

**Concept of Happiness in *Summa Theologiae*
with Reference to Contemporary
Psychological Studies**

Von der Fakultät für Geisteswissenschaften der Universität Duisburg-Essen

zur Erlangung des akademischen Grades

Doktor der Philosophie (Dr. phil.)

genehmigte Dissertation

von

Jaison Ambadan Chacko Ambadan

aus Areekamala, Kerala, Indien

Erster Gutachter: Prof. Dr. Ralf Miggelbrink

Zweiter Gutachter : Prof. Dr. Markus Tiwald

Vorsitzender des Prüfungsausschusses: Prof. Dr. Neil Roughley

Tag der Disputation: 02.07.2018

Concept of Happiness in *Summa Theologiae* with Reference to Contemporary Psychological Studies

General Introduction	6
Chapter I	
The Ethical Perspective of Happiness in Aquinas's Concept of Human Acts	
Introduction	27
1. Human Acts	31
1.1 Voluntary	52
1.2 Involuntary	53
1.3 Circumstances	54
1.3.1 Nature of Circumstance	55
1.3.2 Role Circumstances in Moral Evaluation	56
1.4 Cognitive Participation	57
1.4.1 Three Acts of the Speculative Intellect	58
1.4.2 Three Acts of the Practical Intellect	60
1.5 The Will	62
1.5.1 Cause of the Movement of the Will	62
1.5.2 Manner in which the Will Moves	63
1.5.3 Characteristics of the Act of the Will	64
1.5.3.1 Enjoyment	65
1.5.3.2 Intention	65
1.5.3.3 Choice	67
1.5.3.4 Counsel	68
1.5.3.5 Consent	68
1.5.3.6 Use	69
1.6 Human Acts Commanded by the Will	70
1.6.1 Good and Evil in Human Acts	71
1.6.2 Goodness and Malice in Human Acts	72
1.6.3 Impact of the Interior Act	75
1.6.4 Impact of the External Act	76
1.6.5 Impact of Disposition	77
Conclusion	79

Chapter II

Thomas Aquinas's Cognition of Passion and Happiness

Introduction	82
2. Passions	84
2.1 The Meaning of Aquinas's Account of Passion	85
2.1.1 The Appetitive Power in General	87
2.1.1.1 Passion: A Movement of the Sense Appetite	89
2.1.1.2 Powers of Sensory Apprehension	91
2.1.1.3 The Role of Cogitative Power	93
2.1.1.4 Sensitive versus Natural Appetite	94
2.1.1.5 Sensitive versus Rational Appetite	95
2.1.1.6 The Priority of Good to Evil	96
2.1.2 The Nature of Passion	97
2.1.2.1 Apprehension and Intentionality	99
2.1.2.2 Objects of Passions	101
2.1.2.3 Sensation and Imagination	103
2.1.2.4 Estimative and Memorative Powers	104
2.1.2.5 The Role of the Particular Reason	106
2.2 The Structure of Passions	107
2.2.1 The Concupiscible Passions	108
2.2.1.1 Love as a Passion	109
2.2.1.2 Hatred as a Passion	113
2.2.1.3 Desire as a Passion	115
2.2.1.4 Aversion as a Passion	116
2.2.1.5 Pleasure as a Passion	117
2.2.1.6 Sorrow as a Passion	123
2.2.1.7 Concupiscence as a Passion	126
2.2.1.8 Delight as a Passion	127
2.2.2 The Irascible Passions	128
2.2.2.1 Hope and Despair	129
2.2.2.2 Daring, Fear and Anger	133
2.3 The Passions and Happiness	136
2.3.1 The Spiritual and Animal Side of Human Nature	138
2.3.2 Passion and Temptation	139
2.3.3 Emotion and Discernment	141
Conclusion	142

Chapter III

The Ethical Perspective of Happiness in Internal and External Principles of Human Act.

Introduction	144
3. Ethical Perspective of Human Act	145
3.1 Orientation of Human Act	146
3.1.1 Human Being and Human Action	147
3.1.2 Virtue and Passion	148
3.1.3 Goodness of Human Action	149
3.2 Role of Internal Principles of Human Act	151
3.2.1 Nature of Habitus	151
3.2.2 The Relevance of Formation of Habits	153
3.2.3 Function of Virtue in Human Act	160
3.2.3.1 Role of Theological Virtue	162
3.2.3.1.1 Effect of Faith in Human Act	163
3.2.3.1.2 Impact of Hope in Human Act	165
3.2.3.1.3 Bearing of Charity in Human Act	167
3.2.3.2 The Role of Moral Virtues in Human Act	170
3.2.3.2.1 Influence of Prudence in Human Act	170
3.2.3.2.2 Impact of Justice in Human Act	172
3.2.3.2.3 The Meaning of Fortitude in Human Act	173
3.2.3.2.4 The Meaning of Temperance in Human Act	175
3.2.4 Sin and Vice in General	175
3.2.4.1 Distinctions among Sins	177
3.2.4.2 Causes of Sin	178
3.2.4.3 Consequence of Sin	180
3.3 Role of External Principles of Human Act	182
3.3.1 The Principle of Law	183
3.3.1 Eternal Law	184
3.3.2 Natural Law	185
3.3.3 Human law	187
3.3.4 Divine law	189
3.3.2 Influence of the gifts of the Holy Spirit	190
3.3.2.1 Beatitude and the Fruits	191
3.3.2.2 The Necessity of Grace	193
3.3.2.3 Grace and Human Act	194
Conclusion	196

Chapter IV

The Psychological Perspective of Happiness

Introduction	198
4. Psychology of Happiness	198
4.1 Broad Assessment of Happiness	199
4.1.1 The Meaning of the Word Happiness	204
4.1.2 Influencing factors of Happiness	205
4.1.3 Living Conditions of Happiness	208
4.1.4 Happiness and Wellbeing	209
4.2 Positive Attitude	210
4.2.1 The Scope of Positive Attitude	211
4.2.2 Building Positive Attitudes	212
4.2.2.1 The Resilience Training	213
4.2.2.2 Renewing Strength and Virtue	214
4.2.2.3 Optimism and Pessimism	215
4.2.2.4 Acquiring Optimism	217
4.3 Appreciating the Level of Happiness	217
4.3.1 Pleasure or Pain	218
4.3.2 Desire and Reason	219
4.3.3 The Equilibrium Level of Wellbeing	220
4.3.4 Cognitive Assumption	221
4.3.5 Affective Analysis	222
4.3.6 Transforming Oneself	223
4.4 The Trend of Psychology in Summa	224
4.4.1 The Virtue Theory and Human Habits	225
4.4.2 The Normative Understanding of Nature and Natural Law	226
4.4.3 Flourishing or Eudemonic Happiness	227
4.4.4 Animating Principle of Life	229
4.4.5 Affections of the Will	230
4.4.6 Immateriality and Immortality	231
4.4.7 Thomastic Dualism	232
Conclusion	234

Chapter V

The Multidimensional Perspective of Perfect Happiness

Introduction	236
5 The Nature of Happiness	237
5.1 The Desire for Happiness	238
5.1.1 Pleasure Centred	239
5.1.1.1 Stimulus Synchronized	240
5.1.1.2 Wealth Synchronised	241
5.1.1.3 Aridity in Materialistic Pleasure	242
5.1.2 Ego Centred	242
5.1.2.1 Superman Feeling	244
5.1.2.2 Vacillating Ambivalence	244
5.1.2.3 Subjugated Fiasco	244
5.1.3 Charity Centred	245
5.1.3.1 Empathetic Altruism	247
5.1.3.2 Affective Cognition	247
5.1.3.3 Faith and Charity	248
5.1.4 Transcendent	250
5.1.4.1 The Transcendent Search for Perfection	251
5.1.4.2 Physical and Intellectual Transcendence	252
5.1.4.3 Transcendent Spiritual Domain	252
5.1.4.4 Contemplative Prayer	253
5.2 Enabling into Happiness	254
5.2.1 Understanding Existential Emptiness	255
5.2.2 Resisting Passivity of Appetite	256
5.2.3 Eliminating Cosmic Loneliness	257
5.2.4 Sublime Relationship	258
5.3 Replacement Therapy	260
5.3.1 Strengthening Kinetic Force	261
5.3.2 The Incompetent Nature of Unhappiness.	262
5.3.3 Knowing Unhappiness	263
5.4 Virtue and Happiness	264
5.4.1 Wellbeing and Happiness	266
5.4.2 Practice of Virtue	268
5.4.3 Active Use of Faculties	271
5.4.4 Mean of Human Act	272
5.5 Contemplation	273
Conclusion	277
General Conclusion	279
Bibliography	285

General Introduction

Thomas Aquinas (1224-1274)¹ is one of the greatest thinkers in Western philosophy and theology. He is even called the *angelic Doctor* by the Roman Catholic Church. One of his marvelous works is *Summa Theologiae* which is the primary source of my research to understand the concept of happiness in *Summa Theologiae* with reference to contemporary psychological studies. Aquinas was a Dominican monk, philosopher, theologian, saint and contemplator, and continues to be important and significant in particular for students of philosophy and theology. Pope Paul VI says that "in order that the students may illumine the mysteries of salvation as completely as possible, they should learn to penetrate them more deeply with the help of speculation, under the guidance of Aquinas, and to perceive their interconnections"². It is also concern of the church regarding studies in schools and universities that by their very constitution individual subjects be pursued according to their own principles, method, and liberty of scientific inquiry, in a way that an ever deeper understanding in these fields may be obtained and that, as questions that are new and current are raised and investigations carefully made according to the example of the doctors of the Church and especially of Aquinas, so that there may be a deeper realization of the harmony of faith and reason.³ Aquinas constructs a vast system of integrating Greek philosophy with the Christian faith in his masterpiece *Summa Theologiae*.

The encounter with the philosophy of Aristotle opened up a new perspective for Aquinas's synthesis and distinction between philosophy and theology. This was different from the way of the Fathers of the Church because they were confronted by different philosophies of a platonic type in order to get a complete vision of world and of human life including religion; they mainly used Platonism in the light of faith to respond to question of human being whereas Aquinas convincingly explained Aristotelian works. In one of the general audiences pope Benedict XVI explained the relevance of Aquinas who explored the relation of reason and faith in the philosophy of Aristotle and explained it convincingly.

A "philosophy" existed that was complete and convincing in itself, a rationality that preceded the faith, followed by "theology", a form of thinking with the faith and in the faith. The pressing question was this: are the world of rationality, philosophy conceived of without Christ, and the world of faith compatible? Or are they mutually exclusive? Elements that affirmed the incompatibility of these two worlds were not lacking, but St Thomas was firmly convinced of their compatibility indeed that philosophy worked out without the knowledge of Christ was awaiting, as it were, the light of Jesus to be complete. This was the great "surprise" of St Thomas that determined the path he took as a thinker. Showing this independence of philosophy and theology and, at the same time, their reciprocal relationality was the historic mission of the great teacher. And thus it can be understood that in the 19th century, when the incompatibility of modern reason and faith was strongly declared, Pope Leo XIII pointed to St Thomas as a guide in the dialogue between them. In his theological work, St Thomas supposes and concretizes this relationality. Faith consolidates, integrates and illumines the heritage of truth that human reason acquires. The trust with which St Thomas endows these two instruments of

¹ The year of Aquinas's birth can arguably be placed anywhere between the years 1224 to 1226. See: Thomas Aquinas, *On Evil*. Trans. by Richard Regan, edited by Brian Davies, Oxford University Press, New York, 2003, p 3.

² Pope Paul VI, *Optatam Totius*. Decree on Priestly Training, October 28, 1965, no.16.

