

The process of marketization of the European social democratic political discourse.
The case study of the Spanish Socialist Workers Party (1998-2013)

Von der Fakultät für Gesellschaftswissenschaften der Universität Duisburg-Essen
zur Erlangung des akademischen Grades

Dr. rer. pol.

genehmigte Dissertation

von Moreno Cabanillas, Guadalupe

aus

Valladolid

1. Gutachter: Prof. Dr. Andreas Blätte
2. Gutachterin: Prof. Dr. Susanne Pickel

Tag der Disputation: 12.07.2017

Contents

INTRODUCTION	5
CHAPTER ONE. NEOLIBERALISM AS THE CURRENT HEGEMONIC IDEOLOGY AND THE DERADICALIZATION OF EUROPEAN SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTIES	22
1. Neoliberalism as the hegemonic discourse of economic globalization.....	22
2. The process of marketization of the political sphere because of neoliberalism.....	23
3. The emergence and theoretic foundations of the neoliberal discourse	26
4. Globalization, neoliberalism and marketization	29
5. The ideological evolution of the European Social Democracy after the Second World War: the emergence of a differentiated ideology and its gradual deradicalization in the 20 th and 21 st Centuries	32
6. The economic and political program of the Spanish Socialist Workers Party (PSOE) and its adaptation to the different socio-political conjunctures	39
CHAPTER TWO. MARKETIZATION OF THE POLITICAL SPHERE IN EUROPE	48
1. Marketization of the political sphere as field of study in social sciences	48
a) Newspeak as a Marketization device	54
2. The process of marketization of the European Social Democracy in the literature	69
3. The Spanish Socialist Workers' Party as focus of attention in the study of marketization of left-wing forces.....	73
4. Contribution to the stock of knowledge and justification of the present study	76
CHAPTER THREE. THE STUDY OF LANGUAGE AS METHODOLOGY OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES	81
1. Reiner Keller's Discourse Analysis of the Sociology of Knowledge	82
2. Analysis of texts through Discourse Analysis of the Sociology of Knowledge	89
3. Methodological scheme constructed for the analysis.....	92
CHAPTER FOUR: DESCRIPTION AND ANALYSIS OF THE MARKETIZATION OF THE PSOE'S ECONOMIC DISCOURSE RESULTING FROM THE INTERACTION OF THE NEOLIBERAL WITH THE SOCIALDEMOCRATIC DISCOURSE	100
1. Outcomes of the content analysis. List of categories	101

2. Tracking the gradual emergence of the categories.....	127
3. Language peculiarities	150
4. Analysis conclusions.....	157
CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSIONS. EVALUATION OF RESEARCH OUTCOMES IN REGARD TO POLITICAL SCIENCES APPROACHES AND THEORIES	162
1. Description of the process of marketization of European social democratic parties' discourse. The case study of the Spanish Socialists Workers' Party (1998-2013)	162
2. Marketization as a result of the hegemony of the neoliberal discourse	168
Corpus of the Content Analysis	182
Corpus of the Linguistic Analysis.....	192
References.....	223

INTRODUCTION

After the decade of the 1980s, especially following the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, a consensus was reached in Western countries about the main political lines that governments should follow and apply in the economic field. Contrary to the post-war era, in which the key terms were welfare and Keynesianism, or translating the benefits of the economic boom to all social strata and intervening when necessary in markets to tame their adverse effects, in the post-Keynesianism times, the neoliberal core logic was established (Harvey, 2010: 36) (Brown, 2005: 38). It comprised a set of political measures and an associated discourse that was supported and enforces by all parties that realistically hoped to govern, the centrist parties. The main lines of this discourse comprised a supply-side orthodox economic program, based on the English School of Economic Thought (such Adam Smith, David Ricardo and Stuart Mill), in which the promotion of the single market and globalization were central. However, the economic field was not the only one affected by this new worldview. This new logic permeated most distant political and social fields, emerging as a new vogue of political arguments and values, gradually transforming the internal logic of an increasing number of domains. Orthodox economy-like lexica and meaning emerged in highly diverse fields, such social, educational, and environmental policy in a transversal transfer, which unsurprisingly has been a reason of concern of social sciences' academies in the last decade.

Of the mentioned phenomenon, perhaps the most central aspect for political sciences' scholars is if and how this process influences the democratic quality of the affected countries. In this sense, it can be argued that when a stream of thought becomes hegemonic, be it internationally or transdisciplinary, this itself can cause a homogenization of discourses and policies. This normally leads to a lack of actual opposition or real political options, which present an alternative to the mainstream thought¹ (Lemke, 2012: 5). That happened most notably from the decade of the '90s to 2008, the time during which the economic recession caused the emergence of new forces that were very critical to this establishment, both at the right and left sides of the political spectrum. Although there were naturally parties that sharply contested the neoliberal consensus, until then, they only had a symbolic representation, such as the case of the "radical"

¹ As Lemke et al. also stress: "marketization, in a medium- up to a long-range development, leads to a reduced contingency in the portfolio of arguments that are de facto circulating in the public sphere" (Schaal, Dumm, Lemke, 2013: 5).

left. This work is, to a great extent, intended to describe the content of this consensus and how it was gradually established within the moderate parties.

Academics dealing with the notion of post-democracy (Crouch, 2004) stress how this convergence of political ideologies affects the processes of deliberation and communication culture between the governors and the governed. Allegedly, since the political forces stand for a similar political program, debates must focus on artificial issues (empty shells), which are partly irrelevant for citizens' wellbeing. Professionalization of political communication is a powerful weapon in this battle for votes, in which the debate is guided by highly qualified experts, whose primary concern is not improving citizens' lives, but winning support by creating artificial scenarios.

“Under this model (post-democracy), while elections certainly exist and can change governments, public electoral debate is a tightly controlled spectacle, managed by rival teams of professional expert in the techniques of persuasion, and considering a small range of issues selected by those teams. The mass of citizens plays a passive, quiescent, even apathetic part, responding only to the signals given them. Behind this spectacle of the electoral game, politics is really shaped in private by interaction between elected governments and elites that overwhelmingly represent business interests” (Crouch, 2004: 4).

Marketization is not only related to the convergence of all moderate parties around the neoliberal consensus, but also, following Lemke, limits democracy by triggering the occupation of the political sphere by economic neoliberal values that eventually lead to the “dedifferentiation of political rationality” from the economy (Lemke, 2012: 4), entailing a risk of “the disappearance of the politics” (Schaal, Lemke, Ritzi in Dumm, Lemke: 2013: 1). As Brown stresses, “neoliberal rationality, while foregrounding the market, is not only or even primarily focused on the economy; it involves *extending and disseminating market values to all institutions and social action*, even as the market itself remains a distinctive player” (Brown, 2005: 39-40) (original quote in italics).

This horizontal flow of orthodox values from the economic field to the rest of the spheres, here labelled as marketization of non-economic fields, exerts a major impact on the affected fields. Although peculiarities should be explored case by case, in general, it can be stated that two general conclusions may be drawn. The first pertains to the hollowing out of the traditional

content of the field in question and its substitution by neoliberal economic values. This is clearly visible when considering, e.g., education policy of the last twenty years that, thanks to marketization, has been often pursuing economic aims, rather than educational or cultural, and its colonization by neoliberal market values that meant the partial disappearance of its traditional function. The second major effect is the gradual loss of autonomy in every affected sphere, which is devoid of its autonomous nature having to subordinate its original goals to the economic ones (Blätte, Zitzler, in Schaal, Lemke, Ritzi, 2014: 74). A good example of this is the current management of social policy, having been made contingent on the expectable economic returns.

In this work, it is believed that the political discourse of the European social democratic parties has undergone the mentioned process, i.e. it has been marketized due to the hegemony of neoliberalism following the decade of the 1980s. Likewise, here it is presumed that this alleged marketization is traceable through the study of the discourses articulated by these forces throughout this time period. After analyzing the corpus, a number of research questions are expected to be answered. The most critical follows: Has the political discourse of the social democratic parties been marketized following the decade of the 1980s? If yes, which thematic areas belonging to which political fields of their discourses were altered, to what extent and with what degree of uniformity throughout the discourse? Has marketization altered the central logic of their political discourse or this was only superficial? Which contextual factors affecting the actors involved triggered this process and further altered the social democratic discourse in the research period? Did marketization affect a single political area in a certain region or has it spread to a multiplicity of political fields in different territories?

To answer these questions, the country of Spain, officially known as the Kingdom of Spain, presents a highly suitable scenario. Since the '80s, when the neoliberalization and further marketization of the country was implemented politically, a socialist party with a watered-down but still influential Marxian ideology², the PSOE, was in office in this country. Notwithstanding its origins as workers' party, its secretary general, Felipe González, head of Spanish Government from 1982 to 1996, applied an orthodox economic program in line with the requirements for the access to the European Communities during this time period, and later,

² The PSOE renounced to the Marxian ideology, and exclusively as "dogma" in 1979, under the leadership of Felipe González (El Socialista, issues 128-129, 1979).

the Economic and Monetary Union. Also, the gradual integration of Spain into the European political and economic institutions coincided with the definitive neoliberal impulse of the EU, principally through the adoption of the Single European Act (SEA, signed in 1986) and the Maastricht Treaty (signed in 1992) (Kennedy, 1997) (Bradani, 2009) (Hideko, 2014). The efforts of a social democratic political party to adhere an institution whose political program and objectives contradicted its traditional discourse are key aspects of this thesis.

What also makes of the country of Spain a worthy case study is its harsh impoverishment in relative terms during the economic recession that began in 2008, especially triggered by the net employment loss.³ This new scenario forced the political actors to adapt their political programs and discourses to the new socioeconomic settings. As explained later in this chapter, Discourse Analysis of the Sociology of Knowledge, the methodology applied in this work, is particularly adequate in interpreting situations of “social change” (Keller, 2005: 13). Here, this will be especially visible thanks to the portrayal of the response of the PSOE to these new settings. The emergence of Podemos in Spain, a successful left-wing, critical to Europe, anti-establishment party following the economic crash is the final aspect that makes this country a region worth considering in the study.

The research period selected for this study, 1998 to 2013, is deemed to be highly informative concerning the marketization of the PSOE’s discourse. First, economic globalization, whose associated ideology is here deemed to be neoliberalism (Harvey, 2010), was particularly encouraged and promoted between the ‘90s and 2008⁴, partly thanks to the international agreements on liberalization of trade and markets, usually promoted by international entities from the end of the 1980s onwards (Harvey, 2010:32). This was the case of the Washington Consensus, which fixed neoliberalism as the political program of overarching international organizations, as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (Washington Consensus, Encyclopedia Britannica, n.d.).

Also, following the 1990s, the European social democratic parties have been facing difficulties in presenting themselves as an attractive option to voters in Europe, which is visible in the actual electoral records of progressive parties’ national elections and, at the EU level, in the

³ The unemployment rate reached 26.1% in 2013 and was still in 2017 the second highest rate in the EU (of 19.3%, only surpassed by Greece, with 23.6%) (Unemployment by sex and age, Eurostat, September 2017).

⁴ Stiglitz in this sense devotes one work to ‘The Roaring Nineties’ (quoted in Jones, 2010: 157).

four subsequently failed elections at the European Parliament. This was the case, for instance, in the EU-Elections of June 2009, when the Group of the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats in the European Parliament (S&D) was assigned 196 seats, in contrast to the 274 seats of the major force in Parliament, the Group of European People's Party (EPP). In the European Elections of May 2014, 191 members of the European Parliament (MEPs) were elected from the S&D Group, this number again falling short of the 221 MEPs from the EPP (Results of the 2014 European Elections, European Parliament Website, 2014).

The research period of this analysis stretches until 2013 since, as mentioned, the outbreak of the economic crash in 2008 created a new environment, forcing the economic and political actors to readjust their habitual strategies and discourses to the new arena. According to social constructivists' and hermeneutic scholars, periods of social "change" are highly suitable for studying sociological and institutional transformations, since the reaction (in any form) by the multiplicity of actors will be greatly informative about the context and the actors involved (Meuser, in Bohnsack, Marotzki, Meuser, 2003: 32). Also, in these moments, as a result to the unexpected situation, new approaches and theories usually flourish, which make of these times a fruitful moment of study for social and cultural sciences⁵.

On the other hand, as will be repeatedly stated in this work, the adaptation of the whole European social democratic family to the neoliberal hegemony is a highly peculiar subject of study. First, due to the Marxian origins of most of these forces, which although progressively diluted in the 20th century as a pragmatic movement to seize parliaments, are still present in people's imagination. Besides, these forces were leaders of the extension of welfare and catalysts of material rights for a prolonged period of time following the Second World War, equipped with a Keynesian social democratic program (Marlière, 2010). This political stance, which was soon regarded as outmoded with the rise of neoliberalism, was largely abandoned in the name of the new global era, officially made public by the Third Way Manifesto in 1998 (see Fairclough, 2000).

⁵ Meuser stresses regarding the *Deutungsmusteranalyse* (meaning pattern analyse) that the "situations of change and crisis are the most favourable research opportunities. In these situations, a higher reflexivity on the habitat unfolds, as a result, the *Deutungsmuster* is at least temporarily manifest" (Meuser in Bohnsack, Marotzki, Meuser, 2003: 32).

At the beginning of this shift, during the decade of the '80s and '90s, the adaptation of social democratic parties to the neoliberal era was almost exclusively contested by the extreme left faction within the parties, since their electoral results did not seem to be affected. However, the turn of the millennium meant a steady reduction in their turnouts in all advanced democracies, and a general judgmental view from the media and academia materialized, especially concerning the Third Way's political program. Nowadays, as the awareness about the poor perspectives has extended and the risk of becoming anachronistic institutions exists, many initiatives have been born to design a new ideological program for the progressive forces, especially reflected in intense intellectual activity from Brussels and London⁶.

The outbreak of the economic slump only worsened the situation, adding an economic and institutional crisis to their internal one. The higher relevance of the bottom/up or people/establishment divides in voters' perception has situated these parties in an uncomfortable position, the one of 'establishment parties'; denomination that they share with the center-right parties. The most threatening factor may not be the widely shared perception of these forces being too deeply anchored in the system, since they have proven that they can implement profound structural changes, but instead may be the ideological gridlock. Neoliberal globalization, sealed in the national parliaments of the EU members after integration, leaves little room for political or social innovation, and the European Parliaments' elections that would allow the European progressives to create more room for maneuver have been unsuccessful in the last four terms, since the European Election in 1994 (the European People's Party won in 1999, 2004, 2009 and 2014).

It is perfectly conceivable that The Spanish Socialists Workers' Party is deemed to be in this group of establishment parties, particularly when looking at the long history of the political organization. In 2016, the force celebrated its 137th anniversary, an exciting journey that began in 1879 at the hands of the typesetter Pablo Iglesias in Madrid, founder of a party that has witnessed and participated in a great deal of recent Spanish history. In line with most European socialist parties, the PSOE appeared as a radical left force, with an explicit Marxian ideology inspired in the first Socialist International, celebrated in 1864, as this statement of Pablo

⁶ Such the Foundation for European Progressive Studies (FEPS) and different social democratic think-tanks, as Policy Network, a centre-left think-tank based in London.

Iglesias accounts for: “The aim of the party is the complete emancipation of the working class” (El Socialista, 1886, issue 1: 1).

As explained at length in Chapter 1, the PSOE played a humble role in the Spanish political landscape until the Transition to Democracy at the end of the ‘70s. Prior to the Civil War, it was commonly overshadowed by other organizations, and during Francoism, the Communist Party was the dominant force of the left (Lawlor, Rigby, 1998: 25). Due to the long dictatorship of Francisco Franco, the PSOE was deprived of 40 years of democratic experience until 1975, the time at which the neoliberal paradigm also cemented⁷. The PSOE upheld the Marxian working class’ worldview and discourse, whereas its sister parties readapted their programs to address a broader population.

“At the end of the Civil War, most communist and socialist politicians had to flee Spain in order to survive, regrouping abroad to continue the struggle from there. But life in exile, or the clandestine activities (...), generated structures and attitudes inside the parties totally unsuited to the flexible ways and open competition of a democratic system” (Lawlor, Rigby, 1998: 25).

Following the death of Franco, the Spanish socialists finally broke through on the national political scene. The appointment of a middle-aged Andalusian lawyer as secretary general, Felipe González, in 1974, marked a prelude to a period of socialist hegemony in the Iberian country. The second General Election after the Dictatorship in 1982 was the first of the four victories at a national level with González heading the party. However, at the internal level, the Transition to Democracy caught the PSOE at a time when it was unfit for the contemporary reality and had an almost communist worldview, they had to readjust within the seven years that passed from the moment they were legalized in 1975 until they won their first national elections in 1982. In this period, they had to undergo two transformations: from Marxist to social democrats and from social democrats to socio-liberals⁸, transformations that its Northern colleagues effectuated in approximately 40 years. Considering this, it is unsurprising that its

⁷ Regarding the PSOE, it should be emphasized that it has been a key factor in the Spanish’ recent history. Since the beginning of democracy in 1975, after Franco’s dictatorship, it has governed a total of 21 years, 14 of them led by Felipe González. Moreover, the PSOE, founded in 1889 by Pablo Iglesias, has witnessed more than the last hundred years of history, and today, it is still the major party among the Iberian country’s left-wing forces, although nowadays, this position is increasingly being challenged by the new anti-establishment left-group Podemos.

⁸ Labeled as “liberal learning” by Rodríguez Braun (Rodríguez Braun in Tusell, Sinova, 1992: 66).

discourse, which was still partly revolutionary, and its actions in government (once they seized office in 1982), often sought to be contradictory. The euphoria that the EU integration generated raised its perception as the quickest path to triggering the economic modernization, and led this party to accept a complete set of right-wing policies⁹ which, although they promised long-term prosperity for the macroeconomic figures, stood in opposition to its language and beliefs. During the González governments (1982-1996), this orthodox economic management was partly counterweighted by the implementation of basic social services, such education and health (Recio, Roca, in Glyn, 2001:194)¹⁰.

The next PSOE's general secretary able to seize government at a national level was José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, appointed as Prime Minister in 2004 and again in 2008. His election as head of the PSOE in 2000 meant the end of a leadership crisis in which the party had been immersed since the resignation of González. Zapatero maintained an orthodox economic program that, as with González, never contravened the European Union regulatory framework and neoliberal political consensus. If, in the case of González, this was generally redeemed by the extension of a rudimentary welfare state, Zapatero fixed his eyes on extending the civil liberties (such homosexual marriage and abortion) and strengthening the protection of minorities (easing the legalization of immigrants' status, measures to address gender-based violence, or funding the protection of people with disabilities). In both cases, the core macroeconomic management never diverged from an orthodox economic logic, nor did they try to stop the marketization of politics. Even in the first term, Zapatero campaigned with an expansive economic program and used the benefits of the economic upturn to decommoify the life chances of the most sensitive social groups. Orthodox economic core principles marked the hardest decisions of the second term. In particular, the pressures of the escalating sovereign debt led him to bow to the austerity policy of Brussels, retiring his most popular policies on social advancement and drastically cutting the state countercyclical inversion when it was most needed, such as in the case of the Plan-E, designed to boost the economic dynamism by increasing public expenditure (and consequently the state deficit). Of all of them, the decision that is still hampering the credibility of the force as a left-wing party today was a perceived as a clandestine modification of the Constitution to set paying back the national debt as a priority

⁹ Such measures conducted to the "liberalization" and "deregulation" of the economy (Rodríguez, Núñez, 2003: 368).

¹⁰ In this span of time, the "right to access to public healthcare" was universalized (Rodríguez, Núñez, 2003: 368) and the "right to free education" was acknowledged "by the Organic Law 8/1985" (Rodríguez, Núñez, 2003: 385).

expenditure in alliance with the People's Party in August 2011. The management of the crisis contributed to spreading a perception of a party imprisoned in an economic program, which it could neither coherently explain nor escape.

In this work, it is believed that of all European social democratic parties, an analysis of the PSOE can offer a prime example of the neoliberalization and further economization of this ideological family. As introduced in the decade of 1980s, this party harshly transformed the core of its political program when it seized the Central Government, that is, from a working-class ideology, still represented even during the political campaign for the general election, to an orthodox political program when in office. This two-step transformation, that is, from Marxist to social democrats and from there to socio-liberals, took 40 years for their German counterparts in the SPD, from 1959 with the adoption of the Bad Godesberg Program to 1999, the year in which the manifesto *The Third Way/Die Neue Mitte* was published. More recently, in the two legislative terms headed by Jose Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, the neoliberal economic program set the base of Zapatero's management, a fact especially exposed during the economic crash. At this moment, many other political areas had been already marketized.

In more general terms, as introduced, economic globalization is an issue that neither the PSOE nor the rest of European social democratic parties have convincingly addressed yet. This is evidenced by the recent emergence of alternative forces to mainstream parties, which have made globalization an axis of their discourses during the very convenient time of the economic recession. Unrestrained international markets were supported by progressives until 2008, usually by emphasizing the economic and social benefits they could bring about and disregarding their structural deficiencies. When the crisis awoke a deeply critical public opinion towards it, socialists were caught with no plan B that was feasible on a global scale. Nowadays, they are approaching the theses of global governance, mostly based on the high potential of the EU, but their non-critical pre-crisis behavior (most notably referenced by Schröder and Blair) affect their credibility. Conversely, newly emerged parties can support a more belligerent point of view, whose apparent accurate diagnosis conceals its opportunistic nature and, for many, impracticability. This is the third reason why the case-study of the PSOE offers a paradigmatic example of the marketization of European social democratic parties. In recent years, a newly created radical left-wing party has attained a large proportion of traditional PSOE voters, also but not exclusively by making the PSOE's non-critical position towards neoliberal globalization salient. Podemos, a citizens' movement born of dissatisfaction

with the system in 2014, obtained over 3.2 million votes (13.4% of the total) in the Spanish Elections of 26th June 2016 (Congreso, 26J Elecciones Generales, Ministerio del Interior, 2016), thereby becoming a real threat to the hegemony of the PSOE in the left spectrum.

In this work, the neoliberalization and marketization of the Western political scenario is related to the ideological transformation of European center-left forces. Although it seems obvious that this alone has not contributed to the ideological disorientation in which they are currently immersed, it is believed the change of paradigm is a highly relevant variable and that neoliberalism has influenced progressive forces to alter the main lines of their political discourses. In this sense, the main objective of this work is describing this reaction in relation to their traditional ideological framework. To grasp this phenomenon and connect to the relevance given to language, especially regarding its dialectical relation to reality, a methodology has been selected, focusing on the transformation of institutional discourses.

Discourse Analysis of the Sociology of Knowledge offers a fitting scheme to understand the processes of “social change” (Keller, 2005: 13) by analyzing the “discursive formations” (term borrowed from Foucault [1969]) of the different actors, who are usually confronted with a “structural problem” (Reichert, Schroer, in Schroer, 1994: 56-83). The focus is placed on analyzing the discourses they build to adapt to new circumstances. Deconstructing the different communication outlets they implement to subsequently reconstruct them under an articulated format is a coherent and feasible way to provide these answers. Normally, one of the main difficulties faced by the researcher is the reduction and selection of texts, usually solved by gradually restricting the focus of attention, while focusing on the study of the concrete field. This step-by-step progression to the specific characteristics of the case in question is systematically translated into different research queries, which eventually materialize in the final ones.

As inferred, the main target of the study of Discourse Analysis of the Sociology of Knowledge refers mainly to the content of the different discourses (Keller, 1998:50), especially the semantic structures they transmit. However, although it is likewise the main achievement of this thesis, an endeavor to picture the linguistic devices employed to present the transformation of the content is also intended. Therefore, an epigraph is devoted to presenting which language structures are most commonly used in the communication of the new political stand and worldview.

By using a variation of the Discourse Analysis' discipline, it cannot be surprising that among the objectives, the constructive critique and improvement of the social and political reality are included, while in Keller's approach, this is not particularly emphasized¹¹. Here, this aim is most notably reflected in the extraction of the main content of the language of marketization (here named 'newspeak', following Bourdieu, Wacquant, 2001) and its effects and reverberations in political forces' discourses. This scheme has a broad applicability, such as to other political bodies, as European left or right forces, public institutions, and international organisms.

It will be repeatedly sustained that the adoption of a new language by political organizations should be reconsidered and more consciously contemplated. This text attempts to underline the significance of the conscious use of language in political discourse, in line with critical linguistics and sociolinguistics' approach in the last decades. Recent academic work has demonstrated how its use has been largely underestimated by political forces and governments, often by replicating the repertoire of lexica of their political adversaries without the required degree of critical reflection. Most importantly, the materialization of language in actual realities has been generally disregarded, and politicians have been naively adopting lexica and linguistic devices that only served their own legitimate objectives to a limited extent. This relates to the present case-study, particularly to how the progressive side of the spectrum has been constructing a linguistic scenario with a neoliberal portfolio of terms (Przeworski, in Glyn: 2011). This was possible thanks to the 'cultural hegemony' (Gramsci, in Lears, 1985: 567-593) achieved by the neoliberal powers, which designed a self-referential scheme of values that they successfully transferred to the rest of the actors through language. The progressives have been eroding their identity thanks to the use of a set of frames and concepts created by their adversaries, which were at odds with their history and traditional interests. The other option would have been escaping from this map, a path taken by minority forces. However, decisions motivated by the will of governments and political pragmatism have maintained them in what is called the center today. It could not be affirmed that the decision was easy, but neither matching. Passively adopting the TINA way of life was not only wrong because it was not

¹¹ This social aim is deeply more reflected in critical discourse analyses, such Fairclough, 1992, 2000, 2003, 2006; Jäger, 2001; Jäger, Jäger, 2007; Wodak, 2008; Wodak, in Wodak, Meyer, 2001.

coherent with their traditions and ethos, but most importantly because it was harmful to their constituencies, who no longer distinguish between the center-right and center-left.

Applying the methodology, largely based on Discourse Analysis of the Sociology of Knowledge, to the case-study, the PSOE, has led to the extraction of the “categories of meaning” (Donati, in Keller, Hierseland, Schneider, Viehöver, 2001: 151)¹², representing the adaptation of the social democratic parties to the neoliberal hegemony and its subsequent marketization from 1998 to 2013. The main conclusion that can be drawn from the analysis is this marketization of the European center-left forces’ discourse, causing the alteration of its core logic, which has resulted in the evolution from “intervention in the market” in the post-war era to “adaptation to the market” under the neoliberal regime. This shift in the central rationality is accompanied by a change in the chief instruments and objectives of these forces. If, in Keynesianism, the main goals were material security (by constructing welfare infrastructures), equality (by implementing redistributive policies, equal education, and support of unprivileged groups), and enhancement of workers’ living conditions (through the creation of jobs and increasing the quality of labor), this scene would develop under the hegemonic neoliberalism. The core purpose of the marketized social democrats is successfully adapting to the variabilities of the market. To do so, the main instruments are the following: conforming to a competitive and dynamic state, embracing globalization, promoting a knowledge economy with a market-oriented education, deepening the flexibility of labor, bolstering an enterprising culture, and maintaining an environmentally sustainable model and social cohesion. These tools, discursively implemented by the progressive forces as a political program, have much more in common with the neoliberal basic claims than with the social democratic tradition.

Looking at the typical neoliberal ideological scheme, represented in this work by the neoliberal “newspeak” (a notion borrowed from Bourdieu, Wacquant, 2001), the similarities overwhelmingly prevail. This is the case directly (by using the same notion) or indirectly (connected meanings) for all of them, such as the demands for embracing globalization, competitive state, knowledge economy, market-oriented education, labor flexibility, and an entrepreneurial individual, all of them presented in both the neoliberal newspeak and the marketized social democratic discourse.

¹² He actually refers to them as “categories or frames of meaning through which the actors perceive the world” (Donati, in Keller, Hierseland, Schneider, Viehöver, 2001: 152).

Explaining the surprisingly faithful resonance of the neoliberal core lines in the social democratic political program, or the reasons behind the deep marketization of its discourse, is the main challenge of this doctoral thesis. This question is particularly interesting when considering the progressive ideological background of these forces, especially since the neoliberal discourse contradicts their traditional welfarist-like political program. This paradox is solved in the present work by drawing on the theoretical corpus on hegemony, mainly outlined by Gramsci in the 'Prison Notebooks' (drafted from 1929 to 1935 [Gerratana, 1981], especially emphasizing the role of language in its formation. As mentioned, according to this view, the neoliberal intellectuals succeeded at conforming a vision of the world and a corpus of self-referential values designed to favor their own interests, which were gradually transferred to society at large. This program, created following the Second World War, was spread internationally between approximately 1950 to 1980 (Harvey, 2010). By the end of the '90s, all moderated or central-spectrum political forces had adopted a neoliberal worldview and corresponding language, which served the interests of the overarching powers, which becomes evident when considering the non-critical promotion of economic globalization by all centrist parties.

The notion of hegemony in relation to language will be employed to account for the marketization of progressive forces to provide an answer to the main research questions. These, which will be outlined in Chapter 1, query how the neoliberal discourse has interacted with the European social democratic one between 1998 and 2013, and if the theories on the marketization of non-economic fields apply to the present study; that is, if market-like and neoliberal values and arguments have occupied spheres beyond the economy, as could be the case with social policy, environment, education, or research.

This work attempts to address a multiplicity of research issues deemed to have been neglected in recent years. First, in relation to the foremost position that will be given to the language of marketization in this work, represented here by the newspeak notions. Although this process has been repeatedly addressed during the last fifteen years, not a single work has provided a straight and all-encompassing account on the typical content of its associated discourse.

As will be shown, marketization has been studied rather frequently, especially in the European countries, mainly in relation to social policy and education. However, the concept of marketization has yet been related to the transformation of the European ideological family's political program, although similar terms, such as 'neoliberalism', have been used with similar intentions and in research questions (such in Fairclough, 2001b; Kapeller; Bailey, 2009; Huber, 2009; L'Hôte, 2010; Sachs, 2011; Turowski, 2012). All of these accounts have focused on parties from Central and Northern Europe, often comparing their national discourses, the British Labour Party and the German SPD often being the parties of choice. In this sense, another peculiarity of this thesis is the attention paid to a Southern European party, as is the case of the PSOE, which has only been linked to marketization indirectly, and never as a case study. Another characteristic that makes the present work original is the application of Discourse Analysis of the Sociology of Knowledge to strict ideological discourse and party programs. Keller's approach was originally designed to explore questions of "social change" and "transformations of social orders of knowledge" (Keller, 2005: 9-13), which seems to have a more abstract and neutral character than other works, based on Post-Marxist and Foucauldian worldviews (such Fairclough, 2000, 2006; Jäger, 2001, 2007). Lastly, the enhancement of Keller's asset, with a custom-designed linguistic analysis to explore the strategic devices employed in the marketized social democratic discourse will be the last contribution that the present thesis aims to achieve.

In the following, a summary of the content of the different chapters will be outlined. In Chapter 1, under the title 'Neoliberalism as the current hegemonic ideology: 'marketization' of the political sphere', the most fundamental concepts of the doctoral project will be extensively conceptualized. This will be the case with the notions of neoliberalism, marketization, globalization, social democracy, and the Spanish Socialist Workers Party (PSOE). The first part of the chapter pertains to the general theoretical framework of this study, especially the theories on neoliberalism and marketization, whereas the second part deals with the subject of this work; the European social democratic forces from 1998 to 2013 with special concern about the PSOE. Regarding this second section, the ideological evolution of these forces will be presented with a focus on the economic program. This will deal with tracing their progressive "deradicalization" throughout the course of the 20th and 21th century (Merkel et.al. 2008: 7), which can be related to marketization. The history of European social democracy will be divided in three stages: before the Second World War, in which the common background of all left-wing forces will be highlighted; from 1945-1973, when social democrats succeeded in

creating a welfarist “policy regime” (Przeworski: 324, in Glyn, 2001); and after 1973, when the neoliberal ideology began to be fully established.

Regarding the Spanish party, firstly its foundation as a working-class party in the 19th Century and its radical phase in the first three quarters of the 20th will be depicted; secondly, the abandonment of Marxism and its conversion into a social democratic party; and, finally, its gradual neoliberalization between 1982 and 2013, most notably thanks to the integration in the EU and the establishment of the globally anchored neoliberalism.

Chapter 2 will specifically address the marketization of the political sphere, the action of “disseminating” the neoliberal logic to non-economic spheres, such as the political one (Brown, 2005: 40) and, particularly, the effects of this phenomenon on the European social democratic discourse. This section is largely focused on describing the literature on marketization, marketization of the social democratic discourse and, finally, marketization of the PSOE. The studies are generally rather recent, since most were published between the end of the ‘90s and the present day. Perhaps the most significant contribution of the chapter is the extraction of the newspeak of neoliberalism, depicting the core content of the neoliberal discourse through the categories of meaning. Lastly, a justification of the relevance of this thesis project in relation to its contributions to the social sciences’ stock of knowledge will close the chapter.

The third chapter will deal with the methodology constructed to study the combination of the neoliberal discourse with the social democratic one in the time considered, especially regarding the process of marketization. As will be explained at length, Reiner Keller’s Discourse Analysis of the Sociology on Knowledge is the main approach upon which the present methodological scheme relies, although not the only one. Other discourse analysts’ accounts will complete the toolkit for studying the corpus, especially for accomplishing the linguistic analysis. In the first part of chapter 3, Keller’s contribution will be depicted, adding a general picture of the progress needed in academia to allow this methodology to take form, such as Interpretivism, the ‘Linguistic Turn’¹³, and Constructivism. Since the present work will rely on more sources among the different schools of Discourse Analysis, these approaches will be briefly summarized. Next, in the epigraph ‘Analysis of texts through Sociology of Knowledge

¹³ Here defined according to Oxford Reference as “A change in emphasis in the discourse of the humanities and social sciences reflecting a recognition (beyond the bounds of linguistics itself) of the importance of language in human meaning-making” (Oxford Reference, n.d.).

Discourse Analysis’, some practical considerations about the field work with the documents will be presented, in addition to a general and case-specific definition of discourse. Finally, the methodological scheme created to undertake the corpus study will be outlined, which is composed of five steps, namely defining variables, gathering the corpus (i.e., PSOE’s electoral programs, party congress resolutions and the magazine El Socialista), content analysis, linguistic analysis, and general description of the PSOE discourse.

The most relevant part of the thesis is introduced in Chapter 4, in which the outcomes of the content and linguistic analysis are presented. Regarding the former, the main asset of this thesis is the reconstruction of the discourse, resulting from the combination of the neoliberal and the social democratic discourse, presented in the form of the “categories” of meaning, (denomination of every group of content with relating meaning) (Donati, in Keller, Hierseland, Schneider, Viehöver, 2001: 151), “*interpretationsrepertoires*” (the compounding elements of every category) (Potter, Wetherell, 1995 quoted by Keller, 1998: 36), and “storylines” (a comprehensive narrative created with the *interpretationsrepertoires*) (Keller, 2005: 230). The categories included and described are the following: Economic globalization, Competitive state, Dynamic state, Knowledge economy, Market-oriented education, Labour flexibility, Entrepreneurial individual, Environmental sustainability, and Social cohesion. The emergence of the categories in the PSOE discourse will be likewise traced and extensively explained in relation to the contextual factors deemed to have contributed to their appearance in the epigraph ‘Tracking the gradual emergence of the categories’.

With respect to the language analysis, included also in Chapter 4, the most salient linguistic devices unfolded to strengthen the meaning and persuasion potential of the newly conformed social democratic discourse will be enumerated and depicted. Among others, granularity, presuppositions, and devices to amplify, moderate, and emotionalize the meaning will be characterized and contextualized with examples taken from the corpus of study. In the last part of the chapter, the conclusions of the analysis will be presented, with a focus on answering the research questions, that is, how the neoliberal discourse has interacted with the social democratic discourse, and whether, and if so, how and why the progressive discourse has been marketized. As it will be extensively argued, the results of the analysis point to a clear and incontestable marketization of the social democratic discourse by the neoliberal one, which has clearly, but differentially, affected every policy domain. In broader terms, two types of marketization will be delineated: one affecting the political objectives, in which the political

program has been modified, and the marketization that only alters the political rationales, in which the party pursues traditional social democratic objectives, although these goals are supported by neoliberal arguments.

In Chapter 5, the ideological transformation of the social democratic parties will be depicted at length, based on the last chapter's analysis outcomes. Firstly, this will be accomplished by comparing the core ideological line, objectives, and instruments of these parties in the "Golden Age" (Merkel, 1989 and Przeworski: in Glyn, 2001) with the categories obtained from the content analysis. It will be concluded that the core logic of these forces has been transformed, namely from intervention in the market to assure equality, material security, and labor, to the adaptation to it, with labor flexibility, market-oriented education, and a competitive state, among others. The final part will address the reasons behind this transformation, that is, the factors most likely to have triggered this evolution. The Gramscian theoretical framework on hegemony, always in relation to language, will be the milestone of this explanation, insofar as the contextual settings, such as the conformation of a neoliberal regime, globalization and EU integration. Finally, the peculiarities of the PSOE in undertaking this transformation will be emphasized.

CHAPTER ONE. NEOLIBERALISM AS THE CURRENT HEGEMONIC IDEOLOGY AND THE DERADICALIZATION OF EUROPEAN SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTIES

In the present chapter, which is conceived as the first theoretical chapter of this text, I will provide definitions and characterizations of the core concepts of my thesis. The notions of globalization, neoliberalism, marketization and social democracy will be operationalized thanks to the literature. The presentation and analysis of the theoretical framework is essential in answering the research questions of this thesis, how the traditional social democratic discourse is combined and merged with the neoliberal discourse from 1998 to 2008, and whether the theories on marketization of the political sphere apply to this phenomenon. To answer these questions, the case study of the Spanish Socialist Workers Party (PSOE) has been selected to trace the influence of neoliberalism on its political discourse in order to capture all of the complexities by studying of a single case (Creswell, 2009).

1. Neoliberalism as the hegemonic discourse of economic globalization

Neoliberalism has been the world's "hegemonic" ideology and political discourse since the end of the 1970s (Cerny, 2010: 129). It first emerged "at the beginning of the 20th Century" as an "ideological-theoretical construct", which embodied the basic economic implications of liberal economists (Walpen 2004, in Kapeller and Huber, 2009:163), although with some programmatic alterations, mainly in relation to the role of the state and the emphasis on opening national markets. According to the Oxford English Dictionary, it is defined as "a modified version of traditional liberalism, based on the belief in free-market capitalism" (Oxford English Dictionary 1989, in Golubovic, Golubovic, 2012:4). It is ideologically "embedded" in 21st Century society (Cerny, 2010:129) (Golubovic, Golubovic, 2012) because of an intensive and systematic symbolic inculcation since the decade of the 1970s (Bourdieu, 1998:29). Its discourses are considered "strong discourses" in part due to their self-actualizing nature and because of their "alignment with the primary contours of contemporary political-economic powers" (Peck, Tickell: 2002:382). Bourdieu compares it with "the psychiatric discourse in the asylum" (Bourdieu, 1998:95, in Peck, Tickell: 2002, 382), since all its pillars stem from its own infrastructure. It comprises a set "of beliefs, practices and institutions" (Golubovic, Golubovic, 2012:2) which set the boundaries of what is acceptable and refutable: it provides the area of the "common sense" (Cerny, 2010:129; Bourdieu, Wacquant, 2001).

This rationality has led governments with different ideologies to accept and campaign a global neoliberal consensus (Cerny, 2010:148), which involves the opening of national economies to create a global economic market (capitalist globalization). Here, the “flexible” and malleable character of neoliberalism will be highlighted (Cerny, 2010:130): it can be identified through “different impacts of neoliberalization in concrete historical, social, political economic and geographical terms” (Larner, 2003, in Birch; Mykhnenko, 2010:6). In this sense, Cerny characterizes neoliberalism as a malleable platform used by “political actors” to constitute their strategies (Cerny, 2010:130). In this study, it will be seen a “double structure”, which contains the “out there” neoliberal discourse (the international trend) and the “in here” (e.g. the PSOE’s marketized discourse) (Peck, Tickell, 2002: 383).

2. The process of marketization of the political sphere because of neoliberalism

In relation to neoliberalism, the concept of marketization must be considered, the action of “disseminating” neoliberal and “market” logic to non-economic fields, such the “political sphere” (Brown, 2005: 40)¹⁴. It refers to the spread “of market-economic logic (in this case, neoliberalism or neoliberal ideology) in the political discourse” (Schaal, Dumm, Lemke, 2013: 6)¹⁵. For its definition, I rely on the theoretical concept developed by Lemke et al. (Dumm, Lemke: 2013: 1). As they claim, due to marketization, arguments and practices from the neoliberal economy have been transformed into valid political claims (Lemke, 2012: 18)¹⁶. According to his approach, this transmutation of the market principles to the political discourse “endangers democracies” as it leads to a “reduction” of the “contingency in the portfolio of arguments” in favor of the mark-affine ones causing a “de-differentiation of politics” (Schaal, Dumm, Lemke: 2013: 5).

“Marketization, in a medium- up to a long-range development, leads to a reduced contingency in the portfolio of arguments that are de facto circulating in the public sphere. This reduction of contingency implies – given its increasing latency – a reduction of political complexity” (Schaal, Dumm, Lemke, 2013: 5).

¹⁴ My definition of marketization is based on Wendy Brown’s concept of neoliberalism, namely “extending and disseminating market values to all institutions and social actions” (Brown, 2005:40).

¹⁵ Schaal, Dumm, Lemke (2013) speak rather of “increasing relevance”. However, since my aim is making marketization quantifiable, the notion of “presence” seems to be more appropriate.

¹⁶ Here, it is highly relevant to note the difference between neoliberalism and marketization. Whereas the first refers to a discourse composed of market-like values and arguments, the second relates to its spread to non-political fields (i.e. it is more of a process).

This decrease of the political discourse's "plurality" (they refer to the phenomenon as "Die Rede von der Alternativlosigkeit" [Schaal, Lemke, Ritzi: 2013: 22]) in favor of a certain set of neoliberal expressions that leads to the "de-differentiation" of the political field (Schaal, Dumm, Lemke: 2013: 5), which , can eventually trigger the complete absorption (marketization) of the political logic by the neoliberal one. This approach presents a capital advantage it makes marketization of the political field scientifically measurable through the analysis of political discourse (Schaal, Lemke, Ritzi: 2013: 22). As they stress, "neoliberal hegemony is reflected in the level of the politicians' public justification and, consequently, it is analysable at the level of the speech" (Ib.). For instance, in the public sector, marketization has led to the absorption of the rhetoric of "New Public Management" practices in many "OECD countries" during "the 1980s" (Hood, 1995: 92). These transformations were a consequence of the replication of a business-like discourse and, in practice, encourage the "lessening or removing differences between the public and the private sector" on the part of the governments (Hood, 1995:93). "Public administration had to organize themselves in a new institutional form: as enterprises" (Richter: 2009: 169). According to Bevir, this transformation conducted to the "integration of competition and price mechanisms into public services", which is largely seen to lead to "a fragmentation of service delivery, the state's lack of control over its own policies, and weakening of lines of accountability" (Bevir, 2008: 130).

Another main characteristic of neoliberal discourse is the positive and prominent message it offers about the role of the international economic exchange and trade, mostly as it pertains to the global market, such as the necessity of expanding and opening national markets (Steger, 2005 in Fairclough, 2006:19) and promoting the internationalization of economies (fueling economic globalization). In this sense, Steger identifies the notion of 'Globalism', which he describes as a discourse which represents globalization in "reductive neoliberal economic terms within a strategy to inflect and redirect actual process of globalization" (Steger, 2005, in Fairclough, 2006:19). In his account, he portrays what he considers the six basic claims of 'globalism discourse': "it is about the liberalization and global integration of markets, is inevitable and irreversible, nobody is in charge of globalization, benefits everyone, further the spread of the democracy in the world, and requires a war on terror" (Steger, 2005 in Fairclough, 2006:19). In this sense, Fairclough asserts that this discourse is frequently expressed through an "established and recurrent set of arguments". Similarly, as Kapeller and Huber (2009) point out: "central recurring argument-muster are used, which are usually borrowed from the

dominant School of Economy –the neoclassic-” (Kapeller, Huber, 2009:165). They also stress the presence of “neoliberal basic demands, such the priority of the market usually through economic-neoclassic notions (such “invisible hand”, “Intelligence of the market”), accompanied by the rediscovery of economic all-stars in the sense of Adam Smith, David Ricardo or John Stuart Mill” (Ib.). Neoliberal discourse emphasizes the central task of governments in capitalist globalization: supporting, promoting and extending the market logic and influence (Brown, 2005:41). As Hayek, one of the most prominent neoliberal authors had already claimed in 1945, “planning and competitions can be combined only by planning for competition” (Hayek 2005 [1945]:46).

Marketization extends the neoliberal rationality (marketizes) extensively in the political sphere, by far transcending its original economic habitat. Thanks to neoliberalism, the market is today the supreme “ethic principle” to organize society and politics (Butterwegge, 2008:32). As Polanyi had originally already anticipated in his 1944 seminal work ‘The Great Transformation’, the economy has surpassed its own domain “by *marketizing* non-economic aspects of human life” (in Xing, Hersh: 2006, 52).

The notable position of orthodox economic science in the neoliberal discourse has drawn the attention of most scholars who deal with marketization of politics. Their accounts will be summarized in the following:

- Neoliberal discourse relies on the core principles of the Classic Economic School of Thought (Milgate, Stimson, 2009). When a political body is marketized, it gradually incorporates its lexica and rationality into its discourse.
 - Sometimes, these economic principles are expressed literally by means of liberal/neoliberal newspeak: such is the case with “market mechanism”, “invisible hand”, and “free trade”. More frequently, that discourse, instead of directly adopting the exact vocabulary, implements a new discourse resulting from the market logic, which involves recognizable underlying semantic instruments, such the requests and political claims advocating for “adapting to the market”, and “prompting competition”.
- Neoliberal discourse incorporates economic content in an identifiable and intentional way:

- Presents neoliberal economic claims as unquestionable facts and not as theories of a single and historically-bounded economic school.
- Economy as neutral science which aims at universality.
- Economy as depoliticized zone. “The charm of this “market-tale” stems from presenting the economy as an abstract quasi neutral field, which suggests universality thanks to the omission of any mention of time and space” (Butterwegge, 2008: 29).
- Economy as a non-social area. They address an economic field that does not belong to society. “Market Society needed a previous division between society and market” (Hirschman 1986: 1-2, in Lemke, 2012:8). Bourdieu refers to neoliberalism as a “desocialised” and “dehistoricised” discourse (Bourdieu, 1998).

3. The emergence and theoretic foundations of the neoliberal discourse

In the following, I will endeavor to briefly explain the emergence and evolution of the neoliberal discourse since its emergence in the form of classic liberalism, touching on the theoretical components it has been progressively acquiring up to the present day.

During the 18th Century intellectuals from the economic field attempted to analyze the “social world” using tools of the exact sciences. Influenced by the successful development of “Newtonian mechanics”, they asked if economic relations could also be “governed by hidden regularities” as “physical” bodies are and attempted to apply numerical formulae and theories to the field of social sciences (Milgate, Stimson, 2009:77-78). One of these advancements involved the introduction of the “economic machine”, that is, that markets naturally reach equilibrium without the need for any external intervention (the “market machine”) (Ib.). As they state, this “analogy (...) which persists to the present day (...) transformed the landscape of political economy” (Ib.). During the course of this century, the top theorists of the English School of Economic Thought (such Adam Smith) set the basis for an orthodox economic science largely based on this paradigm. Ideas derived from the spontaneous economic mechanism, such “economic freedom”, “laissez-faire” and “free competition”, conformed the core of this discipline (Classic economics, Encyclopedia Britannica, n.d.). Simultaneously, an independent economic science, autonomous from the rest of social science, took form in this period (which in the long run, meant the rejection to the intervention of political action in

economic activities) (Polanyi, 1957 [1944]: 71). During the 19th Century, the economic activity was “isolated and imputed to a distinctive economic motive” that brought about “separate economic institutions” (Polanyi, 1957 [1944]: 71). According to Lemke et al., this dissociation was a sine qua non condition for the formation of neoliberalism: “the root of neoliberalism is to be found in the separation between politics and economy” (Schaal, Lemke, Ritzi, 2013:9).

The next significant advancement in constructing neoliberal ideology emerged shortly after the economic crash of 1929. In 1938, when numerous “intellectuals”, concerned with how the current crisis had increased state power (“National Socialism in Germany” [Birch, Mykhnenko, 2010:3] or “New Deal in USA” [Schaal, Lemke, Ritzi: 2013:12]) and how this could endanger liberal democracies, met in Paris (Brand, Brunnengräber, 2000). This first event, in which prominent thinkers like Hayek and von Mises participated, was celebrated in Mont Pelèrin¹⁷. Their core objective was “updating” and extending classic liberalism through academic research and campaign work (Birch, Mykhnenko, 2010:2-3)¹⁸. This group of intellectuals were forced to question the role played by the state in the recent economic crash (Butterwegge, Lösch, Ptak, 2008:19). They believed that public administration had been obstructing the economic machine through their anti-market policies (and lack of pro-market regulation), which allegedly prompted the deep economic recession in part. Governments should also abandon regulatory actions and restrict their activities to an active and resolute role in favor of the promotion of competition. This move is fundamental for the escalation towards neoliberalism: the evolution from liberal to neoliberal theory was completed at the moment in which they advocated for the state to take on an active role in the economy. It is accepted that what differentiates neoliberalism from the liberal school is the emphasis of the former on the need for pro-market regulation to allow market dynamics to thrive. One of the main figures of neoliberalism, Hayek, was known for his critique of a laissez-faire ideology, since he considered a state “framework” to be a non-negotiable element of well-functioning markets (Butterwegge, 2008:42).

¹⁷ In 1947, the Mont Pelèrin Society was founded (Olin, in Hayek, 2005[1945]).

¹⁸ Some leading figures were “A. Hayek (*The road to Serfdom*, 1944)”, “Milton Friedman (*Capitalism and freedom*, 1962)” and “Ludwig von Mises (*Socialism: An Economic and Sociological Analysis*, 1922)” (Brand, Brunnengräber, 2000: 58).

The role of intellectuals was not limited to the theoretical renovation of neoliberalism. They were similarly responsible for its international spread (Hayek, 2005 [1945]: 111). As Hayek highlighted: once influential intellectuals are convinced about a political doctrine, it is at around this time that this trend of thought extends to the rest of society. As he expresses in ‘The Intellectuals and Socialism’: “once the more active part of the intellectuals has been converted to a set of beliefs, the process by which it becomes automatically accepted is almost automatic and irresistible” (Ib.). This was the case of the neoliberal ideology. Furthermore, its dissemination across the globe was further accelerated by the Second World War, since its leading theorists (mostly Austrian) had to flee and research at foreign universities (Birch, Mykhnenko, 2010:3). Moreover, since the very beginning of the 1920s, newly-formed international neoliberal “lobby groups” promoted a “political planning”, emphasizing the economic benefits of globalization (Miller, in Birch; Mykhnenko, 2010: 23-25).¹⁹ However, until the decade of the 1970s, neoliberalism was a mere theory, not yet put into practice. The subsequent economic crisis facilitated the next shift “from the abstract intellectualism of Hayek and Friedman to state-authored restructuring projects of Thatcher and Reagan” (Peck, Tickell, 2002: 388).

“A shift from the philosophical project of the early 1970s (when the primary focus was on the restoration of a form of free-market thinking within the economics profession and its subsequent (re)constitution as the theoretical high ground) to the era of neoliberal conviction politics during the 1980s (when state power was mobilized behind marketization and deregulation projects, aimed particularly at the central institutions of the Keynesian-welfarist settlement)” (Peck, Tickell, 2002: 388).

In this respect, academics largely stress how “the crisis of Fordism” (as system of production) following the 1960s marked the turning point in which the actual neoliberal policy-making in Western countries began (Brand, Brunnengräber, 2000:56). The economic downturn leading Western countries to “less productivity and benefit, less economic growth and high unemployment” (ib.) drove a change in the general political zeitgeist: the abandonment of the traditional welfare state in favor of progressive instauration of competition states. The belief that the “rigid” Fordist structure with its “Keynesian financial regulation, unions, corporatist

¹⁹During the last years, literature on this “assemblage of elite policy-planning organizations, transnational corporations, and global-governance organizations” has accumulated (Carrol, 2006:36).

planning, state ownership and ‘overregulated’ labor markets” took gradually shape (Peck, Tickell, 2002: 388). The “cure” for that involved getting rid of these kind of “rigidities” and “over-regulations”, making the different administrative levels more “flexible”, decreasing the political intervention of policy in market processes and restructuring national economies to adjust to the international market (Nielsen, in Jessop, Nielsen, Kastendiek, Perderson, 1991:3).

Among other factors, theoretical work, “lobby groups” (Miller, in Birch, Mykhnenko, 2010:25) and the economic crash of the 1970s allowed the establishment of neoliberalism as the hegemonic theory and political rationality (which remains today, albeit with increasing contestation) throughout practically the entire world. Since then, its instauration of neoliberal programs has been applied extensively and in varying forms to different countries. The first was Chile. After the “coup that ended Salvador Allende’s government and life in September 1973”, the “Chicago Boys”, “economists” who formerly worked under the supervision of Milton Friedman (Harvey 2005, quoted in Birch and Mykhnenko, 2010:5), were relocated to the country in order to enforce neoliberal policies (Ib.). The next countries to fall under the sway of “neoliberal contra-revolution” were Britain and the United States, under the governments of Margaret Thatcher (1979-1990) and Ronald Reagan (1981-1989) respectively (Brand, Brunnengräber: 2000:60). Simultaneously, the conditions imposed on European countries that requested to enter the European Union as new members ²⁰ and later to the Economic and Monetary Union (such as with Spain) followed this logic. In this vein, years later, the social democratic answer to neoliberal ideology, the British Third Way and German *Neue Mitte* at the end of the 1990s, supposed the official acceptance of market and liberal economy by center-left forces as well (Cerny, 2010: 137) (Bourdieu, Wacquant, 2001).

4. Globalization, neoliberalism and marketization

As explained, one of the central claims of the neoliberal discourse and a direct outcome of the process of marketization of politics from 1970 onwards is the demand for extending globalization and the reach of global markets. Next, I will provide a short characterization of the dialectical relation between globalization and marketization.

²⁰ Although in this text the EU is referred constantly as European Union, it only officially acquired this denomination after the Treaty of Maastricht in 1992: “By this Treaty, the High Contracting Parties establish among themselves a European Union, hereinafter called “the Union” (Treaty of Maastricht, 1992: 4). Previously, it was known as the European Communities.

Nowadays, and especially since the end of the 1990s, the study of globalization is a central concern in social sciences research. Especially within political and economic disciplines, today it seems hard to explain any contemporary human phenomenon or dynamic in depth without using this concept. Despite the vast literature devoted to this notion, there is little consensus on what the notion of globalization “does or should encompass, or even on the term’s definition” (Fiss, 2005: 32) (see Lubbers, 1998).

“Globalization has become so pervasively ‘known’ that it is becoming taken for granted, and few people questioned what it really means or even why ‘it’ is important. And in terms of the academic study of globalization, the literature now is so vast, diverse, and (periodically) impenetrable that to read every thought written on the library would require a lifetime in the library” (Jones, 2010:1).

