming.

The shape of the institutions of international society (part II) – and therefore of global governance - is largely determined by beliefs about national sovereignty and multilateralism. The two regions I am investigating have an interesting track record each reflecting both ideologies but in inverse evolution as part I will show. Given the larger implication of two divergent but successful pathways of regional projects for global governance it is also necessary to define the context of international society today (part III). Is it a world of regions and states jostling for power and primacy as the Asian century, China rising and re-establishing the tribute system narratives suggest? Or is international society one of regions alongside nation-states playing a role in improving welfare gains for themselves and for all while managing globalisation and the chaos, complexity and uncertainty of a world of issues (as the EU’s global strategy of effective multilateralism advocates)? Will countries be enemies, rivals, or friends, competitors or teamworkers in addressing global issues in the 21st century? (part IV). I will start this investigation with an analysis of the different pathways of NE Asia and Europe since about the 1600s.

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37 The 2016 EU Global Strategy (published after my manuscript was finalised) reiterates, but without using the term effective multilateralism, that the EU’s interests and priorities in a ‘difficult, more connected, contested and complex world’ (p5) are ‘best served in an international system based on rules and on multilateralism’ (p4). Global and regional order(s) are identified as priorities to ‘move beyond the illusion that international politics can be a zero-sum game’ (p4).
Part I A tale of two regions: NE Asia and Europe’s past and present international societies

This tale will necessarily be broad and selective, not pretending to be a comprehensive history of both regions (which can be gleaned from the referenced and other literature). The broad brush strokes will try and paint a picture that reveals answers to the following research questions. These will give a big picture that will be further refined analytically in parts II-IV. The purpose is to present an empirical comparative case study of what we know as a basis for subsequent theorising.

How to explain the different degree of integration and the big regional differences and opposite developments (from anarchy to community in Europe, from community to anarchy in NE Asia)?

Why do countries in NE Asia reject their common history and focus on their differences instead, especially in the contemporary context of globalisation which is often said to force countries together like in the European case? How has a thick regionness in the Confucian past evolved to such a thin regionness today that makes NE Asia seem like a non-region?

A contrario, how has Europe come such a long way from the proverbial 'Westphalian' anarchy and epicentre of international conflict to become a deeply integrated security community?

What are the effects of critical junctures and of the moralisation gaps? How do emotions and perceptions influence international relations?

As to most readers the European history is very well accessible, the European tale is shorter and less detailed than the NE Asian tale which is underresearched and less accessible to Western and even Asian readers. This may be surprising, but analyses of Asian history textbooks show that pupils learn more about European history than Asian. Yu (2007) analysed history textbooks and concludes that there is 'East Asian Alienation by East Asians' pointing out that both in terms of quantity of texts on each other and in their quality Chinese, Korean and Japanese textbooks all largely emphasise world i.e. European history and national history leaving very little space for the history of neighbours or East Asia as a whole (Yu 2007:226). History in these textbooks is thus nation-centric and Euro-centric leading Yu (2007:228) to deplore: 'Even worse, Asia seems to have no history before modern times.' He quotes a Korean historian writing in 1908 to trace this phenomenon back to the beginning of modern national historiography in East Asia: 'if Asians consider world history from the perspective of Eurocentrism, they disregard their neighbouring countries, the East Asian nations and states' (Yu 2007:230). Yu also deplores distortions of history when the textbooks do refer to neighbours in both ancient and modern periods, such as Chinese textbooks taking over Japanese imperial historiography on Korea (cf Schmid 2002 who shows how 19th and 20th century Japanese historians appropriated and distorted Korean history). Yu attributes this East Asian alienation to a unique historical experience of NE Asia of the investiture
and tribute system that he sees as built on Sino-centrism (which he interprets as a millennia-long claim to the superiority of the Chinese race over other racial groups\footnote{This claim for which he cites ancient Confucian scriptures is rather dubious as the quotes don't refer to race in the modern sense. Song (2012) makes the case against sino-centric interpretations of the tribute and investiture system.}) and replicas of this worldview among the sinicised countries who created their own investiture and tribute systems down the hierarchy (Yu 2007:230-2): 'That world view was adopted by Korea, Japan, and Vietnam. Each of these three countries regarded themselves as a small Zhonghua, and referred to its neighbouring countries as four barbarians; they constructed a small form of Sinocentrism.' (Yu 2007:232). Yu also refers to the emerging Japanese imperialism in this context (Yu 2007:233) for instance the Theory of the Great East Asian Unification published in 1893 and other debates about Japan’s role in Asia and the world, that Duus (2008) also refers to. He does not go further than this somewhat racially distorted view of the investiture and tribute system, but the importance of historical narratives that create various mentalities of victimhood to cement alienation becomes clearer through this account. Similarly it shows that many people in NE Asia do not get taught much about their neighbours allowing stereotypes and nationalist politicians to dominate or manipulate views and media accounts. In an analysis from a Korean perspective on the French-German history textbooks Kim (2009) shows how important writing history from different viewpoints is both as a result of and as part of a process of reconciliation over a long timeframe. Such a process is missing in NE Asia, although there have been some attempts by historians and CSOs and exhortations by politicians (mostly from Korea and China)\footnote{Kim (2009:94) quotes former Korean President Roh saying in 2007 that ‘the people of Asia need to confront the past and build a common ground of historical understanding. Germany, by thoroughly reflecting on its past since WWII, has helped heal the long-festering wounds of European history, laying a psychological foundation for European integration…exemplified by Germany’s initiative in co-authoring history textbooks with France and Poland.’}. Characteristically Kim (2009:95) reports that the government-to-government attempts of Korea-Japan and China-Japan historical committees ‘have not been productive because government-led projects are bound to the government’s official stance and public opinion […]. In contrast, civil society (NGOs, scholars, and teachers) organizations ended up producing many useful auxiliary materials.’ The lack of consolidated and serious historical research and textbooks facilitates the nationalist and the education bureaucracies’ attempts to manipulate history for narrow ends in all countries. Add to this that diplomatic relations and the freedom to travel and even to import cultural products from neighbours are fairly recent, it is clear that alienation and biased perceptions in NE Asia run much deeper than the old stereotypes in Europe which have been subject to de-construction and re-construction of identities over many decades since the end of WWII.

In both tales my focus is on critical junctures of international society and by no means do I strive to write a history book, it suffices to pinpoint a few important episodes that I believe are relevant for my research and the evolution of key institutions of international society. Historians could perhaps use some of these ideas to carry out more comparative research than is possible in the space of this book.

This part will identify the pathways, critical junctures and moralisation gaps of the two regions and how these variables have influenced the evolution of the institutions of international society. I shall strive to determine the influence of ideological modifiers such as nationalism,
multilateralism and Confucianism up to the present (while part IV will look into the future). This should give a clearer picture of the 'ideal types', the challenges and promises of different regional experiences past and present. After this historic comparison I will in part II look at theoretical frameworks to explain the paradoxes observed in this chapter.

My key argument is that NE Asia for several centuries has formed an international society in its region akin to what today would be described as a security community or an integration project that essentially functioned without the institutions war and great power balance which are regarded as a universal key to explaining international relations by realists and the early English School. While it had no ‘multilateral institutions or secretariats’ and came in a hub and spokes form with the Chinese Court at the centre, it had a set of shared norms and procedures, a system of regulating official and private trading networks, a shared writing and recording system and culture and a clear sense of belonging together on civilisational grounds (as opposed to nomadic barbarians, pirates or Westerners for instance Kang 2010:29-33 and Kuhn 2014:17-29, 133-59; Ringmar 2012). It was built on a formal hierarchy between members. This community was destroyed through Western and Japanese imperialism in the 19th and 20th centuries. Japan’s imperialism itself reflected the tension between its Asian-Confucian and Western-nationalist identities.

However, unlike in many other world regions, Western modernity destroyed a millennial tradition of strong statehood based on Confucian state philosophy. Another difference to other regions was the emergence of the first non-Western imperial power, Japan, from that process of ‘creative destruction’. Imperial Japan tried to recreate an Asian community by force and take over regional hegemony from China in the name of anti-imperialism. Japan took possession first of some islands (like Ryukyu/Okinawa and Taiwan) then annexed Korea (1910), parts of China (1931) and then invaded China (1937) and other countries. This doubly imperialist episode marked the end of the ‘Confucian’ world and the emergence of ‘Westphalian’ nation-states in NE Asia. Nationalism and the moralisation gaps related to historical junctures are crucial for understanding current disputes and the very low degree of regionness in NE Asia today. These deeper problems transcend and help explain another plausible (but somewhat narrow) story of contemporary US-China strategic rivalry and power transition that is usually told about NE Asia. A typical example among many is the ‘strategic net assessment’ report by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (2015) on conflict and co-operation in the Asia Pacific region. That undeniable story of great power competition today is not some inevitable law of ‘nature’, but is given meaning to a large extent as the result of earlier critical junctures and pathways: In the US-China case the US story is one of ‘open-door imperialism’ directed against the European colonies, a war against a rising Japan challenging the US, and then a victorious Cold War against communism where the bi-polar order served US interests focusing on an enemy to US values and dominance (Green 2017). The Chinese story for the same period is one of a century of humiliation first at the hands of European and US imperialism, a war against imperial aggression by Japan and then against a US-led war in Korea where China rescued North Korea paying a heavy price. During the Cold War the bipolar order was seen as a threat by China. We will examine these stories of the NE Asian countries

For Europe my key argument is that it created the so-called ‘Westphalian’ institutions of international society (sovereignty, international law) which reflected and regulated its ‘constitutional’ and conflictual dividedness in the 19th century after critical junctures that produced the nation-state and nationalist ideology. Nationalist ideology compelled nation-states to compete (militarily and economically through mercantilism and colonialism) for pre-eminence, glory, territorial gain, and survival up until Europe's self-destruction in two world wars. Europe, at the apex of its power, extended that system across the globe through imperialism. This is where our two regional tales intersect at a critical juncture. The aftershocks of that expansion-driven clash of civilisations are still strongly influencing the international state system today, in particular in NE Asia but also – and more deadly – in the Middle East (cf. Mishra 2014). After the self-inflicted critical junctures of WW1 and WWII, Europe lost its central position in the world and its empires. Europe went on to pursue an integration project, originally to re-build the nation states (Milward 1984) while preventing the re-surgence of an aggressive Germany, but progressively turning to building a stronger European security and prosperity community. European countries adopted a more civil nationalism and progressively developed a multilateralist ideology and legal system that underpinned a deepening and widening integration process up to a constitutionalisation of a specific European legal order ('European way of law'), a monetary and now an economic union as well as a foreign policy that actively promotes multilateralist global governance and rule of law. The still ongoing process has been everything but smooth and is not the outcome of a strategic plan, but an incremental process with advances and setbacks. Some drivers of the process are a cosmopolitan elite, self-interest of nation states, very moderate civic nationalism, successful post-War reconciliation, institutional, legal and liberal lock-ins, constitutionalisation, supranational institutions, syndicated sovereignty and hierarchy. This has led to a division of competences between national and supranational and intergovernmental levels and joint law-making procedures, a particularly dense common management of the economy (single market, EU competence for external trade, EU competition law, EMU) and multi-level network governance. In other words, it has replaced anarchy and hegemony with a jointly owned somewhat fluid consensual hierarchy. The EU resembles a croissant which has a distinct shape when you look at it, but reveals a complex, multilayered and fragile structure once you take your first cut at it.

This tale of two regions is therefore a dramatic story of war, recrimination and reconciliation, of a struggle for nationhood and identity, of nationalism and multilateralism, of economic development and crises, of interdependence and cooperative governance.

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41 This balance has been upset by the sovereign debt crisis not least as the EU institutional system had not been financially and legally equipped with the means to handle it. Hence, the need for Member States to step in directly with their taxpayers money for bilateral aid and the resulting resentment, accusations of 'Teutonic' 'diktats' and 'hegemony' or a 'lazy' and 'wasteful' 'Club Med'.
1) NE Asia’s paradox: from Confucian community to nationalist alienation

1. The Good, the Bad and the Ugly

A headline of the Korea Times on 24 May 2013 ran: “Japan – good and bad”. Below were two pictures, one where a small group of Japanese scholars were welcomed by a smiling Korean policeman on Dokdo Island (독도/獨島). The second picture showed another Japanese scholar in the tight grip of another Korean policeman arresting him to prevent him from boarding a boat to the same island Dokdo. The good Japanese of the first picture were scholars who acknowledged Korea’s sovereignty over Dokdo, whereas the bad Japanese in the second picture was disputing that claim (although the previous evening during a press conference he was still a ‘good Japanese’, but he changed his opinion overnight!). Needless to say that in Japan, the roles were reversed: the first group were the bad Japanese and criticised by the government, the arrested scholar the good one. This trivial incident ignored by the rest of the world will enter Korean history books and lengthen their list of arguments buttressing Korean sovereignty claims over Dokdo which official Japan disputes. At the same time, the attempted scholarly invasion stopped by a vigilant Korean policeman will probably constitute the highest level of Japanese “invasion efforts” to enforce their claim which is ritually celebrated as Takeshima Day (Takeshima 竹島/たけしま is the Japanese name of Dokdo) in Shimane prefecture (to which the island is claimed to be administratively attached). Nevertheless, Korea has taken steps to buttress its defences against a potential Japanese invasion of the rocks while Japan is building maritime and amphibious capacities to defend or reclaim island territories.

So, what is all the fuss about? Well this anecdote undermines a number of IR theory claims: realist ones that assume smaller powers (Korea and Japan) would pull together to balance hegemons (the US) or aspiring regional hegemons (China). It also undermines liberal claims to democratic peace or interdependence creating institutionalised cooperation, friendly relations (and even regional integration like in the EU) and producing security (Brooks 2005, Katz 2013). Even US pressure on their two Asian allies Japan and Korea to work together in the face of a more assertive China

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42 Actually, island is a euphemism: the two main islets of volcanic rock of the group rise sharply out of the sea, are not inhabited and are 73.3 km² for the Eastern island Dongdo and 88.7 km² for the Western island Seodo cf. Cultural Heritage Administration of Korea (2009) Natural heritage of Korea/Dokdo.

43 Actually not quite, a few days later on 4 June 2013 the FT published an Op-ed (p.8) by two American think-tankers James Clad and Robert Manning who urged Japan’s Prime Minister Abe to be bold and ‘give the Takeshima/Dokdo islands back to Seoul’ citing also the opinions of the ‘good’ Japanese scholars welcomed earlier to Dokdo because they doubted Japan’s official claims. The writers argue that in this way Abe could win the Nobel Peace Prize.

44 Takeshima Day (22 February) was voted by the Shimane prefecture assembly in 2005 to mobilise support for Japan’s claims to Dokdo and the right for Japanese fishermen to operate in the area.

45 The US has an alliance treaty with Japan since 1951, revised in 1960, cf.: http://www.cfr.org/japan/us-japan-security-alliance/p31437 (accessed 14.8.2014) and one with South Korea: In 1954, after the Korean War Armistice, the United States and South Korea signed the ROK/U.S. Mutual Security Agreement, in which they agreed to defend each other in the event of outside aggression. In 1978, the two countries formed the Combined Forces Command (CFC), based in Seoul and with a U.S. general at the helm, to defend South Korea. Cf. http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/kor001.asp#1
and the North Korean threat could not remedy the situation. The Dokdo story dividing countries that theoretically should be allies and best friends is thus even more puzzling than the simultaneous stand-off between the ‘usual suspects’ and known rivals for primacy China and Japan over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands or similar conflicts between ‘big bully' China and ‘small underdogs' Philippines and Vietnam in the South China Sea. In particular American observers and policymakers steeped in rational choice and realist approaches are puzzled by this seemingly irrational behaviour. US officials are frustrated that they cannot get their allies Japan and Korea to cooperate more deeply across the board and that Korean and Japanese leaders regularly appeal to Washington to take their side against the other, for instance then South Korean President Park Geun-hye in a speech in the US Congress just a few weeks after her inauguration: ‘Sadly, today the nations of this region fail to fulfil all that we can achieve collectively. That potential is tremendous. The region’s economies are gaining ever greater clout and becoming more and more interlinked. Yet, differences stemming from history are widening. It has been said that those who are blind to the past cannot see the future. This is obviously a problem for the here and now. But the larger issue is about tomorrow. For where there is failure to acknowledge honestly what happened yesterday, there can be no tomorrow. Asia suffers from what I call “Asia’s paradox”, the disconnect between growing economic interdependence on the one hand, and backward political, security cooperation on the other: How we manage this paradox – this will determine the shape of a new order in Asia.’

That top policy makers have a clear understanding of the paradox is an important step to address the underlying issues, but there is a problem with Park’s approach also pointedly revealed in an Op-ed of hers in the New York Times when she was a presidential candidate. It was titled: Park Geun-hye: A plan for Peace in North Asia. Cooperation among Korea, China and Japan needs a correct understanding of history. The problem is of course the word ‘correct’ and in her speech quoted above the word ‘honestly’. This implies an exclusive and absolutist view of the ‘truth’ and a rejection of conflicting views to one’s own that cannot be 'honest' or 'sincere' (another term one hears very frequently in the context of debates about history). This view leaves no room for debate or the versions of others not to mention compromise. Those who disagree are not 'honest' or deny the ‘truth’. But who defines the truth if dissenting views are immediately refuted as dishonest or insincere? This standpoint can also be seen in the arguments of each side about the territorial issues on the sovereignty over Dokdo/Takeshima or the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands. The contestant controlling the islands firmly pretends that there actually is no territorial dispute (thus pre-empting any recourse to a higher authority of international law like the ICJ). All contestants uphold that their own claim is irrefutable and indisputable and that rival claims are 'irrational' or worse. But to the rest of the world the saber-rattling and the events of the last few years such as ramming patrol boats, detaining or even shooting fishermen or coast guards, refusing access to the controversial territories for visiting scholars or parliamentarians from the other country, scrambling fighter jets,
boycotts, violent demonstrations, cancellation of flights, tours, visits and events, aggressive statements by officials or in the media, arguments about school textbooks are evidence that there are disputes. These disputes have even triggered fears of armed conflict. The refusal to even acknowledge a dispute is an insult to the other side. PM Abe in an interview with Foreign Affairs (Teppermann 2013) accused Chinese officials of lying. It is total denials of any legitimacy of the other side’s argument, indicating an antagonistic deadlock for which there can be no rational solution, no mediation/arbitration, no compromise only the total annihilation of the other side’s claim or renunciation on one side, victory or defeat. As we have seen in the headline of the ‘good’ and the ‘bad’ Japanese, on the issues of how to interpret history we have an ugly friend-enemy dichotomy, a good vs. evil decision that Carl Schmitt identified as the essence of politics and which is fundamentally un-liberal (Mouffe 2010:18-9). Thus, these clearly are political not historical disputes. But the political disputes are about mutually incompatible versions of history, linked to national identity, status and pride, national honour, respect and trust. Where international law refers to historical precedent it obviously cannot solve the problems as there is no consensus about history especially when these minuscule rocks were not explicitly recorded in any court documents before the 19th century (Kang 2010:139-57). International law to settle disputes is rejected and cannot apply as the party controlling a contested territory simply denies the existence of a dispute.

The only political alternative to acting out the conflict without resorting to war can be to ‘shelve it’, to agree to disagree and to work around it (Arai, Goto and Wang 2013). But this alternative leaves the conflict simmering and vulnerable to re-ignition, as the escalation of the Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute showed in 2010 and in 2012 (ICG 2013 & 2014; Arai, Goto and Wang 2013 – cf. chapter I.1.17). In fact, Mouffe (2010:22-31) has proposed a theoretical view on politics which throws into relief the characteristics of the process: Mouffe argues that identities are relational and always require an ‘other’, an ‘external’ and are thus antagonistic. However, they are also never fixed but in constant evolution including in their relationship with the ‘other’. Antagonism is thus constitutive of the political and of the social and therefore also of international relations. In order for antagonism not to destroy a larger polity (let’s say international society here) conflict has to take a form that doesn’t destroy the political community, it has to go beyond a friend-enemy relationship. However, according to Mouffe (2010:29) the other extreme would be a rational, interest-based negotiation of competitors which would ignore the key political dimension of antagonism. This would deny that differences exist which cannot be reconciled. They cannot be papered over with a trade agreement either. Between the two extremes of the postulated constitutive dimension of antagonism in political debate on the one hand and of an elimination of such a dimension on the other hand, she proposes a third role relationship, agonism. Agonism is a struggle over power and positions that cannot be rationally reconciled, but it acknowledges the legitimacy of the opponent even though conflicting parties may realize that there is no rational solution for their conflict. They are opponents rather than enemies or rivals (in the liberal image of interest-driven competitor). Agonism relies on certain forms and norms (rule of law, institutions) that ensures non-violent regulation of conflict. Qin (2016) whose relational theory of IR I will revert to in part IV.7, does not share Mouffe’s departure point of antagonism, but comes to a similar conclusion, denying that conflict is the norm in a world view grounded on the concept of correlativity for any pair of opposites. Applied to the NE Asia paradox, this analysis shows why
the simple liberal-rational interest based approach (economic interdependence produces security) does not work beyond the economic realm, as the basic conflict is about mutually exclusive positions regarding historical justice, morality and territory (and thus fundamentally political) not about negotiable (economic) interests. In NE Asia the steps to agonism as a way to channel conflict through legitimate channels and to overcome enmity have not yet been taken in all areas: the insistence on ‘undisputable’ positions denies the legitimacy of the opponent and makes him an enemy or an ‘evil other’ (or a ‘bad’ Japanese as in the newspaper headline). There are no institutions or regimes, not even communication mechanisms that could channel the antagonism to agonism. This is also the weakness of the harmony-focused Chinese thinkers reviewed in IV.7 as the antagonism of these positions chimes not well with ideas such as Qin's that East Asians are better at managing conflict through cultivating relations. In more simple terms than Mouffe's one could argue that NE Asian countries have difficulties talking to each other, let alone making compromises on positions related to national sovereignty, while in the EU compromise is the institutionalised key to multilateral solutions to problems (this is why I talk about constitutional or ideological multilateralism for the EU). The danger of nationalism in combination with the absence of agonistic conflict-regulating norms and institutions that go beyond negotiation of economic and functional interests is that it can develop into enmity if such attitudes prevail across the board. This is fortunately not currently the case in NE Asia as people enjoy mangas, pop culture, fashion and TV dramas and hundreds of thousands of Chinese, Koreans and Japanese live in each others' countries as investors, workers or students (cf Won 2012).

1.1. Nationalism and the moralisation gap

The preliminary analysis of this anecdote suggests that there are several keys to explain NE Asia’s paradox or puzzle are: nationalism, historical justice and a moralisation gap not only material power, anarchy or economic competition.

**Definition:** The moralisation gap

Moralisation gaps are closely linked to nationalism and the narratives of victimhood at the hands of foreigners. Underlying this narrative is an often cyclical view of past glory followed by unjust humiliation or victimisation by foreign invaders and the need to recover the past glory. To occupy the moral high ground the peacefulness and benevolent grandeur of the 'Golden Age' is exaggerated, the own nation's aggressiveness or mistakes are conveniently forgotten, while the foreign humiliations are accounted for in detail and in the darkest possible ways to contrast the innocent victim with the brutal aggressor. Such moralisation gaps are common throughout history and throughout the world and we will study it in more detail for the NE Asia case and Europe. Moralisation gaps have to do with social psychology and are by their nature complex and difficult to analyse 'objectively', let alone to quantify. Pinker (2011:488-97) describes as moralisation gap findings from psychology that something in the human psychology distorts our interpretation and memory of harmful events, driven by a desire to present the self in a positive light. Moralisation

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46 Bilateral summits between Japan and China or Japan and Korea for instance have been rare in times of tensions and trilateral Foreign Ministers meetings were suspended between 2012-15 as were trilateral summits.
gaps are like complementary bargaining tactics between victims and perpetrator: The victim will emphasise the deliberateness of the perpetrator and the pain and suffering he endures as victim. The perpetrator will emphasise reasonableness or unavoidability of the action and minimise the victim's pain. People consider the harms they inflict to be justified and forgettable, and the harms they suffer unprovoked and grievous (Pinker 2011:537). But each side sincerely believes their version of the story, namely that one is an innocent and long-suffering victim and the other a malevolent and treacherous sadist. The counterpart of too much memory on the part of the victim is too little memory on the part of the perpetrators. All sides of a conflict ‘are convinced of their rectitude and can back up their convictions with the historical record. That record may include some whoppers, but it may just be biased by the omission of facts we consider significant and the sacralisation of facts that we consider ancient history’ (Pinker 2011:494).

Galtung (2002:23) who also uses references to social psychology when he talks about deep culture and the 'collective subconscious' of nations, does not employ the term moralisation gap. Yet, in similar ways, he develops a model of deep culture of a nation that informs its identity and international policy through the 'CGT syndrome'. The strong belief of a nation in being a chosen people (C) with a glorious (G) past, but suffering from trauma (T), real or imagined, inflicted by other nations. This in fact is a very similar approach to Pinker’s moralisation gap and a major ingredient of nationalism.

Wang (2014) who has extensively written about the politics of memory points to the dilemma of IR research in coming to terms with such complex issues: ‘For mainstream international relations specialists, discussing how historical memory directly influences foreign policy behavior would likely be considered extraneous to serious analysis. Scholars may believe that historical memory matters but only influences emotions or relates to the actor’s psychology and attitudes. Some may think historical memory as a social narrative is mainly created and manipulated by political elites as a tool to mobilize people to work in their own interests. However, such dismissive views overlook the important function of historical memory as a key element in the construction of national identity. Collective memory binds a group of people together, and is the prime raw material for constructing ethnicity is history.’ This means that if we do not consider international politics as a mechanical system, but as a society in which human beings are organising themselves nationally and internationally, we cannot discount emotions and moral beliefs in the analysis and only focus on some assumed rationality and mechanical clock-work type systems that produce 'predictable' outcomes.

My thesis argues that it is vital to consider moralisation gaps (linked to historical memory and the CGT syndrome) to understand fundamental role-relationships in international relations and the drivers of conflict and crises. My two examples in NE Asia and Europe illustrate the very different outcomes that can occur in international relations depending on how these drivers are addressed.

German historian Christian Meier has written on the universality of the phenomenon of historical memory (across time, he starts by Greek antiquity) and how to bridge moralisation gaps by 'forgetting about it' when he was looking at the extraordinary effort of remembrance in post-War
Germany. Meier (2010:40-1), who doesn't use the term moralisation gap, found that many peace treaties including the emblematic Westphalian ones include passages that turn the page on atrocities committed in times of war through *abolition, oblivion* or *remissio*. Even civil wars, like the American one or the civil, religious wars in pre-modern Europe usually ended with proclamations of forgetting and forgiving. Meier cites the Edict of Nantes where King Henry IV proclaimed: ‘*Que la mémoire de toutes choses...demeurera esteinte et assoupie, comme de chose non advenue*’. Meier (2010:44-9) explains this cross-cultural phenomenon that forgetting and forgiving is necessary to break the cycles of war and evil to allow for peaceful co-existence (at the expense of justice). Hobbes already recognised the importance of forgetting for peace: 'A sixth Law of Nature is this, "That upon caution of the Future time, a man ought to pardon the offences past of them that repenting, desire it ...' A seventh is, " That in Revenges, (that is, retribution of evil for evil,) Men look not at the greatnesse of the evill past, but the greatnesse of the good to follow." Whereby we are forbidden to inflict punishment with any other designe, than for correction of the offender, or direction of others. For this Law is consequent to the next before it, that commandeth Pardon, upon security of the Future Time. Besides, Revenge without respect to the Example, and profit to come, is a triumph, or glorying in the hurt of another, tending to no end; (for the End is always somewhat to Come;) and glorying to no end, is vain-glory, and contrary to reason; and to hurt without reason, tendeth to the introduction of Warre; which is against the Law of Nature; and is commonly stiled by the name of Cruelty. (Thomas Hobbes, 1651/2013: 88)

In other words, in order to achieve peace, injustices have usually not been pursued and crimes not prosecuted for the 'raison d’Etat' and to break potentially endless cycles of violence. This changed after WW1 as the Versailles Peace Treaty explicitly excluded amnesty and provided for sanctions and penalties (on a massive scale) from the losing side (Meier 2010:43). The consequences of attributing the guilt for starting the war to Germany and punishing it through reparations are well known (Raphael 2014:65-74). After WWII the Nuremberg and Tokyo War Crimes trials were an unprecedented juncture in International Law that has set precedents for later evolutions including the International Criminal Court (issues which I will not pursue here). The undeniable aggression leading to WWII, the atrocities committed and the holocaust (which was only brought up later in German remembrance) created a very strong moral asymmetry between victors and defeated (Meier 2010:54). Yet amnesty and forgetting initially dominated German collective moralisation about the war, with a much broader remembrance effort only dominating since the mid-1980s. That such an effort of remembrance and repentance has been largely confined to a minority view in Japan with little government support shows that ‘rational’ and legal processes are not enough to bridge moralisation gaps and to address the politics of emotion and memory. How Germany and Japan addressed these moralisation gaps remains a key issue and China and Korea frequently evoke Germany's example to follow for Japan. Drea (2006:5) points to the book by Ian Buruma, Wages of Guilt (1994) which compares Germany's and Japan's contrasting approaches to their past atrocities. Buruma contrasts Germany's public acceptance of responsibility, its information and education efforts and its consistent and deep apologies with Japan's rejection of responsibility, its downplaying of historical evidence (much of which Japanese officials destroyed between the

49 Unfortunately, his approach explicitly excludes post-WWII Japan as something different, missing an opportunity to make a less euro-centric claim. Later sections of my thesis will partly fill the gap in comparative literature on this.

50 My translation: May the memory of all things stay extinguished and dormant as if they didn’t happen
surrender and the arrival of US soldiers on Japanese soil; Drea 2006:9; Yang 2006:24) and lukewarm apologies. We will return to examine how this issue affects NE Asia's international relations today. The proliferation of truth, justice and reconciliation commissions elsewhere in countries emerging from conflict shows that the moralisation gap is increasingly (albeit implicitly) recognised around the world as a major factor for conflict contributing to cycles of violence.

This set of keys also shows that Western instrumental rationality or international law – and theories like realism or liberalism - cannot explain or solve some key international relations problems because they leave out essential social, emotional and historical variables. The opposite here to Western instrumental rationality, however, is not the purported Eastern irrationality of Orientalism (Said 1995), but different ideas about key institutions of international society. Moreover, the origin of these different ‘Eastern’ ideas is actually the 19th century Western nationalism which instrumentalised the past glory and victimhood narratives as shown above. This, combined with ‘Westphalian' institutions like sovereignty, nation-states and international law, is the story I want to tell on NE Asia’s path from security community and largely non-violent international society to the current tense co-existence.

The forceful extension of Europe’s 'Westphalian system' and its ideas on ‘modernisation’ and a ‘standard of civilisation’ to NE Asia irreparably destroyed the Confucian international society with deep consequences until today. The forced marriage of sovereignty with nationalism at the end of the 19th century with international law as the best man at the wedding contributed to the birth of Japan’s imperialism under the guise of a regional integration project by force in the 20th century. Both the Western and Japanese imperialism left deep scars of historical justice, victim-perpetrator relations, moralisation gaps and disputes over territories explaining shallow regionalism and tensions about seemingly trivial issues in the region.

That double shock of first Western, then Japanese imperialism sparked the implosion of NE Asia’s traditional regional society built around Confucian hierarchy (宗藩; Song 2012). This clash of the Western logic of anarchy, sovereignty, ‘equality’ and nationalism with the Confucian logic of cultural homogeneity, hierarchy and harmony through respect for inequality has had traumatic consequences which are still reverberating in today’s international relations (Lovell 2011, Qu 2010; Dirlik 2002). The infection with ideas developed in a very specific context in Europe led to extreme violence in the 20th century in NE Asia which in turn has consequences until today due to the resulting and multiple moralisation gaps – of the sort the anecdotes cited earlier and the brief narratives above have illustrated - notably on the current conflict fault lines and the region’s inability to pursue an integration or region-building project (Ryu 2010; Kim 2010; Shin 2007; Feenberg 1995).

A short list covering the most salient of NE Asia's moralisation gaps could look like this (and my point is not to argue who is right or wrong or to draw up a complete list of problems and issues; more detail will follow in the next sections):

1) China-Japan 51 : Japan’s colonial annexations (Senkaku/Diaoyu, Taiwan 1895;

51 China here not just referring to the PRC as in most of the text, as the moralisation gap with Japan is largely
Shandong/Tsingtao 1919; Manchuria 1931) and especially its invasion of China (1937-45) and related atrocities (Nanjing massacre, genetic, biological, and chemical experiments on humans and many more); the visits of Japanese politicians to the Yasukuni shrine (where class A war criminals are enshrined among the war dead); the comfort women controversy; controversies over history textbooks and how they cover or not these subjects

2) Korea (both South and North) - Japan: colonisation and abductees - forced labourers and comfort women/sex slaves (1910-45), Dokdo-Takeshima, Yasukuni-shrine, Japan benefiting from Korean War 1950-3

3) China-South Korea: ‘ownership’ of ethnic and cultural heritage and borders (Yanbian district), ancient kingdom of Goguryo, China’s participation in the Korean War saving the North and perpetuating the division (Hahm 2015:19), some maritime disputes

4) Japan-Asia: perceived lack of recognition as liberator from Western colonial rule; perceived lack of recognition for apologies and post-War contributions to peace and prosperity; comfort women often seen as volunteers (Watanabe 2015:25)

5) Japan – US: nuclear bombs, legitimacy of war crime tribunals, comfort women, US imposed constitution with limited sovereignty and the renunciation of the use of force; perceived lack of recognition for apologies and post-War contributions to peace and prosperity

6) Japan - Russia: loss of territory (Northern territories/Kuriles in 1945 to the USSR, with the 1956 Joint Declaration between Japan and the USSR making the restitution of two of the four islands conditional upon a peace treaty.)

7) North Korea-US, Japan, China: poses as victim of US aggression and hostile policy (and US carpet bombing during the Korean War), vis-a-vis Japan similar to but more hostile than ROK on abductees of Koreans to Japan, colonisation and Dokdo; abductions of Japanese to DPRK; China at times seen as a former coloniser, as patronising and not respectful of DPRK sovereignty; China's contribution to the Korean War on the North's side is minimised; DPRK stresses ethnic purity; China's reforms are seen as betrayal of socialism;

8) China - North Korea: Chinese irritation at DPRK minimisation of its help in the Korean War (which prevented conquest of Taiwan) and at its destabilising nuclear brinkmanship which undermines Chinese arms control diplomacy and complicates China’s relations with the US.

9) North and South Korea: two different accounts over the anti-Japanese struggle and the Korean War. South Korea sees the North as an illegitimate ‘other’ responsible for the division of the Korean nation, while North Korea sees itself as the true, independent Korea and the South as an American colony. There are issues about abductees and separated families, naval battles along the Northern Limit Line (NLL – Roehrig 2009), the DPRK's nuclear programme, attacks on ROK and political

shared in the different Chinese territories, PRC, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macau, albeit with nuances and different degrees of official involvement in academic and other discourse.
assassinations (including former President Park's), military exercises and threats

10) China- Taiwan and Hong Kong: One China policy; views on anti-Japanese struggle, the civil war, democracy, repression of indigenous people

11) Others could include issues relating to Okinawa vs the rest of Japan and the US, Mongolia (divided, independence not formally recognised by Taiwan).

Not all moralisation gaps can be covered, only the most significant ones. Most tend to be linked to similar critical junctures (see below). A closer examination of those would probably corroborate my main argument about the importance of historical grievances, critical junctures and how they relate to moralisation gaps and present distrust and emotionally charged perceptions and decisions impeding attempts at integration and co-operation despite 'rational' incentives.

Schmid (2002) for Korea, Lovell (2011) for China and Oberländer (2012) for Japan illustrate how national(ist) narratives of history were (and continue to be) produced, if not outright invented in Korea, China and Japan, much like in Europe around the turn of the 19th/20th century to glorify individual nations and to forge a national identity in the period of social upheaval and modernisation (Dieckhoff 2012:58-63; Pinker 2011:186-8; Galtung 2002). As a result China, Korea and Japan have rejected an earlier largely common cultural/civilisational rather than national identity and their earlier security community. They have become alienated from each other over the last 150 years through the invention and perpetuation of antagonistic nationalist narratives (Schmid 2002, Tamamoto 2003) and the traumatic experience of Japanese imperialism which created most of the current moralisation gaps and territorial disputes (directly or indirectly such as the divisions of Korea and China following the collapse of the Japanese occupation regime52). What is particularly significant in these nationalist narratives is that all countries in the region articulate and cultivate their own sense of being ‘innocent victims’. This includes the Japanese, which is seen as particularly galling by its neighbours who see Japan as the unrepentant perpetrator not the victim. Japan’s victimhood narrative is celebrated annually and broadcast all over the world in Hiroshima and based uniquely on its (and Nagasaki’s) ‘status’ as first and only targets of nuclear bombs. Hiroshima’s Peace Museum (at least when I visited in 1992) conveniently ignored any hint that Japan had actually started the Pacific War itself and so does the museum adjacent to the Yasukuni Shrine (Nakano 2014). Right-wing Japanese accounts – including in the statement by PM Abe at the occasion of the 70th anniversary of the call by the Emperor to surrender53 - argue that Japan had no choice but to resort to war in defence against imperial choking of its ‘Lebensraum’ after the Great Depression in the 1930s – just as Pinker describes the perpetrator’s general attitude seeking to justify past atrocities. The prize for the most drastic invention of victimhood and national history and the most blatant distortions of history goes to the DPRK. The DPRK has gone as far as to turn its invasion of the South to the opposite, a US-ROK invasion of the North and calling it a victorious war of fatherland liberation (as

52 Korea as a Japanese colony (1910-45) was arbitrarily divided between a US and USSR zone of occupation after the Japanese capitulation. China's division was the result of the civil war between the nationalists and the communists after Japan's defeat.
evidenced in Pyongyang’s Museum commemorating the war -author's visit in September 2011 – the museum cleverly has different circuits for domestic, Chinese and Western visitors).

I will turn later to a more detailed examination of the historical issues, but I want to focus first on the significance and enduring power of these ideas of nationalism and the moralisation gap and show that in combination with sovereignty and international law these nationalist narratives are a major cause for NE Asia’s paradox.

Miscevic (2010:25) cites an interesting analysis of the tensions inherent in the concept of nationalism which captures the issues at the forefront in NE Asia well: ‘For Roshwald, nationalism is at once ancient and very modern; it employs twin conceptions of time, cyclical and linear; it seeks self-determination while manifesting a sense of victimhood; it insists on the nation’s particularity of chosenness while claiming a universal mission; and finally, it reveals a symbiosis of kindred and mingled blood, of ethnic and civic nationhood. Through these antinomies, nationalism is constantly able to renew itself and adapt to different situations...’ This continuous adaptation (or manipulation) is evident in the ‘history politics’ in NE Asian countries as I will review below.

1.2 The irony of history: ‘Westphalia’ died in Europe and lives on in Asia

Ironically, North East Asian countries have now become champions of formerly European ideas, those that have actually caused so many of the problems in NE Asia in the first place. Significantly, the 19th century ‘Westphalian’ ideas about national sovereignty and instrumental international law which accompanied European expansion are used mainly defensively in NE Asia. Consequently, the previously transnationally shared ‘old’ Confucian morality then ended at the ‘newly' national borders – which is relevant as in realist terms ‘morality ends at the boundaries of the nation-state; beyond the boundaries there is nothing but anarchy' (Miscievic 2010:15). Meanwhile Europeans themselves have transformed these ideas and have built up a common layer of identity to put the genie of nationalism back into the bottle (Schmale 2010). Beyond the almost invisible borders of an EU country there is not anarchy, but a familiar EU law system applying like at home. While for some this is a manifestation of cosmopolitanism as opposed to nationalism, I argue that it is multilateralism that has been opposed to nationalism in the EU case. This is because multilateralism does not deny or devalue the idea of nationness, national sovereignty and the nation state to the same extent as cosmopolitanism does. Multilateralism does not require a European demos and is compatible with more enlightened, civic forms of nationalism. In other words, a multilateralist can be a patriot, but still cooperate effectively with another country despite historical and identitarian differences. A cosmopolitanist would first have to overcome any such difference and reach a different allegiance level beyond a national community or state.

In my view of International Society 2.0 there is room for the broad spectrum of concepts in this triangle of nationalism, multilateralism and cosmopolitanism. Micievic (2010:26) argues in a similar way (while not using multilateralism explicitly as a category, he implicitly refers to it through sub- and supranational units which are the focus of regionalism studies as we shall see later): 'The interest of philosophers in the morality of international order has generated interesting
proposals about alternative sub-national and supranational units, which could play a role besides nation-states, and might even come to supplement them (...). Moreover, the two approaches might ultimately converge: a multiculturalist liberal nationalism and a moderate, difference-respecting cosmopolitanism have a lot in common.’ The EU is often admired in NE Asia for overcoming nationalism and war. Yet, very few people in NE Asia seem ready to sacrifice the old ‘Westphalian' ideas and their own nationalism to emulate the EU’s path. That would require a renunciation or reconciliation of the conflicting nationalist and victimhood narratives in order to bridge the moralisation gaps. German Chancellor Brandt’s historical gesture of kneeling in front of a monument to the victims of German atrocities in Warsaw is often cited in NE Asia as an example to follow – but always expected from others (usually the Japanese). For instance Korean ‘comfort women’ asked the Japanese emperor to kneel in front of them and apologise.

In this perspective, the NE Asia paradox is a result first of all of the implosion of former international society that directly or indirectly (through European and US force and the take-over of European ideas) produced nationalist narratives and development paths characterised by a deep sense in all countries that they were innocent victims of foreign aggression and of each other, views that were also (and continue to be) projected backwards into ancient history to bolster nationalism and patriotic resistance against foreigners including the former Confucian 'family'. Secondly the paradox results from subsequent historical junctures such as Japan's aggression and the Cold War. All four countries (as well as other territories in the region) thus share a dramatic history of multiple breaks with their own tradition, their earlier relations, their cultures and trajectories of nation-building, moralisation gaps and economic development as well as their place in international society. National pride and status are top concerns overriding other interests such as welfare gains that could be obtained through regional integration. But this paradox is particularly significant because in the past, until the confrontation with Western ideas, NE Asian and some other Asian states had a specific experience of cultural and economic integration and lasting peace. This common heritage has many characteristics of International Society 2.0 in particular a low level of inter-state violence and an order based on rules and shared norms and moral beliefs. This is an important finding as International Society 2.0 thus has non-Western antecedents and thus need not only be conceived of in modern/Western liberal ways or with an EU template even if a simple revival of Confucian international society is no longer possible. Neither is multilateralism a sui generis EU phenomenon. Confucian international society may not have been multilateralist in the modern sense, but in its shared understanding of ritual propriety, hierarchy and affective networks it can be considered as an equivalent society of peaceful and co-operative co-existence (Song 2012). In the next chapters I am going to investigate this thesis from several angles: the role of power and violence in the Confucian international society, its destruction and the influence of powerful ideas such as nationalism, sovereignty and international law, the early and the new economic interdependence and how states handled it, and finally what all this means for the regionness of NE Asia today. But first a few words about Confucianism (a vast topic that can only be addressed very selectively).

1.3. Before nationalism: Confucianism and international society

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China and other East Asian countries influenced by Confucianism and Asian thought tend to have 'a civilizational political culture, which stresses moral dimensions in domestic as well as international governance' (Xiang 2014:109). Xiang (2014:110) opines that: 'The Jesuits discovered with great delight in the late 16th century the Chinese “mystery of statecraft” (arcana imperii), which, in sharp contrast to European monarchies at the time, legitimized the state through a constant moral adjustment by the ruler and the ruled to nature and the world unknown (the Heaven), hence the concept of Mandate of Heaven.' Kuhn (2014:618-24) also describes how European Enlightenment was influenced by Confucian ideas at the time and Zhang Y. (2014) shows how the Jesuits pioneered intellectual and cultural exchanges between Europe and China through accommodation and even integration into the Chinese order before 1704. Ringmar (2012) compares the Confucian, Tokugawa and Westphalian worlds from a perspective of ‘performing international systems’ likening them to tragic (Westphalian) and comic (Chinese tribute system) dramas.

Confucius (ca. 551-479 BC) developed ideas about good government in a period of turbulence in Chinese history with little success in his time. There is no work directly authored by Master Kong (孔子, Confucius is the latinised name used by the Jesuits) but a whole canon of sources attributed to him and his disciples (according to Cheng 1997 the individual author does not count as much as in Western philosophy, it is rather a tradition of thought that is the focus of a never-ending conversation within a school). Confucius' teachings, preserved in the Lunyu or Analects, form the foundation of the Ru (儒) school of thought on the education and comportment of the ideal man, how such an individual should live his life and interact with others, and the forms of society and government in which he should participate. The so-called Five Classics form the Confucian body of thought that spread across China, Korea, Japan and beyond (Kuhn 2014:136-40). While Confucians believe that people live their lives within parameters firmly established by Heaven (seen as a purposeful Supreme Being as well as 'nature' and its fixed cycles and patterns) they argue that men are responsible for their actions and especially for their treatment of others. Fung Yu-lan, one of the 20th century authorities on the history of Chinese thought, compared Confucius' influence in Chinese history with that of Socrates in the West (Riegel 2013). One of the later Confucian scholars, Mencius (孟子 390-305 BC) took up and started to spread Confucius' ideas, but it was only several hundred years later that the newly founded Han dynasty state (206 BC-220 AD) adopted Confucianism as its official ideology (Kuhn 2014:103). Confucianism was not limited to one nation or ethnic group but a multicultural system of political thought and governance (or civilisation; Duara 2001) Chinese in origin, but allowing Korea and Japan (and others like Vietnam) to preserve and develop their cultural specificities (Kuhn 2014:22).

'By the late nineteenth century, the whole East Asian region was thoroughly "Confucianized". That is, Confucian values and practices informed the daily lives of people in China, Korea, Japan and Vietnam, and whole systems of government were justified with reference to Confucian ideals.' (Bell and Hahm 2003:1). Confucianism proved resilient and flexible, able to absorb other traditions like Daoism or Buddhism (Cheng 1997), constantly evolving or in Japan to blend with Buddhist and

55 Confucius himself may not have thought of himself as Chinese and he migrated between different states of what is now China. Today he may have carried a business card identifying him as international strategy consultant and leadership coach.
Shinto practices during the Bakufu period (1600-1854) (Kuhn 2014:551, 579-82)\textsuperscript{56}. It is in this larger sense that I label pre-20\textsuperscript{th} century NE Asia ‘Confucian international society’ (in a chrono-centric way for the sake of convenience rather than a self-reference of the time). There were also unsuccessful attempts at the end of the 19\textsuperscript{th} century to adapt Confucianism to Western modernity. These attempts largely failed in all the NE Asian countries. The impact of modernity in East Asia at the end of the 19\textsuperscript{th} century made Confucianism look like ‘a dead tradition that has been (justifiably) relegated to the dustbin of history.’ (Bell and Hahm 2003:3). Nationalists, modernisers, Marxists and militarists held Confucianism responsible for their countries' inability to withstand or compete with Western imperialism, technology and power\textsuperscript{57}. While Marxists rejected Confucianism as reactionary and feudal, Max Weber considered Confucianism as incompatible with modern capitalism. Hence, after a millennial dominance in an international society in East Asia, Confucianism was quickly replaced by Western, capitalist modernity, with Japanese politicians and administrators ‘quicker than their Korean and Chinese counterparts to employ European legal and political vocabulary, as well as diplomatic practices, which gave Japan an advantage in pursuing an imperialistic policy towards its neighbours’ (Korhonen 2014:6). Ringmar (2012) explains Japan’s nimble adaptation to the modern ‘Westphalian’ system by the already existing ‘Westphalian’ elements alongside ‘Confucian’ ones in the Tokugawa system which was quick to develop the ‘Westphalian’ elements to bolster the legitimacy of the Meiji Restauration. After an unsuccessful reform attempt in 1898 it took China nearly fifty more years than Japan to have its unequal treaties finally abrogated in 1943 and be granted "civilised" status (Duara 2001:108).

Interest in Confucianism only really revived in the 1980s as an explanatory variable for East Asia's economic and industrial development that was so successful compared with the lagging progress of other developing countries. This fuelled the so-called Asian values debate which in turn fell silent after the 1997 Asian financial crisis (Mo 2003:55). Some dismissed the recourse to Confucianism, mainly by Singapore’s Lee Kuan Yew, as an intellectual, pseudo-cultural defence of authoritarian rule. Many continued to consider Confucianism as reactionary (on gender issues and liberal individual values) and saw it as incompatible with democracy, capitalism and the rule of law (Bell and Hahm 2003:3). Despite this view an influential group of scholars started to identify Confucian humanist values and examined how Confucian values influenced modern and democratic societies in East Asia (such as Korea or Taiwan as opposed to the authoritarian ones like China and Singapore). This approach focused on how the traditional adaptability of Confucianism to social and political change could make Confucianism relevant again in the modern world (Bell and Hahm 2003). Their research emphasised that Confucian traditions of ritual propriety 'functioned as a political norm that effectively restrained and disciplined political rulers in pre-modern East Asia' and hence could connect to modern ideas about democracy and rule of law (Bell and Hahm 2003:7; Hahm 2003; Mo 2003). Practices of accountability such as censure of the ruler, vetting of appointments, implementation of laws, adjudication of legal disputes and sanctions on officials' breaches of conduct, were institutionalised through offices of censors and counsellors and officially recorded. These practices allowed the Confucian elites to voice dissent and opposition to the ruler and provide checks and balances on the Court and the

\textsuperscript{56} I'm grateful to Pekka Korhonen for this point.

\textsuperscript{57} Duara (2001:109) quoting Liang Qichao opines: "Nothing could have been further from the Confucian notion of wenming when he [Liang] wrote, "Competition is the mother of Civilization"."
Confucian societies tended to be opposed in moral terms to selfish profit-making and individual pursuits and to emphasise social relations and networks of mutual responsibility. In this sense governments tried to rein in markets and control the economy in ways to ensure public welfare (state granaries, collective water management through the so-called well-field system etc.). However, the Confucian family and networks ethics in fact ensured a decentralised pursuit of prosperity and economic activity often at odds with government efforts at control and centralisation (Bell and Hahn 2003:14; Kang 2010 also notes the frequently undermined government edicts trying to stop private international trade). Such networks continue to be seen as distinctive features of East Asian capitalism today and underlie the concept of ‘open regionalism’ (Yeo 2010). These affective networks therefore provide a distinctive model of international society beyond the realm of states, but also attract criticism for promoting crony capitalism and corruption (Bell and Hahn 2003:15). For Qin Yaqing, these affective networks, or Guanxi (关系) provide an avenue for a distinctive school of Chinese IR (Qin 2016). Similarly the role of government in the economy and its purpose to ensure public welfare is seen as a Confucian influence on the Asian development state (Bell and Hahn 2003:16; Kalinowski 2008, 2012).

Important organising principles of Confucian society are hierarchy and reciprocity and the pursuit of harmony (or order)\(^{58}\) – Kuhn 2014:136-40). The rule of law is something Confucian society has been uncomfortable with, from a philosophical point of view\(^{59}\), but perhaps also in historical opposition to the school of legalists during the Qin dynasty (221-206 BC) which conquered and then unified China’s diverse states using laws and standards in often quite brutal ways (Kuhn 2014:98-103, 140-1; Delmas-Mart 2005). But what modern Confucianists focus on is the traditional practice of mediation (which could be important for dealing also with international conflicts and moralisation gaps): ‘By relying on persuasion and education (as opposed to binding judgements on the parties), the ultimate aim was the reconciliation of the disputants to each other and hence the restoration of the personal harmony and social solidarity that have been temporarily breached by the conflict’ (Bell and Hahn 2003:18; cf. also Galtung 2002). However, as we shall see, the appropriation of modern international law in NE Asia at the end of the 19th century proved a critical break with that tradition and complicates the resolution of conflicts such as the current territorial ones over little islands, which in fact require reconciliation of the disputants.

Ritual propriety or rites – Li (礼) - play an important role in Confucian thought as a constitutional restraint on rulers (Hahn 2003), in human relations and by extension in hierarchical relations between states and rulers in the Confucian international society in NE Asia: ‘Confucius taught that the practice of altruism he thought necessary for social cohesion could be mastered only by those who have learned self-discipline. Learning self-restraint involves studying and mastering li, the ritual forms and rules of propriety through which one expresses respect for superiors and

\(^{58}\) “Good government consists in the ruler being a ruler, the minister being a minister, the father being a father, and the son being a son” (Lunyu 12.11) quoted from Riegel (2013).

\(^{59}\) “If the people be led by laws, and uniformity among them be sought by punishments, they will try to escape punishment and have no sense of shame. If they are led by virtue, and uniformity sought among them through the practice of ritual propriety, they will possess a sense of shame and come to you of their own accord” (Lunyu 2.3) quoted from Riegel (2013).
enacts his role in society in such a way that he himself is worthy of respect and admiration.' (Riegel 2013). The topics of (self)restraint, respect and mutuality are important issues that are also theorized by Wendt (1999) in the constructivist school. They are crucial for a social and relational understanding of international society as we will examine later. These concepts of ritual propriety also explain the insistence on ‘sincere’ apologies and rectifying historical accounts in contemporary NE Asia.

1.4. Before sovereignty: Power and violence in Confucian international society

The ‘long peace’ in NE Asia in the ‘Confucian international society’ from at least the 17th to the 19th century stands in stark contrast to the violence and power politics in the region since the end of the 19th century when European imperialism and its underlying ideology dramatically transformed the region’s moral beliefs and international relations. While the expression ‘long peace’ is from Gaddis (1986) and focused on Cold War Europe, US and USSR relations, the concept of ‘eternal peace’ is an important one in Eastern (Chinese) thought. That long peace relied on very different institutions of international society from those of the ‘Westphalian’ one (International Society Mark I) and in particular from those Gaddis refers to (bipolarity, nuclear deterrence, reconnaissance revolution and ideological restraint in the face of mutually ensured destruction). The European concept of sovereignty was alien to the Chinese or Confucian world which in its international relations operated in a logic of (Confucian) hierarchy with the Chinese Emperor at its centre based on a ‘Mandate of Heaven’ (Kuhn 2014:45-6; Song 2012).

In Barnett and Duvall’s (2005) power taxonomy (chapter II.2.2. and table 3) this hierarchy and the investiture and tribute system correspond to a form of structural power where the relationships are constitutive of the system and based on the productive power of the Confucian state philosophy. These states had developed their statehood earlier than most European states. They had clear boundaries between them, but less clearly delineated maritime and steppe frontiers (Kang 2010:139-157). It is at these steppe frontiers, the frontier of civilisation and barbarians that the productive and structural powers of the Confucian world fizzled out and compulsory power was used in both offensive and defensive (Great Wall) ways (cf. Chaliand 1995 on the history of the steppe empires). Some of these steppe civilisations, however, built up their own states (often using Sinic models) such as the Manchu who even took over control of the Chinese Empire in 1644 (as the Qing dynasty until 1911) while preserving their own separate state, language and ethnic practices (Chaliand 1995). Tibetan kingdoms are another example of such sometimes semi-nomadic states at the frontiers of Empire caught between assimilation and resistance to Chinese rule.

Confucian states were strong, but not conceived of as nation-states, but rather dynastic-administrative states. Their identities were clear, albeit not expressed in nationalist terms like in Europe, but dynastic, hierarchical, administrative, ritual, cultural, local and family identities (Duara 2001:117-25). China then was not a nation-state and in fact was repeatedly ruled by foreign invaders which created resentment among many Han Chinese officials but didn’t affect the international system as the Joseon reaction to the Manchu conquest of Ming-China shows (cf. Joseon and Choson are different transliterations into English of the same Korean words.
China before the 20\textsuperscript{th} century did not use a country-name (Lovell 2011:81). It was known by the names of its dynasties while the term Zhongguo (中國, city or state in the centre or Middle Kingdom) since the 1\textsuperscript{st} millennium BC referred to the area ruled by the (competing) kings in the centre of China (so wasn't fully synonymous with China like today; Kuhn 2014:21, French 2017:69). This was also the case in what is now Korea (the English word itself derives from an earlier dynasty name Koryo, but South and North Korea use different names in Korean language derived from yet different dynasties\footnote{The English names do not adequately reflect the implications of the Korean words used by the two countries for the English word Korea thus not only differentiating the political system: North Korea uses Choson (or Joseon) (朝鮮) the last dynasty name (1392-1910) which had its capital in the North to stress its historic legitimacy, while South Korea uses (大韓), the Great Han which refers to the earlier three ancient kingdoms in the South (Kuhn 2014:21). Needless to say that the historical implications for unity and legitimacy of rule are crucial and intended but too complex to address in detail here. One of the key concepts of order in Confucian thought is 正名 zheng ming; giving the proper names or as Riegel (2013:9) says the use of proper language to describe a social reality including rectifying behavior and the social reality so that they correspond to the language with which people identify themselves and describe their roles in society. Cheng (1997:76-9) presents the concept and the constitutive relationship between language and reality it implies and the harmony it seeks to achieve by naming correctly. For Xunzi (荀子), a classical Confucian scholar, zheng ming was about how one should go about inventing new terms that were suitable to the age (Riegel 2013:9 and Cheng 1997:215-6. It boils down to: only a sovereign who behaves like a sovereign should be called a sovereign (Cheng 1997:448).}). Japan, also a Westernised word, was called Nippon or Nihon (two readings of the same characters 日本) since 671 based on a Chinese word Ribenguo 日本國 or land where the sun has its origin (Kuhn 2014:21, French 2017:196), indicating its geographic position seen from China (not unlike the words Orient and Occident). Country or rather state names in the area have changed over the centuries and Western names are often corrupted names from different periods. States had clear positions in domestic and international society and formed a civilised community demarcated from the (nomadic or semi-nomadic) barbarians and pirates. Unlike 19\textsuperscript{th} century Europe with its power balancing, the Confucian international society formed a community of states ordered in a hierarchy that in its relations with each other largely refrained from the use of force and territorial conquest or exchanges. This community and Confucian International Society shared certain principles of state philosophy (see above 1.1.3.) as institutions of their society. I also use the word community asynchronously of course for analytical purposes, it is meant to reflect elements equivalent to the modern definition of security communities (cf. table 1):
### Table 1: Equivalence of modern security community, Confucian society and today's EU and NE Asia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Security community (Adler and Barnett 1998:30-35)</th>
<th>Confucian international society</th>
<th>European Union</th>
<th>North East Asia today</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>members have shared identities, values and meaning</td>
<td>Confucian state philosophy, stability, cosmic harmony and order</td>
<td>Democracy, fundamental values and objectives enshrined in EU Treaties</td>
<td>Different political and value systems; exclusive national identity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>relations are many-sided and face to face</td>
<td>various regulated diplomatic or tribute and trade relationships which required occasional face to face ritualistic interaction; only partly many-sided, mostly bilateral</td>
<td>EU summits, institutions, committees</td>
<td>Relations are largely bilateral or even non-existent Ad hoc and largely through Foreign Office channels; limited trilateral relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>long-term interests are pursued and often a sense of altruism or responsibility develops</td>
<td>long-term interest in social stability, defence against nomadic incursions and piracy and a cultivation of civilisational achievement and refinement, benevolence</td>
<td>TEU objectives, long-term policies through legislation, community method, majority voting, solidarity clause, respect for rule of law and Court decisions; compromise culture</td>
<td>Focus on almost exclusively national interest, often short-term, no sense of shared responsibility or altruism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>peaceful resolution of conflicts</td>
<td>number of wars/invasions was very low and the case of the Imjin War showed a strong moral reaction against aggression within the Confucian world</td>
<td>Compromises, procedures, ECJ</td>
<td>No mechanism for conflict resolution, risk of armed conflicts; antagonistic and mutually exclusive views on conflicts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reciprocity</td>
<td>very essence of the investiture and tribute system and in general relationships in the Confucian world</td>
<td>Solidarity, financial transfers</td>
<td>Conditional reciprocity and tit-for-tat</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

However, this narrative of a shared long peace and of cultural achievement in this proto-security community – and the institutionalisation of norms for agonistic conflict resolution to apply Mouffe’s (2010) term to Confucian thought - is largely absent in today’s national narratives of
often antagonistic identities. Visions for NE Asian cooperation also largely ignore this past community. Instead the narrative of commonality and harmony is disfigured by projecting the modern nationalist narratives backward in time. Some Koreans I have spoken to believe a history of permanent aggression by their neighbouring countries over centuries being taught in schools where Western historians or political scientists can identify only one major aggression before the 20th century, the Imjin壬辰 war, a double attempt in 1592 and 1598 of Japanese Kampaku (imperial regent and later Chancellor of the realm) Toyotomi Hideyoshi (豊臣秀吉) to conquer first Korea and then China and one further military operation by Manchu forces in Korea in the context of their invasion of China62. The battles of the Imjin War took place on the Korean peninsula and Korean troops were helped by the Ming army to push back the aggression (see below). It is likely that the other hundreds of invasions that seem to exist in the Korean historical consciousness refer to attacks by Japanese or Chinese pirates or border tribes on Korean villages and ships (Kang 2010:86-9). In contemporary parlance that would be non-state actors and private violence and not interstate wars (Münkler 2002), Kang (2010:82-106) has counted and classified the conflicts in the region (including Vietnam and others beyond my focus on NE Asia) and shows that China and other Confucian states did use force and engaged in numerous conflicts, but hardly ever against each other (12 out of 336 conflicts of different types between 1368 and 1841 – listed in a table by Kang 2010:91). Most conflicts were with nomads in what is now Xinjiang, with Tibetan and Mongol polities as well as with the organised pirates (wako) and most were border skirmishes rather than wars (defined as causing more than 1000 battle deaths).

This briefly summarised historical evidence from NE Asia that I will develop a bit more in the next sections shows that power distribution, great power balance and war (traditional institutions of the Concert of Europe and in the English School’s concept of International Society Mark I borrowed from realism) cannot explain the constitution of the Confucian International Society in the Ming (明朝1368-1644) and Qing (清朝1644-1911) periods (Kang 2010, Kuhn 2014). The size and power of China is often seen as a problem for international relations and regional integration today – and of course it is, but in the past regional society in NE Asia, when China was even more powerful compared with its neighbours than it is today, the region did not balance against China, nor did China simply absorb its neighbour-states (Kang 2010:33-7). Its expansion under the Qing was limited to its ‘uncivilised’ Western and Northern border regions and nomadic or semi-nomadic societies (Lovell 2011:82-5; Kang 2010:82-106). Contrary to Europe’s violent history the region found a rather stable modus vivendi a few centuries before Europe did. This system was built around China at the apex of a regional status hierarchy but states remained independent (Kang 2010; Song 2012). In Confucian state philosophy order and harmony were crucial concepts and international order was not a consequence of permanent power balancing, but of ordering role relationships according to this body of thought (Cheng 1997:38-40; Bell and Hahm 2003). In contemporary terms it was the soft power of attraction (Nye 2004) or productive power in the terms of Barnett and Duvall (2005:55-7; cf. chapter II.2.2 table 3) emanating from the Ming and Qing courts and co-constructed by the other polities and thus not exclusively Chinese (Song 2012:176-7). The humanistic and cosmopolitan philosophy underpinning the recruitment of elites and the conduct of state affairs in various countries provided the glue for the Confucian

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62 Korea, Japan and China have different names for the same wars. Imjin is the Korean one, with the Chinese pronunciation Renchen used in the Chinese name, marking the name of the year 1592.
international society and order.

Yet, regarding the importance of war and power politics in the Confucian International Society, according to Kang (2010:1) the Imjin War (see next section) was the only war between China, Japan and Korea in 600 years (until the end of the 19th century) emphasising that contemporary IR theories grounded in realism do not provide the appropriate framework to understand the Confucian international society (while perhaps able to help explain the one or the other behaviour during conflicts such as the Manchu need for a pacified Korea while it was conquering China, but such explanations do not go beyond classical military strategy). Realist IR theories are better suited to capture the NE Asian dynamics since the 1930s, but they tend to miss out on the underlying ideas that created these dynamics in the first place and over-emphasise the Cold War as a global overlay of the regional security complex (Buzan and Waever 2003) and perhaps exaggerate the importance of a new global overlay of US-China rivalry or co-hegemony (G2)(Green 2017).

Military power was not the key category for relations in the Confucian world because the hierarchy was built on civilisational not military or material superiority, on structural not compulsory power (Kuhn 2014:36-8). As already mentioned military power was used in relations with outsiders (nomads, pirates Kang 2010:139-57; Song 2012:168), but rarely among the states forming the Confucian international society (not all those states survive today). This is therefore in line with Wendt's (1999:19) claim that power and interests themselves are effects of ideas. The power of China was not seen by, for instance Joseon Korea, as a threat, just like today US nuclear missiles are not seen as a threat by Canadians or Mexicans and are not what forces them to cooperate with the US. Rather China was an idea of civilisational norm and associated ritual that guaranteed (cosmic and social) harmony and order. It was thus not fear that held the tribute system together as our FT correspondent Anderlini suggested.63 At times though, China's military power was important and used for instance at the end of the 16th century to push back the Japanese invasion of Korea aimed at China, the Imjin War.

1.5. The Imjin War between Japan, Korea and China: a critical juncture in NE Asia’s regional pathway

The Imjin War (1592-1598) marks an important juncture in this Confucian international society as it led to an enduring pattern of covert and later overt rivalry between China and Japan for leadership in East Asia and the Korean trauma of feeling like a “shrimp between whales”. In 1592 Japan challenged the China-dominated system militarily first attacking Korea (as it would again in the 20th century). Interestingly, this happened at the end of a century of civil war in Japan itself (Sengoku jidai 戦国時代) where local leaders (Daimyō 大名) fought against the central authority and each other (Kreiner 2012:168-180). It was not one of the traditionally educated princes, but a military leader of low descent, Toyotomi Hideyoshi64, who after unifying the warring states in

63 Some observers, although they acknowledge there is no evidence, insist on the importance of military power, such as French (2017:7) quoting a Japanese scholar, Takeshi Hamashita: "Like any hegemonic order [the tribute system] was backed by military force, but when the system functioned well, principles of reciprocity involving politics and economics permitted long periods of peaceful interaction."

64 豊臣 秀吉 In Japanese like in Chinese and Korea, the family name comes first. Hideyoshi's surname changed
Japan undertook the military invasion of Korea (and China) for apparently not very clear reasons, but seemingly driven by a need to feed his army and the legitimacy of his rule through conquest (Kang 2010:96). Tellingly, Hideyoshi after reforming Japan and consolidating his rule wanted recognition by the Ming as an equal not a secondary tribute state lower in rank than Korea and Vietnam (Kang 2010:96-7). After the Ming refused to grant equality to the new ruler of Japan, Hideyoshi seems to have then decided to substitute himself for the Emperor of China (Kreiner 2012:180-5) but he died during the war in 1598 and his successor, Tokugawa Ieyasu (德川 家康), abandoned the foreign adventure while preserving much of the unifying reforms Hideyoshi had undertaken. Thus, the revisionist challenge to the Confucian regional order seems to have been partly a consequence of the breakdown of traditional Confucian internal order in Japan itself and the ambition of a Japanese ruler to operate a dynastic change (not to change the system itself) and should be considered as the proverbial exception to the rule.

Contrary to contemporary realist theories about power balancing Korea did not team up with Hideyoshi to challenge China’s hegemony. Korea refused granting Japanese troops free passage to invade China. Neither did China take advantage of its large army in weakened Korea during the Imjin war to simply annex it (Kang 2010:98 says that this idea didn’t even cross the Ming Emperor’s mind). However, ever since this thwarted attempt by Japan to revise the hierarchy and change the order in Confucian international society of the time the ambiguous relations of Japan with the China-centred order have remained a feature of regional society (Kang 2010:97). Moreover, the Imjin War for Koreans is an important element of their victim narrative and the conception of Japanese as relentless colonisers trying for centuries to subjugate Korea. At the same time the role of the Ming troops in the victory is downplayed compared to the merit of Korea’s national hero Admiral Yi Sun-sin (이순신; 李舜臣 whose statue towers over Guanghwamun Square in Seoul). Even the abduction of Korean potters to Japan during the war (a major boost to Japan’s porcelain manufacturing) is seen as a precedent for abductions of Koreans as forced labourers in wartime Japan during WWII and even gets recalled when Japan today accuses North Korea of abductions of its citizens. The underlying narrative is an image of a rapacious Japan owing its own cultural or industrial development and power to exploitation of culturally superior, but militarily weak Koreans since time immemorial and analogous to the 20th century colonisation and the profit Japan drew from the Korean War.

Hideyoshi’s successor, Tokugawa Ieyasu who had taken power by force from Hideyoshi’s son, saw his first priority as ordering Japan’s relations with Korea while Korea needed the trade with Japan for the reconstruction after the war. Korean envoys to Japan expected a re-confirmation of equal status in the tribute system, which Ieyasu was not ready to concede. The Daimyō of Tsushima, an island which functioned as the main trading place between Korea and Japan, ‘helped’ the establishment of diplomatic relations at ‘equal’ status through falsifying several sets of diplomatic documents. As a result several Korean missions travelled to Japan, while the Shogun never replicated, thus making believe that Korea was paying tribute to him. In this case private economic interests of Tsushima families impacted on the official political relations, but the focus was on re-building order.

several times; Toyotomi was given to him by the imperial court after he became regent (kampaku).
Tokugawa Japan which had actually lost the war but taken considerable spoils from Korea, obscured the result and indeed portrayed Korea as a subjugated state. Many years of negotiations led both sides to believe different things about their respective status after the war (Kang 2010:74-6). Tokugawa Japan kept appearances, but in fact left – and was ‘expelled’ from - the China (and Korea) dominated investiture and tribute system in the mid-seventeenth century (after the Imjin War and the end of the Ming dynasty 50 years later). Japan became largely inward-looking, however, it kept trade relations including with Qing China and Joseon Korea and established its own system of tribute relationships (for instance the Ryukyu kingdom (琉球諸島) gave tribute to both China and Japan). Japan was thus not closed or isolated (Kang 2010:79-81) but no longer actively participated in the China-centred international society. Kreiner (2010:197-203) dismisses the idea of a closed Japan as a European misunderstanding (going back to a book by Engelbert Kaempfer published in 1712) and argues that Japan built up a second tribute system in East Asia with Japan as its centre. The Dutch were part of this system (in the Japanese perspective) and followed the rules of the Japanese (Suzuki 2014). This included also Taiwan, the Ryukus (now Okinawa) and the Northern islands (Kuriles). The territories concerned by the ambiguity of the falsified peace settlement and the expansion of Japan trade and control in the 17th century foreshadowed the annexation of all these territories by Imperial Japan at the end of the 19th century when ambiguity gave way to the zero-sum view of sovereignty and nationalism. Ryukyu was forced into this second tribute system through an invasion in 1609 confirming the alienation of Japan from and rivalry with the China-centred world order, but continued its tribute missions to China. As a result the Ryukyu Kingdom owed allegiance to both China (since the 14th century) and Japan (since 1609) until it was annexed by Japan in 1879; Oberländer 2012:268-72). Interestingly, the Japanese established relations with the Ming loyalists who had escaped the Manchu conquest of China by seeking refuge on Taiwan which they controlled for several decades65. Like this Japan could keep relations with the ‘legitimate’ China refusing to deal with the Manchu barbarians and the Qing dynasty66 (contrary to Joseon Korea as we shall see below).

From this brief account by Kreiner, it becomes clear that the China-Japan rivalry became more entrenched after the Imjin war and that the Sino-centric system became paralleled by a similar Japan-centred one, albeit without causing major wars as could have been expected in a ‘realist’ reading of history. The ambiguity of the post-Imjin War period lasted more than 400 years until the end of the 19th century. It cannot adequately be captured or disentangled with notions of power balancing or international law. This ambiguity allowed ‘agonistic’ appearances to preserve a peaceful status quo without enmity or violent conflict.

Imperial Japan at the end of the 19th century created antagonism which endures largely until today not least because the Western rationalist concepts of sovereignty and international law, super-imposed on the situation, do not tolerate ambiguity. Without the Western ideas introduced in the latter 19th century the ambivalent and peaceful status quo may well have continued. China for instance did not annex any of the territorial units in its tribute system. Annexation was not a foregone conclusion as in the 18th and 19th centuries these issues played only a peripheral role in

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65 Note the parallel to the 1945-9 Chinese civil war where the nationalist government sought refuge on Taiwan and perpetuated the Republic of China claiming all China.
66 Note again the parallel with post-War recognition by Japan and Western countries of the ROC in Taiwan which represented China in the UN until 1971 before the PRC took over.
Japan’s development or China’s ambitions. The ‘imperialist turn’ of the Meiji Restoration was due to European ideas about social Darwinism, imperialism paired with sovereignty and *Lebensraum* which replaced the investiture and tribute system with its ambiguities that had allowed shelving any conflicts. As Micievic (2010:10) finds, such expansion and strengthening is characteristic of the nation-state idea in the 19th/20th centuries (and beyond) and often simply justified by the interest of the nation to gain more territory or resources, just as Imperial Japan argued. This period of imperialist aggression then marks a second critical juncture in Japan’s development and international relations on a pathway which started in the 16th century. But it is also important to note that Japan’s imperialism started as a fight against the unequal treaties imposed by Western powers on Japan.

One can thus say that present rivalry between China and Japan for leadership in East Asia and Korean tensions with Japan over equal status versus domination go back to this first important episode of the Imjin War and its aftermath (roughly coinciding with the Thirty Years War in Europe) which can thus be identified as a critical juncture on the region’s pathway, but it required a second critical juncture – Western imperialism and nationalist ideas of the 19th century – to turn this agonistic rivalry into actual conflict, war and conquest. Kang (2010) argues that Japan for the 300 years after the failed invasion of China via Korea by Hideoshi was a part of the Chinese world, but admits it is a boundary case of the Confucian society (Kang 2010:9). A more nuanced view is that while Japan remained strongly impregnated by Confucianism and Chinese cultural practices it sought a larger degree of isolation from China as a state and from its hegemony than for instance Korea and established rival networks of allegiances and trade (Kuhn 2014; Suzuki 2014). Japan also filled the gap left by China’s declining exports to Europe when China was in internal turmoil as the Manchu invaded, overthrew the Ming and established the Qing dynasty (MacGregor 2012:437-8, Kuhn 2014:625). Significantly, Japan did not ally with the Manchu troops to participate in the war against Ming China.

### 1.6. The Manchu invasion of China and constitutional crisis in Korea

At about the time of the Thirty Years War in Europe, the Manchu (滿族) - a semi-nomadic people settled NE of the Great Wall in Manchuria that had been in a tributary relationship to the Ming Court – shook the sino-centric order in NE Asia. The Manchu formed the Qing dynasty in 1636 and took over China in 1644 from the Ming dynasty, which was weakened by the Imjin wars (Song 2012:170). Resistance to Qing rule by partisans of the expired Ming dynasty continued especially in Southern China for many years. That dynastic change at the hand of ‘barbarians’ provoked a constitutional crisis in Joseon Korea linked to their loyalty to the Ming order and civilisation idea of legitimacy (Hahn 2009). In Korea, different from China, officials formed competing parties (당쟁 tangjaeng) which at times toppled monarchs, such as Kwanghae-gun (光海君 1608-23). He was overthrown in 1623 partly because he didn’t oppose the Manchu threats to the Ming dynasty (Kuhn 2014:528-9; Song 2012:161-2). Kwanghae’s successor, King Injo (仁祖 王) pursued a pro-Ming policy provoking a Manchu invasion in 1627 and again in 1637 forcing the King to recognise Qing suzerainty. Yet, the Manchu didn’t occupy Korea or forced Koreans to adopt Manchu ways like they did when they took power in China (Kuhn 2014:530). Nevertheless, until the end of the 17th century Korea remained loyal to the Ming dynasty and felt superior to the
‘barbaric’ Qing (Kuhn 2014:530-1). This also underlines that the issue was not about power but about cultural identity and legitimacy of rule. This constitutional debate was similar in nature to the Japanese dealing with the ‘legitimate’ Ming partisans on Taiwan under Zheng Chengong (鄭成功 ‘Koxinga’) (Kuhn 2014:516) rather than the Qing ‘barbarians’, except that Joseon drew the opposite conclusion. The Qing were initially considered as barbarians until they emulated their Ming predecessors. They thus didn't change the system, but 'slipped into it’. However, the Manchu conquest also led to a military conflict between the Manchu invaders and Joseon dynasty Korea. Because Joseon initially sided with the Ming the Manchu sent troops to secure their southern flank, but also asked for a continuation of an earlier non-aggression pact between brother nations dating back several centuries. Eventually, what is known as the Manchu Pacification of Korea was humilitating for Korea in a nationalist view of events, but for Kang (2010:103-5) does not qualify as a full-scale war because of less than 1000 battle deaths and the fact that the Manchu did not conquer Korea but merely sought to re-instate brotherly relations of the past, open trade with Korea and obtain the mutual recognition for the dynasty in the investiture and tribute system once they had taken over rule in China from the Ming.

Japan with its own imperial system, but with the power in the hands of the Shogunate, resisted and finally bowed out of the formal tributary conditions after 150 years of such tribute relations and organised its own (Kang 2010:60-1; Kreiner 2012:197-203; Kuhn 2014:451). Japan’s domestic situation with the prevalence of the ‘warrior class’ dominating state affairs (shogun and samurai) differed in this important aspect from the evolution of China and Korea where the scholar-officials dominated over the military officials (Kuhn 2014:551). Ironically though the Japanese considered the Qing dynasty (the Manchu) as ‘barbarians’ on the basis of shared Confucian ideas about civilisation (Kang 2010:69) certainly contributing to the emerging rivalry and refusal to recognise the superiority of the Chinese state. Thus this contestation was more about legitimacy in the eyes of each other, rather than power. Qing did not even consider an invasion of Japan to subdue it and Manchu troops didn’t occupy or annex Korea at the same time as it conquered the Ming throne. Japan’s relations with the other countries just remained distant with appearances relatively intact and informal trade flourishing (official tribute trade was always only a very small part of overall trade; Kang 2010:107-38): ‘Between 1644-1911, Japan sent no tributary mission to China, but substantial trade was conducted not only at Nagasaki but also by those that the Qing state repeatedly denounced as “pirates”...that is, traders who were beyond official control.’ (Selden 2008:9)

The important point is that states in the region created a particular culture of peaceful co-existence, a regional society with norms and rituals that was ‘cosmopolitan’ and international and that could accommodate power asymmetry and power transitions including of the Manchu invasion. This Confucian culture of hierarchy (an expression of which was the investiture and tribute system –册封朝贡) analytically may still have been an Empire, but it was certainly constructed and perceived by contemporaries in Korea, Vietnam, the Ryukyu (琉球諸島) kingdom and Japan as something different than the power and conquest-based Roman or British Empires. The concept was inclusive and universal ‘all under heaven’ 天下 and thus cosmopolitan (cf. chapter II.4.2).The nomadic people to the West and North integrated by force under Qing rule may have seen this differently of course but they were outside the Confucian regional society. It was only at
the end of the 19th century that Koreans and Japanese reinterpreted this shared Confucian past in modern Western nationalist and imperialist terms and rejected it as later the Chinese themselves did (Cheng 1997). Of course, the point can be made that this was due to China’s weakness at the hands of foreign invaders, but earlier the Ming/Qing transition only provoked Japan’s distancing from China and that was linked to Japan’s earlier unsuccessful attack on Joseon Korea and Ming China, rather than Ming weakness.

1.7. The investiture and tribute system as international society

There are different interpretations of how the investiture and tribute system worked and even whether it existed as a system at all (Cha 2011; Zhang 2009). Kang (2010) reviews the earlier critical literature such as John Fairbank’s dismissal of the tribute system as functional (a cloak for trade) and other’s of it as merely symbolic (Kang 2010:11-14) and concludes that ‘these rules and rites were intimately involved with ordering diplomatic, cultural, economic, and political relations among a number of actors’ (Kang 2010:13). Kreiner (2012:156) similarly argues: ‘Wichtig ist festzuhalten, daß dieses Tributsystem keine ausschließlich bilaterale Verbindung zwischen China und einem bestimmten Land darstellte. Vielmehr wurde eine multilaterale, internationale Ordnung hergestellt, in der etwa zwei zu China in Tributbeziehung stehende Reiche als gleichberechtigt miteinander kommunizieren und auf diese Weise kriegerische Auseinandersetzungen vermieden werden konnten.’ Gao (2015) who also builds on extensive existing literature, looks at the tribute system from the angle of regional public goods and finds it loosely cooperative and weak in terms of delivering public goods. The weakness of Gao’s argument is that it projects a market-approach to security and economic interaction into a past where there was no real market and demand in such a distinctive way for such public goods. But even so, arguably, the Confucian states did produce important public goods such as shared culture, script and literature and norms from a shared political culture (and philosophy), rules of behaviour, peaceful coexistence, cooperation in fighting pirates, smugglers, nomads and regulating trade, fishing and other economic activities (Song 2012; Kuhn 2014). Selden (2008:9) emphasises the importance of economic exchanges in NE Asia and beyond contrary to Gao, but also contrary to state-centric readings of the tribute trade: ‘Beyond the tributary system and the centrality of silver is a spatial vision centered less on national economies and state policies, and more on open ports and their hinterlands, one that draws attention to maritime intercourse and the periphery, and that calls into question the statecentric parameters that have long dominated scholarship.’ Incidentally that view seems to foreshadow the ‘open regionalism’ of contemporary Asia. But Selden (2008:10) also concludes that ‘Asia, with China at its center, experienced a long epoch of peace and prosperity that resulted from the successful working of a tributary-trade order that placed the region at the center of the world economy at a time when Europe was plagued by war and turmoil. While our discussion has centered on finance, silver and banking, tributary and private trade lubricated the regional order. So too did common elements of statecraft in the Neo-Confucian orders in Japan, Korea, the Ryukyus, and Vietnam.’

67 My translation: It is important to note that this tribute system didn't just create exclusive bilateral links between China and another country; rather it created a multilateral international order in which for instance two countries in a tributary realtionship with China would relate to each other on equal terms and thus avoid violent conflict.
Kang’s book (2010) makes a well researched case corroborated by Kuhn (2014), Song (2012) and other research to present a similar argument as Selden’s based on primary sources. Historians may well want to do more research into the tribute system from this angle and taking account of the places of the various countries in this hierarchical-multilateral international society.

The investiture and tribute system varied over time and among the various actors which included not only the countries of NE Asia, but a large number of kingdoms and tribes in the larger Asian region (Kreiner 2012:157). The investiture and tribute system was the main institution through which a set of widely shared norms, formal and informal rules and protocol of interaction produced substantial stability in a formal hierarchy with the Ming and Qing Courts at the centre of the system. This system emphasized formal hierarchy but allowed considerable informal equality (Kang 2010:54). Kings required formal approval by the Chinese court for their succession and the choice of their heirs to the throne (investiture), but the succession was generally determined autonomously without interference from China and then ‘rubber stamped’ (with gold or jade seals rather than rubber stamps). For instance, the royal succession in Joseon Korea required the approval of the Ming or Qing imperial court (Cho 2011). Tribute refers to the sending of envoys or embassies (high ranking officials) bearing gifts to the superior court (not only to China, but also among the members of the system) at determined intervals. Unlike the emerging network of resident diplomats in Europe after the 16th century there were no permanent Embassies residing in each other’s capitals. The exchange of gifts symbolized the relationship of recognition of superior status and mutual recognition. It involved rather large amounts of expensive items exchanged (so not one way) and was part of ‘official’ barter trade. At the same time the tribute missions which stayed for weeks or months dealt with other ‘diplomatic’ matters such as exchanges of information, negotiations about politics and trade, agreements and settlement of disputes, fighting piracy, recognition of borders (for instance after changes of dynasty or other events), cultural achievements and matters similar in function to what diplomats still do today (Kang 2010:54-81). Thus one can say that the system fulfilled a number of equivalent functions of modern diplomacy and trade agreements in a different form. But it went well beyond diplomacy as it governed international society in constitutive ways (Song 2012).

A key weakness of the system was its hierarchical hubs and spokes orientation around the centrality of China and a lack of integration despite flourishing international trade in the region (Kuhn 2014:566-71). While from China’s point of view the hierarchies were clearly established, countries among themselves – while establishing similar investiture and tribute relations amongst each other – often disagreed about status. Contrary to Kreiner’s above view, Kang (2010:73) for instance finds: ‘There is a great deal of evidence that both Korea and Japan regarded each other as inferiors. States without the cultural or civilizational influence of China had far less claim to superior status relative to other secondary states. As a result, states down the hierarchy had

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68 Such documents can for instance be found in The Academy of Korean Studies Catalogue of Special Exhibition (2011) on King Yeonjo the Great (1694-1776) pp 50-57 with exhibits such as the Qing Emperor’s edict approving Yi Geum as Crown Prince of Joseon, a list of gifts from Qing Emperor to the Crown Prince, Qing Emperor’s edict approving Yi Geum as Jeoson King and his instructions to the new king. These were essentially formalities, but clearly document a hierarchical relationship. King Yeonjo by the way re-established a number of Confucian rituals underlining the rapprochement with Qing China after a prolonged constitutional crisis in Joseon (Korea) provoked by the overthrow of the Chinese Ming dynasty by the Manchu invaders (the Qing dynasty) 50 years earlier (Kuhn 2014:534-6).
trouble dealing with each other and with determining their own hierarchical ranking.

Multilateralism has few historic precedents in NE Asia. Today, the competition about status and rankings is still an important issue of pride or irk between Japan and Korea (especially for the latter due to the colonial experience).

1.8. The destruction of the Confucian International Society

The influence of the Western imperialist powers in the 19th century ‘brought to an end the the regional order and the protracted peace’ under the investiture and tribute system and ‘peace gave way to protracted conflict that culminated in the Asia Pacific War of 1931-1945’ (Selden 2008:12)

This destruction of the regional order, the implosion of Confucian international society and the de-centering of China can be considered a social tipping point or critical juncture where behavioural patterns of the state system in NE Asia changed dramatically due to a number of different and at first unrelated, non-linear changes and trigger events: developments of military technology giving Western countries an edge over their Asian counterparts, the industrial revolution and scientific progress in Europe (Morris 2011, Kocka 2013; O’Brian 2010 on the ‘great divergence’ theory) and the European discourse of a superior standard of civilisation and racism resulting in "civilising missions" (Gong 1984; Duara 2001). Misperceptions by the Qing Court over the nature of the Western threat, the internal turmoil and weakness due to the Taiping Rebellion69 (1850-64) and a wider crisis of legitimacy of Qing rule due to rising nationalism weakened China while Japan modernised and rose to pre-eminence (Mishra 2014; Cheng 1997).

The rising self-consciousness that the cherished superiority had given way to an almost hopeless inferiority compared to Western countries and even to Japan was triggered by the Sino-Japanese War of 1894/5. These events, in Galtung's formula of the CGT complex relate to the chosenness (superior civilisation) and the (chosen) trauma of de-centering, humiliation and loss of status in particular vis-à-vis Japan.

Around 1800 NE Asia was the most prosperous and stable society in the world with a significantly higher living standard than Europe (Kuhn 2014:510; Selden 2008:9). China alone produced more goods than the whole of Europe, about a third of world production (Kuhn 2014:560) and during that time Europeans (Portugese, Dutch and British) traded and conducted diplomatic relations with China on China's terms (Zhang Y . 2014). Paradoxically, China and Asia contributed considerably to the rise of the West including through Confucian ideas about good governance and economic management during the European Enlightenment (Kuhn 2014:607-30). When Western powers overthrew the Confucian investiture and tribute system, they destroyed the regional security community. When Japan then emulated Western imperialism the region was completely transformed through war, domestic turmoil in all countries, and conflicting processes of nationalism (Mishra 2014). According to Selden (2008:12-3) ‘Japan broke sharply with the dynamics of center-periphery relations associated with the tributary order. Perhaps most strikingly, in contrast to the protracted peace of eighteenth century East Asia under the earlier tributary order, Japan precipitated successive wars that kept the region in turmoil and ended in defeat for

69 Referring to the self-proclaimed Kingdom of Heavenly Peace 太平天国 by a rebel who believed he was the younger brother of Jesus Christ. Hong Xiuquan (洪秀全) proclaimed himself heavenly king against the Manchu rulers and led an anti-Manchu, anti-Opium rebellion mainly in the South of China. This civil war was devastating. The rebellion spread over 17 provinces and probably around 20 million people were killed in the upheaval.
the brash, upstart empire within half a century’.

There is no general account of the regional impact of the West on the Confucian world as Kang's (2010) book focuses only on the past Confucian society and how it worked, not how it was destroyed. Mishra (2014) comes closest, but his book – which also covers the Middle East and India - focuses on China and Japan and very little on Korea for instance. A regional history of 19th and 20th century NE Asia remains to be written. However, there are sources usually focusing on individual countries and the works I used list a large number of original sources and secondary literature: Lovell (2011), Qu (2010) for China; Schmid (2002) for Korea; Oberländer (2012) for Japan.

This destruction of the regional order started with the Opium Wars of the British Empire against the Qing Empire (1839-42) to open up Qing China to Britain’s trade70 – or more prosaically to force China’s trade surplus with Britain into a more favourable balance for Britain (Kuhn 2014:568-9). As a result of the Second Opium War (1856-60) the Qing Court finally agreed to the initially rejected Western demand to establish foreign consulates (Qu 2010:67), a major change from the non-resident tribute missions in the past.

Lovell (2011) from a historian’s perspective tells the story of the Opium Wars – the British invasion of several Chinese port cities and finally Beijing that imposed an opening up of China for British trade - in a detailed and demystifying account based on sources from both sides that reveal a large perception gap and failure to understand the respective positions of the two sides. Some of that endures until today in particular as the Chinese account developed in the 1930s by the Nationalist and then the Communist Party and re-invigorated since the patriotic education campaign of the 1990s feeds the nation-building myth of a ‘century of humiliation’ and China’s self-perception as a victim of foreign aggression and of historical injustice. The narrative is particularly sensitive as Britain was a parliamentary democracy and promoted a ‘free trade ideology’ that was Britain’s motive to start the war (free drug trade that is, led by the British East India Company, in modern parlance state sponsored international organised crime). Opium was banned in China as a poisonous drug and the destruction by Chinese authorities of British drug cargo sparked the Opium War. Thus today Western politicians urging China to open its markets and to democratising touch sensitive key elements of this victimhood narrative (or conversely the account can be used to oppose such ideas today based on projecting past humilitating experiences with free trade and democratic countries on today’s politics).

For China the shock of the Opium War was first interpreted as victimising and humiliating by the nationalist party (Guomindang 中國國民黨) in the 1930s (almost a century after the event ‘to persuade the populace to blame all China’s problems on a single foreign enemy: to transform the Opium War and its Unequal Treaty into a long-term imperialist scheme from which only the Nationalists could preserve the country, thereby justifying any sacrifice that the party required of

70 Arrighi (2010) explains the structural and enduring trade imbalance in China’s favour as due to the simple reason that China was not interested in imports from Europe whereas Chinese exports had been in high demand in Europe for centuries (similarly Lovell 2011:37-8). It needed the economic and military assault on China (and later on Japan and Korea) by the Western imperialist nations to change that. It is interesting to note in this context that China is now back in a position of nearly structural trade surplus, but of course nowadays imports are crucial for China.
The same interpretation was later used by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) after it initially ignored that aspect of history as it tried to de-emphasise the Guomindang’s role and emphasised the victor role of CCP resistance against Japan and the class struggle rather than patriotism (Wang 2008:790-4). But China today essentially sees itself as an innocent victim of repeated foreign aggression - with little introspection about its own mistakes and internal problems such as the Taiping Rebellion and other insurgencies against Qing rule whose foreign (Manchu) character was duly emphasised: ‘The Opium War’s birthday extravaganza of 1990 was the start of one of the Communist Party’s most successful post-Mao ideological campaigns, Patriotic Education, a crusade designed – as the People’s Daily explained in 1994 - to ‘boost the nation’s spirit, enhance its cohesion, foster its self-esteem and sense of pride [...]’. Lovell (2011:344). In the 1990s the topic began to be taught in schools, but the humiliation narrative was very prominent in mainland China before 1949 and remained prominent in Guomindang-ruled Taiwan after that date (Wang 2008).

The Japanese aggression against China is a long story that I cannot possibly adequately reflect here (Mitter 2014 provides a detailed account), but the early victory of Japan in 1895 over the Qing dynasty was a key event which precipitated the fall of the dynasty (in 1911). The Qing were already weakened by the Opium Wars and especially the internal tensions (most notably the extremely large and bloody rebellion of the Taiping (1850-1864). Subsequent to a narrow victory over the rebellion, aided by British General Gordon71, the Qing were fundamentally weakened and soon lost control of the country. Japan's victory in 1895 led to the loss of Taiwan and other territories and the loss of Qing suzerainity over Korea (the issue which had prompted the Sino-Japanese war). Perhaps more importantly, it led to a profound crisis in the Chinese elite, that saw its old cherished civilisational superiority not only crumble under the Western barbarians' modernity, but destroyed by a formerly inferior tribute country. A sense of humiliation was certainly palpable then, but more importantly China's intellectuals were prompted to reject their own Confucian culture and imitate Japan in its successful modernisation (Mitter 2014:17-33; Mishra 2014:174-204). In fact a lot of new notions (including Western law and words like 'society', 'democracy', 'nation') entered the Chinese language and thought via Japanese neologisms created to reflect Western knowledge (Duara 2001). Japan was partly admired as a model for reform, partly hated because of the humiliations. Many Chinese intellectuals escaped Qing repression in Japanese exile, reinforcing the ties and 'learning from the West'.

1.9. The power of the gun boats and the power of ideas: nationalism and sovereignty 'invade' Asia

In the 19th century it was the use of imperialist power i.e. the will to impose, by negotiation and by force and asymmetric use of law, Western ideas about civilisation, modernity, nationalism and territorial and economic interests that initially forced the 'Westphalian' ideas on NE Asian states (Qu 2010; Gong 1984). In a first shock of this encounter with Europe a new order (or disorder) was thus built on Western ideas and in particular that of sovereign equality and domestic sovereignty, imposed, imported by necessity or opportunistically emulated. They then adopted

71 “Chinese” Gordon is so vilified in today's China that the fact that Gordon was killed later in Sudan is one of the rhetorical ties that bind China and Sudan today.
these ideas for good, internalised them and continue to defend them today. But with a twist: Where for Europeans international law had originally been associated with regulating warfare and international commerce and nowadays is the privileged instrument to promote universalist claims of liberal values (after shelving or whitewashing the embarrassing past not least through IR theory; Hobson 2012:123, 320-4), in the minds of the countries in NE Asia international law has become associated with intrusion, colonisation and the violent promotion of European standards of civilisation - a facade for conquest. Hence, they used it mainly to defend themselves and insist on equality. Their sense of nationhood and victimhood till today feeds distrust regarding universalist or cosmopolitan claims advanced by former imperial powers. This (simplified) perception of a continued use of international law by Western powers to promote their own interests and values has undermined the credibility of some of the post-War liberal order in particular 'intrusive' pluralist concepts such as 'responsibility to protect'. Hence there is a strong resistance by virtually all non-Western countries on the safeguards provided by sovereignty. Qu (2010) shows how in the 'short timespan of 100 years' China initially rejected the concept of sovereign equality that Europeans tried to impose on it in the 19th century and then became the champion of the 'sacred principle of national sovereignty' that it is today. Qu (2010:67) does not forget to emphasise the irony of history that China in order to be able to sign the unequal treaties after the second Opium War first required the recognition of its sovereign... equality by the foreign invaders.

Adopting Western norms and institutions like international law was at that time the entry ticket into international society defined as it was then on Western terms replacing China's superior civilisation as the earlier defining institution for regional international society (Qu 2010:72). Japan’s Meiji-ishin (明治維新 restauration) and Korea’s emancipation from China and later Japanese colonial rule followed a similar path of adopting Western ways and rejecting own traditions with Korea particularly ambiguous as it rejected part of its own traditions: Bell and Hahn (2003:22) show Jeoson Korea as 'a fascinating example of the way in which philosophies developed in one place actually find their fullest and most "orthodox" expression in another' and that Korea was transformed through its own efforts into an exemplary Confucian society. Hence, the modern Korean rejection of Confucianism as foreign, i.e. Chinese is ambiguous to say the least (Schmid 2002).

Korea became the emblematic theatre of the clash of different concepts of international society between the sino-centric tribute system and the euro-centric balance of power and imperialistic system. Korea's actorness in this situation became limited and constrained until the country fell victim to the ambitions of its neighbours Qing China, Russia and Japan in a contest that also saw the US and France involved in conflicts there. In the mid-19th century Joseon Korea remained faithful to the Qing-led investiture and tribute system and its Confucian values. It rejected Western influence and resisted any opening to the West including by persecuting (mostly Catholic) converts and French missionaries and burning a US merchant navy ship, the USS Sherman, in 1866. The French attacked Kang Hwa island (강화도/江華島 near Incheon 인천) and were beaten back and in 1871 the US marines did the same after an effort to coax Korean officials into signing a trade treaty was rejected. Only in 1882 did the US succeed in signing a treaty with Joseon. Korea was caught in the power plays of the various imperialist powers by then and tried to preserve its autonomy and interests but within a constantly shrinking diplomatic and policy space. Moon
(2008) in his detailed analysis of the consequences of an 1882 agreement on 'commerce and communication rules' – essentially about the respective opening up of Hanseong (한성; 漢城 Seoul) and Beijing for their traders – shows how the demand by rival powers Japan, Qing and Europeans and the US for similar privileges from Korea led to Joseon Korea being trapped in power struggles between the Qing and Meiji courts over control of the peninsula. Japan wanted to roll back the Qing-centred order in NE Asia while foreign powers – mainly Russia – wanted to expand their territory and influence on the Korean peninsula and in Manchuria, leading to interventions by Britain (allying with Japan in 1902) and other European powers as well.

Later, through the Treaty of Shimonoseki (1895) and a treaty with Qing in 1899, Korea used the Western concept to sever its links with the Chinese tribute system and bolster its independent nation-building only to become a victim of Japan’s imperialism with its copy-cat use of unequal treaties, agreements and biased use of international law (Schmid 2002; cf. chapter 1.11.).

1.10. The end of civilisational hierarchy – or the de-centering of China

After the Opium Wars and other conflicts with Western powers, the second – and perhaps then the most important - shock for China was its 'de-centering' in its own world – China lost its civilisational superiority and central status – or some would say its hegemony— in the investiture and tribute system. The legitimacy of the Confucian world dissipated fast. The game of modernisation was played with a different set of cards and China was not dealt a good hand. From being the gold standard of civilisation China almost overnight was pushed in the mud of the world’s ‘backyard’ and Confucianism came to be seen as an obstacle to modernisation not only elsewhere in Europe (Max Weber, Karl Marx), Korea or Japan, but also in China itself (Yan Fu 嚴復, Liang Qichao 梁啟超 cf. Lovell 2011:299-308; Mishra 2014:174-225); Chen Duxiu 陳獨秀, a leading intellectual figure (and a founding member of the CCP) wrote in 1916 (quoted from Lovell 2011:315); ‘We must be thoroughly aware of the incompatibility between Confucianism and the new belief, the new society and the new state’. These important intellectual figures and political activists deplored China’s backwardness, attributed it to corruption, selfishness, isolation, ignorance, conservatism of which the Western countries had merely taken advantage in the ‘struggle for survival’ as the social Darwinist and racist thinking of the time (for detailed analysis of this Hobson 2012; Mishra 2014:182; Mitter 2014:26) spread around the globe. And that struggle for survival required the cohesion of the racial and social group into a nation (Micieve 2010: 6, 10, 12), with the idea, the institutions, the technology and the vocabulary all imported from the West, often via Japan (Lovell 2011:298-300; Mishra 2014). This nation-building ideology was quite different from the later humiliation narrative mentioned above.

Similar narratives dominated thinking also in Korea and Japan at the end of the 19th century, when China the erstwhile Confucian role model ‘became the most common example of a nation lacking civilization’ and the West became the new standard of civilisation (Schmid 2002:57). All ‘new’ nations in the region found proofs in their often distant past that their nations had not always been ‘weak and inferior’ as they were portrayed to be in the social-darwinist climate of the time. Historians quickly noted that past territorial control was not congruent with present-day borders (notably in the frontier lands of Manchuria and the maritime domain (Kang 2010:139-157).
Reconfiguring the own nation in the centre was crucial\textsuperscript{72}: ‘The “Middle Kingdom” was no longer seen as occupying the center but was decidedly on the periphery, both globally and regionally. And as peripheral, China was anything but civilized. This reorientation called into question the full range of practices, texts, and customs that for centuries had been shared by Koreans as part of their participation in the transnational Confucian realm. Formerly accepted as universal, these were increasingly deemed Chinese and thus alien to Korea’. Yet at the same time the common history was needed to differentiate Asia from the West and to elevate Asia’s and thus Korean (or Japanese or Chinese) civilisation to the same level of universality (Schmid 2002:11).

Japan's discomfort with Asia, its preference for the 'Pacific' as its region of choice and its alleged choice to leave Asia as the country modernised or westernised in the 19\textsuperscript{th} century is a topic that became prominent in the 1850s and 60s. 'Leaving Asia' as a development path after the critical juncture of the collapse of the Confucian international society became associated with a scholar, Fukuzawa Yukichi, who continues to be vilified by Chinese and Koreans, as well as some Japanese scholars for his alleged intellectual betrayal of Asia's (Toyo's) cultural unity at the end of the 19\textsuperscript{th} century (Duara 2001). This 'Europeanisation' of Japan paved the way for Japan's imperialism later on (Korhonen 2014:2; Mishra 2014:158) although Korhonen (2014:6) also demystifies a linear account: 'the history of the Japanese people does not contain any categorical betrayal of Asia in a cosmological sense. Redescribing, and then forgetting the 'leaving Asia' issue, of course does not wipe away the legacy of Japanese colonialism, invasion of neighbouring countries, war atrocities and the perennial political inability to bring closure to these issues.'

In fact, the ‘leaving backward Asia to join the civilised modern West’ narrative evolved into the ideas of Pan-Asianism which became the justification of Japanese imperialism (especially after the traumatising experience of the Versailles Peace Conference where it became clear that Wilson's Fourteen Points referred only to Europe and Japan’s main demand, the racial equality clause was rejected by US President Wilson and the European imperialist powers despite a majority vote in favour; Duara 2001; Mishra 2014:244-6; Mitter 2014:46; Green 2017:128-9). Pan-Asianism was not a specifically Japanese idea but widely shared in Asia (Mishra 2014). However, the specific objectives quickly diverged: ‘Sun Yat-sen had had no success in persuading the European powers to back him. He had more hopes of Japan, declaring in a speech in Kobe in 1924 that since Japan’s victory over Russia in 1905, the peoples of Asia had cherished the hope of 'shaking off the yoke of European oppression’. However, Sun’s idea of pan-Asianism, the philosophy of Asian unity, meant something rather different in governmental circles in Tokyo: not cooperation, but domination by Asia’s major power.’ (Mitter 2014:35; cf. Kaneko 1999 who shows that the Japanese version of pan-Asianism did not imply equality, but a vertical structure with Japan at the top). In his lecture Sun distinguished between the Western despotist hegemony (霸道 badao) and the Confucian virtuous king’s rule (王道 wangdao) associated with the investiture and tribute system. In this way Sun appealed to his Japanese audience to renounce the hegemonic, imperialistic way of the West and return to the Confucian, solidarist international society. “As it turned out, the Japanese military appropriated the language of wangdao and used it to rule China instead.” (Duara 2001:116).

\textsuperscript{72} Micievic (2010:13-5) explains that the moral claim of the centrality of the nation is at the very heart of the nationalist programme.
Japan’s early and successful modernisation (the Meiji Restauration) propelled Japan from the traditional innovation laggard in NE Asia (Kuhn 2014:450) to the role of innovation leader inspiring Korean (and Chinese) modernisers. From then on for over a century Japan was leading this (copycat) Asian modernisation process and continued to do so at least economically even after its defeat: Japan despite losing the 1937-45 war against China and the US and in its wake most of its colonial empire, benefited from the Korean War (1950-53) and the Cold War through the alliance with the US to re-emerge as a major power, regional leader ('flying goose'73) and economic giant (Japan overtook Germany in 1968 to remain the second biggest economy in GDP terms until 2010, when China overtook it in turn – in a way restoring the status quo ante bellum) and only non-Western G7 member. More recently Korea and China caught up with the lead goose in many areas achieving equal status in the G20 and China is beginning to again take centre-stage.

The Japanese identity construction has thus been focusing on its superiority over its neighbours, notably China and Korea. That superiority was expressed in military, modernisation and civilisational terms in the first half of the 20th century, and through economic and civilisational superiority (member of the Western international community entwined with a peace state narrative) in the second half of the 20th century. China’s increasing ‘parity’ in the 21st century led to a ‘securitisation’ of China as a threatening and backward, non-democratic ‘other’ which – in contrast to Japan – does not follow ‘international norms’ (Hagström and Hanssen 2015). Hence, there is a continuity of the de-centering of China and the rivalry of civilizational superiority to this day (also in the 2015 statement of PM Abe analysed below). In a way all NE Asian countries seem to have ‘left Asia’.

1.11. The end of ambiguity – The rise of Japan’s imperialism

The third shock for China or perhaps the nail in the coffin destroying the Confucian international society forever and leading to losses of territory that are still not back under Beijing’s control (such as Taiwan and the Diaoyu/Senkakus) was the Japanese imperialism combined with ideas of racial competition for survival and dominance (rather than just a power struggle). Japan borrowed the Western ideas through the Meiji restauration of the ancient imperial system (in a different form) and strengthening of the central government in 1868 to reject in 1911 the unequal treaties it was forced to sign in the 19th century after the American forced opening of treaty ports in 1853-4 (Treaty of Kanagawa 1854, 1858 First Unequal Treaty with US on trade ending Japan’s tariff autonomy, followed by similar treaties with Prussia, the Norddeutsche Bund, Austria-Hungary; Oberländer 2012:264-7; Green 2017:47-51). However, Japan went further to become an imperial power itself. Japan then in fact claimed the mantle of civilisational superiority from the Chinese Empire cloaked in Western modernity to justify its East Asian ‘Co-Prosperity Sphere’ (Daitoa-kyoei-ken 大東亜共栄圏 – Duus 2008 for details) finally reversing the roles that had led to the rivalry at the beginning of the 19th century after the Imjin war (Oberländer 2012:268-87).

73 The expression flying gese development with Japan the lead goose was coined by Akamatsu (1962) to describe a model of international division of labour in East Asia based on dynamic comparative advantage with Asian nations catching up with the West as a part of a regional hierarchy where the production of commoditised goods would continuously move from the more advanced countries to the less advanced ones (Chen e.a. 2011)
Japan’s power manifested itself first in a military victory over China in 1895 and then one over Russia in 1905 (which was elevated to a particular level of symbolism as the first military victory of a non-Western power over a Western one; Oberländer 2012:272-87; Mishra 2014). In the first clause of the Treaty of Shimonoseki in April 1895 – ending the war between the Qing and Meiji Japan that had started over a Chinese intervention requested by the Korean government against a local rebellion (Schmid 2002:25-7) but also by conflict over trade and market access (Moon 2008) - the Qing dynasty recognised the full sovereignty of Korea, formally ending the investiture and tribute system (Schmid 2002:56; Green 2017:69-70). Japan forced the Qing through this treaty to cede Taiwan – and initially also the Liaodong Peninsula (辽东半岛). The latter, however, had to be returned after the 'triple intervention' by France, Germany and Russia only to become a theatre for the war with Russia in 1904/5 resulting in its annexation in 1905 (Mitter 2014:25). But the Treaty laid also the groundwork for Japan’s subsequent annexation of Korea which had been Japan’s objective since the 1870s (Schmid 2002:26; Oberländer 2012:272). Japan’s military successes seemed to vindicate Western-style modernisation and the failure of the ‘old’ Confucian system, but also allowed Japan to pose as an Asian leader against Western imperialism (Oberländer 2012:282-3) – and triggering the ‘Yellow peril’ idea in the West (Hobson 2012:108; Oberländer 2012:282). However, this imperial aggression culminated in a brutal Japanese invasion of China in the 1930s (comprehensively reviewed by Mitter 2014, who estimates that 14-20 million Chinese died during the eight years of the Japanese war against China) and then of many other Asian countries under the guise of a regional integration project, the East Asian 'Co-Prosperity Sphere'.

To sum up: Japan first systematically agrandised the territorial reach of the central government including the Northern Island of Hokkaido at the expense of the indigenous Ainu population, the islands north of Hokkaido (Northern territories, Kuriles), but also set its eyes on islands in the South (annexation of Ryukyus in 1879) and the Korean Peninsula. Finally after an attempted invasion of Taiwan in the 1870s, the war with China in 1894-5 and the one with Russia in 1905, Japan gained the power to annex territories such as Taiwan and later in 1905-10 the Korean and Liaodong Peninsulas, the former German colony Tsingtao (青岛 in Shandong) in 1919, and Manchuria (1931). These territories included the nowadays disputed islets like Dokdo/Takeshima, Diaoyu/Senkaku. Thus the first ‘regionalism project’ in 20th century NE Asia was an imperialist one, imposed through dubious uses of international law, coercion, annexation and war thus discrediting regionalism projects for a long time and opening large moralisation gaps with all of Japan's neighbours. The territories concerned by Japan's imperial expansion are those which today remain divided or divisive, contentious and problematic for various reasons, not only the disputed islets, but also Taiwan and the divided Korean Peninsula, indicating that this episode should be seen as the critical juncture in NE Asia's development as a region. This puts the US role in East Asia in context. Selden (2008:17) emphasises that post-War Japan 'has been notably lagging in formulating approaches to regional accommodation' partly due to Japan’s tendency to 'look to the US rather than to Asia for solutions'.

1.12. Korea’s moralisation gaps with Japan and China
The 1894-5 war between Japan and Qing China reflects a radical change in the regional environment with the global capitalist modernity penetrating the region and changing its power and cultural relations and fundamentally its identity through a focus on nation-building, intermingling nationalising and globalising forces. Schmid (2002) describes this process in his study about Korea between Empires (the Qing and the Japanese). Korea gained its full sovereign equality with the Qing and Japan in the Treaty of Shimonoseki (1895), only to lose it again just ten years later, when after the Russo-Japanese war it became a Japanese protectorate and in 1910 was simply annexed. Nationalism, Schmid (2002:5) argues was part of the globalising modernity at the time and ‘the outburst of writing about the Korean nation during these years certainly reflected a resistance to external political pressures, in particular to Japan after 1905. But this outburst also marked the greater participation of Korean elites in the global ideologies of capitalist modernity, ideologies that in themselves stimulated this rethinking of the nation...’ 

Conversely the ‘Japanese colonialists wielded their accounts of regional and world history to undermine Korean claims to autonomy and to usurp Korean sovereignty’ (Schmid 2002:8). It is interesting to note this early connection between nationalism and globalisation which Micievic (2010:3) also singled out: ‘Territorial sovereignty has traditionally been seen as a defining element of state power, and essential for nationhood. (...) It is the control of the movement of money and people (in particular immigration) and the resource rights implied in territorial sovereignty that make the topic into a politically central one in the age of globalization, and philosophically interesting for nationalists and anti-nationalists alike.’ The Lee Myun-bak administration’s policy of a ‘Global Korea’ (2008-13) to escape its region and embracing globalisation thus has a historical precedent in that period of Korea between Empires.

Korea’s attempts to re-define its relationship with de-centred China and its critiques of Qing China’s backwardness and Confucianism were co-opted by imperialist Japan to justify its regional imperialism (‘Asia for the Asians’; Oberländer 2012:283). Japanese historians at the end of the 19th century were also busy glorifying their own past which included superiority over and domination of the Korean peninsula, creating ‘Japanese versions of the Korean past’ (Schmid 2002:16) and on both sides these included figures from popular legends, which were given a historical existence not least to distinguish the true nation of the people from the sino-centred Confucian elites (yangban). We can see from this brief analysis why even today questions about history – and territories that were defining the projected nation’s boundaries in the past - have such powerful divisive effects between (and sometimes within) Korea and Japan, as history was on the one hand written to justify Korea’s national sovereignty and project it back in time (vis-à-vis China) and on the other hand written by Japan to deny Korea its right to an autonomous existence.

Thus, the moralisation gap between Korea and Japan started even before the annexation and colonisation, which in itself is subject to fierce controversy (Totsuka 2011). Korean historians also have to come to terms with Koreans’ own attitudes towards Japan during the colonisation. For the moment, Korean history tends to portray a nation united in resistance to oppression despite widespread elite collaboration. But as Japan started using its ideology of modernity and superior civilisation for its own imperialist strategy “Civilization and enlightenment” were now being

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74 It is certainly no coincidence that this line of thought has endured, as reflected in the policy priority of the Administration of President Lee Myung-bak (2008-13) ‘Global Korea’.
wielded by the very country to which these Koreans had granted a special authority in this realm; only now it served to legitimize the colonization of their own nation.’ (Schmid 2002:14). Japan’s colonisation of Korea in the name of bringing modernity, civilisation and development remains strictly defined as victimhood with any suggestions of discussing benefits of colonisation (e.g. in terms of modernisation or infrastructure) being taboo and considered as unpatriotic.

These debates continue today, be it when Korea and China quarrel about listing their shared heritage with UNESCO as exclusively theirs, be it when museums are built to claim history (like South Korea’s new Goguryo museum without artefacts75), be it when textbooks are written and scrutinised by the neighbours, be it when cultural imports from neighbours are banned or limited76, or be it when schoolchildren, students and aspirant officials are educated to be true patriots. Analysis of nationalism often points to such restrictions also conflicting with individuals’ autonomy or the value of unconstrained creativity for artists (Micievic 2010:16).

Like Europe, NE Asia after WWII was a key theatre of the superpower rivalry usually referred to as the Cold War, but in NE Asia the Chinese civil war (1945-9) and a bloody hot war between North and South Korea (1950-3) have left these countries divided until today, and as Koreans rightly point out, their country was not divided like Germany as punishment for starting WWII, but quite arbitrarily by the superpowers after the end of Japanese colonial rule once more at the expense of Korea’s right to an autonomous existence. The civil war was started by the North in 1950 and later aided by Mao’s Chinese ‘volunteers’ (Hahm 2015:19). The war led to a situation where there is still no peace treaty for the Korean Peninsula and the division persists since the Armistice of 1953. The moralisation gap runs deep: “As far as the South Koreans were concerned, it was the Chinese intervention during the Korean War that prevented the unification of Korea. As for the Chinese, more Chinese soldiers died in the war – including Mao Zedong’s oldest son – than South Korean, US and all other belligerents combined” (Hahm 2017:10).

In short, Korea’s trauma was to carve out its national identity and autonomy first from the overwhelming, but enthusiastically owned Confucian (later labelled Chinese) tradition and then from Japanese colonisation. Later the division of the country in a civil war after liberation only added to the national trauma and sense of victimhood (vis-à-vis both the USA and China). Particularly agonising for many Koreans was that as a consequence of the Korean War which devastated the whole country, the erstwhile coloniser Japan benefitted from US leniency regarding its imperialist and wartime responsibility and from heavy US aid as an ally in the Cold War, while Korea was arbitrarily divided along a line drawn by a US official (Dean Rusk). In a moralisation gap with the US, nationalist, left-wing Koreans also point to the role the US had in brokering the Treaty of Portsmouth in 1905 (Mitter 2014:25) that ended the war between Russia and Japan and

75 http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/art/201502/148_130902.html accessed on 14.8.2015 Gogoryo refers to an old kingdom (37 BC – 668 AD) straddling what is today North Korea, NE China (Manchuria) and parts of Siberia (Kuhn 2014:182-188) which became contested between Chinese and Korean historians over its identity and relationship with Chinese dynasties (vassal state or independent). Gogoryo was destroyed – ironically – through an alliance between the Southern Korean Shilla dynasty and the Chinese Tang dynasty in 668 (Kuhn 2014:188). Given its location most remaining artefacts are in China or North Korea.

76 ‘Japan’s nationalism targets hallyu stars’ Korea Times 18.3.2013 p5 reports accusations by the Korea Creative Content Agency that Japanese TV stations boycott Korean drama series in which Korean actors who spoke out on Dokdo and other issues play roles or edit those actors out; the same article reports that Korean hallyu content in Japan’s market is limited to 20%
in the Root-Takahira agreement of 1908 which reinforced international acceptance of Japan's control over Korea (Green 2017:98-100; President Theodore Roosevelt got the Nobel Peace Prize 1906 for his role).

Similarly to China, Korea's international relations have a very short history, marked by the Korean War and its subsequent status as an American quasi-protectorate and front line state in the Cold War. Korea's diplomatic relations with its neighbours have been short (1965 Japan, Soviet Union/Russia 1991, China 1992) and apart from the competition for diplomatic recognition with DPRK its substantial relations with countries outside the region only took off at the turn of the 21st century. Korea only became a UN member in 1991. Hence Korea's nation-building process and its entry into international society as an independent nation were delayed by colonisation, civil war and the Cold War division. It is in fact a recent and complex process, deeply marked by trauma and isolation which is why the moralisation gaps of the past have so much political salience today.

1.13. China’s moralisation gap with Japan

As we already saw earlier, the humiliation trauma of China usually referred to as the 'century of humiliation' can be broken down into three stages: 1) the Opium Wars and other wars with European powers in the second half of the 19th century that led to a semi-colonial status under a regime of unequal treaties, annexations and foreign occupation of parts of China's territory; 2) the lost war against Japan and the Treaty of Shimonoseki (1895) that led to loss of territory to Japan, the de-centering of China and eventually the fall of the Qing in 1911; 3) the Sino-Japanese war that started with the annexation of Manchuria (1931) and then the full-blown invasion of China's heartlands (1937).

China won the war imposed on it by Japan at the price of enormous devastation and sacrifice which remains also little recognised in American and Japanese accounts of the ‘Pacific War’ (Mitter 2013:5-6). Japanese hardly acknowledge that they lost the war against China: the US is perceived as the sole victor. Yet, as Mitter (2014:6) points out: ‘For over four years, until Pearl Harbour, China fought the Japanese practically alone. During this time a poor and underdeveloped country held down some 800,000 troops from one of the most highly militarized and technologically advanced societies in the world. For another four years after that, the success of the Allies in fighting on two fronts at once, in Europe and Asia, was posited in significant part on making sure that China stayed in the war.’ The ensuing civil war then led to the division of mainland and Taiwan between the civil war rivals. The Cold War led to the economic and political isolation (and self-isolation during the Cultural Revolution 1966-76) from the West and Japan.

We have already touched upon the first two stages. The really deep-seated moralisation gap opened when Japan waged a war of aggression against China (1931 occupation of Manchuria and in 1932 the installation of the last Qing Emperor as a puppet ruler of 'Manchukuo'; 1937 full-blown invasion of China until Japan's defeat in 1945). Without going into details here (Mitter

77 Teddy should be stripped of Nobel prize, Kim says, Korea Times 15.8.2013 p.1

78 Perhaps the WTO entry of China in 2001 brought closure to that strand of the victimisation narrative and helps to explain the extraordinary publicity given in China around that agreement. This may also explain why the other two strands of the narrative have taken centre-stage since the turn of the millennium.
2014 gives a detailed account), the war was characterised by the brutality of the Japanese troops including the 1937 Nanjing massacre, chemical and biological warfare, mass killings, raping and looting in occupied China and as revenge against guerrilla attacks as well as inhumane 'scientific' experiments on Chinese civilians and prisoners of war together with the forced recruitment of sex slaves (also euphemistically refered to as 'comfort women') for Japanese soldiers (from Korea and China mainly, but also from other countries).\(^79\) While international (especially US) awareness of these atrocities was only really raised by the publication of Iris Chang's 'The Rape of Nanking' in 1997 (Drea 2006), in China the memory of these atrocities was passed on through families and records. However, it was only through the massive patriotic education campaign started in 1991 that these issues were put front and centre in China's national consciousness and education (Wang 2008). While it is true that the patriotic education campaign served the domestic legitimacy of CCP rule after the collapse of the socialist ideology (Cultural Revolution, collapse of the USSR, Tian An Men incident), it cannot simply be dismissed as a 'propaganda campaign' (Wang 2008:800) or as an instrument of rational diplomacy (Watanabe 2015). This would overlook the deep-seated trauma of national humiliation as a 'primordialist background of Chinese nationalism' that one can also find in pre-Communist China, in Taiwan, Hong Kong and even among Western-educated overseas Chinese. As occasional spontaneous anti-Japanese riots, internet blogs, surveys and conversations with ordinary Chinese people show, Japan's atrocities and the lack of 'sincere' repentance are still very much resented. However, according to a report on China's comfort women in the Financial Times (20 March 2015\(^80\)) Chinese courts will not take up individual victims’ cases because the defendant is the Japanese state and there is reluctance to allow individual citizens to seek redress against the state for historical grievances. As we will see this reflects a state-centric interpretation of international law in general, but there is also fear for setting precedents for Chinese citizens suing their own government over historical grievances. Most people in China still buy Japanese goods and millions travel to Japan differentiating between the people they meet today and their ancestors, but the collective historical trauma is still very much alive.

The Japanese invasion of China after 1931/1937 is at the core of the patriotic education campaign and is still re-enacted daily on Chinese TV programmes. Interestingly, though, only 70 years after the event, China for the first time held a victory military parade in Beijing on 3 September 2015. It remains to be seen whether this act is meant as a sign of closure in the sense of staking out the definite victory claim and victor status of contemporary China, or whether the parade leads to a new stage of nationalist competition over history with Japan. King (2015:39) notes though that the parade was ‘much more about China than about Japan’ and that the ‘commemoration activities were carefully designed to avoid further poisoning the bilateral relationship’. King’s argument is well explained by Mitter’s thesis in his book about the Sino-Japanese war that ‘the war still marked a vital step in China’s progression from semi-colonized victim of global imperialism to its


entry, however tentative, on the world stage as a sovereign power with wider regional and global responsibilities’ (Mitter 2014:5). In this sense the 70th anniversary parade may have been held not only to mobilise Chinese nationalism, but to remind the West that China had paid enormous sacrifices alongside its allies to defeat fascism, the greatest threat to democracy at the time: Mitter (2014:8) wrote before the parade: ‘In today’s international society, as China seeks to portray itself as a ‘responsible great power’, the country’s analysts and diplomats recall the days when China fought alongside the US, Russia and Britain as one of the Allies.’ and that ‘it is time for America, and Europe, to remember.’ The parade was partly aimed at bringing that point home to an international audience.

The resulting victim-perpetrator role relationship and a wide-open moralisation gap has superseded communist ideology as one of the main legitimising narratives of the Chinese Communist Party81 and has recently been re-articulated and given a new twist by CCP Secretary General Xi Jinping’s ‘Chinese dream’ and China’s rejuvenation (Wang 2014a). The other main legitimising narrative is economic development, which has often been portrayed as the restoration of China’s national status rather than a promise of individual happiness. The ‘Chinese Dream’ proclaimed by Xi Jinping (2012-) has now put the individual pursuit of a dream of prosperity at a similar level of the national dream of rejuvenation. We will see in IV.7.3. how the Chinese dream is projected to become a global dream of a community of fate.

By contrast, the wartime atrocities are hardly an issue in Japanese education and public consciousness. Especially right-wing governments (which have ruled post-War Japan most of the time) have gone to great lengths to bury these issues as a stain on Japan’s reputation especially since the late 1990s (Nakano 2014). The reversal of alliances that happened after Japan’s defeat in 1945 and the Communist take-over of China in 1949 (China and since 1941 the US fought Japan together) allowed a certain amount of forgetfulness after the Tokyo War Crimes trials, as the US needed Japan in the Cold War where Communist China was on the ‘wrong’ side. Japan was allowed to concentrate on economic recovery and development without looking back too much (Drea 2006, Selden 2008, Green 2017: 245-268). Hence, a whole generation of Chinese have grown up with clear and detailed knowledge about Japan’s past atrocities, but their Japanese counterparts simply do not know what they are talking about – illustrating the concept of the moralisation gap. Of course, those in Japan who want to know can access relevant information as there have been considerable efforts within Japan to document and come to terms with this past, yet for students for example this amounts to an extra-curricular activity which does not add points to exams and for which they may not have much time or interest in general terms. Gustafsson (2016) provides a compelling narrative about the deterioration of Sino-Japanese relations, especially since the mid-2000s, by focusing on the disruptions of routinised recognition through three mechanisms: ‘incongruity between an actor’s identity and a new international environment seen as indicating that one’s self-identity has become obsolete; loss of status resulting from the belief that the other has overtaken or become overly similar to oneself in a key identity category; and anxiety over an actor’s self-identity induced by the ways in which others recognise the self.’ (Gustafsson 2016:2). We will return to this issue of mutual recognition in the chapter on the

81 The move roughly coincided with a nationalist and revisionist turn in Japan to deny aggression and war crimes partly because of Japan’s economic stagnation and partly because of generational change and domestic politics (Nakano 2014).
apologies which were a key ‘ritual’ of routinised recognition. Gustafsson does not use the term ritual, but I believe that the Confucian heritage of ‘li’ and ritual that I explained in chapter I.1.3 is an important key to understanding the strong reactions to these disruptions and changes of identity.

The problem of the Japanese invasion of China, has been compounded by the absence of an inclusive peace agreement involving all parties, hence, international law is remiss in settling some of the disputes. The San Francisco Treaty of Peace with Japan, signed in September 1951 (entered into force in April 1952) during the Korean War left out some of the victims and victors, notably ‘Red China’ and Korea (both North and South), but also the Soviet Union (hence the controversy over the Kurile islands between Russia and Japan; Green 2017:278-284 reports this as a deliberate policy by the US as a wedge issue between Tokyo and Moscow in the future; see also Hahm 2017). However, China was party to some of the war-time conferences that declared the war objectives including that Japan should return all territories acquired by force as stated in Article 8 of the Potsdam Declaration of 26 July 1945 (‘The terms of the Cairo Declaration shall be carried out and Japanese sovereignty shall be limited to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku and such minor islands as we determine.’) In fact, there is a sense of déjà vu from the Chinese perspective: China in 1919 refused to sign the Versailles Treaty as contrary to promises during WWI (which China entered on the allied side in 1917) the German colonies in China were not returned to China, but instead handed to Japan. This prompted a very strong nationalist backlash and a deep resentment at the West’s (in particular Wilsonian America’s) duplicity, led by the modernist youth, the Fourth May Movement (Mishra 2014:251-257). After WWII history seemed to repeat itself as Japan was allowed to keep some of the spoils of war at China’s expense despite allied promises and China’s sacrifices in the war with Green (2017:292-3) acknowledging that Eisenhower and Dulles missed the trends in nationalism in Asia.