³ See: Pope Paul VI, *Gravissimum Educationis*. Declaration of Christian Education, October 28, 1965, no.10.

knowledge faith and reason may be traced back to the conviction that both stem from the one source of all truth, the divine Logos, which is active in both contexts, that of creation and that of redemption.⁴

According to Aquinas sacred doctrine is a science. However he says that there are two kinds of sciences. One proceeds from a principle known by the natural light of intelligence, such as arithmetic and geometry and the like. Second kind proceeds from principles known by the light of a higher science. Thus the science of perspective proceeds from principles established by geometry, and music from principles established by arithmetic. Sacred doctrine is a science because it proceeds from principles established by the light of a higher science, the science of God and the blessed.⁵

According to Pope Benedict XVI Aquinas presents to us a broad and confident concept of human reason: broad because it is not limited to the spaces of the empirical-scientific reason but open to the whole human being, to the fundamental and inalienable questions of human life; and confident because human reason, especially if it accepts the inspirations of Christian faith, is a promoter of a civilization that recognizes the dignity of the person, the intangibility of rights and the cogency of duties.⁶ The most perfect in all nature to be found is a subsistent individual of a rational nature.⁷

Aquinas wrote commentaries on the works of Aristotle to make sense of Aristotle's philosophy, and not to set out a philosophy of his own. The appreciation of his outstanding value as a philosopher depends on seeing his ostensibly theological works as also fundamentally philosophical and an extrapolation of Aristotle's view in the light of catholic theology, and from his own contemplation of truth.⁸

Under the guidance of his enlightening thoughts, and following his spirit I just try to recreate Aquinas in our times. My major concern is the theory of happiness, and I have restricted myself to explore and understand Aquinas's view based on Summa Theologiae and psychological studies. Before he begins treatise on human being, he discusses the existence of God, substance of Angels and the work of creation; these three treatises consist of 74 questions, and lay a strong foundation for treatise of human being.

1. Double Happiness

Aristotle defines happiness, 'as a state which in the opinion of everyone is the end of virtue'⁹. "The common people cannot determine by distinguishing this as good and that as evil, but without discrimination they accept what appears good in one instance"¹⁰. Aquinas

⁴ Pope Benedict XVI, General Audience, 16 June 2010.

⁵ See: ST, Part I, Q 1, Art 2.

⁶ See: Benedict XVI, General Audience, 16 June 2010.

⁷ See: ST, Part I, Q 29, Art 3.

⁸ See: The Cambridge Companion to Aquinas. Edited by Kretzmann Norman and Stump Eleonore, Cambridge University Press, USA, 1999, p 10-11.

⁹ Aquinas Thomas, Commentary on Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics. Trans. by C.I. Litzinger, Dumb Ox Books, Notre Dame, Indiana 1964, p 589.

¹⁰ Ibid, p 591.

sets out a systematic answer to the question of what human happiness is, and whether it can be obtained in this life, in the second part of this great work, as well as in Book III of his shorter volume *Summa contra Gentiles*. It could be understood in a broad sense, that the theme of happiness takes a central position in his work, and the other questions and answers could be understood as a foundation and explanation to this theme. If we could express in a single sentence the theme of happiness, his ultimate answer is that perfect happiness *beatitudo* is not possible on earth, but an imperfect happiness *felicitas* is possible. This clear and specific thought places him midway between those like Aristotle, who believed complete happiness was possible in this lifetime, and Augustine, who taught that happiness was impossible and that it consists merely in the anticipation of the heavenly afterlife.¹¹

Aquinas holds that perfect happiness is not possible in this life time; it is based on St. Paul's assurance in 1 Corinthians 13:12 that "for now we see as through a glass darkly, but then we see face to face." The life we experience presently is afflicted with unsatisfied desires to achieve that ultimate good which is developed in the will by nature of the various experiences gained in life. God has created us with a desire to come to perfect knowledge of Him, but we are in the search of purifying our soul to get a perfect knowledge of God, a vision of God. Upon attaining this knowledge an individual will experience the obliteration of every sadness or worry, and will be fully satisfied by the knowledge of God, and then he will experience ultimate pleasure, a pure and everlasting bliss. However we can attain in the present life an imperfect happiness that depends on the actualization of one's natural faculties; the highest faculty that a human being possesses is reason, then it follows that one could achieve happiness in this life in proportion to the level of truth accessible to reason.

Contemplation of the truth befits a man according to his nature as a rational being: the result being that all men naturally desire to know, so that consequently they delight in the knowledge of truth. And more delightful still does this become to one who has the habit of wisdom and knowledge, the result of which is that he contemplates without difficulty. Secondly, contemplation may be delightful on the part of its object, in so far as one contemplates that which one loves; even as bodily vision gives pleasure, not only because to see is pleasurable in itself, but because one sees a person whom one loves. Since, then, the contemplative life consists chiefly in the contemplation of God, of which charity is the motive, it follows that there is delight in the contemplative life, not only by reason of the contemplation itself, but also by reason of the Divine love.¹²

True happiness can only be found in knowledge of God. Created good cannot constitute one's perfect happiness, because one desires to attain what is universally good and also the object of the intellect is what is universally true; this universal good is not found in creature but in God. We find in the Gospel of John, Jesus prays for his disciples which bears the request of Jesus to his Father to enable the disciples and those who believe in their words to become heirs of God and partakers of God's own beatitude: "I ask not only on behalf of these, but also on behalf of those who will believe in me through their word, that they may all be one. As you, Father, are in me and I am in you, may they also be in us"¹³. A perfect vision and enjoyment of the divine essence do away with the acts of faith and hope in the souls, and

¹¹ See: <http://www.pursuit-of-happiness.org/history-of-happiness/thomas-aquinas>.

¹² ST. Part II-II, Q 180, Art 7.

¹³ John 17,20-21.

the same vision and enjoyment will continue without any interruption and without end, until the last Judgment and from then on forever¹⁴.

2. Intellectual and Volitional Elements

The distinction between practical judgement and command falls within Aquinas's account of the psychological complex of partial intellectual and volitional acts that together comprise the complete human act¹⁵. The completion of human act at various logically distinct or separate points show how the first unconditional act, the act of willing an end, is internally determined to the subsequent intellectual and volitional acts. Primordial inclination of the will influences dynamic parts of human act. Man is master of his actions through his reason and will¹⁶. "Therefore, those actions alone are properly called human which proceed from a deliberate will"¹⁷. Other actions found in man can be called actions of man, but not properly human actions. Human action is an act proceeding from deliberate reason and free will; an act performed by the free will with knowledge of the end to which the act is directed¹⁸. Human act is dealing with morality of happiness therein desire for happiness plays a great role along with the aspiration for truth. The goodness placed by God at the heart of spiritual nature leads one to God and prepare one to receive the light of revelation with the help of grace; it is a natural desire to see God, which resides in the consciousness of human being.¹⁹

The universe is more perfect in goodness than the intellectual creature as regards extension and diffusion; but intensively and collectively the likeness to the Divine goodness is found rather in the intellectual creature, which has a capacity for the highest good. Or else we may say that a part is not rightly divided against the whole, but only against another part. Wherefore, when we say that the intellectual nature alone is to the image of God, we do not mean that the universe in any part is not to God's image, but that the other parts are excluded.²⁰

It could be understood that a certain representation of the species belongs to the nature of an image. Hence, if the image of the Divine Trinity is to be found in the soul, we must look for it where the soul approaches the nearest to a representation of the species of the Divine Persons. Yet the Divine Persons are distinct from each other by reason of the procession of the word from the speaker, and the procession of love connecting both. But in our soul a word cannot exist without an actual thought.

Thomas Aquinas in his comprehension formulates a twofold explanation: God is the first exemplar cause of all things, and the things created may be called the exemplar of another by the reason of its likeness to the exemplar. Therefore created things could be called exemplars. Creatures which are created exemplars, do not attain a natural likeness to God; yet

¹⁴ Pope Benedict XII, On the Beatific Vision of God. Papal Encyclicals Online, 1336.

¹⁵ Bradley J.M. Denis,. Aquinas on the Twofold Human Good. The Catholic University of America Press, 1997, p 340-341.

¹⁶ See: ST. Part I-II, Q 1, Art 1.

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ See: Wuellner Bernard,. Dictionary of Scholastic Philosophy. editions scholasticae, 2011, p 55.

¹⁹ See: Pinckaers Servais,. Morality The Catholic View. Trans. By Sherwin Michael, St. Augustine's Press, South bend, Indiana, 2001, p 30.

²⁰ ST, Part 1, Q 93,Art 2 ad 3.

creatures do attain likeness to God because they represent the divine idea, just as a material house is like the house in the mind of the architect²¹. Likeness stands to image as a kind of preamble in so far as likeness is common to all. Likeness may be considered in the light of a preamble to image, inasmuch as it is something more general than image.²² God is the first Agent; God intends to communicate His perfection, which is His goodness, and every creature intends to acquire its own perfection, which is the likeness of the divine perfection and goodness²³. The discussion of human being in ST, 1aQQ75-102 is part of a larger project to understand God via creation. According to Aquinas, humans are being created in the image of God. Therefore humans are intrinsically good because they were created in the image of the goodness of God, which we understand in the term *imago dei*²⁴.

In his explanation of *imago dei* Aquinas is influenced by Augustin's discussion of the Trinitarian element in human being, and he is also influenced by Aristotle. In his discussion of the image of God in human being, Aquinas focuses on those elements which distinguish human being from animals, and he explains the role of rational soul which includes reason, memory, intellect and will. Image of God in human being is found by reason of intellectual nature and by accidental qualities which enable them to imitate God not only in being and life, but also in intelligence, whereas other creatures do not understand although we see a certain trace of intellect.²⁵ Human soul in its generic and intellectual nature, which consists of active procession of word and love, is the best reflection of the image of God in human being.

First and chiefly, the image of the Trinity is to be found in the acts of the soul, that is, inasmuch as from the knowledge which we possess, by actual thought we form an internal word; and thence break forth into love. But, since the principles of acts are the habits and powers, and everything exists virtually in its principle, therefore, secondarily and consequently, the image of the Trinity may be considered as existing in the powers, and still more in the habits, forasmuch as the acts virtually exist therein.²⁶

Aquinas brings in importance of human act as he speaks of image of God in human being. Because he says, we only know the essence of the soul by knowing its powers, that we know the powers by knowing the habits of first principles, and that we know these habits by knowing the acts.

3. Theological Standpoint

The presentation of moral theology in the discussion of human act is divided into general and particular parts. The first question in the general part is the question of happiness, and this theme dominates the whole of moral theological research by establishing the

²¹ See: ST, Part 1, Q 44, Art 4.

²² See: ST, Part 1, Q 93, Art 9.

²³ See: ST Part 1, Q 44, Art 4.

²⁴ See: Pasnau Robert, . Thomas Aquinas on Human Nature. A Philosophical Study of Summa Theologiae 1a 75-89, Cambridge University Press, USA, 2002, p19.

²⁵ See: ST, Part 1, Q 93, Art 3-6.

²⁶ ST, Part 1, Q 93, Art 7.

ultimate end of life and of human act. The perfect happiness does not reside in wealth or in honour or in any created reality but in the higher end of human life, in the vision of God. Then one needs to know the difference of voluntary act and involuntary act to assess the moral quality.²⁷ Particular part is of moral theology and it is discussed around seven principle virtues.

Acts are properly called human, in as much as they are voluntary; human act has an end, and it is the motive and object of the will which functions as an end. The person that does the act is the cause of that act, inasmuch as he is moved towards it by the end; and it is chiefly in this respect that the person is directed to the act; while other conditions or circumstances of the person have not such an important relation to the act because the inclination of the will towards the end belong to the determination of the person. As to the mode or manner of the act, it is not the substantial form of the act, for in an act the substantial form depends on the object and end. "Every action and choice is thought to aim at some good, and for this reason the good has rightly been declared to be that at which all things aim".²⁸ "For nothing is good except in so far as it has a certain similitude and participation of the supreme good".²⁹ Constant participation in the supreme good through broader evangelical concepts will enable a person to reflect a transcendent form of habit or virtue. Nothing is good except in so far as it is a likeness and participation of the highest good, and the highest good itself is in some way desired in every particular good, hence it can be said that the true good is what all desire.³⁰ An understanding on good is related to sacred teaching. Aquinas clearly wishes to stress this, and he comprises revealed content of Christian faith understood as truth, which today we cannot arrive at by merely philosophical argument.