The current debate on globalization seems characterized by the lack of unbiased contributions and points of view. The intensive politicization and polarization of this topic reflects its relevance, which confronts both the political spectrum and the academic research. For the present study, I will provide a characterization of the concept from what Jones calls the “reformist” (in line of Stiglitz) and “radical” (Naomi Klein, Pierre Bourdieu and Wendy Brown) angle (Jones, 2010: 4)²¹. This generally connects globalization to the neoliberal ideology, the Washington Consensus, and market-oriented political practices (such in Peck, 2010). Within this academic approach, globalization and neoliberalism appear frequently as synonyms: sometimes, critical authors use both terms almost indiscriminately. According to Waters, “globalization, along with the related terms ‘globalize’ and ‘globalizing’, seems to have first come into use in the 1960s, largely in economic contexts” (Waters, 1995:2, in Featherstone, in Ben-Rafael, Sternberg, 2001: 489). The first scientific paper that brought the process of globalization of markets into play was made public in 1983 (Dickens, 1988:15, quoted in Featherston, in Ben-Rafael, Sternberg, 2001: 490). However, around two decades before that, the coining of the notion of a ‘global village’ by McLuhan is noteworthy, as included in his work ‘Understanding Media’ of 1960 (Featherston, in Ben-Rafael, Sternberg, 2001: 490). Regarding the media discourse, the concept “was introduced in print media around the 1960s”, and it “was systematically used by scholars and journalists in the 1980s” (Sklair,

²¹ Epistemology according to the same author refers to the “framework of assumptions in which concepts and knowledge are constructed” (as a Marxist framework) (Jones, 2010:4).

in Dasgupta, Nederveen, 2009: 93). According to Fiss and Hirsch, “before 1984, it was unlikely that ‘globalization’ was featured in newspaper articles or press releases since the term barely entered public discourse then” (Fiss, Hirsch: 2005: 32-34). “Between 1989 and 1999”, academics presumably got used to summarizing “the economic transformations” of the “end of the century” as “globalization” (Touraine, in Ben-Rafael, Sternberg, 2001:265), and progressively, it became a part of the everyday vocabulary. Finally, as Sklair points out, “by the turn of the millennium it was to be found everywhere, and applied to almost everything” (Sklair in Rossi, 2007: 93). The same applied within academic circles, in which literature on globalization has proliferated since the ‘90s, and is still “very much alive” today (Jones: 2010: 9-10).

In an endeavor to describe the concept, I would like to conceptualize globalization as the process of increasing dependence among the different territories of the world that has ultimately led to the formation of an interconnected “world society” (Beck, 1997:27-30) and to a unique social space²². In the same sense, Jones underlines a “growing interconnectedness and interrelatedness of all aspects of society” (Jones, 2010:4). Under this perspective, in this new united society, the relevance of physical distance decreases inversely to the inter-territorial “dependencies”, which strongly increase (Lubbers, 1998). As he states: “Globalization is a process in which geographic distance becomes less a factor in the establishment and sustenance of border crossing, long distance economic, political and socio-cultural relations” (Ib.). According to the same author, this dynamic brings three side-effects: the possibility of creation “of worldwide networks”, “the ‘liberation’ of people, goods and symbols from their geographic context” and the erosion of the national boundaries (Ib.). “Technological innovation” and the “neo-liberal ideology” are the main factors that make these trends possible (Ib.). Regarding the social aspects, the internationalization “of social spaces”, and the creation “of new forms of cosmopolitanism” are fundamental features of the new era, in which the “culture-ideology of the consumerism” penetrates overwhelmingly (Sklair, in Rossi, 2007: 96-97). Concerning the latter, it is worth mentioning the dynamics of “Westernization” and “Americanization”, which, according to the literature, spread over the globe, along with the trends of “homogenization or hybridization” (Leslie Sklair, 2009: 97). Among the large number of dimensions that characterize this new world society (spatial, social and cultural factors), one emerges over the

²² Globalization can be considered as “the spatial integration of the world through the increasing communication and trade” (Featherstone, in Ben-Rafael, Sternberg, 2001:490).

rest: its economic reality. In this sense, there is a general agreement among academics stressing that the economic factor is the key driver of globalization, particularly of the “global economic integration” (Jones: 2010:14). Following this account, “a new stage in the history of world capitalism” (Robinson, 2005: 5) (but not static, it is continuously being updated), is characterized by an increasing extension and intensity of the economic exchange relations and “economic deregulation to permit the freer flow of money, raw materials, information and commodities across national borders” (Featherstone, Sternberg, 2001: 490).

In the era of this capitalist/neoliberal globalization, “the national and regional economies” are progressively converted “into a new global production and financial system” (Robinson, 2005: 5). The traditional national social classes merge into transnational class formations with new forms of global class cleavages (Robinson, 2005: 6). The influence of globalization on the politic sphere, particularly on of national states’ capacity for maneuver, has been one of the major concerns of critical scholars between 1990 and 2010. There is a common pessimistic view on this topic, emphasizing that states’ capacity has been “in decline” since the beginning of the process (Sklaire, in Rossi, 2007:97), although paradoxically, they contribute and have contributed to its extension. Nowadays, they count on democratic legitimacy, but not on actual power, contrary to business elites, among other actors. Neoliberal political practices promoted by international organisms²³ have been adopted widely by governments, although not always in a conscious way (Cerny, 2010:147). Much of this regulation stems from the Washington Consensus (Harvey, 2010:26), in which the main international political powers, as US governments and economic institutions, decided to campaign for neoliberal policies.

5. The ideological evolution of the European Social Democracy after the Second World War: the emergence of a differentiated ideology and its gradual deradicalization in the 20th and 21st Centuries

“The history of social democracy is the history of an ‘ideological tempering’ and ‘continual deradicalization’” (Merkel et.al. 2008: 7).

²³ On the promotion of neoliberalism by international economic organisations, see Stiglitz, 1999.

Primarily, I will provide a general definition of European social democracy. I will consider European social democratic parties the parties that today are full members of the Party of the European Socialists, and that defend and stand for a homogenous (or at least recognizable, aside from national divergences) set of values, and have undergone a similar programmatic evolution mainly during the 21st Century. Since social democratic parties are constantly evolving forces, with a historically bound political program, for practical reasons, at the time of the analysis, they will be mainly regarded in their institutional and programmatic form of the so-called Golden Age (from approximately 1940 to 1970), principally once these forces had evolved to mass parties. For their definition, their objectives and instruments of this period will be considered, namely, the defense of equality (through progressive taxation), security (welfare state) and workers' interests (most notably quality labor).

Respecting the origins of social democratic parties, it is broadly considered that forces that today are on the left or center-left of the ideological spectrum mainly rely on the political values of the Enlightenment, which also served as the French Revolution core *raison d'être* at the end of the 18th Century, that is, "liberty, equality and fraternity" (Giddens, 1997; Sotelo, 1987, in Merkel, 2008: 7). The sway of the primitive European socialists is also essential, that is, a group of intellectuals that developed a theoretical framework and philosophical worldview during the course of the 18th and 19th Centuries, which would later establish the basis of socialism. These scholars' legacy will be fundamental not only for those considered to be social democrats, but also for all progressive organizations (such as the radical left). Among the following intellectuals, there were different approaches that would materialize in diverse socialist factions: Marxist, Christian-socialist, anarchist, etc. To mention some of the most relevant: François Babeuf (1760-1797), Auguste Blanqui (1805-81), Louis Blanc (1811-82), Joseph Proudhon (1809-65), Lamennais (1782-1854), Robert Owen (1771-1858), Ferdinand Lasalle (1825-1864), Karl Rodbertus (1805-1875) and, the two most influential, K. Marx and F. Engels (Spiegel, 2001).

The first years of socialism as an organized movement are framed by the era of the Industrial Revolution in Central and Northern Europe, mainly in the 19th Century. Workers joined forces, establishing different political movements, such as unions and parties (often illegally), hoping to have their interests better represented and defended and achieve improvement of their precarious working and life conditions. The common characteristic of these groups was their ideological extremism (in relation to today's standards), influenced by the sway of mainstream

socialism, in which the Marxist theories and, to a lesser extent, anarchism of Michel Bakunin had a privileged position (Padgett, Paterson, 1991). During the second half of the 19th Century, the Internationals started taking place. There, the most relevant labor leaders and thinkers congregated to unite the international working class (Yürükoğlu, 1979). Almost every International (launched correspondingly in 1864, 1899, 1919) meant the splitting up of the organization and the exclusion of some factions. For instance, during the Second International in 1899, the anarchists had been expelled, and by the Third, being a social democrat had “become a stigma” (Yürükoğlu, 1979: 43) (Padgett, Paterson, 1991). Social democratic parties started functioning as an autonomous faction, separated from the rest of the socialists after the celebration of the Third International in 1919 (Yürükoğlu, 1979: 43). The ideological program during these years was far from homogenous, but the core aims of the labor movement can be broadly identified with the Marxist economic and philosophical worldview. It basically asserts that the capitalist system would be transformed through a “proletarian revolution” into a society without classes (Marx, Engels, (1846) 1974). This new system would engender equal citizens thanks to “the fight against the dominant class” (Ib.). Nationalization of means of production (“collective economy”), centralized economy, and economic planning (e.g., regulation of prices) were the core lines of the political economy (Ib.). There were constant struggles about the ideal strategy to achieve this new state, among them the one that finally originated the expulsion of the social democrats (called opportunists) in the Third International. The setting into practice of the Marxist-Leninist theories in the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917 irrevocably separated communists from the rest. Electorally, the constituency upon which all of them relied was the industrial labor (also agrarian workers in unindustrialized areas).

The outbreak of the World Wars, especially WWII, led to the most meaningful transformation of European socialist parties in their history, namely their evolution from radical left forces to “social democratic” ones²⁴ (Przeworski, in Glyn, 2001). In this sense, the devastation of the economic and industrial centers of Europe, especially following the Second World War, was the major concern of all parties in office, and they had to amplify their scope of representation from the working class to all the citizens (Ib.). With countries literally in ruins, socialist parties could no longer exclusively represent the interests of the working class if they aimed at attaining enough votes to form governments. At the level of the history of ideas, advancements in economic sciences had brought novel theories into being that these parties endorsed until

²⁴ The evolution to the so-called “catch-all parties” (Kirchheimer 1966, 187, in Padgett, Paterson, 1991:21).


1973, substituting the Marxist dogma. In the Keynesian economic model, they found a very convenient methodology to assimilate the working-class interests into the broader population. In general terms, Keynesianism meant a systematic intervention of the state in the economy. In times of economic downturn, this approach is mostly known by its program to decommodify the ill effects of capitalism. According to Keynes, the state should deploy anti-cyclical measures, which most notably imply the massive investment in the system (by raising salaries, decreasing taxes) to encourage economic agents to consume or invest again, so that the system could recover its supply/demand balance (Keynesian economics, Encyclopedia Britannica, n.d.). However, this rise in public expenditure implied an undesirable growth of the state deficit, which was excused due to its positive effects on the rate of employment²⁵. As explained, this economic model succeeded at connecting the interests of the workforce with the national interests, transforming the social democracy in potential a government party, equipped with the defense of the national interest to the detriment of a shrinking working class.

The conversion of these class parties into state parties represented a step forward in their “de-radicalization” (or “tempering”, Merkel et al. 2008), which had started with the first revisionist wage against the communist faction (democratic participation vs. revolution)²⁶. Perhaps the major problem in this last conversion into *mass parties* was that, if the ultimate objective for communists was the advancement towards socialism, social democrat parties did not look to represent a similar purpose, nor a new one with a similarly pretentious status. Although this shift allowed countless governments to seize power, some scholars argue that from this moment, they had been burdened with a loss of *raison d’être* (“ideological meltdown” [Marlière, 2010]). What is true is that with or without idyllic purpose, they found diverse duties to accomplish and stand for in the meantime, most notably relating to the expansion of the welfare benefits, which probably became their new *quintessence* with the defense of equality, also corresponding with the prevalent zeitgeist of the post-war period. Social democrats successfully incorporated these general concerns into their political programs, even today being acknowledged as the parties of the welfare state.

²⁵ This trade-off deficit/unemployment is known in economic sciences as Phillippe’s Curve (Schmid, Buhr, Roth, Steffen, 2006: 88).

²⁶ Symbolically, the German SPD abandoned the Marxist dogma in 1959th and the Spanish PSOE two decades later (1979).

During the social democratic Golden Age, which lasted approximately until 1970, a set of values that distinguished them from their political opponents, especially from the right-wing, can be identified in these parties.



Graphic 1: Objectives of the ‘Golden Age Social Democracy’. Own elaboration.

The first and more basic objective advocated by these parties during the post-World War II era is equality, understood primarily as equality of material resources. Other kind of equalities, such as gender, race, opportunities, and rights, would gain territory in the following decades, eclipsing the original economic one. For some scholars, such as Bobbio, pursuing equality is still what separates them from their right-wing adversaries (although he doesn’t specify which kind of equality) (Bobbio, 2005). The most directly relevant political instrument, intended to enhance the levels of economic equality, seems to be the progressive taxation system. The security, primarily considered material security (financial assistance in unemployment, retirement pension, social security), won a leading role after the Second World War. Constructing the welfare state corresponds with this general perception, carried out not only by parties of the left, but by nearly all political forces as it was a consequence of the general

political zeitgeist of the post-war period²⁷. Due to the historical labor roots of these parties and related to the aim of security, the objectives of full employment and quality labor were also strongly endorsed, although it is not clear to what extent these were defended exclusively or strongly by progressives, and not as a part of the general worldview.

Apart from the already mentioned instruments, the progressive taxation system (to increase the levels of equality), construction of the welfare state (to enhance equality), and quality labor, there is another core social democratic instrument of the Golden Age that applies to all the aforementioned objectives: intervention in the market, which can be understood as all the actions conducted to influence and impact on its dynamics, such as the anticyclical macroeconomic measures enforced in times of economic crisis (such as increasing public deficit), inspired by the Keynesian economic theory²⁸. Intervention in the market is not only the most key social democratic instrument of progressives, but it also functions as the central logic of the whole discourse (see graphic 1). All the (mostly economic) instruments and objectives are intertwined and linked to it.

Lastly, a note on the workforce: The objective of the defense and protection of labor (originally in especial relation to blue-collar labor) can be a remnant of these parties' historical background. In the post-war period, especially after the '70s, these parties lost the privileged relationship with trade unions, whereas decades ago, they normally worked in alliance (sharing the same leader, representing the same interests, etc.). These parties evolved from being the political ramification (defending all matters important to workers) to excluding progressively them of their discourses, except for quality labor and full employment, from which society as a whole (not only the workforce) would benefit.

The decade of the '70s meant a turning point in the political and economic landscape of the post-war period in Europe. Two factors were, perhaps, the most decisive. The first was the deceleration of the economic growth rate in Europe, subsequently, to the "Oil Embargo" of 1973 (Harvey, 2010: 26). The era of reconstruction in Europe was over, and the economic

²⁷ According to Przeworski, this general political zeitgeist was what in his theoretical framework is defined as Policy Regime: "Situations in which major parties, regardless of their partisan stripes, propose and implement similar policies" (Przeworski: 324, in Glyn, 2001).

²⁸ As expressed, these instruments, objectives and discourse will represent in this work the traditional social democratic discourse, and hence, at the time of the analysis, these will be used to study whether and how neoliberalism has reshaped the characteristic progressive political program.

machine was showing signs of not working according to the same patterns (reflected in economic stagnation). At the very beginning, in response to the Oil Crisis and in accordance with the general perception, governments launched anticyclical Keynesian programs, which instead of allowing the economy to thrive, unwittingly drove it into a state of increasing state deficit and inflation. Logically, European countries gradually questioned the suitability of the Keynesian program for running the contemporary economy, including social democratic factions. Related to this, a general change in the political zeitgeist was observed, visible in an expanding discourse on the necessity of finding and implementing new economic solutions for the new emerging era. In this sense, since the 1940s, intellectuals and think-tanks from the right wing had been working on implementing an updated classic liberal program (neoliberalism) suitable for the present era. Fortunately, the socioeconomic conjuncture and the general request for changes would favor the application of their plan. The election of Margaret Thatcher (1979-1990) and Ronald Reagan (1981-1989) marked the beginning of the “neoliberal contra-revolution” (Brand, Brunnengräber: 2000:60), which would be reflected in a certain rationality²⁹, not only translated into macroeconomic policy (economic program), but increasingly throughout all political and social spheres. With respect to the economic program, Keynesianism was progressively surpassed by monetarism, which main lines defended no intervention in the market (contrary to Keynesianism), as the market was the most efficient scheme for distributing resources. As a result of the necessity to compete in an emerging global economy and market, monetarists defended a supply-side economic policy, in contrast to the Keynesian demand-side.

It would not be long before the sway of neoliberalism would be reflected in the political programs of social democrats. Their will to seize offices (Castles 1992: 322, in Merkel et al., 2008:7) would lead these parties to adapt their programs to the general hegemonic political logic, even to the detriment of their programmatic legacy. If the Keynesian zeitgeist of the post-war period was relatively easy to assume coherently by these parties (with some modifications such as the assimilation of working class/society interests), this was not the case with the neoliberal ideology, whose core logic was largely in direct opposition to the social democratic logic. However, regardless of the national divergences, it is assumed today that these parties reacted, revising the main lines of their traditional discourse, with the most

²⁹ In the section ‘The emergence and theoretic foundations of the neoliberal discourse’ the evolution from a Fordist-Keynesian state to neoliberal rationality is thoroughly characterized. Hence, here it would be regarded mainly in relation to its sway in the social democratic ideology.

paradigmatic example being the Third Way Manifest of Gerhard Schröder and Tony Blair in 1998, presented by the Prime Minister of Britain, Tony Blair, and his German counterpart, Gerhard Schröder. In it, these parties call for a “modernization” of the European social democratic political discourse by endorsing the “single market” and “market competition and open trade” as ingredients in “economic success”, “sound public finance” with “no deficit spending”, “supply-side agenda”, “active government” as “key” “in economic development”, upgrading the social value of “individual and business enterprise”, permanent education, and flexibility of “product, capital and labor markets” (Third Way Manifesto, 1998, 3-10).

6. The economic and political program of the Spanish Socialist Workers Party (PSOE) and its adaptation to the different socio-political conjunctures

The PSOE was founded in 1879 by the typesetter Pablo Iglesias and a group of workers and intellectuals in the Taberna Labra in Madrid. The party represented a radical-left ideology in line with the Marxist theses that had dominated Europe by that time and the political program of the First International, celebrated years before in 1864. The first issue of *El Socialista* (the official magazine of the party to this day) started with the following lines:

“Considering that this society is unfair as it separates its classes in two unequal and antagonist classes: the first, the bourgeoisie, which possessing the labor tools is thus the dominant class; the other, the proletariat that, possessing exclusively its physical force, is thus the dominated class” (*El Socialista*, 1886, issue 1: 1).

“The aim of the party is the complete emancipation of the working class” (*El Socialista*, 1886, issue 1: 1).

Initially, the party had little influence on the Spanish political sphere, since there was a clear dominance of Republican parties in the institutions (Carvajal, 2005). Its leader, Pablo Iglesias, was “the first PSOE’s member elected as deputy in the Spanish Parliament” almost thirty years later, in 1910, and was also the founder of the trade union UGT (*Unión General de Trabajadores*) to better represent the workers’ interests (*Nuestra historia*, Fundación Pablo Iglesias, n.d.). Beyond the institutional order, anarchism was the predominant force, surpassing communism. Using violence as a political instrument monopolized the left-wing movements’ debate, which is unsurprising, considering that the first decades of the 20th Century were

characterized by radicalization and weak democratic institutions (Carvajal, 2005). In this sense, the PSOE, in collaboration with the Republican Party, frequently staged the opposition to Government through general strikes and mobilizations (Ib.). In 1917, the Bolshevik Revolution, led by Lenin, had a strong influence on the PSOE, bringing a breath of hope to their militants, who were eager at time of the final revolution. However, after a long and profound debate, the PSOE finally decided not to adhere to the Russian Communist Party, losing a small share of their members, who established the Communist Party in Spain, under the command of Lenin (Ib.).

In these years, the profound radicalization, ideological polarization, and escalating violence finally led to the successful *coup d'état* of the National Front in 1936 and the subsequent Civil War, in which the PSOE was illegalized and persecuted. The organization saw its members and activities reduced and was divided on the external front (led by the members who were forced into exile because of the harsh political repression) and on the internal front, partly organized within the penal institutions in which the militants had been imprisoned (Carvajal, 2015). The PSOE'S decline lasted until the Suresnes Congress in 1974, in which the internal front, led by a new generation of socialists who had not experienced the Civil War, headed by Felipe González, seized power, giving new hope to the PSOE (Carvajal, 2015).

At the time of the first democratic elections, following the collapse of the dictatorship in the national elections of 1977, the PSOE was surprisingly well-situated. This happened even though the party had nearly disappeared during Francoism, and the Communist Party was the leading party of the left, even before the military coup. The political talent of the young progressive leader, Felipe González, elected in 1974, had fostered the party's internal cohesion and popular appeal. Notwithstanding this, the party of the center-right, the UCD, led by Adolfo Suárez, won the election in 1977, relegating the PSOE to a more than honorable second position, becoming the principal party of the opposition (Carvajal, 2015). Two years later, in the subsequent Regional Elections of March 1979, the PSOE maintained its share, albeit disappointing the socialists, since they had reasons to expect a more positive outcome. This perceived defeat was associated with the inability of the movement to integrate new sectors into their project, which, due to its Marxist nature, could be considered as too radical, or, as Roca and Recio argued, to seek "a more centrist stance" (Roca, Recio in Glyn, 2001: 174). González and his allies contemplated strategies to convert the PSOE into a more moderate

party, able to draw the attention of a broad middle class. In the next Congress in May 1979, González publicly stated his demand concerning abandoning Marxism as the party's dogma:

“The Party would never be able to renounce to Marx' ideas or abandon his valuable methodological or theoretical contributions. (But) neither can socialism assume Marx to be an absolute value that draws the dividing line between true and false, or fair and unfair” (El Socialista, 1979, issue, 128: 6).

Due to the formal opposition of the party to his request, he considered it fitting to resign as the PSOE's Secretary General. However, some months later, aware of his popularity and added value to the party, he successfully presented his candidature in the next Congress (Extraordinary Congress of September 1979), practically conditioning his leadership to the acceptance of his political project.

Finally, the party adopted an intermediate formula:

“The PSOE assumes Marxism as a theoretical, critical and not dogmatic instrument for the analysis and transformation of the social reality” (El Socialista, 1979, issue 129: 12-13).

During these years, the PSOE become (at least symbolically) a “*catch-all* party” (Kennedy, 2013:340) as the German Social Democratic Party (Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands) had done 20 years before, especially following the well-known Bad-Godesberg Congress under the leadership of Willy Brandt³⁰.

Partly, thanks to its ideological disguise as a *catch-all* party and González' astonishing appeal, the PSOE obtained an overall majority in the elections in 1982, after a very successful political campaign and some months of fierce attacks directed at the party in office, the UCD (Unión de Centro Democrático). The PSOE campaigned for the elections with an expansionist, demand-side political program they hardly had completed, neither during the first term nor in the three following legislative periods (in total in office from 1982-1996, all under the leadership of

³⁰ In the Political Manifesto from the Extraordinary Congress of 1979 after González victory, the overwhelming presence of Marxist values and arguments in its discourse is remarkable (“The advances toward socialism”, “The bourgeois power”, “The capitalist system drives to oppression, exploitation and discord”) although the official move to the centre was executed by González (El Socialista, 1979, issue 129).

Felipe González) (Recio, Roca, 174, in Glyn: 2001)³¹. The economic priorities of the party pertained principally to the need for “modernization” of the country (Kennedy, 2013: 331-334), which was hampered by intense inefficiencies inherited from Francoism³², such as low industrialization, high unemployment, state deficit, and currency instability. Apart from that, completing the process of democratization (there was reasonable concern for another *coup d'état* after the one conducted by General Antonio Tejero in 1981) was central in its politics. Next, I will present a general image of the main economic measures the PSOE deployed during the González leadership, most notably, in relation to the political values they involve and the economic theories to which they can be related.

The main objective was the modernization of the country, which was immersed in a profound economic slump (17% unemployment rate in 1982 and 5.5% public deficit [Paredes, 2009: 965]) that was hard to tackle and related to intrinsic structural inefficiencies. This modernization was associated with the admission to the European Communities by the government and, later, to the Economic and Monetary Union as part of the Maastricht Treaty, which required restrictive economic policies. Both modernization and EC membership were strongly endorsed and defended by the party, which even today is still identified as one of the most pro-European Spanish forces³³, although they meant the implementation of an economic scheme that contradicted both its ideological tradition and its campaign program. In meeting these requirements, the PSOE applied an orthodox macro-economic plan (Roca, Recio in Glyn, 2001:175), characterized by strong limitation of the state's deficit, control of inflation, and supply-side economics, the latter established by way of a set of measures directed to attain an international flow of income (investments).

As Kennedy states,

“More than any other single factor, European integration provided the PSOE with the framework for its economic policy. By the time the PSOE entered in office in 1982, the European project was itself already beginning to reflect the dominance of New Right economic

³¹ Under the leadership of Felipe González, the party theoretically assumed the European-like social democratic values, such equality, security and quality labour, although approximately 20 years after its sister parties. However, seminal studies contradict this assumption arguing that the PSOE practically skipped this stage by jumping directly to a Third-Way-type social democracy (Merkel, 1989; Roca, Recio in Glyn, 2001; Bailey, 2010).

³² For a comparison of Southern Europe social democracy vs. Northern Europe see Merkel, 1980.

³³ In this sense, Kennedy argues that it “prides itself on being the most pro-European of Spain's political parties” (Kennedy, in de Waele, Escalona, Vieira, 2013, 341).

prescriptions over those of social democracy. Spain's entry into the European Community coincided with the EC's advocacy of more market-driven, deregulatory norms, as reflected in the Single European Act and the 1992 Maastricht Treaty, which indicated the path towards Economic and Monetary Union via price stability, fiscal orthodoxy and reliance of market forces" (Kennedy, 1997: 96).

As a clear example of this, I will provide an extract of the Political Manifesto of the PSOE's 33° Federal Congress celebrated in 1994:

"The Spanish economy needs to control its expenses to assure its presence in the present and future markets. The state cannot substitute the private initiative but needs to create the necessary conditions so that it can work more effectively, such fixing a price of money that supports the productive inversion, an exchange rate that boosts tourism and exports, contributing to the opening of external markets, removing rigidities that hinder competition. To sum up, the state needs to benchmark and reduce their own expenses (...)" (Party Congress Resolution, 1994: 6)

The toughest consequence of applying a monetarism political line was its effects on unemployment: it increased to 22% in 1992 (Recio, Roca, 179, in Glyn, 2001). On the other hand, the benefits were also important. During the four terms of González's governments and fueled by the deregulation of capital movements (Ib.), Spain attained a large sum of foreign investment, which led to almost 1/3 of the firms at the end of the eighties being owned by foreigners (Kennedy, 1997: 97, in Sassoon, 1997) and, in this vein, Spain had "the highest investment-led growth in Europe" in 1989 (Kennedy, 1997: 88, in Sassoon, 1997), with a very positive effect on the financial situation of the subsequent years (until approximately 1992). Spain met both the criteria of the European Communities, officially becoming a member in 1986, and taking part in the Maastricht Treaty. Unfortunately, the boom reached its end at the turn of the decade, a time at which the restrictive conditions from Europe (particularly the Maastricht Treaty criteria of 1992) started being perceived with mistrust.

Although, in the political manifesto of the Extraordinary Congress of 1979, the role of the unions still had a privileged position (especially the PSOE's Union, the Union General de Trabajadores), in the political practice of the following years, they were not seriously considered. Whereas, according to the manifesto, the PSOE stood for "The defense of workers'

interests and support to UGT” (El Socialista, 1979, issue 129: 13), once the PSOE was in office, this position became diluted. While the unemployment benefits increased in the period considered, the overall protection of their rights was not a priority in compared to other concerns, such as the deficit control. One of the most controversial measures introduced by Felipe González was the creation of different temporal contracts and some other policies implemented to increase the flexibility of labor (which was already high, compared to the European average). In 1988, unions (including UGT) declared a general strike, which practically paralyzed the country.

Some authors stress how the PSOE deployed a social democratic alternative in other fields, such as in the national infrastructures (the high-speed train, railways, airports), bringing about “a great leap forward” in the modernization of the country (Kennedy in Sassoon, 1997: 100). Besides, it is agreed that the PSOE carried a policy of decommodification, both in the health sector and in education (Ib.).

The two final legislative terms of González Government were characterized by a worsening of the economic conditions. Despite access to the EU, and later, the Economic and Monetary Union, which largely increased the inflow of international investment, the overall slump in Western countries prevented the national economy from flourishing. The most worrying factor was still the unemployment rate, which rose by over 20% in 1992 (Recio, Roca, 179, in Glyn, 2001). The unpopular restrictive policies carried out by the government contributed to consolidating the numerous corruption scandals, which caused the defeat of González Government after three legislative periods and 15 years in office. This finally happened in 1996, the year in which the People’s Party, a center-right force, emerged during the Transition (but known until recently as Alianza Popular) and seized the National Parliament for the first time. Its leader was José María Aznar, who would hold the office for the two next terms. As a direct result, González left the post of Secretary General of the PSOE the following year. He was succeeded by Joaquín Almunia as Secretary General, however, months later, in the primary elections for the candidature for presidency of the Government within the PSOE, the party members elected José Borrel, ex-Minister of Economy. Finally, bringing an end to several months of organizational uncertainty within the party, the latter left his post as candidate, and Almunia campaigned for office in the year 2000. In this election, the PSOE were clearly rejected by the voters, who supported the PP with 183 deputies, compared to the 125 of the PSOE (Paredes, 2009: 999), causing Almunia to step down. In the next Congress, the party

members elected as José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero as their new Secretary General, a rather unknown deputy who represented a new sector, self-presented as Nueva Vía, independent from the old hierarchy.

During the two following legislative periods (1996-2000 and 2000-2004), Aznar, leader of the People's Party, implemented a clear supply-side monetarist program to encourage the income of international financing (largely in real estate, thanks to privatization). According to Kennedy, it can be stated that Zapatero backed the economic program of the PP in the opposition (Kennedy, 2013: 340). That could be related to the fact that since Aznar had won the elections, the Spanish economy had shown formidable growth (the economy with one of the largest growth rates in the EU with a GDP increase from 2.9% to 5.3% from 1997 to 2004 [GDP Growth, The World Bank, n.d.]), and the unemployment rate had dropped considerably. Years after, with the international recession of 2008, it became clear that the economic grounds upon which this formidable growth relied were inconsistent, unsustainable and, most importantly, too sensitive to external slumps, among other factors, because the system was too dependent on the construction sector. When Zapatero came to power, he also failed to deploy the expected tools and measures needed to address the aforementioned deficiencies in the Spanish economy (Kennedy, 2013:345).

Aznar's legislative periods were characterized by the economic upturn, especially during the first one. This helped Aznar to obtain even better electoral results in the second term, gaining an overall majority in the year 2000. However, two political scandals altered the opinion climate. The first one pertained to the Prestige oil tanker catastrophe, poorly handled by the Government in 2002. The second one was the participation of the Spanish army in the Iraq War, which was strongly contested by the majoritarian public opinion. With this decision, Aznar was largely seen as an authoritarian leader, ignoring his citizens' beliefs. Three days before the next general elections, on 11th March 2004, the Atocha terrorist attack took place, leaving 192 casualties and 1400 injured. The general association of the tragedy with the participation in the Iraq War and the tactless communication by the government (Paredes, 2009: 1008) were fundamental in understanding the PSOE's electoral victory in 2004 under the leadership of J. L. Zapatero.

Zapatero's first term was characterized by an expansive economic program and the extension of civil liberties, often focused on certain social groups, frequently underprivileged ones.

Maybe the widest known among them was the legalization of homosexual marriage and adoption, of abortion, the simplification of divorce, and, at the end of the term, the controversial Law of Historical Memory, to fund the search for the Civil War's casualties. There were also modifications to Immigration Law (also polemic) and important advances in protecting women, particularly in relation to domestic violence, and in rights for people with disabilities. Concerning the economic program, the basic orthodox economic principles were not questioned (supply-side politics, orthodox), but their incomes were partially used to protect some unprivileged or excluded collectives (such dependent citizens, students, unemployed). Actually, some of these new political measures had an expansive character, aiming at the creation of employment at the expense of the public budget, such as the Law of Dependence (over 200.000 new jobs were planned). During Zapatero's leadership, according to Kennedy (2013), both minimum wage and pension increased, salaries increased by 40%, and the investment in education increased two-fold. However, the second term presented a very different economic scenario. The global financial crisis had already started in 2007, one year before the elections, in which Zapatero prevailed with 169 seats against the 154 held by the PP. He campaigned with an expansive program and the promise to carry on with his social program (Encyclopædia Britannica). The crisis of the national debt, the pressure from international financial markets, and the EU austerity policy had altered his political performance, above all from 2010, making him get rid of his most popular policies (Iguarta, 2010). As an illustrative example, at the beginning of the crisis in 2009, Zapatero deployed the so-called Plan-E ("*Plan Español para el Estímulo de la Economía y el Empleo*"), designed to raise the country's domestic demand by increasing public expenditure (and consequently the state deficit) (El Socialista, 2009, issue 678: 3). Due to the mistrust of the, by then, unsteady global markets, and in line with the EU approach to the recession, he suspended this plan in May of 2010, passing a program of austerity. Some of these bills included social cuts, freezing the salaries and pensions of public workers, and the suspension of some of the most recent social policies. Maybe the most controversial political decision under Zapatero was the approval of a modification to the Constitution, in alliance with the main party of the opposition (still the PP), establishing paying back national debt to the international markets as a priority in the case of a surplus (instead of investing the money elsewhere). Despite all attempts, by the elections in 2011 (rescheduled to one year earlier), the unemployment rate had escalated to about 20%. Unsurprisingly, the opposition party, led by Mariano Rajoy, obtained an incontestable overall majority. Once Zapatero left his position as Secretary General and retired from the public sphere, Alfredo Pérez Rubalcaba, who had served in the top positions of the Government with

Felipe González, was elected leader of the party in February 2012. Afterwards, since the PSOE could not regain the support of the citizens, as the clear defeat on the national elections of 2011 and most definitely in the European Parliament elections of May 2014 demonstrated, Rubalcaba renounced the Secretary General right after the European polls. In summer 2014, Pedro Sánchez, a young politician with a PhD in Economics, was elected as the new leader of the party after the first open primary elections (all the party members were entitled to vote) of the PSOE. The internal instability and demonstrable loss of electoral support of the last five years were accompanied by a public debate and the general impression of a need for deep regeneration within the party, both affecting its institutional organization, perceived as outmoded and corrupted, and its political discourse, which did not seem to differentiate sufficiently from its main political adversary, the center-right People's Party. The emergence of Podemos in 2013, an anti-establishment left-wing force, which today has real potential to surpass the PSOE as the leading progressive force, triggered its internal transformation as never before in history.

CHAPTER TWO. MARKETIZATION OF THE POLITICAL SPHERE IN EUROPE

1. Marketization of the political sphere as field of study in social sciences

Especially during the last two decades, the extension of neoliberal rationality to other spheres of human life (such as the political sphere) is increasingly being addressed by academics of the social sciences. Particularly in Europe, there is a tendency to refer to this dynamic as marketization, which here, will be understood as the action of “disseminating” the neoliberal logic to non-economic spheres, such as the “political” one (Brown, 2005: 40). This process is responsible for an increasing presence of neoliberal (market-like) values in non-economic areas (Harvey, 2010; Crouch, 2004; Klein, 2008). Due to the marketization process, “arguments and practices” from the orthodox or monetarist economic theory (upon which neoliberalism is based) have been transformed into “valid” political claims in the public debate (Lemke, 2012:19³⁴). This phenomenon has led “to a reduced contingency in the portfolio of arguments that are de facto circulating in the public sphere”, in favor of economic arguments (Schaal, Lemke, Ritz: 2013:5).

Most notably since the nineties, an increasing number of academics have tried to conceptualize, deconstruct, and portray the notion of marketization. Thanks to them, I can provide an extended definition and characterization, incorporating its core features and implications, which will follow. It should be understood not only as a description of this notion, but also as a review of the literature about it. The first question to be asked is what exactly marketization means and how it affects the political sphere. As explained in the first chapter, here, marketization is considered as the action of “disseminating” the neoliberal logic to “the political sphere” (Brown, 2005: 40). It deals with the extension of orthodox and market-like economic values to non-economic spheres of society and the reduction of their complexity to the market logic. Neoliberalism or neoliberal discourse can be defined as the hegemonic ideology and discourse that stands for the superiority of the market and market logic (according to Cerny [2010:134]) and the primacy of market mechanisms over the political and social dynamics. Thanks to the extensive marketization of society since the 1980s, neoliberalism has been progressively extended to all fields of life, profoundly altering their domestic logic, although in this work, the focus will be placed on the political sphere. Next, a review of the recent literature on the

³⁴ According to Lemke “Arguments and practices from the economy become at the same time valid political ideas in politics”(Lemke, 2012:19).

conceptualization of marketization will supply additional information and approaches, hoping to achieve a wide-ranging characterization of marketization. The different authors emphasize various angles of the notion; these will be placed in the forefront of the present debate.

Consideration of Marketization...

As an extension of neoliberal-market values... This is the conception of this work, inspired largely by the critical literature on globalization and neoliberalism, most notably Wendy Brown (2005) and Matthias Lemke (2012). Marketization can be easily pictured through the metaphor of the propagation of a “thought virus” (Peck, Tickell, 2002:381, Bourdieu, 1998) or an epidemic (in the sense of Fairclough’s social practices [2003]). Some academics describe neoliberalism as a process, almost equating neoliberalism with marketization (“like globalization, neoliberalism should be understood as a process, not an end-state” [Peck, Tickell, 2002: 383]). However, in this work, they are considered separately, the first as a discourse, and the second as the systematic “disseminating” of this discourse’s logic to non-economic fields (Brown, 2005: 40).

As an inculcation of market-oriented behavior... In his work ‘Embedding neoliberalism’, Cerny outlines the phases through which neoliberalism was embedded in the international political economy. 1) “Design and establish institutions and practices that are market-based and market-led”; 2) “Install(ing) a culture of individualistic, market-oriented behavior in people of all social classes, counteracting the ‘dependency culture’ of the Keynesian welfare state”; 3) dismantling “barriers to international trade and capital flows” (Cerny, 2010: 135). In his approach, the second phase, “systematic inculcation of “market-oriented” behaviour” suggests the existence of an agent in the extension of market values, a contribution that could complement the considerations of marketization as an extension of neoliberal-market values (suggesting the existence of someone who endorses and has interests in triggering this process).

As the creation of a market society... Butterwegge argues that a “long-term establishment and enduring stabilization of a market society is the core concern of neoliberalism” (Butterwegge et al., 2008: 16).

In association with market-processes.... Kirchgässner connects marketization to the process in which “increasing spheres of the social life are associated to market processes” (Kirchgässner, 1997: 128).

As a transformation of realities into commodities... Gummet relates marketization to the acceleration of the “commodification process”, that is, the transformation of things into commodities (such goods, services, social relations) (Gummet, 1996:97).

As an intrusion of the economic logic in other fields, especially in the political... (Pierre Bourdieu, 1998, quoted by Dumm and Ritzi in Schaal, Lemke, Ritzi, 2014: 22). As Dumm and Ritzi further explain, “doing so, the economic logic threatens with the destruction of its inner balance and in the end the autonomy” of a concrete field, such as the political one (depolitization of politics). Polanyi could be included in this account, as he traced the historical interrelations between the economic and the political sphere in his master work ‘The great transformation’ (1944).

Maybe one of the most interesting questions is why and how marketization has exerted this strong influence on political life. If we look at the process, it can initially be considered that the process of marketization was triggered by a change in the political zeitgeist (from a Fordist state to neoliberalism), fueled by an enduring economic crisis. This paradigm shift was preceded by a shift in the hegemonic economic theory (to orthodox economics or monetarism), first theorized in academia and subsequently applied to the political life (starting with the coup d'état of Pinochet). Considering the query again (how this initiation of marketization was possible), it can be presupposed that the gradual systematization of the application of neoliberalism (neoliberal policies, rationality, discourse) transformed it into what Przeworski calls a Policy Regime³⁵. However, what should also be highlighted is that neoliberalism altered the system, and not only the policy (the content of it). How did marketization go so far that the political system (the institutions, the relations between institutions) and social system (the individual) were finally oppressed by it? How did it accede to an overriding portion of social and political life? Tellingly, Milgate pointed out that Hume and Smith considered that “forms of trade, or forms of market activity, might actually influence the parameters of government” and that an autonomous economic field could entail “normative and moral possibilities” (Milgate, Stimson, 2009:8).

³⁵ As already explained, according to Przeworski, Policy Regime refers to “situations in which major parties, regardless of their partisan stripes, propose and implement similar policies” (Przeworski: 324, in Glyn, 2001).

The academic concern about providing an answer to these questions and deepening the effects of marketization in different social fields has cemented in what, today, can be considered a new and transdisciplinary subject in social sciences, namely the marketization of society. In this sense, focusing on social sciences, Sebastian Dumm and Claudia Ritzki recently summarized the stand of the research on marketization in the empirical political research (Dumm, Ritzki, in Schaal, Lemke, Ritzki, 2014: 32). As they state, to date in this field, the approaches and methods from the discourse studies, qualitative case analysis, and surveys were the most frequent, although the latter occupied a secondary position compared to the other two, especially the case studies, in which most discourse studies approaches can be framed (since discourse studies usually deal with individual cases).

In the following, I will summarize the state of the research of marketization in social sciences:

Field	Authors (s)	Year and country	Research topic
EDUCATION	Clark	1998 EU	Entrepreneurial Universities (study of five European enterprising universities 1980-1995)
	Lohman, Rilling	2002 Germany	Marketization of school, professional education, education and science
	Heinrich, Kirstein	2006 Germany	Higher education
	*Dolenec	2006 EU	Higher education funding policy in Western Europe (1980-2000)
	*Walkenhorst	2008 EU	Change in EU education policy
	Marx	2008 UK	Marketization of higher education polity in Britain under Thatcher and Major (1979-1997)
	Grassl	2008 Germany	Marketization of education
	Texeira, Dill	2011 International	Marketization of higher education

Field	Author (s)	Year and country	Research topic
POLICY MAKING	Paulsen	1999 USA	American foreign policy. Economy and security under Clinton
	Bogumil	2001 Germany	Marketization of local policy under NPM (1992 onwards)
	Neubauer, Fromme	2002 Germany	Social policy: How marketization affects family and childhood (public services, life chances)
	Gause	2004 Germany	Marketization of Federal Armed Forces: new framework and strategies
	Czerwick	2007 Germany	Marketization of the public sector (NPM)
	*Trampusch	2008 Germany	Marketization of social policy and loss of autonomy
	Bradani	2009 EU	Marketization of the EU integration
	*Grohs	2010 Germany	Local social policy (1990-2008)
	*Minichbauer	2011 EU	Marketization of EU policy on culture (in EU documents)
SOCIAL BEHAVIOUR	*Klein, Heitmeyer	2011 EU	Marketization of society: economic criteria in social relations
NON-PROFIT SECTOR	*Eikenberry, Kluver	2004 EU	Non-profit organizations

Own elaboration. Based to large extent on Dumm, Ritzi, in Schaal, Lemke, Ritzi, 2014: 32 (specific works indicated with *).

As the table reveals, there is an overwhelming number of studies that focus on the field of education (most notably higher education in Germany and the Europe) and policy-making (to a large extent on social policy). Overall, the reviewed works attempt to shed light on the process

of marketization of institutions (such as universities and public institutions), rather than of individual behavior (only one such study found). The different publications were published between the end of the 1990s and the 2010s. Therefore, it can be stated that the process of policy marketization, often in association with neoliberalism, has been a relevant concern for academics, mostly in Germany and across Europe, especially in the disciplines of political and educational sciences during the first decade of the 21st Century.

All of these accounts on marketization seem to be influenced by the preceding, world-wide masterpiece by Polanyi ('The Great Transformation', 1957 [1944]) which, apart from tracking the historical background of today's market and trade system, questioned the present balance of powers in society. In his work, he traces the recurrent *embedding* and *disembedding* of the market in society ("the double movement" [Polanyi, 1957 [1944]: 130]):

"(The double movement) can be personified as the action of two organizing principles in society, each of them setting itself specific institutional aims, having the support of definite social forces and using its own distinctive methods. The first was the principle of economic liberalism, aiming at the establishment of a self-regulating market, relying on the support of the trading classes, and using largely laissez-faire and free trade as its methods; the other was the principle of social protection aiming at the conservation of man and nature, as well as productive organization, relying on the varying support of those most immediately affected by the deleterious action of the market – primarily, but not exclusively, the working and the landed classes – and using protective legislation, restrictive associations, and other instruments of intervention as its methods" (Polanyi, 1957 [1944]: 132).

Academics, who particularly deal with the marketization of policy and policy making, highlight the existence of certain keywords that are weaved in neoliberal discourses and serve as devices to spread neoliberal and market values (as marketizing devices)³⁶. In the marketization of the political discourse, their function has only been addressed by scholars partly and superficially, although their role in the spread of marketization seems capital (Bourdieu, 1998) (Bourdieu; Wacquant, 2001). I will consider these "newspeak" (Bourdieu; Wacquant, 2001) represent the

³⁶ These have been identified and characterized by Bourdieu under the notion of "neoliberal newspeak" (Bourdieu, 1998) (Bourdieu; Wacquant, 2001). According to his account, there are the following: "globalization", "flexibility", "governance", "employability", "underclass", "exclusion", "new economy", "zero tolerance", "communitarianism" and "multiculturalism". Some of them will overlap with the categories abstracted by myself for the content analysis, although the definitions will vary.

discourse of neoliberalism and as fundamental marketizing devices. The content of the newspeak is not expected to be literally imitated; in fact, it reflects the meaning of the discourse, rather than of the exact lexica. In this subchapter, I will try to offer a portrayal of each, drawing from the literature. Prior to that, a note on the internal organization of the notions, although this will be properly addressed in the chapter on methodology. Every keyword will be considered a “Category” of Meaning (Donati, in Keller et al. 2001: 151) (e.g., the category Knowledge Economy) and it will normally establish semantic or pragmatic relations with the rest of the categories at the same level (such Labor Flexibility) and with its lower-rank components (semantic ingredients, here known as “*Interpretationsrepertoires*” [Potter, Wetherell, 1995 quoted by Keller, 1998: 36]). The set of newspeak categories could be portrayed as an integrated network and can be deconstructed. Maybe the most complex task to achieve is to elucidate how these terms function in discourse, how they are intertwined with each other, and how they are embedded in the discourse of neoliberalism, which will follow. Likewise, the endeavor to determine if this network is replicated in the PSOE’s discourse will be the core concern of chapter 4.

a) Newspeak as a Marketization device

In the following pages, I will portray the most relevant keywords, which are used as semantic devices in the marketization of the political discourse, along with their characterization.

Free Market

NEWSPEAK	MAIN POLITICAL CLAIM
Free Market	-Global market as prevalent force -Requires internationalization, boosting competition, expanding markets -The rest of the agents have to adapt to it

This is the most genuine economic term among the newspeak notions and the basic requirement for the spread of globalization. Governments, encouraged and persuaded by the discourse of globalization deployed by international entities, have been arranging policies intended to extend its scope. In his critical account on neoliberalism, Cerny highlights the “active role of the state in designing, promoting, and guaranteeing the free and efficient operation of the market” (Cerny, 2010: 129). Although it relies on the basic parameters of classic political economy (such Adam Smith’s *laissez faire*), it is not an accurate replica. The key difference

relates to the meaning of 'neo' in neoliberalism, the re-regulating efforts that the different administrations should have allegedly carried out in order to actively promote the internationalization of the national markets. Hayek maintained the existence of an institutional "framework as a requirement for a meaningful competition" (Butterwegge et al., 2008:42). The EU Institutions have likewise played a fundamental role in the reform and adaptation of member states' regulation for successful performance in the world-wide competitive field and have similarly expanded the scope of the European market, firstly by way of the creation of the European internal market (EU single market), and subsequently with the successive free circulation treaties with third parties (such the ongoing negotiations for TTIP). Administrations not only aim to internationalize domestic trade, but also to extend the volume of domestic economic activity within each nation. According to this account, economic dynamism is crucial to the entrepreneurial state, since it turns it into a more competitive global player. Another phenomenon associated with the newspeak term 'free market' is the efforts made by states to specialize in certain strategic economic areas, since this specialization is fundamental to competing in the global arena. Internationalization and specialization appear as the key formulae (with R+D) to boost the economy.

This set of regulations, resources, and policies to prepare the domestic economic agents for successful competition in the global arena have been supported by a general discourse conducted to promote, justify, and campaign for the structural transformations this political line demands, such as the liberalization of markets or the removal of subsidies for loss-making sectors (as a key example: the coal mines in Belgium or North Spain). In this worldwide discourse of globalization (astutely analyzed by Fairclough, 2006), a common factor almost invariably appears again and again: the presence of global markets as an overriding subject. They emerge as a supreme force, determining the logic for the performance of the rest of the economic, political, and social agents. Claims, such as that the "global markets" (or globalization) require "flexible workers", "mobility", "permanent education", "specialization" or "innovation" permeate so often in political texts that, today, they entail more symbolic power than real or concrete meaning.



Graphic 2: *Interpretationsrepertoires* of the category Free Market.

Competitive State

NEWSPEAK	MAIN POLITICAL CLAIM
Competitive State	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -It is driven by a market logic -Adapts to the market -Marketization discourse -Functioning as a pure economic agent (“New public management practices”) (Hood, 1995), -Enables and stimulates domestic socio-economic agents (through education and research) -Extends globalization

The logic of the market has been permeating every aspect of social life in the Western world, and the state is not an exception, but its main promoter. States and governments have been playing a salient role in the promotion of the neoliberal discourse and policies and marketizing other spheres of society (Cerny, in Gummet, 1996:91) and the advance of globalization (Hirsch, Bieling, 2009b, in Band, 2012:76). The economic rationality of neoliberalism has invaded governments with diverse political orientations, which legitimized every policy and action in terms of “profitability” and “rational entrepreneurial” factors (Brown, 2005:40). Its internal logic has abandoned the space of the political and has started following the market principles. Today, when politicians intend to legitimize the pertinence of their decisions, they make use of expressions and market-like arguments, such as “effectively”, “efficacy” “sustainability”, “flexibility” or “balance”. According to Crouch, due to the loss of credibility and reputation of

the state, public administrations and policy-making started being run according to economic parameters in an emulation of companies' logic. Hall noted this tendency in 2003, referring to Tony Blair's British Labour party, which he identified as a continuation of the Thatcherist neoliberal "entrepreneurial governance":

"The New Labour orthodoxy is that only the private sector is 'efficient' in a measurable way. The public sector is, by definition, 'inefficient' and out-of-date, partly because it has social objectives beyond economic efficiency and value-for-money. It can only save itself by becoming more like the market. This is the true meaning of modernisation" (Hall, 2003).

This move by the state to a market-like performance can be more clearly seen, drawing on the concept of "New Public Management" (Hood, 1995), principally addressed in Political Sciences and Sciences of the Administration. This refers to significant advances in the social sciences, which have resulted in a theoretical corpus, designed to improve the "effectivity, citizen-orientation, and efficiency/profitability of public bodies" (Krems, unknown date). NPM advocates for a transformation of politics to tackle the requirements of the global knowledge society, which was crystallized in a call for "competition and accuracy and transparency of objectives in public institutions" (Ib.)³⁷. Thanks to these and other advances in social sciences, Administrations are increasingly being driven by dynamics that mainly answer to criteria of profitability, like in business. Hirsch coined the concept "Competition State" (1995, in Brand, Brunnengräber, 2000) to refer to their abandonment of the post-WW II welfare state model and their emphasis on international economic competitiveness (Laner, 2000, in Birch, Mykhnenko, 2008). Similar to international companies, today, governments measure "their performance according to criteria acceptable to the financial markets" (Gummett, 1996:86). All the rest appear to be secondary and traditional social concerns, as distributive policies may be "harmful to competition", and are therefore rejected (Gummett, 1996:86). Governments compete with other governments to obtain international capital in the form of investment, which leads to the so-called "race to the bottom" (Xing; Hersh: 2006). This rationality is accompanied by concrete policies, such as "*privatization* of state-run assets (...), *liberalization* of trade (...), *monetarist* focus on inflation control and supply-side dynamics; *deregulation* of labour and product markets to reduce 'impediments' to business; and, the *marketization* of society through public-

³⁷ On the transformation of OECD countries to NPM practices see Hood, 1995.

private partnership and other forms of commodification” (Hall, 2003; Hay, 2004; Mudge, 2008, in Birch; Mykhnenko, 2010: 5).

Governments are not only deemed to operate as company-like agents, but they also allegedly played the role of market invigorators, such as in the following examples:

- They bow to markets’ and economic organizations’ interests. As Garrets points out, “good government is markedly friendly government” (Garret, 1998:2).
- Rather than a withdrawal (deregulation) of the economy, administrations have carried out a “re-regulation” in favor of market interests since the nineties (Anderson 1999, in Gulobović, Gulobović 2012: 7). It was not so much “less state as a new form of state” (Hirsch, in Jessop, Nielsen, Kastendiek, Perderson, 1991: 73).

“Deregulation, in effect, was never really deregulation: was a new market-friendly regulations—ideally, a form of promarket or procompetitive reregulation” (Cerny 1991, in Cerny, 2010:146).

- Governments “call into question any and all collective structures that could serve as an obstacle to the logic of the pure market” (Bourdieu: 1998). Garret stresses that the competition state “rules out most of the ‘welfare state’” (Garret, 1998:2) (Jessop 2002:454, in Golubović, Golubović 2012: 10). The historical social democratic concerns and electoral promises of welfare benefits could only incoherently fit to this condition (Xing, Hersh, 2006).
- They link the provision of social benefits to competitive economic operations (which is usually attested by disclosing economic indicators, such as GPA variations, or national interest rates in financial markets) (Larner, 2000, in Birch, Mykhnenko, 2008). The social is contingent on the economic.

Finally, states and governments play a substantial role in the promotion of the neoliberal discourse, the marketization of other spheres of society, within society (Cerny, in Gummet, 1996:91). As Gulobović and Gulobović argue, “the state was actively involved in the implementation and dissemination of neoliberal principles” (2012:10). Actually, they identify

the state as “the most important mechanism of institutional embedding” of neoliberalism (2012:10), and using the marketization discourse with its newspeak notions (such as in the form of public reports, bills, media interventions) has been an effective tool.

“The internationalization of economic life could not have gained so much strength without state policies and policies of intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) supporting it. The neo-liberal ideology invited policymakers to liberalize markets, to deregulate economies and to privatize state-firms” (Lubber, 1998).

In the same sense, Tickell and Peck stress the peculiarity of neoliberalism, “a state-led project” which mobilizes “state power in the contradictory extension and reproduction of market(-like) rule” (Tickell, Peck, 2003:166, in Birch; Mykhnenko, 2008).