1.14. Japan’s apologies and their sincerity

Reconciliation of moralisation gaps starts with apologies by the perpetrators and – importantly - the acceptance of apologies by the victims. In NE Asia this simple process is marred in complexity due to the multitude of moralisation gaps, nationalism in all countries and the overlay of the Cold War.

The comfort women issue is the clearest illustration of a moralisation gap, the different viewpoints of victims and perpetrators, the influence of nationalism and the limits of international law on the failure to address historical justice. The UN Human Rights Commission or the Tokyo Tribunal concluded (similar to the Kono statement of 1993) ‘that the Japanese military and government officials and their agents committed the crimes of rape and sexual slavery against women and girls as a part of, and in the course of, their war of aggression in the Asia Pacific. These crimes were widespread – occurring on a vast scale and over a huge geographic area – being highly

82 https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%20136/vol ume-136-l-1832-English.pdf Interestingly the war is defined in Article 8 as initiated on 1 September 1939, thus ignoring the invasion of China by Japan in 1931. Art 10 states that Japan renounces all rights and interests in Japan including those acquired by the 1901 protocol following the Boxer uprising.

83 http://usarmy.vo.llnwd.net/e2/rv5_downloads/postwarjapan/Potsdam%20Declaration.pdf accessed on 13.8.2015
organized, heavily regulated, and sharing common characteristics. They were crimes against humanity committed against tens of thousands of civilian women and girls who were forced into sexual servitude to the Japanese military as part of the comfort system during World War II.’ (Arbigay 2003:14). The issue has poisoned bilateral relations between the two democracies in NE Asia, Japan and Korea, where most of the women (and also a lot of forced labourers) were from, for years.

Japan argues that the 1965 Treaty on Basic Relations with the ROK provided for reparations for the occupation and it is not willing to re-open that basic agreement by agreeing further official compensation (Doh 2011). The 800 million USD Japanese compensation to the Korean government under the 1965 normalisation treaty went in fact to economic development and infrastructure projects rather than the victims (Doh 2011), an issue that Japan feels is Korea’s problem. Indeed, Korea’s Constitutional Court ruled in 2011 that the government was remiss in solving the grievances of the former sex slaves. The Hankyoreh and William Underwood (2010) reveal that records from the 1965 negotiations about the normalisation of Korea-Japan relations ‘show that the Park Chung-hee administration rejected a Japanese proposal to directly compensate wartime workers, while claiming itself the responsibility of distributing funds received from Japan to individual Koreans harmed by forced labour and other colonial injustices.’ Hahm (2017) recalls the strong nationalistic opposition in Korea against normalising the relations. While this treaty did not cover the comfort women at least explicitly it makes court decisions in Japan that deny Korean victims’ individual claims legally more difficult to dispute. All claims by Korean or Chinese former comfort women have been denied by Japanese courts due to the statute of limitations and to the individuals’ lack of standing to sue the state. However, the same source also points to Japanese documents made public in 2008 that show that Japan then understood the treaty very differently with the MOFA interpreting the claims waiver language as legally separate from individuals’ rights to seek damages. Apparently Japan wanted to preserve Japanese citizens’ legal options for wartime damage claims as in other treaties Japan signed with the victorious powers (San Francisco Treaty 1951 and Treaty with the USSR in 1956).

The normalisation of Japan-China diplomatic relations in 1972 hardly touched on war crimes. Even the territorial issues (like the Diaoyu/Senkaku; cf. Hagström and Hanssen 2015 who analyse deliberations in Japan’s Diet in 1972) were reportedly shelved for later generations to solve, as the political priorities at the time were different (Cold War anti-Soviet alliance, development assistance, Mao’s narrative of victorious China; for the latter: Wang 2008). However, Japan continues to insist, like vis-à-vis Korea, that the normalisation treaties have legally and finally settled all compensation issues, notwithstanding the emergence only much later of evidence of war crimes (to be precise of war crimes not covered in the Tokyo Trials) or notwithstanding that the victims at the time of the agreements had no possibility to claim compensation.

Yang (2006) documents how late (after the Cold War) some of these issues actually emerged from archives or other sources in the 1990s. Many crimes, and notably the comfort women issue, only became known in the 1990s (Drea 2006:4), some due to publications by researchers, some through opening of archives (e.g. Soviet ones) or personal diaries and records. Only after such publications

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84 Korea slams Japanese PM’s ‘Comfort Women’ Denial Choson Ilbo 9.5.2012
and the pursuit of the sexual slavery issue for instance by women’s rights groups did some of the deeply traumatised surviving victims step forward (Yoon 2011, Yang 2006). This led, after deep controversy in Japan, to the carefully worded (if not winded) apology statement by Japan’s Chief Cabinet Secretary Kono in 1993\(^5\) that acknowledged state involvement and coercion and offered apologies, but no direct state compensation for the victims (Nakano 2014:6). In 1995 the (socialist) PM Murayama issued a more general apology for Japan’s war guilt at the occasion of the 50\(^{th}\) anniversary of the end of the Asia-Pacific War which, like Kono’s, has served as a reference and benchmark for other Japanese politicians, but unsurprisingly has also drawn the ire of the Japanese right (French 2017:190-5).\(^6\)

\(^5\) Statement by the Chief Cabinet Secretary Yohei Kono on the result of the study on the issue of “comfort women” August 4, 1993: “The Government of Japan has been conducting a study on the issue of wartime “comfort women” since December 1991. I wish to announce the findings as a result of that study. As a result of the study which indicates that comfort stations were operated in extensive areas for long periods, it is apparent that there existed a great number of comfort women. Comfort stations were operated in response to the request of the military authorities of the day. The then Japanese military was, directly or indirectly, involved in the establishment and management of the comfort stations and the transfer of comfort women. The recruitment of the comfort women was conducted mainly by private recruiters who acted in response to the request of the military. The Government study has revealed that in many cases they were recruited against their own will, through coaxing, coercion, etc., and that, at times, administrative/military personnel directly took part in the recruitments. They lived in misery at comfort stations under a coercive atmosphere. As to the origin of those comfort women who were transferred to the war areas, excluding those from Japan, those from the Korean Peninsula accounted for a large part. The Korean Peninsula was under Japanese rule in those days, and their recruitment, transfer, control, etc., were conducted generally against their will, through coaxing, coercion, etc. Undeniably, this was an act, with the involvement of the military authorities of the day, that severely injured the honor and dignity of many women. The Government of Japan would like to take this opportunity once again to extend its sincere apologies and remorse to all those, irrespective of place of origin, who suffered immeasurable pain and incurable physical and psychological wounds as comfort women. It is incumbent upon us, the Government of Japan, to continue to consider seriously, while listening to the views of learned circles, how best we can express this sentiment. We shall face squarely the historical facts as described above instead of evading them, and take them to heart as lessons of history. We hereby reiterate our firm determination never to repeat the same mistake by forever engraving such issues in our memories through the study and teaching of history. As actions have been brought to court in Japan and interests have been shown in this issue outside Japan, the Government of Japan shall continue to pay full attention to this matter, including private researched related thereto.” [http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/women/fund/statem9308.html accessed on 13.8.2015]

\(^6\) Statement by Prime Minister Toshiichi Murayama “On the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the war’s end” (15 August 1995) (Translation): “The world has seen fifty years elapse since the war came to an end. Now, when I remember the many people both at home and abroad who fell victim to war, my heart is overwhelmed by a flood of emotions. The peace and prosperity of today were built as Japan overcame great difficulty to arise from a devastated land after defeat in the war. That achievement is something of which we are proud, and let me herein express my heartfelt admiration for the wisdom and untiring effort of each and every one of our citizens. Let me also express once again my profound gratitude for the indispensable support and assistance extended to Japan by the countries of the world, beginning with the United States of America. I am also delighted that we have been able to build the friendly relations which we enjoy today with the neighboring countries of the Asia-Pacific region, the United States and the countries of Europe. Now that Japan has come to enjoy peace and abundance, we tend to overlook the pricelessness and blessings of peace. Our task is to convey to younger generations the horrors of war, so that we never repeat the errors in our history. I believe that, as we join hands, especially with the peoples of neighboring countries, to ensure true peace in the Asia-Pacific region - indeed, in the entire world- it is necessary, more than anything else, that we foster relations with all countries based on deep understanding and trust. Guided by this conviction, the Government has launched the Peace, Friendship and Exchange Initiative, which consists of two parts promoting: support for historical research into relations in the modern era between Japan and the neighboring countries of Asia and elsewhere; and rapid expansion of exchanges with those countries. Furthermore, I will continue in all sincerity to do my utmost in efforts being made on the issues arisen from the war, in order to further strengthen the relations of trust between Japan and those countries. Now, upon this historic occasion of the 50th anniversary of the war’s end, we should bear in mind that we must look into the past to learn from the lessons of history, and ensure that we do not stray from the path to the peace and prosperity of human society in the future. During a certain period in the not too distant past, Japan, following a mistaken national policy, advanced along the road to war, only to ensure the Japanese people in a fateful crisis, and, through its colonial rule and aggression, caused tremendous damage and suffering to the people of many countries, particularly to those of Asian nations. In the hope that no such mistake be made in the future, I regard, in a spirit of humility, these irrefutable facts of history, and express here once again my feelings of deep remorse and state my heartfelt apology. Allow me also to express my feelings of profound mourning for all victims, both at home and abroad, of that
Importantly, the Japanese government didn't accept legal responsibility for the suffering of the comfort women (closed with the San Francisco and normalisation treaties in their view) and merely set up an 'Asian Women's Fund' financed by private donations for 'atonement money'. Many disappointed victims refused to take any of that charity money. The Fund at least compiled a substantial documentation regarding sexual slavery (Yang 2006). The AWF closed 'successfully' in its own view in 2007 after payments of 'atonement money', but without having achieved reconciliation given how contested the issue remains.

Political efforts to reach settlements and apologies were thus made by Japanese leaders in the 1980s and 1990s but with too many reservations and counter-statements to be accepted by the victims (including the governments of Korea and to some extent China). The background of such initiatives was a certain liberal/neoliberal, internationalist orientation that became dominant in the newly assertive Japan of that period. This was, however, followed by a revisionist backlash in Japan since the late 1990s that challenged and undid the fragile compromise with its neighbors as a revisionist, nationalistic orientation took over.’ (Nakano 2014; Mochizuki 2007:757-8; Hagström and Hanssen 2015).

A good example is the uproar caused in 2013 by Osaka mayor Hashimoto who declared to the press that so-called comfort women from Korea and other countries who were forced into Japanese military brothels during WWII had been 'necessary' for the soldiers ‘to provide respite for high-strung, rough and tumble crowds of men risking their lives under a storm of bullets’. Even international uproar including in the United States could not move the National Restoration Party co-leader to apologise. He did apologise for disparaging remarks about US servicemen whom he had urged to use Japanese prostitutes on their Okinawa bases in order to reduce incidents of sexual assault on local women. However, it is fair to say that such remarks probably don’t represent a majority of Japanese. The government has taken its distances from the mayor, but this does not fundamentally alter perceptions in Korea and China that Japan is not 'sincere' about

history. Building from our deep remorse on this occasion of the 50th anniversary of the end of the war, Japan must eliminate self-righteous nationalism, promote international coordination as a responsible member of the international community and, thereby, advance the principles of peace and democracy. At the same time, as the only country to have experienced the devastation of atomic bombing, Japan, with a view to the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons, must actively strive to further global disarmament in areas such as the strengthening of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. It is my conviction that in this way alone can Japan atone for its past and lay to rest the spirits of those who perished. It is said that one can rely on good faith. And so, at this time of remembrance, I declare to the people of Japan and abroad my intention to make good faith the foundation of our Government policy, and this is my vow.'

http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/press/pm/murayama/9508.html accessed on 13.8.2015. This and other Cabinet statements were endorsed by PM Abe in 2015: ‘Such position articulated by the previous cabinets will remain unshakable into the future.’


88 China accepted the earlier apologies, but objected to acts undermining them such as official visits to the Yasukuni Shrine; Gustafsson 2016

89 Comfort women is a widely used euphemism for what the UN Human Rights Commission and the Women’s War Crimes International Tribunal held in Tokyo in 2000 by reputed international judges and known as the Tokyo Tribunal called sexual slaves; Yoon 2010; Argibay 2003

90 Quoted in Financial Times 28.5.2013 p.4. The article by Jonathan Soble predicts that ‘Japan’s rising son faces eclipse after ‘comfort women’ furore.’

91 Korea Times 27.5.2013: Osaka mayor ‘sorry’ for US brothel remarks. But Hashimoto won’t retract ‘comfort women’ comment. Also covered in the FT article quoted in the previous footnote.
coming to terms with its past. In this view, that the mayor of Japan’s second biggest city and a leader of a party represented in Parliament resorts to such offensive positions (not least to women in general) and distorted views of history directly feeds the Asian paradox that South Korea’s President bemoaned in the US Congress.

Apart from the extreme example of this revisionism by Osaka Mayor Hashimoto, Japan officially protested against Korean NGOs erecting a statue commemorating the comfort women right across Japan's Embassy in Seoul (and later also near the Japanese consulate in Busan) invoking the Vienna Convention claiming the statue impaired the dignity of the Embassy and encouraged an 'incorrect' understanding of the comfort women issue and Japan's Foreign Ministry is also campaigning against similar memorials to be set up in the US (by Korean Americans mostly).

During the 2012 election campaign Japanese PM Abe (then as candidate) expressed doubts about the validity of the Kono statement of 1993 (Nakano 2014) in which Japan admitted direct involvement of Japanese military in the suffering caused by the system of forced prostitution. Abe argued that Kono's statement had not been based on official records which did not mention Korean women were forced into prostitution against their will. After assuming office Abe also commissioned an inquiry into whether the Kono statement hadn’t been unduly influenced by the Korean government implying that the historical ‘truth’ had been somehow distorted, fabricated by the South Korean government, or negotiated away. His Chief Cabinet Secretary Suga (i.e. someone assuming the same position as Kono two decades earlier) reiterated these doubts in Parliament in 2014. It is clear that such doubts at the highest political levels which may well have been intended for domestic consumption provoked indignation in Korea and China, but also in Washington. US open criticism of Abe's suggestion seems to have forced Abe to become more pragmatic after he became Prime Minister and finally to re-state the Kono statement and the Murayama apology. US pressure motivated by geo-political considerations may well have prompted the ‘final, irreversible political settlement’ of the comfort women issue in an agreement between the Japanese and the Korean Foreign Ministers on 28 December 2015. However, controversy erupted including in the UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women which said the agreement did not fully adopt a victim-centered approach to address the issue of women who were procured for Japan's wartime military brothels. Japan rejected the UN panel's view that Tokyo should take into consideration the opinions of so-called comfort women in implementing a bilateral agreement reached with South Korea.

Such an agreement was possible for revisionist Japan only after Abe had established his credentials as a nationalist, his leadership of the Liberal Party and a strong majority in the Diet. The agreement may well have been motivated by a ‘realist’ assessment that Japan needed to improve its relations with South Korea (and China) to maintain economic prosperity and a ceratin

94 NHK on 11 January: ‘Japan seeks security info pact with S.Korea’ reported that Japan was seeking to finally sign the GSOMIA agreement that had been blocked in 2012, also WSJ 28 Dec 2015 Japan, South Korea Agree to Aid for ‘Comfort Women’; SCMP 30 Dec 2015 Why Japan’s ‘comfort women’ apology is a coup for Washington and a blow for Beijing.
degree of diplomatic leadership (rather than ‘nationalist’ self-isolation). Official opposition to the comfort women issue has not contributed to enhance trust in the sincerity of official apology statements which by themselves contain ambiguous language and conditionality. Politicians, officials and part of the media constantly question the historical records and the official responsibility of the Japanese government or military for the ‘comfort women’ system. The official reservations about much of the responsibility for war crimes in Japan contrasts with the official admission and repentance for war crimes and crimes against humanity by the German government and the prosecution of individual perpetrators there (Kaneko 1999).

Another indication of contested memory politics and lack of remorse is the protest by Japan against UNESCO including items relating to the Rape of Nanjing into the UNESCO Memory of the World programme.

More generally, in an interview with Foreign Affairs (Tepperman 2013:5) PM Abe argued that history should not influence politics and be left to historians, the exact opposite of Korean President Park who frames it as a political responsibility Japan has to assume. Abe's position to leave the matter to historians and not make it a diplomatic issue show the perpetrators' (and the rational-liberal) propensity to focus on the present and let bygones be bygones, is unacceptable for the victims: ‘Adversaries are divided not just by their competitive spin-doctoring but by the calendars with which they measure history and the importance they put on remembrance. The victims of a conflict are assiduous historians and cultivators of memory. The perpetrators are pragmatists, firmly planted in the present.’ (Pinker 2011:493). This is precisely the way Prime Minister Abe said it in the interview in Foreign Affairs (Tepperman 2013:5): ‘I have never said that Japan has not committed aggression. Yet at the same time, how best, or not, to define “aggression” is none of my business. That’s what historians ought to work on. I have been saying that our work is to discuss what kind of world we should create in the future.’ Abe's view could not be farther from his Korean counterpart President Park, as we have seen in her already quoted speech to the US Congress: ‘For where there is failure to acknowledge honestly what happened yesterday, there can be no tomorrow.’ The problem is compounded by the fact that the Japanese Prime Minister is the grandson of a suspected war criminal (former PM Nobusuke Kishi a vice minister of the Manchuko government’s industrial department who helped to promote the industrialisation of Japanese-occupied Manchuria and China. A Cabinet member during the war he was arrested by the allies but later released without trial), while Park is the daughter of the President who signed the normalisation agreement with Japan that left out the victims. Park had also been an officer in the Japanese Imperial Army. The two leaders, both carrying their nationalistic and family history baggage, stand on opposite sides of the moralisation gap, a political abyss, with Park refusing to meet Abe for several years until November 2015. This state of affairs calls for an analysis that explain the deeper drivers and issues behind this paradoxical
conflict that structuralist theories might dismiss as ‘Much ado about Nothing’.

Official Japan’s atonement for its wartime past was also often qualified by Japan’s feeling that China and Korea were not ‘grateful enough’ for Japan’s economic development aid delivered after the governmental agreements (1965 with ROK, 1972 with China). However, these agreements were negotiated from a position of economic superiority. Economic co-operation was not altruistic, but in the mutual interest while compensation never reached the individual victims as we have seen. Gustafsson (2016:13-5) explains this attitude by Japanese anxiety over its self-identity as the leading economic power in Asia after its economic situation deteriorated from the early 1990s onwards and China overtook Japan as the second biggest economy in the world in 2010. Moreover, Japan saw its ODA to China and Korea as atonement and ‘informal’ reparations and both countries implicitly recognised it as such during the period where Japan was recognised as economically superior.

The (untitled) statement issued by Japan’s PM Abe as a Cabinet decision on 14 August 201599 also puts Japan’s apologies into a context that stresses another kind of Japan’s superiority and casts doubts about its remorse about history. Abe emphasises Japan’s constitutional modernisation in the 19th century as the first country in Asia (apparently to suggest that this laid the basis for Japan’s credentials as a liberal and democratic leader in the region after WWII) and in line with the nationalist interpretation of the early 20th century describes the Russo-Japanese war of 1904-5 as an ‘encouragement to many people under colonial rule from Asia to Africa’100. This is an odd argument since the war as we have seen led to Japan’s annexation and colonisation of Korea and later of other Asian countries. This was certainly not just an attempt to preserve Japan’s independence from imperialist encroachment from Russia or other powers. Legalistic insistence by Japan which maintains the validity of earlier imposed agreements (such as the protectorate and annexation ‘treaties’ with Korea of 1905 and 1910 or the later limited compensation agreements) has done much to undermine the apologies by its leaders as have narratives of Japanese ‘noble’ intentions perpetuated by right wing politicians (Duus 2008).

Abe’s 2015 statement avoids expressing clear responsibility for the suffering of the comfort women while repeating some of the remorse expressed in the earlier statements: ‘Upon the innocent people did our country inflict immeasurable damage and suffering. History is harsh. What is done cannot be undone. Each and every one of them had his or her life, dream, and beloved family. When I squarely contemplate this obvious fact, even now, I find myself speechless and my heart is rent with the utmost grief.’ This general sentence about History becomes geographically more specific: ‘Also in countries that fought against Japan, countless lives were lost among young people with promising futures. In China, Southeast Asia, the Pacific islands and elsewhere that became the battlefields, numerous innocent citizens suffered and fell victim to

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99 [http://japan.kantei.go.jp/97_abe/statement/201508/0814statement.html accessed on 31.8.2015](http://japan.kantei.go.jp/97_abe/statement/201508/0814statement.html). The date is significant as 15 August marks the announcement of the unilateral end of hostilities by the Emperor. The Japanese capitulation to the Allies was signed on 2 September, but China’s military parade to mark the victory anniversary was held on 3 September 2015. China recently decreed the creation of two new public holidays targeted at Japan, the first being September 3 named The 70th anniversary of Chinese People’s Anti-Japanese War and the World Anti-Fascist War Victory Commemoration Day for December 13, marking the Japanese takeover of Nanjing, China’s then capital under the Nationalists and the Nanjing massacre.

100 Mishra 2014 shows how formative and galvanising the Japanese victory over Russia indeed was for Asian anti-imperialist movements.
battles as well as hardships such as severe deprivation of food. We must never forget that there were women behind the battlefields whose honour and dignity were severely injured.’ Such wording – camouflaging starvation, war crimes and sexual slavery – does not reflect the language often repeated in diplomatic communiques and indeed in the statement itself of ‘facing history squarely’. The 28 December 2015 statement (which only concerns Korean comfort women as other Asians were quick to point out) also avoids a number of important issues such as assuming legal responsibility, a direct apology by the PM and hence has been largely rejected by the victims and parts of Korean civil society. Korea’s opposition party (victorious in the April 2016 parliamentary elections vowed to renegotiate the deal) and the new President Moon Jae-in described Japan’s wartime use of “comfort women” as “crimes against humanity” on 1 March 2018 saying that “the Japanese government, the perpetrator, should not say the matter is closed”. While not formally rejecting the agreement struck by his conservative predecessor, Moon, focused on the moralisation gap to push Japan to “genuinely reconcile with its neighbours on which it inflicted suffering”, a move immediately rejected by Japan’s government. Chief Cabinet Secretary Suga recalled – like PM Abe during a visit to South Korea for the Winter Olympics - that for Japan the 2015 agreement had brought the matter to a close and was the basis for bilateral ties.

PM Abe has consistently expressed ‘apology fatigue’ (French 2012) which certainly resonates well with the younger generations who have no personal responsibility or even memory of the past and get little, often biased information through the state-approved education textbooks (cf chapters 1.10 and 1.15; Watanabe 2015): ‘In Japan, the postwar generations now exceed eighty per cent of its population. We must not let our children, grandchildren, and even further generations to come, who have nothing to do with that war, be predestined to apologize. Still, even so, we Japanese, across generations, must squarely face the history of the past. We have the responsibility to inherit the past, in all humbleness, and pass it on to the future.’ (Abe statement 14.8.2015 quoted above)

A Japanese literary critic and emeritus professor, Norihiro Kato wrote in the New York Times on 16 July 2014 in an Op-ed 'Japan's Break With Peace' that seven million people in Japan have watched 'The Eternal Zero' a sentimental movie about a group of kamikaze pilots making it one of the top ten most successful Japanese movies of all time and deplores 'how such forgetfulness will contribute to peace and security'. Of course, most Chinese and Koreans alive today have no personal memory of Japanese occupation and atrocities either, but the memory is cultivated in many ways through education, memorials, movies, media and oral history (Wang 2008). Societies tend to remain divided with usually nationalist politicians and activists playing ‘history politics’ compounded by a lack of sustained leadership interest in reconciliation (Berger and Bong 2012).

‘Japan has repeatedly expressed the feelings of deep remorse and heartfelt apology for its actions during the war. In order to manifest such feelings through concrete actions, we have engraved in our hearts the histories of suffering of the people in Asia as our neighbours: those in Southeast Asian countries such as Indonesia and the Philippines, and Taiwan, the Republic of Korea and China, among others; and we have consistently devoted ourselves to the peace and prosperity of the region since the end of the war.'

Such position articulated by the previous cabinets will remain unshakable into the future.

How much emotional struggle must have existed and what great efforts must have been necessary for the Chinese people who underwent all the sufferings of the war and for the former POWs who experienced unbearable sufferings caused by the Japanese military in order for them to be so tolerant nevertheless?

We must pass this down from generation to generation into the future. We have the great responsibility to take the lessons of history deeply into our hearts, to carve out a better future, and to make all possible efforts for the peace and prosperity of Asia and the world. ‘(Abe 2015)

Abe’s statement here seems to have been formulated so as to pre-empt renewed Chinese (and Korean) criticism as these passages contain the minimum ‘demands’ by Japan’s neighbours for acceptance of the ‘apology’. China’s official reaction to the statement has thus been relatively muted (King 2015:38-9). This statement also laid the groundwork for the later agreement between Japan and Korea on the issue of comfort women102, but characteristically that statement was also framed by the Japanese side as an end point to endless apologies.

Gustafsson (2016) provides an interesting perspective on what Nakano 2014 calls revisionism. Gustafsson characterises the period from 1972 (when Japan established diplomatic relations with China and when – as a reminder - the comfort women issue had not yet come to light) until the early 2000s as a period in which Japan (routinely) recognised its responsibility for aggression and damage in China and China recognised the expressions of Japanese contrition103. At the same time, China recognised Japan’s economic and development superiority (expressed through Japanese ODA and learning from Japan). We encounter here the familiar theme of ‘civilisational superiority since the de-centering of China and ‘inversion of hierarchy’ cf. chapter I.1.10) ‘During this period, Japan’s self-identity in relation to China had two main components: Japan as a former aggressor; and Japan as an economic great power that functioned as a model of development for China and other Asian countries.’ (Gustafsson 2016:9). Japan’s former aggression was never forgotten, but the emphasis during that period was on ‘former’ (Gustafsson 2016:10) and the ‘zhengming’ lay in order/harmony: China was recognised as the former victim and Japan as the former aggressor who had repented and pursued a pacifist policy. And in fact, during this period Japan accepted Chinese criticism for ‘wrong’ behaviour, for instance after China criticised PM Nakasone’s 1985 official visit to the Yasukuni Shrine. Nakasone expressed contrition for the war in a speech at the UNGA and even stated in the Japanese Diet that the war against China had been an aggression (shinryaku) and had been wrong. PM visits to Yasukuni stopped (only Hashimoto Ryutaro visited once in 1996) and at several occasions Japanese Ministers were forced to resign for nationalistic statements questioning war crimes (Gustafsson 2016:11-1). However, in sharp contrast to that period, PM

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102 ‘We will engrave in our hearts the past, when the dignity and honour of many women were severely injured during wars in the 20th century. Upon this reflection, Japan wishes to be a country always at the side of such women’s injured hearts. Japan will lead the world in making the 21st century an era in which women’s human rights are not infringed upon.’

103 Quote from the 1972 Joint Communique cited in Gustafsson (2016:9): ‘The Japanese side is keenly conscious of the responsibility for the serious damage that Japan caused in the past to the Chinese people through war, and deeply reproaches itself.’
Koizumi paid six visits to the contested shrine between 2001 and 2006 despite Chinese (and Korean) protests (see also French 2017:200-5). Gustafsson (2016:14-9) offers a complex dynamic of respective misrecognition and identity changes in both Japan and China as causes for this deterioration of relations: The visits hurt China’s identity as victims of Japanese aggression just as for domestic reasons it had embarked on a nationalistic patriotic education campaign that focused on Japan’s aggression and humiliation of China. Japan saw this patriotic campaign as anti-Japanese and misrecognition of its long-standing pacifist identity, of its apologies and self-improvement and its ‘generosity’ towards its former victims. The Japanese right-wing (including PM Abe) consequently moved towards yet another identity change of Japan away from apologising for the past to portraying China as a military threat, pacifism as mistaken and potentially dangerous and thus the need for Japan to become a ‘normal’ country including changes to its pacifist Constitution and rules of military engagement. These of course reinforce the Chinese perception of Japan being unrepentant and retaking the path of ‘militarism’. French (2017:201) calls this "the negative feedback loop that persists between the two countries’ nationalisms".

While Gustafsson focuses on Sino-Japanese relations, the routine recognition and disruption by the three mechanisms is similar for Korean-Japanese relations, with Korea becoming economically competitive, and some Korean companies even overtaking Japanese flagship companies (Samsung versus Sony) in the global market place.

With his Yasukuni visits and repeated nationalist statements (Nakano 2014, Fukuda 2015) Abe is widely considered as the standard-bearer of the revisionist policy (Nakano 2014:9; Watanabe 2015; Takahara 2015:32), but overall among the Japanese public there is a plurality of views and a strong adherence to the pacifist ideals of the Constitution, which is also reflected in Abe’s statement. Many Japanese historians and some museums have done much to research and expose wartime atrocities and the mistakes of Imperial Japan (Sahashi 2015). However, in international society the government positions on such issues matter as they are linked to the main institutions that define states and international society. This is especially the case in NE Asia where these institutions – sovereignty and international law – remain state-centric and nationalistic as we will further examine in part II. Therefore countries have not yet been able or willing to build deeply cooperative relationships despite many existing economic ties and people-to-people exchanges. Morality gaps have hardly been bridged.

1.15. Conflicting accounts of victimhood in NE Asia: Japan as a victim?

In a clear reflection of the moralisation gap the dominating conservative view in Japan privileges a narrative of WWII being forced onto it (repeated in the Abe statement 2015), the...
victimhood of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombs and the benefits Japan allegedly brought to the countries it occupied (in terms of development or liberation from Western colonisation). Contrary to what happened in Germany, Japan felt victimised, by the nuclear bombs and destruction of Japanese cities and the cost of war rather than feeling the guilt of aggression. Some Japanese right-wing scholars have gone to great length to reject comparisons with Germany’s post-war repentence (Kaneko 1999). Instead of remorse for actually having started the war Japanese people's own suffering from wartime destruction and death was the focus of remembrance in large sways of the population and in government statements. Japanese also point to their pacifist constitution and the contributions Japan made to regional and international development and human rights after the war, but atrocities committed by Japan are not easily admitted by the mainstream or reflected in the public consciousness (French 2012). The statement of PM Abe 70 years after the end of the war clearly emphasises this ‘moral high ground’ and Japan’s post-war credentials as a Western (i.e. democratic, liberal, peace-loving) leader in opposition to (unnamed) China which is not a liberal democracy like Japan106. This echoes the claims of civilisational superiority by Japan vis-à-vis a ‘de-centred’ and backward China (cf. chapter 1.10).

The concepts Japan pursued in the 1930s and 1940s of an ‘East Asian Community’, a ‘New Order in East Asia’, the ‘Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere’ and an ‘Asian Community’ all under Japan's leadership were portrayed (and continue to be) as an attempt to liberate fellow Asians from Western colonialism and leading them into modernity (Duara 2001; Duus 2008). Duara (2001:111) and Duus (2008:146) argue that rather than a cynical disguise for imperialism, these concepts rooted in Japanese Pan-Asianism, were part of an intellectual heritage building on East Asian commonality of culture, script, race and common ancestors. Similarly Mitter (2014:46-7) argues ‘the Japanese were imperialists in China who thought of themselves as friends and mentors, rather than occupiers’ and (2014:139): ‘the wider ideological clash between Japan and China was a central cause of the tragedy [the Nanjing massacre]. Japanese Pan-Asianism had metamorphosed in the decades between 1900 and the 1930s, and the Japanese were seized with a sincere, if deluded, belief that they had the duty to lead their Asian neighbours, including China, in a journey of liberation from Western imperialism. The notion that China might have developed its own vision of nationalism, in which Japan was as much an aggressor as the West, did not fit into the world view of the invaders. This cognitive dissonance did a great deal to fuel the contempt of the troops for their victims and their consequent savagery’.

The pan-Asian concept, or dream, nourished Japan’s national identity and restored a sense of national pride after decades of humiliation by foreigners. The later war against America and its allies (called then the ‘Great East Asia War’) was portrayed as a fight for liberation and for a new

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106 ‘Japan will firmly uphold basic values such as freedom, democracy, and human rights as unyielding values and, by working hand in hand with countries that share such values, hoist the flag of “Proactive Contribution to Peace,” and contribute to the peace and prosperity of the world more than ever before.’And: ‘We will engrave in our hearts the past, when Japan attempted to break its deadlock with force. Upon this reflection, Japan will continue to firmly uphold the principle that any disputes must be settled peacefully and diplomatically based on the respect for the rule of law and not through the use of force, and to reach out to other countries in the world to do the same. As the only country to have ever suffered the devastation of atomic bombings during war, Japan will fulfill its responsibility in the international community, aiming at the non-proliferation and ultimate abolition of nuclear weapons’.
and more just international order\textsuperscript{107} and an Asian 'racial awakening' (Duus 2008:148-50). Nevertheless, these projects (and the wars) also offered a way out of Japan's economic impasse in the wake of the Great Depression and catered for the fear of a largely resource-poor country stifled by foreign protectionism (Duus 2008:149). America's 'Open Door' closed in 1930 following the Smoot-Harley Tariff Act; US-Japan trade dropped by 60% (Green 2017:154). However, despite these 'noble' aspirations the occupation of the Asian countries by Japanese forces 'proved to be at least as harsh and exploitative as the European colonialists' (Duus 2008:151; Kaneko 1999) and consequently became seen as hypocritical at best opening a large moralisation gap that has not been bridged in the seventy years since the Pacific War ended. Losing this war portrayed as a 'fight in the name of Asia against colonisation' rather than starting it motivated by imperial designs thus has become the key historical memory, or chosen national trauma for Japan.

Of course there are other accounts within Japan which focus on Japan's guilt, but they have remained a critical, albeit vocal, minority. For them Japan's defeat in WWII 'became a prism through which a complete rereading of prewar history was made' with a sense of tragedy about how rapidly Japan had moved from the position of hope of Asia at the end of the 19\textsuperscript{th} century to that of traitor of Asia in just a few decades (Korhonen 2014:2).

Thus the 'East Asian community' idea is fraught with historical implications that undermine its legitimacy at least if proposed by Japan. Even the most 'progressive' regional integration initiative proposed by then PM Hatoyama (2009) side-stepped the Asian historical precedents (both the China centric investiture and tribute system and Japan's Co-prosperity sphere) and used the historical analogy of European integration instead (his grandfather was related to Richard Nikolaus Eijiro, Count of Coudenhove-Kalergi, the founder of the Paneuropa Union).

Japan's post-war diplomacy focused on economic and trade expansion (Yoshida Doctrine) a strategy for Japan laid out by then Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru just after the end of WWII which allowed Japan to rely on the United States for its security needs so the country could focus on its economic recovery\textsuperscript{108}. This strategy could be seen as pursuing regional dominance through other (non-military) means (French 2012). As Duus also notes (2008:152-154) the narrative of Japan as a champion of pan-Asianism and noble liberator of Asia has survived the defeat and persists among influential right-wing politicians in Japan (including Tokyo’s former governor Ishihara who played a key role in re-igniting the Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute and PM Abe). Duus (2008:152) gives an example: 'In 1993, when Prime Minister Hosokawa publicly expressed the belief that Japan had brought "unbearable suffering" to the people of Asia and elsewhere through "national aggression and domination," prominent LDP leaders like Nagano Shigeto, Sakurai Shin, and Hashimoto Ryutaro countered with public statements that denied the war had been "an aggressive war" or reaffirmed it as a "war to liberate Asia". This culminates logically in a sense of Japanese victimhood: 'What kept a positive memory of the dream alive among right-wing conservatives was a complex set of factors, a reluctance to come to terms with defeat and failure, a desire to make sense of the costly wartime sacrifices of the Japanese people, a feeling that Japan

\textsuperscript{107} Note that a new and just international order is nowadays an important issue for China and other developing countries.

\textsuperscript{108} Green (2017:264) dates the US focus on Japan's recovery to 1947 and during and after the Korean War Japan morphed into the US's most important ally in the Pacific – for details Green 2017:278-84.
had once become a "victim" of outside forces beyond control, a desire to protect the memory of the war dead, resentment of American hegemony in postwar Asia, and electoral politics.’ Similarly, Yu Yongtae’s analysis of history textbooks in China, Japan and Korea (Yu 2007:222) highlights that some right-wing Japanese history textbooks perpetuate this narrative: ‘The Husousha (…) textbook version of history asserts that Japan never embraced imperialism or militarism. The book even says that Japan never invaded any neighbouring countries or managed any colonies; therefore it does not acknowledge the fact of anti-Japanese nationalist movements within the region or Japanese occupation. According to this view, Japan acted as a liberator against the imperialism of Western powers alone’. Yu in this case singled out one of the most extreme cases among Japanese textbooks, but even this minority view does a lot of harm in the perceptions of neighbours who are all too eager to use these examples to criticise Japan in general. Yu (2007:222) acknowledges this, but then focuses on a particular Korean grievance which is that in the focus on the Pacific War, Japan’s earlier colonisation of Korea tends to be ‘forgotten’: ‘Some other Japanese textbooks acknowledge Japan’s war of aggression, but see the aggression beginning only with the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931. They exclude aggressive military campaigns prior to 1931 from the analysis of aggression.’ Yu explains this mainly as a result of the US focus in its own historiography of WWII (Pacific War) and the ‘Japanization’ of US post-war policy due to the ‘loss of China’ (i.e. the victory of the Communists in the Chinese Civil War) and at the same time the willingness of China’s nationalist leader Chiang Kai-shek in the immediate post-war period to maintain an anti-communist strategy and to ‘pay virtue back to the enemy Japan’ which effectively led Japan to come off the hook lightly for their historical responsibility in East Asia (Yu 2007:222-5). It is as if NE Asians were competing for a ‘victimhood distinction’ with the recognition of victimhood status being an important objective.

Seen in this light the significance of the recent pronouncements of Prime Minister Abe on the words ‘aggression’ and ‘invasion’ and the scrutiny of neighbouring countries of whether this word would appear in the statement by Japan’s PM at the occasion of the commemoration by Japan of the 70th anniversary of the end of WWII becomes clear109.

1.16. Nationalism as an ideological institution in NE Asia international society

We can see from these accounts that nation-building was intimately linked to the end and deliberate rejection of the consensual, mostly peaceful, cosmopolitan Chinese or Confucian culture of hierarchy and regional order at the end of the 19th century (Schmid 2002) and even more the end of the Japanese Empire in 1945.

The meaning given to these developments has in no small part to do with the desire for recognition, which is also a driver of nationalism. Fukuyama (1992:xix), based on Kojève’s reading of Hegel asserts "An understanding of the importance of the desire for recognition as the motor of history allows us to reinterpret many phenomena that are otherwise seemingly familiar to

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109 In the end Abe’s statement included the ‘right’ terms, but in an ambiguous formulation that avoids taking responsibility: ‘Incident, aggression, war -- we shall never again resort to any form of the threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes. We shall abandon colonial rule forever and respect the right of self-determination of all peoples throughout the world.’
us, such as culture, religion, work, nationalism, and war." And (ibid p xx) "The struggle for recognition provides us with insight into the nature of international politics.(…) Nationalism, a modern yet not-fully-rational form of recognition has been the vehicle for the struggle for recognition over the past hundred years, and the source of this century's most intense conflicts. This is the world of 'power politics,' described by such foreign policy 'realists' as Henry Kissinger." I showed in the previous chapters how important recognition of one's place in the hierarchy was in the Confucian world (among states but also within society down to the rankings in the family). Here recognition was linked to a particular place in the hierarchy not necessarily as an equal and didn't involve nationalism or power politics. We saw how the ambiguity of Japan's post-Imjin War parallel tribute system and then the de-centering of China (de-recognition of its superiority and recognition of nationalism and Western civilisation as the new moral standard) played out. Mitter's (2014) account emphasises the recognition and de-recognition of the inversion of hierarchy in the pre-war period when a ‘sharp reversal of past practice’ occucred: ‘Asians had always come to China to learn, but now Japan was the mentor’ (Mitter 2014:27) and ‘Japan had been mentor as well as monster’ (Mitter 2014:17). The post-war period saw yet another complex inversion of hierarchies and recognition and de-recognition of superiority between China and Japan (Gustafsson 2016) – a process which is still on-going and de-stabilising NE Asia.

Just as characterised by Fukuyama the early 20th century was a world of power politics and war driven by nationalism. This continued well into the 20th century with the Cold War – which was ‘hot’ in NE Asia in the Korean War. With the end of the Cold War there seems to have been a change away from at least violent power politics in NE Asia and a rather clear break with power politics more generally and with nationalism in EU Europe. Sovereignty and its recognition by others has served as the bulwark to avoid repetition of past humiliation and as a rallying cry to fan nationalist emotions even for far-flung and 'useless' bouts of territory. The moralisation gap's essence is the respective non-recognition by each side of the moral claims and grievances each side firmly believes in, often rationalised as we have seen, but fundamentally emotional. Recognition is to try to bring in line the perception of others with one's own in terms of power and status with the minimum being respect and equality (which is what all formerly colonised countries demand from their former rulers). To some extent the focus on recognition is re-assuring as it focuses less on ‘possession’ and thus potential military conflict, than on ‘status’ reminiscent of the Confucian world order built on ritual enactment of status and recognition.

In NE Asia national sovereignty has thus been elevated to a sacral institution that is taboo and bolstered by selective accounts of national history. Respect for sovereignty is a conditio sine qua non for any type of interaction with friend or foe. This fortunately entails the respect for each other's sovereignty except where it clashes with one's own (territorial conflicts!) as a strong norm of co-existence (cf. also Badie 2011:63-4). It is thus unlikely that any attempt by one country in the region to establish itself as a hegemonic power or a consensual leader will succeed unless ideas about sovereignty, nationalism and moralisation gaps change dramatically. Similarly unlikely is an integration project EU-style with a syndicated hierarchy in the short term, but it does not seem impossible to pursue a NE Asia integration project if attitudes to nationalism and historical narratives change in ways European nations’ have and if countries started to stress their
common heritage and cosmopolitan coexistence in the past. Given our above diagnosis, such a process is both overdue and unlikely to progress very fast.

The key to bridging moralisation gaps lies in Education Ministries rather than Foreign Offices. The heritage of 19th century nationalism and 20th century Japanese imperialism – largely perpetuated in history textbooks and political narratives ('history politics' or 'memory politics' i.e. using memory not on the basis of historical accuracy, but to create a specific national identity narrative that serves political ends) - is formative for the relations in NE Asia today: 'History education is no longer a domestic issue in East Asia. Historical narratives and the interpretation of the past have always been the major barriers for a real reconciliation among countries in the region. To a great extent, memories of the past conflicts have come to shape international relations in East Asia.' (Wang 2008:801). All territorial disputes and national divisions in NE Asia hark back to Japan's ascent to a modern, nationalist and imperialist power after the Meiji-ishin and the concurrent decline and collapse of the China-dominated Confucian investiture and tribute system. Countries have gone through traumatic modernisation experiences, occupation and wars which have left moralisation gaps and a sense of victimhood and thirst for historical justice on one's own terms on all sides. All countries have moralisation gaps with the others (as shown above in our short list). All cultivate their chosen trauma and victimhood narratives notably through education of younger generations without personal memories. East Asian integration projects remain under the shadow of Japan's imperial Pan-Asianism of the early 20th century (Duus 2008) or of a sino-centric neo-tribute system French 2017).

The distinct but intertwined histories of China's, Korea's and Japan's modernisation and nation-building until today have very much perpetuated and at times sharpened this traditional rivalry culminating in Japan's dismemberment of China's zone of influence, then territory and finally in a full-blown invasion of China. After losing the war against China and the Pacific War against the US, the Cold War 'renversement des alliances' the US-Japan alliance against the communist USSR and the People's Republic of China (cf also Yu 2007; Green 2017:278-84) resulted in a rapid ascent of former US foe Japan and its economic networks in East and South East Asia. This deprived the victims of Japan's aggression of a sense of victory and historical justice: Japan was allowed to put its imperialist past behind it under the Cold War alliance against (some of) its victims and while the erstwhile colony Korea was first divided by the superpowers and then devastated in the Korean War. Many Japanese more or less shamefully ignored their history of aggression and atrocities and atoned by subscribing to a pacifist Constitution that barred the country from using force again except in self-defence. But the 'never again’ commitment to future peace was hardly accompanied by converting shame or guilt and apologies for the past into sincere reconciliation efforts by most governments. Under the leadership of PM Abe (and Koizumi before him) the commitment to the pacifist Constitution has been weakened after two decades of economic stagnation that imbued Japan with a sense of decline and weakness that some politicians try to compensate for with nationalism. Official Japan could create its own victim narrative as the target of nuclear bombs (very obvious in the Hiroshima Peace Museum and the Yushukan museum adjacent to the Yasukuni shrine). Japan even after the war claimed the mantle of anti-colonial liberator (in SE Asia) and participated in the 1955 Bandung conference. Only after the 1990s did Japan's economic network come under challenge from China, paradoxically actually then a part of
the Japanese economic network (Chen e.a. 2011) which later allowed a rising China and a rising Korea to challenge Japan’s superiority and ignorance of its imperialist past. For a decade or two before their rise territorial disputes and historical grievances “were swept under the carpet” by a generation of pragmatist leaders like Deng Xiaoping, who set aside history and geopolitics in favour of trade and economic development, which allowed NE Asian countries to achieve their “economic miracle” (Hahm 2017:2, 7). However, since the late 1990s, invigorated nationalism has accompanied the rise of China and the rise of Korea and the revisionism of Japan’s right wing parties. Hence the territorial disputes are in fact recent political ones, not historical issues. Nationalism, identity and status recognition are driving history politics – and conflict - in the region and present an almost unsurmountable obstacle to creating a security community.

1.17. Moralisation gaps and conflicting sovereignty claims and territorial issues in NE Asia today

Against this background it is easier to understand the current territorial conflicts in NE Asia which are more about history, moralisation gaps and nationalism than anything else (even though mismanagement by governments did play a role). To some extent they can be seen as a ‘ritualisation’ of positions in line with the Confucian understandings of ritual recognition of hierarchy and status even if it is the status of victim as we saw in the previous sections, as well as of ‘zhengming’. It is quite interesting to note that while the roots go back several decades, in most cases the actual conflicts are fairly recent (Arai, Goto and Wang 2013:6, 21-7). This indicates an instrumentalisation (and ritualisation) for domestic purposes and for nationalist identity construction. For instance, Selden (2011:1) shows the recency of the Dokdo question between Japan and Korea: ‘For more than half a century, since 1953, Dokdo has been under South Korean jurisdiction. The Dokdo question was not resolved, however, by bilateral or multilateral agreement, and although the issue surfaced at various times including the 1965 negotiations over Japan-ROK normalization, it was not until 2005 that Japanese claims led to public standoff over the islets.’ We have already briefly examined the Japan-Korea conflict about Dokdo in the introduction to this part.

The recent conflicts between Japan and China around the islets in the East China Sea called Senkaku (尖閣諸島) in Japanese and Diaoyu (钓鱼岛) in Chinese are also the most serious and consequential. In September 2010 a Chinese trawler rammed a Japanese coastguard vessel in the disputed waters. The captain was detained by Japanese authorities (which is widely seen as a blunder by the inexperienced DPJ government ICG 2013:20-1) leading to harsh Chinese diplomatic reactions which initially were not unlike similar incidents in the past. However, several subsequent Chinese reactions were considered as ‘newly assertive’ retaliation including an alleged economic boycott of exports of rare earth minerals to Japan and the arrest of Japanese employees of Fujita accused of filming in a military zone in China. The alleged economic boycott came as a shock as the pragmatic practice in the past between Japan and China had been to separate politics from business. However, Hagström's research (2012) provides evidence (from Japanese sources) that the rare earth ban in fact occurred and was hotly debated already a month before the trawler incident and was thus totally unconnected to the incident (it came according to Chinese explanations in the process of a re-organisation of the environmentally damaging rare earth mining
industry). The connection with the trawler incident, portraying the ban as a retaliatory sanction was apparently made ten days after the incident by the *New York Times*. From then on it became 'received wisdom' confirming China's 'new assertiveness'. As for the arrested Japanese citizens, Hagström (2012) also establishes that the Japanese indeed illegally entered and filmed in a military restricted area and refutes the claim that the Chinese authorities orchestrated the incident in retaliation for the Japanese arrest of the trawler captain. The Japanese offenders were in fact released relatively quickly without charges pressed against them.

The later release of the Chinese captain was then widely criticised in Japan as humiliating weakness which in turn made the DPJ (Democratic Party of Japan) government vulnerable to the right-wing anti-China politicians, such as then Tokyo Governor Ishihara (Arai, Goto and Wang 2013:42-4). This interpretation fits the Japanese anxiety over China's rise and its own weakness. A month before the incident, the media were full of headlines that China had overtaken Japan as the world's second largest economy (a 'status' Japan had proudly held since the 1960s). Hagström (2012:283-7) provides a rather different conclusion: He shows that Japan did not come out of the trawler incident weakened or humiliated which were the dominating accusations levelled by right-wing politicians against the DPJ government. The arrest and detention of the captain (unlike in earlier incidents) could be seen as a demonstration that Japan actually controlled the islands effectively. Japan also violated a 1997 agreement with China on fisheries by proceeding to arrest the skipper rather than just drive him away. In addition, Japan scored points as the incident was turned (as shown above) by international media and pundits into evidence of China's bullying and 'new assertiveness' which in turn prompted the US Secretary of State, Clinton, to explicitly acknowledge its security guarantees also applied to the Senkakus, something the US had refused to do at senior level before (French 2017:211).

In 2012/3 the dispute between Japan and China over sovereignty over these five islets and three rocks in the East China Sea escalated once more and brought relations between the world’s second and third biggest economies to a post-war low (ICG 2013). This latest crisis started when the Japanese government bought three of the islands from private owners after Tokyo Governor Ishihara Shintaro (a right-wing politician) announced in April 2012 that the Tokyo Metropolitan Government wanted to buy them and build on them citing the need to counter China’s challenge to Japan’s control (ICG 2013:5). The DPJ government apparently underestimated China’s reaction as it thought that the purchase by the central government to pre-empt Ishihara, was the lesser of two evils. However, the government announcement came just a day after a meeting between PM Noda and China’s President Hu causing the latter ‘loss of face’. In fact, for the Chinese the perception of the sale was the opposite: the purchase by the government was seen as a nationalisation and thus as a change of status quo in terms of sovereignty since the islands were now no longer owned privately but directly by Japan as the Chinese Ambassador to the US explained in an interview in *Foreign Affairs*: 'it's quite clear Japan's decision will lead to very

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110 It may seem strange that the Tokyo municipal government should buy far away islands, but Tokyo actually already comprises a number of far-flung islets and rocks at sea (Izu Islands, Ogasawara group, Okino Torishima and Minari Torishima, over 1800 km away from Tokyo city centre. The latter two uninhabited territories one of them as small as 10 m2 so that Tokyo had to invest millions to keep it from eroding, form the basis for a Japanese claim at UNCLOS for a huge EEZ of 257,000 km2 which was, however, left pending by UNCLOS in 2012 as China and South Korea protested the claim (not putting rival claims to possession, but disputing that the UNCLOS definition of islands applied to the rocks in question) – McC McCormack 2012.
Alongside strong statements by senior leaders came an announcement that China had drawn territorial sea baselines around the islands, formalising its territorial claim and declaring that Japanese public service and Self-Defense Forces vessels entering the area would be considered as violating Chinese territorial sovereignty (ICG 2013:11). Chinese Marine Surveillance and Fisheries Law Enforcement boats then regularly entered these waters. In November 2013 an exclusive Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ) overlapping with that of Japan was unilaterally declared by China and covering the island group (ICG 2014:10-14). This has widely been interpreted as an offensive move and yet another indication of China's assertiveness (ICG 2014:11) feeding the Japanese threat perception. While it is clear that China's announcement and the way it was handled after years of preparation was diplomatically inept (the Foreign Ministry was apparently not informed by the military ICG 2014:11), the decision to establish it may have been triggered by assertive Japanese gestures such as announcements to shoot down drones entering its airspace (including the disputed islands) and Japanese surveillance of a Chinese naval drill (ICG 2014:12). In fact, China may merely have been seeking parity with Japan, which had established its own unilateral ADIZ in 1969 and enlarged it in 1972 to cover Okinawa and the Diaoyu/Senkaku group then handed to Japan from US administration (ICG 2014:13). A look at the map of Japan's ADIZ shows, like the map of Japan's maritime claims, that China is in fact locked in by it.

The island purchase crisis provoked by Ishihara marks the deepest rift between China and Japan since the establishment of diplomatic relations in 1972. It was not only diplomatic, but affected economic ties. According to a report in the Financial Times (Rift hits Japan exports to China, 23 Oct 2012 p 2) shipments were down by 14% in September 2012 compared to a year earlier, and ‘exports of consumer goods such as cars and motorcycles collapsed, dropping 42 percent and 31 percent respectively’. Flights were cancelled as angry Chinese didn’t want to travel to Japan anymore (or be criticised by friends for doing so) and Japanese feared for their safety in China after violent boycotts and riots against Japanese companies or owners of Japanese cars in China. Those boycotts, according to Katz (2013:19), cost Japanese companies 120 million USD in property damage and a fall in sales by approximately 40-50 percent. In the months after this crisis erupted Japan’s PM Abe (in office since December 2012) embarked on a diplomatic re-orientation away from China to countries in SE Asia and the US. This may well be followed by Japanese investors. China then moved to strengthen its ties with Korea, which, as we have seen shares China's frustration over Japan's lack of sensitivity for historical grievances.

Following the purchase China implemented what the ICG (2013:10) calls a ‘string of measures that bore the hallmarks of a well-planned campaign with multi agency coordination and high-level decision-making’ or a strategy of ‘reactive assertiveness’, using action by Japan as justification to push back and change the facts on the ground in Beijing’s favour while claiming to be acting in response to Japan’s provocations. In the light of Hagström’s research (2012), this interpretation does not hold, as Japan changed the status quo of the islands and was even able to improve its position notably by securing explicit US backing for including the Senkaku islands into the
purview of the US-Japan alliance. The incident also facilitated Japanese security reforms pursued by the right-wing parties that allow Japan's military (the SDF) a greater role than initially provided for under prevailing interpretations of the Constitution (Article 9). Taking also account of Selden's (2011) and MacCormack's (2012) research on Japan's expansion of its maritime domain, the 'aggressive China' versus 'weak and defensive Japan' narrative promoted from Tokyo and Washington does not look very convincing. Jerdén (2014) offers an interesting analysis on why this purported new 'aggressiveness' of China became so widespread despite obvious flaws in the analysis such as the chronology of the rare earth and the trawler incidents. Etzioni (2011) shows in more general terms the propensity in US policy think-tanks to portray China a threat to US national security.

In short and without going into further detail (provided by the reports of the ICG 2013 and 2014 and the reflections of Arai, Goto and Wang 2013, as well as by Mochizuki 2007 for the antecedents and growing problems in China-Japan relations) the situation around the Diaoyu/Senkaku to a large extent got out of control because of an escalation of incidents that were perceived in very different ways by both sides in line with their nationalist narratives and moralisation gaps examined in the previous section. The deterioration was accompanied by a lack of trust, ‘bad timing’, untested leaders, lack of communication channels, domestic playing up and a flawed US media spin of the 'new assertiveness' of China (Jerdén 2014).

Rivalry had become the distinguishing trait of relations between the two countries since PM Koizumi adopted a more China-critical stance and started visiting the controversial Yasukuni Shrine annually since 2001 (Nakano 2014; Fukuda 2015) and replaced China-friendly officials in his administration (Mochizuki 2007; ICG 2013:36-7). On the Chinese side the relationship has suffered from a suspicion that Japan was in fact playing Washington's game of containing China, the prevalent Chinese interpretation of Obama's 'pivot to Asia' (ICG 2013:23-4; Mc Cormack 2012; Manyin e.a. 2012111). In this view any incident could fit neatly into a conspiracy theory which connects back to the narrative of humiliation through foreign aggression and Japanese imperialism. This amplifies the negative dynamics in the region. There are thus many factors explaining the crisis in the context of a deteriorating relationship, but they are all given meaning through (different) perceptions, moralisation gaps and nationalism rather than just as a function of a military or power balance game. The recognition or mis-recognition of identities and (self-)perceptions plays an important role (Gustafsson 2016). While US-China strategic rivalry and exploration rights for fish and hydro-carbon resources in the area are of course part of the issue, they do not explain the root causes. The control of the islets does not affect the military balance significantly and fisheries and other resources in the area are not decisive in economic terms either. On fisheries a pragmatic agreement had actually been struck in 1997 and a

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111 The US pivot to Asia intends to raise Asia's priority in US military planning, foreign policy and economic policy with the ultimate goal to promote US interests in helping to shape norms and rules in the region to ensure that international law and norms are respected, commerce and freedom of navigation are not impeded and that emerging powers build trust with their neighbours and disagreements are resolved peacefully and without coercion (Manyin e.a. 2012 from the Congressional Research Service quoting US officials). Despite the hype about the pivot, the Obama administration's emphasis on the Asia-Pacific region 'appears to be more of a change in means (i.e. the level of resources and leadership attention devoted to this part of the world) than a change in policy goals' (Manyin e.a. 2012:4). And indeed the US policy goals in the region have been fairly consistent since the 1899/1900 Open Door notes.
resources-sharing idea for possible hydro-carbons had been floated. These could still be pursued if the historical and sovereignty issues were solved or shelved.

International law and the territorial disputes

The underlying dispute over sovereignty and control of the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands is very complex as the two countries claim the islands under different aspects of international law: Japan argues to have acquired the islands as ‘terra nullius’ (uninhabited, not owned by anyone) in 1895 by a secret Cabinet decision that, Japan argues, was unconnected to the then ongoing Sino-Japanese war. China argues that the islands were not terra nullius, as they were discovered, named\(^{112}\) and used as navigation aids during the Ming dynasty and administered as part of Taiwan by the Qing dynasty and that they were seized by force during the Sino-Japanese war (Arai, Goto and Wang 2013:21-7). The islands were then lost to Japan together with Taiwan – the province administering the islets - under the Treaty of Shimonoseki (1895) and therefore should in China's view have been returned to China under the Declarations of Cairo (1943) and Potsdam (1945) which stated that Japan should return all territories acquired through war\(^{113}\). From around 1900-1940 a Japanese fisheries business was established there, after its closure four of the islands were sold to a Japanese family\(^{114}\).

However, after WWII the islands together with the Ryukyus (Okinawa) were occupied by the US under the San Francisco Treaty (1951). The US returned Okinawa and the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands to Japan in 1972 (Okinawa Reversion Treaty). China contested the US decision and claimed the islets. Japan argues that China had not lodged a claim for several decades which in its view implied unchallenged acceptance of Japan's sovereignty. This argument is somewhat disingenuous, as Japan had kept the original annexation secret and as the San Francisco Treaty, to which China was not part, put the islets under US control until 1972. Hence, it was only possible for China to challenge Japan's control in 1972. There is also a dispute between Japan and China over whether when the normalisation treaty was negotiated in 1972 there had been a tacit agreement between the two Prime Ministers that the issue should be shelved and dealt with later. China says there had, while Japan denies such a tacit agreement was struck (Arai, Goto and Wang 2013:24-5). The US officially takes no position on the territorial disputes, but asserts that the US-Japan alliance covers the islands as they are under Japan’s administration (ICG 2013:2). Thus another moralisation gap has opened, as the US ignores the grievances its own role in the post-war settlement (or rather non-settlement of the issue) has caused (Selden 2011 on the role of San Francisco Treaty) and the typical 'perpetrator' reaction is to firmly focus on the present.

No international law convention can actually solve the conundrum especially if one of the sides (the one which controls the islands) simply refuses to acknowledge that there is a legal dispute

\(^{112}\) The British Navy named them Pinnacle Islands, which in Japanese translation is Senkaku 尖閣諸島. The Chinese name is more ancient and different, fishing island: 钓鱼岛.

\(^{113}\) The situation is similar for the Dokdo islands, except that they were seized by Japan during the Russo-Japanese war of 1905. The San Francisco Treaty did not mention Dokdo in its final, signed version, but apparently there were drafts which included references to Dokdo allocating it to Korea in some versions and to Japan in others. ROK took control of Dokdo in a unilateral move in 1952 which has been challenged by Japan.

\(^{114}\) Meanwhile, the Japanese family owners received rent from Japan's Ministry of Internal Affairs and Defense until the Japanese government bought them in 2012. Taiwan also claims the islets which it calls the Diaoyu Tai.
despite the daily evidence of conflict. This makes repeated Western calls on settling the dispute through international law sound rather absurd. Hence, the solution must be political either to shelve it or to close the moralisation gap (cf. Arai, Goto and Wang 2013 for various suggestions on how to tackle the issue).

The focus of my research is not to establish who is right or who is wrong or to review each claim in detail (which is probably impossible), but to show how a number of key issues affect how the broad line of the story is perceived and spun by different players. Nationalism as a key variable is clearly a major explanation for the incidents in recent years and how they have been used to add to narratives from the past. Behind the nationalism lurks the perceived victimhood on both sides: China's historical memory of Japan's aggression and invasions is 'confirmed' by Japan's claim to the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands said to have been acquired by force. Japan, meanwhile, does not link the issue to the war at all claiming rightful ownership under international law and does not even admit that there is a dispute. Japan sees itself as a victim of a rising and threatening China, acting as a bully against international law, 'confirming' the Japanese narrative from the early 20th century that China was not a civilised nation. This in turn links to the US view of China as an illiberal country not respecting the rule of law. However, as we have seen, international law here does not offer any clear solution. And as Japan even refuses to acknowledge a dispute, international law does not provide any avenue for arbitration or mediation. The initial 19th century perception that international law had been used as an instrument of imperialist power, had been biased and dangerous for national integrity is still lingering in the region today and helps explain why it is not directly actionable in domestic courts and systems of law, why countries insist on explicit consent as a precondition for applying international law and why it is mainly used to defend sovereignty (cf chapter II.4.6.3).

The dispute between Japan and Korea on Dokdo/Takeshima mentioned in the introduction is of a similar nature, albeit less virulent because the historically victimised party – Korea – actually controls the islands. Interestingly Korea seized control of Dokdo unilaterally in 1952 by drawing the so-called 'Peace Line' into the sea. The irreconcilable positions on the island, but also on other issues such as the ‘comfort women’ have also brought Japan-Korea ties to a historic low with both sides unwilling to even continue a bilateral currency swap agreed in 2008 and enhanced (to 70 bn USD) in 2011 (Korea Times 10 October 2012: Korea, Japan halt currency swap compact). The newspaper also confirms the fragility of interdependence theory: ‘The spat between Korea and Japan over Dokdo has been souring economic ties.’ The move was sparked by Korea’s President Lee’s unprecedented visit to Dokdo on 10 August 2012, which PM Noda called ‘extremely regrettable’ and following which Tokyo re-called its Ambassador to Korea and retaliated by announcing to bring its claim to the islands to the ICJ. In this case it is Korea which refuses to enter an international arbitration on the grounds that its sovereignty over Dokdo is ‘undisputed’. The issue has also dampened hopes for the conclusion of a bilateral trade agreement.

Even the ‘hot’ military conflicts between North and South Korea have been limited to naval battles and skirmishes around the so-called Northern Limit Line or NLL (Roehrig 2009, ICC 2010)

115 The US has not ratified the UNCLOS putting itself in a rather awkward position when advocating international law to address the issue.
in what amounts to a ‘territorial’ conflict of sovereign control along a maritime demarcation line and most likely motivated by economic reasons (rich fishing grounds). The NLL was promulgated on 30 August 1953 by the United Nations Command (UNC) unilaterally and started to be disputed by North Korea in 1973 when it asserted a claim of 12 nautical miles for DPRK territorial waters, a claim that placed five islands controlled by South Korea in their coastal waters. One of these islands was shelled by DPRK artillery fire in November 2010 killing four South Koreans. Naval battles have taken place regularly in these disputed seas including the sinking of the Cheonan in March 2010. Both sides make an instrumental use of international law in their respective claims. In this sense the fratricidal conflict along the NLL is similar to other territorial issues in the region.

1.18 Trilateral cooperation in NE Asia today

After reviewing those bitter bilateral disputes, I will now examine how the divisive past affects regional cooperation. China, Japan and South Korea have created a process of trilateral cooperation that is weakly institutionalised through regular summits, ministerial and other dialogue meetings, a number of joint projects as well as a Trilateral Cooperation Secretariat (TCS) established since 2011 in Seoul (TCS reports 116, Böhmer and Köllner 2012). Despite an increasing density of dialogue meetings and technical cooperation in a variety of fields, the process is politically fragile as the repeated suspension of summits and ministerial meetings has shown.

The first trilateral summit of leaders from the three countries was held in 1999 in the margins of an ASEAN plus 3 summit. In the wake of the Asian Financial Crisis then Japanese PM Obuchi wanted to reconstruct Japan’s regional leadership role that had suffered during the Asian Financial Crisis to the advantage of China (Park 2013:100-2 and ch. III.3.1.). The stated aim of what was then called tripartite partnership was to promote good-neighbourliness, mutual trust and benefit, comprehensive cooperation and common development. According to Jo (2012) the Asian Financial Crisis taught a harsh lesson to the belief in self-help and weak cooperation and provoked a dramatic change in thinking among political and business leaders across NE Asia. The trilateral summit practice became an annual event and the first independent trilateral summit (without ASEAN link) was held in Fukuoka, Japan 10 years later (December 2008). Leaders issued a very short statement to agree a tripartite partnership 117, once more prompted by the now global financial crisis. The practice of the ASEAN plus 3 summits and trilateral summits in its margins has continued besides the independent trilateral process increasing the frequency of high level meetings. China’s proposal in 2004 to develop ASEAN plus 3 into an East Asian Summit (EAS) in the same format (i.e. Asians only) was thwarted by Japan which secured the involvement in the EAS of Australia, India and New Zealand (later also the USA). Japan took advantage of the lack of prior consultation by Beijing of its partners and the fear in some Asian countries of a too sino-centric order (Park 2013:102-6).

The trilateral process was clearly linked to the growing realisation of economic and financial

interdependence and the need to coordinate among the three economic powerhouses in the region (Jo 2012). However, in 2005 a summit was postponed after Japanese PM Koizumi visited the Yasukuni shrine (Böhmer and Köllner 2012:3) and in 2012 (this time for three years) the summit and Foreign Ministers meetings were suspended because of PM Abe’s nationalist stance and resulting tensions with both China and Korea. After a trilateral FM meeting was held in March 2015 (the first since 2012)\(^ {118}\) summit prospects improved, but had to wait for the 70\(^{th}\) Anniversary of the War Statement by PM Abe and China’s commemorative activities for the end of its war of resistance against Japanese aggression (attended by the South Korean President, but not the Japanese PM). The summit was held in Seoul on 1 November 2015 with the main result a pledge to resume annual trilateral summits.

Trilateral cooperation is essentially pragmatic and functional (Böhmer and Köllner 2012), driven by increased interdependence in various fields, from economic and financial to environmental issues and concerns about nuclear safety and disaster management (especially since the 2011 Fukushima tsunami and nuclear accident; joint statements have been issued on all these issues at the various summits). Political issues are usually not on the agenda or referred to in formulaic ways. It does not question the traditional concept of national sovereignty (Jo 2012). Apart from the political steer provided by leaders and Foreign Ministers meetings, there are annual ministerial meetings of ministers of finance, economics, environment and of the central bank governors plus a multitude of meetings at experts and officials levels.

There are no really common institutions, despite the existence of a joint trilateral cooperation secretariat (TCS) opened in Seoul in 2011. The secretariat, despite its name, does not have a multilateral secretarial function as agendas and minutes of meetings are the responsibility of each country and the country holding the annually rotating chair. However, the head of the secretariat participates in the summits and FM meetings and TCS staff provides public information and research functions (author interviews with TCS staff 28-6-2012 and 15-10-2012). One of its official tasks is to provide annual progress reports to the FM meeting. The first such report covered the years 2008-12 and was presented to Foreign Ministers meeting in Ningbo, China in April 2012. The TCS plays an important role in documenting and consolidating the proliferating meetings at expert and technical levels (over a hundred according to Böhmer and Köllner 2012:2) as well as the political process\(^ {119}\). Moreover, it carved itself a role of policy think tank organising research seminars and international forums as well as networking with the EU and other international organisations (author interviews with TCS staff 28-6-2012 and 15-10-2012).

Trilateral cooperation stays well clear of any politically sensitive topics such as the situation of the DPRK, historical issues, territorial disputes, security and the like. It thus plays an important role in keeping dialogues going (below the high political levels) on matters of common concern even when bilateral relations are tense (functional pragmatism). The areas of cooperation are not

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\(^ {118}\) [Accessed 25.10.2017]

\(^ {119}\) The TCS website claims that in addition to the Summits, the three countries have developed 20 Ministerial Meetings, more than 50 Inter-governmental Meetings, over 100 Cooperative Projects and innumerable activities at the private sector [Accessed 25.10.2017]
defined in the form of a treaty like in the EU, but essentially ad hoc, based on shared interest and summit statements including a Trilateral Cooperation Vision 2020\textsuperscript{120} for five major areas and 40 projects and several action plans in the various domains. The key projects on the trilateral agenda are an investment agreement signed in 2012\textsuperscript{121} and a trilateral FTA for which studies have been conducted for many years (an ‘Academic Joint Study’ carried out over seven years followed by a ‘Joint Study among government officials, business representatives and academia’ launched in 2010 and presented in 2012). The conclusion of a trilateral FTA seems rather doubtful at the time of writing not only because of the political situation, but also because of fundamental differences between the three countries in various sectors such as agriculture, fisheries, electronics and services. However, in trade facilitation, such as the North East Asia Logistic Information Service Network (NEAL-NET), customs cooperation and some standardisation there has been progress. Similarly, in the environmental field there has been effective cooperation on early warning about dust and sandstorms but less so on prevention (Böhmer and Köllner 2012:4; Kim 2009). The three countries found consensus on aspects of international cooperation on biodiversity. In the financial field the meetings of ministers and central bank governors have provided a coordination platform including for preventive measures such as currency swaps (which however have not been used and some have expired because of political reasons). In other fields such as disaster management, mutual information and assistance has been on the agenda prompted by the 2008 Sichuan earthquake and the 2011 Fukushima tsunami, while a student exchange programme CAMPUS Asia (inspired by the EU’s ERASMUS programme) has been launched.

The driving force of the trilateral cooperation has shifted from Japan to Korea, the initiator and host of the TCS. Korea was the hardest hit country during the Asian Financial Crisis producing a deep shock and distrust in global institutions and the almost exclusive partnership with the US. Consequently then President Kim Daejung pursued both bilateral diplomacy (e.g. state visit to Japan in 1998 – Joint Statement\textsuperscript{122}) and advocated NE Asian community formation notably through his proposal to form an East Asian Vision Group and an East Asian Summit encompassing the ASEAN plus three (Jo 2012).

All three countries consider the process as valuable per se and have shared interests addressed within it, but it is primarily functional cooperation rather than institutionalised multilateralism. There has been no fundamental change in the sovereignty-focused, nationalist and inward-looking attitudes and identities of the three countries through trilateral cooperation (Jo 2012). The trilateral format is also not used by the three countries to work out coordinated

\textsuperscript{120} \texttt{http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/jck/summit1005/vision2020.html} accessed on 14.8.2015

\textsuperscript{121} \texttt{http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/announce/2012/5/pdfs/0513_01_01.pdf} accessed on 14.8.2015 According to an analysis note by a dispute resolution consultancy the trilateral agreement doesn’t replace existing bilateral ones but adds some value to those: ‘In addition to the more common protections that are covered under bilateral investment treaties already in force between China, Japan and South Korea (“Existing BITs”), such as fair and equitable treatment, most favoured nation treatment and protection against expropriation, the Trilateral Investment Agreement also promises improved government transparency, express protections for intellectual property rights and exceptions that will allow governments of the host State to take prudential measures to ensure the stability of their financial systems. It also identifies international arbitration as the key dispute resolution mechanism for foreign investors. The Trilateral Investment Agreement does not seek to supersede the Existing BITs, but rather allows investors to “shop and choose” when deciding which investment agreement is most favourable to their investment.’


\textsuperscript{122} \texttt{http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/korea/joint9810.html} accessed on 31.8.2015
positions for larger regional or global meetings in which they take part (such as APEC, EAS, ARF or G20). “Regionness” is therefore thin and integration low (see part III for details). The vulnerability to the political climate between (and within) individual nations shows the limits of trilateral cooperation, while the process itself helps stabilising and perpetuating dialogue at least in more technical areas. Pragmatism and functional cooperation are thus the current limits to multilateralism in NE Asia. The reasons for this have been explained in the previous chapters and I will revert to the broader question of regionalisation in NE Asia later (chapter III.2).

2. The European story from Westphalian anarchy to Lisbonian hierarchy

In Europe we can witness the evolution of the nation-state and the workings of the balance of power and imperialism until the mid-20th century in quite different ways from the working of ‘Confucian’ international society during the same period. Europe largely created International Society Mark I in the 19th century. The US and the USSR in the second half of the 20th century took on super-power roles in the global balance of power system at its European creators’ expense. But in Europe after 1945 we can observe a gradual evolution away from the militaristic, nationalist and imperialist nation-state that had become the international 'Westphalian' norm into a civil, economic and welfare oriented state that has been at the heart of European integration processes123 which essentially have been the main planks of a ‘long peace’ project. The current EU is starkly different from the international society in Europe two generations earlier. Its context has also changed dramatically as we will see in the part on the world of issues. The European integration process and project will be my main focus here as it is the puzzling phenomenon of change in international society from a war-torn continent to one where people live and work together in a largely common space and a political culture that rejects violence, values the rule of law to an extent that it submits to supranational law with direct effect on citizens and economic operators. In many fields Europe now relies on multilateral solutions mainly but not only in economic policy making. The integration process has been beset with problems, but it is nevertheless the outstanding characteristic of international society in Europe. Or in the words of Fligstein, Polyakova and Sandtholtz (Fligstein e.a. 2012:106): ‘The European Economic Community thus began as an international organization with narrow purposes, limited authority and six Member States. Once started, however, the integration process produced the most extensive example of inter-state co-operation of the past 500 years [...]That this has occurred peacefully and without threats of violence or coercion makes the EU project one of the most fascinating in world politics.’

This chapter is considerably shorter than the preceding one on NE Asia as I can refer to considerably more research and literature in existence that gives solid accounts of the European story from various analytical perspectives.

2.1. Ideas of Europe

123 The plural is intentional as European integration describes not only the state-led or institutional integration, but covers business, civil society and people-to-people integration. There are also several institutional configurations of Europe.
The historian Michael Gehler (2005) identifies a number of ideas specific to Europe that have influenced the development path of the continent. Most of these ideas are quite different from the Confucian norms and ideas prevalent in NE Asia until the beginning of the 20th century.

Without repeating Gehler's detailed research across the ages, the main characteristics which he argues are particularly relevant in Europe's history are: first an early focus on scientific and independent theoretical thinking with a tendency to find universally applicable laws that fed teleological thinking including in a cyclical view of the world (Gehler 2005:13-4; 45; similarly Schmale 2010:32 who, however, reminds that this narrative of scientific progress and civilisation tends to whitewash historic atrocities and barbarisms). A second characteristic is the strong influence of Greek and Roman law from Antiquity, to the Middle Ages and particularly in the 19th century when law in particular focused on protection of the individual (Gehler 2005:15-6). Thirdly the influence of diversity and competition is seen as a motor of Europe's development: competition between secular and religious rule, between states, between citizens and the state, between thinkers and inventors, and of course economic competition (Gehler 2005:45; Kocka 2014). A fourth characteristic is the recurring use of warfare over centuries with only few decades of peace (1648-1713, 1815-53, 1945-91; Gehler 2005:46). In line with IR theory, he acknowledges that warfare was a structural phenomenon in Europe with changing reasons, such as the contest between secular and religious universal rule aspirations (pope and emperor), nobility and monarchy interwoven with religious conflict in the 16th and 17th centuries, the conflict between monarchical dynasties over rights, wealth and status, trade and territory from the 18th to the 20th century and finally the phase of conflict between 1914-1945 over nationalism, colonialism, imperialism and economic autarky (Gehler 2005:46-8). The changing reasons for wars indicate that it might not be persuasive to analyse them through a one-size-fits-all prism such as realism or balance of power.

Of course Gehler's characterisations and periodisations can be questioned and refined, but they do indicate that IR theories formulated on the basis of these characteristics are indeed euro-centric and chrono-centric projecting 19th and 20th century ideas back in time and over all of the globe. In Confucian society harmony rather than competition or legal ways of managing society were valued, religious beliefs did not normally lead to inter-state wars. Chinese and Asian philosophers accepted the universe, rather than searching for universal laws and metaphysical interrogations like the Europeans (Cheng 1997).

Even if I do not recount here the details of the wars in between the phases of peace that Gehler mentions, it is clear that the history of Europe is so much characterised by warfare, competition and diversity that it stands in stark contrast to NE Asia's history before the 20th century which was much less prone to inter-state war and less diverse and competitive under a philosophy which emphasised harmony through hierarchy. Sheehan (2008:18) counted 48 wars among European powers between the Peace of Westphalia 1648 and the French Revolution 1789. He notes five between 1815 (end of Napoleonic Wars) and 1914 (the eve of WWI). He leaves out the revolutionary and Napoleonic wars as well as wars waged by Europeans outside Europe. This is not to ignore that in NE Asia there have been large scale revolts as well as several armed conflicts
and a large number of fights along the outer borders in Central Asia and Manchuria as described in the previous chapter. Hence harmony is not to be taken as an empirical description, but a moral belief that has structured to a large extent the international relations of ‘civilised’ states in that regional international society, while Europe developed very different concepts of ‘order’ based on regulating or legitimising warfare (‘just war’ and later the Hague Conventions), religious matters (‘cuius regio, eius religio’) and based on the balance of power, the British foreign policy pursued during the War of the Spanish succession (1701-14). This concept arguably was institutionalised in the peace of Utrecht in 1713 with its aim to create a fair power balance ‘justum potentiae aequilibrium’ (Martus 2015:218-21; Gehler 2005:74). The Peace of Westphalia had pursued very different objectives (hierarchy of dynasties, territorial delimitations based on religion and the preservation of various social privileges; Martus 2005:219). War was 'normality' or as Clausewitz later said just one of the tools of politics. Territory and people could also be passed from one ruler to another in more peaceful ways to manage the balance of power through marriage and inheritance (Hapsburg Austria was particularly good at that: felix Austria nubit), but contested heritages and successions also regularly led to wars (Martus 2015:464). These were part of the complex interrelated dynamic relations and objectives that produced dynamic network policies with global repercussions in the European colonies. Interestingly, the Prussian King Frederick II in his book ‘The Antimachiavel' already argued that the interdependence of political relations rendered the idea of sovereignty absurd (Martus 2015:465). The Seven Years War is sometimes considered as the first world war. All these are well studied (Martus 2015:450-1, 458-60, 464-5 and the sources indicated there).

Early ideas about 'Europe' as a project of union have been numerous and – somewhat paradoxically - tended to be part of the power contests over the centuries (Dante in the contest between Pope and Emperor in Italy in the 14th century; Podiebrad's sovereignty-pooling federation of princes in the religious struggles and contests between monarchy and nobility in the 15th century; Charles' V universal monarchy ambitions that collapsed in the religious divisions of Europe in the 16th century; Sully's grand design against the Hapsburgs in the 17th century; William Penn's, Abbé de Saint Pierre's and Kant's federal projects in the contest between absolutism and Enlightenment in the 18th century). Arguably, in IR, the influence of Kant has been of particular relevance reflected in the English School's and Wendt's 'Kantian logic of anarchy' and in the literature on democratic peace and cosmopolitanism. In the context of European integration, it is interesting to note that Kant's federal project did not envisage a world-state or super-state and was not limited to Europe. He emphasised the need to create structures of law and morality for a global citizenship to enjoy peace, rights and prosperity in a republican-democratic federation of states (Gehler 2005:77-9). Kant would thus be an early proponent of International Society 2.0. Schmale (2010:79-84) shows how the ideas of a state system as opposed to an organic analogy developed in 18th century Europe.

2.2. Critical junctures

2.2.1. From religious wars to cabinet wars in the Enlightenment
At roughly the same time as Hideoshi’s invasion of Korea Europeans were at war over religion. The Peace of Augsburg of 1555 had established the principle that the population of a territory had to follow the ruler’s religion (*cuius regio cuius religio*). This was in particular an issue in the de-centralised Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation with its many diverse rulers (estates of the Empire such as free cities, princes - including some also ruling foreign territories - and bishoprics) and confessional diversity. By the time of the Manchu invasion of China, the European continent had been utterly devastated through a series of interlocking wars, the Thirty Years War, at the end of which that principle of the ruler’s religion was effectively abandoned with the Peace Treaties of Westphalia (1648) (Osiander 2001). The Peace Treaties of Westphalia established a European ‘regime’ based not on power or a modern concept of sovereignty, but on mutual convention with few institutions ‘providing a system of governance for matters of common interest while leaving internal government to each of the participating actors’ (Osiander 2001:278-9). One of these institutions was the judicial concept of *Landeshoheit* (territorial jurisdiction) which Osiander (2001:283) compares to contemporary governance and considers as close to the European Union: ‘There is a clear de facto trend in international politics away from classical sovereignty and toward something closer to landeshoheit, territorial jurisdiction under an external legal regime shared by the actors. Like the estates of the empire, modern states are also tied into a complex structure of governance that creates a network both of cooperation and of mutual restraint.’ This complex system, especially that of the Holy Roman Empire with its unique Constitution and legal procedures, relied on legitimacy of rule and ritual (ceremonial) rather than just power, as Martus shows with the difficult process of establishing a sovereign King in Prussia at the beginning of the 18th century or the development of the Free City of Hamburg in the complex web of relations with the Emperor, the Danish Kings, the rulers in Hanover (and England) and other neighbours (Martus 2015). Ceremonial (ritual in the Confucucian world) was important because the use of force was limited not least by material resources, but also the need for recognition by other rulers and the estates (Martus 2015:70). The 18th century saw a particular form of political stability, based on quasi permanent military conflict accompanying the structural changes of the Enlightenment era. It is at that time that the English created the concept of ‘balance of power’ enshrined in the Treaty of Utrecht concluding the War of the Spanish Succession (Martus 2015:40-2). The principle of territorial states only emerged very slowly over that century. In this ‘European regime’ the actors felt part of a single society (Osiander 2001:279) and Martus (2015) illustrates with a wealth of examples the cross-border network character of many areas of governance and society during the 18th century.

The Enlightenment was a – long-drawn and complex - critical juncture in Europe’s history (more so than a single event or treaty such as the Peace of Westphalia or of Utrecht). It is at that time that the emergence of concepts of ‘balance of power’, but also of international society can be situated. But despite Enlightenment’s emphasis on rationalism, materialism and science it was a period not much less bloody than the preceding religious wars. And in many ways religion continued to play a major role in particular in Germany (Martus 2015:886). The earthquake of 1 November 1755 that devastated Lisbon provoked major intellectual discussions about the role of God, the cosmos, and…society (Martus 2015:616-31). The international economic repercussions (for instance on the bourses in the Netherlands and London) provoked an ‘oikodicee’ i.e. a lack of trust in economic progress (Martus 2015:621) besides the ‘theodicee’ which made people doubt about the
existence or the role of God (a key question of Enlightenment thinking and emancipation for which there is no parallel in Confucian thinking). Critics of civilisation emphasised the limits of progress (Rousseau) while Kant questioned the role of the individual and mankind and emphasised the role of its complex environment (Martus 2015:630). Society not nature was what humans could influence.

Shortly after that earthquake (a critical juncture at the time) the Seven Years War (in reality also several interlocking wars fought in three continents from 1754/6 to 1763) constituted a man-made catastrophe of global proportions: the ‘first world war’ engulfing the British and French colonies in America and India as well as the countries of Europe was fought without changing the status quo of the Silesian territories which were the key issue in the European theatre of that as well as the previous two Silesian Wars. However, the conflict between France, Britain and Spain in the colonies led to the birth of the British Empire (Martus 2015:458-9; 615, 633-680). Contemporary observers bemoaned the resulting ‘anarchy’ (Martus 2015:459). This points to continued instability despite the Peace of Westphalia and the complex political and social dynamics of this century of absolutist monarchies, humanism and critical thinking that culminated in the French Revolution. The Seven Years War had reverberations well into the 19th century notably because of the economic crisis in France resulting from it and constituting a major cause of the French Revolution, the taxation disputes that led to the independence of the US and the emergence of the British Empire with its intercontinental trade triangle (Martus 2015:636). Thus this period shaped globalisation and international order, but also brought home the notion of chaos and complexity: Frederick II in his History of the Seven Years War wrote (foreshadowing chaos theory) ‘daß der menschliche Geist, so umsichtig er auch sei, doch niemals all die feinen Verkettungen so zu durchschauen vermag, um Ereignisse, die von künftigen Zufällen abhängen, vorauszusehen oder herbeizuführen’ (Martus 2015:672) 124. At the same time, this war was not (yet) a war of nations, but of dynastic leaders, with soldiers often drafted from very different peoples including sometimes from enemy territories. However, the idea of a war for the ‘fatherland’ started a process of socialisation of war and patriotism (Martus 2015:658-61).

Ideas about cosmic or God-willed harmony or man’s self-determination (the key Enlightenment narrative) gave way to Newtonian ideas about dynamic, complex systems and Kant’s view of antagonism, war and competition as drivers of history, social order and culture (Martus 2015:462). This side of Kant is not usually referred to in IR. In this anarchy of complexity (often seen in analogy to the Newtonian view of the complex balance of the planetary system) already then some rulers recognised limits to their sovereignty, as Frederick II of Prussia elaborated in his ‘Antimachiavell’ (Martus 2015:465, 472). Interestingly, during this time a number of philosophers (Wolff, Leibniz, Voltaire, d’Argens and others) found inspiration in the Chinese rulers with their Confucian ‘practical wisdom’ to promote the concept of the ‘Roi philosophe’ (Martus 2015:484-5; 489). Key thinkers of that period discovered the social, cultural, economic and natural dynamics beyond individual control in their works on the spirit of nations (Voltaire 1756) and the spirit of Laws (Montesquieu 1748) or the origin of the wealth of nations (Smith 1776). Without going into detail here, the Enlightenment ideas are widely seen as a crucial period of European modernisation

124 My translation: The human spirit (intelligence) as circumspect as it may be, can never really understand all the subtle connections which would allow foreseeing or create events which depend on future coincidence.
of state, administration, judiciary, science, public health and welfare and society at large. The various works on the spirit of nations in the second half of the 18th century prepared the ground for nationalism in the 19th century although their departure point was the discovery of structures and systems beyond the individual and opposed to views of history as that of monarchs.

During the Enlightenment and the Seven Years War politics of emotion and nationalism started to germinate, with devastating – but not linear - effects to play out in the long 19th and short 20th centuries: Martus (2015:886-7) underlines the complexity of state and pre-state, territorial and transregional, religious and social dynamics of the 18th century. Key reference figures for contemporary IR/IL (and many other social sciences) lived and wrote in this period of European Enlightenment, such as John Locke, Montesquieu and Immanuel Kant (who in fact severely criticised the Enlightenment and wanted to revolutionise the philosophy and sciences of his time; Martus 2016:833-844). The period also saw the birth of the United States, very much a product of people fleeing the previous religious wars in Europe and of new ideas of statehood inspired by the modern Enlightenment. This is of course not the place to delve deep into this period, but it is important to highlight it as a critical juncture that influences European (and American) thinking to this day.

2.2.2 The French Revolution, industrialisation and Nationalism

A major critical juncture in Europe's history was the French Revolution opening the way to modern democracy, but also to mass mobilisation for warfare and ideological conflict. From then on the concept of the nation-state started replacing the dynastic monarchies of Europe (Gehler 2005:79-82; Hoffmann 1990). There is a strong connection between industrialisation and the emergence of nation-states and nationalism (Osiander 2001:281; Dieckhoff 2012). Warfare became a means to realise national and ideological ambitions beyond the territorial expansion and power ambitions of monarchs, popes and dynastic (and some republican) states. It was therefore only a matter of time before the structure of power balance in Europe would collapse. Gehler (2005:80) notes that all states newly created in Europe in the 19th century came about as a result of war and nationalism which became an ideology and the exclusive source of state legitimacy. Sheehan (2008:25) quotes German historian Heinrich von Treitschke lecturing in 1874 that all states were created through war and that without war there would be no state. This constitutive relationship thesis sounds somewhat absurd to most Europeans in the 21st century who associate very different things with the state. But even as recently as the 1990s one could witness wars and violence as the midwives of new states in the Balkans and such conflicts over territory continue at Europe's periphery as the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014 or the situation in Georgia shows125. There was thus an in-built tension between the ethnic groups and the state, if the two were not exactly aligned (like in the Austro-Hungarian Empire) or the ambition to create a strong state for allegedly divided nations (Germany, Italy). While a number of thinkers advocated European unity projects in the 19th and early 20th centuries (perhaps most famously Victor Hugo and Giuseppe Mazzini) ethnic nationalism (rather than a civic nationalism, or Kant's universal republicanism) dominated Europe's development for nearly two centuries. Nationalism remains a

125 http://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_in_the_shadow_of_ukraine_seven_years_on_from_russian_3086 (accessed on 14-12-2017)
strong vector of identification even in the EU today\textsuperscript{126}, but it is more of the civic type (Fligstein e.a. 2012:112) and thus offers room for beliefs in multilateral solutions or even cosmopolitan approaches. Given this history of violent births of states and the continued importance of nationalism, the European integration process assumes a particular historical significance in terms of peaceful system change.

\subsection*{2.2.3. 20\textsuperscript{th} century World Wars}

\textit{WWI} and \textit{WWII} were critical junctures and fundamental catastrophes in Europe's self-consciousness, civilisational achievement and its political and economic development path. The nature of WWI was not the short duel of gallant armies diplomats and generals in 1914 expected - despite authors' such as Ivan Bloch or Norman Angell's predictions that due to technical progress (Bloch) and the interdependence of countries through trade and finance (Angell) war in Europe would be too costly and destroy society at large to be contemplated by policy makers (Sheehan 2008:54-61). Sheehan (2008:102) refers to Winston Churchill's opinion shortly after the outbreak of WWI that this was not a war as usual, but a fight for life and death of nations. The industrial and global scale, mass deaths in and between trenches and the senselessness of human sacrifice made this a new kind of war. The post-War settlements for the first time involved the US as a non-European power marking the shift in international politics that would make the 20\textsuperscript{th} century America's century.

WWII was similarly a war of attrition and a fight to the finish, but even larger in scale and destructiveness than WWI in Europe. It was a total war launched by a totalitarian regime and leading to unprecedented numbers of civilian casualties besides millions of soldiers (Sheehan 2008:163; we have seen that the invasion of China started even earlier and exacted a similar human toll). What obviously stands out in this period are the racism (not only in Germany) that drove the Nazi war and the Holocaust. Without discussing these further, racism, totalitarianism, genocide and the holocaust in the first half of the 20\textsuperscript{th} century marked the low point of European 'civilisation' that had been one of the driving forces of imperialism. They underlined Europe's moral bankruptcy beyond its economic and power-political one. After the hostilities ceased, borders and regimes in many parts of Europe changed and millions were displaced in ethnic cleansing. Overseas, the European colonial empires started to crumble.

The two wars also made states more intrusive into civil society and economic activity, controlling travel, regulating food and energy supplies and other economic activities, laying the basis for the regulatory states of the 20\textsuperscript{th} century (Sheehan 2008:112). The early 20\textsuperscript{th} century was also marked by major civil unrest, revolutions and a loss of values of civility and compromise that had been the

\textsuperscript{126} According to research (e.g. Fligstein e.a. 2012:109-14) almost half of EU citizens view themselves as having a strictly national identity, a similar proportion see themselves as having a national and sometimes a European identity and a small percentage (4\%) see themselves as exclusively European. Data sets and questions vary according to different researchers, but a number of surveys and studies conclude that national identity remains important in Europe, that the feeling of being European is not deep but widespread with over half of the population on aggregate supporting European solutions to problems. This varies by Member States. People need not choose between a national and a European identity and ethnic concepts of national identity tend to see non-European migrants as 'the other' rather than other Europeans. This is to some extent also reflected by various right wing or euro-sceptic parties.
hallmark of 19th century Europe (Sheehan 2008:121).

Schmale (2010:9) considers the aftermath of WWII as the most significant critical juncture as it led to an unprecedented phenomenon, European integration. It was indeed an unprecedented (but gradual) transformation of the nature of the state in Europe. Schmale calls it a ‘reflective’ state, meaning a reflection of not only national interest, but also taking into consideration other states' and collective interests. This is part of my understanding of a multilateralist EU.

The Cold War

Europe's and NE Asia’s history intersect at a critical juncture of the Cold War: the North Korean attack on South Korea at the end of June 1950 six weeks after the Schuman Declaration127 led to the perception that Soviet aggression in Europe could be possible. West Germany as the frontline state needed to be re-armed in the view of many American and some European policy-makers (Germans themselves were divided over the issue). The project of a European army in the European Defence Community was proposed by France (Pleven plans) to have German soldiers, but no German army. After the French decided that they still wanted to have a French army instead of French soldiers in a European one, the project floundered in 1954. Almost immediately after the Pleven Plans were shelved the six member of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC)128 started to negotiate deeper economic integration (Messina Conference 1955) producing the Rome Treaty (1957129) which is the founding treaty of the current EU (European Economic Community as it was called then – cf. next chapter on European integration). In the meantime, Stalin's death in 1953 had removed the urgency of the Soviet threat (Jones 2012:55). In the Germany Treaty of 1955 West Germany was handed back its sovereignty by the three occupying forces, but this sovereignty remained limited as West Germany had to commit to not acquiring ABC weapons and to put all its defence forces under integrated NATO command with allied troops given the right to maintain forces on German soil (Sheehan 2008:200). NATO remained the US-led transatlantic security alliance since then. And, of course, Germany remained divided until 1990.

The nuclear age buttressed a domination of science and dogmatism about the ‘omniscience of natural science’ (Popper 1994 [1963] 83) but also a reliance on super-powerful weapons. During the Cold War it was possible to reduce the complexity of international relations to a defining and overwhelming paradigm of nuclear deterrence and military balance under bipolarity (mutually assured destruction) and thus to develop convincing parsimonious, but in the end reductionist theories that overlooked or over-layed for instance regional security (Buzan and Waever 2003). They also discarded the ‘low politics’ of economic or social dynamics which ironically may well have been key to the non-violent collapse of the USSR and the bipolar system in 1991. I consider that period as a historical exception and these theories failed to recognise it as such130. The last

127 Declaration by the French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman on 9 May 1950 proposing the creation of a European Coal and Steel Community, whose members would pool coal and steel production.
http://europa.eu/about-eu/basic-information/symbols/europe-day/schuman-declaration/index_en.htm


130 Not least by failing to anticipate the end of bipolarity and the Cold War due to a domestic policy change in the USSR or the mutation of China from an impoverished, revolutionary and isolated country to a quasi-capitalist, global player and status quo power. Many other developments for instance in the global South were overlooked if
Secretary General of the USSR's communist party declared at the UNGA on 7 December 1998 that force and threat of force cannot and should no longer be an instrument of foreign policy and that the age of ideological conflict was over (Sheehan 2008:237).

Interestingly under the Cold War overlay (Buzan and Waever 2003) the old power-obsessed European nation-states fundamentally changed. In Europe, more than anywhere else, states became civil states. National grandeur and power were no longer chief objectives. Military matters far from being constitutive of the state as such, became domains for specialists under civilian control. Economic issues and welfare started dominating state politics. This evolution was also characteristic for post-war Japan and even South Korea despite the North Korean military threat. China's opening up and reform policy since the mid-1980s went into the same direction. The domestic consensus between citizens and government were important factors for that change (Sheehan 2008:214). This transformation from military nation-state to civil state can be shown in three different ways:

1) In figures of state budgets: These data show an immense growth of state budgets (e.g. UK 1900 ca. 12% of GDP – since the 1960s ca. 40% of GDP\(^\text{131}\); France ca 12% in 1900 to over 50% in the 2000s\(^\text{132}\) There has notably been a strong decline of military expenditure especially in relative terms (even during the Cold War; idem). At the beginning of the 20\(^\text{th}\) century, military expenditure was the biggest item in state budgets, while in the latter decades of the 20\(^\text{th}\) century (and even during the Cold War) military expenditure was a mere few percentage points of the total, in particular social spending (Sheehan 2008:216-7). It is similar for the ‘rising power’ China now, which despite increases in military spending is far from ‘militarisation’\(^\text{133}\). The DPRK is an exception to the general trend with its military first policy.

2) Changes in military service: In the early 20\(^\text{th}\) century military service was the school of the nation nurturing patriotism, national integration, discipline and a spirit of sacrifice. Dying for the nation was a holy duty and the right to impose this sacrifice a source of legitimacy of the state. After 1945 military service was no longer a matter of glory or dying for the nation, but a duty expected to deter war. Soldiers progressively became citizens in uniform and democratic and civilian values replaced heroism and glory (Sheehan 2008:218-22). This is certainly similar in Japan under its pacifist constitution, but much less so in the ROK and China.

3) The collapse and democratisation of the remaining fascist or military regimes in Europe (e.g. Greece, Spain and Portugal in the 1970s) and their accession to the EU. The fall of military strongmen in South Korea (and Taiwan) and democratisation at the end of the 1980s (Green 2017:415-20).

2.3. European integration

\(^{131}\) https://www.ukpublicspending.co.uk/past_spending accessed on 25-10-2017


\(^{133}\) Godement (2015:10) warns of ‘the increasing pace of the regional arms race in Asia’.
The EU as it is today is the product of a long process of integration that did not follow any theoretical prescription from political science or from economic theory (such as Balassa 1961) – although superficially it could seem so (Herbst 1986). The process stretched over decades and was not the implementation of a strategic masterplan to achieve multi-level governance or to manage globalisation. Many advances and setbacks on the way were the consequences of political or economic crises.

Integration can describe a process, a state of affairs as well as an objective and (therefore) has become a key concept in post-War Europe's development path. For economists (like Balassa 1961) economic integration as a process describes the step-wise abolition of discriminatory measures between economic units/states. As a state of affairs it describes the absence of discrimination. There is a quantitative and a qualitative dimension that distinguishes integration (aiming at abolishing or removing discrimination such as tariffs or barriers to trade) from co-operation which leads only to lessening of discrimination or co-ordination of policies. Integration – in Balassa's trademark stage-wise concept - evolves by stages such as FTA, Customs Union, Single Market, Economic and Monetary Union. It is interesting to note that Balassa (1961) saw the liberalist idea of integration as anachronistic (indeed at the time, as Herbst 1996 also shows liberals tended to think in terms of restoring the pre-1914 liberal economic order which had disintegrated through World War I and the Great Depression; similarly: Raphael 2014:175-80). Balassa saw the key question as finding the right balance between government regulation and the play of market forces. This question is still relevant today and especially so after the global financial crisis and Europe's sovereign debt crisis.

Despite a number of antecedents, projects and plans in earlier centuries and even from during the inter-war and war years theory followed political practice as Herbst's (1986) detailed historical analysis of integration theory in the beginnings of European unification or integration immediately after WWII shows. Herbst (1986:194) also explains the profusion of different theories about European integration emerging after the onset of integration with the deliberately pragmatist process pursued by Schuman and other 'architects' of Europe which allowed everyone to find justification for his/her theoretical views: liberals, protectionists, federalists, location theorists, functionalists, nationalists all could argue that the European integration project could be explained through their various logics. Liberals saw the market-logic, protectionists could point to the external tariffs, federalists and functionalists focused on the supranational institutions, functionalists and location theorists pointed to the arrangements for a key industrial sector and analysts looking at national security could argue the logic of peace through integration. However, the Schuman plan and related agreements left the goal of European integration deliberately open and referred to no particular theory. No wonder then, that all these diverse debates are continuing today and that the very pragmatism and openness of the EU integration process makes it difficult to propose a galvanising vision for Europe's future (Nicolaïdis 2010; Gehler 2005:333-45). Jones (2010) dismisses the 'economic mythology of European integration' and underlines the multitude of compatible, but not exactly consistent narratives of European integration. A bit later Jones

134 Haas (1958:16) provided the 'classical' definition of regional integration: 'the process whereby political actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities toward a new center, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdictions over the pre-existing national states.'
(2012:57) deplored the reductionist tendency of individual theories that seek to explain European integration through single theoretical approaches: ‘This struggle for supremacy is unfortunate because it means that competing assumptions about the willingness to participate in Europe are confirmed by testing their logical entailments rather than being examined directly’. In that sense it is revealing that Herbst’s historical research has brought out the deliberate openness of the European integration process from the start that allowed all participants to subscribe to it for different reasons on which Jones (2012:56) concludes: ‘The resilience of European integration derives from this sub-surface complexity. [...] The bottom line is that the European project will continue so long as Europeans want to participate’. From these sources and in the textbooks already referred to in the introduction, the various theories of European integration can be reviewed in more detail than can be done here.

Functionalism (as a theory or method of integration) as conceived by David Mitrany and neo-functionalism theorised by Haas (1958) was of particular innovative force, but was dismissed by realists (Hoffmann 1966) who pointed to the limits of functionalism as a method of integration that could not go beyond the nation state and beyond low politics (economic issues). The functionalist logic was even declared obsolete – perhaps prematurely - by its key proponent (Haas 1975). Nevertheless, it remains an important plank of discussion which tends to take place between the (false) dichotomy of the functionalist 'community method' and classic 'intergovernmentalism'. As Herbst (1986) found for the onset of the integration project, the EU has a bit of everything and a lot of 'in-betweeness’ (Nicolaidis 2010:25). Functionalism, however, remains with different labels the key logic of multilateral state responses to globalisation and implicitly also an important argument of democratic peace theory (Köhler 2014). The idea underlying functionalism – formulated in 1933 by David Mitrany - is that technological progress, increasing and faster communication, the changes of warfare, the increase in economic and social challenges force states to co-operate internationally to compensate for the diminished ability and capacity of nation states to deal with this increasing complexity. Functional necessity pushes states to create networks of transnational organisations or bureaucracies (later called international regimes) that take over some functions of states and the process itself can develop through various methods such as intergovernmental bargaining or the community method among others. A welcome side-effect of that process was a reduced risk of war among states (Herbst 1986:199). Herbst, like Hoffmann (1966), Jones (2012) and others argue that (neo)functionalism underestimates the resilience of the nation-state and the diversity of national interests in Europe. This is no longer controversial, but neither is it that functionalism is an important method of internationalisation and transnationalisation (see chapter III.1.3) not only in the EU. Function doesn’t always follow form though. The integration and disintegration dynamics sparked by the UK’s decision to leave the UK will present an interesting case study in particular the extrication from the complex institutional and legal arrangements and the new relationship of the UK with the continent (Huberdeau 2017).

Following Milward (1984) and Hoffmann (1966) Herbst (1986) also highlights the 'rescue of the European nation state' and the national interests of various European nations leading to the Schuman plan and the creation of the ECSC (the antecedent of the EU). Herbst also shows how the European regionalist logic was developed at cross-purposes with American open-door policy
which aimed at a global economic integration (through the Bretton Woods system, the Havana Charter/GATT). Interestingly, US global liberal open-door policy could be applied without such regionalist 'resistance' in NE Asia. An often-heard argument in Asia to explain the differences between European integration and Asia's non-integration is that in Europe the US followed and enforced a multilateral solution while in Asia it pursued a bilateralist approach (‘hubs and spokes’ Green 2017:278-91) has thus to be qualified (Willett 2009:111; Fukushima 2010). The US had a global policy of open-door and free trade, but in Europe the context was different for the dispensation of US recovery aid, which was organised through a multilateral organisation so as to ensure that the large number of industrialised, but weakened, countries (and customs territories) in Europe would actually liberalise trade and create a payment union to ensure a liberal currency regime in line with US priorities. In Asia there were no comparable industrialised countries apart from Japan to 'integrate' and aid was dispensed bilaterally and under a global regime (Bretton Woods Institutions, UN). Regional leaders in Asia were not interested in a regional project, but in nation building and de-colonisation while European leaders wanted not only to 'rescue' and re-build their nation states, but also to build a Europe that was a civilisational and economic power beyond US strategic designs in the Cold War (Herbst 1986:194).

The Schuman plan was in fact a reaction to the early liberal consensus-based institutions set up under US aegis for the administration of the European Recovery Programme (ERP or Marshall Plan) such as the OEEC, to the Council of Europe and NATO which were classical treaty-based international organisations that in French eyes were not strong enough to permanently solve the 'German question' (cf. the opening quote of Saint-Simon). Hence the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), the attempt to create a defence community without the US (Pleven Plans) and then the Treaty of Rome (1957) (Jones 2012). The same logic led to the Maastricht Treaty (1992) which after German unification in 1990 provided an even stronger binding structure – including economic and monetary union cf. chapter III.3.1 - to guarantee a permanent integration and peace in Europe. Following the logics of multilateralism building on restraint, trust-building with self-binding by Germany as a costly signal, European unification and the German question were inextricably tied together (Gehler 2005:239). In other words, the liberal integration projects in the context of mere co-operation of sovereign nation-states based on classic international law were not perceived as strong enough to ensure permanent security in Europe (this was of course also a lesson learnt from the inter-war period) (Herbst 1986:192). It is interesting to note that these early debates in the post-War period are continuing today with different connotations and issues: the idea of Brooks (2005) that economic co-operation produces security via economic integration of global production chains is not very different from the classic post-War US policy that sought to create an international order through economic integration based on trade on a global scale. The debate between an open integrated world economy based on free trade and the proponents of regional FTAs and Customs Unions (the starting point of European integration) that started in the immediate post-war period continues unabated today – and in a way the two regions I examine are the main protagonists/ideal-types for that debate. My critique of the open regionalism concept (see chapter II.3.) similarly is in line with the arguments of the proponents of the alternative path of regional integration pursued by nation states through mutually binding multilateralist, including supranational, institutions.
The US in a mixture of reluctance and indifference accepted the European integration project although it was from the US point of view the 'third best option': a customs union limited only to an economic sector (coal and steel) instead of a comprehensive customs union (second best option) or an open regionalist Europe in the OEEC (preferred option). This acceptance was a result of security policy considerations: with the onset of the Cold War and the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 the US priority was to rapidly ensure a strong Europe that would stand united with the US against the perceived Soviet threat. Moreover the US wanted to secure Europe's re-integration as an economic centre of gravity for the world economy (which was not yet an issue in Asia where only Japan had a sizeable economy after the loss of China to the Communist camp).

From these beginnings European integration proceeded only seemingly along Balassa's step-wise model (from free trade area, to customs union, to single market, to economic and monetary union). All these steps were in fact realised one after the other (and in no other region). However, they didn't follow a grand design or automatic and (neo)functional ways, but came about in leaps and bounds, marred by setbacks and stagnation. Progress was often made after crises (Gehler 2005 gives a good overview). Nicolaïdes (2010:26) sums it up like this: 'the first half-century of European integration has been a longue marche from market-making to polity-making, from the EU-as-space to the EU-as-actor, from continental consolidation to embryonic global projection.

Only since the Treaty on European Union signed at Maastricht in 1992 can one speak of the EU as more than an economic integration project in substance, although it has always been a political enterprise pursued through economic means after more directly political projects faltered (such as the Defence and Political Union in 1954). The heart of the Maastricht Treaty was of course the agreement to introduce an Economic and Monetary Union (strictly speaking only a currency union came about, economic policy remained essentially national until the European sovereign debt crisis fifteen years later), so another step in economic integration ('crowning" it in fact). However, the trade-off was eminently political with re-united Germany relinquishing its prime monetary power (most European central banks followed German Bundesbank policy as they had little choice to pursue different policies; Huberdeau 2017:89-92). This costly signal followed the logic of self-restraint and self-binding that had been Germany's contribution to European order ever since 1945. Ever since this attempt to create a political union or a hybrid with that label, the EU has been in an uneasy process of self-transformation in the midst of external change: 'the EU has been going through an era of in-betweenness which is now ending. Its 20-year addiction to institutional reform, the almost continuous renegotiation of its founding pact, the democratic prevarication of its elites, and the obsession with process goals over policy outcomes, all speak to the agonies of political mutation. The EU, fired up by the end of the cold war, has been poised between introversion and extroversion, precisely because it is unable to bridge its technocratic aristocratic past and an uncertain but irrevocable future where citizens would enjoy the power of their collective veto over the grand (and not so grand) designs of their political masters.' (Nicolaïdis 2010:25). However, this process has been peaceful contrary to Mearsheimer's pessimistic prediction that after the end of the Cold War Europe 'would probably be substantially more prone to violence than the past 45 years' (Mearsheimer 1990:6). This prediction can safely be discarded from the transformation scenario. In fact, Mearsheimer's second best option for a relatively

135 We will see in chapter III.3.2 and IV.5 how EU climate change policy reacted to this ‘rendez-vous manqué’.
peaceful Europe (after his preferred option to continue the Cold War!), nuclear armament of Germany and a well-managed system of nuclear powers in Europe, can only be seen as grotesque. Mearsheimer locked himself into a paradigm of 'no logical alternative' to his Cold War assumptions about the importance of nuclear weapons. His chrono-centric assumptions did not even materialise twenty years later despite a major crisis straining Europe's cohesion. The global financial crisis, and more particularly the European sovereign debt crisis, marked a major turning point nevertheless. It is widely considered as the deepest crisis of the European integration process (cf chapter III.3.1.) although in 2015 the refugee and migration crisis appeared even more threatening (Huberdeau 2017).

The EU had to make critical choices on its integration path, which despite their often technical nature, where highly political. These decisions concerned national sovereignty and solidarity, economic and monetary policy and also social policy affecting citizens massively. These decisions had to balance EU and euro-zone interests and some were taken in a wider international context, with the IMF and the G20. Europe's reputation took a severe hit and talk of Europe's decline and marginalisation took hold. To make matters worse, these decisions had to take place in the context of foreign policy challenges that affected Europe's core interests (Arab Spring, the rise of China and Asia, crisis of multilateral governance symbolised by the Climate Change summit in Copenhagen 2009 and later the crisis in Ukraine). The ‘Brexit’ referendum in June 2016 marked another low point, but paradoxically also a rebound, as if the integration process was suddenly relieved of a brake. All this adds up – for many analysts – to a rather gloomy picture. Jones (2010:104) emphasises that the important European narratives built on economic integration risk running out of steam: completing the monetary union with an economic one is a frontier which is hard to cross. He sees the single market as "But dealing with those are the top priorities of the Juncker Commission. Jones (2010:105) is sceptical about deepening other areas of integration such as CFSP (similarly Menon 2014) or the environment. However, he also argues (2012:58) that ‘once the analysis focuses on the willingness to participate directly, it is easier to understand why the European project is so complicated and how it has proven so resilient. The breakdown of solidarity in any given endeavour need not entail the collapse of solidarity in another.’ This leaves the integration project with a number of complex building sites, but without a galvanising political vision. In Jones’ logic (2012:59-60) crisis of integration occurs if solidarity breaks down across many areas of integration through contagion. Nevertheless, the comparison with NE Asia shows how far Europe has progressed with multilateralism and with coming to terms with its own past. The fact that the EU has weathered a long-drawn series of different and severe crises (financial, Brexit) and external challenges (Crimea, Syria, migration) over a whole decade shows its resilience. The attempts at re-inventing itself under crisis conditions (including in the external relations and security areas) and that some observers pin their hopes of international leadership on the EU in the void of US international policy after Obama shows the continued relevance of the European integration project. Its main challenge remains to rebuild enthusiasm and support for European integration among the citizens and a broader political constituency in its member states (see Lampert and Blanksma Ceta 2017 for an analysis of the challenge of anti-elite sentiment or revolt which other democracies are also confronting).

2.4. Bridging moralisation gaps in Europe
There are many moralisation gaps in Europe's history, both within states (resistance or collaboration during WWII, dictatorships or decolonisation) and between states. Many of those have led to wars and conflicts perpetuating cycles of violence as the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia show. The most significant moralisation gaps for European integration are the ones linked to WWI and WWII vis-à-vis Germany, the main perpetrator, but also within countries which had sided with Germany or had collaborators in their midst. In this sense the European integration process underpinning or accompanied by bilateral reconciliations and multiple 'people-to-people' processes mark a break with that cycle of violence. The later integration of central European countries into the EU after the end of the Cold War has also helped bridging moralisation gaps (in one of the most famous instances revising the false attribution of killings of the Polish officer corps in Katyn to the Germans, while the real perpetrators had been the Soviet forces) including those of the aftermath of WWII (borders, forced resettlements). Even during the Cold War, major historical issues, such as the disputed Eastern border of Germany could be addressed by agreeing not to resolve sovereignty claims, but by agreeing that the status quo could only be changed with the consent of the parties concerned and thus without violence. In this sense the Helsinki Process is perhaps an interesting recipe to study for NE Asia for non-violent dispute management without compromising on sovereignty and legal claims.

Schmale (2010:105-6) cites a very particular, cosmopolitan, process of remembrance, the holocaust: In January 2000 European Heads of State and Government created a Task Force for International Cooperation on Holocaust Education, Remembrance and Research, in October 2002 European education ministers agreed a joint remembrance day for the holocaust and in January 2005 the European parliament held a plenary session to commemorate the liberation of Auschwitz. Schmale contrasts this with the years immediately after the end of the war. When the European integration process was launched the holocaust did not play a significant role, at most it was subsumed under debates about war crimes, totalitarianism and modernity. The word holocaust and the historical memory only entered the wider discourse in the 1980s and 1990s due to TV and movie productions. Note the parallels in the timelines for the emerging debates over Japanese war crimes due to comfort women stepping forward in the 1990s and best-selling books such as Iris Chang’s ‘Rape of Nanking’ (1997).

As mentioned earlier, European integration was to a large extent initially a process to solve the German question and a way to tame Germany's economic and military might and harness it for a collective purpose so as to prevent a nationalist rise of Germany on its own. This was unlike Japan, which was allowed to rise on its own economically at least. Japan's US-drafted constitution banned it from creating armed forces other than for self-defence and bound it into a military alliance under the impression of the Korean War. European integration was an institutional strategy of reconciliation. However, the institutions developed their own visionary dynamics or European integration narratives and symbolism, promoting the idea of European unity. Franco-German reconciliation, enshrined in the 1963 Elysée Treaty and confirmed rhetorically and through highly symbolic gestures transforming antagonism of the past into joint remembrance (mass in Reims cathedral, leaders holding hands in Verdun) has also produced an unprecedented density of social networks between sovereign nations (personal, friendship associations, school
exchanges and projects, joint history textbooks and research, joint army units, joint Cabinet
meetings and regular summits besides the EU-focused ones). German-Polish reconciliation has
been more recent, but started with a highly symbolic gesture by then Federal Chancellor Willy
Brandt kneeling down in front of a memorial to the Warsaw uprising on 7 December 1970
immediately before the signature of a German-Polish Treaty. This gesture and reconciliation
policy was pursued despite extremely strong domestic political resistance. On the Polish side the
Church made the first step towards forgiveness and reconciliation with Germany. The Helsinki
process provided then the framework for shelving important sovereignty issues, linked to the
massive border changes after WWII and the displacement of millions of Germans and Poles from
their ancestral lands. These have been gradually addressed since the end of the Cold War. These
symbolic gestures of reconciliation stand in contrast to the antagonistic symbolic gestures in NE
Asia, where Japanese Prime Ministers and other politicians commemorate their war dead
including war criminals at the Yasukuni shrine despite the protest of neighbouring countries,
China commemorates the Nanjing massacre, China and Korea celebrate the Korean assassin of the
Japanese governor of Korea – Ito - in the Chinese city of Harbin, infuriating the Japanese
government (French 2017:20), and the Koreans mark the liberation from Japanese rule and more
recently honouring the comfort women prompting Japan's protest. While in Europe divisions are
gradually bridged through joint remembrance, in NE Asia divisions are deepened through
exclusive (often provocative) nationalist celebrations.

The Council of Europe in 1950 laid a basis for a European community of values with the adoption
of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms which
established the European Court of Human Rights accessible to individuals. This is a
significant part of European integration and a Europe-wide international society, as besides the
institutional and legal transformation of Europe's state system the Convention enabled individual
citizens to achieve justice beyond the nation state while at the same time an explicit European
canon of values was created that was entirely different from the prevailing norms of nationalism,
racism and power politics that dominated Europe's international society before 1945. The Cold
War overlay may have maintained the military balance and deterrence as a key structure for
several decades, but underneath this overlay European international society and the states
themselves which form it underwent major transformations, notably as they managed to bridge the
moralisation gaps and to focus on their common future.

3. Decoding the tale of two regions – are conventional IR approaches sufficient?

The tale of two regions doesn't easily fit into dominant realist and liberal images of international
relations. It requires ideological institutions (as variables) to decode it.

136 Germany's Eastern borders were not de jure recognised by West Germany, but it was agreed that they would
only be revised by consensus and without using force.

3.1. Decoding conflict about small islets in NEAsia – realism or nationalism?

The long peace over 300 years in NE Asia (more if one goes back before the Imjin War) was not built on realist assumptions of anarchy, power balance or hegemonic stability and it has not been built either on liberal assumptions of rational interest, individual agency or growing interdependence. Confucian international society found its own way to order international relations during a long peace in NE Asia. Today’s NE Asia is conflicted over issues of marginal strategic interest and about history amidst dense economic networks that neither pessimistic realist approaches nor optimistic liberal approaches can convincingly decode. Realists see ‘Hobbesian’ anarchy, a conflict-prone paradigm of international relations based on classical alliances, balancing against a rising power and the struggle for power among nations (Viotti and Kauppi 2012:39-82; Korab-Karpowicz 2013).

There is certainly a number of compelling arguments that can be made to defend realist views, and ‘realism’ certainly informs strategic and deterrence thinking of the foreign policy, military and think-tank establishments concerned with and in the region. Realism as foreign policy or military strategy analysis is certainly a valid perspective. Hagström and Hanssen (2015) illustrate the explicit emphasis on a ‘realist’ foreign and security policy by Japan’s right wing in contrast to a portrayal of the left as ‘idealistic’ and ‘naïve’. Green (2017) provides a detailed treatment of US grand strategy toward the Pacific over the last two centuries is an excellent example for a level of analysis of foreign policy and military strategy that privileges a view of systemic challenges in the form of the successive rise of the US itself, Japan, the USSR and China to the preservation of a trans-Pacific order linking Asia to the United States. Green has very little to say about relations between the NE Asian countries and about identity and moralisation gaps.

NE Asia is seemingly the last playground for realists. However, from realist perspectives the peaceful development of NE Asia despite several power transitions (first the rise of Japan, then of China) is not easy to explain (Nau 2003). Many realists expected either Japan or China or both to balance against the US (Kang 2010), or Japan and ROK against China, regional conflict between the main powers, or persistent instability (Friedberg 1993). The focus in recent years has been on the rise of China and on the US reaction to it (rather than the regional dynamics) in the perspective of power transition theory (Viotti and Kauppi 2012:68-70 for references). Blackwill and Tellis (2015) are typical representatives proposing a ‘new grand strategy’ of balancing against China’s rise through trade agreements excluding China, propping up US allies in Asia, entering a new arms race, in order to preserve the national US interest of US pre-eminence globally and in Asia and in order to preclude the emergence of any potential future competitor. For most realists conflicts in NE Asia are seen through the simple prism of the rise of China and its challenge to US power (Etzioni 2011; He and Feng 2012) or to Japan (Mochizuki 2007). In fact, we have seen from the historical analysis that the conflicts are not so much linked to China's rise as such, but rooted in Japan's past imperialism in the region and an incomplete settlement of the end of WWII due to the Cold War. In all countries in the region, nationalism has been rising for various reasons, putting the 'old' conflicts on the front burner. In other words, perhaps, if the territorial issues had been settled legally and reconciliation seriously been pursued early enough, the rise of China and
Korea would be seen as less threatening by Japan. China's (and South Korea's) rise and the disappearance of the Soviet threat allow these countries to voice their grievances more vocally and to back them up with new economic and military power resources. Japan’s government has wasted opportunities to improve its difficult relations with these two countries by shying away from costly signals of reconciliation when Japan was 'strong'.

There has been a tendency to revise or to refine realist theories when their initial predictions didn’t materialise or to simply push the moment of truth forward in time. In this vein some realists argue that Korea, Taiwan (as well as other Asian countries) and to some extent Japan are bandwagoning with China as it is their biggest trading or economic partner, creating a dependence relationship reminiscent, some claim as we have seen, of the ancient tribute system (similarly Blackwill and Tellis’ 2015 interpretation of China’s grand strategy), but at the same time they ensure their security through alliances with the superpower USA (Godement 2015). Various degrees of hard or soft hedging strategies have therefore been developed to explain why the predicted conflicts did not occur (Wong 2015). Wendt (1999:17-20) has already shown how little such variations of underspecified realist themes in fact explain, so there is no need to review all these approaches in detail. We have already analysed the importance of the comfort women issue which has deeply divided ‘natural allies’ Korea and Japan and it clearly is not just an expression of Korea bandwagoning with China. Realists have no explanation to offer for these dynamics. The focus here will be on the conflicts in NE Asia especially in the maritime domain.

The story of the competition over small islets and the maritime domain which I told in earlier chapters is read by realists as a geo-strategic game in the context of power transition despite the rather limited contributions the possession of these islets would make to the overall distribution of capabilities and power in the region. Most realist analysts seem to overlook that it is Japan that has expanded its maritime domain in recent years, not the perceived challenger to regional order, China. It was also Japan which ignited the row over Dokdo with Korea as we have seen. Even vis-à-vis China, Japan’s behaviour is more that of a challenger than that of the victim of a rising bully. In a critical analysis that contrasts with the prevalent view of the rise of China as expansionary and aggressive/assertive which fits well into the power transition models, Mc Cormack (2012) provides an account of Japan massively expanding its maritime domain based on a number of minuscule islets and rocks acquired in imperial times. The sum of all Japanese maritime claims would lock China into a situation where it has not much more than coastal waters for itself. The UN Convention on the Law of the Seas (UNCLOS) gives disproportional economic and strategic significance to 'former navigational points' as they form points from which the EEZ extends 250 nautical miles around each of them. As a result, Japan made massive gains from UNCLOS (and Mc Cormack suggests indirectly from the spoils of imperialism as many of these navigation points including Dokdo or the Diaoyu/Senkaku were seized then) while China gained very little. Both countries have a similar coastline length, but Japan's EEZ extends to 4.5 million km2 while China's is only 879,666 km2 (Mc Cormack 2012:2). Strategically, China is more or less locked in to its coastal waters in particular by Okinawa (Mc Cormack 2012:7). Control of the Senkaku/Diaoyu just South of Okinawa and North of Taiwan would provide China

138 The term is from Stephen Walt and describes ‘the opportunistic option of aligning with the source of danger, particularly if it is a strong state’ – Viotti and Kauppi (2012:66). For Japan's bandwagoning , hard or soft hedging strategies see Mochizuki 2007.
with its only safe outlet to the Pacific and ‘constitutes the only sector of Japan’s frontier that is both contested and currently under actual Japanese control, unlike the so-called “Northern territories” that Russia controls and the island of Dokdo/Takeshima that South Korea controls’ (Mc Cormack 2012:8). In short, the maritime disputes have strategic and military significance, albeit in a limited domain, but there is a lot of ambiguity at best if the disputes are cited as evidence for a power transition from Japan/US to China (Jerdén 2014). In the case of Dokdo, Korea managed to wrestle control of the islets from Japan, while in the case of the Diaoyu/Senkaku China did not (see chapter I.1.17 where the issues are discussed in detail).

Beyond being an issue of strategic interest in the expansion of respective maritime ‘territories’ (domains) the disputes over the Diaoyu/Senkaku and Dokdo are more importantly symbols of the nation and the way history is judged – should Japan be allowed to keep the spoils of aggression or should China and Korea be getting what is rightfully theirs now that they are equals (Mc Cormack 2012)? The disputes are also seen by its former victims as evidence that Japan is not serious about redemption for its colonisation and wartime aggression. Conversely, Japan (its political right) sees the dispute as ‘proof’ of China’s ‘backward’ aggressiveness and ‘unreasonable’ behaviour and of China not following international norms in contrast to a peace-loving Japan firmly anchored in the (Western) international community. Interestingly, there is no such discourse about Korean aggressiveness related to Dokdo. For these parties China’s ‘threat’ required that ‘peace had to be maintained through realist politics’ (Hagström and Hanssen 2015:15-7). Realism is used here in fact as the ideological cloak for a revisionist right wing foreign policy (Nakano 2014; Mochizuki 2007) rather than as an analytical tool.

Realism whether defensive or offensive is a limited analytical approach that cannot or will not take account of such historical or emotional variables as the ones presented in my analysis. Realism stands out and is intuitively accepted through its simple focus on distribution of power and power balance. It could be argued that realism, especially neo-realism or structural realism with such a narrow paradigmatic emphasis on power politics is an ideology (Viotti and Kauppi 2012:74-5). In this sense Korab-Karpowicz (2013:22) argues: 'By remaining stuck in a state-centric and excessively simplified “paradigm” such as neorealism and defying any progress in interstate relations it [realism] turns into an ideology.’ This is perhaps why more recently classical realism has seen a revival of sorts (Scheuermann 2013; Rynning and Ringsmose 2008; Heng 2010). It is less paradigmatic and simplistic (parsimonious) than structural or neo-realism which has difficulties explaining change (Wendt 1999:17-20). Classical realists share an understanding of social reality as collective, group-based and politics as a contentious struggle over values among different groups. For them harmony is a utopia (Rynning and Ringsmose 2008:22). As opposed to both defensive and offensive realism, classical realist analysis is based on the assumption that states differ not only in regards to power, but also primary motivations

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139 I do not cover the South China Sea issues here because they do not involve moralisation gaps. However, a crucial problem here is China’s build-up of military or dual-use structures on contested reefs and islets: [https://amti.csis.org/constructive-year-chinese-building/](https://amti.csis.org/constructive-year-chinese-building/) (accessed on 15-12-2017) and China’s refusal to recognise ICJ adjudication of related disputes: [https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/north-east-asia/china/landmark-south-china-sea-ruling-could-revive-negotiations](https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/north-east-asia/china/landmark-south-china-sea-ruling-could-revive-negotiations) (accessed on 15-12-2017).