The reasons employed by holy men to prove things that are of faith, are not demonstrations; they are either persuasive arguments showing that what is proposed to our faith is not impossible, or else they are proofs drawn from the principles of faith, i.e. from the authority of Holy Scripture. Whatever is based on these principles is as well proved in the eyes of the faithful, as a conclusion drawn from self-evident principles is in the eyes of all. Hence again, theology is a science.³¹

A discussion of supreme good, efficient and exemplar cause is always connected to faith and reason. Theological faith is understood as an intellectual habit, and its object is God³². The affirmation of the theological teachings of the church, the doctrine of the Trinity and the Incarnation, depends on our relation to God, a virtuous habit. These doctrines could serve us to clarify God's nature and provide us with a prolific understanding of the one in whom our perfect happiness consists. Although faith is an intellectual virtue, it would be improper to construe the act of faith as something that is purely cognitive or arithmetic in

²⁷ See: Pinckaers Servais,. *Morality The Catholic View*. Trans. By Sherwin Michael, St. Augustine's Press, South bend, Indiana, 2001, p 27.

²⁸ Aristotle,. *The Nicomachean Ethics*, Trans.by David Ross, Oxford University Press, 2009, p1.

²⁹ Bradley J.M. Denis,. *Aquinas on the Twofold Human Good*. The Catholic University of America Press, 1997, p 108-109.

³⁰ See: Aquinas Thomas,. *Commentary on Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics*. Trans. by C.I. Litzinger, Dumb Ox Books, Notre Dame, Indiana 1964, p 4.

³¹ ST, Part II-II, Q 1, Art 5.

³² See: ST, Part II-II, Q 1, Art 1.

nature. The assent of faith is voluntary; it involves not just the intellect but the will³³, an innate desire or love towards what we think contributes to our happiness. A mere acknowledgment of God does not denote a commendable faith; it is the love for God which distinguishes faith from the mere acknowledgement, that is to say, faith involves an appetitive feature whereby the will moves us to God as the source of ultimate happiness³⁴.

It can happen that we invariably love the wrong things and are inclined to some other ends contrary to God's purposes, then one need to undergo some interior transformation whereby he comes to love God. Practical reason makes the moral order compactable with the fact that the principle of human moral order pre-exist in the mind of God; the first principles of practical reason participates in divine reason. The formula is that right human reason is the proximate and homogeneous rule of morally good human action; divine reason is the supreme and transcendent rule,³⁵ divine reason is the first cause and ontological exemplar of practical reason, meaning the practical reason is the proximate but secondary cause of moral goodness.

The act of faith has external and internal cause. Faith requires external inducements like being instructed and persuaded by someone, gathering knowledge from documents that are related to religion, hearing a sermon or attending seminars, reading books and prayer. External inducement may corroborate the knowledge of truth and encourage belief; however these inducements are not sufficient for producing faith with reason because not everyone who saw the miracles of Jesus Christ believed in him. Some people who heard his sermon and miracles believed in him but some did not; therefore an internal movement of the will is necessary to embrace belief. Charity or love of God moves a person to faith. Charity is a form of act of faith because an individual who believes in God does a charitable act from the internal movement of the will for the love of God. Here one finds a moral inclination which directs will towards God.

Jesus Christ is the first and chief teacher of the faith; he knew divine truth without the benefit of revelation. We receive the knowledge of divine truth from The Old and New Testaments which Aquinas calls as *sacra doctrina*. Truth of faith is contained in the Holy Bible under various modes of expression, and in order to gather the truth one need to study and practice it. The revelation given in the Holy Bible is not just a creed for those who cannot think and give reasons for what they believe; one can draw out what is implicit in the revelation by a valid process of inference and develop his reasoning into contemplation.³⁶

³³ See: ST, Part II-II, Q 1, Art 2.

³⁴ See: ST, Part II-II, Q 2, Art 9.

³⁵ See: Bradley J.M. Denis,. Aquinas on the Twofold Human Good. The Catholic University of America Press, 1997, p 139..

³⁶ See: Davies Brian,. The Thoughts of Thomas Aquinas. Clarendon Press, Oxford, UK 2009, p 14.

4. Passion, Reason, Virtue

An appraisal of Aquinas's understanding of passion, its relation to reason and its modification through virtue ethics, considered in a philosophical perspective, enables one to have a theological understanding of human act. However these caveats in no way imply that Aquinas's account of passion is comprehensible only from the perspective of his faith and therefore only related to Christian theologians'.³⁷ Interestingly it is his theology of creation and creature's relationship to its Creator that initiates a logical proficiency to consider human nature, and for him faith is not necessary to know the truth but faith could deepen the knowledge of the natural world, however faith does not substitute or belittle the contribution of philosophical and scientific reflections. Philosophical and psychological reflections on emotion help one to understand human act in different degrees.

Passion is a movement of the sense appetite caused by imagining good or evil; it is a physiological and psychological response to the apprehension of a sensible good or a sensible evil perceived as an object known through the senses which elicits movement from the sense appetite.³⁸ There is an intrinsic difficulty to speak about the psychological realities of passion and even the physiological dimensions of passion, because it is a subjective experience, and there exists many complex vocabularies to express passion, consequently, at times it is difficult to define the characteristics of emotion. There is a kind of personal judgement involved in passion, that is, something like cognitive assessment of person or thing that are of external source.

Human act has internal sources and external sources. The virtues and dynamic qualities existing in a person as a habit are the internal sources of human act. These dynamic qualities of the person are brought to perfection by the gifts of grace, along with beatitudes and the fruits of the good works including that of the spiritual strength; however the internal sources have contraries, which I prefer to call as vices and sins, which will negatively damage the goodness of internal source. External cause of human act is law, a wisdom endowed with an impelling force; it presents eternal law, natural law, human law, Old Testament law and New Testament law. The grace revealed in the Gospel and received through sacraments becomes a second principle of human act exterior in origin but profoundly interior through the depth of its penetration within an individual.³⁹ A positive assessment of passion explains it as intrinsically oriented; this intrinsic orientation develops into virtue.

...supposing the presence of something saddening or painful, it is a sign of goodness if a man is in sorrow or pain on account of this present evil. For if he were not to be in sorrow or pain, this could only be either because he feels it not, or because he does not reckon it as something unbecoming, both of

³⁷ Lombardo E Nicholas,. *The Logic of Desire. Aquinas on Emotion*, The Catholic University of America Press, Washington, D.C. 2011, p 7.

³⁸ See. Lombardo E Nicholas,. *The Logic of Desire. Aquinas on Emotion*, The Catholic University of America Press, Washington, D.C. 2011, p 20.

³⁹ See: Pinckaers Servais,. *Morality The Catholic View*. Trans. By Sherwin Michael, St. Augustine's Press, South bend, Indiana, 2001, p 28.

which are manifest evils. Consequently it is a condition of goodness, that, supposing an evil to be present, sorrow or pain should ensue.⁴⁰

Passion is more than perception; it involves cognition and evaluation of the sensible object. There is a logical progress from raw sense data to the formation of an intention; this logical progression is not a chronological progression; the formation of an intention occurs simultaneously with perception. Faculty of sense is a kind of passive power which naturally responds to exterior sense objects. The received raw sense data is later cognized with the assistance of internal senses fantasy, estimative power, memorative power and common sense⁴¹.

Understanding something and reasoning upon something are different aspect of the cognitive power of an individual; understanding is the acquired knowledge which is also known as intellect, whereas reasoning indicates capacity to reason dynamically towards acquisition of new knowledge. There is a strong relationship between passion and reason; passions simply obey reason but not intellect, because it is reason rather than intellect that applies universal principles to particular situation and reshapes the intentional objects to which passion responds.⁴²

Power of determination makes possible the repetition of specific actions; this determination developed through reasoning forms habits. Habits are related to reasoning but they need not be necessarily informed by right reasoning. Depending on the choice that an individual accepts particular passion develops a capacity which tends towards it. A choice made out of right reasoning guide particular passion effectively towards virtue. Virtue in a person develops not only with the power of reason and will but also through the help of passion. Passion, by helping the execution of reason's command, guides a person for repetition of human act, and thereby the person develops a habit. `Virtue in the irascible and concupiscible powers is nothing other than a certain habitual conformity of these powers to reason´.⁴³

The concept of virtue brings in vivid facets to prospects of formation of morality that develops socially respectful human act. Concept of virtue is a dynamic human quality that could be acquired through education and personal interest. Practice of virtue deepens character traits and substantiates community action. Virtue could be related to religious and social traditions, because as a person grows up in his social situation, he learns the texture of the society and modifies his behavioural patterns.

⁴⁰ ST, Part I-II, Q 39, Art 1.

⁴¹ See: ST, Part I, Q 78.

⁴² See: Lombardo E Nicholas,. The Logic of Desire. Aquinas on Emotion, The Catholic University of America Press, Washington, D.C. 2011, p 97.

⁴³ ST, Part I-II, Q 56, Art 4.

5. Pursuit of Beatitude

The theory of Aquinas on beatitude is central to his discussion from the *Commentary on the Sentences of Peter Lombard* to the *Summa Theologiae*. Unfortunately many philosophers and theologians have not given much importance to his research on beatitude or happiness. I understand *Summa Theologiae* from the point of view of beatitude. All the questions and answers in it could be seen from the perspective of happiness, with lot of depth and acumen.

Beatitude is man's highest good. Therefore it is to be sought among the foremost goods of man. But goods of the soul are nobler than goods of the body, even as the soul itself is nobler than the body. Therefore beatitude is to be sought in goods of the soul. Further that which is the ultimate measure is not measure in any way. Therefore that which cannot be good unless, it be measured cannot be the ultimate measure in human affairs, nor can it be the ultimate end, which is beatitude, since the end is the measure that imposes due limits on things ordered to an end. But bodily goods are praiseworthy or good only to the extent that they receive the measure of virtue, as is evident from what the philosopher says in *Ethics II*. therefore beatitude cannot be in bodily goods.⁴⁴

As a preliminary step, Aquinas defines the Beatitudes in the *Commentary on the Sentences of Peter Lombard* connecting to the Gospel Beatitudes as perfect works emanating from the virtues perfected by the gifts, a progress from the exterior to interior goods and from the active to the contemplative life. The study of beatitude dominates the entire third book of *Summa contra Gentiles*.

An explanation of the guiding intention of God and of human beings at the source of their respective actions opens a wide range of discussions to define perfect end of human act. The explanation of natural law in *Summa Theologiae* functions in a special way in human beings capable of knowing and accepting the finality of inclination to good, and it becomes spiritual in them, ordering them to God as the end of their knowledge and love.⁴⁵ Aquinas's analogical use of the term nature enables him to indicate, in the light of the Genesis account of the Holy Bible which he has considered under the guidance of patristic authors, what was primordial in the human being created by God in His image to act freely under God's impulse and in imitation of God. It is through finality inspired by the attraction or inclination to the good that human action combines with divine action of grace and assimilates towards sovereign good. This understanding of finality concludes by showing that the end of every intellectual substance or human being or human act consist in the knowledge of God.⁴⁶

Beatitude consists in the act of the intellect rather than in the act of the will because intellect grasps its object, the supreme good. As regards human act it participates in the

⁴⁴ Aquinas Thomas,. On Love and Charity. Reading from the *Commentary on the Sentences of Peter Lombard*, trans. By Kwasniewski A peter and others , The Catholic University of America Press Washington D.C, 2008, p 337.

⁴⁵ See: ST, Part I-II, Q 94, Art 2.

⁴⁶ See: Pinckaers Servais,. *The Pinckaers Reader. Renewing Thomastic Moral Theology*, ed. by Berkmann John and Titus Craig Steven, trans. by Noble Mary Thomas and others, The Catholic University of America Press, Washington, D.C, 2005, p 96; SCG III, Q 25.

absolute good, but human act in itself is not the absolute good.⁴⁷ The objectivity of search for beatitude is that, beatitude is good absolutely; it is the object of the will to pursue what is good; however the object is understood as prior to the human act; the intellect understands beatitude as good, and from this understanding follows the act of the will.

Two types of fundamental questions are asked regarding happiness. The objective question is, in what good does human beatitude consist? And the subjective question is in what human action does beatitude consist?⁴⁸ Human beatitude is more than which consist in external goods or even in virtues; it consist in the contemplation of truth, God, the divine realities, because it is proper to human being to search perfect good and it is done for its own sake. Mary of Bethany sitting at the feet of Jesus was suggested by Pope Gregory the Great as a role model for contemplation. It is a process that leads one to extraordinary knowledge of God, a vision of God through the grace of God; then this vision of God will remove all the desires of the person in its totality and will grow in intensity towards fulfilling both heart and mind. Perfect happiness consists in the vision of God. It is objective, because it is caused by a good reality, and it is subjective because it corresponds to the desire of man which carries him forward into contemplation.