These alterations have been accompanied by an intense shift of its relational and interactional functionality, particularly in its behavior with other socioeconomic structures of the national landscape. During the post-war period, the state had a strong role as supplier of social benefits, some aiming at heightening the levels of social protection, security, and equality. This task was considerably diluted from the nineties onwards. With the gradual marketization of politics, its traditional mission as an assistance provider was eroded, partly due to its new role as an activator (or invigorator) of the economy. This very complex transformation has been the outcome of the transformation of the welfare state into a competition state and above all, of the loss of autonomy of the social policy in favor of the economic one. The allocation of social rights and services was no longer considered an independent and sovereign political field. This has altered its traditional concern: from a welfare benefits supplier to an activating and enabling state:

“More self-responsibility” transformed to a key-word (...) alongside with the activating state (...) which is used when is required that social policy encourages an actions-ready civil society instead of ruling (...) a traditional type of socio-political benefits” (Evers, Heinze, 2008: 9,10).

This current activating role of the state (activating policies [Lefresne, 1999; OECD, 1989, in Dingeldey, 2011: 18]) will be illustrated by the following examples:

- Public funds directed to education and training, which is most viewed (and logically expressed as such in official texts) as a productive investment in human capital. Often, traditional social benefits (most notably unemployment subsidies) are conditioned to the participation of the beneficiary.
- Promotion and sponsorship of innovation and research for economic agents: For instance, the sponsorship of research in selected fields (such in information and communication technologies [ICTs] or renewable energies through public funding) or the creation of infrastructures to bolster R&D (e.g., the establishment of R&D bases on college campuses). Usually, the activities related to this aim are run by a public-private partnership (the preferred mix is often public administration + private companies + academic bodies).
- Promotion of economic internationalization through public funding to private agents.

Finally, the meaning of public administrations does not exclusively refer to a national administration, although that is a main interest of the present work. Especially in relation to the activating role of the state, the EU and other international organizations (such as OECD) have taken a keen role in bolstering a number of economic fields (such as those already specified, such exports and R&D).



Graphic 3: *Interpretationsrepertoires* of the category Competitive State.

Knowledge Economy

NEWSPEAK	MAIN POLITICAL CLAIM
Knowledge Economy	-Promotion of education and training, research, innovation and new technologies

It is the ideal economy system in the era of globalization. National governments must transform the core aspects of their economies to be competitive in the international market. The discourse of the newspeak term ‘Knowledge Economy’ has been systematically promoted with the rest of the newspeak notions (to varying extents) by the overruling supranational organization since the nineties. Among them, The World Bank, the OECD and, especially influencing Europe, the European Commission and European Central Bank. The real significance of this notion is related to its literal meaning, especially to the conventional and popular sense of knowledge. Contrarily, it refers to a set of political claims that primarily focus on underlying sectors that are key for the domestic economic success, and therefore deserve to be sponsored:

- Education and training: the political claim states that in a globalized economy, the investment in education and training must be central. Only the economies that can accomplish a quality education system will be competitive in the global markets. Governments are forced to increase their stock of ‘human capital’ (Birch, Mykhnenko, 2008:8). However, this appeal does not exclusively address the administrations. Citizens must engage in permanent education programs to adapt to the flexible labor markets. This claim also suggests a greater share of individual responsibility on the labor market conditions and instabilities: success in looking for employment and the conditions rest exclusively on one’s shoulders.
- Innovation, research and new technologies: these elements’ meanings are interrelated and usually, they appear as a single package. The transformation from an Industrial (Fordist) economy to a Knowledge Economy meant the cementation of innovation, research and new technologies, most notably ICT, as core milestones of the economic functioning. These are matters of high national interest. The idea could be simply expressed under the motto: in the global economy, research and innovation (referring principally to new technologies) are of utmost importance. Perhaps, the most controversial and academically contested issue in this category is the definition this frame offers of research. Research, according to this stance, is solely associated with a

very limited account, hardly identifiable with its traditional meaning. Instead of referring to science in a broad sense, it exclusively talks about numerical sciences and technical degrees, especially information and communication technologies (telecommunications, engineer). As Rooney claims:


“While there is an increasing discussion of knowledge-based economies, knowledge management and knowledge societies, little attention has been given to what knowledge really means in these contexts. Policy prescriptions focus on science, technology and engineering to the effective exclusion of non-technical knowledge. Knowledge embodied in culture, the arts and humanities, the social sciences, social skills, entertainment, spiritually and many others aspects of everyday life are not currently considered central knowledge policy concerns” (Rooney, 2005:1).

And he concludes:

“The common assumption in global policy discourse is that knowledge is important for its instrumental or industrial value to the extent that knowledge and science and technology become synonyms” (Rooney, 2005:1).

As with social policy, it is arguable that knowledge and education have lost their autonomous nature as policy areas, as their respective discourses have been reshaped by the marketization process.

Finally, a valuable illustration of the newspeak term ‘Knowledge Economy’ is offered by the work ‘Finland as a knowledge economy. Elements of success and lessons learned’ published by the World Bank in 2007. In this report, the authors give a picture of how Finland successfully evolved from a “natural-resource-based economy into a knowledge economy” (Dahlman, Routti, Ylä-Anttila, 2007: ix), intended to serve as benchmark for other countries: “The Finnish experience in the 1990s is an example of how knowledge can become the driving force in economic transformation and growth” (Dahlman, Routti, Ylä-Anttila, 2007: xiii). Education and training, innovation, research, and new technologies are the main ingredients (the *interpretationrepertoires*) of the Knowledge Economy category, as the World Bank report also indicates: “Finland is also struggling with the impact of globalization, which is putting pressure on to improve its technology and education systems to stay competitive in a very demanding global environment” (Dahlman, Routti, Ylä-Anttila, 2007: xi).



Graphic 4: *Interpretationsrepertoires* of the category Knowledge Economy.

Market-oriented Education

NEWSPEAK	MAIN POLITICAL CLAIM
Market-oriented Education	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -It is a productive investment -Tool to adapt to the labor market -Accountability is with the individual -Links economic success, equality and social cohesion -Lifelong learning

This newspeak term is strongly connected to the keyword ‘Knowledge Economy’, in the sense that one fundamental tool (in the Knowledge Economy) enables people to adapt to the global and increasingly unstable labor market. It is also the paradigm of the activating and preventive (or proactive) state, the one that invests in education since (as the catchphrase reiterates) it is a productive investment, or in other words, public funds in education and training will generate profit. As Fairclough puts it “‘learning’ has become an economic rather than an educational process” (Fairclough, 2000: 75). In this sense, a discourse on the investment in human capital has been largely articulated by the EU, especially the European Commission, and it has been faithfully and uncritically reproduced by the EU-members. Perhaps, due to its apparently harmless nature (who would stand against the patronage of education and training?), its side effects have been underestimated. When the official narrative focuses on the need of the individual to seek further education and training programs to escape unemployment, the other


components could be overlooked, such as the political and economic background behind high unemployment rates. In the last years, the economic downturn has caused high unemployment figures, which presumably cannot be tempered exclusively by further education for the unemployed. In relation to the newspeak term, to entrepreneurial individuals, another consequence becomes apparent: there has been a reinforcement of the individual as subject of accountability in the case of inactivity. If someone is excluded from the job market, they themselves are responsible for this due to their lacking or inadequate training. The literal newspeak notion, which appears in the neoliberal discourse, is not Market-oriented Education, being this tag, rather judgmental. In this sense, the harsh and prominent criticisms articulated by academics reinforce the conclusion that the marketization of the education system has led to the construction of a market-oriented education system, with undergraduate, postgraduate, and life-long infrastructures and resources³⁸.

There is a prototypical claim repeatedly stated in the discourse of market-oriented education: education and training policies are today's first-class political resources, since they successfully (and simultaneously) boost economic success, equality of opportunities, and social cohesion. The official discourse on market-oriented education also highlights one sort of education over the rest. Life-long learning (also called professional or permanent education) appears as a fundamental political tool to confront the risks and instabilities of the global contemporary world. Following Hodgson, this keyword appeared in the 1990s as a "response to, or even defense against, a changing, frightening and unknown technological, economic, social and political environment" (Hodgson: 2000: 4). For instance, in this sense, 1996 was celebrated in the EU as the "Year for Lifelong Learning" (Hodgson: 2000: 2).

As David Blunkett, politician from the Labour Party puts it:

"In a knowledge-driven economy, the continuous updating of skills and the development of lifelong learning will make the difference between success and failure and between competitiveness and decline" (Blunkett, 1999:3, quoted by Hodgson, 2000: 12).

³⁸ The research on marketization of the education system is traced in Chapter 2.



Graphic 5: *Interpretationsrepertoires* of the category Market-oriented Education.

Labor Flexibility

NEWSPEAK	MAIN POLITICAL CLAIM
Labor flexibility	-Workers have to adapt to a dynamic labor market -Individualization of labor risk

The basic claim of this newspeak notion could be summarized as such: the workforce has to adapt to the market conditions. Optimal economic systems rely on flexible employees, who adapt to the needs of the market. Any intervention (such as the establishment of a minimal wage) would interfere in the market mechanism and is therefore harmful to its optimal operation (Nielsen, in Jessop, Nielsen, Kastendiek, Perderson, 1991: 6). This newspeak term is based on the premise that the “market ‘naturally’ produces full employment and that labour enjoys perfect mobility” (Birch, Mykhnenko: 2008). In Europe, this discourse started in the early and mid-1980s as a “cure” for the problems of the Fordist state (the “euro-sclerosis” diagnosis) (Nielsen, in Jessop, Nielsen, Kastendiek, Perderson: 1991: 3). It is also linked to the “deregulation of the capital markets, lowering of taxes and slimming of the state” (Nielsen, in Jessop, Nielsen, Kastendiek, Perderson: 1991: 6).


Although flexibility does not exclusively refer to labor flexibility, this seems to be of topmost political relevance at present. The sharp rise in the unemployment rate during the current economic downturn in Europe revealed how the international globalization discourse has questionably addressed this query, not articulating a reasonable discourse that could stand for and protect the rights of workers to seek stable employment. Contrarily, it has usually been deliberately one-sided when stressing the benefits of introducing flexibility to the labor market, both for employers and employees, intentionally overlooking the inconveniences it may cause to the masses of job-seekers. This discourse has actively contributed to the elimination of any state regulation and individualization of labor risk. In this sense, especially in the last decade, many authors have voiced critical opinions, arguing how labor flexibility, in reality, meant labor insecurity. As Xing and Hersh maintain, “under neoliberalism, the mantra has become flexibility and insecurity of jobs and the constant competitive struggle for workplaces” (2006: 51). Hayek, one of the neoliberal top theorists, suggested in the ‘60s that individuals had to adapt themselves (with “humbleness”) to the market settings (Butterwegge et al., 2008: 52).

“The dismantling of the corporatist-bureaucratic regulation of work relations by means of market-conforming ‘flexibilization’ is accompanied by a restructuring of the welfare state which is pushing towards greater privatization of the risk born by the wage earner” (Hirsch, In Jessop, Nielsen, Kastendiek, Perderson, 1991: 74).

In his seminal work, *The Great Transformation*, Polanyi expressed a harsh critique of the commodification of labor (and land), which had been unevenly implemented during the last two centuries. Although this case study solely depicts England, the historical path he portrays is a lucid interpretation of what he considers to be the ultimate effect of the marketization of society.

“(In the Industrial Revolution) under the name of labor, nature under the name of land, were made available for sale; the use of labor power could be universally bought and sold at a price called wages, and the use of land could be negotiated for a price called rent. There was a market in labor as well as in land, and supply and demand in either was regulated by the height of wages and rents, respectively; the fiction that labor and land were produced for sale was consistently upheld” (Polanyi, 1957 [1944]: 131).

As portrayed, for the first time during the Industrial Revolution, labor was subject to the market forces, although with decommodification of elements to protect workers, as was the case with the “trade unions” and a legal framework (Polanyi, 1957 [1944]: 77). After the collapse of Keynesianism, the safety net for labor was under attack. Marketization of work led to deregulation and liberalization (dismantling the protective legal framework) and the undermining of trade unions, the latter conducted by way of the mass media’s mistreatment and institutional destabilization.



Graphic 6: *Interpretationsrepertoires* of the category Labor Flexibility.

*Entrepreneurial Individual*³⁹

NEWSPEAK	MAIN POLITICAL CLAIM
Entrepreneurial Individual	-Adapts to the changing market -Behaves in accordance with market principles -“Entrepreneurial actors in every sphere of life” (Brown, 2005:41) -No political engagement: “citizenship as entrepreneurship” (Brown, 2005:43) -Archetype: business entrepreneurial: initiative, risk and innovation - Freedom and independence

If, in the post-WWII era, social values that stressed the relevance of the common and collective (in doing so, referring to society considered as a totalized entity) were underlined, then in the

³⁹ Although neoliberal discourse usually does not contain this expression literally (especially if it does not address an economic topic), it implicitly refers and constructs it.

globalized era, the individual monopolizes the panorama. According to Cerny, “a culture of individualistic, market oriented behaviour” was set to counteract “the dependency culture” of the post-war political framework (Cerny, 2010: 135). The Propaganda of self, as the promotion of “individual capacities” or the normalization of “inequality”, has substituted the historical aspiration for “collective emancipation” or “equality” (Hirsch, in Jessop, Nielsen, Kastendiek, Perderson, 1991: 80-81). Not only do the values that stress the collective reasons (as with the social equality) have a low public profile in the present time, so does the concept of society. “Society in the neoliberal *Weltbild* exists exclusively as a framework of the market, as exogenous entity or as simple synonym” (Butterwegge et al., 2008:51). If the collectiveness and the society were the social subjects of the Fordist era, the entrepreneurial individual is the corresponding subject of the neoliberal society, and, as in the case of the state, its central feature is its commitment to adapt to the market changeability.

A profound pessimistic ethical concept of the neoliberal individual is widely shared among social science academics. Within this critical approach, it is commonly claimed that entrepreneurial men guide their conduct largely in relation to market principles (Lemke, in Brown, 2005) (Brown, 2005) (Band, 2011) (Bourdieu, 1998), that is, they behave as “entrepreneurial actors in every sphere of life” (Brown, 2005:41). In practice, this means the negation of the traditional moral concerns of the individual, which has been largely marketized: “(the individual) erases the discrepancy between economic and moral behavior by configuring morality entirely as a matter of rational deliberation about costs, benefits and consequences” (Brown, 2005:41). In the same sense, Butterwegge argues that this human being applies the “cost-benefits calculus to all spheres of the human behaviour” (Butterwegge, 2008: 30). This “market-morality” promotes greed to the detriment of the common well-being, a feature that some academics see as the “greed is cool culture” (Band, 2011:80). Aside from this, this individualistic morality stimulates competition, an effect that Bourdieu calls “moral Darwinism” and a systematic “cult of the winner” (Bourdieu, 1998). Similarly, the criteria for judging human beings overstate the personal capacity of the individual to “self-care” and their ability to “provide their own ambitions” (Brown, 2005:41), estimations which, in case of turning out negative, blame the individual (Lemke stressed the neoliberal topic of “more human responsibility” [Lemke: 2012:12]) and not society (Schaal, Lemke, Ritzi, 2013:16). Any personal failure, such as unemployment or economic impoverishment, rests on one’s shoulders. Finally, neoliberal discourse similarly aims to create individuals who don’t consider any political involvement (such active political participation) to be valuable. They do not respect

political activity (the public sector is commonly thought to be inefficient) nor the political class. These neoliberal discursive dispositives (in sense of Foucault) aim at depoliticizing the society to a degree at which “citizenship is reduced to success in this entrepreneurship” (Brown, 2005:43).

There is some sort of model to which the entrepreneurial individual will inspire and to which they will be compelled to incline. It serves as an archetype. This is the business entrepreneurial, the person who embarks on operating a business on his own (in contrast to an employee). Some key values confirm its worth. Maybe some of the most repeated are initiative, risk, and innovation. This discourse of the enterprising individual circulates time after time in economic texts, embodying some version of independence and freedom.

2. The process of marketization of the European Social Democracy in the literature

Especially after the start of the economic crisis, a group of academics stressed how European social democratic discourse could have undergone a marketizing process, especially since the 1990s⁴⁰. For instance, Bailey reports that these parties have effectuated a “transition to ‘new’ social democracy that results from the internationalization of a prevalent, neoliberal ‘logic of no alternative’” (Bailey, 2010:15). Similarly, Kappeler and Huber claim that empirical outcomes point towards a possible “shift of these parties to the right wing of the ideological spectrum, becoming more conservative / neoliberal” (Kappeler, Huber, 2009:165). Other authors support this account, albeit looking through a different lens. They suggest that what progressive political leaders and thinkers are trying to do is adapt their program to the neoliberal world. They intend to achieve a social democratic discourse, which can defend their traditional concerns under the sway of neoliberalism (Blätte, Zitzler, in Schaal, Lemke, Ritzi, 2014). In this sense, provisional findings indicate that instead of a mere marketization and neoliberalization of the European social democratic discourse, i.e., the growing presence of neoliberal values in official publications and speeches, the European progressive parties have reacted in a more profound and multidimensional way to the neoliberal shock and transformed major aspects of their economic and political offering. According to the theoretical scheme, new findings draw attention to different roles attributed to public administration by social democrats (“New Public Management practices” [Hood, 1995], “Public Entrepreneurship”

⁴⁰ On marketization and social democracy: Turowski, 2012; Kapeller; Huber, 2009; Fairclough, 2001, in Keller, Hiersland, Schneider, Viehover, 2001; Sachs, 2011; Bailey, 2009.

[Klein, et. al 2010]), to the economic model (knowledge-driven economy), social policy (“preventive social policy” [Blätte, Zitzler, in Schaal, Lemke, Ritzi, 2014], and investment in human capital), and to citizens (proactive seekers of opportunities). In any case, the literature concerning this topic is large, complex, and diverse, although common lines, especially concerning their general conclusions, can certainly be traced. Subsequently, an outline of the most relevant literature on the current marketization of social democratic parties will be provided, offering a broad overview of the most enlightening approaches up to the present time.

Author	Research query	Methodology	Conclusion
Crouch, 2004	Description of the Post-democratic European progressive political party	Description of different cases	Marketization of progressive political parties: running like companies as a symptom of post-democracy (need for private funding for campaigns, strong influence of lobbying)
Merkel, 2008	Political transformation of European social democracy under “globalization and individualization” (in the 1990s) (p.3)	Comparison of six “social democratic governing parties” policies between 1990s and 2000s ⁴¹	“Globalization, European integration and demographic change intensified the pressure of social democrats to reform”. New instruments: supply side economics, conditional decommodification (2008: 14-15)
Kapeller, Huber 2009	The influence of neoliberalism on European social democratic economic program	Comparison of 1980s’ programs with actual ones by way of content analysis	Neoliberalism has a sharp effect on the economic ideas of their political programs: clear programmatic transformation.

⁴¹ Labour Party in UK, German SPD, French Socialist Party, Dutch Labour Party, Social Democratic Party of Denmark and of Sweden.

		(through scale of political attitudes) (Austria, Germany, Switzerland and Great Britain)	
Bailey, 2010	“Transformation from ‘traditional’ to ‘new’ social democratic parties” in “Western Europe over the last quarter of twentieth century” (2010: 15)	“Critical realistic approach” (2010: 20)	Transition to new social democracy in Europe
Sachs, 2011	Alteration of social democratic political modus due to neoliberalism	Comparison of the German SPD, the British Labour Party and the Dutch Labour Party	New structuration of their political programs
Turowski, 2012	European Social democratic reform discourse on welfare reforms resulted from economic globalization (among others phenomena) in the 1990s and 2000s	Qualitative D.A. and comparison of Blair’s Labour, Schröder’s SPD and Göran Perssons (SAP, Sweden)	Depiction of national discursive strategies

This topic has also been addressed in many critical opinion articles in the generalist press and in political analysis works (logically especially in progressive think-tanks’ platforms, such Policy Network). Not many rigorous academic studies have dealt with it yet.

As the table shows, the interest of the academic in the marketization of progressive political parties is novel, and it refers mostly to research periods studied in the last decades. All the available literature refers to European social democratic parties being the forerunners, drawing the interest of academia to the British Labour Party and the German SPD. Almost all cases found present cross-national comparative analysis, leaving out the historical and structural differences of the diverse countries to draw general conclusions.

The apparently limited number of examples presented corresponds with the very specific focus of the literature. Some other research related to social democracy in Europe that has been excluded will be mentioned:

- The literature on the decline of the radical left-wing ideology (considered as the last remaining ideology in a strict sense), especially after the collapse of the communist regimes (Fukuyama, 1992; Bell, 1964).
- Historic accounts of the transition of social democratic parties from working-class parties to mass parties in the post-World War II era, with the associated ideological meltdown.
- Critical Discourse analysis on the Third Way language, which will be highly pertinent to the text analysis. The scholar who has most deeply dealt with the language of marketization of social democracy has perhaps been Norman Fairclough, who has successfully implemented a sharp and acute critical approach (2000, 2006). His studies are still precursors of this field of study, albeit focusing excessively on New Labour. Also, L'Hôte with a focus on the discourse on globalization by this party (L'Hôte, 2010).
- Accounts on the transformation of political parties' programs, not solely the social democratic forces. The Manifesto project coordinated by the Berlin Social Science Center (German acronym: WZB) has, for some decades, emerged as the most significant approach to the ideological mapping and evolution of worldwide parties. Through the content analysis of political manifestos, which is guided by a thorough coding book (and conducted by trained coders), it is the most prestigious approach to the analysis of parties' programmatic alterations.

3. The Spanish Socialist Workers' Party as focus of attention in the study of marketization of left-wing forces

Author	Research query	Methodology	Conclusion
Merkel, 1989	Comparison between social democratic program in Northern Europe / Southern Europe. Were Southern parties actually social democratic in de decade of the 80st (Greece, Spain and France)?	“Comparative analysis of” “North” and “South”	There was a “failure to implement progressive-reformist policies” in Southern Europe. Especially, “Spanish socialists have undergone a liberal Metamorphosis” (1980: 37) (“uncritical emphasis on the market”, p. 25) due to “uncompetitive economy” (p. 28), “ill-designed policies” and “absence of political reforms” (p.35)
Kennedy, 1997	Was the PSOE from 1989 to 1996 a neoliberal party?	Review of policies implemented form 1989-1996	Both neoliberal and progressive elements (1997: 106). Neoliberal economic policy (to great extent due to EU integration) but progressive “social spending” (education, healthcare) (p. 98), “infrastructure projects” (p. 100), “civil liberties” (p. 102)
Maravall, 1997	Did social democratic parties enforce redistributive and welfare legislation in the	Analysis of official data and surveys	They did, but to a limited extent

	economic hardship of the 1980s?		
Roca, Recio in Glyn, 2001	Was the PSOE a successful progressive alternative to neoliberalism from 1982 to 1995?	Review of policies implemented since the beginning of democracy	The PSOE deployed neoliberal policies due to entry in the EU and adverse economic settings (“economic orthodoxy” 2001:175)
Bailey, 2010	Ideological transition from the beginning of democracy	Review of policies implemented since the beginning of democracy	The PSOE did not decommodify Spaniards’ living conditions, instead pursued policies to make Spain attractive for investing
Kennedy, 2013	Which are the key policies implemented by the PSOE since 1982 to 2011?	Review of policies implemented since the beginning of democracy	Under Felipe González: “modernization”, “democratization”, entry to the EU (2013: 331-334). Under Zapatero: raise of “minimum wage”, enlargement of “education budget” (p. 340), civil and social rights, no limitation of “construction-based growth model” (p.345)

Selected bibliography on the marketization of the PSOE.

A great number the contributions are diachronic reports about the set of policies implemented under the different governments, aiming at situating their political positions in the ideological spectrum. Although none of the reviewed studies expressly mentions the notion of marketization, they refer to it indirectly, especially if we consider their emphasis on the acceptance of the hegemonic economic orthodoxy by the PSOE. They refer to the neoliberalization of the party, an idea central in my theoretical framework, and, as expressed

earlier in this chapter, some authors identify with marketization. Their studies can be situated, likewise, in the field of research on the “deradicalization” of social democracy (Merkel et. al. 2008:7), although this refers to an historically broader perspective, namely the gradual ideological meltdown since their formation as class-parties and its progressive integration in the state by extending their electoral scope.

Considering the different approaches to marketization of the PSOE, it seems valuable to isolate the works pertaining to the policies concerning political economy from all the rest (such as gender equality and other social rights). The PSOE’s economic discourse is not only the focus of the present research, but according to the literature, also reveals itself to be the most consistent and invariable line of analysis among scholars, since all the reported studies address it in a similar way. In this sense, most scholars agree on emphasizing how the PSOE has undergone a process of marketization, starting with the first González governments in 1982 and enthusiastically supported by him (Merkel, 1989) (Kennedy, 1997) (Roca, Recio in Glyn, 2001) (Bailey, 2010). However, in the longer period considered (1982-2013), this intrusion of the market-like logic has naturally been contingent on socioeconomic settings. Rather than a trend that increases in time or an accumulative process, the reported analyses indicate different grades of marketization, depending on the current socioeconomic circumstances. Academics focus on pointing out some key events that primarily fueled the marketization of the PSOE in the period from 1982 to 1996, when the party was under the leadership of Felipe González, which is the direct antecedent to my research period (1998-2013). In this sense, an overriding concern is to analyze the effects of the EU integration (Kennedy, 1997, 2013) (Roca, Recio in Glyn, 2001), which is divided into two stages. The first relates to the entry of the Kingdom of Spain to the EU in 1986, and the second relates to the efforts made by the government to meet the requirements of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), established by the Maastricht Treaty (Kennedy, 1997:94), which allegedly entailed an acritical acceptance of neoliberal political logic. This quote by Kennedy summarized the most general account of this initial EU-related marketization: “more than any other single (factor), European integration provided the PSOE with the framework for its economic policy”, namely “price stability, fiscal orthodoxy and reliance on market forces” (Kennedy, 1997:98). Connecting to this, approaches can be seen that (also) see the need for competitiveness in the emerging global arena as a triggering factor of marketization. Partly fueled by the EU-related liberalizing measures and entry of foreign capital, the government aimed at transforming Spain into an appealing territory for foreign investment, which implied shrinking the welfare benefits, advancing the “economic

modernization”, interpreted as one “more flexible, more efficient and more technologically advanced” (Bailey: 2010: 84). Regarding this issue, the “exaggerated” extent to which legislation to intensify flexibility of labor was passed is criticized (Roca, Recio in Glyn, 2001) (Bailey, 2010). Finally, Merkel emphasizes the role of the domestic settings in triggering marketization, especially the difficulties of the PSOE in coping with a “highly uncompetitive” economy that is “more constrained by the international environment” (Merkel, 1989: 27).

The second stage of the referenced academic work includes the studies relating to the marketization of the PSOE in the years prior to the global economic and financial downturn, probably due to the harsh consequences of this for the Spanish economic performance and for the party electoral results. This period coincides with the José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero leadership, first exclusively as Secretary General of the party (2000-2004) and subsequently as Prime Minister of Spain (2004-2011). Most broadly, scholars stress that between 2000 and 2013, the PSOE adapted to the general neoliberal prescription in political economy, once again deriving from the EU and incorporated by the party, although with some exceptions, such as civil liberties or the decommodification of the weakest citizens (Kennedy, 2013). Today, it is largely criticized that the PSOE, when seizing office, did not implement legislation to enhance a short-term-oriented economic model, based on construction and deeply susceptible to economic downturns (Kennedy, 2013: 345). Concerning the studies on marketization during the economic slump, they can be framed in the study of the “*Austerität Politik*”, a field in which Matthias Lemke (sometimes with Schaal, Ritzi, such as in 2013) and Brown (2005) present possibly the most enlightening account, although not referring specifically to the Spanish singularity, but instead depicting the European general orthodox economic line and political discourse.

As the table shows, most accounts found focus on the González leadership, probably due to the Spanish singularity during these years (from dictatorship with weak economic performance to an EU-member state and from a Marxist party to a catch-all party in a short period of time) and on the years prior to the economic recession under the leadership of José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero.

4. Contribution to the stock of knowledge and justification of the present study

The main asset of the present work is the description and analysis of the European traditional social democratic discourse (detectable through key political values, such as equality, material

security and quality labor, and the core general logic of intervention in the market) with the neoliberal discourse, whose respective discourse and newspeak have already been depicted. To date, no one has focused on finding out how these two discourses are interwoven and, above all, whether and how the conventional social democratic discourse has gradually undergone a marketization process, visible in the increasing presence of neoliberal and market-like arguments. The intention of this text is not only to elucidate the network of connections between both discourses, but also to describe the general reaction and strategy of the progressive forces. As depicted earlier in this chapter, several works on the marketization of different political spheres have been published, especially within the discipline of Education Sciences and the Political Sciences in the first decade of the 21st Century in Europe. Generally, these are all case studies that work deductively from a theoretical framework to assess the specific case, similar to the present account, and intend to explain the effects of marketization on it. So far, no single case has been reported that addresses the discourse that resulted from the marketization of European social democratic parties.

The second main contribution this work tries to provide is a portrayal of the discourse of neoliberalism, most notably through the provision of its most frequently used keywords and arguments (the already deployed categories of the newspeak). Perhaps, the theoretical framework is the most interesting and relevant asset I can provide, because similar to other works of this nature, it intends to have a wide field of applicability. The creation of the newspeak is original and novel, although it has naturally been inspired by several approaches to marketization, globalization, and neoliberalism, produced principally during the decade of 2000-2010, which are extensively mentioned in the first chapter (to name a few: Bourdieu, 1998; Bourdieu, Wacquant: 2001; Peck, 2002, 2010; Brown, 2005; Fairclough, 2006; Butterwegge, et al. 2008; Cerny, 2010; Jones, 2010; Lemke, Schaal, Ritzi, 2014). The aim of this work is that this theoretical scheme could be highly informative for any scholar aiming at researching marketization within the European Union borders, and to a certain extent, worldwide. This distinction is due to the salient role of the EU integration, institutions, and official discourse as driving forces of the marketization of social democracy.

As emphasized in the former subchapter, all accounts found that refer to the marketization of the PSOE normally analyze the policies conducted by this party within a limited period, usually when holding office. So far, no approach has been located that expressly deals with the PSOE's political discourse and its transformation over a longer period of time. In this sense, another

added value is the original analysis of the Socialist Workers' Party's political discourse and its alteration over time, especially regarding its marketization due to globalization and Europeanization. If we consider the whole European social democratic family, there are some examples of this kind, most notably the Discourse Analysis of the New Labour discourse (Fairclough, 2000, 2006) and comparative accounts on social democratic reform discourse (Turowski, 2012). Secondly, even if we catalog the present study under the reviewed approaches on the neoliberalization of the PSOE, disregarding its capital interest on political discourse, the linkage of the constructed theoretical framework (with the keywords marketization, neoliberalism, globalization) with the case-study of the present work, i.e., the PSOE, will contribute something new to the stock of knowledge.

Finally, some words on the methodology. It mixes the study of marketization with a constructivist qualitative approach, which seeks to deconstruct and reinterpret its language, particularly with the research program of the Discourse Analysis of the Sociology of Knowledge, as implemented by Reiner Keller. Since its first publication, Keller's approach and research techniques have been used increasingly in many fields, usually in the search for "transformations of social orders of knowledge" (Keller, 2005: 9), starting with his original work on the German and French waste discourse. Proof of that is the Network of WDA (German acronym) that is organized annually at different universities internationally, and the website discourseanalysis.net that gathers academic work of the WDA. This account has been mainly applied to media and social discourses, often to compare different frames of a concrete and normally controversial topic. The originality of this study, in this aspect, is the application of this research program to strict ideological discourse and party programs. The emphasis of my account on combining the de- and reconstruction of content, achieved by Keller's program with an additional language analysis, known here as Text Analysis, should be seen as an advancement. The text analysis' goal is the depiction of the language peculiarities and devices, strategically used to justify and validate the integration of neoliberal ideology within the social democratic discourse.

To conclude, the last original element of this report is the intended critique directed towards the uncritical replication of language by political bodies. As it will be proven, the imitation and spread of market-like arguments by the social democratic parties under the neoliberal hegemony has been effectuated, presumably naïvely, by the PSOE at the very least. Regarding the study corpus (i.e., manifestos among other texts), the contribution of the PSOE has often

been limited to the translation of political content, normally from English to Spanish, of EU and international organizations' political and legal documents.

Newspeak notions summary

NEWSPEAK	MAIN POLITICAL CLAIM
Free Market	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Global market as a prevalent force -Requires internationalization, boosting competition, enlarging markets -Rest of the agents have to adapt to it
Competitive State	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -It is driven by a market logic -Adapts to the market -Marketization discourse -Functioning as a pure economic agent (“New public management” practices) -Enables and stimulates domestic socio-economic agents (through education and research) -Extends globalization
Knowledge Economy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Promotion of education and training, research, innovation, and new technologies
Market-oriented Education	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -It is a productive investment -Tool to adapt to the labor market -Accountability lies with the individual -Links economic success, equality and social cohesion -Lifelong learning
Labor flexibility	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Workers have to adapt to a changeable labor market -Individualization of labor risk
Entrepreneurial Individual	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Adapts himself to the changing market -Behaves in accordance to market principles -“Entrepreneurial actors in every sphere of life” (Brown, 2005:41) -No political engagement: “citizenship as entrepreneurship” (Brown, 2005:43)

	-Archetype: business entrepreneurial: initiative, risk and innovation - Freedom and independence
--	---

Newspeak of marketization. Own elaboration.

CHAPTER THREE. THE STUDY OF LANGUAGE AS METHODOLOGY OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

In this chapter, I will outline the methodological framework I have constructed to analyze the marketization of the social democratic discourse. I will make use of the core research queries, i.e., how the social democratic discourse has combined with the neoliberal discourse, and whether, and if so, how the marketization process has reshaped the progressive discourse of the Spanish Socialist Workers' Party between 1998 and 2013, in order to study this phenomenon. The goal of this chapter is also to present the academic advancements in different fields, such as sociology, linguistic, and philosophy, which occurred mainly during the 19th and 20th centuries and upon which my methodological scheme relies.

The research program I have designed for the analysis of the texts is based on the Discourse Analysis of the Sociology of Knowledge developed by Reiner Keller, which has been adapted to my research questions (Keller, 2001, 2005). The concrete method selected for the analysis of the corpus is the case study, aiming at the intensive and complete description of the concrete phenomenon. The analysis process is divided into five steps, suggesting a certain chronology. They will be introduced in the following, although they will be extensively depicted at the end of the chapter.

- Defining variables: Operationalization of the notions of neoliberalism, marketization, globalization, social democracy, and PSOE. How do these variables relate to each other?
- Assembling the corpus: Documents by the PSOE, which stem from approximately 1998 to 2013. Electoral programs, party congress resolutions, and articles of *El Socialista* (the party's official magazine).
- Content analysis: reconstruction of the discourse resulting from the interaction between the PSOE's political discourse and neoliberalism
- Linguistic analysis: Selection of the most representative texts (38 fragments). Identification of language peculiarities and strategic linguistic devices.
- General description of the PSOE's discourse: conclusions about content and language peculiarities. Answering the research questions, based on the outcomes of the analysis.

Finally, during the process, the researcher also participated in the activities of the political party

thanks to several professional involvements from 2012 to 2015, mainly in the fields of communication and research. This “participatory research” (Bergold, Stefan, 2012) provided a privileged view of the party inner structure and added academic value to this study.

In the following, I will describe the position of my theoretical framework within the academic field. Similarly, the main notions, thanks to which the analysis can be conducted, will be described. In this sense, I will focus on tracing the theoretical developments required to construct my theoretical basis, which primarily draws from the Discourse Analysis of the Sociology of Knowledge, although not exclusively. Next, a short account of the academic background of my methodology.

1. Reiner Keller’s Discourse Analysis of the Sociology of Knowledge

Professor Keller from the University of Augsburg has achieved one of the most often employed research programs for analyzing texts in Germany. He has implemented a program, which aims to create sociological theory through the artificial reconstruction of discourses. To accomplish that, he gathers different texts from a variety of sources, whose content he codifies and reorganizes in constructed categories. His ultimate aim is to reach sociological conclusions, not linguistic ones, which is the reason he seeks to obtain the content and meaning of the different discourses, partially ignoring the linguistic peculiarities. In doing so, he attempts to clarify how some sociological or political controversy is constructed by the different parts, mainly by tracing how the correspondent discursive packages are built, which will presumably supply information about the parties involved in the problem. In his first internationally acclaimed work, which focuses on media discourse about waste treatment in Germany and France (Keller, 1998), he accomplishes a very extensive and arduous analysis of texts, which he completes with expert interviews. He draws on the sociology of knowledge, Discourse Analysis, Foucauldian theory on discourse and hermeneutics, and on this basis, he has created a very innovative research program through which he obtains original conclusions.

The central mission of the sociology of knowledge is “the study of the historic and cultural factors that influence thought” (Maasen, 2009: 8). Thought is not only considered as an abstract and exclusively internal process, but rather in all its manifestations: such as art, language or

science⁴². The main question that researchers of the sociology of knowledge bring into play are: how has this thought or this knowledge been formed? Which factors have contributed to its formation?⁴³ As is evident, it is a deeply constructivist account, which, based on the advancements by Berger and Luckmann, stresses that reality is a social construct, and that its formation process could be traced. “The mission of Sociology of Knowledge is also the analysis of the collective and institutional process in which the specific knowledge becomes social reality” (Keller, in Keller et al. 2001: 116). Maybe for that, this is especially suitable for “the analysis of phenomena and questions of the social change” (Keller, 2005: 13). Based on the advances made in hermeneutics, mainly in Germany (Keller, in Keller 2001:116), it seeks to interpret meaning. With that aim, it depicts the gradual formation of it (the incorporation of the different items to the overall entity) and the behavior of the different actors in relation to it. It addresses social realities in their different formats to understand the role and logic of the actors involved. Also connecting to hermeneutics of sociology of knowledge, frequently, this approach tackles a “structural problem that individuals in a community must overcome (whether they are aware of it is irrelevant)” (Reichertz, Schroer, in Schroer, 1994: 60). Usually, and similarly to other interpretative approaches, it works using case studies, through intensive research of singular cases (Reichertz, Schroer, in Schroer, 1994: 62); it tries to obtain a detailed account of the meaning of a specific phenomenon. As Dilthey puts it: “understanding has always the particular as its object” (Wilhem Dilthey, as cited in Bauman, 1978: 38, in Lock, Strong, 2010: 54). Accordingly, it has a predominantly qualitative nature⁴⁴. In contrast with standardized methods, it does not aim to refute or confirm a set of hypotheses or the existence of an already reported phenomenon. Contrarily, its scope is achieving an explanation of a general and usually broad central question. Academics agree that a qualitative analysis is most suitable for the depiction of unexplored fields or innovative perspectives and viewpoints. The research questions are broadly formulated and lack specificity to avoid leaving out or disregarding any meaningful factor due to an excessively restrictive focus.

Maybe one of the most salient contributions by the sociology of knowledge, among other qualitative approaches, is its focus on the process (Keller, 2005:10). Other accounts concentrate exclusively on the reasons behind the emergence of a certain scenario, rather than its formation;

⁴² Kellers refers to them as “discourse materializations” (Keller, in Keller et. al. 2001:129).

⁴³ These, among other questions, are highlighted by Keller (Keller, 2007: 66-68).

⁴⁴ According to Flick, the main features of qualitative approaches are: “a) understanding as the principle of knowledge b) reconstruction of a case as starting point c) construction of reality as basis d) text as the empirical material” (Flick, 2000:40).

in this case, both concerns have an equal weight. It is not only the questions concerning the reasons that are relevant, but the process is also taken into account: it is believed that the process per se is informative about the circumstances of the formation. As it will be shown in Chapter 4, in this work, this concern is capital, as is visible here in the endeavors to identify the sources and trace the gradual formation of the categories of meaning and *interpretationsrepertoires*.

In contrast with many qualitative approaches, which acquired relevance during the decade of the '60s, such as conversation analysis, sociology of knowledge as understood by Reiner Keller relates to macro processes, which involve a collective of individuals. It does not concern the meaning of individual behavior, in relation to everyday routines or habits, as is often the case. It specifically aims at understating social changes in a certain integrated system. This pertains to the sway of the work on it this matter and his endeavors to trace the meaning of macrostructures' dynamics in society from a global perspective. Although Foucault did not develop a replicable methodological research scheme (Jäger, Jäger, 2007: 17), he implemented a solid theoretical corpus on the interaction of power and discourse that has been the basis not only of Keller's sociology of knowledge, but for nearly all discourse studies. In his extensive academic work, Foucault studied the interaction between discourse and power during different historical moments, accomplishing diachronic reports and, in doing so, created original, innovative, and appealing publications. In line with Keller, he traced the *archaeology* of many social discourses, such as the one of sexuality and insanity, but providing no replicable methodology (Ib.).

Keller's work can be situated in the general frame of the discourse studies, in his case, from a sociological point of view. The field of the discourse studies took form thanks to the increasing significance of interpretative approaches during the 1960s and the advancements of linguistics in text analysis. They are represented in different schools of thought, mainly in the USA and Northern and Central Europe. Notwithstanding the diversity of approaches and the risk of generalization, this heterogeneity implies they can be described as those that make use of texts and language to understand reality. I will present a descriptive account of its development, in which I will try to center on the logic behind its emergence, rather than on the precise historical facts. As it will be explained later in this work, language was largely considered an interesting subject of study from the 20th Century onwards, mainly due to its character as a connecting channel between man and reality (Harris, 1998). From the disciplines of linguistics and philosophy, its performative and social character were underlined (Ib.), and the interpretative

paradigm opened the door to all sorts of human and social products for the study. Analogously, and inspired by the leap forward given by Saussure, linguistics experimented with text analysis, mainly regarding the internal connections and references among the different compounding elements of texts, such as words or phrases, trying to find their logic (Maingueneau, 1980). Internationally, different schools internationally implemented tools to depict these relations, such as with structuralism⁴⁵. The turning point occurred when linguistics looked for answers to these questions out of the text and the language, which was the step required from the linguistic discipline to make Discourse Analysis possible. As Dessons points out: “the introduction of the notion of discourse in the field of linguistics around 1950 marks a decisive turning point in the reflections of language” (Dessons, 2006: 57). In the long term, discourse scholars gradually developed a methodology to accomplish language-based studies in different fields of reality (e.g., history, polity, society). Today, studies on discourse can be grouped into two trends: discourse studies on one hand, which focus mainly on the theoretical framework⁴⁶, and Discourse Analysis on the other, which thanks due to the selection of case-studies and application of linguistic methodological tools from the.

As such, DA of the Sociology of Knowledge cemented several new methodologies in social and cultural sciences, and new approaches had to be implemented. This will be the focus of the following lines.

During the 18th and 19th Centuries, human’s creations (in any format: art, architecture, texts) had gradually started being regarded as social and historical that documents could report on historic, social, and personal facts. The traditional methods, among which, natural science techniques still prevailed, were inadequate to fully understand them. Therefore, human scientists worked on a new paradigm, an interpretative one, whose goal was the understanding of meaning (Kecskemeti, in Mannheim, 1952: 12). The emergence of hermeneutics in Germany, which is still very influential, was the clearest example of this trend. As Lock and Strong report, the “hermeneutic scholarship really took off in Germany in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries as scholars attempted to make a human science out of meaning” (Lock, Strong, 2010: 55). One of its major figures was Dilthey, who developed a system to “relate

⁴⁵ Maingueneau mentions the “North American distributional linguistics” and “the works on enunciation of Jakobson and Benveniste” (Maingueneau, 1980).

⁴⁶ As Maingueneau argues, “the emergence of the discourse analysis was a symptom of the new role attributed to texts”. Scholars tried to obtain the meaning of texts which they consider, as Foucault expressed, instead of “documents”, as “monuments” (Maingueneau, 1980).

texts to the cultural context in which they were produced” (Ib.). In the first decades of the 20th century followed Dilthey in stressing how “no product of human culture could be analysed and understood in a 'timeless' fashion” (Kecskemeti, in Mannheim, 1952: 6) strongly emphasizing how thought and knowledge should always have been considered in their “historic and social space” (Hitzler, Honer, 1997: 65). Mannheim also decisively moved the interpretative paradigm forward, underlying how “cultural phenomena” could not be researched with methods of the natural sciences as they “cannot be 'ob-served' like the things with which physicists deal” (Kecskemeti, in Mannheim, 1952: 12), therefore stressing the need for a new approach.

In the history of sciences, it is remarkable how until the 20th Century, it was believed that the external reality, to which natural sciences were devoted, was the only researchable sphere of life (Benavides, 2003). This paradigm has largely been surpassed today, and is known as “scientific materialism” (Ib.). There was a strong belief in the ability of those disciplines, whose methods and tools were thought to connect to reality, and to explore it. At the end of the 19th Century, a gradual concern about other spheres of life gradually took form, which meant a turning point in the history of Western sciences. This this can largely be attributed to Max Weber, who made a decisive contribution to the emergence of social sciences as an academic discipline, and whose studies made use of new elements, such as language constructions (Corbetta, 2010). In this sense, in his interpretative approach, in which he studied social relations, language was used for constructing categories (named Ideal Types) able to explain social phenomena (Corbetta: 2010: 21).

The second advancement that was relevant when considering language in social research refers to the foundation of modern linguistics in the 20th Century by Ferdinand de Saussure. In his masterpiece ‘Le cours de linguistique générale’ (1913) he stresses how social forces exert a significant influence on the formation of the *langue*, drawing attention to the “social” character of language (Saussure, 1967 [1913]: 33). He advocated for the creation of a “new science”, which would address the link between “signs” and “social life” (Saussure, 1967 [1913]: 40). From the field of the philosophy, in ‘Philosophische Untersuchung’ (1953), Wittgenstein emphasizes the pragmatic character of language and its role in constructing reality (Harris, 1988). These advances opened the door to a double via of access to language: two new ways of accessing language: on one hand, academics brought in external textual elements (or context) to understand language, and on the other hand, conducted studies on language to understand external reality. Therefore, from the 20th Century, language was considered both a valuable

field of study and a methodological tool to explore reality. This turning point, essential for the present account, is broadly known as the ‘Linguistic Turn’.

The academic advancement that could be the most decisive for the current study is the consolidation and spread of ‘constructivism’ throughout the ’60s, which forms a core pillar of the DA of the Sociology of Knowledge. After social sciences emerged as an autonomous field, scholars questioned how mankind shapes the world they live in, and vice versa, and how their circumstances affect their living conditions. Today, this consideration is capital in understanding social sciences and, in academia, is closely associated with the “social constructivist worldview” (Creswell, 2009: 8). There is a fundamental forerunner on this academic pathway; the publication by Berger and Luckmann ‘The Social Construction of Reality’, which, as its title suggests, provided an account on how “reality is socially constructed” (Berger; Luckmann, 1966: 13). Still today, its systematic descriptions on how humans create and perceive the reality they live in still conform to an unavoidable account of any qualitative approach.

“The relationship between man, the producer, and the social world, his product, is a dialectical one. That is, man (not, of course, in isolation but in his collectivities) and his social world interact with each other” (Berger, Luckmann, 1966: 78).

This work, a milestone of the constructivist paradigm, offers fundamental angles to this research:

- Observing the social reality as the outcome of a process that can be traced. An analysis of social circumstances or qualities requires “an inquiry into the manner in which this reality is constructed” (Berger, Luckmann, 1966: 30).
- The main role ascribed to language: it is conceived as a channel through which knowledge is transmitted and created. “Sociology of knowledge presupposes a sociology of language” (Berger, Luckmann, 1966: 207).
- The existence of “sub-universes of meaning” (Berger, Luckmann, 1966: 102), each works according to its own functioning (a predominant discourse, governing rules, etc.).

In the following, the most widespread schools of Discourse Analysis in Europe today will be reviewed, albeit mainly with consideration to their weight in the conception of the present study, which is principally appreciable in constructing the linguistic analysis' guide. Based on an extensive study of Foucault's theoretical basis, Siegfried and Margarete Jäger implement a methodological scheme they have been applying to different social fields for decades. They also focus on discourse studies, particularly in relation to how discourses are socially built and transmitted. They represent the most salient school of critical discourse studies (named *Kritische Diskursanalyse*) in Germany, aside from Keller's work. The Jägers are strongly influenced by Jürgen Link, especially in their endeavors to study collective symbols⁴⁷. They run the Duisburger Institute für Sprache und Sozial Forschung, through which they conceive academic work from an "advocacy/participatory philosophical worldview", to use Creswell's classification (Creswell, 2009: 5), as materialized in their efforts to protect and empower collectives their research (asylum seekers, immigrants). For the present work, the glossary of terms, which presents novel characterizations and much operationalizing potential, may be the most salient contribution from their account. This is the case with such notions as: discursive fragment or collective symbol.

The most influential Critical Discourse analyst in the Anglo-American area is likely Norman Fairclough. His approach, like the Jägers', undoubtedly engages in exerting an effect on society and politics. The most notorious subjects studied by him are the discourse on globalization (which draws on the Gramscian concept of hegemony) and on New Labour, which will logically have a predominant role in this research. He developed a research technique that highlights the role of social practices in constructing reality ("CDA is analysis of the dialectical relationships between discourse (...) and other elements of social practices" (Fairclough, 2001b). Connecting to Norman Fairclough in her theoretical basis, the Austrian social science scholar, Ruth Wodak, accomplishes discursive-historical studies, which draw systematically from the context (through the combination of different disciplines' theories and methodological tools) to understand texts. Some of her preferred topics are national identity and xenophobic political discourse.

⁴⁷ According to S. Jäger, Link "understands under collective symbols the totality of the so-called 'representation' of a culture. Allegories, (...) metaphors, broad shared examples, etc." (Link 1997: 25, cited in Jäger, 2001: 133-134).

Teun A. van Dijk emerged from a very different theoretical background, and his account is largely influential in the Spanish-language countries. He is especially interested in how the production and interpretation of discourses occur on a psychological and neurological level (he studies the set of mental structures and filters). Additionally, he has a keen knowledge of linguistics, since he started his career implementing text analysis studies, and he has increasingly relied on enunciation and contextual settings. Political discourse and ideology are the major concerns of his most recent work, such as analyzing parliamentary speeches and party confrontations, often directing the focus on pre-selected topics, such as xenophobic attitudes. He is one of the most accomplished scholars as his knowledge of discourse, ideology, linguistics, rhetoric, and psycholinguistics, which forms a wide-ranging and solid basis that has consistently moved the Discourse Analysis (also critical in this case) forward. Many elements of his research program will be replicated in the linguistic analysis.

Even if this is not a genuine Discourse Analysis approach, the current relevance of frame analysis approaches in media and communication studies makes these disciplines worth mentioning disciplines. Often, the program shows some overlap with some Discourse Analysis techniques, a case in which frames are a subcategory of discourse. Since Ervin Goffman first implemented the notion of frames (Goffman, 1974), many scholars have acknowledged and employed this concept to relate media coverage to political and social confrontation, such as with social movements. Equally, there is an increasing tendency to use frames to understand how political ideologies function, mostly in relation to their transmission and power in operational discourses, as is the case with the internationally acclaimed George Lakoff (1996, 2004).

2. Analysis of texts through Discourse Analysis of the Sociology of Knowledge

In this subchapter, I will outline some practical matters that must be considered in order to understand the application of the research program of the Discourse Analysis of Sociology of Knowledge to my case-study. This is a qualitative approach, which primarily implicates that constructing a methodological scheme must tightly fit to the precise case (Flick, 2000: 13). Contrarily to standardized methods, such as with quantitative or qualitative content analyses, the conception of the method is not pre-established and does not occur prior to the selection of the case and corpus. This contingency of the research process on the case makes replicability, such as when recycling an elaborated study for a new case, impracticable. There is a continuous

back and forth movement (a dialogue) among the different stages of the investigation. Although in the present account, this is depicted as a unidirectional and almost chronological path, in reality, there is no such linearity, at least not in a large share of the process. Ruth Wodak and Meyer highlight this feature of qualitative approaches (“abductive” method [Wodak, in Wodak, Meyer, 2001:70]). This circularity of the process brings a “permanent reflection about the entire research method” (Flick, 2000:59).

Another characteristic of all qualitative approaches is that they usually prove the validity of their conclusions through the provision of examples from the corpus⁴⁸. Especially in DA, the full extent of the corpus is inaccessible in its totality; therefore, it cannot be fully browsed. As a result, there is only a partial representation of the content, which, although it will never be “quantitatively” fulfilled, it could indeed be “qualitatively” fulfilled, should the process be conducted scientifically (Jäger, 2003:4-5). Here, we see what is known as the “saturation principle” (*Theoretische Sättigung der Kategorie* [Glaser, Strauss, 1967: 61, in Flick, 2000: 82-83]). According to this theory, the analysis of texts should be prolonged until the researcher has consistent reasons to believe he/she will find no further valuable information if he/she continues extracting information on the specific discourse. In practice, this occurs when the information obtained is systematically repeated for a prolonged time. Another method to obtain a satisfactory account on the discourse investigated is the “triangulation” (Cicourel, 1959, in Wodak, Krzyżanowski, 2008) of sources and methods, which could be described as the utilization of all sources of information and research techniques required to find an acceptable answer to the research query. Fairclough implicitly alludes to it with his idea of “transdisciplinary research” (Fairclough in Wodak, Meyer, 2001:163). In the present endeavor, triangulation is often reflected, such as by way of conducting participatory research to complete the documents analysis’ outcomes or in the application of different Discourse Analysis research techniques at the study of the corpus.

Every DA study must create its own definition of discourse. This not only has to rely on the concrete approach’s research paradigm and worldview, but will also be used in the analysis as one of the main working tools of the methodology. In every work, the definition will be two-fold, crystallized in two characterizations. First, the researcher will outline a general characterization of discourse, which will apply to other studies. Second, connecting to the

⁴⁸ Such in the works of Jäger, in Marvin, Dembowski, 2002; Jäger, Jäger, 2007; Dijk, 2006; Dijk, 2008.

delineation of the research's objectives, a more grounded and case-adapted definition of discourse will be provided, which will apply exclusively to that case. The broad definition of discourse states the following: I will consider discourse a set of texts in relation or connected, which produce and transmit some socially constructed meaning. Leeuwen and Kress provide an enlightening characterization, as follows:

- 1) "Discourses can be condensed in 'dogmas' – nuggets of essential wisdom (...). Such statements will be repeated on many different occasions and in many different formulations (...)
- 2) Discourses are plural (...)
- 3) Discourses legitimize specific practices and serve the interests of specific institutions
- 4) Discourses are socially constructed and historically specific
- 5) Discourses can be realized in different genres and different modes or combinations of modes" (Leeuwen, Kress, in Dijk, 2011: 114).

The concrete relation between the texts required for them to be identified as a single discourse will be established by the concrete research question on a case-by-case basis. In the present study, the discourse will be composed of the set of texts and text fragments that inform about the neoliberal discourse and the European social democratic one between 1998 and 2013.


Although the widespread meaning of texts evokes the graphic representation of language, in this case, all kinds of language and communication will be included, although always by making use of their graphic format (their transcriptions)⁴⁹. The connection required among texts could be of two types: a) Relation of the meaning: they refer to the same topic or theme; b) Coincidence of the language structure: lexica and word order previously used in other statements. In this investigation, these two criteria will be considered separately. The first, the relation of meaning, will be the main concern of the content analysis, in which the entire meaning of the discourse will be described; the second will be addressed in the linguistic analysis, in which the language structures of different texts will be observed in relation with one another, attempting to make sense of their function.

⁴⁹ In this sense, Keller separates "communicative actions" from their "materialization" (Keller, in Keller et al., 2001: 129).