140 According to Molloy (2013:779) one of the founding fathers of realism, Morgenthau considered the balance of power as ‘an ideology to begin with’ that was far from being an effective means to secure peace, but rather the origin of most European wars.
Nationalism here has taken a particular twist: It is about restoring national dignity which has come to be symbolised by minuscule bouts of far-flung territory. At the same time all parties want to show that they are strong, will never yield to foreign pressure and thus qualify as great powers. It is because of such nationalism, yearning for status recognition and sense of (in)justice or victimhood that conflicts over uninhabited islets and rocks for which no one ever died in battle have become so dominating for NE Asia's international relations. And the world is watching in disbelief such ‘irrational’ and ‘dangerous’ behaviour. Compare this with the millions who died in Europe for key territories in the 20th century – and still Europe (except for the Balkans and some former USSR Republics due to nationalism combined with moralisation gaps; cf. Schneider-Deters e.a. 2008) has managed to put that past behind and build a peace project. Europe seems to have overcome141 or reconciled its ‘moralisation gaps’ - the different viewpoints of perpetrators and victims (Pinker 2011:491-95, 525) - which had been so fatal after WWI. Territorial issues have been largely solved or at least don’t hinder European integration (Aland islands142, Saarland referendum in 1957, Gibraltar143, German Polish border).

Victim-perpetrator roles and moralisation gaps regarding islets and maritime claims in NE Asia are abstract – there are no individual victims driven out of homes or killed in battles (unlike the moralisation gap on comfort women and colonial or wartime atrocities), no referendums can be held like in the Saarland (or the Falklands) to determine their status since no one lives there. This elevates the ‘victimhood’ crystallising around the islets to an uncontroversial, highly symbolic national cause confirming Micievic’s (2010:26) emphasis on territory as formative for nationalism. Nowadays given this history and in the tradition of the anti-colonial movement, NE Asian countries all emphasise sovereignty, equality and non-interference at the same time as they claim or try to achieve superiority (or recognition of status) over their neighbours. Territory is

141 Referring back to Havel's opening quote: not so much overcoming nationalism as transforming it by overcoming or reconciling the moralisation gaps nationalism helped produce.
142 Cf. Eve Hepburn’s (2014) analysis of Finlands Swedish-speaking Aland islands' special status agreed between Finland and Sweden after Finland's independence thanks to a decree by the League of Nations of 1920.
143 There are long-standing disputes between EU members Spain and the United Kingdom over sovereignty of Gibraltar located at the southern tip of the Iberian Peninsula. Gibraltar was captured by Britain in 1704 during the War of Spanish succession and its sovereignty ceded in perpetuity to Britain in the Treaty of Utrecht (1713). In 1830 it became a Crown Colony and in 1969 Gibraltar adopted a Constitution which in its preamble contains a British guarantee that Gibraltar would not be passed to the sovereignty of another state against the wish of its people. Gibraltar joined the EU when the UK joined under article 355(3) TFEU, but with important exemptions in areas of customs, taxes, trade, agriculture and fisheries and border controls for people (not a Schengen area member). There have been frequent disputes between Spain and the UK over border controls, smuggling and environmental issues in the surrounding sea. Interestingly, both sides also occasionally take these disputes to the European Commission which in September 2013 for instance sent an investigation team to report on the disputes. With Brexit the issue has become more salient (http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/gibraltar-brexit-northern-ireland-border-spain-theresa-may-a8234516.html; accessed on 16-3-2018).
sacro-sanct despite the alleged 'de-territorialisation' induced by globalisation. Even 'trespassing' by foreign fishermen is defined as a violation of ‘maritime sovereignty’ and leads regularly to diplomatic tensions, deadly skirmishes or even naval battles. A 2013 article in a Korean newspaper even called upon defending Korean ‘sovereignty’ over plants and native species under the 2010 Nagoya Protocol.\(^{144}\)

**Alternative explanations? Is it all about China’s rise and a multi-polar world?**

An important question about NE Asia in a realist prism is whether a rising China can actually organise a regional pole of influence (through power or ideas or both as Blackwill and Tellis (2015) suggest). The problem with a multipolar concept in NE Asia is of course that not all Asian states can be poles just by themselves. So the question is whether Asian states would be part of a China-centred Asia-pole, a Japan-centred Asia pole\(^{145}\), or part of the US-led Asia-Pacific pole? Asking the question already shows that the purported multipolar world in which Europe and the US decline and the Asian pole rises has a hollow ring. NE Asia can remain divided and locked in competition or it could integrate and form a regional pole. The competition between China and Japan for a central role in East Asia goes back to the crisis of the old tribute system in the 17\(^{th}\) century after the Imjin War and its demise in the 20\(^{th}\) as we have seen, but countries in NE Asia (or in Asia at large) would not accept a revival of traditional, China-centred hierarchy, nor for that matter Japanese leadership compromised by its 1930s Asian imperialism (Jo 2012; Buzan and Waever 2003; Kim 2008; Yu 2007). China’s pursuit of regionalism is often viewed with suspicion as the attempt to create a Chinese sphere of influence or even the restoration of a sino-centric world order for which Chinese scholars such as Zhao 2005 (cf. chapter IV.7) provide the intellectual underpinnings (Jo 2012; French 2017). The US role in the region is thus seen by many as a guarantee that neither Japan nor China reclaim a leadership role (Soeya 2015) and only then does the ‘balance of power’ make sense - and tilts and re-balances when China or Japan are perceived as trying to dominate. But in fact this is less of a ‘balance’ than a lid on a rice-cooker. Therefore, this does not translate into uncontested US leadership either. In this sense we have a rather unstable order in NE Asia in which power-based hierarchy is both informally accepted to some extent (US role) and formally contested to a larger extent (in particular amongst Asian countries themselves). In real politics an assertion of ‘East Asianness’ emerged in the 1980s emboldened already by the economic success of the East Asian countries (China not yet among them) and was a basis for a quest for East Asian forums without Americans or Europeans (Yeo 2010:327, Fukushima 2010; Jo 2012). But over the last two, three decades, they could not agree a joint vision or strategy. The two competing visions of the East Asia Summit (EAS) with China preferring ASEAN+3 and Japan promoting ASEAN+6\(^{146}\) in 2005 are part of this tension (Yeo 2010:328; Mochizuki 2007:757; Park 2013). They also remind of the centuries-old competition between China-centred and Japan-centred trade networks (Maas 2014). An “Asian pole” challenging or balancing against the US and Europe therefore seems unlikely to emerge any time soon.

\(^{144}\) *Korea Times* 16.5.2013 p. 3.

\(^{145}\) Todd (2004) hardly mentions China, but sees Japan in the role of the Asian leading country. This raises the interesting scenario question whether Japan could recover its leading role in case demographics and development problems in China slow that country’s rise.

\(^{146}\) With the three additional countries being seen by Japan as allies against Chinese domination.
Thus, configurations of Asian institutions are fluid and often either include or exclude the US depending on the acceptance of the US informal leadership role (hierarchy) which is of course strongest in alliance relationships (Japan, South Korea). This fluidity spins a myriad of comments and analysis in Asian or Asia-focussed think-tanks with many analysts focusing on a power contest between China and the US (Terhalle and Depledge 2013).

As I have shown in the previous sections, it is nationalism that is the key to understand most current conflicts, rather than realism or political system differences. In some realist prisms nationalism has been appropriated in power transition explanations. In this sense nationalism is a result of confidence in China to be a power on the rise and in Japan of the fear of a power in decline (Hahm 2015; Nakano 2014 focusses on the links between Japan's rising nationalism and its economic stagnation since the 1990s). However, the inverse causality is more persuasive as I tried to show in the preceding sections. The ICG (2013) also emphasises the politics of emotions: ‘Nationalism makes sovereignty in the East China Sea a highly explosive issue, as sentiments over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands run deeper in the Chinese psyche than any other territorial dispute in modern Chinese history, with the exception of Taiwan. Anti-Japanese sentiment in China is a legacy of the Japanese invasion during the Second World War and has been reinforced by decades of government-driven patriotic education and mass media recounting Japan’s brutal occupation and China’s heroic triumph under the CCP leadership.’ ‘Sentiments’, ‘psyche’, ‘patriotic education’ are not part of the realist toolkit.

The power of emotions

Japan’s relations with China and Korea remain marred over positions on territories in the maritime domain, over conflicting interpretations of the past through ‘provocations’ such as Prime Ministers’ and Cabinet Ministers’ visits to the Yasukuni shrine and over controversial or ambiguous statements about the war or the ‘comfort women’ (Hahm 2015; Nakano 2014). One can imagine where European integration would be if German Chancellors were to regularly pay their respects at cemeteries where war criminals or SS officers are buried or if they were denying, belittling or justifying Nazi atrocities. My analysis puts into focus emotions, morality and perception (in particular moralisation gaps) rather than power distribution issues. If one uses the conclusion by Alexander Wendt (1999:109) that ‘power explains what it explains insofar as it is given meaning by interest’ then power distribution as such is not explaining rivalry or competition in NE Asia even though it is an important political factor which enters into the equation. This power equation includes the role of outside powers, in particular the USA. From many US policy-makers’ or analysts’ perspective the global power balance between the US and China may indeed be the main focus of interest, but the picture within the region looks more complex. National interests alone are also not giving meaning to power. World views, status and recognition are equally important (and traditionally better captured in the English School framework of analysis; Terhalle and Depledge 2013:581).

147 As one can see from the Bitburg controversy, the invitation in 1985 to then President Reagan to commemorate 40 years of alliance at a war cemetery that contained graves of members of the Waffen SS, stirring international controversy: http://www.helmut-kohl-kas.de/bitburg_1985.html accessed on 26 November 2014.
Therefore, one could complement Wendt’s conclusion about power and interest by adding that power explains what it explains insofar as it is given meaning by interest and moral beliefs or emotions (ideological institutions). In such a view it is ideas, historical experiences and national objectives, strongly related to status and identity that give meaning to the constitutive institutions of international society; sovereignty, international law and the economy. It is nationalism that gives meaning to power in NE Asia and interests are national and sometimes emotional ones. In NE Asia conflictual relationships and rivalry have remained together with moralisation gaps. These moral beliefs about historical ‘right and wrong’ and moral justice keep conflicts alive that could theoretically be solved rationally through liberal institutionalist methods (such as shared regimes for fisheries and gas, joint administration of the disputed islets or regional integration). But such liberal approaches also do not seem to be sufficient to explain NE Asia’s international relations.

3.2. Liberal approaches: Explaining European integration and NE Asia’s non-integration?

If the realist approach with its focus on power, traditional security dilemmas, war and political competition (Viotti and Kauppi 2012:129) is insufficient, what about liberal institutionalist approaches that are usually underpinning and explaining international co-operation including multilateralism and ‘enmeshment’ (Terhalle and Depledge 2013:576-579)? Through this lens compulsory state power and states’ roles are diminished or considered as less relevant because of economic interdependence, globalisation and deterritorialisation and because a multitude of other ‘sovereignty-free’ actors is involved in global governance (Viotti and Kauppi 2012:130).

The tale of two regions seems to provide a model liberal-institutionalist account of European integration (Viotti and Kauppi 2012:138): ‘The present-day story of liberalism and IR theory, then, begins in Europe and in particular in the aftermath of World Wars I and II (…)’ during the Cold War ‘Europe was also the test bed for theories in the liberal tradition’. In NE Asia at least this obsolescence of the state sovereignty idea does not look plausible. And even in the EU states are far from obsolete: ‘The nation-state remains obstinately a key determinant of European citizen voting behaviours, refuting any claims of imminent obsolescence of this unit of governance.’ (Longo and Murray 2011:683). Similarly, power and national preferences need to be factored into accounts of reforming international governance institutions as the case study by Lesage e.a. (2013) on the reform of the IMF shows.

Liberal-rational approaches have the merit to account for economic interdependence and offer a number of useful insights into dynamics of co-operation, individual or non-state agency and institution-building (or regime theory). However, the belief that markets are self-regulatory (and thus the implied or explicit belief that states and politics are secondary or even an obstacle) obscures the roles of history and politics and powerful ideas such as nationalism for which (since the 19th century) the nation-state remains the most desired expression. These ideas conflict with the liberal focus on instrumental rationality and the autonomy of the individual which are key ideas underpinning the current Western-led liberal order – but also rooted in distinct European and
American traditions of thought since Greek antiquity (Gehler 2005:13-16).

These various liberal approaches include many regionalism scholars. They all focus on positive-sum perspectives of international relations, common interests and shared norms (Viotti and Kauppi 2012:131). While they explain many European integration steps, these approaches have difficulties accounting for the shallow integration in NE Asia, although one can find some of the world’s densest trade and production networks there (Hatch, Bair and Heiduk 2014). There is only a very limited positive spill-over into political or security dynamics in the region. These approaches can also not account for seemingly irrational conflicts about economically insignificant interests related to history and status that have even damaged flourishing economic relations or security interests at times such as during the crisis between China and Japan over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands. There is very little evidence for either building up an institutional liberal regime, regional integration projects or for liberal peace regimes in NE Asia. NE Asian countries have relied on self-help and in the case of Japan and ROK security on their respective US alliance more than on regional or international co-operation (on regionalism see III.2).

Some liberal narratives postulate democratic peace or global harmony flowing from converging political values and open markets (Fukuyama 1992). In such a view – informed by the domestic transformations in Central and Eastern Europe in the 1990s - domestic political system change would alter the constitution of the regional international society for instance if the DPRK were to open up and democratize or China were to become more democratic (Wan 2003; Terhalle and Depledge 2013:577).

Political system differences have indeed fed US-China antagonism ever since the ‘loss of China’ to the Communists, US support for Chiang Kai Shek’s Republic of China on Taiwan until 1971 and the division of Korea (Green 2017:241-296). They continue to be cited as an obstacle to NE Asian integration or to the emergence of a democratic peace regime there. The cleavage of political systems and the enduring legacy of the Cold War (liberal – 'communist') are mirrored by competing concepts of regionalism (East Asian versus trans-Pacific). This frames role-relationships (US, Japan, Taiwan and ROK anti-communism; US-China rivalry; North and South Korea enmity). The legacy of Cold War divisive influences on NE Asia’s regional society is certainly a major issue for regionalism there and ideological divisions provide a powerful obstacle to integration. The Cold War overlay also hindered the resolution of the territorial issues in the maritime domain and made reconciliation after the Asia-Pacific War more difficult. Political system differences continue to play important roles within the two divided nations though (ROK-DPRK, PRC-Taiwan) but especially because they have been reinforced by civil war in the 1940s (China) and 1950s (Korea) unlike most of Europe's Cold War divisions. This means important moralisation gaps within divided nations not political system differences as such make reconciliation difficult. However, at present in NE Asia ideological confrontation between liberal and authoritarian (let alone 'communist') value systems does not seem to be the main obstacle to

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148 On July 20, 2014 the Financial Times reports in an analysis by Henny Sender 'Commerce becomes a casualty of Sino-Japanese political spats' that two years into the dispute 'Japanese direct investment in China is down 50 per cent from last year's already reduced level'

149 Americans tend to speak of "Communist North Korea", although this country hardly pursues a Marxist ideology (Myers 2010) and has actually erased references to communism or socialism from its constitution.
economic cooperation not least as it does not affect economic systems like it used to in Europe during the Cold War – there is a widely shared understanding on the market logic of globalisation (except for the DPRK\textsuperscript{150}) – cross-straits relations are a good example. If political system competition were the key factor, the two democratic countries Japan and South Korea plus Taiwan facing China and North Korea, should be expected to reinforce their political and economic ties and build a democratic security community for which there is very little evidence: And as we have seen the US has not been able to get its two allies Korea and Japan to enhance their bilateral military cooperation as the GSOMIA issue showed. There is no traction for the League of Democracies and the US ‘pivot to Asia’ reinforces ties with both democratic and non-democratic countries in Asia, even authoritarian and communist Vietnam (Moon and Park 2015). Instead we diagnose tense bilateral relations and no recognition by Japan and South Korea of fellow democracy Taiwan’s sovereignty, no legalisation to enable cooperation, no FTA but enduring conflicts about history and territory among the liberal democracies as much as across the system divide.

Furthermore, ROK's democratisation in the 1990s did not attenuate its nationalism nor its difficult relations with Japan contradicting Yu's (2007:237-8) belief that democratisation is a necessary pre-condition for solving historical issues. To the contrary – in a democracy vocal minorities cannot be ignored by governments. The emergence of the comfort women issue in the 1990s is a good example (chapter I.1.14; Berger and Bong 2012; Yoon 2011). Similarly Japan’s democratic and pacifist Constitution has not prevented a strong sense of nationalism and revisionism in parts of the elite and population (Watanabe 2015, Nakano 2014, French 2012). Even in China an authoritarian system quite good at controlling and repressing political dissent, has difficulties reining in nationalist activists.

Similarly, there is little evidence for an anti-US or anti-ROK alliance between China and North Korea (although the 1961 China-North Korea friendship and mutual assistance treaty stipulates that the two nations undertake all necessary measures to oppose any country or coalition of countries that might attack either nation). China's relations with the US, Japan or ROK are far more important strategically and economically than its relations with the DPRK. China, like the other countries, opposes the DPRK’s nuclear programme and above all wants stability in the region for which the easiest way is to maintain the status quo, however unsatisfactory it may be on other counts (such as nuclear proliferation, economic costs or human rights) to pursue its development and prosperity in a secular project of nation-building (Wang 2014, 2014a).

Without going into details here, this list shows that ‘democratic’ or ‘liberal’ political systems are not sufficient to produce legitimacy for overcoming obstacles to cooperation or multilateralism that are rooted in ideological institutions such as nationalism. Nationalism and the moralisation gaps have proven stronger even than both superpower ‘balancing policy’ and liberal domestic political systems or liberal international order.

\textsuperscript{150} But even in the DPRK there have been tentative reforms and a certain tolerance for market activities and a certain openness (via China) is visible in the streets of Pyongyang with Western cars and other consumer goods for instance increasingly available in the last few years.
Finally most liberal-rational IR approaches (for an overview Viotti and Kauppi 2012:129-66) have no rear-mirror and tend to focus on post-WWII institutional liberal order and post-Cold War global governance and thus take little account of history apart from economic history (Finlay and O'Rourke 2007; Kocka 2014). These approaches focus on rational actors and interests and the norms, regimes and institutions they create (usually through bargaining and driven by domestic or transnational interest groups). They also tend to agree with realists that international relations lack a stable hierarchy due to their anarchic character, the difference being the respective focus on absolute versus relative gains and the connection to war and violence (Viotti and Kauppi 2012:148). Therefore, liberal approaches can also not adequately account for past Confucian international society with its state-centrism and lack of provision of shared public goods (Gao 2012) and the low importance of trade and economic integration compared to domestic economic production (Kuhn 2014:566-571) and politico-civilisational hierarchy. Confucian hierarchy and moral beliefs may have humanistic and other similarities with liberal ideas, but the underlying cultural factors are more important to explain Confucian international society. In particular the liberal focus on the individual and his/her autonomy is at odds with the Confucian emphasis on the collective and its hierarchical social relations. Similarly the low esteem by the former Confucian official ideology for profit and traders sits uneasily with Western Enlightenment liberal doctrine rooted in individual economic freedom.

4. Conclusions

NE Asian countries have learned formal ‘sovereign equality’ from Europe in the 19th century and rejected their own older hierarchical model and its only informal equality. This is a consequence of them adopting nationalism at a time when Europeans had defined and practised sovereignty and international law in social-darwinist and imperialist terms and international relations in a predatory way (trivialised by the English School as an expansion of international society – Suzuki e.a. 2014). NE Asian countries quickly emulated the behaviour of the Europeans: international law was appropriated as a defence against imperial domination and continues to be used as an instrument to defend sovereign equality, territory and the principle of non-interference in domestic affairs. Subsequently, Japan's militarism and imperialism led to a sequence of half a century of regional wars and territorial conquest.

We have seen that even today as a consequence of the many moralisation gaps stemming from this ‘clash of civilisations’ a multilateralist regional project in NE Asia is very unlikely in the near future. An entrenched reluctance to accept any kind of hierarchy that is implied in delegating authority to multilateral structures make the definition of a shared regional project politically very difficult (while allowing pragmatic economic cooperation). I will review evidence for this hypothesis in part III when analysing NE Asian countries’ responses to economic crisis and the climate change challenge. The economic success story (so far) of NE Asia’s development states and of their national strategies of self-help during financial crises have also not prompted any desire for deep regional integration, as we will see in chapter III.3.2.

The historical factors influencing the pathway of regional society in NE Asia analysed above, in particular the unresolved heritage of those (relatively recent) processes has led to several
moralisation gaps and victim-perpetrator roles and brought about a competitive nationalism as a way to define and ensure national identity and development. These processes (not dissimilar to processes in 19th and 20th century Europe; Dieckhoff 2012; Osterhammel 2011:580-616) transcend the liberal democratic – communist system divide after the Cold War, (during the global Cold War overlay these conflicts seemed frozen similar to ethnic conflicts in South-East Europe) and the interdependence pressures of globalisation.

This particular logic of sovereign equality and these role relationships defined through different interpretations of history and identity cannot be explained only with realists' models of anarchy and power balance or transition models or with rational interest calculation and liberal bargaining. These are more useful to examine day-to-day foreign and economic policy making and US strategy in the region (Green 2017). The ideology of nationalism, the desire for recognition and the moralisation gaps along conflicting views of historical justice offer a better explanation for currently tense relationships, conflicts over islets and the near-total lack of regional political cooperation. Conversely, they hold the keys to any regional project or collaborative governance: sincere and sustained reconciliation, mutual recognition of differences, but also shared heritage and a process of rendering ‘historical justice’ would go a long way to reduce tensions in the region and build trust as a fundamental condition for co-operation. Scholars researching other regions such as Africa will recognise some of these dynamics related to colonialism and nationalism / tribalism.

Political system differences (democratic or authoritarian) play only marginal roles today compared to nationalism and moralisation gaps with the exception perhaps of the divided Koreans, although North Korea’s ideology is less communist than nationalist-racist (Myers 2010). We have also seen that nation building processes are still ongoing and that formalised international relations between NE Asian countries are fairly recent and in some cases not yet established. A sense of historical enmity and antagonism is palpable. They won’t easily ‘un-learn’ their national sovereignty culture of formal equality unless nationalism is going out of fashion and moralisation gaps are effectively bridged through reconciliation. This may mean that Education Ministries rather than Foreign Ministries hold the keys to a cooperative future to develop a less nationalist narrative that children are steeped in. A more ‘accurate’ history of the region could be written and reflected in the textbooks like the efforts in Europe (where the world's first bi-national history textbook with identical text was launched by France and Germany in 2003): 'The condensed and canonical character of the information selected for and presented in textbooks gives them central significance in academic, political and educational respects. Textbooks, as carriers of the knowledge and information that one generation wishes to pass on to the next, frequently find themselves at the centre of political controversy. They may promote prejudice and animosity, yet can also contribute to reconciliation and peace-building.'

Europe by contrast has found an original way around a similar dilemma by rejecting nationalist ideology and pursuing reconciliation of moralisation gaps through bilateral and multilateral strategies, mainly European integration. European integration has created a consensual almost

151 This is how the Georg Eckert Institute for International Textbook Research describes the role of history textbooks, [http://www.gei.de/en/the-institute.html](http://www.gei.de/en/the-institute.html) accessed on 27.4.2015
anonymous form of multilaterally syndicated hierarchy that also reflects and builds on the cooperative, liberal-institutional logic of economic interdependence. The EU’s core competences are jointly managed in particular in economic fields (foreign trade, single market, economic and monetary union). This original product of regional integration will be analysed in more detail in chapter II.3.

My tale of two regions was prompted by quite a puzzle: why do countries in NE Asia reject their common history and focus on their differences instead, especially in the contemporary context of globalisation which is often said to force countries together? How has a thick regionness in the Confucian past evolved to such a thin regionness today that makes NE Asia seem like a non-region? How has Europe come such a long way from the proverbial ‘Westphalian’ anarchy and epicentre of international conflict to become a deeply integrated security community? This waxing and waning of ‘regionness’ under the influence of ideas (ideological institutions) and key institutions of international society is quite intriguing. The explanations for this puzzle I came up with are:

- NE Asia and Europe are core regions of the world, one perceived as rising and often threatening with conflict potential that for some observers recalls 1914. The other, Europe, forming a very differently constituted society in which war has become unthinkable, but which is perceived as in decline.
- The parallel drawn to 1914 for contemporary NE Asia and China’s rise is not convincing. However, we are also far from a liberal-democratic peace order.
- Realist models and power transition models are useful, but too narrow to explain the complex dynamics in NE Asia. Explaining key features of China’s / NE Asia’s rise requires more comprehensive concepts of power in international society, a historically informed analysis and examining of moralisation gaps.
- Nationalism can be seen as an ideological institution of international society together with multilateralism and cosmopolitanism. These ideological beliefs are key switches to different pathways of antagonism or co-operation as the paths of Europe and NE Asia have shown.
- Moralisation gaps and victim-perpetrator roles (rather than just ‘historical issues’) feeding nationalist ideology perpetuated by history textbooks, the education system and political activists are too big to bridge through economic interdependence and rational-instrumental liberal approaches in NE Asia while European nations have successfully overcome or defused them. They are also used politically for a purpose (which is a typical rationalisation by perpetrators e.g. Japanese viewpoints on China’s historical issues (Watanabe 2015)
- Hierarchy in different forms has been shown to produce order and legitimacy in different balances as opposed to Empire and anarchy

Table 2 below gives an overview of these key findings. In the following chapters I will further develop them and try to conceptualise them addressing the following questions:

1) Which shortcomings in traditional theories need to be addressed to improve the

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152 This anonymity of the supranational institutions can be useful to dilute responsibility for specific decisions - scapegoat function - but it creates a ‘democratic deficit’ of European institutions.
explanatory value of international society approaches?
2) Which alternatives to euro-centric concepts of international society exist(ed) in the regions?
3) How has the power and violence paradigm changed (in the two regions at least) and affected the key institutions of international society?
4) Which logics of anarchy or hierarchy can explain the long peace of the Confucian world and of the EU?
5) How have the decline of violence and the dynamics of globalisation altered the understanding of anarchy in the contemporary world of complexity, uncertainty and chaos?
6) Which institutions of international society define the shape of the regions, their degree of integration and how do they evolve in the context of complexity, uncertainty and chaos?
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ideal types (real or theoretical)</th>
<th>EU</th>
<th>Confucian world</th>
<th>Westphalian (realist)</th>
<th>Functionally multilateral</th>
<th>Cosmopolitan (world society)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hierarchy</td>
<td>Syndicated and to some extent organising principle (in field of EU competence), organised inequality</td>
<td>Formal, investiture and tribute system</td>
<td>Formal equality, informal hierarchy of great powers</td>
<td>Formal equality, output legitimacy of various group configurations Informal hierarchy or club diplomacy</td>
<td>World government; federation effective equality, trans-national democracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(national) Sovereignty</td>
<td>Syndicated with supranational components</td>
<td>Dynastic – administrativ e; mandate of heaven (supranational as recognised by several states)</td>
<td>Organising principle</td>
<td>Moderated organising principle</td>
<td>Redundant or subordinated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationalism</td>
<td>Weak, civic</td>
<td>Limited, cultural</td>
<td>Strong to extreme</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Weak or overcome, different allegiances and sources of legitimacy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multilateralism</td>
<td>Institutionalised, constitutional</td>
<td>Limited and functional</td>
<td>Non-permanent alliances, treaties, positivist international law, balance of power</td>
<td>Issue related, expansion of agreed rules/laws/regimes</td>
<td>Constitutionalised, not necessarily state based</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cosmopolitanism</td>
<td>Democratic deficit, but teamworkers can address collective action</td>
<td>Strong (Confucian), Tian Xia 天下 universalism, but not</td>
<td>Only in utopian writings</td>
<td>Limited cooperation; can address urgent and important collective</td>
<td>Real and institutionalised (world government)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Part II introduces a new classification of institutions of International Society building on the forms of international society summed up in the table above and conclusions from the pathways examined in Part I. Part II offers a more structured analysis of the effects of the complex anarchy and diffusion of power. I start by addressing theory issues that have so far hindered an analysis covering the complexity and historical pathways of two very different regions of the world outlined above. Part III then uses the new insights to check evidence on the consequences of the historical moralisation gaps, nationalism and multilateralism, the anarchy of complexity and the diffusion of power in these two regions. Part IV delves deeper into the consequences of this research for global governance and international order.

**Part II: International Society and its institutions**

I have outlined in the first part the pathways and critical junctures of two different international societies over the last 300 years or so. This has allowed identifying how critically ideological institutions of international society such as nationalism, multilateralism, Confucianism and imperialism were/are modifying key institutions of international society like balance of power, war, sovereignty and international law. I have traced key logics of anarchy and hierarchy which have shaped and are shaping NE Asia and the EU in very different ways. Furthermore, I found that the two regions’ pathways in this world of issues remain largely determined by developments originating from ideas and the past critical junctures in their regions such as the end of the Confucian order, the experience of imperialism and its consequences in NE Asia and the extreme nationalism and racism experienced in Europe in the 20\textsuperscript{th} century culmination to ‘Westphalian’ Europe’s ‘suicide’ in two world wars.

As I noted already in I.3 commonly used IR approaches do not explain adequately the evolution of NE Asia from a Confucian international society to the current conflict-prone yet peaceful, non-integrated yet networked heart of the global economy. These approaches also do not explain the mutation from ‘Westphalian’ warring Europe to the peaceful EU. This inadequacy of the mainstream IR approaches such as realism, liberalism and even constructivism is due to a number of problems: they tend to be euro-centric, chrono-centric and rooted in a limited understanding of anarchy and hierarchy. Most imprison themselves in paradigm mentalities and fight turf wars. My comparative story shows the need for a holistic approach built on a new understanding of anarchy
and hierarchy, a reconsideration of international society which allows political space for different values and which accounts for the moralisation gaps fuelling politics of emotions rather than the pursuit of rational interest only. My new approach requires a better understanding of key institutions of international society such as sovereignty, international law and the economy. In part I I have already examined the drivers of change in international society along historical pathways and shown that they are influenced by ideological institutions of international society such as nationalism and, multilateralism, Confucianism and cosmopolitanism. I identified a number of critical junctures which have contributed to changes in order (anarchy and hierarchy), changes in ideological institutions (nationalism  multilateralism; Confucianism  nationalism) and moralisation gaps often associated with violent changes of international societies at critical junctures and how they in turn influence international relations.

The unsatisfactory frameworks of realism and liberal interdependence made me turn to the concept of international society and some of the constructivist approaches about ideas and role-relationships which provide clues to some of the lacunae of the realist and liberal approaches. But the traditional international society approach as formulated by the English School and Wendt’s social theory of international relations (1999) also do not capture all the issues I identified in a satisfactory way, not least as their focus is still very much on power and violence as fundamental social institutions of international society.

Thus, finally, after I found that power and power-based relationships are not enough to explain the constitution of international society in Europe and NE Asia both today and in the past it is necessary to explain why this is so and how the power and violence paradigm has changed and how that change has affected the institutions of international society. The answer to this question has to address the fundamental assumption of IR theory – that of an Anarchical Society. Is anarchy in the classical definition – so intimately linked to hard power - still the most suitable way to describe the context of international relations in the 21st century? How can it be shown in past and present NE Asia/Europe that anarchy is not just the absence of central authority? How can we understand anarchy today to take account of the changes in the power and violence paradigm and the complexity of the world of issues? International Society has to be seen in its historical context. International Society Mark I - like realism - focused on the context of anarchy defined as absence of a central authority (and the resulting disorder). International Society 2.0, however, is characterised by power diffusion, globalisation, risks and complexity that breed uncertainty. This context is not just disorder, or an absence of central authority, but chaos (Bishop 2009, Smith 2010). Chaos dynamics present very different security and policy dilemmas from those addressed in realist and liberal models based on rational choice and game theory. I turn now to re-conceptualising International Society.

International society from Mark I to 2.0: Violence, Anarchy and Institutions

The English School is credited with developing the concept of international society (Viotti and Kauppi 2012:239-74). H.Bull and A.Watson defined international society as: “a group of states (or, more generally, a group of independent political communities) which not merely form a system, in
the sense that the behaviour of each is a necessary factor in the calculations of the others, but also have established by dialogue and consent common rules and institutions for the conduct of their relations, and recognize their common interest in maintaining these arrangements.” (quoted in Viotti and Kauppi 2012:240)\textsuperscript{153} The English School concept is quite compatible with many of the main IR images (realism, liberalism, constructivism) and not as reductionist as some of them taken individually. Wendt (1999) for instance has developed his three cultures of anarchy on the basis of the English School's three traditions (Hobbesian, Grotian, Kantian)\textsuperscript{154} and Wendt also emphasises that states form an international society. This definition also implies that it does not seek to cover all states, but only certain groups of states, so it leaves open the issue of world society.

The English School has started to look at history and to other parts of the world to address issues of euro-centrism and lack of historical perspective, but not always very systematically or comparatively. In fact, the logic of research has mostly identified other groups of states in history that formed their own international societies. This then looks like a ‘museum collection of international societies’. Some scholars have gone further to research pre-modern links between Europe and different international societies and criticising earlier euro-centric research (though their focus also remains on Europe's links with others – Suzuki e.a. 2014). English School scholars also say little about nationalism and the moralisation gap, presumably because they are seen as domestic level issues. We have seen that this is not the case, nationalism and emotions around moralisation gaps are problems of international society and frequent root causes of international conflict. They also impact on global governance.

Bull identified five key institutions for international relations in such a society of states to maintain order: balance of power, international law, diplomacy, war and great power management. The organising principle of international society for Bull is anarchy. Order was then the minimum condition of co-existence preserving the states and the society of states and regulating violence (Hurrell 2007:2). I call this concept International Society Mark I. This concept reflects the Cold War context. It is understandable that analysts writing in times of war or existential threats focus their analysis on war and violence. Such a focus can also be found with Chinese philosophers writing in the long period of the Warring States (5th to 3rd centuries BC) which are currently re-discovered by Chinese IR scholars.

For Hurrell (2007:2) the key challenge for international society is ‘the need to capture shared and common interests, to manage unequal power, and to mediate cultural diversity and value conflict’. This is a crucial issue for and difference between International Society Mark I with its purported commonality of values and norms (reflecting the Cold War ideological antagonism) and International Society 2.0 which is characterised by diversity and agonism (cf. chapter 1.2. on euro-centrism and value plurality). From the minimalist or pluralist concept of international society as conceived by Bull and his associates scholars have developed more normative or solidarist concepts that go beyond state-centric and anarchy-focused approaches to focus on human security and governance (Hurrell 2007:3-7). These conceptual changes reflect changes in international society since the end of the Cold War. Baumann and Dingwerth (2015) explicitly

\textsuperscript{153} I have already proposed an update of this definition of International Society 2.0 in the Introduction.

\textsuperscript{154} For Bull the liberal, law-based Grotian tradition represented a middle way between the pessimistic, power focused Hobbesian tradition and the naiveté of the cosmopolitan, Kantian, tradition (Lawler 2013:25).
focus their discussion on power and global governance on world politics after the Cold War and argue that anarchy has not marked international policy since then. Hurrell (2007:8-9) attributes those conceptual changes to globalisation, but argues that they do not transform international society into a 'post-Westphalian' one. He rightly points to the plurality of political identities in search of recognition and to the limits of the liberal-rational account of governance and universalist pretensions. From there, Bull's bottomline of a thin, state-based pluralism is not enough according to Hurrell (2007:12). However, Hurrell still puts a disproportionate emphasis on violence, war and the balance of power in his concept of order in international society where the structure is supported by norms and institutions cementing unequal power relations and their 'legitimacy' (Hurrell 2007:27-39; 71-75). My thesis goes further by questioning the excessive focus on violence, war and power balance as well as the the narrow approach to anarchy and hierarchy. I also go beyond the focus on post Cold-War developments.

The social theory of international relations (Wendt 1999) and the concept of international society already build on each other and digest insights from realism and liberalism; hence they do not fall into the trap of paradigm mentality. Yet they share the assumption of an anarchic society and they have developed only limited concepts to theorise on globalisation and regionalisation which can be seen as key drivers of the development from International Society Mark I to 2.0. Buzan (2005:124-5) argues: ‘the economic sector has to be brought into the English School's conceptualization of the norms, rules, and institutions that constitute international society. In particular the primary institutions arising within the economic sector need to be identified (...) Among other things, bringing the economic sector into this discussion will require a retelling of the English School's account of how international society rose in Europe and spread to global scale. Once this is done (...) open the whole discussion of international society to the subglobal/regional level.’ Here Hurrell’s (2007) monograph on global order already has made a significant contribution and my comparative case study contributes to this research agenda. But as I will argue, globalisation is not just a driver of change in International Society – it is part of a fundamentally different concept of anarchy.

Viotti and Kauppi (2012:248-9) formulate a research agenda on developing the ideas of international society further to one of world society in this way: ‘Buzan argued that a conceptually robust concept of world society could become the best approach to coming to grips with the phenomenon of globalization, a challenge for IR theory in general. The relation between international society and world society is not only the biggest weakness of existing English School theory, but also where the biggest theoretical if not practical gains can be made. Working out the relation between order and a more cosmopolitan culture in “international” society is one of the unfinished legacies of Bull’s work. A revised English School theory, therefore, has potential to improve how globalization is conceptualized, but only if world society can be developed as a coherent theoretical concept.’

My thesis contributes to this agenda by examining different regional and historic pathways and institutions of international society, what globalisation means for international society, and how

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155 Cf. Wendt (1999:242) ‘The vast majority of states today see themselves as part of a “society of states” whose norms they adhere to…’. In the following, I will show that these norms vary in the regions I examine.

156 Arrighi (2010), Morris (2011 and Kocka (2014) provide good accounts in this sense.
they relate to nationalism, multilateralism and eventually cosmopolitanism. Contrary to the focus postulated by Viotti and Kauppi a cosmopolitan 'world society' is not an inevitable outcome or benchmark, though. There are other ways to come to terms with globalisation (and regionalisation) such as developing multilateralism further. This will be addressed in the concluding part IV.

In this part I will review the theoretical and methodological problems that arose from the tale of two regions which need to be addressed to answer my research questions. My theoretical analysis will focus on a new conceptualisation of institutions of international society which takes account of my empirical findings from part I.

1. Overcoming Theory and Methodology Problems

In searching for an adequate toolkit for my rather complex investigation of the issues identified in part I I encountered a number of theory and methodological problems that I will address briefly first. This is because I focus on the puzzle and its causes and not on a hypothetical cause for which I would need to construct a puzzle.

1.1. Paradigm mentalities

The first problem is that of paradigm mentalities where different schools oppose each other (Heng 2010). The mere opposition of different schools does not imply scientific progress in knowledge creation (Lu 2010:112) if a new theory does not take account of its predecessors (Popper 1994). Karl Popper argued that paradigm mentalities and agreed frameworks are detrimental to healthy inquiry by limiting diversity. Popper called for keeping ‘the flow of ideas running from all tributaries’ (Walker 2010 in Viotti and Kauppi 2012:27-32), a call he borrowed from the historian Trevor-Roper (Popper 1994 [1969] 143). Erk (2013) deplores the risks of scholarly insulation through overspecialisation that does not take account of a wider picture and of research in neighbouring disciplines. Popper (1994 [1976]:33-64) warned of the ‘myth of the framework’. Framework mentalities tend to be linked to euro-centrism and ‘chrono-centrism’ (see below). This easily leads researchers to explain away challenges to their frameworks, to make a given theory ‘watertight’. Such a closed framework is then no longer able to explain deviating developments – something that the unexpected or shall I say unpredicted end of the Cold War threw into relief in the IR field (Ruggie 1993:561 referring to Robert Gilpin who had seen a peaceful end of the Cold War as low probability in 1981 given that he believed that the main mechanics of power transition throughout history had been hegemonic war). Theories then tend to resemble ideologies. It seems to me that many theory turf wars (in which I shall say straight away I do not wish to engage here) are linked to a wrong reading of Popper. Popper indeed says that progress in science happens through conflicts among theories and that a new theory should contradict and overthrow its predecessor (Popper 1994 [1975]:12)\textsuperscript{157}.

\textsuperscript{157}One could argue that Popper had natural rather than social sciences in mind and that in IR there are no natural laws which need to be uncovered and therefore they need not be overthrown as many different factors, including the analyst’s selection of and perspectives on them explain social structures and events. Morris (2011) seems to assume ‘natural laws’ of biology, sociology and geography at work in determining social development and history. But he focuses on the big picture in a very long time frame.
However, significantly, Popper (ibid) makes a second point: a new theory ‘must always be able to explain fully the success of its predecessor. In all those cases in which its predecessor was successful, it must yield results at least as good as those of its predecessor and, if possible, better results.’ This does not suggest turf wars, but building blocks. Of course, Popper was somewhat imbued with the belief of the omnipotence of the natural sciences while in the social sciences this maxim is not so straightforward as in the natural sciences. ‘Predecessors’ and ‘successors’ tend to continue arguing their points ad infinitum rather than trying to build on each other. (Heng 2010:539 talks about endism and returnism: ‘For every prophet of ‘endism’ almost like a Newtonian law of physics, it seems there is an equal and opposite perspective warning of ‘false dawns’ and the ‘return of some familiar old concept or other’ and ‘For every Fukuyama, there seems to be a Mearsheimer’. A typical example in our context for this returnism is A. Friedberg’s (2000) article entitled ‘Will Europe’s past be Asia’s future?’

Social reality is too complex to prove some theory ‘wrong’ in an absolute sense or with some experiment (Nørgaard 2008). There are always several (if not infinite) valid interpretations of history, politics and economic processes (and they are all more convincing with the benefit of hindsight, contrary to theories in physics). Heng (2010:541) comments on repeated IR debates: ‘While these debates have been unhelpfully posed in the form of an either/or, it is more accurate to understand the world in terms of complex combinations rather than simple opposites.’ Barnett and Duvall (2005) propose the same conceptual pluralism for the key concept of power. Note that such an understanding in non-dichotomous ways is characteristic of Chinese philosophy revealing the euro-centrism of many IR approaches already at the level of ontology (Zhao 2005; more on this in part IV.7). The various contradictory interpretations of history and the moralisation gaps in NE Asia corroborate this argument. This being said, Wendt's Social Theory of International Politics (1999) fulfils in my view Popper's criteria in that it explains the successes of and goes beyond its predecessors, in this case (structural) realism and liberal rational choice theories (Viotti and Kauppi 2012:277-9, 293-8). Wendt captures in an open-ended way this infinite range of possibilities of interpretation as he makes all explanations, including his own, subject to construction and re-construction by society and analysts themselves. Analysts should avoid going too far with this though as Zhuang Zi’s (莊子) 2400 year old butterfly metaphor shows: In what one could call an antique version of constructivism he recalls the dream of himself, Zhuang Zhou (莊周), who dreamt he was a butterfly looking at the world from above including the sleeping Zhuang Zhou. When he woke up he wondered whether he was Zhuang Zhou dreaming he was a butterfly, or a butterfly dreaming he was Zhuang Zhou (Cheng 1997:122-3).

However, Wendt's theory is also very much focused on power and omits some key issues that my comparison of the EU and NE Asia will focus on: there is a restrictive and somewhat euro-centric view of anarchy and role relationships, a limited consideration of the economy and the omission of the key role relationships arising from moralisation gaps (victim-perpetrator) and that of

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158 Viotti and Kauppi (2012:15) consider constructivism not as a theory or image like realism, liberalism, economic structuralism or the English School, but as ‘a theoretically informed interpretative understanding related to the study of IR. As such, one can find constructivists theorizing with this “understanding” within any of the four images we identify.’

159 Zhuang Zi is believed to have lived in the IVth century BC, Cheng 1997:103.
teamworkters in multilateralism.

I draw on the knowledge produced by scholars from different persuasions and different disciplines. For me the substance is more important than the label: ‘In the end, however, the purpose of IR is not only to determine whether we can know the world but also to explain and understand how the world operates.’ Heng (2010:540). This way, I feel comfortable building on insights from different images or theories or interpretative understandings used by fellow researchers – be they realist, liberal or constructivist – rather than to imprisoning my analysis into one particular framework or school. But my result is a theory grounded in such ‘predecessors’ to explain the diverging paths of Europe and NE Asia.

Such playing ‘Lego’ with different theory bricks may be anathema to defenders of a particular school, but when dealing with the complexity of international relations it seems to me rather straightforward to explore these complexities to combine and re-combine the Lego bricks with an open mind and the resources developed by various specialists (Erk 2013). Or as Popper (1994 [1976] 38) says: ‘My thesis is that logic neither underpins the myth of the framework nor its denial, but that we can try to learn from each other.’ And (p. 44): ‘victory in a debate is nothing, while even the slightest clarification of one’s problem – even the smallest contribution made towards a clearer understanding of one’s own position or that of one’s opponent – is a great success.’ Finally (p.60): ‘The mistaken method [of criticism] starts from the question: How can we establish or justify our thesis or our theory? It thereby leads either to dogmatism, or to an infinite regress, or to the relativistic doctrine of rationally incommensurable frameworks.’ In another lecture Popper (1994 [1963] 159) points out that ‘scientists in their critical discussions, do not attack the arguments which might be used to establish, or even to support, the theory under examination. They attack the theory itself, qua solution of the problem it tries to solve.’ My focus is not attacking anyone or any particular IR paradigm160 because, as I argued above, social sciences quasi by definition offer more than one ‘solution’ to any problem. So, I’m building on various insights and my own thinking and experience to contribute to the flow of ideas on the problems I took up in my research questions in international relations and regionalism.

1.2. Euro-centrism and value plurality

The second methodological problem is that most IR schools are reflecting essentially Western thinking (Hobson 2012). I found most mainstream approaches but also recent works such as Pinker (2011), Bremmer (2013) are too much dominated by Western, and especially US concepts and examples, while the reaction to that in China for instance (Yan 2011) is too much pre-occupied with their own parochial approaches and sometimes dubious readings of Chinese history (Hui 2012; Lovell 2011:302-3 for the victimhood narrative of the Opium War) and still constrained by certain limits to challenging the official party positions especially on ‘sensitive issues’ (Sun 2013). However, the diversity of norms, beliefs and values both in the past and today need to be reflected not just criticised. Korhonen (2014) shows how even geographical terms such as Asia are

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euro-centric and developed significant conceptual conflicts about Japan's identity in the 19th and 20th centuries that underlie interpretations of its imperialist turn in that period.

Euro-centrism has not only coloured many analysts’ approaches to international relations, but it is in itself a problem of a normative projection of universal values on a plurality of polities and societies. "Naturally, the notion that non-European actors were able to construct social rules that could promote some form of coexistence between states did not enter the minds of English School scholars" (Suzuki e.a. 2014). In IR studies of non-European international societies and pre-19th century interactions of Europeans with other international societies have long been neglected due largely to a focus on researching (if not propagating) the universality and expansion of European ideas and norms of order (and international society) despite the considerable violence and disorder that came along with the expansion of international society Mark I (Suzuki 2014:76-80; Suzuki e.a. 2014: 4-8). The boundaries in international society created by (euro-centric) values and ‘membership criteria’ are an important issue to address (Zhang C. 2017; Qin 2016). International Society 2.0 cannot simply be conceived of with the benchmark of the EU or a set of liberal-rationalist approaches or cosmopolitan views which are fed from mainly Western sources and which ignore emotions, multiplicity of modernity (Eisenstadt 2000) and passions, such as nationalism, which are fundamentally constitutive of political phenomena (Mouffe 2010:16). We have seen in the NE Asia paradox how important these passions and collective identities are (and remembering WWI and II should remind us how destructive they can be). Zhang's research on European and Chinese ‘curious and exotic encounters' before the 19th century thus concludes with the question: "how much do cultural differences matter in constructing a lasting, stable and peaceful international order?" (Zhang Y. 2014:74).

This may lead to disagreements and conflicts about some of the norms, but also to phenomena of pioneering norm evolution independent of hegemonial power that others may chose to follow, to emulate, to adapt or to oppose (cf. Wissenbach 2011). But such disagreements are necessary and unavoidable. Mouffe (2010:13) argues that they are desirable in a ‘multi-polar world with a balance of regional poles’. Multipolarity in her view (Mouffe 2010:163) has to accept the deep plurality of the world and other forms of modernity. She thus holds a similar view as Eisenstadt (2000) with his focus on multiple modernities. Mouffe opposes her multi-polar world to the liberal-technocratic rationality of global governance (Mouffe 2010:135), ‘effective multilateralism’ (Mouffe 2010:151) and visions of cosmopolitan society (Beck, Giddens, Habermas – Mouffe 2010:118-35). Her view also differs from the realist concept of multipolarity as just the number of great powers in the system. Hurrell (2007) does not go quite as far, but he also rejects euro-centric, liberal-rational accounts that do not take account of deep plurality.

According to Hobson's extensive research (2012), most IR theorising is heavily euro-centric. For some IR is an American social science (Hoffmann 1966) and realism an American prism (Guzzini 1992:24-33). Tamamoto (2003:193) also includes liberalism into that prism: "I take the discipline of international relations, dominated by the discussions of realism and liberalism and their variants, to be, in large measure, a post-1945 American discipline (...) understood as an...

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161 The term euro-centric is used here generically as ‘from a Western perspective’, or focused on Western history/experience cf. Yu (2007) who describes NE Asian history textbooks as 'eurocentric'. In fact more often than not IR perspectives on Asia are American rather than European.
expression of American culture and identity." This US bias certainly reflects the preponderance of US policy with its emphasis on 'realist' and 'liberal' approaches. But beyond this Tamamoto (2003:191-94) refers to cultural differences which for instance make US rational choice fail to acknowledge that there are cultural differences to what is believed to be rational. Tamamoto also argues that identities matter in the behaviour of nation states and people. He criticises in particular the artificial separation of domestic and international realms which allowed US IR scholars to underplay cultural and identity issues in an endeavour to develop a 'positivist' and 'scientific' account of international relations. Such a view then is of course not able to deal with moralisation gaps or ideological institutions of international society such as nationalism, multilateralism, cosmopolitanism or Confucianism. Even constructivists often get entangled in this US dominated focus, partly because they want to overcome the realist system paradigm (which is not my focus here).

One issue where this euro-centrism is particularly relevant is the legitimacy of international order. If it is not perceived – especially by powerful actors such as the countries in NE Asia - as reflecting their interests and values, international order becomes fragile and contested (Lieber 2014; Thorup 2010; Zhang C. 2017). More generally, Hurrell (2007:10) argues: ‘Contemporary international society is characterized by a complex plurality of ideas, views, and values. It is also characterized by a plurality of political identities in search of recognition.’ International Society Mark I as developed by Bull and Wight during the Cold War was constructed as European (here meaning Western) international society deeply committed to Western liberal values which the authors regarded as universal in fact and normative belief (O’Hagan 2002:108-31; Little 2014). I showed how important this issue of recognition and status is for the countries of NE Asia and that despite their different political systems they all share a certain ambivalence about normative Western value domination and maintain a defensive stance in international law and sovereignty as we shall see in more detail in section II.3 on sovereignty and international law. Thus, naturally, this ambivalence extends to Western social science that does not reflect this plurality and includes influential attempts to re-define for instance Confucian values (Bell and Hahm 2003, Zhao 2005 – cf. part IV).

Hurrell (2007) traces ‘how liberal interest-driven accounts of the problems of global governance all too often disguise or evade the deep conflict over values, underlying purposes, and ways of seeing the world’. Others more candidly formulate this worldview as a kind of liberal imperialism: ‘a moral discourse denying (certain) states their legitimacy’ (Thorup 2010:664) and an attempt to ‘institutionalize sovereign inequality’ (Thorup 2010:672). Mouffe (2010) in a very similar way criticises the Western liberal-rational and cosmopolitical denial of such value conflicts and the propensity to define universal standards of behaviour without alternatives as fundamentally denying space for political debate. This propensity is also in part an issue regarding the EU’s democratic deficit (as we will see later). According to her such antagonisms will not or should not go away, as such differences are the very nature of politics. This issue also affects the economy

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162 Not to mention that we can ourselves observe on a daily basis how our or our friends' decisions are not always rational, as we follow the herd, social conventions, fashion, impulses and emotions…Game theory, social psychology and behavioural economics have done a lot to elucidate this ‘irrationality’.

163 It is interesting that during the 18th century Enlightenment movement in Europe antagonism including conflict and war were seen, not least by Kant, as engines of History promoting the development of culture, arts and social
and interdependence and a ‘de-westernization’ of globalisation (cf. below 1.6). Unfortunately this de-Westernisation all too often is only presented as a decline of the West or a rise of the rest (i.e. a power transition), as if we were still living in the 19th century or the Cold War. The decline or ‘de-Westernisation’ is perhaps more an erosion of ideological monopolies which allowed the West defining without much consultation with others the norms of liberal international order and limiting legitimacy to certain types of democratic states. The crucial issue is the role of sovereignty and international law in this process of an evolving international order that can paradoxically be sustained by illiberal states (Dunne and McDonald 2013) contradicting the belief that domestic order and international order have to be normatively overlapping as the founders of the English School assumed. Dunne and McDonald (2013:5) call China and other states non-liberal internationalists, countries which are well ordered, not aggressive to their neighbours, contribute to peace keeping seek multilateral solutions and use diplomacy. As we have seen sovereignty and international law have also created moralisation gaps when they were used as tools of imperialism and of the expansion of International Society Mark I. These gaps remain difficult to bridge for global governance.

Many authors share doubts about universalist IR approaches (realist or liberal). Hobson (2012) goes farthest by denouncing IR theories as essentially euro-centric if not outright racist. Hobson (2012) reinforces that point of IR theory being a prisoner of a very particular, a-historical worldview. Starting with a biased view of European history and missing out on the history of other world regions creates difficulties in characterising the institutions of International Society. Qin (2010:31) calls the English School definition of international society "static and socio-culturally confined". Others liken the liberal, cosmopolitan discourse to hegemony and Empire (Thorup 2010). More pragmatically, a number of ‘emerging’ and ‘developing’ countries simply do not accept Western dominance of multilateral institutions which they see as undemocratic. They are calling for a more democratic international order and respect of their sovereignty and recognition of their own paths to political, economic and social development. The legacy of ideas becomes particularly relevant when one looks at alternatives to Eurocentric accounts.

Hurrell (2007:15) insists that interdependence perspectives tend to frame issues as ‘non-political’ responses to collective action problems: ‘Although analytically extremely impressive, this literature tended to skirt rather easily over the problem of managing power, especially unequal power, and the difficulties of mediating between conflicting values’. Hurrell (2007:40) professes ‘deep scepticism about claims regarding the existence of consensus and shared values across international and global society. All communities and polities have to find ways of dealing with diversity and with value conflict (...) and the creation of any kind of world society has had to face up to the existence of fundamental differences in religion, social organization, culture, and moral outlook.’ Hurrel's list should include diversity of philosophical/political thought and historical justice (moralisation gaps). The work of Zhao Tingyang (2005) will be reviewed in part IV as an example of a philosophical-political theory questioning Western assumptions about international or world society. The often postulated necessity of commonality on norms and values as pre-condition for an international society is a key problem for this concept. Qin (2010:135) criticises Buzan's efforts to develop international society in reference to the rise of China: "Buzan
takes common identity as a defining feature of international society”. Moreover, norms, values and positions evolve themselves (cf Pinker 2011; Lewis and Steinmo 2012) so consensus cannot be ‘frozen’ or considered permanent. In this way the commonality need not be seen as a pre-condition, it can also be seen as a result or a process of the development of International Society on different pathways – otherwise we are re-creating ideological antagonism as during the Cold War.

The question arises if regionalism as identity and outcome of historical developments can give rise to non-euro-centric theories about international relations, regionalism and ideas about future pathways for global governance. I shall address such possible pathways in part IV.

1.3. Lack of historical perspective

The third methodological problem is that usually IR scholars focus on a contemporary time frame and fail to account for past developments that impact on contemporary international politics. Conceptual history shows that political vocabulary and even geographic names change over time and that it is not advisable to associate contemporary meanings to words and concepts used even only a century ago (Korhonen 2014:3). IR often uses deformed accounts of history such as the ‘Westphalia’ myth (Erk 2013, Osiander 2001). Many scholars look for effects of causes as they start from trying to prove the validity of a particular contemporary ‘paradigm’ or ‘framework’ of analysis as discussed above. There is no simple cause and effect law for international relations and causality cannot be observed (Nørgaard 2008:7) nor can predictions be made on the assumptions of ‘natural law-like’ mechanisms like in physics or rational game theory models. However, there are pathways that come close to providing some explanation of behaviour over a longer time frame (Mahoney 2004; Mahoney and Larkin Terrie 2009; Pierson 1996). Thus a look into the rear mirror may contribute to understanding the road ahead or at least understanding the obstacles to be cleared for things to move ahead. Therefore, I drew on historical comparison and insights from historic institutionalism to enrich these IR approaches. History is not a deterministic variable nor is it a positivist account of the objective truth. Rather it is a process of selecting relevant facts using criteria selected by the historian or researcher from his/her ‘temporal’ position (Korhonen 2014:1). However, the past has influenced ideas including moral judgements and legitimacy about key institutions and norms of both international and regional societies. It has left a legacy of unresolved problems, territorial disputes and accusations of wrong-doing lingering among nations (the moralisation gaps) as we have seen. None of this can just be dismissed as instrumental use to advance some supposed interest or power ambition in a system approach. The idea of pathways (Pierson 1996) applied in a wider sense helps to explain the institutionalisation of such ideas and from an analytical point of view to classify the facts we know and to determine the direction of probable causality (Nørgaard 2008:6-9,11).

We observed in part I that many problems in NE Asia are firmly rooted in the past (or interpretations of the past) – and that the past is never far away from the present. We are witnessing seemingly irrational conflicts around uninhabited islets, rocky outcrops and lines drawn in the seas of the region that are difficult to explain fully with theories focusing on rational interest, material capabilities, power balancing and security as a fight for survival or domination.

164 In a contribution to the Financial Times titled Threats to peace are lurking in the East China Sea (26 June 2013
Neither is the control of these islets only a matter of access to maritime and seabed resources in expanded exclusive economic zones (EEZ), although these elements enter strategic calculations or at least the lines of argument to undermine the opponent’s claims: for instance, Japan argues that China only expressly claimed the Diaoyu/Senkaku islets after a geological survey indicated there were gas reserves in the area (Tepperman 2013:6). The key issue, as I have shown, is emotional and linked to identity rooted in the past - and politics is not least about emotions, passion for national identity and historical justice (Mouffe 2010). Heyes (2012) offers a concise critical discussion of identity politics in general where she argues that ‘the notion of identity has become indispensable to contemporary political discourse’ (p.3) and that it is linked to a sense of victimhood. According to Heyes ‘any claim to identity must organize itself around a constitutive exclusion’ (p 17). Fukuyama (1992:214-5) also points to the importance of ‘recognition’ as a non-rational driver of international politics, citing the passions of religion and nationalism.

The proposal by former South Korean President Park Geun-hye for a Northeast Asian Peace and Cooperation Initiative (Park 2011) is expressly referring to this paradox of the past as present and of emotions versus rationality that she describes in a speech to the US Congress: ‘Sadly, today the nations of this region fail to fulfil all that we can achieve collectively. That potential is tremendous. The region’s economies are gaining ever greater clout and becoming more and more interlinked. Yet, differences stemming from history are widening. It has been said that those who are blind to the past cannot see the future. This is obviously a problem for the here and now. But the larger issue is about tomorrow. For where there is failure to acknowledge honestly what happened yesterday, there can be no tomorrow. Asia suffers from what I call “Asia’s paradox”, the disconnect between growing economic interdependence on the one hand, and backward political, security cooperation on the other. How we manage this paradox – this will determine the shape of a new order in Asia.’ While she seems having doubts about the possibility to achieve an ‘Asian century’, at the same time she is explicitly looking to European experiences as a model or source of inspiration for Asia (Park 2011:13,17) and her initiative may even involve the EU. This looking to Europe rather than to Asia’s own past is characteristic; Hatoyama’s vision of an East Asian Community was also inspired by the European example. Therefore this investigation comparing the European and NE Asian experiences of regionalism in a longer term perspective is actually very timely not least for assessing the ‘Asian century’ claims. Both regional pathways differ from that of the US to which both regions maintain important institutional and ideological linkages. This needs to be borne in mind as Katzenstein (2005) emphasises in his book situating both regions in ‘the American Imperium’ although US policy towards Europe and Asia is not the

http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/jscript/EnPrint.html accessed on 20 May 2013: Full text of Park’s speech at U.S. Congress


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focus of my analysis. I situate the two regions not simply in the American Imperium but in a world of issues (in which American influence shapes the issues considerably of course).

This third problem of a lack of historical perspective in much theorising is linked to the second problem of a focus on universalist (Western) rationality: ‘Whereas rationality is conditional and future oriented, values are the product of history. They are what differentiates one society from another and one international system from another ’ (Hurrell 2007:44).

1.4. Chrono-centrism or a-historical cherry-picking

The forth problem is chrono-centrism. With chrono-centrism I mean the 'reification' of ideas of a particular period on how the world worked at the time and then applying it retro-actively or in predictions. There is a tendency to frame historical events in ways to conform to a contemporary theory of IR essentially to prove its universality and its general validity like laws of physics. Mumford (2015:7) talks of 'conceptual travelling' or 'conceptual stretching'. He warns (2015:11) that predictions create dangerous conditions of determinism in IR by manipulating three temporal realms: the past is used from the standpoint of the present to determine actions in the future. Examples are the myth of 'Westphalia' (Osiander 2001), another is the power balance from European international politics of the 18th-20th centuries including extrapolations on power transitions, or the focus on polarity in a Cold War prism, or the analogy drawn between China's rise today and that of Wilhelminian Germany and Meiji-Japan in the 19th century. Yet another such projection back in time to explain a contemporary view is that of Japan's leaving Asia (Datsu-A) to join European imperialism in the 19th century (Korhonen 2014). I will come back to some of these issues in different parts of my thesis. Of course, we cannot completely escape chrono-centrism as we live in a different time from that when analysed events occured. Mumford (2015:4) admits that any contemporary attempt to investigate the past consciously or unconsciously reflects our own position in time and how we view the society we live in. This is a retrospective attempt to understand the world we live in. Historians in the 19th century similarly constructed the past of the world they were living in as we saw before. Mumford deplores a tendency in IR of 'frequently abusing history to uphold theories, hypotheses or policy recommendations' and 'the use of history for prediction and policy relevance' (2015:5).

Consequently, he advocates (2015:6): 'the avoidance of the social scientist's predilection for separating dependent from independent variables and an embracing of all variables and an assumption of their interweaving influence through time.' 168 Using all variables is of course impossible. In my own thesis I will also use concepts of today to describe or explain phenomena in the past, but I will avoid reifying them by pointing out straight away that they are merely

168 The article by Eilstrup-Sangiovanni (2008) is a typical example – she nicely presents her theory that 'integration presents an alternative to preventive war as a means to preclude a rising revisionist power from establishing a regional hegemony. The implication is that it is not countries that enjoy stable and peaceful relations that are most likely to pursue integration, but rather countries that find themselves caught in a regional security dilemma, which they hope to break out of by means of institutionalised cooperation.' However, she reduces the applicability by a number of 'ifs' and picks two examples where the dependent variable (integration) suits her theory. These examples are essentially two answers to the German question in the 19th and 20th centuries and are hence not very convincing for any generalisation. NE Asia is quite obviously a simple counter-example to that idea which is partly right in the European specific contexts, but far from being an idea that applies in all or even many instances. The article is an example of how arguments are exchanged within reductionist closed paradigms, here power transition theory.
equivalents to contemporary terminology for analytical purposes. Historical facts cannot flawlessly fit a given theory narrative, so selectivity and interpretation are necessary but with as much critical questioning as possible (for instance through different interpretations).

In the arts, individual painters have unwittingly – and often unrecognised by their contemporaries - opened paths for others to follow in their footsteps and developed ideas further. There are reactions and counter-reactions to works of art which at least retrospectively and after eliminating dead ends have created a seemingly direct path to a contemporary painting. Like art critics need to also study pre-modern and modern art to understand contemporary art and discover these pathways which is only possible retrospectively (Klotz 1994), IR scholars also need to study the history of international relations to decipher critical junctures and map pathways even if their focus is on today’s world. This may lead to historians objecting to projecting contemporary IR approaches back or forward in time in a-historical ways (as with the Westphalian myth or the tribute system). That is why it is important to use such insights with a specific research question in mind (Nørgaard 2008) rather than to mine the past for gems to add lustre to a theory or to make predictions. Historical analysis and investigation of sources has helped de-mystifying IR accounts or debunking political narratives such as nationalist interpretations of the past.

1.5. The awkward place of regionalism in IR

A fifth methodological problem is that few IR approaches provide sufficient explanations for what is happening in regions and which role regions play in international relations. This is because they work at different levels of analysis. Realists focus on states, violence and anarchy as absence of state-like authority as seen above. In IPE, by contrast, regionalism is often limited to a question of trade networks, sub-state entities or economic institutional arrangements, while states are neglected in these approaches. There is also the bias of quantitative research to seek easily available data (Van Langenhove and Maes 2013). Besides, few analysts use a comparative or historical comparative analysis of different regions (Söderbaum 2015). The problem is compounded by frequent difficulties to define what a region is. Erk (2013) underlines the importance of examining what is not happening. Hence the interest to study the contemporary non-integration in NE Asia compared to the integration in Europe and the integration of the Confucian world and non-integration of ‘Westphalian’ Europe to better understand regionalism at both levels of analysis: state society and regions.

The insights that one can gain from comparative regionalism have so far insufficiently informed IR theory (Murray and Warleigh-Lack 2013) and are rather astonishingly hardly reflected in international society concepts. These insights concern the regional contexts and their diversity or even absence of order, their pathways, institutions, economic logics and governance. Ideas can travel far, but they tend to be shared foremost by closely linked communities, of which regions are a key example. Representations of the ‘other’ tend to be those of neighbours not distant countries (unless the distant countries “moved closer” as colonisers or invaders or migrants). Threats also tend to emanate from nearby countries or actors. That ‘othering’ of neighbours can be a formidable obstacle to regionalism. Therefore we find diverse regional societies alongside more largely shared ideas about for instance how to manage the global economy and complex anarchy
that characterise international society at large. Local identities and particularisms are an intrinsic aspect of globalisation (Dieckhoff 2012). Others emphasise the global security overlay over regional security complexes (Buzan and Waever 2003). Regional societies thus are ambiguous and can be catalysers of, but also obstacles to transformation in international society, as will be further discussed in III.2 (Telò 2015, Söderbaum 2015 for literature reviews of the field of study).

1.5.1. Regionalism and globalisation

The dominant New Regionalism Approach anchored in IPE as part of the globalisation paradigm focuses on dynamics of change and social transformation and sees regionalism as a key process (actually it seems some see it as the exclusive process) in these changes: ‘Today’s regionalism is extroverted rather than introverted, which reflects the deeper interdependence of today’s global political economy and the intriguing relationship between globalisation and regionalisation.’ (Hettne and Söderbaum 2002:33). Hettne and Söderbaum (2009:8) describe this ‘intriguing relationship’ as mutually constitutive: ‘The only clear conclusion that can be drawn is that regionalisation and globalisation are mutually constitutive processes within the broader context of global system change’. Unfortunately, it remains unclear why this should be so and why the national level is not part of such a constitutive relationship. What one can observe in NE Asia does not support a claim of regionalisation replacing the state or of territory and borders becoming irrelevant. Dokdo/Takeshima and Diaoyu/Senkaku are arguably economically of little significance but have taken on a defining character for regional relationships with negative consequences for political and even economic linkages. Nor is it convincing to argue that in NE Asia globalisation and regionalisation are ‘clearly’ mutually constitutive. Logics of production chains are not necessarily regional (Hatch, Bair and Heiduk 2014) and if they are there can be more important reasons than or regional projects, for instance the size and skill sets of Japan's and especially China's population and the latter's workforce make them important factors in terms of quantitative data for trade and investment flows. To be relevant for regionalism these data would have to be compared with other extra-regional inflows and outflows and qualitative issues would have to be properly accounted for, too.

Asian policymakers are trying to set up and pursue ‘rational-instrumental’ institutionalised cooperative structures with or without involving outside powers (Trilateral Cooperation Secretariat-TCS, ASEAN plus 3 (China, Korea, Japan), plus 6 (China, Korea, Japan, India, New Zealand, Australia) and the East Asia Summit and its plan for a Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RECEP), the APEC-linked proposal for a Free Trade Area of the Asia Pacific (FTAAP) (Wong 2015) or the Six Party Talks (6PT) between US, China, Russia, North and South Korea, Japan on the DPRK's nuclear programme and other processes. The sheer number of institutions or forums and the variety of configurations and membership of such regional projects (the proverbial ‘noodle bowl’ of trade agreements for instance), their frequent nature as ‘talking shops’ are bewildering for those who base liberal institutionalism and international regimes on assumptions about rational interest calculations, efficiency, transaction costs, and solving collective action problems. Trade networks in NE Asia contribute to prosperity, but create few institutions for wider political exchanges, do little to solve non-trade collective action dilemmas and usually also avoid difficult regulatory trade (behind the border) issues. They do not support
Hettne and Söderbaum's claim of regionalism being constitutive with globalisation. In NE Asia, unlike Europe, they are not confined to the region (and certainly not to any particular political regional architecture, although ASEAN enjoys a certain centrality) and are therefore usually referred to as 'open regionalism' (cf. chapter III.3.2.).

I hypothesise that the state in international society remains a key skeleton structure of international society even under conditions of globalisation and regionalisation. It is the state and the economy which are mutually constitutive – not regionalism and globalisation. Regionalism is thus just one possible development path for international society, underpinned by multilateralism as an ideological choice besides dense economic and other regional networks. We will see this in the comparison of the regional responses to the financial crisis and the climate change challenge in III.3.

Ultimately, I am asking what regionalism (including in a historical perspective) means for changes in or of the international society and in particular for multilateralism (Ruggie 1992) as a mode of global governance. Europe's recent transformation has for the time being a limited impact on the larger global system despite the EU's normative foreign policy. That is because nowadays, in the 'globalised world' extension of regional ways to organise cooperation (or the European way of constitutionalised relations) can only spread without the imperial violence that had earlier extended Europe's 'Westphalian' system globally. But which ideas 'win', which of the ideas on the spectrum between the EU and NE Asia will shape future global governance? Will it be the 'European Way of Law' as Slaughter and Burke-White (2006) argue? Or will different regional societies focused on national sovereignty simply co-exist? Will the EU be 'running the 21st century' (Leonard 2005) or end as a failed experiment?

1.5.2. Regionalism and multilateralism

Multilateralism is often opposed to regionalism or terms such as plurilateralism or minilateralism. This is a misconception. Multilateralism does not need to be global or universal. It is an organising principle or an ideology not an issue of numbers of participants (minimum three of course). It is constitutive of regionalism as regions are multilateral in nature (as long as states are part of the region concept). It concerns all three levels of analysis, state, regional and global (and some include sub-national levels too). I see it as opposed to multipolarity. Moreover, multilateralism is a key ideological institution (concept) underlying regionalism as well as global governance that seems to define a pathway from International Society Mark I to 2.0, but it is not a foregone conclusion that this pathway will be taken by all regions/states. Nor does multilateralism simply

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169 This focus does not diminish the importance of non-state led developments in the form and shape that international society takes. To use an anatomical analogy, the state system may be the skeleton and the economy, civil society and other social phenomena may be the muscles, tendons, senses and other parts of the body. Rousseau in 1755 used a body metaphor for the state with sovereignty as head, law, traditions and will (in modern parlance ideas and culture) as brain; trade, industry and agriculture as the mouth and stomach that keeps the body alive and running, public finance as the blood which 'a wise economy, functioning as the heart, distributes nutrition and life to the whole body' with the citizens being the limbs and body (Rousseau 1964:244 my translation). The point is that one cannot decide which part is more important than others, as they all form an organic whole. In this context it is interesting that with the 'age of reason' the significance of widespread body analogies in the formation of social collectives and networks was replaced gradually through abstract-rational views of systems (Schmalle 2010:50-2, 70, 79).
mean integration à la EU nor does it automatically lead to cosmopolitanism and world society as it still relies on the state system. The Lisbon Treaty and Europe’s Security Strategy (ESS 2003; EUGS 2016) also show that the EU does not want to confine itself to a regional society in a world of regions. There is also a world of issues that the EU wants to shape – and so do NE Asian countries, but with different objectives based on different beliefs and in a much more defensive posture based on the principles of sovereignty, non-interference and equality.

Different from liberal internationalism which champions individual rights, peace through trade and the rule of law (Clark and Reus-Smit 2013:39) multilateralism champions multilateral co-operation and decision-making as an important element of legitimacy of international order based on international law and equality of states in peaceful co-existence respecting plurality of values, ideas and political systems170. While it is privileged by the EU in a normative way the NE Asia region is defining multilateralism in a functional way. To a large extent multilateralism also feeds on ‘output’ legitimacy or efficiency in problem solving rather than the ‘input’ or process legitimacy associated with the ‘democratic deficit’ of international organisations and regimes. Functional multilateralism will be examined in part IV as a concept of global governance that responds particularly well to the problems of complexity and normative diversity.

1.6. Globalisation – IR’s Cinderella, but can we understand states’ international relations without the economy?

The sixth and final problem is that the economy has a conspicuously low profile in realist and related IR theories, except as part of the measurement of power capabilities. Yet, it is in the economic domain writ large that the major structural changes in the international system have become obvious and have been defining big and important things in the last decades. As Hurrell (2007:9) says in one of his central arguments about international order: ‘No satisfactory account of international society can fail to consider the far-reaching challenges that derive from globalization-in its economic, social, political, and ecological dimensions. The density of international and world society has undoubtedly increased along both solidarist and transnational dimensions, reflecting the increasing complexity of world society, the involvement of a wider range of actors and processes, and far-reaching changes in the scope and range of international law and institutions.’ We have to go beyond a mainly economic understanding of globalisation (Messner 2011) and thus beyond economic logic, markets and trade to understand globalisation as part of the anarchy of complexity.

Hobsbawm (2008:2) describes the post Cold War context as “the enormous and continuing acceleration of the ability of the human species to change the planet by means of technology and economic activity, and globalisation” which he sees as an accelerating advance since the 1960s of the world as a single unit of interconnected activities unhampered by local boundaries. Significantly, Hobsbawm states the paradox, that globalisation has affected everything except the territorial state which politically and militarily remains the only effective authority (Hobsbawm 2008:23; similarly Zhao 2005). He does not mean that states remain unaffected by globalisation, on the contrary he argues that their capacity of control and their monopoly of force are quickly

170 While all EU members are democratic, their political system differ considerably.
eroding: “We have a rapidly globalising world economy based on transnational private firms that are doing their best to live outside the range of state law and taxes, which severely limits the ability of even big governments to control their national economies.” The global financial crisis seems to have vindicated this gloomy assessment. He also identifies the decline in the acceptance of state legitimacy (Hobsbawn 2008:36-37). Hobsbawn somewhat paradoxically concludes that while in the 21st century states remain the only effective actors, they can no longer fulfil their traditional functions neither within their boundaries nor internationally in the face of globalisation and global challenges such as climate change (Barrett/Stavins 2003) and the privatisation of violence (Münkler 2002). He also points to the increasing number of states in the 20th century (they quadrupled since 1913) which have made the traditional (Westphalian) state system unstable, disorderly and unable to cope with these challenges. This paradox of increasing numbers of non-powerful or even non-viable states has been a challenge to structural realist arguments (Kostagiannis 2013, Maass 2014). Hobsbawm dismisses (like Zhao 2005:45, 84-90) the UN and other international organisations which have no effective power than that granted by powerful states (p 24) as unsuitable to deal with this 21st century instability and predicts that the international system will remain multilateral and depend on the ability of the major players to agree with one another (p. 27). Hobsbawn is not alone in questioning the role of the state (Scheuermann 2010; Ruggie 1992) and the ambivalence he so articulately points out reinforces the argument that IR must come to terms with globalisation. One way of doing this, only hinted at by Hobsbawm when he deplores the inability of states to fulfill their traditional functions, is to look at it from a functional angle – the world of issues – and re-define the context of states in the international system. The new emphasis is on other key functions than the ‘realist’ monopoly of violence and the ‘Westphalian’ roles of sovereign recognition as equals without a higher authority to deal effectively with global issues. The role of the state is one of the fundamental questions about globalisation and I will therefore analyse it in relation to my concept of a world of issues that states in an international society have to deal with (part III).

In liberal economic approaches to globalisation and regionalism (IPE) by contrast the economy, and especially the globalised market, is over-emphasised often to a point that states and borders disappear from the analysis or are dismissed as obstacles to the ‘invisible hand’ of the global markets, while in empirical reality they still play major roles as not least the territorial disputes in Asia have vividly demonstrated in recent years. There is an obvious failure of interdependence to actually produce regional integration or security in NE Asia. In fact, a certain ambivalence about globalisation with its diverse and contradictory impacts needs to be reflected in IR theorising. One objective of this thesis is to make a contribution to that effort by bringing the economy into the international society concept. I do this in two ways: 1) as part of the complex anarchy that structures international society and international relations 2) as a constitutive institution of International Society 2.0. The economy is also a key objective of governance in two regionally very distinct ways (cf. chapter III.3.). Hence, I introduce (in chapter 4.6.4) a discussion on the constitutive relationship between state and economy under conditions of globalisation.

In short, the often-heard argument that globalisation inevitably does away with territory (determinationalisation), states and nationhood is not enough to capture IR dynamics in the 21st century. No wonder that IR has shown a tendency to ignore globalisation as a fuzzy concept and
overly complex category of analysis in approaches whose ambition tends to be to produce parsimonious theories and predictions. However, as globalisation has contributed to major changes and impacts on identity, nationalism, multilateralism and international politics, I prefer using the concept critically rather than avoiding it altogether. In this process I hope to clarify its meaning in IR by re-defining anarchy as a condition of complexity, chaos and uncertainty in a world of issues of which globalisation is a part on the one hand and by treating the economy as a constitutive institution of international society on the other hand.

This new conceptualisation of anarchy is necessary because the observable uncertainties and changes linked to globalisation nurture doubts about the assumption of anarchy simply defined as absence of central authority and the associated defensive or offensive need for power or violence as the sole basis for theorising on international relations and international society. As Wendt (1999:249) says: 'Anarchy as such is an empty vessel and has no intrinsic logic; anarchies only acquire logics as a function of the structure of what we put inside them.' So instead of authority, I put in complexity. This complexity, uncertainty and disorder cannot be only attributed to the absence of a central authority: as if a world government (or a great power concert) could magically deal with this complexity! The world has also seen that the bipolar order based on military balance collapsed spectacularly and that unipolarity or hegemonic stability didn't work or last long either. Uncertainty breeds security dilemmas (and not just in the restrictive sense of ‘realist’ power relations) and crises and challenges leadership. Change, crises and risk in many policy areas, produce an almost permanent sense of crisis and anticipation of catastrophic consequences that do not always materialise - climate change, demographic trends, food, energy, global finance for instance in recent years (Giddens 2009; Beck 2010). Such crises are difficult to predict and to respond to because of complex linkages of causes and effects. Lo’s review (2012) of key books on the global financial crisis illustrates that point as there is not even consensus among leading economists and commentators ex-post on the causes of the crisis. My new conceptualisation of anarchy as one of complexity speaks to Wendt's research agenda (1999:308) of a world 'after anarchy' and of thinking of a world that is becoming 'domesticated' but not 'centralised'. The presence or absence of central authority is no longer the question.

1.7. Conclusion: Addressing complexity

One could argue after I exposed a long list of methodological problems that comparing Europe and North East Asia over a long historical period is a too complex undertaking. However, it is precisely by not shying away from complexity that I intend to make a contribution to theory development backed up by empirical evidence (Erk 2013). Putting complexity squarely into the centre of the analysis and using freshly defined concepts to navigate it allows following a number of stories to explain international relations in Europe and NE Asia and yields new insights into IR theory once one abandons a quest for paradigms and parsimony.

In fact, complexity is one of the keys to open the puzzle of Europe’s and NE Asia’s paradoxical development paths to examination. I found already that simple paradigmatic explanations such as power transition models or liberal institutionalist accounts do not convince. My departure point is to use a comprehensive comparative and historically informed approach towards international
society. The theory of International Society and the social theory of international relations as developed by Wendt (1999) are good starting points for such a comprehensive approach. My thesis develops these approaches further by introducing the politics of emotions (moralisation gaps, nationalism), proposing a new conceptualisation of institutions of international society, by moving away from euro-centric concepts and by reviewing key issues of multilateralism. The central role of conflict and ways to deal with it – antagonism, agonism, integration – is a key underlying theme of my investigation.

I see a social structure that fits the economy, globalisation and the complex world of issues into international society: This complex culture of anarchy, induced largely by globalisation and the advancement of science captures the main dynamics of globalisation affecting international relations in the state system: economic interdependence, diffusion of power in various ways, rising uncertainty and perceptions of risk. This could be called 'Smithian' or 'Ricardian' if one wanted to stick to Wendt's labels with 'dead white males' that inevitably become flawed through chrono-centric readings or euro-centric approaches associated with them. A label that merely implies an economic logic of globalisation (which would ignore its social and political complexity and would imply a normative dimension) is also not adequate. Instead I propose to simply work with the word 'complexity'. Complexity characterises the contemporary policy-making context domestically and internationally. In the words of the 2009 Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences, Elinor Ostrom: 'When the world we are trying to explain and improve, however, is not well described by a simple model, we must continue to improve our frameworks and theories so as to be able to understand complexity and not simply reject it.' (Ostrom 2010:665).

2. The evolution and institutions of International Society

2.1. A new approach to power, violence and hierarchy

The story of the two regions has laid open to examination a number of blind spots in the traditional realist or liberal-institutionalist images in IR including the English School. Because these traditional approaches focus on power, war and national security they cannot explain the key feature of both the Confucian world and the EU – non-violence and peaceful co-existence. The traditional alternative approach to explain peaceful co-existence is liberal institutionalism or democratic peace theory. We found that neither of those can convincingly be applied to NE Asia. This has wider implications for the study of IR because the phenomenon of non-violence is not limited to these two specific international societies as this chapter will show. They are not just

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171 Smith nowadays is loathed by some and acclaimed by others as the forefather of neo-liberal globalization ideology. Arrighi (2010:20) quotes him and reveals a more nuanced picture of Smith’s views on early globalization: ‘By uniting, in some measure, the most distant parts of the world, by enabling them to relieve one another’s wants, to increase one another’s enjoyments, and to encourage one another’s industry, their general tendency would seem to be beneficial. To the natives, however, both of the East and the West Indies, all the commercial benefits which can have resulted from these events [world market formation through European discoveries] have been sunk and lost in the dreadful misfortunes which they have occasioned.’
exceptions to the rule of power in anarchy. To a large extent a long trend towards non-violence in human society at large has laid the basis for International Society 2.0. (cf. 3.1).

Realism and the early English School focused on war and great power balance in a narrow view of power as compulsory or institutional alongside sovereignty and international law. These concepts were useful to explain European politics and later the Cold War overlay (perhaps also post-Cold War US-China rivalry) of security complexes (Buzan and Waever 2003) but could not explain Confucian International Society or the current tensions and conflicts over history, territory and identity in NE Asia. These concepts could also not offer a credible explanation of why the EU emerged as an enduring and powerful economic and security community. The EU was usually and tellingly discarded from theorising in that approach (often assuming that sooner or later it would disintegrate). Hurrell (2007:16) expresses similar doubts. His approach 'involves a clear rejection of the view that the international system can be viewed solely in material terms as a decentralized, anarchic structure in which functionally undifferentiated states vary only according to the distribution of power. Central to the 'system' is a historically created, and evolving, structure of common understandings, rules, norms, and expectations. The concepts of state sovereignty, international law, or war are not given by the game of power-politics. Rather, shared and historically grounded understandings of war or sovereignty shape what the nature of the game is, how it is to be played, and, very critically, how it has changed and evolved. International Relations cannot therefore be taught or analysed as part of an abstract game independent of its human or historical origins. It grows out of its past, although never fully outgrows it and the system is the result of complex historical processes of change and development.' My two examples reviewed in the tale of two regions substantiate Hurrell's point empirically, but they also offer more insights beyond a focus on a narrowly defined system and changes within it.

An international society approach informed by constructivist interpretative understandings172, a focus on ideas, identity, the concept I introduced of the moralisation gaps and also historical institutionalism provides more complex, but also more versatile tools to explain role relationships and conflicts as well as cooperation dynamics in both regions. A key point here is to recognise that power politics (labelled 'realism' in the 20th century) is also a socially constructed, ideological institution. While it is often 'objectivised' as the default mode of international interaction even by Hurrell (2007:31173) it is not a principle like anarchy or hierarchy in my understanding. It is the simplest, most instinctive but also a pessimist and 'uncivilised' way of ordering a group or society as described by Hobbes' view of the state of nature174. And it is intimately linked to ideas of the 19th and 20th century like nationalism, social Darwinism or colonialism, incidentally marking the moral low point of European civilisation. However, over a long time a complex civilising process has come to discredit violent use of power as a legitimate social institution to order society, first in domestic society (Hobbes 1651/2013; Pinker 2011), but ultimately also in international relations. As Nye (2011:12) says: 'on an increasing number of issues in the twenty-first century, war is not the ultimate arbiter'. It has taken Europe a long time to move away from war and power politics

172 Viotti and Kauppi (2012:15) argue that constructivism is not a theory of IR but an interpretative understanding.
173 ‘There is indeed a profound sense in which it is the possibility of war and conflict that continues to define the meaning of ‘normal’ politics and our understanding of political order’.
174 Rousseau had a more optimistic view of the state of nature. Chinese philosophy also has different currents and views of human nature, but the tendency is a more holistic and benign view (Cheng 1997).
under anarchy as a way to organise international society or to arbitrate conflict through the consensual hierarchy of the EU (security) community. The East Asian sino-centric world had found a more civilised way through hierarchy already a few centuries ago for its own world (or Confucian international society) until in the 20th century it was forced to converge with the imperialist ‘Westphalian’ European system characterised by power politics and claims to racial and national superiority (International Society Mark I) as we have seen in part I. Anarchy as absence of higher authority, hegemony and Empire made sense in a crude world of nationalism and social Darwinism as major ideological beliefs where power and war were principal instruments of international politics. However, in an increasingly non-violent and complex world, anarchy has to be re-defined in more sophisticated ways to make sense of these phenomena.

Pinker (2011:291) sees a moral development which is why he devotes a chapter of his book to psychology and neuroscience to show that humans are not only selfish rationalists, but also ‘moral animals’. An internalised norm has developed through social learning, cosmopolitan thought, technology and media (p.477) that has created the conviction that war is inherently immoral (p 291). And this norm has been codified progressively in international law (Mazower 2012). Pinker goes beyond Arrighi’s well argued points about the changing hegemonic orders, not least because he explains the ideas and driving forces that may explain the changing nature of hegemony which Arrighi (2010:67) describes in this way: ‘the provision of a livelihood to all subjects became the key objective for the members of the interstate system to pursue. Just as the liberal ideology of British hegemony had elevated the pursuit of wealth by propertied subjects above the absolute rights of government of ruler, so the ideology of US hegemony has elevated the welfare of all the subjects (“high mass consumption”) above the absolute rights of property and the absolute rights of government. If British hegemony had expanded the interstate system in order to accommodate the “democratization” of nationalism, US hegemony carried the expansion further by selectively accommodating the “proletarization” of nationalism.’ The key point here is that Arrighi doesn’t focus on the power aspects of hegemony, but the welfare benefits and on ideas such as nationalism which I have identified as critical modifiers for international society.

Little (2005:45-56) picks up the distinction between system and society made in the definition of international society by Bull and Watson and points to the ambiguities of the distinction based on values and norms. Little refutes attempts to distinguish societies from systems based on a common identity (p.49). He insists on openness so that boundaries of international systems and societies do not necessarily have to coincide making it possible to envisage two international societies existing within a single international system (p51-2). Thus he makes the point that openness and boundaries of international societies which can move for instance on the basis of a civilisation-barbarians dichotomy or a threat perception leads to distinguish international systems, international societies and world societies. He argues (p.56) that ‘it is not possible to suggest that there is an evolutionary trend operating within international relations that is taking us from anarchy to hierarchy or that there is a developmental process that moves us from an international system through to an international society.’ The latter assertion seems to contradict Pinker’s (2011) claim of a universal trend towards less violence and more civilisation. Nevertheless, my case

175 Lebov (2013), referring to other books by Pinker and other authors is generally sceptical of the ‘reverse engineering’ by evolutionary biologists through selective accounts bolstering normative assumptions and ignoring the complexity and non-linear dynamics of social processes.
studies contribute to Little’s call for more comparative research on this issue and substantiate his theoretical arguments. The NE Asian case even seems to show that an inverse evolution from hierarchy to anarchy and away from an international society defined through a high density of commonality and cooperation and shared values has taken place. (The same is true for the disintegration of European empires after WWI). However, Little doesn’t recognise nationalism, or multilateralism, or Confucianism or other ideological institutions as the driving forces of these changes. In this respect his differentiation between system and society is not particularly helpful to answer my questions.

Moreover, instead of focussing on qualitative differences to distinguish international society(ies) within the international system, one could see regions as regional societies (shorthand for regional international society) because a regional society, say the EU, may remain limited to its region and not become a larger international norm producer (like the Confucian regional society did not become the global norm although it defined itself as a world society). Regional societies can thus co-exist with other regional societies, today as different international societies co-existed in the past – say Renaissance Europe or Confucian East Asia. Contrary to a higher degree of isolation or of effectiveness of state control over external interdependence in these early periods or in International Society Mark I, today such co-existing regional societies are deeply interconnected (‘globalisation’) and share an increasingly thick tissue of international (but not necessarily domestic) norms and behaviour forming the international society bedrock. Thus, instead of multiple international societies, like Little (2005), I see one general International Society 2.0 with a number of regional (EU) and perhaps functional or ideological societies – for instance the League of Democracies (Laurenti 2008) or the free traders in the WTO or the BRICS - embedded in it. A minimal pluralist international society can be identified on the basis of the UN Charter which has established a number of important principles, institutions and rules most states adhere to most of the time and has thus created a basis for the development of International Society 2.0 at a global scale (Bellamy 2005) superseeding a mere ‘Westphalian’ system of individual states bound by no or few rules or separate international societies in the ‘realist’ past that viewed the others as barbarians and uncivilised. Moreover, International Society 2.0 also reflects the worldwide decrease of violence, the influence of globalisation which has broken down many barriers and boundaries that in the past isolated international societies more or less from each other. More or less means they were not totally closed, there has always been trade and exchange of ideas but not to the level of systemic impact on society (before colonialism). Lovell's (2011) account of the different perceptions of the British and Chinese sides of each other during the Opium Wars illustrates this point. Peaceful coexistence and anti-colonialism have become norms in International Society 2.0 as opposed to key norms of power, violence and colonialism in International Society Mark I. Such norms are occasionally violated (e.g. the Iraq war or the annexation of Crimea), but these violations trigger(ed) protest and condemnation at a scale that makes them clearly appear as violations of accepted behaviour. There is no explicit civilisation-barbarian dichotomy anymore in the society of states, but extremist groups still thrive on such chosen dichotomy and trauma in their attempts to destroy International Society 2.0.

International society has traditionally been understood as trans-regional: transatlantic or Western based on shared interests and values. This is probably due to the spirit of the Cold War when this
theory was developed (Kimmage 2013 views the assumed Western commonality critically). Less explicitly normative, but equally possible is a functional understanding (WTO and other regimes which often articulate in organisational terms normative beliefs such as the embedded liberalism Helleiner 2010 refers to). Functional or issue-related connections exist between otherwise different regional societies. Ruggie (1993) for instance designated transnational microeconomic links as a non-territorial region (sic) in the world economy, a de-centered yet integrated space-of-flows alongside the spaces-of-places or national economies, which engage in trade, foreign investment etc. This corresponds to IPE contention that the growth of transnational corporations is responsible for the (debatable) ‘withering away of the modern system of territorial states as the primary locus of world power’ (Arrighi 2010:82).

International Society 2.0 is thus not a normative community or harmonious group as an outcome of an integration process. It is, however, one where a certain degree of common understandings on constitutive institutions exists, where – if I dare say as the result of a civilising process (Pinker 2011) - peaceful co-existence has become a strong norm respected by most states most of the time176, where diversity is generally tolerated and accommodated and where states and societies are deeply interconnected. International Society 2.0 is in fact global and thus hardly distinguishable from the international system making the quest by Little (2005) to distinguish the two somewhat futile. This is due to the end of the Cold War ideological overlay, the trend of receding violence as a fulcrum of international relations, the increase of economic and other areas of interdependence, to the transformation of anarchy into a complex one and to the increasing density of international law and organisations (underpinning peaceful co-existence and a lot of co-operation). Domestic political system differences that used to divide the world into antagonistic camps held back from fighting out the normative differences by the deterrence of mutually assured destruction during the Cold War are today no longer as significant. Of course differences remain and are important, but in international relations they tend to be limited to a few usually rhetorical ‘battlegrounds’ such as human rights or humanitarian intervention. In other areas, especially economic, where the competition within largely market economies is the accepted norm, the domestic political system differences matter little: the EU and China for example are linked in a commercial and investment relationship second only to that of the US-EU or US-China one. The moralisation gaps between countries in NE Asia do not run along political system lines, but nationalist ones: the grievances the People’s Republic of China hold against Japan are similar to those of South Korea versus Japan, despite the latter being liberal democracies. Thus I focus on Little’s points of openness and co-existence of regional societies with different norms, but in larger international society (and potentially world society) rather than a system. These factors are thus not the ones related to power distribution in a system. Therefore we have to ask what happened to power in International Society 2.0?

2.2. The diffusion of power in complexity

Power is a key term everyone understands intuitively, but no one can define precisely: Nye (2011)

176 Note that most of the conflicts making the world look violent at the time of writing are not inter-state conflicts, but intra-state ones or pursued by NSA such as ISIL.
points out that power is a contested concept and that there is no one definition accepted by all who use the term. He opts for a dictionary definition of power as capacity to do things, affect others and to get the outcomes one wants, but emphasises that this all depends on context, agents and relationships and the 'game' that is played between actors. I argue that we are witnessing a diffusion of power, a blurring of international policy and a weakening of international institutions rather than a power shift or transition from for instance the US to Asia. By power diffusion I don’t mean only a simple dispersal of capabilities among a larger number of units – the classical realist idea of multipolarity (Womack 2004; Jørgensen 2013) - or to ‘emerging powers’ Lieber (2014 on BRICS) a key topic in IPE (see also part III). It is essentially a relational phenomenon in an international society.

2.2.1. Multi-polarity versus multilateralism

The concept of multi-polarity is currently 'en vogue'. In a similar way, Russia's Foreign Minister and a number of emerging countries are using the term 'polycentric world order' reminiscent of a neo-Westphalian concert of powers dominating several poles of the world177. They contradict sovereign equality and revert to the kind of power-based hierarchy that Krasner (1999) unmasked as 'organised hypocrisy': The big powers are sovereign equals, but the smaller powers have to fit into a hierarchy assuming lesser categories exist in the spheres of influence of each pole. Hence the concept of multipolarity contradicts the principle of sovereign equality and lacks legitimacy. It is thus unlikely to enhance order and stability. Polycentric world order sounds more innocuous, but ultimately is a variant of multipolarity. Multilateralism on the other hand puts the emphasis on non-discriminatory relations between multiple countries. Multilateralism is based on consent and rules and therefore possesses legitimacy even if it doesn't always imply strict equality (majority voting, weighted voting or quotas, different degrees of influence i.e. a residual importance of power).

Ironically, the extension of globalisation promoted by the US has also helped destroy the unipolar moment of US hegemony after the end of the Cold War by enabling the 'emerging countries' to grow economically (despite political system differences) and to 'become poles' in the narrow sense of capability distribution. Analysts (Cooper 2004:3) mostly agree (while sometimes drawing different conclusions) that the end of the Cold War provides the watershed where the new global era (and for some the dominance of the US as the only superpower) began. After the end of bipolarity the recurrent discussions about uni- or multipolarity (as numbers of great powers in the system) look more like attempts of 'conceptual stretching' to cast the world in familiar patterns of power balance (returning from the Cold War bipolarity to the previous European Concert type of multi-power balancing on a global scale, or the often touted G2 bipolarity of the US and China).

Polarity is usually understood in the realist tradition as simply the number of great powers in the system with for instance military and economic might as measures (cf. Jørgensen 2013, Buzan and Waever 2003). In my dissenting view, a pole is a force of attraction prompting a centripetal alignment partly for ideological reasons (but admittedly a pole can also be built by force) of other

177 https://sputniknews.com/world/201708111056384861-russia-lavrov-international-relations/ and https://ecpr.eu/Filestore/PaperProposal/00991ba1-72fc-4f93-9ef2-e82d95cc76c3.pdf both accessed on 16-3-2018
states around it (like the US and USSR), rather than just a by-word for the number of great powers in the system as realists use it.

In terms of pole of attraction, or soft power, the situation then is puzzling – the EU has attracted a large number of new members (even though it is seen as a declining power and dismissed by realists), while in Asia neither China nor Japan nor even the US have been able to muster so much attraction as to form poles. Neither has their combined ‘great power’ been able to stop a small and poor country like North Korea to develop nuclear weapons. This is casting doubt on concepts such as uni-, bi-, or multipolarity (Badie 2011:13). Buzan and Waever (2003:30-9) dismiss the validity of polarity for different reasons: they accept the definition as the number of great powers in the system, but argue this no longer makes sense given that the classification of great powers has changed in their view since the end of the bipolar era. So why cling to the notion of multipolarity if it is of dubious value to explain anything?

Thus, instead of a polar distribution of power I see power more fundamentally as dissolved by the complexity of the global context of international society. It is more appropriate to think about this in terms of diffusion of power (1) to a variety of different actors state and non-state (dispersal) (2) dissolution in complexity i.e. a structural inability to address complex problems in a world of issues (3) plurality of values and moral beliefs altering power's legitimacy, and states’ special responsibility and equality (dilution of power). The dispersal of power captures the same trend as that identified by realists as shifting great power constellations or multipolarity. But diffusion of power also includes, but goes beyond the well-known argument in the globalisation and global governance literature that power/authority is no longer the exclusive preserve of states, but includes various other types of actors or structures (Baumann and Dingwerth 2015:107). We will see in chapter III.2. for instance, how the network structure of global finance questions traditional realist models of power. More fundamentally, the dissolution of power in complexity points to the limits of state power even in the dictionary definition of power as capability to achieve desired outcomes (see 2.3.3)\(^\text{178}\). An indicator of this dissolution in complexity is that even large and powerful (in the traditional sense) units have insufficient capabilities to deal with everything on their own or to achieve desired outcomes (for instance a 'successful' US military intervention in one place can trigger terrorist backlashes or the cost of it contributes to global economic imbalances between borrowers and creditors).

This combination of factors of power diffusion can thus be approximated more to a social tipping point (Grimm and Schneider 2011) or a critical historical juncture where a series of non-linear, not necessarily connected developments and changes produce systemic or major behavioural change. All critical juncture or social tipping point situations require ex post substantial societal adaptation in social, cultural, political or economic terms' (Grimm and Schneider 2011:11). One could consider the current era of complexity as the post-Cold War societal adaptation phase. We will see later that cosmopolitans predict a radical change away from a state system, following globalisation and transnationalisation approaches which have hypothesised the end of the state or its insufficient capacity to govern in a globalised world (Grimm and Schneider 2011:12). In my

\(^\text{178}\) Perhaps conversely that feeds the populist attempts at simplification, the desire to go back to a less complex world and simple narratives such as 'America first' or 'take back control'.

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view, important behavioural adaptations within a society of states can also occur and have occurred that match the criteria for critical junctures and social tipping points as we can see in my tale of two regions. Power diffusion to complexity and plurality is one phenomenon of such adaptation, different from the ‘traditional’ system or hegemon changes through major wars associated with power transition theory.

2.2.2 Alternative explanations? It’s not the rise of China – stupid!

The power transition frenzy in the US is usually associated today with the rise of China (it used to be the rise of Japan until the end of the 1980s) as already briefly mentioned in chapter I.3.1 (Terhalle and Depledge 2013). China may be rising in economic and classical power terms, but the constraints arising from its own development also undermine its newfound strength through a myriad of political, economic, social and environmental challenges – the very complexity and chaos that define today's international society context. There is also a dilution of ‘normative’ power – norms that were ‘imposed’ e.g. by the US after the Cold War are being contested by those that were not ‘present at the creation’ and are kept down by governance rules which are stacked against them (US veto in IMF, over-representation of European countries, low quotas frozen in the past when they were set and not keeping pace with economic weight). Hence, the importance of the G20 for new rules or enhanced voice in the global economy (Held and Young 2013), and of the UN framework for equal representation and sovereignty. From a US perspective this 'defection' from international liberal norms is often considered as ‘irresponsible’ or ‘free-riding’ behaviour (Lieber 2014; Blackwill and Tellis 2015:20) and US hegemony/leadership is usually considered as ‘indispensable’ often without even stating clearly what is in it for the the other countries in the world (for a typical example of US pre-eminence seen as an objective in itself without justification: Blackwill and Tellis 2015; Terhalle and Depledge 2013).

A key question is how international society comes to terms with a diffusion of power in complexity, chaos and uncertainty that may produce a social tipping point rather than asking who the next hegemon is. This is why I do not replicate the navel-gazing of US analysts about the US role taking it for granted as the leading power which has a vested interest in preserving its leadership or hegemony and the ‘embedded liberalism’ of the post-war order which is not for the time being under serious challenge from powers in the regions I examine (Ikenberry 2011a – for a critique of Ikenberry see Terhalle and Depledge 2013:576-9). After President Trump assumed office it seems more under challenge from the White House itself (Blinken 2017). But the US has to contend both with issues it cannot ‘manage’ alone (like climate change, economic crises) and with the diversity of the world which doesn’t allow imposing its views on what is right and wrong, fair and just on other countries. And of course even a rising power China cannot address such issues alone as Terhalle and Depledge (2013:580) seem to suggest when they argue that ‘China has not assumed hegemonic leadership on climate change in place of the US, despite having the material capacity to do so.’ In his keynote speech to the World Economic Forum in 2017 China’s President Xi himself endorsed economic globalisation, free trade and the Paris agreement on climate change in what can be seen as a rebuke of the Trump administration’s protectionist stance.
and a promise of Chinese co-leadership of the current global order.\textsuperscript{179}

Kupchan and other authors of a think-tank report looking at the future of the liberal order write: ‘Western democracies must recognize that their own liberal international order will not be universalized, and should seek to find common ground with emerging powers and forge a normative consensus on a new rules-based order. Peacefully managing the onset of a polycentric world will require compromise, tolerance and recognition of political diversity.’ (Transatlantic Academy 2014:ix). In fact this corresponds to democratic societies’ own, domestic beliefs in political and social diversity and competition within a set of agreed (constitutional) rules (which I refer to as agonism). As we will see later the EU’s chief characteristic is that it is a new rules-based order. The focus here is on rules for relationships and behaviour – international relations – rather than norms of appropriateness – international politics. The assumption being that order and rules of the game are a pre-condition to work out and agree the appropriate substance of international politics. This postulated behaviour change on a global scale in terms of international relations and global governance is precisely such a critical juncture that may lead to a new dominant behavioural pattern. The US in this view is merely under pressure to reinvent itself, to re-focus its capabilities, to deal with complexity and uncertainty, to re-focus its budgets, to redefine its international priorities and global sense of mission, to make room for ‘emerging powers’ and to re-negotiate the terms of its leadership legitimacy (He and Feng 2012). This means in other words that the US needs to adapt its behavioural pattern (which Terhalle and Depledge 2013 refer to as exceptionalism) to a new environment and not just to a new antagonist or nemesis as which China is often portrayed. The ‘America first’ slogan of President Trump points in the opposite ‘nationalist’ direction and a reluctance to exercise international leadership within the established liberal order. Emerging powers seem largely to want to have a greater say in how the multilateral institutions and the global economy are run which the eclipse of the G8 in favour of the G20 seems to illustrate\textsuperscript{180} and to gain respect and status from the established powers, especially the US. So it is not burning down the capitalists’ club – like Mao Zedong would have liked – but joining it and re-writing the rules as Xi Jinping seems set out to do.

At the same time, how can multilateral governance be more inclusive and more effective in such a new paradigm (Jørgensen 2013)? The answer lies in a different, more meaningful concept of anarchy than the traditional realist or even liberal one. We already noted that the traditional IR views of anarchy were not particularly useful to explain Confucian International Society or the EU. Consensual hierarchy has better explanatory value as I will show in the next chapters. In International Society 2.0 or in a world of issues international relations analysis can no longer be based on an assumption of anarchy as an absence of central authority.

To bolster the argument for multilateral governance – and against multipolarity – we need to consider the ‘rise of China’. There is very little evidence for any Chinese intention to militarily

\textsuperscript{179} https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2017/01/full-text-of-xi-jinping-keynote-at-the-world-economic-forum

\textsuperscript{180} ROK officials hosting the G20 summit in Seoul in 2010 were constantly emphasising the decision of the 2009 Pittsburgh G20 summit that the G20 was the ‘premier forum for international economic co-operation’ i.e. the top club.
challenge the US or to form alliances against it. China-Japan tensions over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands or DPRK threats against South Korea are unlikely candidates for 'proxy wars' between the US hegemon and a rising China over global or even regional hegemony. These conflicts have their own specific roots and issues as we have seen. We have also seen that perceptions of China’s ‘new assertiveness’ may be overblown. I noted in part I that traditional approaches tend to overlook or avoid emotions and moralisation gaps. This is why a closer look at the regional dynamics – ‘the world of regions’ - is very important. The investigation showed that the conflicts in NE Asia were rooted in historical junctures and pathways and due to ideas about nationhood and historical justice rather than a systemic power play. Power plays do go on in good old realist ways not least between the US, its allies in the region, and China, but it is not the distribution of power per se that produces these games. They are given meaning by identity construction (Hagström and Hanssen 2015) and explain the dynamics between the NE Asian countries themselves that don’t fit into the alleged US-China strategic power play. A first indication of this historical, regional dimension was that basically all these conflicts concern territories once occupied by Japan’s imperialist governments between 1879 and 1945. Furthermore, there are unresolved history issues or moralisation gaps arising from this occupation (like the comfort women). Solving these issues would probably reduce the likelihood of inter-state wars and political rivalry dramatically. Finally, deep-seated animosity persists between US allies Japan and Korea. For these reasons I do not focus on the current rise of China in terms of power transition, but address the issue in a larger context of power diffusion and regional (non-)cooperation with a historical perspective. Heng (2010:546) comments in his article on 'ghosts in the IR machine' on power balancing in the context of China's rise: 'Even that 'traditional' flagship concept balance of power re-packaged as 'soft balancing' cannot disguise the fact that no active balancing is currently ongoing as would be predicted in theory. To the contrary, it only demonstrates the tenuous attempts to stretch the notion of 'balancing' to prove its contemporary relevance.' (cf Mumford 2015:7 on conceptual stretching)

The danger of over-simplifying the current global transformation to purely frame it as a classical power transition, as emerging multipolarity or as a zero sum game like many US scholars, journalists or think-tanks do (focusing on China’s rise and likening it to that of Imperial Germany or Japan in the 19th and 20th centuries) is that this type of social construction of enmity or rivalry may recall the ghost of great power rivalry and war which international society had already banished when staring into the abyss of nuclear armageddon. Mumford (2015) warns of the danger of analogical reason as a tool for ideologically informed policy justification and selective and simplified analogies. Power transition models ignore the world of issues and the importance of history and emotions (nationalism) by focussing narrowly on material capabilities and rivalry for hegemony as an end in itself in the present or future. Violence and egoistic pursuit of self-interest have proven not to be adequate solutions to problems of complexity and uncertainty. Besides, countries have clearly learnt from past power transitions or crises and strive to avoid

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181 China’s leaders in fact launched a study of the rise of various powers in the past to avoid repeating their mistakes. This was even broadcast on central TV for a larger audience. The voluminous literature by US think-tanks also indicates a ‘learning process’ although some of these works take a prophesising tone arguing inevitability of conflict. The recent Chinese foreign policy slogans such as ‘China’s peaceful rise’, ‘peaceful development’, ‘harmonious world’ and ‘new type of great power relations’ are in fact variations of the old theme of ‘peaceful co-existence’. Hagström and Hanssen (2015) show that – despite misgivings about its insufficient reconciliation efforts - Japan has learnt from its past economic isolation and military aggression and hence committed to never wage war again. This is also reflected in Prime Minister’s statements reviewed in part I.
repeating the anarchy-driven scenarios of war and eschew even the nationalistic “management” of economic crisis (beggar thy neighbour – Drezner 2012). Instead most states are focusing at least rhetorically on peaceful means and win-win approaches in a competitive and sometimes cooperative or multilateral logic regarding global (or regional) commons while maximising their power resources for development as the 60 years of relatively peaceful and prosperous developments in Europe and NE Asia since the Korean War show. Finally, balancing power between states in an anarchical world is not in itself adequate to cope with increasing complexity. While balancing behaviour can sometimes be observed, it does not as such constitute the structure of international relations or of international society.

2.2.3. A differentiated view of power and its diffusion

In short, realist approaches to power, albeit of some value, cannot on their own explain the complex and paradoxical development of the two regions especially in a longer-term perspective which includes Europe’s ‘warring states’ period and the paradox of integration after two world wars on the one hand and the more or less harmonious Confucian world of the past and the current unstable, but peaceful co-existence in NE Asia on the other hand. It is thus helpful to consider power in a more holistic way, stressing its multiple forms and the interconnections between them. This differentiation of the view on power has been pioneered by Nye (2004, 2011) and further developed by Barnett and Duvall (2005) who propose a taxonomy of power that goes beyond the classical realist view of ‘compulsory power’ as they call it, i.e. the capacity of country A to get B to do something it would otherwise not do (Barnett and Duvall 2005:49). Their approach already clarifies key aspects of diffusion of power better than that traditionally used to analyse international relations (but Nye 2011:16 criticises their approach as too abstract and complex). Barnett and Duvall distinguish between direct and diffuse, specific and constitutional forms of power to arrive at a taxonomy of compulsory, institutional, structural and productive power. ‘Compulsory power exists in the direct control of one actor over the conditions of existence and/or the actions of another. Institutional power exists in actors' indirect control over the conditions of action of socially distant others. Structural power operates as the constitutive relations of a direct and specific – hence, mutually constituting – kind. Productive power works through diffuse constitutive relations to produce the situated social capacities of actors.’ Barnett and Duvall (2005:48). These ideational shifts (related to productive power) affect the configuration of power in international society and its institutions.
Table 3 Diffusion of power in International Society 2.0 (shading) based on the matrix by Barnett and Duval (2005:48; not shaded)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Power works through</th>
<th>Direct relational specificity</th>
<th>Diffusion of power through</th>
<th>Diffuse relational specificity</th>
<th>Diffusion of power through</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Interactions of specific actors</td>
<td>Compulsory (direct control)</td>
<td>Dispersal to strengthened competing actors and new regimes</td>
<td>Institutional (indirect control e.g. through international institutions or regimes) e.g. BWI</td>
<td>Dispersal to competing actors within existing or new regimes e.g. G20, BRICS bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social relations of constitution</td>
<td>Structural (determination of social capital and interests; often one side dominating e.g. master-slave)</td>
<td>Dissolution in complexity</td>
<td>Productive (e.g. systems of knowledge and discursive practice; identities; meaning)</td>
<td>Dilution due to different views of legitimacy, moralisation gaps</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This pluralism in conceptualising power matches to a large extent my somewhat less abstract concept of an anarchy of complexity and of International Society 2.0 as I will argue over the next chapters.

The ‘real’ anarchy within international society encompasses the uncertainties and varying dynamics of economic logics and other risks which have largely replaced clearly identifiable threats from other states. It reflects also the multitude of actors (state and non-state i.e. the diffusion of power and influence) that affect these dynamics and logics in complex and asymmetric ways. The anarchy in this sense is akin to complexity, uncertainty (especially about causes and effects) and potentially disorder (Bremmer 2013). This complex anarchy of uncertainty is apparently not leading that much to inter-state violence or power coalitions to revise the international system as briefly shown above nor is change proceeding according to simple (or even sophisticated) power balancing or power transition models (between two or more power centres or multipolarity). Instead, logically, we find a more complex adjustment of various dimensions of power in international society and a number of conflicts over other things than power and resources. Those are conflicts over the recognition of moral beliefs, values, grievances and emotional issues. The decline of power balancing is a logical consequence (or symptom) of the diffusion of power in complexity (as shown in the table 3).

States in international society are playing a crucial role trying to manage uncertainty and risk and to establish order and predictability and adapting themselves to such challenges. In the two

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182 Currently the most deadly of such conflicts are playing out in the Middle East, but there the states tend to be unstable and mostly colonial creations with ensuing moralisation gaps and conflict potential (Mishra 2014).
regions reviewed here I observe very different ways to cope with this complex anarchy: one is driven by institutional multilateralism - the EU has created a supranational, syndicated hierarchy (a specific type of central, but jointly managed authority which is one of the examples of fundamental behavioural pattern change after a critical juncture) that it periodically adapts to changing circumstances (deepening and widening, flexibility); the other is driven by nationalism - NE Asian countries cooperate functionally on the basis of strict sovereign equality and no institutionalised central authority but using institutions à la carte and often as instruments for nationalist ends (for instance the contest between China and Japan on the wider or narrower membership of the East Asia Summit EAS and different configurations of regionalism).

I will develop these ideas in the course of the next chapters, but I see these as key points of developments of international society that have to be squared with the historical pathways and institutions. Institutions are understood here in a wider sense not just as international organisations and cognizant of the fact that states are particular historic forms: institutions like sovereignty, international law, power etc. that evolve over time and in specific cultural and social contexts among which violence, hierarchy and autonomy have stood out for a long time, but are not immutable.

The central but questionable place of violence and its constitutive link to power and the state system (violence as a constitutive institution of international system and International Society Mark I) in realist IR theory is thus a crucial issue and therefore I will look at it in more detail in a theoretical perspective that explains the empirical evidence I already discovered in two significant international societies the Confucian world and the contemporary EU, namely that violence, power and anarchy are not necessarily always of central importance in international relations. More evidence could be collected from other parts of the world, but these two regions have very interesting parallels and differences that promise to yield particularly relevant research results.

3. Diffusion of power, violence and the state system

Waltz (2000:5) asks “What sort of changes would alter the international political so profoundly that old ways of thinking would no longer be relevant? Changes of the system would do it; changes in the system would not. (…) If the system were transformed, international politics would no longer be international politics, and the past would no longer serve as a guide to the future.” The examples from the two regions in part I show that in NE Asia’s past the system might never have been as Waltz has described it and in the contemporary world, the EU example shows that system change away from anarchy, empire and violence is at least regionally in progress for a significant group of states (significant in terms of number, wealth, power capabilities, global influence and past history of violence), so significant that it cannot just be discarded as an exception to the rule. Apart from questioning the euro-centric reduction of the past to the European past that Waltz elevates to a dogma I argue that Europe has already transformed the ‘international political’ in its region so profoundly that there is a change of system in progress. Metternich, Talleyrand, Gladstone or Bismarck would certainly see more change than continuity.
in today's European system, compared to their time. Waltz' way of defining the international political would also have found few followers in the Confucian international society.

Many analysts, even constructivists such as Wendt when he developed his social theory of international politics (1999) or English School theorists such as Hurrell - chose to focus on the state system and security because states are key actors in the regulation of organised violence. Violence in a somewhat circular argument is one of the basic problems of international politics (Wendt 1999:193), because states were mainly defined through the monopoly on the legitimate use of organised violence: Based on Weber, Wendt (1999:213) defines the 'essential' state as 'an organizational actor embedded in an institutional-legal order that constitutes it with sovereignty and a monopoly on the legitimate use of organized violence over a society in a territory.'

Interestingly, the often cited 1933 Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States defines the state as having a permanent population, a defined territory, a government and the capacity to enter into relations with other states183. It doesn’t speak of a monopoly of violence. It also states in Article 4 that 'States are juridically equal, enjoy the same rights, and have equal capacity in their exercise. The rights of each one do not depend upon the power which it possesses to assure its exercise, but upon the simple fact of its existence as a person under international law.' This produces an essentially relational definition of the state system governed by mutual recognition of legal personality 184 and peaceful co-existence. The Convention explicitly stipulates peaceful co-existence, non-recognition of territory acquired by force and non-intervention in domestic affairs by other states.

Neither this definition nor Wendt’s refer to the economy or other state functions than legal personality under positivist international law. It is, however, the economy (and globalisation) that has profoundly affected the evolution of the state system away from the simple monopoly of violence and exercise of international law functions. States do not only have legal personality, they also have economic personality.

Pinker (2011:75-7) emphasises the importance of an economic revolution for the non-violent evolution of humankind which logically diminishes the importance of the monopoly on the use of violence by states (Nye 2011). This economic revolution in Europe led away from feudal land systems and Christian ideology hostile to commerce and technological innovation to trade and division of labour. This induced positive-sum games: your trading partner is more valuable to you alive than dead. This was in turn related to the consolidation of the states, underlining the constitutive interrelations between the state and the economy which Arrighi (2010) also emphasises. The two triggers of the civilising process – the Leviathan and gentle commerce – are related' (Pinker 2011:77). Pinker here makes a key point that has been overlooked by those who read Hobbes focusing only on the Leviathan and concluding that in the international sphere the absence of a higher-level Leviathan – a world government or a hierarchy (empire) – a deadly

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183 http://www.cfr.org/sovereignty/montevideo-convention-rights-duties-states/p15897 accessed 17.8.2014. The Convention stipulates that states exist independent of recognition by other states, which creates difficulties for instance to determine the statehood or not of Taiwan.

184 Note that recognition by other states is not explicitly mentioned beyond the ‘capacity to enter into relations with other states’.
anarchy was the only alternative. In fact, Pinker (based on Norbert Elias) shows that it is the emergence of the state units together with the emergence of economic transformations combined with other factors that rolled back the state-of-nature anarchy at both domestic and later international levels. ‘The centralization of state control and its monopolization of violence, the growth of craft guilds and bureaucracies, the replacement of barter with money, the development of technology, the enhancement of trade, the growing webs of dependency among far-flung individuals, all fit into an organic whole. And to prosper within that whole, one had to cultivate faculties of empathy and self-control until they became [...] second nature.’ Pinker (2011:78) also draws a parallel to findings from biology which support an evolutionary tendency towards cooperation.

It remains an important argument in realist and other images that anarchy is linked to sovereignty: The state as a structure has constitutional independence through external sovereignty in the sense of an absence of any external authority higher than the state, like other states, international law or a supranational Church (Wendt 1999:201-13; Hobbes 1651/2013). However, independence or sovereignty is not the same as autonomy: Keohane (2002:72) concludes that ‘sovereignty has never been simply a reflection, at the level of the state, of international anarchy, despite Kenneth Waltz’s definition, which equates sovereignty with autonomy’. The ability to exercise the right of sovereignty can be constrained by many factors be it by internal weakness and lack of resources of a state or by external constraints, by other states or NSAs or more importantly through self-restraint, internalisation of norms, (international society) or the creation of new forms to exercise sovereignty like the syndicated hierarchy in the EU. Therefore, sovereignty inevitably changes and adapts to context and prevailing ideological beliefs, including on how relevant autonomy is for a state compared to other options such as alliances, co-operation or deep multilateralism. These beliefs, I have shown, change over time, but they also differ according to the pathways and critical junctures among countries in the same point of time (which is why Europe and NE Asia at the same time and in the same context of today’s world of issues have different ideas on sovereignty and autonomy, and the same holds true for many African countries who emphasise sovereignty as autonomy due to their history as former colonies. The transformation of state sovereignty over time and in different regions and contexts is therefore a key topic of this thesis. Hoffmann (1966) considers the state as not only a form of social organisation but as a factor of international non-integration in every theory. Discussing this and the opposite claims made by globalists will be one of my key arguments around the state in a world of issues and in a world of regions in part III.

In this context we must be aware of the euro-centricity of the realist concept: the 'modern' state is itself a historical phenomenon with a relatively short history: especially in the current form of the nation-state which started in a particular region (Europe). The European ‘modern’ state system – distinct from the earlier historical principle of hierarchical order through Empires (cf. Münkler 2005) led to the genesis in the 18th century of a system of balance of power between sovereign states (political units) that over the centuries shaped European and later global international order. They were characterised by state sovereignty and the separation of domestic and foreign affairs (territoriality) and they refused external interference in domestic matters (although the Concert of Europe actually derogated from this principle as it was set up to prevent revolution and
anti-monarchical social change Mazower 2012:3-12). It also adjudicated issues concerning small powers (for instance the creation of Belgium). Stability was created by balancing and preventing hegemons from dominating others, alliances were thus not permanent (Cooper 2004:22) and not based on ideological or moral beliefs (like in the Cold War). Nevertheless, since the 17th century the number of European states had been shrinking dramatically through the creation of unified nation states such as Germany or Italy or Empires absorbing smaller entities (Austria-Hungary, Ottoman, Russian Empires). This tendency reversed after WWI and the Cold War (Maas 2014).

Later, in 10th century Europe, after and due to the French Revolution and based on various philosophical schools (Enlightenment) the idea of national self-determination merged with the doctrine of state sovereignty giving birth to an important modifier: nationalism and consequently ‘national sovereignty’ (Christiansen 1994; Hobson 2009, Dieckhoff 2012). That led to the ‘demographic explosion’ of state units. In this period some European states also extended their colonial rule over most parts of the world in the 19th century.

There are of course some other accounts. Arrighi (2010:37-48) dates the origin of the modern capitalist state back to Renaissance Venice. Similarly Ruggie (1993) talks of a double invention of the modern state (once in Venice and again in NW Europe). Arrighi (2010:44-5) attributes the rules of the Westphalian system to Dutch diplomacy and their principles of separating quarrels between sovereigns from civilians paving the way for freedom of commerce and abolishing barriers to trade and protecting property – the principles which were foremost in the interest of the Dutch burghers but coincided with those of other countries. At this time (rudimentary) international law and the balance of power became constitutive institutions of a sovereignty based order. Arrighi interprets the balance of power both politically and economically: ‘The balance of power between the emerging dynastic states of Western Europe was instrumental in preventing the logic of territorialism from nipping in the bud the rise of a capitalist logic within the European system of rule. The balance of power was thus always integral to the development of capitalism as a mode of rule.’ (Arrighi 2010:39).

However, as we have seen in part I, for a while Europe's state system co-existed with a much older and very different one, the Confucian state system with a very different thinking about the state and society where the monopoly of violence did not play a prominent role and the economy was largely state managed (Cheng 1997, Kocka 2014) and didn’t produce the dynamics Arrighi builds his account on. Thinking about the state in the Confucian world was not static, but has been continuously debated and adapted: Distelrath (2012:204-60) shows these debates in modernising Japan; Lovell (2011) refers to Liang Qichao and other Confucian modernisers in China; Hahm and Bell (2003) propose a Confucianism for the modern world. Most states in NE Asia have a longer tradition of statehood, self-rule and centralisation than most European countries. Arguably, since, the Chinese Tang dynasty (618-906 - around the time of Charlemagne) the Chinese state has not been run by aristocracy or military, but based on a Confucian idea that talent not birth should be the selection criteria for the elite. Since then officials have been selected by competitive examination (mainly focused on the Confucian classics – for a short overview on those Wong 2013; a comprehensive one Cheng 1997) to manage state affairs and the economy. In the Confucius temple in Beijing one can find the monuments to the merit of officialdom with the
names of the winners of these examinations over the centuries engraved on granite steles. This shows the importance of these officials who had an important role in government, constraining the personal power of the monarch who largely had to rely on the experts in matters of ritual propriety crucial to maintain the legitimacy of the ruler (Hahm 2003:45-6, 50-1; Kang 2010:34) and also had to contend with the institutionalised accountability structures embodied in the censorate (Mo 2003) in Korea more so than in China. This administrative system was also taken over by the other states in the Confucian world with Japan as a partial exception given the dominance of the ‘warrior – samurai class’ over civil servants and the weakness of the monarch unlike China and Korea (Kuhn 2014:443, 551). The contemporary civil service examinations in these countries still echo this tradition. Kang (2010:37) and others affirm that ‘Korea became more Confucian than China itself’ but Korea emulated China in full independence and in its own ways, including developing its own highly influential neo-Confucian schools. Confucian states also developed a public welfare policy based on regulation, taxes and state granaries (Bell 2003; Chan 2003) long before Europe created welfare systems. Based on the idea of Mencius the so called well-field system where a central field was to be collectively tilled before the individual plots were worked on was part of a system to ensure public goods. The states regulated markets, trade and economic activities and had effective tax systems (Bell 2003). China, Korea, Japan, Vietnam, and other ‘Sinic states’ which have since disappeared ‘were centrally administered bureaucratic systems based on the Chinese model. They developed complex bureaucratic structures and bear more than a “family resemblance” in their organization, culture and outlooks. This form of government, along with the calendar, language and writing system, bureaucracy, and educational system, was derived from the Chinese experience, and the civil-service examination in these countries emphasized a knowledge of Chinese political philosophy, classics, and culture.’ (Kang 2010:33). These states cooperated in the economic sphere and trade was flourishing in Asia. Nevertheless, Gao (2012) argues that they did not provide many regional (international) public goods. However, they have a shorter tradition of ethno-cultural nationalism or ‘nationness’ in the modern sense (museums, education ministries and historians in NE Asia are still busy uncovering and projecting this nationness into the past). It can be argued that this specific tradition helps understanding the emergence of the Asian development state in the second half of the 20th century. The Asian development state – which contradicts the postulated concept of governance as the declining capacity of the state to direct economic growth and social progress (Tömmel 2009:10) – has been comparatively successful in terms of fostering economic growth and development.

Thus, the state system cannot be understood always and at all times as a universal one, simply premised on power balancing in anarchy of like units; there can be regional state systems emerging from the more global system, like the EU or more closed regional societies like the Confucian, which add to or change features of the global fabric. Moreover, certain functions of the state could be realised at least partly in other forms of social organisation (and there are examples of that in the past and also in present niches of the globe). The moral beliefs and ideologies (nationalism, Confucianism) have been far more important in shaping the international state system than acknowledged by Waltz and most other realist images who confine states' existence ultimately to their power and the use of violence. The trend of declining violence which I shall present in the next chapter, therefore undermines such claims.
3.1. The decline of violence in international society

Scholars such as Pinker (2011) have argued that the central role of violence in international politics may be decreasing across the board. From an English School perspective Bellamy (2005:16) argues: 'since the end of the Cold War there has been growing evidence of a shift towards a different type of society in which factors such as the balance of power and strategies of deterrence play less of a role'. Further evidence for such a diffusion of power is provided by international law: The UN Charter has made wars of aggression and conquest illegitimate. War is no longer an instrument of politics as it used to be. Wendt (1999:205-6) when he explains pluralist security communities and collective security comes to a similar conclusion that the 'Hobbesian' culture of anarchy (enmity and denial of the other's right to exist) has become rare in today's state system and is being replaced by 'Lockean' (rivals, live and let live and mutual recognition of sovereignty and limited use of violence, the 'Westphalian' culture of anarchy) or 'Kantian' (friends, non-violent, teamplay) ones (Wendt 1999:246-312).