6. Significance of the Research

Happiness is a multi-dimensional anthropological phenomenon which needs to be approached from the point of view of various anthropological sciences. Thomas Aquinas deals with happiness in the light of the then theological and philosophical terms of his time. But the basic insights remain still valid and meaningful even when approached in the light of the recent scientific explorations. In this regard, this research has its own limits. It does not present a complete or comprehensive vision into the details of how he deals with the theme in all his works. Primarily, his second part of *Summa Theologiae* is my source for this research. In the development of the theme I have also referred to other parts of *Summa Theologiae*. I refer also to other moral theologians and philosophers and critical writers in my attempt to explore the various dimensions and implications of happiness in human life. I do not claim that I would present a hundred percent new comprehensive vision of happiness.

The relevance of the topic is needless to be pointed out. Human dynamics of happiness is always there in one's search for truth and meaning in life. Thomas Aquinas's basic innovations into this topic still become relevant and meaningful even today when the dynamism of happiness is approached from an inter-disciplinary point of view. His innovations into the ontological predicaments of human life rewrite happiness as a basic feature of human existence itself rather than mere an epistemological or psychological phenomenon. Such a passionate movement of emphasizing the predicaments of life is there in all theologians who take human life and existence seriously. Thomas Aquinas's exploration

⁴⁷ See: ST, Part I, Q 26.

⁴⁸ See: ST, Part I-II, Q 2.

on happiness remains a unique directive for the students on consciousness and other anthropological phenomena.

The concept of happiness of Thomas Aquinas, and its implications in the wider context of the moral theological direction are already extensively and widely explored and studied by many. But the nuances and implications of the concept of happiness in comparison with and in reference to the recent studies in psychology, with reference to human act and kinetic force, with a special reference to the inter-disciplinary dimensions, along with an understanding of the cognitive evaluative process in passion, is the novelty of my research. In other words the significance and novelty of the research is the attempt to meaningfully place the topic in the recent moral theological milieu which is characterized by the psychology and inter-disciplinary background, and to trace the resulting moral theological implications.

7. Chapter Outline

My research on the concept of happiness in *Summa Theologiae* with reference to contemporary psychological studies consists of five chapters. I would like to explain some of the important features of these five chapters.

7.1 First Chapter

First chapter tries to deepen the understanding of human act and it develops a general understanding on happiness. It explores the nuance of voluntary and involuntary human acts, and speculative and practical mind. The will as the rational appetite plays a major role in an inclination of a person towards a desired end. This inclination of the will is to be analyzed on the grounds of the movement of the will, to decide whether it is *volition* or *nolition*; volition is a desire of good and that leads to a good human act.

Some of the features of the act of the will, which are causing an impact on human act, are the following: enjoyment or delight, intention, that is the direction or application or causal power to an effect, choice, which is selecting means to an end, counsel, that is inquiry concerning the right choice of means, consent, meaning application of sense to something, and use that is carrying out a command of reason. Human actions can be good or bad because of that at which they aim; goodness and badness in human actions can depend on their circumstances. This chapter also estimates the contractarian, the utilitarian and the divine command theories as moral appraisal of human acts. Good and evil are essentially different acts of the will; good and evil are acts differing in species and they are derived proper to the acts of the objects.

Good is to be done and evil is to be avoided: these principles are grasped by virtue of what Aquinas calls 'synderesis', which he thinks of as a disposition.⁴⁹ Synderesis is a natural

⁴⁹ See: Davies Brian, . *The Thought of Thomas Aquinas*. Oxford University Pres, New York, 2009, p 233.

disposition of the human mind by which we apprehend the basic principles of behavior.⁵⁰ The mind can directly grasp certain moral principles, but these principles need to be practically applied as we find ourselves in concrete circumstances; we recognize the stage in which practical reasoning of human act is evaluated and thought about for performance as conscience.⁵¹

7.2 Second Chapter

In my second chapter I would like to further explore the nuance of human act in relation to cognition of passion and happiness.

The medieval philosophers generally accepted two kinds of distinction between a number of principles and capacities that account for movement and sensation, known as the sensitive part of the soul, and a number of principles and capacities that account for thought and volition, known as the intellective part of the soul. The sensitive and intellective parts of the soul sit astride another fundamental cluster of principles accounting for nourishment, growth, and reproduction, known as the vegetative part of the soul. There are psychological experiences founded solely on the vegetative part, for instance hunger, thirst, and sexuality, merely as physical reactivity. But medieval philosophers, along with modern psychologists, do not classify these together with the passions of the soul or emotions: they are more primitive motivational forces, now called ‘drives’ or ‘urges’.

This chapter tries to explore the teleological conception of the passion in relation to the principles of appetite in the sensitive part of the soul, the order of passions of the soul, and a description of the concupiscent and irascible passions of the soul. One needs to ask a few questions, such as, what causes the passions? What impact do they have on the person who suffers them? Can they be shaped and reshaped in order to better promote human flourishing? The aim of the second chapter is to provide a better understanding of Aquinas’s account of the passions; it identifies the Aristotelian influences that lie at the heart of the *Summa Theologiae*, and it enters into a dialogue with contemporary thinking about the nature of passion.

Passions are important as we develop the account of what human beings are, and what is involved in human action, and what can be thought of as theological or philosophical premises. People have passion; it is something we need to take into account of, as we consider happiness in relation to human act in general; because it has a bearing in the life of human beings considered as ordered to the beatific vision

A consideration of human act in general enables one to distinguish between apprehension and appetite. Apprehension refers very broadly to the power to acquire and process information, including the power to receive sensory impressions, to form and manipulate sensory images through imagination, to make sensory judgements, to think and to

⁵⁰ See: ST, Part I-II, Q 20, Art.2; Davies Brian,. *The Thought of Thomas Aquinas*. Oxford University Pres, New York, 2009, p233.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, P 234.

engage in reasoning. Appetite refers very broadly to the power to be moved or to move oneself interiorly or exteriorly, in relation to objects of apprehension. And passion is a kind of motion that a person experiences, a motion of the human being as a whole.

Human being is a micro-cosmos and has three different degrees of life namely, vegetative life, sensitive life and intellectual or spiritual life; that is to say human being has lower order of life and a higher order of life. Human being is dynamic and always moves towards perfection through human act. A passion is the act of the sense appetite, a passive power, from dormancy to act, in response to the apprehension of an object to which the sense appetite is inclined.⁵²

Passion is an *object related non-volitional affective psychological* state, or, in medieval terms, emotion is an actualization of the sensitive appetite, which is a semi-autonomous faculty of the soul⁵³. Psychology, in the Aristotelian tradition, is a subordinate branch of natural philosophy, which identifies three kinds of clustered activities that living beings exemplify, stemming from three distinct principles, that is, from three types of soul: (a) nutrition, growth, and reproduction, typical of plants and trees, whose principle is the vegetative soul; (b) self-movement and perception of the world, typical of animals, whose principle is the sensitive soul; (c) thought and reasoning, typical of human beings, whose principle is the intellective soul with cognitive powers to acquire and assimilate information and with appetitive powers to move the subject. These kinds of soul are arranged in a hierarchy such that the latter include the former: anything capable of the sensitive soul is capable of the vegetative soul, and anything capable of the intellective soul is capable of the sensitive soul and the vegetative soul⁵⁴.

Passion is an act of the sensitive appetite. Such acts are properly passive because those acts require something external to activate them, and they differ in accordance with their active causes⁵⁵. They result from an impulse received on the ground of some subjective want, and are more or less dependent on the excitability of the bodily organism.⁵⁶ There is an order among a number of motive powers, the second only moves by virtue of the first, the lower appetite is not sufficient enough to cause movement, unless the higher appetite consents; in

⁵² See: Lombardo E Nicholas,. *The Logic of Desire. Aquinas on Emotion*, The Catholic University of America Press, Washington ,D.C. 2001, p34. See also: ST, Part I-II, Q 41. Art.1.

⁵³ King Peter,. *Oxford Handbook to Aquinas. Aquinas on the Emotions*, May 2012, p2; <http://dx.org/10.1093/oxfordhd/9780195326093.013.0017>.

⁵⁴ See: *Ibid.*

⁵⁵ See: Miner Robert,. *Thomas on the Passions. A Study of Summa Theologiae 1a2ae 22-48*, Cambridge University Press, 2009, p 58.

⁵⁶ See: Scheeben Mathias Joseph,. *A manual of Catholic Theology. Based on Scheeben's „dogmatik“ Volume 1*, Wilhelm Joseph and Scannell B.Thomas, Kegan Paul trench Truebener & Co, London, 1906, p 419.

this way, the irascible and concupiscible are subject to reason⁵⁷. “Reason is a principle source of knowledge and possesses a domain of its own”⁵⁸.

Bodily pleasures hinder the use of reason: firstly by distracting the reason, because human beings attend often to that which pleases, secondly by being contrary to reason, because some pleasures, especially those that are in excess, are contrary to the order of reason, and thirdly by fettering the reason – in so far as bodily pleasure is followed by a certain alteration in the body, greater even than in the other passions, in proportion as the appetite is more vehemently affected towards a present than towards an absent thing⁵⁹. However, appropriate pleasures increase activity⁶⁰. The full notion of happiness includes the well-being of the sensitive appetite; the attainment of happiness requires knowledge of the passions.

7.3 Third Chapter

In the third chapter I would like to explore the ethical perspective of happiness in internal and external principles of human act. Examining the conscience by Christians refer to the Ten Commandments, and for Roman Catholics the commandments of the Church also play an important role as a force in analyzing and examining human act.

The theological virtues namely faith, hope and charity, alone cannot sufficiently inform a believer of what is required to act properly in every situation. Christian tradition incorporates the four cardinal virtues prudence, justice, fortitude, and temperance. These virtues provide the focal points for many other allied and auxiliary virtues. Altogether, these moral virtues constitute the substance of a happy life, which embodies every quality required for a complete and flourishing human act. `Morality is partly a practice in which persons give and demand reasons of one another; yet this implies that it is also a practice in which persons hold themselves accountable for their own attitudes and actions⁶¹.

Human act proceeds from the deliberation of reason. `A religious ethical life or moral life typically includes explicated or codified norms, by which persons orient themselves, as they seek to hold themselves and others accountable to a common way of life⁶². “It is obvious that whatever actions proceed from a given power, are caused by it in accordance

⁵⁷ See: ST part I, Q 81, Art.3.

⁵⁸ See: Scheeben Mathias Joseph, . A manual of Catholic Theology. Based on Scheeben’s „ dogmatik“ Volume 1, Joseph Wilhelm and Scannell B. Thomas, Kegan Paul trench Truebener & Co, London, 1906, p 148.

⁵⁹ See: ST part I-II, Q33, Art.3.

⁶⁰ See: Aristotle, .The Nicomachean Ethics. Trans.by Ross David, Oxford University Press, New York, 1980, p 190(10.5, 1175a36).

⁶¹ Cates Fritz Diana, . Aquinas on The Emotions. A Religious Ethical Inquiry, Georgetown University Press, Washington, D.C. 2009, p 22.

⁶² Cates Fritz Diana, . Aquinas on The Emotions. A Religious Ethical Inquiry, Georgetown University Press, Washington, D.C. 2009, p 24.

with the nature of its object. But the object of will is the end and good. That is why all human acts are for the sake of an end⁶³”.