In conducting the DA, not only should a case-specific definition of discourse be provided, but a methodological toolkit must also be constructed. This will contain epistemological devices used to deconstruct and describe the PSOE's marketized discourse. The main idea of the process is the deconstruction and classification of the discourse content to facilitate the reconstruction of its meaning. This will be exhaustively described in the presentation of the methodological scheme.

3. Methodological scheme constructed for the analysis

Although his approach is capital for the present work, since my research question, the field of research, and the nature of the corpus differ from the area of study of Reiner Keller, it would be undesirable and erroneous to replicate his methodology in my project. Besides, as he suggests, D.A. of Sociology of Knowledge assists as a theoretical framework, rather than a *modus operandi*, as "sociology of knowledge refers to a research program or a research perspective, not to any specific method" (Keller, et al., 2001: 129). Finally, as perceived in qualitative approaches, the methodology must be constructed and readapted to suit the case-study.



Graphic 7: Research steps for the analysis of PSOE's documents. Own elaboration.

In the present study, five research steps can be identified, which will be the subject of this subchapter. These will be shortly itemized and explained to make the research process explicit and transparent.

a) Defining variables

What are the definitions of neoliberalism, marketization, and globalization that I will use in my study? How do these three variables relate to each other? Characterization and operationalization of the main concepts of the research. Accomplished in Chapter 1.

b) Gathering the corpus

The corpus is composed of PSOE documents, which originated from approximately 1998 to 2013. Electoral programs, party congress resolutions, and articles of *El Socialista* (the party's official magazine). It is not only texts conforming to the discourse per se that will be included, but also documents that inform on the process of marketization. These will be outer-discursive or contextual sources, such as reports from international bodies (EU institutions, IMF, OECD), other social democratic parties' discourses, other Spanish political parties' electoral programs, etc.⁵⁰

Once the main concepts of the study have been described and operationalized, and the corpus has been constructed, the analysis of the documents can begin. For this research, the analysis has been divided in two stages: the first focusing on the content and meaning, and the second on linguistic peculiarities of a selected set of texts. Next, I will outline the method designed to obtain the content and meaning of the discourse.

c) Content analysis

Its purpose is the reconstruction of the discourse, resulting from the interaction between the social democratic political discourse and neoliberalism.

1) Selection and coding of discursive fragments with MAXQDA

First, all the documents have been uploaded to MAXQDA software⁵¹ and classified chronologically and by source, such as electoral programs, party congresses'

⁵⁰ See Annex for a detailed account of them.

⁵¹ MAXQDA is a "text analysis software" especially adapted for qualitative approaches. For the current work, the version MAXQDA 11 was utilized (*Introduction, Maxqda 2007, 2007*).

resolutions, or working papers and articles from El Socialista, so there is some logical order in the further analysis. Subsequently, the selection of discursive fragments was conducted; the set of phrases selected in this first classification of the discourse because they are expected to contain a part of the discourse. To obtain discourse fragments addressing economic topics, the focus has been restricted to a precise question: the political program to achieve a competitive and cohesive society in the global economy. Frequently, the selected extracts include a specific keyword (such ‘knowledge economy’, ‘innovation’)⁵², which is normally considered an indicative signal. When the discursive fragments are selected, they are simultaneously classified thematically (as ‘economy’, ‘environment’, ‘state’, ‘individual’, ‘EU’, ‘global government’, ‘neoliberalism’). Text fragments will be considered here, following Jäger as “a text or a part of a text which addresses certain topic” (Jäger, 1993).

2) Summary discursive fragments’ content

Once the discourse fragments had been classified and grouped in topics, their content was summarized. To do so, the information they contain is transformed into propositions, which are sentences (with a single verb) created to simplify and separate (*polish*) the content. This step is exclusively for practical reasons, since sometimes, the vocabulary and sentence structures used in political texts are so complex that the extraction of their content is only viable through this intermediate step. After the content has been summarized, the reorganization of the information by similarity (a second thematic sort-out) in different worksheets has been accomplished.

3) Creation of thematic categories


If, in the last step, the related information had been grouped, in this one, a descriptive title has been ascribed to the related information. This had to represent the content transmitted by each one; it had to reflect the idea and the point of view from which the message has been framed. These notions will be “categories” (Donati, in Keller, Hiersland, Schneider, Viehöver, 2001: 151), and will be used to depict the whole discourse. They can be defined as the denominations of every group of content with

⁵² These keywords are the so-called “newspeak” notions (defined in Chapter 3 and the notion of which has been borrowed from Bourdieu, Wacquant, 2001) were exclusively used as a preliminary guide to help tracing the transformation of the PSOE discourse, that is, as an orientating guide for the research field. In none of the cases did these hamper one of the basic mottos of the qualitative research, namely being open to unexpected findings.

relating meaning.

4) Description of each category

To conclude, every category has been described. With that aim, the compounding elements that conform its meaning have been isolated (here known as *interpretationsrepertoires*) (Potter, Wetherell, 1995 quoted by Keller, 1998: 36) and, in secondarily, they were used to elaborate a comprehensive narrative of meaning (storyline). In this sense, following Keller, the storyline will be seen as the sub-narrative of a discourse, through which the different ‘*interpretationsrepertoire*’ (components of meaning) are connected (Keller, 2005: 230)⁵³.



Graphic 8: Compounding elements of a category.

At the time of the description, the intertextuality (external relation with other texts) is a major concern, most notably, whether the categories’ components are evoked through any notion, phrase, or meaning pattern. This has been the case with previous social democratic programs, EU Treaties, European Commission directives, etc. Following Fairclough, I see intertextuality as the “relation with (‘another’) external texts, how elements of other texts

⁵³ In some categories, there are various sub-narratives deriving from different frames (“organizing basic ideas, which structuralise the horizon of meaning” [Gamson, in Keller, 2005: 38], or in other words, patrons of meaning in a discourse).

are ‘intertextually incorporated’; how other texts are alluded to, assumed, dialogued with and so forth” (Fairclough, 2003: 36).

5) Tracking the gradual emergence of the categories

Once the categories of meaning had been created and depicted, the gradual emergence of the central categories were traced; a concrete assessment of how the most relevant ones have cemented and evolved in the PSOE discourse. As with the creation of the categories, their meaning has primarily been considered and not their external form (the specific ‘notion’). The exact term has been considered recurrently, since it added worthy contextual information to understand the gradual cementation of the discourse, mainly in relation to the intention of the actors involved (i.e., ‘modernization’ instead of ‘neoliberalization’, ‘national borders’ instead of ‘tolls’).

The study of the gradual emergence of the central categories is deemed of chief interest, especially referring to the intertextual relations between external discourses and the initially neoliberalized, and then marketized, PSOE discourse. The meaning transfer occurred between international organizations’ discourses and the PSOE discourse, such as the FMI, OECD, and WTO, and above all, the European Institutions have been a central focus of the analysis. Even if this transfer is not considered to be exclusively unidirectional, this is thought to be predominant. The domination in terms of the factual power of the international organizations, especially with the EU institutions, whose decisions have increasingly been of a binding nature in the period considered, make this a statement of common sense. One of the basic theses of this work is that all the organizations have pushed in the same direction, i.e., advocated for the same political program during the period studied due to the hegemonic leverage of neoliberalism.

A relevant constraint faced during the analysis is the practical impossibility of assessing the evolution of the categories’ *interpretationrepertoires*, i.e., considering the single progress of each of them. On one hand, the high amount of *interpretationsrepertoires* of the whole set of categories impedes this purpose, and on the other, the aim of this dissertation is to provide a general view of the core discourse meaning and its gradual formation, rather than limiting the focus of attention to a specific category.

The two main questions that the tracing of the cementation of the categories aims to address

are the following:

- a) When each category of meaning of the marketized PSOE discourse appeared and for how long?
- b) Which contextual settings (of a national or international character) intervened in the conformation of the categories?

d) Linguistic Analysis

Its core aim is the identification of language peculiarities. These are conceived as the linguistic devices used to present the alteration, resulting from the combination of neoliberalism with social democratic discourse in a credible way and normally with strategic aims. Not all the text fragments have been submitted to this analysis, but only a selection of the most illustrative and representative of the whole discourse, which comprises 38 pieces. To varying extents, these have been examined according to the Guide for the Linguistic Analysis included below.

Guide for the Linguistic Analysis⁵⁴

1. Meaning and reference

Level of description: generality vs. specificity and granularity (preciseness vs. vagueness) Focus of the text

“Speech acts: representatives (true claims), directives (commands, requests), commissives (promises, threats), expressives (praising, blaming), declaratives (proclaiming a constitution, announcing an election, declaring war)” (Searle, cited by Chilton, Schäffner, in Dijk, 2011: 315)

Topois: locus communis

Implications and presuppositions

2. Formal structure

Syntactic structures and sentences:

Word order, order of clauses, hierarchical relations between clauses.

Sort of text: which sort of text does the fragment belong to?

⁵⁴ The epigraphs ‘Meaning and reference’ and ‘Formal Structures’ have been to great extent adapted from the analyses of ideology in discourse of Teun Van Dijk (2011, 2008). The academic lexica used by Van Dijk in these cases have been to some extent literally replicated (translated from Spanish).

Narrative: exposes real or fictitious facts

Descriptive: presents the characteristic features of a being, situation, or place with accuracy and clarity

Argumentative: thesis-arguments-conclusions

Expositive: transmits certain information (scientific, didactic).

Sequence: stages of a process

Description

Comparison/opposition: analogous/difference

Enumeration

Cause-effect

Problem-solution

Pronouns and demonstratives: in-groups and out-group membership; closeness and distance

Rhetorical moves: repetitions, enumerations, rhymes, alliterations to emphasize

Metaphors: argumentation by similarity. “Transmission of an available meaning schema to a new object or context” (Donati, in Keller et al., 2001:161), particularly if the transmitted meaning is socially relevant (like the so-called “collective symbols” analyzed by Jürgen Link [1992a, quoted in Jäger, Jäger, 2007:40]).⁵⁵

I have not accomplished the text analysis guide thoroughly and exhaustively; only the most salient strategic linguistic devices have been considered. The linguistic analysis must be understood as a valuable supplement to the content analysis, designed to provide extra information on the marketization of the social democratic discourse, and to add depth to the study of the categories found in the Content Analysis.

To grasp the internal strategy of the European social democratic parties with respect to neoliberal globalization, a few interviews with former and current party national leaders, seen as protagonists of the discourse, party consultants, and academics (the latter two in an expert capacity) have been implemented. The interviews are a supplement to the analysis of texts. As

⁵⁵ On the function of metaphors as structuring devices of perception, especially in political discourse, see Lakoff, Wehling, 2008.

Keller points out, the scope of the expert interviews is obtaining an “impression of the self- and external perception of the correspondent group of actors and to situate the analysis better in its context (Keller, 1998: 49).

e) Participatory research

The researcher approached the field of study having also participated in the activities and political outcomes of the PSOE national party in Madrid and the Party of the European Socialists in Brussels thanks to different professional involvements from 2012 to 2015. These experiences provided highly valuable knowledge about the case-study, thus allowing access to both formal and informal knowledge on the organic structures of the factions, their decision-making process and the sociological features of their constituencies and party members. Participatory research can be defined as a number of “methods” “geared towards planning and conducting the research process with those people whose life-world and meaningful actions are under study” (Bergold, Stefan, 2012).

f) General description of the discourse

Depiction of the content and language peculiarities. A reconstruction and description of neoliberalism with social democratic discourse has been afforded, considering both its meaning (thanks to the categories) and language features.

CHAPTER FOUR: DESCRIPTION AND ANALYSIS OF THE MARKETIZATION OF THE PSOE'S ECONOMIC DISCOURSE RESULTING FROM THE INTERACTION OF THE NEOLIBERAL WITH THE SOCIALDEMOCRATIC DISCOURSE

The core research question that inspires and leads this approach is how the traditional social democratic discourse is combined and merges with the neoliberal discourse. In particular, I endeavor to shed light on whether and, if so, how and why the process of marketization, considered as the increasing number of market-like and neoliberal values in political discourse, has reshaped the traditional social democratic political program between 1998 and 2013. To answer this question, the case study of the Spanish Socialist Workers Party (PSOE) in this period has been isolated. A description and delineation of the topic and the specification of the methodological tools have been already accomplished. Similarly, I have offered a theoretical framework on marketization, globalization, neoliberalism, and social democracy (Chapter One), provided the most recent studies on the central topic of this work, namely marketization (Chapter Two), and constructed a methodological scheme for the analysis, based on Reiner Keller's Discourse Analysis of the Sociology on Knowledge (Chapter Three). All these former epigraphs have tried to provide different tools to deal with the empirical work, in this case, the analysis of the documents. The methodological scheme constructed to study the documents principally relies on Discourse Analysis of the Sociology of Knowledge, albeit complemented by other approaches to Discourse Analysis, such as Norman Fairclough's, Teun A. van Dijk's, Sigfried Jäger's, and different authors from the discipline of the frame analysis. It comprises two main stages: the first, focusing on the content (reconstruction of the discourse resulting from the interaction between the social democratic political discourse and neoliberalism), and the second, on the language peculiarities, regarded here as the strategic linguistic devices employed to construct this new discourse.


This chapter will be devoted to illustrating the outcomes of both the content and linguistic study to depict the combination of the neoliberal with the social democratic discourse. In the conclusions, the core research questions of the study will be answered, namely how social democratic and neoliberal discourse interact in the period considered. Is the social democratic discourse affected by the neoliberal discourse? Are the theories about the marketization of the political field (the occupation of politics by orthodox and market-like economic values) applicable to the European social democratic parties?

1. Outcomes of the content analysis. List of categories

Firstly, the reconstruction of the newly emerged discourse will follow. In a logical and practicable order to de- and reconstruct its content, a different set of notions has been created, i.e., categories (denomination of each group of content with relating meaning) (notion taken from Donati, in Keller, Hierseland, Schneider, Viehöver, 2001: 151), *interpretationsrepertoires* (the compounding elements of meaning that conform every category) (borrowed from Potter, Wetherell, 1995 quoted by Keller, 1998: 36), and storylines (a comprehensive narrative created with the *interpretationsrepertoires*) (notion taken from Keller, 2005: 230). They will principally address themes of international economy, since, as introduced in the methodological chapter, during the selection of discursive fragments, the focus has been restricted to a precise topic: the political program suggested to achieve a competitive and cohesive society in the global economy. After the description of their content, a short comment will follow, aiming to explain their meaning, relating them to the socioeconomic context and academic stock and, most importantly, finding out how both discourses, the social democratic and the neoliberal, interact and are interwoven.

a) Category Economic Globalization


The first descriptive category I have found in the study of the texts is Economic Globalization, which portrays the current global scene to which economies, with their domestic social and economic agents, must adapt. It is depicted as a completely new scenario that exerts an overriding and inescapable influence on national economies and societies. In this category, as consequence of the outbreak of the economic crash, two “frames” (Goffman, [1964] 1974) (that is, patrons of meaning) can be distinguished, each with their corresponding *interpretationsrepertoire* and storylines: Embracing Globalization and Governing Globalization. As in other cases, the economic and financial downturn triggers the disassociation between both.



Graphic 9: Frames of the category Economic Globalization

Category Economic Globalization (Frame A: Embracing Globalization)

In the marketized social democratic discourse of the PSOE, the first frame found at the time of the analysis that derives from the category Economic Globalization is Embracing Globalization. According to this frame, due to technological innovations, a new scenario, economic globalization, has cemented. This new scenario is subjected to continuous change. Economic globalization demands an economic system characterized by free competition, open borders, modernization and flexibility. Economic globalization also requires a unified and a more profoundly integrated Europe. Higher quotas of social protection are also necessary to ensure welfare, equality and environmental and social justice.



Graphic 10: *Interpretation repertoire* of the Frame Embracing Globalization of the category Economic Globalization

Storyline

Economic globalization, which has emerged as the new global ecosystem thanks to technological advances, has led to the formation of a scenario of permanent change. In order to succeed in this setting, governments must open and modernize their economies and enforce regulation conduct to bolster free competition, trade, and flexibility. The countries of the European Union should advance in their integration, since a more unified Europe will be better positioned. States must protect their citizens from it by safeguarding welfare, equality, environment, and social justice. Economic globalization is irreversible, but not inalterable.

This frame matches, to a great extent, the neoliberal discourse on globalization (Steger, 2005, in Fairclough, 2006), and it is a faithful copy of the Third Way political line of social democracy, initiated by the Third Way by Gerhard Schröder and Tony Blair.

The idea of the inescapability of globalization and single global market, most probably stemming from the overruling international entities, such as The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), World Trade Organization (WTO), International Monetary Fund (IMF), The World Bank, and EU bodies, has been broadly supported and replicated in the central spectrum of the political parties' ideological scheme in Western societies. Steger underlines this sense of irreversibility in his description of the promotional discourse of globalization⁵⁶, which he names 'Globalism' (Steger, 2005, in Fairclough, 2006: 39) (i.e. "globalization is inevitable and irreversible"). Similarly, the PSOE's defense of the opening of national trade to competition also coincides with Steger's account ("globalization is about the liberalization and global integration of markets" and "globalization benefits everyone") (Steger, 2005, in Fairclough, 2006: 39). Equally, the Third Way Manifesto also stands for a "single market" and "market competition and open trade" as ingredients of economic success (Third Way Manifesto, 1998: 6):

"Product market competition and open trade is essential to stimulate productivity and growth. (...)

- The EU should continue to act as a resolute force for the liberalization of world trade.
- The EU should build on the achievements of the single market to strengthen an economic framework conducive to productivity growth" (Third Way Manifesto, 1998: 6).

Besides, this neoliberal discourse on globalization persistently demands flexibility of the national economies, addressing all the economic agents conforming them, among them, labor force, state bodies, and enterprises. This notion has been extensively studied and is largely considered a "powerful symbolic weapon" of the neoliberal discourse (Fairclough, in Keller, Hiersland, Schneider, Viehöver, 2001). In the PSOE discourse, the demand for flexibilization is applied to the most diverse and even unpredictable fields. Academic bodies, pension allowances, regional, local and national administrations, or procedures to hire public servants should allegedly have been flexibilized. That could lead to the conclusion that, rather than a referential meaning, it often exerts a symbolic function. It should also be mentioned that in a hegemonic neoliberal paradigm, in which citizens are supposedly inclined to ascribe positive

⁵⁶"Globalism': "discourse of globalization which represents it in reductive neoliberal economic terms within a strategy to inflect and re-direct actual process of globalization in that direction" (Steger, 2005, in Fairclough, 2006: 39).

values to market-like statements, the utilization of their basic notions and arguments could obey strategic reasons, such as textual embellishment or persuasion.

There is an agreement among critical academics condemning the portrayal of globalization as a non-starred (Steger, 2005 in Fairclough, 2006:19)⁵⁷ and almost accidental phenomenon, which supposedly unfolded spontaneously with the help of technology. In this sense, scholars largely stress that globalization was fueled, aside from by substantial advances in information and communication technologies and transport infrastructures, by an international political “consensus” that spread worldwide, with an orthodox economic approach (such Brand, Brunnengräber, 2000: 73). Based on this agreement, a predefined single regulatory framework has been gradually replicated case by case by the corresponding political leaders. Technological advances logically played a fundamental role in the setting in motion of globalization (an essential condition), but the favorable regulation of the application of these technologies for achieving this goal was unquestionably of a political nature. Also, according to the PSOE discourse and in line with the neoliberal narrative, globalization entails an environment of permanent change, a scenario of continuous adjustments (“Change as inevitable” [Fairclough, 2000: 26]). All the economic agents must adapt to this landscape. This is, perhaps, one of the most meaningful characteristics, as it frames the whole social democratic marketized discourse. It is noticeable how the lexica of the PSOE discourse persistently transmit pressure and a rush to act. Verbs and expressions denoting dynamism and movement are abundant in the text (such “keeping pace”, “rapid changes”)⁵⁸. The consequence is that the documents transmits to the reader a sort of emergency of action, a necessity of stepping in and getting involved in the process. The actors addressed are impelled to feel that they are figuratively stood in quicksand, in which they have to move to survive. Dynamism and flexibility are offered normally as first-hand solutions.

Some social democratic values are included in the category, although progressive rationality definitely appears sharper after the economic crisis (the dividing line between the frame ‘Embracing Globalization’ to ‘Governing Globalization’). As in the storyline that was reconstructed, in the global economy, governments must protect their citizens by safeguarding

⁵⁷ “Nobody is in charge of globalization” (Steger, 2005 in Fairclough, 2006:19).

⁵⁸ In the Third Way Manifesto these expressions are also abundant, such “societies undergoing rapid change”, “newly emerging world”, “in a world of ever more rapid globalisation”, “the growing demands for flexibility”, “open up fresh opportunities”, “to keep pace”, “the ever more pressing problems of crime”, “economies are in transition”, “the rapid advance”, “react to shifting demands” (The Third Way Manifesto, 1998: 3-8).

welfare, equality, environment, and social justice. This political claim is partly adopted by conservative and liberal parties, too. Usually, it is assumed that being competitive in the global economy will have a positive effect on citizens' life conditions, most notably on employment, as is the case with this example from the Spanish center-right major party:

“The maintenance of a budgetary stability is the guarantee of a sound economy (...) This will entail that our budget will have more available resources to address the priority policies, such as education, health, pensions, security, justice, research and infrastructures” (Spanish People's Party, Electoral Programme, 2004: 14).

Or:

“Our entire economic policy is social policy” (Spanish People's Party, Electoral Programme, 2000: 17).

Perhaps, in the social democratic discourse, this social concern is clearly underlined, with direct political actions and socialist values, such as equality and social justice, although it is present in both liberal and progressive discourses. In conclusion, perhaps, the core political rationality of both political forces converges (orthodox economy and social policy).

Finally, looking at the number of times the notion of globalization appears in PSOE's political discourse, remarkably, the sharp decrease after the outbreak of the economic recession in both party resolutions (a drop from 56 times in 2008 to 17 in 2012) and political programs (from 14 in 2008 to 8 in 2011), it could be presumed that the notion became rather unpopular after the crisis, being associated with the triggering factors of the financial crash, with financial markets or with the interrelation and mutual dependency of national economies.

Category Economic Globalization (Frame B: Governing Globalization)

According to the second frame of the category Economic Globalization extracted in the analysis, Governing Globalization, the general scenario and many compounding elements of the first frame, that is, Economic Globalization, were responsible for the economic recession of 2008, as was the case with the global financial markets. Besides, it was argued that the economic crisis required a greater degree of political governance to assure fairer levels of social justice. Moreover, an empowered European Union was demanded. This Union should be more

As stated, the social democratic discourse on economic globalization was reshaped by the economic and financial crisis of 2008. From an orthodox economic discourse with a few social arguments before the crash that presented globalization almost as a thrilling challenge and opportunity, it evolved into a more unfavorable view. This is the case of the global financial markets, which are subject to harsh criticism. Prior to the economic crash, they were principally considered to be a source of capital and associated with the investment required to feed the economy. Unsurprisingly, in period following the crisis, their responsibility in the state of affairs was emphasized. Continuing this trend, in the last European Parliament Elections, this criticism has been raised by the Party of European Socialists in its electoral program:


“Europeans had to pay for the mistakes and irresponsibility of an unregulated financial sector. The rescue of banks has cost €1.6 trillion of taxpayers’ money. Over 5 years, the finance sector has said that it has learned from its mistakes. We will make sure that never again will banks gamble with citizens’ lives. Instead we must actively put the framework in place that will make the financial sector work for the real economy and contribute its fair share to society” (Party of European Socialists’ Electoral Program, 2014: 3, 4).

Economic globalization loses its identity as an irreversible force to which the national agents must bow and adapt with flexibility, modernizing endeavors, and liberalization of markets. Contrarily, now it is seen as a phenomenon that has to be tamed and set under control. Politics must recover the hegemony over markets to govern globalization. Doing so, governments can recast their effects in favor of greater social justice and welfare. At a European level, the PSOE discourse advocates for achieving this governance by empowering the European institutions, enlarging their economic competencies, and by deepening EU integration. This European predilection of the PSOE is not new, nor is its demand for a greater European unity to face globalization, by claims such as, “only a unified Europe can face globalization” (El Socialista, 1999, issue 625: 31)⁵⁹. Nevertheless, the direct claim for governing and socializing globalization by means of EU integration takes on a prominent and harmonic significance in the post-crisis discourse.

⁵⁹ Actually, the PSOE has been largely recognized as the most pro-European political party in Spain among all political forces or, as Kennedy points out it “prides itself on being the most pro-European of Spain’s political parties” (Kennedy, in De Waele, Escalona, Vieira, 2013, 341).

b) Category Competitive State


After Economic Globalization, the second category obtained in the analysis of the corpus is Competitive State. This category portrays the mission and functions of the public administration under economic globalization. As in the previous case, the outbreak of the economic recession in 2008 triggered the division of the category into two different frames: Liberal State (before 2008) and Social State (after 2008).



Graphic 12: Frames of the category Competitive State

Category Competitive State (Frame A: Liberal State)

In the marketized social democratic discourse, the State is compelled to become a competitive State, that is, one principally focused on economic profitability. Before the economic crash, the predominant discursive frame was the one underlying its liberal character (frame Liberal State), that is, equipped with an orthodox economic program with no space for state deficit and able to bolster free markets and assure monetary stability. The two prime functions of the state are the following: creating an orthodox economic framework (such as by safeguarding political stability, promoting competition and bolstering productivity and growth) and advancing towards a knowledge economy (such as by investing in human capital and research).



Graphic 13: *Interpretation repertoire* of the discourse A (Liberal State) of the category Competitive Economy

Storyline

The liberal state relies on the orthodox program established by the European regulatory framework, which stands for fighting against state deficit, aiming at monetary stability and free markets and competition. The governments' tasks are, on one hand, ensuring that this orthodox economy functions well (providing a stable institutional framework, promoting competition, liberalizing markets, achieving productivity, and growth) and, on the other, bolstering the Knowledge Economy's settings by fueling R+D+I and investing in human capital.

The government must construct a profitable state in the global scene. In doing so, it has to enforce the European regulatory settings (such the Stability Pact, 2000), mostly concerning the orthodox economic program, entailing the fight against public deficit, monetary stability (mostly tackling inflation), and open markets. The Washington Consensus of the end of the '80s, first applied in Latin American countries and, after, far beyond, determined this hegemonic political direction, such as "Fiscal discipline (...), Trade liberalization (...),

Increasing foreign direct investment (...), Deregulation and reduced role of the state” (Washington Consensus, World Health Organization website).

The European supervision of the main settings of the economic management was established most notably by the creation of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) at the Treaty of Maastricht in 1992, in which the creation of a European common currency was established.

This decision for each member state involved:

- “Coordination of economic policy-making between Member States;
- Coordination of fiscal policies, notably through limits on government debt and deficit;
- An independent monetary policy run by the European Central Bank (ECB);
- The single currency and the euro area” (‘Economic and Monetary Union’, European Commission’s webpage).

This program is embedded in the framework of open and free market policy and promotion of competition:


“The adoption of an economic policy (...) conducted in accordance with the principle of an open market economy with free competition” (Treaty of Maastricht in 1992: 6).

There is sharp opposition to economic protectionism and a defense of the free access to national markets by foreign capital (free competition). In this context, the state’s core functions are the provision of a stable institutional framework to markets, promotion of competition, liberalization of markets, and prompting productivity and growth, the latter mainly by way of investing in research, development and innovation, and in human capital. The creation of quality jobs should be the focus of governments and will be achieved by boosting growth and productivity. The archetype of this model is given by the Nordic countries: market liberalization combined with social investment.

Category Competitive State (Frame B: Social State)

According to the outcomes of the analysis of the corpus, even after the outbreak of the economic crisis in 2008, in the marketized social democratic discourse the state is compelled to perform as a competitive state, although its social character is now strongly underlined. In the frame Social State, public administrations are demanded to foster social investments as engines of competitiveness, such as by investing funds in the so-called sectors of sustainability.

To achieve this, the public administration needs to raise taxes and conduct a number of selective social cuts without damaging the existing social cohesion.



Graphic 14: *Interpretation repertoire* of the discourse B (Social State) of the category Competitive Economy

Storyline

The competitive state should to be upgraded to a social state, a competitive state with social functions, based on a Knowledge Economy (relying on R+D+I, education, etc.) and with social investment as an engine of competitiveness in sectors of social wellbeing (in the sectors of future and of social sustainability). To accomplish this, it has to raise taxes and enforce austerity cuts, without hampering social protection.


As in the last case, a major concern in the post-crisis period is stressing the social character of the state, which apart from aiming at productivity and growth, should focus on improving citizens’ welfare. Prior to the crisis, although the elements of the Knowledge Economy and some social elements, such as the creation of quality jobs, are to be found, the traditional orthodox economic policies were overriding, such as maintaining state accounts in line with the demands of international capital and the deregulation of national markets. After the downturn, the prototypical state evolves into a more traditional progressive body, whose main

concerns are social cohesion, investment, and sustainability. Concerning raising taxes and austerity cuts, these refer to a set of new laws, approved in 2008 by the Government of José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero in response to the crisis, entailing a general rise in taxes at the end of 2009 and extensive spending cuts in line with the European austerity policy (most notably on salaries for public workers or some newly acquired social benefits, such as the cheque bebé [state allowance for newborn babies]). The rhetoric on their presentation underlined how these cuts and increases of duties would not affect general social well-being or the social budget.

There is a highly frequent pattern in the social democratic discourse, namely the linkage of social policy and objectives with economic ones and vice versa, such as including women in the labor market or the creation of high-quality jobs to amplify growth, and the bolstering of productivity and economic dynamism to create jobs, fight exclusion, and prompt social cohesion. This pattern has already been documented in other policy areas, such as the environmental policy (Coffey, 2014) and even in other European social democratic parties, such as the SPD (Blätte, Zitzler, in Schaal, Lemke, Ritzi, 2014).

c) Category Knowledge Economy

The next category that was identified in the analysis of the marketized social democratic discourse of the PSOE is Knowledge Economy, that is, the economic model that needs to be promoted by the state to achieve a profitable economy able to compete at a global level. To advance towards a knowledge economy, the public bodies have to invest in human capital, such as in education and training of the citizens, and research, development and new technologies.



Graphic 15: *Interpretation repertoire* of the category Knowledge Economy

Storyline

Due to globalization and technological advances, a new economic model has replaced the industrial one, the Knowledge Economy, whose core constituting elements are R+D+I, new technologies, and human capital. All these milestones have simultaneous social and economic benefits, which constitute their discursive strength. Respecting the economy, they drive economic growth and increase productivity. The achievement of higher levels of equality, equality of opportunities, and welfare are their social advantages. Since they all are economically and socially advantageous, they should be promoted and sponsored by public bodies, by investing in research, R+D+I, new technologies, and in human capital through education. All these components are tools for transforming knowledge into economic and social returns.

This economic model has largely and systematically been encouraged by the overruling economic organisms, stressing their economic potential, as for instance in this report from the World Bank Institute, namely “Finland as a knowledge economy. Elements of success and lessons learned”:

“Knowledge has become one of the main driving forces of economic and social developments in both industrialized and developing countries. Accelerated by rapid advances in information and communication technologies (ICTs), the knowledge economy (KE) offers possibilities to increase productivity and competitiveness, leapfrog development phases, and open paths towards more sustainable futures” (Dahlman, Routti, Ylä-Anttila, 2007: ix).

And further:

“The lessons learned [from Finland] also encourage building an infrastructure for a knowledge economy such as investing in education and research, as well as in information and telecommunication systems” (Dahlman, Routti, Ylä-Anttila, 2007: ix).

And also from the World Bank as a policy program:

“The Skills & Innovation Policy (SIP) program of the World Bank Institute's Growth and Crisis practice provides policy advice to client countries on four Knowledge Economy (KE) pillars: economic and institutional regime, education, innovation, and Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) to help them make the transition to a KE” (Skills and Innovation Policy, World Bank website, 2011).


There are also many examples expressly addressing *interpretations repertoire* of Knowledge Economy, such as innovation, as regular reports comparing national performances' indicators, or human capital:

“A nation's human capital endowment — the skills and capacities that reside in people and that are put to productive use — can be a more important determinant of its long term economic success than virtually any other resource” (The Human Capital Report 2015, World Economic Forum, 2015).

This category is so largely and homogeneously extended in all political forces that it is hard to assess the ideological background with certainty. The component of investment in human capital may stem from the socialist-progressive tradition, from the angle of improving workers' life prospects by educating them and heightening the level of equality and equality of opportunities. This ingredient is combined with the investment in R+D+I and new technologies, which can be hardly ascribed to any of the major political forces' history, but as a common field in both, surely relating the idea of progress through science.

d) Category Dynamic State

Apart from becoming a competitive state, oriented to create a more profitable national economy at a global level, the results of the analysis of the PSOE discourse point towards a claim to transform the state into a dynamic state. This dynamic state will imitate the working logic of private companies by means of adopting the so-called New Public Management practices, that is, a set of company-like general directives conducted to improve the productivity and efficiency of public bodies. Only a dynamic state will be able to lead the rest of socio-economic agents to higher levels of competitiveness and efficiency.



Graphic 16: *Interpretation repertoire* of the Frame A (Dynamic State) of the category Dynamic State

Storyline

The state should lead and prepare the rest of the economic and social agents in the global scene to achieve a more competitive economy, which can be further translated into higher welfare quotas and social cohesion. It should manage the ill effects of globalization by providing tools to all domestic agents to adapt to it successfully. It conducts proactive and preventative actions directed towards the root causes of social evils to avoid having to repair them later, which will save public resources. The state should be invigorated and stimulated (modernized) to increase its flexibility, efficiency, and productivity, assimilating its performance to private companies by adopting the New Public Management practices' set. Only if it is modernized, it can be economically sustainable. Also, only this new invigorated state can lead and enable the rest of the agents to succeed.

Governments must lead the domestic socio-economic agents, such as companies, individuals, and universities, to economic competitiveness. They hold a managerial position, whose responsibility is coordinating the diverse areas and substructures in the global arena,

approaching the functionality of a CEO. Drucker, in his harsh critique on governments' ineffective functioning, had foreseen this new role the end of the decade of the 1960s⁶⁰:

“Government would become increasingly the decision-maker, the vision-maker. (...) It would, in other words, be the "conductor" that tries to think through what each instrument is best designed to do” (Drucker, 1969: 19).

In doing so, their main task is enabling domestic actors to prosper, that is, to be competitive. On the other hand, instead of repairing the damages of economic failure, it should anticipate them with preventative policies and a proactive attitude. By the time of the Third Way Manifesto, social democrats proclaimed their sharp predilection for an active state, e.g.: “an active government, in a newly conceived role, has a key role to play in economic development (Third Way Manifesto, 1998: 8)” or “the state must become an active agent for employment, not merely the passive recipient of the casualties of economic failure” (Third Way Manifesto, 1998: 10). Today as well, this preventative attitude plays a role in the conservative political line, mainly in relation to labor policy (“Strengthening the resources directed to address active policies on employment” [People’s Party Electoral Programme, 2000: 22]).

Another fundamental mission of the state involves invigorating itself by increasing its levels of efficacy, flexibility, and use of ICTs. It has to enhance its performance, meanwhile reducing the resources needed, becoming more efficient. It should resemble the private enterprises' functionality, running, and performance, working to objectives and outsourcing non-central services. These are what, in this work, are considered to be “New Public Management” practices (Hood, 1995), and it seems to be a sine qua non condition to maintain public services, as shown in the proposition: “in order to sustain the public, we must increase its efficiency and quality” (PSOE’s Party Congress Resolution, 2012: 35). Actually, perhaps one of the most noteworthy characteristics of this category is the relationship established between the state’s auto-invigorating endeavors and its capacity to lead the rest of national agents to social aims, such as in the following examples of 2004:

“To invigorate the society, the state should be invigorated” (PSOE’s Electoral Program, 2004:

⁶⁰ Drucker’s revealing approach of 1969 sees government as a “poor manager” and hence, he pleads for a “reprivatisation” of public services in business, what would consistently heighten the required flexibility (Drucker, 1969: 7-20).


130).

“To allow the economy to thrive, the public sector should be itself more productive, work with concrete targets and be more transparent” (PSOE’s Electoral Program, 2004: 106).

“The state should be more dynamic (...) to achieve welfare and social cohesion” (PSOE’s Electoral Program, 2004, 106).

This auto-invigoration connection, prompting the rest of the domestic subjects, which does not yet seem to have been addressed at length by academics, could respond to the will of making public organisms more efficient and productive after the inefficiencies allegedly experienced persistently under the Fordist state.

e) Category: Market-oriented education



Graphic 17: *Interpretation repertoire* of the category Market-oriented Education

Storyline

All citizens are entitled to receive a quality education. Education must be a major public investment, as it produces economic returns (it bolsters national competitiveness and productivity) and integrates individuals in the labor market. It is the core tool to connect growth, employment, and equality, and therefore has to be the basis of labor. Education must persistently adapt to changeable labor markets, therefore, should be a life-long task.

As progressive taxation has a positive effect on equality, education is the core socialist instrument to assure equality of opportunities. In response to the highly treacherous new global stage, the social democratic discourse appears with an apparently simple solution: education. Allegedly, it links economic growth with their social democratic ideological stock, namely decommodification of life-chances, and from it stems its strength. States should redirect their resources to assure its quality and scope. In this icy and constantly evolving international market, education must be continuous by extending far beyond the school years. The constant updating of skills is an inescapable task in the Knowledge Economy, assisted by the public administration and facilitated by ICTs. Companies should also be involved in this mission by sponsoring and encouraging continuous education, which will be prompted when labor stability recovers its normal state.

In the mid-nineties, life-long learning emerged at the forefront of international policy making on education. The EU institutions and other international bodies' reports started underlining the necessity of continual education to face the instable new economic scene. As Hodgson puts it, "lifelong learning was the 1990s response to, or even defence against, a changing, frightening and unknown technological, economic, social and political environment" (Hodgson, 2000: 4). In this sense, she stresses how the EU launched, in 1996, the 'Year for Lifelong Learning' and the OECD drafted a report along the same lines (Hodgson, 2000: 4).

"Since the first common principle of 1963, in all the European Commission and the European Council have produced more than 100 major official regulations or policy documents (directives, regulations, decisions, recommendations, opinions) concerning vocational training in Europe" (Ant, 1998, in Hodgson, 2000: 23).


As can be seen in the following example, which connects permanent education with the emergence of Knowledge Economy:

“Living and working in an increasingly knowledge-driven economy puts human resources - as the main ‘knowledge carriers’ - at the forefront of policy debate. In order for a country to maintain its competitive base, to provide quality of life to its citizens, and to create employment opportunities and employable workers, the skills of its workforce require continuous upgrading and are quintessential to the country’s economic performance” (Towards a European Research Area Key Figures 2001, European Commission, 2001).

Hodgson emphasizes the Labour Party’s predilection for it as an instrument to boost social inclusion and to differentiate progressives from their center-right rivals (Hodgson, 2000: 14).


f) Category Labor Flexicurity

As with the categories Economic Globalization and Competitive State, in this category two differentiated frames (Labor Flexibility and Quality Labor) appear, but this time they permeate rather simultaneously. Following the financial crisis, the frame Quality Labor is unsurprisingly emphasized.



Graphic 18: Frames of the category Labor Flexicurity

Category labor Flexicurity (Frame A: Flexibility)



Graphic 19: *Interpretation repertoire* of the Frame A (Flexibility) of the category Flexicurity

Storyline

Under globalization, workers must adapt to labor markets. Labor flexibility satisfies the necessities of adaptability to the changeable markets of enterprises and the need for a work-life balance for employees. In economic recessions, the right to work must be redistributed as much as the salary (“work less to work all”). To tackle unemployment, workforce also has to become more employable, mainly by way of permanent education. Also, an increase in the productivity rate and economic growth will boost the workforce’s figures.

Workers have the unnegotiable duty to adapt to the market. Flexibility fulfils the needs of companies, having to cope with unstable and varying trade, and of the workforce, to reconcile their job position with their private lives. This frame has been persistently promoted by international institutions, such as EU bodies:

“For employers, a sufficient degree of flexibility will be increasingly necessary in order to improve their adaptability (...). Employees seek greater flexibility in order to reconcile personal and working life” (Council of the European Union, 2008: 4).

In this sense, according to the mainstream discourse, labor flexibility bolsters economic competitiveness, since it allows enterprises to operate with the necessary workforce at any time.

To fit the varying needs of companies, workers must rely on permanent education. European social democrats have doubtlessly bowed to this political line, albeit complementing it with a social angle:

“Having the same job for life is a thing of the past. Social democrats must accommodate the growing demands for flexibility – and at the same time maintain minimum social standards, help families to cope with change and open up fresh opportunities for those who are unable to keep pace” (Third Way Manifesto, 1998: 4).

In recent years, a new European discourse on the benefits of workforce flexibility has emerged. Apart from stressing the benefits of workers’ flexibility for a good work-life balance, it intends to identify it as an opportunity for workers to improve their value as human capital:

“Flexibility, on the one hand, is about successful moves (“transitions”) during one’s life course: from school to work, from one job to another, between unemployment or inactivity and work, and from work to retirement. (...) It is about progress of workers into better jobs, ‘upward mobility’ and optimal development of talent” (Towards Common Principles of Flexicurity, Commission of the European Communities, 2007: 4, 5).

Social science scholars tracked down the origins of “flexibility” in the transformation of the “Fordist” state into the competitive state in the 1980s (Jessop, Nielsen, Kastendiek, Pedersen, 1991: vii-83). According to the general view, it emerged as the recipe to wipe out the apparent rigidities preventing Europe from thriving. As Nielsen argues:

“It was the “euro-sclerosis” diagnosis which made flexibility such a prominent issue on the political agenda. The institutional set-up was held to have caused rigidities such as which calcifies the veins of the modern economy: and increased flexibility was seen as the cure. This approach prevailed until the late 1980s” (Nielsen, in Jessop, Nielsen, Kastendiek, Pedersen, 1991: 3).


And:

“Promotion of flexibility was presented as the cure – especially in relation to the labour market. It also implied deregulation of the capital markets, lowering of tax rates and a general slimming

of the state. Revitalization and accelerated integration of the European Community were also seen as part of the cure” (Nielsen, in Jessop, Nielsen, Kastendiek, Perdersen, 1991: 4).

As Nielsen further argues, identifying flexibility as the solution for the economic deceleration was a “discursive phenomenon” in line with the predominant economic theory (Nielsen, in Jessop, Nielsen, Kastendiek, Perdersen, 1991: 4-8). In this sense, perhaps, the notion of flexibility seems one of the oldest and most decisive in the marketization of social democratic rationality as it fixes not only labor, but also the core logic of the whole discourse by underlining that all economic agents must adapt to the market.

Category labor Flexicurity (Frame B: Quality Labor)



Graphic 20: *Interpretation repertoire* of the Frame B (Quality Labor) of the category Flexicurity


Storyline

According to the analysed discourse, the PSOE aims to achieve better-quality and a higher number of jobs and increase the social value of labor. Workers urge stability and higher wages. Labor precariousness hampers economic efficiency and affects social cohesion. The workforce should participate in the management of companies, and collective negotiation should be encouraged (instead of individualization). Investment in human capital must be prompted, also

conducted and financed by companies. Young workers are a special concern; they must be protected from precariousness and allow their emancipation.

This is definitely the traditional social democratic discourse on labor, tightly interwoven with the neoliberal discourse on flexibility. It follows the background as workers’ representatives of European progressive parties and with their links with trade unions. If Pablo Iglesias, founder of the PSOE at the end of the 19th Century, was a contemporary leader, he would probably represent this stance, in line with his main but old-fashioned political claims, such as “the main goal of the PSOE is the full emancipation of the working class” (quoted in *El Socialista*, issue 640, 2000:30). This social democratic goal of quality labor diverges from the official European discourse, which instead of focusing on the need for quality labor (more and better jobs), underlines the necessity of facilitating labor transitions, assuring that workers “will not face long periods of unemployment” (European Commission, official webpage).

g) Category Entrepreneurial Individual



Graphic 21: *Interpretation repertoire* of the category Entrepreneurial Individual


Storyline

This discourse highlights how the economy needs more entrepreneurial dynamism, such as an increase in the number of companies, especially the innovative ones, and a more competitive business fabric to achieve better economic records. Entrepreneurship is central in the socialist

program, since it is fundamental in achieving social wealth (such as full employment) and can be implemented thanks to equality of opportunities and freedom. An entrepreneurial culture should be promoted in the school years.

In this category, genuine neoliberal elements, such as entrepreneurship and business ventures, are claimed to be socialist-inherent by means of their association with traditional socialist values, most notably equality and equality of opportunities and creation of social wealth. The rest of the category's components have only a neoliberal character, and they can be ascribed to the marketized social democratic discourse, as is the case with the promotion of an entrepreneurial education and culture by the state.

h) Category: Environmental Sustainability



Graphic 22: *Interpretationrepertoire* of the category Environmental sustainability

Storyline

It refers to a prudent use of natural resources, protecting the ecosystem and environmental balance. It is required for economic growth, as it is a factor of competitiveness (and vice versa: its misuse hampers economic performance). It is also a factor in equality, since its responsible use redresses the balance of environmental equality between territories and generations.


In many social issues, as with education, environmental sustainability is integrated into the progressive discourse, with an emphasis on its capacity of boosting both economic growth and equality. It is associated with core socialist values, as is the case with the neologism

‘environmental equality’, also present in many other formulae, as gender equality or economic equality.

The overall weight of environmental topics in the PSOE discourse is unquestionably less advanced than in that of other left-wing parties (most notably the group of forces known as green parties), at least, at the level of the daily debate in which it is rarely topicalized. This is likely the case for many European social democratic contemporaries, whose national constituencies are more aware and interested in environmental topics, and consequently, their leaders must thematize them recurrently (such as with the contested nuclear energy in Germany). In Spain, probably due to the existence of what are perceived as more urgent concerns, such as advancing in the still rather primitive welfare benefits, environmental issues can sometimes be secondary, limited to censuring the devastation of coasts, a result of the era of the construction bubble or climate change.

i) Category: Social Cohesion

Graphic 23: *Interpretation repertoire* of the category Environmental Sustainability



Storyline

According to the discourse, in a society that enjoys of social cohesion, all citizens can freely develop their life aspirations independently of their personal characteristics. This freedom of choice that separates life opportunities from personal economic constraints is part of the socialist commitment to equality. It allows participation in economy and society, to great extent, by means of inclusion in the labor market. A socially integrated territory will lack social conflicts and marginalization, which would otherwise hamper the economic dynamism. In this sense, social protection is a factor of competitiveness and economic prosperity; social capital produces relevant economic returns and cohesion makes the economy more sustainable. Education and training are the most fundamental devices for integration and are therefore core instruments in achieving a cohesive society.

The history of social democratic parties has been the story of “ideological deradicalization” (Merkel et.al. 2008: 7), which can be traced by looking at the systematic readjustment of their goals, from the elimination of social classes and the absolute equality in the pre-war era, to the redistribution by way of progressive taxation in the Fordist state, to the equality of opportunities thanks to education in the Third Way discourse. Social cohesion, also ascribed to the post-Third Way political line, is a step further in this process. There is a sense of marketization of social policy in validating social policy measures by their economic benefits, especially in the connection established between a lack of social conflicts and marginalization and economic dynamism. In this context, social protection is presented as investment in human capital and social cohesion, as an essential factor in achieving economic sustainability⁶¹. This discourse connects to the official European rationality, which regards “competitiveness and social progress” as “two sides of the same coin”, since “continuing social progress can be built only on economic prosperity” and its “key resource” is “a well-educated and highly motivated and adaptable working population” (European Social Policy - A Way Forward For The Union A White Paper, Commission of the European Communities, 1994:4).

2. Tracking the gradual emergence of the categories

Broadly, it could be said that, while in the eighties and nineties the macroeconomic program was neoliberalized, the decade of 2000 was when the rest of the political fields were marketized, although with some exceptions. The most concrete intervening fact in both phenomena was the integration of Spain in the European Union, with all overriding international organizations, including but not limited to the EU institutions, pushing the political discourse in the same direction. As will be extensively explained in the conclusion chapter, the hegemonization of the ideology of neoliberalism and globalization were the most relevant and profound causes of marketization.

The categories of meaning itemized in this work did not appear in the discourse simultaneously, but usually at different stages of the process, and each were influenced by several specific factors. Even if the precise assertion of the exact time of the cementation of every category is not plausible due to the character of this work (which aims to provide a general all-encompassing picture), there are some peculiarities worth mentioning. One of them is the early emergence of two of the nine categories, namely Economic Globalization and Competitive

⁶¹ On social exclusion in the Third Way discourse, see Fairclough 2000:51.

State, as a consequence of the negotiations and subsequent access of Spain to the EU, to which the first part of this epigraph will be devoted.

It cannot be ignored that during the course of the 1980s, the negotiations on becoming a member of the EU contributed to the spread of neoliberal values in the PSOE's political discourse. This frame was strengthened by the internal Spanish political opinion climate, most notably the perceived inefficient economic management inherited from Francoism, which was deemed to counter the international zeitgeist. Although the country tried to move the negotiations for the membership forward in the 1960s, even with the dictatorial regime still in power⁶², it was not until 1986, when Spain joined the EU as an official member. By then, the Spanish political system had successfully evolved from a dictatorial regime to a (albeit inexperienced and unsettled) democracy, following the death of Francisco Franco in 1975, followed by a peaceful but tense transition. The wish to access the European Communities was repeatedly expressed in the first democratic government, led by Adolfo Suárez from the party Union of the Democratic Centre (UCD, Spanish acronym) (*España y la Unión Europea*, Ministerio de Asuntos Europeos y Cooperación, n.d.) and finally achieved by the socialist leader, Felipe González, in his first legislative term (1982-1986) (Kennedy, 2013). As introduced, under the leverage of the negotiations to join the EU and as an emulation of their colleagues from the European Communities, an orthodox economic program won influence at the level of the Spanish political elites, and with it, neoliberal values progressively permeated throughout the political discourse⁶³. This gradual cementation of the neoliberal hegemony coincided with Felipe González's fourteen years in power from 1982 to 1996, and it cannot be understood without the admission criteria (most notably the conditions pertaining the public deficit and inflation) that the EU candidates were required to fulfill for membership. The fact that the PSOE party was in power during the economic integration into the EU (approximately until the Maastricht Treaty in 1992) should be considered a fundamental intervening factor in explaining the resolute and uncontested neoliberalization of its discourse.

⁶² Already in 1962 the Spanish Government expressed its wish to be vinculated to the EU (Jordán, Fuentes: 2000 in Jordán Galduf, 2003: 114).

⁶³ Although is not methodologically feasible to determine the precise moment in which every single value emerged (named category or *interpretationsrepertoire* in this work), and most importantly, the concrete contextual settings triggering this transformation, it is desirable to attempt to achieve these objectives as much as is realizable.

One chief idea preceded the cementation of all neoliberal values, namely the necessity of conforming a competitive state, defined as pre-established by the European Community and more broadly by the international overriding bodies, such as the FMI and OECD. A competitive state was seen as a government able to compete in the new economic framework of open markets. To build a competitive state, governments ought to run the countries in a specific fashion (defined here through the category Economic Globalization) and stick to a determined form (as Competitive States). Respecting the latter, they should enforce actions to reduce the weight and expenses of the public body with an austerity plan to avoid incurring a domestic deficit (i.e., avoiding “excessive government deficits” [Treaty of Maastricht, 1992, 18]). It was essential to reorganize the services provided to the citizens, mostly in relation to slimming down and optimizing state-led services and benefits. Below, an example of the gradual incorporation of the frame of a Competitive State category in the PSOE discourse:

“We have to resist to the inertia of a public sector that needs to grow to be effective, now the golden rule should be to spend better, and, if possible, spend less. Knowing with certainty what has to be done and which things the state is not supposed to do” (PSOE’s Electoral Programme, 1996: 14, 15).

With respect to the economic policy and the government’s program to achieve a competitive economy (the policies), they should allegedly prioritize the conformation and maintenance of a solid and stable macroeconomic framework, such as by monitoring the inflation rate in order to achieve price stability and to boost competition within and beyond the national borders, that is, to enhance the reach, dynamism and openness of the internal market. The role of the successive EU treaties in the neoliberalization of the PSOE economic program is undeniable, especially in the case of the Single European Act and the Maastricht Treaty⁶⁴. The gradual integration into the EU, especially following the Single European Act, which made the single European internal market possible in 1993, brought about a sharp rise in international investment and capital inflow within the borders of the country (the Foreign Direct Investment went from 4% between 1981-1985 to 24% from 1986-1990) [Alonso y Donoso, 2003 in Jordán Galduf, 2003]. This also meant a pressing need for deregulations, liberalization and

⁶⁴ “Each Member State shall: adopt, if necessary (...) multiannual programmes intended to ensure the lasting convergence necessary for the achievement of economic and monetary union, in particular with regard to price stability and sound public finances” (Treaty of Maastricht, 1992: 17)

privatizations, which also fueled the internal competition⁶⁵. Under these circumstances, the PSOE created (or rather replicated) a discourse to advocate for the openness of the national economy and the worldwide market, through political claims such as, “At this stage, it is not advisable to try to profit from protectionism and from the fear to compete” (PSOE’s Electoral Programme, 1996: 163).

In particular, the discourse to open the Spanish economy to the world was backed by a largely favorable public opinion. Citizens widely associated the integration with the end of the international isolation of Franco’s regime and a promise for economic modernization. As Jordán Galduf stresses, “There was a widely shared wish to overcome the secular isolation respecting Europe, stabilization of the democracy and modernization of the country” (Jordán Galduf, 2003: 114). As Recio and Roca likewise highlighted, the “modernization” of the economic functioning of the country, usually in relation to “productive efficiency, economic growth, and social welfare, (...) was widely associated with the entry of Spain into the European Community” (Recio, Roca, in Glyn, 2001, p. 175).

It can be hypothesized that, in the neoliberalization of the PSOE discourse, situated in this work between approximately 1982 and 2000, and pertains most notably to the conformation of a competitive state and embracing economic globalization and open markets, three catalyzing contextual factors gave it a crucial impulse. The first would be the party’s ascent to power in 1982⁶⁶, in the framework of the prior negotiations of the preceding Government and the gradual adaptation of the Spanish economic management to the European admission criteria. The second would be the ratification of the Single European Act in 1987, whose core objective was the creation of an internal market, or literally, “progressively establishing the internal market over a period expiring on 31 December 1993” (Single European Act, 1987: 7)⁶⁷.

⁶⁵ As Clifton, Comín and Díaz Fuentes point out, the privatization process in Spain started with the socialist government in 1983 and it was “euphemistically referred to as ‘deinvestment’ (Clifton et al., 2003: 72, 73). It pursued, among other objectives: “making the public enterprise sector profitable”, in bankruptcy at the time of the Transition, and augmenting the state incomes to lessen the “state deficit” (Ib.).

⁶⁶ As suggested in this work, the PSOE ran the elections of 1982 with a to a great extent archaic left political program (with clear influences of Pablo Iglesias’ vision and profoundly detached from the social democratic program of its European neighbours) and, once in Government, it implemented a neoliberal political programme deeply influenced by the integration in the EU (Roca, Recio in Glyn, 2001: 175).