In the EU case, for what concerns the relations among its 28 members, in Wendt's terms, they have become 'friends' and the question of regulating inter-state violence is hardly relevant any more. Law enforcement also hardly relies on violence in the EU system. Interestingly - and as illustrated in part I.1.1.7 - the earlier hierarchical Chinese tribute system also worked through mutually agreed regulation of a number of interactions (rituals and rules) that had little to do with violence or power balancing and states rarely resorted to war as a means of politics within its system (while war against outsiders and "non state actors" like nomads, rebels and pirates was quasi permanent). Yet, here neither enemy, nor rival, nor friends describe these role relationships adequately. In the parlance of the time, civilisation and moral achievement and terms related to family hierarchy were used (Kang 2010; Cha 2011). The aim was universal harmony (rather than just order). This is in line with the Confucian notion that governing is not based on power, but on ritual harmony. Cheng (1997:75) cites a dialogue between Confucius and one of his disciples about the question of what governing entails. Confucius lists three things: the people have to have enough to eat, they have to have arms to defend themselves and they have to have confidence. Prompted on which of the three could be omitted if pressed, Confucius answered that people could do without weapons (precisely the opposite priority of realists).

Non-violent international relations have worked for a long time in NE Asia's Confucian world and since the 1950s in Europe under hierarchical conditions (cf. chapter 3.3.). But what about the decline of violence under conditions of anarchy? If cultures of anarchy – or anarchy tout court - have been defined as creating order through organised violence among states in international relations (Wendt 1999) and if war and power and related material capabilities have been seen as determining the structure of international relations, then a general decline of violence in the world and in particular among the developed states I am dealing with in the two regions is a significant game changer especially as NE Asia currently does not have a system of consensual hierarchy.

Pinker’s book The Better Angels of Our Nature (2011) provides an answer to Waltz's question about system change based on empirical and theoretical findings. And Pinker is not simply opposing hierarchy and anarchy. He gives a comprehensive account of how violence in human
society – including in international relations, but not only – has declined over long stretches of time to the point that Pinker (p.xxi) concludes 'today we may be living in the most peaceable era in our species' existence' and 'the world has (almost) put an end to war' (p.302). While Pinker and Arrighi have very different starting points the results of their analyses are quite similar: war and inter-state violence are no longer legitimate and efficient means of politics and today's state system has to do largely without them although not discounting war and violence completely as an eventuality to prepare for. As we will see later in this chapter, the idea of global risks also points to system change as many of those issues and risks cannot be dealt with through war or balance of power but require collective action.

Wendt, Arrighi and Pinker as well as my own findings about the Confucian world and the EU make one point clear: International politics doesn't have to rely on violence or the threat of it, nor does anarchy have to be considered only as the simple absence of a higher state-like authority above states. The choice is no longer between permanent war or hegemonic stability. In fact the experience in many other parts of the world (such as Africa or Latin America which have experienced few inter-state wars) may corroborate my point and deserves some research that I can't cover here). International politics can instead be seen as a system of rules, norms, laws and ideas that work without a monopoly of violence at some central level of authority. In short, this is an International Society 2.0. The Confucian world and the EU show that such a system works and ensures a long peace better than hegemony or power balance. This has to do with the general decline of violence as a way to organise relationships.

This doesn't mean that occasionally violence is not used even in the 21st century by states against other states to achieve political objectives (US-Iraq/Afghanistan; Russia-Ukraine, DPRK-ROK), but all these rare cases have had to be justified in the face of international scrutiny and compliance with the UN Charter. Each exercise of such violence has been accompanied by a significant cost in terms of legitimacy (domestic and international) or politically costly counter-reactions (including terrorism) that sometimes have wiped out the intended gains. And of course, there is the economic cost which has contributed to weaken the powers using force rather than strengthening them (which is a different experience from WWII and the Korean War which had positive effects for the US economy).

Pinker (2011) using statistics, but also insights from social psychology and neuroscience shows a decline of violence in international relations (including of terrorism, civil war and genocide) at all levels that he attributes to a civilising and humanising process. He thus confirms predictions in the 1980s by many scholars that the post-war era was just that, an era where war among great powers became obsolete (Pinker 2011:253-4) notwithstanding the rearguard pessimism of some realists like Mearsheimer. This process is linked to the industrial revolution and modernity bringing about (in non-linear ways) great leaps in social development and promoting ideas about the individual in society (Eisenstadt 2000) and a translation of these ideas into institutions of international society and into international organisations (like the UN or the EU)\(^\text{185}\). Mazower (2012) provides an account of various ideas about internationalism and world governance that generally and

\(^{185}\) Modernity of course can also be blamed for totalitarian excess in Europe and elsewhere, for colonialism, racism and social Darwinism.
independently confirm these tendencies described more comprehensively by Pinker.

Pinker identifies six processes and trends (summed up on p. xxi and xxv of his book and developed in separate chapters) that cover several millennia: first, in the transition from hunter-gatherer societies to agricultural ones the ‘Hobbesian’ anarchy of the state of nature started to be subject to a ‘pacification process’. Second, in Europe then at the end of the Middle Ages till the 20th century Pinker sees a civilising process at work that led to a ten to fifty fold reduction of homicide and fewer, but more costly wars mainly due to the centralising authority of states and the effects of commerce. The third process is the Humanitarian Revolution which in Europe of the Enlightenment started the abolition of despotism, slavery, judicial torture, superstitious killing and sadistic punishments. The fourth major transition took place after WWII: great powers and developed countries largely stopped waging war on each other. Pinker calls it the Long Peace probably borrowing the term from John Lewis Gaddis. The more recent fifth trend since the end of the Cold War, somewhat surprisingly, shows a decline in other organised conflicts of all kinds (civil war, genocides, autocratic repression and terrorism), which Pinker calls the New Peace. Finally, the sixth trend is the Rights Revolution which has reduced aggression against ethnic minorities and promoted civil, gender, children, gay and animal rights.

These trends Pinker argues (p.xxvi) are driven by the five historical forces, the Leviathan (state and judiciary with a monopoly on legitimate use of force), Commerce (positive sum games), Feminisation, Cosmopolitanism (here meaning literacy, mobility and mass media allowing people to take other perspectives and enlarging sympathy) and finally the ‘escalator of reason’, an increasing application of knowledge and rationality to human affairs. Some of those can be seen at work in international relations as he lays out in his book. This is not far from the focus of constructivists on ideas.

Clearly Pinker’s findings contribute to explaining why globalisation, as a trigger in a larger than economic sense, has been one of the factors that helped reducing violence and increasing prosperity. In fact, globalisation can be seen as shorthand for several connected and mutually reinforcing trends (e.g. commerce, cosmopolitanism, the recognition of human beings as equal rather than inferior as at the time of globalisation through imperialism (Pakenham 1991), and the spread of scientific knowledge). That this comprehensive view of globalisation in an ideational context is having a different effect on the use of violence as a means of international politics has also become clear in the global economic crisis or Great Recession of the years following 2007. Contrary to the effects of the Great Depression in the 1930s the most recent crisis has not led to an increase in violence. Drezner (2012:5) in his review of global economic governance during the crisis notes that contrary to a number of predictions the crisis would trigger an increase in the use of force as a tool for embattled leaders to stay in power have not been borne out in his analysis. He cites a number of studies indicating that the crisis has not reversed the ‘secular decline in violence that started with the end of the Cold War’.

One key aspect of the civilising process Pinker (based on a book by Norbert Elias of the same

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186 Gaddis (1986) and his 1989 book The Long Peace, Inquiries into the History of the Cold War. These works explain the stability of the Cold War era.
name) identified is self-control (p72) attributed to a psychological change, a culture of dignity and control of emotions inhibiting (violent) impulses and anticipating long-term consequences of actions. This point is also important in Wendt's social theory of international relations (1999) which refers to a master variable of self-restraint in combination with other variables (I suppose both Wendt and Pinker have borrowed from Elias). Pinker (p74) sees this emergence of self control as triggered by the consolidation of a genuine Leviathan after (European) Middle Age anarchy of fiefs, the cultivation of court manners (courtesy) changing the rules of the social game. This means that the application or threat of force has become less necessary over time as people internalised non-violent rules of behaviour. Confucian thought in fact closely resembles Pinker's description of the mechanisms and beliefs underlying self-control or self-restraint, a key requirement of Confucian moral belief about human conduct (Gao 2015).

Wendt (1999:343-57) offers an explanation of changes between the different cultures of anarchy (Hobbesian, Lockean, Kantian) consisting on the one hand of degrees of internalisation (of norms) which Wendt argues need not be progressive, and on the other hand the interplay of (any of) his 'master variables' interdependence, common fate and homogeneity with self-restraint. Self-restraint needs to incorporate trust as well. Without trust, cooperative relationships cannot be sustained. Trust has to be earned and learned – one way is through functional, problem-oriented cooperation (others: personal networks, apologies, costly signals etc.). Pinker (2011:78) emphasises this notion of self-restraint or self-control in humans individually and as a society as a key variable in the civilising process which has greatly reduced the importance of violence in society. This interplay can be progressive and Wendt attributes a shift from Hobbesian anarchy to currently prevailing Lockean one (and Kantian in the EU) to this interplay.

Pinker has identified the emergence of the state system (at first centralised monarchies and consolidated political units) as key driver of a trend of reduced violence, a change in warfare and of a civilising process promoting trade and economic development. This is similar to Hobbes' argument (1651/2013). He shows that over time in Europe the premise of international law changed from war as the basic state of international relations absent specific agreements on peace until the end of the Middle Ages (Pinker 2011:162) to the progressive deglorification of war (p163-5), the dropping out of several erstwhile belligerent nations from the conquest game to become trading nations during the ‘Age of Reason’ (p167) until the rise of nationalism and the counter-Enlightenment movement of the 19th century glorified war again (Pinker 2011:238; Raphael 2014:38-65) with the Age of Ideology (the 20th century) culminating in world wars and the Cold War (239-40). Finally, the horrors of these wars produced a change in the ‘cognitive categorization of war’ (p251) and the UN Charter banned war as an instrument of politics. The Long Peace was no accident: ‘Each component of the war-friendly mindset – nationalism, territorial ambition, an international culture of honor, popular acceptance of war, and indifference to its human costs – went out of fashion in developed countries in the second half of the 20th century.’ (p257). One reason why NE Asia lags behind in cooperation and integration may be that this mindset has not (yet) completely gone out of fashion despite rapid development (or maybe because of the rapidity of the development leaving no time for mindsets to change to the same

\[187\] I noted self-restraint of the Chinese 'hegemon' in the Confucian world. Wendt, Pinker and many other IR scholars tend to find their examples for self-restraint in European history.
extent as wealth accumulated). The main obstacles for NE Asia to make that ‘fashionable’ step seem to be the moralisation gaps and the complex victim-perpetrator relationships I reviewed above and widespread, cultivated victim mentalities on all sides that I have discovered in part I. But clearly NE Asian countries are now also focusing on economic development, and a ‘thin’ regionness is being built on economic networks.

Hobbes introduced the importance of the state as a social organisation (he called a ‘Leviathan’ or a 'common-wealth') to address a conflict between two parties so as to avoid the violence of a fight between the two antagonists. Given the violent nature of most conflicts in his time, this Leviathan had to rely on the use of force too. This device creates a power triangle instead of a power dilemma. In domestic society as theorised by Hobbes, the Leviathan was the power of the state and central authority through the force of law (Pinker 2011; Hobbes 1651/2013). In IR for purely anarchy and power-based analysis that Leviathan was not a central government authority but either a powerful hegemon (unipolarity) or a system of great power balance (bipolarity, multipolarity, oligarchy) as the only possible manifestations of the counter-logic to anarchy; power-based hierarchy (the hegemon or the great powers are typically ‘more equal than others’ to borrow from George Orwell’s Animal Farm parable). I argue that Leviathan in IR is not necessarily a superpower, a hegemon or a superstate. It can take the form of a set of institutions and mechanisms in international society which gain 'central authority' or legitimacy (like rule of law) which does not rely on a monopoly of violence (cf next chapters). This is actually in line with Hobbes' concept of the domestic order as well. These institutions contribute to solving conflicts and provide ways out of security and collective action dilemmas and thus help produce stability or the 'long peace' that I have observed in Confucian NE Asia and the EU Europe. Of course deterrence and military forces remain necessary for worst-case scenarios and routine security matters. In the EU that Leviathan is the syndicated hierarchy of supranational structures and a constitutionalised system of international law, in Confucian NE Asia it was a system of hierarchical, but shared and largely internalised political ideas, rituals and agreements. Nowadays in Asia the Leviathan is weak: it merely is a combination of US power projection, minimal but so far successful norms of peaceful coexistence, respect for sovereignty and instrumental use of international law with functional cooperation facilitated by informal norms. One of the key norms is national development for which a peaceful environment is needed. This makes NE Asia’s peace and stability look more precarious than the EU, but over the last 60 years it has worked. Thanks to Pinker’s extensive research we can establish a key characteristic of International Society 2.0: non-violence and peaceful co-existence.

3.1.1. Hobbesian anarchy – a misread concept?

Pinker in particular shows that the pessimistic Hobbesian assumptions of anarchy in a state of nature no longer hold much sway in describing social relations. Actually, these assumptions by

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188 Zhang (2014) differentiates degrees of internalisation of hierarchy in the Confucian world in different periods and among countries.

189 Out Of Civil States.

There Is Always Warre Of Every One Against Every One Hereby it is manifest, that during the time men live without a common Power to keep them all in awe, they are in that condition which is called Warre; and such a warre, as is of every man, against every man. For WARRE, consisteth not in Battell onely, or the act of fighting;
Hobbes clearly were not applied to Hobbes' own world which had moved far beyond the state of nature: 'It may peradventure be thought, there was never such a time, nor condition of warre as this; and I believe it was never generally so, over all the world: but there are many places, where they live so now. For the savage people in many places of America, except the government of small Families, the concord whereof dependeth on naturall lust, have no government at all; and live at this day in that brutish manner, as I said before' (Hobbes 1651/2013:75). The rule of law and a passion for peace and justice is in Hobbes' view anchored in people living in society. Hobbes' fundamental law of nature is thus not the brutish anarchy and war, but 'To seek Peace, and follow it' (Hobbes 1651/2013:77) with war clearly a means of last resort and used rather defensively. Hobbes, who is talking about domestic order not international society, identifies both trust and the power of the rule of law (enforced by state power) as guarantees of 'Covenants' (agreements and promises) as the norm in a society which is built on the rule of law and respect for liberty and the rights of others (p.80/1). In fact, Hobbes assumes a third law of nature that is: 'That Men Performe Their Covenants Made: without which, Covenants are in vain, and but Empty words; and the Right of all men to all things remaining, wee are still in the condition of Warre' (p.84), so precisely the social condition is not one of lawlessness and arbitrary violence. Justice and the norms of propriety such as respecting agreements depend on the erection of a 'Common-wealth' i.e. a state or society. If transposed to IR, which Hobbes usually is (oddly as he hardly writes about international issues), then an international society also is not a 'state of nature' but a 'common-wealth' built on the rule of law with some 'coercive Power to compell men equally to the performance of their Covenants'. This then is not an anarchy where might is right, but a society built on rule of law where those who break Covenants (so even when the power to enforce the law is weak) are considered as bringing destruction upon themselves as they destroy trust and propriety (i.e. legitimacy) that binds society together: 'He therefore that breaketh his Covenant, and consequently declareth that he thinks he may with reason do so, cannot be received into any Society, that unite themselves for Peace and defence;' 'Keeping of Covenant, is a Rule of Reason, by which we are forbidden to do any thing destructive to our life; and consequently a Law of Nature' (p.86). All the Laws of Nature in Hobbes' list are in fact society norms that are meant to contain and eradicate the key reasons Hobbes identified as the reasons for violence (quarrel) in human nature: Competition (gain), Diffidence (safety) and Glory (Reputation). These Laws of Nature in his treatise constitute the moral beliefs of society as a peaceful body of norms to mediate the natural diversity of members of society (multitude) (p. 92/3).

but in a tract of time, wherein the Will to contend by Battell is sufficiently known: and therefore the notion of Time, is to be considered in the nature of Warre; as it is in the nature of Weather. For as the nature of Foule weather, lyeth not in a showre or two of rain; but in an inclination thereto of many dayes together: So the nature of War, consisteth not in actuall fighting; but in the known disposition thereto, during all the time there is no assurance to the contrary. All other time is PEACE. Hobbes (1651/2013):74.

190 Full quote: The Fundamental Law Of Nature

And consequently it is a precept, or generall rule of Reason, "That every man, ought to endeavour Peace, as farre as he has hope of obtaining it; and when he cannot obtain it, that he may seek, and use, all helps, and advantages of Warre." The first branch, of which Rule, containeth the first, and Fundamentall Law of Nature; which is, "To seek Peace, and follow it." The Second, the summe of the Right of Nature; which is, "By all means we can, to defend our selves."
Pinker (2011:35) starts his analysis with the finding from evolutionary biology that all violence is strategic and the assertion that Hobbes got the basic ideas right and correctly identified the main reasons for violence – competition, diffidence and glory (gain, safety and reputation). Note that in the Chinese philosophical tradition Xunzi (荀子), who lived in the 4th century BC (Cheng 1997:201) had identified similar reasons: According to Wong (2013:24) 'Xunzi explicitly opposes his position on human nature to Mencius’s. He asserts that far from being good, human nature is bad because it includes a love of profit, envy and hatred, and desires of the eyes and ears that lead to violence and anarchy.' Cheng (1997:200-220) therefore calls Xunzi the 'realist heir of Confucius'.

Anarchy in Hobbes' sense as I understand it, however, is the anti-society, the situation of uncivilised tribes used mostly rhetorically and as a warning to the citizens in his time (the English Civil War) to avoid the chaos of civil war through order guaranteed by sovereignty. But this concept of anarchy does not seem to me to describe the actual context in which society functions, and even less so that of international society. Pinker (2011) has also shown that even the war-prone violent social context of the time in which Hobbes wrote has fundamentally changed for the better, hence there is even less need to believe that a lawless anarchy or state of war is the 'default' context of international society today. Picking this 'utopian' state of nature, meant as a rhetorical contrast to Hobbes' key story about social organisation to describe a fundamental paradigm of the international state system today, seems to me rather disingenuous for these reasons. The absence of sovereignty and power of a sovereign (power of the sword in Hobbes' terms) to regulate international society is of course an important issue when Hobbes' treatise is used as a reference, but Hobbes clearly situates the power of the sovereign in the context of laws of nature and social norms that constrain its arbitrariness and are different from the use of power at will in the state of nature. But such an analogy must also be placed in the historical social and legal context which was very different from today's international (and domestic) societies as Pinker (2011) shows through analysing various historical trends and forces. Hobbes after all argued against universal pretensions of the papacy and the church and the constitution of autonomous and sovereign states in the midst of civil war. To overcome divisions was his chief aim, hence also his call to forget injustice and to bridge moralisation gaps (see quote in I.1.1. Definition of moralisation gaps).

Pinker emphasises the importance of the third party ‘bystander’ (one could also say referee), the Leviathan or force of law between the victim and the aggressor or force of war in his triangle of violence. This is not a major feature in Confucian thought, which is rather built on affective networks, hierarchical relationships and rites (rules) defined in conformity with strongly held normative beliefs. This way of thinking also enhances the importance of confessions and apologies compared to punishment, which as we have seen is still a key demand in the contemporary victim-perpetrator relationship in NE Asia.

The merit of the analysis by Pinker is that he goes beyond paradigm mentalities and isolated approaches such as the democratic peace theory or hegemonic cycles of capitalist accumulation (Arrighi 2010:28-85) which are too linear and one-dimensional and thus subject to easy criticism.
by counter-examples. Without going into details here, there is a whole literature defending and attacking democratic peace theory, but they tend to argue often narrowly specific causal factors which are then easy to dismiss. For example Rosato (2003) refutes liberal normative and causal claims as flawed logic of democratic peace theory only to conclude that in reality American hegemony has ensured the decline of war in the Americas and Western Europe but not beyond. Evidently, American hegemony did not ensure peaceful relations in Confucian international society… Pinker shows that the decline of violence is much more universal and attributable to many more developments than Rosato argues 191. Pinker uses multiple scientific approaches – including the Hobbesian trap or security dilemma familiar to IR theorists, statistics, biology (genetics and evolution), psychology and game theory – that create a solid narrative and thesis of less and less violent social and human development of which warfare is but one element (he is not predicting that it is irreversible). However, in his trends he mostly builds on euro-centric sources like the above reference to the European Middle Ages and courtesy. My review of the pre-19th century Confucian international society shows that in the NE Asia region a civilisation order had taken root that had already made war and power balancing among its members obsolete and which relied on shared ideas about harmony, order, propriety and self-restraint (or virtue). I see as an equivalent of courtesy in China: ritual and self-control as basic philosophy of rule in a longer state tradition than Europe (Cheng 1997; Mo 2003; Hahm 2003). This could benefit from more research on how other civilisations have created their own trends to reduce violence or of a long peace for instance (my analysis on Confucian regional society in part I has partly 192 done this).

3.2. Cultures and logics of hierarchy and sovereignty in NE Asia (and Europe): Hierarchy and the' long peace'

After clarifying basic assumptions about power and violence in this and the following chapters I look for explanations with the help of my next research questions:

Why have Confucian NE Asia and EU-Europe witnessed the long peace? How is/was it organised?
On which institutions of international society and which organising principles was the peaceful order based? Are there similar explanatory variables in these two different international societies to explain the long peace?

We have seen in the chapters on NE Asia's history and pathway how the ideas of nationalism and modern civilisation's superiority on the basis of social Darwinism made their destructive entry into the Confucian International Society and how the recent territorial disputes have played out and fit into the moralisation gaps opened by the early 20th century conflicts in NE Asia. The section on Europe's trajectory has shown that European integration and bilateral reconciliation managed to heal even deeper historical scars and to overcome past enmity. The wide-spread perception of Asia rising and Europe declining poses problems regarding the viability of Europe's experience for Asia which is currently being advocated by South Korea as a path to NE Asian cooperation. In the previous section we have de-mystified the 'Hobbesian' anarchy and the assumptions of violence

191 One could add that the US was involved or started a number of the few international wars in the last decades rather than deterring them.
192 I say partly because in the context of this thesis I cannot apply the full breadth of Pinker's methods or analyse all the issues in this period.
and power politics as constitutive institutions of international society. From Hobbes’ own words the assumption of anarchy as a state of nature is simply uncivilised and not part of society. Similarly Wendt (1999:265) considers Westphalian assumptions basically as a Lockean culture of anarchy. In this respect Confucian and Hobbesian thought concurs. Furthermore, the empirically observed decline of violence over the centuries corroborates the doubts about anarchy.

The constitution of a ‘common-wealth’ or third party is important for my analysis as the EU has created a syndicated supranational law and institutions modulating sovereignty without a genuine hegemon (neither among the EU Member States nor an external one) but through creating a jointly owned and constituted third party – a ‘common-wealth’ in that Hobbesian sense (cf. next chapters). This has made inter-state violence unthinkable among EU members today (in a way that neither Metternich, Gladstone nor Bismarck could have dreamt). In the Confucian world one could argue that China was a powerful hegemon, but as we have seen its power didn’t flow from the barrels of the guns, but from the ink of the brushes. Its self-restraint played a crucial role in establishing a consensual hierarchy whose legitimacy was based on civilisation and recognition of cultural achievement including norms defining relationships, rather than on the power of a hegemon (Henry 2010). On the other hand NE Asian countries today have not yet found a way to deal with their history and territorial problems in their victim-perpetrator relationship (linked to Hobbes’ third reason for inter-state violence: glory, national honour and reputation or ‘face’ linked to nationalism and additionally to confession and apology in the Confucian sense of propriety). NE Asian countries do not accept a jointly organised supranational Leviathan to arbitrate which can be gleaned from the way trilateral cooperation has been organised (cf. 3.3.3). Nor is the de-facto hegemonic third party in NE Asia (the US) powerful enough to enforce that role, or legitimate enough to get such a role recognised by all (it has to rely on alliances and deterrence; Godement 2015). Washington – the third party - is almost powerless to adjudicate territorial disputes or even to push reluctant allies to talk to each other. Washington cannot overcome politics of emotions and moralisation gaps. Significantly, territorial and history issues even hamper cooperation between the US’s closest allies in NE Asia (Japan and ROK) despite strong strategic pressure from the hegemon as we have seen in part I. Such intervention would not be compatible with their sacral concept of national sovereignty. Thus, even in this case violence and power only play a very limited role in terms of international politics (deterrence of war, but military might or sanctions have not prevented the DPRK’s nuclear and ballistic missile programmes). Moralisation gaps can only be bridged through the parties’ own volition (if one excludes war to ‘sort them out’).

As we have seen in the previous chapter, the beginning of the 20th century with Europe’s ‘Westphalian’ ideas imposed on the region marks a critical juncture in NE Asia’s history and that of its international relations. Specific ideas about international society and its key institutions such as sovereignty and international law entered the hitherto Confucian world together with a new standard of ‘civilisation’ and power politics of the imperialist age. The subsequent development of these ideas in NE Asia and Europe respectively help explaining the contrast between Europe and

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193 In a contribution to the Financial Times (26 June 2013 p. 7) Kurt Campbell, former US Assistant of State for East Asian and Pacific affairs wrote regarding China-Japan territorial disputes: ‘American counsel has had only limited effect on the conduct of both sides. Behind the scenes, Washington has made it clear that its security ties animate its approach to a prospective crisis, but that the US seeks to avoid such a showdown through creative diplomacy and a greater recognition that everyone has bigger fish to fry in Asia.’
NE Asia today: multilateralism and a syndicated hierarchy in multi-level governance on the one hand and ‘old fashioned’ nationalism and emphasis on sovereignty on the other hand. It is therefore important to look at this transformation and critical juncture from the meaning given to key concepts such as hierarchy and equality which are intimately linked to sovereignty and international law.

3.3. Anarchy or hierarchy?

Historically, it seems that despite the centrality of sovereignty and sovereign equality and the assumption of anarchy, hierarchy actually seems to have been the norm in the international system, rather than the exception over the long-term at least in the two regions we are examining. And hierarchy in consensual (or legitimate) form rather than imposed or flowing from the muzzles of the guns seems to have been the more successful guarantee for a ‘long peace’ and mutual respect with enough autonomy to preserve a sense of identity and sovereignty. My analysis of centuries of hierarchical order in pre-modern NE Asia corroborates that assumption as does the evolution of the EU in the last six decades.

The Western concept of sovereignty theoretically or legally implies equality and its mutual recognition (Armstrong e.a. 2007) – thus international law emphasises the importance of a relational rather than a structural concept. However, empirically we often find explicit hierarchy or implicit hierarchy to the extent that sovereignty was called organised hypocrisy (Krasner 1999), the European Great Power Concert in the 19th century is a good example. Zhang (2014) further differentiates hierarchy according to three degrees of relationships of authority: status hierarchy (the weakest), institutional hierarchy and (internalised) rule hierarchy. In the Confucian world ‘sovereignty’ (an unknown concept there) implied self-rule and an internalised place in the Confucian hierarchy, not formal equality as such. Lawson and Shilliam (2009:663) put the principal question of IR now not as establishing the importance of hierarchy to world history, but exploring the various logics under which different forms of hierarchy operate. As reviewed above, Kang (2007) argues that while Europe developed the ‘Westphalian’ system of formal equality (and informal hierarchy, or ‘organised hypocrisy’) that led to the balance of power system (balanced through alliances, frequent wars or threats of war), East Asia developed a (far more peaceful and stable) system based on formal hierarchy and status, but informal equality and sovereignty. Kang opposes hierarchy and equality not sovereignty and equality, hence he sees hierarchy as compatible with sovereignty. The question is how hierarchy is organised and how does it and did it function in our two regions at different points in time?

3.3.1. Syndicated hierarchy in the EU

\footnote{The ‘long peace’ (Gaddis 1986) of the Cold War can arguably be seen as based on the power of the guns or missiles, but in fact the deterrence effect of mutually assured destruction (MAD) mainly preserved the balance between the superpowers and on the European theatre, while military conflict in the periphery of the Cold War still occurred despite the super-power ‘hierarchy’. In this sense the balance of power during the Cold War was not as stable as it is often seen, notably Asia saw a series of hot wars, but proxy-conflicts were also waged elsewhere for instance in several African countries or in Afghanistan.}

\footnote{Cf. also the sub-title of Münkler’s (2005) analysis of Empire: the logic of global rule [die Logik der Weltherrschaft].}
The EU is not just an intergovernmental organisation of states that exercise their sovereignty as they please. Cooper (2004) speaks of pooled sovereignty, but this also only partly reflects the nature of the EU and the way sovereignty operates (see chapter 4.5. below). In fact, the EU is constituted in a novel form of hierarchy which is neither that of Empire, nor imposed by a regional hegemon through institutional power (Barnett and Duvall 2005 for that concept). It is also not a hierarchy of a supranational unit above the states, but the EU’s hierarchy is voluntarily agreed and collectively managed by the member states who even accept inequality in decision-making and by the supranational institutions, such as the European Commission, the European Parliament and the European Court of Justice (to name the most important). This novel form of hierarchy and multi-level, polycentric governance deserves some reflection in the context of IR theories.

Lake (2005:4) challenges a basic assumption of realism by opposing hierarchy to anarchy and calls for a new foundation of international relations theory. Anarchy according to Lake’s interpretation of Waltz is a political relationship in which the units possess no authority over one another and are not bound under any common authority while hierarchy obviously exists when one unit possesses authority over another one. Authority in this sense is a form of power (A getting B to do something B would not otherwise do) not something distinct from power and not necessarily resting on some form of legal order, but I would think that authority and thus hierarchy can flow from a formal agreement such as the EU Treaty. Baumann and Dingwerth (2015:111-2) consider power and authority as concepts with substantial overlap, with ‘authority’ putting a greater emphasis on voluntary compliance, but still including the possibility of coercive relations alongside non-coercive ones. Conversely power doesn’t have to be coercive as we know from Nye’s soft or smart power idea (2004, 2011) and from Barnett and Duvall’s (2005) taxonomy (table 3).

Lake (2005:10) rejects the judicial analogy to domestic order of indivisible sovereignty in international relations (which for legal positivists and realists in turn provided the foundation for the assumption of international anarchy). Lake (2005:10) argues that there is nothing inherent in the concept of sovereignty that implies a single apex of authority or that authority cannot be shared between branches and levels of government or even between public and private spheres. Authority/sovereignty can be exercised differently in different policy areas and there can be multiple authorities defined by policy area operating in or over any given society. Lambach (2013) also argues that there is no single hierarchy in international relations, but hierarchy and agency depend on the context of regions and policy areas. However, the power of actors influences their ability to exercise agency and to influence the rules of the game.

In my view, if applying Lake's model, in the EU we have to consider that countries A and B in their role as Members of the Council of the EU act as A’ and B’ within the competencies and decision-making procedures defined by the EU Treaty. In the EU power/authority is not about A getting B to do something but (A’ + B’ +…Z’) + S (S= supranational institutions) to get A-Z to do something that they may not exactly have wanted to do individually, but are doing because they

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196 Although he sees anarchy as one extreme where A has no authority over B on a continuum at the other end of which is a total authority of A over B which is seldom found (only in totalitarian states or cults) (Lake 2005:13)
have collectively agreed a procedure by which in certain policy fields they not only accept the authority of supranational authority and majority voting, but also have to act in common to adopt certain policies they agreed by Treaty they can no longer decide individually. This corresponds to what Barnett and Duvall (2005:52-3) classify as structural power: ‘the co-constitutive, internal relations of structural positions that define what kinds of social beings actors are’ (here A’ as members of the EU rather than just country A). Structural power differs from institutional power which focusses on differential constraints on action (or the indirect exercise of power by a hegemon for instance the US through the BWI), whereas structural power operates even when there are no instances of A acting to exercise control over B. In addition here power is not exercised by one particular country on the others or the structures, but ‘collectively’ even if in political reality some countries exercise bigger influence than others. The structures of the EU define the structural role relationships of the actors themselves, constituting them as well as the EU as a multilateralist, multi-level system of governance. We will see below the importance of the legal order to ensure the functioning and the resilience of this form of multilevel governance. The EU is in permanent evolution, giving the EU flexibility to expand, reduce or differentiate policy areas where Member States overlap and share sovereignty in a polycentric order. National constitutional bargains tend to be less flexible as the arrangements are meant to last ‘forever’.

Zhang (2014) describes hierarchy and political authority as matters of degree that varied through time and space, citing a number of examples from NE Asia. Zhang (2014:4) argues: ‘Interstate hierarchy can then be seen as a relationship in which one state's rule over another state is accepted as legitimate by the other state. Hierarchy is not so much a matter of material capabilities as it is of one state's perceptions or beliefs about another state's role and behaviour. It is a normative or ideational phenomenon.’ Applying Zhang’s definition to the EU may be useful, but it is too narrow, as the EU hierarchy is not one between states only. It is not strictly speaking one between a higher supra-national 'unit' (in Lake’s parlance) over the state 'units'. It is a collective, syndicated hierarchy and varies in degrees of authority a) in time and b) according to agreed policy areas (as Lambach 2013 also posits for international relations in general). In general terms, in Zhang's three degrees of hierarchy, the EU tends to the rule hierarchy, fully internalised and structural in its exercise of power (which corresponds to the above structural power concept of Barnett and Duvall 2005).

This is consistent with the multilaterally syndicated “Lisbonian” culture of hierarchy in the EU and is more complex than the simple ‘pooling’ of sovereignty idea suggests. In the EU hierarchy is constitutionally defined on one level as supranational hierarchy of legal norms and acts and some supranational institutional competences, on the other level through weighted majority voting rights of countries in the Council and differentiated representation of peoples in the European Parliament. This is in fact an agreed inequality, not an 'organised hypocrisy'. Weighted voting reflects size and power, but also avoids domination by either a small number of big countries or a big number of

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197 There are some varieties on the EU decision making procedures which in particular determine the role of S, the supranational institutions like the Commission and the Parliament, or Court of Justice. In CFSP the formula applies with a much diminished or no role for 'S', but countries still act collectively (A', B'...) and the object of the exercise of power or authority in CFSP is directed to external issues/actors, so not against A, or B...The intra-EU intergovernmental bargaining within CFSP is about whether to do something, what and who pays.

198 Barnett and Duvall (2005) use different examples for structural power such as Marxist or Gramscian accounts of the structure of capitalism.
small countries over the other group so in a way it combines hierarchy qua power/size and equality without formal vetoes (in most policy areas). On yet another level there are the formal and informal rules and procedures of the supranational EU institutions’ interplay. In the EU syndicated hierarchy has multiple levels and different forms: supranational, inter-governmental, national, regional and even private authorities and sovereignties co-exist and are exercised differently in different policy areas. This order has some of the characteristics of polycentric governance (to which I will revert in the chapters on climate change; see Ostrom 2009; Thiel 2016; Araral and Hartley 2013) The complexity of this multi-level interplay of institutions, member states other actors and of the rules of the various multi-level games at times creates political and legal dynamics unforeseen by the individual actors at the time of ‘creation’. This goes therefore beyond principal-agent models and simple intergovernmental bargaining although these concepts are useful to analyse the ‘micro’ processes of negotiating issues within the EU system or for the treaty modifications to it (Moravcsik 1993, 1998).

Conversely, even Cooper’s (2004) ‘post-modern’ European states have still a strong penchant to exercise national sovereignty, rein in the EU institutions and assert nation-states authority, protect national identity (culture, education, languages) and policy preferences especially in identity related areas like culture, education and foreign policy, but also on issues such as taxation and home affairs. States keep their identities and languages, but people add another layer of identity on it (Fligstein e.a. 2012, Hooghe and Marks 2001) including EU citizenship. EU member states have also created a new supra-statal level of law and policy-making institutions, international decision-making and international (European) law. The EU and its member states also promote international law, the UN system and other international regimes (WTO etc.). This has resulted over time in an internationally open regional multi-level system of governance with supra-national institutions and European laws transcending the nation-state and its institutional control and with it national sovereignty and the principle of non-interference (Christiansen 1994; Scharpf 1994; Tümmler and Verdun 2009).

3.3.2. Hierarchy in the Confucian world

Taking the example of the investiture and tribute system in East Asia before the West, Kang (2012) develops and illustrates the debate about legitimate authority as a variant of hierarchy in international relations and as an alternative to purely materialist, power-based interpretations. He is building on David Lake’s work which he extensively quotes (see above).

In a society like the Confucian, where military values did not play a prominent role, but cosmic harmony, the mandate of heaven and ordered social relations from the family to the family of

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199 For instance, industry standardization bodies, direct effect of EU law and possibility for private actors to invoke EU law or when codes of conduct are established between business and consumer associations at the behest of the European Commission. The Lisbon Treaty also confers EU citizenship and provides for consular assistance for EU citizens abroad.

200 Suganami (2007) demonstrates in his analysis of classical conceptions of sovereignty, that the issue of non-intervention cannot simply be seen as an extension of the notion of sovereignty, but intervention is actually compatible with even classical definitions of sovereignty. Similarly Nardin (2008) emphasises the international rule of law as imposing limits and constraints on states and opposes the use of international law as an instrument of power.
states there was little legitimacy for violence to change the cosmic order. Confucian international society warranted stability over all else expressed through rites, tributes and exchange of gifts and recognition of legitimate rule. The often noted phenomenon that foreign invaders of China tended to ‘assimilate’ to the Chinese ways rather than imposing their own has to do with the importance of the legitimacy to rule through rituals, standards of civilisation etc. reflecting the mandate of heaven and cosmic harmony rather than ethnic customs or language. In that sense (and in that sense only) rites and rituals fulfilled similar functions as the EU’s sophisticated legal system today or the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation in the past (Osiander 2001; Martus 2015). Military actions were considered either barbaric (and thus power was basically only used against the nomadic peoples), or necessary to re-establish cosmic order when the mandate of heaven was lost (instability, revolt, dynastic change) and in some cases military actions were punishments of an offence against civilisation and international order (Imjin War). This contrasts with the classical European idea of war as a legitimate instrument of politics, territorial aggrandizement and greed and resembles more the EU practice today (where military means are used only outside the EU).

Bearing in mind Zhang's definition above, the investiture and tribute system can be seen as a normative system constituting role relationships in which hierarchy was not so much a matter of material capabilities, but one of acceptance of rules, behaviour and norms such as in general terms 'li' (propriety, ritual). This comes close to a case of structural power in Barnett and Duvall's (2005) sense. However, the collapse of the Confucian hierarchy at the end of the 19th century had a lot to do with the demonstration of Western power questioning the legitimacy of the civilisational appeal the traditional system and role relationships were built on. Confucian philosophy of state and international relations lost their legitimacy in the eyes of many Chinese, most Koreans and certainly the Japanese. Japan, however, failed to establish a new and accepted hierarchy through its power-driven imperial leadership claim. Power could overcome Confucian ideals, but not the new ideology of national self-determination and nationalism. Hence, power and legitimacy are not mutually exclusive they both play a role in how hierarchy evolves, power probably more in cases of change, legitimacy perhaps more in terms of sustainability and ensuring the long peace. This could be captured by the concept of productive (or discursive, ideological) power that Barnett and Duvall (2005:55-6) describe as a diffuse social process that constitutes actors 'through systems of knowledge and discursive practices of broad and general social scope' and that produce social identities (such as the nation-state or the Confucian hierarchy and one's place in it). Barnett and Duvall (2005:56) give categories or labels such as civilised, rogue, Western, democratic states as examples of productive power. It is important to note like Zhang above, that power is given meaning through the ideological beliefs (as Wendt 1999 reasons) here Confucianism versus nationalism (and modernity).

In the Confucian system framing of hierarchy as a result of power politics does not convince for the following reasons:

1) China (A) rarely resorted to force and authority to get Korea or Japan (B) to do what it wanted as we have seen in chapter I.1.1.6, but required mainly a ritual confirmation of its cultural authority. Death of sovereigns didn't spark international wars of succession like in Europe and neither did religion (Kuhn 2014:34-5). Countries B, C… didn't have to tremble before the
Emperor's edicts, but just had to wait for A to endorse decisions made by B’s and C’s governments.

2) one may argue that the principle of reciprocity blurs this one-way exercise of authority, as we have the kind of constitutive relationship of for instance teacher and student. Without student there is no teacher. The teacher has authority over the student only if the student recognises the teacher as such (he could change course or leave the university). Japan did this, it left the “Chinese class” i.e. stopped tribute missions and thus escaped the authority of the Qing court de facto, while not challenging the authority of the teacher as such until the 20th century perhaps like a student still enrolled in the university, but not attending classes. This is the essence of the ambiguity after the first critical juncture (Imjin War) that I described in chapter II.1.1.4. This ambiguity ended with Japan's victorious war with Qing China (Treaty of Shimonoseki 1895) and its concurrent claims of civilisational superiority (i.e. rhetorically upholding the legitimacy of the old system, but filled with new Western concepts of superior civilisation and race) that fed its imperial ambitions over the next 50 years. This created new constitutive relationships of coloniser-colonised (Korea) and aggressor-victim (China), but could not re-create the Confucian relationship based on moral authority. To the contrary, even today the resulting moralisation gaps don’t allow Japan to play a leadership role in NE Asia.

Thus Lake's argument of essentially compulsory power or authority based hierarchy (as opposed to anarchy) falls short of accounting for the two types of consensually and reciprocally constituted hierarchy in the EU and in the Confucian world that give those two international societies structural power. However, I support his view that hierarchy is a key feature in the two international societies rather than anarchy and that the two are really at opposite ends of a spectrum (that means anarchy and hierarchy can also co-exist in a larger international society).

3.3.3. Hierarchy in NE Asia today

In a regional context hierarchy in any form today is particularly sensitive in NE Asia because of four historical experiences I reviewed in part I:

1) the former Chinese centrality in the Confucian world which is now often re-interpreted as 'hegemony'

2) foreign occupation and humiliation experiences in the 19th and 20th centuries

3) Japan's imperialist domination (1895-1945)

4) Incomplete nation-building (divisions)

Countries reject or avoid hierarchy especially amongst each other and insist on sovereign equality even at trivial occasions due to the nationalist and victimhood narratives explained before. In NE Asia, the question of hierarchy (or even just leadership) is inevitably associated with a zero-sum diminution of national sovereignty or status and with domination by one country (and
imperialism), with the USA, China and Japan all jostling for primacy. Sovereignty and international law have thus mainly served as instruments and institutions of protection against foreign interference (real or imagined) and domination and to stake out territorial borders including previously irrelevant ‘maritime frontiers’ (Kang 2010:153-7).

In NE Asia there is characteristically a near complete absence of formal multilateral institutions or organisations which could assume a consensual arbitration or a supranational hierarchical role similar to that played by EU institutions in which the various conflicts and positions (or common projects) could be addressed. Evidence for institutional multilateralism or regionalism in NE Asia is thin: In 1999 China, Japan and Korea started a process of trilateral cooperation, but its institutionalisation is weak. The Trilateral Cooperation Secretariat (TCS) opened in September 2011 in Seoul in fact has not even a proper secretarial role. Its officials participate in summits and other meetings, but meetings are prepared and recorded by the host country and officials from each country’s ministries, not the TCS. The TCS has assembled and documented the trilateral cooperation process and tries to carve out for itself a policy advice role like a think tank (interviews with officials from TCS 28-6-2012). They do not discuss bilateral tensions (interviews with officials from TCS 15-10-2012). Pre-negotiations of a trilateral FTA have only begun in 2012 (with uncertain prospects in terms of depth, scope and ratification) while one country in the region, North Korea, has decided to stay out of even the thinnest forms of regional cooperation and indeed globalisation altogether and is prioritising the military (Songun, 선군정치, 先軍). The trilateral process is at its beginning and relatively shallow, the project is purely pragmatic cooperation and the products are very few. In many areas each country has deeper institutionalised cooperation with partners outside the region than with each other201, while the DPRK is not at all involved in a regionalisation project (it even withdrew from the Greater Tumen Initiative, but in 2012 seconded an official to the GTI secretariat in Beijing). This also shows the limits of the argument that globalisation/interdependence quasi automatically lead to multilateral cooperation. There is no transfer of sovereignty to any joint institution. Incidentally, this echoes some of Murray’s (2010:317) questions for a comparative regionalism research agenda such as: What sort of Community is being constructed in East Asia? Must regional integration encompass institutionalization? The issue about institutions is often dismissed as a euro-centric concern or benchmark not appropriate for Asia. Be that as it may, the fact that NE Asian countries do have institutionalized links with partners outside the region, but not amongst themselves, is an indicator of weak political cooperation. Institutions need not be conceived of as formal organisations or procedures. Murray also asks what – and who – determines the pathways to regional integration? What transformation has come about? These issues will be looked at in part IV.

The contested order, sovereign equality, nationalism and absence of multilateral hierarchy has fed tensions and security dilemmas reflected in military build-ups, alliances and occasional ‘sabre rattling’ as we have seen earlier. It is a strong expression of the rejection of any kind of informal or formal (multilateral or supranational) hierarchy/authority that flows from a nationalist concept of

201 I make a difference between mere volume of exchanges, like trade, and institutional arrangements facilitating trade or investment. The free trade agreements Korea for instance has with the EU (its second biggest trading partner after China) and the US are much deeper than the non-institutionalised but volume-wise or product-chain wise more significant trade relations with China and Japan. Japan and ROK each have deep alliances with the US against a common contingency, but hardly any military-to-military ties between them.
International Society Mark I. In the economic and other fields of complex anarchy we find similar constraints on NE Asia cooperation.

Thus Europe's and NE Asia's pathways in terms of nationalism, hierarchy, sovereignty and international law have developed quite separately, briefly converged and then again developed in opposite directions since they intersected (or clashed) at the critical juncture of the Opium War and the unequal treaties of the 19th century.

3.3.4. Hierarchy in international society and in global governance

Hierarchy in international relations is more generally observable in many ways: Münkler (2005) shows that hierarchy until the 20th century usually came in the form of Empires, Lake (2005) measures it quantitatively in the security field, Lambach (2013) puts it in the relational context of actorness, structure and agency, Kang (2007, 2010) and Zhang (2014) describe it historically, Zhao (2005) justifies it philosophically for the Chinese world (as we shall see below in chapter IV.2.) and I analysed syndicated hierarchy as a characteristic of the EU (despite a large variety of non-hierarchical modes of EU governance). In more recent history, bipolarity in the Cold War describes the organisation of de-facto hierarchical alliances and "friends" around two superpowers clustered like around magnetic poles. These superpowers also interfered repeatedly directly or through proxies in domestic affairs of their "satellites" or in their spheres of influence using compulsory power (the US under the Truman doctrine for instance in Korea, South East Asia, South America and the Caribbean; the USSR under the Brezhnev-doctrine in central Europe and Central Asia but also across other developing countries). They also set up multilateral frameworks of institutional power to moderate the direct exercise of compulsory power (e.g. BWI, OECD, COMECON) for global economic governance. The five veto-wielding permanent members of the UNSC (P-5) also constitute a hierarchy of (self-selected) great powers for security governance.

Today there are further debates about hierarchy in international relations: debates about US hegemony in alliances, the 'unipolar moment', multi-polarity, humanitarian intervention, neo-colonialism, the legitimacy of the G20 (Badie 2011) or the ‘directory’ in the EU in reality all explicitly or implicitly revolve around hierarchy, its legitimacy or not and on how to manage it to preserve sovereign equality, as Lawson and Shilliam (2009:663) argue.

Reinforcing the above observations from different angles of the importance of hierarchy my evidence from contemporary Europe – the EU – and from 'pre-modern' East Asia – the China centred investiture and tribute system - questions the dichotomy of anarchy and hierarchy. These findings confirm the doubts expressed in the previous section in more general terms over 'Hobbesian' anarchy and the link between it and power and violence. Anarchy clearly is not or has not been the only and universal organising principle of the international state system. In both regional cases we find a more subtle system of non-violent, not exclusively power-focused non-imposed but jointly owned or consensual hierarchy which have both produced stability and a ‘long peace’ in their regions in the context of relatively closed international society in the past in one case in NE Asia, and the context of open international society at present in the other in the EU. The need for Empire/hegemony with compulsory and/or institutional power to ‘pacify’ or ‘order’
anarchy and balance of power behaviour is a euro-centric concept of hierarchy which explains certain periods of European and US history. Anarchy can also prevail when (international) society breaks down (just as viewed by Hobbes as a lapse into pre-social states of nature) for instance at critical junctures like the end of the Confucian international society. But it is not a universal concept as the Confucian international society and the EU show which build on more constitutive and reciprocal structural and productive power.

3.3.5. From anarchy and hierarchy to complex anarchy

The difficulties that traditional theories encounter in explaining the paradoxes outlined in the Introduction and in part I prompted me to research deeper drivers of these developments. I find some of those in a new understanding of international society on the one hand and in a different understanding of anarchy on the other. Other drivers are related to history, moralisation gaps and value differences. These make sense in a re-defined international society concept, much less so in traditional power or rationally focused system approaches about ‘like units’ in which there is little room for history, emotions and value plurality. In fact most theories of IR have focused on rational and interest driven relations between actors (state to state, state-non-state, state-economic actors, state-international institutions/organisations/ regimes) be it realists or liberal institutionalists, constructivists or Marxists. All have more or less accepted anarchy as the systemic structure or environment in which states (and non-state actors) operate. I suggest that re-defining this context actually changes the perspective and opens up new ways of explaining the evolution of the state system or international society. My concept of anarchy does not focus on the absence of something, but on the presence of complexity (which could not be handled by a central authority anyway). This perspective also bridges the artificial dichotomy between material and ideational approaches. This complexity is not only economic (so not Marx's super-structure), but globalisation, risk society, global challenges such as climate change, pandemics, overpopulation and poverty as well as the international, regional and transnational fabrics including terrorism and networks that have evolved over time have created a highly constraining environment for states that often dominates the political agenda (cf. chapter IV.5). These constraints are so strong that like a magnetic field they structure the states’ relations and behaviour without the causality for such behaviour being attributable in a clear-cut or hierarchical (higher authority) way. To take the example of climate change: cows, cars and companies create the problem that states have to come to terms with to pursue their interests and arguably to ensure their survival. This dilemma is not produced by another state, cannot be solved by a hegemon or by a higher authority (a world government). The dilemma is not just posed by the economy as superstructure and it is not just a collective action problem that liberal institutionalists and rational game theorists use to explain the creation of regimes or international organisations²⁰².

I argue that complexity, chaos and uncertainty together form a new 'complex anarchy' context of today's international relations which shapes International Society 2.0 and its network dynamics. Bishop (2009) and Smith (2010) underline that chaotic systems are all characterised by sensitive dependence (also known as the butterfly effect) and are deterministic and non-linear. Chaos appears to be unstable, aperiodic behaviour in non-linear dynamic systems. Chaos explanations

²⁰² Global finance is another example (see parts III and IV). Migration could also be viewed like this.
are thus not causal explanations. They focus on system behaviour, not on law-like necessity; qualitative rather than quantitative patterns. Therefore responses to chaos patterns need to address complexity and cannot rely on using power/authority. Complexity differs from causal chains of threats or security dilemmas (for which game theory provides a variety of possible responses).203

My approach to 'anarchy' is therefore different from that used by the realist, liberal and English schools or Wendt's (1999) constructivist approach which generally understand 'anarchy' as 'absence of higher authority above the state or state-like units' (Wendt 1999:246-7). Wendt (1999:257) defines three 'salient' logics of anarchy, but all simply refer to cooperative or conflictual relations between states and in non-hierarchical ways. Instead of such a restrictive view and a consequential dichotomy between hierarchy and anarchy, I consider 'anarchy' as the environment of international relations characterised by complexity, chaos and uncertainty. In fact this complexity can create system change by the accumulation of non-linear, smaller changes that can lead the system to change triggered by events. This can be called a tipping point (Grimm and Schneider 2011:3). I will mainly use the term 'critical juncture' from historical institutionalism, as tipping point is now often used in the context of climate change to describe a future irreversible and harmful change. A social tipping point need not have such strong implications of irreversibility and damage to the system. The general meaning of both terms in my understanding is similar when applied to social processes: a society moving from one predominant behavioural pattern to another one (Grimm and Schneider 2011:3). That is for example the case of the breakdown of the Confucian international society at the end of the 19th century which led NE Asian states to adopt the 'Westphalian' state system, or the change in Europe from the ‘Westphalian’ system of power and war politics to that of European integration after 1945. The concept of critical juncture differs from 'power transition' which is a much narrower concept of (linear or cyclical) change of power distribution within a rigid system premised on 'classical' anarchy.

This new way of conceiving anarchy as complexity is particularly relevant for global governance and will be further discussed in part IV. In fact the responses to complexity require international cooperation and legitimacy.

Thus International Society Mark I and 2.0 do not simply differ in their institutions and intrinsic developments since the end of the Cold War, but also in terms of their context and definition of

203 I associate with this new complex anarchy a wider scope, going beyond economic globalisation, but often linked to it: Global risk further defines the logics of anarchy in international society. In the 21st century, a major difference to previous eras of “globalisation” like in the 19th century is the existence – and awareness - of essential global risks according to Beck (1986, 2010), Gao (2015) and Giddens (1999). For example, an important process impacting on international society – and driven by the anarchic globalised economy - is the unfolding of global warming which threatens the foundations of the world as we know it in the second half of the 21st century unless serious international action is taken now (IPCC 2014, CNA 2007, Stern 2007, Richardson e.a. 2009, Rockstrøm e.a. 2009, Breakthrough Institute 2012). Risks such as climate change, economic crises or pandemics differ from threats of war between nation-states. Yet, these global risks are often securitised (and called non-traditional security NTS) (Wissenbach 2010a; Barnett and Adger 2007; Council of the EU 2008; Richardson e.a. 2009). The degree of securitisation differs (CNA 2007; Wissenbach 2010a), but it shows that the national security establishments are taking it seriously next to the more traditional threats. As global phenomena and risks associated with them are beyond the power of any one country or alliance of states to control, such risks present a new type of security dilemma. This complex risk security dilemma requires different, usually non-military answers and calculations that are much more complex than any of the game theory approaches to the traditional security dilemma (for a critical view on the insufficiency of game theory even for those in the real world see Lebov 2013).
anarchy in the *longue durée* and of hierarchy (the realist absence of central authority versus the complex anarchy of uncertainty). In the complex anarchy simple $A \rightarrow B$ inter-state relations of authority or power projection are replaced by a complex web of relations (not only between states) in various policy areas that underpins co-operation and co-ordination, but also competition. Corresponding mechanisms are multilateral summits and regimes, albeit not as developed and institutionalised as in the EU. This trend finds expression in regimes or ‘club diplomacy’ with formal and informal rules. Decisions in the G20 for instance require consensus and have no legal status, yet they impact on non-members and formal international organisations such as the IMF, the Financial Stability Board or the Basle Committee of Central Banks (a new institutional power). Decisions are collective $A'+B' \sim X'$ similar to the EU’s, but without the supranational level, the legal force and in much more limited fields. The main function of bodies such as the G20 is policy coordination to manage complexity (in a crisis management mode at least initially) without the exercise of power or hierarchy among members but vis-à-vis non-members who have to accept the consequences without a seat at the table. Characteristically there are always more than twenty at the G20 table, as international organisations (UN, WTO, IMF, WB) and representatives of under-represented economies (e.g. the AU or ASEAN) are invited and there are also regular or irregular guests of the Chair. This shows the (uneasy) quest to ensure broader representative legitimacy besides output legitimacy to manage problems of globalisation (in the case of the G20 macro-economic and financial system aspects).

3.4. Conclusions – organised legitimacy

As the EU example and my analysis of the tribute system show, hierarchy/authority need not and is not only based on force or hard power or domination and it doesn't only function between states, but can be organised in a syndicated, collective way. The key to its functioning is legitimacy linked to ideological and moral beliefs (productive power), not just compulsory or institutional power. Of course, to some extent a superpower can ignore such moral authority and legitimacy at times, but in the long run lack of legitimacy undermines its soft power and moral authority. Legitimacy makes the exercise of power sustainable. Thus, the evolving 'content' of legitimacy, the ideas about what is legitimate and what is not greatly influences the sustainability of power. In some societies, in some epochs, power itself, strength, victory in war, glory etc. were enough to legitimise rule. That was of course not necessarily a sustainable order, as any contender strong enough could seize power by the same violent means than the incumbent. Ideological institutions of international society to a large extent influence what is legitimate: in societies glorifying a nation's superiority or sense of holy mission, power and violence are legitimate and victory in a war the ultimate prize (often associated with divine influence to enhance legitimacy). But this is by no means an atemporal universal norm as my two case studies for core world regions show. In societies believing in the peaceful settlement of disputes through the law and majority voting (like in the EU) there is no place for violence and war to advance national interests (which are themselves subject to change).

Legitimacy based on a shared worldview that explicitly shuns the use of violence amongst members of a society (such as the EU or the Confucian international society – the 'Kantian' logic of anarchy in Wendt's terms) is a key element of a social relationship among states that is not
contingent on anarchy and power and does not require a super-ordinate external central authority or hegemonic power. Legitimacy for the EU’s syndicated hierarchy is *qua* law (and procedure). For Osiander (2001) this was similarly the case in the Holy Roman Empire. For Confucian international society legitimacy was both divine and earthly morality (cosmic harmony, earthly stability and prosperity as well as appropriate behaviour). However, part of its legitimacy rests on output efficiency. Multilateral systems that produce little, will not be taken serious. The EU has developed a multilateral system that is built on these two aspects of legitimacy (democracy and efficiency: input and output) with consent and rules elaborated through processes and institutions that preserve the principle of sovereign equality, popular consent (EP) and common interest (EC) in a syndicated hierarchy. Here sovereignty is no longer organized hypocrisy, but organised legitimacy albeit in complex ways. The EU faces a structural problem of input legitimacy (democratic deficit Habermas 2011) which has been exacerbated by the far-reaching impact of the changes in economic policy during the financial and sovereign-debt crisis since 2007. These changes impact on Member States’ domestic polities and welfare policies in unprecedented ways, raising concerns among citizens, academics and policy makers (Lonro and Murray 2011; de la Porte and Heins 2015). However, it is clear that complexity, chaos and uncertainty require responses and concepts of order which are themselves complex (hence the attractiveness of populism with its seemingly simple solutions).

After the review of the challenges to theories based on violence and power we can preliminarily draw the following conclusions before moving to revisit definitions of the institutions of International Society 2.0:

*First*, war and violence have observably declined in international relations in general, as we have seen based notably on Pinker’s (2011) comprehensive analysis. The legitimacy of the use of violence as a means of policy, governance or global order has dramatically declined in international society. Our tale of two regions has shown that in Europe in particular after WWII the nature of the state system fundamentally changed (Schmale 2010:9). The end of the Cold War and the subsequent constitutionalisation of the European Union (in the Maastricht and Lisbon Treaties) reinforced these changes. Moreover, war and violence were not found to be central for explaining Confucian international society. Therefore, at least in these significant cases, approaches to IR based on power balancing, conflict and war among nations have become far too limited in their explanatory value. In contemporary NE Asia the decline of violence and the diffusion of power is less clear-cut, but we have noted a rather peaceful, albeit tense, co-existence since the Armistice of the Korean War in 1953. A pessimistic reading of simmering tensions, rivalries and arms races tends to dominate the analysis of international relations in the region. But I have shown that below this surface, the undercurrents of these tensions are in fact moralisation gaps and nationalist interpretations of sovereignty and international law as well as of history, that vie for recognition rather than for violent solutions. Besides, national development relies on stability and functioning economic exchanges. In general terms, therefore, violent challengers to the evolving International Society 2.0 today are rare, some are non-state actors (terrorists) and only a handful are states. In our North East Asia region we find one, the DPRK, but arguably the

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204 And the same applies to many violent conflicts in Africa or the Middle East which have a lot more to do with historical grievances, nationalism-tribalism and moralisation gaps than with power balance between states.
US also shows a propensity at times of using violence and war as an instrument of policy to pursue its national interest, undermining the trend to non-violence. But even the DPRK is not ‘rogue’ but shares major constitutive institutions of International Society albeit in an extremely nationalistic interpretation: essentially the minimum ‘Westphalian’ one of state sovereignty and some minimum, positivist, norms of international law (defensive and consent-based as the DPRK leaving the NPT in 2003 shows). The DPRK seems like a vestige of International Society Mark I uneasily surviving in International Society 2.0.

Second – NE Asia and Europe in different periods have both experienced periods of long peace in an order based on consensual hierarchy underpinned by strong moral beliefs in peaceful co-existence or even in a common destiny. These epochs show that anarchy is not only what states make of it, but that power projection under conditions of anarchy is only one way of conceiving order. The concept of anarchy depends on variables such as ideas about violence, power, war or about international relations as a system or a society. In a society, as Hobbes already made clear, anarchy cannot be the defining structure. In a context of declining violence, anarchy can even less be regulated by power, but mutates into anarchy of complexity in which power is diffusing. This anarchy of complexity rooted in the dynamics of globalisation, norm-evolution as shown by Pinker (2011) and risk society (Beck 2010; to which I will turn later) seems to provide the clues to explaining the evolution of the EU and even the relatively peaceful enhancement of prosperity in NE Asia without violent power games. The legitimacy of international (and domestic) orders that do not rely on force seems more resilient and conducive to other developments such as those summed up by globalisation or Pinker’s civilising and humanistic processes. Those in turn reinforce the non-violent legitimacy in a double movement with multiple feed-back loops. This new form of legitimacy underpins International Society 2.0 which is about (complex) order and stability, co-existence and co-operation rather than territorial expansion, aggression and deterrence.

Hierarchy in different forms is another way of conceiving order, co-existence and co-operation and not only in the form of Empire based on compulsory or structural power. Hierarchy is even compatible with modern sovereignty/autonomy as the EU case shows. Consensual hierarchy has shown to be stable, lasting and conducive to prosperity. By contrast IR images based on anarchy assumptions have relied on selective accounts of highly unstable periods, mostly in European history or of exceptional and short periods of superpower domination (Cold War, unipolar moment) and are thus hardly universal images.

My comparative historical long-term perspective as well as the findings by Pinker (2011) and others remove the centrality of the violence-based and Cold War paradigm which dominate in (neo-)realist theories. It allows finding empirical evidence for contradictory developments which have led to my puzzle: in exploring ways to solve the puzzle I investigate the supersession of ‘Westphalian’ anarchy based on power and the ultimate use of violence by another form of anarchy as well as by order based on non-violent, consensual hierarchy. Complexity is now squarely in the centre of analysis.

The findings laid out here of a decline of violence in international relations and across human
society at large, of the importance of consensual hierarchy as order and of the transformation of anarchy into a context of complexity clearly challenge realist premises that have been built on the purpose of state survival, anarchy and examples from the former European state system, presumably because this so-called 'Westphalian system' and its great power balance became the framework for global politics during the exceptionally violence-prone 19th and 20th centuries when the discipline of IR emerged from the social sciences.

Third and as a consequence of the decrease of violence as well as of the increase of globalisation and global risks economic logics increasingly determine international relations. Consequently, its logics have to be integrated into the international society concept. The economy in its constitutive relationship with states is causally linked to the decline of violence in international relations in a double movement. The market economy and the anarchy of complexity created by globalisation, the progress of science ('escalator of reason') and global risk have replaced the anarchy of war and power as a key structure of international relations and the two regions provide powerful but contrasting examples for this. This phenomenon remains under-theorised in IR. My contribution to develop the theorising on these findings further is to draw up a new classification of institutions of international society that better explains how international society is constituted and how it contributes to regional and global order which is no longer built mainly on balance of power (as it was as recently as during the Cold War) or on a liberal value community as right after the Cold War, but on elements of competitive and cooperative governance to deal with regional and global challenges and risks emanating from the anarchy of complexity (I will show those in the economic/financial and climate change governance areas in party III).

In line with my argument about a trend away from the use of violence, these differences and the overall complexity or chaos mainly play out in economic and discursive competition and through power diffusion – rather than power transition - in the international system. Power diffusion produces competition and cooperation in complex, polycentric and network logics of global governance to deal with security and prosperity dilemmas including the tragedy of the commons (Hardin 1968; Ostrom 2010) and global risk (Beck 2010) rather than the rivalry and violent conflict of linear power transition models. The more complex and unpredictable the world of issues the greater the loss of legitimacy and efficacy of using violence as an instrument of politics. This has opened the policy space for different conceptions of power as in Barnett and Duvall's (2005) taxonomy or Nye's work on soft and smart power (Nye 2004, 2011) and more complex hierarchies varying across policy areas, time and regions (Lambach 2013).

Fourth, the tale of two regions suggests different pathways to global governance205. Essentially there is on the one hand the institutionalised, constitutional, supranational, multi-level and economically deeply integrated European approach to regional and (global) multilateralism and on the other the nationalist autonomy accompanied by pragmatic functional co-operation and economic networks in NE Asia constrained by national sovereignty and restrictive interpretations of international law (which NE Asia shares with the US). The moralisation gaps and victim-perpetrator role relationships complicate moves to deepen co-operation or integration. Both

205 cf. Hooghe and Marks 2001:1 who suggest in general terms that the development of governance is characterised by path dependence.
pathways have produced distinct, but in general terms peaceful and prosperous outcomes (= situation today) for the respective regions and it is difficult to argue one is superior to the other, but the implications for international society are different. Order and prosperity differ in both regions. The issue of hierarchy is missing in Zhang and Buzan's (2012) analysis of international society and its institutions as they are referring to 'anarchic societies'. Therefore, they cannot fully capture hierarchical orders such as the Confucian world or the EU that do not rely on power balancing in anarchy. This is a fundamental problem for the English School. As long as the concept of anarchical society is not reconsidered, the English School imprisons itself. Hence, my proposal to revise the definition of anarchy from ‘absence of higher authority’ with a state-like monopoly of violence to anarchy as complexity or chaos that needs to be ordered through institutions of international society (including sovereignty, international law and the economy).

Order – a central category for the English School - can flow from legitimacy, from power balancing or ‘concerts’ as in the 18th or 19th century or during the Cold War, or from international law like in the EU or from ritual as norms like in the Confucian world. In a complex anarchy, order assumes a somewhat different meaning and brings in output or performance legitimacy: addressing complexity, increasing predictability, addressing root causes of problems including economic inequality, historical grievances and justice or human security or in a nutshell to produce some kind of legitimate order which maintains peace and prosperity for a large part of mankind. Consequently, this complexity and multiple challenges to legitimacy of hierarchies, makes global governance and order more complicated to achieve as I will review in part IV. Global governance, nascent in transition from a world ordered by military power and the results of war and the Cold War until recently, is necessarily a challenging process in which the principles of nationalism, multilateralism and cosmopolitanism collide and often spark innovation (such as EU integration or global coordination through club diplomacy such as the G20), but also create obstacles in terms of efficiency and speed to respond to urgent, but complex challenges such as economic or climate crises. There is no magic wand to make complexity and collective action dilemmas disappear (whatever populist leaders say). Simplicity or simple paradigms for that matter cannot be the answer to complexity. Complexity thus affects power; its dissolution requires developing new instruments to deal with complex risks and challenges. Its dispersal requires collaboration with a larger number and different types of actors. Power’s dilution requires a larger degree of tolerance of different values and approaches to problem-solving.

While all this points to cosmopolitanism as a way forward, importantly, nationalism as an ideological institution of international society and the insistence on sovereignty that comes with it, seems here to stay and cannot be discounted from international society despite the emergence of cosmopolitan constituencies in science, business and civic activism. Emerging forms of governance including a plurality of states, the scientific and business communities and many non-state or sub-state actors have started to tackle global challenges and risks in incremental, functional, but essentially collaborative – multilateralist – ways. This essentially relational development is responding to the diffusion of power by re-aggregating different strands and actors of power and legitimacy (table 3 above).

We will examine next how these developments of and responses to the diffusion of power in complexity can be captured in a new concept of the institutions of international society building
4. Institutions of International society revisited

The international society concept as developed originally by the English School (Mark I) is not adequate for the reasons outlined in the previous chapters. Hence, I set out to revisit it.

4.1. Europe and NE Asia - equivalency of institutions?

In the analysis of the two regions in the past and in chapter II.3.3 where I contrasted the logics of hierarchy and anarchy we already saw sets of different, but equivalent institutions of international societies in different parts of the world at different epochs. The complex reaction to the introduction of the Westphalian ideas, principles, institutions and norms into NE Asia has been a critical juncture in NE Asia's development path. Europe’s critical juncture after 1945 was the development of an integrated community which has produced a syndicated hierarchy and a very specific multi-level governance model. The evolution of ideas, principles, institutions and norms in the two regions is therefore significant.

I will show below that constitutive institutions evolve in tandem with different logics of anarchy or hierarchy to form the basic and characteristic institutions that shape international or regional societies differently. In this way the institutional classification becomes analytically more valuable. Even if the terms are ‘Westphalian’ and were not used in their contemporary narrow sense in the Chinese world they cover by extension and in an asynchronous way the analogous or equivalent institutions of the Confucian International Society (table 3). Statehood was expressed through mutual recognition of the Emperors and kings as sovereigns and the associated symbols (state seals and rituals such as investiture by the Chinese Son of Heaven or Emperor in Western parlance). The Confucian states used a (rudimentary) form of international law (such as agreements on tribute, official and commercial trade, repatriation of citizens, the use of documents for diplomacy etc.). In this sense it is somewhat euro-centric to define the Chinese world as pre-modern, rather than to recognise it as an equivalent, albeit different international society.

4.1.1. Ideological, constitutive, instrumental and mechanical institutions of international societies

4.1.1.1. Critique of terminology

In my differentiation of institutions I build on Barry Buzan’s work (as summed up in Zhang and Buzan 2012 and Wang and Buzan 2014), but develop it according to my own understanding. Buzan has already taken the work of the English School founders further and is credited by Viotti and Kauppi (2012:248-9) to have introduced concepts of social structure and a theory about norms into the English School, not least bringing globalisation into the world society concept. Zhang and Buzan distinguish ‘primary institutions that evolve to constitute both players and the game of international relations’ (Zhang and Buzan 2012:10, reference also the following quotes). They also
call them organic institutions such as sovereignty, non-intervention, territoriality, nationalism, war, balance of power, international law, diplomacy, great power management, the equality of peoples, colonialism\footnote{In earlier publications – here cited by Qin 2010:136 – Buzan identified as primary institutions sovereignty, territoriality, diplomacy, great power management, nationalism, the market, equality of people and environmental stewardship, a fairly heterogeneous list.} which they say are ‘composed of principles, norms and rules that underpin deep and durable practices’ and also ‘form the social structure of international society, which is dynamic and always evolving, albeit usually slowly and with a great deal of continuity’. Distinct from those are ‘recent, instrumental, mainly state-designed expressions of the underlying social structure of modern international relations’ such as regimes and intergovernmental organisations designed by states or international organisations to fulfil functional purposes. While I share Buzan’s basic idea\footnote{Wang and Buzan (2014) use a similar taxonomy}, I find their list analytically somewhat confusing, as principles and norms, structures and institutions are not well distinguished and seem to be conflated into one and used almost synonymously, while the distinction to secondary institutions seems to rely more on a timeline (recent, modern – but then why is colonialism still in the list of organic institutions?). Moreover, the list does not include any economic institutions although they argue themselves that the economy equally ‘constitutes both the players and the game of international relations’. The list remains quite euro-centric, as it does not reflect some other possible institutions such as the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence, or some of the institutions of for instance the Confucian International Society which in the context of their investigation of the Chinese tribute system is somewhat astonishing. Multilateralism is entirely missing from their list.

Building on their categorisation, Buzan and Zhang develop four types of ‘anarchic international societies’ which ‘reflect basic organizing principles inherent to increasing degrees of international social order’: power political, (Westphalian) coexistence, cooperative and convergence. To complicate terminology still further, Zhang and Buzan (2012:11) also refer to a partly parallel scheme by Reus-Smit and Clark, which introduces ‘fundamental institutions’ embodying ‘sets of prescriptive norms, rules and principles’ which are shaped by higher order constitutional structures which again are beliefs, principles and norms and confer legitimacy on actors and their behaviour. According to the review by Zhang and Buzan, Reus-Smit and Clark see these constitutional structures as constituted by ‘a hegemonic belief about the moral purpose of the state; an organizing principle of sovereignty; and a norm of pure procedural justice.’

From there the authors are going on to examine the investiture and tribute system as an international society with different institutional design and constitutional structure informed by Chinese culture. In other words, instead of clarifying their terminology and trying to distill structures/institutions for that system which are comparable to the more familiar ‘Westphalian’ ones which they use for their classification, they argue for a culture-specific case to qualify as international society by itself. While I agree that the Confucian world qualifies as international society and condone their attempt to overcome Euro-centrism, their approach does not advance theorising about international society and its institutions much, as basically at any given time and place analysts can construct a specific society and distinguish it from others leading to an atomisation of international society theory and a ‘museum collection’. As Lu (2010:112) observes when evaluating attempts to develop a specifically Chinese IR theory, mere opposition of different
schools does not imply scientific progress in knowledge creation (cf also Popper in II.1 and my review of Chinese IR literature in IV.7). A mere list of different international societies does not enhance the explanatory value of the concept. A clearer terminology can go some way to alleviate this problem, without – of course – losing sight of the important specific and cultural traits of the different regional international societies which are grounded in different beliefs on the ‘moral purpose of the state’ and different role relationships. It is therefore crucial to find common or equivalent institutions and those which modify international society to produce different outcomes or types and thus explain various pathways. I make that attempt in table 4 and then proceed to analyse institutions further.

Table 4: Comparison of equivalent institutions in 19th century Europe and NE Asia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institutions</th>
<th>Sovereignty</th>
<th>International Law</th>
<th>Power</th>
<th>War</th>
<th>Economy</th>
<th>Diplomacy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Westphalian</td>
<td>Sovereignty (ruler, people, national)</td>
<td>Customary, codification Treaties, int. organisations</td>
<td>Balance of power in anarchy; Concert of Europe (great powers)</td>
<td>Instrument of policy, maintain balance of power, territorial expansion</td>
<td>Mercantilism, colonialism; partly superseded by British free trade liberalism</td>
<td>Residential Conference, Treaties, Foreign Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confucian</td>
<td>Mandate of heaven (for Chinese Emperor, but obligation to carry out rites to guarantee well-being of people); Investiture</td>
<td>Rites, agreements, historical records/ Teachings</td>
<td>Hierarchy civilisation standard, no power balance</td>
<td>Against non-member s, pirates and punishment for transgression s; territorial stability</td>
<td>Regulated intra-Asian and foreign trade; unregulated trade in affective and local networks</td>
<td>Investiture letters, tribute missions, agreements Ministry of Rites</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4.1.1.2. A fresh classification of institutions of international society

Firstly, more conceptual clarity about the institutions of International Society is required because traditionally the institutions focused too much and in euro-centric ways on power balancing and violence under assumed conditions of anarchy and discounting the economy as explained above.
Secondly, the international society concept suffers from confusion around terms such as institutions, principles and norms as I just highlighted with the example of the very different things that are listed for instance by Zhang and Buzan (2012). It requires a sharper distinction of important terms. I propose to refine the analytical distinctions among various types of institutions that allow conceptualising international society more precisely:

- **ideological (modifying) institutions** such as nationalism, multilateralism, cosmopolitanism (and in the past colonialism/imperialism (Kohn 2012 on the distinction between the two), Confucianism...). These terms condense and bring out what Reus-Smit and Clark call the hegemonic belief about the moral purpose of the state. The ideological institutions help explain change in international society. They also help answer questions regarding norms and moral beliefs of international society and its purposes as ultimately moral beliefs and ideological institutions link to people and not just to abstract political units; cf. Wang and Buzan (2014:27): 'What is the relationship between citizen and state? How do we live the 'good life'? How is progress possible in international society?'

- **constitutive institutions**: sovereignty, international law, the market economy (and their equivalents under for instance the Confucian belief system – see table 3 – or other past institutions in a colonial relationship for example)

- **instrumental institutions** necessary for conducting the relationships in international society: diplomacy, balance of power, multilateral organisations, trade, rules, investiture and tribute system to name a few (they are often subject of foreign policy analysis)

- **mechanical or functional institutions**: These are ideologically largely neutral (little inherent normative content) nuts and bolts institutions consciously designed by states to make international society function (technical regimes and intergovernmental organisations).

This classification having been made, it is important to acknowledge that any type of cooperation contributes in smaller or bigger ways to a learning process which may affect later evolving norms of international society (cf. Lewis and Steinmo 2012; or the ideas of functionalism). Hence this classification should be used dynamically and not be seen as statist.

The differentiation I propose of institutions at ideological, constitutive, instrumental and mechanical levels opens up the concept to conceive more precisely of important forms of inter-state behaviour, relationships and order as institutions of international society across regions and across time. In particular it allows conceiving of international society in different times and places in a comparative and more systematic way rather than just producing a collection of different international societies as Zhang and Buzan (2012) do (see above). There are equivalents

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208 To some extent that is normal, as institutions evolve (Lewis and Steinmo 2012). For example formerly constitutive institutions of (some) international societies such as war and great power balance in 'Westphalian Europe' and the European Concert or colonialism (Kohn 2012) have lost their constitutive character with the decline of violence and war as instruments of politics that we have observed.

209 Successful cooperation tends to lead to more cooperation and more mutual trust. It may contribute to network governance and webs of personal relations between the people and their organisations involved in the cooperation processes. Functionalism has built on such an approach to explain institutionalisation through spill-overs. I use it to explain why in a world of regions (differently constituted regions) and a world of more and more complex and interlinked issues the international society develops and manages (more or less) centrifugal tendencies of regional development paths. A bit like the solar system's planets move away from the centre, yet keep a certain order without clashing. This will be part of my analysis in the context of the EU integration process.
even though the exact terms differ (Confucian ‘heavenly mandate’ differs from Westphalian sovereignty but has an equivalent analytical (and ideational) core function describing the rule over a territory, people and legitimate use of force). The institutions and their character as constitutive, instrumental or mechanical evolve with the logics of anarchy or hierarchy and the prevailing ideological institutions (norms, modifiers) of international society. They can move between categories because they are part of a socially constructed and empirically documented reality. I will review all the categories in more detail next.

4.2. Ideological institutions

Ideological institutions are powerful modifiers of the constitutive institutions and of state behaviour related to widely shared moral beliefs and norms such as nationalism, multilateralism, Confucianism, or cosmopolitanism (the list is not exhaustive and others could be realism, colonialism/imperialism, socialism). These beliefs are not abstract attributes of states (like sovereignty or law), but are shared by the citizens (elites) making up the society of states (at the level of emotions or tymos; see below 4.2.1 – 4.2.3). But, - and this is a vital link between the two levels - these beliefs are also expressed and used by states themselves. The fine line is sometimes whether elites are simply manipulating such beliefs, but then again, the agency of these elites is part of the international society concept and the key element here is how these beliefs affect international relations (while another research agenda could focus on the domestic level drivers of the genesis, transmission and use of such beliefs – for instance Lowell 2011; Wang 2013).

Nationalism influences sovereignty, international law and the economy to produce a different kind of society and different relationships from a society with the same constitutive institutions modified by multilateralism or Confucianism as the two case studies show. Cosmopolitanism would lift sovereignty to a non-state level and international law would be further constitutionalised and democratised than the EU with probably a more ‘social’ market economy.

It is clear from this list that ideological institutions are much more conditioned in their ideational and material influence by the Zeitgeist and can be disputed in different regions much more than the constitutive institutions as such. They are either flowing from deeply anchored moral or ideological beliefs or critical political choices. They are thus subject to change as Pinker (2011) illustrates through his six trends and historical forces, albeit slowly, but at the same time they cause changes in the otherwise more stable constitutive institutions. That’s why they are modifiers both in the sense of differentiation and in the sense of change over time depending on evolution of ideas, shared beliefs and moral norms. Here I review the three ideological institutions I consider crucial for International Society 2.0 today. I already reviewed Confucianism as an ideological institution and attempts at reviving it in chapter I.1.3.

4.2.1. Nationalism

Nikolov (2008:1315) defines nationalism as a doctrine emerging in the 18th and 19th centuries along with the rise of the nation-state, which refers to doctrines and political movements that
maintain that a nation usually defined in terms of ethnicity or culture is entitled to a sovereign or autonomous political community rooted in shared history, culture, religion, custom and common destiny. Micievic (2010:1) defines nationalism as a term ‘generally used to describe two phenomena: (1) the attitude that the members of a nation have when they care about their national identity, and (2) the actions that the members of a nation take when seeking to achieve (or sustain) self-determination.’ He highlights (2010:3-4) that: Territorial sovereignty has traditionally been seen as a defining element of state power, and essential for nationhood. It was extolled in classic modern works by Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau, and is coming back to the center stage of the debate (...). It is the control of the movement of money and people (in particular immigration) and the resource rights implied in territorial sovereignty that make the topic into a politically central one in the age of globalization, and philosophically interesting for nationalists and anti-nationalists alike. The territorial state as political unit is seen by nationalists as centrally ‘belonging’ to one’s ethnic-cultural group, and actively charged with protecting and promulgating its traditions.’ Micievic (2010:5) distinguishes between civic nationalism and ethnic or ethno-cultural nationalism, the latter being the most ‘exclusionist’: ‘For the ethno-(cultural) nationalist it is one’s ethnic-cultural background which determines one’s membership in the community. One cannot chose to be a member: instead, membership depends on the accident of origin and early socialization. However, commonality of origin has turned out to be mythical for most contemporary candidate groups: ethnic groups have been mixing for millennia.’ The ethno-nationalist approach emphasizes the ethnic homogeneity of the nation-state whereas the civic nationalist approach sees a community of people who share a sense of belonging to a nation and its values independent of their ethnicity, origin, religion or beliefs (Gehler 2005:83). These definitions underline the importance of territory and ethnicity on the one hand, but also indicate that the spectrum of ideas about nationalism is quite large and need not be narrowly conceived of as ethno-cultural, if not racist, as it was fashionable in 19th century Europe (Korhonen 2014:4) and still is in today’s Balkans and in NE Asia (cf. Myers 2010 for the DPRK’s extreme ethnic nationalism). A more civic idea of nationalism is currently how one could describe nationalism in the EU which is much more inclusive than the ethno-cultural one.

National identity took primacy over individual identity and autonomy, later combining with racist and ‘social-darwinist’ ideas to create an offensive or even totalitarian form of nationalism (Gehler 2005:81). Ideas about national self-determination, national pre-eminence and ethnic superiority or ‘standards of civilisation’ (Gong 1984, Hobson 2012, Pinker 2011, Mazower 2012) became one of the driving forces of international relations, including imperialism which with these ideas and the enormous increase in military power and industrial prowess of European

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210 A cross-Atlantic survey by Glocalities Why elites are failing...and people revolt (Lampert and Blanksma Ceta 2017) draws attention to a new political divide between Patriots and Egalitarians arguing that this ‘schism is closely related to the two different tendencies which form the essence of glocalization: the tendency for universalism (in political terms: cosmopolitanism) and the tendency for particularism (or nationalism in the current political context)’, but also explain this dynamic by a backlash against cosmopolitan elites, globalisation and digital disruption. This is different from traditional nationalism as a competition between nations for superior status or territory.

211 Here I draw a line between modernity which is about the emancipation of the individual and the actually rather pre-modern, tribalist nationalism (Pinker 2011) of the 19th and 20th century, but I am aware that others like Hannah Arendt see the totalitarian state as an integral part of modernity. But this is why I prefer not to use the term ‘modern state system’ as it may have many different implications, but refer to ‘Westphalian’ and nation-state to distinguish different meanings, ‘Westphalian’ here focusing on the concept of sovereignty despite the misgivings about this term which I noted elsewhere.
nation-states led to European dominance over most of the globe (Fidler 2001). Schmale (2010:94-5) shows how the concept of 'nation' became racially defined in the 19th century, contributing to an atomistic view of the European state system as well as to legitimising imperialism (discourse of alterity and racial superiority). International law at that time was a key vehicle (instrumental institution) for the nationalist, euro-centric idea of a standard of civilisation (Fidler 2001), a theme also underlying the English School's euro-centric narrative of an expansion of international society (Suzuki 2014:76-80). As we have seen in part I, rather than a standard of civilisation Europeans exported violence to destroy existing international societies and humiliation contributed to a nationalist backlash. Nationalism has been the most enduring legacy of Europe's 19th century imperialist expansion.

This is an example of how powerful ideological institutions of international society can be when material conditions allow it. European imperialism indirectly extended the nation-state system – which went far beyond the dynastic-legal Westphalian concept of the state system - to East Asia (and the rest of the world) as the colonised people adopted nationalism as the preferred ideological belief (some adopted socialism but usually in one country) and national sovereignty as the key institutional objective to sustain the anti-colonial struggle. Osterhammel (2011:603) argues in his history of the 19th century that the modern Western notion of the state was too clear-cut to adequately capture the diversity of polycentric and hierarchic political worlds outside Europe before this extension of the "Westphalian" state across Asia and Africa. But the 'standard of civilisation' precisely aimed at "the reordering of non-Western governments, laws, economics, and societies in the image of the West" through the imposition of the 'Westphalian' state, Western international law and other norms (Fidler 2001:141).

Despite this obvious consequence of nationalism for international relations, there is only a limited literature examining the connection between nationalism and IR (Kostagiannis 2013). This has to do with the paradigmatic disregard by mainstream IR theorists on the domestic constitution of states, although nationalism has been at the origin of the (from the realist point of view) paradoxical increase of the number of states in the international system (Kostagiannis 2013:836) if not the historic (and euro-centric) phenomenon of the nation-state to begin with (Gehler 2005:80).

Nationalism is not simply a domestic issue; it is a 'raison d'Etat' and informs the institutional behaviour of states in international society. It is obvious that nationalism with all the passions and mass mobilisation for or against territorial expansion or the 'honour of the nation' constituted the state and international relations in a different way than the old dynastic states (or trading republics) embodied only by monarchs, a small bourgeois elite or a Confucian ruler. Nationalism strengthened the state after the 19th century liberalism had started to weaken it and created the notion of 'national interest' shifting state legitimacy to the projection of military power (Osterhammel 2011:902-3) rather than power balancing. Hence abstract structural realism considering all states as like units does not seem a convincing approach to explain international relations across time and different regions. Kostagiannis (2013:836-7) describes nationalism 'as a phenomenon whose emergence and development is determined by the domestic and international distribution of power, and yet in turn obtaining a dynamic of its own which alters the former'. Like other institutions it is not static and mirrors 'the changes in both domestic and international
4.2.2. Multilateralism

Ruggie (1992:566-8) defined multilateralism in the following way: "what is distinctive about multilateralism is not merely that it coordinates national policies in groups of three or more states, which is something that other organizational forms also do, but that it does so on the basis of certain principles of ordering relations among states." Caporaso (1992:600-1) defines multilateralism more comprehensively and treats it as a belief or ideology rather than a state of affairs: 'As an organizing principle, the institution of multilateralism is distinguished by three properties: indivisibility, generalized principles of conduct, and diffuse reciprocity. Indivisibility can be thought of as the scope (both geographic and functional) over which costs and benefits are spread...Generalized principles of conduct usually come in the form of norms exhorting general if not universal modes of relating to other states, rather than differentiating relations case-by-case on the basis of individual preferences, situational exigencies, or a prior particularistic grounds. Diffuse reciprocity adjusts the utilitarian lenses for the long view, emphasizing that actors expect to benefit in the long run and over many issues, rather than every time on every issue.' Both Ruggie and Caporaso thus consider multilateralism as a belief or organising principle, which is the way I apply the concept to international society as an ideological institution. It is astonishing that earlier definitions of international society and its institutions did not include multilateralism. In part IV I will come back to a particular way of looking at functional multilateralism. The difference between multilateralism and liberal internationalism is a more specific focus of the latter on 'domestic norms and legitimacy' such as liberal values or a particular form of government. Multilateralism can work with liberal and illiberal internationalists and independent of the domestic constitution of states provided they subscribe to peaceful coexistence, international law and the above principles. It can, in other words, be functional rather than normative (in a moral prescriptive sense) although multilateralism is itself a powerful norm condemning violence as an instrument of international relations, emphasising cooperation over conflict and striving to find solutions to collective action problems (the 'tragedy of the commons'). Such a belief contrasts with the winner-takes-all tendency of nationalism.

Multilateralism is not incompatible with national interest (or even nationalism), but in multilateralist approaches other beliefs and principles than 'nation first' are strongly anchored, such as peaceful co-existence, respect for agreements and membership obligations in IOs and other principles of international law. As always, this is a matter of degree: in deeply integrated multilateralist societies, such as the EU, multilateralist principles are stronger and sometimes constitutionalised and guaranteed by judicial review, in others the commitment to multilateralist principles can be much looser, more functional than ideological. Trust is a key enabler of multilateralism (Köhler 2014). Trust can also help bridge moralisation gaps which in turn facilitates multilateral cooperation.

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212 Osterhammel (2011:580-603) traces and categorises different pathways to the nation state globally in the 19th century: revolutionary independence of colonies, hegemonial unification and evolutionary autonomisation.

213 Which is slightly at variance with Caporaso’s above definition in that it is actually differentiating relations case-by-case but on the basis of issue-areas and situational exigencies.
A key problem of multilateralism remains democratic accountability (in an increasingly polycentric mode of multilateral governance and especially a trilemma of democracy, national sovereignty and global economic integration) as we will examine in following chapters and in parts III and IV.

4.2.3. Cosmopolitanism

Cosmopolitanism is defined by Micievic (2010:19) as 'the view that a. one's primary moral obligations are directed to all human beings (regardless of geographical or cultural distance) and b. political arrangements should faithfully reflect this universal moral obligation (in the form of supra-statist arrangements that take precedence over nation-states). ' Kleingeld and Brown (2013:1) emphasise that there are different versions of cosmopolitanism but argue that the 'nebulous core shared by all cosmopolitan views is the idea that all human beings, regardless of their political affiliation, are (or can and should be) citizens in a single community.' They distinguish among political cosmopolitans: 'Some advocate a world state, some favour a federal system with a comprehensive global body of limited coercive power, some would prefer international political institutions that are limited in scope and focus on particular concerns (e.g. war crimes, environmental preservation), and some defend a different alternative altogether.' (Kleingeld and Brown 2013:12). In the liberal cosmopolitan approaches the role of the state diminishes in favour of directly addressing rights, duties, needs and interests of human individuals (for a critical discussion of Habermas' attempt to reconcile the liberal-individual tradition and the democracy-people's sovereignty tradition in cosmopolitanism Mouffe 2010:108-17). In short, liberal cosmopolitans stress the individual human being as the unit of analysis (and concern), they postulate universality and equality of all human beings and argue that these beliefs should become the general principle of international politics (this rationale underpins the concept of human security as developed in the 1994 UNDP Human Development Report). For Dunne and McDonald (2013:9) ‘cosmopolitans who regard sovereign states as having the potential to play a positive role in world politics are accepting of states, but only conditionally. For them, the legitimacy of states will wither as new and more just forms of community evolve depending on the extent to which states perform functions consistent with cosmopolitan principles.’

Such views are thus incompatible with realist positions in IR or with nationalism. Certain economists defend an economic cosmopolitanism in the form of free trade with minimal political involvement (Kleingeld and Brown 2013:13-4). The historical context to current thinking about cosmopolitanism is anchored according to these authors in the European Enlightenment when philosophers reflected on the increasing rise of capitalism, world-wide trade, empires expanding across the globe, membership in a ‘republic of letters and the impulses of the American and French Revolutions with the declaration of human rights, the sovereignty of the people and by extension of the indivisible sovereignty of the human race as a whole in a single world state (Cloots) or an international legal order and league of nations (Kant) or a world federation with multi-layered sovereignty (Fichte) (Kleingeld and Brown (2013:7-9); Martus (2015).

In my examination of European Law (in chapter 4.6.2. below) cosmopolitan concepts play a role (as they do for the International Criminal Court), which can be traced back to Kant: 'Kant also
introduced the concept of "cosmopolitan law", suggesting a third sphere of public law – in addition to constitutional law and international law – in which both states and individuals have rights, and where individuals have these rights as "citizens of the earth" rather than citizens of particular states." Kleingeld and Brown (2013:9).

In a less euro-centric tradition, Confucianism is clearly a cosmopolitan ideology, especially when one looks at some of its Daoist roots that go beyond even the focus on human beings or humanity as a whole to include nature and the harmony of all beings (animated or not) (Cheng 1997; Zhao 2005). However, the Confucian cosmopolitanism is state centric and in the Confucian world individual states did not dissolve into one entity. But we have seen that Confucian and modern Asian thinkers have developed their own cosmopolitan body of thought which is insufficiently reflected in Western literature on political theory and IR. In these they state encompasses all humanity and subsumes the individual. I will review in chapter IV.7 a modern Chinese view on cosmopolitanism reflecting a different philosophical tradition contesting views held by Western cosmopolitans like Habermas who argue that Asian societies have no choice but to adopt the individual-liberal legal order and human rights alongside capitalist modernity (Mouffe 2010:113).

There is no automaticity that nationalism will evolve into multilateralism as it did in Europe or into cosmopolitanism under some Confucian revival (Zhao 2005) despite the 'universal history trend' of Fukuyama or the 'escalator of reason' and other trends identified by Pinker (2011). The ensuing gap between ‘world society’ and ‘international society’ or a concept of interest-based order and a cosmopolitan view of the world has been the focus of debates and – as already mentioned - seen by Viotti and Kauppi (2012:248) as ‘the biggest weakness of existing English School theory, but also where the biggest theoretical if not practical gains can be made’. My thesis on the evolution of International Society 2.0 and the investigation of different historical and regional pathways and my re-classification of institutions of international society makes a contribution to this debate (part IV).

4.3. Constitutive institutions

I see three key constitutive institutions of international society today: sovereignty, international law, and the (market) economy. The current international system is not conceivable without these three institutions. There are other institutions, like war and power balance, that the system can actually do largely without, at least currently in Europe and for a long time in NE Asia’s past shown in previous chapters. We have to bear in mind that these institutions have varied across space and time and are subject to evolution (and that can be in either direction).

4.3.1. Why balance of power is no longer a constitutive institution today

War and balance of power were understood by the English School founders as primary institutions of international society alongside sovereignty and international law (Zhang and Buzan 2012:9; Viotti and Kauppi 2012:240; Hurrell 2007:30-34). They made no distinction of levels of functions of these institutions although their nature is in fact quite dissimilar. Viotti and Kauppi (2012:240) sum up the early, rather functionalist, concept: ‘for the English School the concept of order in the
anarchical society plays an important theoretical role. Order, however, results not simply from power and the balance of power, but also from the acceptance of rules and institutional arrangements that are in the enlightened, rational self-interest of states and other actors.’ Cf Hurrell (2007:32): ‘Crucial then, is the emphasis placed by international society writers on the balance of power not as the expression of some automatic or mechanistic logic of power competition, but rather as an institution with its own shared rules, mutual understanding, and unspoken assumptions that could assist power-political bargaining and legitimize agreed outcomes.’ This seems to imply a secondary, instrumental or interest-based concept for rules and ‘institutional arrangements’ accompanying or moderating violence and power balancing.

Balance of power in my new classification is currently not a constitutive but a somewhat more parochial and instrumental institution of international society although it had been constitutive of the old European international system. One could argue that even then it was merely a foreign policy designed by states, notably Great Britain, and enshrined in treaties such as Utrecht 1713 (Martus 2015:218-21), or arrangements like the Concert of Europe and the Cold War where it clearly was an important and institutionalised phenomenon. The idea was elevated to universal status in IR due to the ideational influence of realism for which balance of power (in various forms) is a sort of law of nature of international relations. Because war or the threat of it is central to the operation of balance of power, the decline of war and violence as a legitimate means of policy and as a way to deal with today’s complex anarchy also means the demise of balance of power as a constitutive institution of international society and as a way to legitimise order (cf. Badie 2011:75). It is therefore only a particular form of policy that can be substituted by other forms. It was for instance not constitutive for international relations in NE Asia before the West (Kang 2010), nor is it now in the EU. In most parts of the world it is of secondary importance now, as the threat of inter-state violence as an instrument of power politics recedes. For Wendt (1999:17-8, 284-5) balance of power is even meaningless as almost every behaviour can be in one way or another framed as balancing and thus explains little. According to Cooper (2004) Europe after WWII and the Cold War developed a new system replacing the ‘modern’ (nation-state based) balance of power system.

This does not mean that states renounced trying to use their power to influence international politics, or EU decisions. But balance of power theory argues that this goes beyond such simple politics and tactics to explain order and system structure, which based on the findings of the tale of two regions goes too far. Hence, I classify it as an instrumental institution like diplomacy. And indeed, it remains an instrument of foreign policy and one way (among others) of how foreign policy is analysed and strategically or tactically conceptualised, not least in NE Asia (Green 2017: 541-2).

The 'new' EU system is an embodiment of a much older idea of a united Europe and has its roots in the Kantian world peace idea. This system doesn’t rely on power balance, does not emphasise

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214 This view has certainly been influenced by anglo-american thinking rooted in the IR research focus on the British and American Empires. The German Empire during the era after the Peace of Westphalia until the Napoleonic wars was rather different in nature, a mutually interdependent patchwork of overlapping ‘verflochtenenen’ spheres of authority and complex composite politics rather than a system of power balance (Martus 2015:215-6) which looks more akin to international society or complex orders like the EU than the balance of power systems.
sovereignty and has overcome the separation of domestic and foreign affairs: “The European Union is a highly developed system for mutual interference in each other’s domestic affairs, right down to beer and sausages.” (Cooper 2004:27) Cooper's ‘post-modern’ world – or Wendt’s Kantian logic of anarchy - extends beyond the EU to military matters (CFE treaty) and international justice (ICC) - the focus of the debate between pluralists and solidarists in the English School (Bellamy 2005, Buzan 2005).

Beyond the question of the importance of balance of power in a particular time and space, balance of power as an instrumental institution of international society can be understood as an expression of sovereignty and to a minor extent of international law (for instance arms limitation treaties, conventions against chemical and biological weapons etc. which regulate the military balance through international law). It describes a particular international behaviour of sovereign states notably in military strategy. In this perspective it is not constitutive of the system but is one way of regulating international relations between states, hence it is best seen as an instrumental institution.

It is due to the Paris Peace Pact (or Briand-Kellog Pact) of 1928 and the creation of the UNO\(^{215}\) and the subsequent thick institutionalisation that international law has risen to become constitutive of the system replacing balance of power (compared to pre-19th century systems; Mazower 2012:191-213). Arguably, it often falls short of universality and can sometimes be considered as an expression of institutional power in Barnett and Duvall's (2005) sense. Which institution falls into which category can change over time and space and depends on prevailing logics of anarchy and hierarchy which in turn are devised according to shared beliefs on the purpose of social and international relations. I will turn now to the three currently constitutive institutions of International Society 2.0.

4.3.2. Sovereignty, international law and the market economy in the two regions

In the two regions I am comparing there are widely divergent ideas about these three constitutive institutions:

1) sovereignty is an expression of nationalism and power politics in Asia; in the EU the syndicated cooperative sovereignty is an expression of constitutionalised multilateralism\(^{216}\);
2) there is a largely instrumental use of international law subordinated to national sovereignty in Asia, whereas constitutional international law is superordinated over national sovereignty in the EU in specified areas;
3) there are different versions of capitalism: national development state with state-directed market economy in NE Asia; the liberal, social and integrated, transnational (single) market economy in the EU (and various scales in between).

\(^{215}\) This is also an argument used by Arrighi (2010:68-9) who attributes to US hegemony the restrictions of the rights and powers of sovereign states through the creation of the UN and BWI although the USA ended up using these institutions in a different way during the Cold War (Mazower 2012:216-49).

\(^{216}\) But the EU is eager to promote its sovereignty in external relations such as diplomatic protocol, right to speak in UNGA, membership of IOs, using state-like symbols like flag and anthem etc.
But despite diverse interpretations these three institutions are still shared and accepted by all (including by the outlier DPRK in its own way) as the founding stones of international society, hence they are constitutive of international society. How states conceive of these institutions allows establishing a minimum of commonality for international society, such as mutual recognition, peaceful co-existence or the ability to enter into agreements or join IOs.

Constitutive institutions are characterised by the authority to change formal decision-making rules or organising principles and – this is where the economy comes into play – determine the power over resources (Hooghe and Marks 2001:23). Here I will make some general points and in chapter 4.6 I will analyse more extensively the three constitutive institutions. Constitutive institutions are not neutral, but modified by ideological institutions. The relationship is both ways (I’m not looking for a causal relationship, but a social, relational one). Thus the constitutive institution sovereignty for instance was socially constructed in different ways at different times and places (Osiander 2001) and the word itself may not have been used in all these constructs (see equivalence table 3). Yet it always had its core constitutive function as autonomous rule over a territory and people and guarantee of domestic order, law and peace (Hobbes 1651/2013:99-107). The way it was exercised changed due to such modifiers as Christian, Confucian, nationalist or imperialist ideology or through multilateralism or cosmopolitanism.

The ideological institutions procure legitimacy in the form of shared beliefs for the prevailing logics from different sources (domestic and international). Nationalism and sovereignty have since the 19th century been shared nearly universally as key legitimising beliefs and organising principles, but each nationalism in itself is constituted in specific ways and often as against another. Nationalism as we have seen was not an ideological institution in the Confucian world where cosmic and social harmony was the key moral belief and the dichotomy (or graduation) was between civilised and less or uncivilised peoples. Nationalism was also not a determining variable before the 19th century in Europe. Sovereignty or its equivalent in both regions (autonomous rule fits both regions) was linked to dynasties and their states in sometimes highly personalised ways, sometimes in more amorphous forms (such as the already mentioned arrangements of the Holy Roman Empire until 1806).

Sovereignty in principle can be shared in small boundaries (e.g. tribal ethnic or nationally) wider boundaries (e.g. regions) or universally (all humanity rather than states i.e. cosmopolitanism, analogous to people's sovereignty taking over from that of monarchs in the 18th and 19th centuries). But – different from autonomy – sovereignty’s full realisation depends on the recognition by other sovereign states. Beyond such key concepts are more specific norms defined by groups of states based on political systems and shared values, such as democracy, human rights and other liberal-cosmopolitan precepts which have not yet achieved the same universal acceptance as nationalism and sovereignty, such as humanitarian intervention. These are often implied “membership criteria” when Western politicians talk about the international community. A good example is the norm of peaceful co-existence which includes the protection of (and by) sovereignty and from non-interference in domestic affairs widely promoted by emerging and developing countries while many Western countries now put (cosmopolitan) human rights protection ahead of non-interference (within Europe through the European Convention of Human
Rights and the Strasbourg Court; abroad often in more controversial ways). This indicates a moralisation gap that has to do with the extension of International Society Mark I by the European 'great powers' through colonialism/imperialism in the past. I will come back to this moralisation gap in the part on global governance.

Table 5: Institutions of International Society in Europe and NE Asia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Constitutive institutions</th>
<th>Sovereignty</th>
<th>International Law</th>
<th>Economy</th>
<th>Ideological (modifying) institutions</th>
<th>Political norms</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Europe (EU)</td>
<td>Syndicated, Cooperative; transformative, normative</td>
<td>Constitutionalised, Supranational law above national law, direct effect, actionable by citizens</td>
<td>Liberal and social market economy; global, regional, transnational regulation and networks</td>
<td>Liberal multilateralism; cosmopolitanism</td>
<td>Shared, liberal, HR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NE Asia</td>
<td>National, sacred; defensive</td>
<td>Positivist, separated from domestic law, no or limited direct effect, not easily actionable by citizens, state-centric</td>
<td>Various: Autarky, state managed market economy, Development states; global and partly regional regimes, but mostly national regulation</td>
<td>Nationalism (realism)</td>
<td>Peaceful coexistence of different political value systems</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4.4. Instrumental institutions

Instrumental institutions are closely linked to the constitutive ones and translate them into relationships. They are necessary or instrumental for the exercise of sovereignty, the rights and obligations under international law (within the framework of written or unwritten rules the state has subscribed to) and the maintenance of the constitutive institutions. Instrumental institutions include diplomacy, war and strategies of balancing (including alliances), but also market rules, and concrete organisational expressions of multilateralism like the UNO, the BWI or the WTO. In the
Confucian world the investiture and tribute system was an important instrumental institution.

As argued above, the balance of power remains an important (nationalist) instrumental institution in NE Asia where it underlies foreign and security policy making and strategies. In the EU the balance of power is now mediated through the syndicated hierarchy and multilevel governance structures.

The WTO liberal trade regime is an important (multilateralist) instrumental institution (of international law and the market economy) of the international society in the economic realm with legalisation and arbitration as its key characteristics. It includes an organisational structure, supra-national dispute settlement and compliance mechanisms and international law agreed by parties. It has made an important contribution to defining the global economic logic of anarchy in market-economy terms, rather than mercantilist or protectionist terms. The latter have been associated with the Great Depression in the 1930s and the lessons of that period have been an important support for keeping an open trade regime during the global financial crisis for instance through the G20 process (Drezner 2012).

Diplomacy has a special status as it is normatively codified as an inviolable institution of the international state system with privileges and immunities on the one hand (such as mutual recognition of sovereignty of which diplomatic relations are an expression). On the other hand diplomacy by definition is the form of communication and intercourse among sovereign states (or state like units recognized by other states) that is essential to ensure minimal conditions of order (Hurrell 2007:37). It is to a large extent part of the core function of international law: regulating interaction and consequently has been formally codified (in 1961 only) in an international treaty (Vienna Convention). Diplomacy both as norm and form has clearly been characteristic as an institution for the state system and international society across the ages and in different regions (even if the practice may have produced different names and forms for the functional equivalent of diplomacy, such as tribute missions in the Confucian regional society). The current international system is also inconceivable without it, but I do not see it as constitutive, because unlike sovereignty, the economy and international law, diplomacy is a form of interaction only and does not in itself constitute an international society (there can be sovereignty without diplomacy as China during the Cultural Revolution has shown, or there can be communication and interaction between states even in the absence of formal diplomatic recognition like in the Six Party Talks on the DPRK’s nuclear programme. Among the six participants some have not established diplomatic relations with each other (US, Japan and ROK don’t have diplomatic relations with the DPRK). But there is no formal diplomacy without recognised sovereignty or internationally recognised legal personality of an international organisation such as that of the EU).

On the other hand diplomacy is also a catalytic institution instrumental in creating and developing international law (treaty negotiations, diplomatic conferences, creation of regimes and IOs). It is thus probably best seen as an instrumental institution expressing sovereignty and making possible formal interaction between states (and similar state-like actors) through the exercise of sovereignty

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217 Not all parties are sovereign states, for example Hong Kong or Taiwan as separate customs territories.
218 During the Cultural Revolution 1966-76 the PRC only maintained one Ambassador abroad, in Egypt.
and law-making powers of the participating states (and in some cases of the EU). Diplomacy as an institution is subject to change and evolution and some of its current practices may already seem anachronistic to many people in today's internet society.

Diplomatic relations were often established to enable trade to take place with a minimum degree of safety for merchants and for a long time with a maximum of state control (not least to extract revenue from the activity of traders). This instrumental use of diplomacy was characteristic not only of Europe, but also North East Asia. Protection against (or sometimes deliberate and covert use of) piracy have been long standing features of European diplomacy (especially in the Mediterranean and the colonies, but also in NE Asia) and international relations (and the development of navies) and are to this day. Sea lanes of communication as well as fishing grounds are crucial for economic activity and have prompted international agreements and conventions but also conflict.

‘Economic diplomacy’ therefore is as old an institution of international society or the state system as diplomacy tout court or war (with which it was often intimately linked) underlining the constitutive relationship between the state and the economy. Arrighi (2010:40) shows how Venice and other North Italian city states took the lead in developing dense and extensive networks of residential diplomacy (different from the non-resident tributary missions in the Confucian world):

‘through these networks they acquired the knowledge and the information concerning the ambitions and capabilities of other rulers ...which were necessary to manipulate the balance of power in order to minimize protection costs...The accumulation of capital from long-distance trade and high finance, the management of the balance of power, the commercialization of war, and the development of residential diplomacy thus complemented one another and, for a century or more, promoted an extraordinary concentration of wealth and power in the hands of the oligarchies that ruled the northern Italian city-states.’ Establishing resident diplomatic missions in China was a key objective of European powers in their wars with the Qing dynasty which initially refused such requests.

Multilateral organisations, regimes and processes of international negotiations and the codification of international law and rules for instance under the UN framework are a characteristic instrumental institution of post-WWII international society. Membership and participation in this kind of organisational activity is going beyond traditional diplomacy, but can be seen as an extension of it or as a result of diplomatic agreements. Like diplomacy itself, these regimes are also important expressions of statehood and international influence (in particular for developing countries) as a tool of policy of sovereign countries (thus countries seek membership in IOs to enhance their sovereign status and recognition rather than to contribute to solving collective action problems; hence also the difficulties of EU normative actorness on the international stage and in the UN and other IOs). They thus qualify as instrumental institutions to help achieve the ultimate purpose of international society: order, ideally of the peaceful and prosperous sort.

4.5. Mechanical institutions

A third category of institutions are mechanical ones, the nuts and bolts of international relations,
so to speak, that do not depend much on prevailing norms. At times they may have been created to serve the needs of the (market) economy (trade agreements). They reflect technical aspects of communication, interaction and international law. The nuts and bolts include technical regimes (to regulate standards and measures on aviation and shipping for instance), negotiations, arbitration and any more or less universal conventions which make the system as it is constituted work, but have only limited or indirect influence on how international society is constituted. They often relate to the people who are involved in managing the institutions and are conducting international policy on a daily basis. Most of those institutions for instance continued to function during the Cold War despite ideological divergence. Of course there is a grey area in the sense that over a long time even such mechanical institutions have a history of constitutive innovation: for instance the idea to set up international organisations in the 19th century to agree on time, postal and telegraphic communication or international train time tables and so on to respond to internationalisation (or early globalisation). While those innovations developed a life of their own and may spill over to foster denser cooperation among states, the objective was overall of a technical nature to ensure communication or solving problems. The theory and logic of neo-functionalism (Haas 1958) proposed that such functional institutions could create political spill-overs changing the nature of the political system or of international society gradually.

In general terms, the categorisation of institutions is always subject to time and process and changing ideological beliefs as the example of 'balance of power' shows, but political spill-overs in practice have been largely limited to the EU and are generally subject to the evolution of the ideological institutions or modifiers specific to the EU’s constitutional evolution. How did the constitutive institutions of international society evolve? What drives change? How did the different versions we observed in the two regions come about?

4.6. Constitutive institutions of International Society and their evolution: sovereignty, international law and the economy

4.6.1. Sovereignty and international law in different logics

Many scholars consider sovereignty as the “foundation of both of International Relations (IR) as a field of enquiry and of international politics as an ‘actual existing’ field of practice.” (Lawson and Shilliam 2009: 657). Sovereignty is in their view synonymous with the emergence of the modern state or the ‘Westphalian system’. World order in this classical view remains tied to a distinction between inter-state relations and domestic affairs of states. Given the absence of central authority the ‘power’ of states is the essential instrument (for realists) to pursue state interests and to influence the behaviour of other states. In its ‘ideal’ form, the ‘Westphalian system’ is built on formally equal units which recognise each other’s domestic sovereignty and sovereign equality. Initially sovereigns were monarchs (hence the early indivisibility of sovereignty for which for instance Hobbes was a strong advocate) until the French Revolution shifted sovereignty to the people, parliaments and different branches of government and the judiciary represented and “divided” domestic sovereignty in Western countries. During the 19th century the nation-state in
Europe became territorially and increasingly ethnically defined (cf. Micievic 2010:3) producing a nationalist logic of sovereignty. However, Krasner (1999) called sovereignty "organised hypocrisy" because this formal equality was a fiction in a system dominated by a few great powers which in reality were more equal than the others. Moreover, Europeans only applied sovereign equality to the European states, not their colonies, dominions or ethnic minorities. The imperial carving up of Africa (and most of Asia) at the end of the 19th century became a safety valve to preserve the European balance of power in the face of the rise of Germany and a growing sense of nationalism everywhere in Europe (Mayall 2005, Mazower 2012). Before the UN was created, sovereign equality only applied to a small number of ‘great powers’ and hierarchy through Empire dominated international relations with the rest of the world. Sovereignty was clearly not ‘designed’ for a global system or society, but emerged from a specific European context from the end of the 17th to the 19th century. By the 19th century outside Europe and the Americas there were relatively few political entities that had a similar degree of permanent state organisation. Among them were the 'sinic states' in East Asia.

The 20th century saw an enormous increase of sovereign nation-states due to the collapse of Empires after WWI and due to the emergence of anti-colonial movements for national self-determination after WWII (Mayall 2005, Hobsbawm 2008, Osterhammel 2011:586-203, Raphael 2014). National sovereignty (despite its Eurocentrism and often questionable applicability to multi-ethnic or tribal societies in many parts of the world) has served and is still serving the newly independent countries as a shield against inequality (Lawson and Shilliam 2009: 663), foreign interference and ultimately also against deeper integration (Bach 2011). It often hides a domestic weakness of newly independent states (Mayall 2005) or utter state failure (Sorensen 2009, Taylor 2007). It is a crucial concept for all NE Asian states, not least because all have territorial and historical disputes with each other which we have seen go to the root of their national identity.

Keohane (2002:65) defines sovereignty as a social institution: 'sovereign statehood is an institution – a set of persistent and connected rules prescribing behavioural roles, constraining activity, and shaping expectations – whose rules significantly modify the Hobbesian notion of anarchy.' Keohane omits the nationalism which deeply affects the behaviour and roles of the sovereign states and actually modifies sovereignty itself. Keohane situates sovereignty in the context of Hobbesian anarchy and Lockean rationality. If in this definition one replaces ‘sovereign statehood’ by ‘Confucian statehood’ it would remain equally valid. However, the context of NE Asia’s statehood in the Confucian world was not anarchy but a hierarchical order by consensus or a shared belief in the cosmic order of things (mandate of Heaven) and did not require the institution of sovereignty to function in their international society. The function of the Confucian state was not to set up legal framework as in Europe (the rule of law), but rather to foster the sense of responsibility and harmony to produce order through a high standard of social conduct and exemplary behaviour following rites and tradition and thus an extension of the family as nucleus of society (Cheng 1997:73). This even comes close to Keohane's above reference to

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219 For details on the 'scramble for Africa' in the 19th century Pakenham (1991)
220 The use of the adjective Hobbesian is a bit disingenuous as Hobbes himself conceived of sovereignty in the same way as a set of rules and beliefs invested in a sovereign to keep peace and order in society.
221 The Chinese word for country includes the character for family.
behavioural roles in the international society. According to Cheng (1997:580) sovereignty was a cosmological concept with the Son of Heaven as the central axis and universal authority. The essential notion of Confucian government was not power but ritual harmony (Cheng 1997:75), at least in theory, with the ultimate Confucian dream of a world not placed under a government even an ideal one, but balancing and harmonising itself (Cheng 1997:78). Nevertheless, the equivalent autonomy of dynastic-state rule over a defined territory and its people well existed in the Confucian world.

Thus, the crucial point in IR is not sovereignty as such, but the logic with which it is used to conduct international relations under moral beliefs and related cultures of anarchy or hierarchy. Logics are ideologically modified by shared beliefs such as nationalism, multilateralism, Confucianism or colonialism for example. It is the combination with nationalism as an ideological institution characteristic of (initially European) International Society Mark I since the 19th century that made sovereignty sacrosanct and divisive along ethnic or national lines. The combination with racism made it aggressive and totalitarian (Hobson 2012; Myers 2010 analysis of North Korea’s ideology, while not focusing on sovereignty, shows that its race-based ideology of superiority can explain North Korea’s aggressive stance and contempt for international law and that it can be traced back to similar conceptions of Japanese imperialism). Colonialism reserved sovereignty for a few ‘great powers’ denying it to ’lesser’ countries. And we have seen in part I how the concept was adopted by NE states. The EU shows that sovereignty can be conceived in a much less nationalistic and divisive logic, but in a cooperative, multilateral and to an extent cosmopolitan one with multilateralism its distinctive ideological institution.

Sovereignty and international law are two sides of the same coin and constitutive of statehood in international society. Hobbes saw sovereignty and laws of nature as equally constitutive of domestic society (common-wealth, state, civitas). International law also reflects the ideological modifiers in international society. In 19th century Europe it came to justify the ‘superiority of western civilisation’ and Europe's colonial expansion. In the later 20th century it increasingly adopted cosmopolitan traits (at least in some Western reading) while in the developing world international law’s defensive function for national sovereignty was upheld. In the EU international law (European Law) came to be the most formal and binding expression of multilateralism with supranational character and cosmopolitan traits. In the different logics of anarchy and hierarchy international law is a key institution that has modified the international system (Pinker 2011, Mazower 2012).

The logics defining and modifying state-sovereignty are also reflected in the way international law is conceived of. Similar to realists in IR, legal positivists focus on the state, they separate international law from politics and they purge moral or normative considerations from their theories. They link compliance with international law to state consent (cf. Armstrong e.a. 2007:77-82). Such a logic makes agreeing international treaties and rules difficult and delegation of sovereignty to multilateral institutions unlikely. Slaughter and Burke-White (2006:328) formulate this logic succinctly: “States can be part of the international legal system to the degree they choose by consenting to particular rules. Likewise, they can choose to remain apart, asserting their own sovereignty and eschewing international involvement. Formally, Westphalian
sovereignty is the right to be left alone, to exclude, to be free from any external meddling or interference. But it is also the right to be recognized as an autonomous agent in the international system, capable of interacting with other states and entering into international agreements.”

For instance sovereignty and international law in NE Asia today remain in a defensive, state-centric, nationally charged, exclusive, free from external meddling ‘Westphalian’ logic of early 20th century Europe - despite the influence of globalisation in particular on control of cross-border movements and information as we shall see in part IV. How and why did the logic governing sovereignty and international law change so dramatically in its intellectual birthplace - Europe?

### 4.6.2. Syndicated sovereignty and law in the EU: multilateralism as modifying institution

Christiansen (1994:7) reduces European integration to the question ‘who has, or should have, how much sovereignty?’ Even more simply, Cooper (2004:44) defined sovereignty in the EU as ‘a seat at the table’. While these may be somewhat simplistic formulations, they show that sovereignty in Europe is divisible and extensible and not reduced to exclusive domestic control of the state that defines its place in the international system, but resembles a good that can be traded, bargained about, divided, grown and redistributed. However, this multi-level horizontal and vertical division of sovereignty differs from the domestic vertical division of sovereignty into several branches of government in the current parliamentary democracies. Cooper's 'seat at the table' hints at another difference with a domestic political system underlining that the EU is still like an International Organisation (cf. Piris 2012 on the EU’s hybrid nature) where a seat at the table and the governmental vote are the decisive element of membership. Thus, the EU cannot simply be called post-sovereign. We need another way to define sovereignty in the EU and that is to uncover the logic which governs it and which ideological institution defines it as a particular and distinctive form of international society. I argue that multilateralism (here as opposed to nationalism rather than to bilateralism) is the key modifier for both sovereignty and international law (as it is for the economy – Single Market etc.). In fact, the syndicated sovereignty of the EU is largely enshrined through legal constitutionalisation (and treaties). A good way to start is with some fundamental interpretations of the European legal order, given that international law is the one – younger - face of sovereignty, while its older face is that of force and violence.

The European Court of Justice (ECJ) in its landmark case van Gend en Loos 1963 did away with the ‘Westphalian’ boundary between external and internal sovereignty, international and domestic law: “The [European] Community constitutes a new legal order of international law for the benefit of which the states have limited their sovereign rights, albeit within limited fields, and the subjects of which comprise not only Member States but also their nationals.” According to the

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222 North Korea until 2013 went so far as to collect travelers’ mobile phones at the airport and return them upon leaving the country.


ECJ the community law not only imposes obligations on individuals, but also rights which become “part of their legal heritage”. These rights arise not only expressly from the Treaty of Rome, “but also by reason of obligations which the Treaty imposes in a clearly defined way upon individuals as well as upon the Member States and upon the institutions of the Community.” Arguing that EC law had direct effect on individuals’ rights and obligations, the Court also stated that “the Treaty is more than an agreement which merely creates mutual obligations between the contracting states”. In another landmark case in 1964 (Costa vs ENEL) the ECJ also established a clear hierarchy between the European level law and the national law.

Contemporary international relations within the EU system are constantly negotiated within this dynamic multilateral legal order not only between states but including supranational institutions and non-state actors in a very different way from traditional international law but also from a domestic legal order e.g. a federation. The legal order also confers rights and obligations on citizens and civil society (de facto especially the economic actors) in international relations like in no other international legal system. Policies implemented in various ways with authorities at different levels and functional levels in constant exchange and adaptation to external and domestic challenges no longer fit the realist notions of exclusive domestic control by states as sovereign equals and of non-interference.

Therefore, the European legal order is no longer exclusively state-centric and normatively agnostic or exclusively tied to a national version of sovereignty. Such a multilateralist legal order deeply affects the conception of sovereignty and the logic it applies to international relations in the EU and of the EU with the wider world. The multilateral European way of international law is restricting sovereignty’s violent face of power, its national exclusiveness but also ensuring individual rights in the international sphere and the distribution of public goods (such as economic and social rights and obligations).

But international law also modifies the principle of anarchy as Keohane's above cited definition of sovereignty suggests. The establishment of a new legal order and supranational institutions endowed with sovereign rights and prerogatives above national law albeit in limited fields invalidates the assumption of anarchy in international relations in Europe as we have seen and similarly that of a unique plural system of legal norms in legal positivist terms (Laïdi 2005:75). The EU legal order also empowers citizens and private actors who, through EU law dispose of powerful tools to influence or challenge national policy and legislation (at least in a large number of economic or cross-border fields) thus also limiting the ability – and internationally widely used

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224 http://curia.europa.eu/juris/showPdf.jsf;jsessionid=9ea7d2dc30d5fe8d00e697974af18e98c0669ccae029.e34KaxiLc3qMb40Rch08axu5bNf0?text=&docid=87399&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=855872 accessed on 8.4.2016

225 For a deeper discussion of the confederal or federal nature of the EU including references to a wide literature on these issues: Bolleyer and Börzel (2014). These authors argue that how to classify the EU has been a contested issue for decades, but it is widely accepted that the EU is a multi-level governance system with federal principles at work and can be compared with other multi-level systems such as federations or confederations. The EU has a large proportion of hierarchical modes of governance as well as non-hierarchical ones, but intergovernmentalism and differentiation are not as common as could be expected in an increasingly heterogeneous entity.

226 The Lisbon Treaty created the possibility for a European citizen's initiative to make proposals for legislation to the European institutions as of 1 April 2012: http://ec.europa.eu/citizens-initiative/public/welcome
practice - of states to avoid their legal obligations through non-compliance (Alter 2000:489-492). This gives the European legal order a cosmopolitan component that is lacking in most regions and in most other areas of international law.

Liberal IR and IL scholars (Slaughter and Burke-White 2006; Leonhard 2005) build on this EU innovation to prescribe this ‘European Way of Law’ as the future development path of international law to deal with globalisation’s transnational challenges and threats following the increasing dissolution of the separation between domestic and international law (and politics). They argue that “the very concept of sovereignty will have to adapt to embrace, rather than reject, the influence of international rules and institutions on domestic political processes.” This means a re-definition of sovereignty from sovereignty as control to sovereignty as (international) responsibility (Slaughter and Burke-White 2006:350-1) and as domestic participation of citizens and civil society/businesses especially in the (single) market defined by EU legislation. This is in fact a similar concept as that underlying Duchêne's 'civilian power Europe' (Duchêne 1973). He argued that Europe should domesticate the relations between states in the world through contractualisation, thus overcoming the realist anarchy and the separation of domestic and international order and domestic and international law. This therefore is also the expression of a new and distinctive logic of anarchy and hierarchy.

This new European concept of sovereignty goes back to the explicit refusal by the architects of the European Community (Jean Monnet) of the institutions of balance of power and destructive nationalism as a basis for Europe's political order (Laïdi 2005:16). It is linked to normative preferences in Europe's foreign policy that distinguish Europe from other global actors (notably the US and the Asian countries). Laïdi (2005:66-7) lists six such preferences:

1. refusal of realpolitik
2. belief in the socialising forces of international trade
3. adhesion to non-commercial values such as the precautionary principle\(^{227}\), environment protection, cultural diversity
4. primacy of wider responsibility over national sovereignty
5. the importance of individual rights
6. political compassion for global social inequity

These foreign policy preferences are expressions of Europe's identity, history, civil society expectations and interests and reflect specifically European concepts of international society. They reveal a non-nationalist, multilateralist and partly cosmopolitan ideology very different from the nationalist ideology in NE Asia and elsewhere (including the USA). Since these preferences are intended to shape the larger international society and they respond at least to some extent to Beck's (2010) call for cosmopolitan action in the face of existential global risk it is relevant to take account of them although my focus is less on foreign policy than on the international society level. The European Security Strategy (2003:9-10) explicitly takes up these preferences and the issue of sovereignty as international responsibility: 'In a world of global threats, global markets and global media, our security and prosperity increasingly depend on an effective multilateral system. The development of a stronger international society, well functioning international institutions and a

\(^{227}\) cf. Giddens 1999 linking it to the risk society.
rule-based international order is our objective’. And: ‘The quality of international society depends on the quality of the governments that are its foundation. The best protection for our security is a world of well-governed democratic states. Spreading good governance, supporting social and political reform, dealing with corruption and abuse of power, establishing the rule of law and protecting human rights are the best means of strengthening the international order.’ This quote does not mention nationalism, it acknowledges global constraints on national sovereignty, but maintains the ‘inter-national’ and state-centric conception of international society (rather than a cosmopolitan world society) but postulates domestic conformity with international norms. In this sense Europe’s development and foreign policies tend to promote certain values above traditionally national sovereignty. Kaya (2014) speaks of ‘new sovereignty’ in this context. Here is not the place to discuss typical issues related to these policies such as humanitarian interventions and conditionality on which there is a substantial literature. At the same time elements of the European Way of Law posit an international rules-based order which comprises individual rights. So elements of cosmopolitanism can be found, but more explicitly multilateralism is clearly established as the desired organising principle of international society, not just in the EU.