There is a harmony in the interplay of the human faculties of reason, will, sensation and sense perception; they tend to function together in coordination.⁶⁴ Development of virtue in the irascible and concupiscible powers is nothing other than a certain habitual conformity of these powers to reason⁶⁵. In other words virtue as a habit is developed through passion and will be active through the passions, in so far as they participate in reason. In so far as virtue participates in the reason, it is the principle of a human act. `Passion is not just tamed by virtue; ordinate passion helps the execution of reason’s command and thus positively assists the performance of virtuous human acts.’⁶⁶

Passion grows up in a person from infancy. This is why it is difficult to rub off the engraved passion, as it is deep rooted in life. And we measure even our actions, by the rule of pleasure and pain, for to feel delight or pain rightly or wrongly has effect on our actions. It should be considered that it is harder to fight against pleasure than anger, but, positively, virtue is concerned with what is harder; because the good is better when it is harder. The whole concern of virtue is with pleasure and pain, for the man who uses these positively for a good end will be good, and he who uses them badly will be bad⁶⁷. A human act is called bad when it is lacking the fullness of being that human act ought to have. “A bad action can have a *per se* effect in so far as it possesses goodness and being, just as adultery is the cause of new human life, in so far as it involves the union of male and female, not in so far as it lacks the order of reason.”⁶⁸

“Habit is a quality which is difficult to change”⁶⁹; this stability allows human being to resist inadequate change and develop specific character⁷⁰. “For no function of man has so much permanence as virtuous activities, and of these themselves the most valuable are more durable because those who are blessed spend their life most readily and most continuously in these”⁷¹. There is a difference between an intrinsic power and a habit: the first practical principles bestowed on human being by nature, do not belong to a special power, but to a

⁶³ ST, Part I-II, Q 1, Art 1.

⁶⁴ See: Pinckaers Servais,. *The Pinckaers Reader. Renewing Thomastic Moral Theology*, ed. by Berkmann John and Titus Craig Steven, trans. by Noble Mary Thomas and others, The Catholic University of America Press, Washington, D.C, 2005, p 278.

⁶⁵ See: ST, Part I-II, Q 56, Art 4.

⁶⁶ Lombardo E Nicholas,. *The Logic of Desire. Aquinas on Emotion*, The Catholic University of America Press, Washington, D.C. 2011, p 105; ST, Part I-II, Q 59, Art 2 ad 3.

⁶⁷ See: Aristotle,. *The Nicomachean Ethics*. Trans by Ross David, Oxford University Press, 2009, p 27 (1105a, 8-13).

⁶⁸ ST, Part I-II, Q 18, Art 1, ad 3.

⁶⁹ ST, Part I-II, Q 49, Art 1.

⁷⁰ See: Dobson L Melanie,. *Health As A Virtue. Thomas Aquinas and the Practice of Habits of Health*, Pickwick Publications, Eugene, 2014, p 18.

⁷¹ Aristotle,. *The Nicomachean Ethics*. Trans by Ross David, Oxford University Press, 2009, p 16(1100b, 12-17).

special natural habit, which we call *synderesis*⁷². “*Synderesis* is said to incite to good and murmur at evil, inasmuch as through first principle we proceed to discover, and judge of what we have discovered”⁷³.

Certain principles of human act have a source external to them namely, law and grace. Law is a the work of a wisdom endowed with an impelling force, and it is multifaceted; however, grace, which is revealed in the Gospel and received through the sacraments, becomes a second principle of action, exterior in its origin, but profoundly interior through the depth of its penetration within us and exists as an influencing force to human act⁷⁴.

7.4 Fourth Chapter

In the fourth chapter I would like to research about the possibilities of the psychological perspective of happiness in the human act. The search for happiness as a human endeavour is studied by many psychologists throughout the world. Psychological researchers assess people’s happiness with varied measures, and there are so many different definitions of what makes people happy; these definitions are mostly based on certain needs that must be satisfied or fulfilled in order to achieve the emotional state of happiness; one should here cautiously differentiate the thoughts which refer to long-term happiness from the momentary feelings of joy which one experiences in daily life.

The term happiness, the core of psychological wealth, extends beyond the material riches, emotional intelligence, and social capital; psychological wealth includes attitude towards life, social support, spiritual development, material resources, relationships, positive attitude, health, habits, and life satisfaction.⁷⁵

Four categories of desire draw our attention in order to have a general perceptive of the internal drives that lead to a sense of fulfillment. They are desire connected with biological opportunities and dangers, ego-comparative desires, contributive-empathetic desires, and transcendental desires; they have their corresponding faculties: brain and sensory faculties, self-consciousness, empathy, and conscience and transcendental awareness⁷⁶. An idea about the fundamental drives which function as a background in human act is necessary in order to know some of the causes of happiness; when one understands the pattern of his desires, the better will be his understanding about his driving forces for happiness.

⁷² See: ST, Part I, Q 79, Art 12.

⁷³ Ibid.

⁷⁴ See: Pinckaers Servais,. *Morality The Catholic View*. Trans. By Sherwin Michael, St. Augustine’s Press, South bend, Indiana, 2001, p 28.

⁷⁵ See: Diener Ed and Diener Biswas Robert,. *Happiness. Unlocking the Mysteries of Psychological Wealth*, Blackwell Publishing, USA, 2008, p 3.

⁷⁶ See: Spitzer Robert,. *Finding True Happiness. Satisfying Our Restless Hearts*, Ignatius Press, San Francisco, 2015,p33.

Every writer of the theme happiness interprets and tends to delineate own definition and terms. Interestingly, it is difficult to find out a concrete psychological description of its meaning in a single term. One of the general notions of happiness is that, “it is a subjective well-being in scientific parlance”⁷⁷. Most of the writers in psychology acknowledge a subjective well-being as a criterion for happiness. In a relative understanding of happiness, the state of being or the state of life of an individual is given priority in defining happiness, and then it is the degree to which an individual favourably judges the overall quality of his life as a whole.⁷⁸

One’s attitude to life is central to his happiness. A qualitative composition of attention, interpretation, and memory help a person to develop an attitude which can increase the psychological wealth. In order to develop positive attitude one needs to focus on strengthening self-esteem, finding meaning of life, and stabilizing confidence to face the different realities of life.

Aquinas, who recovered the works of Aristotle, is considered as one of the great contributors to the discipline of psychology with his emphasis on the reconciliation of supernaturalism with rationalism. Aquinas attributes human being with rational soul, the *anima rationalis*, that human beings are essentially different from other kinds of being, because they have a mind, and it is the soul the core of human identity, which makes human beings different from other beings. For Aquinas, there existed a clear difference between body and soul, however, he is neither a Cartesian dualist nor a materialist; his view had a middle position between these options⁷⁹; it is *Thomastic* dualism or *hylomorphic*⁸⁰ dualism. Today we read thoughts of positive psychology in the writing of Seligman, who emphasised that there is a virtue, action proceeds from character, and action fundamentally proceeds from good character or from bad character⁸¹. I would say, in this sense, positive psychology is an expansion of Aquinas’s theory of virtue; and an understanding of his theory of passion and beatitude will enable us to learn the approach of positive psychology better. Psychologically considering, when Aquinas understands mind as a form⁸², it opens scope for changes in the

⁷⁷ Diener Ed and Diener Biswas Robert., Happiness. Unlocking the Mysteries of Psychological Wealth, Blackwell Publishing, USA, 2008, p 4.

⁷⁸ See: Veenhoven Ruut., Conditions of Happiness. D Reidel publishing Company, Netherland,1984, p 22.

⁷⁹ <http://edwardfeser.blogspot.de/2012/09/was-aquinas-dualist.html>.

⁸⁰ Hylomorphism or hylemorphism is a philosophical theory developed by Aristotle, which conceives a being (*ousia*) as a compound of matter and form. The word is a 19th-century term formed from the Greek words *hyle* which means wood or matter and *morphē*, which means form. Aristotle defines matter as that out of which a thing or something is made. For example, letters are the matter of syllables. Thus, matter is a relative term- an object counts as matter relative to something else. For example, clay is a matter relative to a brick because a brick is made of clay, whereas bricks are matter relative to a brick house. Change is analysed as a material transformation - matter is what undergoes a change of form. For example, consider a lump of bronze that is shaped into a statue. Bronze is the matter, and this matter loses one form and gains a new form, that of a statue. See: <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hylomorphism>.

⁸¹ Seligman E.P. Martin., Authentic Happiness. Using the New Positive Psychology to Realize Your Potential for Lasting Fulfillment, Atria Paperback, New York, 2013, p 125.

⁸² See: Pasnau Robert., Thomas Aquinas, on Human Nature. Cambridge University Press, 2002, p 71-72.

form of the mind, and I would say positive or negative form, active or indifferent form, occupied with good habits or habits of evil. This understanding also gives scope for healing therapy, that is, a form can be changed or remodified thereby perfect human act is possible.

7.5 Fifth Chapter

In the fifth chapter I would like to explore the multidimensional perspective of perfect happiness. Aristotle's most significant work *Nicomachean Ethics* describes the theory of happiness as the ultimate purpose of human existence. People seek pleasure, wealth, and a good reputation; although each of these has some value, none of them can occupy the place of the chief good for which human being aims. To be an ultimate end, an act must be self-sufficient; it seems that all other goods are a means towards obtaining happiness, while happiness is something final and self-sufficient, and is the end of action.⁸³

According to Buddhism ultimate happiness is achieved by overcoming all cravings. The Eightfold Path teaches that by restraining oneself, cultivating discipline, and practicing mindfulness and meditation, monks and nuns attain nirvana and stop their craving, clinging and karmic accumulations, thereby ending their rebirth and suffering and they achieve perfect happiness.⁸⁴ The worldly happiness is named in Buddhism as mundane happiness which is seen for lay people as a worthy goal.

Concept of appetite is essential to Aquinas's metaphysical questions on human being and to his anthropological understanding of human act. Appetite is the principle that seeks toward something good, it is a kind of inclination towards something desirable⁸⁵, and it functions as an essential constituent of a person that directs the mind toward perfection and completion. Book of Genesis explains that God loves everything that He created; it brings in the understanding that being and goodness is interrelated not only because God created it but also because any kind of being that exist is necessarily good; it could also be inferred that perfection of anything is also good, thereby an appetite could also be evoked as an inclination towards that perfection.⁸⁶ This appetite is an integral part of the inherent dynamic nature of human being.

Appetite could be called as desirability which functions indivisibly as associated force of an individual and his goodness. Perception and reason are related to desire because choice of the person regarding a foreseen object is progressed through perception and reason, that is to say a positive choice will lead to positive desire and a negative choice will lead to a negative desire. Theoretical and practical are analogous terms which help one to understand

⁸³ See: Aristotle, *The Nicomachean Ethics*. Trans by David Ross, Oxford University Press, New York, 2009, p 10-11.

⁸⁴ See: <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Happiness>.

⁸⁵ See: ST, Part I-II, Q 8, Art 1.

⁸⁶ See: ST, Part I, Q 20, Art 2.

perception and reason. Most of one's actual thinking is both theoretical and practical. The primary grasp of what is good is more of a practical grasp.

There are four types of appetite which fundamentally influences an individual: they are, pleasure centered, ego centered, charity centered and transcendent. This appetite involves reasonable passivity in an individual. An individual has the potential to become something other than his present efficiency. Therefore the type of appetite that one has, can change one's perceptive. Appetite has a nature of *exitus-raditus*, because it comes from the act of the will and deemed to be returned to the person as enrichment.⁸⁷

Creating an appetite for perfect happiness and maintaining this created desire through the privations of pleasantness of life calls for healthy understanding of oneself, because perception, reason and desire control human action⁸⁸. Human desire to perfection could face obstacles in the form of physical, moral⁸⁹, and metaphysical privations. When we say that a person's disposition manifests his appetite, it is a claim that implicitly defines also evil in terms of appetite; in this way evil can be defined not only as a privation of goodness but also as a frustration of appetite, and the consequent disintegration of the person, insofar as evil blocks his appetite from attaining natural end.⁹⁰

The genre of appetite will depend upon the source of desire, and it will also be distinguished by the knowledge or ignorance of the goal, from which has evolved the tendency of the person as a human act. Although the created appetite after being activated moves towards perfection, they depend upon their source appetite. Replacement therapy involves in creating positive thinking. Three reasons that well-being should be taught are the great number of depression, the nominal increase in happiness over the last two generations, and greater well-being enhances learning and attitude; positive mood produces broader attention, more creative thinking, and more holistic thinning.⁹¹

However only human acts, not acts of a man, make up one's moral life,⁹² which is understood and justified in believing flourish of human life, includes not only economical and physical prosperity but also participation in social life. Moral virtue can refine a person and

⁸⁷ See: Lombardo E Nicholas,. *The Logic of Desire. Aquinas on Emotion*, The Catholic University of America Press, Washington, D.C. 2011, p 30.