⁶⁷ According to Hideko “European countries have increasingly tailored their policies to conform to neoliberal doctrines of financial liberalization and market deregulation, particularly following the Single European Act of 1986 and the Maastricht Treaty of 1992” (Hideko, 2014: 8)

In particular, the creation of a single European market led the Spanish Government to implement numerous adjustments to prepare for free competition with profoundly more advanced economies. The conformation of a single market occurred in 1993, one year after the third key contextual fact, namely the Maastricht Treaty. In this Treaty, the intention of the conformation an EU that also included monetary policy gave a decisive step forward, and with it, the launch of the Euro as national currency⁶⁸, which was introduced in several stages for different countries. The member states had to reach certain economic objectives (again, mostly relating the public deficit and inflation) to be admitted to the Economic and Monetary Union, a prerequisite for a further introduction of the new currency, which finally was feasible in Spain in 2002. These facts contributed to the economic policy of the PSOE from 1982 to 2002, to a great extent determined by the conditions and prerequisites established by the EU to gain access to the EU during the negotiations on integration, to be competitive in the Single European Market, and to be admitted to the EMU and Eurozone.

“The real convergence with Europe is the priority which orientates our entire political offering. The respect to the nominal convergence, and more precisely, the budgetary commitments assumed in the Stability Pact is the essential condition that will determine the timing of the application of our policies” (PSOE’s Electoral Programme, 2000: 68).

“Fighting inflation, reducing the public deficit, and monetary stability are essential instruments to build a healthy and competitive economy” (PSOE’s Electoral Programme, 1996: 22, 23).

“The budgets assumed in the E Stability Pact is the essential determinant of our economic policy” (PSOE’s Electoral Programme, 2000: 69).

“Since the mid-1990s, fiscal policy has largely been dedicated to meeting the Maastricht Treaty criteria for participation in monetary union. Substantial deficit reduction was achieved between 1995 and 1997, with the deficit falling by 4.7 percent of GDP” (Spain: 1999 Article IV Consultation, IMF, 1999).

⁶⁸ Maastricht Treaty on the European currency: “Resolved to achieve the strengthening and the convergence of their economies and to establish an economic and monetary union including, in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty, a single and stable currency” (Maastricht Treaty, 1992: 1)

After the neoliberalization of the PSOE's economic discourse, its marketization took place, defined here as transferring orthodox and neoliberal values to non-economic fields. The transfer of a neoliberal discourse and values (and naturally the associated policies) from the international level to the Spanish party mainly occurred during the 2000s. In this thesis, as introduced, it is believed that there was a central cause behind the marketization of non-economic fields in the PSOE discourse, namely the hegemony of neoliberalism and its role as an ideology of economic globalization, which will be the central concern of the concluding chapter. Specifically, in the Spanish case study, the integration in the EU played a substantial role, above all, due to the internationalization of the economy that it triggered. The associated transformation of its discourse on education or knowledge are examples of the profundity of the transfiguration of the core values of the PSOE discourse due to neoliberalism, economic globalization, and the EU integration.

The categories of meaning emerged due to the gradual marketization of non-economic fields, and their continued application in the discourse provide evidence of transferring several political values and a core discourse from the international neoliberal discourse to the PSOE discourse. This process, which started when the PSOE seized power in 1982, can be traced thanks to the imprints it left and still leaves on texts, in the form of meaning packages (categories of meaning), keywords, and phrase structures. The aim of this epigraph is to explain how (by which means and channels) the PSOE discourse was gradually marketized by the international neoliberal discourse, and which historical events or contextual facts triggered this. In pursuing this goal, two items in particular will be considered, namely the historic moment in which every category of meaning appeared in the PSOE discourse for the first time and the most relevant contextual facts, which have most likely contributed to making this meaning arise. Since the emergence of the categories of meaning is tightly interrelated and often ascribable to the same contextual fact, the categories were regrouped by the topics they address (namely state, knowledge, education, labor), which will allow a more congruent text and an almost chronological narrative.

As introduced at the beginning of this epigraph, there were two forerunners in the process of marketization: the transformation of the welfare state into a competitive state and the implementation of an orthodox economic program by the Government due to the negotiations

and subsequent admission to the EU⁶⁹. It can be hypothesized that the economic program of the state and its final objective as a state were the subsequent political fields to be marketized, as a reaction of the emergence of the two mentioned. As a result, the marketization of the states' conception of knowledge, namely the commodification of it and its transfiguration into a factor of competitiveness followed. That went so far that, in this new discourse, knowledge should function as the growth engine of the new economy, unsurprisingly relabeled the Knowledge Economy, in this work depicted as the new economic model, which has substituted the industrial one. The purpose of the Knowledge Economy to provide a success formula for achieving a competitive economy in the framework of economic globalization. A discourse for the promotion of investment on R+D+I, new technologies (particularly ICT), and human capital was articulated. This is included in the list of marketized values, since the meaning of knowledge in it has been transformed to adapt to the requirements of markets, similar to several other concepts. With it, the PSOE view of knowledge, with education, has redefined its core scope, namely from 'wisdom' and 'progress' to specific training and 'know-how'. This category appeared at around the year 2000 and has been maintained in the PSOE discourse to this day, with a rather homogeneous meaning throughout the entire period.

This discourse has unequivocally been transferred, to a great extent, from the European institutions starting at the beginning of the 2000s. The Lisbon European Council of March of 2000 was influential in setting the political benchmark for the next decade, based on this new economic paradigm through the well-known Lisbon Strategy:

“The Union has today set itself a new strategic goal for the next decade: to become the most competitive and dynamic knowledgebased economy in the world capable of sustainable economic growth with more and better jobs and greater social cohesion. Achieving this goal requires an overall strategy aimed at: preparing the transition to a knowledgebased economy and society by better policies for the information society and R&D, as well as by stepping up the process of structural reform for competitiveness and innovation and by completing the internal market” (Presidency Conclusions Lisbon Council, European Council, 2000: 2).

⁶⁹ The transformation of the macroeconomic policy can be partly seen as a neoliberalization, since principally (but not only) the economic discourse is transformed.

In this respect, ten years later, in 2010, the Commission published a working paper assessing the effectiveness of the Lisbon Strategy. In it, it was admitted that, although the whole plan had not achieved the expected objectives, such as certain quotas for employment, growth, and innovation, it has succeeded in establishing a common political program for the EU, especially in “providing” the “focus” and “set(ing) the agenda for reform”, such as with “success of the Flexicurity concept” and in “research and innovation” (Lisbon Strategy evaluation document, European Commission, 2010: 3).

“The knowledge society depends for its growth on the production of new knowledge, its transmission through education and training, its dissemination through information and communication technologies, and on its use through new industrial processes or services” (The role of the universities in the Europe of knowledge, Commission of the European Communities, 2003: 2).

The category Knowledge Economy has been rather smoothly and effortlessly incorporated into the PSOE discourse, especially as one of its compounding *interpretationsrepertoire* coincided with a native socialist value, i. e., education (as an instrument to improve workers’ life conditions and perspectives) and the associated investment in education. Both have been the most regular and resistant *interpretationsrepertoire* along the period (2000-2012), presented as a pillar to fulfil not only the conformation of a knowledge economy, but also as a fundamental tool to advance towards the realization of a society of equal opportunities.

“We stand for a sound, innovative and thriving undergraduate education system as one of the vectors of the transformation of the productive model and of the knowledge economy” (Party Congress Resolution, 2012, 117).

“As socialists we want to implement the required measures so that all citizens can exercise their right to receive quality higher education (...), so that they can have access to the highest levels of the knowledge society, with no condition other than education, without any kind of discrimination” (PSOE’s Electoral Programme, 2004: 170).

“Education is still today an essential instrument (...) to ensure the equality of opportunities of all citizens. The advance of the knowledge society underpins the strategic character of policies of education” (Party Congress Resolution, 2004, 13).

Another *interpretationsrepertoire*, namely the need for innovation, usually associated with entrepreneurship, has been also a highly recurrent element of the discourse, although it emerged later, around 2004. This is closely interwoven with the “hackneyed phrases” research, development, and innovation, stemming from 2004 onwards and with a permanent nature in the discourse. All these elements are partly deprived of their original meaning in the PSOE discourse, being used exclusively with an emphasis on their commercial purpose. They are solely employed, considering their role as instruments to create economic profits. This is a side-effect of the internationalization of the Spanish economy, resulting from the EU integration and neoliberal globalization of the end of the '80s. Because of the more intense competition, greater pressure was on Spanish economic actors to create added value to make their products and services more attractive in the global scene. A third element, which also emerged around the start of the 21st Century, and tightly interwoven with innovation, are the Information and Communication Technologies, mostly in relation to the internet, as the lines below from the PSOE party dating from 2004 show:

“(We want to) Advance to an education able to cope with the challenges of the knowledge society, with an increasingly globalized world from a cosmopolitan perspective. That’s why we will integrate ICT into education as an educational tool, and we will assure the effective knowledge of at least two foreign languages, especially the two most widely used in the EU” (PSOE’s Electoral Programme, 2004: 167).

This ICT discourse is still the focus of innumerable reports from international agencies today, as the following text illustrates:

“ICTs are a major driver of growth... Over the long term, the OECD ICT sector has seen consistent growth, representing more than 8% of OECD business sector gross value added (...) ICT services were also the leading component of employment growth in the whole business sector. During 2000-2009, ICT investments were more important for growth than non-ICT investments in a majority of OECD countries” (The future of the internet economy. A statistical profile, OECD, 2011: 29).

In this sense, the European Commission has even created an index of innovation to assess the actions implemented by the EU countries to boost innovation, namely the ‘European

Innovation Scoreboard'. It has been published annually since 2000. In the 2004 edition, it repeatedly highlighted how Japan and the USA outranked the European Union in innovation, concretely in "patents", "working population with tertiary education", and "R&D expenditures" (European Innovation Scoreboard, 2004, p. 4). This comparison with Japan and the USA is a recurrent formula to stress the need to raise the investment in innovation and research since, at very least, the turn of the millennium:

"However, a number of indicators reveal that EU dynamism falls far behind that of its major competitors. At the end of the 1990s EU expenditure (in research) fell to 1.8% of its GDP, as compared with almost 3% in the United States and Japan" (Towards a European research area, European Commission, 2000).

When considering the investment in research in OECD countries, it should be highlighted that the percentage for Spain falls behind the European Union during the research period between 2000 and 2010. The public funds allocated to R&D in these years evolved from 0.88% of the GDP in 2000 to 1.23% in 2010, whilst the EU-28 average went from 1.68% to 1.95% in 2010 (Main Science and Technology Indicators, OECD Stats, n.d.). The investment by Japan (from 3% to 3.59%) and the USA (2.62% to 2.74%) are, as recurrently underscored by the EC, consistently superior.

Many elements of the marketized PSOE discourse of knowledge overlap with the party discourse on education, which will be the next focus of this text. Unsurprisingly, in the political programs and party resolutions of the corpus, the concept of education has as overriding character, shown not only by the number of times it appears in its texts (over 600 times from 1996 to 2012), but also in the privileged locations they occupy (such in the documents' index as an autonomous epigraph). Education is not only a cornerstone of the PSOE's political discourse, but also of the whole European social democratic family. In its contemporary discourse, it is presented as a chief instrument to achieve a more equal and fairer society with the provision of quality public education.

It is assumed that, under the leadership of Felipe Gonzalez between 1982 and 1996, the PSOE contributed to the universalization of the public education system in Spain, what is still, to this

day, seen as a one of the party's greatest achievements in Government⁷⁰. Again, the need to tackle the educational backwardness, as many others inherited from Francoism, played a role in the education discourse at the end of the nineties, usually as part of the broad packages of measures intended to adapt the country to the open market, in which Spain was already anchored, as the following text extract shows:

“(Education should be) (...) a catalyst of employment and the foundation of the process of modernization that we have to address on the verge of the 21st Century” (PSOE's Electoral Programme, 1996: 48).

“During these years, relevant transformations of our education system have been implemented in order to overtake the Spanish backwardness and achieve a modern and high-quality education, able to educate free and responsible citizens, ready to join an open, plural, tolerant and solidary society” (PSOE's Electoral Programme, 1996: 48).

At the beginning of the 2000s, education (along with knowledge) was identified as one of the key instruments of the new century and economic era, indispensable for an inclusive and equal society.

“I urge Spain to win the challenge of progress (...) in a century in which education, knowledge, information, research will set the foundation of the economic growth and consequently the individual and social welfare” (PSOE's Electoral Programme, 2000: 5).

“In the 21st Century, the core engine of prosperity and development will be talent” (PSOE's Electoral Programme, 2000: 8).

For the first time in the PSOE discourse, right after the turn of the millennium, education was identified with the promotion of ICTs within the educational system, often with foreign languages, both presented as instruments to fit the demands of the modern labor market.

⁷⁰ In González first legislative term, the “right to free education” was established “by the Organic Law 8/1985” (Rodríguez, Núñez, 2003: 385).

“After these past years of neglect, I want to give education a boost as a priority, and adapt it to the new times, to achieve an education able to prepare the youth for the use of informatics and new technologies, new languages and one which allows them to adapt to the new work demands” (PSOE’s Electoral Programme, 2000: 6).

“(We stand for an education) that enables (Spaniards) to access informatics and the domination of new technologies in their daily life” (PSOE’s Electoral Programme, 2000: 8).

“We should locate the key factor for change in the revolution of information” (Party Congress Resolution, 2000, 14, 15).

This discourse on the instruction of new technologies and foreign languages was strengthened as the decade advanced, usually drawing on metaphors to identify them as symbols of the new modern era (new times, key factor for change). For instance, in the documents stemming from 2004 onwards, its weight in political claims increased considerably.

“The advancement of the knowledge society underpins the strategic character of the policies on education. Consequently, we will encourage the universal access to information and communication technologies” (Party Congress Resolution, 2014, 13).

“Advancing towards an education which addresses the challenges of the knowledge society, the increasingly globalized world from a cosmopolitan standpoint. With this aim, we will include ICT in schools as education tools, and we will assure the actual knowledge of at least two foreign languages (...)” (PSOE’s Electoral Programme, 2004: 167).

It can be stated that the period between 2000 and 2004 meant a decisive impulse in the marketization of the PSOE’s discourse on education. Incorporating marketized values was more resolute than in other periods of time. Perhaps, the economic boom of these years, in which the ‘economic miracle’ was occurring under the government of the center-right party, which launched a clear-cut neoliberal program, lays behind this definitive commodification of education. After 2004, the discourse on life-long learning also emerged, which would become a core part of the PSOE marketized discourse on education:

“(This society of knowledge and permanent and dramatic change) is introducing changes that demand life-long learning citizens. We have to educate people not only so that they learn, but also so that they continue learning” (PSOE’s Electoral Programme, 2004: 165).

“Permanent education can play a crucial role in equipping individuals with fitting skills for the increasingly changeable labor market” (PSOE’s Electoral Programme, 2004: 106).

Also, the encouragement of entrepreneurship in education, the so-called “Promotion of an entrepreneurial spirit” (such as in the PSOE’s Electoral Programme, 2004: 165), especially in the education system: “as one of the basic competencies of elementary and tertiary education” (PSOE’s Electoral Programme, 2008: 156), cemented around 2004. Simultaneously, the party considers education as an investment in “human capital”: “The human capital stock of the Spanish economy is inferior to the Communitarian average” (PSOE’s Electoral Programme, 2004: 105).

The documents stemming from 2008 (both the political program and the party resolution of this year) show how, more than ever, in the second half of the 2000s, the European political program of education was directly and, sometimes, even literally endorsed by the Spanish socialists.

“We want to raise the education level of children and teenagers in situations of social disadvantage by guaranteeing them an equal education. To this end, we will advance in accomplishing the commitments of the Spanish Government in education with the aim of achieving the Lisbon Strategy’s objectives in 2010” (PSOE’s Electoral Programme, 2008: 136).

“In a society based on knowledge, the implementation of a university system of excellence and quality in the European Higher Education Area is a priority (...)” (Party Congress Resolution, 2008, 12).

“The roadmap is the now renovated Lisbon Strategy, on which the Government has relied to implement its own national program of reforms with relevant successes” (Party Congress Resolution, 2008, 11).

In this vein, since joining the European Union, there has been a general consensus on pointing out the need for reform in the education system. Especially the report called “Programme for International Student Assessment”, published annually by the OECD (widely known as the PISA report), which year after year contributed to creating an atmosphere of general dissatisfaction, as it repeatedly situated the Spanish students in the last positions among EU countries in terms of academic performance⁷¹, and the international ranking of academic institutions, in which the Spanish universities and research programs hold a too modest position for the size, population and even economic performance of the country. In this sense, since the end of the dictatorship, changes in government recurrently meant a new political national law in education, usually with an ideological intention, launched by the winning party, often lacking political consensus⁷². All these factors contributed to undermine the self-confidence respecting the general Spanish approach to education. Especially in more recent times, Spanish political leaders were not confident enough to advocate and implement their own political ideas in education, independent of the EU education plan. In this sense, the PSOE core political view and program on education was no more than a copy of the European core line, although usually with a social democratic leaning (with a more resolute discourse on the relation between education, growth and equality). The fact that the PSOE held power from 2004 to 2008 may also be a factor in explaining the emergence of this pronounced EU-influenced education.

The economic downturn brought no real transformation of the PSOE discourse on education, indicating that they could not implement a specific response to the economic and financial crash. The main ideas that had emerged, especially in the middle of the decade, were even reinforced following the crash, namely: consideration of education as a productive investment, the need to incorporate new technologies in the education system, promote of entrepreneurship, and strengthen foreign languages in the curriculum. This was, for instance, the case of the promotion of entrepreneurship in the education system “Reorient the tertiary education towards the innovation” (PSOE’s Electoral Programme, 2011: 22) or “(Education) can constitute the foundation of a new sustainable growth model based on training, knowledge and the capacity of innovation” (Party Congress Resolution, 2012: 112,113); Training in foreign languages: “The final objective is better knowledge of English among the Spanish population” (PSOE’s

⁷¹ In 2014, Spain was the EU country with the highest rate of “early leavers” of education with a 21.9%, a rate, double the EU average of 11.2%, as data from Eurostat reveals (Eurostat, 2017).

⁷² According to Rodríguez and Núñez “none of the Spanish governments has been able to address the gradual deterioration of the education levels” (Rodríguez, Núñez, 2003: 385).

Electoral Programme, 2011: 22) and especially the incorporation of ICTs into education, with the newly coined concept of School 2.0 (Escuela 2.0)

“To encourage an education system able to tackle the new demands of the knowledge society, in which digital competencies are essential, we will extend the program ‘School 2.0’ (...)” (PSOE’s Electoral Programme, 2011: 82).

“Our commitment should be to increase the digital reach in schools, with a greater focus and budget for the School 2.0 program to achieve the European average ratio of use of new technologies in class” (Party Congress Resolution, 2012, 119).

The Spanish party’s discourse on education after the downturn only presented a relevant modification due to the unfavorable economic settings: the demand for more economic instruments to decommodify access to public education, most notably the availability of grants and subsidies and, more recently, the reduction of the public tuition fees at public universities, which were on the rise, especially following the beginning of Peoples’ Party government in 2011 (particularly “pursuant to the Royal Decree-Law 14/2012” [Albert Verdú, Roig Cotanda, 2013: 6]).

“We have the intention of consolidating grants as factual rights in all levels of education to continue advancing the equality of opportunities and social cohesion. Our utmost purpose is that no student has to drop out of the education system for financial reasons” (PSOE’s Electoral Programme, 2011: 80).

As demonstrated, education has been a marketized field in the PSOE discourse. Connecting to this and tightly interrelated is the PSOE discourse on labor, which equally is one of the most marketized political fields in the study period. In this sense, several factors, which will be described in the following, contributed to the neglect of the social democratic stance on labor, in which workers’ rights were systematically prioritized, most characteristically through the demand for quality jobs and improvement of workers’ life prospects.

As a precedent to the definitive marketization of the PSOE discourse, the government of Felipe González launched some broadly unpopular measures on labor, most notably measures intended to increase the flexibilization of labor market, especially implementing new types of

temporary contracts and lowering the dismissal costs. The labor market reforms of 1986, 1992, and 1994, which were greatly contested, especially by trade unions, were the outcome of the perceived “rigidities” inherited from the Francoism, especially pertaining to the “labor conditions and relations and the state’s market interventionism” (Infante, in Valeriano, 2009: 91).⁷³ In this sense, not only the González government, but all political national representatives of the ’90s and the 2000s were the target of relentless pressure from the overriding international organizations about the labor policy program they were supposed to enforce. These demands, usually in form of policy recommendations, all contained the request for a restructuring of labor relations by the Spanish authorities, who were supposed to get finally rid of the mentioned “rigidities” (Infante, in Valeriano, 2009: 87). The underlying core argument to advocate for this change was the perceived urgency to boost the adaptability potential of labor with a new regulatory framework. Human resources ought to be flexible enough to suit market demands permanently and tightly in all its imaginable expressions, such as the temporal aspect (flexible labor relations, cutback of dismissal costs), the economic (wage flexibility, individualization of working conditions), the spatial (workers’ mobility), and the political (trade unions’ bargaining ability). All the relating suggestions were unavoidable tasks to accomplish in achieving a competitive economy in the global era. If there is an issue in which these global organizations had been relentlessly insistent over the period of study, it is the flexibilization and adaptability of labor to the changeable market settings. In this sense, the IMF called for supply-side labor market reforms in the Spanish economy from 1999 to 2012, practically without respite, especially for “lowering dismissal costs” (Spain: 1999 Article IV Consultation, IMF, 1999), changes in the “collective bargaining system”, “wage moderation”, “greater geographical mobility” (Spain: 2002 Article IV Consultation, IMF, 2002), and, with a later emergence “labor market flexibility” (Spain: 2004 Article IV Consultation, IMF, 2004). This happened independently of the different socioeconomic settings characteristic of the Spanish economy throughout these years.

Although the PSOE did bow to this discourse on the flexibility of labor, albeit frequently intertwined with a conflicting socialist discourse of labor quality, its political stance advocating flexibility has usually not been expressed homogeneously, but by a multiplicity of values, which will be illustrated next. In this vein, one of the first adjacent meanings of labor flexibility

⁷³ As Valeriano points out, these rigidities pertained to, for instance “the troubles faced by companies when dismissing workers due to economic grounds” and “the limited possibilities of temporary contracts” (Infante, in Valeriano, 2009: 87).

to appear in the time considered is the one pleading for a more intense distribution of the (hypothetical) national labor stock among the citizens (such with wage moderation and distribution of working hours among workers). This demand, which appeared around 1996, is connected to the profound economic crisis at the beginning of the '90s in which, due to a perceived labor scarcity, the available "labour stock" ought to be collectivized (the unemployment rate reached 24.2% in 1996 and went slightly down to 22.3% in 1996, according to the IMF [Spain: 2008 Article IV Consultation, IMF, 2008]).

"In the coming years, we want to increase the positive effects of the labor reform on employment. To this end, we will enter into agreements with employers and trade unions leading to a deeper distribution of the labor, to a more flexible labor time distribution and better labor organization" (PSOE's Electoral Programme, 1996: 22).

Among them, one of the most frequently highlighted elements of the 'distribution of labor' was the reduction of labor wages. Because of the internationalization process, the efforts to transform the economy from a demand-side to a supply-side economy led to a discourse on labor, primarily focused on "wage moderation" (Spain: 2002 Article IV Consultation, IMF, 2002), that is, the reduction of salaries in order to control inflation, among other objectives. This discourse can be found both in an international neoliberal discourse and in the marketized PSOE discourse, and it is a direct consequence of the newly cemented paradigm of flexible labor, human capital adaptable to changeable macro-economic requirements (also seen here as cutbacks in the protection of labor as part of the international orthodox economic program). Following examples from the PSOE discourse and a third text extract from the IMF, which shows the correlation between both discourses:

"An improvement in the rate of employment ratio is taking place. It does not rely exclusively on the economic growth of the last two years. The moderation of salaries and the labor reform had also a positive effect on the reduction of the number of jobless citizens" (PSOE's Electoral Programme, 1996: 22).

"(In the last two years, we have implemented) a labor reform forcing a change in the social agents' behavior, thus prioritizing the creation of employment. This was accompanied by an exemplary wage moderation in accordance with the high unemployment rates of our economy" (PSOE's Electoral Programme, 1996: 124).

“Spain’s recent economic performance stands as testimony to the lay-off of sound policies across a broad swath. A stability-oriented fiscal policy, extensive product and labor market reforms, and continued wage moderation have led to a high output and employment growth during the last upswing” (Spain: 2002 Article IV Consultation, IMF, 2002: 35).

After almost fourteen years in power (from 1982 to 1996), the PSOE finally lost the parliamentary elections in 1996. It was not only the profound economic crisis of the early nineties, but also a dilated record of corruption scandals leading directly to the party’s general secretary, that was behind this defeat. Then, the People’s Party, led by José María Aznar, seized power and managed to maintain it from 1996 and 2004, a time in which the economic performance of the Iberian country reached the highest level in the country’s modern history (average GDP growth index of 4.45% in Aznar’s first term) (GDP Growth, The World Bank. n.d.), boosting the employment figures (unemployment went from 22% in 1996 to 11% in 2004). It was the time of the so-called ‘Spanish economic miracle’ but also when the economic orthodox program, already initiated by the PSOE, was more overriding. Meanwhile, in the PSOE, a new secretary general, Jose Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, was appointed in July 2000, and four years later, he won the parliamentary election, becoming the next Spanish Prime Minister in 2004.

From approximately 2004 onwards, the PSOE bowed to a new discourse on labor flexibility, based on work-life balance and the presumable advantages that flexible working hours can provide for the family unit. The most common motto underlined how flexibility of labor is also needed by workers in order to reconcile employment with familial responsibilities. In doing so, the party was alluding to a different concept of flexibility: the adaptability of labor to private life (which implies a narrower meaning referring mainly to working hours that allow for familial responsibilities to be reconciled). It could be presumed that a better work-life balance in this favorable economy could partly be presented as a reward for the outstanding national economic performance, due to which the workers would deserve better working conditions. The controversial issue here is that this flexibility alluding to a better work-life balance was employed to validate and strengthen the marketized flexibility by situating both elements as items in the same group (aligning them) in the political discourse.

“it is not only companies that need flexibility in organizing working hours. Workers also need flexibility in their work schedule to adapt it to their family’s needs (...)” (PSOE’s Electoral Programme, 2008: 30, 31).

“Our labor legislation and collective negotiation should address a long list of subjects to favor the reconciliation of personal and professional life: flexible working hours; right to work part-time (...)” (PSOE’s Electoral Programme, 2004: 74).

“Economic incentives for companies to encourage flexible working time to achieve reconciliation of employees’ work, familial and personal life” (PSOE’s Electoral Programme, 2008: 220).

It is remarkable how, even during the years of the economic boom (ca. from 1998 to 2008), the defense of labor flexibility (the marketized and all-encompassing one: temporal, spatial, political, and economic flexibility) was still present in the PSOE discourse. The PSOE’s claims in this sense, were usually intertwined with typical social democratic values, such as the right to collective negotiation (countering “individualization” of working conditions). These are deemed to be mitigating formulae used by the PSOE to hide marketized values behind typical socialist claims, as demonstrated in the following lines:

“Promoting negotiated formulas of flexibility and new forms of employment which decrease the working time” (PSOE’s Electoral Programme, 2004: 97).

“This regulation ought to seek a new balance between flexibility and labor security, favoring adaptability and collective negotiation of working relations at the expense of deregulation and individualization” (PSOE’s Electoral Programme, 2004: 121).

Around the middle of the 2000s, the concept of employability emerged in the PSOE discourse, which connects to one of the most profoundly anchored values of the European social democratic tradition; education. Even if, at first glance, it doesn’t seem to be relatable to the flexibilization of labor, in the marketized discourse, it plays a reinforcing role. When highlighting the need for workforce employability, the burden of responsibility for citizens’ work situation falls to the individual and not to the system, i.e., a political framework.

Employability has been persistently employed by the PSOE as part of the success formula to tackle unemployment.

“(As socialists,) we endorse a real improvement of workers’ permanent education and an increase of educational offerings (...) in order to increase the ‘employability’ of our youth” (PSOE’s Electoral Programme, 2004: 92).

Also around the middle of the 2000s, the international organizations coined the concept of flexicurity to serve as an archetype for national labor policies⁷⁴. This intended to be a mid-point for reconciliation between the divergent concepts of labor flexibility and stability. According to international marketized discourse, flexicurity is a concept pertaining to certain political frameworks that enable workers to conduct successful (e.g., quick) transitions from one position to another.

Soon after the economic downturn caused the job market to break apart, a renewed discourse on labor flexibility cemented. At first, a discourse demanding the amplification of the flexibility of companies, making labor regulations looser to avoid massive dismissals, especially concerning salary, working hours, etc. Here, the frame of distribution of labor, also employed in the economic recessions at the beginning of the ’90s, seems to emerge again, although not explicitly. It could be concluded that in times of labor scarcity, the PSOE is inclined to draw on the meaning frame of ‘collectivization of labor’.

“The reform of labor of 2010 and the collective bargaining reform of 2011 have a common goal: increase the internal flexibility of companies, so that these can have a greater ability to adapt to changes of the economic and socio-labor realities” (PSOE’s Electoral Programme, 2011: 56).

Secondly, traditional socialist core values, such quality labor and defense of workers, are triggered by the long duration and sharpness of the recession. This frame, probably the most characteristic and organic core objective of socialist parties, arose once the party was defeated in the parliamentary elections of 2011 and took on a stronger character as the lustrum 2011-

⁷⁴ The first document in which this term has been found is “Time to move up a gear”, European Commission, 2006.

2015 advanced⁷⁵. The PSOE relies on a trade union-like discourse, denouncing labor precarity in all its manifestations (instability, insufficient wages, minimum wage).

Another relevant keyword to trace the gradual marketization of labor is ‘entrepreneurship’, which, together with ‘flexibility’, helps to identify the moment and the contextual facts leading to a substantial transformation of the PSOE’s discourse. In this vein, unsurprisingly, from 1996 to 2012, the word-root ‘emprend’, which mostly stands for ‘emprendimiento’ (entrepreneurship) or ‘emprededores’ (entrepreneurs), appeared in the PSOE’s political programs and manifestos over 120 times with a meaning relating to business and venture. Although the first mention is in 1996, it was not until 2004 that the notion took on an overriding prevalence in this discourse with an increasing presence in the most recent texts⁷⁶. Looking at the documents of international organization relating to labor and education, this number reaches 178 hits in just 18 texts (from documents stemming from 1994 to 2010). This notion is first spotted in the international texts in 1994, first formulated by the European Commission and with a meaning and intention that has endured over time:

“Raise the status of initial vocational education and training, and encourage the development of the entrepreneurial skills of young people and their capacity to exploit the new technologies throughout appropriate work experience” (European Social Policy. A way forward the Union, European Commission, 1994: 17).

Until the present time, there has been a constant demand at the EU level to boost entrepreneurship among EU citizens within the education system. Unsurprisingly, in this study, innumerable text fragments have been spotted advocating for a specific curriculum applicable to all member states to bolster entrepreneurship with a special mention in the early school years. In some, it is argued that Europe cannot compete with Japan and the USA without a more broadly entrepreneurial approach shown by its citizens⁷⁷. In the PSOE discourse, the central meaning of the category ‘entrepreneurial individual’, that is, stimulation by the state of

⁷⁵ Although it is beyond the span of time of this study, the influence of the new anti-establishment party Podemos in 2014, perceived by the citizens as more left-oriented and a direct competitor of the PSOE in the left ideological spectrum, had certainly a leverage on the PSOE discourse on flexibility of labor.

⁷⁶ As an interesting anecdote, from the time period between 1996 and 2004, the notion of entrepreneurship and its derivatives (searched in the corpus through the word root ‘emprende’) appeared 22 times, whilst from 2005 to 2012 this word root appeared 86 times.

⁷⁷ Four years later, the objective of promoting entrepreneurship by public bodies also played a key role in the Third Way manifesto in 1998.

entrepreneurial activities, as well as an entrepreneurial attitude to advance towards a more competitive economy, has also prevailed between 1998 and 2012. Even if there are a few variabilities and circumstantial frames and values because of the different economic and political settings, it can be stated that this category has been extraordinarily resistant throughout the period. It has not been substantially revised, not even during the peaks and troughs of the economic boom or downturn, as the following example shows:

“Conforming an adequate framework to the entrepreneurial activity is perfectly compatible with the equality of the policies carried out” (PSOE’s Electoral Programme, 1996: 16).

The most regular political claim pertaining to entrepreneurship in the PSOE discourse (as was the case with the international organizations) has been the need to bolster entrepreneurship from within the education system, especially during the early school years.

“To bolster an entrepreneurial attitude, we will promote its regular inclusion in the undergraduate curriculum, technical studies and occupational training (...)” (PSOE’s Electoral Programme, 2000: 57).

“We will design a ‘Strategic state’ plan to promote the culture of youth entrepreneurship” (PSOE’s Electoral Programme, 2008: 88).

“We will inculcate a culture of entrepreneurship in the earliest education” (PSOE’s Electoral Programme, 2008: 116).

“We deem it to be necessary to include training in the promotion of the entrepreneurial culture in the education system” (Party Congress Resolution, 2012: 60).

As with flexibility, the value of entrepreneurship has been also occasionally adopted, adapted, and defended, as if it were an original socialist value (giving it a social democratic façade). This discursive strategy is regularly used by the PSOE to reinforce and simultaneously conceal neoliberal values in its discourse. Interestingly, by drawing on this technique, the PSOE

validates neoliberal values by means of organic socialist ones, as shown in the following examples:⁷⁸

“For the socialists, a real distribution of opportunities means enabling everyone not only to develop his/her life professionally as employee, but he/she must also be able to do it as entrepreneurial” (Party Congress Resolution, 2008: 10).

“Having the opportunity to be entrepreneurial represents a real distribution of opportunities” (Party Congress Resolution, 2008: 4).

Especially following the downturn, the meaning of entrepreneurship is mitigated by its association with traditional socialist values, such as the defense of minorities and underprivileged groups, such as “we will encourage entrepreneurial initiatives of women” (P2011, p. 100) and “we will also launch new measures to support the special centers of employment and entrepreneurs with disabilities” (PSOE’s Electoral Programme, 2011: 107).

At the midst of the crisis, in 2012, the PSOE claims for the internationalization of Spanish entrepreneurship, which interestingly was one of the strategies of the Spanish economy to ameliorate the downturn as far as possible: increasing the international focus of trade, above all, with respect to exports.

“In the current situation, we will promote the entrepreneurial potential of our society and our youth, giving the maximal primacy to the internationalization of Spanish companies” (...) (Party Congress Resolution, 2012: 23).

As a strategy to validate and underpin the category Entrepreneurial Individual in some of the harshest times of the downturn, the PSOE attributed the extraordinarily elevated unemployment rate to the lack of an entrepreneurial culture:

⁷⁸ The opposite scenario (validating socialist values by means of neoliberal arguments) is extensively addressed in the conclusion epigraph of this chapter, and here, it is understood as ‘marketization of rationales’.

“Another reason for youth unemployment is the lack of an entrepreneurial culture among youths, who focus their job search on low-skilled jobs and the public sector” (Party Congress Resolution, 2012: 56).

3. Language peculiarities

In the second section of this chapter, the most salient language peculiarities of the new discourse resulting from integrating the social democratic discourse with the neoliberal one will be enumerated. Language peculiarities, in this case, will be conceived as the linguistic mechanisms frequently used by the PSOE to present the alterations in its discourse in a credible way and typically with strategic aims. The notion referred to connects with the concept of discursive dispositive, defined by Keller as “a material and abstract infrastructure through which the discourse is (re)produced and causes effects” (Keller, 2005: 230), naturally with the categories, *interpretationsrepertoires* and storylines, that is, the discourse’s content. To conduct the study, 36 texts fragments have been selected from the political programs, party resolutions, and the magazine El Socialista. The main selection criteria have been the relevance of the fragment’s content for the study, and whether the fragment supplies valuable information relating to the research questions. In order to be included, the fragment needed to have a presumption of intentionality on the part of the enunciator; the researcher must have had reason to believe that the language use was strategically biased. In addition, the content must refer to and report about a category, also addressing any of their *interpretationsrepertoire*⁷⁹.

In analyzing the language, the core objective is to delve further into the study of the founded categories and of the discourse reconstructed in the content analysis. I start with the assumption that the linguistic devices will, by means of strategic structures, assist and reinforce the content of the discourse that should be academically verified by the analysis. However, it would be logical to think that the form of the discourse has unfolded according to the same meaning pattern and intention as the content, and its study will report about the underlying mechanism beneath both of them.

Granularity (as defined by Dijk, 2008) is the most repeated linguistic mechanism in the PSOE’s *marketized* discourse. Here, it will be the unnecessary provision of information by the

⁷⁹ Only the most relevant devices are included, therefore the list of items does not exactly coincide with the ‘Guide for the linguistic analysis’ constructed in the methodological chapter, since part of their contents provided no further insights into the research questions.

enunciator, who gives out too many details or examples to prove a certain affirmation or argument. There is a golden rule about it: a high amount of linguistic resources deployed to refer to the same topic indicates a speaker's preselected focus of attention. Conversely, relevant omissions are also meaningful, albeit the latter is more difficult to prove (although by context, the researcher can argue that a meaningful current issue is not mentioned). The effects of granular propositions are two-fold: on one hand, as inferred, the long extension of the segment amplifies the relevance of the meaning expressed, or, at least, that is the presumable goal of the speaker. On the other hand, the concatenation of phrases obstructs comprehension, since the text becomes so thick and dense that its intelligibility is impeded. It can be hypothesized that these fragments entail more power due to their extension than due to their actual meaning.

The social democratic discourse in general, and the PSOE's discourse in particular, are replete with these formulae, in practically all the categories and *interpretations repertoire*. Some refer to Knowledge Economy, Internet, Innovation, Information and Communications Society, Social Investment, Education, Scientific and Technological Parks, Open Economy, Economic Freedom, and Non-Deficit Public Budget. In conclusion, it can be argued that the issues mentioned are strategically placed in the foreground of the public debate by the PSOE.

As with granularity, the text contains a high number of another linguistic device, namely presuppositions. Here, presuppositions will be statements that, although presented as facts in the text, are not proven to be true, such as by way of an explanation, demonstration, or additional data. These claims are found to be contentious, suspicious, or politically-conditioned by the analyst, and not, as implied, unquestionable facts. Usually, these are used to complement the text's point of view with some added argumentative value. Some examples will be outlined in the following.

“Since then (the fall of the Berlin Wall), democracy and market has defined the path to progress and social wellbeing. Since then, the democratic socialism has been reinforced, as it understood that freedom and market are part of the same citizens' request” (PSOE's Electoral Programme, 2011: 14, 15).

It affirms that the population as a whole called for free markets and democracy following the Soviet Union's collapse and social democratic parties successfully responded to this demand.

“If we wish for the public sector to boost the economy, it itself has to become a more productive agent” (PSOE’s Electoral Programme, 2004: 104, 105).

This is a very recurrent presupposition in the PSOE discourse; no explicit explanation of the precise correlation between economic competitiveness and the productivity of the public sector has been provided. Category Dynamic State, *interpretationsrepertoire* Auto-invigorator state.

“(Title: Spain needs a new impulse in welfare politics and modernizing our public services making them sufficient and efficient.) Today’s Spanish society, in 2004, presents strong demands for a new social organization. Not only relating to the so-called morals with regard to social justice demands, but existing problems in a society that are new to a great extent” (PSOE’s Electoral Programme, 2004, 70-71).

By alluding that society has changed, and therefore that it presents new challenges, this discourse strategically frames the issue to introduce a new social policy approach (modernization of public services). Category Dynamic State.

“A cohesive society (...) is a more competitive, capable and efficient society” (PSOE’s Electoral Programme, 2004, 70-71).

Similarly, this is a highly repeated statement, usually accompanied by countless examples about the economic returns derived from social cohesion, although with no allusion to the reasons, the ‘why’ questions, which would establish such a link (social cohesion-economic returns). This claim can be refuted when considering several economies that, although they benefit from high levels of productivity and growth, they suffer from largely unequal societies and restrained welfare benefits, such as in the paradigmatic case of the Anglo-American model. Category Social Cohesion.

“Education is used as an instrument that allows for the creation of a ‘virtuous circle’ of growth, employment and equality. Due to this crucial function, education cannot be reduced to a period in our life” (PSOE’s Electoral Programme, 2008, 134-135).

That is more a misleading argument, rather than a presupposition. Workers should not limit education to a certain age since permanent education can work as a protective shield against

the instabilities of the labor market and not only because of its potential in relation to the health of the national economy. On the other hand, the so-called ‘virtuous circle’ is a valid argument for the state to invest in education, not for the citizenry. Category Market-Oriented Education.

“Citizens all over the world call for a higher presence of politics, required to regain the territory left to economic powers during the last decades (...). We need changes in the international and European governance to be able to regain this territory for politics, as requested by citizens” (PSOE’s Electoral Programme, 2011: 6).

This is again the utilization of a presupposition (that “citizens all over the world call for a higher presence of politics”) to frame one convenient scenario for political action (“changes in the international and European governance”) Category Economic Globalization. Frame Governing Globalization.

“Today, more than ever, the ideological struggle about the role of the state and its legitimacy to intervene in the social processes has regained relevance” (Party Congress Resolution, 2012, 89-91).

Due to the crisis, there is a demand to rethink politics, albeit this discussion appears cyclically, most notably in the wake of each economic downturn, such as at the end of the 1970s and in the post-World War II era. Category Economic Globalization. Frame Governing Globalization.

The most relevant conclusion that can be drawn from the data is that all presuppositions are strategically used to reinforce the categories’ content and meaning or some of their compounding *interpretationsreperoire*.

Aside from this, different formulae are used recurrently in the social democratic discourse as devices to deliberately augment or lessen the relevance or effects of meaning, or to address the recipients’ feelings. These expressions expose the intention or normative load intended by the speaker and identifying them can be an accurate tool in determining the speaker’s goal at the time of the analysis.

“Better distribution of the available labor is a requirement derived from the values of justice, equality and solidarity that we defend (...). The distribution of labor can favor incorporation

into the workforce for a large number of people, especially for those people who have more objective problems restricting them from working ordinary full-time hours” (PSOE’s Electoral Programme, 1996: 24).

In this case, instead of using the notion of flexibility, they bring ‘distribution of labor’ into play, and in doing so, they also try to disguise this value as a traditional social democratic one (by associating it with their own ideological scheme: solidarity, equality, etc.). Category Flexibility.

“The advances of the Information Society make citizens more equal (...). The digital devices improve the quality of life for people in situations of dependency and with disabilities by allowing them to develop their daily activity easily and at a higher quality” (PSOE’s Electoral Programme, 2000: 13).

Although, in this text, the Information and Communications Technologies (ICTs) are also linked to other benefits, such as facilitating the search for work or running a business (in a set of omitted sentences), the association of the digital devices with people in situation of dependency is not accidental. It is a tool to obtain the reader’s endorsement of communications technologies by adding emotive aspects to the text. For instance, it could be also mentioned how multinationals profit from ICTs by saving resources in communication tasks or how the digital revolution has allowed companies to drop their expenses in human resources, but this information is intentionally omitted. Category Knowledge Economy.

“We should situate the real clue behind the change in the informational revolution. This communication’s triumph over time and distance is the axis of the change of the era” (PSOE’s Electoral Programme, 2011, 14-15) (Category Knowledge Economy).

“We should bring the world of communication, information, new technologies to all the corners of the society” (El Socialista, issue 639, 2000: 4) (Category Knowledge Economy).

“A more dynamic state will not be an agent opposed to the market, instead it will walk at the market’s side. The new public sector that we propose will not adapt to change (...), but will lead changes. It will not be reactive, but proactive in the face of future challenges” (Party Congress Resolution, 2004, 105-105) (Category Dynamic State).

“Today, it is more evident than ever that the best investment in growth and employment for the future is social investment” (PSOE’s Electoral Programme, 2011, 73-74) (Category Social Investment).

In last place, metaphors, which function by equating similar notions, are one of the most powerful devices to alter meaning. By substituting the real definition with a symbolic one, they add an additional and original value to the expression, drawing upon the reader’s culture and usually introducing some normative charge to the formula. Some examples will be listed in the following: “Healthy public accounts” (El Socialista, issue 667, 2006: 28), “Opening to a world without barriers” (El Socialista, 1999, issue 625: 17), “Slimming the ministerial structures” (PSOE’s Electoral Programme, 2004, 129-130), “Social policy as an engine of competitiveness” (PSOE’s Electoral Programme, 2011: 73-74), “The democratic structures cannot become mere puppets controlled by merchants” (PSOE’s Electoral Programme, 2012: 89-91).

To summarize, it can be affirmed that most of the devices used to modify meaning are normally implemented to emotionalize and amplify it. The nature of the texts, a “promotional” one (Fairclough, 2000: 12), characteristic of party programs, resolutions, and the party’s magazine, is the reason for that. Moderating formulas are scarce, since non-positive claims are directly omitted. They are usually presented in government speeches, often to reduce the public relevance of unpopular political measures, whereas in promotional texts, the party may choose the preferred topics (mostly reporting on self-promotional matters), while when seizing office, unpopular actions must be presented (frequently through moderating expressions, such as euphemisms).

Referring to the overall text structure of the political discourse, usually, the symbolic charge is not restrained to a single word or expression, instead it spans a set of phrases. Especially in the preamble of the discourse, an introduction is recurrently strategically placed to create a predisposed ‘picture of reality’, so that the reader is prepared to receive the information and is more inclined to accept the core message of the text, usually in form of a political claim. In this work, this strategy will be Depiction of Scenarios, highly common in the social democratic marketized discourse, above all, in relation to the alluded political measures required to be

competitive in globalization, such as the progress needed to advance towards Knowledge Economy.

“Competition is not a common and permanent characteristic of all market sectors, but it can be threatened or excluded in certain circumstances. When that occurs, public intervention will be required to guarantee its conservation” (PSOE’s Electoral Programme, 2008: 165, 166).

These phrases approach the sort of discourse usually used to endorse the protection or conservation of a natural or cultural value, as could be the case of an endangered animal species or an historic monument. Symbolic meaning: competition as an endangered species.

“Today, more than ever, the ideological struggle about the role of the state and its legitimacy to intervene in the social processes has regained relevance (...). The conquests achieved are attacked for three decades by the neoliberal ideology, based on the market fundamentalist (...) conquests threatened also by the global crisis” (Party Congress Resolution, 2012, 89-91).

Symbolic meaning: state of war, conflict between neoliberalism and welfare.

“Today’s world has experienced formidable changes in the last years. Economic globalization, the technological revolution, Information and Communication Society, massive immigration, the alterations to the social structure, new forms and sectors of production, advancements in medicine, family transformations...; All this requires new approaches able to offer answers for the future” (PSOE’s Electoral Programme, 2004:10).

Symbolic meaning: new scenario that requires a new political approach.

Another highly recurrent tool of persuasion in political communication, especially in campaigns, is repetition. The repeated sound pattern established by the reiterated notion is a powerful resource due to its capacity of being uncritically accepted by the public. Also, its meaning is blocked as soon as the idea is fully introduced into people’s “common sense” (Bourdieu, Wacquant, 2001; Cerny: 2010) and daily use⁸⁰. Here, some will be mentioned: “Distribution of labor” (five times in the same discourse fragment, PSOE’s Electoral Programme, 1996: 24-25), “Respect (to markets)” (referring to different elements of market

⁸⁰The concept “common sense” borrowed from Bourdieu, Wacquant, 2001 and also from Cerny: 2010.

dynamics and trade, four times, PSOE's Electoral Programme 2004, 112), "Economic freedom" (referring to market dynamics, three times, PSOE's Electoral Programme 2004, 112) "(Social) Investment" (five times, concerning active state, PSOE's Electoral Programme, 2004, 71-71 and four times, PSOE's Electoral Programme, 2011:73-74), "State's provision of resources and opportunities" (concerning active state, twice, PSOE's Electoral Programme, 2011, 73-74), "(Technological) Revolution" (respecting the technological changes and the emergence of the Knowledge Economy, seven times, PSOE's Electoral Programme, 2011, 14-15).

Catchphrases, pre-established expressions, and formulae deeply embedded in a culture with relevant social meaning in a certain community are the last linguistic devices employed systematically by the PSOE. These are used repeatedly in political discourses, since they are easily understandable and visualizable by the recipients. Many are used internationally. Here, the catchphrases found in the PSOE's discourse: "Added value" (Category Competitive State, *El Socialista*, issue 661, 2005:21), "Competitive advantages" (Category Competitive State, *El Socialista*, issue 661, 2005:21) "Make up for lost time" (Knowledge Economy, *El Socialista*, issue 639, 2000: 6), "Spain is situated at the bottom" (Knowledge Economy, Electoral Programme: 2004, 111-112). Also, several technical terms were found, such as "Spin-off" (Competitive Economy, *El Socialista*, issue 661, 2005:21) and "Systemic risks" (Economic Globalization, Electoral Programme 2011: 6).

4. Analysis conclusions

Now, once the analysis of the documents has been concluded, both of the content and the linguistic aspects, the main research questions of this study will be addressed. The first queries how the traditional social democratic discourse interacts with the neoliberal discourse in the period considered (1998-2013), especially regarding whether the social democratic one has been reshaped by the neoliberal. The second question focuses on testing whether the theories on marketization of politics (the occupation of politics by orthodox and market-like economic values) apply to the present case.

Concerning the first question, it can be concluded that the social democratic discourse has been profoundly affected by the neoliberal one, since, as the outcomes point out, it has acquired a new central inner logic, which overlaps with the neoliberal one in the period studied. This novel core rationality places economic goals on the frontline of the political priorities, demanding all

socio-political agents to continuously adapt to the market. Although the extent of this influence varies depending on the specific political domain and the topic, which will be depicted next, this is incontestable on the whole and gets to the heart of the whole discourse. Respecting the second core research question, it can be argued that the theories on the marketization of politics are suitable for the current case-study. The political discourse considered depicts a political field subordinated to the economic logic, presenting a scenario in which all socio-political agents must bow to the demands of the market. To justify this massive adaptation to the market's requirements, the social democratic discourse draws on market-like arguments and values, adopting a marketized discourse with a limited number of exceptions.

In the following paragraphs, a portrayal of the different areas of the marketized social democratic discourse will be examined, isolating every political domain and examining the ways and the extent to which these have been reshaped. Different styles of marketization can be identified, which will be grouped in two trends: Marketization of the political objectives and marketization of rationales (Blätte, Zitzler, in Schaal, Lemke, Ritzl, 2014)⁸¹. The first will be associated with the areas in which the political program has been modified, and hence, the concrete goals and policies suggested by their rationale differ from the traditional social democratic ones. Contrarily, in the marketization of rationales, the party pursues traditional social democratic objectives, but these goals are defended with neoliberal arguments, such as supporting the fight against climate change or the gender pay gap to obtain economic returns. Unsurprisingly, the marketization of objectives has a more profound nature, since it transforms the entire political program.

Primarily, the policy areas that have reshaped their complete program and objectives will be presented. The first affected area in the PSOE discourse is the international economy, the political program offered to improve the national competitiveness on the international scene⁸². The evolution entails a move from a social democratic economic theory (demand-side) to a pure orthodox political line (supply-side), launched most notably in the Washington Consensus

⁸¹ This classification connects to Peter Hall's "three analytical levels" to trace policy change of progressive parties: "readjustment of existing instruments", "use of new instruments" and "a change in objectives" (quoted in Merkel, Petring, Hankes, Egle, 2008: 7); Merkel et al, draw on "core values", "concrete objectives" and "strategies" (Merkel, Petring, Hankes, Egle, 2008: 7).

⁸² Policy-making on international economy belongs partly to the economic field and partly to the economic, hence, in this case, my definition of marketization – occupation of politics by neoliberal and market-like logic – fits only relatively.

and persistently imposed by the EU bodies, with the defense of the so-called neoliberal discourse on globalization (Steger, 2005 in Fairclough, 2006). In this context, the main task of governments is to be competitive in the global market, and this should be achieved with the provision of a stable political framework, with the removal of obstacles to competition, tackling public deficit, monetary stability, liberalization of markets, deregulations, attracting investment, and promotion of internationalization. It is noticeable how the socio-political concerns of the state, such as could be the case with decommodification endeavors⁸³, hold a secondary position in relation to the economy and are mostly thought to occur automatically, once the national dynamics operate efficiently. After the economic crisis, social concerns regained part of their relevance, although the main orthodox political line was not modified. The most relevant alteration in the international political economy is the demand for a global governance structure able to control the international markets, stance the the PSOE profoundly supports, and the re-embeddedness of economic powers to political ones (most notably through an empowered European Union).

Respecting the mission of the state within the national boundaries (national affairs' field), the government is principally requested to lead and assist the country-wide agents in heightening their productivity and profitability on the global scene, assuming a purely managerial role. This connects to the marketization of the state's functionality, identified in this work as the progressive adoption of "New Public Management" practices (Hood, 1995), that is, of business-like logic and patterns by public institutions, such as the outsourcing of non-pivotal services and using business language, such as efficiency, flexibility, and profitability.

In respect to the marketization of objectives, the policies surrounding the notion of labor have been also altered. In this new discourse, the workforce should continuously adapt to the market's requirements, a replica of the core dictum of the neoliberal ideology. Additionally, governments should enforce legislation to increase the flexibility of the labor system (and the adaptability of enterprises), which concretely entails deregulating protective legal frameworks. The major product of the marketization of labor is the archetype of the entrepreneur, the self-employed individual who persistently adjusts to the changeable economic settings. Entrepreneurship has to be prompted and inculcated, starting during the school years, so that

⁸³ Such as when they advocate for protecting citizens from the ill effects of globalization, albeit this is certainly less present, lacks concretion and holds a complementary, almost ornamental role.

the number of independents increases⁸⁴. The notion of education transmitted is similar to the conception of labor, since it is affected by the same central idea: continual updating of skills to adapt to the market demands, as the concept of life-long learning faithfully reflects. Connecting to education, the conception of knowledge has been extensively marketized, to the point where knowledge is transformed into a commodity, politically privileged due to its expected economic returns, and considered accordingly as one of the state's most relevant investments. With research, education is mostly related to technical and numerical degrees and subjects (such ICTs), disregarding both social and cultural sciences, having barely any anecdotic mention in the span of time considered.

Secondly, a few words on the marketization of rationales, which should be seen as a sort of pseudo-marketization, since the social democratic political goals are not altered, but only argued in a different way. I refer to the provision of an economic-like argument to sustain a social or political goal (Blätte, Zitzler, in Schaal, Lemke, Ritzi, 2014). This method is repeatedly applied to different political fields, mostly in the social policy, as is the case in the following example: “the inclusion of women in the labor market will be translated into economic returns”. Similarly, the fight against poverty, investment in education, inclusion of people with disabilities, enhancement of the quality of education, and environmental concerns (the fight against climate change is perhaps the most repeated and, more broadly, environmental sustainability as factor of competitiveness) are advocated with economically founded arguments.

As mentioned, there are a few exceptions; a couple of non-marketized areas in the social democratic discourse. The first is the demand for quality labor, but this is interwoven with simultaneous calls for flexibility of the workforce, the latter of a highly marketized nature. The PSOE's rationality on this issue is therefore two-fold, and both discourses are not consistent, even contradictory. The post-crisis discourse on globalization (global governance) has escaped from the marketization process, since its primary objective is the political hegemony over the economy at an international level.

⁸⁴ Throughout the time period considered, his discourse interacts with the discourse of quality labor, which sharply contradicts it, thus demanding better working conditions and enhancing the value of labor.