The EU is a prototype of ‘an extra-territorial and multi-level universe of political communities’ (Lawson and Shilliam’s 2009:664). The EU has thus created at least regionally a new international system that has very little in common with the traditional ‘Westphalian system’ (ironically also developed in Europe and then extended to if not forced on the rest of the world through imperialism). Some scholars (such as Zielonka reviewed by Henry 2010) consider the EU as a neo-medieval empire which ‘resembles in some respects the formations of overlapping political control and influences that existed in medieval Europe’ (cf. also Erk 2013 and Osiander 2001). Neo-medievalism had earlier been invoked by Hedley Bull to describe a possible alternative to the ‘anarchical society of inter-state relations’ (Henry 2010:264). While this model has some charm it ignores the religious dimension of medieval society. There are also some more fundamental problems: 1) Zielonka apparently sees the neo-medieval stage of the EU as a way to developing a Westphalian nation-state (Henry 2010:264; cf. also Osiander 2001 who likens the EU to the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation). This is an example of chrono-centrism and returnism and it is quite unlikely that the EU develops into a state in this sense. 2) The resemblance with medieval Europe is superficial. Overlapping jurisdictions had very different reasons and after the creation of nationalism and the nation-state it is difficult to turn the clock back to feudal rights centred on a myriad of personal relationships of authority and property. 3) The EU’s differentiation is due to functional and political reasons such as compromises papering over differences between member states, not grown from ‘dysfunctional God-given’ structures. 4) Instead of a typology that invites chrono-centric projections, my concept of International Society 2.0 can accommodate the issues which prompted Zielonka and Bull to come up with the neo-medieval concept: overlapping centres of authority, ‘fuzzy’ governance, diversified institutional authority, the role of private actors and the various ways of diffusion of state power shown in chapter II.3. (see also chapter IV.4). I described those as anarchy of complexity. The EU’s diversified governance is a result of and a response to such trends in the contemporary world, but at the same time ‘although the EU’s heterogeneity has increased over time, this trend has not led to the emergence of a Europe à la carte either, where member states systematically opt out from areas subject to hierarchical modes of decision-making’ (Bolleyer and Börzel 2014:400). Only
the UK, after a long history of securing exceptions to common policies, budgets and rules, has decided to opt out completely from the EU’s hierarchical modes of decision making and jurisdiction.

As argued so far, the EU has not developed a new alternative to sovereignty. However, it constitutes sovereignty and law in a radically new logic: multilaterally syndicated sovereignty. Multilateral is used here as opposed to national, but also to cosmopolitan. It also implies ‘polycentric’ governance as opposed to ‘Westphalian’ central authority (Henry 2010:268). Syndicated sovereignty is larger than the sum of its national parts and interwoven with the supranational level (so not just pooled) and it provides a ‘return on investment of national interest’ in terms of enhanced capacity to deal with international challenges and development notably in economic fields and in managing globalisation (Wade and Meunier 2010). It is not the divided domestic sovereignty of a federation and it is not the exclusive national sovereignty in an anarchic society. Neither is it the pooled but separate sovereignty of traditional multilateral organisations or a post-modern cosmopolitan sovereignty228. It is still the basic modern ‘Westphalian’ sovereignty, but used in a different multilateral logic at multiple levels, or to be more precise: by multiple authorities at different levels with considerable overlap and variation according to policy areas, hence the term polycentric. Sovereignty is still crucial in the EU – ‘Westphalian’ sovereignty in the EU has not been transferred from states to supranational institutions to create a super-sovereign Leviathan. It has evolved mainly through legalisation (Abbot e.a. 2002; Alter 2000; Slaughter and Burke-White 2006) adapted to the context of globalisation and the additional context of regional integration. Member States did not simply surrender sovereignty to the EU ‘bureaucracy’ but they defined the scope of supranational institutions’ activities and created mechanisms of oversight through committees and horizontal cooperation networks amongst themselves (Tömmel and Verdun 2009 review the different types and policy areas). At the same time states were constrained by gaps in control and lock-ins as well as unintended constitutional modifications through ECJ interpretations, doctrine or secondary legislation with the directly elected EP in co-decision (modifying state intentions). Bolleyer and Börzel (2014:385) diagnose that the ‘EU’s lack of a monopoly over coercive force, which is often highlighted when discussing the adequacy of comparing state and non-state systems, is of minor importance for its working insofar as its supranational institutions wield significant powers of hierarchical coordination.’

The multilateral, multi-level governance of the EU therefore constitutes a polycentric order. While the term polycentric governance has been coined to analyse mainly metropolitan area governance (mainly from US examples) and more recently environmental governance around the world (Thiele 2016; Ostrom 2009, 2010), polycentricity explains the EU order better than the medieval analogy. The theorists of polycentric governance define it as an organisational structure where multiple independent actors mutually order their relationships with one another under a general system of rules to deal with the complexity of collective action in the provision of public goods (Ostrom 2009, 2010; Araral and Hartley 2013; Thiel 2016). Unfortunately, most of the research and empirical studies of polycentric governance were done at local (metropolitan) governance

228 The use of the syllable "post-" implies a certain continuity not a complete break with the Westphalian system for instance through using legal instruments, contractual relations and formal equality. Bolleyer and Börzel (2014:385) classify the EU as a confederation arguing that the EU’s centre is weaker than cooperative-federalist analogies. The classification debate is not essential for my argument.
level with public policy or administration lenses (looking at efficiency of big government, markets and involvement of stakeholders and citizens). Ostrom (2009) one of the pioneers of that research agenda has proposed to apply the concept to global governance of climate change, essentially to argue that while climate change is a global problem, the solution must not be only global, but should be found at many different levels (given that specific context I will revert to polycentric governance in the chapters on climate change and global governance, where I cite the EU’s way of dealing with climate change through multi-level, multi-stakeholder approaches). More generally, though, the complex governance of the EU with competencies orchestrated by the Treaties and allocated to various centres of authority in different ways created (an enormously complex) order where various centres of authority at supranational, national and sub-national, political, parliamentary, executive, technical or advisory levels interact to produce policy (mostly through regulation or projects). The authority of those various centres varies considerably across policy areas which is why the term multilevel governance which is usually used to describe the EU is perhaps less appropriate than the term polycentric, given that the multilevel analogy suggests a more even picture of a somewhat clear-cut and hierarchical alignment of neatly superimposed layers of authority. The subsidiarity principle (Huberdeau 2017:54-5) plays an important role in the EU’s polycentric governance. The polycentric concept also captures the intergovernmental dynamics of EU decision-making (outside the Treaty) which for instance appeared during the financial crisis (see chapter III.3.1).

Despite supranational and polycentric governance, national sovereignty in the EU is still relevant and Habermas (2012) rightly points to the Kompetenz-Kompetenz (the competence for constitutional treaty modifications) as a major difference to a federation, but there is a layer of hierarchy through law (as legitimate authority) on top of the European nation-state. This supranational layer is syndicated because it is not imposed from above or entirely separate from Member States but jointly owned and managed by the Member States and the institutions they have created. At the same time it is no longer subject to explicit consent in each case and has its own more or less autonomous institutions endowed with political legitimacy. There have been many unintended spillovers, but states are still gate-keepers, albeit not in all policy-areas in which to a larger or lesser extent they also have to deal with supranational institutions, such as the European Central Bank, the European Parliament, the European Commission or the European Court of Justice who supervise, enforce and develop rules. It is not simply a zero-sum transfer of sovereignty as neo-functionalists tend to argue but a process of social adaptation of the institution 'sovereignty' that reflects political constraints on member states over time (Pierson 1996 p.147; Keohane 2002:65). This additional syndicated layer of hierarchy is not uniform and not easy to understand for most voters in the EU (and the Brexit negotiations show even for the governments) and its legitimacy relies on mostly indirect democratic representation.

Alongside the resilient state-sovereignty, nevertheless, supranational institutions matter:

- the European Commission (EC) remains a strong institution with a legal, albeit not political, monopoly of initiative and a strong network position and information advantage to guard the treaties and drive integration. Its network position has been weakened by strong states at times. However, Piris (2012) argues that if the Commission has been weakened compared to the 1980s, then it is mainly because of the development of another supra-national institution -

- The European Parliament since the Lisbon Treaty is very much on a par with the Council in terms of co-decision on legislation and budgetary matters. It is directly elected by citizens across the EU. Its political clout has become obvious when the EP’s was able to enforce its ‘Spitzenkandidat’ on the European Council as nominee for European Commission President after the 2014 EP elections. However, Huberdeau (2017:100-2) points out, structural weaknesses such as the lack of initiative and lack of control of EU resources in the budget (the EP only co-decides on spending) and with the decline of Commission legislative proposals, the EP role as co-legislator obviously diminishes.

- The European Court of Justice (ECJ) is above national courts (supremacy and direct effect rulings of the ECJ), but it relies on domestic courts for implementation and supervision (Alter 2000) and some national constitutional courts (notably the Bundesverfassungsgericht in Germany) have drawn some lines in the sand linked to fundamental democratic norms.

- The European Central Bank (ECB) has become the most independent supranational institution for the Eurozone, but it still is the hub for the network of its national central banks and confined to a specific Treaty-based mandate of monetary policy.

Thus, there is a uniquely constituted, syndicated layer of hierarchy on top of the European nation-state. It is supranational and at the same time multilaterally owned and managed by the Member States. The sovereignty of Member States has thus not been replaced by EU supranational sovereignty, but there is a new multilateral level of and a new polycentric way to exercise sovereignty. Syndicated sovereignty is enacted and exercised in different ways in different policy areas, and there are movements back and forth between supranational and intergovernmental tendencies; hence sovereignty in the EU is not exercised in a logic (or context) of anarchy, but one of syndicated hierarchy. This syndicated hierarchy has replaced the balance of power in Europe’s regional society, but has not created a ‘national’ centre (like in former European empires or like in the Confucian world that was centred on the Chinese Emperor). Instead new centres of authority have been added constituting a polycentric governance order. The supranational hierarchy does not cover all policy domains and the role of the supra-statal institutions varies from policy area to policy area. So, in Europe there may be limited state sovereignty, but enhanced, syndicated multilateral sovereignty through additional supranational or supra-statal centres of authority.

However, Europe’s sovereign debt crisis in 2010/11 has sharply altered this picture – interference in key domestic affairs is no longer confined to “beer and sausages” (Cooper 2004:27) but to monetary (since 1999 EMU) and increasingly fiscal policies – key attributes of sovereignty (new fiscal compact: Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union229) and issues that affect the welfare of citizens more than EU Directives on beer or sausages. In then ECB President Trichet’s (2011) words “We can see before our eyes that membership of the EU, and even more so of EMU, introduces a new understanding in the way sovereignty is exerted. Interdependence means that countries de facto do not have complete sovereignty."

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internal authority. They can experience crises caused entirely by the unsound economic policies of others”. What made the sovereign debt crisis so peculiar and challenging for the multilateral EU logic and thus so difficult to handle compared to previous crises is that the interference passed no longer only through the supranational syndicated hierarchy. Interference occurred directly between Member States due to the large sums involved that exceed the EU’s budget and that only Member States can mobilize (Gillespie 2013). This bilateral direct interference with only partial use of the EU institutions raises the question of democratic accountability in new ways than the traditional EU system as such (Habermas 2011) and it also released the ghost of nationalism, old prejudices and ‘forgotten’ moralisation gaps (such as the Greek government claiming wartime compensation from Germany230). Consequently this new domain is now subject to further development of Europeanisation in the multilaterally syndicated logic: the report by the Presidents of the European Council and the European Commission ‘Towards a genuine Economic and Monetary Union’231 makes proposal to develop the banking union, fiscal union etc. (cf. chapter III.3.1). The migration crisis has shown similar in-built tensions. The old nationalism is still lurking behind the controversies of the sovereign debt crisis, indicating the ‘struggle’ between the ideological beliefs nationalism versus multilateralism (or ‘European identity’).

In Europe today, the syndicated hierarchy is under attack (Nicolaïdis 2010) and confronted with a democratic deficit. Nationalism has come back to haunt the EU elites (Lampert and Blanksma Ceta 2017), most strikingly with the June 2016 ‘Brexit’ referendum in the UK. However, intergovernmentalism is not the answer to the challenges of the world of issues and even if Europe were to disintegrate, that may not lead to a return of the nation state (Vollaard 2014). More flexibility – even a multiple speed EU - more network (or polycentric) governance that includes national institutions as well, but also avoiding over-ambitious designs are being advocated (Piris 2012). The EU cannot afford to be seen as just another level of the same kind of national government that has become discredited with many voters (Leonard and Torreblanca 2014). The EU has a different role in managing the world of issues. The EU is not only a region but also part of global governance in which most EU member states can no longer pretend to play significant roles on their own (Nicolaïdis, 2010:33;38;44). However, its often mooted (relative) decline may undermine this role in global governance (Menon 2014), an area where a lot of effort by EU policymakers is needed especially after the sovereign debt crisis (part IV).

In short, state sovereignty in the EU is still relevant, but multilaterally and supranationally syndicated to different degrees in different policy areas. The sovereignty of MS has not been replaced wholesale by EU supranational sovereignty (and is thus not post-Westphalian), but syndicated sovereignty has added new ways and new centres of authority to exercise sovereignty to the somewhat diminished national level. Syndicated sovereignty is enacted and exercised in different ways depending on rules set through the treaties, EU legislation and jurisprudence (Bolleyer and Börzel 2014). It also leads to the Europeanisation of national politics. Europe has created a very specific type of international society that differs in its internal polycentric governance constitution including supranational institutions from any existing regional order, but fits into international society at large as it still operates with the constitutive institutions of

230 Greek demands for war reparations set creditors on edge FT 11.3.2015
sovereignty, international law and the market economy within the rules and norms of the international society. It is also conditioned by and responding to the wider context of anarchy defined as complexity in the age of globalisation to which I will turn in the next part. We will look at the mechanisms of that internationalisation in chapter III.1.3.

The EU’s constitution has implications on the international state system, for instance through the acquisition of legal personality by the EU, its capacity to enter into agreements with states and to be represented in the UNGA or international organisations. But even more so, beyond this formal representation, European foreign policy – or rather external action – extends multilateralised domestic policies and constitutive elements of European governance for instance on climate change to the international level. The EU pursues a constitutionalisation of global issues by promoting international agreements and organisations (UN) as spelt out in the ESS cited above. The EU actively promotes the constitutionalisation and multilateralisation of International Society 2.0 as a way to improve global governance. This EU policy on global governance tends to be resisted by the NE Asian states despite the EU having ‘strategic’ partnerships with them.

4.6.3. The logics of international law in NE Asia and Europe – nationalist, multilateralist or cosmopolitan?

International law is a constitutive institution of the international society governing inter-state relations but also international economic relations (Armstrong e.a. 2007:24-31) and it also plays an important role in the two regions we examine. We have in the previous section already seen how intimately linked it is to the social construction of the institution sovereignty.

In Europe, the institution of international law has developed essentially after the medieval period when the states were forming, albeit with roots in antiquity and canonical (church) law in which the tension between universalism and particularism is reflected. Some early precursors are simple but important principles such as ‘pacta sunt servanda’ and diplomatic immunity. International law in the modern sense did not govern international relations in Europe until the second half of the 19th century (Mazower 2012:65-93). The canon boats of Western powers brought these concepts into NE Asia at the end of the 19th century as we have seen. International law was essentially perceived by those at its receiving end as a Western product that not least served to institutionalise and ‘legitimise’ European imperialism and ‘standard of civilisation’ in the world. European colonial powers used it to annex and control vast amounts of territory and to establish commercial and other privileges (Eberhard 2006, Mazower 2012). Hence, international law is still sometimes perceived by developing countries today as biased and enshrining unequal power relationships. Even the post-1945 international regimes (UN system especially the UNSC, Bretton Woods Institutions) cemented hierarchies of power (Arrighi 2010, Mazower 2012; cf. part IV).

Is international law equally important to shape international relations in NE Asia as it is in Europe? Or are legal institutions secondary in NE Asia as in the non-legal Chinese governance tradition through moral codes, rituals and hierarchical relations (Delmas-Marty 2005) that we have also observed in the investiture and tribute system of Confucian International Society? In this context the research on Confucian ritual as constitutional norms (Hahm 2009) explores new parallels to
the rule of law in NE Asia’s past. Bell and Hahm (2003) also investigate the equivalents to rule of law in Confucian society, although with focus on civil and criminal law. More significant is of course how contemporary international law in NE Asia is used and shapes international regional society today.

In fact, NE Asian states have adopted international law – China for instance despite its non-legalistic Confucian and later socialist tradition has ratified more international conventions than the United States – but they have done so on the premise of the traditional concept of consent flowing from state sovereignty which protects their domestic autonomy. The US, originally the heartland of the international legalism (Mazower 2012:65-93) takes a similar stance, but there the hierarchy of norms is to protect the domestic democratic system from encroachment by international law, as democracy is placed above the rule of law (Goldsmith 2000). Like for the US, state consent remains a key condition for NE Asian countries to accept international law. Such issues were also for instance a major concern for South Korea when negotiating a political framework agreement with the EU, whose so called essential elements (human rights, rule of law and non-proliferation) posed a challenge for domestic guardians of sovereignty: would the application of the death penalty in Korea for example violate these essential elements and thus trigger a suspension by the EU of the agreement and the FTA linked to it? Should the EU be allowed to unilaterally suspend the agreement questioning the equality of the partners and overriding Korea's national sovereignty? Thus a dialogue mechanism (similar to Art. 96 of the Cotonou Agreement) was introduced to address this issue and to preserve Korea's sovereign equality more explicitly.

NE Asia has thus not created its own regional law system, but very much relies – if at all – on international law and that largely in a positivist, state-centric tradition dependent on consent. This attitude is linked to the utilitarian appropriation of sovereignty and international law as a tool to catch up with and defend the nations at the beginning of the 20th century: The Qing Court for instance adopted international law in such a way (Qu 2010:72), because sovereignty was upheld as inviolable by the Western countries, it could be used as a means to better fight against the unequal treaties with the West's own legal concept. Adopting Western norms and institutions like international law was also the entry ticket into international society defined as it was then on Western terms (Qu 2010:72) replacing the earlier held institution of rituals to recognise China's superior civilisation as defining benchmark for international society. Korea tried the same, but lost its newly acquired sovereignty after a short period of 'independence' from Qing China under the tribute system. Korea became a victim of the imperialist use of international law by Japan which after ridding itself of the unequal treaties imposed by the Western powers, imposed an unequal treaty on Korea (1905 flowing from the already unequal Treaty of Shimonoseki 1895) and annexed it shortly afterwards (1910; Green 2017:98-100).

A particular problem of that period is that international law was a bastard of violence: treaties, such as the ‘Protectorate Treaty’ of 1905 or the Annexation Treaty of 1910 were forced upon Korea by Japan with some important procedural formalities. The dispute between Korea and Japan about the legality of these treaties is still poisoning bilateral relations between the two countries today: There remains a wide gap between official Japanese and Korean positions and deep
controversy between Japanese researchers which focus on the claim by Korea, the UN International Law Commission and a number of Japanese researchers that the 1905 Protectorate Treaty was null and void *ab initio* because it was only signed by the Korean Foreign Minister under coercion and never ratified by the Korean Emperor (Totsuka 2011). As a consequence all subsequent treaties between the two countries until Korean independence in 1945 would also be null and void. For instance the 1910 Annexation Treaty was signed for Korea by the Japanese Resident Governor General, a position created under the 1905 Protectorate Treaty and since the latter is illegal in the Korean view, so is the 1910 one. Japan’s Foreign Ministry and a number of researchers argue that not all international treaties require ratification, so that the 1905 treaty was ‘unfair but valid’. This ‘no ratification required’ theory is itself subject to ambiguity as the international law at the time was not very explicit about that. However, Totsuka (2011:8-11), analysing Japanese international law textbooks from that period (Japanese versions tended to be translated from Western sources) including a Public International Law textbook written in 1899 by a scholar who in 1910 became a senior official in the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, finds no text that would support the ‘no ratification theory’ concluding that the Japanese official position was not even in line with customary international law at the time.

Korea regained its sovereignty only after the end of Japanese colonial rule in 1945, but was not party to the decisions made over its division or the Allies’ peace treaty with Japan (San Francisco Treaty; Green 2017:282).

This is not the place to solve a thorny legal issue that is debated between eminent legal scholars in Japan, Korea and elsewhere, but an illustration of how important and divisive the use of international law can be and how that differs from the evolution in Europe. The fact that the Japanese government, even at the occasion of the centenary of the annexation treaty in 2010 continues to maintain the legal validity of its colonial rule has prevented attempts at reconciliation (such as a suggested first ever visit by the Japanese Emperor to Korea at that occasion). The apology about the colonial rule ‘imposed against their will under the political and military circumstances’ stated by PM Kan in August 2010, failed to clarify Japan’s stance despite the PM’s affirmation that he ‘would like to face history with sincerity’. (quoted from Totsuka 2011:1). Thus the wide gap on international law between Korea and Japan reflects the moralisation gap between the two countries that international law cannot bridge. International law is here subjected to the logics of nationalism (on both sides).

A similarly problematic role of international law in NE Asia can be observed in maritime disputes around various islets or rocks. In the past when NE Asian countries didn’t ‘know’ international law these were never formally claimed as territory and mainly served fishermen as an abode or as navigation points (which is why they are found on ancient maps, but are rarely if at all mentioned in any documents). Since UNCLOS (the UN Convention on the Law of the Seas in force since 1982) introduces not only important rights to EEZs but also the principle of historic ownership, most disputes in the region that we have reviewed earlier have gained importance but have also become untractable as precisely the historic ownership tends to be disputed (McCormack 2012)

and subject to moralisation gaps. Some of the islets are also concerned by the San Francisco Treaty (1951) to which not all claimants – notably China, South and North Korea, and the Soviet Union/Russia - were part as it was signed in the heat of the Korean War. This adds another layer of ambiguity to an already complex legal picture because international agreements need the consent of all parties concerned. Legal arguments (for instance drawn from UNCLOS; McCormack 2012) are used quite frequently in NE Asia by all countries to buttress each side’s political arguments (for instance regarding territorial disputes, the Northern Limit Line in the sea between North and South Korea), but invoking the rule of law is also cover against being seen as overly aggressive.

Most agreements between NE Asian countries lack binding obligations, precision and compliance mechanisms and there is no delegation to third parties like international courts or arbitration without each party’s explicit consent. Thus, at least to some extent basic international norms are (sometimes selectively) respected and used to advance political agendas, but there is no ‘thick’ legalisation of international relations in NE Asia. The history of international law itself as an originally often instrumental institution of international society is thus still palpable in the region. For contemporary NE Asia this history, and the self-serving nationalist interpretation and use of sovereignty and international law is still an obstacle for cooperation, let alone integration.

The empowerment of individuals or private actors (companies) to use international (EU) law to challenge national laws and policies that we have observed as an effect of ECJ rulings (van Gend en Loos, Costa vs. ENEL) and which were unintended in the Treaty of Rome is something that NE Asian countries resist. For instance, while international law has the force of law in Japan, international instruments that are not binding under international law, such as declarations on human rights, have no direct legal force. Some human rights treaties, even though binding under international law, only establish an objective which is to be achieved progressively, and their enforcement in domestic law is often thwarted. In some cases invoking international human rights has helped amending some Japanese laws or interpreting the Constitution for instance on the Korean minority in Japan (resident aliens), women or confinement of mentally ill persons (Iwazawa 1998:288-90). Thus, to some extent, while an international rule cannot be directly applied, it may be applied indirectly. Such indirect application of international human rights law can actually be very effective as Iwazawa (1998) shows, but as this was clearly not intended by the authorities it does not change their exclusive approach to state sovereignty and international law. These limitations made it impossible for victims of Japanese war crimes for instance to obtain compensation through the courts.

In the narrow area of WTO dispute settlement, which can affect domestic law substantially, challenges have to be brought by governments and rulings don’t produce direct effect (Grimmelt 2010): ‘Where a U.S. law or regulation is at issue in a WTO case, the adoption by the WTO of a panel or Appellate Body report finding that the measure violates a WTO agreement does not give the report direct legal effect in this country; thus federal law is not affected until Congress or the executive branch, as the case may be, takes action to remove the offending measure.’ This situation

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is similar in NE Asian countries.

On the other hand, the more liberal, democratic countries RoK and Japan have more sympathy for the progressive liberal international law – at least if it is applied elsewhere and if it supports the national interest (Japan for instance is a strong promoter of the human security concept; both RoK and Japan have acceded to the International Criminal Court’s (ICC) Rome Statute, sponsor or support Human Rights resolutions on other countries, notably the DPRK (2013 Commission of Inquiry), in the UNGA 3rd Committee or the UN Human Rights Commission (HRC), yet both oppose UN resolutions to abolish the death penalty which both countries still have on their books and Japan still applies).

Thus there are indications that NE Asia’s traditional (but imported) ‘Westphalian’ concept of international law while still emphasising national sovereignty is showing some differences along the political system lines between a somewhat more liberal, value-oriented use of international law in Japan and South Korea and a more restrictive, positivist interpretation in China and in particular the DPRK (which openly rejects some international law like UNSC Resolutions and left the NPT – Myers 2010:134, 166). However, this does not seem to herald a fundamental change of direction towards the ‘European Way of Law’ and certainly not compromises on territorial claims. There is no compromise on sovereignty between the two democracies Japan and Korea on territorial issues (Dudden 2012, Selden 2011). South and North Korea – usually deeply antagonistic – find common ground upholding the same claim to Korean sovereignty over Dokdo and harbouring similar historical grievances against Japan.

Japan and Korea can rely on US support for their sovereignty (paradoxically at the price of limiting it in the military area) and thus can afford to be less defensive on sovereignty than China and the DPRK who, because of the regime difference and the division of their nations (along political system lines), feel threatened by the US and are thus extremely sensitive on territorial integrity and sovereignty. Surely, like-mindedness plays an identity-shaping and a foreign policy role for Japan and the ROK, but support for the US agenda is the price for the alliance. A good illustration for this link can be found in Hagström and Hanssen (2015) for Japan’s identity construction. However, both nations also emphasise their like-mindedness with the EU at times (for instance on the ICC), which has no such alliance bargain to offer.

The use and development of international law in NE Asia is therefore very different from the EU’s and does not follow the path outlined by Slaughter and Burke-White (2006) on the future of international law. According to these authors, as we have seen, the function of international law is no longer interstate relations, but governments’ capacity or will to act towards their peoples. There is clearly little appetite in NE Asia to follow such a logic of international law irrespective of political systems.

International law can work in various ways – cement institutional power or hierarchy, innovate like the EU’s supranational level or buttress sovereign equality and related normative preferences, resolve, freeze, or sow seeds of conflict. It is what states (and the EU as a supranational entity with its specific legal system and empowerment of individuals) make of it. Nationalism and
multilateralism, different logics of anarchy and hierarchy constitute this institution in tandem with sovereignty differently in different regional societies. The hard and soft power of the actors involved – be it states and international institutions or legal scholars and international lawyers - shape the international legal order regionally and internationally to define the boundaries of International Society 2.0 and regional societies. The odds are that this remains a slow process, but that globalisation with all its inherent contradictions to principles and institutions of International Society Mark I is a force that will leave a multilateral mark on its shape (cf. part IV).

After examining two ‘traditional’ institutions of international society and re-defining them in the context of ideological beliefs we turn now to the constitutive institution which has hitherto rarely been recognised as such in the International Society literature: the economy. Given the traditional ‘neglect’ and conception of the economy merely as a power resource, material capability or an externality, the first question is to ask in what way the economy is constitutive of international society? An important question regarding the constitutive relationship between states and the economy in our era of globalisation is: Do states and their ideologies still shape the constitutive institution of the market and of globalisation or are they just becoming an externality to market forces in the shifting balance of power between the state and the economy (Habermas 2011)?

4.6.4. The market economy

Trade across long distances and borders has been a human (but of course not necessarily a state) activity since Neolithic times (MacGregor 2012; Morris 2011). A history of capitalism (Kocka 2014)234 or of international trade (Finlay and O'Rourke 2007) shows that the economy has in all places and eras been deeply entwined with the state. Yet in IR (apart from liberal images) the economy is treated as a separate issue or a power resource if at all and in economics the state tends to be seen as an abstract unit and rational actor considering only comparative advantages and utility maximisation (Finlay and O'Rourke 2007:4-5).

The constitutive relationship between the state and the economy has been recognised early on by John Locke who highlighted the importance of the state in the economy: 'The great and chief end...of men's uniting into commonwealths, and putting themselves under government, is the preservation of their property;' (quoted in Morris 2011:471). Jean Jacques Rousseau in 1755 described society, state and economy as a body, a living organism where all parts function together235.

234 Kocka (2014:7) in his history of capitalism suggests that ‘market economy’ could be used instead of ‘capitalism’ which has been a controversial, often politicised concept besides also being an analytical concept. Kocka (2014:18-20) disagrees with Fernand Braudel's and Arrighi's (2010) separation of market economy from a super-structure of capitalism where the former are distinct from the financial markets. For him the definition of capitalism includes the co-ordination through markets and prices, supply and demand and a commodification of resources, production and functions. It also includes the importance of decentralised decision-making by individuals (including companies, groups) and the fundamental importance of capital, credit and profit, uncertainty and risk.

235 Rousseau in 1755 used a body metaphor for the state with sovereignty as head, law, traditions and will (in modern parlance ideas and culture) as brain; trade, industry and agriculture as the mouth and stomach that keeps the body alive and running, public finance as the blood which ‘a wise economy, functioning as the heart, distributes nutrition and life to the whole body’ with the citizens being the limbs and body (Rousseau 1964:244 my translation). The point is that one cannot decide which part is more important than others, as they all form an organic whole.
A state without resources cannot exist. The resource seeking behaviour beyond the domestic realm led to mercantilist foreign trade and colonial expansion. As Finlay and O'Rourke (2007:5) put it: 'For much of our period [the second millennium AD] the pattern of trade can only be understood as being the outcome of some military or political equilibrium between contending powers.' The early European 'mercantilist' approach to the international economy was characterized by a strong symbiosis of government and monopolistic companies such as the Dutch VOC (Vereenigde Nederlandse Oostindische Compagnie) and British East India Company (Kreiner 2012:192-203; Kocka 2014:49-53). These companies were given quasi-state like competences including in military fields. This also meant a symbiosis of violence and trade, another indicator for the constitutive relationship or mutual dependence between the economy and the state. Reasons for establishing such monopolies were state-control and revenue, security, public welfare (public goods and services, infrastructure), ideology or rent-seeking. Kocka (2014:48) sees a dynamic symbiosis of ambitious governments, calculating financiers and ruthless adventurers behind the European expansionism and the world trading system the Europeans created through trade and force. Pakenham (1991) illustrates this phenomenon in his book on the scramble for Africa by governments, financiers, adventurers and missionaries; Lovell’s (2011) account of the Opium Wars also exposes this ‘dynamic symbiosis’.

Domestic taxation, tariffs and fees on imports and exports as well as on markets, banking and financial systems have provided the states with important resources and revenue, helping to constitute effective statehood just as much (if not more) than state control over instruments of violence constituted statehood: ‘Credit makes war, and makes peace; raises armies, fits out navies, fights battles, besieges towns; and, in a word, it is more justly called the sinews of war than the money itself...Credit makes the soldier fight without pay, the armies march without provisions...and fills the Exchequer and the banks with as many millions as it pleases, upon demand.’ (Daniel Defoe quoted in Morris 2011:476). This point is important, as the economy was not simply a power resource for waging wars, but also helped establish and transform statehood itself in a constitutive relationship long before people talked about ‘globalisation’ (Kocka 2014: 24, 42-45, 46-49). This corroborates the process nature of statehood and by extension of the development of international society. Just like it makes little sense to oppose domestic statehood and the national economy, it makes little sense to simply oppose the state system to the economy or globalisation, both impact on each other – not necessarily in equal measure and in the same ways over time and space - and are mutually constitutive. Finlay and O'Rourke (2007:7) sum it up similarly: ‘Plunder may not have directly fuelled the Industrial Revolution, but mercantilism and imperialism were an important part of the global context within which it occurred, expanding markets and ensuring the supply of raw materials. Violence thus undoubtedly mattered, in shaping the environment within which the conventional economic forces of supply and demand operated.’ Finlay and O'Rourke (2007:14) interpret the evolution of the world economy essentially as cycles of eras of trade conducted within a geopolitical framework and demarcated by major wars or economic expansion, with today's framework being the Pax

\[^{236}\] Münkler (2002) usefully reminds us that the state monopoly on violence is also a rather recent phenomenon and that 'private' violence has a long history.

\[^{237}\] There is such a connection with US borrowing through government bonds largely held by China and this has been impacting on global macro-economic imbalances.
An economic system beyond domestic extortion and rent-seeking or mercantilism and colonialism pre-supposes some kind of social order (Hettne 1994:38) consisting of coherent rules accepted by the actors domestically but also in international society. According to Hettne (1994), the market system in itself is not an order, but confined by a particular order expressing a value system and normative content. Put simply: Mercantilism fits into a nationalist order, the market economy into a multilateralist one. Hence I see the market economy as the corresponding constitutive economic institution of International Society 2.0 with some regional varieties which differ according to the underlying social orders. Hettne sees the ‘new world order’ as characterised by three different capitalisms reflecting different underlying social orders: American, European and Japanese (see also Kalinowski 2012). The socialist market economy of China has entered the list in the meantime, giving rise to the currently fashionable liberal versus authoritarian capitalism dichotomy (Gat 2003).

Today's age is usually described as one of globalisation (different from the earlier colonial-imperial variant of globalisation). Globalisation is not a new phenomenon even if the word as such is recent. While 100-150 years ago, the ‘contraction of the world’ (as globalisation was then called) was on the one hand associated with industrialisation and capitalism, it was also linked to Empire and an ‘essentialisation’ of European civilisation as superior and universal (Said 1995; Eisenstadt 2000; Hobson 2012). Today, globalisation is still usually associated with interdependence, ‘deterrioralisation’, contraction of space and time and the role of non-state actors and also for many still with a form of (US) hegemony or domination (Falk 2005) or embedded liberalism (Helleiner 2010). Many of these transformations are commonly associated with globalisation especially of financial markets and liberalisation of capital flows (Kalinowski 2012). Katzenstein (2005:14) counted the entries in some databases in 1971 the word didn't appear; Arrighi (2010) writing in 1994 hardly uses the word in his 400-page study of capitalist accumulation. Thus the importance of the terminology to explain a particular transformation in a short period should not be exaggerated – Rosenberg (2005) dismisses globalisation as mere Zeitgeist.

Globalisation, while not new, is increasingly dominating the global agenda and the discourse

238 Hobson (2012:338) cites a liberal analysis by David Starr Jordan from 1919 who wrote in a book on Democracy and World Relations: ‘On sea and land, distance has been annihilated and remote peoples are closer together today than were the various parts of a small kingdom a century ago...Furthermore, the extension of [communications] and banking service to all parts of the world has made the whole earth an economic unit. Currents of trade set far beyond national boundaries. Capital goes wherever it sees a profit... Information conveyed almost instantaneously around the world becomes common property... The interrelations of financial adjustment give to the economic world a sort of sensory system. Whatever affects one part of it is instantly felt by all the others’. Hobson (2012:124) also shows how geopolitical writers such as Mackinder and Mahan at the end of the 19th century conceived of globalisation or global interdependence in similar ways as we talk today about globalisation: Mahan in 1897 wrote: ‘Events which under former conditions would have been distant and of smaller concern, now happen at our doors and closely affect us. Proximity... is a fruitful source of political friction, but proximity is the characteristic of the age. The world has grown smaller... ’ Keohane (2002) and O’Rourke (2009) are other authors who insist on globalisation being a long process and not a recent phenomenon. However, the word as such has entered the discursive space in the 1980s.

239 The industrial revolution arguably marks the beginning of globalisation as a process bringing about a radical change in the use of energy and production processes and a steep and unprecedented rise in social development (Kocka 2014). For a very long-term context Morris (2011:490-554) and Arrighi (2010).
mainly about free markets, non-state actors and democracy. In particular globalisation often refers to the rapid expansion of capital markets. The long-term perspective that the various scholars cited above have taken is important because the centennial twin processes of globalisation and modernisation (forced or not) have transformed cultures of anarchy, somewhat unevenly but in both Europe and later NE Asia. Globalisation is also linked to big strides in science which on the one hand has propelled technological progress, enhanced quality of life, diminished mortality and morbidity and helped the acceleration and contraction of the world (Kocka 2014). On the other hand that has helped making humankind become aware of the negative consequences of globalisation and risks humanity has created itself for itself (cf chapter IV.5 on global risk society).

A focus on post-War globalisation or just the last thirty or so years since the word has been in use does therefore not give a full picture (Rosenberg 2005). However, the years since the end of the Cold War (or actually a bit earlier since the Chinese reform process started in the 1980s) have seen profound transformations in international politics which have sparked the debate about the role of the state in the era of globalisation. Baumann and Dingwerth (2015) review the literature in this context. The high profile of globalisation today is due in particular to the end of the Cold War when the military balance quickly lost its structural importance for international relations and the market economy spread globally (Kocka 2014) as a constitutive institution of International Society 2.0. The globalisation debate has increasingly questioned the state and the way international society works, hence considering the market economy as a constitutive institution of international society today requires analysis and arguments beyond the historical evidence. First we shall look at the nation state's position in the globalising world.

4.6.5. The resilience of the (nation) state in a globalising world

Globalist perspectives tend to clash directly with mainstream images of the international state system including that of international society as developed by the English School (Bellamy 2005), because of globalisation from this perspective challenges the states’ primary role in the international system. In earlier discussions on globalisation some 'hyper-globalist' (Weiss 2003:3) authors argued that there was even the ‘end of the nation state’ (Ohmae 1995) mainly because the other actors of globalisation like transnational corporations, cities, sub-regions or macro-regions (Drucker 1993) took over state functions especially economic management (such arguments are understandable from the point of view of management consultants such as Ohmae). This view would consequently define international society essentially without the constitutive institutions of sovereignty and international law with companies, not states, as the main actors. This perspective – if confirmed – would also challenge my thesis about nationalism as key ideological institution. Moderate globalists argued that states were retreating from economic management, severely constrained and deeply transformed by globalisation (competition, multinationals, financial capital, WTO and IMF rules/prescriptions etc.) implying some external force that reduced the autonomy of states, which has become the 'standard' view of globalisation (Weiss 2003:3-5). I argue that this is throwing the state system out with the economic bathwater. Already the long historical view shows that the decrease of the state role in the economy since the 1980s followed a long period of exponential increase of state involvement in the economy and provision of welfare due to a large
extent to the Great Depression, the wars and upheavals of the first half of the twentieth century (cf. chapter I.2.2.3). Not least in NE Asia – a growth pole of the global economy – we have seen how important nationalism and nation states still are. More recently, the European sovereign debt crisis saw erstwhile so powerful financial actors beg states for bail-outs and states - more than the EU institutions - had to deal with those and other measures. The economic logics of complex anarchy merely forces states to adapt and behave differently and to relinquish controls of some areas that they traditionally controlled, while introducing new policies in other areas including through intergovernmental organisations and other regimes. Internationalisation (including multilateralism) is a state-society's response to the absence of a 'globalised state' at the same level as the 'globalised market economy' 240.

In this global context the old notion of 'national economy' makes much less sense nowadays. This transformation has not occurred to the same degree in Europe and NE Asia though. We will see in the case studies on crisis response in chapter III.4 that NE Asian states still relied largely on national self-help. The changes associated with globalisation do not, however, make the state system secondary or redundant, even though it may not be the best suited format to address some global challenges, as we will see shortly. Barry and Keith (2000:8) similarly dismiss the arguments of the decline of the state through economic globalisation and international trade and competitiveness based on ‘unwarranted assumptions about the efficacy of the markets and the decline of public institutions’ and argue that the states continue to play a role in structuring economic interaction and policy development including through internationalisation (Barry and Keith 2000:17).

The state, sovereignty, international law and the economy have in fact evolved over a long time and in a complex interplay as the above mentioned long-term studies show 241. The institutions influence each other (for instance mercantilism giving way to more liberal market economies and globalist approaches also influencing state behaviour and roles in the economy). Wendt (1999) identified a number of master variables (interdependence, homogeneity and common fate) for his three conventional logics of anarchy that work in combination with self-restraint. In the market economy a similar principle of self-restraint is at work (you don't rob or plunder, but trade) and trust is necessary (at a price and associated with control and compliance mechanisms). Economic transactions do not only require self-restraint, but also trust that you will be paid for your merchandise or service in a currency which has an enduring value and will be accepted by every party to trade. For example, the institution of 'good money' or 'sound money' and of course of

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240 Kocka (2014:123) sees the absence of global statehood as an unsolved problem in the development of capitalism.

241 Historical pathways influence international politics and eventually the choice or formation of economic institutions in international society as a few examples can briefly illustrate: The repeal of the British Corn Laws in 1846 in favour of free trade; the Meiji Restauration in Japan (Distelrath 2012:252-60) which despite the misleading name was in fact the Western-style modernisation and industrialisation of Japan (with the restauration of the Emperor to embody the sovereignty of the nation, hence the name); the US Open Door Notes of 1899 and 1900 demanding most favoured nation status for US trade in Asia and the preservation of China's territorial integrity and sovereignty from the European colonial powers and Japan (Arase 2012, Oberländer 2012:282) or the choice of European integration over the US preference for a global US-led liberal project. In the European case, the liberal market as an institution was part of a post-War settlement, like the Marshall Plan aid to Western Europe and the creation of the OEEC/OECD (Milward 1984) with the subsequent 'deviation from that settlement through European integration that we have analysed in chapter I.2.3. China's WTO accession in 2001 marked a decisive turn in its economic transition from socialist planning, autarky and mercantilism to a more open market approach.
‘credit’ is essential to high finance and capital accumulation. The good money notion was first enacted in Genoa by law in 1447 (Arrighi 2010:115) and has remained a key institution globally ever since (Osterhammel 2011:1038-47). This was no different in NE Asia for instance Japan’s Meiji-ishin (Restauration) introduced that same notion to stabilise the Japanese economy and trade (Distelrath 2012:248-60). Thus, the monetisation of the economy (first by private banks, later through the monetary sovereignty of states)\textsuperscript{242} is an important expression of this trust. States ensure a large portion of this trust through the issuance of currency (and until 1971 their convertibility into gold) and as lenders of last resort. The financial crises in Asia in 1997/8 and the transatlantic and European ones after 2008 to a large extent have been characterised by a breakdown of trust in these institutions in the context of a strongly interdependent economy and the need for states and central banks to restore trust. This crisis of trust in the centre of global finance (Oatley e.a. 2012) with the US subprime mortgage crisis led to a rapid proliferation of originally limited problems to the whole system especially the banking system which operates on the basis of trust. Similarly, production chains depend on trust in the timely delivery of components. Interdependent systems thus require cooperation to function properly. And cooperation requires trust (which can come in form of guarantees and agreements, financial services or through family networks as has been a characteristic of many Asian especially Chinese capitalist networks or companies such as Japanese multinationals or Korean chaebols (Katzenstein 2005; Hatch, Bair and Heiduk 2014). States and some multilateral institutions (IMF, ECB) do play an essential role in providing ‘trust’ as a public good in the economy. These master variables were also identified among others by Pinker (2011) in his long-term study on the decline of violence underlining the significance of the interaction of moral beliefs and material conditions.

Wendt's choice of the state system for his social theory of international politics and his focus on security or organised violence –similar to most writers of the realist and the English School – unfortunately puts aside the world economy as a seemingly autonomous structure of the international system. Wendt (1999:193) acknowledges that his choice of actors and structures would affect the resulting story. As he calls one of his cultures of anarchy 'Lockean' the omission of this economic story seems astonishing in the light of the quote from Locke above. Many liberals on the other hand focus on other actors than states and thus produce different (valid) 'Lockean' stories. Economic structuralists go even further: Arrighi (2010:35) does the opposite to Wendt, he sees the state system as a function of logics of capital accumulation and capitalism and nation states as tied in a scheme of contradiction and unity, with capitalism and territorialism as alternative strategies of state formation. He however, cautions that the actual outcomes may depart even diametrically from each of these logics (this weakens his argument…). Moreover, both realist and economic structuralists propose the kind of rigid framework that Popper rejects (cf. II.1.1.) and which tend to produce zero-sum approaches. Both storylines are somewhat ignoring that constitutive relationship between states and the economy and the links between their stories.

Many analysts of globalisation argue that states do not play a constitutive part in the era of globalisation or reject their continued existence on moral grounds: Proponents of world society (or globalism including Zhao 2005 reviewed in part IV.7; cf. also Lu 2012 on world government) argue that the state system is in itself the obstacle to world society, but it is their burden of proof.

\textsuperscript{242} For the significance of the creation of the Bretton Woods system as a major revolution in the agency and production of world money see Arrighi 2010:287.
that another type of social organisation than state-society could actually overcome the real differences of interests and the logic of the 'tragedy of the commons' (Hardin 1968). Keohane (2002:72) puts it this way: ‘At a more basic theoretical level, no one has yet convincingly traced the microfoundations of a socialization argument: how and why those individuals with influence over state policy would eschew the use of the state as agent for their specific interests in order to enable it to conform to norms that some self-constituted authorities proclaimed to be valid. The only major attempt in recent centuries to found an international institution on untested belief – the League of Nations – was a tragic failure. The League could only have succeeded if governments had genuinely believed that peace was indivisible and that this belief was shared sufficiently by others that it would be safe to rely “on the institutional fabric of international society”.

Another indicator of a constitutive relationship between states and the economy (and here the institution of international law comes in prominently) is that in the end of the day it is states which decide which economic activity is legal and which is not - note the defence of the opium trade in the 19th century by Britain against China’s domestic laws interdicting drug use and the classification of the same drugs trade as illegal by the international society including Britain today (Lovell 2011). In 1763 Japan banned the export of silver (Kang 2010:125) and of course one could fill books with lists of trade restrictions. Some examples of the state controlling trade and resource seeking today are licenses for imports and exports, tariffs, quotas, product standards and supervision of quality, registration of companies (even to take advantage of FTA provisions companies also have to register first with respective customs authorities) and the legal framework for the exercise of their activities, control of market access for goods, services, capital and people and so on. These are also the stuff of international law and agreements (FTAs, bilateral investment treaties, WTO) through which state control is modulated and adapted to the increasing economic processes. States determine important rules of the market, interfere in mergers and acquisitions or even create markets. The Single Market project has been at the heart of the European integration project since the Treaty of Rome (1957) and the result of (and source of) hundreds of legislative acts of the EU, thereby very much constituting the core of the syndicated sovereignty and constitutionalised body of European Law. The EU requires the market economy as a criterion for membership (formulated in the so-called Copenhagen criteria for enlargement in 1993), making it formally and legally a constitutive institution of its regional society. Market-making and law-making go hand in hand despite often conflicting interests. The EU has even created markets to manage public goods for instance through its Greenhouse Gas (GHG) Emissions Trading System (ETS – cf. chapter 4.2).

In this context it is noteworthy that in Europe many of these competences have been syndicated at the supranational level: the EU’s foreign trade competence and WTO membership, the Single Market and associated regulatory competence, the EU competition law, the ETS and of course EMU. In NE Asia nation states assiduously cultivate the government control of these instruments to avoid automatic spill-overs of sovereignty.

In fact, one way to make sense of the importance of the economy and the state’s role in it is to reconsider the separation into two systems or the debate over super-structure. Weiss (2005) looking at the impact of globalisation on the state and its domestic institutions argues that
globalisation even had a state augmenting effect through entwining of different power networks in which states continue to assume a pivotal position; ‘Political entwinment is a fundamental feature of both global and supranational systems of governance, which depend heavily on the institutional resources of the nation-state to legitimate their continued operation and to execute their goals.’ (Weiss 2005:351).

There are thus many constitutive elements linking the state and the economy throughout history as well as today and in different parts of the world including in international relations: Today, currency and monetary policy, setting of interest rates, taxes, regulation, sovereign debt and the high state share and budgets for education, public health, welfare, infrastructure and industrial policy in most developed economies are indicators of this constitutive relationship. States – and the European Commission - can and do fine and sanction economic operators including powerful multinationals for tax evasion, anti-competitive behaviour, health hazards, or environment pollution. They are not always successful and some states take advantageby offering tax havens or other regulatory loopholes to companies avid to exploit these. These are not merely instruments, but key attributes of states (some monopolistic) and crucial for the social and political legitimacy of most economic and most international activities including those carried out by non-state actors. Civil society and businesses in a large measure of course contribute to how the states prioritise such policies and budgets, the state itself is part of society (domestic and international) and depending on political systems more or less owned by its citizens and influenced by transnational or international constraints. States (or state-like communities/regional societies like the EU in some areas) still retain much of a monopoly in regulation (even if they sometimes delegate it to industry), monetary and fiscal policy.

State policy has increasingly prioritised the economy at the expense of the ‘classical’ security related institutions (Buzan 2005; Falk 2005): Economic growth has become a top priority in particular for North East Asia’s development states with only North Korea pursuing a military first policy at least nominally. In Europe and more recently in NE Asia the collective and individual welfare of citizens has become a key focus of the state and a source of domestic (and EU) legitimacy (or legitimacy crisis) (Kalinowski and Cho 2012). Similarly, globalisation is a product of political choices and a pathway with its own logics, but these logics are also (but not exclusively) outcomes of state policies (Kalinowski 2012:5-6). States have de-regulated (and thus deliberately relinquished sovereign control and relaxed international law) in the 1980s and 1990s giving non-govermental economic actors more freedom. They can re-regulate, albeit with difficulty (because of path dependency), but increasingly have to do so internationally rather than nationally. However, with some political choices locked in (e.g. liberalisation of capital markets) pathways are drawn which limit later choices for states creating the impression that states “lost” power.

While states have come increasingly to prioritise the economy relative to security, many economic issues have also become securitised, showing how the states appropriate economic issues as crucial for their existence and interactions and further blurring the distinction between the political and the economic realms. States have a strategic interest in international economic stability and growth – it is a core element in many national security strategies. Multilateral economic
governance was a top priority for states of any domestic persuasion following the 2008 global financial crisis (Drezner 2012). The securitisation of the economy is related to its being no longer only a national economy to be regulated and more or less controlled by governments but increasingly interdependent and globalised producing external opportunities and risks.

In today’s globalisation context some governance levels and some policy areas simply escape the traditionally national exercise of sovereignty and territorial control (Ruggie 1993) which contributes to the uneasiness about globalisation and its character as both a source of opportunity and risk. The cross-border economic and social movements are qualitatively different from earlier phases of globalisation (Keohane 2002:193-202; Katzenstein 2005:13-21; O’Rourke 2009; Arrighi 2010, Messner 2011). Hence, I consider globalisation also as one of the issues of complexity and risk states have to deal with in International Society 2.0.

The three constitutive institutions – sovereignty, international law and the economy - are in a dynamic relationship as we have already seen in the tale of two regions. Therefore, regarding the economy, the issue is between nationalist approaches to sovereignty and law (and to markets) and multilateralist approaches to regulation (i.e. the exercise of sovereignty to manage globalisation and the creation of international rules for international markets). Thus, like for sovereignty and international law it is important to look at the specific logics the economic institutions take in international society. States are not only reacting to logics of economic dynamics, but states constitute and influence these dynamics based on their beliefs in the purpose of international society and of order which are of course closely related to the domestic preferences and concepts of the national and international political economy (such as current beliefs in open markets, global competition or deregulation). This therefore creates a truly constitutive relationship.

The market (with some variation) is now almost globally accepted as the key economic institution of international society. But we still note many differences between the EU and NE Asia. A classification of role relationships resulting from the market economy under nationalist and multilateralist ideological beliefs illustrates these differences.
### Table 6: Political and economic logics of anarchy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political logics of anarchy</th>
<th>Hobbesian (nationalist)</th>
<th>Lockean (competitive)</th>
<th>Kantian (multilateralist)</th>
<th>Complex (cooperation and competition)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Economic institutions</td>
<td>Mercantilism</td>
<td>Market and international regulation; regulated/fair competition and dispute settlement mechanisms; (including Confucian antecedents) competitiveness of nations/companies</td>
<td>(regional) economic integration; common market, common monetary, economic and commercial policies. Supranational institutionalisation.</td>
<td>Globalised market economy and value chains; Global governance, knowledge/information society Disaggregation of state functions (supranational and transgovernmental networks); global risk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Colonialism</td>
<td>Intergovernmental (often multilateral or plurilateral) and transnational regimes.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Development state</td>
<td>Intergovernmental, mostly bilateral, agreements, FTAs.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cut-throat competition; military support; economic diplomacy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Approximate Timeline</td>
<td>19\textsuperscript{th} / 20\textsuperscript{th} c.</td>
<td>End of Cold War (1991) to WTO entry of China (2001) (global, limited to the West before)</td>
<td>Mainly in the EU since 1957, some features in WTO</td>
<td>Global since 2001 (WTO entry of China)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### 4.7. States and economic role relationships

After arguing the constitutive relationship between the state and the economy let me turn to the role relationships that result from it. Above I have focused on economic institutions in a complex anarchy involving states and the economy or private actors and emphasized states’ understanding of economic issues and dynamics in their identity and interactions as constitutive in the same way as role relationships under cultures of anarchy which Wendt (1999) distinguishes: enemy, rival,

\[\text{243} \text{ The Hobbesian, Lockean and Kantian logics are from Wendt (1999), I added the complex one and in brackets my preferred terminology.}\]
friend, or as victim-perpetrator.

International Society 2.0 has replaced the colonialism, mercantilism, cut-throat competition and similar conflictual economic institutions of International Society Mark I with the simultaneously competitive and cooperative market institutions which have spread with trade, capital flows, globalised production chains and accompanied to some extent by assorted multilateral regulation and regimes. Regardless of the global trend towards the market, important differences exist between varieties of capitalism (Kalinowski 2012) and role-relationships differ markedly: In Europe we have a single market with freedom of movement for goods, services, capital and people that comprises twenty eight nation-states (and several others associated to the EU) and we have in the nineteen-member Eurozone a monetary union in Europe. The EU, domestically and internationally, strives to jointly manage global public goods and bads. Regional integration is deep and covers many policy areas. This is one of the biggest and wealthiest economic areas in the world and thus very significant for the analysis of IR.

In NE Asia market opening and freedoms of movement are much more limited. NE Asia has long been the economically most dynamic region in the globalised world, but it has not developed an integration project even remotely similar to the EU. There are no normative or teleological milestones to map out a path to integration although there is a (rather pragmatic) vision for trilateral cooperation 2020. It does not deliver collective public goods and the countries in NE Asia do not normally act collectively or co-ordinate ahead of global summits or negotiations. And according to Gao (2012) NE Asia doesn't have such a tradition even in its more integrated Confucian past. NE Asia's response to the Asian financial crisis in 1997/8 at first and then the 2008 global crisis has not prompted significant functioning economic or monetary cooperation or any significant joint proposals. Despite strong economic interdependence not even an FTA among the three countries is in place (under negotiation since May 2012) while all countries have FTAs with partners outside the region. Each country deals with global issues on its own with little dialogue or cooperation among them, but rather competition as the ETS discussion in Korea has shown – industry feared for loss of competitiveness vis-à-vis China, Japan and the US.

These various understandings of the context of international politics also affect global governance. If a country sees the international context as a struggle for survival among hostile states (in the role relationship of enemies like the DPRK with the ROK, Japan or the US) it will emphasise military power and nationalism. If a country’s aim is development it will emphasise power and wealth creation with a strong dose of nationalism (examples China, ROK). If a country aims at maintaining and enhancing its prosperity in a world seen as interdependent and largely benign, states will prioritise economic integration and emphasise multilateral governance (EU member states, Korea and Japan to some extent). Therefore, the ideational shared understandings by states, or in other words the ‘cultures of anarchy’ notably nationalist or multilateralist and the resulting role relationships matter.

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245 Currency swaps like the Chiang Mai Initiative etc. were not actually used during the 2008/9 crisis. I examine this in more detail in part III.
246 These understandings and changes are of course to a large extent the product/result of social changes within states and the population can be and often is strongly influenced by global trends which are not set by states. At the
Analytically focusing on the constitutive relationship between states and the economy the ideal-type role relationships Wendt (1999) has proposed in his story of international politics – enemies, rivals and friends – can be further differentiated: we can distinguish the following types of roles (which as we shall see in part IV are very important for prospects of global governance):

- Rivals/opponents
- competitors
- teamworkers and partners in joint welfare or development (e.g. regarding public goods and the ‘tragedy of the commons’ (Hardin 1968)
- one which is not strictly a role of internationalisation i.e. the few almost autarkic outsiders like the DPRK
- In the past there have been other role relationships which I can't cover here: coloniser-colonised for instance.

These role relationships can determine internationalisation strategies such as regional integration, functional cooperation or autarky, with similar master variables as those identified by Wendt (1999): interdependence, common fate, homogeneity in interplay with self-restraint and trust. Role relationships are not fixed in stone and can differ from one policy area to another, competing in one field, teamworking in another for example.

Of course, these relationships are distinct from but intertwined with those the states have with the private actors who carry out most of the economic transactions per se. Whether economic actors conform to, circumvent or refuse the rules set by states (or IOs) does not matter here - I have already mentioned that states try to define which activities are legal or illegal and they can do that individually or in cooperation with others. It also doesn't matter for the purpose of my analysis whether states can always enforce the rules or not. However, as Keohane (2002:57) observes: 'states with strong but flexible public institutions, able to manipulate the world economy when possible and to correct for its effects when necessary, seem to thrive best in an open world political economy.' The open market political economy is now a reality which has become truly global, even though, especially since the global financial crises, there are analysts who contrast a purported ‘Chinese model’ with the ‘Western’ one, but there is no consensus on how to define it.

In both regions I examine, states have a long history of ‘manipulating the economy’, and size and strength matters - maybe not as much as the understanding of their roles, but power is an important factor contributing to the understanding of a state's role. Thus, while NE Asian countries have been managing globalisation (or manipulating the world economy) largely on their own the smaller and weaker states of the EU have pursued deeper integration for that purpose (Milward 1984, Schmale 2010:112). But despite operating in the same global open world economy (the

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same time state regulated efforts at shaping such trends remain significant (laws, national education curricula, monuments and museums, state media, political discourse, etc.)

247 Colonialism was also disguised as a noble civilizing mission, when it was in fact mostly driven by economic motives – as can be seen from the ‘out-sourcing’ of this activity to chartered companies (Arrighi 2010:250-8) or private individuals who then paid ‘taxes’ to their sovereign (who mostly never set foot in their colonies). Of course, colonialism also involved prestige and power politics and was often sparked by power contests among many (but not all) European nations at that time.


249 Small in terms of territory and population, but in relevant economic terms (i.e. per capita standards) most EU states are quite strong and collectively by any measure they form the biggest economy in the world.
context of complex anarchy as I defined it) their roles are informed by a different understanding on who they are and what they want to be: nationalist or multilateralist.

4.7.1. Rivals: economic security dilemmas and mercantilism

Rivals see the economic anarchy as a battleground for the survival of the fittest, they promote national champions, national exports and where possible import substitution. In the 19th and 20th centuries European countries, the US and later Japan rivalled in their scramble for colonies, 'Lebensraum' and access to resources or markets if necessary by military means or dubious uses of international law (unequal treaties for example creating coloniser-colonised relationships in the process).

Mercantilism and the neo-mercantilism of development states which leverage market forces are typical rivals for national dominance, exclusive gain or status. Governments use the state resources to achieve national technological progress and strategies to maximise national (not necessarily citizens') welfare. This can come at the expense of others (and even of some domestic stakeholders, for instance sacrificing social security or women’s labour participation to big business interests with the aim of national development).

Mercantilism has been an expression of power politics, but I would argue that the widespread distinction between ‘high’ politics and ‘low’ politics has more to do with states’ self-representation and justification than with the driving forces of international politics even in the past. Glory and honour, status and prestige expressed through military uniforms rather than the business suit were the stuff of diplomacy and war, but they in turn were often motivated by economic or territorial gain, but it was not 'de rigueur' to admit that openly. Even today many Ambassadors are almost full-time 'sales representatives' for important national companies (private or state owned) trying to gain access to foreign markets.

In a mercantilist economic logic rivalry or cut-throat competition mirror the 'Hobbesian' culture of anarchy and war as an institution, and in the past they usually came in pairs. Mercantilism and colonialism of course did not require much self-restraint or trust and are cousins of violence. In international trade mercantilism with its zero-sum logic has been a dominant institution of pre-modern economies and still plays a certain role in the export-oriented growth and development model of the development state (Kalinowski 2008, Kalinowski and Cho 2012; for pre-modern mercantilist Confucian thought in Japan, Dazai Shundai an influential scholar of the 18th century (太宰春台), Distelrath 2012:246-50). The transition from backward agricultural economies to 'development states' is a good example of differentiation in social transformation of states internationally (flying geese pattern Chen e.a. 2011) and of the way the logics themselves evolve through such transformations. The development state originated in Japan's post-war bureaucracy-led reconstruction and reindustrialisation (Klein und Kreiner 2012:421-5, 440-7) and is also characteristic of Korea (Kalinowski 2008; Kalinowski and Cho 2012) and more recently

250 Hettne (1994:38) quotes Alexander Hamilton’s (1791) classical definition of mercantilism: ‘Not only the wealth but the independence and security of a country appear to be materially connected to the prosperity of manufactures.’
That logic is crucial to understanding NE Asian countries’ internationalisation and regionalisation or the lack thereof (Hatch, Bair and Heiduk 2014). The development states seek to leverage market forces rather than substitute a planned economy for it like in the former Soviet Union or China before its market reforms. Yet, Asia’s development states focus less on the ‘invisible hand’ of market forces than on the visible hands and brains of government think tanks, economic planning institutions, economic and social engineering to achieve ‘optimum outcomes’. They tend(ed) to neglect social welfare (‘outsourcing’ it to women in traditional roles of educators and caregivers; Klein und Kreiner 2012: 462-5). This of course includes the international dimensions as well. The protectionist development states in Asia were tolerated by the US as an exception to its general preference for more liberal and open markets during the Cold War to allow re-construction and support for anti-communist policy (Arrighi 2010:59-75). That changed after the Cold War as the US policy of forcing liberalisation and painful re-structuring on Asia during the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis showed. Already in 1985 the US had pressured ultra-competitive Japan to revalue its currency (Klein und Kreiner 2012:456-8).

Mercantilism has strong elements of zero-sum competition, but cooperation can occur when states are at different stages of development - like in the flying geese model - for instance through production chains controlled by a 'mother company' (which was also the rationale for regionalisation in East Asia driven by Japan’s multinationals (Hatch, Bair and Heiduk 2014). They try and keep as much control and policy-space as possible while acknowledging that internationalisation is key for national prosperity and growth (and thus domestic legitimacy) and are ready to pay the necessary price in terms of market opening and competition where useful and when they acknowledge the master variable of interdependence (the nationalist outsiders such as the DPRK are not ready to compromise autonomy and policy space even if that costs them dearly in foregone prosperity). However, they protect strategic sectors or try to acquire and control them abroad including agriculture (food security), energy and natural resources for industry. Such rivalry is connected with nationalism i.e. the desire for one's group to dominate others, or to be recognised. Politically countries are opponents if not enemies (as in the DPRK – ROK case). Rivalry usually produces zero-sum games and the desire to maximize one's absolute and relative gains (all this is a matter of degree). The centralised state with its ‘visible hands’ is seen as a key player in the globalisation game.

4.7.2. Competitors: interdependence and networks

Competitors, as mentioned above acknowledge the master variable of interdependence and value order. They try to increase the cake where possible through cooperation to produce win-win outcomes, but compete for the bigger share, advantage and status. Competition thus can include cooperation at least for setting rules that define fair competition. The WTO is an illustration of a cooperative regime that defines rules of fair competition and settlement of disputes (at least in a large number of trade related issues) and other regimes have been set up to regulate other issues (WIPO for intellectual property for instance). The WTO dispute settlement mechanism even has supranational elements. In other cases competitors bargain to agree mutually acceptable outcomes, but as various game theoretical insights show they may not always reach the optimum. Competitors as must be expected subscribe largely to liberal market logics and are comfortable
with network capitalism and minimum state control (development states try to maximize). Competition is framed as a healthy process to increase domestic prosperity and growth and the competitiveness of a country (rather than domination or territorial expansion) becomes a reference for national pride and status. The disaggregated state performing different roles in different networks is emblematic of this competitive globalisation game. Development states in NE Asia have been in transition to more liberal market economies since the Asian Financial Crisis (Arrighi 2010; Kalinowski and Cho 2012; Sorensen 2009 talks of modernising states). Competitors can be political opponents, but also more or less friends.

Competition and anti-trust law frequently have cross-border effects and a large number of international agreements and treaties have been set up to agree rules that cover customs duties, investment conditions, capital flows, taxation, quality standards and other market-access conditions usually on the basis of reciprocity. Such regimes are to the international economy what the Conventions of The Hague and Geneva are to warfare or equivalent to examples from ‘high diplomacy’: arms control treaties, CBMs and mutual recognition of immunities and privileges.

The marketisation of the economy and of countries and the ensuing ‘competitiveness of nations’ idea, however, is an ideational phenomenon that goes back to thinkers such as Smith and Ricardo who argued against mercantilism. More recently Michael Porter (1990) has introduced the idea of the competitiveness of nations rather than companies an idea which has become a key feature of international politics.

States compete internationally in a market-like complex anarchy to improve the well being of their companies and citizens as well as their own resources and not as Waltz assumed simply for survival or expansion of territory (i.e. as enemies in the end of the day). If competition among states were about survival it is difficult to explain why the number of states has increased – including small and fragile ones - not decreased in the 20th and 21st centuries. Competition takes place less in logics of war and survival, but in an economic logic of maximising prosperity and national competitiveness. States do not resemble – as in Waltz's neo-realist approach – firms in a free market competing for profit and survival, but they rather resemble the complex production and value chains of co-operating yet competing companies that build on each others’ competitive advantages to maximise profit and market share (status, influence and prosperity for states).

The notion of competitiveness of nations (rather than companies) fits a nationalist view of globalisation while acknowledging the end of a strictly ‘national’ economy and discarding the ‘realist’ idea of competition through war. Such maximising of competitiveness and prosperity can best be achieved not through fighting wars over a cake of determined size, but through a mix of cooperation (positive sum games that enlarge the cake to be distributed) and competition for the biggest or best share. Thus, states develop specific strategies and policy mixes to manage the challenges of globalisation – the EU for example mainly through regional and institutional cooperation and integration and through clearly defined rules for fair competition, the single market and a common monetary and commercial policy, states in NE Asia through national competitiveness strategies and national re-insurance (Forex reserves). This is why the nationalist development states in NE Asia do not behave as some realists predict with violence apart from
occasional sabre-rattling around moralisation gaps and disputed territories.

4.7.3. Team workers

The team workers keep their individual interests, they compete among themselves and may disagree at times, but they manage their interests in common according to rules agreed in the team (to compete with others but as a team). Teamwork fits polycentric governance images where trust and reciprocity among competing actors pursuing an overall goal are key ingredients of collective action (Ostrom 2009:35; 201:660-1). The team workers’s most obvious manifestation is the European Union. In the EU the team ‘leader’ is often the syndicated supranational hierarchy (in particular the European Commission) that I described in chapter II.3. Individual member states can assume an issue-leadership role or advocate various positions, but the decisions tend to be collective based on either consensus or majority voting. Many decisions are bargained hard about within a set of written and unwritten rules (as the case studies in chapter III.3 will show). There are different coalitions on different issues including a long-standing division among so-called ‘free traders’ and ‘mercantilists’ on issues such as EU trade defence and market access. The EU has exclusive competences in large parts of international trade policy and the European Commission, based on a mandate of the Member States within the framework of the EU treaties negotiates as 'team leader' with other countries or economic blocs or in international organisations such as the WTO. The EU treaties and secondary legislation (acquis communautaire) define the team work rules differently in different issue-areas. In the environment field for instance the external competence is shared producing a high degree of complexity both for the EU institutions and other countries (Vogler 2009). This is not the place to review these complexities in detail (there are whole libraries on who does what how in the EU e.g. Wallace, Wallace, Pollack 2005; Hodson and Peterson 2017), but to illustrate the point that team workers have different ways to organise the teamwork and are themselves not altruistic principals. The syndicated supranational entity, some international regimes and states engaged in transgovernmental networks are emblematic of the team workers’ conception of the state's role in the globalisation game.

4.7.4. Role relationships and global governance

The role relationships briefly described above help explaining some of the global governance problems in a more detailed way than Wendt’s three role relationships of enemies, rivals and friends. Those mainly relate to security relationships and the survival of states which, as I have argued, is no longer really the name of the game. Most of those global governance issues deal with public goods or bads and the tragedy of the commons (Hardin 1968; cf. chapter III.1.2.) in a more or less economic logic of anarchy, although in this context security in the face of global risks can also be a public good. But then security takes a different logic from the interstate threat related concept of security dilemmas given the diffuse causality of global risks (cf. chapter III.2). Team workers tend to see global or regional public goods and the tragedy of the commons from the collective perspective and try to find solutions that privilege the common interest over the individual (while trying to get the best individual deal in the collective framework – teamwork is not altruism). They invoke the master variable of common fate and subscribe to the view that global risks are not easily traceable to a particular source or causal chain. Competitors and even
more so rivals have difficulties in assuming such a perspective - they suspect others will take advantage of their necessary concessions. They are distrustful egoists and as in NE Asia may be political opponents. They may engage in blame-games and attribute responsibility for abuse of public goods or for global risks to others while trying to minimise negative outcomes for themselves in the typical self-interested rationality that produces the tragedy of the commons in the first place (Hardin 1968). These arguments tend to be fed by moralisation gaps linked to apportioning blame and costs to solve problems and to occupy the moral high ground. I will illustrate this in part III with the example of responses to climate change.

Of these role-relationships it is the team workers followed by the competitors who seem to be those who actively propose responses to globalisation, i.e. governance while rivals will try and exploit it for their advantage and be passive or obstructive in cases where governance compromises their interests, autonomy and sovereignty. A typical view is Lieber (2014) who accuses the BRICS to be free riders in the international community.

In parallel with the increasing density of globalisation these role-relationships structure the international state-system and international society increasingly as they define the relations between states in very different ways, produce (or don't) rules and decide the density of norms and rules of interaction. This explains to a large extent the instability and diversity of the current international order in which the US imposed rules are no longer as encompassing as in the second half of the 20th century an issue I will turn to in part IV.

5. Conclusions

Due to different historical pathways international society is constituted differently in EU-Europe today compared to 'Westphalian' Europe and also to contemporary NE Asia. The evolution in these regions seems to have gone in opposite directions: the Confucian world was closer to contemporary Europe's syndicated hierarchy than to today's nationalist international relations in NE Asia. NE Asia has adopted nationalism and 'Westphalian' concepts of sovereignty and international law that Europe has if not abandoned then profoundly modified mainly through the multilateral European way of law. I found that ideological institutions – in particular nationalism and multilateralism - were important factors in determining the way such regional societies change at critical historical junctions. Moralisation gaps resulting from such junctures have determined relationships in a constitutive way: victims and perpetrators in NE Asia are also rivals and nationalist opponents. Europeans have largely transformed nationalist rivalry through integration and reconciliation, albeit short of a new 'Europeanism' (or a primarily European identity).

Nationalism and multilateralism have also deeply affected the economy, mercantilism in conjunction with nationalism, the globalised market economy in conjunction with multilateralism. Multilateralism is indispensable for the globalised economy, with NE Asia's development states somewhere in between as could be expected given their persistent nationalism in an economically densely networked region (Hatch, Bair and Heiduk 2014).

Given that such differences 'fit' within an order relying on the same originally Western institutions
of international society we can speak of a world of regions and states that form international society at large despite the regional differences. International Society Mark I - the inimical relationship type - has been changed almost universally by a decline of violence and of the balance of power. International Society 2.0 reflects the rise of interdependence within the global market economy, networking of communication and governance, and a slowly emerging awareness of a fragile and fledgling community of fate facing global challenges. But this awareness is not usually as strong as the nationalism (or national interest) embodied in national sovereignty and consensus based views of international law in most countries. It has not led to many actionable cosmopolitan moments involving states. International society and multilateralism remain at low normative common denominators with many 'boundaries'. EU Europe is promoting the further development of International Society 2.0 through multilateralism, syndicated sovereignty, a European Way of Law with cosmopolitan elements, global (economic) governance, albeit its polity is also still anchored in 'Westphalian' sovereignty.

The decline of violence, the rise of the market economy and challenges related to globalisation have been important factors in the evolution to International Society 2.0. On the one hand globalisation together with the increasing importance of international law and regulatory regimes has transformed the logic of anarchy in which international society operates. On the other hand the economy has become a crucial issue for any state and international politics: Economic issues such as enhancing welfare, prosperity and status but also national competitiveness have replaced violence and balance of power as key institutions of the state system to the extent that the state system itself, the territoriality and monopoly of violence of the state have been questioned as irrelevant in some Western liberal discourse and some 'sino-cosmopolitan' views (Zhao 2005; cf. chapter IV.7 for an analysis of this perspective). NE Asia's territorial disputes have shown that this discourse isn't compelling, while the EU seems to largely correspond to that ideal type of a globalised regional order. It is almost synonymous with the single market (and in the early days people referred to the EEC as the 'common market' and the 'marché commun'). This complex and dramatic change in a world of issues and how regions deal with the crises that are part of them will be further discussed in part II.

In this chapter I have shown that institutions of international society are not immutable, but subject to changes of ideas on international relations/international society. The ideational changes can develop gradually over time (Pinker 2011) or occur more rapidly through critical junctures (cf. part I). Such change is easier to analyse with a new typology of the various institutions of international society. My thesis has thus introduced a more systematic typology than found in the literature by classifying institutions of international society into ideological, constitutive, instrumental and mechanical ones. Alongside sovereignty and international law the economy stands out among the key constitutive institutions which determine how international society functions. I reviewed how sovereignty, international law and economic models constitute the EU and NE Asia as very different regional societies: one with a syndicated, multilateral hierarchy and a common market, the other with a 'Westphalian' national sovereignty and a nationalist development state – almost inverse to their respective constitution in the 19th century. These constitutive institutions also help explaining the NE Asia paradox described in part I. I looked at possible causes for such varied effects: the decline of violence, war and power balancing,
globalisation and complex anarchy and their effects on the state system. In the next part I will look at these issues further in a view to examine how the new context of complex anarchy is affecting regions and global governance.

In conclusion, I argue that International Society 2.0 is a society in transition reflecting the instability of the global political economy (after the Nixon shock) and the uncertainty of the political order with its diffusion of power (after the end of the bipolar Cold War overlay). It is a society marked by the tensions between different, sometimes opposing concepts of the key ideological institutions of international society, nationalist, multilateralist or cosmopolitan. It is not a linear development, but one marked by critical junctures some of which I have identified. Critical junctures can go in either direction – from cosmopolitan-Confucian to aggressive nationalism as in NE Asia at the beginning of the 20th century or from aggressive nationalism to multilateralism (with some cosmopolitan elements) like in Europe after WWII. Dominating ideas of the time – the zeitgeist - such as 'social Darwinism' borrowed from the natural sciences in the 19th century, or 'globalisation' today play a major role in this process, hence the importance of identifying the ideological institutions of International Society and their evolution.

But International Society 2.0 is also an encouraging development: it is a world of increasing cooperation and tamed competition rather than violent conflict and rivalry. There are attempts at raising prosperity for all (development states, Millennium Declaration) and at solving global problems incrementally (WTO, Paris Agreement on climate change, G20…). That is different from dramatic visions of the world descending into chaos or into a clash of civilisations. It stops short of the end of history but also of a world government. It makes do with the antiquated state system, but also prompts changes of states and their interaction, perhaps revitalising a multilateral state system through structural changes and instrumental adaptations, the EU being one such example. It is less about the rise and fall of great powers but their criss-crossing paths of development and society building and their uneasy cooperation and 'natural' competition. The new is different, but the old is still recognisable. Human society is complex and full of contradictions unlike systems that may be complex, but not contradictory. That is as true for small groups as it is for international society. It may bring about world society. Human society has the propensity to learn. There are continuities and disruptions, in short International Society 2.0 is unpredictable but familiar. Part III will substantiate these claims spelling out my concept of a world of issues.

**Part III A World of issues and a world of regions**

The duality between nationalism and multilateralism as ideological institutions of International Society 2.0 is also structuring responses to challenges of the multiple, complex challenges of the world of issues: NE Asian countries have shown a strong preference for national responses and intergovernmental negotiations, emphasising national sovereignty. The EU approaches these challenges in characteristically multilateralist fashion aiming at establishing global 'rules of the
game’ and itself working as a team most obviously in international trade, but also on issues such as climate change and development. The different ideological beliefs explain at least partly how they engage in global governance and how countries deal with a world of issues. This world of issues can be described as chaotic complexity, a new form of anarchy that structures the context of international society which in turn shapes their responses. Therefore global governance reflects the diversity of values, moral beliefs and world views and of course interests and burden-sharing. This contributes to the impression of a ‘messy’ world order or even of disorder. Surely, the EU and NE Asia are ideal-types for analytic purposes and a lot could be said about for instance internal EU divisions, but the examples of the financial crisis and response to climate change will show this deeper dichotomy between nationalist and multilateralist approaches. The response to climate change also highlights the importance of moralisation gaps in transforming the 'tragedy of the commons' with the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities included in the formal agreements, like the Kyoto Protocol, but difficult to negotiate precisely (for instance in terms of actions or costs) between the different parties on both sides of the moralisation gap. But is the EU’s multilateralism just an instrumental response of small states to globalisation challenges?

Many scholars consider globalisation and regionalisation (such as EU integration) as mutually constitutive or regions as taking over functions of the states to better deal with globalisation (creating economies of scale) for example: ‘Regions are mainly created by States as tools to better cope with the forces of globalisation and localisation’ (Van Langenhove and Maes (2013:174). In such a view, many especially quantitative research approaches to regionalism focus on trade data, which are also often used as indicators to measure globalisation and regionalisation. Trade, however, only captures one dimension of regionness and of globalisation - the easiest to measure (cf. Van Langenhove and Maes 2013:179 on the criticism of research methodology in regionalism based on data availability).

Regionalism can be considered as a form of internationalisation (see below), but it can also describe a more complex set of dynamics as the EU integration process shows, which as we have seen cannot simply be reduced to a response to globalisation. Conversely, the complex dynamics of the ‘non-integration process’ in NE Asia show that regionalism is not a constitutive part of globalisation, as these countries have hardly developed a regional project despite being key players in globalisation. Contrary to theories predicting that an increase in intra-regional trade or production chains produces spill-overs or even security (Brooks 2005; Telò 2015:25), in NE Asia political and institutional regionalism seems to be virtually non-existent. Shared but also contested geography, history and economic development links (‘flying geese’, but also rivalry and competition) constitute a rather specific form of 'nationalist regionalism' in NE Asia. The awkward ‘open regionalism’ concept will be discussed in this context. The notion of geography and territoriality plays an obviously important part in discussing regionalism, the only form of internationalisation with an explicit geographic connotation. Telò (2015:18) defines "regional entities as groupings of neighbouring and interdependent states and societies, sharing certain cultural and historical legacies, and cooperating in various policy fields related to the exogenous global economic and political changes associated with globalization." We will see that in NE Asia

251 Telò (2015) for a review of different approaches to regionalism and the outline of a post-revisionist research agenda that is similar to my research.
a number of the elements of that definition turn out to be problematic. But first more generally, there are a few important questions: How do differently constituted regions evolve in the current context of complexity, uncertainty and globalisation? What forms of internationalisation can we observe? In chapter 3 I will test the answers empirically in brief case studies: How did the EU and NE Asia respond to financial crises and the climate change challenge?

1. The globalised economy, complex anarchy, and international society

1.1. Governance in the changing context of two regional societies

I have argued that a decline in violence makes the focus of IR theories on the inter-state violence anachronistic and ill equipped to deal with other big and important things. As Wendt (1992) famously wrote 'anarchy is what states make of it'. I argue that today's anarchy is not only 'made' by states, but that it is mainly made by chaos: economic issues, uncertainty and global risks are distinct ingredients that make it up in chaotic structures of complex causes and effects (Smith 2010). States (and other actors) respond to this complex world of issues and shape it to some extent driven by ideological beliefs about order and international society, largely nationalism and multilateralism. Complexity contributes to power diffusion as shown in chapter II.2. Complexity 're-makes states' and changes how they relate to each other and with other actors. Complexity transforms them in a double movement (e.g. government decisions on financial market liberalisation created dynamics that affected states in various ways that were not anticipated or even predictable – although of course there have been arguments about these political decisions). That does not mean, however, that one can dismiss the state system like many scholars working on globalisation or regionalisation do. I have already argued that even in the most 'cosmopolitan' of international societies, the EU, state sovereignty still matters. Even in the EU's neighbourhood inter-state violence has not yet gone out of fashion as not least the events in Ukraine since 2014 or the Russia-Georgia war in 2008 have shown. Modified by multilateralism sovereignty in the EU has become syndicated and strongly influenced by the European Way of Law, but it is still state-centred. But even in the economic field where globalist pressures are most pervasive, states are not obsolete. They remain key actors, albeit not alone.

Complexity, change and uncertainty structure international relations, but most states do their part to address or structure complexity (nationally and/or multilaterally). Complexity, chaos and uncertainty pose major challenges to states and regions interested in order at regional and global levels. The extent and capacity of global governance to deal with these challenges are partly defined by the issues themselves (world of issues), partly by the constitution of the international society (and its actors, states and regions). I will here first look at the world of issues, the states and in the next step at how the world of regions deals with it. How do states make do with complexity and chaos? One way of managing complexity is governance (rather than government) which suggests that the complex culture of anarchy is no longer only a matter for the territorial
state. In this context, I recall from chapter II.2 my thesis that state power is dissolved, more diffuse and diluted.

1.2 Governance and anarchy – what anarchy?

The structural effect of complexity on states and the diffusion of power in complexity has become clear in the global financial crisis. The dispersal of power to a greater number of actors was reflected in the choice of the G20 rather than the G7 format to coordinate the international crisis response. Moreover, the G20’s efforts to re-regulate the private sector were a reaction to the dispersal of power to non-state (financial) actors and the ensuing risks to the capacity of states to guarantee global order. That change of format also reflects the dilution of power away from a rather homogenous (Western liberal) group of states to include actors with different moral beliefs and domestic political systems (many with a decidedly non-liberal and anti-Western stance) in this steering committee (or club). The dissolution aspect of power diffusion is illustrated by the rapid melt-down of the global economy and the financial instability produced globally and in the euro-zone which necessitated an emergency re-drawing of EU institutions to prevent the unravelling of the euro-zone (see chapter 3.1 below). The dissolution of power is perhaps even more important in dealing with climate change which threatens the very survival of international society and mankind. In the UNFCCC framework the world of states is trying to address climate change: all of them have to agree the outcomes of negotiations for them to be implemented. There is a tyranny of numbers, as all countries have to agree on something that states can do, but the problem is produced not by states but by other actors: companies, citizens, cars, cows… Climate change also has an important historical dimension where we re-discover the moralisation gap this time between the early industrialisers (Europe, US, Japan…) on the one hand, the latecomers and developing countries who want to achieve development through industrialisation on the other hand and also those who suffer the consequences of the accumulated and still increasing greenhouse gases (GHG) in the atmosphere. Some (small island) states even fear for their very survival (but contrary to neo-realist theories not because of a death threat from a like unit). Agreement is further complicated by largely different interests, resources and problem perceptions. Therefore, we also find ‘club diplomacy’ beyond the more inclusive format such as the UNFCCC. The most important “clubs” are the G20 and the Major Economies Forum on Energy and Climate (MEF) rebranded from the Major Economies Meeting MEM launched in 2009 by President Bush as an alternative to the UNFCCC process; (Terhalle and Depledge 2013:578; cf chapter IV.5)²⁵³. Within UNFCCC we also find various sub-groupings as clubs of like-minded states.

The dramatic implications of coping with complexity, risk, historical justice and cost (moralisation gaps about GHG) in a state-centric world were described as the ‘tragedy of the commons’ through a metaphor by the biologist G. Hardin in 1968⁴: ‘The tragedy of the commons develops in this

²⁵² Crisis-driven economic club diplomacy has already been the preferred response since the 1970s with the creation of the G5 then G7, 8, then the G20 at Finance Minister level in 1999 and at leaders' level in 2008.
²⁵³ There are other “clubs” within and without the UNFCCC negotiations such as ALBA, the Alliance of small island states (AOSIS) etc. structuring the negotiations. See Creutz (2017) on strategies of smaller states in global governance.
²⁵⁴ http://www.sciencemag.org/content/162/3859/1243.full The quote is slightly edited to make it shorter. The tragedy of the commons interpreted as a prisoners’ dilemma in game models was long seen as a theory of collective action dilemma which predicted that self-interested individuals pursue actions that result in socially sub-optimal outcomes unless an external authority (government) imposes regulations (Ostrom 2009:7-8). Ostrom
way. Picture a pasture open to all. It is to be expected that each herdsman will try to keep as many cattle as possible on the commons. [...] the inherent logic of the commons remorselessly generates tragedy. As a rational being, each herdsman seeks to maximize his gain. Explicitly or implicitly, more or less consciously, he asks, "What is the utility to me of adding one more animal to my herd?" This utility has one negative and one positive component.

1) The positive component is a function of the increment of one animal. Since the herdsman receives all the proceeds from the sale of the additional animal, the positive utility is nearly +1.

2) The negative component is a function of the additional overgrazing created by one more animal. Since, however, the effects of overgrazing are shared by all the herdsmen, the negative utility for any particular decision-making herdsman is only a fraction of -1. Adding together the component partial utilities, the rational herdsman concludes that the only sensible course for him to pursue is to add another animal to his herd. And another; and another... But this is the conclusion reached by each rational herdsman sharing a commons. Therein is the tragedy. Each man is locked into a system that compels him to increase his herd without limit--in a world that is limited. Ruin is the destination toward which all men rush, each pursuing his own best interest in a society that believes in the freedom of the commons. Freedom in a commons brings ruin to all. (Hardin 1968:1244). The ruin comes after overgrazing depleting the grasslands – a tipping point is reached that suddenly makes all herdmen worse off or even threatens their very existence.

‘In a reverse way, the tragedy of the commons reappears in problems of pollution. Here it is not a question of taking something out of the commons, but of putting something in--sewage, or chemical, radioactive, and heat wastes into water; noxious and dangerous fumes [and GHG; UW] into the air [...] The calculations of utility are much the same as before. The rational man finds that his share of the cost of the wastes he discharges into the commons is less than the cost of purifying his wastes before releasing them. Since this is true for everyone, we are locked into a system of ‘fouling our own nest,’ so long as we behave only as independent, rational, free-enterprisers.’(Hardin 1968:1245)

If we take the tragedy of the commons as a metaphor for the difficulty to provide global public goods in a society of self-interested (nationalist) states, then governance is a way to address the tragedy of the commons or to provide global public goods -- the commons in the first place - through various ways of internationalisation to regulate the behaviour of the 'herdsmen' (here the nation-states). Co-operation between states and international and non-state actors to deal with the tragedy of the commons was described in the 1990s by authors such as Rosenau and Czempiel through the notion of governance ‘as a mode of jointly establishing public order and providing common goods in the absence of government’ (Tömmel 2009:9). We find here again the ‘absence of a higher authority’, i.e. of world government in the traditional understanding of anarchy. In the

and others, however, found little empirical evidence supporting such predictions (Ostrom 2009,2010).

255 Hardin's metaphorical tragedy plays out dramatically in many drought-affected parts of the world with some more factors involved than rational decision-making, including the demographic growth, the effects of climate change, the marginalisation of traditional life styles and the weaponisation of the herdsmen.

256 Ostrom (2009) rightly warns to conclude that the conventional solution of the collective action models for a global collective action problem is a global solution at just one level (citing examples of policy failures by very large entities including the fisheries policy of the EU or UNCLOS, or the Clean Development Mechanism under the Kyoto Protocol; Ostrom 2009:22-5). She advocates instead policy at multiple scales and levels. The term 'internationalisation' should thus be read in that generic way, not as a term advocating a solution at just the global (or any one) level.
absence of a world government, governance implies an order resulting from co-operation among states creating international regimes and from complex interactions between public and non-governmental actors ‘pursuing different objectives, but all contributing to provide common goods and thus to establish order in a globalizing world.’ (Tömmel 2009:10). ‘Order’ in terms of the ‘tragedy of the commons’ would mean mechanisms that prevent ‘overgrazing’ and ‘fouling our own nest’.

There is no commonly agreed definition of the term governance in the literature but it encompasses a broad range of conceptualisations ranging from mainly state-centred views to a much broader definition focussing on the interactions between various state and non-state actors (Tömmel 2009:9 and Baumann and Dingwerth 2015 for literature references) or polycentric governance (initially at local levels only, Ostrom 2009). One important conceptual perspective of governance sees it as ‘a reaction to the declining capacity of the state to direct economic growth and social progress and to solve complex problems of modern societies.’ (Tömmel 2009:10). This is a variant of the argument about the alleged ‘withering away’ of the state, but one that focuses on the complexity of international society and incidentally on the limits of conceiving governance simply as optimising rational behaviour. Araral and Hartley (2013) argue that ‘governance of complex, modern societies requires institutional diversity embodied in multi-level, multi-purpose, multi-sectoral, and multi-functional units of governance’. Nevertheless, Tömmel (2009:13) affirms that ‘The state or public authorities play the most prominent role in structuring processes of governance’. For many observers the failure of the markets in the global financial crisis was also a crucial argument to re-emphasise the role of states (Leggewie and Welzer 2011:102-18; Kocka 2014:118-9). Additionally, the rise in populist anti-globalisation movements and political parties in Europe and elsewhere after the financial crisis seems to indicate that many citizens feel more secure in the confines of the nation-state (Lampert and Blanksma Ceta 2017).

1.2.1 The limits of liberal-rational approaches to governance

Governance structures tend to follow the issues; regimes are fanning out along the complex systems and sub-systems of the problems as they arise and are recognised, reproducing in the governance structures the complexity, chaos and networks of the world of issues. Yet, at international level, most remain state-centric. The complexity and in particular the unpredictability of chaos dynamics presents a particular challenge to ‘rational’ and ‘bureaucratic’ governance actors (Bishop 2009). If patterns of developments and risks and causal chains for challenges and threats are uncertain or unknown, then the difficulty of setting up adequate “rational” regimes, prevention or response strategies increases dramatically. These dynamics of complexity and chaos go beyond Hardin’s tragedy of the commons as there is no way to conceive a central authority that could manage the complexity (nor is the basic collective action dilemma so simple as in Hardin’s text; Ostrom 2010). Thus, secondly, at a minimum, governance has to be nimble, flexible and functional rather than work through rigid institutional structures. This also presents a challenge for regional institutions not only global multilateral ones. As NE Asia shows, it may even encourage non-regional, not territorially bound multilateral projects as we shall see shortly. This reshaping of governance, however, is associated with the formation of political structures with ever more extensive complex organisational capabilities to control the natural, social and political
environment on a world scale. The state system is only a part of world politics, but an essential one in particular from an IR perspective, not only a realist, but also certain constructivist ones (Viotti and Kauppi 2012; Wendt 1999). But it is also an essential part of the world economy for IPE scholars who haven’t been carried away by ‘globalism’ (Weiss 2005).

However, most global issues are characterised by the complexity and uncertainty of the issues at hand beyond the ‘simple’ problem of ‘overgrazing’. This leads us to another formative feature of the re-definition of anarchy as complexity with implications for governance: the so-called new global threats and a complex agenda of problems and challenges that have been conceptualised as ‘risk society’ (Beck 2010; Giddens 1999). Of course, many economic decisions are rational and can be explained in game theory. Hardin (1968) showed how such rationality can lead to collective tragedy. However, the global financial crisis has shown, that the sum of individually more or less rational decisions goes beyond simple mechanisms of the rational game of ‘overgrazing’ in Hardin’s model. They can create chaotic dynamics that escape the model of rationality – Keynes’ ‘animal instincts’ perhaps - and can to some extent be captured by chaos theory (Bishop 2009) and behavioural economics. The chaotic character of the complex anarchy is underlined by the fact that many risks, like economic crisis or climate change, or even social inequalities cannot be attributed to a particular identifiable source or linear causal chain. They do not follow laws, but complex patterns and affect systems as a whole. They are therefore difficult to apprehend and difficult to ‘manage’ (even if there were a global government). International society thus evolves in a context of a chaos-system where chaos does not simply mean disorder or randomness, but complex, non-linear, non-law-like patterns which exhibit sensitive dependence on small changes in initial conditions (Bishop 2009; Smith 2010). This generates uncertainty and unpredictability. International politics to deal with this complexity is still in its infancy (Messner 2011) as the reactions to the global crisis and the international response to climate change show. The simple reflex of co-ordination and classical intergovernmental negotiations within the ageing global multilateral system and even (albeit to a lesser extent) through regional integration like the EU did not look very effective in many respects (cf part IV). Complexity and uncertainty are thus defining characteristics of the globalisation induced culture of anarchy. They produce risk and insecurity alongside welfare and prosperity. Thus, the legitimacy of the states is very much linked to how they respond to this new type of complex anarchy, hence the increasing ‘securitisation’ of economic, ecologic, biologic and other issues.

How to manage these chaotic challenges of the world of issues is then the states’ key question of our time regardless of how important non-state actors are in creating, affecting or managing these complex uncertainties. Even when states cannot effectively deal with global problems without these non-state actors, they are in a unique position to provide global regulation, monitoring and agenda-setting and for many the nation-state has become a safe haven from the consequences of unfettered neo-liberalism. And since states have very different views on causes and effects of complex problems as well as on historical justice and fairness regarding their solution we find daunting political and moralisation gaps between them (not only rational and material interests to be bargained about which remain of course significant). This political antagonism and the

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257 Leggewie and Welzer (2011:79-99) argue that in many instances humans act against their better knowledge due to cultural or psychological mechanisms leading to seemingly irrational decisions. Behavioural economics has also investigated this problem of ‘rational’ bias of many theories.
significance of moralisation gaps show the limit of liberal-rational approaches to global governance (Mouffe 2010).

The ideological and constitutive institutions of international society and what the moralisation gaps tell us about the underlying issues are useful concepts to define order through international society. This approach cannot capture all inadequacies or all the negotiation dynamics, but it focuses on some of the big and important things related to order and justice and thus indirectly on power (in the concept of power diffusion outlined earlier). Of course, the effectiveness of each multilateral process would need to be assessed in more detail than I can here on a number of criteria and benchmarks (for the G20 see Bartoldi, Scherrer and Stanoeva 2013). I will give some examples in chapter 3 below: the regional responses to outline key dynamics of the EU's multilateralist response and the nationalist ones in NE Asia to the economic crisis and to climate change, while in part IV I look at global governance. Moralisation gaps appear at crucial instances: the already reviewed historical moralisation gaps in NE Asia make attempts at regional cooperation on any issue very difficult and prompt countries to seek sovereignist national and international approaches. They cooperate where they must or where they have an interest, navigating around insoluble political divisions. The sovereignist-nationalist approach also prevents a deeper multilateral solution. This is compounded by another moralisation gap specific to climate change (historical and inter-generational as argued by Leggewie and Welzer 2011:64, 53-64 and with unequal impacts 63, 34-6). Conversely, during the economic crisis the focus on present interdependence and immediate crisis prompted even the nationalist states to engage in collective approaches. But even there moralisation gaps were never far from the negotiations.

The new form of 'club diplomacy' governance (G20), actually, allowed for status recognition, especially for China and the ROK who thus achieved 'parity' with Japan which for a long time had been the only Asian member of the global economic governance forum, the G7/8. The G20 replaced the G7 which had been created to enhance macro-economic coordination after the collapse of the Bretton Woods system and the oil crisis in the 1970s. The new format shows the dispersal of power to a greater number of economic cores and the diffusion of power from key formal institutions like the IMF to a looser 'steering committee' but the difficulties of international co-ordination also reflect the dissolution of power in complexity. The G20 has a narrow functional mandate so as not to overburden it with this complexity. There is no central authority governing the global economy (cf Oatley e.a. 2012 who map the networks of global and regional finance) and even less so formulating responses to global threats. Thus, we have a diffuse and complex network context of a world of issues, often politicised risks, in which states have to manage themselves and their relations with others often in equally complex processes mirroring the complexity of the world of issues and blurred accountability. I will revert later to the legitimacy issue, but club diplomacy bases its legitimacy on aggregate individual “power” of participating states, but also on the representation of a large part of world population and its GDP. Representation in other words is evolving beyond the traditional multilateralism based on “one state one vote” and has a whiff of cosmopolitanism about it258. As a reminder, the EU also has a

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258 Understandably there is a lot of criticism about the G20 notably from small states: ‘Although the G20 represents the vast population of the world, it clearly affects the standing of states that are left outside. Since its decisions are taken behind closed doors with little or no transparency, it becomes understandable that many weak or small states have voiced concern over the G20’s lack of legitimacy’ (Creutz 2017:6)
system of representativity based on weighted votes. Yet as Arrighi (2010:31) says, the absence of central rule does not imply that there are no rules, no organisation and no order not least due to the role of states in international politics. Ostrom (2009) and others have shown how such diffuse rules develop at local levels in polycentric governance. These dynamics of complex anarchy can be captured by the concept of international society defined more openly and inclusively (see my definition of International Society 2.0 in the Introduction) than in the English School’s original definition which as we have seen in part II lacked the focus on economic and other complex dynamics through its restrictive definition of anarch as absence of central authority and power in a state system.

1.3. Governance and territoriality – what spaces?

Governance is quasi by definition not territorially bounded (equivalent to the free commons in Hardin’s example) and not built on the exercise of the state’s monopoly of violence (although most definitions don’t make this explicit). Governance deals with the “flows-of-spaces” (or chaos patterns) between states (Ruggie 1993) that are not necessarily organised or controlled by states. Governance goes beyond territoriality in this sense. It is these spaces often organised by non-state actors (or not at all organised) that Paterson (2005) argues are better captured by international society concepts rather than international system approaches. Such flows rather than territorial spaces have always existed: Arrighi (2010) opposes capitalist to territorialist logics in early modern Europe. It is, however, not persuasive to simply oppose these logics to declare the end of the nation-state. Both logics – the territorial and the ‘flow of spaces’ for instance of the market economy - co-exist in a ‘double movement’ which has ‘always been a major feature of the modern world system’ (Arrighi 2010:80; Rosenberg 2005). In NE Asia we can observe this double movement simultaneously: on the one hand a logic of ‘open regionalism’ suggests that transnational trade and production links are more important than national or regional spaces (Hatch, Bair and Heiduk 2014), on the other hand territorial conflicts over (economically) insignificant islets dominate politics at times and hinder institutional and economic regional integration. Even in the EU there is a co-existence of collective spaces and flows (Single Market, EMU) and more territorial, intergovernmental spaces and flows (home affairs, taxation, foreign policy). This problem of flows-of-spaces and territoriality is particularly acute for regionalism.

While important parts of international society are not bound by territoriality – those flows of spaces - states are. However, states have created instruments to extend their territorial reach into these flows and spaces for instance through co-operative regimes (Efinger, Rittberger e.a. 1990; Bellers and Häckel 1990), through co-opting NSA and also through instruments to deal with the externalities impacting on state functions. The flows-of-spaces are thus becoming functional spaces. Another instrument to ‘extend’ the states’ territorial reach and to cope with these dynamics is regionalisation. Regionalisation has a strong territorial connotation unlike other forms of internationalisation and governance. Because of the focus of our analysis on comparing two regions in a world of issues, regionalisation naturally deserves our particular attention. Regionalisation can be associated with state-led internationalisation processes, but it is also often seen as a process led by non-state, mainly business, or sub-national level state actors so it is an ambiguous concept that we will examine in more detail below (chapter 2).
International Society 2.0 as an analytical concept acknowledges those flows-of-spaces and non-state, 'non-territorial' actors. It includes globalisation, regionalisation and various other forms of internationalisation, beyond looking only at the territory-bound, power-focussed traditional state system which can’t adequately capture the responses to the challenges of the global economy and global risk. But it also includes the states as main actors that are often obscured in 'globalist', liberal approaches focussing almost exclusively on the flows of spaces, NSA and market dynamics. That is why it was important to acknowledge the market economy as a constitutive institution of international society. Both the 'solid', territory-bound states and the 'fluid', de-territorialised economy have to enter the equation.

Besides creating regimes and IOs states take on increasingly diversified (or disaggregated) functional roles, acquiring 'fluidity' or flexibility, and use diverse instruments and also increasingly accommodate other actors to deal with flows-of-spaces and complexity. This is captured by the various dimensions of the diffusion of power as presented in chapter II.2 and table 3. Governance – global or regional - could be seen as the tissue of network interactions that is evolving to structure a world of complex issues to which power is diffusing rapidly and to bring order into chaos through internationalisation in various forms. It is these international activities which have seen decisive increases and transformations over time. Thus, in terms of extension of activities across the globe and internationalisation of processes across territories there can be no doubt that globalisation has profoundly changed the state system: the longue durée perspective shows this change impressively. For Arrighi, for instance, the state system has for the last 500 years since the Venitian capitalist state been indissociably linked to capitalism, constituting a ‘unique fusion of state and capital’ (Arrighi 2010:12). The ‘recurrent expansions and restructurings of the capitalist world-economy have occurred under the leadership of particular communities and blocs of governmental and business agencies, (Arrighi 2010:10). Kocka (2013:43) corroborates these findings in the development of early islands of capitalism in other parts of the world. Arrighi (p8) defines capitalism as distinct from production, industry and trade, as the non-specialised top layer in the hierarchy of world trade. This distinguishes the fungibility of capital and the non-territorial flows and spaces that have ‘the power to reshape the markets and the lives of the entire world’ (p11) from more territory-based economic activities. But Kocka (2013:42-6) shows that Europe at that time was actually lagging behind the Arab world and China in terms of commerce and capitalist development. But it proved more dynamic especially in terms of financialisation, long-distance trade and production methods. The dynamic centre then moved to the US (Oatley e.a. 2012 for a mapping of global financial networks) and with the ‘Pacific century’ idea a shift back to Asia is associated (Wilkins 2010).

The question arises how states respond to these dynamics. What forms of internationalisation can we observe? Is regionalisation a privileged response?

Complexity in its different dimensions reviewed above has a common denominator in the sense that it cannot be addressed by states individually. Internationalisation and globalisation thus go hand in hand. With globalisation ever more pervasive, states are adapting increasingly to it and are increasingly refining their tools to manage and benefit from it (global economic governance;
Globalisation (building on a whole corpus of earlier theorising on inter-dependence) is often cited by policymakers as well as by many analysts as a rationale for regionalisation and regional integration. For these analysts national responses to globalisation are seen as inadequate and nations as too small to face globalisation challenges on their own (lack of power). The global financial crisis is seen as one more piece of evidence to corroborate the belief held by globalists and many regionalists alike that nation states are simply not able to cope on their own with the challenges of globalisation (Messner 2011; Piris 2012:5-6). The expectation of interdependence and integration theory is that globalisation necessarily (almost by definition) leads to more cooperation and integration (for instance through spill overs) and alters the national interest, sovereignty and the constitution of the state system (Keohane 2002; Messner 2011). The observation in reality is that despite an increasing density of corporate cooperation and integration, there are widely different outcomes of how states in different regions have responded. And not all have chosen regionalist strategies. Some preferred national strategies or in some areas trans-regional ones (Korea for instance preferred bilateral FTAs with the EU and the US over shallower regional projects; the TTP project comprised a group of countries on three continents while China engaged in the BRICS alongside regional initiatives in Asia and launched its own trans-regional ‘One Belt One Road’ initiative; Stanzel 2017). And if anything, nationalist attitudes are becoming more prominent not less including contestation in domestic politics against globalisation or against the EU (Lampert and Blanksma Ceta 2017). The EU has indeed deepened (but also differentiated) integration (and widened membership) and resorted to more intergovernmental ways to deal with the financial crisis (and in foreign policy). It has suffered pressure of disintegration (Vollaard 2014). At the same time, the EU is also very much a globalised actor and integrated in global and inter-regional networks and cooperation. By contrast, the economic success of NE Asian countries seems to vindicate a national rather than a collective response to globalisation just as the EU is struggling with a sovereign debt crisis. National responses in NE Asia consist of for instance accumulation of currency reserves or exchange rate and capital controls (Kalinowski 2012). The amount of foreign exchange reserves in US dollars and Euros rather than in regional currencies points to a similar conclusion: countries do not see the region as the ultimate guarantor of their economic security and centre of interaction, but are ultimately first self-reliant and then focussing on the US, Europe and other markets internationally. Globalisation may actually have undermined rather than strengthened the rationale for regional integration in NE Asia.

This questions the assumption underlying many regionalism studies that because globalisation challenges individual states’ capacity to deal with it on their own, regionalism is a preferred response to globalisation as opposed to other forms of cooperation (Moon 2011). There is no single compelling economic logic of globalisation producing economic or even less political

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259 One could argue that at least for China, with its huge population and market the internationalisation logic of ‘too small to deal with globalisation on its own’ does not apply and thus one need look no further. However, this economic pattern of regional and international linkages shows that the size argument falls short. China’s grand strategy of national development over the last thirty years has built on reforms and opening-up and thus internationalisation was a key driver of its prosperity. It is actually the smallest country in NE Asia – the DPRK – which pursues a closed door policy (but ironically is dependent on outside aid, not self-reliant as its ‘juche’ ideology makes believe).
regionalism as Van Langenhove (2012) argues, no single compelling logic of internationalisation in the context of globalisation. The ideological institutions of international society – nationalism, multilateralism - are in other words also modifying the constitutive institution market economy. We turn now to these various responses.

1.4. State responses to complexity and governance challenges – what form of internationalisation?

In this section I examine the role of the state and the global economy and make a distinction between globalisation and internationalisation to analytically limit governance to what states make of it before turning to regionalisation as a specific form of internationalisation. Globalisation in my analysis is part of complex anarchy, but as argued above, the globalised economy is also a constitutive part of international society. Therefore, it is directly affecting international society in three ways:

1) as an economic institution which internationalises society and determines its core structures of order together with sovereignty and international law (cf. previous chapter on institutions).
2) as a context for international relations that elicits state responses to complex challenges and chaos dynamics through governance.
3) as a context for internationalisation dynamics that can reinforce, but also undermine regionalism, depending on nationalist versus multilateralist beliefs and to some extent on whether regional projects are simply responses to globalisation or products of specific, more complex development paths.

How states react to this changing context is an indication and recognition of globalisation's importance. States are developing more sophisticated tools to manage globalisation all the time – they may do so under pressure, but states remain the main social structure for the (international and domestic) articulation, arbitrage and legitimacy of key decisions regarding prosperity, security and welfare of citizens, even if they ever more often have to enlist the help of or contend with NSA or as in the EU act multilaterally at regional level. The law, regulation, taxes, occasionally fines, state spending and control of money supply conditions very much set the framework for much economic activity (admittedly often under pressure of powerful lobbies and financial markets).

I suggest building on the distinction between globalisation and internationalisation that Katzenstein (2005:13-9) makes to argue that internationalisation is the catch-up game that states play to deal with the complexity of globalisation, its (new) actors and often chaotic processes and the increasingly complex world of issues. Katzenstein defines globalisation as a process that transcends space and compresses time and internationalisation as a process of territorially based exchanges across borders with the nation-state as a central actor. This distinction allows for less state-centred transnational accounts of globalisation – including the flows-of-spaces - while making the focus on the state and international society more precise. It also allows considering regionalisation as a form of internationalisation (with territory based exchanges and processes). If internationalisation is states' catch-up game with globalisation and complexity, states may
arguably be ‘handicapped’ players as they are by definition not as mobile as capital, corporations or individuals. They can’t collect taxes abroad or even stop other states – weak or minuscule as they may be - from not collecting any (tax havens). They need to raise capital on the financial markets and have limited influence on the conditions and behaviour of these markets as the sovereign debt crisis in EU countries has shown. Nowadays states can no longer drive globalisation by sending armies or gunboats to ‘open’ countries for trade or annexing territories like in the 18th /19th century. States cannot stop polluting factories abroad with surgical drone strikes or cruise missiles in the name of saving humanity from global warming. This decline in autonomy is of course not due to a lack of military capabilities, but to self-restraint and the norms of sovereignty and peaceful co-existence states have internalised. Because the economy is part of international society it is no longer just a state resource to be mobilised for warfare or an object of conquest.

Internationalisation’s instruments (regulation, supervision, monetary policy, trade and investment agreements, international organisations etc.) are the equivalent of diplomacy, arms control, international law and treaties in ‘high politics’ and are in principle not new but have adapted to the specifics of and new actors in globalisation processes, hence they have been dubbed ‘governance’. This is where the ‘globalised economy’ is part of the institutions of international society not just an externality. 'New' actors (business, NSA) play roles in shaping the rules of the game or its objectives, or defend/advance particular interests and hence affect governance (directly or more often through domestic agency).

However, different states follow different logics, including regarding the degree of sovereign control over macro-economic (fiscal and monetary) policy (Weiss 2000:9). Weakening traditional gate-keeper roles (at least in some areas and in some regions e.g. the EU single market) was a deliberate choice (even if under pressure) and has been accompanied by international agreements (WTO, EU treaties, FTAs, international financial regulation, Basle III, the Financial Stability Board FSB etc.). Very few states (such as the DPRK) made the 'nationalist' choice to stay out of such arrangements constraining their autonomy. In this perspective states change in their functions, but change is not the same as weakening (Katzenstein 2005:18). One such change has been away from mercantilism, protectionism and repression towards open market economies. But this openness to private economic activity during the industrial revolution coincided with the introduction of public education and welfare policies to cushion against the negative social impacts of free trade (Dieckhoff 2012). Similarly Weiss (2003:15-7) for the contemporary world, argues for an enabling view of globalisation with positive consequences for social protection and education thus in fact strengthening the state. The state's share of GDP remains high in most developed and emerging economies despite de-regulation since the 1980s. Finally, states are learning and applying lessons from the past successes and failures. For instance during the global financial crisis comparisons were made with policy failures of the 1930s (Drezner 2012, Helleinen 2010). Thus internationalisation works both ways – it changes the domestic intra-state processes (Weiss 2000) as well as the outward engagement with other states. Here I will focus on the latter which is also the meaning proposed by Katzenstein (2005).

Indeed, one almost universally observable adaptation in state behaviour regardless of their
domestic political system (North Korea largely excepted) in order to manage globalisation is internationalisation. States and their leaders have to deal with an unprecedented and ever increasing amount of issues internationally rather than just domestically. For many of these issues the state may be the ‘wrong sort of unit’ (Kennedy 1987:131), too small or too large, hence the creation of new instruments (institutions), organisations, international regimes or new units (regions) to deal with them. Collectively these instrumental or mechanical institutions can be considered as global governance within the dynamic framework of constitutive institutions sovereignty, international law and the market economy. The disaggregation of state functions and their transnational interactions explain the need for the top level to not only decide domestically, but also to engage internationally, hence the multiplication of international summits, such as the G20. Not surprisingly many such summits are also accompanied by CEO and CSO ‘summits’ sometimes co-opted by the state summit hosts sometimes organised autonomously to influence or criticise the state-led processes. Some platforms such as the World Economic Forum or the alternative World Social Forum draw participants from all levels. I do not diminish the role of non-state actors many of which are important actors in globalisation, I just do not focus on them in my analysis, while in line with the literature on governance and globalisation I consider them as part of International Society 2.0.

Multilateral structures (can) co-exist with non-state, non-territorial structures and networks (Arrighi 2010:85). Thus, the different forms of internationalisation are on the one hand demand-driven (response to a changing context, globalisation and pressures from interest groups or other states). On the other hand, they are supply-constrained to various degrees by norms and institutions that states follow guided by their ideology: nationalism, multilateralism or cosmopolitanism.

Internationalisation helps explain the resilience of the territorial nation-state in the transformative non-territorial globalisation process. Raustiala’s (2002) analysis of transgovernmental networks and international law (cf Egan 2009 for the EU) offers a number of explanations for how transgovernmental regulatory networks either substitute, complement or create synergies with international law and organisations to help the state (disaggregated into its various agencies and government branches) adapt to the complexity of globalisation for instance in financial markets, competition law or environmental regulation. Oatley e.a. (2012), through their mapping of the networks of global finance, provide an interesting view of the structure of network governance in a hierarchical system that is essentially relational. Its actors are both state and non-state actors,

260 Many global issues are no longer left to traditional diplomacy and envoys, but are dealt with by Ministers and Leaders themselves often in varying configurations not along fixed institutional structures. This suggests a reaction to the disaggregation of state functions in its dealings with a complex environment: summits re-centralise the disaggregation of state functions. The G7 and G20 have their roots in the ‘fireside chats’ of the G5 at Rambouillet in 1975 to discuss economic crisis management in the 1970s (Badie 2011:87). Even in the EU summitry started as extraordinary and irregular gatherings of leaders (for instance the special summit in The Hague in 1969 to relaunch the European integration process by a new generation of leaders). Summits over time became first political routine and then legally institutionalised with the latest development being the institution of Eurozone summits in the fiscal compact treaty of 2012 (again to deal with economic crisis management). If states had weakened and other actors were really dealing with the issues, there would be no need for such summits. They indicate that rather than weakened or retreating, states have internationalised and developed other functions and tools such as international (global or regional) governance beyond gate-keeping and border control which used to be key state functions in another age of territoriality. Summits also point to the highly political nature of governance issues: leaders deal with issues in person. Economic summits are a more regular and frequent occurrence than security summits.
such as heads of state, finance ministers, banks, the G20, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, the IMF, private rating agencies and various NGOs: ‘The international financial system is a set of economic and political relationships among private and public actors operating in domestic and international fora’ operating in the logic of a complex adaptive system like a flock of birds: ‘A complex adaptive system (CAS) is one in which multiple agents interact without guidance provided by a central controller and produce a structured and persistent collective outcome’. All actors (or nodes in a network) are related to each other in different ways (ties connecting the nodes): ‘This collective behaviour produces a structure: a global network of creditor-debtor relationships.’ (Oatley e.a. 2012:7-8). This model resembles the polycentric governance models developed in other contexts, but polycentric governance implies more active attempts to define rules of the game guided by specific objectives. Their mapping of the global finance network shows a hierarchical structure with the US as the central node which explains why the subprime mortgage crisis in the US affected all the other nodes in the network through contagion while a crisis in the periphery (such as the Asian Financial Crisis or Europe’s sovereign debt crisis) had only limited effects across the global network, despite the strong effects of the crisis on the regional nodes themselves. Conversely, if the system were flat, the peripheral crises would have equally spread throughout the whole system. However, the centrality or hierarchical structure in a network system has different implications for power and governance than the traditional IR models: ‘Although the structural configurations derived from network topologies map onto familiar IR conceptions of structure, the two differ sharply. Network models derive state power from network structure. Traditional IR models derive structure from state power defined in terms of national capabilities.’ (Oatley e.a. 2012:11). We thus find, despite the hierarchical structure a dispersal of (state) power in the relationships among many state and non-state actors and a dissolution of power in the complexity of the structure thus created. This concept of network governance confirms my thesis of anarchy as one of complexity and chaos: ‘Recasting international financial interdependence as a self-organizing network indicates that the system may exhibit non-trivial topologies, that network structure may have non-obvious implications for system performance, and that system change may be characterized by complex non-linear dynamics.’ (Oatley.e.a. 2012:18). Therefore network governance – perhaps emulating polycentric governance - is particularly suitable for the complex world of issues in International Society 2.0.

Governance at the bottom line means that states are using various instruments and ways to manage aspects of globalisation together (Wade and Meunier 2010) with other states and actors, sometimes through institutions or regimes, sometimes as nodes in a network structure developing and refining role relationships in a complex culture of anarchy in international society. Not all states use all these tools at all times and in the same ways, nor are the ties between the various nodes equally strong, hence the interest to compare the EU with NE Asia below.

The EU is a prime example of the use of all types of processes of internationalisation, supranationalisation and transnationalisation in its various forms from legalisation, institution building to transgovernmental networks to deal with globalisation (Tömmel and Verdun 2009). In chapter 3.1 the example of the EU’s banking union illustrates this point. Territory and internationalisation tensions seem more or less reconciled through a regional integration project. At the same time the EU is not a result of such a process. It had been created for other purposes as
well as we have seen in part I. I will address the specific issue of regionalisation and governance in the next chapter (2). First I examine the implications of different types of internationalisation for sovereignty.

1.5. Transnationalisation and sovereignty

Transnationalisation is an internationalisation process but without formal state intervention, it describes self-organisation of NSA such as industrial standardisation, codes of conduct, certification regimes, arbitration, internet governance, financial markets etc. to deal with globalisation issues (Zürn 2010:17; Hooghe and Marks 2001:10). However, in reality, transnationalism can hardly do completely without involving state-set frameworks such as international law and spaces 'offered' to them. Baumann and Dingwerth (2015:117-9) show that even internet governance which is often held up as an example of private transnational governance is not as delinked from state hierarchy as it is made believe in such accounts. We can distinguish transgovernmentalism, where specific agencies in government become economic institutions in a largely non-government network from private transnational networks. Some transnational governance takes place between sub-national entities (regions, cities) across borders, a common phenomenon in Europe (Hooghe and Marks 2001:10-1) and to a lesser extent through economic linkages between sub-national entities in Asia (Yeo 2010). In many, if not most countries, there is strong nationalist resistance to transnationalism and even to transgovernmentalism as it is widely perceived as undermining sovereignty and the state's role as gatekeeper between the external and the domestic which is upheld as a value per se.

It is important to acknowledge different interpretations of sovereignty (due to ideological modifiers). It is not only the 'usual suspects' (like China or North Korea) who reject interference in domestic affairs: Kyl, Feith and Fonte (2013), American scholars with a political background as lawmakers and senior officials, oppose transnationalism, global governance and global norms and rules unless they are made by Americans, democratically accountable to Americans. They accuse transnationalists of wanting 'to give various rules the force of law without having to win majorities for those rules in democratically elected legislatures' (p.118) and argue that international law has to be based on explicit state consent and that the US must defend its right to choose its treaties. They explicitly reject the EU model: 'The transnationalists achieved great influence there decades ago, as many Europeans now recognize to their regret, and contributed to the growth of intrusive yet unaccountable bureaucracy' (p 121). These polemic scholars, however, do not propose any viable alternative solution to tackle genuinely transnational problems apart from the United States.

261 It may sound strange to use the word government as an economic institution. The intention is not to limit government to its economic role. However, the term is used in that sense by J.J. Rousseau in his 1755 contribution to Diderot’s famous Encyclopédie 'Discours sur l’ économie politique' in which he distinguishes the public economy or government from the supreme authority or sovereignty: « Je prie mes lecteurs de bien distinguer encore l’économie publique dont j’ai à parler, et que j’appelle gouvernement, de l’autorité suprême que j’appelle souveraineté; distinction qui consiste en ce que l’une a le droit legislatif, et oblige en certains cas le corps même de la nation, tandis que l’autre n’a que la puissance exécutive, et ne peut obliger que les particuliers. » (Rousseau 1964:244). Rousseau here distinguished the public economy that he calls executive power or government from the supreme authority which he calls legislative power or sovereignty. Rousseau in the same text uses a body metaphor for the state with sovereignty as head; law, traditions and will (in modern parlance ideas and culture) as brain; trade, industry and agriculture as the mouth and stomach that keeps the body alive and running; public finance as the blood which ‘a wise economy, functioning as the heart, distributes nutrition and life to the whole body’ with the citizens being the limbs and body (Rousseau 1964:244 my translation).
adopting rules for the others to follow: 'Indeed, Americans can benefit from international cooperation that is rooted in countries’ widespread acceptance of useful rules of the road. But U.S. officials should adopt such rules, as they do with domestic legislation, through democratic processes.’ (p.125). Sovereignty is here defined as an intrinsic element of US democracy and any international agreement sub-ordinated to national political and legal processes that largely exclude the executive branch and 'activist judges exploiting the democracy-unfriendly theories of the transnational legal movement.' (p.125) While this debate is very much one within and between the US and Europe (as we can see from the above the EU model serves as polarising reference for both proponents and opponents of transgovernmentalism in the US), it is safe to say that all countries in NE Asia share with the US the defensive focus on national sovereignty and consent-based international norms (albeit for different reasons than the US concern about democratic accountability and the US political system). And of course, also in Europe there are many (including political parties on the left and the right) who oppose transnational companies and neoliberalism and deploring the hollowing out of social, economic, environmental and even political rights (big data).

The fallacy from a global governance perspective is of course that the concern for democratic accountability is a strictly national one. The EU with its directly elected European Parliament is a rare example of a multilateral system with democratic accountability beyond the national level (despite a persistent democratic deficit). There is room for an international democratic process at equal or higher level than national parliaments and electorates. Global governance is a timid instrument to address this problem as its accountability is limited (usually to government representatives in international summits, conferences or organisations). I will come back to this dilemma or trilemma in part IV.8 (see also Huang and Bailis 2015 on trilemmas in economic and climate governance). Interestingly, the problem of democratic accountability also appears here between states and their ‘equal rights’ in global governance. This fallacy is precisely the one that China and other emerging countries deplore, when they point to a democratic deficit in the international order or speak of 'hegemonism’ (which is one of the moralisation gaps in global governance). They insist on their own consent rather than that of the US Congress to international norms to make them applicable to themselves and truly international. As China’s Ambassador to the US said in a Foreign Affairs interview: 'So we are ready to integrate ourselves into the global system, and we are ready to follow the international rules. Of course, these rules were set without much participation by China, and the world is changing. You cannot say that the rules that were set up half a century ago can be applied without any change today.' (Tepperman 2013a:12). Li Keqiang, China’s Premier in an interview with the Financial Times on 31 March 2015 said: 'And we are ready to continue to play our role in building the current international financial system. And if there is a need for reforming the current system, we are also ready to work with other countries to help make the system more just, reasonable and balanced.’

1.6. Supranationalisation and sovereignty

n=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ft.com%2Fcms%2Fs%2F0%2F3a42d156-e288-11e4-aa1d-00144feab7de.html%3Ff	ca
mp&_i_referer=&classification=conditional_standard&_iab=barrier-app#axzz3rivr5aYQ accessed on 16.4.2015
Supranationalisation is characteristically associated with the EU and I have covered this extensively in previous chapters. But the term more generally describes the involvement of international organisations in international decision-making: the UN and its various agencies, the IPCC, the ICC and the international Human Rights regime, the WTO (dispute settlement mechanism) etc. On all this Keohane (2002:50) reminds scholars that ‘Neither peace nor coordinated economic and social policies can be sought on the basis of a hierarchical organizational principle that supersedes governments. Governments must be persuaded; they cannot be bypassed’. Arguably in the EU they often are by-passed, but it is still governments which originally consented to the institutions and rules which allow that to happen in limited areas (the already mentioned Kompetenz-Kompetenz). The EU’s multilateral supra-nationalism differs from the one in the UN and similar international organisations through its syndicated hierarchy and legal order which in many areas no longer relies on state consent (Hooghe and Marks 2001) and through its cosmopolitan traits as we have seen.

Internationalisation is therefore firstly a consequence of the realisation of inter-dependence referring to situations characterised by reciprocal costly effects among actors (Keohane 2002:14) in a globalising world on the one hand, and ‘denationalisation’ of many social processes (economic interactions, travel, culture, environment, science, NSA) on the other hand (Zürn 2010:15; Dieckhoff 2012). However, it also takes account of the persistence of the nation state as political idea and real actor in economic and other processes beyond instrumental rationality (costly effects) à la Keohane. In the EU it is a convergence of the integration process and a multilateralist belief embodied in constitutionalisation and common projects such as the single market, the EMU or the ETS. The important point is that internationalisation is a systemic, structural response to the globalised complex logic of anarchy to manage flows-of-spaces including (and beyond) the economic aspects of globalisation, but also a security community premised in both respects on overcoming moralisation gaps and inequalities. It has transformed and is still transforming the international state system from the traditional power logics in International Society Mark I to the more complex and networked (tentatively polycentric) economic, ecological, scientific (knowledge) and social logics of International Society 2.0.

Supranationalisation and regionalisation have evolved together in the EU, but that doesn't mean that regionalism has to follow the EU trajectory. Regionalism is an important and problematic form of internationalisation, but also more than just that. Therefore it will be examined in more detail in the next section. Is regionalism the most promising form of multilateralism? Is regionalisation an alternative to globalisation? Are trade relations a sufficient indicator to speak of regionalisation? Does regionalism have the potential to transform institutions of international society, or is the EU transformation a special case?

2. Regionalisation and international society

Regionalism is an area of study that has generated a lot of literature from different perspectives. It has, however, not been systematically addressed in International Society literature. The field of study and research is quite fragmented with the notions of regionalism often vague or contradictory (Van Langenhove and Maes 2013:174; Söderbaum 2015:5: ‘One of the main
characteristics of the study of regionalism is that regionalism means different things to different people in different contexts and time periods’).

The question – raised in the 1990 by the economist Jagdish Baghwati - of regionalism and globalisation is usually framed to investigate whether 'regions' are a necessary (or constitutive) part of globalisation or, to the contrary, an obstacle to it (Telò 2015:21-4). This question is often debated in terms of trade creation or trade diversion in a rather narrow view of regionalisation versus globalisation. Trade agreements are made mainly for profit and welfare gains. Sometimes they are political signals of cooperation, but it is difficult to read normative integration intentions into them, especially for the shallower kind that does not concern many behind the border issues. Such FTAs do not create a sense of belonging or identity. They are typical mechanical institutions of international society and functional agreements. In some instances, like the APEC, the trade-based regionalism process adds a political consultation dimension (APEC is basically a discussion forum, or talk-shop, not a rule-making body). NE Asia shows that the regional level does not function as either an institution (project) to manage globalisation nor is it an obstacle to it. NE Asian countries have strived in the global economy without a regionalisation project apart from their bilateral links with ASEAN and free trade agreements geared more to embrace globalisation than regionalisation (Shu 2015:88,101). The shallowness of most other trade and economic cooperation agreements in the wider Asia region also indicates that it is rather unhelpful to reduce the world of regions to this binary question. This is not to argue the other extreme that the EU template is the reference model for all regionalisation processes and projects (Warleigh-Lack and Rosamond 2010). The EU clearly has a specific role in managing globalisation, but it has not been created for that purpose and it has many other roles and features that have been studied either as a specific field (European studies) or under the so-called 'old regionalism' (Telò 2015, Söderbaum 2015 for overviews of the field of study). For some time already, the study and practice of regionalism no longer required the EU blueprint as a benchmark. Acharya (2012:11) even talks about 'euroexceptionalism' and the European sovereign debt crisis further questions the European regional blueprint's relevance as a model (Bach 2011, Acharya 2012). Europe’s recent economic predicament has cooled the appetite for regional integration elsewhere, notably Asia’s fledgling monetary integration plans.