⁸⁸ See: Aristotle,. *The Nicomachean Ethics*. Trans by David Ross, Oxford University Press, New York, 2009, (1130a, 20), p 103.

⁸⁹ See: ST, Part I, Q 43, Art 1 explains: "since every nature desires its own being and its own perfection, it must be said that the being and the perfection of any nature is good. Hence it cannot be that evil signifies being, or any form of nature. Therefore it must be that by the name of evil is signified the absence of good".

⁹⁰ See: Lombardo E Nicholas,. *The Logic of Desire. Aquinas on Emotion*, The Catholic University of America Press, Washington, D.C. 2011, p 30; See also ST, Part I, Q 49, Art 1.

⁹¹ See: Seligman E.P. Martin,. *Flourish. A Visionary New Understanding of Happiness and Well-Being*, Atria Paperback, New York, 2011, p 80.

⁹² See: McInerny Ralph,. *Aquinas on Human Action. A Theory of Practice*, Catholic University of America Press, Washington D.C. 2012, P9-10.

instil sustainable changes through formation of habit in doing good works. Each virtue is based on an idea which is either discovered or learned by the person.

When we consider happiness related to virtue, it is reasonable that this virtue should be in a highest human act, including a transcendent human act, because we want the best happiness. This virtue need to be a force which guides our natural human act with a consideration to the divine perspective, whether it be thinking of God or searching the presence of God in and around us. Contemplation leads to happiness with purity and permanence, the purity of pleasure lies in the immateriality of object and its permanence lies in the object of contemplation which is unchangeable.

In this research I would like to reconstruct the concept of happiness in *Summa Theologiae*; it is an immanent interpretation of Thomas Aquinas and his benevolent idea.

Chapter I

The Ethical Perspective of Happiness in Aquinas's Concept of Human Acts

Introduction

Thomas Aquinas notes that philosophers and theologians consider causes and judge in two different ways. A philosopher considers and judges according to caused causes, and a theologian judges according to uncaused causes⁹³. This chapter will take more theological focus on the ethical perspective of Happiness in the concept of Human acts; and consequently is going to examine primarily on human acts in relation to perfect happiness, as it relates to God as the efficient, exemplary, and final cause of all created perfections. All perfections must be caused by something that has these perfections essentially; all perfections found in anything must be originally and superabundantly in God, and Aquinas considers that in order to properly understand the effect, it is necessary to understand the cause.

The Bible reveals that God made the world⁹⁴, and all that is in the world, and the entire universe is created out of nothing. He spoke His Word, and everything came into existence; this is creation. In the beginning, God created the heavens and the earth⁹⁵. Therefore every being in any way existing is from God. According to Aquinas, the existence of God can be proved in five ways⁹⁶.

The first and more manifest way is the argument from motion, it is evident to our senses that some things are in motion, and according to him, God is the first mover, who is put in motion by no other. The second way is from the nature of the efficient cause. In the world of senses, we find there is an order of efficient causes; there is no case known in which a thing in the world is found to be the efficient cause of itself, for so it would be prior to itself

⁹³ See: Rziha John,. *Perfecting Human Actions*. ST. Thomas Aquinas on Human Participation in Eternal Law, Catholic University of America Press, Washington D.C, 2009, p30.

⁹⁴ "Of Him, and by Him, and in Him are all things", Rm.11:36: as quoted in St. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologica*, Complete English Edition in Five Volumes, translated by Fathers of the English Dominican Province, Christian Classics Notre Dame, Indiana, Part 1, Question 44, Art 1. Hereafter the same will be referred as ST.

⁹⁵ In the first part of Genesis 1:1-2:3, Elohim, the Hebrew generic word for God, creates the heaven and the earth in six days, starting with darkness and light on the first day, and ending with the creation of mankind on the sixth day. God then rests on, blesses and sanctifies the seventh day (of Priestly source). In the second part, Genesis 2:4-2:24 God, now referred by the personal name "Yahweh", creates the first man from dust and breathes life into him. God then places him in the Garden of Eden and creates the first woman from his rib as a companion (of Yahwistic source). The narratives in Genesis 1–2 were not the only creation myths in ancient Israel, and the complete biblical evidence suggests two contrasting models. The first is the "logos" (meaning speech) model, where a supreme God "speaks" dormant matter into existence. The second is the "agon" (meaning struggle or combat) model, in which it is God's victory in battle over the monsters of the sea that mark his sovereignty and might. Genesis 1 is the supreme example of the "logos" mythology; Isaiah 51:9–10 recalls an ancient Canaanite myth in which God creates the world by vanquishing the water deities: Awake, awake, put on strength, O arm of the LORD; awake, as in days of old, the generations of long ago. Was it not you who cut Rahab in pieces, who pierced the dragon? Was it not you who dried up the sea, the waters of the great deep, who made the depths of the sea a way for the redeemed to pass over?

⁹⁶ See: ST, Part 1, Q 2, Art. 3.

which is impossible. According to Aquinas, the first efficient cause is God. The third way is taken from the possibility and necessity. We find in nature things that are possible to be and not to be, since they are found to be generated and to corrupt, and consequently, they are possible to be and not to be; but it is impossible for these always to exist, for that which is possible not to be at some time is not. Therefore, if everything is possible not to be, then at one time there could have been nothing in existence; if at one time nothing was in existence, it would have been impossible for anything to have begun to exist, but something must exist and the existence of which is necessary; according to Aquinas, the source of the existence which causes all things is God. The fourth way is taken from the gradation to be found in things. Among things there are some more and some less good, true, noble, and the like; there is something which is truest, something best, something which is uttermost being. There must also be something which is to all being the cause of their being, goodness, and every other perfection, and this Aquinas calls God. The fifth way is taken from the governance of the world. We see that things which lack intelligence act almost the same way so as to obtain the best result; whatever lacks intelligence cannot move towards an end, unless it is directed by some being endowed with knowledge and intelligence. Therefore, some intelligent being exists by whom all natural things are directed to their end, and according to Aquinas this being is called God. Aquinas uses these five ways so as to provide demonstrations that the truth of God exists⁹⁷. Insofar as the *Summa Theologiae* can be thought of as offering a defense of God exists, the defense is not really over until 1a, Q 45; the five ways in 1a, Q2 are but an attempt to get a certain ball rolling⁹⁸.

Thomas Aquinas in his comprehension formulates a twofold explanation: God is the first exemplar cause of all things, and the things created may be called the exemplar of another by the reason of its likeness to the exemplar. Therefore created things could be called exemplars. Creatures which are created exemplars, do not attain a natural likeness to God; yet creatures do attain likeness to God because they represent the divine idea, just as a material house is like the house in the mind of the architect⁹⁹. God is the first Agent; God intends to communicate His perfection, which is His goodness, and every creature intends to acquire its own perfection, which is the likeness of the divine perfection and goodness¹⁰⁰.

The discussion of human being in ST, 1aQQ75-102 is part of a larger project to understand God via creation. According to Aquinas, humans are being created in the image of God. Therefore humans are intrinsically good because they were created in the image of the goodness of God. This is known theologically as the *imago dei*¹⁰¹, and it is a lynchpin of the Catholic understanding of human nature. “The Catholic Church teaches that the human soul possesses

⁹⁷ See: ST, Part 1, Q 2, Art. 3. See also: Davies Brian,. Thomas Aquinas *Summa Theologiae*. A Guide and Commentary, Oxford University Press, New York, 2014, p33.

⁹⁸ See: Davies Brian,. Thomas Aquinas *Summa Theologiae*. A Guide and Commentary, Oxford University Press, New York, 2014, p35.

⁹⁹ See: ST, Part 1, Q 44, Art 4.

¹⁰⁰ See: ST Part 1, Q 44, Art 4.

¹⁰¹ Pasnau Robert,. Thomas Aquinas on Human Nature. A Philosophical Study of *Summa theologiae* 1a 75-89, Cambridge University Press, USA, 2002, p19.

by reason of the act of creation an active force and tendency to lead a moral and religious life in accordance with the soul's essential character of image of God"¹⁰². Human beings are composed of a spiritual and corporeal substance, which gives us a theoretically perplexing kind of dual status. This unique dual status makes us especially interesting in many ways, and provides some justification for paying special attention to our species in a general account of God's creative activities¹⁰³.

Nevertheless, sin has transformed human nature; it has broken the mirror, as it were, in which humans were supposed to reflect the divine life. Sin entered the world when humans disobeyed a decree from God; afterwards, humans were forced to leave the Garden of Eden, the perfect home that had been created for them, and go out into the world to toil and suffer. The effects of this disobedience were even more far reaching; sin marked the soul of the first humans in many repercussions that it would be transmitted to all succeeding generations. This is called Original sin, which is a state of being, rather than a condition of guilt. From the moment of their birth, humans are able to reflect God's holiness only imperfectly; humans were created to submit instinctively and freely to God in all their actions, but original sin mars their will, so that it does not always point in the direction of obedience to God.

According to Aquinas, original sin is in a serious sense, not sin on our part; we are not responsible for any action of Adam; the disorder which is in an individual human being, a descendent of Adam, is not voluntary by reason of his or her personal will¹⁰⁴. The descendants of Adam are born in need of God's grace, considered as what raises people to perfect union with God¹⁰⁵. Aquinas suggests that, for all his pre Fall glory, Adam fell short of God and wanted to be like God by his own efforts and not by God's; that Adam sinned principally in wanting to be like God in knowing good and evil, so that he might determine for himself by his own natural powers what was right or wrong for him to do; Adam sinned in desiring God's likeness in his own powers of action, so that of his own capabilities he might achieve happiness¹⁰⁶.

The concept of original sin stands as a backdrop to Catholic thought on human nature, with the *imago dei* front and center. It is actually from their creation in the image of God that humans obtain the freedom of the will that allows them to act sinfully and keep their broken relationship with God from being healed. Catholics reject the idea that humans are predestined to act in one manner or the other¹⁰⁷; both, their sin and their obedience are the result of free choice. God is all-powerful and could simply will humans to be good, but God

¹⁰² See: Scheeben Mathias Joseph, . A manual of Catholic Theology. Based on Scheeben's „ dogmatik“ Volume 1, Joseph Wilhelm and Thomas B. Scannell, Kegan Paul trench Truebener & Co, London, 1906, p 413.

¹⁰³ Ibid.

¹⁰⁴ See: ST. Part. I-II, Q 81, Art 1.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid. See also Davies Brian,. Thomas Aquinas Summa Theologiae. A Guide and Commentary, Oxford University Press, New York, 2014, p208.

¹⁰⁶ See: Davies Brian,. Thomas Aquinas Summa Theologiae. A Guide and Commentary, Oxford University Press, New York, 2014, p209.

¹⁰⁷ See: Lexikon Fuer Theologie und Kirche. Praedestination, Josef Hoefler und Karl Rahner (Hrsg), Herder, Freiburg, 1963, P 669.

chooses to limit divine action in order to preserve human freedom; similarly, while God's infinite knowledge may foreknow what humans will choose, this does not impinge on the freedom of their choice in any way.

According to Aquinas, the type of the Divine wisdom, inasmuch as by it all things are created, has the character of art, exemplar or idea; so the type of Divine wisdom, as moving all things to their due end, bears the character of law. Accordingly, the eternal law is nothing else than the type of Divine wisdom as directing all actions and movements¹⁰⁸. Eternal law comes to be recognized by us as we acquire knowledge of how to act well, however since the eternal law is, in fact God, it cannot be comprehended for what it is by people in this life¹⁰⁹, since the created intellect cannot see the essence of God, unless God by His grace unites Himself to the created intellect, as an object made intelligible to it¹¹⁰. But it can still be grasped by them to some extent and to varying degrees, in so far as people can be aware of general moral principle and of more specific ones falling under them, because all just laws derive from the eternal law¹¹¹.

Law is a rule and measure of acts, whereby man is induced to act or is restrained from acting¹¹², and rule and measure can be in a person in two ways: as in him that rules and measures, and as in that which is ruled and measured, since a thing is ruled and measured, in so far as it partakes of the rule or measure. All things subject to divine providence are ruled and measured by the eternal law. All things partake somewhat of the eternal law in so far as they derive their respective inclinations to their proper acts and ends, and among all others the rational creature is subject to Divine providence in the most excellent way, in so far as it partakes of a share of providence by being provident both of itself and for others; it has a share of the eternal reason, whereby it has a natural inclination to its proper acts and inclination to its proper act and end. This participation of the eternal law in the rational creature is called the natural law¹¹³.