Respecting the language devices obtained from the linguistic analysis, it can be concluded that, as expected, language has been strategically used to reinforce the content and persuasion potential of the discourse. Many linguistic devices have been found to support some category or *interpretations repertoire*. In this brief study, the genuine economic topics were the themes that formed the basis for a major number of devices, such as when reporting about an orthodox economic program (economic freedom, open economy, competitive state) and Knowledge Economy (Information and Communications society, technological revolution). Also, the function of the state in leading all socio-economic agents to success in the global arena (category Dynamic State) has been profoundly embellished. Respecting the preferred devices, according to the analysis, it can be stressed the salient role of granularity, presuppositions, and structures for emotionalizing and amplifying (alteration of meaning), with these being the favored devices.

CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSIONS. EVALUATION OF RESEARCH OUTCOMES IN REGARD TO POLITICAL SCIENCES APPROACHES AND THEORIES

This final chapter will be devoted to identifying the reasons and tracking the process through which the political sphere, and particularly, the European social democratic parties have been marketized to varying degrees. The focus of the present study is the political discourse, which will naturally hold a prime position in the conclusion epigraph. In the previous chapter, it has been proven that the discourse of the PSOE has undergone a marketization process, regarded as the increasing presence of market-like and neoliberal values, visible in the categories of content obtained from the analysis, of which an overwhelming majority stems from the neoliberal discourse, especially prior to the economic slump. Similarly, the language employed to validate this marketized discourse contained countless linguistic devices to reinforce the persuasive potential of this new rationality, such as one-sided presuppositions, metaphors, and detailed accounts supporting market-like arguments (here called granularity).


To track the process and spot the grounds of this marketization, primarily, the evolution of the core values of the European social democratic parties will be depicted. To this end, the key objectives and instruments of the Golden Age social democracy, already described in Chapter 1, will be reintroduced. Secondly, I will present a summary of the categories obtained in the content analysis, representative of the marketization of these parties (through the case study of the PSOE from 1998 to 2013). The goal of this first part is to shed light upon the actual and specific transformation of the European progressive discourse. Thereafter, in the second part of the concluding chapter, the factors most likely to have contributed to this change will be outlined.

1. Description of the process of marketization of European social democratic parties' discourse. The case study of the Spanish Socialists Workers' Party (1998-2013)

As depicted in the epigraph 'From a radical left program to social democracy (the welfare social democracy 1040-1970)' in Chapter 1, during the Golden Age, the core objectives of social democratic parties were the following: achievement of higher degrees of material security, equality, and the defense of workers' rights. Their quintessential instrument was the intervention in the market, understood as the direct action in market dynamics to manipulate

their functionality, and the decommodification⁸⁵ of indispensable and strategic services and benefits. This not only was a key tool of socialists, but also the general underlying logic of their core discourses. According to the outcomes of the analysis in the current work, presented in Chapter 4, this scheme has been substantially altered in the time considered in this study, from 1998 to 2013. As the categories of meaning extracted show, the central rationality of the marketized European social democracy has evolved from intervention to the adaptation to the market, which has become the central discursive logic that practically the whole discourse follows and that sharply contradicts the defense of political intervention to decommodify the negative market outcomes of the previous period. This is undoubtedly the most relevant shift in these forces' discourse, since it affects the angle from which progressive forces envisage the relationship between the political field and the economic sphere that, since the beginning of socialism as a theoretical corpus, has been one of the most frequently used tool to separate the right-wing from the left-wing in the ideological spectrum.

Unsurprisingly, following the profound economic crash in 2008, this core logic was again slightly reshaped, mainly through the cementation of a demand for regulating economic and financial globalization, so the international economy works in favor of the society and protects citizens from its ill effects by strengthening the social function of the state.



Graphic 24: Core rationality European social democratic parties' discourses

⁸⁵ I understand decommodification as Esping-Andersen suggests, namely diminishing the dependence of the "well-being" to the "cash-nexus" (Esping-Anderson, 1989: 29).

Not only has the core logic of European progressives gradually been altered, but the entire set of instruments and objectives has also consistently changed from one period to the other, although not homogeneously and with some of their elements partly resisting the change. Therefore, it is necessary to assess each case individually. The objectives and instruments of these forces in the welfare social democracy were the following: material security (allegedly achievable through constructing a welfare state), material, equality of opportunities and rights (by way of redistributive policies, equal education and empowering socially unprivileged groups respectively), and defense of workers' interests (by creating jobs and improving the quality of labor). Of all these, the analysis of the documents has shown that none of the objectives and instruments have escaped the marketization process, although some resisted in part. Among them, the three less marketized are the objectives of the equality of rights (by empowering unprivileged social groups, such as women or non-national ethnic collectives), of opportunities (by way of equal education), and the representation of workers' interests (but this is exclusively in relation to the aim of full employment⁸⁶), which actually may presumably have a more salient public profile than in the times of the Golden Age. As stated in the conclusions of Chapter 4, social policy has likewise been partially marketized, being part of the policy areas that have undergone a marketization of their rationales (and not of their objectives), here seen as a pseudo-marketization. In the marketization of the rationales, the social democratic political goals are not altered, but only argued in a different way (see Blätte, Zitzler, in Schaal, Lemke, Ritzi, 2014). This new line of reasoning highlights the economic returns of social policies by drawing on economic-like arguments, which is a manifestation of the gradual loss of autonomy of social policy (Ib.).


At the other end of the scale, the objectives most profoundly marketized are the material security (with welfare state) and material equality (by means of redistributive policies), which have been broadly neglected due to the state's transformation into a competitive state (concealing its status as a welfare state). Assuring both material equality and security usually refers to a provision of services and benefits by public administrations, entailing massive public spending. It can be argued that this state's spending has been redirected to what have been largely identified in the social democratic discourse as "productive investments", most notably in advancing towards a knowledge economy (education and R+D+I), which allegedly is the

⁸⁶ With the exception of the objective of full employment, the social democratic discourse on employment is dual and contradictory, since it simultaneously stands for quality labor and flexibility, which is only possible at the level of the discourse and not in reality.


most suitable program to adapt to the international markets and enabling the economic agents to do the same, sponsoring the specialization in some industrial sectors and internationalization.

After the outbreak of the economic crash, only two non-marketized areas can be identified; the discourse on global governance and on social state, the latter highlighting the need for reinforcement of the social function of the state mainly by protecting citizens from the adverse effects of globalization. However, these are rather punctual exceptions and not very influential since the core logic, namely, adjustment to the market by all economic agents, is not questioned by these parties (at least to date). This demand for market regulation at a macro level is an incipient tendency, endorsed most notably by the Party of the European Socialists (such as in the PES electoral manifesto, 2014), which exerts a varying influence on its member parties. The call for the enhancement of a state with a stronger social function can be a partial return to the social democratic traditional model (aiming at a welfare-like safety net). Both are here seen as partially demarketized fields.

In the following graphics, the evolution of the social democratic discourse is represented, in the first diagram by presenting the Golden Age social democracy's core logic (intervention in the market and its associated objectives and instruments), and in the second, the central core logic of the marketized social democracy (adjustment to the market with the categories of meaning obtained from the analysis).



Graphic 25: Core logic of the 'Golden Age social democracy'. Own elaboration.



Graphic 26: Core logic of the marketized European social democracy (1998-2013). Own elaboration. *The elements marked belong to the post-crisis period.

Once the portrayal of the evolution of the core discursive logic of European social democratic parties has been provided, namely from intervention in the market to assure equality, material security and labor, to the adaptation to it, with market-oriented education, competitive state and so on, the reasons for this transformation will be outlined.

2. Marketization as a result of the hegemony of the neoliberal discourse

As stated, not only the process already presented in this chapter, but also the reason the political sphere and particularly the European social democratic parties' discourse have been marketized will be addressed. Unsurprisingly, there is not a single factor likely to have triggered the process, but a complex network of relations associated with different events, actions, strategies, and historical periods.

Primarily, an initial explanation will be offered by drawing on the theoretical scheme provided by the literature on hegemony, often in relation to language⁸⁷. As described in the epigraph 'The emergence and theoretic foundations of the neoliberal discourse', marketization was primarily caused by a shift in the economic paradigm during the last three decades of the 20th Century, from Keynesianism to orthodox economic theory (Harvey, 2010: 32). From this moment on, different actions carried out on various fronts gradually resulted in the crystallization of a neoliberal ideology and discourse as the hegemonic paradigm in Western countries. This progression towards the universalization of a new zeitgeist can be understood by drawing on the theories developed by Gramsci at the beginning of the 20th Century⁸⁸, who indirectly conceptualized a theoretical framework, which still is the most frequently used tool to reconstruct the processes of hegemonization to this day, especially in relation to neoliberalism (such Gill, 2000; Robinson, 2005; Bradanini, 2009). Gramsci's '*Prison Notebooks*' (drafted from 1929 to 1935 [Gerratana, 1981]) offer a rich and acute portfolio of terms, which, although they were not thoughtfully explained, they were presented in relation to their suitability for shedding light on past historical events, and are still the most useful

⁸⁷ Lears defines hegemony as a "spontaneous' consent given by the great masses of the population to the general direction imposed on social life by the dominant fundamental group" (Lears, 1985: 568).

⁸⁸ The main source is the *Prison Notebooks* drafted by Gramsci and reedited and translated by Hoare, Nowell 1999 and another version by Forgacs, 2000. My work is also based on the Spanish version of the masterpiece: Gerratana, 1981.

scheme for understanding how hegemony is constructed. In the following paragraphs, I will provide a short account of this process.

The outbreak of the economic slump of 1929 and the subsequent Second World War led a group of international intellectuals to reassess the role the governments should hold, particularly regarding economic dynamics. These not only established the theoretical basis of the neoliberal ideology (reinforcing the active function of the state as a promoter of market dynamics), but also conceptualized an efficient mechanism to spread it, especially with the foundation and internationalization of center-right organizations and think-tanks and extending this network world-wide (transforming a set of values in a complex infrastructure of power) (Harvey, 2010: 31). Since they represented the capitalist social class (recently conceptualized as “Transnational Capitalist Class” in Sklair in Dasgupta, Nederveen, 2009: 85), these academics pursued a mission to create favorable discursive and material infrastructures (in sense of “discursive formation” [Foucault, 1969]) to facilitate the achievement of their interests, accomplished most notably in the 1970s to 1990s, by international agreements, such as the Washington Consensus (Harvey, 2010: 26). They were also responsible for the creation of a set of values, along with its systematic and successful international spread (in Gramsci’s work they are named ‘organic intellectuals’ and defined as “the thinking and organizing element of a particular fundamental social class” [Gramsci in Hoare, Nowell, 1999: 131]). In this respect, the theories on how, historically, every ruling social class imposes its own values in every society is a core element of the Marxian theory. According to this account, they could set their values, since they “count(ed) on the means of spiritual production” (Marx, Engels, (1846) 1974: 50). To compel the rest of population to adopt their own morality and ideology, the dominant strata had “to present its interest as common interest of all members of society (...), to present ideas as the only rational” (Marx, Engels, [1846] 1974: 52). In this respect, Gramsci added how this ideological transmission was accomplished to the Marxian theory. According to him, the “subaltern classes” are not obliged or forced to adopt any belief, but do it inadvertently, mostly by means of “absorption of language” driven by the “social prestige” of the dominant classes (Lears, 1985: 568). Ruling classes enjoy a time-constrained “cultural hegemony”, which can allegedly succeed at constructing “a world view that appeals to a wide range of other groups within the society” (Lears, 1985: 567-593) with its corresponding discourse (“spontaneous grammar” [Gramsci, quoted by Eves, 2004: 90]).

Returning to the case study, I can presume that the intellectuals of the “Transnational Capitalist Class” (in Sklair in Dasgupta, Nederveen, 2009: 85), which have cemented as the global dominant class, have progressively weaved and spread a discourse with a self-serving account of facts (narrative), neoliberalism, which has been taken for faithful and universal by the broader population. This neoliberal discourse, of economic nature and consisting of orthodox and market-like values, has transcended the economic field permeating throughout all human areas, such as the political discourse – an action identified as marketization. According to this view, if a non-economic social field were marketized, it would have adopted economic neoliberal values, concealing its original logic. This was the case with the social democratic European parties, which have adopted a neoliberal narrative that unsatisfactorily matched their own corporate interests (see e.g., Moschonas, 2009; Bailey, 2010; Cramme, 2011), since it was “borrowed from the hegemonic social group” (Gramsci, in Eves, 2004: 79) and not self-produced.

The shift of philosophical paradigm is the factor that can be most directly attributed to triggering marketization of the political sphere, at least, when looking at it from the viewpoint of the Western history of ideological literature. The accounts on the cementation of neoliberal hegemony are countless, especially after the turn of the millennium, and there are numerous internationally acclaimed political sciences and international relations scholars devoted to this topic (such as Jessop, Nielsen, Kastendiek, Perderson, 1991; Gummett, 1996; Beck, 1997; Bourdieu, 1998; Bourdieu, Wacquant, 2001; Brand, Brunnengräber, 2000; Peck, Tickell, 2002; Brown, 2005; Crouch, 2004; Fiss, Hirsch, 2005; Fairclough, 2006; Carrol, 2007; Birch, Mykhnenko, 2008; Butterwegge, Lösch, Ptak, 2008; Klein, 2008; Kapeller, Huber, 2009; Milgate, Stimson, 2009; Peck, 2010; Birch, Mykhnenko, 2010; Broad, 2010; Cerny, 2010; Klein, 2010; Band, 2011; Lemke, 2012; Crouch, 2013; Lemke, Schaal, Ritzi, 2013; Lemke, Schaal, Ritzi, 2014).

There is one extended approach, which complements the theories on neoliberalism, providing a more profound historical background. According to a well-known school of thought, initiated by Polanyi, the original grounds of marketization can be traced back over a century, to the emancipation of the economic discipline from the rest of the social sciences, which led to the creation of an economic field that was independent and autonomous, with a new institutional order detached from political control (Polanyi, [1944] 1957). This newly created, unrestrained and autonomous field, once unbound from society, extended to the rest of the social territories,

as the very definition of marketization provided in this work suggests. As Schaal, Lemke and Ritzi argue: “the root of neoliberalism is to be found in the separation between politics and economy” (Schaal, Lemke, Ritzi, 2013:9).

The function of language is capital in this hegemonic configuration and transmission; hence, a study of it reports on this ideological struggle and the discursive strategies employed to “articulate” (Laclau, Mouffe, 1985) the hegemonic dominance and the reactions of the different actors to this spread. The current content of this discourse has been partially addressed by social sciences academics, albeit usually only superficially and never in an all-encompassing depiction (most notably Bourdieu, 1998; Bourdieu, Wacquant, 2001; Fairclough, 2006). In the present work, the characteristic language of neoliberalism, spread to other social fields by the marketization process, is represented by means of the so-called “newspeak” of neoliberalism’, which has been formulated based on the international academic literature and aims at a quasi-universal applicability. Naturally, this is a stylized account, which provides an abstract theoretical scheme, which must to be readjusted and validated from case to case (in the present account, this will be applied to the European social democratic parties). The content of the newspeak is not expected to be literally imitated; in fact, it reflects the meaning of the discourse, rather than of the exact terms. In the present work, it has been proven that the process of marketization of the political sphere entails the adoption of newspeak claims and arguments by political forces, i.e., Free Market, Competitive State, Knowledge Economy, Market-oriented Education, Labor flexibility, Entrepreneurial Individual (see table below), which by including and readapting them in their discourses, have been spreading neoliberal and market-like values, often contradicting their traditional discourses, and adopting an orthodox-economic logic, which has gradually concealed the political one⁸⁹.

NEWSPEAK	MAIN POLITICAL CLAIM
Free Market	-Global market as prevalent force -Requires internationalization, boosting competition, enlarging markets -Rest of agents have to adapt to it
Competitive State	-It is driven by a market logic

⁸⁹ The newspeak notions are exclusively used as a preliminary guide to help in tracing the transformation of the PSOE discourse, that is, as an orientative guide to access the research field. In none of the cases have these hampered one of the basic mottos of the qualitative research, namely “being open to unexpected findings”.

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Adapts to the market -Marketization' discourse -Functioning as a pure economic agent (“New public management” practices) (Hood, 1995), -Enables and stimulates domestic socio-economic agents (through education and research) -Extends globalization
Knowledge Economy	-Promotion of education and training, research, innovation and new technologies
Market-oriented Education	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -It is a productive investment -Tool to adapt to the labor market -Accountability lays on individual -Links economic success, equality and social cohesion -Lifelong learning
Labor flexibility	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Workers have to adapt to a changeable labor market -Individualization of labor risk
Entrepreneurial Individual	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Adapts himself to the market changeability -Behaves in accordance to market principles - “Entrepreneurial actors in every sphere of life” (Brown, 2005:41) -No political engagement: “citizenship as entrepreneurship” (Brown, 2005:43) -Archetype: business entrepreneurial: initiative, risk and innovation -Freedom and independence

Newspeak of marketization. Own elaboration.

The role of language in constructing hegemony has been persistently highlighted by Gramsci⁹⁰, and thereafter, triggered especially by the advancements by Saussure and Wittgenstein, and as a consequence of the linguistic turn by many others, particularly the post- structuralists, especially Laclau and Mouffe (Laclau, Mouffe, 1985). In an initial step at the beginning of the 20th Century, it was considered for the first time that language was not just the mere reflection of the internal thought (as believed by pre-Cartesian authors [Benavides, 2003]), but its forms,

⁹⁰ It is not fortuitous that one top notion employed by Gramsci to refer the hegemonic ideology was the one of ‘spontaneous grammar’ (Gramsci, in Forgacs, 2000: 354) (Eves, 2004: 90).

its structures, and lexica exerted an influence (reshaped) on mental processes. Saussure was the precursor in this trend, being the first one to deny the language-thought dichotomy established by Descartes (Saussure, in Harris, 1988) (Saussure, 1913). He also stressed the social side of language, its historical, cultural, and ideological elements, which later led authors to look at it when studying ideological struggles, in the same vein of Foucault, who pointed out that ideology constrains the possibilities of language (“Every society has its own order of truth: i.e., it accepts certain discourses, which can function as real discourses”⁹¹[Foucault 1978:51, quoted in Jäger, Jäger, 2007: 7]). The constructivist paradigm drew the attention to language to explain the conformation and solidification of “social orders” (notion borrowed from Berger, Luckmann, 1966: 70), applicable to hegemony. One ideology can only become hegemonic if, in the first place, it is linguistically constructed and transmitted by several channels to a broad population. These theories were endorsed and largely developed by the post-structuralist authors, eventually triggering the substitution of the Marxian concept of ideology with the one of discourse, most notably by Laclau and Mouffe, who thoroughly explained how hegemony is “discursively articulated” (Laclau, Mouffe: 1985:184-195).

Another complementary approach to hegemony is a more recent one, which originated in the Political Sciences field in the 2000s. As with the previous approaches, it sees hegemony as something unstable and historically bound, although this time, the focus is directed to its transmission to the different fields of policy-making and territories. Its most well-known asset is the coining of the notion “policy regime”, a general political frame containing certain programs accepted and consequently enforced by the major political forces in some territories and periods of time (Przeworski in Glyn, 2001). Following Przeworski, who coined the concept, it refers to “situations in which major parties, regardless of their partisan stripes, propose and implement similar policies” (Przeworski: 324, in Glyn, 2001). By applying this approach to our subject of study, one may state that European social democratic parties implemented a neoliberal program due to the cementation of neoliberalism as the new policy regime at the end of the ‘70s. This global paradigm shift was surely prompted by the prolonged terms in office of neoliberal heads of government in Great Britain, Margaret Thatcher from 1979 to 1990, and the USA, Ronald Reagan from 1981 to 1989. Their general political line was systematically replicated by many other governments (Brand, Brunnengräber: 2000:60), a

⁹¹In his work, Foucault speaks of discourse referring to all social practices, in which language is naturally included.

process that would be identified as “policy transfer” in this framework (Dolowitz and Marsh, 2000)⁹².

“The horizontal transfer of neoliberal policy regimes that originated in the USA and the UK in the 1980s converged to form a neoliberal international policy regime, which in turn exercised an influence on the world democracies vertically so that they too adopted a neoliberal national policy regime” (Shiratori in Hideko, 2014: 400).

This transmission occurred not only as a top-down movement, from an international consensus at the level of the overriding political institution and the international organizations, but also vertically, from country to country and between the different policy areas within domestic political arenas. Most notably, I refer to the replication of values and arguments from the economic area to other policy fields, such as social policy, which in the present account is known as marketization of the political sphere.

Lastly, the factor that definitely and irrevocably triggered the marketization of all European political forces was the conformation of a European Union with an orthodox economic program with a list of prerequisites had to be met in order to be admitted as a member state. The countries that would enter the EU, often led by social democratic parties at that time, had to readjust their economic, political, and social regulatory framework to embrace the new neoliberal political regime.

On the question of why the European parties implemented a neoliberal program and an associated marketized discourse, the first answer points to the solidification of a neoliberal policy regime (systemized by European neoliberal governments in the 1980s) embraced by them (among others: Merkel, 2008:6). Secondly, the admission to the European Union with the subsequent acceptance of the economic criteria by governments implied that they were definitely becoming anchored to the new policy regime (Ib.)⁹³.

⁹² According to Dolowitz and Marsh, a policy transfer is “a process in which knowledge about policies, administrative arrangements, institutions and ideas in one political setting (past or present) is used in the development of policies, administrative arrangements, institutions and ideas in another political setting” (Dolowitz and Marsh 2000, 5).

⁹³ According to Merkel: “Globalization, European integration and demographic change intensified the pressure of social democrats to reform” (Merkel, 2008: 14-15).

Now, once the change of paradigm at an international level and its effects on the mainstream political discourse have been depicted, it is time to go into detail about the neoliberalization and subsequent marketization of European social democratic parties. It would be logical to think that these parties also adopted a marketized discourse as a direct consequence of the neoliberal mainstream hegemony, from which they progressively acquired its core discourse (with the newspeak devices), which was simultaneously transferred from one political domain to another from the '80s onwards. The peculiarity of these parties is that, in this case, the neoliberal discourse contradicted their traditional political program (Moschonas, 2009; Bailey, 2010), making them an interesting case that is worth considering. At this point, I refer to all European social democratic forces, the official members of the Party of the European Socialists. Logically, each is and was entrenched in different cultural, contextual, and institutional settings; therefore, it is complex to draw conclusions pertaining to the whole set of national parties. Also, as the span of time of the marketization of these is prolonged, approximately from the decade of the '80s to 2008, the internal strategic reasons for these groups probably varied from one time to another. As a consequence, the only traceable common underlying logic behind this neoliberalization seems to be the shift in the hegemonic political paradigm. Notwithstanding the aforementioned, I will endeavor to outline some hypotheses on the possible internal strategy that drove these parties to adopt a logic that sharply diverged from their historical stance.

The first question that must be posed is whether this marketization of their political discourses effectuated by these parties was “voluntary” or “coercive” (Dolowitz, Marsh, 2000)^{94,95}. Bearing in mind the cementation of neoliberalism as a hegemonic paradigm, which sharply contradicted core progressive ideas, it is presumable that it was not a purely voluntary transformation, at least, not conducted on their own initiative. Likewise, it is conceivable these forces evolved in accordance with their presumable perception of the voters' expectations and

⁹⁴ Dolowitz and Marsh differentiate between the 'voluntary political transfer' and the 'coercive' and they argue that in periods of economic difficulties, the transition from one paradigm to another tends to be 'coercive' whereas 'during stability it is mostly voluntary' (Dolowitz and Marsh 1996, in Shiratori in Hideko, 2014:389-392). This contention sharply reflects the attitude shown by the EU member countries from South Europe, profoundly affected by the slump, towards the EU financial conditions, such as Spain. Whereas from 1986 to 2008, the opposition to the convergence criteria was measured, and with the outbreak of the economic crisis, this rose sharply.

⁹⁵ Dolowitz and Marsh designed a more detailed scale of the voluntary of the actors involved, conformed of five different degrees of willingness: “Lesson-drawing (perfect rationality), Lessons-drawing (bounded-rationality), Voluntarily but driven by perceived necessity (such the desire for international acceptance), Conditionality and Coercive Transfer (directed imposition)” (Dolowitz, Marsh, 2000: 13).

preferences, which evolved gradually with the collapse of the Fordist regime, almost like a sort of fashion trend.

Another fundamental item affecting both citizens and politicians are the variations in language. If some words became or were perceived as outdated, such as interventionism, strong government, and use of public deficit that represented core instruments of these forces and were associated with regressive political measures and economic setbacks, and neoliberal values were conversely seen as a 'must' to obtain supporters, it is conceivable that they were forced to adopt the lexica of their political adversaries. Logically, due to the dialectic relation between language and social practices and the demonstrated theories about how language influences thought, gradually, this new vocabulary was transformed into a new line of policy action on one hand, and in a new way of thinking or rationality on the other. This transfer was not only a top-down movement, but also crossed from one political domain to another, spreading market-like ideas with it at the level of the language, action, and ideology. The process mentioned would explain marketization as a pseudo-voluntary adaptation process, triggered by the will of these parties to attain votes that, in the classic literature on partisan politics, is seen as a "votes seeking" strategy (Schumacher, Vis, 2012: 1), that is, the genuine will of "gaining votes" (Downs, 1957 [1944]: 137).

Apart from the change of parading, marketization occurred, to a great extent within the EU boundaries with the conformation of the European Union, which the member countries joined at different stages. The literature focused on explaining why the social democratic parties contributed to and endorsed an allegedly neoliberal union is vast (such Moschonas, 2009; Bailey, 2010; Cramme, 2011), and it can be framed in a large corpus of case studies where these forces contradicted their traditional programs (e.g., Schumacher, Vis, 2012: 1; Lunz, 2013). However, the outcomes of these works are far from homogenous and conclusive, the only common assumption being the contention that the EU institutional settings are at odds with the social democratic ideology.

"The EU, in its current form, is not the ideal place for socialist ideologies, moderate or radical. It is not supportive of more economic regulation, a more encompassing welfare state, or Keynesian deficit spending. EU developments do not fit the traditional social democrats' 'love affair with centralised control' (Sassoon, 2006, 24) and are at odds with the principle of

welfarism, a central ideological pillar of modern social democratic culture” (Moschonas, 2009: 17).

The underlying question, at this point, is why the social democratic parties embarked upon and persistently endorsed the EU project. One can be based on the presumption that in the background of the neoliberal hegemony, launching an economic and trade union that had no obstacles to free competition and a fondness for extending global markets had a better chance of being welcomed by center-left forces than in other periods of history. This would connect to the scholars sustaining a prior neoliberalization of social democratic forces (such as Lavelle, 2008, quoted by Moschonas, 2009: 16). Also, at the time of integration, the Union was presumably presented by mainstream channels as a union of nations to avert the nationalistic ideologies that had led to World Wars twice in history, rather than as a transnational economic agreement. In some countries, mostly in the South of Europe, such as Spain and Greece, where long dictatorial regimes had recently collapsed, its association with “modernization” and shorter distances from the “neighbors” to the North was prevalent (Kennedy, 2013: 340) (Merkel, 1980). With the extension of globalization and the materialization of its pervasive effects, progressive forces envisaged the European Institutions as a terrain in which they could intervene in markets to transform the benefits of the winners into social rights of the losers at a supranational level. This approach, in which the Union was seen “as a protector against globalisation” is still extensively endorsed by them (Cramme, 2011: 6). However, nowadays, the social Europe is far from achievable, and the Union remains mostly recognizable by its orthodox-economic policies.

Finally, with European institutions, globalization is perhaps the most quoted factor when discussing the causes of marketization, particularly in social democratic parties (such as Merkel et al. 2008⁹⁶; Marlière, 2010; Scharpf, 1991, in Garret, 1998; Turowski, 2012: 19; Meyer, in Giddens, 2001). There is an agreement in academia on stressing how the free and global market dynamics constrain the actual power of governments to intervene in the economy, mainly due to the possibilities to relocate capital in the search for less protective states (the so-called “race-to-the-bottom” between countries to attain international investment [such as in Brakman, Garretsen, Marrewijk, Witteloostuijn, 2006: 19]). Therefore, governments must allegedly

⁹⁶ Merkel et al. point to “globalization, European integration and social change” as the phenomena that “have devaluated traditional social democratic policy instruments” (Merkel et al. 2008).

compete to attract international flows by lowering taxes on movable capital and by limiting market regulation (such the protective framework of labor). Therefore, globalization would force social democratic parties in office to contradict their social democratic discourse on welfare and redistributive taxation. Because of this acquired political action's logic, they would accordingly implement a renewed political discourse, in which market-like and neoliberal arguments would advocate for liberalizing markets and bolstering free global competition.

Finally, some words on the marketization of the case study in this work, the Spanish Socialist Workers' party. The process of marketization that it underwent was triggered by the same factors as the rest of the progressive forces, neoliberalism, globalization, and EU integration, although due to the national historical background and the party's internal settings, its development presents peculiarities.

After the victory of the fascist National Front in the Civil War (1936-1939), the PSOE was outlawed for almost forty years, specifically from 1939 to 1977. A significant proportion of its members were either exiled or imprisoned, and its weight as an opposition party during Francoism was consistently inferior to the influence of the Communist Party (Aguilar, 2006: 1). During these years, they upheld the ideology inherited from the time of the civil conflict, of a Marxian nature as a reflection of the ideological polarization at the beginning of the 20th Century, being devoid of the organizational resources to work on an updated version similar to their colleagues from the North. Additionally, since they were excluded from all governments, they did not have to meet pragmatic decisions, which, in other parties, meant a gradual updating of their program, first transforming the ideological scheme from revolutionary to democratic-participatory, then from a workers' party to a mass-party with a Keynesian-welfare program. When the PSOE was legalized in 1977, they had barely evolved ideologically, nor did they have the intellectual base to accomplish it, and lacked experience in matters of government. In 1979, Felipe González, after succeeding in a strident internal struggle, presented a more centrist stand, renouncing the Marxian ideology "as dogma" (El Socialista, issues 128-129, 1979), that for the time being, in relation to its colleagues, resulted in an anachronism. In order to achieve this transformation, he was advised and assisted by the German sister party, the SPD (*Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands*), which had successfully made a similar transition in 1959.

When the party seized government in 1982, neoliberalism was the hegemonic international ideology, and the rest of social democratic parties were already incorporating market-like values and arguments into their discourses. The PSOE in office, led by Felipe González, had to face urgent challenges, such as the economic “modernization” of the country and finishing the process of “democratization” of the dictatorship’s institutions (Kennedy, 2013: 331-334), with a special concern about the army. The negotiations for the eventual admission to the EU gave the party a substantial reason to enforce a neoliberal orthodox program in the economy that sharply contradicted the electoral program with which they had run for office. In contrast to their neighbors to the North, due to the dictatorship, Spain skipped the period of the welfare boom conducted by European progressives in the post-war period, in which they had established a protective net of services and benefits (Ib.). Since the welfare state’s structures in Spain were so rudimentary, they could implement basic social services, such as the universalization of the “right to access to public healthcare” and the “right to free education” (Rodríguez, Núñez, 2003: 385), but catching up with the Northern European countries was not only beyond their reach, but also unrealizable, now that they were aiming at EU membership. Instead of that, they focused on adapting its economic infrastructures to the standards required for the gradual integration into the Communitarian Institutions.

The Government’s official admission to the EU coincided with the definitive neoliberal impulse, effectuated by implementing two fundamental treaties (Kennedy, 1997: 96). The first was the Single European Act (SEA), enforced in 1987⁹⁷, in which the main objective was the realization of the European common market with the removal of all possible obstacles to competition. Years after, the Maastricht Treaty, approved in 1992, established the future creation of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), by which the economic parameters and institutions had to be transformed Europe-wide to adopt a common European currency, the Euro, which would happen in Spain in 2002. In both the Single European Act (SEA) and in the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, not only the economic convergence would be launched, but also the amplification of the European competencies (in most cases, only partially or in a shared regime with the members) beyond the economy, such as in social policy, “agriculture”, “environment”, “research”, “health protection”, “education and training”, “energy”, “tourism” (Treaty of Maastricht, 1992: 6) (Fernando Tomás, Forcada Barona, 2000 et al.) (Mangas Martín, et al.

⁹⁷ As Bradanini puts it “in Europe, the neoliberal turn began with the Single European Act of 1986” (Bradanini, 2009: 15) (also in Hideko, 2014: 8).

2010). In this vein, Europe was taking charge of an increasing number of policy areas and domestic political discourses of the different fields. As demonstrated in this work, throughout this process, the legislation and policy recommendations from Brussels were being gradually included in the PSOE's discourse, with its neoliberal core logic, by means of "policy transfer" (Dolowitz and Marsh 2000: 5). First, an orthodox logic permeated the economic discourse, especially to endorse the negotiations to enter in the Union, and later in the EMU, and afterwards, the remaining policy areas were gradually marketized. The sway of the rest of the international organizations, such as the OECD, the IMF, the World Trade Organization (WTO), and The World Bank, which usually campaigned for the same political line and even worked in coordination with the EU, is likewise fundamental in understanding the adoption of an orthodox economic line and the marketization of non-economic areas⁹⁸.

The discourse implemented by the Spanish Socialist Workers' Party, especially in government, was constrained by the policy line taken by the EU, from the very beginning to the present day. That has been occurring directly, by coercive impositions from the EU, or indirectly, by enforcing legislation of different degrees of enforceability, especially when the PSOE was in office (from 1982-1996 and 2004-2011). However, this transmission from Brussels entails another peculiarity pertaining to its internal institutional function. Although the real weight of the European Parliament has largely increased in this period, originally, the power of the Council, composed of the national heads of government, was consistently higher than the elected European parliament. In the European Council, the influence of the strongest nations in an economic sense used to be, to a varying degree, reflected in the policy outcomes, which, in the background of the recession, received more attention from the media and public opinion. Therefore, apart from the general organic neoliberal line of the policy-making, the decisions met were more fitting to the strongest nations, which was not the case for Spain⁹⁹. As a consequence, it can be argued that apart from having to adopt a discourse that was not coherent with their policy line, the PSOE also endorsed a neoliberal rationality that was not fitting to its country.

⁹⁸ Numerous examples of this policy transfer from the EU and international organizations are included in the categories of the process of marketization of Chapter 4.

⁹⁹ For example, Spain was one of the greatest beneficiaries of the Cohesion Funding, such from 2000 to 2006, in which received "most of the cohesion policy support". Afterwards, due "to the EU enlargement" and "relatively rapid growth", it was consistently cut (Yuill, Méndez, Wislade, 2006: iii).

Basing on the theoretical framework of hegemony, during this time, it can be stated that the party never enjoyed a strong intellectual base, mostly represented by the Foundation Ideas para el Progreso and several institutes with a limited influence and a rather an unambitious program¹⁰⁰. It can be argued that the lack of such power of 'intelligentsia' was a salient factor, so the PSOE uncritically and blindly adjusted and endorsed a hegemonic neoliberal rationality that was at odds with its objectives and strategy, and even with the economic and political circumstances of Spain. As Gramsci claims, sometimes "subordinate groups may participate in maintaining a symbolic universe, even if it serves to legitimate their domination" (Gramsci, in Lears, 1985: 573). In this sense, Eves argues that non-dominant collectives normally "do not have effective intellectuals of their own" and therefore "they are subordinated and adopt conceptions which are not their own but borrowed from the hegemonic social group". In this case, this group will be devoid from "a coherent philosophy or world-view" that will eventually lead it to live in "continual incoherence and contradiction between their actions and their thoughts" (Eves, 2004: 78-80).

¹⁰⁰ The Foundation IDEAS, already shut down due to corruption scandals, was never particularly strong, especially in comparison to FAES (*Fundación para el Análisis y los Estudios Sociales*), a well-known and rather strong centre-right organization, particularly in Latin America, or its all-mighty social democratic analogous, the FES (Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung).

Corpus of the Content Analysis

Corpus of the discourse

PSOE's Electoral Programmes

Programa Electoral Partido Socialista Obrero Español, 2000.

Merecemos una España mejor, Programa Electoral Partido Socialista Obrero Español, 2004.

Motivos para creer, Programa Electoral Partido Socialista Obrero Español, 2008.

Programa Electoral Partido Socialista Obrero Español, 2011.

PSOE's Congress Resolutions

Partido Socialista Obrero Español. (2000). *Resoluciones políticas 35º Congreso.*

Partido Socialista Obrero Español. (2004). *Resoluciones políticas 36º Congreso.*

Partido Socialista Obrero Español. (2007). *Resoluciones políticas 37º Congreso.*

Partido Socialista Obrero Español. (2012). *Resoluciones políticas 38º Congreso.*

Partido Socialista Obrero Español. (1998-2012). *El Socialista*. Issues 611 to 689.

Contextual information

Partido Socialista Obrero Español

El Socialista. (1886). Fundación Pablo Iglesias. Issue 1.

El Socialista. (2009). Fundación Pablo Iglesias. Issue 677.

GONZÁLEZ, F. (May, 1979). *Fidelidad a la declaración de principios*. El Socialista, Fundación Pablo Iglesias, issue 128.

GONZÁLEZ, F. (October, 1979). *El Psoe, unido y más fuerte*. El Socialista, Fundación Pablo Iglesias, issue 129.

33° Resoluciones PSOE (1994). *Resoluciones políticas 33° Congreso Partido Socialista Obrero Español*.

European Social democracy

Party of European Socialists. (2004). *Manifiesto of the Party of European Socialists. Growing stronger together. Five commitments for the next five years*.
https://www.pes.eu/.../Manifiesto_2004_EN.pdf_238143098.pdf

Party of European Socialists. (2009). *Manifiesto of the Party of European Socialists. People first. A new direction for Europe*. Retrieved from <http://bit.ly/2hG4Zsf>

Party of European Socialists. (2014). *Manifiesto of the Party of European Socialists. Towards a New Europe*. Retrieved from <http://pes.cor.europa.eu/NEWS/Pages/Towards-a-New-Europe-The-Manifiesto-of-the-Party-of-European-Socialists.aspx>

Foundation of European Studies. (n.d.). *Programme Next Left*. Retrieved from <http://www.feps-europe.eu/en/projects-next-left>

Friedrich Ebert Foundation South Africa Office. (1998). *The Third Way/Die Neue Mitte*, Working Documents No. 2, Johannesburg. Retrieved from <http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/suedafrika/02828.pdf>

Fundación Ideas (former PSOE's official think-tank)

Reports

Green jobs in the community of Madrid: future potential (report). (March, 2011).

Report. Fundación Ideas.

Hacia una economía abierta. Ideas para el crecimiento en el horizonte 2020 (report).

(January, 2013). Fundación Ideas.

Ideas for a new economy. Towards a more sustainable Spain in 2015 (report).

(January, 2010). Fundación Ideas.

New Ideas to improve the functioning of financial markets and the world economy.

Ten major reforms to respond to a systemic crisis (report). (December, 2008).

Fundación Ideas.

Taxing financial speculation. Some proposals for the G-20 (report). (May, 2010).

Fundación Ideas.

Fundación Ideas (former PSOE's official think-tank)

Working papers

Candela, A.; Mulas-Granados, C. & Nombela, G. (July, 2010). *The new social agenda: reform for active employment policies* (Working paper). Fundación Ideas.

Corojan, A. & Campos, E. (March, 2011). *Open government: scope and implications* (Working paper). Fundación Ideas.

Moroto, R.; Candela, A.; Mulas-Granados, C. (January, 2011). *Women and sustainable economy: status and prospects* (Working paper). Fundación Ideas.

Paramio, L.; Ramos-Vielba, I.; Torres-Mora, J. A. & Urquizu, I. (May, 2010). *The current challenges and the new agenda of social democracy* (Working paper).

Fundación Ideas.

Other political parties

Partido Popular. (2000, 2004, 2008, 2011). Programa electoral. Retrieved from <http://www.pp.es/conocenos/programas>

NAVARRO, V. & TORRES LÓPEZ, J. (2014). *Un Proyecto económico para la gente. Democratizar la economía para salir de la crisis mejorando la equidad, el bienestar y la calidad de vida* (Documento). Podemos. Retrieved from <http://bit.ly/2xORlqF>

Legislation and binding texts of the European Union

Presidency Conclusions Lisbon Council, European Council, Lisbon, 2000.

The Bologna Declaration. (1999). The European Higher Education Area. Joint declaration of the European Ministers of Education. Bologna.

Treaty of Maastricht. (1992). Official Journal of the European Communities, Volume 35, 92/C 191/01. Retrieved from https://www.ecb.europa.eu/ecb/legal/pdf/maastricht_en.pdf

Treaty of Amsterdam. (1997). Official Journal of the European Communities, Volume 40, 97/C 340/01. Retrieved from https://www.ecb.europa.eu/ecb/legal/pdf/amsterdam_en.pdf

Treaty of Nice. (2001). Official Journal of the European Communities, 2001/C 80/01. Retrieved from https://www.ecb.europa.eu/ecb/legal/pdf/amsterdam_en.pdf
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/ecb/legal/pdf/en_nice.pdf

Treaty of Lisbon. (2007). Official Journal of the European Communities, Volume 50, 2007/C 306/01. Retrieved from https://www.ecb.europa.eu/ecb/legal/pdf/amsterdam_en.pdf <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:12007L/TXT>

Recommendations and reports from the European Union

A coherent framework of indicators and benchmarks for monitoring progress towards the Lisbon objectives in education and training. (2007). Communication from the Commission, Commission of the European Communities, COM(2007) 61 final. Brussels.

Action Plan: The European agenda for Entrepreneurship. (2004). Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions of 11 February, COM(2004) 70 final. Brussels.

Adult learning: It is never too late to learn. (2006). Communication of 23 October 2006 from the Commission to the Council - Adult learning, European Commission, COM (2006) 614. Brussels.

Cohesion Policy in Support of Growth and Jobs. (2005). Community Strategic Guidelines, 2007-2013. Communication from the Commission, European Commission, COM(2005) 299 final, SEC(2005) 904. Brussels.

Common Actions for Growth and Employment: The Community Lisbon Programme. (2005). Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament Commission of the European Communities, COM(2005) 330 final, SEC(2005) 981. Brussels.

Council Recommendation on the National Reform Programme 2011 of Spain and delivering a Council opinion on the updated Stability Programme of Spain, 2011-2014. (2011). European Commission, SEC(2011) 718 final. Brussels.

European area of lifelong learning. (2001). Communication from the Commission of 21 November 2001 on making a European area of lifelong learning a reality, European Commission, COM(2001) 678 final. Brussels.

Economic and Monetary Union. (n.d.). Economic and Financial Affairs, European Commission. Retrieved from http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/euro/emu/index_en.htm

Entrepreneurship in Europe. (2003). Commission Green Paper of 21 January 2003 on Entrepreneurship in Europe. Brussels.

European Innovation Scoreboard 2004 Comparative Analysis of Innovation Performance. (2004). Commission Staff Working Paper, Council of the European Union, SEC(2004)1475. Brussels.

European Social Policy - A Way Forward For The Union A White Paper. (1994). Commission of the European Communities, COM(94) 333. Brussels.

European values in the globalised world. (2005). Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Commission of the European Communities, COM(2005) 525 final/2. Brussels.

Flexicurity. (n.d.). Employment, Social Affairs & Inclusion, European Commission. Retrieved from <http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=102>

Implementation of the common principles of flexicurity within the framework of the 2008-2010 round of the Lisbon Strategy. (2008). Report by the "flexicurity" mission, Council of the European Union, REV 1 (en) SOC 776, ECOFIN 606. Brussels.

Key competences for lifelong learning, Recommendation 2006/962/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 December 2006 on key competences for lifelong learning, European Parliament and European Council [Official Journal L 394 of 30.12.2006], Brussels. 2006.

Lisbon Strategy evaluation document. (2010). Commission Staff Working Document, European Commission, SEC(2010) 114 final. Brussels.

Mobilising the brainpower of Europe: enabling universities to make their full contribution to the Lisbon Strategy. (2005). Communication from the Commission, Commission of the European Communities, 20.4.2005, COM(2005) 152 final SEC(2005) 518. Brussels.

Modernising universities. (2006). Communication of 10 May 2006 from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament – Delivering on the modernisation agenda for universities: education, research and innovation, European Commission, COM(2006) 208 final. Brussels.

Overcoming the stigma of business failure - for a second chance policy. (2007). Communication from the Commission of 5 October 2007 to the Council, the European Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, *Implementing the Lisbon Partnership for Growth and Jobs*, European Commission, COM(2007) 584 final. Brussels.

Promoting entrepreneurship in schools and universities. (2006). Communication from the Commission of 13 February 2006 - Implementing the Community Lisbon Programme: Fostering entrepreneurial mindsets through education and learning, European Commission, COM(2006) 33 – final. Brussels.

Recommendation for a Council Recommendation on the 2007 up-date of the broad guidelines for the economic policies of the Member States and the Community and on the implementation of Member States' employment policies. (2006). Part III, Commission of the European Communities, COM(2006) 816 final. Brussels.

The future of the internet economy. A statistical profile. (2011). OECD.

The role of the universities in the Europe of knowledge. (2003). Communication from the Commission, Commission of the European Communities, COM(2003) 58 final. Brussels.

Time to move up a gear. (2006). Country chapters: Spain, Communication from the Commission to the Spring European Council, European Commission, p.141-145. Brussels.

Time to move up a gear. (2006). Communication from the Commission to the Spring European Council, Part 1, European Commission, COM(2006) 30 final. Brussels.

Towards Common Principles of Flexicurity: More and better jobs through flexibility and security. (2007). Communication from the Commission to The European Parliament, The Council, The European Economic and Social Committee and The Committee of The Regions, Commission of the European Communities, SEC(2007) 861,862.

Towards a European Research Area. (2000). Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions of 18 January 2000: COM(2000) 6 final. Brussels.

Towards a European Research Area Key Figures 2001. (2001). Special edition, Indicators for benchmarking of national research policies, European Commission, Research Directorate General. Brussels.

Country reports International Monetary Fund

Spain: 1998 Article IV Consultation. (1998). IMF Country Report, International Monetary Fund.

Spain: 1999 Article IV Consultation. (1999). IMF Country Report, International Monetary Fund.

Spain: 2001 Article IV Consultation. (2001). IMF Country Report, International Monetary Fund.

Spain: 2002 Article IV Consultation. (2002). IMF Country Report, International Monetary Fund.

Spain: 2004 Article IV Consultation. (2004). IMF Country Report, International Monetary Fund.

Spain: 2006 Article IV Consultation. (2006). IMF Country Report, International Monetary Fund.

Spain: 2007 Article IV Consultation. (2007). IMF Country Report, International Monetary Fund.

Spain: 2008 Article IV Consultation. (2008). IMF Country Report, International Monetary Fund.

Spain: 2010 Article IV Consultation. (2010). IMF Country Report, International Monetary Fund.

Spain: 2011 Article IV Consultation. (2011). IMF Country Report, International Monetary Fund.

Spain: 2012 Article IV Consultation. (2012). IMF Country Report, International Monetary Fund.

Reports World Economic Forum

The Human Capital Report 2015. (2015). Employment, Skills and Human Capital Global Challenge Insight Report, World Economic Forum.

World Bank

Dahlman, C. J.; Routti, J. & Ylä-Anttila, P. (2007). *Finland as a knowledge economy. Elements of success and lessons learned*, WBI Development Studies. World Bank Institute, The World Bank, Washington D.C.