Regionalism has become almost a fad after globalisation dominated the agenda for some time. Nowak (2014:1) calls regionalisation 'the overwhelming trend' in key areas of global economic governance such as finance, trade and development aid. Indeed, empirical research has shown that in nearly all continents there are various efforts at regionalisation (Acharya 2012; Telò 2015a). However, NE Asia has not developed a regional project to deal with global or even regional issues, but mostly relied on national policies and shallow international coordination and regional exchanges (in the trilateral co-operation process or through larger forums like ASEAN+3; cf. Shu 2015 for an analysis of the domestic factors in Asian countries behind those developments).

In a book review Rui Baptista (2014:160) notes the importance of regions in globalisation within a context of ‘qualitative, rather than quantitative’ changes in the global economy but in the tradition of the opposition of states to globalisation in which regionalism seems to present an escape route: ‘The rediscovery of the region as a space for generating development and shaping global

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263 Regions can be sub-national entities as well, but here I use the word region in terms of involving states and levels above them.
processes has opened up new avenues for research and policy efforts within globalizing economic structures. Globalization has weakened institutional buffers between national economies and global markets, leading to increased inequality within countries and demanding for increased flexibility and specialized learning at the regional level."

This weakening of institutional buffers is a traditional topic for attempts to analyse regionalism/regionalisation, analogous to the debate I have analysed about the role of the state in the market economy. The weakening of the state (and the institutional buffers) has traditionally been read as enhancing the importance of regionalism. Van Langenhove (2012) for example proposes to ‘unpack’ regionalism starting from a perspective of globalisation which poses structural problems to the Westphalian order that forces the states to adapt and change. He identifies (2012:17) regionalisation as one possible option for states’ ‘self-transformation’ (others being reinforcing the classical gatekeeper role of states or the creation of a new world order – similar to my spectrum from national-soverignist, multilateralist to cosmopolitanist world society. The EU can be seen as an exemplary case for a self-transforming regionalist and NE Asia as a classical gatekeeper option. Van Langenhove defines a state’s actorness through three main policy domains (2012:19-20): economic policy (every state being a single market with its own economic policy), an institutional framework to deliver public goods and finally sovereignty (authority over its citizens and legal personality in international relations).

On that basis Van Langenhove (2012:19) ‘unpacks’ regionalisation and distinguishes three approaches: integration projects (i.e. normative ideals and goals), processes (i.e. transformations leading to integration that are based on discursive acts and interactions) and products (i.e. institutions, policies and practices emerging as outcomes of processes). Crucially, in each of the three domains state actorness ‘can be subject to processes of regional integration or disintegration’ (p. 20) for example removing economic obstacles towards integration, building institutions or creating regulations that facilitate the delivery of public goods or transfers of sovereignty. The results can be a wide variety of possible regionalisation processes and outcomes including regions assuming all or part of the three domains. However, arguably in his classification the classical gatekeeper option with states as their own single markets, institutional frameworks and sovereign entities would not qualify as a regional integration process. Van Langenhove (2012:21) rightly emphasises that ‘each regional integration process follows its own trajectory and can remain insulated within one dimension of governance or, alternatively, spill over and cumulate the characteristics from the other varieties [...] There is no evidence of some kind of natural evolution bringing cases of the first variety of regional integration automatically to the level of the second or third variety.’ Warleigh-Lack and Rosamond (2010:1001), who investigate the 'frontier' between EU studies and regionalism agree with this approach. They point to one issue where my international society concept precisely can function as a bridge over this...

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De Lombaerde (2011) reviews the problematic variety of concepts such as 'region', 'regionalisation' and 'regionalism' and argues that 'regions can be defined in different ways, depending on the research questions that are asked' (p.677), but he basically agrees that the distinction between product and process and a duality of regional integration policies and institutionalisation on the one hand and 'real' integration or regional interdependence on the other hand is fundamental to conceive of regionalism/regionalisation. Some authors question the key notion of 'integration' arguing that regionalisation can proceed without integration which has 'euro-centric' connotations (Warleigh-Lack and Rosamond 2010). This has led to the 'bracketing' of the EU 'model' of regional integration in new regionalism research. Telò (2015) proposes a post-revisionist synthesis.
EU studies-new regionalism (NR) frontier: 'A corollary of the switch from IR-derived to comparative politics-derived conceptual frameworks has been the neglect in much EU study of the links between regionalization in Europe and the global or international context; and yet the globalization-regionalization matrix is a standard feature of NR studies'.

The International Society 2.0 approach accommodates both globalisation and regionalisation without reducing EU or regionalism studies to that dichotomy. The various types of institutions of International Society that I have developed explain to a large extent the diversity of these processes but also what links them. Telò’s (2015) post revisionist synthesis also goes beyond this dichotomy, but does not explicitly embed his synthesis into a concept of international society.

Many of these regionalisation processes are really internationalisation in various forms where nations come together to co-operate on or to co-ordinate strategies regarding international problems or opportunities or to deliver some public goods. That this internationalisation process sometimes happens in regions is not a structural explanation for regionalism. Regionness can thus rather be seen in more or less multilateralist or more or less nationalist ways (table 7). In the latter case regionness will be mainly functional and competitive relationships will dominate, in the former mainly comprehensive and even constitutionalised and teamworker relationships will develop.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regionness</th>
<th>Nationalist</th>
<th>Multilateral</th>
<th>Integration (EU)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sovereignty</td>
<td>Exclusive, national</td>
<td>Pooled, shared through consent</td>
<td>Syndicated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International law</td>
<td>Positivist, thin</td>
<td>Regimes</td>
<td>constitutionalised</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Market) Economy</td>
<td>Developmental, selectively open</td>
<td>Networked, regulatory regimes</td>
<td>Common regulation, single market</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>national economy</td>
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Hettne and Söderbaum (2009) consider regionalisation as a specific form of internationalisation in various institutional shapes and processes through various phases such as a proto-region, regional complex, regional international society, regional community and regional polity (Van Langenhove and Maes 2013:175-6). That sort of classification, however, reminds of Balassa’s stepwise approach to economic integration and suggests at some wider level a functionalist evolution of regional patterns in the direction of an integrated polity – the very teleological approach to ‘old’ or European regionalism that Acharya, Bach and Van Langenhove are sceptical about.

Furthermore, there are very similar processes that comprise very large concepts of regions (APEC for instance) or very fractured regions (like the TPP initiative including some North American, some South American and some Asian countries that do not form a region by any other criteria than being involved in the initiative). Other examples are some international projects such as the BRICS, IBSA or South-South co-operation (G77 + China) that can hardly be characterised as regional, but have created international organisations such as the New Development Bank or normative documents and groupings (such as South South Co-operation with a wealth of summits,
groups, think tanks and UN documents). Conversely for NE Asia the new regionalism approach yields at best a wafer-thin regionness by any other indicator than trade, tourism (often for shopping) and investment. Thus, regionalism as just a geographically bounded internationalisation process in a limited area of cooperation (like trade, investment, finance) itself does not really yield many insights into regional versus global governance and does not easily corroborate claims of regionalism as the overwhelming trend or the biggest problem in global governance. There needs to be something else.

Regionalism may produce specific norms and rules only shared by members of a specific regional society in whatever organisational form it comes (a regional community in the new regionalism terminology, Van Langenhove and Maes 2013:176). It could thus be defined by its distinctive shared norms, beliefs and institutions.

I distinguished ideological modifiers (Confucianism, nationalism, multilateralism) and different ways of conceiving of institutions of international society. I have also shown how role relationships such as regional teamworkers operate in the regional and global governance context and the importance of moralisation gaps that hinder regional cooperation. However, even in such a normative perspective regionalism can find itself on the same plane as other internationalist or multilateralist endeavours, such as the BRICS, IBSA etc. Counting trade and investment agreements and measuring flows of goods or services are thus not good indicators for the existence of a regional society and don’t constitute a ‘regional project’ (in Van Langenhove’s sense).

Thus we are confronted here with a puzzle regarding NE Asia’s regionness. It seems almost like a non-region in political and institutional terms despite a large amount of intra-regional trade and investment linkages. Yet there are many cultural affinities: attitudes to education, family and work; ancestor worship; use of Chinese characters and vocabulary; fashion, music, TV; architecture, urban planning265. But again these do not seem to lead to regionalism.

Does that mean that countries in NE Asia do not need or do not want a regional response to globalisation? Or only in certain carefully delineated functional areas? Is there actually a compelling economic logic of interdependence that leads to region building? While in the EU the answer may be a straightforward yes, in NE Asia it would have to be much more qualified, despite a number of attempts to ‘construct’ an Asian regionalism by many analysts and policy-makers (East Asia Vision Group266; Hatoyama 2009; Vision 2020 for trilateral cooperation; Jo 2012 and see chapter I.1.18 and my case studies below).

2.1. What drives regionalism in the globalised world of issues?

Indeed, international cooperation in NE Asia remains very limited and functional. It is focused mainly on trade and investment in selected areas or as Chen e.a. (2011:79) say “by broader

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265 Although even the commonality of cultural heritage is contested with countries either competing in claiming ‘ownership’ (for instance through UNESCO world heritage registration) or emphasising national differences, projecting nationalism back in time.

patterns of de facto economic interactions in East Asia instead of being mainly the result of regional integration policies”. Some regionalist endeavours were driven by competitiveness concerns when other regions deepened regional integration, for instance Asian regionalisation in the early 1990s had been prompted by the fear of fortresses Europe (Single Market) and America (NAFTA) (Fukushima 2010). After the Asian Financial Crisis financial cooperation became a focus (chapter 3). In NE Asia (and elsewhere outside the EU) it is difficult to detect beyond sometimes ambitious declarations any far reaching political or institutional integration projects (while loose and functional international, regional and transnational cooperation is on the increase). There is a vague yearning to build a peaceful regional order for the ‘Asian century’ to finally materialise, but any such vision is usually meant for the very long term. The economic success of NE Asian countries including during the global financial crisis seems to vindicate a national rather than a collective response to globalisation while the EU was struggling with its regional sovereign debt crisis.

In NE Asia economic considerations did not lead to regional institutionalisation at all or only in ways that do not differ substantially from agreements with other partners outside the region (e.g. business linkages, currency swaps but no far-reaching trade and investment agreements) because of ideational (nationalist) resistance preventing political spillovers. In fact in NE Asia the intra-regional economic activity has become more important in the last decade as the national economies opened up to embrace globalisation (Shu 2015). If one follows Brook’s (2005) argument such integrated production chains should have produced security and cooperation, but they have not (yet). But does basing regionalisation only on patterns of economic interaction even make sense in general terms? Such patterns emerge frequently with partners outside the region and integration could happen (but didn’t) along such linkages (like APEC, KORUS and EU-Korea FTAs). Economic networks follow an economic, profit logic and do not necessarily prompt institutional or political networks to emerge. They can reinforce but also weaken regionalism.

States in NE Asia may not focus on regional cooperation, but on global networks precisely because so much of their economic and political interactions and interests are with partners outside the region and because they are competing with each other. From a regionalisation perspective the openness that both Katzenstein (2005) and Yeo (2010) see as a characteristic of Asia’s network regionalism is therefore ambiguous. It prompts the question whether NE Asia actually has a distinct regional project at all or whether each country is part of international (regional and global) economic networks and international society just on its own. Business actors are active both in regional and global networks or to be precise in functional networks that correspond to their production or sales logics, not to political or geographic patterns while of course proximity and infrastructure influence location and sales decisions. Political agreements (FTAs, BITs) may facilitate regional but also transnational economic networks. The flying geese metaphor has expressed the specific character of these networks. Yet the author of the comparison may have overlooked that in nature the geese take turns to lead (that implies a relationship of team players), something that lead goose Japan seems not ready to easily accept. Some business

267 Of course they focus not on NE Asia as I do, but on larger East Asia, so some of my criticism of their arguments may be refuted from such a larger geographical position, but with the centrality of the NE Asian economies for the whole of East Asia, I believe the question needs to be addressed also in a larger context. See Shu (2015) for an analysis of the differences between NE Asian and SE Asian countries’ economic cooperation drivers.
networks also follow an ethnic pattern, like overseas Chinese networks or Japanese investment networks for reasons of trust or culture, but these people are geographically mobile beyond the region as a strong migration of Chinese companies and business people for instance to Africa over the last decade shows. A regional network can also be limited to sub-regions of countries in a region and by-pass countries or sub-regions altogether (e.g. the DPRK is not part of many such networks, rural areas in many otherwise densely networked countries neither).

Furthermore, there actually are competing political concepts intertwined with economic networks of Asian regionalism: The US driven trans-Pacific or Asia-Pacific project favoured by Japan and more ‘native’ East Asian projects (initially promoted most vocally by Malaysia and trade hawks in Japan and Korea tired of US economic pressure (Green 2017:450-1, 511268), but arguably nowadays by China). Asian countries themselves are divided between the two projects or try to be part of both. The underlying story is one of competing aspirations of leadership in the wider Asia region between Japan, the US and China (Park 2013). Membership of or association to some of the institutional expressions of these projects are very much fluctuating and some involve India, Russia or other rather distant partners stretching the concept of region.

These competing projects unsurprisingly come with a historical baggage and are linked to the critical junctures reviewed in part I. The US trans-Pacific policy dates back to the 1899 and 1900 Open Door Notes (Green 2017:94-6, 107) and the 1921/2 Washington Treaty System - a multilateral order or concert of powers to ensure East Asia was open for trade, conflicts were settled in a peaceful and consultative manner and naval competition was controlled (Arase 2012:237). The Great Depression prompted the collapse of that system and Japan embarked on an imperialist regional project of an East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere (to ensure its national development, food and energy security), but was defeated by the US in the Pacific War (1941-45) and by China in its 'War of resistance against Japanese aggression' (1937-45). Under Presidents Truman and Eisenhower the US for the first time defined pre-eminence in Asia as a core strategic interest and implemented a trans-Pacific alliance policy to contain the USSR and China during the Cold War (Green 2017:245-96). It did so in a similar way as in Europe through both military alliances and economic aid (though bilaterally rather than in a multilateral package). APEC was conceived after the Cold War and institutionalised by President Clinton in the same vein and as a regional anchor of the global trade system the US promoted (then), but that "new multilateralism was still only one 'overlapping plate of armor' – as Clinton put it in Seoul – resting on top of the great power relationships that continued to define real power and influence in the region” (Green 2017:463-4). US policy in Asia has not always been consistent: For instance, Korea has a strong military alliance with the US, but was shocked by the lack of empathy and support by the US and the BWI during the 1997/8 Asian Financial Crisis and thus sought to promote regional institutions (Jo 2012; Green 2017:474-7). Bush and Obama's Transpacific Partnership (TPP) proposal with a rather heterogenous membership followed a similar strategy and excluded China (Green 2017:5369) whereas China-ASEAN FTA or China, Korea, Japan FTA plans are part of the more ‘Asian’ project (Wissenbach 2013). The “Asia for Asians” projects tend to resist US leadership in the region embedded in anti-hegemonic and identitarian rhetoric, while the US strategy in Asia

268 Green (2017:465) cites the Japanese journalist Funabashi Yoichi: "Asia will no longer put up with being treated simply as a card; it will now demand respect as a player."
remains premised on the forward military presence and hub and spokes alliances coupled with engagement with China (Green 2017:468-9).

2.2. The problem with network or ‘open regionalism’

To deal with the institutional void in Asia’s regional cooperation some authors substitute regionalism (the state-led process) by regionalisation (led and built by capitalist networks) (Katzenstein 2005:219-25, Yeo 2010). Acharya (2012:12) argues in general terms: ‘regionalism is no longer the monopoly of states...Regionalism is understood as different from regionalisation in the sense that the latter can be market driven and less political, although not entirely apolitical, than the former.’ Katzenstein 2005:219 makes a similar point in a comparative analysis: ‘European regionalism centers on state bargains and legal norms, Asian regionalism on market transactions and ethnic or national capitalism’. This argument is more specifically opposing the state-led political integration project in Europe to Asia’s market-led one – a somewhat surprising claim given NE Asia’s more state-influenced economies and lower degree of market integration than in Europe. Yeo (2010:332) develops Katzenstein’s distinction of networked regionalism and institutionalist regionalism focusing on ASEAN arguing that ‘different cooperation problems called for different institutional designs. The actual institutional designs for any regional project would depend on the goal of cooperation and type of problems that the project aimed to solve’.

She thus points to a functional approach to regionalisation without using that term. Yeo (2010:332) distinguishes the network concept where agents interact loosely within the network’s realm and openly outside of it. She emphasises that the network is free from the rigidity of a tight hierarchy. She then argues that such a concept fits ASEAN’s weak states, their preference for track II diplomacy and that the network is driven by cities or sub-regions rather than nation-states (similarly Bach 2011:34-6). This idea suffers from the logical tensions between the global and the regional networks raised above. It cannot apply to NE Asia’s strong nation-states because of the argument’s emphasis on the weakness of states and because it bypasses the security issues in NE Asia.

In fact, NE Asia (and perhaps the wider Asian region) is an example of the problem of regionalism being used to describe phenomena which are for a large part not ‘regional’ but international (Ruggie’s non-territorial region is an extreme example). ‘Open regionalism’ has been used to try and come to terms with a concentration of trade and economic relations (in the Asia region) that did not prompt or rely on political institutions or a closed membership configuration. The term mainly refers to trade and economic phenomena and opposes open regionalism to the supposedly closed regionalism of the EU (‘fortress Europe’) or North America (NAFTA). In reality it is an internationalisation phenomenon - mainly born out of private economic networks - that is neither geographically bounded nor politically created as political ties in the network are much weaker than the economic ones. The economic networks may be facilitated by regional proximity and supporting policies and follow regional and global production networks (which can be quite volatile and not necessarily follow a ‘regional’ logic per se). Therefore the phenomenon described as open regionalism can be better captured by the International Society 2.0 concept that is open to networks and various kinds of internationalisation processes and linked to the constitutive institutions ‘market economy’, sovereignty and international law which are all key elements
shaping internationalisation.

The open regionalism concept really tries to come to terms with a functional problem of trade policy where regional trade agreements are seen as either building blocs or stumbling blocs for the open global trade regime (Bergsten 2012), but this is a narrow functional focus on trade policy and an over-simplification (Telò 2015:30) that misses the regional dynamics and issues of history and identity in NE Asia that I uncovered in part I.

These positions also fail to recognise the centrality of the state in regions where states are not 'weak' (see also earlier arguments on the continued relevance of states in the global economic and complex logic of anarchy). In chapter 3 I will show that one can build regionalism in NE Asia on open network integration based on corporate interaction as Acharya, Katzenstein and Yeo advocate for the larger Asian region. It is merely a selective functional mapping exercise of market evolution and production chains, which can be explained without creating a regionalisation approach: Through globalisation 'national' economies are linked to global trade, investment and production networks (Hatch, Bair and Heiduk 2014). This usually affects state behaviour in the international society edging it towards cooperation and competition (rather than rivalry) as we found in part II. This phenomenon was initially essentially limited to highly industrialised countries and regions: European and transatlantic on the one hand and Japan and East Asia on the other hand. Since the reform and opening up of China such networks have dramatically expanded and have incorporated more and more emerging and developing countries (notably resource-rich ones; Kaplinsky and Messner 2008). The nature of these networks also keeps changing – for instance the Chinese One Belt One Road initiative (OBOR)\(^{269}\) - and there is little evidence they can bring about a regionalisation process or project without a political lead, not to mention a security community as stipulated by Brooks (2005). The phenomenon has also deepened through ever more global production networks and division of labour with NE Asia – and particularly China - being the 'workshop of the world' (especially assembly of components sourced from other Asian countries; (Hatch, Bair and Heiduk 2014:4). It is the investment and production linkage of ASEAN economies to the NE Asia region (at first to Japan, in the 1980s and then to Korea, Taiwan and China) that drove the process of the ASEAN + 3 or the China-ASEAN FTA, Japan-ASEAN EPA, Korea-ASEAN FTA, the AFTA and AEC projects with ASEAN intra-regional trade at the end of the 2000s standing at 25%, ASEAN + 3 at 50% (Bach 2011:35; Chen e.a 2011; Shu 2015). The ADB's integration tracker yields the following results for intra-regional trade\(^{270}\)

\(^{269}\) In English another acronym – BRI, Belt and Road Initiative – is used, while in Chinese the term has not changed. Stanzel e.a. 2016; Ghiasy and Zhou 2017.

\(^{270}\) https://aric.adb.org/integrationindicators/result?sort=country&filter=all&r_indicators%5B0%5D=TCINTSHARE&DOT&r_reporters%5B0%5D=673&r_partners%5B0%5D=673&r_years%5B0%5D=2007&r_years%5B1%5D=2008&r_years%5B2%5D=2009&r_years%5B3%5D=2010&r_years%5B4%5D=2011&r_years%5B5%5D=2012&r_years%5B6%5D=2013&r_years%5B7%5D=2014&r_years%5B8%5D=2015 accessed on 11.7.2017. For the EU the same source indicates a considerably higher trade density: European Union
Then the increasing linkages between China, Korea and Japan and increasing consumer demand from within the region especially from China drove the trilateral cooperation first within ASEAN plus three and then independently (mainly pushed by Korea). East Asia today enjoys perhaps the thickest web of transnational business networks (Hatch, Bair and Heiduk 2014:3). The former dominance of vertically integrated networks dominated by Japanese multinational corporations which took off in the 1980s after the Plaza accord forced a revaluation of the Yen has given way to ‘a complex, criss-crossing pattern of production networks that are at once more global and more regional than before’ (Hatch, Bair and Heiduk 2014:5). However, despite these networks the industrial policy of states is to promote national champions and import substitution – the Korean industrial policy for instance is trying to loosen the dependence of Korean companies on the import of Japanese components by promoting R&D in Korea. Hatch, Bair and Heiduk (2014:6) find that governments have influenced the production networks for instance through protective tariffs and standards and that in terms of liberalisation much more could be done, arguing that production networks have prospered despite limited progress in reducing tariffs. Moreover, we have seen in part I how vulnerable these networks are to political disruption (and the Tsunami in 2011 showed the vulnerability to natural disasters).

Because of the shift from a Japan-centred network to a China-centred one (or at least the emergence of a bicephalous one) many see the emergence of China as other Asian countries’
biggest trading partner as a sign of regionalisation, but fail to see that this is not a phenomenon limited to the region – China has become many countries’ first trading partner even very distant ones. China’s trade with Europe or Africa is much larger than its trade with India, but this would hardly be described as a regionalisation process. Concepts of regionalism based on selective trade flows which may explain aspects of ASEAN’s integration processes do not necessarily apply to NE Asia (Shu 2015). Regionalism in NE Asia - if it emerges at all - beyond multinational corporations-led strategies and production and consumption chains would require a political multilateral project to replace national approaches to globalisation.

NE Asia has strong states with a centuries-old tradition of governments (at least trying to) control trade and private networks (Kang 2010:107-38; Osterhammel 2011:1036) and a strong focus on government to government diplomacy. The nation-state is the defining framework and institution of the regional society. This is not to say that company networks, cities and provinces don't matter, but they do mostly in the functional areas of business, trade and people to people exchanges, but they do not influence that much how NE Asia's international state system is constituted and their interactions across borders may not be as spontaneous as some analysts believe. Informal networks may also contribute to better mutual understanding or reducing stereotypes, but research has shown that influences such as the ‘Korean wave’ (Paik 2012) etc. remain temporary and superficial not structural to create a common identity beyond nation-building processes and national identity.

Where Katzenstein and Yeo are right is that market-driven economic interdependence and government cost-benefit calculations have supported (basic) liberal approaches to explain developments in the economic sphere in NE Asia. Non-state actors (businesses in particular) do play an important role in national preference formulations which have contributed to promotion of trade and investment in the national development interest. But these developments have not (yet?) led to any substantial institutionalisation (not even FTAs). Oatley e.a. (2012) also note the absence of a regional financial network organisation in East Asia similar to the structure apparent in Europe. Hill and Menon (2012) consider Asian regional financial safety nets, such as the Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralised (CMIM) as ‘unusable’ (cf. chapter 3. below). The role of international institutions and non-state actors remains limited by government policy. This also means – as former Korean President Park stated in her address to the US Congress – that NE

271 In this case China’s size does matter as an explanation.
272 Telò (2015a) adds a big country’s relations with a group of other countries on a different continent as inter-regionalism (so not only region to region like ASEM), although I would argue that in many cases the cohesion of the region partnering with a big country is limited. Thus, FOCAC and OBOR are strongly bilateral relations China is conducting with a heterogenous group of partners.
273 In China at least sub-regional networks are still essentially centralized and controlled by strong national gatekeepers. For instance the development plans and international cooperation projects of Chinese provinces are mostly products of the central government, not local governments (Interview with Foreign Trade Officials in Nanning on the Pan-Beibu Gulf project – 21-23.7.2010- and with officials in Tumen river area on Tumen river development project; 13.9.2010). Private businesses are more autonomous than local authorities (and this varies according to the internal constitution of states), but still need approvals and licenses or access to foreign currency and accounts to do international business. In other countries export processing zones are also approved by central governments.
274 Trade liberalisation was politically easier in a multilateral framework such as the WTO. But due to the stagnation of the WTO's DDA the issue of bilateral or trilateral FTAs is back on the political agenda in NE Asia, but also elsewhere. Whether FTAs produce the kind of institutional lock-ins is doubtful, notably when comparing the competition between the EEC and the EFTA in the early years of European integration that ended with the defection of most EFTA members to the EC/EU.
Asia’s economic integration potential is not used.

In the end it is the states’ focus on national development combined with corporate investments that has helped regionalisation, but also kept it at a low common denominator, because, as Wan (2003:288) argues, Asian nations do not consider foreign economic policy in isolation, but link it to security and other national interests which includes promoting their countries' business and cultural achievements in rivalry/competition with others. Economic growth and (minimal) cooperation are thus part of a comprehensive conception of national security and development (maximising national wealth and power) and hence promoting common prosperity in the region benefits national interest and security and thus only indirectly delivers a regional public good of shared prosperity without any common project or organisation to manage it (cf. Gao 2012). Or as Green (2017:541-2) soberly diagnoses: "It may be fashionable in some corners to argue that nation-states no longer dominate the international relations of Asia – that we now live in an era of epistemic communities, non-polarity, multilateralism, and shared transnational challenges that diminish the centrality of national power. However, it is a fallacy to believe that multilateralism or transnational challenges will transform the geopolitics of Asia in the foreseeable future, even as we must work on these nonstate challenges on their own merits."

However, mechanisms for regional governance, given the persistence of state control and the preservation of sovereignty in legal terms can be facilitated through intergovernmental secretariats (such as the Trilateral Cooperation Secretariat in Seoul cf. chapter I.1.18) to manage and monitor the processes driven by various ministries and agencies (financial safety nets, FTAs, Campus Asia). Cooperation whether bilateral or multilateral is thus defined in strictly functional terms (monetary, financial regulation, trade, climate change, environmental pollution, education and tourism services) not normatively or politically. It advances on separate institutional tracks (ministerial meetings) and at different speeds. Overall political coordination (and cover) is ensured through summits, mimicking the EU and global summity. But these summits are only held when political relations are good, not as a matter of institutionalised schedule and even less to solve significant political differences. No legally binding decisions are taken. At least the use of not strictly diplomatic channels via the direct involvement of line Ministries without passing through the Foreign Ministries, indicates a softening of the domestic-external separation, or porosity to adapt Katzenstein’s (2005:21-2) notion of porous regions. G20 summits and Asian frameworks (ASEAN plus 3, EAS) provide extra ‘political cover’ for internationalisation of NE Asian cooperation. Such multilateral (and even trilateral) frameworks make it easier to avoid accusations of selling out the national interest to particular foreigners (analogous to the scapegoat function of European institutions). At the same time the G20 process grants enhanced global status (hierarchy) for its members which may well be the most important reason for countries such as China and Korea to participate in it and accept the (very light) interference into their macro-economic sovereignty.

So can we speak of regionalisation or a regional society in NE Asia in a context of rivalry and on the basis of such a non-institutionalised, functional process without a regionalism project?

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275 In the EU the General Affairs Council is still composed of the Foreign Ministers. But over time other Council formations for instance of Ministers of Finance, Agriculture and so on have been established which no longer report to Foreign Ministers within their fields of competence.
The EU integration and NE Asia non-integration cases show that there are other factors at work than economic networks that define regional and international society. There are specific role relationships in a region shaped by history and identity more than by economic logic. The transformative power of globalisation no doubt exists (Shu 2015), but impacts have been uneven and varied and perhaps limited to a functional and thin multilateralism in areas such as trade, investment and finance. The often assumed homogenising effect of globalisation needs to be qualified and analysed with the overall role relationships in regions in mind. At the same time the simple opposition of globalisation and regionalisation which has its root in a narrow focus on trade liberalisation needs to be abandoned and make way for a much more intricate relationship, albeit perhaps short of the constitutive relationship that Hettne and Söderbaum (2009) postulate as we have seen above. Warleigh-Lack and Rosamond (2010:1001) refer to the ‘globalization-regionalization matrix’ as a ‘standard feature of NR studies’. In the EU and NE Asia key institutions of international society vary due to historical, ideational and material factors, pathways and role relationships. These factors tend to determine the 'thickness' or 'thinness' of 'regionness'. They are of course more difficult to quantify than trade data, but that doesn’t diminish their relevance and they need to be better captured by new research designs (van Langenhove and Maes 2013 – see chapter 3 and 4 below).

The rather exceptional transformations of those key institutions in the EU therefore deserve a fresh look beyond simply studying the EU *sui generis* in integration or area studies and without leaving the EU out of comparative regionalism simply because it is not just a globalisation induced 'new' regionalist project (Van Langenhove 2012; Warleigh-Lack and Rosamond 2010; Söderbaum 2015; Telò 2015). After all, NE Asia shows that globalisation does not necessarily prompt regional responses and my research in previous chapters has highlighted more important factors to build up regionness.

Even if regions are conceived of as 'responses' to globalisation or complex anarchy, then the key challenge for analysts making that case is that the logic of complexity also requires complex or holistic and flexible internationalisation strategies, not necessarily dictated by trade relations only. Here I bring together the threads of my analysis in part I with conventional regionalism images. Regional institutions as we have shown often move on specific pathways with geography and history forming deep ruts. Such pathways change usually only at critical junctures or tipping points. These have to be researched and evaluated alongside other data (like economic or people-to-people exchanges). The same holds true for global institutions for that matter (cf. IV.4). The EU case is original as it already has developed a dense multilevel governance structure and complex and holistic strategies as well as a deeply engrained system which makes it a unique case of a constitutionalised and comprehensive (rather than a functional) 'regional' international society within the larger international society. But as the sovereign debt crisis has shown and the analysis by Piris (2012) has corroborated the EU as a multi-level governance system is also under stress from divergent pressures due to complexity.

**2.3. Conclusions – regional integration vs. conflicted regionness**
It is possible – and widespread in regionalist approaches - to understand international society’s boundaries not only geographically or in institutional-organisational terms but as Van Langenhove (2012:21) says ‘within one dimension of governance’. In many such cases regions are conceived of for delivering specific public goods such as trade and investment which are functional understandings of regionness (Van Langenhove and Maes 2013:180, referring to quantitative indicators for regional integration, intra-regional trade and service integration, budgets mobilised at the regional level already proposed by J. Nye in 1968). We have seen in the Confucian world a different concept of ‘regionness avant l’heure’. Functional logics of cooperation could be looked at from the perspective of Van Langenhove’s (2012) criteria for regionalism – projects, processes and products characteristic for a group of (neighbouring) states to allow speaking of a regional society: Functional multilateralism may very well be a way to start regionalism through a process perhaps leading to products and maybe a project. Besides, national interests may evolve through collective learning or reconciliation towards common or joint interests or cognitive convergence (Haas 1980:359, 368) pursued through functional multilateralism. In an optimistic, neo-functionalist logic, this may help overcome nationalism and may eventually lead to regional integration beyond trade facilitation like it was in the EU, but integration requires political will to overcome nationalism and moralisation gaps rather than only functional spill-overs as we have seen in chapter I.2 on European integration and as it is borne out by the contrasting development of NE Asia.

The problem is that functional multilateralism is not bound by geography while a purely functional concept of a region in one dimension of governance is flawed with contradictions and unclear territorial boundaries between the global, international and regional. Thus, regions need political ‘projects’ or a minimum of common identity in a geographically defined area. In geographically dispersed areas one could identify international social and political projects (such as the BRICS) with an equivalent minimum threshold of a project and some form of identity, but this couldn't be called regionalist. It is simply multilateralist. Otherwise, let’s say Europe and Australia which have many things in common could form a region were it not for the ‘tyranny of distance’. And here one would then find for instance a (solidarist) international society that agrees on functional norms like free trade or value norms and projects like democracy or Human Rights promotion, human security and humanitarian intervention independent of geography (comprising for instance the EU, Canada, Australia, Japan and others). This is the ‘West’ or ‘the international community’ and surely the understanding the founders of the English School had in mind. While ironically the term ‘West’ is geographic it doesn't have a regional territorial meaning given its large and geographically unconnected remit. This has led to oppose the ideologically defined liberal 'West' and the analytically undefined ‘rest’ perpetuating the opposition of ‘East’ and ‘West’ of the Cold War (the Western and the Soviet camps which were not regional, because they included countries in different continents), but without the communist political antagonist. This is a dead end.

In the light of my analysis regionalism and globalisation no longer serve as meaningful templates for either a constitutional relationship or a relationship of opposites, building blocks or stumbling

276 Haas (1980:390) puts it nicely: ‘Learning occurs when communists, capitalists, totalitarians and democrats agree that, in some issue-area, new information or knowledge compels the redefinition of past interest in the service of joint gains.’
blocks. Söderbaum (2015:20-1), one of the key proponents of the new regionalism concept, acknowledges that the study of regionalism has to move beyond it, as the global context itself has changed: ‘While new regionalism focused on the relationship between globalization and regionalism, often in the form of whether the two processes reinforced or competed against each other, current debates about regionalism are focusing on the rising complexity of regionalism and the multifold interactions between state and non-state actors, institutions and processes at a variety of interacting levels, ranging from the bilateral to the regional, interregional, and multilateral/global.’

And, of course, the West’s "other" such as the global 'South' (which includes many countries on the Northern hemisphere) or the BRICS also have their own common understanding often opposed to important Western norms such as human rights, humanitarian intervention and civil liberties. Boundaries in international society bring to the fore logical tensions between the global the regional, transregional and transnational levels.

One problem or unclear boundary in a functional approach is that a commonality of understanding can (but need not) transcend geographic regions, an issue most obvious in the idea of ‘open regionalism’ or rather 'open transnationalism'. In such an understanding the commonality produced by the global logic of economic interdependence outweighs geographic proximity as in NE Asia.

In the economic area there is a contradiction between global economic cooperation or even interdependent networks (production chains) and political regionalism in particular in NE Asia. In the security area there is very little evidence for a cooperative approach to security in the NE Asia region (despite theoretical models of commercial peace or economic cooperation producing security as we have seen Brooks 2005; Katz 2013; see also regional security complexes Buzan and Waever 2003). Security is nationally defined and held hostage by the nationalist interpretations of sovereignty and the victim-perpetrator relationships which make cooperation difficult as outlined in part I. The NE Asia 'non-region' challenges the idea of regionalism as it seems to hover in a limbo between national and global logics without adopting a regional response. The EU by contrast has aggregated all three levels (national, regional and global plus in some cases the sub-national level, too) in many dimensions of governance and issue-areas, but less in the security one (Wade and Meunier 2010) providing one possible – but not prescriptive – path of integration. Even on the European continent there are other institutions, regimes and organisations such as the EEA, the Council of Europe and NATO or the OSCE in the security realm. We have also seen that EU integration has not been a simple template, but a complex process resulting also in institutional or legal differentiation in various issue areas (Warleigh-Lack and Rosamond 2010:997-9). At least since the late 1990s NE Asia has started to pursue some regional cooperation (trilaterally between China, Korea and Japan) and thus there seems to be a recognised need for a cooperation process and a reflection of increasing economic and social interconnectedness between these countries (Jo 2012).

In short, regionalism needs geography, functional multilateralism and a political project that links and gives sense to these two in combination. Geography is a notion which for the international
society concept originally was not a major issue as it had little direct bearing on commonality of norms despite the use of the geographic term 'West'. In the EU case geography is a clearly defined membership criterion (only European countries can become members, so that Morocco’s application to join the EC was refused on these grounds277) and thus geography, institutions and a norms-based definition of membership (Copenhagen criteria) more or less overlap. The Council of Europe has an even wider membership with a looser institutional structure, classical intergovernmental agreements but a normative acquis notably the European Convention on Human Rights (Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms). Thus, even in Europe the geographical definition of the 'region' is not so straightforward. The EU through its political project, its institutions and its Member States has constructed a thick, albeit somewhat uneven, form of regionness which is both exclusive and open for new members who qualify and are willing to join: legalisation, constitutionalisation and a syndicated hierarchy with supranational institutions, a particularly dense common team management of the economy (single market, EU competence for external trade, EU competition law, EMU) and multi-level governance that in some issue areas is hardly more than intergovernmental. The EU is firmly embedded in the constitutive institutions of international society, connected and networked globally in International Society 2.0, but it stands out by its constitutional adoption of multilateralism as a key ideological institution of international society.

By contrast NE Asia remains wedded to the thin norms of International Society Mark I, a nationalist view of sovereignty which produces a very thin regionness in normative and institutional terms. But even geographical links in NE Asia are weaker than in Europe. In Asia and even NE Asia the geography as a basis for a region concept is not so obvious: islands and peninsulas create distance and insular cultures, distances are huge and countries differ very much in size and climatic conditions278. Nevertheless we find self-identified, albeit heterogenous groupings that see themselves as regional organisations (ASEAN for example) and despite these same differences in the past we had the clearly defined Confucian International Society in the past which had a geographical centre and peripheries (Kang 2010).

It is not clear on the basis of which criteria to define NE Asia today as a region if it has no institutional shape, no common identity, a loose geography and if globalisation and the prevalent 'open regionalism' idea make geographic and economic boundaries porous (Katzenstein 2005) and the space-of-flows global. It does not even fulfil all criteria in Telò's definition of region cited at the beginning of this part279. On the other hand the territorial conflicts in NE Asia, about very small places in fact, seem to belie this primacy of the space-of-flows of open-regionalist and globalist approaches. This extreme difference makes the comparison between the NE Asian

277 It is well known and to some extent a problem for the EU membership criterion that the borders of the geographic notion Europe are not so clearly defined on its Eastern frontier. Borders are social constructs and thus not objectively defined unless they correspond to natural features like coastlines – and even there UNCLOS has blurred the picture.

278 Japan is an archipelago, Korea a peninsula, China a large continental country with maritime boundaries to the East and South-East and historically shifting (and currently not everywhere finally agreed) boundaries to the West and North; Mongolia could be seen as part of NE Asia, while others may see it as part of Central Asia.

279 “regional entities as groupings of neighbouring and interdependent states and societies, sharing certain cultural and historical legacies, and cooperating in various policy fields related to the exogenous global economic and political changes associated with globalization.” NE Asia's interdependence is limited, they are not cooperating in many fields and one cannot speak of a regional entity.
'non-region' with the highly integrated European region particularly relevant to understand international society boundaries and regionalism dynamics. This paradox may be elucidated if one adopts a relational theory of international relations (Qin 2016) which posits that actors base their actions on relations in the first place. Using this prism allows seeing the "conflicted regionness" in a different light, as a result of difficult relationships, informed by moralisation gaps, but also shared cultural norms (both Confucian and 'Westphalian'). These conflicted relations are in a way the glue that binds the NE Asian countries together, as their key actions are to cultivate these conflicted relationships in search of recognition of their respective grievances and non-material objectives, alongside material and economic interests. The relationships themselves thus become constitutive of this conflicted regionness, beyond the more rational interdependence approaches, and add to the complexity of regional cooperation beyond dealing with functional challenges. This relational complexity is difficult to capture with "euro-centric" and binary approaches as we have seen above with the dead end of opposing the West and the rest or of regions as building blocks or stumbling blocks of multilateralism (see chapter IV.7).

The investigation of regionalism versus internationalisation under conditions of globalisation and complexity therefore shows a mixed record. A 'regional society in the making' in NE Asia could at best be seen in functional mostly economic terms, but regionalism as a project or institutionalised form of cooperation is not strong (or thick) as countries' other international or global linkages, networks and cooperative agreements are as important as the regional ones.

The extent to which regionalism can illustrate the boundary problem in international society is the main reason to integrate this field of comparative study of international relations into my research. Warleigh-Lack and Rosamond (2010:994) deplore the divide between scholars analysing the EU and those examining other regions using different lenses. Hence some of my research questions addressed their ‘invitation to scholars of EU studies and the new regionalism to engage in a process of dialogue.’ My International Society 2.0 approach offers ways to use the ‘acquis académique’ of EU studies together with other insights (including comparative historical case studies, internationalisation and regionalism) to think about regional and global governance beyond narrowly defined templates (cf. Warleigh-Lack and Rosamond 2010:1004). At the same time I believe that the research on regions, given the empirical heterogeneity could use the concept of (regional) international society to come to terms with this diversity while moving away from its euro-centric intellectual baggage and its restrictive focus as a companion of globalisation under a New Regionalism lens. This is because the regional society idea goes beyond economic and functional cooperation but on the other hand does not require organisational institutional templates like the EU\textsuperscript{280}. At the same time, International Society 2.0 is not a mere collection of loosely connected regional societies, as the transnational and interregional BRICS group also indicates.

There are, in the end, deeper layers of ideas and pathways to examine 'regionness'. These are largely determined by ideological institutions that are themselves not static, but very resilient to

\textsuperscript{280} ASEAN is a good example for a regional project without very much in terms of formal institutions, but vibrant economic networks. The African Union by contrast has a strong regional or pan-African identity and has set up an institutional structure similar to that of the EU with some elements resembling the UN, but has very little economic or genuine political integration despite a large number of far-reaching declarations and plans. See: \url{http://www.nyulawglobal.org/globalex/African_Union.html} (accessed on 15-12-2017)
change. Critical junctures alter regional international society more profoundly than economic ties or economic crises. Paradoxically the ‘regionness’ in NE Asia may consist of the particular set of nationalist ideas and moralisation gaps that make it so difficult to develop a regional project, but force NE Asia's countries to focus on each other and their different moralisation gaps in a quest to produce order in their region while enhancing national development and keeping peace. This deeper layer of ‘conflicted regionness’ is very different from the one measured in trade and investment flows that mostly reflect private sector micro-economic logics.

The most challenging conundrum of the conflicted regional society in NE Asia is to comprehend the (social) institutions that make it up despite the political system differences and historical and territorial disputes. That is because one characteristic of an international society is normally a common understanding on norms and rules of interaction. At least one country in the region – North Korea (DPRK) – regularly defies some of them, but in other ways similar to its neighbours it invokes national sovereignty and positivist international law (without adhering to peaceful co-existence, not to mention international human rights law or non-proliferation agreements). Even among the other countries in general the degree of commonality is low and seemingly confined to preservation of sovereignty, an instrumental, positivist use of international law (Dai and Renn 2016 show that for UN Conventions) and part cooperative, part competitive economic relations of development states. What makes this all the more fascinating and puzzling is that NE Asia has the past experience of a very different regional society as we have seen in chapter I.1.6. In that bygone Confucian world the commonality in the region was higher than today even though the density of trade must have been lower. However, then they didn't have to deal much with integrated production chains, public goods and bads and global governance apart from piracy, nomadic incursions and trade (Gao 2012, Kang 2010). Nevertheless, NE Asia as a region is discernible as the ideational construction and de-construction of its common history and the constitutive victim-perpetrator relationships, nationalism and development state identity and a shared – but now disputed and ‘nationalised’ - cultural heritage. It is this ambiguous constitutive role relationship which makes NE Asia distinct as a region without a regional project, yet bound by these relational issues that diminish its political, economic and global integration and governance potential and that of the 'Asian century'. The unresolved issues (not only the disputes about islets, but also the division of Korea and China) leave this region with a rivalry and potential for conflict that run counter to the expectations of the usual globalisation and regional integration logics. At the same time it is a monumental regional political project to overcome these legacies and change the role relationships through political reconciliation in the region which is in fact a economically densely networked regional project in waiting.

The contrast with European integration couldn’t be greater in this respect. In Europe today a shared cultural heritage is regularly invoked, reconciliation processes have been undertaken (some like in Northern Ireland directly supported by the EU) and even the difficult, national historical narratives have in some cases actively been re-written to purge them of enemies (“Feindbilder”). We have thus a transformative process of relations, ideas and institutions in Europe.

Using a regionalism approach has helped clarifying the question of boundaries in international society which can be geographic, normative and functional. I highlighted the relational dimension
in addition. However, the normative and political ones rarely overlap with geographic, economic and functional ones because the globalised nature of the market economy reduces the functional and sovereignist (geographic) boundaries (expressed for instance through tariffs, standards, market access rules, consumption patterns, production chains), but the moral beliefs (nationalism, moralisation gaps) remain strong. Hence there is a considerable flux and difficulty to define regions, as it is probably only in the EU where all these boundaries more or less overlap and are integrated into a political project that has redefined sovereignty and development as a collective responsibility. The frontier between EU studies and regionalism has been shown to be an artificial obstacle to researching these dynamics (Warleigh-Lack and Rosamond 2010). My international society approach allows bridging some gaps between research agendas (cf. chapter IV.1). Using the overarching approach to examine regional dynamics comparatively from an international society perspective with its set of ideological, constitutional, instrumental and mechanical institutions avoids imprisoning the regionalism agenda in a false dichotomy between globalisation and regionalism and between the EU institutional template and regionalism elsewhere. My approach thus advances the regionalism research agenda in Söderbaum’s (2015) sense of putting it into a new context and informed by comparative studies of regionalism in different areas and time periods and emphasising evolving role relationships (which is also a key preoccupation in Qin’s 2016 relational theory of IR).

With my International Society 2.0 approach these diverse regional or international phenomena driven by nationalism and multilateralism are easier to conceptualise. There is room for various and diverse internationalisation projects and processes, regional or otherwise. The BRICS for instance could be seen as a particular international society on a par with a region within the larger International Society 2.0 if their international project delivers public goods and produces distinct norms and perhaps institutions (the New Development Bank created by the BRICS points to that kind of evolution). The BRICS and similar projects could in fact produce a distinct concept of multilateralism most likely of a functional type, but with an underlying moral belief anchored in South-South co-operation. In these respects such a concept would differ from the one practiced in the EU (Keukeleire and Hooijmaaijers 2013). The ‘West’ could also be seen in this light as a specific international society – and it was in a way the starting point for the concept of international society as we have seen before.

My understanding of International Society 2.0 does not build on the old Cold War divisions or the new divisions alongside domestic political systems (liberal democratic versus authoritarian, both of which can be found in the BRICS or the G20) between the West and the rest nor does it share the narrow view of some (new and old) regionalism approaches. Countries in NE Asia and in the EU are part of international society at large composed of sovereign states or autonomous political units that are linked in various complex internationalisation relationships influenced by global complexity and uncertainty. A case can even be made that regions as such can be members of international society - an especially good case can be made for the EU as it shares the constitutional institutions of international society through its syndicated sovereignty and legal hierarchy and has legal personality. The EU also has entered into many agreements with a large number of other countries and is a member of some IOs (most notably the WTO) benefiting thus from mutual recognition by states as a ‘like unit’.  

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3. Regional responses to global challenges in NE Asia and the European Union

After looking at regionalism in the EU and NE Asia as an option of 'self-transformation' of states along distinct regional pathways I will look at the role of regions in international society to deal with global issues and later in part IV as agents of change in the world of issues. The role of regions to deal with or offer solutions to global issues and as agents of change in the larger state system may be significant in a period of change and uncertain transformation (which is often awkwardly called post-Cold War) even if the regions do not bring in a specific regional project such as NE Asia. I contend that regions in whatever configuration could develop norms, institutions or instruments to manage specific challenges of globalisation or risk society. However, it is overall mainly nationalism or multilateralism as driving ideas of international society which in the different regions affect how regions manage global challenges and develop norms.

In the economic field, traditional multilateralism has worked better than for environmental issues because the global economy is not a cost to be shared, but (as long as it grows) is a gain to be made and maximised (and distributed). As it is beneficial for all it is a common interest to preserve the cake and make it grow. Nationalism in this field has become secondary given a rather large global consensus on the competitive-cooperative interdependence dynamics of the global market economy and the institutions set up to regulate them (BWI, WTO) and the growing role of transnational business and finance networks. Crises in Europe and in Asia have not (as could be expected based on the experiences from the 1930s) precipitated disintegration, protectionism and war, but generally spurred awareness that cooperation and internationalisation in various forms including through institutionalisation needed to be enhanced to effectively protect or advance a country's interest through collective action and regional or global governance and avoid a worse future scenario. Awareness of interdependence combined with learning from the Great Depression and the Asian Financial Crisis played a major role in policymakers' reactions to the 2008 financial crisis (Hettne 1994; Yu 2003; Drezner 2012; Jo 2012). Europe could build on its institutional structure and habit of cooperation while NE Asian states mostly relied on self-help policies with limited coordination and cooperation conducted as a result of learning from the 1997-8 Asian Financial Crisis (Jo 2012). Global economic governance has worked – in emergency mode - during the global crisis (Drezner 2012), but it remains to be seen whether cooperation continues after the sense of urgency and the fear the world economy could collapse has been lost (Bertoldi, Scherrer and Stanoeva 2013). The Trump administration’s initial parochial and protectionist stance indicates that the G20 consensus is fragile and vulnerable to nationalism.

These ‘lessons learnt’ and the existing multilateral regulatory regimes (BWI, enhanced G20) allowed channelling the reactions to the economic crisis towards preserving the cake (the

281 I am at this point not delving into a discussion of sustainability and limits to growth. The rather simple growth model prevails despite evidence that its dynamics are unsustainable and potentially disastrous (IWR 2014). This debate will probably become more important in a context of population growth, accelerated climate change and other dramatic effects on the balance of the eco-system. Hence, the second global challenge I examine, climate change, addresses that more difficult aspect of globalisation.
interdependent global economy) rather than preserving one's slice (the national economy only). Policy makers were all too well aware that attempts at preserving the national slice through protectionist, beggar-thy-neighbour policies in the 1930s had only deepened the economic crisis and triggered a political cataclasm.

Regional society experience fed directly into the G20 summit process. The EU proposed to the US president in 2008 holding the G20 summits in the first place. Korea’s proposal to the G20 to put global financial safety nets on the agenda was based on Asia's regional experiment and project. In Asia in 1997/8 the financial crisis had been a watershed in raising awareness for the need to cooperate regionally (Roundtable 2007:381-2; Jo 2012): Asian countries became aware that a regional and more institutionalised response accompanied by corresponding and loosely coordinated national measures was necessary. These reactions were thus not a spill-over effect or an integrationist evolution in the mould of Balassa (1961) or Haas (1958), but a functional-institutional (pragmatic) response to a particular crisis and critical junctures based on past experiences (Pierson 1996; Jo 2012).

This reaction to a crisis (near-catastrophe) was also driven by fear of a larger catastrophe in the future, thus by a perception of risk and a joint urge to prevent another crisis (Beck 2010; cf. chapter IV.5 on risk society). The rather good performance of Asian economies during the 2008/9 global financial crisis has vindicated the precautionary and preventive Asian policies undertaken nationally after 1997/8 (e.g. Korea: Kalinowski and Cho 2012) even though some of the institutional set-ups like the CMI weren't actually used. Even the management of the European sovereign debt crisis has taken lessons from the Asian financial crisis notably within the IMF. Preparing for the next anticipated crisis shows the importance of understanding risk society as anticipation of catastrophe and International Society 2.0 as a learning society. This is an opportunity for a historical institutionalist research agenda.

The problem of climate change is very different as it is not a cake to be grown and re-distributed, but a cost to be shouldered (in both mitigation and adaptation; IPCC 2014). The Stern report (Stern 2007), as one of the most influential studies, first quantified the cost. Here the argument for a multilateral solution is compelling, but hampered by the moralisation gaps and material interests regarding burden-sharing responsibility that are driven by nationalist ideas and role relationships (see below and part IV). Using the global economic crisis and climate change as test cases for my thesis parallels the two examples of Hardin’s tragedy of the commons (economic growth and pollution).

A clash of multilateralist and nationalist norms of global governance

Both the EU (alongside some of its bigger member states) and the NE Asian countries (except DPRK) have become important players in the governance of the global economy and international

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282 G20 summits to some extent look very familiar to European leaders who hold such summits several times a year. For others this is a new experience. They even adopted the EU's old 'troika' system of the current Chair being assisted by the former and future presidencies.

283 But as we will see later they failed to implement them leading to 'national insurance policies' through rapid accumulation of foreign exchange reserves. This ironically led to further imbalances in the global economy.
institutions (for instance as members of the G20 or the MEM). This warrants at least some comparison between the EU and these countries in global governance efforts. The EU, because of its deep integration and international promotion of norms and multilateralism, is the prime candidate as an international norm producer (Aggestam 2008) or normative power (Manners 2008), but there are others promoting different – usually national-sovereignist - norms (Acharya 2012, Bach 2011).

The question arises then whether the EU is just one model among many, or an exception and self-appointed precursor for change in the international society. For global governance this EU model would mean a world of team workers rather than rivals/competitors. A globally extended EU model would nevertheless fall short of a world government. NE Asian countries’ shared insistence on national sovereignty and non-intrusive international law and their reluctance to envisage multilateral solutions also shape global governance. Their nationalist norms directly compete with EU multilateralist approaches that the Euro crisis has made unattractive. NE Asia’s experience that national solutions with only limited regional or global co-ordination and co-operation worked will make NE Asia reluctant to adopt a multilateralist perspective on the world of issues. Their belief in national sovereignty remains robust. The contrast between the two regions especially in the crisis recovery increases the likelihood that other regions may emulate (NE) Asia rather than the EU, bolstering the idea of an ‘Asian century’ with Asia’s minimalist-sovereignist normative power paradoxically overtaking Europe’s evolution from the same sovereignist to a multilateralist stance.

Despite this pessimist scenario, some analysts make the case that EU-style team work governance could plausibly be a way to solve global challenges284 and to overcome the shortcomings of the traditional multilateralism (European Think Tanks Group 2014). This idea fits into Pinker’s (2011) mega-trend of pacification and civilisation of humankind, but this view is often euro-centric285. Contributing to global governance is also an explicit strategic objective of the EU (ESS 2003; Lisbon Treaty)286. The EU as a member of the international society as currently constituted is already promoting such ideas for global governance building on its own experience. This can be patronising at times and not taking enough account of other countries’ views (due to the overwhelming focus on internal EU co-ordination as well as due to a widespread lack of appreciation of partner countries’ contexts and moralisation gaps including those linked to colonialism; Delcourt 2015). Nevertheless, the EU has developed an institutionalised profile and a

284 This is what Leonard (2005) argued when he suggested that Europe may run the 21st century.

285 Hobson (2012) distinguishes different conceptions of euro-centrism, in this case it would be the paternalistic one (Hobson 2012:6). ‘This entails what I call Eastern derivative agency wherein such societies will develop but only by following the ‘naturalized Western path’ that had been pioneered by the Europeans through their ‘exceptional institutional genius’.’

286 Article 21 of the Lisbon Treaty: " The Union’s action on the international scene shall be guided by the principles which have inspired its own creation, development and enlargement, and which it seeks to advance in the wider world: democracy, the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, the principles of equality and solidarity, and respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter and international law. The Union shall seek to develop relations and build partnerships with third countries, and international, regional or global organisations which share the principles referred to in the first subparagraph. It shall promote multilateral solutions to common problems, in particular in the framework of the United Nations." There is a whole literature examining the EU’s capability to live up to its objectives in terms of foreign policy and international actorness: Gehring, Oberthür and Mühleck 2013; Keukeleire and Hooijmaajier 2013; Gowan and Brantner 2008; Fox and Godement 2009.
number of strategies for global challenges such as climate change or development (European Think Tanks Group 2014). Beyond specific sector/policy strategies the EU has developed, followed and advocated general norms in international relations (rule of law, human rights, democracy, open trade…), is the main promoter of (effective) multilateralism and through its innovative response to globalisation has also itself become something of a laboratory for global governance (currently under severe stress tests). With its climate policy for instance the EU has embarked on a new 'green' economic paradigm addressing the problem of the commons at the regional level forging a new market-based cap and trade mechanism at its core just as it was still in the midst of its Eastern enlargement to now 28 increasingly diverse member countries. At the same time it has promoted a global agreement and policies to help developing countries deal with climate change. The Paris Agreement can be seen as a partial success of the multilateralist mode of governance promoted by the EU. The EU’s emission trading system (ETS) is explicitly open to linking with other systems outside the EU. Deepening this new market paradigm went on undeterred by the financial crisis and the resurgence of nationalism (for instance in the US). Thus the EU is pursuing its institutionalised regional integration project also in this field despite the turmoil of globalisation. The EU is a leading proponent at the global level of multilateral solutions to the global warming problem and a key engine of the UNFCCC negotiations. Moreover the inclusion of international aviation emissions into the EU-ETS has already tried to extend the reach of the system globally (and raised massive protests from countries outside the EU which feel that the EU encroaches on their sovereignty (Moscow Declaration 2012\textsuperscript{287}) and in particular China (Huang and Bailis 2015:509). The EU here showed impatience with the lack of progress in the global multinational aviation organisation ICAO, but had to drop its active stance in the face of international opposition. The 'optimistic’ take on the EU has been replaced by doubts over the EU’s very future due to the sovereign debt crisis and sluggish economic growth.

The EU, despite its ambitions, is often regarded as a ‘weak’ actor or a leader without followers (Blühdorn 2012) in the pursuit of these issues because other countries think in classical power and sovereignty terms (Messner 2011:24-5). There is a widespread impression of a return of geopolitics. NE Asian countries are an obvious example. Moreover, the EU ‘input success’ in the process of agreeing multilateral policies, programmes and institutions (such as the ETS system – for which the EU has 'followers' like Korea) to tackle climate change will have to be replicated in ‘outcome success’ i.e. in terms of actual emissions reductions compared to other national strategies, or in sustainable growth compared to classic economic growth. For the time being on these counts there are doubts on the effectiveness and results of the EU climate and energy packages, but it goes beyond the scope of this thesis to address these. However, for these reasons the EU model is currently not the most attractive pathway to be followed by other countries in terms of global governance.

NE Asian countries in contrast to the EU follow specific norms in their region and some promote them to uphold key norms of International Society Mark I: Their defensive use of earlier European international society institutions of national sovereignty and international law and the Five

Principles of peaceful co-existence\textsuperscript{288} were at the origin of China's and India's foreign policy and became formative for the non-aligned movement. These principles and the ‘Asian way’ of international co-operation imply consensus politics, ‘freezing’ or shelving conflicts, strong government/bureaucracy role in governance, but also nationalism and very little multilateralism or regionalism. Arguably these defensive minimal norms based on national sovereignty and an instrumental use of international law are shared by the vast majority of countries irrespective of their political systems. Their seemingly successful economic crisis management and their national climate policies as well as their successful development over the last decades are thus likely to inspire a large number of developing and emerging countries more than the EU.

We will in this chapter first look at regional responses within the region itself. In part IV we will also examine how regions influence in global governance.

\textbf{3.1. Economic crisis}

The start of the global financial crisis is conveniently dated to the bankruptcy of Lehmann Brothers bank on 15 September 2008. The repercussions of that collapse initially prompted a global liquidity crisis (credit crunch), fear of 'toxic assets' and bankruptcy prompting a lack of trust in the global and European banking system which initially in 2008/9 was handled quite well by the EU, including through stimulus packages (Schelkle 2011). However, the liquidity crisis transformed into a sovereign debt crisis in early 2010 (but both the financial and the sovereign debt crisis are linked through a 'negative feed-back loop' to the failures of the banking system). The sovereign debt crisis led to a major shift in the scope and nature of the problem and prompted a major overhaul of political and economic management in the EU, off-setting in its course the normal institutional balance between supranational and intergovernmental governance. The EU found a new balance through complex policy, institutional and legal changes. By contrast, the NE Asian countries managed the global crisis rather well, it was basically over in NE Asia once the stimulus measures had taken effect and the global situation stabilised\textsuperscript{289}. NE Asia reinforced its very weak regional safety nets built up after the Asian Financial Crisis, during the global crisis out of concern about contagion from the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis and global instability. However, they were not used. NE Asia has avoided (for now) a sovereign debt crisis, although in all countries public debt (notably regional and municipal) has risen sharply. However, despite some reforms in NE Asia (or rather the wider Asian region) there was no major overhaul of regional economic and political governance as countries focus on national strategies.

It has become clearer that before Lehman Brother's collapse there is a history to the global financial crisis which did not come like a bolt out of the blue, but as a result of complex and chaotic global dynamics developed over time. There is considerable heterogeneity in analysis on

\textsuperscript{288} Mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty, Mutual non-aggression, Mutual non-interference in each other's internal affairs, Equality and mutual benefit, \textit{Peaceful co-existence}. Proclaimed by China, India and Myanmar in 1954.

\textsuperscript{289} However, debt from the stimulus programmes especially by local authorities seems to have become a major problem in China and Korea, although it is largely domestic debt. Decline in global demand has also slowed their GDP growth.
the reasons of the crisis (Lo 2012). The background to the crises, in simple terms, can be traced back to the ‘Nixon shock’ in the 1970s which destabilised the post-War monetary system. That governance system had placed the ‘production’ of world money from private into governmental central banks and international organisations. The Bretton Woods Institutions (IMF, World Bank) and national central banks had focused on welfare, security and power rather than profit (Arrighi 2010:287). Neo-liberalism reversed that system of state production of world money and its focus on prosperity, welfare and development: the globalising economy shifted to a much more dominant focus on private profit again, revitalising the market economy (Kocka 2014:117). The supersession of the gold standard and fixed exchange rates accelerated a tendency of governments losing control of the production and regulation of world money propelled by the off-shore (seen from the US) petrodollar and Eurodollar markets (Arrighi 2010:323). These vast amounts of capital have since been circling the globe for ever more lucrative profits through ever more complex instruments and transactions and kept growing tremendously. Cross-border capital movements increased from ca. 4% of global GDP in the 1980s to 13% in 2000 and 20% in 2007 (Kocka 2014:93). For many economists this is one of the reasons for periodic boom and bust cycles (Kocka 2014:92-99). In this view, the deregulation of the financial markets 30-40 years ago in the USA and most Western countries caused them to get out of control (Arrighi 2010:329-30; Kocka 2014:92-95; Underhill 2011) and led to crises such as the Asian Financial Crisis, the transatlantic financial crisis and the European sovereign debt crisis to mention just those in the two regions I examine (Latin American countries and Russia for instance went through a number of severe crises cf. Oatley e.a. 2012). Without going into details, there is evidence of chaotic and complex dynamics which have produced risk of repeated crises.

Yet countries have also benefited not least through low inflation and cheap credit for public expenditure (be that on defence, R&D or welfare). Through the 'financialisation of capitalism' (Kocka 2014:92-99) a number of traditional aspects of the capitalist economy have changed: capital as a source of investment and factor of value creation in the 'real economy' has become more self-centred focusing on speculation and 'gambling' instead of 'solid banking' (Kocka 2014:94); credit and debt, including state debt has risen exorbitantly since the 1980s, replacing a more traditional mode of saving and future-oriented investment and making the market economy more unstable. These phenomena are in themselves complex and not easy to explain or to manage given a variety of factors and developments in different parts of the world, but the trend points to a major change in contemporary society (Kocka 2014:96, 117).

Governments tried to get the genie back into the bottle as the G20 process and the EU reaction to the sovereign debt crisis show. The regional responses to the financial crisis differ in the two regions, but both regional responses have informed the global response for which the G20 has been a focal point for coordination. The EU, some of its Member States and the key NE Asian

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290 I don’t claim that my above summary is an uncontroversial one.

291 Kocka (2014:95) gives some examples Germany’s debt as a percentage of GDP hovered between 16% and 24% between 1950 and 1975, climbed to 41% in 1985, 56% in 1995, 69% in 2005 and 81% in 2011; France’s from 16% (1975), 31% (1985), 55% (1995), 67% (2005), 86% (2011); US 33% (1975), 68% (2005); Japan 24% (1975) 186% (2005).

292 Cf. Bullon-Cassis (2011) presents a quantitative analysis of G-8 and G-20 communiques reflecting such a reaction to financial markets.
countries (China, Japan, South Korea) are all members of the G20\textsuperscript{293}. How the regional responses informed the global governance of the crisis will be analysed in part IV.

The EU represents a 'real existing ideal type' model of multilateralism with constitutionalised and supranational structures and transnational networks alongside national governments at least trying to work as a team (despite considerable tensions among members) in a framework of regional integration. However, seen from Asia, the EU's internal crisis revealed the dangers of multilateral engagement and 'hasty integration'. Hence, NE Asia is the other 'ideal type' model with its national-sovereignist governance, national self-insurance with at best intergovernmental agreements or just national domestic action regarding international issues. In this model, internationalisation tends to be weak and proceeds through loose coordination or classical intergovernmental agreements. The G20 reflects both approaches as the loose coordination model also relies for implementation of decisions on strengthened multilateral institutions such as the IMF or the FSB. Kalinowski (2010) finds similar differences and argues in a more limited way that the different responses can be explained by the underlying differences in economic policy. He elaborates on similarities and differences in the political economies of the two regions (and comparing them with the most financialised capitalism of the US and the UK). While my approach focusses less on the political economy (and domestic levels), Kalinowski's concept corroborates my main arguments including on the path dependence of nationalist and multilateralist approaches.

Here I want to briefly illustrate how the European and NE Asian responses differed in some key aspects in regard to international governance (nationalist – multilateral) and the use of the various forms of internationalisation discussed in chapter 2\textsuperscript{294}. For the NE Asian response a brief look at the 1997/98 Asian Financial Crisis (AFC) is necessary as that crisis has conditioned quite a few elements of the region's later response to the global crisis in 2008. The Asian Financial Crisis has actually also contributed the global institutional blueprint. The G20 group of Finance Ministers and Central Bankers was in fact created in 1999 after the Asian Financial Crisis to move beyond un-coordinated national policy-making and in 2008 following a proposal by the EU to the US was elevated to summit level. The FSF (Financial Stability Forum) was also created as a reaction to the Asian Financial Crisis and converted by the G20 into the Financial Stability Board (FSB) in 2009 (Moschella 2013). It may not be a coincidence that these global forums have been more successful than the Asian regional ones.

3.1.1. The crisis and the EU response

The following is necessarily a very general simplified account of a complex and long-drawn crisis with many aspects that would warrant a more detailed analysis than can be provided here. There is already a wealth of analysis of the various threads of the crisis – many of which are still spinning at the time of writing - and there is certainly a lot more to be published. I am less concerned here about reviewing the crisis, its causes and all the policy measures in detail or about assessing the

\textsuperscript{293} The EU is represented by the European Commission, European Council and the ECB (summit the Presidents).

\textsuperscript{294} There are of course many other aspects that can be considered, such as the appropriateness of economic and policy approaches, the social benefits and costs of individual measures, alternatives to the crisis management, questions about bail-outs, democratic accountability etc. But these topics are not my focus here.
individual policy choices and their appropriateness or impacts. This brief case study focuses on the balance of institutionalised multilateralism (multi-level and to some extent polycentric governance) and nationalist politics and solutions at EU level (not domestic discussions in individual countries) and what the crisis response means for the EU system and international society. The global level aspect of this will be discussed in part IV. This case study is particularly relevant as the Eurozone crisis was seen by many as a life or death 'experiment' and if indeed the EU had disintegrated that would have proven pessimist realists and pessimist economists right about multilateralism in general. Such real life 'experiments' are rare in social sciences, hence comparing the reactions in two regions to the same crisis is a good opportunity to answer one of my research questions related to the 'competition' between nationalism and multilateralism as organising principles of International Society 2.0: How did these differently constituted regions respond to the current context of complexity, uncertainty and globalisation?

Some pundits and euro-sceptic politicians argue that the crisis has proven that the EU is no longer useful, that supranational cooperation does not work and that the nation states are the only entities that can address the challenges which European societies are confronted with. Integration could even be seen as dangerous: a crisis in a small member state could spread to the whole Eurozone and arguably that crisis also occurred because Greece had given up national policy autonomy (the devaluation instrument). That because of national egoisms the Eurozone or the EU will break apart has been the most frequent, but also the most uninformed misunderstanding. The misunderstanding is due to the nation-state-centred or "realist" approach and a view of the European integration dynamics through the lens of rational bargaining about national interest, cost and benefit rather than understanding it as a multilateralist political project. Paradoxically, at the same time, these observers deplored the lack of speed and decisiveness of European action. They failed to see that the twenty-eight member countries of the EU are still sovereign countries, even though they have pooled and shared part of that sovereignty in some policy areas, including, for nineteen (as of 1 January 2015) of them, their monetary policy by adopting a common currency. But they have shared less sovereignty in economic and fiscal policy and in financial supervision (Priewe 2017). For instance, at the beginning of the crisis the EU had twenty-seven different regulatory systems in place, national rules, and rescue measures bailing out banks. This has slowly been changing through the establishment of common mechanisms (for a detailed review of the change in governance of EU financial markets Kudrna 2016).

EU leaders would argue, by contrast to the 'nationalists', that in a world characterised by complex interdependence where production chains are global, where capital knows no borders, where ideas and communication flow at the speed of a mouse click, to pretend that national self-sufficiency is the solution seems self-defeating, surely from a European perspective with many countries that are being fast overtaken in GDP size by emerging countries. Crisis management and the overhaul of economic, fiscal and monetary governance was clearly also an immensely political process (not just the application of some system theory or rational choice game theory).

295 Krugman (2013:439): 'The creation of the euro was supposed to be another triumphant step in the European project, in which economic integration has been used to foster political integration and peace; a common currency, so the thinking went, would bind the continent even more closely together. What has happened instead, however, is a nightmare: the euro has become an economic trap, and Europe a nest of squabbling nations. Even the continent's democratic achievements seem under threat, as dire economic conditions create a favorable environment for political extremism.'
Looking back at the crisis the sceptics seem to have been proven wrong as the EU and EMU survived and economic growth has picked up – after a lost decade (Priewe 2017). Nevertheless, the EU integration project and process has revealed deep flaws and weaknesses. Priewe (2017) lists five key problems: 1) divergence of inflation and real interest rates between EMU members (the most fundamental and most difficult to tackle); 2) too little, too late reactions of the ECB before 2012 and its continued lack of competence to act as a lender of last resort; 3) excessive austerity at the wrong time; 4) lack of fiscal policy capacity; 5) excessive debt and problems of banking supervision. Many of these weaknesses have to do with a lack of political and legal integration and the resulting inadequacies of the institutional design of EMU. What is quite interesting with hindsight is the debate at the height of the sovereign debt crisis that the EMU would collapse, the Eurozone disintegrate and maybe bring down the EU itself. This debate was led mainly by US pundits who had from the start held the view based on Mundell’s (1961) optimal currency area theory that the EMU could not work (Rhodes 2011; Vollaard 2014:1145; Krugmann 2013). But most of the critics focused on the first generation optimal currency area theory ignoring that Mundell himself (who changed his original position by 180°) and others had developed a second and third generation of the theory by including monetary and trade integration aspects. This evolution of the theory questions less the creation of EMU as such as it touches upon how it should be governed (Priewe 2017:8-10). These theory-based ‘rational’ views produced plausible arguments (which were known by EU policy makers: Eichengreen 2012), but tended to ignore the political nature of the EU and the EMU (Willett 2009:110-14). Fred Bergsten (2012a) argued the case against the pessimists in an article in Foreign Affairs in autumn 2012 entitled ‘Why the Euro Will Survive’ with precisely these arguments and pointing to the past experiences with crisis-driven often improvised and ambiguous integration steps in the EU that I have already mentioned in chapter I.1.2. Bergsten’s argument is based on the political nature of the integration process and the pattern of the EU finding institutional responses to crises of different kinds that reflect political compromises more than any institutional grand design. He agrees with the EMU critics who had found fault with the EMU from the start: ‘The European crisis is rooted in a failure of institutional design.’ That failure was due to the EMU’s political nature: after German unification there was a strong desire to bind in Germany further through EU integration in line with earlier French policy. Germany for its part sent an irrevocable signal of its continued commitment to ‘Westbindung’ or European integration. For others there was the wish to enhance fiscal discipline or to push through unpopular reforms at home (Eichengreen 2012). Europeans came together for different reasons. The process was somewhat hasty and left many rules ambiguous. In the Zeitgeist of that time EMU was mainly a logical step to complete the single market and markets were believed to be sufficient to regulate economic and monetary activity through factor mobility (Priewe 2017:6-8). Moreover, and crucially, at the beginning of the crisis there was no common ‘bail-out fund’ or financial safety net, nor was the ECB conceived as a lender of last resort or given the powers of micro-prudential supervision of European financial institutions. The qualifying, but quite arbitrary, Maastricht criteria were deemed sufficient and EMU was left without a central fiscal capacity. The EU budget itself, the budget given to the supranational institutions to manage, was far too small to confront the massive scale of the various national debt problems: According to Piris (2012:41) the EU budget was about 1% of EU total GNI, whereas the overall share of member states’ public

296 The same topoi returned with the migration crisis in 2015.
authorities was about 47%. State aid in the form of re-capitalisation and forms of asset-relief measures between October 2008 and December 2012 amounted to 591.9 billion EUR or 4.6% of EU GDP – even 12% if non-activated bank guarantees are included. Thus the individual member states (and the IMF) had to come to the rescue directly with their own budget and largely without EU funds under the pre-crisis multilateral institutional framework for financial decision-making leaving the field largely to intergovernmental negotiations: the ESFS and ESM were created as entities separate from the EU institutional and legal framework. This finding is crucial, as the intergovernmental decision-making process is vastly different from the ‘normal’ EU procedures and contributed to unleash nationalist emotions.

There are a number of more or less detailed diagnoses of the various governance failures with a number of economic theories applied, but the essential problem is widely agreed: While through the Maastricht Treaty a currency or monetary union was created, the signatories of that treaty left the economic union to the economic convergence assumed to follow through a mix of market forces and light-touch policy guidance (like the Stability and Growth Pact) and associated regulation (of the financial services sectors; Eichengreen 2012; Bergsten 2012a; Piris 2012:41; Priewe 2017). In essence fiscal and macro-economic policy as well as prudential supervision remained national, while the currency became supra-nationally managed, moreover with a very narrow legal mandate (price stability) for the ECB and ensuring the ECB would not become a ‘federal reserve’ or a lender of last resort. The ECB enjoys a high level of independence from the governments and the other EU institutions, but ironically had to contend with the market forces as the crisis showed.

The original blueprints for Economic and Monetary Union (the Werner plans of 1970 and the Delors report of 1989) were less lopsided than the political result set out in the Maastricht Treaty which was strong on monetary union (supranational) and weak on the politically difficult and re-distributive economic or fiscal union left largely to national management and ‘the markets’. Thus, the problem of EMU design was not ignoring the ‘we told you so’ of grand-standing American economists, not a lack of informed macro-economic analysis and plans, but what level of further supranational integration was politically feasible in a particular moment in time for the

298 http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/publication6142_en.pdf (accessed on 8.4.2015) The Werner report already highlighted disequilibria within the European Community and through the interdependence of industrialised economies including the flows of speculative capital. EMU was supposed to contribute to satisfactory levels of growth, high employment and stability including in an unstable global environment. Full liberalisation of factors of production and capital were recognised as essential just as in any national economy. More importantly the authors saw the transfer of essential fiscal and monetary matters to the Community level and a harmonised management of national budgets (size, balances and how to finance deficits and utilise surpluses) as essential. These ambitious initial plans for an economic and monetary union as a response to the collapse of the Bretton Woods system were shelved not least due to the 1973 oil crisis. Instead on a Franco-German initiative in 1979 the European Monetary System and the European Currency Unit (ECU) were created, which later became one of the foundations of the EMU.
299 http://aei.pitt.edu/1007/1/monetary_delors.pdf (accessed on 8.4.2015). The Delors Committee also emphasised the need for intensive and effective economic and fiscal policy coordination and the need to promote convergence, as under the stable exchange rates in the EWS and the elimination of capital controls and n-tariff barriers through the single market programme countries lost tools to shield their economic policy from developments elsewhere in the Community. This required a cooperative economic and fiscal policy-making including through binding measures at supranational level. While the Delors report was drawn up to inform policy makers, the treaty - as an outcome of a political process - ignored some of the recommendations described as essential. From 2012 onwards a series of reports and speeches have come back to the formulation of essential requirements to develop EMU further in a reiteration of the political process of deepening (or not) European integration.
states and leaders involved, regardless of potential for future problems and conflict. Willett (2009:110-1) sums up succinctly that EMU was not the result of a Balassa-mould logic, but a political project: ‘This analysis suggests that, rather than being a historical inevitability, the creation of the euro was in fact a low-probability event that relied on a highly unusual combination of circumstances and interpretations.’

The ‘political’ re-emerged during the sovereign debt crisis. The EU started tackling these sensitive issues, as leaving them to the markets had proved a disastrous abdication of political responsibility. In fact within the EU the multilateral and the national principle conflicted, but have been accommodated through an agonistic process that has catered for both the integration (community method) and the intergovernmental way. Crum (2013) describes this conflict as a trilemma between executive federalism (equivalent to my multilateralism and syndicated hierarchy with a democratic deficit), national autonomy, and democratic federalism (a development of multilateralism through transfer of democratic decision making to the EU level as proposed by Habermas (2011)see also IV.8). Crum also predicts on the basis of path dependency and the cost of the dissolution of EMU, that the well-trodden European integration path, here his executive federalism, will be the most likely course of the EU. Not so kind observers speak of continued EU muddling through or see ‘no exit from the Euro-Rescuing Trap’ (Scharpf 2014).

During the crisis the result of the initial EMU design problem was (predictably and predicted by several analysts) that the lack of convergence and increasing economic divergence (reflected also for instance in spreads of bond yields) prompted disintegration pressure from market forces (Priewe 2017). Dauderstädt (2014) analysed EU convergence and divergence in a longer time frame and not just in terms of the Maastricht criteria, but in terms of the alignment of economic growth, income and social conditions. He found that since 1999 the EU experienced a phase of overall convergence, but more driven by central than southern Europe. Since 2009 trends of divergence appear as a consequence of the ‘hard landing’ due to monetary shocks, austerity policy, the refusal to jointly share debts and the ensuing recession. In general, Dauderstädt (2014:3) found that ‘the EU is doing better than we are often led to believe’, while it is in fact within member states that the social divisions have widened. Those may often be blamed by euro-sceptics on the EU, but Dauderstädt’s analysis does not support that argument except for the countries affected since 2010 by austerity policies. For Priewe (2017), however, the (more narrowly defined) divergence of inflation and real interest rates remains the key fundamental problem to be addressed.

These market pressures were also not always rational, but irrationality could last long enough to bankrupt a country. We find the same ‘irrational’ switch in the Asian financial crisis: first an obsession with the Asian miracle prompted huge capital inflows into Asia until a sudden reversal of investor sentiment led to equally massive outflows that directly caused the crisis (Kalinowski 2012; Willett 2009, and also Oatley e.a. 2012 describe the underlying dynamics). The dilemma, or trilemma (Crum 2013; Kalinowski 2012) depending on the approach, between EU level integration in some fields and national policy making as well as democratic accountability/policy-making continues to face the EU while the crisis in terms of growth is giving way to the new normal of tepid growth amidst persisting high unemployment (Crum 2013,
The reasons behind the debt problem were as diverse as EU membership. In many cases, it was not because of profligacy in public spending but because of banking sectors which collapsed after Lehman Brothers and had to be rescued by the taxpayer (nationalisation of private debt) adding to the debt accumulated through fiscal stimulus packages. The accumulation of public debt through the national stimulus measures led to the opening of Excessive Deficit Procedures by the EU against 23 out of 27 member states (Schelkle 2011:377). In other cases the debt problem arose because of asset bubbles which burst with the global crisis, increasing budget deficits and debt. These bubbles were linked to the imbalances within the Eurozone design, as the capital from Northern competitive countries found lucrative, but assumedly equally risk free investment possibilities in the less competitive Southern countries (Priewe 2017:12-3). For several countries, however, public debt levels that accumulated gradually were at the origin. Some countries had neglected structural reforms when times were good and they could borrow money cheaply. While the Irish government bankrupted itself by converting banks' debt into sovereign debt, the sovereign debt crisis in Greece and other countries had more fundamental macro-economic (and political) reasons.

In terms of crisis reaction measures, there are quite a few steps and new institutions to list, without going into all the details which would fill entire books a short overview is in order: in the beginning (2008), when the crisis was diagnosed as a banking crisis, the EU re-vamped the financial supervision bodies which had a national focus and only a very light EU-level governance dimension: for micro-prudential supervision the European Securities and Markets Authority, the European Banking Authority and the Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority were set up in an increasingly polycentric network governance format which left the bulk of the competences in the Member States, but with stronger involvement of the supranational institutions in oversight and for systemic issues. A European Systemic Risk Board was also created in that context for macro-prudential supervision. Governing the EU financial markets through the de Larosière reforms ‘hardened’ from soft law and guidance to binding standards in a specialised multi-level or polycentric mode of governance relying on the Community method and the concepts of delegated and implementing acts introduced by the Lisbon Treaty (Kudrna 2016). The European Banking Authority (EBA) accountable to the EP and the Council gained supranational powers (for details Kudrna 2016:77-80). As the crisis deepened and in early 2010 mutated into a sovereign debt crisis (with specific reasons in different countries such as Ireland or Greece) the European Financial Stability Mechanism (EFSF - almost overnight) and then the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) were set up as firewalls.

The reaction to the sovereign debt crisis in Greece was in emergency mode and prompted by fears

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300 Before 2008 a number of countries often accused of irresponsible government spending, like Spain, Italy or Ireland had actually reduced government debt assiduously.


of imminent collapse and contagion. The European Commission was allowed to issue up to 60 billion EUR in bonds guaranteed by the EU budget and the temporary (3 years) EFSF was set up to mobilise another 440 billion EUR (up to 750 billion) guaranteed by the Eurozone member states. Since late 2010 through the 'European semester' the European Commission regularly analyses the fiscal and structural reform policies of every Member State, provides recommendations, and monitors their implementation. In 2012 a permanent financial safety net, the ESM was created to take over from the temporary EFSF. To give a legal basis for these measures which contradict the 'no bailout clause' of Art 125(1) of the Lisbon Treaty, the EU agreed to invoke Art. 122(2) of the Lisbon Treaty to allow financial assistance to a member of the Eurozone ‘with severe difficulties caused by natural disasters or exceptional occurrences beyond its control’ (Schelkle 2011:380; Crum 2013:620). The legal basis was created through a simplified treaty amendment under Art. 48-6 TEU (Huberdeau 2017:155).

The underlying problem with the financial safety nets is that no country and no EU institution was going to throw good money after bad without guarantees and conditions that 'irresponsible' policies were changed and specific reforms implemented (these reforms are for instance defined through the legislation and European Commission monitoring: ‘Six Pack’ and European semester or in specific country cases the negotiations led by the ‘troika’ of European Commission, ECB and IMF). The problem with financial support in such cases is that of ‘moral hazard’ and the possibility that assistance reduces the incentives for reform. It explains the resistance of 'creditor countries' against a 'transfer union' (Draghi 2014). This moral hazard, together with the limitations to its mandate was also the problem for the ECB.

The ECB is one of the most independent of the supranational institutions of the EU (Huberdeau 2017:145). It stepped in when the member states’ fiscal authorities were not able to or couldn’t agree on fiscal measures, stretching its treaty mandate, but not as far as becoming the lender of last resort, which the German and other governments oppose fiercely because of the fear of a ‘transfer union’ and moral hazard (Priewe 2017). The ECB started in spring 2010 to buy Greek debt (government bonds) on the secondary market (so by-passing the Treaty’s interdiction of direct financial assistance by the ECB to a government) and it extended this bond buying programme to other countries as the crisis spread (Ireland, Portugal, Italy, Spain). In December 2011 the ECB initiated a more long-term stabilisation policy, the Long Term Refinancing Operation (LTRO) making inexpensive loans available to eurozone banks for three years. A second LTRO round followed in February 2012. In July 2012 the ECB President Mario Draghi finally announced that the ECB would do whatever is necessary to sustain the Euro: ‘Within our mandate, the ECB is ready to do whatever it takes to preserve the euro. And believe me, it will be enough’. This announcement stopped the crisis escalation and prevented an existential crisis of the EU although in reality the ECB is still not a lender of last resort (Priewe 2017:14). This would mark a major step towards fiscal integration, beyond what has been agreed in the Treaty.

The first mandate of the ECB, albeit unwritten, is by definition preserving the very existence of

303 http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/economic_governance/the_european_semester/index_en.htm (accessed on 8.4.2015)
304 For a critical view of creditor countries’ especially Germany’s policy: Underhill (2011).
the Euro, it is not only price stability. So when there are threats to the integrity of the monetary union the ECB believes that it has the mandate to intervene. Dauderstädt (2014:32) argues that if the ECB had made such a declaration in 2010 ‘it would have nipped the crisis in the bud and prevented the catastrophic austerity policy.’ But of course the ECB did not want to send a message that member states can go on with irresponsible fiscal policies, unsustainable levels of debt and lack of supervision when it was discovered that the reality of the financial sectors was not exactly the one that they were pretending to be. This produced a balancing act and a series of ‘unconventional’ monetary policy measures that were judged very differently by the various member states as well as by ‘the markets’ and analysts: ‘Compared with conventional monetary policy (i.e. interest rates), these measures are less easy for the market to anticipate and their effects are less well understood.’ (Draghi 2015:3). There is no magic wand to dissolve this dilemma, but according to Draghi a series of structural reforms to enhance national economies’ flexibility, pro-active labour market and (re)qualification policies to use the untapped growth potential and to enhance employment are required (Draghi 2015:5-7).

In 2011 crisis management turned increasingly into crisis prevention and addressing causes of risk (cf chapter IV.5. on risk society). In parallel to the ECB’s monetary measures the EU in December 2011 adopted the so-called Six-Pack and later Two-Pack legislation to enhance EU level economic and fiscal coordination and supervision. The ‘Six Pack’ (five EU regulations and one directive306) defined more robust economic and fiscal surveillance of national policy (deficit, debt, expenditure, macro-economic imbalances, early warning system) by the EU level reinforcing the twenty year old, far less constraining Stability and Growth Pact. The Six Pack legislation is based on the Treaty but introduces a new decision-making model of ‘reverse qualified majority’ i.e. the Council of the EU on the basis of a Commission recommendation can impose sanctions on a state not complying with the rules unless a qualified majority of member states votes against it. This rule and the sanctions defined in the legislation makes enforcement of rules more automatic. Therefore the new legislation strengthens the syndicated hierarchy in the field of economic policy.

In addition the intergovernmental Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance (Fiscal Compact Treaty)307 was signed on 2 March 2012 by all but two member states (UK and Hungary), creating a rather complex legal structure outside the treaty frameworks, but involving the EU institutions and providing for a new euro-zone only summit (Huberdeau 2017:154).

Finally, and simultaneously, building on the de Larosièere committee blueprint for a regulatory response to the financial crisis, the content of financial market regulation and its governance framework was overhauled (Kudrna 2016). A European System of Financial Supervision (ESFS) was created reforming the looser European level committees of national supervisors that had just been set up before the crisis broke out under the Lamfalussy reform. The banking union (single supervisory and resolution mechanisms) has been advanced after the supervisory network mentioned above was found wanting, albeit with important difficulties to implement a unified, effective multi-level governance system to overcome the dilemma that ‘European banks are European in life, but national in death.’ Macaes (2013:7). The Single Rulebook for supervision

was followed by the Single Resolution Mechanism (the Single Resolution Board started operations on 1 January 2016) and the new bail-in rules of the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive provide for the orderly resolution of banks and a burden-sharing between shareholders and creditors, reducing the negative feedback loop between bank and sovereign debt further. The banking union remains incomplete but has been much ‘Europeanised’ compared to the pre-crisis situation which was characterised by the contradiction between a single currency and a single market for financial products and services and seventeen separate, national bank regulators (Eichengreen 2012:129). The Europeanisation or integration is proceeding through the gradual implementation of the European resolution fund (funded by annual levies on banks) (2014 Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive and Single Resolution Mechanism). The EU put a multilevel system in place that involves private actors (banks contributing to the fund), national governments/regulators (back-stop in line with EU state aid rules) and the European financial safety net (ESM). The single Supervisory Mechanism is managed by the ECB creating a risk of fragmentation with the ESFS managed by the European Banking Authority (EBA) and the EU members who chose not to opt-in into the banking union such as Sweden and the UK (Kudrna 2016:79). There is as yet no European fund for deposit guarantees but EU rules on levels of protection exist. This shows the difficult limits of financial solidarity between countries ("transfer union"). The ‘banking union’ illustrates the use of various forms of internationalisation with its transnational (banks’ funding), transgovernmental (network of regulators) and supranational (ECB guidance) elements.

The resurgence of nationalism during the crisis

The sovereign debt crisis, fundamentally also a banking crisis due to the ‘negative feedback loop between bank and sovereign debt, changed the political nature of the integration game, because the macroeconomic, fiscal, macro- and micro-prudential policies and institutions had to be built up under the contradictory pressures of the market forces and of the citizens wary of bail-outs and austerity policies adding to the already different interests of creditor and debtor countries. The powers of creditor countries greatly increased producing resentment in the debtor countries and damaging the EU equilibrium of multi-level governance. Electorates in many countries were suffering the consequences from the crisis and the crisis response in the real economy and in the labour markets. In elections in Greece, Italy and other countries the risk of anti-EU parties entering government worried the rest of the EU governments and delayed negotiations. The primacy of national politics over the European common goals was clearly visible. Market pressures were particularly challenging as they expected what politicians could not give them: a guarantee that bailouts would come or the euro be rescued at any cost. Such a ‘blank cheque’ would have presented a moral hazard and it would have taken the pressure off the debtor countries to carry out structural reforms demanded by the creditor countries (moralisation gap between creditors and debtors). On the other hand the massive bail-outs that contrast with the dearth of funds mobilised for social or environmental issues prompted criticism and have created a new moralisation gap between states, citizens and markets (‘privatising profits, outsourcing risks’) that

309 Much was made about the German word for debt – Schuld – which also means guilt, creating a moral undertone already in the language
reinforced previous Eurosceptic attitudes over ‘too neo-liberal’ EU policies. These moralisation
gaps illustrate the main weakness in the EU integration process: democratic accountability versus
centralisation and an executive or intergovernmental focus, a tension between output efficiency
(and legitimacy) and input legitimacy (democratic process and accountability). Scharpf (2014) is
particularly critical of the asymmetry of the euro-rescuing regime which he characterises ‘either
as an authoritarian expert regime or as a dictat [sic] imposed by the creditor governments’. This
assessment reflects the mood in many countries that felt that austerity measures were imposed on
them by powerful countries (and Germany in particular). One could argue that this shows that
national power is still relevant even in today’s EU. And it certainly is, especially in the
intergovernmental modes of decision-making and in particular when making treaty changes that
affect the institutional order and balance and require unanimity. However, I have shown in my
account that it is precisely in the areas where the EU’s syndicated hierarchy was weak (and
member states remained competent) that the power balance mattered and led to suboptimal results
and produced grievances between member states. In the end, none of those led to defections
(Grexit was avoided).

During the crisis, the normal procedures of the EU syndicated hierarchy were insufficient (for
fiscal matters no adequate EU procedure was foreseen by the Treaty) and under-funded for rapid
decision making. Some rare efficient decisions – such as the creation of the EFSF - were possible
in intergovernmental formats (extraordinary summit meetings) under enormous market pressure.
But in general terms the intergovernmental decision-making proved slow and problematic. Apart
from the fiscal compact treaty, there were no ‘defections’ from the EU framework as such
although one could observe a breakdown in solidarity (Jones 2012). Brexit, the ultimate defection
from the EU as such, did not seem linked to the economic crisis or even EU policy as such, but
due to domestic politics and a long-standing hostility to the EU in important UK political parties
and media, partly based on misinformation (Huberadeau 2017).

After the emergency mode, gradually the EU decision making reverted to the normal institutional
and legislative processes. The EU had to break several vicious circles affecting Europe in diverse
ways while at the same time restoring growth and preserving its social model (de la Porte and
Heins 2015). The European summits were about combining short term action to stabilise the
markets and medium-term action to stimulate growth, together with a longer-term vision on the
way forward to institutionally strengthen EMU. In fact, the EU reacted at both Member State and
Union level as well as at the global level (G20, IMF). On all levels action was unprecedented (and
unimaginable just a few years ago), albeit often still too slow to effectively address market
pressures. On the international level the limits of EU representation and voice (e.g. none in the
IMF, limited in the G20) and over-representation of (small) EU Member States in the BWI became
a liability.

In sum, the EU experience in reaction to a crisis characteristic of the anarchy of complexity and
the diffusion of power in International Society 2.0 provides a case study in how multilateralist
approaches to solving the sovereign debt crisis within an (insufficient or ill-designed)

310 But even treaty changes reflect results of bargaining and compromise in a multilateralist framework which are
rarely zero sum games.
institutionalised framework (EU and EMU) were interacting and clashing with the national principle. After prolonged tensions among nations a consensus emerged to address structural institutional weaknesses and policy leading to an evolution of the multilateral institutions towards more integration, but also towards a more polycentric set-up (new agencies and modes of supervision and economic governance). Disagreements remain about the concrete measures and scope of this integration (Juncker 2017; Priewe 2017:18-26 for various options); The "balance" between nationalism (intergovernmental governance) and multilateralism (EU level, syndicated) is likely to evolve to more integration. This case study shows that:

1) The EU had critical structural gaps that made it ill-prepared for the financial crisis. Many of those were addressed in largely intergovernmental crisis mode (summits) and then plugged with new rules agreed for the EU at large or the Euro-zone more specifically.

2) The “E” of EMU was very weak before the crisis and this weakness was known. Through the crisis the EU had to recognise that economic policy and reforms (or lack of those) in one country was a concern for all members as prosperity for all depended also on prosperity in individual countries and the other way around (asymmetries, diffusion of power in complexity). This implies a further sharing of economic and fiscal sovereignty through the syndicated institutions rather than through ad hoc coordination of national measures.

3) The EU managed within its complex institutional structure to adopt a certain amount of legislation and stop-gap measures and it was able to mobilise Member State solidarity (with limits!) outside the EU/EMU framework to create the bail-out funds and firewalls the volume of which were far beyond the EU budget itself, but it failed to jointly shoulder all national debts, triggering a negative spiral of capital flight, more debt, banking crises and recession.

4) The EU reaction was (almost by definition) slow, sub-optimal, and therefore costly and unpopular. National interests diverged and were not easily channelled through the EU institutional multilateralist model of the syndicated hierarchy, as the bailouts required funds that could only be mobilised by the economically powerful member states (notably Germany). The intergovernmental mode was slow and less efficient (Huberdeau 2017:162). Similarly, ‘haircuts’ on debt were not foreseen by common rules and thus impacted the creditors’ national interest (Priewe 2017:13).

5) Path dependency – including persisting with the traditional supply-side measures of the Maastricht criteria - created constraints that precluded alternative courses of action, contributing to a technocratic approach to the crisis and negative public reactions.

6) a vigorous and polarised political debate emerged about crucial European policy choices affecting core national policies and citizens in many countries and which put the EU at the forefront of national and international politics indicating a certain recognition that the democratic deficit needs to be addressed together with concerns over unemployment and growth. This points to an agonistic turn of democratic debate rather than the technocratic, no-plausible-alternative-mode of governance. This agonistic turn was visible in the French
Presidential election campaign, where the Euro was a major topic.

3.1.2. Perspectives on EU integration after the crisis

Despite the vicious cycles and these moralisation gaps and in the space of a few years, the EU has in fact radically changed the way Europe collectively governs Europe's economies and financial markets. It has (partially) addressed the fundamental problem of EMU identified above – the original weakness of institutional design. Without going into the details of these and other measures, the EU governance overhaul in response to the crisis has been characterised by the following main tendencies:

1) A tendency of incrementally increasing institutional integration\textsuperscript{311} and multilateral policy cooperation and coordination. This path dependency (also illustrated by the fact that these measures regarding economic integration were largely predicated already in the Delors report) was characterised by a crisis-driven creative muddling-through not unlike that in previous integration phases although with a number of problems due to the complex nature of the issues: there were legal constraints prompting different modes of integration including outside the treaty frameworks; there were market forces adding sometimes irrational – and thus unanticipated - risk, creating time and cost pressures; there were specific negotiation dynamics given the need for member states rather than the EU institutions to foot the stimulus programmes and bail-out bills. The EU overhaul the European financial regulatory framework that supervises banks, insurance and security firms, and new EU laws strengthened budgetary and macro-economic surveillance. It created new or reformed existing mechanical institutions of its international society. The new Fiscal Compact Treaty increased the institutional and legal complexity of the EU without fundamentally changing the institutional set-up (similar to Schengen and other intergovernmental arrangements outside the treaty framework cf. Piris 2012). The ECB (slowly and against notably German resistance) moved beyond a narrow definition of its mandate and adopted ‘unconventional’ and more complex monetary policy measures (Draghi 2015; Priewe 2017). All these decisions were made under pressure and had to take account of the nature of the EU with its partial, asymmetrical competences in the fiscal and monetary fields, the narrow mandate of the ECB, the limited multi-level governance framework for financial regulation and supervision and the complex multi-level negotiation games notably between creditor and debtor countries. Changing the EU Treaty to overcome legal limits and constraints was not a realistic option as that would have required unanimity, possibly referendums in some countries, and would have taken too long. This has led to slow and often sub-optimal outcomes from an analytical or market perspective, but this was a political process not a scientific endeavour to construct an ideal type. The proposals by the European Commission to complete the EMU tabled in December 2017 are in keeping with this incremental approach, rather than an attempt at fundamental reform. Even proposals that sound “revolutionary” such as the creation of a European Monetary Fund (EMF) and a EU Minister of Economy and Finance are in reality rationalisations and adaptations of the

\textsuperscript{311} Some observers, such as Macaes (2013) point to a reversal of integration processes especially in the economy itself. Dauderstädt (2014) shows that convergence (a similar meaning to economic integration) in the EU had generally been enhanced before the crisis, but receded due to the crisis, bolstering Macaes' assertion of a reversal of integration. The difference depends on whether one looks at institutions or policies or economic indicators.
systems developed during the crisis. The EMF is simply anchoring the ESF in the EU’s legal framework without changing the contribution key and governance structure, similarly the intergovernmental treaty (fiscal compact) of 2012 is to be incorporated into the EU framework while the Minister is a rationalisation of the competencies of the Vice-President of the Commission and the Chair of the Euro-Group. The legislative proposals by the European Commission are basically aiming at avoiding parallel structures, incorporating the intergovernmental elements into the normal institutional framework (including accountability to the EP – although funding is not from the EU budget - and judicial review by the ECJ).

2) A second tendency was a dilemma/trilemma between the need for European governments and EU institutions to manage market pressures, and the requirement to be accountable to national electorates, not to financial markets (reflecting the diffusion of power in complexity). They have to deal in a democratic way with a wide array of short but also often long term issues at the heart of their citizens' concerns such as jobs, pensions, savings, education and how to finance all this (taxes, debt). In this respect the EU differs from the IMF which faced no such democratic accountability constraints towards the citizens of Asian countries during the Asian Financial Crisis and imposed much more bitter conditionality (which on top of it turned out to be the wrong medicine; see below). Any reform of EMU needs to be carried out in a democratically accountable way not least through involving at the minimum the European and national parliaments. This is needed to ensure democratic oversight of the process and to reassure the citizens of Europe that they are a part of the process. More integration means more demand for democracy and more accountability at EU level (which is also a pattern in other areas of integration): No taxation without representation, no austerity without solidarity. The intergovernmental mode of decision-making is neither effective (need for unanimity) nor democratic (a small minority party in a national government – like the 'True Finns’ – could block EU level decisions affecting other countries and millions of citizens; Priewe 2017:18). The lack of ‘proper’ accountability mechanisms has led to a crisis of citizen confidence in the EU (reflected in surveys and a surge of votes for euro-sceptic or anti-establishment parties; cf. Scharpf 2014). The ECB recognised this and in 2015 started for the first time to publish summaries of its policy meetings (Draghi 2015). Priewe (2017:18-9) therefore argues that in the long run it is unavoidable that the EMU’s indirect democratic governance in the second degree (national leaders accountable to national parliaments) has to be replaced by a European economic government elected by the EP and decision-making through qualified majority voting. The Commission proposals of December 2017 (see above) emphasise the enhanced accountability to the EP, although it is not the EP which is financing the EMF. Hence, the concern seems to be to enhance legitimacy and effectiveness of the status quo and streamlining the complexity which arose during the crisis.

3) The financial and sovereign debt crisis led to a complex, multi-level and polycentric policy making process that has considerably increased the political stakes in the EU (and especially the Eurozone). Far-reaching decisions profoundly affecting citizens and states alike had to be made.

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and consequently deep tensions between and within member states rose to an unprecedented scale\textsuperscript{313}. The real economy had to cope with distintegrative tendencies rather than the economic convergence the EU had been experiencing since 1999 and which was the underlying objective of EMU in the first place (Macaes 2013; Dauderstädt 2014, Völland 2014). This political process affected the constitutive institutions of the EU’s international society and its syndicated hierarchy: national fiscal sovereignty, the community method, the intergovernmental agreements were at stake and characteristically a number of moralisation gaps typical for a critical juncture appeared (e.g. accusations of irresponsibility, laziness, heavy-handedness, arrogance and the like; taking of moral positions on policy choices; mutual acrimony; digging up old stereotypes or even wartime reparation issues). In this situation the discursive mediation (for instance through speeches of the EU presidents) as well as the institutional mediation and innovative governance (Kudrna 2016), allowed defusing these disputes and to bridge the moralisation gaps to some extent, but this political crisis of legitimacy is continuing and weakening popular support for European integration.

4) All crisis measures were negotiations, extremely complex, multi-level and polycentric negotiations, where there were different players, different games and different perceptions and different cultures involved. The need to effectively deal with the plurality of the political and economic context of international society and the diffusion of power in complexity including within the deeply integrated EU is thus a key factor borne out by the EU ’experiment’ of crisis. This ‘lesson’ of multilateralism under existential pressure of complex market, economic and political dynamics is also an important one for global governance (part IV).

5) Beyond crisis management the EU has put in place or is in the process of establishing preventive mechanisms that are addressing the challenges of ’risk society’ i.e. unpredictable future risk (cf part IV) based on lessons learnt in the form of deeper financial integration and public-private risk sharing (through the SSR and SRM of the banking union) and medium-term fiscal planning supervised by the EU peer review mechanisms and sanctions and regulation of rating agencies. This governance reform will make the EU/EMU governance more polycentric. Future-oriented, growth stimulating investments have also been proposed by European Commission President Juncker.

6) The EU used the G20 and other global governance mechanisms (IMF) as well as trade negotiations to actively improve international coordination and re-assure its partners about its strategies (cf. part IV).

Nevertheless, some changes are still due to be implemented as we will see below. The EU has acquired unprecedented power on monetary, economic and fiscal matters and competitiveness and will probably emerge institutionally stronger from the crisis, but politically the EU has been weakened (at least temporarily) because of the democratic deficit in combination with an output

\textsuperscript{313} These tensions revealed moralisation gaps such as between Greeks feeling victimised by Germany seen as lacking solidarity despite having been the main beneficiary of EMU while Germans accused Greeks of being lazy and profligate free-riders. Characteristically for moralisation gaps such accusations – mainly in the media but also by leading Greek politicians and finally the Tsipras government – were assorted with historical references such as Nazi occupation of Greece.
efficiency that was often found wanting (too little too late especially on contagion prevention and banking reform) or politically contested (austerity without debt default allowed except the limited Greek and Cyprus 'haircuts'). The problems of intergovernmental coordination and policy disagreements between countries have not been resolved (Schellinger 2015). The subsequent institutional measures, while not always adequate and confined by national interests, did go into the direction of extending the syndicated hierarchy of the EU’s institutional set-up to avoid future breaking points. The new French President in 2017 has re-started the discussions about moving further in that direction with a Eurozone budget and finance minister as a way to further integrate economic policy already suggested in 2011 by ECB President Trichet and his successor (see below).

There is consensus that further changes to the current EMU architecture are needed to address the structural weaknesses of the original arrangements and to ensure stronger foundations for a sustainable single currency (Priewe 2017), but as the sense of urgency recedes the political diversity in how precisely to address these weaknesses will increase and make deep reforms - some of which would require treaty changes - more difficult. This resembles familiar patterns of integration in incomplete leaps and ambiguous bounds, usually crisis-driven where the EU institutions tend to produce the (more or less grand) design and the member states pick holes into them or where integration continues in one area after it breaks down in another (Jones 2012). In this case the reform initiatives are no longer just Commission white papers, but collective consensus proposals by all the institutions involved: The December 2012 report "Towards a Genuine Economic and Monetary Union" set out four essential building blocks for the future of EMU: an integrated financial framework, an integrated budgetary framework, an integrated economic policy framework, and strengthened democratic legitimacy and accountability. In February 2015 the 'analytical note' by the new Commission President Juncker in consultation with his colleagues at the Council, the euro-group and the ECB on 'Preparing for next steps on better economic governance in the Euro-area' in the same vein, but perhaps with more limited ambition, focused on preparing the ground for further developing concrete mechanisms for stronger economic policy coordination, convergence and solidarity as it became apparent that the crisis response had led to greater divergence, rather than convergence in the EU (Dauderstädt 2014). There are different visions on the future of EMU among member states which considerably limit the policy development options as laid out in the Five Presidents' Report on completing Europe's economic and monetary union of June 2015 which takes a long-term stepwise approach with the second reform step envisaged only for 2025 after a period of consolidation.

The tendency is to reduce the scope of mechanisms outside the treaty framework (such as the ESM, the fiscal compact etc.), to focus on a larger scope of convergence criteria, a capital market union and a fiscal capacity at EU level once convergence has improved. The envisaged social dimension remains vague at this stage, despite the Social Summit for Fair Jobs and Growth, held...

in November 2017 in Gothenburg, Sweden. The 2015 report is seen as less ambitious than the 2012 one (Hacker 2015) and the 2017 Commission proposals boil down to a mere consolidation and institutional integration of the acquis. This is in line with my above hypothesis that once the urgency for reform has waned, the level of ambition for reform also diminishes in line with previous experiences from European integration.

The collective proposals by the institutions focus on completing the banking union (with the main differences on deposit insurance), an enhanced fiscal capacity and fiscal coordination for the EU (but falling short of fiscal federalism advocated by other influential expert groups; Schellinger 2015; Priewe 2017) as well as some institutional reforms such as a Euro-Treasury or Euro-zone budget echoing earlier calls for a European Finance Minister. New proposals have also been made in the areas of labour market and social policies (which have largely been absent in earlier discussions on EMU) such as introducing competitiveness councils and monitoring of labour market and social policies, enhanced coordination of social security systems, recognition of qualifications and minimum social standards (Schellinger 2015; Huberdeau 2017:156-9). In particular ECB President Draghi (Draghi 2014, 2015) has raised the necessity to consider these wider so-called automatic stabilisers which could temporarily re-distribute money, help synchronising business cycles and provide shock-absorbers such as through an additional common unemployment insurance (which has been taken up in the European Commission's 2017 proposals).

ECB President Draghi (2014) warned that EMU needs to be completed achieving ‘minimum requirements’ in all areas defined by these reports to dispel doubts about its future. Two of Draghi’s minimum requirements in the absence of fiscal transfers (which are the norm in other economic and monetary unions such as federal states) are that ‘all euro area countries need to be able to strive independently’ and that ‘EMU countries need to invest more in other mechanisms to share the cost of shocks’ including deepening financial integration in ways that improve private risk-sharing. The euro area is diverse and economic policy-making at the national level remains the most effective method for many economic decisions. Yet, national policies cannot be decided in isolation if their effects quickly propagate to the euro area as a whole. The very high levels of economic and financial interdependence, particularly in the euro area, call for a qualitative move towards an economic and fiscal union, in order to ensure the smoothest possible functioning of the EMU for the benefit of European citizens. Therefore, such national economic, social and fiscal policies must reflect fully the realities of being in a monetary union and convergence has to go beyond the arbitrary Maastricht criteria. Maintaining an appropriate level of competitiveness, coordination and convergence accompanied by social policies and investments to ensure sustainable growth without large imbalances and reducing inequalities is essential. Draghi (2015:3) postulates governance of structural reforms to be exercised jointly at the eurozone level arguing that: ‘Like any political union, the cohesion of the euro area depends on the fact that each country is permanently better off within the union than without. Convergence is therefore essential to bind

the union together, while permanent divergence caused by structural heterogeneity has the opposite effect. For this reason, that every national economy is sufficiently flexible should be accepted as a part of our common DNA. It has to be a permanent economic feature that comes with participation in the euro area, in the same way that the Copenhagen Criteria are permanent political features of membership of the EU.’

Further steps towards integration can be pursued in the longer-run, including stronger fiscal integration, possibly coupled with common debt instruments and ultimately the development at the euro area level of a fiscal body, such as a treasury office. But it should be clear that such more far-reaching steps would involve significant further pooling of decision-making and would likely require Treaty changes and corresponding steps including in redistributive and social policies to ensure political legitimacy. In his 2017 'State of the Union' Address to the European Parliament, European Commission President Juncker underlined that the European economy had bounced back, that unemployment and public deficits had gone down and European banks had started lending again, turning the page on a lost decade of crisis. Juncker proposed to move towards more qualified majority voting in single market and taxation issues, to have the ESM 'graduate into a European Monetary Fund', to have the European Commissioner for economic and financial affairs morph into a European Minister of Economy and Finance (note not only Finance). The Minister would also preside over the Eurogroup and be accountable to the European Parliament. Juncker rejected separate institutions for the EU and the Eurozone and logically called for an extension of the Eurozone to more members including by assisting Member States to reach the qualifications (these proposals were formalised in December 2017319).

The crisis has shown that moving towards more decisions made at European level on financial, fiscal and economic policies requires strong mechanisms to legitimise the decisions taken in common and to ensure the necessary democratic accountability and political participation. This is essential to build public support for European-wide decisions that have a far-reaching impact on the everyday lives of citizens. While the role of national parliaments is no doubt important especially when decisions are made in intergovernmental set-ups, it is in the constitutional logic of the EU’s multilateralism and syndicated hierarchy that accountability be channelled through the European Parliament together with the Council and that the EP be further empowered. A feedback loop with national parliaments would also enhance democratic governance.

A look at the context of the crisis is also important. Globalisation and integration have not fundamentally reduced the cultural, historical, political, economic and legal plurality in the EU (and even less globally, to the contrary, economic growth has empowered countries to take pride in their nation). Integration, just like multilateralism in general, has to take account of national (and other) diversity. European fiscal, economic and social policy will have to be polycentric with strong EU-level fiscal capacity, regulation, guidance and supervision and an enhanced role of the ECB as a lender of last resort, acquiring in fact competences that other central banks already have (Priere 2017:19-20), while respecting national policies. It is not helpful to consider the EU as a

homogenous entity: the sovereign debt crisis revealed a persistent lack of commonality in for instance economic policy and social policy preferences between and within countries. As I asserted earlier, the nation states and the constitutive institutions of international society remain relevant in the EU. The institutional, often technocratic, mediation of this diversity is characteristic of the EU integration process. However, in the sovereign debt crisis the limits of the technocratic approach became clear: polarised political debates about austerity and other policy preferences and an increasingly negative attitude towards the EU – including exit scenarios (Vollaard 2014) - seen both as only possible solution and as responsible for the social and economic problems. The ‘no plausible alternative’ scenarios (see discussions about the ‘Grexit’) correspond to Mouffe’s (2010) criticism of the a-political neoliberal consensus. Hence the politicisation of the EU through the sovereign debt crisis may very well open a new critical juncture on the pathway of European integration, propelling the EU polity into an agonistic mode of policy-making beyond its technocratic, semi-automatic traditional trajectory (‘neofunctional spill overs’) that allowed political debate only at critical junctures. The migration crisis in 2015 may have a similar effect as it presents similar characteristics to the global financial crisis: an external shock too big to handle in the existing political and legal framework, an asymmetric problem straining the solidarity among member states with only a limited role for the supranational institutions. Multilateral trilemmas, such as the executive federalism one outlined by Crum (2013), require innovative solutions in the face of complexity and diffusion of power that redistribute power among the polycentric governance actors in the EU and EMU including a stronger role for the EP and more broadly accountability mechanisms over the syndicated hierarchy (see also IV.8).

3.1.3. NE Asia’s response to financial crises

NE Asia provides a contrasting example of reactions to the Asian and then the global financial crisis. NE Asia’s reaction is comparable in some respects to the EU’s because there were also regional safety nets and macro-economic surveillance put in place to deal with risk. These regional mechanisms, such as the Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI), were created in the larger context of ASEAN plus three and as additional ‘lines of defence’ after national currency reserves and bilateral swap agreements which are faster to activate and nationally controlled. However, in stark contrast to the EU’s financial safety nets, they were not actually used in either the Asian Financial Crisis or during the Global Financial Crisis due to major shortcomings in design (Hill and Menon 2012; Willett 2009). Moreover, China and Japan (and to some extent the ROK) are competing about regional leadership (Park 2013). Those flaws reflect that there is much less political will to commit to regional solutions than there was even in the initial phase of the EMU on economic and fiscal cooperation. This is not surprising, because as we have seen NE Asia had not created a regional single market like the EU and because the NE Asian countries are focused on national development and national competitiveness and haven’t overcome political grievances (Willett 2009). The crises in 1997/8 and 2008/9 have shown that this nationalist model of the development state has been resilient, albeit expensive (Kalinowski 2008) just as the EU’s multilateral decision-making proved costly in other ways as shown above. Regional co-operation shows little substance – or in Willett’s (2009:115) terms regional agreements ‘have not yet brought great benefits, but neither have they imposed substantial costs’ and there is hardly any
institutionalisation. NE Asia’s economic and monetary co-operation remains a far cry from integration and is still characterised by self-help strategies. China in particular has taken a very cautious, state-centred and gradual approach to financial liberalisation under the impression of the Asian Financial Crisis (Huang and Bailis 2015).

The Asian Financial Crisis according to many observers presents a watershed in regional integration endeavours (Roundtable 2007; Shu 2015). But as with the ‘open regionalism’ and trade-based approaches to regionalism, the problem has been a lack of substance and institutionalisation and recourse to external support (IMF, bilateral currency swaps). None of the mechanisms created have actually been used (Willett 2009:116), hence there is a certain ambiguity and a lack of serious institutionalisation that contrasts with the deeply multilateralist approach of the EU. According to Hill and Menon (2012:1) ‘Financial safety nets in Asia have come a long way since the Asian Financial Crisis (AFC) of 1997/98. Not wanting to rely solely on the International Monetary Fund (IMF) again, the Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI) was created in 2000. When the CMI also proved inadequate following the Global Financial Crisis (GFC), it was first multilateralized (CMIM), and then doubled in size to US$240 billion, while the IMF de-linked portion was increased to 30% of the available country quotas. A surveillance unit, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)+3 Macroeconomic Research Office (AMRO), was set up in 2011. These are impressive developments, but are they enough to make the CMIM workable?’. The answer the authors give to this question is a straightforward ‘no’ – this is also the view of Kalinowski (2010, 2012) and most other observers. Shu (2015:88) emphasises that state-led economic regionalism has been a conscious policy choice of individual East Asian states in response to the domestic transformations of the government-business relationships to embrace globalisation as the main objective.

The Asian Financial Crisis, as it is a watershed, or critical juncture, in Asia more than the Global Financial Crisis deserves a brief analysis from the point of view of national versus multilateralist approaches. Like in the EU case study above, the conclusions to be drawn for global governance will be presented in part IV.

In a nutshell the Asian Financial Crisis was prompted by a huge inflow of (Western) capital into Asian countries that had started liberalising their financial markets under the impulse of the Washington Consensus and the pressures of globalisation after the Cold War. The perception of an East Asian miracle drove investor capital into the new growth region creating asset bubbles and over-investment. The unilateral currency pegs created large amounts of foreign debt contracted with overvalued currencies as well as current account deficits. Lack of prudential supervision and insufficient risk-focused regulatory oversight in combination with the currency pegs created ‘perverse incentives’ (Willett 2009:59). Willett (2009:118) diagnoses a similarity in the root causes of the Asian and the Global Financial Crises: ‘In each case the fundamental problem was one of perverse incentives and tendencies toward herding by financial-market participants that resulted in excessive risk taking and overinvestment in particular areas.’ Interestingly, the Korean case resembles the Greek one in one aspect: Just as Greece’s weak spots and risks were at first underestimated through its inclusion in the EMU which made investors automatically consider Greece as a safe place, Korea’s financial liberalisation in the 1990s was linked to the entry into a
When investor sentiment changed and capital was withdrawn the debt became unsustainable, currencies were devalued, foreign exchange reserves melted down rapidly and many countries including Korea had to turn to the IMF for assistance despite the existence of an ASEAN Swap agreement, ASA, created in the 1970s like in Europe as a consequence of the collapse of the Bretton Woods system of managed exchange rates (Willett 2009). China, concerned about the prosperity of Hong Kong just returned from Britain and about its international credibility, pledged not to devalue and thus became an anchor of stability. This marked a turning point which led to a rapprochement between NE Asian countries and ASEAN (Huang and Bailis 2015:499; Roundtable 2007; Shu 2015). The ASEAN plus three process started in 1999.

The Asian Financial Crisis affected several ASEAN countries and South Korea through dramatic outflows of capital that forced the countries to turn to the IMF for bail-outs. The IMF imposed very painful conditions creating deep-seated resentment, reinforced by the realisation that the IMF imposed ‘bitter medicine’ was based on a misdiagnosis, as the IMF acknowledged later on (Hill and Menon 2012:3; for a more nuanced view Willett 2009:122-124). This resentment prompted the realisation that Asia needed its own regional financial safety nets. There was also bitterness that the US ally had let Korea and other Asian nations down in times of need, while it had assisted Latin American countries in earlier crises. The resentment was still palpable 10 years later, during the Global Financial Crisis, when for instance Koreans, felt that the IMF and EU displayed too much leniency towards Greece and other EU countries and too easily derogated from the strict conditionality imposed on non-Europeans in past crises and prescribed medicine which was decidedly less bitter than the one administered to them during the AFC.

Not least because of the lack of international (multilateral) support, countries pursued self-help strategies, further down the path of (weakening) development states: Kalinowski’s (2008) case study of Korea (the country most affected by the AFC in NE Asia) shows that the post-AFC recovery was achieved by the pre-crisis development model relying on export orientation and strong state intervention, rather than market opening and financial liberalisation. Shu (2015:94) points to fundamental changes to the government-business and labour relationships which allowed Korea to adopt a pro-globalisation position focussing on promoting its competitiveness. Such strategies are costly in terms of foreign currency accumulation providing cheap credit to the US and to a lesser extent Europe, huge sums of money being ‘invested’ with very low returns in US and other foreign government bonds (and at the mercy of currency fluctuations in terms of value) (Campanella 2015). But they are costly also in terms of social security, possible market failures and economic inefficiencies (Kalinowski 2008) (Korea has the lowest labour productivity in the OECD). Shu (2015:104) emphasises that for all NE Asian countries, post AFC domestic reforms and regional cooperation were pursued as an integral part of their pro-globalisation agenda, with China reforming its SOEs and joining the WTO, Japan reforming its economic bureaucracy and Korea its chaebols and promoting FTAs with external partners (ASEAN, EU, US). The reaction to
the global financial crisis was consistent with that export-driven approach with Korea signing free trade agreements with the EU and the US and urging the preservation of the open trading system against protectionist reflexes. The export orientation of the NE Asian countries was challenged by the crisis in their main export markets (EU and US) prompting at least some efforts to promote domestic and regional investment (mainly infrastructure) and consumption as well as a drive to pursue other export markets in the emerging and developing world.

The first proposal for a regional financial safety net came from Japan during the AFC. Japan due to its own economic problems since the early 1990s had not been able to extend much bilateral help (unlike China which entered the regional scene) but proposed in 1998 to create an Asian Monetary Fund as an alternative to the IMF to bolster its regional leadership role (Park 2013:95; Shu 2015:98). But China sided with the US and the IMF arguably to preserve the central role of the IMF for developing countries, but more likely because it was irked by the lack of consultation by Japan, which had sent its AMF proposal only to several ASEAN countries, Korea and Hong Kong (Park 2013:96). This proposal, lacking China’s support, was refused by Washington which had no interest in loosening its hegemony in Asia and its control of the Bretton Woods Institutions (and thus weaken the ‘embedded liberalism’ and institutional order the US had set up after WWII and itself weakened through the Nixon shock).

As a consequence the Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI) was set up in 2000 by ASEAN, extending the ASEAN Swap Arrangement (ASA) to the three NE Asian countries (whose currency reserves were crucial for the initiative’s funding). Instead of an Asia-only project, the CMI was linked to the IMF at China’s insistence (Park 2013:100; Shu:2015:98-9). In 2000, when Japan proposed the CMI (in the hope to internationalise the Yen), China supported the initiative not least echoing the widespread frustration in Asia about the US and IMF in the Asian Financial Crisis (Park 2013:98-9). Rivalry or conflictive competition (Park 2013:87) proved to be dysfunctional for multilateral solutions. Besides this ‘multilateral’ safety net a network of bilateral swaps was set up in 2002 between ASEAN and the ‘plus three’ countries. However, both arrangements are simply a series of national agreements, not based on funds deposited in a central institution or managed jointly that could be drawn upon quickly in an emergency. Besides, and like in Europe before the ESM was created, the pledged funding was inadequate.

The first test for the CMI came in 2008, when the GFC hit Asia with a short-term liquidity crisis (capital outflows). But the CMI failed the test, as the countries in need of liquidity support used bilateral swaps with the US, China, Japan, Australia and multilateral development banks (Hill and Menon 2012:2). As a consequence the CMI was multilateralised in 2009 (CMIM) by repackaging the set of bilateral swaps into one self-managed reserve pooling arrangement and then in 2012, as fear of contagion from the Eurozone crisis mounted, doubling its size to $240 billion (with an increase of the share that could be mobilised without an IMF programme to 30%). In 2011 the AMRO was set up to enhance surveillance. An ASEAN plus three Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors meeting was also created in 2012, bringing together for the first time the monetary and fiscal authorities of member countries (Menon and Hill 2012:6). This was perhaps drawing a lesson from the EMU design problem, but perhaps simply mimicking the G20 meetings of finance ministers and central bank governors. The new forum decided to create preventive and
precautionary credit lines (similar to those created a bit earlier by the IMF through the G20 process; for details on how they work Menon and Hill 2012:6). However, Menon and Hill (2012:7-13) argue that as things stand the CMIM is unlikely to be called upon at all and that it is neither a complement nor an alternative to the IMF, its purported raison d’être.

The CMIM was anyway designed to favour the more vulnerable ASEAN countries (Hill and Menon 2012:4) and is thus less a NE Asian mutual assistance pool than a safety net provided by NE Asian countries to their ASEAN neighbours (in which they all have invested for industrial production). However, drawing on the funds is a cumbersome, time consuming process that involves a series of meetings of non-resident bodies including for most of the funds a tie to an IMF programme (Hill and Menon 2012:4-5 for details and borrowing quotas).

The surveillance mechanism, AMRO, which started working in 2011 in the form of a company under Singaporean law, is part of the multilateralisation drive for the CMI to provide independent monitoring and analysis for due diligence to minimise moral hazard in the borrowing process under the CMIM. Thus the approach of reinforcing both the multilateral safety net and the multilateral surveillance resembles the EU’s approach. However, the independence, mandate and resources of the ASEAN plus three arrangements are far more limited and controlled by the national ‘principals’ and allow only very limited ‘agency’ by the new mechanisms. This is also reflected in the extremely small staff numbers (twelve in AMRO; Hill and Menon 2012:5)

The designed weakness of the regional financial safety net, despite its substantial reforms during the global financial crisis, shows that it is only a token third line of defence, after the use of national reserves, programmes and controls, or bilateral swaps and that it is still largely dependent on IMF support. While the ‘technical’ approach is similar to the EU’s, the Asian financial safety net does not reflect a deeply multilateral or even regional approach. Regarding NE Asia, this is even less the case, as the CMIM and AMRO are focused on potential borrowers, with the ‘plus three’ in the role as potential lenders (for whom the IMF link provides decidedly more assurance against moral hazard than relying on the small AMRO). This is very different from the EMU, in which the European Commission and European Central Bank play the major roles in surveillance and supervision for the creditor countries (but even here, for the large bail-out programmes launched at the beginning of the sovereign debt crisis the IMF is a leading part of the process).

The three NE Asian countries, while propping up the CMIM, agreed bilateral currency swaps and bond buying programmes among themselves, but because of political tensions (see part I), ROK for instance didn’t prolong its swap arrangements with Japan.

In sum, the NE Asia model provides a case study in how nationalist, development state approaches to solving the banking and debt crises produced successful, but costly self help solutions with occasional cooperation and only a weakly institutionalised regional or multilateral framework almost designed not to be used (CMIM, AMRO). This case study shows that:

1) NE Asia had put in place self-help mechanisms that were dealing with 'risk society' i.e. unpredictable future risk based on lessons learnt from the 1997/8 Asian financial crisis. National
self-help and ‘light’ multilateral processes show path dependency. Rational interest and interdependence approaches didn’t produce liberal institutional structures.

2) Some additional regional co-operative measures were taken together with other Asian countries (ASEAN) such as enhancing the Chiang Mai Initiative through multilateralisation, AMRO and bilateral currency swaps, but these remained marginal or unused, producing only a token regional project.

3) The main risk insurance mechanisms in NE Asia are almost exclusively national (massive forex reserves, forex and capital controls) not least because they experienced a lack of international solidarity and multilateral support underlining a lack of mutual trust and scepticism about multilateralism as well as a ‘dual identity’ as rivals and responsible leaders (Park 2013:93-4).

4) NE Asia used the G20 and other global governance mechanisms to improve international coordination and to enhance their global national status and international influence, but hardly to change global governance substantially, although a proposal by South Korea to set up global financial safety nets based on the insufficient regional experience was launched in 2010 when Korea chaired the G20 summit. NE Asian countries have sometimes similar, but no common position in the process and are mainly competing with each other. Even agenda setting shows that G20 matters little for NE Asian countries’ interests (Kalinowski 2010). This will be addressed in part IV as a part of global governance.

In short, the very limited cooperation on financial safety nets (CMIM, AMRO etc.) is a weak indicator for nascent regionalism in (NE) Asia or for any substantial change of international society institutions towards multilateralism. This is obvious not only by comparison with the EU, but also on its own merit (or the lack thereof). NE Asian countries focus on national solutions and global cooperation. Regional cooperation is not a priority.