Natural law's commands extend to all doing or avoiding of things recognized by the practical reason of itself as being human goods¹¹⁴; and that all virtuous actions, insofar as they are virtuous in accord with natural law in that they benefit us because of what we are by nature, and natural law governs the activity of everyone in the same way, since everyone is human, just as everyone is subject to truth as acknowledged by sound theoretical reasoning. People will determine how they ought to act in the circumstances in which they find themselves, and what one person rightly concludes that he or she ought to do need not be

¹⁰⁸ See: ST. Part. I-II, Q 93, Art 1.

¹⁰⁹ See: Davies Brian,. *Thomas Aquinas Summa Theologiae. A Guide and Commentary*, Oxford University Press, New York, 2014, p215.

¹¹⁰ See: ST. Part. I, Q 12, Art 4.

¹¹¹ See: ST. Part. I-II, Q 93, Art 3.

¹¹² See: ST. Part. I-II, Q 90, Art1.

¹¹³ See: ST. Part. I-II, Q 90, Art 2. See also Budziszewski.J., *Commentary on Thomas Aquinas's Treatise on Law*. Cambridge University Press, USA, 2014, p228.

¹¹⁴ See: ST. Part. I-II, Q 94, Art 2.

what another person in different circumstances ought to decide to do. Aquinas does not therefore think that all conclusions based on right practical reason are binding on everyone, but he holds that everyone is bound to act in accordance with right practical reasoning¹¹⁵.

1. Human Acts

According to Thomas Aquinas, “life is shown principally by two actions, knowledge¹¹⁶ and movement”¹¹⁷. Motion or movement is nothing else than the reduction of something from potentiality to actuality¹¹⁸. Living things are animate¹¹⁹ and nonliving things are inanimate. Not every principle of vital action is soul, for then an eye would be a soul, as it is a principle of vision. First principle of life is called soul. Nothing corporeal can be the first principle of life¹²⁰. Body¹²¹ is competent to be a principle of life. Body owes to some principle, which is called its act. Soul, which is the first principle of life, is not a body, but an act of body¹²². Just as heat is not a body, but an act of a body. In the movement of a body, there are two kinds of contact, that of quantity and that of power. Body can be touched by an incorporeal thing, which moves the body¹²³.

Actions done by man¹²⁴ are properly called human, which are proper to man as man. Man is master of his actions through his reason and will¹²⁵. “Therefore, those actions alone are properly called human which proceed from a deliberate will”¹²⁶. Other actions found in man can be called actions of man, but not properly human actions¹²⁷, because they are not proper to man as man¹²⁸.

Aquinas holds that we should distinguish between acts of the human being and human acts. He thinks that we certainly go through various quasi automatic movements like stroking our chins while concentrating on what we are saying to someone, these being acts of the

¹¹⁵ See: ST. Part. I-II, Q 94, Art 4&5. See also Davies Brian,. Thomas Aquinas Summa Theologiae. A Guide and Commentary, Oxford University Press, New York, 2014, p216.

¹¹⁶ Knowledge is a form of the soul.

¹¹⁷ See: ST. Part.1, Q 75, Art. 1.

¹¹⁸ See: ST. Part.1, Q 2, Art. 4.

¹¹⁹ It means, having a soul.

¹²⁰ See: ST.Part.1,Q 75,Art 1.

¹²¹ It denotes specifically the human body.

¹²² See: ST.Part.1,Q 75,Art 1.

¹²³ Ibid.

¹²⁴ The word “man” has physical and metaphysical definitions; according to physical definition: a living substance of a material body and a spiritual soul as its form; a creature composed of a body and spiritual soul, made to the image of God and for the glory of God and His own beatitude. According to metaphysical definition, he is a rational animal. See Wuellner Bernard,. Dictionary of Scholastic Philosophy. editions scholasticae, 2011, p 72.

¹²⁵ See: ST. Part I-II, Q 1, Art 1.

¹²⁶ Ibid.

¹²⁷ Human action is an act proceeding from deliberate reason and free will; an act performed by the free will with knowledge of the end to which the act is directed. See Wuellner Bernard,. Dictionary of Scholastic Philosophy. editions scholasticae, 2011, p 55.

¹²⁸ See: ST. Part I-II, Q 1, Art 1.

human being. Whereas, when someone deliberately acts with a view to particular and precise goals, they are human acts¹²⁹. Aquinas's account of intellectual and volitional acts together comprise the complete human act¹³⁰.

a) End

Aquinas uses in the second part of his *Summa Theologiae* the term End¹³¹ to identify what specifies human actions. He reasons that, since human actions do not have substantial forms¹³² to determine their species as plants and animals do, the closest analogue will be that human action plays a comparable role. The end seems to him to be this corresponding principle, for whatever human action proceeded from a power, is caused by a power, in accordance with the nature of its object; "therefore, all human actions must be for an end"¹³³.

Acting for an end means that when we aim for end, we have to be aiming at something specific and particular end, even if it involves a series of intermediate actions for an end, and not at some collection of end proceeding to infinity¹³⁴. "The constitutive will acts as bearing either on an end or aim, on the one hand, or on the means of achieving that end, on the other"¹³⁵.

Indeed an action proceeded without the deliberation of reason has an imaginary end, but not one that is fixed by reason¹³⁶. In order to produce a determined effect, it must be determined to something, which has a nature of an end. This determination is effected in the rational nature by the rational appetite¹³⁷. Act which is effected by natural inclination is called the natural appetite¹³⁸.

"Acts for an infinite series of ends amount to an impossible command even though there might be an infinite number of desirable things"¹³⁹. Man who is possessed of reason

¹²⁹ See: Davies Brian,. *Thomas Aquinas's Summa Theologiae. A Guide and Commentary*, Oxford University Press, NY, 2014, p155.

¹³⁰ See: Bradly Denis J.M.,. *Aquinas on the Twofold Human Good. Reason and Human Happiness in Aquinas's Moral Science*, The Catholic University of America Press, Washington, D.C. p340.

¹³¹ End is the object or good which the thing itself by its operation can achieve; the definite object of a function. See: Wuellner Bernard,. *Dictionary of Scholastic Philosophy. editions scholasticae*, 2011, p40.

¹³² Every corporeal being has two principles, substantial form and matter. Substantial form is what determines a being to be of a particular kind. See Pilsner Joseph,. *Specification of Human Actions In ST Thomas Aquinas*. Oxford University Press, 2006, p 2. Hereafter it will be referred as SHA.

¹³³ See: ST. Part I-II, Q 1 Art 1.

¹³⁴ See: Davies Brian,. *Thomas Aquinas's Summa Theologiae. A Guide and Commentary*, Oxford University Press, NY, 2014, p155.

¹³⁵ McInerney Ralph,. *Aquinas on Human Action*. The Catholic University of America Press, 2012, p 55.

¹³⁶ See: ST. Part I-II, Q 1 Art 1.

¹³⁷ Rational appetite is the power or tendency to a good that has been perceived by the intellect or away from an evil perceived by reason; the will. See: Wuellner Bernard,. *Dictionary of Scholastic Philosophy. editions scholasticae*, 2011, p 8.

¹³⁸ See: ST, part I-II, Q 1, Art 2. Natural appetite is the spontaneous, in-deliberate, habitual and unvarying tendency or inclination of a natural body or natural power to a good naturally suitable to itself or away from something evil to it; an act of any appetite towards its object or end.

¹³⁹ See: Davies Brian,. *Thomas Aquinas's Summa Theologiae. A Guide and Commentary*, Oxford University Press, NY, 2014, p155.

moves himself to an end because he has domination over his action through his free will, which is the faculty of will and reason taking place in two ways: moving by itself to the end and being moved by another to the end, those things that are possessed of reason move themselves to the end¹⁴⁰.

In describing the ends that distinguish the spheres of the natural and the supernatural virtues, Thomas Aquinas uses a variety of formulae such as the twofold good of man, or the twofold happiness of man, or the end that is proportionate to human nature, or the end that exceeds the proportion of our nature; to suggest that man has a twofold end, is equivalent to saying that man has a twofold good¹⁴¹. That is to say, humans happiness is twofold: one is proportionate to human nature which one can obtain by means of his natural principles, the other is a happiness surpassing human nature which can be obtained by the power of God; it is necessary for human being to receive from God some additional principles whereby, one may be directed to supernatural happiness, even as one is directed to connatural end by means of natural principles. Such like supernatural principles are called theological virtues, while their object is God, because they are infused in us by God, and because these virtues are made known to us through Divine revelation¹⁴².

God has summoned us, not to a natural, material, or even spiritual light, but to His own wonderful light, that we may be a light in Him and in His way, to walk as children of heavenly, divine light¹⁴³. It is the origin of an action that indicates whether or not it is properly of the natural or supernatural order: if human being is the sole cause of an action, then it is of natural order, if the act requires the direct elevation by God, then it is the supernatural order¹⁴⁴. The supernatural life here on earth is not only a striving after eternal life, it is an introduction to a beginning, and an anticipation of that life; the acts of theological virtues faith, hope, and charity, which form the substance of all supernatural life should be considered from this point of view¹⁴⁵.

i) Intention and Execution

“To intend is to tend towards the thing, to see it as an object of pursuit”¹⁴⁶. There is an essential order of one to another; if the first be moved, then those that are ordained to the first also move¹⁴⁷. Without the first mover others cannot move. The human agent can attain

¹⁴⁰ See: ST, part I-II, Q 1, Art 2.

¹⁴¹ See: Bradley J.M. Denis,. Aquinas on the Twofold Human Good. The Catholic University of America Press, 1997, p397.

¹⁴² See: ST, part I-II, Q 62, Art 1.

¹⁴³ See: Scheeben Mathias Josef,. Nature and Grace. Trans. by Cyril Vollert, Wipf and Stock Publishers, Eugene, 2009, p172.

¹⁴⁴ See: Swafford Andrew Dean,. Nature and Grace. A new Approach to Thomastic Ressourcement, Wipf and Stock Publishers, Eugene, 2014, p 151.

¹⁴⁵ See: Scheeben Mathias Joseph,. A manual of Catholic Theology. Based on Scheeben’s „ dogmatik“ Volume 1, Joseph Wilhelm and Thomas B. Scannell, Kegan Paul trench Truebener & Co, London, 1906, p 461.

¹⁴⁶ McInerny Ralph,. Aquinas on Human Action. The Catholic University of America Press, 2012, p 62.

¹⁴⁷ See: ST, part I-II, Q 1, Art 4.

worldly happiness through his own actions; consequently, one should presuppose some understanding of the human act, the act that is intelligently intentional and freely chosen¹⁴⁸.

There is twofold order in ends; they are the order of intention and the order of execution¹⁴⁹. In either of intention and execution there is something which comes first, that which is first in the order of intention¹⁵⁰ is the moving appetite¹⁵¹. If you remove this first principle, then there would be nothing to move the appetite¹⁵². In the principle of execution there is an operation as its beginning; if this principle is taken away, then no one will begin to work¹⁵³. The principle in intention is the last end, and the principle in execution is the first of things which are ordained to the end. In the absence of last end nothing would be desired, and action would not have its term. It would continue indefinitely. Whereas, accidental causes are indeterminate, and it happens that there is accidental infinity of ends, and of things ordained to the end¹⁵⁴.

ii) Desire

“Desire means to wish or long for the possession or enjoyment of something, which the appetite does not presently possess”¹⁵⁵. The operation of the will takes place by producing desires; these desires in turn lead to action on the part of our mind or body¹⁵⁶, and it is impossible for one man’s will to be directed at diverse last ends¹⁵⁷, because man desires for his own crowning good. It is not possible for the appetite to tend to two things as though each were its perfect good. Secondly, because in the process of rational appetite the principle needs to be that which is naturally desired; natural desire needs to be one because nature tends to one thing only; the principle in the process of rational appetite is the last end and the last end is one¹⁵⁸. Thirdly, because voluntary actions receive their species¹⁵⁹ from the end¹⁶⁰; they receive their genus¹⁶¹ from the last end just as natural things are placed in the genus according

¹⁴⁸ See: Bradley J.M. Denis,. Aquinas on the Twofold Human Good. The Catholic University of America Press, 1997,p 396.