Skills and Innovation Policy. (2011). World Bank. Retrieved from <http://go.worldbank.org/AW9KZWJB10>

Other

Washington Consensus. (n.d.). Trade, foreign policy, diplomacy and health, World Health Organization. Retrieved from <http://www.who.int/trade/glossary/story094/en/>

Corpus of the Linguistic Analysis

Source	Fragment	Page
1996 PSOE's Electoral Programm e	De nosotros depende aprovechar esta ocasión histórica. Nada nos va a ser regalado, nadie garantizará nuestro éxito, salvo nuestra propia voluntad y nuestro esfuerzo colectivo	7
1996 PSOE's Electoral Programm e	Empleo y bienestar social deben conjugarse simultáneamente. Para ello es necesario disponer de una economía eficiente y en crecimiento. España puede y debe aumentar su potencial de crecimiento, tiene que invertir más y mejorar sus niveles de productividad. La empresa es un espacio imprescindible para la obtención de esos objetivos. La creación de un marco adecuado para la tarea de los emprendedores es perfectamente compatible con la equidad de las políticas que se emprendan. Es más, sin empresas eficientes no habrá creación de empleo estable, ni podremos generar suficiente riqueza para profundizar en la redistribución.	16
1996 PSOE's Electoral Programm e	REPARTO DEL TRABAJO El acelerado incremento de la productividad derivado de la revolución tecnológica y los modernos sistemas de organización del trabajo determinan, a nivel global, una disminución de las necesidades de trabajo humano. De ahí que la idea de trabajar menos para trabajar todos sea correcta y que el objetivo de la reducción de la jornada de trabajo resulte razonable y necesario. Pero tal reducción, para que ejerciera efectos importantes y positivos sobre el empleo, habría de ser notable y exigiría una amplia generalización pues, de lo contrario, afectaría a la competitividad de unos países respecto de otros. Por todo ello, sin cuestionar la justeza de las reivindicaciones que en este sentido plantean, entre otros, la Confederación Europea de Sindicatos y los sindicatos españoles entendemos que, aquí y ahora, podrían darse pasos adelante en el reparto del trabajo. Repartir el trabajo significa, ante todo, ordenar de otra manera el trabajo. Para que todos trabajen, es necesario trabajar de otra manera y en otras actividades.. Se trata de un objetivo social que todos -Gobierno, Sindicatos, Organizaciones empresariales- debemos asumir, y cuya aplicación exige promover la cultura del diálogo y la concertación. El reparto del trabajo no se limita a distribuir el empleo disponible, sino que persigue también aumentar la cantidad de trabajo al organizarlo de otra manera y al fomentar nuevas actividades que puedan desarrollarse a través de trabajos remunerados. Además, el aumento del trabajo sólo se logra si somos más productivos. Por ello, toda política de reparto del trabajo debe descansar sobre el compromiso de no poner en riesgo la productividad. Y ese compromiso tiene que llevarse a la práctica a	24-25

	<p>través del diálogo y la negociación colectiva. Distribuir mejor el trabajo disponible es una exigencia derivada de los valores de justicia, igualdad y solidaridad que defendemos y es también una posibilidad que queremos explorar, sin poner en riesgo la necesaria competitividad de las empresas. El reparto del trabajo disponible puede favorecer la incorporación al empleo de más personas, especialmente de aquéllas que tienen más dificultades objetivas para desempeñar puestos de trabajo de jornada ordinaria completa.</p> <p>Existen mecanismos e instrumentos que deben ser potenciados porque contribuyen a distribuir mejor el trabajo existente y a favorecer un uso más flexible del tiempo de trabajo. Una nueva y mejor ordenación del tiempo de trabajo, que permita un uso más flexible de éste, puede contribuir a mejorar las perspectivas de empleo de amplias capas de nuestra población, y en especial de muchas mujeres.</p>	
1996 PSOE's Electoral Programme	<p>1. UNA SOCIEDAD CON FUTURO La educación y la cultura son los principales instrumentos creados por la humanidad para promover su liberación, el progreso en la historia y el bienestar individual y social. La educación y la cultura permiten entender el mundo, dominar sus transformaciones, utilizar sus posibilidades. La educación y la cultura permiten conocer las técnicas, favorecer el empleo, aliviar el trabajo, disfrutar del ocio, proteger el medio ambiente, entender y respetar al otro, al diferente. Sólo con la educación y la cultura se comprende el presente y se puede anticipar el futuro. Los socialistas queremos ofrecer un futuro para todos y construido por todos. Por ello, defendemos el derecho de todos los españoles a la mejor y más completa educación. Una educación que transmita conocimientos y desarrolle la creatividad, pues éstas serán las mayores fuentes de nuestro bienestar en el siglo XXI. Una educación que les permita acceder a la informática y a dominar las nuevas tecnologías en su vida cotidiana. De este modo, España podrá prepararse y preparar a sus ciudadanos para el desarrollo de la ciencia y de la tecnología, el progreso de las nuevas infraestructuras, tecnológicamente avanzadas, y el aumento continuado del nivel cultural.</p>	8
2000 PSOE's Party Congress Resolution	<p>El Partido Socialista tiene, ante todo, vocación de mayoría. Y debe reafirmarla expresa y constantemente. El destinatario de sus propuestas, alternativas y mensajes, debe ser, en consecuencia, el conjunto de los ciudadanos. Por ello, debe ser capaz de recoger las aspiraciones y preocupaciones colectivas; debe ser capaz de realizar una oferta política, diferenciada y propia, diseñada desde los valores de la izquierda, que abarque las necesidades y preocupaciones de nuestra sociedad.</p>	35
2000 PSOE's Party	<p>El PSOE es el partido que representa los valores propios de la izquierda y del mundo progresista. La defensa de la solidaridad, de la justicia social y de la igualdad de oportunidades forman el bagaje moral básico e irrenunciable para la conducción de nuestras políticas.</p>	36

Congress Resolution	Por ello, debemos aparecer ante los ciudadanos como el partido que garantiza el Estado de Bienestar y la cohesión social en España.	
2000 PSOE's Party Congress Resolution	A lo largo de esta legislatura, aplicaremos las ambiciosas medidas contenidas en el programa electoral del PSOE y pondremos todo nuestro empeño en lograr que España se encuentre esta vez en el grupo de cabeza de los países que primero se incorporen a un nuevo modelo productivo y social más moderno e innovador que nos permita seguir avanzando en justicia social y en igualdad de oportunidades.	14
2000 PSOE's Party Congress Resolution	<p>Más ciencia, innovación y sociedad de la información y el conocimiento para todos y todas. Además de las políticas educativas y de formación permanente para equipar mejor a los ciudadanos ante el cambio, las políticas de desarrollo de la Sociedad de la Información permitirán avanzar en cinco objetivos fundamentales para los socialistas: la igualdad, la pluralidad, la mejora de las condiciones económicas, la creación de empleo, así como en la mejora de los servicios públicos.</p> <p>Los socialistas concebimos Internet como un espacio de libertad, modernidad e igualdad de oportunidades, donde las personas se comunican, relacionan e informan intercambiando ideas y compartiendo conocimiento. En este sentido, somos conscientes de que mediante su fomento, uso y difusión los procesos sociales se democratizan, las barreras tecnológicas y económicas se eliminan y los ciudadanos y ciudadanas encuentran nuevos ámbitos de participación en los que desarrollar sus proyectos personales y profesionales.</p> <p>La igualdad en el acceso a la información implica igualdad de oportunidades, los dispositivos digitales y las ayudas técnicas mejoran la calidad de vida de las personas dependientes y/o con discapacidad contribuyendo a que puedan desarrollar su actividad diaria en condiciones de igualdad.</p> <p>Una sociedad justa es aquella que ofrece las mismas posibilidades a cada una de las personas que la integran, eliminando cualquier riesgo de exclusión que se pueda dar.</p> <p>En una sociedad como la actual, la desigualdad no sólo se mide en términos materiales, sino que influye, cada vez en mayor medida, la capacidad de acceso, de generación y de transmisión del conocimiento.</p> <p>El avance de la Sociedad de la Información y el Conocimiento impulsado desde una perspectiva progresista y al servicio de los ciudadanos es un instrumento decisivo para que todos seamos más iguales. Su universalización permite avanzar en la calidad de vida y en la mejora del bienestar social; aporta mayor calidad democrática al permitir más participación ciudadana; mejora la cohesión social y territorial.</p>	13

2000 PSOE's Party Congress Resolution	El avance de la Sociedad de la Información hace que los ciudadanos sean más iguales. La igualdad en el acceso a la información y el conocimiento mejora la igualdad de oportunidades a la hora de buscar trabajo o contratar un trabajador, crear un negocio o comprar un producto o servicio. Los dispositivos digitales mejoran la calidad de vida de las personas en situación de dependencia y con discapacidad permitiéndoles desarrollar su actividad diaria con mayor facilidad e igualdad.	13
2000 PSOE's Party Congress Resolution	UN PROGRAMA ELECTORAL PARA GANAR EL FUTURO España afronta un periodo de grandes retos y grandes oportunidades. La primera crisis económica mundial del siglo XXI ha mostrado cómo la globalización es un fenómeno que puede aportar muchos beneficios a la Humanidad, pero que también puede generar riesgos sistémicos que se trasladan muy rápidamente entre países y entre continentes. Esta crisis mundial, que tuvo su origen en un mal funcionamiento de unos mercados financieros completamente desregulados, ha terminado resultando en una gran crisis de carácter real que está afectando con especial dureza a Europa. Los ciudadanos de todo el mundo reclaman una mayor presencia de la política, que debe recuperar un espacio abandonado durante las últimas décadas a los poderes económicos. No es aceptable que el destino de la vida de millones de personas, de sus empleos y de su bienestar material, dependa de decisiones arbitrarias de unos mercados financieros internacionales cuyas decisiones tienen en ocasiones mayor influencia sobre la economía de un país que los propios representantes políticos elegidos democráticamente por sus ciudadanos. Necesitamos cambios en la gobernanza internacional y europea, para recuperar ese espacio para la política que demandan los ciudadanos.	6

<p>2004 PSOE's Party Congress Resolution</p>	<p>Una economía más productiva e innovadora, que aumente la cohesión social y cree empleo de calidad .El modelo económico que el PSOE se propone potenciar es el de una economía más abierta, libre y competitiva, basada en unas pautas de crecimiento equilibrado y justo, sostenido y sostenible, centradas en la innovación y el incremento de la productividad. Para conseguirlo, los socialistas apostamos por un crecimiento más innovador que deje atrás la especulación y fortalezca el capital humano, a través de una educación pública de calidad. Apostamos, también, por un crecimiento económico más productivo, en el que el sector público no sólo aumente sus niveles de inversión en I+D+i, sino que además establezca un marco claro para dinamizar la inversión tecnológica privada y promover la iniciativa emprendedora y el tejido industrial y empresarial. Creemos, finalmente, que nuestra economía debe superar sus déficits en capital físico elevando la inversión pública en infraestructuras respetuosas con el medio ambiente, con el fin de garantizar la cohesión territorial y el desarrollo del país, procurando una atención especial a las zonas rurales. Aspiramos a conseguir una economía más participativa. Para ello, fomentaremos la responsabilidad social y medio ambiental de las empresas. Impulsaremos la participación de los trabajadores en la toma de decisión de las empresas y el papel de los pequeños accionistas. Los socialistas pondremos en marcha mecanismos que impidan las prácticas abusivas que limiten la competencia, defendiendo el interés de los consumidores y usuarios. Los socialistas queremos una economía que cree empleo de calidad y aumente la competencia en los mercados, que mejore el grado de cualificación de los trabajadores y eleve los niveles de capital físico y tecnológico como única fórmula para competir en una economía globalizada y combatir el fenómeno de la deslocalización. Reformaremos nuestro sistema fiscal para hacerlo más justo, eficiente y equitativo, y promoveremos un gran acuerdo social por la competitividad y el empleo de calidad que ponga en marcha políticas activas que combatan la precariedad laboral, mejoren el acceso al mercado laboral de los colectivos más vulnerables como las mujeres, los jóvenes, los discapacitados, los parados de larga duración y los mayores de 45 años. Abordaremos, junto con sindicatos y organizaciones empresariales, un conjunto ambicioso de medidas contra la siniestralidad y la promoción de la salud laboral. Nos proponemos elevar la tasa de ocupación de nuestro mercado laboral y alcanzar el pleno empleo de calidad. Para ello, pondremos en marcha políticas que permitan conciliar la vida laboral con la personal y familiar, además de fomentar la cultura emprendedora y el autoempleo como fórmulas de incorporación al mercado laboral. Mejoraremos las condiciones laborales y sociales de los trabajadores autónomos y fomentaremos la economía social. La promoción de la responsabilidad social de las empresas, la erradicación de toda forma de discriminación y acoso laboral y la</p>	<p>13</p>
--	---	-----------

	reducción de la siniestralidad de nuestro mercado de trabajo, serán también ejes de nuestra política laboral.	
--	---	--

2004 PSOE's Electoral Programm e	<p>V. DINAMIZAR LA ADMINISTRACIÓN PÚBLICA: MÁS EFICIENCIA, MÁS CALIDAD, MÁS TRANSPARENCIA Y MÁS PROXIMIDAD El objetivo de dinamizar la economía sólo puede articularse de manera efectiva, si la Administración Pública se convierte en un agente más flexible en la atención a los ciudadanos, más eficiente en la utilización de sus recursos y más eficaz en la resolución de los problemas y en la prestación de los servicios públicos. Por ello, los socialistas proponemos una serie de cambios fundamentales en la estructura y en el funcionamiento interno de la Administración: Nuestra apuesta por la Eficiencia : f Adelgazar las estructuras ministeriales y crear Agencias sectoriales de carácter técnico. La creación de nuevas Agencias, Organismos o Unidades de Gestión se realizará de forma paralela a la eliminación o supresión de aquellas estructuras administrativas que son innecesarias para un desarrollo eficiente de los cometidos del conjunto de la Administración Pública. f La Conferencia Sectorial de Administración Pública pondrá en marcha nuevos mecanismos de coordinación entre la Administración General del Estado y el resto de las Administraciones territoriales. Desde la cooperación y coordinación entre las diferentes Administraciones Públicas, introduciremos un sistema de “prestación de servicios” y de adscripción transitoria de personal entre Administraciones. f Implantar el método de funcionamiento administrativo (presupuestación, gestión y contratación) orientado a resultados. Nuestro compromiso con la Calidad : La apuesta por la eficiencia y la racionalización de recursos en una Administración Pública internamente más dinámica, debe ser compatible con los más altos estándares de calidad en la prestación de los servicios públicos, con el consiguiente esfuerzo inversor que estamos dispuestos a acometer. Por ello, los socialistas: f Nombraremos Agencias de Alto Impacto a aquellas partes de la Administración con las que habitualmente se relacionan los ciudadanos. f Generalizaremos dentro de la Administración Pública el uso de las tecnologías de la información. Mejoraremos la formación a través de cursos de reciclaje y especialización de los funcionarios. Ampliaremos y flexibilizaremos la jornada laboral, especialmente en aquellas áreas comprendidas en las agencias de alto impacto. Eliminaremos la brecha digital que el PP ha creado entre las diferentes administraciones, especialmente significativa en la Administración Local, y generalizaremos dentro de toda la Administración Pública el uso de las TIC.</p>	129- 130
--	--	-------------

<p>2004 PSOE's Electoral Programm e</p>	<p>Libertad</p> <p>Económica</p> <p>El PP ha politizado los mercados hasta un punto inédito en la historia de la democracia española. Desde el Partido Socialista nos comprometemos a respetar la libertad económica: en el respeto a los proyectos empresariales que no atenten contra la competencia; en la concurrencia en igualdad de oportunidades a los contratos públicos; en la no injerencia en los órganos de gobierno de las empresas; en la separación entre poder político y económico; en el respeto a la diversificación de la cartera industrial de las empresas, sin imponerles políticas referidas a medios de comunicación; en el desarrollo de la competencia; en el respeto a los proyectos empresariales que no atenten contra el medio ambiente. Libertad económica potenciando la movilidad empresarial y el espíritu emprendedor.</p> <p>El objetivo que nos proponemos es liberalizar la economía para que los consumidores se beneficien de la apertura de los mercados y de los cambios tecnológicos. Para conseguirlo, es necesario que la competencia entre empresas encuentre los menores obstáculos posibles y, a su vez, en aquellos sectores en que, por sus características, subsistan situaciones de monopolio o de posiciones de dominio de mercado, es necesario que la regulación se oriente a facilitar el avance de la competencia y a impedir el abuso de posición dominante por parte de las empresas con poder de mercado.</p>	<p>112</p>
---	--	------------

<p>2004 PSOE's Electoral Programm e</p>	<p>Innovación Innovar es crear nuevos productos, nuevos bienes, nuevos servicios, nuevas formas de organizar nuestro trabajo. La innovación crea empleo, permite que nuestro trabajo rinda más, que las empresas sean más competitivas y que la economía sea más productiva. Permite un mayor nivel de renta disponible y del bienestar. Las empresas deben liderar este desarrollo de la innovación, apoyándose en tres ingredientes: la existencia de un entorno propicio a la innovación, su colaboración con el sector público potenciado desde el Sistema Nacional de Innovación (SNI) y la disponibilidad de recursos invertibles en proyectos innovadores. Entendemos el SNI como el conjunto de instituciones públicas y privadas que interactúan en la producción y difusión de tecnología e innovaciones, entre las que cabe destacar las universidades, los centros públicos de investigación y las empresas. España se encuentra a la cola de todos los indicadores de Ciencia y Tecnología, especialmente en lo que se refiere al sector empresarial. Sólo el 29% de las empresas son innovadoras, frente a la media europea del 59%. La producción de patentes española es sólo superior a la de Grecia y Portugal. La presencia de las empresas españolas en la red es muy inferior a los países de nuestro entorno, sólo el 30% cuenta con una Web corporativa y menos de un 5% utiliza el comercio electrónico. Nuestro Sistema Nacional de Innovación (SNI) adolece de iniciativa privada, presenta graves deficiencias en su configuración y las restricciones presupuestarias impuestas por el PP han llevado a la ciencia pública a una situación dramática. Los objetivos que nos proponemos van encaminados a dinamizar el esfuerzo científico y tecnológico en nuestro país y catalizar la inversión privada. Para ello, actuaremos en las siguientes líneas de actuación prioritarias: f Fortalecer el sistema público de Ciencia y Tecnología, promoviendo la excelencia en la Ciencia Básica con las medidas contempladas en el apartado sobre Ciencia, Tecnología y Sociedad del Conocimiento: nuestro futuro. f Estrechar la relación entre el mundo académico y empresarial. Para ello, apoyaremos la labor de los Parques Científicos y Tecnológicos como punto de encuentro de universidades y empresas; facilitaremos la movilidad laboral de los investigadores entre los centros académicos y las empresas; priorizaremos los proyectos concertados de Universidades y OPIS con Empresas; reforzaremos los Centros Mixtos de I+D especializados en la provisión de tecnología para PYMES; mejoraremos la transferencia de tecnología, reforzando y orientando las OTRIS como intermediarias proactivas entre la universidad y la empresa; impulsaremos desde las Universidades la creación de semilleros de empresas. Así mismo fomentaremos la creación de empresas de base tecnológica con instrumentos financieros, estructuras de apoyo y facilitando la presencia de investigadores públicos en las mismas. Apoyaremos a la explotación de la propiedad intelectual con la creación de la Oficina de Fomento de Invenciones Patentables.</p>	<p>111- 112</p>
---	--	---------------------

2004 PSOE's Electoral Programm e	<p>II. LOS INSTRUMENTOS: UN ESTADO MÁS DINÁMICO Y UN GASTO SOCIAL MÁS PRODUCTIVO</p> <p>Los socialistas queremos una sociedad de ciudadanos activos, en la que la igualdad de oportunidades esté garantizada para el pleno ejercicio de la libertad individual de todos. Para conseguirlo, el Partido Socialista propone recuperar el papel a jugar por el sector público, el cual, además de asegurar la protección social de todos los ciudadanos, deberá promover la participación activa y dinamizadora de los mismos en la economía y en la sociedad. Un Estado más dinámico no será un agente opuesto al mercado, sino que caminará al lado del mercado. El nuevo sector público que proponemos no se adaptará al cambio, sino que, con la participación de las empresas y de todos los ciudadanos, liderará los cambios. No será reactivo, sino proactivo ante los retos del futuro; asistirá a los ciudadanos y promoverá su inclusión en la sociedad. Será, en suma, un Estado que lidere y dinamice al resto de agentes económicos y sociales. Para conseguirlo, los socialistas proponemos utilizar de distinta forma a la realizada por el PP, los instrumentos que conforman la política económica nacional. Todo ello, bajo dos restricciones que consideramos imprescindible cumplir: f Un modelo de fiscalidad que con una distribución más equitativa de los impuestos promueva una mejor recaudación sin aumentar la presión fiscal. f La presencia del sector público en la economía no sobrepasará los límites actuales en el Para profundizar en el papel inclusivo y dinamizador del Estado, desde el PSOE proponemos reformar el sistema impositivo actual, reorientar el gasto público para la consolidación de nuestro sistema de bienestar social, que debe converger progresivamente con los niveles medios europeos en gasto social per capita, favorecer la inversión productiva y utilizar de manera escrupulosa los instrumentos regulatorios de que dispone el Estado para conseguir mayores cotas de libertad económica. Asimismo, si aspiramos a que el sector público dinamice la economía, debe transformarse él mismo en un agente más productivo. Para ello, el Estado debe ofrecer más y mejores servicios públicos con los mismos recursos que actualmente emplea. La Administración debe reorientar sus actividades en función de los objetivos y los resultados y aspirar a la máxima excelencia en la calidad de los servicios que presta. En este sentido, la Administración debe presupuestar, gestionar y contratar motivada por la consecución de unos resultados concretos a los que debería comprometerse públicamente año a año, y que deberían ser fiscalizados por agencias y comisiones parlamentarias específicas. Los socialistas estamos convencidos de que un Estado más dinámico en su funcionamiento interno y externamente dinamizador de la actividad económica, a través de un gasto público más eficiente y productivo, jugará un papel decisivo en la consecución de las metas de bienestar y cohesión social que nos proponemos.</p>	104- 105
--	---	-------------

2004 PSOE's Electoral Programm e	<p>II. ESPAÑA NECESITA UN NUEVO IMPULSO DE POLÍTICAS DEL BIENESTAR Y MODERNIZAR NUESTROS SERVICIOS PUBLICOS HACIÉNDOLOS SUFICIENTES Y EFICIENTES La sociedad española de hoy, del año 2004, nos presenta fuertes demandas para una nueva organización social. No son sólo llamadas morales a la justicia social. Son problemas que nos presenta una sociedad en gran parte nueva y que la política debe resolver, porque sabemos que el mercado es insensible y ajeno a sus soluciones y porque reivindicamos esa función noble y principal de la política para organizar la convivencia en libertad y con justicia. Cómo atender las necesidades de los mayores dependientes. Cómo conciliar mejor trabajo y familia. Cómo evitar el desarraigo y la exclusión. Cómo extendemos la red de cuidados y educación infantil a los niños de 0 a 3 años. Qué más haremos para integrar la discapacidad. Qué nuevas demandas surgen de una sociedad consumista. Qué medidas reclaman los pensionistas de hoy y de mañana. Ésa es la política social que debemos definir. Su coste y su financiación es parte principal del debate económico y político, pero nos negamos a enfocar este debate desde el prisma neoliberal que niega al Estado y a lo público la intervención social. Y, sin embargo, la inversión social tiene retornos económicos: genera actividad económica, proporciona ingresos fiscales y empleo, ahorra prestaciones de desempleo y gasto sanitario al pasar al servicio socio-sanitario lo que ahora son altos costes hospitalarios. La mayoría de esos empleos beneficiarán a los colectivos que tienen especiales dificultades de inserción laboral, y contribuirán a bajar la alta tasa de desempleo de nuestro país y subir la tasa de actividad. Significa también abrir horizontes para el desarrollo laboral y personal de muchas mujeres españolas, que están realizando un trabajo callado y poco reconocido que nadie paga directamente. Una sociedad cohesionada, satisfecha de su modelo social, de su equilibrio interno y de sus prestaciones a los desfavorecidos, es una sociedad más competitiva, más capaz y más eficiente. La estabilidad política es también consecuencia de la estabilidad social, de la satisfacción moral colectiva con su organización social. En último término, la inversión en cohesión social y en políticas de bienestar, es también inversión de capital humano, fundamental para las próximas generaciones y para el futuro del país. La inversión educativa, la formación profesional de nuestros trabajadores, la inversión sanitaria, la cultura de los servicios sociales avanzados, son inversiones productivas de largo alcance, además de expresión del grado de modernidad, de libertad y de desarrollo de una sociedad.</p>	70-71
2008 PSOE's Party Congress Resolution	<p>Trabajadoras y trabajadores más seguros en mercados flexibles. La globalización tiende a hacer menos competitivos a los países con modelos sociales menos flexibles, por lo que el Estado del Bienestar debe adaptarse para ser más sostenible. Debemos apostar por una globalización inclusiva, basada en la cooperación y seguridad, frente a las posturas que defienden que las decisiones las tome solo el</p>	14

	<p>mercado.</p> <p>Junto a las nuevas medidas para equipar a las personas y extender la Sociedad de la Información, el éxito de nuestro país en el nuevo modelo productivo globalizado dependerá de nuestra capacidad de adaptar las políticas sociales y laborales a la nueva realidad. Conforme se acelera este cambio, todos los países europeos se están viendo en la necesidad de idear nuevas fórmulas políticas que permitan conjugar una mayor flexibilidad a fin de garantizar más y mejor empleo y una mayor seguridad ante los cambios que se sucedan.</p>	
2008 PSOE's Party Congress Resolution	<p>El gran reto al que nos enfrentamos las fuerzas progresistas en el siglo XXI es el de construir un equilibrio similar en el marco de la globalización. Preservar los enormes beneficios económicos que este proceso genera y encontrar fórmulas que permitan asumir los costes del cambio acelerado y permanente que este proceso tiene sobre las personas, es un desafío de gran magnitud. Hacer frente a ese desafío requiere una actitud abierta para ver nuestro futuro económico al tiempo que damos las mismas oportunidades a millones de personas que nunca veremos. Abordar el futuro con esa visión y esa generosidad es algo que raramente se intenta y muy pocas veces se consigue, pero la política está ahí para eso, y eso es lo que tenemos que hacer.</p>	18
2008 PSOE's Party Congress Resolution	<p>Pero para que las reformas sean posibles, los mensajes han de ser positivos, y no negativos como hasta ahora. La ciudadanía ha de saber que la globalización no hace sino acelerar unos cambios que de todas formas se habrían producido. Por tanto, la globalización ha de entenderse como un fenómeno que crea nuevas oportunidades, un proceso nuevo que trae consigo riesgos pero que exigirá también dar un impulso renovado a otra forma de cobertura social más eficiente y dinámica y en beneficio de un mayor número de ciudadanos. Si se ponen las medidas adecuadas en marcha, la globalización puede ser más justa y por tanto más positiva para toda la ciudadanía. La actual etapa de turbulencias financieras internacionales, que se inició el pasado verano como consecuencia de la crisis de las hipotecas de alto riesgo en Estados Unidos, ha puesto de manifiesto la insuficiente capacidad de adaptación del marco supervisor y regulatorio a la aparición de nuevos productos financieros más sofisticados, más complejos y más opacos, que dificultan la correcta valoración de los riesgos. Por ello, es necesario avanzar en una mayor transparencia, en una mejor regulación y en una cooperación entre supervisores a nivel mundial. Cuando los agentes actúan en los mercados globales, las instituciones encargadas de supervisar sus actuaciones deben adquirir también esa dimensión. En este sentido, la Unión Europea debe liderar una respuesta global adecuada que establezca nuevas reglas más transparentes y una convergencia transnacional de las normas sobre mercados financieros</p>	11

	que impidan que fondos especulativos condicionen la estabilidad del sistema financiero y de la economía real.	
2008 PSOE's Electoral Programme	<p>Políticas para aumentar la competencia en los sectores. La competencia no es una característica común y permanente de todos los sectores del mercado sino que puede llegar a verse amenazada o excluida en determinadas circunstancias. En la medida que esto ocurra será necesaria la intervención pública para garantizar su conservación así como su promoción en caso de que resulte del funcionamiento natural del mercado. Todo ello sin olvidar los objetivos de cohesión social y territorial que deben garantizarse en determinados sectores, en tanto la competencia es un medio y no un fin en sí mismo para alcanzar una mayor prosperidad económica y una solidaridad real y efectiva. Esta intervención pública a través de las normas sobre competencia ha alcanzado su plenitud con la reciente Ley de Defensa de la Competencia. En este sentido, la madurez alcanzada en la configuración y la aplicación del Derecho de la competencia en nuestro país se verá reforzada a través de las siguientes medidas:- Una mayor seguridad jurídica. Para ello se priorizará el desarrollo normativo de la nueva Ley de Defensa de la Competencia para establecer un marco normativo sólido y fiable.- La garantía de la unidad de mercado. En un contexto de globalización económica la garantía de la libre competencia no puede disolverse en una fragmentación territorial a nivel interno. Si bien el desarrollo autonómico de las competencias en esta materia ha supuesto un gran avance debe garantizarse en todo momento el principio de unidad de mercado como base de nuestro sistema económico.- Reforzamiento del pilar privado, que implica incrementar la capacidad disuasoria. Las víctimas de comportamiento anticompetitivos deben obtener judicialmente resarcimiento de daños. Por ello, en coherencia con la política de competencia de la UE, favoreceremos el ejercicio de acciones privadas, tanto individuales como colectivas, y se contemplarán nuevos instrumentos para restablecer los desequilibrios ocasionados por los comportamientos infractores, especialmente en lo relativo a las prácticas agresivas de las empresas respecto de los consumidores. Igualmente se reformará el régimen sancionador para que cumpla un objetivo desincentivador.- Fortalecimiento de las PYME. La política de la competencia debe contribuir al desarrollo sostenible de las PYME y, en particular, a facilitar la cooperación y la formación de redes con participación de PYME. Es preciso que exista un marco para que los pequeños productores de explotaciones familiares agrarias, los trabajadores autónomos y las PYME integrantes de redes puedan ejercitar la negociación colectiva con sus clientes principales de forma consistente con la política de la competencia.- Vigilancia especial en servicios básicos y operadores con poder de mercado incrementado la transparencia de los mercados. Para ello, asumimos fomentar la</p>	165- 166

	<p>política de transparencia de precios, para lo cual los reguladores harán públicos los precios más comunes.</p>	
--	---	--

<p>2008 PSOE's Electoral Programm e</p>	<p>1.3. EL CAPITAL HUMANO: INVERTIR EN EDUCACIÓN Y CONOCIMIENTO ES INVERTIR EN PROGRESO. La educación es el instrumento más adecuado para garantizar el ejercicio de una ciudadanía democrática, responsable, libre y crítica, que resulta indispensable para la constitución de sociedades avanzadas, dinámicas y justas. Para los socialistas, la educación es el primer factor de progreso individual y social. Su extensión a toda la ciudadanía, en condiciones de calidad, es el fundamento más sólido para construir una sociedad económicamente avanzada y cohesionada social y territorialmente. Por ello, queremos seguir otorgándole la debida prioridad política y presupuestaria. Los socialistas estamos convencidos de que el futuro de nuestra sociedad depende de la educación. La educación aumenta la productividad y la competitividad de la economía, y por tanto es positiva para el crecimiento económico en el largo plazo. Además, si los trabajadores están mejor formados tienen menos posibilidades de sufrir desempleo y más opciones de acceso a empleos de calidad. Pero la educación no sólo repercute en el crecimiento económico y en el empleo. Una política educativa bien diseñada reduce la desigualdad de ingresos y de oportunidades de vida de los ciudadanos. La educación es un instrumento que permite crear un 'círculo virtuoso' entre crecimiento, empleo e igualdad. Y dado este papel crucial, la educación ya no puede quedar reducida a una etapa de nuestra vida. En la sociedad actual, se hace necesario entender la educación como una actividad más de nuestra vida cotidiana, un aprendizaje a lo largo de la vida. Los avances en todas estas áreas durante los últimos cuatro años han sido muy significativos. Se han aprobado dos nuevas leyes fundamentales para reformar el sistema educativo en todos sus niveles. Pero somos conscientes de que los cambios en educación son lentos, las mejoras se notan en el medio plazo, y las políticas educativas más efectivas son aquellas que tienen continuidad en el tiempo. Por ello, los socialistas seguiremos trabajando para ofrecer a toda la población una oferta de educación y formación de calidad, que incorpore tanto los conocimientos necesarios para su desarrollo personal y profesional como los valores propios de una sociedad democráticamente avanzada y en continuo proceso de cambio. Nuestras propuestas en el terreno educativo se fundamentan en una visión activa y comprometida con la calidad de nuestro sistema educativo, con voluntad de impulsar y financiar reformas a través del diálogo y el acuerdo con las Comunidades Autónomas, desde el respeto a los ámbitos competenciales existentes en esta materia. Un Gobierno con voluntad de sumar esfuerzos y energías para mejorar la educación de todas las generaciones de españoles desde la convicción de que la educación es una responsabilidad de toda la sociedad y las instituciones implicadas.</p>	<p>134- 135</p>
---	--	---------------------

<p>2008 PSOE's Electoral Programm e</p>	<p>1.1. POLÍTICA LABORAL: MEJORAR LA CALIDAD DEL TRABAJO Acercar nuestra economía al objetivo del pleno empleo y mejorar la calidad del trabajo deben ser los objetivos para la próxima legislatura. Por trabajo de calidad entendemos todos aquellos elementos que los ciudadanos y ciudadanas desean que reúna su trabajo y que contribuyen a mejorar la productividad:- Un salario suficiente, que permita satisfacer las necesidades de los trabajadores y trabajadoras y de sus familias.- Un trabajo estable y continuo, que permita construir un proyecto vital a largo plazo.- Un trabajo para todas las edades, que asegure oportunidades de empleo durante toda la vida activa, con especial atención a los jóvenes y a los trabajadores de más edad.- Un trabajo seguro, que proteja la salud y la seguridad del trabajador y, sobre todo, su vida.- Un trabajo en igualdad, en el que no exista discriminación no solo por razón de sexo, sino también por cualquier otra circunstancia personal o social (la edad, la discapacidad, la orientación sexual, el origen racial).- Unas condiciones de trabajo, particularmente las referidas al tiempo de trabajo, que permitan conciliar la vida laboral con la vida familiar y personal. - Un trabajo que permita la participación y el compromiso de los trabajadores en los objetivos y fines de la empresa para la que trabajan. Para hacer efectivo el tipo de trabajo que deseamos será necesaria una fuerte implicación de los poderes públicos en dos aspectos concretos: el fomento de las políticas de empleo y de incentivación de la contratación indefinida y el control de las malas prácticas que puedan producirse. Partiendo de estas premisas proponemos las siguientes medidas dirigidas a conseguir un trabajo de calidad para los trabajadores y las trabajadoras, un trabajo de calidad también para las empresas.</p>	<p>22-23</p>
---	---	--------------

<p>2011 PSOE's Electoral Programme</p>	<p>2.1 Una inversión social que genere crecimiento económico y empleo. Preparar antes que reparar El primer reto que tenemos que afrontar para desarrollar nuestro modelo social es, sin duda, el crecimiento económico y la generación de empleo. No es posible sostener un Estado social avanzado si no contamos con una economía que crezca de manera sostenible y que tenga como objetivo la creación de empleo; como tampoco es posible que la economía crezca de forma sostenible sin desarrollo social y humano. Hoy es más evidente que nunca que la mejor inversión en crecimiento y empleo de futuro es la inversión social. La crisis ha demostrado que el principio de la derecha según el que basta con favorecer cualquier tipo de crecimiento económico para generar bienestar social no es válido. El crecimiento debe acompañarse de políticas sociales que garanticen que todos los ciudadanos se benefician de él por igual. Y debe basarse en la mejora permanente de nuestro capital humano y social, la mayor riqueza de las sociedades con futuro. La política social del futuro debe concebirse y diseñarse por tanto como inversión, y no como gasto. Queremos “preparar” antes que “reparar”. Preferimos dotar de recursos y oportunidades a los individuos antes que dejar al mercado, con su injusta dotación inicial de recursos y oportunidades, funcionar libremente para luego indemnizar a los perdedores. Nuestro programa social, por ello, une el mantenimiento de las políticas de protección y el desarrollo de nuevas políticas de activación. Para alcanzar nuestros objetivos tenemos que equilibrar la perspectiva estática, que se limita a aliviar las dificultades presentes en los individuos o bien a mantener los ingresos perdidos, con una renovada perspectiva dinámica, que piensa los problemas sociales en términos de trayectoria vital, y de futuro. El Estado del Bienestar que queremos es un sistema con una fuerte dimensión activadora. Es decir, orientado hacia inversiones sociales preventivas que minimicen indemnizaciones futuras y que capaciten a los ciudadanos. Ambos enfoques no sólo son compatibles sino que, además, son totalmente necesarios. Sin políticas que aseguren rentas y recursos a quienes atraviesan dificultades, no serán efectivas ni posibles las políticas de activación. Pero las políticas de protección tampoco serán posibles sin ese enfoque de la política social como motor de competitividad y productividad.</p>	<p>73-74</p>
<p>2011 PSOE's Electoral Programme</p>	<p>La desaparición del Muro tuvo tanta fuerza expresiva, puso en juego tantas emociones, combinó de tal modo ideología e interés, política y economía, que los portavoces del pensamiento reaccionario quisieron identificar con sus intereses las imágenes que recorrieron el mundo. Y, sin embargo, los ciudadanos europeos decidieron encomendar a las mayorías progresistas, lideradas por partidos socialdemócratas, la dirección de muchos de sus países en este tramo final del siglo XX. Pero lo cierto es que, junto a la democracia, también se generalizó la aceptación del mercado: porque se buscaba tanto la democracia parlamentaria como el modelo económico y social</p>	<p>14-15</p>

vigente en los países del occidente europeo. Desde entonces democracia y mercado marcan la senda del progreso y el bienestar de las sociedades. Desde entonces se ha fortalecido el socialismo democrático, porque entendió que la libertad y el mercado formaban parte de una misma exigencia de la ciudadanía, que el progreso y el bienestar social formaban parte de este binomio; y porque siempre defendió que sólo el establecimiento de un poder democrático fuerte y no subordinado a intereses económicos particulares puede garantizar un sistema de libre mercado ya que éste, por sí sólo, no garantiza la justicia social. Fue un proceso acelerado porque estos cambios políticos, la desaparición que provocaron del sistema de bloques antagónicos vigente durante buena parte del siglo, la ausencia de un orden internacional que, aceptado por todos los Estados, impusiese reglas para la convivencia entre sociedades definitivamente libres, coincidieron con los efectos de la revolución tecnológica, de la globalización económica y la globalización financiera. La revolución tecnológica ha provocado la globalización de la información, de la economía y del comercio, del sistema financiero. Pero ha incidido también en aspectos más íntimos y personales de la existencia humana como los relacionados con la forma de adquirir conocimientos y disfrutar del ocio, la calidad de la vida y su duración, la sanidad y las nuevas posibilidades de las investigaciones en biotecnología, biomedicina y biogenética que, por su parte, no pueden quedar sin ningún tipo de control ético, las nuevas formas de trabajo y las nuevas necesidades de formación, la universalización del reconocimiento de los derechos humanos y la incorporación masiva de las mujeres como fuerza emergente en todos los ámbitos sociales y económicos, consolidando así una de las mayores transformaciones sociales de nuestro tiempo. Y, como consecuencia de todo ello, la revolución tecnológica está provocando, también, una revolución cultural. Una revolución que puede abrir cauces nuevos para la liberación de la humanidad. Pero una revolución que, de no ser regulada, ahondará las diferencias respecto del acceso a la nueva alfabetización informática y avivará sentimientos identitarios de carácter fundamentalista y de rebeldía de los grupos marginados. La auténtica clave del cambio la debemos situar en la revolución de la información. Ese triunfo sobre el tiempo y la distancia para la comunicación es el eje del cambio de era. Está provocando una profunda alteración en nuestras vidas y ha dado lugar a la llamada Nueva Economía, en la que el capital va viendo la necesidad de vincular su propio valor con el valor del conocimiento. De ahí la exigencia creciente, una vez más, de concebir la educación y la formación como principales factores de la igualdad de oportunidades.

<p>2011 PSOE's Electoral Programme</p>	<p>Han cambiado demasiadas cosas para que nos mostremos indiferentes a los cambios, para que pensemos que podemos seguir actuando como en el pasado, para seguir usando los mismos conceptos y utilizando idénticos instrumentos para hacer política. La trascendencia y profundidad de estos fenómenos es tal que se modifican sustancialmente los términos de la vida política, y se exige de partidos y dirigentes la capacidad de adelantarnos y dar respuestas en lugar de reaccionar ante hechos consumados, de definir proyectos y propuestas, lenguajes y formas de acción política adecuados al nuevo modelo social, y que respondan a las inquietudes y aspiraciones de los ciudadanos en este momento histórico. Lo que se hace especialmente urgente cuando el aumento cierto del bienestar material de las clases medias, su capacidad para prescindir de algunos aspectos de la protección pública, junto con la difuminación de las certezas que proporcionaron las ideologías cerradas y de los mecanismos de solidaridad basados en la pertenencia a una clase social, provocan la tendencia a refugiarse en uno mismo, la exacerbación del individualismo, el recelo de la acción colectiva, la tentación del "sálvese quien pueda".</p>	<p>16</p>
<p>2012 PSOE's Party Congress Resolution</p>	<p>SOCIALISMO ABIERTO PARA LA SOCIEDAD DE LAS OPORTUNIDADES El mundo no ha dejado de cambiar desde que en 1879 Pablo Iglesias, junto a otros compañeros, fundó el PSOE. Pero el proyecto político socialista siempre ha sido inseparable de la búsqueda continua de la libertad, la igualdad, la redistribución, la justicia social, la solidaridad y la dignidad de la persona. Así fue cuando hubo que conquistar derechos sociales y laborales básicos, contribuimos a la restauración democrática, hemos ocupado responsabilidades de gobierno y cuando nos ha tocado liderar la oposición democrática. En España, como en Europa, los valores de la socialdemocracia se han convertido en gran medida en ideales mayoritarios de comportamiento y de convivencia social. Sin embargo, hoy más que nunca, ha vuelto a cobrar vigencia la disputa ideológica sobre el papel del Estado y su legitimidad para intervenir en los procesos sociales con políticas de fomento de la inclusión social y promoción de la igualdad de oportunidades, que son señas de identidad del socialismo democrático. Las conquistas logradas son atacadas desde hace tres décadas por una ideología neoliberal, basada en la exaltación del fundamentalismo de mercado y de aquel individualismo que se presenta como contrapuesto a lo público, que, además, cuestiona las propias bases de los sistemas de protección social, los pilares básicos del Estado del Bienestar moderno. Conquistas amenazadas, además, por una crisis global que en Europa se ve agravada por los problemas de crecimiento y competitividad y las carencias institucionales que se han hecho especialmente visibles en el caso de la Unión Europea. La crisis económica, provocada por quienes se resisten a cualquier tipo de regulación de los mercados financieros, no puede abocarnos socialmente a la anulación de la política y a que las instituciones</p>	<p>89-91</p>

<p>democráticas se conviertan en meras marionetas controladas por los mercaderes. Para los y las socialistas, la crisis no puede saldarse socialmente con una pérdida de legitimación de la política que pone en cuestión a las propias instituciones democráticas. Por tanto, hoy volvemos a necesitar una reflexión profunda sobre el modelo de sociedad que queremos y sobre el proyecto político que necesitamos. Un proyecto renovado, y participativo firmemente asentado en nuestras convicciones, valores y principios pero que, a la vez, sea capaz de dar respuesta a los complejos retos que se nos plantean. En definitiva, como hemos sido capaces de hacer a lo largo de nuestra historia, mostrando el carácter reformista que nos anima, tenemos que adaptar nuestros principios a la realidad social para ampliar las condiciones en que todas las personas puedan desarrollar libremente sus aptitudes y capacidades, garantizar la igualdad de oportunidades para todos los ciudadanos y ganar otra vez la condición de referente político mayoritario que identifica y conjuga las aspiraciones de sectores sociales muy diversos. En este sentido, apostamos por una sociedad de oportunidades permanentes para todos los ciudadanos y ciudadanas, independientemente de su origen, género, orientación sexual, condición social o territorio en el que vivan.</p>	
---	--

2012 Party's Resolution	<p>Por ello, y siendo evidente que nuestra regulación laboral actual ha quedado obsoleta frente a las necesidades actuales, el Partido Socialista por su vinculación con la defensa de los derechos de los trabajadores y trabajadoras, tiene una responsabilidad especial en la creación de un nuevo ordenamiento laboral responsable y adaptado a las necesidades de nuestros tiempos. Los principios que deberían orientar nuestro mercado de trabajo tienen que ser la flexiseguridad y la empleabilidad. Por ello, es necesario que el nuevo modelo de mercado de trabajo contemple la capacitación de los trabajadores como un eje central, y que aporte sistemas de protección y apoyo en situaciones de desempleo que deben ser transitorias hacia la consecución de un nuevo trabajo. No es un camino adecuado ir hacia un modelo de sustitución creciente de empleos estables por modalidades de relaciones de servicios de trabajadores autónomos cuando realmente son trabajos por cuenta ajena. Apoyar la creación de nuevos puestos de trabajo en subempleos de escasa remuneración y pocos derechos no es la mejor alternativa para un país que necesita urgentemente mejorar su productividad. Nuestro mercado de trabajo se caracteriza por una gran segmentación, una elevada proporción de trabajadores, en especial jóvenes, sometidos a contratos temporales, en condiciones de precariedad, inseguridad, bajos salarios, escasa participación en la formación continua, ausencia de empleos que corresponden a su nivel de formación y ausencia de perspectivas de carrera. Romper la estabilidad de los vínculos entre trabajadores y empresas supone la pérdida de incentivos por ambas partes para realizar las inversiones necesarias en la mejora del capital humano que son productivas para la empresa, y beneficiosas para la carrera profesional de los trabajadores y trabajadoras. Los socialistas nos comprometemos con el aumento progresivo del Salario Mínimo Interprofesional hasta alcanzar unas remuneraciones mínimas dignas que garanticen la proporcionalidad entre trabajo y salario. Los socialistas siempre favoreceremos modelos empresariales en los que los trabajadores participen y obtengan parte de los beneficios obtenidos de manera responsable. El mundo laboral del siglo XXI se va a caracterizar por la empresa flexible en la jornada laboral de los trabajadores y trabajadoras, pero también por la necesidad de trabajadores flexibles en sus habilidades, con capacidad para readaptarse a cambios de empresa y de sector productivo, y por la necesidad de una formación permanente, así como de una apuesta fuerte y generalizada por la formación profesional.</p>	50-51
2012 Party's Resolution	<p>Los cuatro vectores del cambio Hay cuatro fuerzas actualmente en movimiento en todo el mundo, que deberían ser los cuatro vectores para orientar las políticas y promover los cambios que requiere España, porque estas tendencias constituyen a la vez los retos más importantes que afronta nuestro país, pero también son importantes fuentes de oportunidades para transformar la economía española. Estas cuatro fuerzas son: - la globalización de la economía mundial</p>	43-44

asociada al cambio tecnológico ; - el envejecimiento poblacional y el cambio demográfico - los riesgos económicos y humanitarios asociados al cambio climático ; - el desequilibrio territorial entre el ámbito rural y urbano El proceso de globalización de la economía mundial exige que la economía española aumente su grado de competitividad, ya que los bienes y servicios producidos en nuestro país están cada vez más sometidos a la competencia exterior de cara a los consumidores españoles, y además las empresas españolas tienen que abrirse camino y plantear sus proyectos con vocación exportadora, para lo cual deben contar con apoyo del Estado a través de diversas iniciativas. En este contexto, se hace necesario que la globalización solo sea en términos económicos sino también en términos sociales, para promover la democratización y los derechos de los trabajadores en todos los países. A pesar de las reformas emprendidas durante los últimos años, los desequilibrios financiero, exterior y público de nuestro país han de seguir corrigiéndose. Hacer una economía competitiva exige, por un lado, un proceso de especialización productiva en aquellos sectores donde España tiene ventajas comparativas y más oportunidades de éxito, bien por la disponibilidad de tecnología, recursos, productos, experiencia empresarial y emprendedora, capital humano, situación geográfica, etc. Por otro lado, resulta imprescindible mejorar nuestra productividad, lo cual requiere políticas de largo plazo que potencien la formación de capital humano cualificado, y apuesten decididamente por la ciencia, la innovación y la tecnología, desde los primeros momentos de la formación escolar, así como la responsabilidad social empresarial. Para ello se potenciará la creación de empresas en sectores estratégicos e innovadores capaces de acelerar el cambio de modelo productivo, fomentando así el empleo estable y de calidad. Un país con una estructura productiva competitiva y diversificada es un país con mayor flexibilidad para poder adaptarse a los cambios estructurales que se producirán en la economía mundial durante las próximas décadas. Por ello, necesitamos la contribución de todos los sectores de la economía, muy especialmente de aquellos que aportan un mayor valor añadido, y que todos ellos sitúen la innovación y la vocación internacional en el centro de sus estrategias empresariales. Los socialistas consideramos esencial reforzar la apuesta por políticas a favor de la I+D+i como factor estratégico para nuestro crecimiento económico así como seguir apoyando la creación y la actividad de los espacios tecnológicos y la apuesta por la creación de empresas spin-offs desde la universidad pública española.

2012 Party's Resolution	Las opciones de izquierda han resultado especialmente dañadas por las estrategias europeas para afrontar la crisis, en un contexto de mayoría conservadora. Los partidos progresistas en el gobierno, en clara minoría, se han visto sometidos a la presión de mercados y partidos conservadores para actuar en una senda que reduce el papel del Estado como soporte de la cohesión social ante la crisis y también como agente dinamizador en el proceso de reactivación posterior. Esto ha relegado a los gobiernos progresistas a vivir en la contradicción permanente entre su discurso político y su acción económica, lo que ha terminado minando la confianza ciudadana sobre su capacidad para gestionar la salida de la crisis. Desde la oposición, esos mismos partidos progresistas nos enfrentamos a la dificultad de articular, transmitir y defender una alternativa viable, nítidamente socialdemócrata, creíble y de futuro frente a las políticas económicas y sociales que se están imponiendo.	3
2012 Party's Resolution	Dentro de este nuevo enfoque, incorporaremos plenamente nuestro compromiso por la sostenibilidad económica, social y medioambiental como seña de identidad de nuestro proyecto político, como elemento indisociable de nuestra apuesta por la igualdad y por la equidad a escala global, impulsando un desarrollo basado en el conocimiento. Sostenibilidad significa durabilidad, estabilidad, armonía con la naturaleza, uso racional de los recursos, futuro y solidaridad... todo lo contrario del cortoplacismo miope que ha caracterizado el paradigma económico hasta ahora dominante. La estrecha interdependencia entre la evolución de la economía, de la ecología y de la sociedad apenas ha sido considerada hasta la fecha por lo líderes políticos, salvo excepciones muy valiosas en algunos países de nuestro entorno, en los que - incluso durante la crisis - se genera empleo, se mantiene la cohesión social y se reduce la contaminación y los impactos medioambientales. La cultura emprendedora en todas sus fases y el apoyo a los sectores de futuro será otro eje principal para avanzar hacia la economía del bienestar. Asimismo, apoyaremos la responsabilidad social y medioambiental de las empresas ya consolidadas, la iniciativa privada de carácter social, medioambiental o ético, y una cultura cívica de respeto, consumo responsable y buen uso de los bienes públicos. Lo haremos impulsando y requiriendo la evaluación y supervisión del comportamiento de las grandes corporaciones cuya actividad tiene un impacto importante en nuestra sociedad; favoreciendo nuevas formas de propiedad empresarial, como las mutuas, sociedades laborales y cooperativas, que garanticen una mejor y más justa gestión de los recursos económicos; profundizando la democracia en nuestras instituciones domésticas, mejorando su representatividad, ayudados a este fin por nuevos mecanismos de participación ciudadana, y garantizando la transparencia, el control, la supervisión y la eficacia de las Administraciones Públicas y de la Justicia. social. En este contexto, una reforma integral del sistema fiscal español será	6

<p>esencial para profundizar en su carácter progresivo, garantizando una mayor proporcionalidad y equidad entre lo que contribuyen las rentas más altas y las medias y bajas, y para reequilibrar la creciente diferencia entre la carga fiscal soportada por las rentas del trabajo y la impuesta sobre el capital y las sociedades, así como desarrollar una imposición “verde” que grave los consumos excesivos y las actividades contaminantes e incentivando de forma clara y diferenciada la fiscalidad de aquellas rentas generadas por actividades productivas verdes, sostenibles, innovadoras o creadoras de empleo sostenible. Igualmente importante será el desarrollo de un sistema efectivo de lucha contra el fraude fiscal, dotado de un mayor número de personal y medios, contra la economía sumergida y la evasión de capitales. Asimismo, exigiremos la garantía de los derechos sociales básicos de la ciudadanía y, por tanto, también y con especial atención los de los colectivos más vulnerables, a través de una educación inclusiva, servicios sociales y sanidad públicas universales gratuitas y de calidad, y sistemas de protección social efectivos y de futuro. En este sentido, reivindicamos nuestro modelo de bienestar, que constituye uno de los mayores logros de las sociedades europeas en las últimas décadas y que podría estar en riesgo en los próximos años.</p>	
---	--

2012 Party's Resolution	<p>Las claves para la política industrial en España, en línea con la estrategia planteada a nivel europeo, deberían ser las siguientes: - Innovación para el desarrollo de nuevas tecnologías y nuevos productos. - Fomento del espíritu emprendedor, que permite la búsqueda de nuevas oportunidades. Prácticamente todas las iniciativas emprendedoras comienzan siendo de autónomos o pymes, pero la política de apoyo a las personas emprendedoras debería diferenciarse de las pymes tradicionales que tienen otros objetivos y otras dificultades distintas a los proyectos emprendedores de economía social, cooperativas, sociedades laborales, y autónomos. - Mejora de la competitividad, a través de políticas que afectan directamente a los costes y precios de la industria (política energética, infraestructuras, comunicaciones, política de transporte, políticas de mejoras de las condiciones laborales etc.). - Internacionalización, las empresas industriales de cualquier sector van a trabajar de forma creciente en mercados globales, y por tanto tienen que acometer procesos de modernización y acceso a mercados extranjeros. - Especialización, las oportunidades para la industria española van a localizarse en nichos de productos muy concretos, o en la participación en cadenas de producción a nivel europeo/mundial, donde las empresas para tener éxito deben estar altamente especializadas. - Sostenibilidad medioambiental: la transición hacia una economía baja en carbono, para hacer frente al reto del cambio climático, debe contemplarse como una oportunidad más que como una restricción para la política industrial. - Potenciación del sello de calidad de los productos españoles en los mercados internacionales mediante una adecuada política de promoción y difusión. - Impulso y voluntad política para que las empresas industriales apuesten por introducir, utilizar y desarrollar el Diseño Industrial de sus productos.</p>	65-66
-------------------------------	--	-------

2012 Party's Resolution	<p>España: Más democracia, mejor Estado El nuevo socialismo abierto que debe protagonizar la nueva etapa del PSOE que comenzará tras el 38 Congreso Federal requiere una clara apuesta por la economía del bienestar y la sociedad de las oportunidades, apuesta que sólo será posible si estos procesos se implementan desde una democracia por y para toda la ciudadanía, desde instituciones públicas fortalecidas a través de la transparencia y la eficacia. El desarrollo de las tecnologías y de los nuevos medios de comunicación social constituye una oportunidad única para una mayor y mejor democracia. El PSOE debe apoyarse en ellas para ser más abierto y participativo en la defensa de los valores que nos identifican y hemos de ser vanguardia en el uso inteligente y respetuoso de estas herramientas. Una opción de progreso como la que representa el PSOE siempre debe perseguir que la política gobierne la economía, que el interés general disponga de mecanismos suficientes para prevalecer frente a los intereses privados particulares. Es un posicionamiento esencial, casi natural para una opción de izquierdas, pero no suficiente. También debe ser percibido como un partido político que está dispuesto a transformar la política, lo público, lo que es de todos, para afrontar los cambios sociales, culturales y económicos que nos ha tocado vivir, y hacerlo con tres objetivos prioritarios: la radicalidad democrática, la igualdad de oportunidades y la protección de los que más sufren la desigualdad. Cuando se habla de reformar lo público, casi siempre se hace desde posiciones conservadoras, que más que reformar, bajo el eufemismo de su adelgazamiento, buscan disminuir o eliminar la capacidad de las instituciones públicas de intervenir en la sociedad. La consecuencia es un estado débil y una sociedad en manos de los más fuertes. Frente a ello, debemos encabezar su necesaria adaptación a la realidad dotando a las instituciones de mayor eficacia y calidad desde el rigor presupuestario, con el objeto de prestar el mejor servicio y prestigiarlas ante la ciudadanía. Desde el PSOE vamos a oponernos a la degradación y la privatización de lo público que practican, directa e indirectamente, los conservadores y, precisamente por eso, proponemos una transformación del Estado, de la relación de la ciudadanía con el mismo y de los sistemas de control de los responsables públicos, como la única manera de preservar la equidad, la libertad y la igualdad de oportunidades de la ciudadanía. No se trata de disminuir su importancia, sino de aumentarla, optimizar sus recursos, reajustar su estructura a los nuevos tiempos y hacerlo con visión de futuro. Es precisamente la debilidad de los poderes públicos lo que nos ha conducido a la situación que padecemos, y sólo su fortalecimiento será capaz de ayudarnos a salir configurando una sociedad justa e igualitaria. Fortalecer lo público es mejorar los procedimientos administrativos, haciéndolos más ágiles y al alcance de todos y todas. Es convertir el Estado en un dinamizador de la sociedad, y no únicamente en su controlador. Es reducir las cargas</p>	25-26
-------------------------------	---	-------

	<p>administrativas, los papeles, las ventanillas, las duplicidades. Es seguir avanzando en la implantación de las tecnologías, en el funcionamiento de la Administración y de sus instituciones para ganar en transparencia, eficacia y accesibilidad.</p>	
--	--	--

Nº 5. UNA ECONOMÍA PARA LA GRAN MAYORÍA

Política abierta

Tu opinión nos interesa

ESTAMOS HACIENDO EL
PROGRAMA ELECTORAL
SOCIALISTA

Y queremos saber de primera mano las cosas que a ti y a los tuyos os preocupan en vuestra vida diaria.

Si nos interesa tu opinión es porque estamos convencidos de que la política y las decisiones que en ella se toman tienen siempre, para bien o para mal, consecuencias directas.

¿QUÉ TE ESTAMOS PIDIENDO?

Te pedimos que nos digas cómo ves algunos temas

...Te pedimos tu opinión

¿CÓMO PUEDES OPINAR?

A través de estos Cuadernos de Opinión con tu familia, amigos y amigas o colectivo. Después nos gustaría recibir tu opinión a través de:

900 112 000

programa@psoe.es

Ferraz 70, 28008 Madrid

91 582 04 22

http://www.psoe.es

¿Y DESPUÉS QUÉ?

Después iremos elaborando el programa electoral que esperamos que también sea el tuyo.

Pero esa será tu decisión.

¿Crees que en esta época de grandes cambios la economía va a mejorar tu bienestar y el de los tuyos?

Si te hacemos esta pregunta es porque el crecimiento económico no está trayendo siempre bienestar y empleo digno para todas y todos.

Aceptar pasivamente la globalización proponiendo como único objetivo el crecimiento y concibiendo los aumentos en la desigualdad como un precio inevitable, ha causado grandes destrozos que ya se están pagando social, económica y medio-ambientalmente. Pero la solución no es oponerse a los cambios, sino trabajar a partir de ellos.

UNA ECONOMÍA CON FUTURO, UNA ECONOMÍA AL SERVICIO DE LA GRAN MAYORÍA

El bienestar social

- avanzar hacia el pleno empleo
- el desarrollo del Estado del bienestar



El compromiso ecológico

- Objetivos ambientales en todas las políticas
- una actitud personal y política de respeto y defensa de la naturaleza

El progreso económico

- un crecimiento sólido, sostenible, basado en la ciencia y la educación,
- la inversión en infraestructuras y capital humano

En concreto, los países que mejorarán en el futuro son los que sean capaces de abrirse a un mundo sin barreras y tecnológicamente avanzado, al tiempo que preparan a todos los ciudadanos para esa nueva situación.

Además, para que exista realmente un futuro, hay que actuar contra los riesgos ecológicos con gran rapidez y decisión.

Y...¿cómo podemos hacer esto? A través de una forma diferente de abordar la política económica que combine progreso económico, bienestar social y compromiso ecológico. Esa es la nueva economía progresista.

- La vieja política...
- Una economía para la gran mayoría
- Y tú... ¿qué opinas?



JOSÉ LUIS RODRÍGUEZ ZAPATERO

“El cambio tranquilo es d

El nuevo secretario general ha devuelto la ilusión a los militantes y votantes del Partido Socialista. Es un hombre joven, comprometido, solidario, que lucha por sus ideas de transformación y servicio a los ciudadanos. Es suave en las formas pero firme en sus convicciones, cordial con el adversario, como ha demostrado en su primera visita a La Moncloa, pero decidido a fiscalizar con rigor la acción política del Gobierno. Recibió a *El Socialista* en su despacho de la planta cuarta de la calle Ferraz, una tarde calurosa de finales del mes de julio. Este es el contenido de nuestra conversación.

¿No le da miedo dedicarse a la política en un país en el que el Presidente del Gobierno acaba de echar de mala manera de la presidencia de una empresa pública privatizada a un amigo del colegio, porque ahora no le bailaba las gracias?

Precisamente estoy en la actividad pública porque quiero hacer las cosas de forma radicalmente contraria a lo que ha hecho el Sr. Aznar con Telefónica y con el Sr. Villalonga. Me parece que es el ejemplo de un uso y abuso del poder en el origen y en el final, y donde sólo los intereses personales o del poder se han puesto por encima de los intereses generales de una compañía, de su buen funcionamiento y del prestigio general de la misma.

El Gobierno del PP basa su acción política en la situación económica del país. ¿Es tan buena y, sobre todo, la perciben los ciudadanos como tal, llega a todos?

La situación económica es mejorable. Si en este país hubiera un proceso de auténtica competencia, de un reparto del poder económico y el Gobierno no estuviera dedicado, como está, a favorecer a determinados oligopolios, sería mucho mejor. La situación social, desde luego, estaría muchísimo mejor si hubiera un Gobierno de otra orientación.

¿Qué es lo que falta en la redistribución, qué sectores son los más perjudicados con esta situación económica, que es insultantemente boyante para algu-

nos, y digamos, lamentable para otros? En primer lugar, los inmigrantes. Son los más perjudicados por un Gobierno insensible que, en una situación que permitiría, desde el punto de vista económico, ayudas sociales, educativas, de vivienda, en definitiva, una política de integración, se inhibe. Pero junto a estos hay otros muchos; tenemos en estos momentos una situación bastante lamentable en las fuerzas y cuerpos de Seguridad del Estado.