3.2. Climate change

The problem of climate change, a global (public and private) bad, or ‘fouling or own nest’ in the parlance of Hardin’s tragedy of the commons, is a major and complex global governance challenge that exposes the tensions between the need for cooperation and solidarity and the politics of national self-interest. Unsurprisingly, the EU and NE Asia have very different responses to the challenge.

Climate change has been on the EU’s agenda since the late 1980s first as part of its environmental policy, but increasingly in its own right. It has arguably become a cornerstone of EU policy (Tol 2012:288) and a flagship for EU efforts to lead globally on a major governance challenge (Oberthür 2011). Just before the Rio Earth Summit in 1992 (which launched the UNFCCC) the EU already agreed a package of measures to stabilise its GHG emissions and after the summit climate change became one of the priorities of the EU’s environmental action programme. Ahead of the UNFCCC COP 1 in 1995 the Council of Environment Ministers agreed to seek significant emissions reductions and for the first time set a target that ‘global average temperatures should not
exceed 2 degrees above pre-industrial levels’ – this has meanwhile become a broadly accepted global goal (Morgera e.a. 2011:834-5). In 2003, as part of the implementation of the Kyoto Protocol which it ratified in 2002, the EU launched the Emissions Trading System (ETS) to cap GHG emissions from mainly industrial production and power generation (covering about 11000 large installations across the EU). The Lisbon Treaty (Art 191(1)-(3) TFEU includes an obligation to promote international measures to combat climate change and among others bases environmental and climate action on the precautionary principle, preventive action, available scientific and technical data, cost benefit analysis and stipulates the polluter pays principle. Climate change has been an issue of progressive European integration: The 2009 climate and energy package320 ‘shifts the emphasis from the Member States to the European level in areas such as renewable energy, energy efficiency and energy-intensive industries included in the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS).’ (Morgera e.a. 2011:829). In these areas specific targets have been agreed and compliance mechanisms have been created at EU level.

In NE Asia by contrast, there are no regionally agreed policies in place and each of the countries has a very distinct climate change agenda driven overwhelmingly by national concerns and national competitiveness (e.g. air pollution and new industrial policy in China, green stimulus and innovation in Korea and Japan). Japan, as an early industrialiser, was a key promoter of the Kyoto Protocol, but has since become a laggard. The two regions I am focussing on respond differently to climate change, Europe with a proposal for an international legally binding framework (global institutional multilateralism which will be covered in more detail in part IV) and its own collective integrated and polycentric climate and energy policy with the Emissions Trading System at its heart (regional integration and multilateral burden-sharing in a teamwork role relationship). Countries in NE Asia (and many others) prefer national actions with as little international/supranational accountability as possible. In Japan, in the absence of a national policy, there is a sub-national ETS in Tokyo and China also experimented first with sub-national ETS before launching a nation-wide system (in line with its previous policy of economic reform pilot projects). Regional co-operation in NE Asia focusses on very limited aspects of climate change, such as dust storms or technical cooperation in environment and energy matters and is to some extent characterised by blame games. There are regional forums and programmes such as UNESCAP, UNEP or Asian Development Bank initiatives and the Asia Pacific Partnership for Clean Development and Climate321, mostly focusing on information exchange or technology transfer. Nations in NE Asia characteristically mainly go for themselves eyeing their neighbours suspiciously, while the EU, despite a lot of difficulties on the way, has been able to forge a strategy on climate change that reflects a teamwork approach of multilateralism with legally enshrined measures and burden sharing. Similar to the economic crisis, the shortcomings of intergovernmental approaches at the beginning of the EU ETS has evolved into more centralised EU-level governance and integration of GHG reduction efforts. That strategy may be far from perfect (Tol 2012; Helm 2014), but that is not my focus here. We thus find a similar contrasting pattern for the long-term governance challenge of climate change between the EU and NE Asia as in the short-term case of the financial crisis (ch 4.1 above).

321 http://www.asiapacificpartnership.org/english/about.aspx accessed on 8 July 2015
3.2.1. The EU’s multilateralist approach – escaping the merciless logic of the tragedy of the commons?

Besides its own EU domestic contribution to GHG emissions reductions which – with an estimated 10% of the global total322 – are today almost marginal on a global scale (Tol 2012:289, 291), the EU’s objective has consistently been and remains to achieve a legally binding international agreement that contains ambitious mitigation commitments from a critical number of (major) emitters that are binding at the international level323, strong rules for holding all parties of the agreement accountable for their commitments and provisions for regular review of emissions reduction targets in accordance with the requirements of climate science led by the International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC set up in 1988). The EU has been successful in establishing the UNFCCC objective of keeping the temperature rise below 2°C above pre-industrial levels firmly on the political agenda (Morgera e.a. 2011:835). Many countries, however, prefer commitments that are not binding at the international level, but only at the domestic level. This shows a difference in approach to sovereignty between the multilateralist EU position and the nationalist preferences in NE Asia and elsewhere that do not easily accommodate supranational legal commitments. Both approaches are reflected in the Paris Agreement as we will see later. The cancellation of US domestic action to fulfil its national commitments and its announced intention to withdraw from the Paris Agreement, show how precarious domestic commitments are without internationally binding agreements. The EU’s own locked-in climate and energy policy as an example of a multilateralist, polycentric governance approach is the focus of this section, while the global governance challenges of climate change are discussed in part IV.

3.2.2. EU Climate policy 1986-2015

The multilateralist and precautionary EU position in the international negotiations is closely linked to its own domestic action (Oberthür 2011). Its domestic action in turn had to deal with very diverse emission profiles, economic development and political priorities in the EU’s member states. The legal basis for environment policy provides for shared competence and the ‘Europeanisation’ of climate policy has been slow and went through different phases, mirroring other processes of European integration. As in other fields, but probably more so, the domestic action could not be taken in isolation from international developments. In fact, the Europeanisation of climate policy has been driven to a large extent by the global agenda and the global negotiation processes in which the EU collectively played a major role. EU climate policy reflects the basic conundrum of international climate change responses about emissions reductions (mitigation) that are necessary according to a global scientific consensus to prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system and adaptation to consequences of global

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323 Currently in terms of ‘importance’ as an emitter the EU is no longer at the forefront, even if the EU were to reduce its emissions to zero, global warming would continue unabated as long as major ‘new’ emitters like China, India and other fast growing countries do not substantially reduce their carbon footprint and as long as the USA refuses to do the same.
warming. This boils down to burden sharing of national measures which have to reach a critical mass and to whether and how to let the international community monitor compliance with pledged reduction measures and who pays. With its climate change and energy packages the EU deliberately wants to set a global example (Oberthür 2011; Van Schwaik and Schunz 2011).

The negotiations leading to the signature and then the ratification of the Kyoto protocol (KP, 1997, in force since 2005) were crucial for the EU both in its domestic action and for its international role in promoting a legal framework with binding emissions reductions. The EU in that phase was at odds with the USA which opposed the ‘free ride’ for developing countries in the Kyoto protocol (no emissions reductions obligations for the so-called non-annex 1 countries, i.e. developing countries) and in 2001 refused to sign, let alone ratify the Kyoto Protocol. The EU meanwhile succeeded in winning over enough industrialised countries – and crucially Russia, with a link to facilitating the latter’s WTO accession – to ratify and implement the Kyoto Protocol’s first commitment phase (which expired in 2012). However, the EU found itself marginalised in the subsequent process of negotiating a second commitment period and a successor agreement to the KP. This was visible in the Copenhagen UNFCCC COP 15 summit in 2009. However, after that failure the EU continued to push for its key objective and adapted its negotiation strategy to the new geopolitical and geoeconomic realities (Oberthür 2011; Van Schwaik and Schunz 2011; Heidener 2011). The EU is now pushing for a differentiated approach that no longer rigidly distinguishes between industrialised and developing countries, but focuses on a more pragmatic and dynamic way to implement differentiated responsibilities. That shift allowed for a successful negotiation of the Paris Agreement.

The EU is the only industrialised block to have taken on serious internationally binding reduction obligations (Van Schai and Schunz 2011). In 2009 the EU decided a reduction by 20% of 1990 levels of emissions by 2020 and indicated its intention to continue down that path in view of 2050. In 2014 the EU endorsed a binding EU target of at least 40% reduction by 2030 compared to 1990. New legislation was enacted including the third phase of the Emissions Trading System (ETS). The EU’s reduction commitments (see below) are closely linked to the UNFCCC process as they are signals to the global community that the EU is committed and willing to play a leading role. While the EU had originally opposed emissions trading in the negotiations for the KP, it adopted an Emissions Trading Directive after a long consultation process in October 2003. A key reason for adopting emissions trading was that this could be adopted within the EU’s syndicated sovereignty approach of the community method. The original preference for a carbon tax would have required unanimity as tax matters are excluded from EU competence. The ETS started on 1 January 2005 initially conceived as a pilot phase and covering only CO\textsuperscript{2} to keep monitoring simple. Combustion plants and industrial installations such as mineral oil refineries, pulp and paper of a certain size had to have permits and account for their emissions with

327 Emissions trading was advocated by the US and others (the Umbrella Group) as an alternative to specific emission reduction targets for developed countries. This position is reflected in the carbon trading elements in the KP such as CDM and JI (Articles 6, 12 and 17 of the KP).
verification by independent monitors under the competent authorities (usually environment agencies or ministries) of the member states. The first trading period of the ETS (2005-07) focused on establishing the (mechanical) institutions and procedures (‘learning by doing’) and with a limited scope (CO² only and a limited number of industry sectors and energy). The pilot phase also facilitated buy-in from sceptical industry some of which had even ‘played’ cap-and-trade to convince boardrooms that ‘green’ was no longer just a matter for engineers. It was characterised by teething problems (such as over-allocation of allowances absent reliable data on historic emissions) that would progressively be addressed in subsequent phases. However, the initial over-allocation by member states together with the effects of the later financial crisis are still plaguing the EU ETS, especially the low price for permits. The second period from 2008-12 corresponded to the first commitment period of the KP and was meant to ensure member states’ compliance with the Kyoto targets. Member States submitted national allocation plans for the European Commission to examine and approve (some were rejected). The first and second phases thus had the cap set for each member state and mainly for CO². The third trading period runs from 2013-2020 (in line with the 2020 targets of the 2009 climate and energy package), widened the scope of gases and of covered sectors and introduced a centralised EU cap with a linear reduction factor. This third period also signaled the EU’s willingness to take on further commitments under the KP or a new international agreement (the Paris Agreement).

In October 2014 the European Council endorsed the 2030 climate and energy framework with at least 40% EU domestic GHG emission reductions compared to 1990. Implementing the European Council decision implies a reform of the ETS (to achieve 43% reductions of emissions compared to 2005) and setting targets for member states for the sectors not covered by the ETS (to achieve 30% reductions) and the incorporation of land use, land use change and forestry (LULUCF) in the 2030 EU legal framework. The package decision also calls for a minimum 27% EU level binding renewable energy target and an indicative target of 27% energy efficiency. EU level targets will, as in the past, be disaggregated by member states. Critics – including the IPCC - however, argue that in reality the EU’s reduction commitments do not represent a very ambitious target. Emissions reductions seem fairly easy, albeit costly, to achieve, not least because industrial emissions have largely been outsourced to Asia (which is why Helm 2014 argues carbon consumption not emission should be used for reduction targets). Moreover, economic activity has contracted or slowed across the EU in the wake of the financial crisis and with it have emissions (Morgera e.a. 2011:838; Helm 2014). Tol (2012) and Helm (2014) consider EU climate policy as costly and ineffective. The carbon price in the ETS has remained low largely a result of overallocation by member states in the early phases and the long economic crisis. The ensuing price collapse has been the focus of criticism, but also of reform measures at EU level. Some – including French President Macron – are calling for the introduction of a price floor (such as the UK has done) and while at EU level that has not been agreed, Member States are free to introduce such measures.

330 For instance Climate Action Network (a coalition of 130 organisations across Europe): “A weak reduction target, the massive use of international offsets, and inflexible policy design have led – together with the economic recession – to an enormous oversupply of pollution permits. The price for these permits (called emission allowances) has therefore dropped so much that it no longer drives change to a low carbon economy.” http://www.caneurope.org/docman/emissions-trading-scheme/2832-can-europe-ets-reform-position-april-2016/file accessed on 13-3-2018
The European Commission maintains that the reduction factor is more important than the price and that the EU successfully cut emissions by 29% between 1990 and 2016 while the EU GDP grew by 53% thus meeting the EU’s objectives of cutting GHG emissions while maintaining economic prosperity.\textsuperscript{331} The International Carbon Action Partnership considers European ETS as a learning system and its 2017/18 reforms an important milestone raising the prospect of carbon prices that "bite" (ICAP 2018:2).

Reforms have been undertaken to reduce the surplus of allowances, while the price floor is not part of the 2018 climate and energy package. The main elements of the 2017/8 reforms designed to bring the EU's instruments in line with its 2030 climate targets were striking a balance between strengthening the price signal, protecting industry from carbon leakage and securing solidarity mechanisms for the poorer member states (ICAP 2018:12). Regarding the price signal a market stability reserve was created in 2015 (Henningsen 2015) stipulating that from 2019 onwards allowances will be transferred to it thus gradually removing the accumulated surplus. The MSR has then be made more stringent doubling the intake rate and further down the road cancelling large quantities of allowances altogether. This – and the strengthening of the cap, the linear annual reduction factor of 2.2% for phase 4 as well as measures to reduce free allowances - is expected to lead to price increases after 2023 (ICAP 2018:12-13: 35-37). The reform package also foresees elements meant to assist fossil-fuel dependent countries through a Modernisation Fund as well as Innovation Fund to finance transitory measures and research and innovation to modernise energy systems.

Besides the ETS reform the EU is now setting binding reduction targets for the sectors outside the ETS and has integrated LULUCF.\textsuperscript{332} The European Commission has also proposed legislation on renewable energy targets, maintaining as the European Council requested the 27% target of 2014, despite findings that a higher target was realistic and affordable. Given the steep decline in prices for renewable energy technology pressure has mounted to increase the agreed renewables targets beyond 27% (the European Parliament voted for an increase to 35%\textsuperscript{333}).

The emissions reduction targets in the third period (and beyond) are now fixed in the long run through a linear reduction factor of 1.74% each year (2.2% a year in phase 4 2021-2030). This provides certainty of the desired reduction and was meant also to provide long-term certainty for investors to reduce abatement costs. The latter price signal has been devalued by the collapse of the carbon price, but operators know that they must pursue reductions along the legally fixed trajectory. The ETS was also extended in scope to cover new sectors such as chemical and aviation industries. The tendency over the three phases has been an evolution from coordination between member states to harmonisation and centralisation of cap setting, registry, monitoring and

\textsuperscript{331} \url{https://ec.europa.eu/clima/sites/clima/files/strategies/progress/docs/swd_2017_xxx_en.pdf} accessed on 13-3-2018
\textsuperscript{332} The integration and design of the LULUCF has long been contested and refused by the European Commission in previous climate and energy packages. Its inclusion now is seen with scepticism cf. \url{http://climateactiontracker.org/countries/eu.html} accessed on 13-3-2018. See also: \url{https://www.euractiv.com/section/climate-environment/news/zero-emissions-from-the-forest-sector-by-2030-council-and-parliament-reach-lulucf-agreement/} accessed on 13-3-2018.
verification and certification of verifiers. Mistakes such as overallocation, windfall profits and system security have been reviewed and largely corrected while the emission reduction targets have been reached. One could see this as learning by doing or functional spillover.

Through the linking directive the EU allows its operators/installations to also use the international mitigation mechanisms of the KP which provide cost-effective reductions in developing or transition countries (CDM and JI), but the EU accepts them in the ETS only after checking the environmental integrity of the credits (Morgera e.a. 2011:844). After linking was agreed with Switzerland in 2017, an important candidate for future linking is California334. In a future situation where EU industry competitors in sectors subject to carbon leakage are also subject to a linked ETS that would lay to rest the issue of possible border taxes for carbon.

The third allocation period (2013-2020) shifted gradually from free allowances based on verified historical emissions (so-called grand-fathering) to a system of auctioning allowances. Benchmarking for free allowances for emissions was introduced to foster best technological and management practice in installations notably in sectors affected by carbon leakage. The allowance registry has been centralised after national registries were hacked. The reforms of the ETS agreed in 2009 for the third and subsequent periods overall reflect a shift from national to syndicated (supranational) management (Morgera e.a. 2011:844-6). Auctioning is also supposed to raise funds dedicated to climate change adaptation, research and international aid for mitigation and adaptation in developing countries. These provisions are not legally binding on member states which are free to use the fiscal revenue from auctions for other purposes, but it does set a 'moral' target.

Moreover, precisely because of the internal negotiation challenge, the normative multilateralist EU international stance is remarkable335. Despite itself being responsible only for around 10% of global GHG emissions (down from 17% in 1990336, plus historic responsibility) locked in emissions patterns that are costly to change (existing energy infrastructure, buildings and traffic etc.) and itself being probably less vulnerable to consequences of climate change than many other countries in the world (IPCC 2014, the EU has taken a leadership role internationally to reduce GHG emissions. The EU promotes international co-operation through soft or hard law and market mechanisms where necessary to facilitate buy-in and trade-offs and considers its own multilateral model of teamwork cooperation as adaptable to the global context. For the EU using international law and cooperation based on the scientific evidence and the precautionary principle is ‘normal’. This normative preference over interest-driven competition is remarkable: Vogler (2009:470) - because of the challenge to agree internal burden sharing - considers the negotiation of climate policy ‘a particularly stern test for a theory EU foreign policy-making [sic] that claims to demonstrate that institutional factors and normative entrapment can over-ride or

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335 http://climateactiontracker.org/countries/eu.html accessed on 13-3-2018: “The European Union has established a well-deserved reputation as a global leader on climate policy. However, in the wake of the Paris Agreement’s entry into force, the EU’s climate policy has not yet effectively responded to the 1.5°C limit in the Paris Agreement, which goes beyond the former 2°C goal agreed in Copenhagen.”
modify hard bargaining based upon national economic interests.’ Van Schwaik and Schunz (2011:182) conclude: ‘Despite internal divergences that oftentimes impair its strategic capacity, the EU’s negotiating stance throughout the past 15 years has been predominately influenced by its normative convictions about climate change.’

However, the EU’s teamwork approach and multilateralist stance in the global negotiations also encountered major problems. Heidener (2011) shows how the internal cohesion (in the run up to the Kyoto Protocol and thereafter its operationalisation or the lack of internal cohesion (at Copenhagen) have reduced the EU’s effectiveness and actorness on the global stage. More importantly the international context changed considerably (Oberthür 2011:676-9). Morgera e.a. (2011:838) still consider leading by example the best and most viable option for the EU though (cf. part IV). Schwerhoff (2016) qualifies such leadership and underlines the need for credible, costly signals (which given the low ETS carbon price and low actual emissions of the EU are found wanting). After the Paris Agreement and the US government’s reversal of its domestic GHG reduction measures, the EU has declared its willingness to lead worldwide climate change actions again, but its level of ambition is still in doubt337. It has notably joined hands with China which launched its own ETS (so far only covering power plants) not least based on lessons learnt from the EU.

The case of climate change shows two interlinked dynamics quite clearly through the analysis of the EU internal dynamics characterised by national bargaining mediated by the supranational institutions and mechanisms and the EU’s external dynamics where the normative multilateralist principle clearly dominated the EU’s ‘leading by example’ strategy (Van Schwaik and Schunz 2011:169). Nevertheless, the EU turned out to be a ‘leader without followers’ at the international level (Blühdorn 2012; Van Schwaik and Schunz 2011; Heidener 2011; Schwerhoff 2016). Therefore, the EU changed strategy in the run-up to COP21 pursuing an active climate diplomacy to (successfully) forge coalitions in particular the High Ambition Coalition in 2015 with the group of 79 African, Caribbean and Pacific states (which are linked to the EU through the Cotonou Agreement). That coalition announced during the COP21 that they had agreed core elements of a deal and were subsequently joined by the US and a number of other countries, in particular Brazil which broke ranks with the group of reluctant, hardline developing countries including India, China and South Africa. Climate change governance as pursued by the EU domestically and externally is an illustration of the multilateralist principle and normative ambition in International Society 2.0 and we will see below how it differs from the nationalist principle in NE Asia.

The EU has forecast international climate finance needs at 100bn EUR per year by 2020 and its share is supposed to be between 10 and 30 percent of that amount (Morgera e.a. 2011:848). These figures are in line with UN estimates (Purdon 2014:302). In 2013 the EU and its member states contributed 9.5 billion EUR for climate finance in developing countries while also injecting 4.6

337 http://climateactiontracker.org/countries/eu.html: “A significant acceleration of climate action is therefore essential to meet the EU’s long-term 2050 emissions reduction goal of 80–95% below 1990 by 2050. The EU also needs to increase its long-term goal to reflect the Paris Agreement’s temperature increase goal – with 95% reductions by 2050 being consistent with the Paris Agreement. Slowing down now will require much faster—and therefore more costly—action than would otherwise be necessary in the post 2030 period. Failure to increase the effectiveness of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) and the slowdown in the development of renewable sources of energy may threaten the achievement of even the unambitious 2030 target.”
billion USD into the Green Climate Fund, in 2016 the Commission reported disbursements of 20.2 bn EUR. Different from mitigation where emissions are in focus that are ‘without passport’, adaptation is context specific and depends on local conditions in different countries. These are not very well reflected in the international negotiations which tend to focus on questions of principle including the moralisation gaps and figures for finance at a global scale and worries about additionality (climate finance should be additional to other development aid from the point of view of developing countries while for the EU ODA and climate finance should go hand in hand; Purdon 2014:320-5). According to the Paris Agreement (Article 9) ‘developed country Parties should continue to take the lead in mobilizing climate finance from a variety of sources, instruments and channels, noting the significant role of public funds ... and taking into account the needs and priorities of developing country Parties.’ Countries are expected to provide climate objectives in development plans. Given the pressures on public finances in the EU due to the economic crisis the EU and its member states have to fight on two fronts: ensuring credibility with developing countries and mobilising resources in innovative financial ways, including from the private sector. The EU also establishes a link between its financing efforts and the scale of national commitments to lower emissions and strategies of climate resilient development.

The EU's internal collective, multilateralist energy and climate change package adopted in 2009 (and its 'updates' in 2014 and 2018) by the European Council illustrates the multilateralist teamwork approach of the EU. Of course, it had been negotiated through competitive inter-state bargaining over burden-sharing (Vogler 2009). However, these negotiations took place under conditions of syndicated sovereignty and hierarchy (roles of supranational institutions such as Commission, EP and the collective adoption through majority voting in Council $A + B + \ldots + Z$) (cf. chapter II.3.3.1). Use of market mechanisms has helped the internal burden sharing effort together with disaggregating the sectoral issues and emission reductions objectives and the creation of modalities for exceptions, transitions and buy-offs. The use of market mechanisms was pursued after the initially preferred (and economically probably more effective) carbon tax approach had to be abandoned given the required unanimity in taxation matters that nation states (such as the UK which has its own carbon tax) upheld as a matter of principle (Mathys and de Melo 2011:4-6; Holzinger e.a. 2009:60). Helm (2014) still advocates for a carbon tax to correct the ineffectiveness of the ETS, but this U-turn is politically not feasible. Moreover, the cap of the emissions is less concerned with the price signals, but with the certainty of the reduction of emissions (the hard law element). Other measures need to complement emissions trading, which is why the ETS is not a stand-alone measure, but embedded in a package of other climate and energy measures implemented in different ways at different levels involving a multitude of actors. This multi-pronged approach could be likened to polycentric governance at an international level. The concept has been developed and empirically studied in sub-national public policy settings, hence there is no consolidated model of international polycentric governance and there are many challenges to simply transposing it to the international level including the fundamental assumption that ‘polycentricity is the ability of groups to solve their own problems based on options that are institutionally enabled in a self-governance regime’ and that the proponents of the concept rely on

clear boundaries and geographic proximity and democratic interaction (Aralal and Hartley 2013) and a number of design principles that have been elaborated on the local governance level (Ostrom 2010:653 for a list). The research is agenda-focused, rather than analysing existing institutions and what they do. A research agenda on polycentric governance, which has been heavily focused on US examples and comparisons with specific sub-national governance of resources in other parts of the world, could look at the EU’s climate policy as a particular international polycentric order in that particular area of public goods (or bads). The EU’s ETS created a market where a number of actors (the European Commission, the Council, national environment agencies, businesses, monitors, carbon certificate exchanges etc.) have to work together as autonomous actors with clear user/non-user boundaries, resource boundaries, conditions adapted to the local situation, accountability and monitoring, sanctions and conflict resolution mechanisms (which are several of the design principles for polycentric governance listed by Ostrom 2010:653). The effort sharing decision by its name and very nature is polycentric and the role for instance of cities in contributing to achieve the EU’s nationally disaggregated targets in many sectors has become very important (while cities have no direct voice at the decision making table, but deploy considerable lobbying efforts). Many European cities are also members of worldwide networks pledging city-level emissions reductions and sharing experiences (Cities take up climate baton at COP 23). Somewhat at variance with the polycentric governance concept is the tendency of centralisation in EU rule-making and coordination such as the reduction factor and other ETS rules. The effort sharing decision in this respect is more in line with the polycentric model which postulates a higher degree of autonomy of the plurality of stakeholders. The stakeholders bound by the effort-sharing decision are relatively free in how to achieve agreed aims. This approach is in line with the subsidiarity principle adopted by the EU in general terms starting with the environment in the Single European Act of 1987 and enlarged in scope in subsequent treaties (Huberdeau 2017:110). Indeed, a lot of the EU’s legislation in many policy areas (in form of Directives) sets clear aims, but leaves the implementation modalities to member states or subsidiary entities. Hence, building on these insights, research in EU public policy under the concept of polycentricity looks promising.

It is beyond the scope of this thesis to pursue a detailed debate on the various and extremely complex technical aspects of the different international or EU instruments and their cost, impact and results and the criticism of EU climate policy by many NGOs or academics. My main focus is to look at the fundamental elements of a multilateralist approach in ensuring participation, compliance and cost-effectiveness (such as identified by Barrett and Stavins 2003). The EU ‘domestically’ has in fact created a regime which has achieved a measure of ambition in the trade-off between participation, compliance and cost-effectiveness through its climate and energy packages (Vogler 2009; Morgera e.a. 2011). To some extent the EU is a microcosm of the global situation: within the EU there are early industrialisers, big emitters and ‘developing’ countries with recent or low emissions. In fact, the diversity of EU member states in terms of energy mix, development and emissions is stark. These differences could only be addressed through protracted negotiations on burden sharing and effort sharing resulting in ‘climate and energy packages’ (in 2009 and in 2014 or even the so-called ‘EU bubble’ of 1997) which in turn allowed ambitious

341 For a succinct critique see: http://climateactiontracker.org/countries/eu.html accessed on 13-3-2018
emissions reduction commitments in the international arena. Vogler (2009) provides a detailed account of these negotiations which it is not necessary to reproduce here. The key point is that the packages allowed disaggregating reduction burdens and economic challenges and opportunities for further development (some poor EU countries are for instance allowed to increase emissions, while more developed ones commit to larger reductions, there are side-payments and transition phases and other creative solutions) that allow transforming zero-sum negotiations into distributive bargaining (Vogler 2009:476-8).

The 2004 and 2007 enlargements of the EU have not dented its commitment to climate change mitigation despite challenges from “coal-addicted” Poland\(^ {342}\) and despite a somewhat lower ambition in emissions reduction, nor has the economic crisis which according to some analysts has even reinforced the EU’s desire to maintain a competitive level-playing field (Oberthür 2011:676). If the UK leaves the EU and with it the ETS and the other relevant EU legislation, the EU would lose one of the leading advocates of climate change policy which has more ambitious legally binding targets under its Climate Change Act than the EU’s (Hepburn and Teytelboym 2017). The ETS would also have to provide for the UK allowances and possibly negotiate a linking agreement.

In sum, the EU could be seen as a 'laboratory for global governance' and poly-centric governance at transnational level (in particular if the supranational EU-ETS were to link with the sub-national Californian ETS). However, what distinguishes the EU in its internal climate policy and legal regime is the institutionalised participation, accountability and compliance structure flowing from the EU treaty and the syndicated hierarchy of supranational institutions and majority decision-making procedures. These have ensured also an agreed – and thus fair - burden and effort sharing mechanism which is mostly legally binding as well (in such a way mechanical institutions of international society were created). We have seen that even within this syndicated framework there had to be a gradual integration after the initial more intergovernmental approach proved not very efficient. Member states keep strong control with European Council decisions always preceding the Commission's legislative proposals. In its external policy the EU distinguishes itself by a normative commitment to promote multilateralism and international law, as well as the scientific evidence based policy-making as key planks to address climate change as a global public concern (Van Schaik and Schunz 2011).

Contrary to its own tradition of command and control environmental legislation (Holzinger e.a. 2009), the EU has adopted a market-based system at its core – the emissions trading system and the polycentric effort-sharing decision (but of course they contain hard law cores). As Mathys and de Melo (2011) argue, this allows industry reducing cost of compliance (or even rent seeking) by passing costs on to consumers. This flexibility has facilitated consensus among rather diverse member states and industry-driven interests. The collapse of the prices for allowances (over-allocation, impact of financial crisis, collapse of oil prices) has added further problems to the effectiveness of the ETS to incentivise industry to invest in alternative production technology or energy saving (Henningsen 2015; Helm 2014). EU climate policy thus has a mixed record

which reflects the inevitable compromises of multilateral policy making.

This internal process allowed the EU to agree binding targets for emission reductions and ‘fair’ ways to achieve them among diverse member countries combining solidarity and different responsibilities with compliance monitoring. Interestingly a cost-benefit analysis seems to have been a secondary concern (Tol 2012) although the emissions fell while the economy continued to grow (decoupling). In fact the EU put into practice the principle of ‘common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities’ that is enshrined in the UNFCCC’s article 3.1 (Morgera e.a. 2011:842). Vogler (2009) and Van Schaik and Schunz (2011) highlight that the normative commitment to a global multilateralist solution had facilitated the internal EU ambitions and effort sharing packages despite very divergent national interests among the EU member states themselves (Vogler 2009 calls this a normative entrapment). This is in fact an important finding that illustrates that a teamwork role relationship in global governance does not mean that supranational levels of governance can simply override national sovereignty and national interests, but also that the syndicated hierarchy and normative entrapment override a focus on just relative national gains that Purdon (2014) defends. The EU case illustrates that teams achieve common positions through hard bargaining and compromise as well as creative pragmatism. What unites them in the endeavour is the need to reach an agreed superior objective. These objectives detailed above have been described as a mix of European identity as a global leader on an issue very popular with European electorates, innovation and competitiveness as well as advancing global multilateralism and international law (Oberthür 2011:675-6). The framework of syndicated hierarchy with its supranational institutions and constitutionalised decision-making procedures play a very important role to set the agenda, steer the negotiations (also adding another level between the national and the international level) and to ensure compliance. This tends to move from soft compliance tools to harder ones and towards centralisation as the evolution of the different phases of the ETS for instance show (free allocation/grandfathering, national allocation plans, tighter caps, auctioning, non-transfer between phases etc.). This is similar to the case of the economic policy coordination which was rather loose in the beginning (Stability and Growth Pact) and became much stricter and more supranational in the wake of the economic and financial crisis as we have seen in the previous chapter.

3.2.3. NE Asia and climate change: ‘me first’?

The picture in NE Asia looks very different from Europe’s. Countries - in line with their nationalist and development state orientations – focus on national competitiveness and do not cooperate significantly on climate change. So, first I review each country and then assess cooperation between them.

In NE Asia Japan was the only annex 1 (industrialised) country of the Kyoto Protocol with binding reduction commitments. Korea and China are both non-annex 1 countries. Since the Kyoto Protocol was signed the economic and emissions profiles of the three countries have

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343 Within the market-based mechanisms of governance that is. Hard law had been the preferred tool in EU environment governance before the market approach to climate change was adopted given the resistance to tax matters to be dealt with at European level (Holzinger e.a. 2009).
evolved considerably and Japan has abandoned its earlier leading role in the region as it feared for its industrial competitiveness. Consequently, Japan (like Canada and Russia) did not sign up for a new commitment period under the KP (Bäckstrand and Elgström 2013:1381). It, however, has a similar position in international negotiations as the EU in terms of seeking an agreement binding on all parties and overcoming the division between annex-1 and non-annex-1 countries from the Kyoto Protocol. That division puts Japan at a competitive disadvantage with its neighbours Korea and China. But its mitigation ambition does not match the EU’s and it stands accused of backsliding behind earlier commitments344. Japan has no national emissions trading system either. The Fukushima nuclear accident in 2011 led to Japan shutting down all its 48 nuclear reactors for several years and to a loss of public confidence in nuclear energy in Japan (and in Korea), making it more difficult to reduce emissions from power generation. To the contrary Japan has increased its reliance on coal and fossil fuels leading – together with better economic growth – to higher CO² emissions. This post-Fukushima energy fiasco as well as uncertainty over international and European carbon markets has also contributed to Japan abandoning its trial implementation of a voluntary emissions trading scheme that began in 2008 (Mochizuki 2011; Roppongi e.a. 2016). The weakness of climate legislation in Japan (Energy Conservation Law and Global Warming Law) prompted the Tokyo Metropolitan Government to introduce, after years of consultation and preparation such as through mandatory emissions reporting since 2002, a mandatory sub-national cap-and-trade programme for CO2 emissions in 2010 (Roppongi e.a. 2016). This ETS required large offices and factories to reduce CO2 emissions by 6-8% in the first period (2010-14) and 15-17% in the second period (2015-19) depending on the type of facility. Compared to base year emissions (based on average emissions between 2002-7) CO2 emissions by the covered entities fell by 25%, mainly through energy saving projects. 90% of facilities managed reductions in-house, only 10% through trading. This shows the importance of the cap relative to the trading (like in the EU ETS). The Tokyo ETS was linked in 2011 with a very similar ETS in neighbouring Saitama, so that credits from Saitama can be used for compliance under the Tokyo ETS. Tokyo also has a Carbon Reduction Reporting Program for SMEs in 2010 (Roppongi e.a. 2016). This sub-national scheme on the one hand shows that national climate change policy is not the ‘only game in town’. Big cities control a lot of the emissions and thus can implement effective climate policies in the area of their jurisdiction, but at the price of coordination problems with other parts of the country (carbon leakage). On the other hand sub-national entities have limited voice in international negotiations, but do participate in networks such as carbonnCities Climate Registry or ICLEI and associations of mayors or cities against climate change345 or pursue their own climate change adaptation solutions (Leonardsen 2017). Tokyo has been active in sharing its practice with neighbouring countries such as China, ROK and Malaysia.

Tokyo municipality (which on its own has a very large economy of 1.2 trillion USD and a large GHG footprint of 65 million tonnes most of which is CO²) introduced its own CO² emission reductions policy (30% by 2030 compared to 2000) which includes the above mentioned world’s

345 Bonn Center for Local Climate Action and Reporting (carbonn) and the carbonn Cites Climate Registry (cCCR) combine to create an online platform where cities self-report greenhouse gas emissions reduction and climate adaptation targets, accomplishments and actions. As of May 2012, cCCR had 164 Reporting Cities from 21 countries reporting GHG emissions of 1195 million tCO2e and 680 Actions, http://www.iclei.org/details/article/carbonn-and-cccr.html accessed on 21.4.2016
first urban ETS\textsuperscript{346}. Its distinctiveness is that it includes sectors which in the European approach are covered by the effort sharing decision not the ETS, for instance emissions from buildings, transportation and households. This is due not least to the importance of the service industry in Tokyo and the size of emissions from these sectors (60% with more than 630,000 facilities with 40% from 1300 large facilities). Tokyo therefore faces also less resistance by industry which has thwarted national climate change ambition. The Tokyo cap-and-trade programme started in 2002 with a mandatory reporting programme with the mandatory reduction phase starting in 2010 to allow for enough preparations. Emission allocations are based on grandfathering and established MRV procedures that were tested in the first phase of reporting. The system includes a compliance factor disaggregated by categories of emitters with only the excess reductions over compliance obligations allowed to trade. Hence the system is a mix between more traditional standard setting and market mechanisms. The system allows for offsets within Tokyo municipality and linked outside areas including the Saitama ETS. Trading is not through a public exchange but only between participating entities and thus rather limited (only 56 transactions by March 2015). Households, owners and tenants of buildings take on specific obligations.(ICAP factsheet 2016; Roppongi e.a. 2016, ICAP 2017).

Japan's INDC\textsuperscript{347} submitted to the UNFCCC in July 2015 reflects the lower ambitions qualified by some as inadequate because ‘Japan can almost reach its proposed INDC target without taking any further action’. Japan also includes its technology transfer policy to developing countries as an attempt to limit domestic reductions under its Japanese Crediting Mechanism\textsuperscript{348}.

Japan and Korea rank very low in the percentage of renewable energy in their energy mix but through the introduction of feed-in tariffs in 2012 Japan has doubled its modest share of renewables in recent years (Compston and Bailey 2016:155), while China is championing renewable energy.

While relatively disappointing in mitigation ambition, Japan remains (traditionally) a major financier of international climate adaptation (recent 1.5bn USD contribution to the Green Climate Fund for example)\textsuperscript{349}.

Korea is among the 10 biggest emitters of GHG and 6\textsuperscript{th} among OECD member in per capita emissions\textsuperscript{350}, but is still listed as a developing country under the UNFCCC without emission reduction obligations (Yun, Ku and Han 2014:284). Korea decided to make a virtue out of this paradoxical position by launching an ambitious low carbon, green growth policy that includes an ETS, a Global Green Growth Institute and the hosting of the Global Climate Fund while insisting

\textsuperscript{346} ICAP factsheet March 2016:

\textsuperscript{347} http://www4.unfccc.int/submissions/INDC/Published%20Documents/Japan/1/20150717_Japan's%20INDC.pdf accessed on 18.4.2016

\textsuperscript{348} http://climateactiontracker.org/countries/japan.html accessed on 21.4.2016


\textsuperscript{350} The information on Korea’s green growth policy and ETS are in the public domain and confirmed by the author’s own involvement in advising the Korean government on ETS matters between 2009-2013 as well as on presentations by Korean officials made during the ICAP ETS Training Course in May 2015 in Seoul.
on its developing country status in the UNFCCC negotiations. In 2009 Korea set its national emissions reduction target in the format of a 30% reduction by 2020 compared to a business as usual scenario (BAU, rather then fixed emissions reductions). In 2010 Korea enacted the Low Carbon Green Growth Act which launched a ‘Target management scheme’ covering two thirds of Korea’s GHG emissions by some 500 designated entities. The TMS was implemented in 2012 with reductions from business as usual targets for various sectors. Korea launched an ETS building on the TMS in 2012 and started implementing it in 2015. The TMS was designed to win over industry and lay the basis for the ETS implementation as it allowed establishing an MRV system and reducing actual emissions (without trading allowances or banking them). At the same time the Korean government launched the four river restoration project - a massive ‘green’ infrastructure project (criticised by environmentalists as lacking in environmental credentials and impact assessments and in fact involving a lot of concrete poured along riverbanks to transform them into recreational areas). This project shows the intersection between an economic stimulus programme during the global financial crisis and the policy to promote a green economy motivated by the desire to bolster industrial competitiveness.

For the Paris COP 21 in 2015 Korea pledged a reduction of 37% compared to business as usual beyond the target set in 2009 for a maximum of 30% reduction. However, the INDC for COP 21 has been criticised for lack of fairness and ambition and even backsliding from the earlier pledges and overall rated as ‘highly insufficient’ to meet the Paris objectives (Choi, Gallo and Kim 2015:9, 12-3). In real terms the ROK 2030 target would reduce emissions by a mere 5% compared to Korea’s 2005 emissions. Despite highly advertised political ambitions to be a pioneer of the green economy, a bridge and role model for developing countries and a host of global green growth/climate fund organisations, Korea’s emissions reduction policy is largely dictated by the interests of its powerful industrial and energy conglomerates (chaebol 재벌/財閥) and political and public concern about Korea’s competitiveness against its bigger neighbours China and Japan at a time of slowing economic growth (for a climate policy network analysis of Korea’s various governmental, economic and environmental policy actors see: Yun, Ku and Han 2014). The burden for emissions reductions will fall disproportionately on households and transport sectors and Korea’s INDC also relies on, as yet unspecified and un-budgeted for, carbon credits from international markets for 11.3% of its projected reduction (Choi, Gallo and Kim 2015).

However, Korea extensively borrowed from the EU’s experience with emissions trading avoiding a number of the errors. Incidentally, this shows the importance of policy diffusion and learning from the example of ‘leaders’ (Schwerhoff 2016). The TMS allowed establishing the precise emissions over three years of the covered installations that reduced the over-allocation of allowances through ‘grand fathering’. Korea also immediately worked with benchmarking of emissions in some sectors including domestic aviation. The TMS also allowed industry getting

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331 “Green” New Deal Projects Threaten Korea’s Rivers and Tidal Flats
332 http://climateactiontracker.org/countries/southkorea.html accessed on 11.10.2017
333 http://www4.unfccc.int/submissions/INDC/Published%20Documents/Republic%20of%20Korea/1/INDC%20Submission%20of%20the%20Republic%20of%20Korea%20on%20June%2030.pdf accessed on 18.4.2016
ready for the ETS. The country also debated the alternative of a carbon tax, but decided on the introduction of the ETS to establish the reduction objectives and to pursue them in the most cost-effective way referring to emissions trading as a global trend. The three phases of the Korean ETS (2015-17, 2018-20 and 2021-25) were specified at the outset with limited borrowing and banking from one phase to the other to provide long-term certainty. The Korean ETS has also provided for a national reserve for market stabilisation where the EU is in the process of establishing one as a reaction to the huge surplus that accumulated mostly because of external shocks to the system (economic crisis). Korea also from the start banned offsets from the HFC-23 and limited the amounts of international offsets allowed to the third phase and 50%. Industry opposed the introduction because of fears of losing competitiveness and argued that Korea should wait for an international agreement on climate change. The government, rather unusually moved forward despite industry opposition, but made the introduction of the TMS and the ETS as industry-friendly as possible including through sharing the management responsibility between the more industry friendly Ministry of Strategy and Finance and the Environment Ministry with the Prime Minister co-chairing the Green Growth Committee (Yun, Ku and Han 2015:293, 297). In 2017 the responsibility entirely passed to the business-friendly Strategy and Finance Ministry and in 2016 allowances were increased through borrowing facilities and the allowance reserve to ease the burden of ETS participants (ICAP 2017:55). On 1 January, under the new government, the responsibility was transferred back to the Ministry of the Environment as phase two started with some key changes: Auctioning will be introduced and benchmark-based free allocation (similar to the EU) will be extended to more sectors (but energy intensive sectors and those exposed most to carbon leakage will continue to receive free allowances), trading will be stimulated and a limited amount of domestic offsets (5%) will be introduced (ICAP 2018:39). This back and forth shows industry resistance and shifting political priorities of the different administrations, but the Korean ETS is now a firm element of Korea's climate change policy.

The government's role in pushing the ETS despite strong industry reluctance can be explained with the traditional government tendency to steer the national economy, in this case banking on the future competitiveness of the early mover towards green growth and green technology. In this respect Korea stuck with its tradition of the national development state, which it also defends in the international negotiations where it is trying to occupy a middle ground between developing countries and industrialised countries refusing to accept international emissions obligations. The later weakening of the system may be due to the change of Presidents (from Lee Myung-bak to Park Gyeun-hee). The new President Moon Jae-in, who took office in May 2017, may yet again change the priorities as he has an ambitious energy plan to reduce fossil fuel emissions (especially from coal fired power plants switching to natural gas, but also phasing out nuclear power plants), to increase the share of renewables from 3.6% of electricity production in 2016 to 20% by 2030, but also phasing out nuclear energy.

However, adopting the ETS in close consultation with the EU shows that Korea is one of the few 'followers' of EU climate change leadership, while in terms of ambition, Korea clearly is less progressive than the EU. Based on modelling various scenarios Choi, Gall and Kim (2015:26-7)

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355 There are plans to weaken the role of the MoE further.
356 Oxford Analytica Daily Brief, September 25, 2017: South Korea's energy plans may struggle to stick.
find that ‘South Korea would reduce mitigation costs by linking its ETS with other carbon markets. […] Specifically, the results show that from a purely financial perspective, linking South Korea’s carbon market with the EU ETS would be the best scenario: as a net seller of carbon credits to a vast carbon market, South Korea could actually meet its mitigation target while earning significant revenues.’ They also find significant advantages in linking Korea’s with China’s upcoming national carbon market, but recommend purchasing carbon credits from voluntary markets to preserve national autonomy. Hence, while on the surface and in Korea’s public diplomacy (in negotiations, but also through the creation of the Global Green Growth Institute (GGGI\(^{357}\) and hosting the Green Climate Fund) its position on climate change looks progressive and multilateralist, the national interest of the development state is the key to understand its position, which is in fact not very ambitious and falls short of the measures needed to help achieve the Paris objectives\(^ {358}\).

China is of course the key player in the region and globally as it has become by far the biggest emitter of GHG in absolute terms. In China’s export-driven energy intensive economy exports embody between a quarter and a third of China’s emissions (Huang and Bailis 2015:498), hence an argument over “emissions consumption” (Helm 2014) and how to account for fair reduction commitments if polluting production is outsourced by Western countries consuming the end products, indicating another moralisation gap in international politics. However, with the ‘new normal’ of less intensive growth and a shift to higher value added, the ‘green economy’ has become one of China’s development objectives amidst a new phase of deep economic and social transformation. Indeed, like in Korea, policy makers have understood that a switch to green growth as an area where innovation can create market share, new jobs, and technological leadership can also achieve health and environmental benefits and enhance energy security (Li 2016, Hilton 2017, Chiu 2017). Yet, a transition to green growth poses major challenges to vested interests and will have economic and social impacts on restructuring industrial sectors and regions in China, but some of the problems will be transferred abroad: through the OBOR initiative Chinese concrete and steel will be used to build infrastructure outside China to absorb industrial conversion and job losses. China’s climate policy is mainly national and cautious towards international market mechanisms (except the CDM and the gradual approach in the ICAO; Huang and Bailis 2015:495). Under its 2011 national cap-and-trade plan China has also embarked on domestic emissions trading with seven pilot projects in various provinces and cities with a combined volume of 1.24 billion tons (the EU ETS covers about 2 billion tons). Based on the lessons learnt from the pilots China and with EU assistance\(^ {359}\) prepared a nationwide ETS that

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\(^{357}\) http://gggi.org/about-gggi/background/organizational-overview/ (accessed on 20-7-2017) The GGGI was an initiative launched by the Korean President in 2010 as part of his domestic and international green growth strategy meant to launch a new phase of Korean economic development following the global economic crisis and the foreseeable decline in traditional manufacturing exports. The GGGI served Korea’s international strategy to preserve its non-annex 1 status in the UNFCCC despite its high level of industrial development while displaying active engagement notably to developing countries to build bridges between the developed and developing world. GGGI develops multi-stakeholder programmes in developing countries and has a membership of 24 developed and developing countries.

\(^{358}\) According to the Climate Action Tracker “Under current policies, South Korea is unlikely to meet its NDC target, which the CAT rates “Highly insufficient”. We project that the growth rate of South Korea’s emissions will slow from 4% per year in the period 1990–2012 to 0.3–0.4% in the period 2012–2030. However, to reach the NDC target, emissions need to peak and start declining. To achieve this, more stringent policies are required.” http://climateactiontracker.org/countries/southkorea.html accessed on 11.10.2017.

was launched in December 2017 (ICAP 2018:67-83 for details of the national ETS and the pilots). The pilots vary in their design and coverage but include both benchmarking and grandfathering for allocation, thus also taking lessons from the initial EU experience of over-allocation through generous grand fathering. Allowances are traded in exchanges under the supervision of China’s Securities Regulatory Commission, but showed strong government involvement (not surprisingly given most participating entities are state-owned) and a lack of transparency in data availability. Nevertheless, the pilots allowed learning by doing and setting up of registries, domestic MRV and benchmarking procedures in China’s specific economic context. The pilots’ experiences have strengthened the momentum and policy-making capacity for introducing a national emissions trading scheme after 2017 (Compston and Bailey 2016; Huang and Bailis 2015). The national system, unlike the pilots and the EU or Korean ETS, only covers power generation including 1700 facilities responsible for 34% of China’s CO2 emissions. Plans for a wider scope were delayed indicating strong industry resistance. The national ETS will evolve gradually, starting with the power sector and in three phases of about one year each. The first year will be dedicated to complete the legal framework and market support systems including registry and data reporting and capacity building. In year two trading simulation is foreseen in the power sector (reminiscent of the EU power sector organising simulations before the EU ETS was created to convince business executives rather than leaving the issue to specialised departments and engineers) and in the final phase the compliance entities in the power sector will start spot trading for compliance purposes. If all works well, the ETS could then be extended to other sectors for which during this initial three years data will be consolidated, but no timeline is foreseen for their participation in the ETS (ICAP 2018:18). The pilots will continue to operate in parallel. One challenge may be that due to China's regulated electricity prices the power sector cannot easily pass on costs to consumers like in Europe unless the electricity sector itself is reformed.

The national ETS, despite this cautious approach, will be a key instrument to achieve China's commitments under the Paris Agreement alongside the expansion of renewable energy and energy efficiency measure: China’s pledged GHG reductions ahead of the Paris COP 21 in 2015 foresee a peak in emissions no later than 2030 with a cut in carbon emissions per unit of GDP by 60-65% from 2005 levels by 2030. This reflects a preference to reduce carbon intensity of economic activities over specified reduction targets. Other GHG were not explicitly covered in the INDC360, so that there is considerable uncertainty and contradictory estimates about the level of ambition and the potential for emissions reductions compared to business as usual (BAU)361. This makes it difficult to compare the pledges with those of the EU and other players and China, in line with its past stance, refuses to allow external accountability for its pledges out of sovereignty concerns (Huang and Bailis 2015:508).

Apart from China's new policy instruments such as the ETS to reduce industry emissions, the country has embarked on a number of green economy trajectories that will contribute to making its economy more climate-friendly through renewable energy and energy efficiency targets (Chiu

360 http://www4.unfccc.int/submissions/INDC/Published%20Documents/China/1/China's%20INDC%20-%20on%2030%20June%202015.pdf accessed on 18.4.2016

E-vehicles and the announced phasing out of the internal combustion engine should lower transport emissions in the long run and will have a global impact on car manufacturers given the importance of the China market. Those measures also enhance energy security as they lessen import dependence. In 2017 China already reached its 2020 target for installed solar power capacity and has become a world leader, although solar only covers 1% of China’s energy consumption which still relies mostly on coal. China has become a global leader in renewable energy and professes high ambitions to increase its share of renewables to 15% of energy sources by 2020 compared to 9.8% in 2013. More importantly, they aim at reducing air and water pollution which are major economic cost factors and causing popular unrest while also creating jobs (Chiu 2017). China is thus still far from being a low-carbon economy, but it has started a long march to energy transition and emissions control. This shift already has a global impact.

According to Hilton (2017) China’s capacity to manufacture at scale has lowered the international price for solar panels by 80% over just a few years transforming the balance of cost between high and low carbon sources of power generation also for third countries (and thus allowing the EU to potentially increase their renewables target). Similar impacts can be expected for other green technology.

China strongly insists on maintaining the separation between developed and developing countries in the negotiations of a new international agreement and on proportional historic responsibility for GHG emissions to be assumed by developed nations (Friman and Hjerpe 2015; Huang and Bailis 2015). Its pledges (INDC) under the Paris Agreement are not very ambitious and China may do better than pledged (like for the solar panels) and then boast overachievement in emissions reductions as well. On 3 September 2016, China ratified the Paris Agreement, and it has policies in place to reach its NDC goals which include a commitment to peak CO2 emissions by 2030 at the latest, lower the carbon intensity of GDP by 60%–65% below 2005 levels by 2030, increase the share of non-fossil energy carriers of the total primary energy supply to around 20% by that time, and increase its forest stock volume by 4.5 billion cubic metres, compared to 2005 levels.

Cooperation in NE Asia on climate change is relatively limited and while all three countries have understood that climate change will affect their development prospects negatively and that they feel compelled to act they opt for gradual, nation-centred approaches, which lack ambition. All countries in NE Asia still rely heavily on fossil fuels and especially coal-generated energy and Korea is among the top international providers of finance for coal power plants. Industrial competitiveness of the nation and considerations of energy security, jobs and technological progress as well as domestic health concerns clearly rank higher than ambitions for reducing GHG emissions to preserve the global public good climate. The energy mix and climate policy are

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363 The International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) assesses that under current policies and investment patterns, the share of renewables in China’s energy mix is projected to only reach 17% by 2030 compared to 13% in 2010. RMap analysis, however, shows that the country could realistically achieve scaling up modern renewables to 26%.


mainly decided by the Ministries in these countries responsible for industry with only weak
influence from environment ministries or civil society, but strong business pressure. In Japan that
has even led to sub-national units taking the lead on GHG reduction schemes after the government
abandoned more ambitious plans in the face of industry opposition. The nationalist logic of the
development state thus becomes apparent in the narrative underpinning climate policy as part of
innovation and green growth, so as to seize the economic opportunities as early movers from the
green economy (Yun, Ku and Han 2015). We have seen that the three countries have different
national strategies to address the issue domestically and internationally. Moreover, the three
countries perceive each other as competitors rather than partners, mirroring the conflicted regionness I identified earlier. They tend to prefer domestic mitigation and adaptation to
international cooperation to various degrees (Purdon 2014). In a number of technical areas there
have been meetings of experts and officials and workshops in various configurations (detailed
overview in Kim 2009). Those aim at exchanging information and best practice on issues of
shared concern such as acid rain, dust and sand storms (DSS), energy, water and waste. Within the
trilateral cooperation process, China, Japan and Korea have held a series of ministerial and
officials’ meetings on environmental issues. Leaders adopted a Joint Statement on Sustainable
Development at the second trilateral summit in Beijing in 2009 that covers environment, circular
economy, water, forestry and climate change, renewable energy and energy efficiency. The
Tripartite Environment Ministers Meeting (TEMM) has been pursued since 1999 and consolidated
its exchanges through a Tripartite Joint Action Plan on Environmental Cooperation in 2010
University organised the “1st Forum of Carbon Pricing Mechanism in China, Japan, and Korea”
together with the Institute for Global Environmental Strategies from Japan and the Greenhouse
Gas Inventory & Research Center of Korea under the guidance of the National Development and
Reform Commission, China, the Ministry of the Environment, Japan, and the Ministry of Strategy
and Finance, Korea (ICAP 2017:16). Kim (2009:29) finds that ‘the activities of environmental
cooperation in Northeast Asia are far from satisfactory’ and ‘not effective enough to address the
regional environmental issues’ and considers the various mechanisms, networks and platforms as
‘a preparatory stage for full-fledged cooperation to tackle environmental problems’. This
assessment is still valid and in line with the bigger picture of limited cooperation in NE Asia it is
unlikely to change. The global ambition of all three players is also very limited as the climate
action tracker assessments demonstrate. However, international competitiveness in “green” sectors
such as renewables is clearly a (nationalist) motivation that produces global benefits, especially
cheaper prices (Chiu 2017).

On climate change and other environmental policies Kim (2009:32-33) sees increasing
convergence on what needs to be done. Contrary to Europe where networks of scientists, experts
and policy makers are well established and the syndicated institutions translate policy convergence
into institutionalised multilateral action, in NE Asia mutual benchmarking, competition and
co-benefits of technical cooperation in environmental fields (air, water, waste Kim 2009:25) only
slowly led to some progress on combating climate change. The increasing density of functional
networks and policy dialogue are enhancing convergence of national priorities and thus contribute

to addressing climate change. However, the lack of a governance mechanism in NE Asia reduces
to political problems (historical rivalries and system differences), differences in economic
development, aversion against taking responsibility, insufficient funding and a lack of an overall
governance mechanism. He considers the TEMM as the most promising nucleus of a future
governance architecture as this mechanism is politically grounded in the trilateral cooperation and
is led at Ministerial level with significant achievements at least at dialogue level. This view is
shared by Böhmer and Köllner (2012) who see trilateral functional cooperation below the political
level as becoming gradually institutionalised in the sense of becoming permanent, stable and more
complex, delivering technical results and becoming a value per se. They see the TEMM as one of
the most active and effective strand of China, Japan, Korea trilateral cooperation.

However, the analysis shows that this is only a thin veneer on top of largely national policies
informed by national priorities, competition and sometimes rivalry with neighbours and global
trends (including expectations of early mover advantages). Just like in the economic field it seems
more likely that NE Asian countries work more closely with partners outside their region than
with each other. Like with the FTA with the EU and the US, Korea has for instance cooperated
closely with the EU on emissions trading and may consider linking its ETS with the EU’s. Japan
has no national ETS, but the EU ‘linking directive’ allows linking with subnational cap-and-trade
schemes. China has studied EU ETS, Korea’s TMS and ETS plans and pragmatically devised its
own pilots (in keeping with previous economic reform experiments such as SEZs). In general,
China prefers a cautious and gradual approach, informed by concerns about sovereignty and
domestic policy flexibility (Huang and Bailis 2015).

Japan in the 1990s, but less so in the new millennium, Korea (with its active green growth
diplomacy after 2008) and China with its more recent engagement on climate change and
facilitation of the Paris Agreement (Li 2016) have progressively displayed willingness to
contribute to global public goods and to play an international role in line with their respective
capabilities. They have been much less willing to work on the provision of regional public goods
or effort sharing in a logic very different from the EU’s. What may sound paradoxical when
analysed through traditional prisms, makes sense when taking account of the historical pathways,
moralisation gaps and the resulting regional rivalry and status competition (conflicted regionness).
So also in this sector the multilateralism of NE Asia is not one of regional integration, but of a
transnational nature with cooperation preferred at a global level (here the Paris Agreement, while
in the economic realm the focus was on G20) rather than with neighbouring countries which are
seen as competitors, not partners. To some extent at least the international engagement reflects a
competition over international recognition of each country’s specific contribution to global
governance while the same competition reduces the willingness to work together as a region to
enhance global weight for common priorities which has been the EU’s multilateralist stance. That
picture can also be found in the NE Asian response to the financial crisis (as we have seen) and in
competitive moves to assert leadership in other domains affecting global governance such as the
respective national forums with African partners, the Chinese-led AIIB versus the Japan-led ADB,
the Chinese One-Belt-One-Road initiative that competes with Japanese and Korean infrastructure
lending abroad.
4. Conclusion

Governance as it has been organised in the (neo)liberal rational model of 'globalisation' is criticised by Mouffe (2010) as ignoring crucial political and moral issues (similar Hurrell’s 2007 view on solidarism and pluralism; cf. ch II.0). Our examples from Europe and NE Asia on history, economic cooperation and climate change corroborate her criticism – nationalism, critical junctures and moralisation gaps are key to understanding problems of global governance beyond merely framing them as rationally solvable collective action problems and rational bargaining games among like-units. NE Asian politics on history, economic cooperation and climate change show how difficult governance is if it is not part of a consensual normative social and political context conducive to cooperation in which various interests can be aggregated through sophisticated procedures such as in the EU. NE Asian countries believe in self-help, not in multilateral solutions. The lack of trust between countries reveals role relationships of competitors and sometimes rivals. An international (regional) society subject to political antagonisms without a context conducive to cooperation is not good at joining up for solving the tragedy of the commons or more complex chaotic challenges at regional level. We are witnessing a ‘contest’ of two belief systems and principles: nationalism and multilateralism. These also influence strongly such organising principles as hierarchy and autonomy as well as the choice of instrumental institutions of international society. They also determine whether moralisation gaps are bridged or not (beyond game theory) and thus also how the ‘tragedy of the commons’ and risk society are defined (perceived, constructed) and addressed through different role relationships beyond ‘rational’ negotiations. This also informs foreign policy strategies. Teamworkers are good at governance (and compromise), the syndicated hierarchy of the EU helps agreeing team positions and narrowing bilateral moralisation gaps to overcome the constraints of nationalism. We saw that in the EU these nationalisms affect EU governance negatively in the intergovernmental mode, much less so when the community method is applied. Rivals and competitors focusing on national autonomy and prestige are not good at governance and sharing public goods or fighting public bads, but they may be good at insuring themselves against risks and negative consequences on a national basis. As long as the insurance cover is seen as sufficient and not too costly they have little incentive to prioritise multilateral modes of policy making and multi-level governance. Multilateral projects are sometimes even used to pursue rivalry with other means (as we have seen in the case of the AFC and various proposals for regional groupings by Japan and China). Thus, our view of governance has to take account of these dynamics and evolve beyond mere calls to follow liberal-Western or EU leads as I will further develop in part IV.

From this empirical chapter a clearer picture of the concept of International Society 2.0 emerges characterised by a world of issues to which we saw different regional responses. Here ‘regional’ is understood not just in the sense of a collective response but also in the sense of how the ‘region’ defines itself within this world of issues (Telò 2015; Fawcett 2015), including in NE Asia as a de facto non-region of competing nations locked in a complex relationship resulting from past moralisation gaps and development pathways. I called this conflicted regionness. Responses also differed depending on the issue area (rivalry in security, competition in the economy and loosely

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366 This normative consensus could be discursive or legally enshrined.
cooperative on the financial crisis and climate change), but were clearly distinguishable: multilateralist in Europe (with notable exceptions acutely revealed through the crisis that were progressively addressed) and nationalist in NE Asia. It has also become clearer from the EU story that states and their national interests and power still matter even in deeply integrated polities and that the answers to interrogations about the changes in international relations do not question states as much as they question the context of anarchy itself in which international society functions with states as key actors. The anarchy defined as absence of higher authority in International Society Mark I may have explained power games in the 19th and 20th centuries, but is of much less explanatory value today. On the contrary, limiting anarchy to the narrow 'Westphalian' concept prevents a comprehensive analysis as in that prism states in international relations are static and understood as effectively restricted to using violence and power balancing. That is clearly no longer the most important international role of states for critical and existential issues such as economic management and addressing climate change (while military power and military balance/alliances remain important tools as last resort in case of interstate conflict, as deterrence or for posturing on territorial issues.

In the last chapters I have found:

1) The market logics of the global economy that compel states to develop strategies of internationalisation (in various forms and using various instruments) also affect regionalisation in some cases to a point of non-geography bound transnationalism which regionalism theory (even when qualified as open) cannot explain.

2) The dynamics of risk society lead to a securitisation of many risks and enhance uncertainty given the diffuse causality and unpredictability of risk. These dynamics compel states to take precautionary strategies that are very different from traditional military deterrence and power balancing diplomacy. For instance, the rise of China is partly framed as a military threat to US power, but also viewed (especially in Europe) as competition and a major game changer for economic or environmental governance requiring cooperation and dialogue.

3) Both dynamics are characterised by interdependence of a multitude of actors and patterns of chaos (the results of the diffusion of power in complexity) that became apparent in their impacts in economic and financial crises and in the risk scenarios for climate change (cf. also part IV).

As a result, International Society 2.0 faces a number of governance challenges. States have developed different role relationships – nationally, internationally, transnationally and regionally - to deal with the challenges influenced strongly by historical and institutional pathways. The focus on relationships is somewhat underdeveloped in Western IR theory, but a relational theory of IR has been proposed by some Chinese scholars identifying the international society as one of interrelatedness, with "actors in relations", rather than just actors, and relations in motion (Zhang C. 2017; Qin 2016). Such concepts can help to better understand the conflicted regionness of NE Asia (III.2.3) and may contribute to develop concepts of world society.

I have suggested that the team-worker role relationship developed by the EU for its region is
currently the most effective, albeit perfectible governance strategy (in terms of problem solving capacity and legitimacy of the team decisions). This is due to the multilateralist development path the EU has taken after overcoming nationalism and moralisation gaps since 1945. This has produced new forms of sovereignty and international law and a set of supranational bodies that form a syndicated hierarchy and co-operative process of governance. But as the chapter on EU integration showed, this multilateralism has been a difficult learning process over several decades, not a deliberate strategy according to some visionary blueprint. I also found in the case studies of the global financial crisis and the EU sovereign debt crisis as well as the EU's response to climate change that it is often slow, reactive and suffers from a democratic deficit, and where the syndicated hierarchy does not apply (as in the initial stages of managing the financial crisis) national interests unequal power and regional moralisation gaps (e.g. during the Greek crisis) have weakened the multilateralist stance of the EU.

I found that nationalist strategies, as developed in NE Asia for instance, have served the countries there well, but have been largely unable to solve collective action problems or to produce international public goods for instance on security, the environment and even economic ones beyond national insurance. They also proved costly. The inclusion of NE Asian countries in new global governance mechanisms such as the G20 or the MEM has enhanced their status (recognition), fed the popular story of the power shift to Asia, but has not substantially improved regional and global governance perspectives (see part IV). I found that these problems are due to the nationalist development path that has so far proven unable to bridge important moralisation gaps which have proven stronger than the logics of economic interdependence.

Cosmopolitan approaches are largely absent in empirical reality in both regions, although some aspects of EU policy-making could be labelled cosmopolitan. Those are isolated, limited but significant manifestations of a possible world society in the making, beyond more visionary, but also more utopian ideas such as those of Beck and Zhao analysed in part IV. Yet, I also found that ultimately sovereignty is still a national one. The cosmopolitan strategies advocated by a number of analysts like Beck, Giddens, Leggewie and Welzer to deal with ecological issues or global risk are consistent in theoretical terms, but remain prescriptive as regards their translation into real international politics as we have seen in our case studies. The nationalist and multilateralist pathways, often combined with moralisation gaps, but also the inequalities of the human condition in different parts of the world clearly stand in the way of a 'cosmopolitan moment'. We will examine this preliminary conclusion from the regional perspectives in part IV in a global perspective.

The problem of the new complex and chaotic anarchy itself is also a problem for regional projects and global governance very different from the 'simpler' context at the time when the BWI and the GATT (WTO) were created. I argue that the financial crises and climate change illustrate that causality is complex and not something a state or for that matter most other actors can deal with/control. Sometimes science can analyse, model and predict chaos patterns and impacts (e.g. IPCC, Stern Report; Oatley e.a. 2012). This anarchy is intrinsically difficult to address as the two case studies showed. The complexity also provides 'excuses’ for non-action and maintaining moral positions that may be unhelpful to solve a global issue, but are consistent and rational from
their proponent’s perspective and moral belief. Blaming the state system (or sovereignty) as such for difficulties to deal with it is perhaps not entirely wrong when the issues are down to clear-cut bargaining over collective action problems (the tragedy of the commons idea though already indicates that these collective action problems are intrinsically difficult to solve rationally). Advocates of world government need to show that a central authority would have the capacity to deal with this complexity better than state-teamworkers in a multilateralist international society, not to mention the question of legitimacy and representativeness. States could also be 'blamed' for not overcoming moralisation gaps or for manipulating them for political ends or as bargaining chips, but again those often escape rational or legal 'solutions'. The psychological-emotional nature of moralisation gaps (Pinker 2011) requires some form of reconciliation between victims and perpetrators and cannot be simply dismissed or weighed against some 'rational' interest. This is a fine line, and finding out the depth and the importance of each moralisation gap is an important research task. But beyond this the complexity and diffuse causality and in some cases the scale of the challenge are by their nature more difficult to address than the tragedy of the commons (which makes this new complex anarchy much more significant for international relations and international society than the absence of a higher authority idea suggests). Regions are no exception to this difficulty, although through their scale and constitution (especially in the form of the EU’s enhanced and legally enshrined collective, polycentric problem-solving capacity) they can make significant contributions to global governance, in particular in the economic sphere, but also beyond. This is the topic to which I now turn.

Part IV. Order in a world of regions or a world of issues?

We have seen in the previous chapters that regional and global governance are not like that of a domestic polity where central authority produces collectively binding decisions. Besides the doubts over a potential central authority’s capacity to deal with complex anarchy, this would require democratic accountability in a cosmopolitan concept (Weltbürger, Weltregierung). Instead legitimacy and power, albeit diffusing in various ways, still largely lie with nation-states. Similarly, the output and performance legitimacy of international institutions, organisations or regimes derives from states which have set them up to solve problems and to respond to the world of issues. I call this latter set of responses functional multilateralism as it is driven by function rather than form, by necessity rather than by ideology or moral belief. The EU is the only group of states that has gone beyond such functional multilateralism in its region and has transformed multilateralism into an ideology and legal order. A fundamental problem for global governance is that states differ (perhaps increasingly) on moral beliefs (or values) and therefore on how they analyse and solve (or not) global problems.

Alongside nation-states, or competing with them, civil society, business and sub-national actors (like cities which have become very active on transnational cooperation on climate change;
Ostrom 2009:18-9;  http://www.c40.org/;  http://www.worldmayorscouncil.org/about.html;  Leonardsen 2017) are very influential in International Society 2.0. Many networks are driven by (non-state) elites. They also face legitimacy and democratic deficits as champions of particular issues (cf Nicolaïdes 2010:38). They show even greater differences in moral beliefs and interests than states which are bound by the shared ideological and constitutive institutions of international society. These are much less relevant in the NSA sphere, but in the NSA sphere there are no such equivalent shared ideological and constitutive institutions as those between states in international society.

In this context, what differences do the various concepts of the constitutive institutions of international society today make for global governance and for regionalism? How can international society come to terms with plurality and diversity of values and cultures? Which logics of multilateral governance for instance the two regions that I have examined here - multilateralism or nationalism - could work not only regionally, but also globally? Is functional multilateralism the only form of multilateralism compatible with nationalism? Is it sustainable?

1. Comparing EU and NE Asian regional cooperation in the context of globalisation

I started my analysis with a puzzle of two starkly different yet successful regions of global importance. NE Asia is a non-region by many standards of traditional regionalism literature and stands in almost total contrast to the European Union: no integration project, an only fledgling and institutionally speaking weak process of trilateral cooperation, one country, the DPRK, completely marginalised, production and trade networks extending well beyond the region and consequently next to no product of regionalism. Paradoxically though, countries locked in political disputes about insignificant islets, about schoolbooks and about recriminations over the past form the dynamic centre of today’s global economy. Moreover they are touted as rising powers in an ‘Asian century’367. I coined the term conflicted regionness to describe this paradoxical phenomenon.

This paradoxical situation of NE Asia and its co-existence on the global stage with integrated Europe, raised a series of questions on fundamental issues in IR: on one-size-fits-all theories, on socialisation into an international society and on the norms and institutions on which that international society is built and on how it develops and changes; on the potential of community-building in NE Asia - inspired by the EU experience or more likely along a different

367 At this point in time an Asian century may be a hyperbole at the same level as the end of history and the clash of civilisations and a mixture of wishful thinking and undeniable economic and demographic realities (Jørgensen 2013). Beliefs and simplifications transported by the media influence such floating perceptions and tides of opinion and conventional wisdom and they do matter at least temporarily. Fashionable beliefs in the 1980s that the US were in irreversible decline compared to a striving Japan that was poised ‘to rule the world’ looked premature already in 2003 (Alagappa 2003c). These beliefs at the time though prompted responses in real policy-making, such as the EU’s single market and research policy programmes in the 1980s to enhance Europe’s competitiveness vis-à-vis Japan. It is at this point that globalisation became an important ‘raison d’être’ and narrative justifying the European integration project. The idea of ‘competitiveness of nations’ emerged as a key political driver for international economic relations. The people who predicted that Japan would rule the world or a coming war with Japan, now do the same with China and maybe tomorrow with India or Africa.
regional path of projects, processes and products - which could perpetuate the differences between regional societies interconnected at global level (Telò e.a. 2015). Hence, global governance is my next focus of analysis. Global governance is often seen as consisting of regional building blocs or multi-level including inter-regional relationships. Therefore, the paradoxical developments of Europe and NE Asia over the long-term are also a challenge to regionalism theories which pursue similar quests on states, institutional architecture, inter-dependence (Murray 2010:310), but tends to focus on post-WWII or even post-Cold War developments (Fawcett 2015). Söderbaum (2015:5) deplores that it is rare for regionalism scholars to engage with ideas about regions/regionalism for different time periods, area specialisation and research disciplines. This is all the more regrettable, as globalisation, complex risks and emerging global governance, such as the G20 where we find the key players of both regions engaged, have created a new context for regional integration and global governance.

I analysed essential concepts such as the role of the state, sovereignty, power, interdependence, conditions for international cooperation, community building or integration, regional order and hierarchy in international relations. These concepts all relate to order and rule in international society. The legitimacy of global governance in international society is the source of political debate (Zürn 2015). I looked at agonism as a promising way to manage conflict in international society despite differences on moral beliefs, moralisation gaps and values. I identified two main and different types of regional governance – driven by nationalism and multilateralism - in areas such as security, economic integration/cooperation and global public goods as empirical examples of forms of governance with and beyond the nation state. I now have to look at different scenarios for the future of global governance of a world of issues and ultimately different views on a future world society: a world of nation-states, a world of competing or/and interconnected regions, EU-type integration or territorially unbound functional multilateralism as in NE Asia, the BRICS or other transnational networks and organisations.

Clearly the ‘outlier’ in these scenarios is the constitutionalised regional multilateralism of the EU which is under pressure to adapt to internal and external challenges. The EU has transformed some of the key traditional concepts of the ‘Westphalian’ European state system in various ways to a truly multilateralist international society and security community, but not in an analytically straightforward way in line with any one given theory or a single political vision and without replacing fundamental 'Westphalian' institutions of international society like sovereignty and international law. The EU member states have progressively syndicated sovereignty and created (albeit not always intentionally) an institutionalised, even constitutionalised, supranational, but jointly owned, reasonably democratic level of hierarchy as a response – often in times of crisis - to the eroding usefulness of national sovereignty in the globalised world. European integration since the end of the 1980s has thus been at least partly a response to the diffusion of power in complexity. The EU has even attracted more and more states into its syndicated-hierarchical state system – some of them in the process of nation-building - despite this transformation of national sovereignty. Some of the newer member states of the EU are still struggling between the wish to be part of the greater whole and nation building. Overall, EU Member States remain important actors and nations in their own right, but accept interference by the supranational hierarchy in which they hold variable shares in a growing number of policy fields. This is why I came up with
the term syndicated sovereignty and analysed the concept of a jointly owned and managed hierarchy that allows European countries to eschew the constraints of traditionally nationally defined sovereignty as well as the old power balancing and hegemonic hierarchy. This concept goes beyond the traditional dichotomy of ‘delegating’ or ‘pooling’ of sovereignty (Zürn 2015:324) and has tended toward a polycentric order. The syndicated hierarchy is yielding a supranational peace and governance dividend, while its promise of prosperity has suffered during the financial crisis. EU member states in various ways have to deal with citizen discontent about their role in the EU and the EU itself and this will influence integration endeavours.

I also underlined the importance of the 'European way of international law' for the constitutionalisation and democratisation of the rules and norms of the regional society. This has allowed the European nations, after centuries of warfare under ‘Westphalian’ rules and institutions, to become team workers in the economic anarchy through the single market and EMU and in a security community. These logics have been established and function in reasonably democratic ways of the indirect, representative kind (Lisbon Treaty; Habermas 2011, Piris 2012; Vollaard 2014) although the co-managed hierarchy comes at the price of direct democratic accountability to the European demos (which is still divided along national or sub-national identities). The economic and sovereign debt crisis has tested this new way of governance and the test showed that the institutional implementation of the various logics of syndicated hierarchy and teamwork has not yet been completed in all relevant policy areas: the EU is still a state system not a federation and the democratic deficit is significant when the EU-managed issues go to the core of national politics (Crum 2013). The migration crisis has been a similar test in a policy field which is far less integrated than economic management has been. Established and internalised institutions have channelled international political conflict in agonistic ways in the EU with the emergence of euro-sceptic or populist-nationalist parties as a critical part of the demos.

In Europe the scale of the EU was widely seen as a key incentive for member states to enhance integration and co-operation despite divergences on policy choices and disintegrative pressures from the markets. Other regions also began to feel the pressure to combine forces, including the big countries in NE Asia, which, however, as we have seen are much more geared to national self-sufficiency and slightly co-ordinated national ‘sovereign’ responses within an open world economy and open regionalism framework. Hence, our two regions offer almost diametrically opposed governance solutions to the same global challenges. Kalinowski (2012:5) explains this difference with the varieties of capitalism and argues that ‘national political economies do not follow a “best practice approach”, but an endogenous dynamic’ along a strong path dependency. My approach endorses this view, but puts it into a larger concept of nationalism versus multilateralism in International Society 2.0, beyond choices of economic policies or varieties of capitalism, which themselves are at least partly expressions of (and hence dependent variables) different beliefs in nationalism or multilateralism.

By contrast to Europe NE Asia is an obvious laggard in building up an institutionally, legally or politically integrated regional society to face up to the challenges of globalisation which are not as high on NE Asian countries’s agenda as they are in the EU. Nevertheless, NE Asia has been economically successful (DPRK excepted) and stable without major violent conflicts in the last 60
years (whereas the Cold War was actually a hot war in the region and has not really ended as the absence of a peace agreement for the Korean peninsula and the continued conflict and arms race there shows). NE Asia's earlier highly integrated and harmonious, but hierarchical Confucian regional society (that cannot be simply reduced to the tribute and investiture system, but needs to acknowledge a distinctive logic of international relations as I have shown) was rejected at the beginning of the 20th century. A tsunami of globalisation as imperialism in the 19th and early 20th centuries swept away the Confucian world. The basic institutions in NE Asia are ‘Westphalian’ and nationalist and this makes implausible any return to a formal pre-Westphalian, sino-centric hierarchical order despite some Chinese IR scholars’ (and possibly policy makers’) attempts to rethink the region in such a way. Conflict along moralisation gaps, history and territorial disputes are fairly antagonistic at times, with the only temporary ‘solution’ to shelve or ring-fence such issues.

I found that individual IR theories such as realism and liberal institutionalism or interdependence studies on their own do not sufficiently explain the situation and that regionalism approaches – maybe due to their implicit benchmark of EU-style regional integration on the one hand and the confusing notion of open regionalism associated with economic networks and ASEAN on the other hand – fall short of explaining NE Asia's regional society consistently. Therefore, my hypothesis was that nationalism is the key ideological institution that determines role relationships in NE Asia. I found that these are dominated by the moralisation gaps and victim-perpetrator roles mainly shaped and nationally framed by critical junctures in the 19th and 20th centuries. The globalisation logic of complex anarchy that prompts cooperation in Europe produces competition and rivalry in NE Asia between still quite mercantilist development states. Yet, unlike in realist images, this 'Westphalian' character has not led to violent rivalry, but peaceful, albeit uneasy, co-existence. War and balance of power are no longer constitutive institutions of international society while they still play an instrumental role such as in the US strategy towards Asia (e.g. deterring DPRK, hedging against a rising China while trying to integrate it into the US-led world order368). Green (2017:542) concludes his comprehensive analysis of US strategy towards the Asia-Pacific by arguing that "Administrations that have thought they could transform regional geopolitics through multilateralism or transnationalism have inevitably found themselves retreating to the balance-of-power strategies that should have been their starting point." This being said, beyond the focus on foreign policy strategy the deep reasons that compel US administrations to focus on balance of power rather than on multilateralism are to be found in the prevailing nationalism in NE Asia (and arguably in the US itself) that hinders adoption of multilateral or transnational approaches as we have consistently seen.

While US allies in the region welcomed a predictable US engagement in Asia they have a strong degree of economic interdependence with China and are unwilling to engage into any containment strategy against China (Blackwill and Tellis 2015, Green 2017:522). However, due to nationalism and moralisation gaps at present NE Asia’s own problem-solving capacity in the face of global risks and challenges seems low, or to be precise below potential, compared to the EU’s teamwork method of regional multilateral governance which illustrates in real life, not only in theory, a novel approach to multilateralist governance and regional integration (albeit with its own difficulties).

368 For a sceptical view Blackwill and Tellis 2015).
I also analysed features of a ‘post-Westphalian’ order, the anarchy of complexity, the diffusion of power and the necessity of cooperation in the economic sphere including a larger role for non-state actors, but found that NE Asia remains very much a state centred international society with a defensive and instrumental interpretation of sovereignty and a positivist use of international law even in the more liberal democracies Japan and Korea. However, there are both in Europe and in Asia philosophical attempts and historical roots to think a world society rather than a state society in the face of global risk. These ideas have not yet had a deep impact on the global international society, but they may be part of a future wave of globalisation as fundamental change not only to the economy, but also to the state system (Messner 2011) (cf infra 5).

Despite the pressures of interdependence and globalisation – often believed to be universal trends - we found in fact two distinct regional societies with very different inter-state relations and responses to the economic and ecological risks logics of globalisation. This weakens the case for any theory with a universal claim built on a parochial experience (usually Western, but Chinese IR theories are facing the same problem – cf. infra 7). But this also weakens the case for regionalism if that has little to tell about other regions or if it is the mere mapping of trade and investment relations of 'open regionalism'.

To come to terms with this complex situation I proposed an update of International Society 2.0 to take account of the changed complex logic of anarchy and chaos and related role relationships in addition to those identified by Wendt (1999) in an increasingly non-violent international state-system where state survival is no longer threatened by other states, but by much more complex threats and risks. International Society 2.0 also addresses the questions raised by the distinctness of regional societies and notably the historical transformations of the traditional 'Westphalian' institutions in one of them (the EU) as well as the NE Asian past international logics. In this way I avoided the Euro-centrism of the original concept of International Society Mark I. International Society 2.0 is characterised by a large variety of different forms of rule, authority and legitimacy, with different levels of ‘control’ by nation-states (largely depending on their ideological preference for nationalism or multilateralism). In this concept of International Society 2.0 global governance is the (fluid) sum of various (functional) authorities and their networks as we will see below (similarly Zürn 2015:323).

2. Change in international society

The most striking change in international relations at the end of the 20th century has been the (partially successful) extension of largely trans-Atlantic liberal market-based economic transactions (or embedded liberalism; Helleiner 2010) to the formerly socialist countries (Central and Eastern Europe, Russia, China) and to the development states in Asia (trans-Pacific liberalism – APEC was created in 1989) and elsewhere (African, Latin American developing countries). The huge reduction of costs and increase in speed of transportation and communication, a wave (or several) of democratisation, the withering away of ideological conflict (Fukuyama 1992) and inter-state warfare have produced a complex global rather than a bi-polar or multi-polar structure of international relations. Ideological system conflict has been replaced by nationalism,
moralisation gaps and the quest for historical justice and status recognition in the international order (often based on economic development, but also culture, sports and other rankings). Beyond the scope of this book, I would venture the hypothesis that these issues are also valid explanatory variables for conflict and grievances in other parts of the world and perhaps most dramatically in the Muslim world (Mishra 2014).

The increasing complexity of the world of issues itself and the dynamics of change also question the adequacy of instrumental institutions and regimes created to address issues that have evolved. Trade and finance are good examples: Trade remains a major driver of the global economy and thus of national prosperity. Trade has grown at twice the rate of world GNI since the 1980s, but its nature has changed tremendously with strong growth of intra-firm trade and disaggregated global value chains implying that value added along the chain happens in many different locations, but more and more within the operations of transnational companies or networks organised by major companies (Hatch, Bair and Heiduk 2014). Intermediate goods now account for 60% of global trade and about a third of global trade is conducted within multi-national enterprises (European Think Tanks Group 2014:2). Trade regulation has not been able to keep up with these trends as regulators tend to address issues between customs territories (and states) and have less influence on regulating intra-firm trade or trade networks and the panoply of ‘behind-the-border’ issues arising from these value chains, be it taxation or environmental and social security or labour issues with critical repercussions on domestic politics and fuelling anti-globalisation protests (Lampert and Blanksma Ceta 2017). The European Commission has exercised its powers to address some of these issues for instance through fines imposed on multinational companies. Finance and trade have been key issues in the global financial crisis and also underlying the structural global imbalances (that still persist) (Kalinowski 2010). During the global financial crisis one of the key and least controversial policy planks was a G20 agreement not to erect barriers to trade. Some critical observers noted an increase in protectionist measures despite the agreement, but overall global trade did not have to face major new impediments, while efforts to deepen the global trade regime (WTO Doha Round) stalled. The vowed protectionism of US President Trump is seen by many observers as a potential game changer for global trade governance and has weakened that G20 consensus.

Some markets are more interdependent than the societies in which they operate and financial markets in particular have become increasingly disconnected from the real economy and the real society (computer algorythms, complex products, the volumes and speed of transactions…).

369 UNCTAD World Investment Report 2013 Global Value Chains: Investment and Trade for Development p. xxi: ‘About 60 per cent of global trade, which today amounts to more than $20 trillion, consists of trade in intermediate goods and services that are incorporated at various stages in the production process of goods and services for final consumption. The fragmentation of production processes and the international dispersion of tasks and activities within them have led to the emergence of borderless production systems. These can be sequential chains or complex networks, their scope can be global or regional, and they are commonly referred to as global value chains (GVCs). GVCs lead to a significant amount of double counting in trade, as intermediates are counted several times in world exports but should be counted only once as “value added in trade”. Today, some 28 per cent of gross exports consist of value added that is first imported by countries only to be incorporated in products or services that are then exported again. Some $5 trillion of the $19 trillion in global gross exports (in 2010 figures) is double counted. Patterns of value added trade in GVCs determine the distribution of actual economic gains from trade to individual economies’ http://unctad.org/en/publicationslibrary/wir2013_en.pdf.

370 Trade profits contribute to the financialisation of the global economy. Global financial assets have risen from an estimated 12 trillion USD in the 1980s to 212 trillion USD in 2010 compared to global GDP of 65 trillion USD in 2010 (European Think Tanks Group 2014:2). Due to these imbalances, many states in NE Asia have
The regulation of global trade and especially of global finance has become a major complex challenge. Interdependence cannot be ignored: A crisis in an economy the size of Greece – only about 2% of EU GDP – provoked Europe-wide, and indeed global, concern. The collapse of one US bank sparked the global financial crisis after all. The financial crisis has revealed structural shortcomings in the institutional framework for financial stability at global, regional and national levels. But according to the analysis by Oatley e.a. (2012) it was not a systemic crisis because the system itself has changed little. But this interdependence simultaneously reaches around the globe illustrating perhaps the chaos dynamics with the battering of the Lehmann Brothers ‘butterfly’s’ debt-laden wings creating an unpredicted financial ‘storm’ of global proportions, sparking a crisis of the EU system and in international society at large. 

Globalisation to some extent is a catch-all word that describes these changes in terms of a transformation of the spatial organisation of social relations and transactions and a change in the intensity, velocity and impact of those (Keohane 2002:15-6). Keohane (2002:198) distinguishes between globalism, a state of affairs or phenomenon, and globalisation, the latter being the process by which globalism becomes increasingly thick. This distinction is somewhat artificial, as Keohane’s examples of globalism are themselves processes or results of processes. Ultimately, the characteristics of globalisation are all related to extension, acceleration and system effects producing important changes at a global scale (Messner 2011). These changes are particularly obvious in economic (in particular financial) and political reality and underline how intertwined they are. But globalisation goes beyond economic issues. Globalisation is in fact an extremely complex process with many dimensions and changes – time, speed, information, ideas, religion; globalisation is economic, technological, physical (climate change), biological (diseases, biodiversity), social, environmental, military (terrorism, weapons proliferation, humanitarian intervention). Globalisation has multiple, sometimes contradictory impacts. Furthermore, globalisation as a phenomenon to be ‘managed’ by the EU is an essential element of EU legitimising narratives that has been challenged by the European sovereign debt crisis (Lonro and Murray 2011) and by euro-sceptic or nationalist parties. These diverse issues have become part of the ‘high politics’ agenda of international relations not least through the idea of competitiveness of nations rather than the military balance. I thus conceive of globalisation in IR as a process of change in a complex world of issues that states and other actors in the international society have to deal with. Moreover and very significantly in my view, causality among these issues and risks is difficult to establish, effects are often complex, unpredictable and indirect. One of globalisation’s defining consequences is thus increasing uncertainty and complexity and globalisation contributes to the diffusion of power in that complexity. This uncertainty, chaos and complexity makes it futile to look for ‘either-or’ structures or dichotomous organisation principles, or parsimonious IR theories (Baumann and Dingwerth 2015). I have therefore posited complexity as the starting point for theorising on International Society 2.0. 

accumulated massive currency reserves usually held in US or European treasury bonds. The international currency trade reaches sums in days that correspond to a year’s goods trade. Oatley e.a. (2012) analyse the global financial system as a hierarchical network structure that can explain the systemic impact (or not) of crises in different nodes (details in chapter III.1.4).
Scheuermann (2010:1) argues similarly that 'most contemporary social theorists endorse the view that globalization refers to fundamental changes in the spatial and temporal contours of social existence, according to which the significance of space or territory undergoes shifts in the face of a no less dramatic acceleration in the temporal structure of crucial forms of human activity.' Rosenberg (2005) questions this reduction of social theory to space and time and inverses the causality: it is not changes in spatial and temporal phenomena that have transformed international politics, but international politics – notably the end of the Cold War and social change in the West (neoliberalism) – that have produced social changes and with it the temporal and spatial phenomena. Hobsbawm (2008:83) argues that the end of bipolarity marked the onset of an era of international instability whose end cannot yet be foreseen because 'since 1989 an international power system has ceased to exist, for the first time in European history since the eighteenth century. Unilateral attempts to establish a global order have so far not succeeded'. Rosenberg (2005) argues similarly that the end of bipolarity created a vacuum that was quickly filled by Western power and Western ideas, but that this unique situation was far from a structural change, but could only endure as long as the non-West was weak. This ‘age of instability’ is seen by Arrighi (2010:9) as a turning point of ‘systemic chaos’, of ‘discontinuous change during which growth along the established path has attained or is attaining its limits, and the capitalist world-economy “shifts” through radical restructurings and reorganizations onto another path.’ (he doesn't say which one). The spread of liberal capitalism, multilateral institutions (like the WTO) and technology have been a consequence, Rosenberg argues, of the ideological and power vacuum left by the collapse of the Soviet Union. The same can be said for liberal democracy as a model of government (Dunne and McDonald 2013:2). For Rosenberg ‘globalisation’ is merely a passing Zeitgeist while for Held and Young (2013:311) it is a ‘global community of fate’ (the wording echoes Wendt). Note that in both directions of causality one can discern a constitutive relationship between state and economy.

Without continuing this discussion on what caused what which suggests that my assumption of the non-linearity of cause and effects in chaos dynamics holds, there seems to be a large consensus that the end of the Cold War marks a social tipping point for world order. Bipolarity has not been replaced by a new power based polarity, but by an International Society 2.0 characterised by the diffusion of power in complexity. Globalisation is thus not just an economic phenomenon but a part of this diffusion of power in complexity (cf. chapter II.3). In this sense, it is part of incremental, non-linear changes in sub-systems and components that lead to social tipping points (Grimm and Schneider 2011, Smith 2010) or critical junctures (which tend to be clearly identifiable only with the benefit of hindsight, here for instance the collapse of the USSR and the socialist camp of the Cold War, the rise of China due to its domestic reforms of opening-up). The process of social adaptation and transformation after the end of the Cold War tipping point is revealing a number of challenges such as the collapse of order, diffusion and dispersal of power.

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371 This is not the place to argue a causal relationship between globalisation and the collapse of the Soviet Union, but given that the collapse came after the economic and political reforms undertaken by Gorbachev (perestroika and glasnost) to adapt the USSR’s uncompetitive economy to enhance productivity and living standards and to create liberal forms of rule, the odds are that these domestic transformations came about at least to an extent as a response to the challenges of globalisation and the competitiveness pressures brought about by it. However, these major changes did not in the same way affect basic ideas about Russia's identity and its role in the world, well expressed by the often used phrase 'eternal Russia'. In any case the extension of the capitalist way of life to the former communist world – and in particular China - made globalisation truly global.
accelerated globalisation especially financialisation of the market economy (Kocka 2014:92-99),
and the awareness of new complexities and global risks such as climate change (Beck 2010). One
of the lessons from the Asian and Global Financial Crises, but also from the long process of
experimenting with solutions for the climate problem, is that global (and regional) governance is a
‘learning by doing’ process. Epistemic communities, advocacy and science networks therefore
have gained traction, as they provide much of the ‘learning’ inputs.

I understand therefore the overall context of International Society 2.0 as one of accelerated change
in chaotic patterns (especially since the critical juncture marked by the collapse of the socialist
international society in 1991) resulting in increased complexity. With these changes in context key
institutions of international society such as the state, its sovereignty and international law and the
economy also change, albeit slowly. Evolving role relationships reflect these changes replacing
balance of power with competition and cooperation (competitive cooperation? cooperative
competition?) among increasing numbers of actors (G7 superseded by G20 for example). This
acceleration is partly a 'material' one driven by globalisation such as the (uneven) financialisation
of the market economy, ICT etc. Partly it is driven by ideational changes and by the increasing
awareness of global risks (due to crises occurring or to scientific progress (cf. chapter 5 below),
but also because policy-makers focus less exclusively on inter-state violence). But evolution and
change as such are "normal" in the sense that international society has never been a static system
(although it may have looked static during the Cold War). The need to explain ‘change’ in
international society is therefore much less pressing than in a ‘system' approach to IR as change is
an intrinsic feature of social dynamics. It is the drivers of change (for instance the ideological
institutions of international society, globalisation, the trend away from violence) and the pathways
of and obstacles to change (such as the moralisation gaps) which need to be analysed in each case.

These changes explain the multiplication of power’s faces hard, soft and smart (Nye 2002) as
states have to deal with a new context of complex and chaotic anarchy, different logics of
sovereignty and law, changing role relationships and through a wider range of instrumental
institutions of international society. This prompted me to examine the diffusion of power in
complexity and to define institutions of international society in new ways distinguishing different
categories and comparing the evolution in two regions.

3. Change in institutions of international society

The turning point of the Cold War's end was not a turning point in terms of multilateralism as such:
Mazower (2012) traces the rapid evolution of international organisations, internationalisation and
norms back to the 19th century (see also Osterhammel 2011). Norms of co-operation have in the
20th century led to a proliferation of International Organisations and international regimes in
economic and political fields. Their membership increased after the ideological antagonism ended
in 1991. Pinker (2011) has shown similar trends accompanied by strong norm evolution towards
less violence and more trust and socialisation. Those in turn have affected key institutions of
international society in some areas: trade regimes like the WTO and economic organisations like
the BWI have strongly contributed to establishing the market economy as a key institution of
international society. Ideas about post-war criminal justice (the Nuremberg and Tokyo War Crimes
Tribunals, and later those for the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda and others, the Rome Statute of the ICC) and later responsibility to protect, the growth of international trade and finance and the need to manage more and more global public goods such as the environment for example have had an impact on sovereignty as responsibility and more cooperative international relations for some time, most obviously and most consistently in Europe through European integration. Tipping points are thus parts of longer-term, non-linear, dynamic processes and acceleration of change rather than a singular event.

I found that the dynamics and directions of change and social adaptation to change and complexity in the two regions I examined are very different and have produced different understandings of some of the institutions of international society, notably of sovereignty and international law, but also to some extent of the market economy (varieties of capitalism) and the commitment to the provision of public goods and ways to deliver them (or not). Both regions have been quite "successful", depending on one's yardstick, but taking economic growth, prosperity and power as rough indicators. Both regions have evolved in an international context in which constitutive institutions of international society have only been transforming slowly (as postulated in historic institutionalism), not radically as liberal cosmopolitans expected in times of accelerated globalisation and increasing global risk.

Sovereignty and international law have only significantly evolved in the European integration process; elsewhere they have remained relatively 'traditional Westphalian', in particular in NE Asia due to historical pathways and moralisation gaps. The constitutive institution 'market economy', meanwhile, has seen the most dramatic changes since the end of the Cold War, with extension to now nearly all countries, a growth and extension of many global (or regional) regimes and a de-regulation of many areas of economic activity in particular, finance, trade, communication, transport and travel (Kocka 2014:92-99). Even environment pollution has been addressed through market mechanisms (Kyoto Protocol, EU ETS). Crises are part of the 'market model', but have also led to attempts at re-asserting state control for instance after the Asian Financial Crisis (capital controls, national currency reserves and currency swap arrangements) or after the global financial and economic crisis (G20 activities like macro-economic co-ordination, macro-prudential supervision and re-regulation of financial market activities, safety nets, IMF emergency credit lines, national and multilateral bail-outs etc.) or after the European sovereign debt crisis (EU Six-Pack and Two-Pack legislation, European semester, banking union, fiscal compact treaty).

Regions have followed distinct paths, due less to material constraints, but due to ideological institutions of international society: a belief in multilateralism and teamwork in the EU and belief in self-reliance, national wealth and power maximisation (development) in NE Asia. These different approaches, as we saw, are linked less to the challenges of the world of issues themselves, but to earlier historical junctures and moralisation gaps. Differences in the way financial crises affected the two regions or different interests or stages of development of course played a role, but not a decisive one. This means that global governance is not only a ‘rational’ way to manage interests, but its parameters are conditioned to some extent by historical pathways, moralisation gaps and underlying moral belief systems.
The minimal 'Westphalian' norms of internationalisation in NE Asia are producing little multilevel governance and not much institutional change. However, the relative success of NE Asian countries gives these sovereignty-based bilateral approaches to international co-operation rather strong output legitimacy: it works, it is simple and it respects the sovereignty of partners.

The EU, especially since the sovereign debt crisis has confronted existential doubts about the viability of its model of institutionalised and constitutionalised multilevel governance. This has also considerably weakened its hard and soft power (Kundnani 2016). Integration (for instance of monetary policy) or the way it was managed (imbalance with lack of fiscal integration, cost of bail-outs and austerity, political tensions) has been seen as a cause of the sovereign debt crisis. Some analysts, policy-makers and political parties, have argued for a re-nationalisation of EU competences for mainly two reasons: 1) the output legitimacy, speed and efficiency of the EU was low in times of crisis with high political and economic cost during protracted negotiations 2) the input legitimacy in terms of democratic accountability was weak in general, but particularly in doubt because of the enormous importance of the decisions taken during the crisis (although many of those were in fact intergovernmental decisions within the EU framework, rather than EU decisions).

The past success of integration, conversely, can be explained by a relatively high output legitimacy for instance for the single market or regional policy leading to enhanced prosperity and civil liberties and a relatively high level of cohesion at low cost (Dauderstädt 2014) so that democratic accountability could be confined to an incrementally improved balance between the EU institutions (growing powers of the European Parliament, several opt-outs from treaty provisions; Piris 2012). The issues decided at EU level relatively rarely drew citizens' attention or passion. All this changed with the financial crisis. When the economic crisis hit, citizens' prosperity declined, the EU institutions were not able to handle the huge bail-outs through their own budget and many citizens felt that while profits of the financial and banking sector in the past had been privatised, now risks and losses were socialised leading to unemployment, loss of assets and deep cuts in social and public policy budgets. The perception was that austerity was decided in Brussels or Berlin without giving citizens much say. Depending on where people lived, the solidarity between the EU countries was either seen as too costly or insufficient or accompanied by too harsh austerity conditionality. In all cases the EU became the crystallisation point for public anger. The lack of democratic legitimacy and in some cases uncertainty over legal bases for many of the decisions to 'save the euro' or the banks or some countries became manifest. Many politicians and citizens retreated to the national ‘comfort zone’. Yet overall we saw in the case studies of the economic crisis and the EU climate policy that more rather than less integration has been pursued to address critical issues. This produced more centralisation, legislation and accountability at syndicated EU level. This marks a difference to the intergovernmental method of bailouts during the crisis and differs from the national self-reliance in NE Asia.

Political contestation of these endeavours is part of the democratic process of the EU integration rather than evidence for the lack of it. The democratic deficit is often misunderstood. Because the EU member states all have democratically legitimised positions that can be far apart, the processes
of mediation between such positions through the EU institutions lead to compromises. These are in fact multilateral (indirectly representative) democratic procedures creating legitimacy through the syndicated sovereignty. This contrasts with the veto system in most international organisations that really lead to democratic deficits. Renationalisation of competences in the EU would not lead to more democratic legitimacy, because in that case a number of important decisions would simply no longer be made at European level and it should be examined whether national decisions are adequate and effective in the context of the interdependence and complexity of the world of issues (Huberdeau 2017). In this sense intergovernmental modes of decision making may be less democratically legitimate from the international society angle, while they are more legitimate from the nationalist domestic perspective which focuses on state control as superior authority. After all, the EU countries have created common public goods in many areas, which therefore require common decisions to avoid the tragedy of the commons. This is precisely the importance of the constitutionalised multilateralism as opposed to nationalism. National vetoes would in this case not carry a lot of legitimacy.

By comparison to the global multilateral order it is remarkable that the EU - which is clearly a structural institution-based regional variant of the ageing post-War international society - has actually shown an enormous adaptability and capacity to change and to reinvent itself through a series of half a dozen major treaty changes since 1986. The changes in the 1980s starting with the Single European Act and the Single Market Programme were in no small part due to the globalisation economic logic and the thinking in competitiveness of nations terms in the 1980s different from initial motives of European integration (German question cf. chapter I.2). EU membership has more than quadrupled from the original Six in 1951 to twenty-eight in 2013 despite demanding membership criteria. Through several rounds of enlargement the EU brought into its fold the countries in Southern, Northern, Central and South Eastern Europe (many of them new democracies). This increase in membership since the 1950s has surpassed in relative terms that of the UN membership expansion although the UN merely requires statehood as membership criterion (not an adhesion to all its Conventions). The EU also expanded and in some cases deepened the policy areas it covers. Integration has also proven dynamic and innovative in how it functions (several reform treaties introducing majority voting, mutual recognition of industry, health and safety standards in the single market, creation of new institutional mechanisms to deal with sovereign debt crisis for instance or innovative climate policy) compared to the UN or other international organisations. Nevertheless, its institutional functioning is still beset with a number of sometimes fundamental difficulties due to a large extent to the growing size and diversity of the Union, such as difficult decision making in the Council (partly unanimity, partly high thresholds for qualified majorities), a weakening of the European Commission and ambiguous roles of the European Parliament and increasingly differing views in the Member States on the purpose of the EU (for details Piris 2012:20-37; Vollaard 2014; Menon 2014). Institutions got bloated and top-heavy as member states insisted on each having a leading representative. A number of policies of the EU as a consequence also suffer from deficits and imbalances, most obviously in economic and monetary governance (Piris 2012:37-52) and in

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372 The economic crisis in the EU did not stop Estonia from joining the Eurozone in 2011, Latvia in 2014, Lithuania in 2015 nor the accession negotiations with Croatia which joined the EU in 2013 and other Western Balkan countries. Iceland even applied to join as a consequence of the global banking crisis (but withdrew its application after a change of government).
external relations (Vimont 2015). This leads Piris to conclude that the reforms of the Lisbon Treaty (2009) despite progress in many areas were insufficient to meet the needs of the (enlarged) EU and to tackle the imbalances in the EU system. According to Piris (2012:54), my health warning of institutional stagnation (below chapter 4) applies to the EU despite its many reforms over the 60 years of its existence: ‘The EU’s decision-making system was built in the 1950s and aimed at “one-decision-fits-all”. The successive enlargements from six to twenty-seven members have not been followed by the great and bold reform that was necessary. The major elements of the EU system, which should be designed to allow its institutions to take quick and bold decisions, have basically remained the same.’ Piris is exaggerating this point as political stasis was more pronounced in the Europe of the Six or the Nine (blocking UK accession, the ’empty chair crisis’ and the Luxembourg compromise, the shelving of the Werner plans for monetary union, Eurosclerosis; Huberdeau 2017:49-61) and was due to lack of political will or an abuse of the institutions for narrow political ends by individual members (which has incidentally become more difficult with the enlarged membership). Nevertheless, the decade since 2008 has weakened the EU and especially its ‘community method’ due to intergovernmental decision making, shift of power to the Council and the ECB, loss of an important member state (if Brexit is confirmed) with a concurrent reduction of budget contributions, reflex of nationalism (national referenda, Eurosceptic parties, migration fears).

However, even such a pessimistic reading of EU reforms compares favourably with the UN system and the Bretton Woods Institutions: the latter have been unable to adapt themselves to a similar extent even though they have a much more restricted mandate and lower entry barriers for membership. This at least partly explains the launch of new and alternative institutions such as the New Development Bank, the AIIB, the CMIM or even the ESM. The EU, despite severe criticism (Piris 2012) and many problems has actually shown the empirical possibility of a genuinely multilateralist institutionalisation and constitutionalisation which has shown resilience in a context of shifting power and global change. This resilience was put to a severe stress test by the financial crisis and so far the EU looks set to survive the test with adaptation through more integration. It has also shown capacity to adapt through deepening, widening and diversification of institutional arrangements using both the ‘community method’ and intergovernmental agreements. However, the remaining doubts about the EU ‘model’ will only dissipate if the EU manages to deliver economic growth, employment and public goods again and enhances the participation of citizens in the EU decision making.

At the same time as Europe’s multilateralism was put to a severe stress test, global multilateralism has come under pressure and even attack and is failing to deliver. In place of an institutionally consolidated multilateral order, such as the BWI before the ‘Nixon shock’, ‘club diplomacy’ or great power concerts have seen a revival (Badie 2011) and a more fragmented (e.g. New Development Bank, AIIB) and at the same time more networked International Society 2.0 has emerged. Following the isolationist turn in US international policy in 2016/17 there is a leadership deficit for global governance. The EU and China have emerged as candidates for such leadership, albeit with questionmarks about their capacity. But perhaps this development only underlines the inadequacy and anomaly of a singular leadership of international society raising the question of how to organise polycentric governance among countries with different political systems and
approaches to global public goods. The tension between nationalism and multilateralism is at a new stage.

4. Health warning: ageing multilateral institutions

There are (or shall we use the past tense: were?) obvious advantages to the global structured, institutionally organised variant of one-size-fits-all multilateralism, such as the GATT/WTO or the BWI relying on a quite singular leadership (USA). These advantages were favourable for the West which exercised its institutional and productive power largely through such frameworks. Global rules, agreed dispute settlement procedures and processes enhance predictability, trust and limit free-riding features of the 'tragedy of the commons'. Even during the global economic crisis the 'new club' G20 heavily relied on the institutional support of the 'old clubs' the IMF, the Basel Committee of Central Banks and the FSB.

But the existing US-led liberal multilateral order has showed signs of stagnation and ineffectiveness in tackling a range of global issues even before President Trump explicitly abdicated US international leadership. The WTO Doha Development Round is if not dead then in a profound coma and has yielded only very little compared to its initial ambitions. At the Nairobi Ministerial Conference in December 2015 it only narrowly escaped the final toll of the bell. Many development organisations are under scrutiny as independent national policies have lifted more people out of poverty than international aid. The Rio process to promote sustainable development after more than twenty years has not made significant measurable progress in any of its baskets. The international climate negotiations in the UNFCCC framework for instance after initially high hopes were limping from one conference of the parties to the next and have produced an agreement only in Paris in 2015 (in force since 4 November 2016 already ratified by over 160 countries373) which has yet to show results in reaching its objectives to limit global warming. Swift, radical and verifiable emissions reductions have not yet been agreed internationally while global GHG emissions continue to rise despite a global science consensus on the emissions concentration and temperature change limits. National programmes seem at least to gather some momentum374 and domestic action is becoming the 'new green'. So currently the disadvantages of global multilateral institutions have become the focus of attention: organisations and normative-institutional arrangements are difficult to agree, rigid and difficult to change. When they don’t deliver they become unpopular, when they deliver they can be seen as intrusive.

Most global, international organisations reflect the situation of power distribution when they were created and former ideological divisions in their membership or governance arrangements (e.g. UNSC, Bretton Woods Institutions). They cater for the moral belief in sovereign equality with a large dose of ‘organised hypocrisy’ e.g. largely leaving out the Global South and the inequalities of globalisation. They have been unable or slow to adapt and evolve and thus lost legitimacy with the

373 http://unfccc.int/paris_agreement/items/9485.php accessed on 17-10-2017
374 Pilita Clark from the Financial Times reports in the newspaper's September 7, 2014 edition 'Emerging economies outpace G7 on tackling climate change' that the so-called E-7 (seven major emerging economies) had cut their carbon dioxide emissions per dollar of gross domestic product by an average of 1.7 per cent in 2013, while the G7 only managed a 0.2 per cent reduction. The PwC report 'Two degrees of separation: ambition and reality' can be accessed at http://www.pwc.co.uk/assets/pdf/low-carbon-economy-index-2014.pdf
criteria for inherited club membership no longer perceived as in line with current realities or effectiveness or both in times of change. The reaction in Asia to the flawed but imposed policies of the IMF in the 1997/8 financial crisis is a good example (and provided a critical juncture for regional cooperation; Jo 2012) as we saw in chapter III.3.1.

Some multilateral and UN organisations, conventions and processes have gotten paralysed by the sheer number of participants\textsuperscript{375} (UNFCCC, ICAO) or reflect compromises and low common denominators often negotiated over years if not decades: the ineffectiveness of the UNFCCC negotiations and the lack of progress of the UN Earth summit process (Rio 1992 to Rio +20 in 2012) are emblematic for the failure of the classical, intergovernmental multilateralism based on sovereign equality of all states big or small. Regimes that eschew both the team work model and club diplomacy ('concert of great powers') but rely on consensus and international bargaining in a competitive role relationship tend to be ineffective. The UNFCCC negotiations have an ambivalent record at best as we will see below – on the one hand the international science panel on climate change (IPCC) has created perhaps for the first time in human history a global – cosmopolitan - science consensus which has compelled most nations to act on climate change, however, on the other hand the negotiations themselves have been held hostage by the old inter-national principles and national interest driven positions (notably consensus, insistence on sovereignty and non-interference, domestic action instead of internationally binding agreements and accountability) but also different interpretations of the responsibilities (redistributive justice; Friman and Hjerpe 2015; Barrett/Stavins 2003) characteristic of the competitive relationships I defined in chapter II.4.7.

Normative concepts developed (or imposed) in particular periods by the powers that be – for example the ‘Washington Consensus’ or OECD guidelines - have been under pressure from developing and emerging countries which feel that their ideas on international society and what norms should regulate it have not been fairly taken account of although they often do not clearly articulate any new norms, but simply insist on fair representation and status for instance in the UNSC, BWI etc. Most governance reforms in these institutions move at a glacial pace or not at all. Some emerging countries are increasingly frustrated with the (Western) resistance to reform and some have therefore joined up to create alternative institutions irrespective of their domestic political systems. Western countries, by contrast, balk at the continued insistence of some fast-growing emerging countries to be still considered 'developing' countries instead of taking on responsibilities for the global commons.

Interests and values of emerging countries beyond self-help and national sovereignty are not yet well and consistently articulated in terms of what they stand for. They cannot always agree amongst themselves: for instance, when the IMF had to replace its managing director Strauss-Kahn, emerging and developing countries challenged the tradition of appointing a European official and argued that one of their own should take the helm of the IMF, but they could not agree a single candidate, so that they lost to Christine Lagarde. But they increasingly articulate

\textsuperscript{375} Contrary to the EU or OECD which have strict entry requirements, and the League of Nations which did not admit micro-states like Liechtenstein, San Marino or Andorra (Mazower 2012:268-70) any state, however minuscule, can become a member of the UN. UN membership has increased dramatically from 51 members in 1945 to 193 in 2011. http://www.un.org/en/members/growth.shtml (accessed on 11.12.2011)
what they stand against (like non-intervention, non-interference, non-accountability, non-binding obligations in international agreements for instance for emissions reductions) and often use their national sovereignty to block international cooperation and agreements which are not in their national interest. The US can often be found in a similar situation (not only since Trump’s Presidency), focused on domestic politics and national interest rather than international accountability and ignoring international regimes when it suits them (Terhalle and Depledge 2013; Goldsmith 2000), even occasionally the ones the US had itself promoted (e.g. Nixon shock; 2003 invasion of Iraq without UNSC authorisation).

Passive resistance to institutional dominance of the ‘old system’ has started to change to a more active stance with emerging countries, notably China, taking concrete initiatives to supplement the current institutional architecture for instance by creating a New Development Bank (BRICS)376 which includes a Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA) or the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). South Korea created the Global Green Growth Institute and proposed to the G20 to create global financial safety nets and to change the agenda of international development policy from aid effectiveness to development effectiveness (Busan High Level Forum 2011377). These may be seen as first steps to a more polycentric governance in particular as these countries underline that their new initiatives are supplementing existing institutions, not replacing them.

Interestingly, the shareholders in the BRICS Bank bargained hard about the governance structure, with China pushing for the model of other development banks (one dollar, one vote) while India and Brazil favoured the 'one country, one vote' principle which better reflects the sovereign equality. The latter governance model was finally adopted at the BRICS summit in Fortaleza in July 2014, so that the 'New Development Bank' is indeed new in terms of internal governance structures compared to other multilateral development banks378.

The US (and to some extent European countries) resist reform of the global multilateral institutions notably the BWI. They find themselves increasingly in a situation where they want to have both the cake and eat it, but the cream of the cake is turning sour: the US is not willing to give up its control and veto in the BWI and other regimes, but it has also blocked the modest reforms of the IMF governance agreed in 2010 mostly at European countries' expense (Congress has only approved them late in 2015 although the US suffered no loss of influence in this reform package). At the same time as it was blocking these reforms the US wanted to prevent its allies from joining the Chinese initiative to create an Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) which was portrayed rather unconvincingly as a strategic challenge to the US-led liberal order. Trying to cling to its institutional power without compromise diminished the US’s productive power when most of the US allies decided to join, noting that the AIIB was likely to become an

376 Stephany Griffith-Jones (2014) in a paper for UNCTAD calls the BRICS Development Bank a dream coming true that fills existing gaps in the southern financial architecture.


378 The bank will be based in Shanghai and India will be the first Chair. It will begin with a subscribed capital of 50 billion USD divided equally between the five founders. It should start lending in 2016 and is open to new members as long as the BRICS capital share doesn't drop below 55%. The CRA will be held in the reserves of each BRICS country, with China contributing 41 billion USD, Brazil, India and Russia 18 billion each and South Africa 5 billion. In case of need China could draw up to half of its contribution, South Africa double its share and the others the amount they paid in. http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/07/16/us-brics-summit-bank-idUSKBN0FK08V20140716 accessed 8.10.2014
important addition to the financing needs for infrastructure that the traditional BWI and the ADB were not able to effectively address (Renard 2015). Li Keqiang, China’s Premier in an interview with the Financial Times on 31 March 2015\(^{379}\) said: ‘And the initiative of AIIB is not to reinvent the wheel. Rather it is intended to be a supplement to the existing financial system. China wants to work with others to uphold the existing financial system. And we are ready to continue to play our role in building the current international financial system. And if there is a need for reforming the current system, we are also ready to work with other countries to help make the system more just, reasonable and balanced.’ It is perhaps not a coincidence that only after the creation of the AIIB the US Congress finally agreed to the IMF governance reforms agreed in the G20 process in 2010. Similarly, the abandoning of the TPP agreement by the US has reduced US multilateral productive power and upset Asian regionalism.

We are thus witnessing a dispersal of power to new actors as well as attempts to enhance the effectiveness and fairness of the international multilateral order, not its replacement with something different. In other multilateral regimes emerging countries joined without changing the rules, as they had been more flexible and subject to negotiations, for instance the WTO. This newer generation of multilateral institutions of the BWI family, the WTO, was about welfare gains, not costs, and driven by a strong business lobby for trade liberalisation. Even so each negotiation round was very difficult and went years beyond schedule. The WTO *acquis* functions, but could also unravel if major partners do not respect supranational dispute settlement panels' findings\(^{380}\). Further liberalisation package negotiations in the Doha round seem unlikely to succeed. The European Think Tanks Group (2014) has pointed to problems of international trade regulation and the inability of national regulators to manage the fiancialised global economy.

In this situation there are three responses by emerging and developing countries:

1) self-help and national sovereignty as we noted in NE Asia’s responses to the financial crises and climate change (a response that has also gained popularity in the US and in some European countries as the Brexit shows)

2) setting up functional multilateral alternatives to the existing ageing multilateral institutions incuding regional ones like the CMIM or AIIB or transnational ones like the NDB (a response by emerging powers such as China, India or South Korea)

3) Joining new ‘clubs’ including traditional and new ‘great powers’ such as the G20 or MEM/MEF (attractive for the middle powers).

These responses point to either a more multipolar or a more polycentric order. We can see that emerging and developing countries eschew hierarchies in which they themselves are not part of the top tier: Integration à la EU is not among the pathways for major players. In a global perspective we find loosely overlapping (and often competing) centres of (functional) authority which are only slowly institutionalising and developing relations amongst them and which are contested (Zürn 2015:330-1). It is interesting to note that Steffen Martus in his book about the German Enlightenment describes the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation as a broad array


\(^{380}\) See Shawn Donnan ‘WTO plunged into crisis as doubts grow over its future’ *Financial Times* August 1, 2014.
of overlapping and intricate (verflechtet) communities in different functional areas (political, legal, military, economic, order, information) that functioned as a system of competing interests in permanent flux and contestation (Martus 2015:215). He also finds that this prima facie disorderly system of governance proved one of the most stable and long lived in German history. Without stretching the comparison too far (Henry 2010, cf. II.4.6.2), some of that does remind of the progress of European integration or the broader situation of global governance, corroborating perhaps through a distant historical analogy Zürn’s findings that loosely coupled, contested and competing spheres of authority in global governance do not imply weakness (Zürn 2015:330-1). In fact, these may be characteristics of emerging polycentric governance at international level that needs to be on IR’s research agenda. This more optimistic view seems corroborated by recent events:

Despite the crisis, the EU’s single market, four freedoms and currency union seem to have been less affected by the ‘ageing’ multilateralism: The EU did not break up or revert to anarchic power struggles, although the departure of the UK will affect it. It instead followed its pathway to a more integrated (but also more differentiated; Piris 2012) institutional method and developed a number of mechanisms and legal frameworks to address the crisis. The EU has made a number of institutional improvements, although a widespread judgement was 'too little, too late' and the process raised new questions on the EU’s democratic accountability (Longo and Murray 2011; Huberdeau 2017).

More generally, despite all sorts of hardships, dramatic reverberations in parts of the world and policy mistakes the global financial crisis has not plunged the world into a Great Depression as in the 1930s and has not led to worst-case scenarios of conflict reminiscent of the 20th century (including in NE Asia where the Great Depression was a crucial factor fuelling Japan’s imperialism). Drezner (2012) finds: 'Despite initial shocks that were actually more severe than the 1929 financial crisis, global economic governance structures responded quickly and robustly. Whether one measures results by economic outcomes, policy outputs, or institutional flexibility, global economic governance has displayed remarkable resiliency since 2008. Multilateral economic institutions performed well in crisis situations to reinforce open economic policies, especially in contrast to the 1930s.' Countries seem to have learnt from previous crises in ideational and institutional terms. However, there are also doubts about the explanatory value of liberal institutionalist approaches: the global financial crisis has so far not resulted in a new economic and financial system (no new Bretton Woods ‘moment’ – Helleiner 2010) except the creation of the G20 summit process, of the Financial Stability Board (FSB), of the Basle III agreement etc. It yielded only very meagre reforms of the BWI (the BWI small voting rights reforms, new credit lines, MAP) (Lesage e.a. 2013). In the aftermath of the crisis there are indicators of growing fragmentation: Europe created its own ‘IMF’ with the ESM, BRICS launched the New Development Bank and China the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. Globally the ‘club diplomacy’ of the G20 and other such formations could be the anti-ageing ointment for the ageing multilateralism or the harbingers of polycentric governance. But we will see below that this alternative also faces challenges.
5. Global risk – a game changer for international society?

Beyond the challenges to the ageing multilateral system largely due to economic and discursive (productive) power shifts, increasing complexity of challenges and institutional deadlock, risk and uncertainty in a complex world of issues increasingly undermine the international order created after 1945.

The economic aspects of complexity and uncertainty as part of the globalisation process are clearly an important change to be studied in the field of IR not only in IPE. The inclusion of the market economy in my list of constitutive institution of International Society 2.0 reflects this and the implications are critical: Beyond the well-studied phenomenon of interdependence, risk taking including credit-financed investments and speculation on future gains is central to the modern day economy and entrepreneurial activity (for Kocka 2014:21 risk-taking is part of the definition of capitalism). The financial system is especially prone to risk taking (with many incentives for investment bankers and shareholders) and the financial crisis has shown that the risk is systemic and especially in its links to the real economy unfolding in chaos-patterns. Therefore, regulatory and macro-prudential supervisory activity by states is a necessary financial safety net. In order to be effective such regulation has to follow the network pattern and it has to be multilateral, albeit not necessarily global as the EU example showed. At a minimum, it needs to comprise the key nodes of the global network (Oatley e.a. 2012).

Economic risk and crisis clearly has been a major dramatic reality for international order, seen sometimes at the verge of collapse (like in the 1930s). But beyond the possible impact of these global risks on states’ autonomy which is similar to the ones discussed in the context of economic globalisation, global risks may affect the state system or international society in a different way, as a game changer through their chaotic complexity. The global financial crisis was seen as a risk of economic ‘meltdown’ with huge implications for international society. Different from this 'conscious', but still complex and often unpredictable risk-taking, there are other risks much further removed from the control of the state actors such as climate change. The challenges of climate change are often presented as a threat to all humanity creating a community of fate. Thus ‘risk society' presents a particularly challenging and novel dimension of global governance.

Global risks are often securitised (Buzan and Waever 2003) – notably by countries that focus on national sovereignty - and called non-traditional security (NTS) although there is no agreed definition of what is traditional and non-traditional security (Wissenbach 2010a; Barnett and Adger 2007; Council of the EU 2008; Richardson e.a. 2009). The degree of securitisation differs, but has risen over the decades since the end of the Cold War with the diminishing focus on the military balance (CNA 2007; Wissenbach 2010a). However, threats to security, traditionally seen as 'high politics' have also dramatically changed and complexified the policy makers’ international security agenda with a new focus on international terrorism most obviously since 2001. States remain key actors in ‘risk society’, like they remain in the globalisation dynamics, but many threats to national security such as terrorism, climate change, economic crises or pandemics no
longer emanate that much from other states or even clearly identifiable actors\footnote{A simple truck can be seen as a vehicle of globalisation, a source of climate change and even a weapon for terrorists…}, but from much more complex, diffuse and chaotic dynamics. The traditional institutions of (liberal) multilateralism (national-interest based negotiations premised on consensus in the UN framework) are clearly not able to cope with such challenges, at least not with sufficient speed and effectiveness (Scott 2008).

In a less security focused perspective environmental issues get closely linked to globalist perspectives not least because of the impact of economic activity on the environment and the earth’s climate (externalities in the sense of Hardin’s tragedy of the commons; cf also the IWR 2014 report on sustainability indicators). They are the essence of what is generally accepted as the main focus for (global) governance. This perspective is notably held by the ‘multilateralist’ EU. But ecologists question the adequacy of the contemporary sovereign state system, arguing that it is structurally unable to solve collective action dilemmas (Goodin 1992) or to take an ethical point of view to protect nature (Eckersley 1992).

Beck (2010) makes some key points concerning these risks:
1) they are not limited to one geographic location and do not respect nation-state borders
2) past experience is not a guide to possible future catastrophes and
3) because of the complexity and length of chains of effect it has become difficult to assign clear causes and effects (e.g. for financial crises, but also the long timespan of several generations to understand the causes of anthropogenic climate change and more generally my point on chaos dynamics)

But Beck goes one step further than most analysts who essentially describe global challenges in similar terms but stop at the concept of the collective action dilemma (Barrett/Stavins 2003; Hardin 1968). And this step is a challenge to the structural realist assumption that the international system has not fundamentally changed. Waltz (2000:5) asks ‘What sort of changes would alter the international political so profoundly that old ways of thinking would no longer be relevant? Changes of the system would do it; changes in the system would not. (…) If the system were transformed, international politics would no longer be international politics, and the past would no longer serve as a guide to the future.’ Beck (2010:132) is answering that question by describing a purported “cosmopolitan moment” (or why not a “cosmopolitan tipping point”?): ‘The belief that the risks facing humanity can be averted by political action taken on behalf of endangered humanity becomes an unprecedented resource for consensus and legitimation, nationally and internationally. In this sense, the fundamental principles of modernity, including the free market principle and the nation-state order itself, become subject to change.’ Beck argues that such existential risk for humanity cuts through the ‘self-sufficiency of cultures, languages, religions and systems as much as through the national and international agenda of politics’ and connects people with each other that would otherwise not want to have anything to do with each other (137). Global norms could be created in such a way, in a cosmopolitan moment of communication, for instance on climate change. The Paris Agreement falls short on that benchmark.

\footnote{Note the parallel, point 2 above, between Beck and Waltz here.}
According to Beck (2010:127-8) modern society has become a risk society in the sense that it is debating, preventing and managing risks that society itself has produced. These risks are often incalculable both in terms of occurrence and consequences (e.g. once the climate has changed irrevocably it is too late to act) something climate scientists refer to as a tipping point. A tipping point is a critical point at which a state of a system is qualitatively altered, often due to strongly non-linear, extreme responses by components in the climate system suggesting that these changes are irreversible (Grimm and Schneider 2011:4-5; IPCC 2014). Therefore prediction, prevention and precaution have become key principles while uncertainty and not-knowing present a dilemma for policymakers (Beck 2010:131). These are also exploited by vested interests (e.g. those who deny climate change is anthropogenic) and visible in the different priorities regarding climate change and how to internationally address it between the two regions (cf. III.3.2.). Risks exist in a permanent state of virtuality and it is the anticipation of catastrophe, not catastrophe itself, which produces a compulsion to act. Consequently, Beck argues that the old paradigmatic threat to security has not become obsolete since the end of the Cold War, but the dangers now perceived are of a different order. They often lack a clearly identifiable agent, a hostile intent or military potential – it is manufactured uncertainty and thus a difference to earlier calculable security threats (Giddens 1999:4,6). Risk is not reducible to the product of probability of occurrence multiplied with the intensity and scope of potential harm as in game or utility theories. Beck sees it as a social construct. 'Modern societies are shaped by new kinds of risks and manufactured uncertainties, their foundations are shaken by the global anticipation of global catastrophes.' (Beck 2010:129). But since risk is a social construct, societies differ in how it is conceived of e.g. securitised or as a development challenge (Wissenbach 2010a; IWR 2014) or as a problem of historical justice. For instance, in the climate change negotiations the latter is usually framed as a moralisation gap between the rich early industrialisers and their legacy of pollution as opposed to more recent polluters such as the emerging countries (for China see Godement 2017:10-11) or the countries trapped in industrial underdevelopment, suffering the ecological damage of climate change without contributing to its causes (such as Tuvalu – Khor 2015; Friman and Hjerpe 2015). These multiple perspectives dilute the 'community of fate' idea.

Global risk in International Society 2.0 can be analysed from at least these three perspectives:
1) an issue which shapes and constitutes the complex anarchy in which International Society 2.0 operates (the world of issues is not only economic)
2) an issue for global governance, i.e. how states deal with challenges in the role relationships identified in the previous chapters (nationalism versus multilateralism).
3) an issue of moralisation gaps and historical justice in the creation or perception of risk and how to manage it (for instance grievances exploited by terrorists, economic inequality, historic and present responsibility for GHG emissions, unequal access to and quality of health services during pandemics, polluters and victims of pollution etc.)

Beck distinguishes between unintended catastrophes (climate change, financial crises – those I

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383 Sometimes literally: Accusations have been levelled at pharmaceutiical companies to exaggerate risks of pandemics in order to obtain funds for developing vaccines or increase their sales. Politicians also tend to manufacture risk for electoral and other political reasons. This can increase uncertainty if the trust in politics is eroded.
focused on in part III.4) which are ambivalent, as they affect different people differently through threats and opportunities and the intentional catastrophes, such as terrorism, which are not ambivalent as they cannot provide any opportunities (2010:132). Giddens (1999:7-8) introduces the link of risk to responsibility in particular the ambiguous absence of clear causality, agency or accountability which in turn affects decision-making. Yet it is precisely these issues of responsibility and accountability – and associated cost or compensation – that dominate international negotiations.

Beck’s argument that mankind faces a cosmopolitan moment shows that there are serious attempts to redefine the international system as such, not only transformations within it. This would then be the tipping point or a critical juncture (and in Waltz's language a change of the system). However, a problem with Beck’s argument is that it is highly speculative and not backed up with empirical evidence. Certainly, most governments/states (and many citizens) have become acutely aware that global challenges are on the one hand beyond their traditional means to deal with them and on the other hand directly affect their domestic agenda if not their core interests like development (Leggewie and Welzer 2013) or in the case of small island states their very survival. States are also aware that such risks cannot be dealt with through traditional military force, economic hard power or traditional diplomacy (dialogues and treaties, balancing, bandwagoning, buck passing) as these risks do not emanate from other nation-states or even tangible non-state-actors (such as terrorist groups or individual companies). Nevertheless, this awareness doesn’t stop many states from trying such tactics in the international negotiations mainly to avoid accountability, obligations and costs. This indicates that the ‘global community of fate’ has not been internalised by most states despite overwhelming scientific evidence and a lot of rhetoric. Most states continue to address the issue through ‘game theory’ (tragedy of the commons), cost-benefit calculations and hard-nosed negotiations and buck-passing with accountability mainly defined in nationalist terms as we have seen in the case studies in part III.4.

Maybe in the G20 we come closest to Beck’s idea that people who would normally not sit together and talk about their domestic affairs suddenly agree mutual surveillance of macroeconomic policy and global regulation for the financial sector (Drezner 2012). However limited and timid these G20 actions may seem, they signal on the one hand a possible departure from a nation-centred to a global or cosmopolitan realpolitik and on the other hand show that Beck’s cosmopolitan moment has not yet come, given the prevailing priority of defending national sovereignty and interests or pursuing a national agenda despite agreement in the global forum on a few urgent matters in everyone’s interest, such as repairing the global financial safety net. The global ‘community of fate’ was only briefly a binding glue when the world leaders feared that the global economy was going to break down.

Beck's idea of a cosmopolitan moment has to contend with the empirical persistence of nationalism (in particular in NE Asia but also in the US as we have seen in the previous chapters) despite crises and global risks of all kinds (climate change, terrorism, piracy, pandemics...). Nationalism has not been weakened by globalisation or by democratic transitions (Shin 2007:23). It has just been transformed from violent power politics to non-violent competitive or rivalry relationships in a context of power diffusion. Sometimes states in international society are at least
trying to address collective action problems or global risks out of shared self-interest. So far only syndicated, constitutionalised multilateralism and a bridging of moralisation gaps (as in the EU) have been able to diminish the importance of nationalism as an ideological institution of international society and to establish deeply multilateralist team-work forms of governance with both input and output legitimacy (III. 3.1 and 3.2).

The concept of risk society as developed by Beck and Giddens has a normative character beyond global governance in the conventional understanding: the authors argue for alternatives to the state system and a transition to a world society (Beck 2010, Giddens 1999, Habermas 2011) and are joined by Zhao (2005) with his World Enlightened Empire from a Chinese perspective (cf. below ch. 7). However, how the transition could be achieved remains vague and speculative, eschewing the question on exactly how the alternatives should come about and be conceived of in reality. Yet, the basic issues of risk society can also - and arguably better - be conceived of within the concept of International Society 2.0. In this concept, I argue that risk society can be understood as a crucial element of the complex anarchy and uncertainty that I hypothesised. Such a complex anarchy is actually a 'more anarchic anarchy' than the traditional understanding in IR of anarchy simply as the lack of a higher level of government above the states. A supranational level of authority would not necessarily perform much better in addressing complexity, inequality and moralisation gaps, it could only hypothetically come about after these issues have been addressed (as the European integration process indicates). Complex anarchy is more anarchic because of the distinctive feature Beck and other authors have so well argued: complexity and multiple and unattributable causality of risks instead of clear and present threats from a distinct 'other state / political unit'.

The complex anarchy in a risk society (similar to the logic of globalisation) goes beyond the traditional one based on (inter-state) violence and sovereign autonomy to include chaos, tipping points and uncertain causes and effects. But just like states have adapted to the market logic of globalisation, states can also adapt instrumental and mechanical institutions of international society to risk society and develop new role-relationships (which co-exist with others and may be temporary for instance until a crisis is over or an issue tackled). States are adept at delaying their dissolution that the cosmopolitanist authors are arguing for and stick to inter-state cooperation to address global challenges, for instance through upholding the UNFCCC process while devising other strategies to pragmatically deal with preventing or adapting to climate change (MEM/MEF, EU climate and energy package, China’s domestic agenda of reducing carbon intensity).

5.1. The climate change challenge: Live and let die?

Global warming or climate change is a consequence of mostly anthropogenic GHG\textsuperscript{384} concentrations in the atmosphere that are unprecedented in the last 800,000 years (IPCC 2014:4\textsuperscript{385}). It has become a major topic on the international political, security, economic, social and of course environmental agenda. The issue quite spectacularly moved up from low politics to high politics in a decade. International negotiations to prevent dangerous climate change have been going on since the end of the 1980s with the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change

\textsuperscript{384} Under the Kyoto Protocol: carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, hydrofluorocarbons, perfluorocarbon and sulphur hexafluoride.

(UNFCCC) adopted at the Rio UN Conference on Environment and Development in 1992 and in force since 1994\textsuperscript{386}. A key feature of the climate change challenge is that it is ‘global, unequal, long-lived, and uncertain’ (Tol 2012:289). Therefore designing a comprehensive climate change regime is extremely difficult given the multiplicity of cooperation problems, divergent interests, the amount of financing needed for mitigation and adaptation and the problem of short-term versus long-term cost benefit distribution with different relative gains and losses for the different countries and considerable uncertainty over which measures governments are able and willing to implement and how they would impact on the trajectory and effects of global warming in different parts of the world (Purdon 2014). It is an excellent example of the complexity that I saw as behind the diffusion of power and the challenges of the world of issues for International Society 2.0

\textquoteleft Between 1750 and 2011 cumulative anthropogenic CO2 emissions to the atmosphere were 2040 \pm 310 \text{ GtCO2}. About 40\% of these emissions have remained in the atmosphere (880 \pm 35 \text{ GtCO2}); the rest was removed from the atmosphere and stored on land (in plants and soils) and in the ocean. The ocean has absorbed about 30\% of the emitted anthropogenic CO2, causing ocean acidification. About half of the anthropogenic CO2 emissions between 1750 and 2011 have occurred in the last 40 years.’ (IPCC 2014:4). Considering current commitments of GHG emission reductions (including the gap between the Paris Agreement’s ambition and the INDCs for UNFCCC COP 21 about which the Decision 1/CP.21 itself expresses ‘serious concern’\textsuperscript{387}), the concentrations will still continue to rise, making it almost impossible to limit the global warming to just 2°C above pre-industrial levels and more likely to somewhere near 4°C by the end of the century: ‘Without additional efforts to reduce GHG emissions beyond those in place today, global emissions growth is expected to persist, driven by growth in global population and economic activities. Global mean surface temperature increases in \textit{2100} in baseline scenarios—those without additional mitigation—range from 3.7°C to 4.8°C above the average for 1850–1900 for a median climate response. They range from 2.5°C to 7.8°C when including climate uncertainty’ (IPCC 2014:20).

\textbf{5.2. The world is not enough}

While governments have been negotiating about reducing GHG emissions for two decades, those emissions have continued to increase relentlessly while global energy has become more carbon intensive, not less. Some scientists have argued that climate change is among the earth-system processes and associated thresholds, which if crossed, could generate unacceptable environmental change pushing beyond the ‘planetary boundaries’. These scientists argue that a new era in the earth’s history has arisen – the Anthropocene – because ‘human actions have become the main driver of global environmental change’ beyond the boundaries of ‘the safe operating space for humanity with the planet’s bio-physical subsystems or processes’ (Rockström e.a. 2009:472). They

\textsuperscript{386} The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change is an environmental treaty produced at the UN Conference on Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro in 1992. The treaty as originally framed set no mandatory limits on GHG emissions for individual nations and contained no enforcement provisions; rather the treaty included provisions for updates (called protocols) that would set mandatory emission limits. The principal update was the Kyoto Protocol signed in 1997 at the Conference of Parties (COP) the highest organ of the UNFCCC and more recently the Paris Agreement sealed by COP 21 (http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2015/cop21/eng/10a01.pdf accessed on 18.4.2016). The complexity of the negotiations with over 190 state parties on two parallel but separate tracks has been a serious challenge.

\textsuperscript{387} http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2015/cop21/eng/10a01.pdf accessed on 18.4.2016.
also stress that Earth’s sub-systems can react in nonlinear, often abrupt ways sensitive to thresholds that are not easy to determine – in line with my thesis on the chaotic anarchy of complexity and the challenges of risk society. These scientists, as well as their critics (Breakthrough Blog 22 June 2012388), do emphasise that ‘determining a safe distance involves normative judgements of how societies choose to deal with risk and uncertainty’ (Rockström e.a. 2009:473) and ‘future metrics of environmental change must make the connection to particular human and environmental outcomes and values explicit (...) only when the trade-offs of environmental change, and the political and ethical implications of proposed limits, are made transparent, can a useful discussion of the ethics and politics of environmental change in the Anthropocene proceed.’ (Breakthrough Blog 22 June 2012). This discussion among scientists shows that the political agenda needs to deal with the implications of risk society and the diversity of values in the international society. To some extent these value differences and associated moralisation gaps are structuring the international negotiations, beyond mere cost-benefit based rational bargaining and beyond the exercise of traditional power (Terhalle and Depledge 2013).

While for some scientists the world is not enough, for some social scientists the way the world is presently run is not enough. A critical fallacy of the climate change problem (and similarly of the financial system) is intrinsically linked to the problems of the state system in globalisation and to accountability issues: Negotiations take place between states, while emissions are produced by companies, cars and cows. When gases are emitted they don’t carry passports crossing borders, but when they are to be reduced they become national. States are held responsible for reducing GHG emissions on their territory, protecting their citizens from impacts of climate change even though emissions are caused by non-state actors and spread into the global commons (atmosphere). In the financial crisis states were similarly held responsible for bailing out ‘their’ banks while bankers continued to earn huge salaries and had expanded their dealings way beyond the national economy. The state’s traditionally defined gate-keeper role between external and internal issues as a characteristic of sovereignty (Sperling 2010) is being challenged quite fundamentally by the dynamics of the issues described here as complexity and risk society, but at the same time this gate-keeper role is being jealously preserved in the international negotiation dynamics. Moreover, there is a problem of leadership and consensus-building in this complex situation (Schwerhoff 2016; Friman and Hjerpe 2015)

Arguably the moralisation gaps and material inequalities that get linked to nationalism make the intergovernmental negotiations and a cosmopolitan consensus also extremely difficult. From this perspective, states as such are not the problem, but the huge discrepancies in the human condition and views on justice and equity across world society. Therefore, international society has to come up with agonistic mechanisms that acknowledge differences, inequalities and moralisation gaps and address them politically.

The threat of global warming provides a fertile ground for cosmopolitan projects at various levels of society and politics (Leggewie and Welzer 2011; Beck 2010). Often radical theories show how crucial climate change has become for political (and economic) theory in general and for IR (Purdon 2014 opposes a neoclassical realist theory to mainstream neoliberal institutionalist and

constructivist approaches). It is clearly an important matter for international society (both in reality and in theory). Climate change has been framed as a fundamental challenge to mainstream international and economic theory. Green political theory rejects anthropocentrism and proposes a new ethics comprising a holistic view of the human and non-human interests and those of future generations (Eckersley 1992; Paterson 2005). Such theories point to the limits to growth (even ‘sustainable’ development which eco-radicals see as the recuperation of environmentalism by traditional political elites). Such ethical approaches also underpin the papal encyclical letter Laudato si 2015\textsuperscript{389}. The postulated harmony of nature as opposed to the destructive exploitation of nature by the human race is also a feature in Chinese political thought: Zhao (2005) for instance deplores the Western concept of the world as a resource to be exploited as opposed to an Eastern holistic philosophy of everything under Heaven (see below chapter 7). In this line of thought there are various ideas on how to translate eco-centrism into practice ranging from supranational world government to local community-led reinvention of politics, over polycentric governance (Ostrom 2009; Araral and Hartley 2013) to more familiar liberal-institutionalist reforms of international politics to address the urgency and scale of the issue. Global warming and environmental issues are at the heart of concepts of risk society as we have seen (Giddens 1999, Beck 2010) and the precautionary principle is seen as key to avoid the possibility of catastrophe (an irreversible tipping point for the climate) in highly complex scientific and economic scenarios: \textit{The precise levels of climate change sufficient to trigger abrupt and irreversible change remain uncertain, but the risk associated with crossing such thresholds increases with rising temperature. For risk assessment, it is important to evaluate the widest possible range of impacts, including low-probability outcomes with large consequences.} (IPCC 2014:13) As we have seen the EU has made the precautionary principle a legally enshrined Treaty provision (cf. chapter III.3.2.) and is thus part of an epistemic community advocating the translation of improved scientific knowledge into environmental policy (Purdon 2014:306).

Climate change thus throws up a number of challenges facing international society: It reveals the problem in international politics of the dominance of the nation state (here both too small and too big to deal with the problem: ‘think globally act locally’ as opposed to interest calculations in relative terms and free riding in collective action; Purdon 2014) and the (untested) dynamics of polycentric governance involving other actors (Thiel 2016) to deal with chaotic complexity. It reflects the multilateral and cosmopolitan principles (the earth as one and common, the ‘artificiality’ of slicing emissions by nations) and shows the ‘uselessness’ of violence and balance of power for addressing this challenge and the moralisation gaps between victims and perpetrators (here polluters, industrialised versus developing countries).

5.3. Climate change as a challenge for international governance

Climate change is a fundamental challenge to the planet and human society. There is a certain inevitability of global warming due to the long-term effects of accumulation of greenhouse gases (GHG) in the atmosphere and there is the inter-generational dimension of causes, effects and

responsibility. These complex links and challenges to the economy and development perspectives of many countries make the climate change challenge particularly difficult to address in conventional inter-state governance: ‘The design of climate policy is influenced by how individuals and organizations perceive risks and uncertainties and take them into account. Methods of valuation from economic, social and ethical analysis are available to assist decision-making. These methods can take account of a wide range of possible impacts, including low-probability outcomes with large consequences. But they cannot identify a single best balance between mitigation, adaptation and residual climate impacts. Climate change has the characteristics of a collective action problem at the global scale, because most GHGs accumulate over time and mix globally, and emissions by any agent (e.g. individual, community, company, country) affect other agents. Effective mitigation will not be achieved if individual agents advance their own interests independently. Cooperative responses, including international cooperation, are therefore required to effectively mitigate GHG emissions and address other climate change issues. The effectiveness of adaptation can be enhanced through complementary actions across levels, including international cooperation. The evidence suggests that outcomes seen as equitable can lead to more effective cooperation.’ (IPCC 2014:17). The IPCC here concludes with a liberal game-theory position on international cooperation that seems to underestimate the different perceptions of and moralisation gaps on risks and responsibility and the relative gains and losses in the multilevel cooperation process in which the IPCC focuses on the aggregate global level (cf. Purdon 2014:305-6 for a realist critique focussing on the relative gains at nation-state level and Ostrom 2009 arguing for multiple levels approach, not just a global level). It is widely agreed that global action, despite many obstacles, is necessary (but not enough) to tackle the climate change phenomenon, incidentally making it a major challenge for nationalist approaches. The question is then which form multilateral action can take. The Kyoto Protocol has tried a combination of hard law (legally binding emission reductions for industrialised countries) and market mechanisms to facilitate buy-in (see Purdon 2014 for arguments why carbon trading is more effective than climate funds).

The international UNFCCC process has produced the Paris Agreement which has abandoned the hard law and shifted to soft law and a bottom-up ‘pledge and review’ approach based on domestic action pledges (Article 4). Most observers profess scepticism about the chances to meet the 2 degrees objective and the level of ambition, through the Agreement pointing to the risk of backsliding (see ch. III.4.2.2 about NE Asia’s commitments). On the positive side there is the commitment to a global multilateral endeavour with in-built mechanisms to revise ambitions upward (stock-taking starts in 2023) and various initiatives promoting clean energy and shifts away from fossil fuels hence, it may be that the international agreement has been a catalyst for a plethora of global action by various actors. The pledge of US states and cities to continue their own low carbon policies despite their abandonment by the federal government shows that global and local action does not rely solely on inter-national action and commitments.

International cooperation has worked reasonably well in many areas e.g. trade regimes. The instrumental and mechanical institutions of international society, such as ‘more successful’ existing

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390 http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2015/cop21/eng/10a01.pdf accessed on 18.4.2016. It is set to enter into force in 2020 provided 55 parties responsible for 55% of emissions will have ratified it.
regimes on trade and economic cooperation show some fundamental differences compared to the one being negotiated to address the climate change challenge. Mathys and de Melo (2011:16) who analyse climate change policies from a political economy angle point to the difference with the global trade regime: ‘Providing for the public good of a suitable climate is now recognized as the biggest challenge of global governance displacing in importance the provision of an open trading system as a universal public good. Reciprocity in trade relations along with a few general principles (non-discrimination, binding of tariff reductions, a weak dispute settlement process at the GATT) and a "live and let live" philosophy contributed to the enormous success under the GATT-led multilateral negotiations. Unfortunately such reciprocity is absent when it comes to climate change and countries that do not mitigate cannot be deprived of clean air.’ Conversely the tensions between the immediate pursuit of economic growth and the long-term consequences of climate change could be summed up as ‘live and let die’. In the end multilateral trade is built on bilateral trade flows from A to B. Hence, reciprocity is an instrument of ‘retaliation’ if necessary and (supranational) WTO dispute settlement procedures can be called upon to adjudicate disputes. Moreover, to address equity concerns developing countries enjoy preferential measures that are fairly easy to set up and monitor. None of these concepts are central (or useful) in an international climate change regime (apart from specific rules on emissions trading).

Similar possibilities were built into the Montreal Protocol (MP) regulating the production and trade of CFC gases. The Montreal Protocol (MP) has successfully stopped the depletion of the ozone layer and moreover it contributed five times more to reducing GHG emissions than the first commitment phase of the Kyoto Protocol by eliminating ozone-depleting substances (mainly CFCs) which are also GHG (Velders e.a. 2007). The MP’s success is probably due to its focus on a small and tradeable category of products (rather than on emissions created all along the global value chains and across all economic and private activity). These products were eliminated by the MP and could be substituted by others through making them illegal and providing subsidies.

Unfortunately, the CFCs phased out under the Montreal Protocol have been replaced by HFCs which are not depleting the ozone layer, but are GHG. The destruction of HFC-23 – initially rewarded under the CDM mechanism with carbon credits - has led to a perverse incentive to produce it (cheaply) in the first place simply to destroy it later and reap the ‘rewards’ (Ostrom 2009:24-5). This is why the EU clamped down on the use of these credits in the EU ETS and Korea excluded them from the start in its ETS. This means the UNFCCC regime and the MP regime which has the tools and track record of cooperation between developed and developing countries in reducing ozone-depleting substances, need to be linked (Velders e.a. 2007; Morgera e.a. 2011: 844)

Barrett and Stavins (2003) – like the IPCC quoted above - consider compliance and participation versus cost-effectiveness as the fundamental problem of an international climate change agreement applying basically Hardin’s (1968) tragedy of the commons or collective action dilemma approach. In domestic environmental policy (including that of the EU; Holzinger e.a. 2009) hard law and fines to enforce provisions are widespread. In the international climate change regime the absence of a central authority to enforce compliance like in domestic environmental policy – in line with the traditional understanding of anarchy - creates a free-rider problem (unlike
as we have seen from Mathys and de Melo free riding in international trade). Barrett and Stavins (2003:350) argue: ‘free riding depends upon the structure of the underlying environmental problem. For climate change, each country can claim for itself only a small fraction of the global benefit of its mitigation efforts, and because marginal abatement costs are increasing, the incentive for countries to mitigate climate change on their own is greatly reduced. That the damages from climate change may increase at an increasing rate may only serve to enlarge the incentive to free ride (as others mitigate more, a country’s incentive to mitigate at the margin falls).’ In this logic the EU’s strategy to lead by example and inviting others to follow in exchange of a more stringent EU GHG reduction target is not entirely persuasive (and the failure to reach an internationally binding agreement at the COP in Copenhagen 2009 may have brought this message home but Morgera e.a. 2011:838 argue this is still the most viable option). In fact, with only 14% of global emissions and high mitigation costs in an economic space losing competitiveness (Helm 2014) the EU should have every incentive – like the US (Purdon 2014:309) - to free ride rather than to lead.

Barrett and Stavins review various proposals including the Kyoto protocol and find that ‘those proposals that are best in terms of cost-effectiveness (conditional on implementation) – primarily market-based instruments, such as tradeable permit regimes – are less likely to be effective in promoting compliance and participation. Other proposals – such as various kinds of domestic “policies and measures” – appear better at promoting compliance and participation, but are less likely to be cost-effective. None of the alternatives fully meets the challenge of offering a cost-effective international regime that will enjoy a reasonably high level of implementation by sovereign states.’ (Barrett and Stavins 2003:351; cf. Tol 2012 and Purdon 2014 who finds that carbon markets perform better than climate funds). The authors made this point before the Kyoto Protocol entered into force and before the EU ETS was launched, however, their fundamental point is still at the heart of the negotiations to replace the Kyoto Protocol which has indeed shown some of the predicted weaknesses in particular of its flexibility provisions (Clean Development Mechanism, CDM and Joint Implementation, JI), the ‘hot air’ of extra allowances (Assigned Amount Units, AAUs), and the non-participation of fast-growing developing countries (so-called non-annex 1 countries which include even highly industrialised OECD member South Korea and also China, meanwhile the biggest emitter of GHG) and of the USA. The Paris Agreement relies on domestic policies and measures which Barrett and Stavins have (correctly) identified as less cost-effective but easier to encourage participation. The catalysing effect on other (non-state or sub-state) actors may correct that deficit in a polycentric configuration. None of the measures implemented so far has reached the UNFCCC objective to stabilise greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system. GHG emissions have been rising along with economic growth and the ‘right to develop’ and concentrations in the atmosphere with them.

Monitoring, reporting and verification (MRV) are instruments for accountability that are technically and legally required and important to ensure fairness, comparability of commitments and confidence in the agreement itself. It is essential for emission trading systems. This is another difference to the international trade regime where statistics are readily available from exporters, importers, private operators and various IOs. The challenges of MRV bear some similarity with
the challenges we observed for global financial regulation. MRV is often seen as infringing upon national sovereignty even if it is reciprocal monitoring. This is reflected in the EU's top down approach of a multilaterally binding process (in line with its syndicated hierarchy and legal system) versus the preference of most other UNFCCC parties for a bottom-up approach of essentially voluntary national pledges without too many constraints and international interference. The EU focusses on the scientific scenarios that require substantial mitigation efforts to keep the temperature rise contained. In the existing Convention the MRV system is divided into one for developed and one for developing countries (through the annexes to the UNFCCC in 1992 which the EU considers as outdated, but to which developing countries understandably remain attached), because under the Kyoto Protocol (adopted in 1997, in force since 2005) the latter didn't have to take commitments. In the Paris Agreement (Article 13) the instrument for accountability is toothless: 'an enhanced transparency framework for action and support, with built-in flexibility which takes into account Parties’ different capacities…’ and shall ‘be implemented in a facilitative, non-intrusive, non-punitive manner, respectful of national sovereignty, and avoid placing undue burden on Parties’.

Moreover, disagreement about historical responsibility for emissions and moral issues linked to the question 'who pays' have polarised positions framing them not so much as a liberal bargaining than as victim-perpetrator relations with moral overtones of international – and also intergenerational - historical justice (Friman and Hjerpe 2015). These three factors – nationalism, competition and moralisation gaps or fairness - have made solving such a large and complex collective action problem very difficult. International negotiations have been going on for a quarter of a century in the vain pursuit of creating a 'central authority' regime to deal with this complex issue.

5.4. Nationalism versus multilateralism in climate change negotiations

The general tenor of the negotiations since the 2000s391 is that most developing countries – especially China and India whatever their own growth and emissions - want industrialised countries to move first and to provide the bulk of the cost for both mitigation and adaptation (Khor 2015). Most industrialised countries, in particular the US, balk at that trade-off and want big GHG emitters like China and India to commit to emissions reductions to ensure a level playing field in terms of national industrial competitiveness. These actors are thus driven by strategic national interest rather than a commitment to multilateralism and global public goods (Van Schaik and Schunz 2011:179; Purdon 2014:309-11).

However, the exclusive focus on (absolute and relative) cost benefit and collective action doesn't take into account two major issues: 1) the dynamics of risk society and 2) moralisation gaps linked to nationalism. The climate change issue goes beyond mere cost and compensation calculations. Fairness is the key problem in the negotiations or in other words the moralisation gaps on who is responsible for what and should do what. As we saw in chapter I, moralisation gaps are persistent

391 In the 1980s and 1990s the major game played in the international climate negotiations had been a transatlantic one as the EU-15 and the US had been responsible for about 60% of GHG emissions. They thus shaped the negotiations leading to the UNFCCC and the Kyoto protocol (Oberthür 2011:676).
and difficult to bridge. In addition the value placed at long-term action for the sake of the planet and various evaluations of risk and moral obligations play an important role. As Barrett and Stavins (2003:358) corroborate based on game theory experiments: ‘People often refuse offers they perceive to be unfair, even when doing so comes at significant personal cost.’ (similarly Schwerhoff 2016 who examines leadership dynamics in climate change negotiations). Conversely some states that are likely to ‘lose’ or consider their resources flowing to emerging competitors may pull out of international cooperation or regimes, such as the US from the KP from the start (repeated for the Paris Agreement) and Canada, Japan and others from a second commitment period (Purdon 2014).

The EU’s normative stance based on a belief in multilateralism, international law, sustainable development (equity), scientific evidence and the precautionary principle (as a response to risk society, unpredictability and uncertainty) has largely failed to effectively sway nationalist, strategic, but short-term interest-based actors such as the US, China or Japan (Van Schaik and Schunz 2011; Heidener 2011). The 2009 Copenhagen accord didn’t reflect, neither conceptually nor substantially EU positions (Heidener 2011:4). Other parties were much less willing than the EU to sign up to an ambitious legally binding treaty and were approaching the climate change problem based on concerns about national competitiveness. The EU found itself marginalised with its preference for a multilateralist pathway. Japan is a good example in our other region: from a rather committed, albeit self-interested, co-leader at the time when the Kyoto Protocol was negotiated, Japan has lowered its emission reduction ambitions and commitments at national level (though interestingly the Tokyo municipality has created a costly emissions trading scheme and Japan is an important contributor to the climate funds; cf. chapter III.3.2.). These lowered ambitions explicitly reflect competitiveness concerns vis-à-vis China and Korea. While Heidener explains the EU’s failure to achieve its stated objectives at Copenhagen largely with problems of the EU’s internal cohesion there are deeper factors at work. ‘The reasons for this failure to wield power are both related to the Union’s own behaviour and to the external context in which it operates. While the EU regularly acts on the basis of what it finds appropriate and tries to shape what others should find appropriate as well, these other key actors (the United States, Japan and lately also the BASIC countries) seem to consistently operate under a logic of consequence. They were less prepared to commit to what may be scientifically sound activities on climate change, and more interested in protecting their countries’ short-term interests. In such a context, there is little, if any, negotiation space for persuading other actors of one’s own position.’ (Van Schwaik and Schunz 2011:183). Despite the failure at Copenhagen, the EU has maintained its normative and principled multilateralist stance (Bäckstrand and Elgström 2013; Schwerhoff 2016) which was also its chief objective for the 2015 COP21 in Paris. Once again it has prepared this international position by first agreeing an internal climate and energy package 2014 (cf. III.3.2.1) to bolster its credibility. Finally, at COP21 in December 2015 the EU could re-claim a leadership role and a relative success. However, the Paris Agreement was possible only after the US and China found a bilateral agreement ahead of the Paris conference which (at least until the Trump Administration took office and denounced the Paris Agreement) put to rest the chicken and egg game on who should move first that had paralysed the international negotiations. Hence, the

392 In both cases a newly elected Republican president reneged on agreements struck by his Democratic predecessor.
two countries facilitated the multilateral agreement in a departure from their earlier maximalist positions. Yet, China’s basic stance has not changed as the Paris Agreement is not legally binding and recognises differentiated responsibilities. China showed to the world that it was a responsible stakeholder in the multilateral system without giving up on its national priorities. The latter had substantially evolved (as we have seen in chapter III. 3.2.3.) though since 2009 as air pollution had become a major domestic concern that prompted the government to become more active in curbing GHGs which are also major causes of air pollution. This confirms the primarily nationalist, development state stance of China in most negotiations about global public goods, but also a growing willingness by China to contribute to global governance arrangements that respect its core interests (such as sovereignty and non-interference in its domestic affairs) and evolving priorities and are not too costly.

The EU’s ‘failure’ in recent years to achieve an ambitious internationally binding agreement is relative in the sense that over the long run the EU has been successful at least in setting the global agenda, ensuring that the IPCC scientific findings and the emissions reduction targets are linked to the ‘maximum 2 degrees temperature rise compared to pre-industrial levels objective’ and in making the Kyoto Protocol work despite US opposition (Morgera e.a. 2011:835-8; Van Schwaik and Schunz 2011:175; Vogler 2009; Heidener 2011) and finally in brokering the Paris Agreement, even if the latter falls short of binding mechanisms to reach its stated objectives.

The EU case of promoting an international climate change agreement based on the international science consensus (epistemic community; Zürn 2015) and the precautionary principle shows that the principle of multilateralism competes (at a disadvantage) with the principle of nationalism in global governance, whereas within the EU there are mechanisms in place (the syndicated hierarchy and EU law) which allow the two principles to co-exist on a more equal footing. In fact, norms and interests are not mutually exclusive and differentiated responsibilities could be accommodated in a legal framework as the EU case shows (Van Schaik and Schunz 2011:178). For many countries and the EU itself a number of interests are also important (competitiveness, early mover advantage, the political popularity of the issue, the long-term cost-benefit justification of the precautionary principle provided by the Stern report 2007). However, the protracted EU internal negotiations and considerable creativity deployed to achieve desired normative outcomes despite resistance and complexity show that the normative logic of appropriateness was in itself a superior objective as Vogler (2009) and Van Schwaik and Schunz (2011) argue convincingly. Other countries, such as Korea, have pursued a ‘green growth’ policy domestically (including a controversial green-washed river restoration project as an economic stimulus during the global financial crisis) expecting – like the EU – that they could get an early mover green technology advantage while internationally sticking to a self-interested stance. The Korean case is quite telling, as Korea clearly is no longer a developing country. It is an OECD member with a per capita GDP above that of many EU member states and among the world's biggest emitters of GHG, but Korea nevertheless insists strongly on keeping its ‘developing country status’ in the UNFCCC (non-annex 1).

The limits of multilateralist normative ambition are reached, when no institutional mechanisms are put in place to ensure compliance and mutual trust among the team members. As we have seen,
the issue of trust goes beyond the issue-area of climate change, but is a result of larger moralisation gaps and historic pathways. Compliance and trust are precisely the most contested issues in the UNFCCC negotiations. Those issues have also been advocated as key factors to ensure that polycentric governance works (Ostrom 2010, Aralal and Hartley 2013). Hence, using this concept to fill gaps in the existing international governance regime needs to be approached with a certain level of caution, although the Paris Agreement may provide a loose framework in which polycentric dynamics can unfold alongside the state-centred dynamics. Team Europe has more or less managed that (as a possible model of polycentric governance in this policy field as we have seen in chapter III.3.2.2), while Team World or Team Asia are far from such a team-work approach and mutual trust even on existential challenges such as climate change.

The Paris Agreement thus is an important milestone in global multilateralism – on the one hand a global agreement has been reached (instead of a fragmentation into plurilateralism or club diplomacy like in international trade), on the other hand the agreement has few legally binding elements and enforceable accountability mechanisms. It is still a teamwork model of governance (given common objectives and mutual accountability), but it falls short of the legal framework in which for instance the EU teamwork governance model operates. It is debatable whether the Paris Agreement will lead to the proclaimed objective of keeping warming below 2°C (time will tell, but scepticism seems to be prevailing), but it did create momentum for a multilateral endeavour with relatively clear reference points and benchmarks. It is innovative with the in-built dynamism of reviews of the nationally determined contributions (Article 4.3 and 14) and if emissions trading or carbon markets gain more global traction beyond the EU ETS, chances are that a legal framework will emerge, not least because solid MRV data are essential to make emission trading work. That is because any carbon trading requires legally binding regulation to define the game for the market participants. However, that sort of regulation is easier to achieve than intergovernmental agreements because they avoid issues of sovereignty and moralisation gaps and affect private financial flows rather than public funds.

5.5. Climate change and International Society 2.0

I argue that to effectively come to terms with the complex anarchy produced by globalisation and risk (such as climate change) states need to change their understanding of national sovereignty (not giving up sovereignty) and instrumental international law, develop adequate institutions (instrumental and mechanical, such as carbon markets) and role relationships (such as teamworkers). Violence and balance of power are clearly not organising principles for a global climate change regime. They need to develop agonistic international policy mechanisms that acknowledge and manage differences in values and moralisation gaps, but allow building trust and compliance mechanisms. This can be a gradual process in which multilateralism and innovative international law play a key role. The mechanical institutions developed are likely to be functional regimes trying to follow the chaos patterns in reverse to come to terms with complexity in various issue areas. This would not abolish or replace the international state system, but would profoundly modify it as the EU shows. It would still fall short of Beck’s benchmark of a cosmopolitan world society, but could be a stepping stone towards it. Both the risk society logic and the market economic logic push in that direction not some normative prescription from European integration.
or Western liberal values. And during the global economic crisis first tentative, but relatively successful, functional steps were taken in that direction (Drezner 2012) as were in the Kyoto Protocol and in the Paris successor agreement for climate change. One of the key problems in global governance in these areas is that multilateralist approaches, like the EU’s, which aim at adapting the ageing institutional multilateralism frozen in the time of the Cold War, are not easily compatible with the prevailing nationalist policies of self-interest and self-help. What implications does all this have for the current world order?

6. The end of the post-war liberal international order?

In a liberal institutionalist vision of the world a governance model of team-workers may very well present the most efficient available option of global (multilateral) governance compatible with a state-centred international society that is not willing or able to create constitutionalised, supranational ‘meta-authorities’ (Zürn 2015:330). Messner (2011:17) for instance calls for pooling sovereignty for global governance and institutional responses, but admits (p.21) that the ‘reinvention of policy under the conditions of globalisation is still in its infancy’. Coming to terms with the chaos-dynamics of the complex world of issues and at the same time the various ideological beliefs (in particular nationalism) is a major challenge for that vision of international society. The concept of International Society was originally conceived of in a very different context and based on a normative, liberal-universalist assumption of an ‘international community’. The Western liberal world order established not least through the creation of international organisations and regimes potentially open to all states (but in reality only the Western camp in the Cold War) was revitalised after the Cold War ended, although with few reforms to accommodate the changing context. It has now run up against the complexity of the world of issues and the diversity of beliefs and status aspirations of different countries and regions nourished by critical junctures, historical grievances (moralisation gaps) and historical pathways as we have seen exemplified by the European and NE Asia regions. Besides, as Zürn (2015:330) argues, the more international institutions interfere in domestic social and political processes, the more politicised (supported and contested by different groups) they become.

The EU’s Security Strategy (ESS) of 2003 reflected the euro-centric, universalist legalistic attitude that could also be found across the Atlantic among liberal institutionalists: ’The quality of international society depends on the quality of the governments that are its foundation. The best protection for our security is a world of well-governed democratic states. Spreading good governance, supporting social and political reform, dealing with corruption and abuse of power, establishing the rule of law and protecting human rights are the best means of strengthening the international order.’ This – cosmopolitanist - view which, significantly is no longer at the core of the 2016 successor of the ESS (EUGS 2016) - hinted at the basic problem of commonality of values and norms as the EU postulated certain domestic norms in other states rather than just norms for ‘good’ international behaviour and the legitimacy of international institutions. Lawler (2013:18) points to that tension: ’The Cold War's end saw a revival of Liberal enthusiasm for the Good State, but the translation of this into the foreign policies of key Western states generated new lines of critique focusing on the underlying universalism.’ That universalism is the belief that (Western) liberal states could stay as they were and that other states had to adjust to or mimic them
(Lawler 2013:21). But as Reus-Smit (2007:44) rightly points out in his examination of the legitimacy of power: ‘Where one needs legitimacy will depend, therefore, upon where one seeks to act, and the relevant constituency will be determined by that realm of political action.’

In other words, global governance requires global or universal legitimacy and global or universal support, recognition or consensus in one way or another reconciling the tensions between multilateralism and nationalism (e.g. the Paris Agreement in multilateral form and national substance). That consensus has to be built up, not just postulated on the basis of moral beliefs of just a group of (powerful) states (that are implicitly or explicitly considered superior to others’). The legitimacy of sovereignty and international law and forms of market economy as institutions of international society are already quite well established and globally supported at least by governments and economic operators. But the legitimacy of other institutions or values may not (yet) be. They are mostly young, often contested and under permanent scrutiny (Zürn 2015). Some of the instrumental institutions (such as BWI etc.) have lost legitimacy and effectiveness; others are being created (BRICS, AIIB) built on new concepts of legitimacy, functions and national interests. This presents a fundamental dilemma if important values enter into conflict with these established institutions. Clark and Reus-Smit (2013) argue that special responsibilities (like the UNSC or the G20) accompanied by accountability to international society at large are a way to reconcile power and principle (like sovereign equality) and to bridge the gap between order and justice (pluralists and solidarists). This approach allows for plurality and moves away from false or exaggerated dichotomies, but others (Badie 2011 or Hurrell 2007) may look at this with scepticism, given the inequality of power reflected in such arrangements (club diplomacy).

An increasing value diversity and complexity – and therefore politicisation of competing ways to design global governance - have become the hallmark of international politics since about the turn of the millennium. Yet, only the ‘quality’ and functioning (or problem-solving effectiveness) of international society is determined by the degree of commonality, not the existence of international society itself. Dunne and McDonald (2013:13) argue that from the ‘vantage point of the second decade of the twenty-first century, the confidence in liberal internationalism has ebbed and the liberalism project is now in question in international theory and in practice. Recurring disagreement over the design and purpose of multilateral institutions put in place to provide governance over security, trade and finance have demonstrated that cooperation is harder to achieve and to sustain than generations of liberals had anticipated.’ We have observed the same phenomenon in our comparison between the EU and NE Asia for security (territorial disputes, history politics), finance and climate change. A recent study by the (liberal) Transatlantic Academy (2014:ix) arrives at the same conclusion: ‘Western democracies must recognize that their own liberal international order will not be universalized, and should seek to find common ground with emerging powers and forge a normative consensus on a new rules-based order. Peacefully managing the onset of a polycentric world will require compromise, tolerance, and recognition of political diversity.’ The G20 shows that both the liberal and illiberal powers are necessary to set global rules and to address global challenges, somewhat in contradiction to the ESS quoted above. New emerging institutions, in the same vein, address needs (functions) of governance or finance not provided by the existing institutions. Thus they introduce competition and complementarity, rather than rivalry or displacement, but the US construed the creation of the
AIIB as a Chinese challenge to its hegemony and to the WB and thus unsuccessfully played up rivalry in a liberal vs. illiberal dichotomy (Renard 2015). As Zürn (2015:331) concludes in his reflection on rule and legitimacy of global governance, contestation should not be seen as normative weakness; rather contestation and permanent questioning of authority and permanent (re)negotiation of the scope and use of authority is innate in the ‘reflexive authority’ in global governance. It is eminently political and in Mouffe’s 2010 sense global governance is thus agonistic by design. Martus (2015:216) has shown that such reflexive authority in competing overlapping spheres of governance has worked at least in the context of the Holy Roman Empire in the 17th and 18th century.

Dunne and McDonald (2013:9) contrast the "ideal" cosmopolitan order of withering states with internationalism (one could also say multilateralism): ‘By contrast, according to internationalists, a world made up of 195 states that were committed to peace and justice would not be a second-best normative outcome. For them a system of just states would bring about an end to the ‘state of war’ identified by Rousseau and Kant as an impediment to progress.’ In NE Asia we find an emphasis on another minimalist norm – national development and peaceful co-existence - as an existing canon which has a wide following but is thin on morality, human security or global justice, but is at least opposing the use of force to settle disputes. Similarly a fragmented, functional network of governance institutions could produce better results than some of the established institutions with monopolistic global ambitions.

Agonism is a promising way to understand debates over international relations in the context of diffusion of power and the complexity of the world of issues and the variety of values in different regions, rather than antagonism in the mould of the ideological contest of the Cold War and of power transition models. We already noted that the alleged contest between liberal and authoritarian states is not a plausible narrative and in a paper by the Carnegie Endowment (Carothers and Samet-Marram 2015:13) the authors show that there is no evidence autocracies have an interest to spread authoritarian ways of governance nor that all democracies have a genuine interest in supporting democracy elsewhere.

Agonism mediates nationalist aspirations and promotes multilateralist legitimacy. Deepening the existing institutional and legal multilateral order per se is not a high priority for many countries, but it is for the EU. NE Asian countries are basically satisfied with it, as they have benefitted from it: Li Keqiang, China’s Premier in an interview with the Financial Times on 31 March 2015 said: ‘So China has been a beneficiary of the current international system in terms of both peace and development. Still China is a developing country, and we still have a long way to go before we can achieve modernisation. We still need to draw on the advanced technologies and managerial expertise of other countries. Past progress shows that pursuit of mutual benefit makes all winners. And that is in China’s fundamental interest. So there is no such thing as breaking the existing order.’

In a similar vein Korea while being an active OECD member and aid donor doesn’t want to relinquish its comfortable position as a developing non-annex 1 country in the UNFCCC.

They want more voice and more status recognition in it and re-balance the decision-making processes, but shy away from taking on legal or other costly obligations (Godement 2017).

The two regional societies I examined thus seem to hold very different promises for the future. In terms of models for global governance it seems that for the current context of globalisation other forms of inter-state cooperation than regional integration are evolving which I describe as functional multilateralism within an international society. An example is the G20. This functional global steering group is an alternative to the ‘regionalism’ often opposed to multilateralism. Interestingly, European nations, the EU as such and the NE Asian nations are all members of the new club and the objectives and rules of membership are more diverse and open than the European Concert of the 19th century that Badie (2011) refers to as an ancestor of club diplomacy and which belongs firmly to International Society Mark I. It could very well be that functional multilateralism will lead to some process of regional integration in NE Asia such as the nascent trilateral cooperation between China, Korea and Japan. But this would be step by step through spill-overs or following major political decisions about reconciliation of moralisation gaps. This would then imply a fundamental change in the way regional society is constituted there. It may, however, not happen in that way at all and regional integration may not come about (this is currently the more likely scenario). NE Asia may remain a loosely and functionally cooperating geographical region with a low level of regionness but high level of (closely nationally controlled) internationalisation, global interactions and global governance impacts. NE Asia, perhaps together with others such as ASEAN, could gradually enlarge and deepen co-operative approaches to regional and global issues. Or they could pursue separate paths with non-regional internationalisation processes (e.g. China in BRICS, Japan in TPP, Korea through a network of FTAs with ASEAN, EU, US, China etc.). It would require a critical juncture to overcome the moralisation gaps and nationalisms which divide the NE Asia region politically. After that more regional cooperation or integration scenarios could open up as possible pathways than the current situation allows.

Thus, at present the EU way and the functional cooperation/multilateralism in NE Asia are alternatives for global governance at opposite ends of the multilateralism-nationalism spectrum. They do not preclude evolution within respective pathways. The EU for its part could deepen its integration in line with previous junctures on its pathway or differentiate functionally in the ways Piris (2012) is describing in various scenarios or it could stagnate or even reverse its integration (‘Grexit’ and ‘Brexit’ scenarios). The first defection from the EU since its creation – if Brexit goes ahead - will allow an interesting analysis of the effects on the integration of the remaining 27 with scenarios reaching from a domino effect of more defections, a multi-speed Europe to more integration.

With the ‘end’ of the Western-centric liberal international order in the sense of reaching its effectiveness and legitimacy limits (not end in the sense of collapse), the question arises on how the world and global governance move on from there. Given that the liberal order and International Society Mark I were both based on a value community (a form of normative authority) – the West – that has largely lost its global legitimacy through contestation and politicisation, the need to broaden the ‘definition’ (cf my definition of International Society 2.0 in
the Introduction) or expanding the ‘limits’ of international society beyond the Western liberal consensus arises. In other words, commonality, diversity and boundaries come into focus. If Western liberal society is no longer the nucleus of the future world society, what else could it be?

7. Euro-centrism, boundaries and commonality of international society

The evolution of the liberal international order into a less West-centric, more pluralistic and more multicultural International Society 2.0 is gradual and diffuse, but significant. It is not a clear-cut power transition. The emphasis in the definition of international society by Bull/Watson on ‘common’ – but in fact essentially euro-centric liberal - rules and interests is a key problem in a world of diversity (and of contestation of Western norms). For Zhang Y. (2014:74-5) and Little (2014:173-180) the question of how much cultural differences matter in constructing a lasting, stable and peaceful international order is most fundamental.594 My two regional examples differ on this count: In NE Asia commonality is thin – despite cultural similarities - and can best be described as peaceful coexistence and a conflicted regionness. As we have seen common interests or a shared cultural heritage do not necessarily produce common institutions or common rules. This can be largely attributed to competing nationalisms and moralisation gaps i.e. a very divergent interpretation of the past between victims and perpetrators. In the EU, by contrast, a thick commonality is managed by common institutions and practices, albeit with increasing differentiations according to issue areas (Piris 2012). The EU countries have successfully bridged their moralisation gaps. The traditional approaches to international society do not capture these key issues not least because they have implicitly or explicitly addressed commonality normatively on the basis of Western political systems and values (with the system competition of the Cold War in mind). Today the international society concept faces the problem of actually agreeing norms and rules for instance on globalisation, climate change, sustainable development and global inequalities, multiple modernities and civilisations, human rights, humanitarian interventions, and many other issues. This is in fact the research agenda on the relation between international society and world society and order and cosmopolitan culture under conditions of globalisation that Viotti and Kauppi (2012:248-9) have tasked the English School with. Those contested norms and rules are at the heart of many current discussions in policy-making circles, but also among academics and civil society at large. These debates themselves are characteristic of International Society 2.0 opening a policy space for agonistic policy-making reflecting the diversity and plurality of beliefs, modernities, cultures, norms, social priorities and ideas in the world at large (and beyond just the level of states – i.e. world society). To some extent this diversity is also reflected in the way institutions of international society are conceived of, for instance in the rich debates between pluralists and solidarists (Dunne 2005:78-80) on humanitarian intervention or responsibility to protect and national sovereignty. However, in my context of the tale of two regions I focus on a more cultural difference which Suzuki e.a; (2014) show in historical perspective and a broader debate on the ideological beliefs such as nationalism, multilateralism, cosmopolitanism and

594 Apart from the fact that European history across the ages is already a product of various cultural developments including through its interactions with international societies outside Europe (Little 2014:165 and Suzuki e.a. 2014).
Confucianism (there could be others).

In the English School the so-called ‘pluralist’ view argued that ‘states have relatively little in common other than the calculations of interest’ (Viotti and Kauppi 2012:248). The ‘solidarists’ in the School argued in more ‘multilateralist’ terms that ‘international society has a relatively high degree of shared norms, rules and institutions among states.’ (Viotti and Kauppi 2012:248). Hurrell (2007:41) describes the membership dilemma: ‘If a common culture and shared values play an important role in underpinning the core of an international society, they naturally give rise to questions about boundaries and membership.’ Limiting international society and defining principles of inclusion and exclusion will always be contested. In a relational prism of international politics as proposed by Qin (2016) the relationships themselves are key to understand international society, more than the commonality of values or interests. Boundaries are thus those of inclusion in specific relationships and processes which I reviewed in part I for NE Asia, showing in particular that the moralisation gaps (which are by definition relational) at times dominate “rational” interests. I defined this paradox into the regionalism concept as conflicted regionness. More generally I focussed on role-relationships (such as teamworker or rivals) as defining behaviour of different types of international society. In this prism, apart from the relationships reflecting historical pathways and critical junctures, very little defines NE Asia as a region.

The EU on the other hand has ringfenced its regional society through the Copenhagen criteria (1993) for membership in the EU, a mixture of geographic belonging and democratic and liberal norms enshrined in the Lisbon Treaty as well as the acceptance of the body of existing EU law and its syndicated hierarchy that regulate relationships in many areas. While the EU limits membership in its organisation rather strictly, it also promotes the same values globally for international society (ESS 2003), but in most cases without a membership perspective.

The EU is often regarded as a pioneer of regional integration and a ‘force for good’ in global governance as the vast literature about civilian, normative and ethical power Europe that has accompanied the evolution of the EU as an international actor shows from at least the 1970s onwards (Duchêne 1973, Manners 2008; Aggestam 2008). On the other hand a century and a half ago Europe pioneered and extended norms of International Society Mark I (essentially the nationalist and social-darwinist norms of international relations plus international law) more successfully than today’s norms, but European powers did so violently and at the expense of the colonised people. In this process, characterised by nationalism, colonialism, imperialism and a presumption of setting a standard of civilisation based on the norms and institutions of Europe’s regional-turned-international society the regional international societies and orders in other parts of the world were largely destroyed (Gong 1984). One example is the China-centred investiture and tribute system in the Confucian world as we have seen in part I. There are many other examples around the world.

Ironically, the resistance to contemporary new multilateralist norms pioneered once more by Europe (but usually in a non-violent way) such as democracy and human rights and constitutionalised, supranational policymaking among nations or humanitarian intervention comes
from an insistence by the former victims of European imperialism on the very norms of International Society Mark I imported from Europe – essentially national sovereignty - more than from more traditional regional values (‘Confucian’ values for instance). Hence, we are not in an alternative to International Society but International Society 2.0 contains both types of international relations (the multilateral EU type and the nationalist European one of yore in the NE Asia type). Both types are rooted in the key institutions of sovereignty, international law and the (regulated) market economy. Cosmopolitan world society would go beyond these key institutions. As we saw, it is the role relationships within international society which make the difference, an aspect also emphasised by Gao’s (2015) analysis of an harmonious order of global co-governance and Qin’s (2016) relational theory of IR.

The concept of international society has in fact been politically appropriated to reflect particular ideological norms such as liberal democracy (Fukuyama 1992; Thorup 2010; Qin 2010) just as it was confined to the Western world during the Cold War. This normative 'hijacking' is the inherent weakness of the concept (at least in analytical terms) 395, but this weakness can be turned into an opportunity when put into a perspective allowing political plurality in Mouffe’s (2010) sense. Plurality – both political and cultural plurality - is essentially liberal in a sense of tolerance for different worldviews, values and ideas as they are not imposed. Thus plurality itself is a normative belief compatible with liberal thought. It is also compatible with the traditional Confucian thinking about harmony and order. Harmony is understood not as homogeneity, but as tolerance, seeking common ground from different positions and peaceful co-existence of different polities. “Harmony does not mean to converge all members of a society into a homogeneous one, but to manage relations among these members in such a way that their differences will not lead to conflict and disorder, but on the contrary, can add up to stability.” (Qin 2016:39). Conflict in this view can be accommodated without resorting to violence. Order is based on the moral belief in the cosmic harmony of all things and avoids systemic conflict and violence prevalent in Western thought. In this Confucian view of order anarchy does not exist because all polities are supporting and managing order as such. Interestingly Gao (2015:86) refers to the role relationships in that order as 'friends' and identifies the EU as a laboratory for democratic co-existence of mankind. This aspect of international society is its normative side which should not be confused with institutions and principles. Qin (2016) emphasises that relations between actors that differ in many respects are such are the key to harmony as his relational image of IR “holds that harmony is the ultimate ideal order of society”. This, of course, is fundamentally different from the realist – so called Hobbesian – view of the world underlying Western justification for power politics.

How to achieve commonality or ‘world society’ when my two regional case studies reveal large gaps in concepts of international society despite the shared roots? Hurrell (2007), similar to Wendt (1999) refers to historically created common understandings, but refers little to understandings that are different from those of Western scholars and from European/US history (e.g. Gao 2015). For NE Asia it is crucial to investigate these understandings given the Confucian heritage and the presence of non liberal-Western political systems in the region. In this way the question arises to what extent there are thresholds of commonality that allow us to speak of an international society

395 In moral terms other weaknesses could be listed such as inequalities, the unsustainable exploitation of the planet etc. But these are not my concern here, but would be addressed through a cosmopolitan evolution of world society.
encompassing all regions not to mention the elusive world society. How to make room not only for ‘new powers’ but also ‘new or different concepts and ideas’ and adapt the current order? These questions raise the problem of boundaries in international society (Little 2005) albeit in specific ways.

Wendt in his Social Theory of International Relations (1999:193) argues that analysis of international relations and change in them should begin with culture and then move to power and interests as the structures of human association are primarily cultural rather than material phenomena. This corresponds to looking at the productive power in Barnett and Duvall’s (2005) taxonomy first and then on other non-specific concepts of power. Wendt argues – against rationalism – that these structures not only regulate behaviour but construct identities and interests. Pinker (2011) corroborates Wendt’s thesis through his investigation of biological and psychological insights which define humans not only as rational, but also as moral. Suzuki e.a. (2014) show the importance of culture in pre-modern relations of Europe with other societies across the world. Morality is a crucial ingredient of any society. Gao (2015:78-80) opposes the morality of the Confucian concept of society to the interest-driven concept of current Western (liberal) thinking about IR, while Qin (2016) rejects the binary, taxonomical Western thinking and focuses on relations and processes of interaction as structure.

I cannot cover this important debate intensively, but a short reference is in order to theories of alternative modernities (Appadurai 1996; Gaonka 2003 and others), multiple modernities (Eisenstadt 2000; Wittrock 2000) and intercultural transversality (Jung 2011) which have been challenging the hitherto euro- or US centric views of the world. My review of Chinese-centric world views below should be seen in this context as part of a debate between culturally different moral beliefs about the world and international society. In the 1980s and 1990s in the wake of the East Asian economic growth ‘miracle’ discussions about East Asian civilisation were challenging the Western universality discourse (both in terms of forms of capitalism and in terms of civilisation and individual versus collective ‘Confucian’ values). While these discussions first took place among the smaller East Asian countries, the involvement of China in recent years (for instance a series of conferences organised by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences which is affiliated to the Communist Party), has given this debate a new twist in terms of productive or discursive power. With China’s growing material power and its ‘rediscovery’ of Confucius for positive identification and a certain view of regional heritage, this ideational constellation is suddenly seen as a serious alternative to the dominant US/European discourse rather than just an academic debate. Fears about a Chinese attempt to re-invent the tribute system (French 2017) seem misplaced as it is quite clear from my tale of two regions that Asian countries are using Western ‘Westphalian’ ideas rather than Confucian ones in their international relations. Some Western writers have reacted with two of the traditional Eurocentric topoi – oriental despotism in the contemporary guise of authoritarianism and state capitalism (Gat 2003) and the ‘yellow peril’ mutated into globalisation as an Eastern (first Japanese then Chinese) threat (Hobson 2012:88, 108). Others like Huntington (1996) prophesised a clash of Western with Confucianist and Islamic civilisations. I showed that that this clash actually already happened at the end of the 19th century and that we are still experiencing its aftershocks and moralisation gaps in the chaos dynamics of these critical junctures; cf. Mishra 2014).
This euro-centrism of productive power projecting European morality or civilisation and interests, but also European binary thinking onto the world has a long tradition. I showed in part I how NE Asia even borrowed heavily from European ideas. Historical experiences contribute to structure identities, but as we know from Said (1995) history is filtered and organised to construct identity for nationalist ends or to postulate a cultural superiority used as a powerful tool to produce foreign policy and legitimising compulsory power and rule. His book ‘Orientalism’ is a detailed study on how Western ‘science’ structured not only perceptions, but created a certain identity of the Orient over centuries and used it to legitimise colonialism and imperial rule. People commonly talk about Asia as a region but in fact Asia is a euro-centric concept with a very complex history. The word initially had a pejorative connotation of inferior civilisation although nowadays it is used more pragmatically (Said 1995; Korhonen 2014; Mishra 2014). Asians themselves did not construct an Asian identity at the time (Korhonen 2014), and apparently not one of Europe specifically as the cultural and political ‘other’ until the end of the 19th century (Mishra 2014; Zhang 2014; Suzuki 2014). As Lovell (2011) shows from Chinese documents at the time of the Opium Wars the British navy was initially merely seen as an irritant comparable to Japanese and other pirates or barbarians, not as a significant threat or a significant cultural other. China’s self-referential culture, though, started to crumble at the end of the Opium Wars to a point where it was vilified and completely rejected like in Liu Shipei’s ‘Book of Rejection’ or Zhang Bingling’s vitriolic ridiculisation of Confucius (Cheng 1997:574-603). After that Confucius needed a century for his intellectual and political comeback (Bell and Hahm 2003). Imperialist Japan, after a rapid modernisation based on Western ideas and science used the same mechanism as outlined by Said to construct an Asian and Japanese identity and impose it on others (Klein 2012:381-4, 408; Schmid 2002; Korhonen 2014; Mishra 2014:189, 205-9).

Debates about modernity and Asian reactions to the Western ideas started at the same time as the West and its power (military, technological, scientific, economic, lifestyle, law…) overwhelmed Asia’s traditional societies in the second half of the 19th century. These were of course not illiterate tribes, but had a very long and rich tradition of statehood, political thought, civilisation and wealth (cf. Morris 2011, Cheng 1997, Mishra 2014). Here we can say that two very different international societies – ‘Westphalian’ and ‘Confucian’ – clashed and the more powerful superseded the Confucian one especially at the level of culture (modernity) and ideology (nationalism, imperialism, racism). The ‘clash’ with the West polarised societies in Asia. Broadly speaking there were those who uncritically admired and wanted to emulate the West, those who wanted to merely borrow or cherry-pick from the West and those who rejected it and strove to revive (or more accurately re-imagine) their own, often idealised, traditions (Mishra 2014 gives a detailed overview; for Japan also Mathias 2012). In 19th and 20th century China the ‘modernisation’ as a reaction to Western aggression (Lovell 2011; cf. part I for more details) – in the name of free markets and a superior civilisation - sparked two main reactions: one an optimistic and more materialistic reaction which saw modernisation as progress and catching up with the advanced

396 Hobson (2012:2-5) notes how influential Said’s study has been in many social sciences including International Relations. However, he also considers Said’s study as ‘double-reductive’ and ‘unpacks’ various strands of euro-centrism or Orientalism in the IR field more particularly. He uses a matrix of four dimensions: paternalist and anti-paternalist eurocentric institutionalism and offensive and defensive scientific racism.

397 Because of that I avoid the word pre-modern when referring to Asia before the Opium Wars.
West that had to pass through a rejection of own Confucian and domestic traditions; the other a pessimistic and more ideational resistance against foreign values and Western barbarism and attempts to modernise Confucianist thought (Cheng 1997:574-603; Mishra 2014:174-197; cf. chapter I. 1.3). These ambiguous tendencies are still present in China’s contemporary discourse. Confucian values have made a come back into the academic (and policymakers’) debates about world society not only in China (Gao 2015; Zhao 2005; Bell and Hahm 2003).

Given that NE Asia has this distinct intellectual, moral and cultural history and a specific modernity experience and is often seen as internationally on the rise, it is useful to examine at least in a cursory way an ‘Asian’ perspective (cf I.1.2.1. and Gehler 2005 for the European contrasting one). Chinese political thought can be seen as highly influential in NE Asia. While each country has its own traditions and thinkers, they share common roots in Chinese thought (Chinese here not in a national meaning but as shorthand for thinkers of different persuasion and ethnic origin in the Confucian world398 including Confucian scholars from Korea and Japan a bit like ‘Greek’ philosophy and historiography is seen as the basis for Western thought, not something ‘specifically Greek’; Gehler 2005; Helferich 2005). The merit of exploring Chinese thought has been highlighted by Simon Leys (1991:60-1): ‘Du point de vue occidental, la Chine est tout simplement l’autre pôle de l’expérience humaine. Toutes les autres grandes civilisations sont soit mortes, ou trop exclusivement absorbées par les problèmes de survie dans des conditions extrêmes, ou trop proches de nous pour pouvoir offrir un contraste aussi total, une alterité aussi complète, une originalité aussi radicale et éclairante que la Chine. C’est seulement quand nous considérons la Chine que nous pouvons enfin prendre une plus exacte mesure de notre propre identité et que nous commençons à percevoir quelle part de notre héritage relève de l’humanité universelle, et quelle part ne fait que refléter de simples idiosyncrasies indo-européennes399.”

Of course this is not the place to review centuries of very rich and diverse Chinese – or for that matter Japanese and Korean - political thought which more qualified scholars than me have done (Cheng 1997, Helferich 2005:512-41; Wong 2013; Bell and Hahm 2003), but to look at some recent and significant views of the West’s ‘alter ego’ – China - on international society and on issues related to my research questions. In general terms the Chinese views in fields such as IR or political science are more pre-occupied today with (patriotic) alternatives to Western political thought than for instance Japanese or Korean mainstream IR scholars who are strongly assimilated into the American academic world. In particular the concept of world society is something that has been present in Chinese political thought since the beginning and a recent work, Zhao (2005), on this that explicitly challenges the ‘Western’ narratives (such as Fukuyama’s 1992 universalist pretensions on liberal democracy or US hegemony) has attracted some attention in China and beyond (Jo 2012; Wang and Buzan 2014). Actually, one could argue that Chinese political thought has always been ‘constructivist’ and relational rather than causal – ‘le monde en tant qu’ordre

398 Which is itself a simplification as the Confucianist state philosophy absorbed and reflected other moral and religious traditions such as Buddhism, Daoism, Shamanism and Shintoism to name but a few. It was also arguably an elite conception of society that had to compete with other concepts in the populations at large.

399 From the Western point of view China is simply the other pole of the human experience. All the other great civilisations are either dead or absorbed by problems of survival in extreme conditions, or too close to us to offer such, a total contrast and a complete otherness, a so radical and illuminating originality as China. It is only when considering China that we can measure more exactly our own identity and where we can start to grasp what in Europe’s own culture is universal and what just reflects simple indo-european idiosyncrasies” (my translation)
organique ne se pense pas hors de l’homme et l’homme qui y trouve naturellement sa place ne se pense pas hors du monde.’ (Cheng 1997:35-6, 502). In this sense thinking about world society started from the universal, world ‘end’ as opposed to the Western departure point from the individualist, liberal ‘end’ searching for the place of the individual in society and the world. The Chinese worldview is universal (one-worldness) while the Western is inter-national and divisive. Could such ‘sino-cosmopolitan’ thinking replace nationalism or multilateralism as ideological institution of international society and open a non-Western cosmopolitan path to world society? There are indications in scholarly work, but more importantly in Chinese leaders’ visions of a “community of common destiny” to some extent associated with China’s Belt and Road Initiative, that this is precisely what could be a new phase of globalisation. I will first review the important scholarly debates in China and NE Asia.

7.1. A China-centric alternative view of IR and international society?

Some scholars, notably in China, have been reflecting for some time about reviving an international society based on Confucian political thought and the “integration” experience under the 天下 (all under heaven) (Yan 2011; Hui 2012; Wang and Buzan 2014; Noesselt 2014) or of global co-governance in an harmonious order based on Chinese traditions (Gao 2015). Confucianism as philosophy has endured (Bell and Hahm 2003), but the political order or international society based on this thinking has vanished at the beginning of the 20th century. On the other hand, does a search for indigenous models and theories enrich universal approaches or, are they simply parochial attempts to justify authoritarian rule or to refute 'eurocentric' theory with a 'sino-centric' one (Wang and Buzan 2014; Zhang, C. 2017)?

Some Western IR theories go back to Thukydides’ history of the Peleponesian War. Some Chinese researchers go back to similarly ancient Chinese writings such as Sun Tse (or Sun Tzu 孫子) and Sima Qian’s 司马迁 histories of Chinese dynasties and produce analyses about pre-Qin international relations (Yan 2011; Hui 2012) to develop a Chinese IR school or to include Chinese history and IR traditions into global IR theory (Wang and Buzan 2014). However, some of this looks like ‘realism with Chinese characteristics’ and argued with chrono-centric and sino-centric instead of euro-centric examples. Said (1995:349) warns: “any attempt to force cultures and peoples into separate and distinct breeds or essences exposes not only the misrepresentations and falsifications that ensue, but also the way in which understanding is complicit with the power to produce such things as the ‘Orient’ and the ‘West.’” Such ancient thought does to some extent inform modern policy-makers as part of their cultural environment and education while looking at airport bookshelves Sun Tse has become a sort of management guru. "Othering" the West seems to be a political trend in China especially since Xi Jinping’s rise to core leader. Gao (2015:84) points out that this ‘realism’ in Chinese political thought is in fact a pragmatic outer layer influenced by strategy around a moral core of order based on peaceful co-existence. Sima Qian is quoted to underline the fundamental difference between the conflictual and violent

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400 The world as an organic order cannot be conceived of outside man, and man finds his place naturally in it and cannot be conceived without the world (my translation of Cheng)

401 The designation of the period of the Japanese imperial reign of the current Emperor Akihito – Heisei 平成 – was derived from a text by Sima Qian (Klein und Kreiner 2012:457)

402 Ironically perhaps this may be an indication of the shift of statecraft from violence to the economic realm.
'realism' of Western thought and the 'pragmatic realism' or 'moral realism' (Zhang C. 2017:11) of Chinese thought. Sima Qian in essence says that even if a country is strong it will perish if it likes war, but if the world is peaceful and a country forgets war it will be in danger. This shows as Gao says (2015:9) that Chinese belief in harmony is not a form of 'idealism' but fundamentally pragmatic and based on the relationships with others (a violent other requires a different strategy than a peaceful other including deterrence and deception as fundamental ingredients).

Hui’s (2012) critique of a landmark book by Yan Xuetong – a leading proponent of Chinese IR theory - promoting a Chinese alternative on ancient Chinese thought and modern Chinese power is questioning the interpretations of the alleged historical foundations of Yan’s assertion that Chinese ancient history provides systemic alternatives to Western theory and thus accuses him of ‘building castles in the sand’. Indeed, a number of such attempts to develop Chinese IR theories look decidedly focused on developing cultural alternatives from Chinese history, despite the fact that they no longer inform Chinese policy and that the sources may not be entirely reliable, especially when one goes back to pre-Qin periods of Chinese history (corresponding roughly to European antiquity and the dialogue of the Melians). Moreover, as Zhang C. (2017) argues, some of these indigenous theories lead to a Chinese exceptionalism mindset and are used as a "shield to resist Western ideas and ideology". We find the return of a similar pattern of polarisation of thought as at the beginning of the 20th century in China's encounters with the West (see above). Thus I think it is more useful to explore the more recent past and how it influences the present international relations in NE Asia and China’s relations with the region and more globally which is what I'm trying to capture in my International Society model. Here the Confucian international society as I see it, a proto-security community, would be a very interesting research agenda, both for IR and regionalism.

Other Chinese scholars, like Qin Yaqing focus on Chinese culture and the social concepts underpinning it, like Guanxi (关係, relationship networks, or affective networks; Qin 2016; cf. Bell and Hahm 2003; Wang and Buzan 2014:24; Zhang, C. 2017). Guanxi relations have long been a topic in business schools' research on management cultures in China. As I have already shown in ch III.2.3. and 4., Qin's relational theory of international relations offers clues to the paradox of conflicted regionness in NE Asia. His focus on a transformative synthesis of Chinese and Western IR theory looks more promising (Zhang C. 2017; Qin 2016) and is very compatible with my own International Society 2.0 approach as I will show below.

If we follow Wendt's exhortation to start the analysis of international relations and change with culture (1999:193) - more important perhaps than the strategists are the philosophers who have developed the ‘Confucian’ state philosophy. But can we just stop at Ley’s ‘total otherness’ of China? How to take account of the role of the state, sovereignty and law in international relations if some of these words did not even exist in Confucian parlance? Are these merely Western concepts that played a minor role in the Chinese world (Armstrong e.a. 2007; Delmas-Marty 2005)? In fact there were different institutions with analogous social functions as I have shown in chapter 1 (table 1) which is one way to come to terms with this problem. Another would be to dive much more deeply than I can do here into Confucian sources and examine how the philosophy was applied in political practice at different periods. Bell and Hahm (2003) have done that with a
view of applying Confucianism to the modern world and a number of other scholars like Tu Weiming actively pursue this research agenda. I will look at an influential example, Zhao Tingyang (赵汀阳 see below).

While there are attempts to develop “Asian” or “Chinese” IR in response to the resented US domination these attempts have not yet led to a credible new school. Not least as alternatives such as Zhao's enlightened world empire (see next section) are decidedly unrealistic and controversial. In his critical review of Chinese scholars' attempts to establish a Chinese IR theory Lu Peng (2010:101-118) argues that a knowledge system which is particular to a region may well better explain that region's international relations, but cannot in itself be a successful basis for a (new) theory, because otherwise there would be an infinite number of particularistic "theories". Thus he argues that so far China's IR is not advanced enough to provide a full-blown alternative knowledge system compared to Western IR. However, if one turns this argument around, if Western IR theory is indeed Western and thus particularistic, then it faces the same problem. This is also the case for Eurocentric integration theories. As we have seen, current (US dominated) realist and liberal IR theories indeed seem to have problems explaining contemporary European as well as past and some of the current North East Asian international relations and only partly account for cultural differences and regional contexts. Lu's other point (p 113) is that if Western theory is weak in explaining China's international relations, a possible Chinese IR may prove equally weak in explaining Western international relations or to be recognised by Western scholars (this may be in particular so, as academic freedom, especially on sensitive international issues is still somewhat limited or subject to ideological and patriotic bias in China). In my view one way to come to terms with this dilemma is to look at how the respective approaches could fit into a concept of International Society 2.0 which is open to value diversity and cultural diversity. Gao (2015) is an example of examining 'global co-governance' taking account of both Western and Chinese IR and political thought. Perhaps it is not surprising that the English School is quite well received in Chinese IR journals (but very little in Korea which is heavily influenced by US scholarship). I am not sure whether Zhao Tingyang could be counted as part of the English School, but he tackles the research agenda on world society outlined by Viotti and Kauppi (2012:248-9) in their review of the English School.

7.2. A world society based on Chinese political philosophy?

Zhao (2005) proposes a worldview and an analysis different from the Western framework which he discusses in his work (in terms of philosophy, but also of realist and liberal prisms). His world society that he develops in a critical dialogue between Western and Eastern thinking (similar to the Enlightenment reception of Confucius mentioned in chapter I.2.2.1.) differs from the Kantian one – his departure point is to elevate the world as a whole (including nature) as the basic unit of the international system, rather than nation states. His state of nature is not the 'Hobbesian' version of war and struggle for survival. Nor the eco-centric perspective of Eckersley 1992 although there is some affinity. Zhao's concept is rooted in ancient Chinese philosophy and religion across all different schools of Chinese thought which defines 天下 as all under heaven (Zhao 2005:8; Cheng 1997). For Zhao (2005:3) this is the only valid and legitimate basis for a world system and world rules, as the Western concept of the world inevitably projects a dominant country’s values
and concepts on it which he rejects as illegitimate. Qin (2010, 2016) argues in a similar way. Zhao is thus one example of a line of Asian thinkers who use Asian ideas and values to propose alternatives to the West's (parochial) modernisation experience. Pettman (2010:303) refers to several generations of Japanese thinkers expounding such communalist and universalist values of a continent that shares 'a love for the Ultimate and Universal' as opposed to Europeans' emphasis on the particular and the individual. Incidentally, this one-worldness was also the philosophical underpinning of Japan's Greater Asian Co-prosperity Zone (大東亜共栄圏 Dai-tō-a Kyōeiken) (Duus 2008 for details) with the slogan Hakkō ichiu (八紘一宇), literally "eight crown cords, one roof" i.e. "all the world under one roof") (Klein 2012:408). Similar thinking to Zhao's had been invoked in the Japanese imperialist project of the 1930s (Klein 2012:408), so the Asian-centric, anti-Western narrative feeding the 'Asian century' idea is not just academic and not just recent (Wilkins 2010; Korhonen 1996) and not simply a consequence of China's rise. The consequence of China's rise is that people start wondering or taking note of what 'China' thinks (Zhang C. 2017:7). For Zhao, given that China's rise is a fact that need not be discussed, it is the duty of China if it is to be a true great power to assume responsibility for the world and not only itself and thus to share this unique worldview with the world to ultimately replace the Western parochial and nation-focused concept (he regrets that China is not actually using its own traditions and thought – its westernisation has been a 'real' cultural revolution p. 61). Zhao thus does not describe China's policy as it is, but as he would like it to be.

He particularly rejects Carl Schmitt’s friend-enemy thinking and the West’s conflictual approach (p 14) that can be transcended by the capacity of Chinese thought to integrate into a harmonious concept which knows no inner and outer dichotomy (15). This rejection of Western binary thinking is also Qin's starting point and a problematique identified by other Chinese analysts (Qin 2016; Zhang C. 2017). Zhao’s political philosophy – for him all Chinese philosophy is political/social philosophy (p. 126-7, 131) – moves from the largest world unit to the state and then the family (both words are contained in the Chinese characters for country 国家) as opposed to all Western philosophy which takes the individual as a starting point, then community and finally the state. Thus modernity, capitalism, colonialism and Empire are all products of this limited Western view focused on sovereignty (35). Given his universal departure point there can be no international anarchy like in the West (he refers to the Greek concepts of chaos, kosmos and eidos p.37), but there is intrinsic harmony (which does not mean there is no conflict as explained above) (2005:16-18). He even postulates that mankind cannot tolerate anarchy, neither can states, so that world rules are necessary (133).

Zhao also rejects the UN (45, 84-90) as merely an aggregation of smaller, state units – an inter-national organisation rather than a world institution (93). According to him it has not been very successful at keeping world peace and has been instrumentalised by the superpowers, but his main objection is that it cannot by its nature overcome the conflicts of interests between the units which form it. It is merely an organisation serving national interests and falls short of the one-worldness benchmark of the 天下 concept. Interestingly, in the context of my own comparison here, Zhao sees the EU as the most advanced model of political organisation that has overcome nationalism, and as a very important human experiment of post-modern governance (157). Nevertheless, it still falls short of one-worldness of the 天下 (33, 115-6), which implies a
world government based on a world society rather than an Empire (44).

Zhao criticises the current world order as a ‘realist’ Hobbesian ‘non-world’ (21) and even contemporary Western concepts like the liberal market economy do not question the jungle but merely try to regulate it (22). Interestingly China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi (2014:5) uses the same phrase to outline China’s role in the world: ‘Under no circumstances will China follow the West and admire the law of the jungle’403. According to Zhao, Kant and Habermas have tried to move beyond this through a cosmopolitan approach, but have not transcended the focus on the individual or the state which inevitably leads to distinguish between oneself and another, internal and external and a permanent Schmittian quest for an enemy and thus the impossibility to be world-responsible (24-5). 天下 as it comprises all under heaven does not know anything external (无外). Qin (2016:39-41) develops this further (and applies it to IR) through the recourse on the (Confucian) notion of zhongyong dialectics, which leads us to a different epistemological foundation from Western theories away from "the Kant-Hegel construct of the conflictual self-other binary" dualism to the Confucian tradition of seeing the polar opposites (ying and yang) as two correlated parts of an organic whole, not entities independent of each other. The key to understanding this difference is the inclusivity and wholeness, which transcends the binary and conflictual self-other and friend-enemy schemes that provide the epistemological foundation for most Western theory. For IR that means a contrasting assumption to Western IR theory, where the realist assumption of essential conflict postulates conflict between nations, while the liberal assumptions are based on competition between individuals. Both Western IR assumptions lead to clashes of cultures, values and norms producing antagonist others. For the Chinese thinkers the opposites tend to co-evolve into a new, harmonious synthesis containing elements of both poles. They do not deny conflict, but don’t see it as structural and normal, rather as a deviation from the (harmonious) state of nature and universal principle of order.

In this vein Zhao is also critical of the concept of democracy (民主) which focuses on the rights and interests of the individual, while a morally higher principle is that of 民心 (he uses English “general heart” in brackets to “translate” the word that he sees as close to the “general will” p 124). This ‘general heart’ focuses on a rule for the common interest of all people rather than an aggregation of individual interests of a majority (28-30) and thus also implies the priority of rules in the common interest over individual freedom (31). His rather unconvincing theory is that “one” can feel the real will of the people, there is no need to consult the ballot box which only divides it (57/8). In the end the rule has to be exercised by a 天子 (son of heaven, Emperor) with a heavenly mandate and based on an a priori existence of the 天下, a world society and government (58). This is defined as Empire (帝国), not in the (Western) military sense, but as a world civilisational Empire (文化帝国) with countries as lower-level governance levels much like a global federation (78-9). There is then obviously also no room for a clash of civilisations in this worldview (84, 149).

Zhao (2005:39,65) is conscious that his 天下 concept is a utopia and unlikely to be realised (153), but that does not diminish its role as a benchmark for world society just like other (Western)

403 This formulation – alluding to Hobbes - is also contained in the Work Report to the 18th Party Congress: http://www.china.org.cn/china/18th_cpc_congress/2012-11/16/content_27137540.htm
cosmopolitan projects and thinking. Thus he rejects the dead end of 'Hobbesian' anarchy and of liberal thought that conceives of an end of history (92-3). For him the defining moment is the reality of globalisation which affects everything and everyone, but paradoxically the world as such does not exist in this concept of globalisation: no world interest, no world consciousness, no world system, no world values (101).

Zhao’s key quest is for a system that can solve the world’s problems (such as climate change) and clearly he does not believe that a system based on sovereignty and anarchy (which produces conflict and violence – he cites Anthony Gidden’s book The nation-state and violence) and an economy based on the maximisation of individual profit and the “invisible hand” of the market is able to do that (90-92). The “world” is currently just a geographical notion of something to be exploited with no one feeling responsible for it (111). This is due to the Westphalian system of inter-state organisation (139). Globalisation is an uncontrolled – and potentially destructive – economic process which begs a global political system to regulate it (116). His answer is to bring about a globalism (cf Keohane 2002:193-202). 天下, not as a revival of traditional Chinese Empire (there has never been a good, moral Chinese Emperor in his eyes), but a world system based on classical Chinese philosophy and ideal concept of Empire – which unfortunately because of the domination of Western thinking has not been properly understood in its differences to the Western notion of Empire (118). He admits that the current reality is very different from his ideal (108-9). Zhao calls for nothing less than a re-definition of the world not as a geographical notion or natural resource, but a human-defined political and social system, with a sort of world government/ world Empire (世界帝国) as its top layer that expresses the general will of humankind (and nature) (150).

Zhao with this vision of world society challenges the realist view of international relations in a very fundamental way by rejecting the centrality of anarchy and conflict as well as nationalism and further raises the pertinent question of how to subject globalisation with its potential to destroy the world to human government rather than liberal, invisible self-regulation. Liberalism is a dead end because of its focus on the individual and on the exploitation of the planet. However, he makes little reference to international law, in line with the Chinese tradition which has few legal elements (Delmas-Marty 2005). In many ways Zhao’s argument resembles Beck’s cosmopolitan moment and community of fate which is also a key element of Gao’s (2015) reflection on global co-governance. But paradoxically he also shares Mouffe’s scepticism about cosmopolitanism growing out of Western liberalism. But where Mouffe (2010) calls for the return of the political and agonistic debate, and Beck (2010) talks about a cosmopolitan realpolitik, Zhao proposes an enlightened son of heaven with little need to consult the will of the people or debate with them. He is therefore the nemesis of the equally ‘apolitical’ liberal absolutism of Fukuyama. Mouffe’s agonism is a way to overcome Schmitt’s friend-enemy scheme that Zhao also abhors. Gao is clearly influenced by Zhao although he doesn't quote him; he develops an argument for co-existence as a way to mediate conflict and diversity. Gao’s goal of global co-governance is thus not far from Mouffe’s (2010) idea of agonism: 1) weak conflict and strong harmony 2) reconciliation of global authority (great powers acting with a sense of global responsibility) 3) friendship relations instead of interest-based conflictual role relationships 4) seeking common ground and accommodating differences 5) multi-actor democratic deliberation and inclusive
international order (Gao 2015:84-6). Qin (2016) develops a more synthetic line of thought that takes the focus away from the entities and their supposedly innate differences and focuses on relations as structure, but in essence the agonism of Mouffe and the Chinese thinkers' focus on harmony have a lot in common when applied to my concept of International Society 2.0 in the sense that global governance is a common endeavour pursued in different ways and with different values that are co-evolving through cooperation and competition between states and the relationships that are shaping up to deal with both the complexity of the world of issues and the historic development path of countries and regions.

Zhao’s version of world government or world society is different from the Kantian or multilateralist view pursued by the EU in important ways: lack of international law and ‘republican constitution’. Nevertheless, he sees the EU as an important intermediary step. He paradoxically rejects Empire (in particular the American Empire) while proposing a world Empire which in fact is a form of world society. He offers no solution to how to bring it about, in particular as he rejects democracy as insufficient to express the general will (Rousseau’s volonté générale/ China’s 心). The danger here is of course that in this system the risk of totalitarian rule – while not intended, as Zhao clearly has some form of enlightened ruler in mind – is very high, just like Zhao admits that none of the Chinese Emperors in history measured up to the enlightened Confucian benchmark. Gao differs from Zhao in this respect; Gao (2015:86) is advocating a democratic and deliberative global governance for which he sees the EU as a laboratory. Qin (2016) does not propose a specific form of governance, and in fact the examples that he uses in his theory essay are fairly China-centric, which means that he has not fully escaped the trap of opposing culturally informed schools of thought. However, his definition of relational governance comes close to my addition to the International Society 2.0 concept especially as he points out that it is supplementing rule-based governance and is compatible with findings from research on polycentric governance: "a process of negotiating socio-political arrangements that manage complex relationships in a community to produce order so that members behave in a reciprocal and cooperative manner with mutual trust evolved over a shared understanding of social norms and human morality." (Qin 2016:43). The key variable for Qin, like for Wendt or Olson and in my own approach, is trust, but he does not elaborate how to build it up, running the risk of a circular argument. From my analysis of NE Asia and European integration building trust requires overcoming moralisation gaps and defining processes and institutions that are reliable enough for states to modify their sovereignty and autonomy. It will thus be a very useful research agenda to test for instance the behaviour and compliance in club diplomacy such as the G20 in view of building trust in the club rules and the other members sufficiently to change the balance between nationalism (sovereignty) and multilateralism (common/global public goods). The analysis by Dai and Renn (2016) shows for China’s case a general reluctance to embrace UN Conventions and additional protocols, in particular in normative fields such as human rights, while in the environment field China’s acceptance of the UN acquis is considerably higher and even higher than the US (Dai and Renn 2016: 15-6). A similar analysis could be done in other areas. I argue that a multilateral approach where a group of countries pursues a common objective (like in

404 To recall the last part of my definition: States accept to deal dynamically with the interdependence of the global economy, networks including non-state actors and the complex challenges of the world of issues. They recognise the need to subscribe to common but differentiated global responsibilities and to negotiate responses to challenges without resorting to war as a means of politics.
the EU) makes it easier to set aside bilateral moralisation gaps, as the relationship changes from bilateral win-loose to a multilateral everyone wins something dynamic.

However, Zhao’s benchmark to find a way to conceive of a general world interest rather than to leave the world to anarchy and exploitation on the basis of individual or national interest – the need in other words to find a way to provide global public goods fairly and find responses to the challenges of globalisation and the risks humanity faces, is an important issue that needs to inform international relations in the present era of uncertainty and global risk society. The current international system is a historical, social and relational phenomenon and thus subject to change. In fact it is not even very old in a historical perspective. It thus cannot be excluded that in 50 years from now, for instance under catastrophic impacts of climate change, it may take a form different from the one we know today (Beck 2010). In that sense the utopian concept that Zhao has developed shows at least a possible development that takes account of a number of deficits of the current system in coming to terms with global risk and global policy confined as it is to nation-state borders and sovereignty. In this sense Zhao is just one – rather articulate and thoughtful – example of possible epistemological and ontological challenges to currently prevailing theorising about IR. Not that it is likely to be even feeding a Chinese consensus (Li 2011), but it is an illustration of what Pettman (2010) refers to when he is looking at Asian alternative perspectives on the European international and regionalism experience. Not least Zhao's criticism of neo-liberal globalism certainly chimes with similar criticism in the West. In the meantime, Zhao can also be understood as an anti-liberal rejection of Western philosophy and of US political domination and a call to arms for Chinese scholars to use their humanist-authoritarian tradition to develop an equally powerful alternative IR narrative.

Zhao's and Yan's different approaches to mobilising Chinese thought as an alternative to Western versions of modernity (and intellectual dominance) are rooted in the Chinese and Asian reactions to the destruction of its political and social identity at the beginning of the 20th century/at the end of the Confucian world described in part I. Yan combines Western realism with Chinese tradition focusing on a nationalist power narrative while Zhao's roots are in a universalist, anti-nationalist tradition of thought (which was very much alive in the inter-war years, but has been neglected or dismissed in historiography because of its association with Japanese imperialism/pan-Asianism Duara 2001; see also part I). However, those roots and intellectual traditions are also part of China's rise, an assertion of values, historical identity and moral beliefs that need to be part of International Society 2.0 or a future world society concept (Gao 2015). It is more than nostalgia or nationalism especially in Zhao's case who rejects nationalism explicitly. Pettman (2010), Qu (2010) and Schmid (2002) show that there is a counter-reaction of Asian identity formation and this interaction of identities or clash of civilisations a hundred years ago is a significant influence on contemporary International Society 2.0.

After reviewing the academic debates in China about world society, it is important to look at whether and how this “new thinking” about the past translates into today's Chinese policy-making, which after all has a greater potential to influence global politics than Chinese scholars.
7.3. China’s vision of a new international order: Confucius is back!

In 2017 China’s core leader Xi Jinping attracted global attention when he endorsed globalisation at the WEF in January and committed to do his part in managing globalisation – of which China had been a major benefactor - and mitigating its negative effects. While shying away from directly claiming a global leadership role, in the context of US President Trump’s avowed protectionism and nationalist “America first” line, the Davos speech was widely interpreted as a declaration of China’s co-leadership of the globalised world. In May 2017 a summit attended mainly by developing and emerging countries celebrated China’s new signature foreign policy, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI or OBOR), again widely interpreted as a Chinese attempt to shape globalisation and to buy geopolitical influence. Xi, however, portrays it differently, saying at the BRI summit that China would "not resort to outdated geopolitical manoeuvring" and hoped to create "a big family of harmonious co-existence." To domestic audiences, Xi has been more outspoken than in international forums. In early 2017 he stated his aspiration for China to take on leadership of a new global order in a post-Western era (Kaufman 2018:1).

More significantly perhaps, for our research is a new theme in China’s diplomatic endeavours, the *community of common destiny* (命运共同体) which Xi Jinping launched at the 2013 Bo’Au Forum – where exactly 10 years earlier the famous “China’s peaceful rise” was proclaimed by Xi’s predecessor Hu Jintao. The term remains to be defined, but it reflects dissatisfaction with the current US-led international order and proposes a new platform for countries to coalesce around for peaceful development as equals and in harmony. The BRI is translating the theoretical construct of the community of destiny into a concrete policy platform (Rolland 2018). The underlying themes of the community – peaceful development - are in line with those proclaimed by Deng Xiaoping (and also Hu Jintao’s very Confucianist harmonious world), but they also reflect the more active stance in China’s international policy based on its growing power and stature that the BRI embodies. The BRI in a nutshell is an aggregation of various economic cooperation initiatives with Chinese lending for the countries in Eurasia (a new silk road) and also along a maritime silk road stretching from China via East Africa and the Middle East to Europe.

Importantly, the key ideas of the community of destiny resonate with the scholarly debates reviewed in previous sections drawing on China’s traditional thinking and civilisation, thus marking a new chapter in the long debate launched by Liang Qichao at the beginning of the 20th century about the inferiority of China’s traditional Confucian civilisation and the need to adopt Western civilisation through modernisation (see I.1.10). Xi’s stance rejects that cultural pessimism: China is back and Confucian civilisation and International Society should be back, too. Now, the traditional values of China’s ancient civilisation “are celebrated as a source of national strength and an essential element of China's present success” (Kaufman 2018:6).

The connection of Xi’s policy stance and leadership claim with the long reflection of Chinese thinkers about the concept of world society through the community of destiny idea is the focus on the term ‘civilisation’ which has appeared prominently in Xi’s discourse. In his speech at Bruges

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405 [http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-05/14/c_136282982.htm](http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-05/14/c_136282982.htm) accessed on 16-3-2018

406 [http://english.boaoforum.org/mtzxwzxen/7379.jhtml](http://english.boaoforum.org/mtzxwzxen/7379.jhtml) accessed on 16-3-2018
in 2014 after his state visit to the EU\footnote{http://www.chinamission.be/eng/id/t1143591.htm accessed on 15-3-2018}, Xi asserted that China – representing the Eastern civilisation - and Europe – the birthplace of Western civilisation - were of equal weight and merit. Xi rejected the 19th century idea of superior Western civilisation (but making China the representative of the Eastern civilisation he re-asserted the lost hierarchical superiority within that Eastern civilisation; Kaufman 2018:7). Xi is implying what the Japanese expressed in the inter-war years – a claim to inherit the leadership of Asian (Eastern) civilisation because of its success in mastering Western Civilisation at the time (Duara 2001:107) and China mastering globalisation today. Interestingly, the recourse to China’s civilisation and linking it to its successful modern development path provides the foundation for the promotion of the community of common destiny in which all civilisations find their place as equals: “not only China can forge its own path to the future, but it can better forge all humankind’s path to the future” (Kaufman 2018:9) – which is a claim to open a path to world society based on an idealised version of Confucian international society, and rejecting the ‘Westphalian’ basis of Western civilisation. However, as we have seen, in general terms, China, like its neighbours in NE Asia, are fervent defenders of the ‘Westphalian’ version of sovereignty (on the basis of the five principles of co-existence underpinning Chinese foreign policy) and international relations and if anything has become more prominent in NE Asia’s states, it has been the spirit of nationalism, not of community. Hence, the mantle of Eastern civilisation serves as the self-consciously nationalistic ideology of the Chinese nation\footnote{As Xi stated in Bruges: “These values and teachings [of Confucius, Laozi and Mozi] still carry a profound impact on Chinese people’s way of life today, underpinning the unique value system in the Chinese outlook of the world, of society and of life itself. And this unique and time-honored intellectual legacy has instilled a strong sense of national confidence in the Chinese people and nurtured a national spirit with patriotism at the very core.”}. The appropriation of the ‘civilisation’ idea for a nationalist cause (unlike Zhao’s cosmopolitan concept) is reminiscent of the 19th and early 20th century Western civilisation discourse (Gong 1984; Duara 2001). Despite Xi’s benevolent recognition of the equality of Western and Eastern civilisation and his emphasis on peaceful development and harmony, he is transforming, subtly or not so subtly, the transnational idea of civilisation to a notion of national consciousness when the territorial nation is equated with the wider idea of civilisation (Duara 2001:106-7). This tension is not resolved by vague references to cooperation; multilateralism, exchange and mutual learning between different civilisations, as sovereignty and nationalism remain the foundations of China’s foreign policy, including the BRI.

Crafting the idea of a community of common destiny (where the Chinese word for community like in English is identical with the word used to translate European Community: 共同体) on the ‘Westphalian’ heritage would require a profound transformation of the constitutive institutions of international society, not simply a declaration of peace, harmony and prosperity underpinned by economic instruments and infrastructure construction under the BRI\footnote{Xi Jinping speech at BRI summit May 2017: http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-05/14/c_136282982.htm accessed on 15-3-2018}.

A further issue is that despite the repeated references to China’s policy of good neighbourliness (in the speech at the BoAu Forum) the obvious tensions in Northeast Asia have not been solved as we have seen in part I. In this context, Hahm (2017:21) advocates a return to a liberal international order in the region and that the “the region should overcome history and geopolitics while economically binding the region together ever tighter”, however, he refers to strengthening the
cooperation between US allies in the region, thus leaving out China and the DPRK from this order. My examination of NE Asia’s history, moralisation gaps, nationalist development stance even towards global public goods in the 21st century, would provide the basis for a strong dose of skepticism along the Confucian belief of first putting your own family and house in order before putting in order the state and the world. The ‘conflicted regionness’ of NE Asia and the return of nationalism, history and geopolitics (Hahm 2017) augur not well for a community of common destiny or even a multilateralist international order in the region, let alone globally. This being said, the basic idea of a community of destiny, as a vessel that could be filled with peace, prosperity and global governance, rhymes with both the European Community idea and the heritage of the Confucian international society.

In the meantime, the erosion of much of the post-War international order and its leadership makes it urgent to conceive of intermediary steps and pragmatic multilateralist initiatives. Arguably, the BRI is such a pragmatic initiative, but some of its wider outcomes – in particular peaceful and mutual understanding of different civilisations – look like wishful thinking or at least a very long-term vision. More tangible are the potential material outcomes of the various cooperation agreements and funding instruments that have to be judged on another level of analysis than is chosen here, project by project. In the final section of this chapter I will examine the potential of a pragmatic use of multilateralism in global governance in an era of transformation and complexity.

8. Dynamic functional multilateralism instead of one-governance-fits-all?

The post-war liberal order and the belief in multilateralism tended to have a one-size-fits-all, liberal ‘Western’ model of governance at odds with the nationalist self-help approach and quest for status recognition by NE Asian countries (and many others). We have earlier identified the problem of the rigidity of institutional multilateralism with the tyranny of numbers and the ageing formats of representation (including partly in the EU) and inequality. We have also explained the puzzle of Europe and NE Asia and their divergent conceptions of regional or global governance. We found that multilateralism organised as 'one-governance-fits-all' cannot deal with either the complexity of the world of issues and the ensuing diffusion of power or the diversity of cultures (civilisations), values, states and regions. Conversely, sovereignty doesn’t have to be ‘national’ (as the EU shows). If, however, it is defined through nationalism, sovereignty correlates with a focus on maximising national power over responsibility, on procedural justice and moralisation gaps, constraining cooperation. If sovereignty is ‘multilateralist’ the correlation with power changes, procedural justice gives way to (re)distributive justice (e.g. EU economic and climate change policy) and reconciliation of moralisation gaps. Responsibility and reflective cooperation become more important (e.g. taking responsibility for global public goods or bads).

Multilateralism in International Society 2.0 comes in different types. It is a dynamic concept. Generally, it is increasingly loose in institutional (or legal) terms, à la carte in terms of membership and geographically open or porous rather than regional or global. It follows the
problem dynamics in an \textit{ad hoc} manner (policy diffusion following power diffusion) more than a plan or vision or institutional templates of global governance. An early example was the G7, now the G20. Conceptually, polycentric governance tries to capture these agenda centred dynamics in areas such as resource management and climate change (Araral and Hartley 2013; Ostrom 2009). The term has been misappropriated in Russian diplomacy and by the BRICS to replace 'multipolarity' (Thakur 2014\textsuperscript{410}) Multilateralism is becoming more and more pragmatic and functional rather than institutional and ideological. An example is the overall technical and functional trilateral cooperation in NE Asia (Böhmer and Kollner 2012), or China's wide-ranging Belt and Road Initiative (see above 7.3). Functional multilateralism differs from the normative and institutional multilateralist order built up after WWII and reinvigorated at the end of the Cold War. It is – or needs to be – more pragmatic and more dynamic to effectively come to terms with chaos dynamics, diffusion of power, and diversity. A generation after that critical juncture it is clear that the current international society which emerged partly as a result of the extension of the European regional international society at the end of the 19th century and then the extension of a US sponsored liberal order in the 20th century during the Cold War is a transient phenomenon (Little 2005:46 and from a different angle also Arrighi 2010; Kimmage 2013). Even the US (under Republican administrations) has regularly turned its back on liberal internationalism and international law since the Cold War ended. Indeed, distinct developments in Europe, NE Asia (and elsewhere) are examples of increasing differentiation and diversity. They reflect the various forms of power diffusion and of anarchy of complexity and chaos that are characteristic of International Society 2.0. However, these diverse examples remain so far embedded in the tissue of international society at large, not least as they do not fundamentally question the constitutive institutions of international society as we have seen in part II. More than the institutions, it is the relations between countries that change depending on both historical pathways and the complexity of issues and policy developments.

One of the boundary problems of the traditional international society concept as we have seen is related to the eurocentric ideas, values, identities and norms that are expected to a greater or lesser extent to be shared by all members (Bellamy 2005). But today membership and boundaries of international society are blurred and porous, especially as the ideological dichotomy of the Cold War has vanished. The extent of the normative content (or quality in the ESS language) of 'international society' is subject to debate and contestation as is 'membership'. For instance, when Americans or Europeans urge China to become a 'responsible' stakeholder they seem to imply that this responsibility and the norms of international society are defined by the US or Europe while China (and many others) resist the imposition (as they see it) of Western values. Dai and Renn (2016) have researched empirically China's embeddedness in the international institutional order

\textsuperscript{410} See also: Op-ed by RF Minister of Foreign Affairs Lawrow in a South African newspaper: http://carnegie.ru/2017/03/27/iranian-and-russian-perspectives-on-global-system-pub-68409


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which they argue remains often undefined in much scholarly work (they define it as adherence to non-economic UN Conventions and protocols). While they find generally a lower level of commitment of China than Western powers and even other BRICS countries, China's score does not differ much from that of other (supposedly liberal-democratic) NE Asian countries (which confirms my thesis about their 'Westphalian' reluctance to adopt international law and their insistence on sovereignty) (Dai and Renn 2016: 13).

Initially, in the English School International Society was also defined in such a euro-centric or Western-centric way (Bellamy 2005:10, Badie 2011, Hobson 2012:222-33). For some such ideas are even hypocritical efforts to cement inequalities: ‘Club diplomacy’ perpetuates a neoliberal 'Western' ideology that exploits the weaker ‘non-members’ and tries to keep newcomers at bay (Badie 2011). What in fact is at stake here is the legitimacy of authority and norms in International Society 2.0 (Zürn 2015). Legitimacy can no longer be imposed (through various forms of power) but has to be negotiated in agonistic ways to go beyond the atomistic and divisive legitimacy of national sovereignty.

The political boundaries in a world with increasingly diverse values, perspectives and beliefs have become apparent after the Cold War ended (contrary to Fukuyama's 1992 prediction of an inevitable convergence of values and systems) but they are less clear-cut and not aligned with simple political system differences such as democratic versus authoritarian. These fluid boundaries are difficult to define as the expression ‘the West and the rest’ shows. From China's and Korea's perspective the boundaries of historical justice are equally if not more important than the boundaries of political ideology (or even the substance of an issue at hand Terhalle and Depledge 2013:581): in their view Japan, a largely liberal democracy that shares fundamental values with the US and has a pacifist post-war record, would first have to show sincere apology for past atrocities (like the comfort women or the Nanjing massacre) before a shared future can be built in NE Asia or Japan could be allowed to take a permanent seat in the UNSC commensurate with Japan’s post-war pacifist efforts. Conversely, Japan from within the boundaries of Western liberal-democratic order, brands China as ‘uncivilised’ (non-democratic and a threat to international values) to reject such claims in a return of the standard of civilisation (Fidler 2001) and the debate from the early 20th century.

My thesis conceives of multilateralism as an ideological belief that has for instance driven EU integration after the end of the Cold War. But the EU is not the only 'template' of multilateralism. Multilateralism has a history (Mazower 2012 for the Western history) – or different histories as the Confucian world shows (cf table 4). In its current form, it largely stems from the experience of international cooperation as an instrumental-institutional way to create international regimes, facilitate internationalisation and to sustain the Western liberal order. Increasingly multilateralism has to deal with the complexity and chaos of a world of issues and to accommodate the plurality of a world of regions and the concomitant moralisation gaps. The recent developments of club diplomacy, transnational forums and new institutions can be understood as functional multilateralism and first infant steps to reinvent policy under the conditions of globalisation (Messner 2011). Functional multilateralism, for instance in the G20 or BRICS, is underpinned by a decline of violence in international society, but also aggregates distinct visions of global
governance that do not necessarily conform to the post-War Western liberal order (rather more to the five principles of peaceful co-existence and as a reaction to perceived US/Western double standards; Thakur 2014).

Governance in International Society 2.0 has to contend with persisting nationalism but also:

1) with the plurality of values, cultures and norms
2) with the diffusion and dispersal of power in complexity, in particular the erosion of the institutional power of the West that sustained the liberal post-war international order.
3) the functional challenges that Habermas (2011:10) calls ‘die durch nationale Grenzen hindurchgreifenden Funktionssysteme der Weltgesellschaft’ (the cross-border transnational functional systems of world society) or what I called the world of issues with its complexity
4) emotional-moral dynamics and moralisation gaps sometimes from a distant past.

Functional multilateralism is a dynamic form of governance responding at least partly to these critical developments in International Society 2.0, alongside the more rigid institutional multilateralism of the 20th century. International order and global governance in an international society in a context of complexity, of transformation and of uncertainty can on the one hand be built on institutional multilateral foundations (international organisations, international regimes) which make it more predictable, stable and normative (EU, BWI, WTO, UNFCCC and possibly emerging ones such as the AIIB, NDB). On the other hand, such instrumental and mechanical institutions of international society can be supplemented by loose, consensus-based international arrangements that are open and flexible enough to accommodate various dynamics (coalition of the willing, ad hoc arrangements, G20, MEM and other ‘clubs’, bilateral treaties and regional agreements including BRICS and BRI).

More radical governance alternatives, namely of the cosmopolitan or Confucian types underpin the evolution of ideological institutions and moral beliefs (notably in civil society and academia), but have so far found few institutional expressions as shown above. The concept of polycentric governance, which at the basis is agenda-driven (the concept was mainly applied to urban management and environment) and thus functional, could occupy a middle-ground between the cosmopolitan and state-centred alternatives as it could be developed around the existing international agreements (such as the Paris Agreement on Climate Change), but encompass many more actors (cities, companies, individuals i.e. those responsible for emissions) than national governments working hand in glove to reach the internationally agreed objectives. The Tokyo Metropolitan government’s ETS (and others at subnational level) show how such polycentric dynamics can work through government regulation and involvement of the private sector even if they are not pursued by a national government (chapter III.3.2.3)411. US cities and states equally have pledged to deliver GHG reductions under the Paris Agreement despite the national level reneging on its international commitments (Leonardsen 2017).

The analysis of how different regions like Europe and North East Asia organise their respective regional society and simultaneously deal with global issues in the international society shows that social adaptation after critical junctures (social tipping points, Grimm and Schneider 2011) takes a lot of time, more than generally anticipated by political leaders or advocates of liberal-rational game theory. Transformation processes also reflect the chaos dynamics of the anarchy of complexity. These transformations have yielded quite a diverse array of global governance regimes412:

1. Integrated, syndicated like the EU
2. Global, old-generation international organisations (UN, BWI, UNCTAD)
3. Global, new-generation international organisations or regimes (WTO with some supranational elements; UNFCCC with science panel IPCC and dynamic elements)
4. Diplomatic conferences (e.g. COPs in UNFCCC; Six Party Talks on the DPRK nuclear programme)
5. Loosely co-operating regions (ASEAN with its CMIM, AMRO, Trilateral Cooperation between China, Japan and South Korea)
6. Open regionalism of economic networks (APEC, ASEAN plus three)
7. Trans-regional processes and products (APEC, ASEM, BRICS, AIIB, NDB at international level, polycentric governance at multiple levels such as World Mayors Council on Climate Change)
8. Club diplomacy and arrangements (G7, G20, MEF, FSB, Basle agreements)
9. Bilateral or minilateral agreements notably FTAs, BITs, currency swaps, military alliances
10. National policies/unilateralism (in security for instance, but also economic policy such as quantitative easing, currency pegs or internationalisation of a currency)
11. More or less private regimes, international NGOs etc. some of which hold the international society of states accountable for what they are doing or not doing (including influential rating agencies).

Dynamic functional multilateralism characterises open forms of global and regional governance guided by an acceptance by 'great powers' of responsibility for the world of issues beyond a struggle for power guided by national interests only: summitry in variable geometry without creating new legal or strong institutional arrangements, attempts to deal with issues trying to find specific functional solutions, sometimes by mandating existing international organisations or

412 The list is illustrative and doesn't aspire at an exhaustive catalogue, similarly just a few examples are given out of the hundreds of regimes.
regimes (G20 → IMF, FSB, Basle Committee; Nuclear Security Summit → IAEA; UNFCCC → IPCC) and a focus on enhancing legitimacy through output efficiency and outreach strategies rather than through democratic accountability or equal representation. Zürn (2015:328) refers to these new authorities as 'politically assigned epistemic authorities' (although he uses as examples the financial rating agencies, which in my view are self-assigned rather than politically assigned, which is why the EU for instance is proposing to regulate them). Summitry is characteristic of these arrangements as this confers executive legitimacy and shows leadership. Organising functional multilateralism at summit level addresses also the need for domestic coordination of the various disaggregated state functions arising from internationalisation and transnationalisation as a way to deal with the anarchy of complexity. The disaggregation of state functions (through internationalisation, transgovernmentalism) is being re-centralised by global functional summits in order to collectively and effectively address global challenges. The global summits superficially resemble the EU summits, but given the persisting need for consensus and the lack of trust and institutional mechanisms, these summits fall short of the EU team worker model of governance and the constitutionalised legal context specific to EU multi-level governance.

Dynamic functional multilateral arrangements are mushrooming in International Sociey 2.0. The Paris COP 21 climate change deal injected a potentially more dynamic approach into the traditionally rigid UN process. Functional multilateralism relies on state consensus, loose or no institutional frameworks and output legitimacy (effectiveness, problem solving capacity) such as the G20, the NSS, or several processes in Asia (trilateral cooperation between Japan, China and Korea, East Asia Summit - EAS, ASEAN Regional Forum - ARF), but contrary to the EU (or international regimes) these functional multilateral arrangements do not necessarily produce durable legal norms or institutions or a Kantian culture of anarchy (Zürn 2015) and even less an EU-like entity which entails a syndicated hierarchy. They remain at the instrumental or mechanical level of institutions of international society. But the current situation does not preclude an evolution to a more 'syndicated' model of governance.

Globalisation market logic and networks facilitate and supplement functional or instrumental inter-state cooperation on issues of shared and differentiated interests and responsibilities. Functional multilateralism is pragmatic cooperation following the logic of complexity to address the world of issues in particular in areas recognised more or less as common fate issues. I argue that dynamic functional multilateralism is the ‘bespoke’ form of international relations for an age of uncertainty and transformation (and non-polarity) if states do not want to commit to deep and value-driven integration à la EU, do not accept hierarchy as under the US-dominated liberal international order (or the former investiture and tribute system), but also do not want to revert to realist templates of anarchy and war. It also functions at a level below the political cleavages and moralisation gaps that structure role relationships of rivalry and competition in NE Asia (Böhmer and Köllner 2012). Functional multilateralism respects sovereign equality (pooling resources instrumentally especially in the economy but not pooling sovereignty or domesticating

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413 Haas (1980) theorises about different reasons why international regimes occur in a situation of complex interdependence and issue-linkage, describes different regime types and how they are defined. He refers to them as ‘Regimes are norms, procedures, and rules agreed in order to regulate an issue-area.’ (Haas 1980:397).
414 Some processes such as the Nuclear Security Summit (NSS) explicitly try to produce a new regime or to extend and improve existing regimes. Cf. also Haggard and Simmons (1987).
international law). It avoids political integration and can be called into question and reversed any time. But it also contributes to rolling back nationalism and power politics by creating new nodes of authority or in Zürn’s (2015:323) formulation ‘loosely coupled spheres of authority’. Functional multilateralism seen as a network of different types of nodes, institutions and spheres of authority can contribute to exercising self-restraint, to building trust and to deepening interdependence. These are some of the master variables (Wendt 1999) promoting eventually cooperation and new role relationships. Trust is built by small steps. Limited functional agreements produce incremental gains that consolidate progress, not very different from (neo)functionalism, albeit not with the latter’s teleological automaticity of political spill-overs and institution-building. Many analysts like Brooks (2005) or Buzan and Waever (2003:161-3) believe – in fact similar to Haas’ logic of neo-functionalism - that globalisation prompts ever increasing cooperation and integration in this way and changes the role of states and the international state system not only in the EU. Dynamic functional multilateralism can reinforce tendencies of increasingly non-violent and knowledge based (epistemic authorities) network international relations in an International Society 2.0. States in networks – or even as actors within a future polycentric order - reflect the lessons learnt from past crises and build on incremental steps to solve collective action problems and change ideas despite an enduring focus on national sovereignty promoting the interplay of civilising, humanising, scientific and learning trends (Pinker 2011; cf. chapter II.3.1).

Functional multilateralism, however, is vulnerable to nationalism and free-riding. The challenges of the world of issues seem only to determine functional output-efficient, not structural or institutional (input) responses. Structural responses and global or regional institutions as forms of multilateral order are conditioned by ideological institutions of international society and – as we have seen for the EU example or the BWI during the Cold War – are the result of a political or social project of institutional or productive power.

Moreover, functional multilateralism is far from perfect in a normative sense if the benchmark is the solving of global or regional problems in comprehensive and effective ways (as we have seen for instance in the examples from NE Asia or the UNFCCC). Dynamic functional multilateralism as a method of global governance may not be conducive to finding satisfactory and sustainable solutions for all challenges (climate change being an obvious example as we have seen; Aralal and Hartley 2016; Leggewie and Welzer 2011; Kim 2009). Neither can functional multilateralism (such as trilateral cooperation in NE Asia) be consideres a panacea for improving politically complicated relations (Böhmer and Köllner 2012:6). Rather cooperation in NE Asia remains strictly functional and pragmatic as well as focused on intraregional networks in economic, financial, environmental and technical fields precisely to avoid the politically sensitive areas. But without an overarching political purpose the outcomes of this form of governance remain limited and vulnerable to the political conjecture of the day, manoeuvres by spoilers (notably DPRK), domestic nationalism and the resulting state of bilateral relationships as the NE Asia case has impressively shown. Other forms of governance or concepts such as polycentric governance also

415 cf. Richard Haass: What international community? Korea Times 3-4 August 2013 p.7: ‘In these [trade, climate change] and other areas, governments will need to rally around regional undertakings, form coalitions of the relevant or willing, or simply seek understandings among countries to do their best to adopt common policies. Such approaches may lack the reach and legitimacy of formal global undertakings, but they do have the advantage of getting something done.’
require an overarching purpose and normative and institutional framework to deliver (Ostrom 2010) but are useful to advance thinking on transnationalism.

Only the EU has embarked on a more ambitious, perhaps more cosmopolitan form of constitutionalised multilateralism with syndicated sovereignty, effective political authority beyond the nation state, and nations as team workers. The EU’s syndicated sovereignty and its collectively owned hierarchy provide a model of hierarchy without hegemony, of thick networked multilateralism which is not just an embedded leadership role for one nation-state and it goes beyond the merely functional problem-solving approach. The EU has also shown a degree of functional dynamism including in its reactions to the sovereign debt crisis. On the other hand, national sovereignty and national identity continue to be very important institutions of Europe’s international society – and Brexit demonstrates their disruptive potential. Overall, European integration remains compatible with civic and open nationalism. This makes the EU’s multilateralism future-friendly especially if it uses its possibilities of flexibility dynamically and devises sustainable multilateralist ideas (Nicolaidis 2010). As I have tried to show in chapter III.3.2.2 the EU may have crafted a template of polycentric governance in the climate change area, building up a system relying on various levels of government and markets in various sectors to reach agreed objectives in line with Araral’s and Hartley’s (2013:1) premise for polycentricity that ‘governance of complex, modern societies requires institutional diversity embodied in multi-level, multi-purpose, multi-sectoral, and multi-functional units of governance’. In the EU it works because of its syndicated legal order and sovereignty.

At a global governance level just as in the former Confucian world or in the EU effective multilateralism requires some form of consensual or cooperative hierarchy. At the global level so far it is an informal, often issue-based and functional hierarchy or club diplomacy (Badie 2011) such as the G20 which is not dissimilar to concerts of great powers except that what holds them together is not power-balancing and preventing the rise of new powers, but co-responsibility to seek solutions to specific (but not all) global challenges and to co-ordinate amongst states to manage them (including avoiding free riding). The G20 has also assigned tasks to existing multilateral institutions. This form of thin consensual hierarchy in multilateralism suits both the established hegemon, the US (Goldsmith 2000; Katz 2013 – cf chapter I.1.3), and the emerging powers well, albeit for different reasons (US instrument of prolonging hegemony or leadership – embedded liberalism, democratic sovereignty; emerging powers: status, limited and cost-effective responsibility; Terhalle and Depledge 2013).

Functional multilateralist club diplomacy could be seen as adapting the liberal international order based on institutional Western (US) power or leadership to the challenges to certain norms and values and the sharing of costs and benefits (fairness) from emerging and developing countries (for a US centric sceptical view Lieber 2014, for a more optimistic one Clark and Reus-Smit 2013). Functional multilateralism also fits the Chinese political culture privileging output or ‘deeds legitimacy’ over input or ‘process legitimacy’ (Xiang 2014:113). Hence, the international response to chaos and complexity in a globalised world does not need to be non-cooperation or every country for itself (Bremmer 2013) or a new constellation of polarity. Most countries – at least in NE Asia - seem comfortable with international society’s three basic institutions as such
(sovereignty, international law, the global market economy), but not necessarily with the liberal (cosmopolitan) evolution and institutionalised – static - dominance pursued by the West (Thorup 2010) nor with the (neo-realist) costly 'Hobbesian' template of a struggle for power and survival. China and other countries in the region (and beyond) want to participate in the norm setting in international society and enhance their status through a ‘soft revisionism’. They want to ‘get a seat at the VIP table’ where the rules are set rather than ‘turn the tables’. Japan's quest for a permanent seat in the UNSC is an example as is China's pursuit of more adequate representation in various IOs or all three countries' presence in the G20. In their region they prioritise national status, political and identity issues due to the specific historical background in their region, not as a precursor for some global struggle for dominance while pragmatically pursuing economic cooperation as a national interest (but as the Senkaku/Diaoyu economic fall-out shows subordinated to nationalism when it comes to the crunch). Static nationalism is complemented by a more dynamic functional multilateral cooperation.

Importantly though, functional multilateralism preserves policy space for different approaches instead of imposing a liberal-technocratic end of political debate with the frequent (and Western-centric) rationalist-universalist pretence ‘there is no alternative to this or that’ (Mouffe 2010). New institutions such as the G20, the European Stabilisation Mechanism (a de facto European IMF), or the AIIB and New Development Bank, or the GGGI show at the level of mechanical institutions that there is space for alternatives and innovation (dynamism). Opening peaceful policy space in this way for competing beliefs, values and norms is a major step to world society reflecting the diversity of the world (rather than its assumed commonality) even though it may not encompass the widest spectrum of cosmopolitan values or 'one worldness' because in the guise of functional multilateralism it remains state-focused. A pragmatic functional agreement, even if it remains discursive can also serve as a platform to rally non-state actors or sub-national state actors to pursue shared objectives in a polycentric view of governance. This seems to be a possible scenario of combating climate change under the Paris Agreement. Since international debates and negotiations in a world of issues are necessarily focused on specific (functional) issues, they may avoid the other extreme of antagonistic ideological debate that would take the form of a new Cold War (or in other words a friend-enemy scheme on all issues), an ideological contest between liberal democracy and authoritarian states for instance (Gat 2003) or a clash of civilisations (Huntington 1993). Gao (2015:87) warns that this fragile logic of co-governance could be jeopardised if a logic of conflict prevails in what he sees as a possible critical juncture for mankind.

The EU's ESS was seeking to promote a normative concept of multilateralism trying to shape this policy space beyond nationalism and its cherished institutions and is therefore contested416. Below the benchmark of the ESS the concept of functional multilateralism can lay the ground for a wide range of future political possibilities from pragmatic muddling through, to global or minilateral joint ventures or regional integration and transregional agreements. The present functional multilateralism without transfers of sovereignty, institutionalisation and legalisation as practiced in NE Asia, in other regions (Bach 2011) and on a global scale in the G20 is an avenue to develop international society based on national sovereignty and minimum institutionalisation and

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416 The ESS has been replaced by a new EU Global Strategy cf Biscop (2016).
legalisation which leaves the political options open while helping to overcome the zero-sum games of 'realist' international relations or new Cold-War-type liberal-authoritarian antagonisms.

Dynamic functional multilateralism allows for cultural and normative diversity in the way constitutive institutions like sovereignty, international law and the economy, and instrumental institutions are conceived of at the level of nation states and their inter-relations. Working out relations between international order in its various forms and an overarching concept of international society that can effectively deal with a wide spectrum of ideas and values as well as with the global risks is the essence of the idea of International Society 2.0 as an association of all political units with considerable policy autonomy that debates and solves key issues in other terms than through friend-enemy roles, violence and war.

Such a dynamic functional multilateralism is a phase of social adaptation that fits an age of change and uncertainty after a critical juncture, but falls short of fully addressing the complexity and normative dimension of global challenges and risk society. However, the latter have taken shape in various forms and thus serve as a benchmark or goal for international political adaptation, the IPCC being a good example and the theoretical body of literature (like Beck, Giddens, Leggewie, Zhao and various think tanks and NGOs) contributing to preparing the discursive and normative ground for further social adaptation and eventually construction of a world society in the future by progressively expanding this minimal normative consensus. Dynamic functional multilateralism is a transition strategy of muddling through the inertia of the status quo shaken by the dynamics of change. It is a stage in the 'reinvention of policy under the conditions of globalisation' (Messner 2011) that will proceed incrementally, rather than in a big bang. AIIB, NDB or perhaps the BRI are such small steps. Social adaptation after critical junctures take a long time as we have seen both with European integration after WWII and NE Asia after the clash of civilisations at the end of the 19th century. Even 60 years after the Rome Treaties, European integration is still an incomplete and open-ended process. Multilateralism as an idea to organise international society and global or international governance has already been gaining ground (even in NE Asia), but it is an arduous process and the institutional steps difficult as also the history of the BWI, WTO or UNFCCC show (Helleiner 2010).

Regional experiences are useful templates: Functional multilateralism can, but does not have to be regional. Even in the EU, where the congruence between traditional regionalism and functional integration is high, there are increasingly functional differentiations of integration: enhanced cooperation, variable geometry, opt-outs and opt-ins, Eurozone governance, Schengen space, the intergovernmental treaty on economic governance – these features of differentiation and dynamism are comprehensively discussed by Piris (2012). While this is not fundamentally altering the institutional character of the EU at present (Bolleyer and Börzel 2014) it has compelling advantages over a one-governance-model-fits-all approach (Piris 2012; Vollaard 2014). And not forgetting that a number of European states are not EU members, but have contractual or institutional arrangements with the EU that over time contribute to developing a normative and legal space (Coman and Ponjaert 2015).

417 cf. Helleiner 2010 on the myth of a Bretton Woods moment where he shows that the creation of the post-War economic order was also in fact the fruit of prolonged and hotly contested negotiations rather than the purported 'big bang'.

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Thus, rather than analysing governance through a constitutive relationship between regionalism and globalisation as such we may have to direct our focus on tracing the chaos dynamics of the world of issues. Governance of complex issues is addressed functionally in different ways ranging from regional integration to geographically ‘unbound’ functional multilateralism. Functional multilateralism is possible at global, regional or transnational level in various configurations – it does not depend on geography, but on issue dynamics. The role of states as vehicles for political autonomy and legitimacy of regulation amidst a diversity of ideas, moral values and objectives is crucial in any of these configurations (as it probably is also for polycentric governance). This captures the interaction tissue of globalisation where economic integration expands out of natural geographical regions along trade and production networks such as APEC which Bergsten (2012) and others have termed ‘open regionalism’.

Functional multilateralism emphasises legitimacy by efficiency or output such as the efficiency of decision-making, rather than equality in democratic participation or representation. Rodrik’s ‘trilemma of the world economy’ maintains that ‘we cannot simultaneously pursue democracy, national determination and economic globalization’ (Crum 2013:615; see also Huang and Bailis 2015 for trilemmas in economic and climate governance). In a larger perspective of the trilemma – multilateralism, nation state and democratic politics – the question arises whether multilateralism can be both efficient and democratic. Can a balance be found between the three which is legitimate and efficient? The EU is only one example for the difficulties of that balancing act and the emphasis on any one or two of the three aspects varies over time and issues as we have notably seen in the analysis of the EU’s economic crisis (cf. Warleigh-Lack and Rosamond 2010:1004).

Zhao (2005:57-8) has pointed to the fundamental problem with the divisiveness of the democracy and nationalist aspects of the trilemma in world governance. Similarly, Crum (2013:616) states that ‘the nation is the way that the dividedness of the world polity has historically come to be embodied.’ Diversity is therefore ‘the underlying value upon which the goods of the nation and of national self-determination seem to depend’ (Crum 2013:616). Zhao (2005) rejects this dividedness and diversity and leaves little room for nation and democracy in his vision of world society. Beck (2010) and other Western cosmopolitans reject the nation-state angle of the triangle, but have difficulties finding a world (or European) demos. Habermas (2011) tries to conceive a more balanced triangle. Interestingly in all these models the authors – even the Chinese - acknowledge the EU’s special role as an advanced experiment in balancing the three points of the triangle in innovative ways which I have tried to conceive of as a syndicated hierarchy with a specific interplay of constitutive institutions of International Society 2.0.

International governance is a trade-off: democracy emphasises participation and representation often to the detriment of efficiency as for instance shown by Piris’ emphasis on the postulated main objective of the EU’s institutional design ‘to allow its institutions to take quick and bold decisions’ (p.54), but as also demonstrated by the long drama around the Greek bail-outs (especially in 2015 with elections and a referendum and a Greek government deliberately playing the nation and democracy cards; cf. Crum 2013:615 who reviews the three options of executive federalism, democratic federalism and EMU dissolution).
The Chinese thinkers (Gao, Zhao) rather deplore the divisiveness and conflictuality of the Western democratic contest that may divide the world rather than unite it and draw on a universalist Confucian tradition. Here they have a different approach than Mouffe and many Western thinkers who can’t warm up to the top down harmony approach (suspected of authoritarianism) that privileges the efficiency side of the triangle at the expense of both the nation-state and democracy. Crum (2013:626) sees a ‘considerable normative justification’ of EU-style executive federalism in terms of preserving EMU (or multilateralist governance) and the primacy of the nation state as a vehicle for political autonomy and diversity. The EU may in fact occupy a middle ground with its political space being in principle non-violent, consensual-hierarchical and procedurally democratic, albeit largely technocratic, with role relationships of teamworkers on many issues.

Crum (2013:618) lists three preconditions for democratic institutions both at national and international levels to effectively secure the exercise of collective political autonomy: 1) a stable constitutional order and legitimate procedures 2) shared space for political debate and 3) political processes to facilitate the development and confrontation of different, competing positions on decisions to be taken. He doesn’t see these preconditions fulfilled in the EU, but one could argue that compared to other international organisations or multilateral endeavours – and certainly compared to NE Asia - that the EU meets those three conditions at least to some extent (the EU Treaty might have been amended several times, but the underlying constitutional order has been stable for several decades, the political debates have increased and the political processes to deal with different positions have developed). Contrary to what Crum asserts, the political debates during the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis were not just national and the political process at EU level was far from consensus based. The EU offers a new kind of balance of the trilemma beyond the primacy of the nation state (which may explain the nationalist backlash in some countries). This allows reconciling different points of view albeit at the price of limited democratic debate at the level of the citizens and rather heavy procedures of decision-making. Interestingly, both Zhao (2005) and Gao (2015) noted that the EU has come closest to their vision of harmonious co-governance.

There is thus no shared structured response yet to the world of issues and its complex chaos dynamics, but an increase in functional multilateralism, “international steering committees” and patchworks of epistemic or political authorities which eschew re-defining the key institutions of international society, while the EU and some others are trying to re-shape these institutions on the basis of their own integration experience. Advocates of such steering committees point to effectiveness and problem-solving capacity as producing legitimacy. Critics deplore the lack of representativity and democratic accountability which are the focus of most ‘cosmopolitans’. Even the European Security Strategy advocated an effective multilateralism. The fundamental boundary seems to run along moralisation gaps and between nationalism and multilateralism. Until multilateralism becomes the new normal of international relations, the old normal of conflict and zero-sum games will endanger international politics and hinder the development of global governance and world society (in whatever institutional form). Nationalism is the fundament of

418 Incidentally, these are seen more or less explicitly as basic conditions for polycentric governance as well: Ostrom 2010; Araral and Hartley 2016.
that old conflictual normal. The European Union stands out among the great powers as the one that has found an original way to create a multilateralist polity while keeping individual countries' national identities largely intact.

The cosmopolitan world society in both its Western and Eastern conceptions remains largely a utopian or distant aim. For some it is not even desirable as it would spell an end to politics (Mouffe 2010) or produce cultural alienation (like currently in the Muslim world; cf. Huntington 1993). Zhao himself thinks his idea of a Confucian world empire is utopian. For the other two pathways the EU and NE Asia are respective existing models (or ideal-types in the Weberian sense, not ideal in terms of perfection) of regional integration and dynamic functional open regional cooperation and are thus important to continue to watch and analyse.

International Society 2.0 provides a rich research agenda with much potential for IR, regionalism and comparative historical analysis beyond euro-centric and paradigmatic concepts.
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