Hay un deterioro objetivo de la seguridad ciudadana y hay que empezar a decirlo, el Sr. Mayor Oreja es un ineficaz en su responsabilidad. Los policías, los Guardias Civiles están con unos sueldos que no les permiten realizar un trabajo digno y eficaz. A mí me parece importante que la opinión pública lo conozca, se diga y eso sea un elemento del debate político. Además, creo que hay situaciones sociales muy claras que exigen una respuesta inmediata y urgente, por ejemplo, lo que afecta a una parte importante de las mujeres de este país, que están sin una perspectiva laboral y el Gobierno no da una respuesta mínimamente activa, mínimamente imaginativa, que apueste decididamente por elevar la tasa de ocupación y que haya más mujeres empleadas.

Lo que más nos preocupa, en segundo lugar, es que en este país trabajar es muy inseguro con este Gobierno. Trabajar es un riesgo y parece mentira que en un país, que en principio es moderno y avanzado, tengamos los índices de siniestralidad y

mortalidad laboral que tenemos. Hay una dejación del gobierno que no exige ni a las autoridades, ni a los empresarios una respuesta mínimamente creíble. Estos son dos problemas sociales que creo que deberían ser absolutamente prioritarios.

¿Qué respuestas tiene la izquierda, el Partido Socialista, ante los retos de la Nueva Economía?

La izquierda debe hablar de nueva sociedad y no permitir que el capitalismo se adueñe de lo que es progreso tecnológico, de la capacidad creativa del hombre, de desarrollar y de investigar. Debemos coger el toro por los cuernos y liderar lo que es la Nueva Economía, convirtiéndola en nueva sociedad. Nosotros debemos llevar el mundo de la comunicación, de la información de las nuevas tecnologías a todos los rincones de la sociedad. Hay que poner al servicio de la inmensa mayoría de los agricultores, de los pequeños comerciantes, de los trabajadores autónomos, en definitiva, de toda la sociedad, los instrumentos suficientes para que puedan incorporarse a la comunicación, que es el futuro y quien se quede atrás en eso va a ser muy difícil que pueda recuperar el tiempo perdido. Creo que hoy las posibilidades que se abren para llevar adelante un proyecto socialista son mucho más atractivas de lo que pudieran serlo en otro momento histórico.

¿Qué es lo peor de los hombres que nos gobiernan, del núcleo dirigente del PP?



Invirtiendo en futuro: parques científicos y tecnológicos

Las estadísticas internacionales nos muestran que en las dos últimas décadas la producción científica española ha crecido de manera significativa, cuantitativa y cualitativamente. Si tenemos en cuenta los artículos científicos publicados, hoy ocupamos un lugar en el escenario mundial que se aproxima al que correspondería a nuestra dimensión económica. La comunidad científica ha sacado buen partido de una inversión que apenas superaba el cincuenta por ciento de la media de la Unión Europea en 2004, medida en porcentaje del Producto Interior Bruto.

En los Presupuestos para 2005 el incremento de la inversión pública en I+D+i ha alcanzado el 27% y el compromiso del Gobierno es mantener el esfuerzo a lo largo de la legislatura. Con ello se pretende potenciar y consolidar nuestra capacidad para generar conocimiento, dedicando más recursos y mejorando su gestión, pero también impulsar la transferencia y transformación del conocimiento generado. Si ha sido destacable la mejora de la producción científica, las estadísticas también nos muestran el principal punto débil del sistema español de ciencia y tecnología: su bajo rendimiento a la hora de transformar conocimiento en innovación. Es aquí donde los parques científicos y tecnológicos realizan una función estratégica.

Según la Asociación Internacional de Parques Científicos y Tecnológicos (IASP), un parque científico-tecnológico es una organización gestionada por profesionales especializados, cuyo objetivo fundamental es incrementar la riqueza de su comunidad promoviendo la cultura de la innovación y la competitividad de las empresas e instituciones generadoras de saber instaladas en el parque o asociadas a él. A tal fin, un parque científico-tecnológico estimula y gestiona el flujo de conocimiento y tecnología entre Universidades, instituciones de investigación, empresas y mercados; impulsa la creación y el crecimiento de empresas innovadoras mediante mecanismos de incubación y de generación centrí-

fuga (*spin-off*), y proporciona otros servicios de valor añadido así como espacio e instalaciones de gran calidad.

Una gran parte de los parques de nueva creación son parques científicos. Estos parques, en los que se establece una fuerte interacción entre investigación pública y privada e innovación, suelen ubicarse dentro de un campus universitario o en una zona próxima, con fuerte influencia del entorno académico. Es habitual que cuenten con un Centro Europeo de Empresas e Innovación (CEEI) u otro tipo de incubadoras para impulsar la creación de empresas innovadoras. La incubadora de empresas de base tecnológica del Parque científico de las Universidades Autónoma y Complutense de Madrid y la Bioincubadora CIDEM-PCB, instalada en el Parc Científic de Barcelona, son buenos ejemplos. El papel de las incubadoras académicas tecnológicas adquiere especial importancia en campos como la biotecnología, donde

no existen grandes infraestructuras científicas de apoyo fuera del sistema público. Las infraestructuras universitarias son fundamentales para mejorar la competitividad y supervivencia de las bioempresas *spin-off*.

Las ayudas públicas estatales a los parques científicos y tecnológicos se realizan principalmente en forma de créditos con cargo al Capítulo VIII de los Presupuestos que pueden combinarse con subvenciones. En 2005 se invertirán cerca de 190 millones de euros, diez veces los recursos destinados en 2004. En la última convocatoria se ha procurado facilitar la gestión y mejorar las características del préstamo. A los tres años de carencia, un tipo de interés del 0% y un plazo máximo de amortización de 15 años, se suma que los parques no tendrán ya que depositar avales para acceder a los créditos.

La innovación aporta a las empresas ventajas competitivas y a los servicios públicos mayor calidad y eficiencia. En la empresa el estímulo de la innovación tecnológica y la transferencia de conocimientos son esenciales para aumentar la productividad y, con ella, la competitividad. En ese incremento de la productividad está la base de un modelo de crecimiento económico equilibrado y duradero que nos permitirá alcanzar mayores niveles de bienestar y mayor cohesión social.

En el Programa electoral, el PSOE proponía un nuevo modelo para el sistema de investigación e innovación, un sistema de I+D fortalecido en sus posibilidades de producir conocimientos científico-técnicos y reforzado en su relación con las empresas. El impulso del Gobierno a los parques científicos y tecnológicos va justo en esa dirección y es una inversión en nuestro futuro. ■

Félix García Lausín

Preparados para el futuro

INMACULADA RODRÍGUEZ-PIÑERO

Secretaria de Política Económica y Empleo

No es casualidad que en la Conferencia Política las nuevas tecnologías hayan sido las protagonistas. La modernización de nuestro país es uno de los objetivos de este Partido, aplicar esa modernidad es una prioridad, también en economía.

Nuestro Secretario General ha llevado al centro de sus discursos la política económica consiguiendo así acercar al ciudadano la información económica, esa misma información que antes era tratada con tanto oscurantismo. Por fin se ha abierto el debate económico a la sociedad, transmitiendo la apuesta por el progreso social, la estabilidad presupuestaria y por un modelo de crecimiento económico duradero en el tiempo y medioambientalmente sostenible para conseguir un país moderno, preparado para los nuevos retos y socialmente más justo.

Y es que, pese a las críticas sin sentido y oportunistas del PP, la

Creemos más que antes y más que la media de la Eurozona, EEUU o Japón. Este ritmo de crecimiento nos va a permitir superar en renta per cápita, en 2010, a países como Italia y converger con Europa.

Pero no sólo crecemos más, sino que la composición del crecimiento ha evolucionado hacia un patrón más equilibrado. Fruto de ello es la mejora del comportamiento de las exportaciones, la recuperación de la actividad industrial y el aumento de la inversión en bienes de equipo. Este dinamismo es más significativo si tenemos en cuenta el elevado precio del petróleo y el alza de los tipos de interés. Dos factores externos que escapan a la acción del Gobierno y presionan la inflación y el nivel de endeudamiento de los ciudadanos.

En cuanto al mercado laboral, una política de empleo acertada junto con los resultados de los más de

20 acuerdos fruto del diálogo social, se traducen en que se han creado 900.000 puestos de trabajo en el último año, en que la tasa de paro baja hasta el 8,5% y en que diariamente se convierten 5.000 empleos temporales en indefinidos. Así, hasta finales de año podremos alcanzar 800.000 contratos que van a ser indefinidos y antes eran precarios, la mayoría para mujeres y jóvenes, para que tengan más oportunidades y un horizonte de emancipación mucho más claro en sus vidas.

Y todo ello gobernando con austeridad, con la responsabilidad del buen gobierno y el rigor presupuestario. Por eso se ha logrado, por primera vez en la historia, un superávit presupuestario del 1,1% del PIB. Unas cuentas públicas saneadas que nos prepararán y serán un seguro para anticipar los riesgos de futuro, para hacer frente al reto del envejecimiento de la población.

Pero, sin lugar a dudas, el reto más trascendental de la economía pasa por aumentar la productividad y por fomentar la competitividad de nuestras empresas. La res-

puesta ante el fenómeno de la globalización y de la competencia en los mercados internacionales no puede ser la adopción de estrategias puramente defensivas. Debemos profundizar en la modernización de nuestra estructura productiva para potenciar nuestras ventajas comparativas y ser capaces de desarrollar productos y servicios nuevos, innovadores y de mayor calidad. Y por ello el Ejecutivo tiene, por primera vez en la historia, una estrategia pública de liderazgo en I+D+i tal y como se ve reflejado en los Presupuestos para 2007 que dan un impulso decidido a la investigación civil y cumplen, con un año de adelanto, con el compromiso de duplicar el gasto de I+D+i en esta legislatura. Los Presupuestos del próximo año son una confirmación de la apuesta por el gasto público productivo, social y solidario con un doble objetivo: la consolidación del gasto social, que experimentará un crecimiento superior al 8% y el impulso a la productividad a través de un incremento del gasto de infraestructuras que superará los 14.000 millones de euros y de un aumento del 26% en educación que permitirá mejorar nuestro capital humano. Y todo ello bajo el paraguas de la estabilidad presupuestaria. Aquellos que nos acusan de no to-

mar medidas para preparar a nuestro país para el futuro son los mismos que nunca se preocuparon de adelantarse al mañana, que dejaron un país con una bolsa de inmigrantes sin regularizar, con una dependencia energética exterior del 80%, con una escalada de precios de la vivienda inasumible por las rentas medias y bajas y con la política del "todo urbanizable" que tanto daño ha hecho a nuestras ciudades. El Gobierno de Zapatero, en tan sólo dos años, ha estructurado políticas de eficiencia y ahorro energético dando un impulso clave a los energías renovables, ha realizado una regularización de inmigrantes que ya tienen derechos y deberes, ha instrumentado una política de vivienda por primera vez en España y ha reforzado las infraestructuras para seguir cohesionando territorialmente nuestro país.

Esto es preparar a un país para el futuro. Aún queda mucho trabajo por hacer, muchos retos que resolver, pero la diferencia es que ahora contamos con un Gobierno comprometido, empeñado en llevar el desarrollo y la modernización a todos los ciudadanos. Porque la extensión de derechos sociales no se contraponen con la eficacia económica y este Gobierno así lo está demostrando. ■

Tarjetas de Navidad de Solidaridad Internacional

Imprime tu mensaje en el interior

Colección Enrique Krause
Tamaño plegadas: 15 x 11 cm.

- Modelo 01
- Modelo 02

Colección Mónica Pironio
Tamaño plegadas: 20 x 10 cm.

- Modelo 04
- Modelo 05
- Modelo 06

Y ADEMÁS...

- Agendas personalizadas
- Calendarios
- Cestas de Alimentación de Comercio Justo

Menos de 200 uds. **PVP 0,74 €**

De 200 a 1.000 uds. **PVP 0,72 €**

Más de 1.000 uds. **PVP 0,67 €**

solidaridad internacional

www.solidaridad.org
902 15 23 23

Las tarjetas de navidad de Solidaridad Internacional tienen un valor añadido: el de quienes se benefician de las acciones de desarrollo que desde 1986 la ONG lleva a cabo en América Latina, África y Oriente próximo.

HAZ TU PEDIDO YA EN EL 91 598 62 90 O POR EMAIL: agarcia@solidaridad.org

References

- Aguiar, F. (2006). *The Spanish Socialist Workers Party (PSOE) 1879-1988. From Republican to Liberal Socialism*, IESA Working paper series, Instituto de Estudios Sociales de Andalucía-CSIC. Retrieved from <http://digital.csic.es/bitstream/10261/2061/1/19-06.pdf>
- Albert Verdú, C. & Roig Cotanda, M. (2013). *Tuition fees in Spanish Public Universities in the academic year 2012-13*, Universidad de Alcalá José, Universitat de València, IEB: Institut d'Economia de Barcelona, 1-25.
- Andersen, E. (1989). *Welfare States: Construction, Deconstruction, Reconstruction II*, Adaptation from Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology, Vol. 26:29, 3-75. Retrieved from <http://rszarf.ips.uw.edu.pl/welfare-state/esping-andersen.pdf>
- Anton, A. & Schmidt, R. (Ed.). (2011). *Hacia un nuevo Socialismo*. Madrid: El Viejo Topo.
- Aristóteles. (1998). *Retórica*. Madrid: Alianza Editorial.
- Bailey, D. J. (2010). *The political economy of European Social Democracy. A critical realistic approach*. Abingdon: Routledge.
- Band, U. (2011). *Post-Neoliberalismus? Aktuelle Konflikte Gegen-hegemoniale Strategien*. Hamburg: VSA Verlag.
- Beck, U. (1997). *Was ist Globalisierung?* Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag.
- Bell, D. (1964). *El fin de las ideologías*. Madrid: Tecnos.
- Benavides Delgado, J. (2003). *Lenguaje publicitario: hacia un estudio del lenguaje en los medios*. Madrid: Síntesis, 2003.
- Berger, P. & Luckmann, T. (1966). *The social construction of reality. A treatise in the Sociology of knowledge*. London: Penguin Books.
- Bergold, J. & Thomas, S. (2012). *Participatory Research Methods: A Methodological Approach in Motion*. *Forum Forum. Qualitative Social Research*, 13 (1). Art. 30, 2012.

Retrieved from <http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:0114-fqs1201302>

- Bevir, M. (2008). *Key Concepts in Governance*. London: SAGE Publications.
- Birch, K. & Mykhnenko, V. (2008). *Varieties of Neoliberalism? Restructuring in large industrially dependent regions across Western and Eastern Europe*. Centre for Public Policy for Regions, working paper 14.
- Birch, K. & Mykhnenko, V. (ed.). (2010). *The rise and fall of neoliberalism. The collapse of an economic order*. London: Zed Books.
- Blätte, A., Zitzler, S. (2014). *Vorsorgene Sozialpolitik als sozialpolitisches Leitbild der SPD*. In Lemke, M., Schaal, G. S. & Ritzi, C. (Ed.). *Die Ökonomisierung der Politik in Deutschland. Eine Vergleichende Politikfeldanalyse*. Wiesbaden: Springer.
- Blommaert, J. (2010). *The sociolinguistic of globalization*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Bobbio, N. (1995). *Derecha e izquierda*. Madrid: Taurus.
- Bogumil, J. (2001). *Modernisierung lokaler Politik. Kommunale Entscheidungsprozesse im Spannungsfeld zwischen Parteienwettbewerb, Verhandlungszwängen und Ökonomisierung*. Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft.
- Bohnsack, R., Marotzki, W. & Meuser, M. (Ed.). (2003). *Hauptbegriffe Qualitative Sozialforschung*. Opladen: Leske + Budrich.
- Bourdieu, P. (1998). *Acts of resistance. Against the new Myths of our time* (Translated by R. Nice). Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Bourdieu, P. (1998). *The essence of neoliberalism*. Le Monde Diplomatic. Retrieved from: <http://mondediplo.com/1998/12/08bourdieu>
- Bourdieu, P. & Wacquant, L. *New Liberal Speak*. (2001). *Notes on the new planetary vulgate*. On Radical Philosophy, issue 105, 2-5, 2001. Retrieved from: XXXXXX
- Bradani, D. (2009). *The Rise of the Competitiveness Discourse—A Neo-Gramscian Analysis*,

Bruges Political Research Papers / Cahiers de recherche politique de Bruges, n° 10.

Retrieved from: XXX

Brady, D., Beckfield, J. & Seeleib-Kaiser, M. (2004). *Economic globalization and the welfare state in affluent democracies, 1975-1998*. Zentrum für Sozialpolitik, Zes-Arbeitspapier Nr. 12/2004, 921-948.

Brakman, S., Garretsen, H., van Marrewijk, C.; van Witteloostuijn, A. (2006). *Nations and firms in the global economy. An introduction to international economics and business*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Brand, U., Brunnengräber, A. & Schrader L. (2000). *Global Governance. Alternative zur neoliberalen Globalisierung*. Münster: Weltfäliches Dampfboot.

Bresser-Pereira, C., Maravall, J. M. & Przeworski, A. (1994). *Economic reforms in new democracies: a social-democratic approach*. In Smith, W. C., Acuña, C.H. & Gamarra, E. *Theoretical and Comparative Perspectives for the 1990s*, New Brunswick: Transaction Books, 181-212.

Broad, R. (2010). *The Washington Consensus meets the global backlash: Shifting debates and policies*. In James, P. & Stager, M. B.: *Globalization and culture*. London: SAGE.

Brown, W. (2005). *Critical Essays on knowledge and politics*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Butterwegge, C., Lösch, B. & Ptak, R. (2008). *Kritik des Neoliberalismus, 2. Verbesserte Auflage*. Wiesbaden: NS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften.

Carrol, W. (2007). *Hegemony and Counter-Hegemony in a global field*, *Studies in Social Justice*, Volume 1, Issue 1, 36-66.

Carvajal, P. (2005). *Más de 100 años*. Madrid: Fundación Pablo Iglesias, Divisa Home Video.
Retrieved from: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SqmK2cK_xnI

Castells, M. (2009). *Communication power*. New York: Oxford University Press.

- Cerny, P. G. (2010). *Embedding Neoliberalism. The Evolution of a Hegemonic Paradigm*. In *Rethinking World Politics: A Theory of Transnational Neopluralism*, New York: Oxford University Press.
- Charaudeau, P. & Maingueneau, D. (2005). *Diccionario de análisis del discurso*. Madrid: Publicaciones Amorrotu,.
- Charaudeau, P. (2005). *Le discours politique. Les masques du pouvoir*. Paris: Librairie Vuibert.
- Chilton, P. (2004). *Analysing political discourse. Theory and Practice*. Oxon: Routledge.
- Clark, B. R. (1998). *Creating Entrepreneurial Universities. Organizational Pathways of Transformation*. Oxford: IAU Press Pergamon.
- Classic economics*. (n.d.). Encyclopedia Britannica. Retrieved from <https://www.britannica.com/topic/classical-economics>
- Clifton, J., Comín, F. & Díaz Fuentes, D. (2003). *Privatisation in the European Union, Public enterprises and integration*. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publisher.
- Coffey, B. (2014). *Market metaphors and the environment. A critical Discourse Analysis*. 9th International Conference on Interpretative Policy Analysis, Panel Session.
- Congreso. 26J Elecciones Generales. (June 2016). In Ministerio del Interior, Retrieved from <http://resultados2016.infoelecciones.es/99CO/DCO99999TO.htm?lang=es>
- Corbetta, P. (2007). *Metodología y técnicas de investigación social*, Madrid: McGraw-Hill.
- Corner, J. & Hawthron, J.. (1985): *Communication studies. An introductory reader*, Abingdon: Routledge.
- Coseriu, E. & Laureda, Ó. (2006). *Lenguaje y discurso*. Navarra: Ediciones Universidad de Navarra (EUNSA).
- Cramme, O. (2011). *The power of European integration. Social democracy in search of a purpose*. *Policy Network*, 1-14. Retrieved from: <http://www.policy->

network.net/publications/4047/-The-power-of-European-integration-Social-democracy-in-search-of-a-purpose

- Creswell, J. W. (2009). *Research design. Quantitative, qualitative and mixed methods approaches*. California: SAGE Publications.
- Crouch, C. (2013). *Jenseits des Neoliberalismus: Ein Plädoyer für soziale Gerechtigkeit*. Wien: Passagen Verlag.
- Crouch, C. (2004). *Post-democracy*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Crouch, C. (2008). *Postdemokratie*. Frankfurt am Main: Edition Suhrkamp.
- Czerwick, E. (2007). *Die Ökonomisierung des öffentlichen Dienst. Dienstrechtreformen und Beschäftigungsstrukturen seit 1991*. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag.
- Dahlman, C. J., Routti, J. & Ylä-Anttila, P.(ed.). (2007). *Finland as a knowledge economy. Elements of success and lessons learned*. WBI Development Studies, World Bank Institute.
- Dan, V. (2011). *The added value of frames: On the differences with related concepts*. In: *Critical perspectives on the European media sphere. The intellectual work of the 2011 ECREA European media and communication doctoral summer school*. Retrieved from <http://www.researchingcommunication.eu>).
- Dessons, G. (2006). *Émile Benveniste, L'invention du discours*. Paris: Éditions IN PRESS.
- Diamond, P. (2012, September 27). *Left Parties have lost their Way*. Social Europe Journal. Retrieved from: <http://www.social-europe.eu/2012/10/left-parties-have-lost-their-way/>
- Dijk, Van T. A. (2005). *Política, ideología y discurso*. Quórum Académico, Vol. 2, n. 2, 15-47.
- Dijk, Van T. A. (2006). *Ideología: una aproximación multidisciplinaria*. Sevilla: Editorial Gedisa.

- Dijk, Van T. A. (2008). *Ideología y discurso. Una introducción multidisciplinaria*. Barcelona: Ariel Lingüística.
- Dijk, Van T. A. (2008) *Ideología y discurso*. Barcelona: Editorial Ariel.
- Dijk, Van T. A. (2009). *Discurso y poder: contribuciones a los estudios críticos del discurso*. Barcelona: Editorial Gedisa.
- Dijk, Van T. A. (Ed.). (2011). *Discourse Studies: a Multidisciplinary Introduction*. London: SAGE Publications Ltd, London, 2011.
- Dingeldey, I. (2011). *Der aktivierende Wohlfahrtsstaat. Governance der Arbeitsmarktpolitik in Dänemark, Grossbritannien und Deutschland*. Frankfurt: Capus Verlag.
- Dolenec, D. (2006). *Marketization in higher education policy an analysis of higher education funding policy reforms in Western Europe between 1980 and 2000*. *Revija za Socijalnu Politiku, Journal of Social Policy* 13 (1) , 15-34.
- Dolowitz, D. P., Marsh, D. (2000). *Learning from Abroad: The Role of Policy Transfer in Contemporary Policy-Making, Governance*. *An International Journal of Policy and Administration*, Vol. 13, No. 1, Blackwell Publishers, Oxford, 5–24. Retrieved from <http://ejournal.narotama.ac.id/files/0952-1895%252E00121.pdf>
- Donald, J. Hall, S. (1986). *Politics and Ideology*. Philadelphia: Open University Press.
- Donati, P. R. (2001). *Die Rahmenanalyse politischer Diskurse*. In KelleR, R.; Hierseland, A., Schneider, W. & Viehöver, W. (Ed.). *Handbuch Sozialwissenschaftliche Diskursanalyse. Band 1: Theorie und Metyhoden*. Wiesbaden: Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften.
- Downs, A. (1957). *An economic theory of political action in a democracy*. *The Journal of political economy*, The University of Chicago Press, Volume 65, Issue 2,135-150. Retrieved from <http://www.hec.unil.ch/ocadot/ECOPOdocs/cadot2.pdf>

- Drucker, P. (1969). *The Sickness of Government*, National Affairs, issue 14. Retrieved from http://www.nationalaffairs.com/public_interest/detail/the-sickness-of-government
- Dumm, S. & Ritzi, C. (2014). *Analyse von Ökonomisierungsprozessen. Ein Überblick am Gegenstand der empirischen Politikfeldforschung*. In Lemke, M., Schaal, G. S. & Ritzi, C. (Ed.). *Die Ökonomisierung der Politik in Deutschland. Eine Vergleichende Politikfeldanalyse*. Wiesbaden: Springer.
- Early leavers from education and training*. (May 2017). Statistics Explained. Eurostat. Retrieved from http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Early_leavers_from_education_and_training
- Eikenberry, A.M. & Kluver, J. D. (2004). *The marketization of non-profit sector: civil society at risk?*, Public Administration Review 64 (2), 32-141.
- España y la Unión Europea*. (n.d.). Ministerio de Asuntos Europeos y Cooperación, Gobierno de España. Retrieved from <http://www.exteriores.gob.es/Portal/es/PoliticaExteriorCooperacion/UnionEuropea/Paginas/EspUE.aspx>
- Evers, A. & Heinze, R. G. (Ed.) (2008). *Sozialpolitik. Ökonomisierung und Entgrenzung*. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag.
- Eves, P. (2004). *Language & Hegemony in Gramsci*. London: Pluto Press. Retrieved from <http://www.algumlugar.net/flavia/politeia/Language-nHegemony-nGramsci.pdf>
- Fairclough, N. (1992). *Discourse and social change*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Fairclough, N. (1994). *A dialectical-relational approach to critical Discourse Analysis in social research*. In Schroer, N.: *Interpretative Sozialforschung. Auf dem Wege zu einer hermeneutischen Wissenssoziologie*. Opladen: Westdeutsche Verlag.
- Fairclough, N. (2000). *New Labour, new language*. London: Routledge.
- Fairclough, N. (2001). *Globaler Kapitalismus und kritisches Diskursbewusstsein. Die*

- Rahmenanalyse politischer Diskurse*. In Keller, R.; Hiersland, A., Schneider, W. & Viehöver, W. (Ed.). *Handbuch Sozialwissenschaftliche Diskursanalyse. Band 1: Theorie und Methoden*. Wiesbaden: Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften.
- Fairclough, N. (2001a). The dialectics of discourse. *Textus*, Vol. XIV, No. 2, 231-242.
- Fairclough, N. (2001b). *Critical Discourse Analysis as a method in social scientific research*. In Wodak, R. & Meyer, Michel (Eds.). *Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis*. London: SAGE Publications, p. 121-138.
- Fairclough, N. (2003). *Analysing discourse. Textual analysis for social research*. London: Routledge.
- Fairclough, N. (2006). *Language and Globalization*. Oxon: Routledge.
- Fairclough, N. & Fairclough, I. (2012). *Political Discourse Analysis. Method for advanced students*. Oxon: Routledge.
- Featherstone, M. (2001). *Postnational flows, identity formation and culture space*. In BEN-Rafael, E. & Sternberg, Y. (ed.). *Identity, culture and globalization, The Annals of the International Institute of Sociology*, volume 8, Leiden: Brill.
- Fiss, P. C. & Hirsch, P. M. (2005). *The Discourse of Globalization: Framing and Sensemaking of an Emerging Concept*. *American Sociological Review*, VOL. 70, 29–52.
- Flick, U. (2000). *Qualitative Forschung. Theorie, Methoden, Anwendung in Psychologie und Sozialwissenschaft*. Reinbek bei Hamburg: Rowohlt Taschenbuch Verlag.
- Forgacs, D. (ed.) (2000). *The Gramsci reader. Selected writings 1916-1935*. New York: New York University Press. Retrieved from <http://ouleft.org/wp-content/uploads/gramsci-reader.pdf>
- Foucault, M. (1969, version 2006). *Arqueología del saber*. México: Siglo XXI.
- Foucault, M. (1969, version 1972). *The Archaeology of Knowledge*. London: Routledge.
- Foucault, M. (1970, version 1999). *El orden del discurso*. Barcelona: Tusquets Editores.

- Fukuyama, F. (1992). *The end of the history and the last man*. New York: The Free Press.
- Funtowicz, S. (2014). *Is the Internet to science what the Gutenberg press was to church? Collapsing the monopole of knowledge*, Keynote lecture, 9th International Conference on Interpretative Policy Analysis.
- Garret, G. (1998). *Partisan politics in the global economy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Gause, C. (2004). *Die Ökonomisierung der Bundeswehr. Strategische Neuausrichtung und organisationskulturelle Rahmenbedingungen*. Wiesbaden: Deutscher Universitäts-Verlag.
- Gieler, W. & Delay, I. (2005). *Globalization and transition. Case studies in economical and socio-political perspectives*. Berlin: Wissenschaftlicher Verlag Berlin.
- Gill, S. (2003). *Gramsci, Modernity and Globalization*, International Gramsci Society. Retrieved from http://www.internationalgramscisociety.org/resources/online_articles/articles/gill01.shtml
- Glaser, G. G. & Strauss, A. L. (1967). *The discovery of Grounded Theory: strategies for qualitative research*, New Brunswick, London: Aldine Transaktion.
- Glyn, A. (2001). *Aspirations, constrains and outcomes*. In GLYN, A. (Ed.). *Social democracy in neoliberal times. The left and economic policy since 1980*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 8-20.
- GDP Growth*. (n.d.). The World Bank. Retrieved from <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG?locations=ES>
- Goffman, Erwin (1964): *Frame Analysis. An essay on the organization of experiences*, Noththeastern University Press, Boston, 1974.

- Golubović, N. & Golubović, S. (2012). *Embedded neoliberalism. Sustainability of Serbs and ethnic minorities in border municipalities in eastern and southern Serbia*. University of Niš.
- Gramsci, A. (Ed. by Gerratana, V.). (1981). *Cuadernos de la Cárcel*, Tomo 1, 2. México D.F.: Edición Era. Retrieved from <https://kmarx.files.wordpress.com/2012/06/gramsci-antonio-cuadernos-de-la-cc3a1rcel-vol-1.pdf>
- Grassl, H. (2008). *Ökonomisierung der Bildungsproduktion. Zu einer Theorie des Konservativen Bildungstaats*. Baden-Baden: Nomos.
- Greimas, A. J. (1966). *Semántica estructural. Investigación metodológica*. Paris: Librairie Larousse.
- Grohs, S. (2010). *Modernisierung kommunaler Sozialpolitik. Anpassungsstrategien im Wohlfahrtskorporatismus*. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaft.
- Gummett, P. (1996). *Globalization and public policy. Studies in international political economy*. Glos: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited.
- Hall, S. (2003, August 6). *New Labour has picked up where Thatcherism left off*. The Guardian Online. Retrieved from <http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2003/aug/06/society.labour>
- Halliday, M. A. K. (version 1982). *El lenguaje como semiótica social. Una interpretación social del lenguaje y del significado*. México: Fondo de Cultura Económica.
- Harris, R. (1988). *Language, Saussure and Wittgenstein*. Padstow: T.J. Press.
- Harris, Z. H. (1952). *Discourse Analysis*. Language, Vol. 28, 1, 1-30.
- Harvey, D. (2010). *Neoliberalism as a creative destruction, Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. 610, 22-44.
- Hayek, F.A. (version 1945): *The road to serfdom with The intellectuals and Socialism* (condensed version), The Institute of Economic Affairs, London, 2005.

- Heinrich, P. & Kirstein, D. (Ed.). (2006). *Ökonomisierung des Hochschulwesens*. Redebeiträge und Thesen des 17. Glienischer Gesprächs, FH für Verwaltung und Rechtspflege Berlin
- Hideko, Magara (2014). *Economic Crises and Policy Regimes: The Dynamics of Policy Innovation and Paradigmatic Change*. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing.
- Hirsch, J. (1991). *From the Fordist to the Post-Fordist state*. In Jessop, B., Nielsen, K., Kastendiek, H. & Pedersen, K. O. (1991). *The politics of Flexibility. Restructuring state and industry in Britain, Germany and Scandinavia*. Brookfield: Edward Elgar.
- Hirsch, J. (1995). *Globalization of capital, democracy and citizenship*. Aalborg.
- Hitzler, R. & Honer, A. (1997). *Sozialwissenschaftliche Hermeneutik*. Opladen: Leske+Budrich.
- Hoare, Q. & Nowell, G. (ed. and translated). (1999). *Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci (1929-1933)*. London: The Electric Book Company Ltd.
- Hodgson, A. (ed.): *Policies, politics and the future of the Lifelong learning*, Kogan Page, London: 2000.
- Hogan, J. P. (Ed.). (2006). *Cultural Identity, Pluralism, and Globalization. Volumen 1*, Washington: Council for Research in Values and Philosophy.
- Hood, C. (1995). "The New Public Management" in the 1980s: Variations on a theme, *Accounting, Organizations and Society*, Vol. 20, N 2/3, pp. 93-109. Retrieved from <http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.464.4899&rep=rep1&type=pdf>
- Iguarta, J. C. (2010). *La verdadera historia del PSOE: de Pablo Iglesias a Zapatero*. Madrid: Buenas Letras.
- Íñiguez Rueda, L. (2006). *Análisis del discurso*. Manual para las ciencias sociales. Barcelona: Editorial UOC.
- Introduction*, Maxqda 2007, VERBI Software, Consult. Sozialforschung GmbH, p. 4, Marburg,

2007.

Jacques, M. (2000). *¿Tercera vía o neoliberalismo?*. Barcelona: Icaria.

Jäger, S. (1993). *Diskurstheorien. Diskursanalytische Methoden*. In: Hug, T. (Ed.). *Stichwörter zum „Insbrucker Taschenbuch der Pädagogie“* (2nd Ed.). Duisburg: DISS.

Jäger, S. (2001). *Kritische Diskursanalyse. Eine Einführung*. Duisburg: DISS.

Jäger, S. (2002). *Kritische Diskursanalyse in der Praxis*. In Marvin, C.; Dembowski, G. (Ed.): *Das Foucaultsche Labyrinth. Eine Einführung*. Aschaffenburg: Alibri, 2002.

Jäger, M. & Jäger, S.: *Deutungskämpfe. Theorie und Praxis Kritischer Diskursanalyse*, VS Verlag, Wiesbaden, 2007.

Jakobson, R. (version 1974). *Ensayos de Lingüística general*, Editorial Ariel, Barcelona, 1984.

Jessop, B. (2003). *Globalization: It's about Time too!*. Wien: Institut für höhere Studien (IHS).

Retrieved from https://www.ihs.ac.at/publications/pol/pw_85.pdf

Jones, A. (2010). *Globalization. Key Thinkers*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Jordán Galduf, J. M. (2003). *Balance de la integración de España en la Unión Europea*, 25

Años de Constitución Española. ICE, issue 811, 113-132. Retrieved from

http://www.revistasice.com/CachePDF/ICE_811_113-

[132__04757A14E53491E76A60A88A78E09FCA.pdf](http://www.revistasice.com/CachePDF/ICE_811_113-132__04757A14E53491E76A60A88A78E09FCA.pdf)

Kapeller, J. & Huber, J. (2009). *Politische Paradigmata und neoliberale Einflüsse am Beispiel von vier soziodemokratischen Parteien in Europa*. Österreichische Zeitschrift für Politikwissenschaft (ÖZP), 38. Jg. H.2, 163-192. Retrieved from <http://bit.ly/2xVuzNq>

Keynesian economics (n.d.). Encyclopedia Britannica. Retrieved from <https://www.britannica.com/topic/Keynesian-economics>

Keller, R. (1998). *Die gesellschaftliche Konstruktion des Wervollen; die öffentliche Diskussion über Abfall in Deutschland und Frankreich*. Opladen/Wiesbaden: Westdeutscher Verlag.

- Keller, R. (2005). *Wissenssoziologische Diskursanalyse. Grundlegung eines Forschungsprogramms*. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften.
- Keller, R. (2007). *Diskursforschung. Eine Einführung für SozialwissenschaftlerInnen*. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag.
- Kennedy, P. (1997). *The PSOE modernization and welfare state in Spain*. In Sassoon, D. *Looking Left: European Socialists after the Cold War*. London: Tauris & Co.
- Kennedy, P. (2013). *Spain*, in De Waele, J., Escalona, F. & Vieira, M. (ed.). *The Palgrave handbook of social democracy in the European Union*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Kerber, H. & Schmieder, A. (Ed.). (1984). *Handbuch Soziologie. Zur Theorie und Praxis sozialer Beziehungen*. Reinbek bei Hamburg: Rowohlt Taschenbuch Verlag.
- Kirchgässner, G. (1997). *Auf der Such nach dem Gespenst des Ökonomismus. Einige Bemerkung über Tausch, Märkte und die Ökonomisierung der Lebensverhältnisse*. *Analyse & Kritik*, 19, 127-152.
- Klein, N. (2008). *The Shock doctrine. The rise of disaster capitalism*. New York: Metropolitan Books.
- Klein, P., Mahoney, J. T., Pitelis, C. N, & McGahan, A. M. (2010). *Toward a theory of public entrepreneurship*. *European Management Review*, issue 7, Macmillan Publishers, 1-15. Retrieved from <http://seipa.edu.pl/s/p/artykuly/93/932/Public%20Entrepreneurship%20Theory%202009.pdf>
- Klein, A. & Heitmeyer, W. (2011). *Demokratientleerung und Ökonomisierung des Sozialen: Ungleichwertigkeit als Folge verschobener Kontrollbilanzen*. *Leviathan* 39 (3), 361-383.
- Krems, B. (n. d.). *New Public Management, Online-Verwaltungslexikon*, Köln. Retrieved from <http://olev.de/n/nsm.htm>

- Laclau, E. & Mouffe, C. (1991) *Hegemonie und radikale Demokratie: zur Dekonstruktion des Marxismus*. Wien: Passagen Verlag.
- Laclau, E. & Mouffe, C. (1985). *Hegemonía y estrategia socialista. Hacia una radicalización de la democracia*. Madrid: Siglo XXI.
- Lakoff, G. & Johnson, M. (1980). *Metaphors we live by*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Lakoff, G. (1996). *Moral Politics*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Lakoff, G. (2004). *Don't Think of an Elephant: Know Your Values. Frame the Debate*. Vermont: Chelsea Green Publishing.
- Lakoff, G. & Wehling, E. (2008). *Auf leisen Sohlen ins Gehirn. Politische Sprache und ihre heimliche Macht*. Heidelberg: Carl Auer Verlag.
- Lawlor, T. & Rigby, M. (ed.). (1998). *Contemporary Spain*. London / New York: Longman.
- Lears, T. J. J. (1985). *The concept of cultural hegemony: problems and possibilities*. The American History Review, Volume 90, Issue 3, 1985, 567-593. Retrieved from <http://xroads.virginia.edu/~DRBR2/lears.pdf>
- Lemke, M. (2012). *Die Ökonomisierung des Politischen. Entdifferenzierungen in kollektiven Entscheidungsprozessen*. Epol, Schriftenreihe des Verbundprojekts Postdemokratie und Neoliberalismus, Discussion Paper Nr. 2. Retrieved from http://www.epol-projekt.de/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/Discussion-Paper-epol-2_lemke.pdf
- Lemke, M., Schaal, G. S. & Ritzi, C. (2013). *Ökonomisierung statt Neoliberalismus. Eine Forschungsheuristik zur Analyse der Hegemonialwerdung von Marktlogiken in zeitgenössischen Demokratien*. Unkown publisher.
- Lemke, M., Schaal, G. S. & Dumm, S. (2013). Economization. Strategies for the identification of economic arguments in hugh text data collections. Workshop VisArgue, Universität Konstanz, 2013.
- Lemke, M. & Dumm, S. (2013). *Argumentmarker. Definition, Generierung und Anwendung im*

- Rahmen eines semi-automatischen Dokument-Retrieval-Verfahrens.* Epol, Schriftenreihe des Verbundprojekts Postdemokratie und Neoliberalismus Discussion Paper Nr. 3. Retrieved from http://www.epol-projekt.de/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/Discussion-Paper-epol-3_dumm_lemke_CC.pdf
- ‘Linguistic Turn’ (n.d.) In Oxford Reference, Retrieved from <http://bit.ly/2eLIIn6>
- Lluch, E. (1992). *Recuperar el pasado, alcanzar Europa*, in Tusell, Javier; Sinova, Justino (Eds.). *La década socialista. Veintiún especialistas analizan la política del Gobierno Socialista (1982-1992)*. Madrid: Espasa Calpe, 35-49.
- Lock, A. & STRONG, T. (2010). *Social Constructionism. Sources and Stirring in Theory and Practice*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Lohman, I. & Rilling, R. (Ed.). (2002). *Die verkaufte Bildung. Kritik und Kontroversen zur Kommerzialisierung von Schule, Weiterbildung, Erziehung und Wissenschaft*. Opladen: Leske+Budrich.
- Lozano, J., Peña-Marín, C. & Abril G. (1993). *Análisis del discurso: hacia una semiótica de la interacción textual*. Madrid: Cátedra.
- Lubbers, R. & Koorevaar, J. (1998). *The Dynamic of Globalization*. Tilburg University seminar. Retrieved from <http://koorevaa.home.xs4all.nl/html/dynamic.html>
- Lunz, P. (2013). *What's left of the left? Partisanship and the political economy of labour market reform: why has the social democratic party in Germany liberalised labour markets*. LSE ‘Europe in Question’ Discussion Paper Series, LEQS Paper n° 65/2013. Retrieved from <http://www.lse.ac.uk/europeanInstitute/LEQS/LEQSPaper65.pdf>
- Maasen, S. (2009). *Wissenssoziologie*. Bielefeld: Transcrip Verlag.
- Mangueneau, D. (1980). *Introducción a los métodos de análisis del discurso*. Problemas y perspectivas. Buenos Aires: Librería Hachette.

- Maingueneau, D. (1999). *Términos claves en el análisis del discurso*. Buenos Aires: Nueva Visión.
- Main Science and Technology Indicators*. (n.d.). OECD Stats. OECD. Retrieved from https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=MSTI_PUB
- Malo De Molina, J. L. (2001). *Los efectos de la entrada de España en la Comunidad Europea*, Encuentro luso-español de economía. Retrieved from <https://www.bde.es/f/webbde/GAP/prensa/intervenpub/diregen/estudios/ficheros/es/es tu151001.pdf>
- Mannheim, K. (ed. by Kecskemeti, P.). (1952) *Essays on the sociology of knowledge* Oxford. New York: University Press.
- Maravall, J. M. (1997). *Regimes, politics and markets, democratization and economic change in Southern and Eastern Europe*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Marks, G. & Wilson, C. J. (2000). *The Past in the Present: A Cleavage Theory of Party Response to European Integration*. B.J.Pol, 30, 433–459. Retrieved from <http://www.unc.edu/~gwmarks/assets/doc/marks.wilson%20-%20a%20cleavage%20theory%20of%20party%20response%20to%20European%20integration.pdf>
- Marlière, P. (2010, August 26). *The decline of Europe's social democratic parties*, Open Democracy. Retrieved from <https://www.opendemocracy.net/philippe-marliere/decline-of-europes-social-democratic-parties>
- Marx, C.; Engels, F. (1974). *La ideología alemana. Crítica de la novísima filosofía alemana en las personas de sus representantes Feuerbach, B. Bauer y Stirner y del socialismo alemán en las de sus diferentes profetas (5th Ed.)*. Montevideo / Barcelona: Ediciones Pueblos Unidos / Ediciones Grijalbo. Retrieved from <http://www.socialismo-chileno.org/biblioteca/La IA marx.pdf>

- Marx, K. (2008). *Die Ökonomisierung der Bildung. Britische Hochschulpolitik unter den konservativen Regierungen Thatcher und Major 1979-1997*. Essen: Die Blaue Eule.
- Mayren, P. (2010). *Qualitative Inhaltsanalyse. Grundlagen und Techniken* (11th Ed.). Weinheim: Beltz Verlag.
- Méndez Lago, M. (2000). *La estrategia organizativa del Partido Socialista Obrero Español (1975-1996)*. Madrid: Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas / Siglo XXI de España Editores.
- Merkel, W. (1989). *After the Golden Age: A Decline of Social Democratic Policies in Western Europe during the 1980s?* Harvard University Center for European Studies, Working Paper Series 20. Retrieved from http://www.people.fas.harvard.edu/~ces/publications/docs/pdfs/CES_WP20.pdf
- Merkel, W., Petring, A. Hanks, C. & Egle, C. (2008). *Sociodemocracy in power. The capacity to reform*. Oxon: Routledge.
- Meuser, M. & Sackman, R. (Ed.) (1992). *Analyse sozialer Deutungsmuster. Beiträge zur empirischen Wissenssoziologie*. Pfaffenweiler: Centaurus-Verlagsgesellschaft. Retrieved from http://www.soziologie.uni-halle.de/sozialstruktur/docs/deutungsmuster_ein_1992.pdf
- Meyer, A. (2001). *From Godesberg to the Neue Mitte: The new social democracy in Germany*. In Giddens, A. (Ed.). *The Global Third Way Debate*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Meyer, H. & Spiegel, K. (2010). *What's next for European social democracy?*. Notebook Vol 18. No ½. Retrieved from <http://www.renewal.org.uk/articles/whats-next-for-european-social-democracy/>
- Milgate, M. & C. Stimson, S. (2009). *After Adam Smith. A century of transformation in politics and political economy*. Oxfordshire: Princeton University Press.

- Moschonas, G. (2009). *When institutions matter: the EU and the identity of social democracy*.
 Renewal, Vol 17, No. 2. Retrieved from
[http://renewal.org.uk/files/Renewal_summer_2009.Moschonas_EU .pdf](http://renewal.org.uk/files/Renewal_summer_2009.Moschonas_EU.pdf)
- Neuebauer, G., Fromme, J. & Engelbert, A.(Ed.). (2002). *Ökonomisierung der Kindheit. Sozialpolitische Entwicklung und ihre Folgen*. Opladen: Lenke+Budrich.
- Nielsen, K. (1991). *Towards a flexible future – theories and politics*. In Jessop, B., Nielsen, K., Kastendiek, H. & Perderson, K. O. (1991). *The politics of Flexibility. Restructuring state and industry in Britain, Germany and Scandinavia*. Brookfield: Edward Elgar.
- Nuestra historia*. (n.d.). Fundación Pablo Iglesias. Retrieved from
<http://www.fpabloiglesias.es/fundacion/nuestra-historia>
- Oatley, T. (2012). *Debates in international political economy*. Chapel Hill: Pearson Education.
- Padgett, S. & Paterson, W. E. (1991). *A history of social democracy in postwar Europ*. Essex: Longman Group UK.
- Paredes, J. (Ed.) (2009). *Historia de España Contemporánea*. Barcelona: Sello Editorial.
- Paulsen, T. (1999). *Economic diplomacy: Die Ökonomisierung der amerikanischen Aussenpolitik unter President Clinton 1993-1996*. Opladen: Leske + Budrich.
- Peck, J. & Tickell, A. (2002). *Neoliberalizing space*, Antipode, Vol. 34, issue 3 .
- Peck, J. (2010) *Constructions of neoliberal reason*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Pérez Infante, J. I. (2009). *Objetivos y contenido de la reformas laborales en España y propuestas de futuro*. In Gómez, V. (ed.). *La reforma laboral en España*. Madrid: Editorial Biblioteca Nueva, Fundación Ortega y Gasset, 89-109.
- Polanyi, K. (1957). *The great transformation. The political and economic origins of our time*. Boston: Beacon Paperback.
- Przeworski, A. (1985). *Capitalism and social democracy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press and Maison des Sciences de l'Homme. Retrieved from

<http://isites.harvard.edu/fs/docs/icb.topic1134169.files/Readings%20on%20Social%20Democracy/Przeworski%20-%20Capitalism%20and%20Social%20Democracy.pdf>

- Recio, A. & Roca, J. (2001). *The Spanish socialists in power. Thirteen years of economic policy*. In Glyn, A. (Ed.). *Social democracy in neoliberal times. The left and economic policy since 1980*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 172-189.
- Reichertz, J. & Schroer, N. (1994). *Erheben, Auswerten, Darstellen*. In Schroer, N.: *Interpretative Sozialforschung. Auf dem Wege zu einer hermeneutischen Wissenssoziologie*. Opladen: Westdeutsche Verlag, p. 56-83.
- Results of the 2014 European Elections*. (July 2014). In European Parliament Website. Retrieved from <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/elections2014-results/en/election-results-2014.html>
- Richter, P. (2009). *Ökonomisierung als gesellschaftliche Entdifferenzierung. Eine Soziologie zum Wandel des öffentlichen Sektors*. Konstanz: UVK Verlagsgesellschaft.
- Robinson, W. I. (2005). *Gramsci and Globalisation: From Nation-State to Transnational Hegemony*. *Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy*, Vol. 8, No. 4, 1–16. Retrieved from http://www.soc.ucsb.edu/faculty/robinson/Assets/pdf/gramsci_glob.pdf
- Rodrick, D. (2012). *The globalization paradox. Why global markets, states, and democracy can't coexist*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Rodríguez Jiménez, J. L. & Núñez De Prado, S. (2013). *Historia de España actual*. Madrid: Editorial Universitas.
- Rodríguez Braun, C. (1992). *De la agonía a la agonía*. In Tusell, J. & Sinova, J.(Eds.). *La década socialista. Veintiún especialistas analizan la política del Gobierno Socialista (1982-1992)*. Madrid: Espasa Calpe, p. 52-66.
- Rooney, D., Hearn, G. & Ninan, A. (2005). *Handbook on the knowledge economy*. Glos:

Edward Elgar Publishing Limited.

Rössler, P. (2005). *Inhaltsanalyse*. Stuttgart: UVK Verlagsgesellschaft, 2005.

Sachs, M. (2011). *Sozialdemokratie im Wandel: Programmatische Neustrukturierungen im Europäischen Vergleich*, Wiesbaden: VS Verlag.

Sassoon, D. (1997). *Looking Left: European Socialists after the Cold War*. London: Tauris & Co.

Schaal, G. S. & Ritzi, C. (2012). *Neoliberalismus und Posdemokratie: Bausteine einer kritischen Gesellschaftstheorie*. Hamburg: Helmut-Schmidt-Universität.

Saussure, F. (1913): *Curso de lingüística general*, Ediciones Akal, S.A., Madrid, 1967.

Scherrer, C. & Kunze, C. (2011). *Globalisierung*. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht.

Schmid, J.; Buhr, D.; Roth, C.; Steffen, C. (2006). *Wirtschaftspolitik für Politologen*. Paderborn: Verlag Ferdinand Schöningh.

Schmidtke, O. (2002). *The Third Way Transformation in Social Democracy. Normative claims and policy initiatives in the 21st century*. Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing.

Schumacher, G. & Vis, B. (2012). *Why social democrats retrench the welfare state? A simulation*. Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation 15 (3) 4. doi: 10.18564/jasss.1959. Retrieved from <http://jasss.soc.surrey.ac.uk/15/3/4.html>

Sklair, L. (2007). A Transnational Framework for Theory and Research in the Study of Globalization. In ROSSI, I. *Frontiers of Globalization Research. Theoretical and Methodological Approaches*. New York: Springer US, p. 93-108.

Sklair, L. (2009). *The Transnational capitalist class and the politics of capitalist globalization*. In Dasgupta, S. & Nederveen, J. (Ed.). *Politics of Globalization*. New Delhi: SAGE Publications.

Seeileb-Kaiser, M. (2011). *Globalization, political discourse, and Welfare systems in comparative perspective: The Federal Republic of Germany, Japan, and the US*. Zes-

- Arbeitspapier 2001. Paper prepared for the 2nd International Convention of Asia Scholars.
- Shiratori, H. (2014). *Multilevel policy regimes, political cleavages and party systems: horizontal and vertical transfer of policies and its effects*. In Hideko, M. (Ed.) *Economic Crises and Policy Regimes: The Dynamics of Policy Innovation and Paradigmatic Change*. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, p. 385-404.
- Skrzypek, A. (2011). *A comparative analyses of core values of PES member parties and the ideological evolution within the PES*. In Stetter, E., Duffek, K., Skrzypek, A. (Eds.). *Next Left vol. IV. Progressive Values for the 21st century*”, FEPS Belgium.
- Spiegel, H. W. (2001). *El desarrollo del pensamiento económico. Historia del pensamiento económico desde los tiempos bíblicos hasta nuestros días*. Barcelona: Ediciones Omega S.A.
- Steger, M.B. (2010). *From Market Globalism to Imperial Globalism: Ideology and American Power after the 9/11*. In James, P. & Stager, M. B. *Globalization and culture*. London: SAGE.
- Steiner, C. (2009). *Facetten der Globalisierung. Zwischen Ökonomie, Politik und Kultur*. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag.
- Stiglitz, J. E. (1999). *Globalization and its discontents*, London: Penguin.
- Texeira, P. N. & Dill, D. D. (Eds.) (2011). *Public Vices, private virtues? Assessing the effects of marketization in higher education*. Rotterdam: Sense Publishers.
- Thomas, H. (1992). *Los años socialistas en España*. In Tusell, J. & Sinova, J. (Eds.). *La década socialista. Veintiún especialistas analizan la política del Gobierno Socialista (1982-1992)*. Madrid: Espasa Calpe, p. 21-26.
- Trampusch, C. (2008). *Status Quo Vadis? Die Plusalisierung und Liberalisierung der “Sozial-Politik”: eine Herausforderung für die politikwissenschaftliche und soziologische*

- Sozialpolitikforschung*. In EVERS, A. (Eds.). *Sozialpolitik. Ökonomisierung und Entgrenzung*. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaft, p. 157-185.
- Turowski, J. (2012). *Sozialdemokratische Reformdiskurse*. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag.
- Unemployment by sex and age* (September 2017). In Eurostat. Retrieved from <http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/submitViewTableAction.do>
- Weber, Max (2005, version 1930): *The Protestant ethic and the spirit of capitalism*, Routledge, London / New York.
- Walkenhorst, H. (2008). *Explaining change in EU education policy*, *Journal of European Public Policy*, 15(4), p. 567-587.
- Washington Consensus. (n.d.) In *Encyclopedia Britannica*. Retrieved from <https://www.britannica.com/topic/Washington-consensus>
- Weiffen, B. (2009). *Die Ausbreitung der Demokratie –eine Komponent der Globalisierung?*. In Kessler, J. & Steiner, C. *Facetten der Globalisierung. Zwischen Ökonomie, Politik und Kultur*. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften.
- Werner, A., Lacewell, O. & Volkens, A. (2011). *Manifesto Coding Instructions*. 4th fully revised edition. Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung. Retrieved from <https://manifestoproject.wzb.eu/information/documents/handbooks>
- Wodak, R., Nowak, P., Pelikan, J., Gruber, H., De Cillia, R. & Mitten, R. (1990). „*Wir sind alles unschuldige Täter*“. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag.
- Wodak, R. (2001). *The discourse-historical approach*. In Wodak, R. & Meyer, Michel (Eds.). *Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis*. London: SAGE Publications, p. 63-94.
- Wodak, R. & Krzyżanowski, M. (2008). *Qualitative Discourse Analysis in the social science*. Great Britain: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Xing, L. & Hersh, J. (2006). *Understanding global capitalism: Passive revolution and double movement in the era of globalization*. *American Review of Political Economy*, Vol. 4,

number 1/2, 36-55. Retrieved from <http://arpejournal.com/ARPEvolume4number1-2/XingHersh.pdf>

Yürükoğlu, R. (1979). *Proletarian Internationalism*. London: İşçinin Sesi Publication.

Yuill, D., Méndez, C. & Wishlade, F. (2006). *EU Cohesion Policy 2007-13 & the implications for Spain: Who gets what, when and how?*, European Policy Research Paper, Number 59. Retrieved from http://www.eprc.strath.ac.uk/eprc/Documents/PDF_files/R59_Cohesion_Policy_2007-13.pdf

Zizek, S. (1989). *The sublime object of ideology*. London / New York: Verso.

Zizek, S. (Ed.). (1994). *Mapping ideology*. London / New York: Verso.