¹⁴⁹ See: ST, part I-II, Q 1, Art 4.

¹⁵⁰ Ibid.

¹⁵¹ Appetite is a form and a power that has an inclination, from the subject, towards an object suitable to its subject or away from an unsuitable object. Appetite is contrasted with dislike or indifference to the object. See Wuellner Bernard,. Dictionary of Scholastic Philosophy. editions scholasticae, 2011,p8.

¹⁵² See: ST, Part I-II, Q 1, Art 4.

¹⁵³ Ibid.

¹⁵⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵⁵ Wuellner Bernard,. Dictionary of Scholastic Philosophy. editions scholasticae, 2011, p 35.

¹⁵⁶ See: Pasnau Robert,. Thomas Aquinas on Human Nature. Cambridge University Press, 2002, p 200.

¹⁵⁷ See: ST. Part I-II, Q1, Art 5.

¹⁵⁸ Ibid.

¹⁵⁹ Specie here means a likeness or representation of the object; the cognitive form representing the object and present in the cognitive power as the intrinsic principle determining the knowing power to know actually and to know this object. See Wuellner Bernard,. Dictionary of Scholastic Philosophy. editions scholasticae, 2011, p 116.

¹⁶⁰ See: ST. Part I-II, Q 1, Art 5.

¹⁶¹ Genus means the sum of the constituent notes that are common to two or more species, abstracting from the specific differences. See Wuellner Bernard,. Dictionary of Scholastic Philosophy. editions scholasticae, 2011, p 51.

to a common form. Therefore, there is naturally one last end, and the rational appetite of an individual man must be fixed on one last end¹⁶².

The operation of an appetite power is completed, when the agent is inclined towards its object and these inclinations come in the form of desires, and indeed the Latin *appetitus* can often be plausibly translated as desire, hence the will operates, producing desires, and these desires in turn lead to action on the part of our mind or body, and the act of the will is an inclination towards something¹⁶³.

“Everything naturally desires its ultimate perfection”¹⁶⁴. Desire is a necessity in meeting the last end. To prove this Aquinas states two reasons. Man considers whatever he desires is good, when man desires something not as a perfect good, he desires it tending to the perfect good, because beginning of anything is ordained to its completion¹⁶⁵. Secondly, it is because last end stands in the same relation in moving the appetite, as the first mover in other movements; secondary moving causes do not move things as by the first mover, secondary object of the appetite, except as ordained to the first object of the appetite¹⁶⁶. When men eat like a glutton, according to St. Paul, “whose God is their belly” (Phil.3,19). Such people have their last end in the pleasure of their belly. According to St. Mathew, ‘no man can serve two masters’; therefore, ‘it is impossible for man to have several last ends not ordained to one another’¹⁶⁷. St Augustine says “that all men agree in desiring the last end which is happiness”¹⁶⁸.

Last end can be explained in two ways. One method is considering only the aspect of the last end. The second method is considering the thing in which the aspect of the last end is realized. Everyone agrees in desiring the last end. Many do not agree upon the thing in which this aspect is realized. It is because people have different type of desires. For example, some desire riches, whereas others desire pleasure, and still others on something else¹⁶⁹. “God is the last end of man”¹⁷⁰. Irrational creatures do not concur with man in this end. Man and other rational creatures attain to their last end by knowing and loving God.

b) What Consists Man’s Happiness

The discussion on happiness starts with reflection concerning ends; Aquinas considers union with God to be something we should aim for, although human being acts often unthinkingly, as for example, one strokes the chins when talking to someone while focused on

¹⁶² See: ST. Part I-II, Q 1, Art 5.

¹⁶³ See: Pasnau Robert., Thomas Aquinas on Human Nature. Cambridge University Press, 2002, p200.

¹⁶⁴ ST, part I, Q 62, Art.1.

¹⁶⁵ See: ST, part I-II, Q 1, Art 6.

¹⁶⁶ Ibid.

¹⁶⁷ ST, part I-II, Q 1, Art 5.

¹⁶⁸ ST, Part I-II, Q 1, Art 6.

¹⁶⁹ See: ST, Part I-II, Q 1, Art 7.

¹⁷⁰ ST, Part I-II, Q 1, Art 8.

what one is saying and not at all on one's chin¹⁷¹. Aquinas therefore, holds that we should distinguish between 'acts of human being' and 'human acts'; we can certainly go through various quasi-automatic movements like stroking our chins while concentrating on what we are saying to someone, these are called acts of human being; and we sometimes deliberately act with a view to particular and precise goals, which are called human acts; this human acting for an end, has to amount to acting for some particular end even if it involves a series of intermediate actions for an end¹⁷².

According to Aquinas, human action¹⁷³ aims for an end perceived as goodness, which is perfective or fulfilling; therefore, human action is a movement to what is fulfilling or perfecting. He thinks that people by nature or desire are attracted to what perfects and fulfills them, in this fact lays the foundation of morality because in all things there is an appetite for completion, the final end to which each moves, marks its own perfect and fulfilling end¹⁷⁴.

According to Aquinas, in beatitude (*beatitudo*) lies human fulfillment, by which he means union with God, the beatific vision; the word *beatitudo* can be translated into English as "happiness", as can the Latin word *felicitas*, thus Aquinas holds that human good ultimately lies in being happy; when Thomas Aquinas uses the term *felicitas*, however, he is thinking of what we might call "earthly happiness" which can be lost, and it is not *felicitas* that he has in mind when saying that our fulfillment lies in *beatitudo*; while rejecting different forms of *felicitas* in favour of the answer *beatitudo*, Aquinas states that perfect happiness of human being lies in *beatitudo*¹⁷⁵.

Human being has an important role in achieving happiness that one cannot arrive at union with God, if one does not want what is good, if one does not desire the good that God is, and Aquinas thinks of such wanting on the part of the blessed as starting in their lives; if we come to enjoy the beatific vision in the next life, that is because we already want God in this life; which emphasizes the importance of theological virtues as a preparation.¹⁷⁶

The supernatural character of man's present vocation appears even more in the emphatic expressions with which the Apostles extol its grandeur and exaltedness above all human conceptions, revealed by the Spirit who search the deep things of God and see in its

¹⁷¹ See: ST, Part I-II, Q 1, Art 1.

¹⁷² See: Davies Brian,. Thomas Aquinas's Summa Theologiae. A Guide and Commentary, Oxford university press, New York, 2014, p155.

¹⁷³ *actiones humanae*, which he also calls 'moral action'.

¹⁷⁴ See: ST, Part I-II, Q 1, Art 5.

¹⁷⁵ See: ST, Part I-II, Q 2; See also Davies Brian,. Thomas Aquinas's Summa Theologiae. A Guide and Commentary, Oxford university press, New York, 2014, p156.

¹⁷⁶ See: Davies Brian,. Thomas Aquinas's Summa Theologiae. A Guide and Commentary, Oxford university press, New York, 2014, p158.

realization in the Incarnation of Christ a marvelous manifestation of the power, majesty, and love of God to which every human being is invited as adoptive children of God¹⁷⁷.

The status, the life, and the goods to which God has called man, are designated in Scripture as an elevation from slavery to adoptive sonship of God. This designation itself, and the explanation given in Holy Writ, make it evident that the sonship is not merely a natural relation of man to God founded upon sinlessness, but a peculiar, thoroughly intimate relation, raising the creature from its humble estate, and making it the object of a peculiar Divine benevolence and complaisance, admitting it to filial love, and enabling it to become the heir of God that is, a partaker of God's own beatitude. The adopted creature is described also as the friend of God and the bride of the Holy Ghost¹⁷⁸.

We find in the Gospel of John, Jesus prays for his disciples which bears the request of Jesus to his Father to enable the disciples and those who believe in their words to become heirs of God and partakers of God's own beatitude: "I ask not only on behalf of these, but also on behalf of those who will believe in me through their word, that they may all be one. As you, Father, are in me and I am in you, may they also be in us"¹⁷⁹.

A perfect vision and enjoyment of the divine essence do away with the acts of faith and hope in the souls, and the same vision and enjoyment will continue without any interruption and without end, until the last Judgment and from then on forever¹⁸⁰.

i) Wealth

Everyone searches for happiness, and it is always interesting to ask, what constitutes happiness. Boethius says: "wealth shines in giving rather than in hoarding: for the miser is hateful, whereas the generous man is applauded"¹⁸¹. The goods of fortune, external goods, and bodily goods are not constituents of happiness; rather they are the necessary conditions for virtuous activity¹⁸². Happiness does not consist in wealth; there are two kinds of wealth, natural and artificial. Natural wealth are things that meet the natural wants of man such as food, drinks, clothing, etc., and artificial wealth is invented by the art of man for the convenience of exchange and business such as money¹⁸³.

Natural wealth is sought by man as a support to human nature. In the order of nature, all created things are below the nature of man¹⁸⁴. "Thou hast given him dominion over the works of thy hands; thou hast put all things under his feet, all sheep and oxen, and also the beasts of the field, the birds of the air, and the fish of the sea, whatever passes along the paths of the sea"¹⁸⁵. Artificial wealth is sought by man to procure the necessities of natural wants.

¹⁷⁷ See: Scheeben Joseph Mathias, A manual of Catholic Theology. Based on Scheeben's „dogmatik“ Volume 1, Joseph Wilhelm and Thomas B. Scannell, Kegan Paul trench Truebener & Co, London, 1906, p 444.

¹⁷⁸ Ibid, p 445.

¹⁷⁹ John 17,20-21.

¹⁸⁰ Pope Benedict XII, On the Beatific Vision of God. Papal Encyclicals Online, 1336.

¹⁸¹ As quoted in ST, Part I-II, Q 2 Art 1.

¹⁸² See: Bradley J.M.Denis, Aquinas on the Twofold Human Good. The Catholic University of America Press, 1997, p 400.

¹⁸³ See: ST, Part I-II, Q 2, Art. 1.

¹⁸⁴ Ibid.

¹⁸⁵ Psalms: 8,6-8.

Therefore, it is considered much less in the light of last end. Thus happiness does not consist in wealth.

ii) Honours

Aquinas denies that human fulfillment lies in honour. Honour is given to man on account of some excellence in him¹⁸⁶. Man's excellence is in proportion to his perfect good. Honour can result from happiness, but happiness cannot principally consist in honour¹⁸⁷.

iii) Fame or Glory

Aquinas denies that happiness consists in human fame or glory. St. Ambrose says that glory consists in being well known and praised¹⁸⁸. Things known are related to human knowledge because human knowledge is caused by things known, and God's knowledge is the cause of the things known. Therefore, the perfection of human good cannot be caused by human knowledge, and man's happiness cannot consist in fame or glory. On the other hand, man's good depends on God's knowledge as its cause. Thus man's beatitude depends on the glory which man has with God. Human knowledge often fails; therefore human glory is frequently deceptive. God cannot be deceived, His glory is always true¹⁸⁹.

iv) Power

“The power of man cannot relieve the gnawing of care, nor can it avoid the thorny path of anxiety: and further on: one thinks a man is powerful who is surrounded by attendants, whom he inspires with fear indeed, but whom he fears still more?”¹⁹⁰ Therefore, it is impossible for happiness to consist in power; there are two reasons for this argument, power has a nature of principle whereas happiness has the nature of last end; secondly, power has relation to good and evil whereas happiness is man's proper and perfect good. Aquinas also considers that some happiness could be derived from the good use of power, but this is enlightened by virtue rather than use of power¹⁹¹.

Happiness is a man's supreme good which is incompatible with any evil; wealth, power, honour, glory, or fame could be found both in good and evil men¹⁹². Therefore, the supreme goodness of man cannot be in anything which is incompatible with evil. Having gained happiness man cannot lack anything, but even after acquisition of the foregoing things man may still lack many necessary things, like wisdom and bodily health. Happiness is the perfect good which cannot be increased by the addition of evil element, whereas that cannot be said regarding the foregoing things. Through the principles that are in man, he has been

¹⁸⁶ See: ST, Part I-II, Q 2, Art 2.

¹⁸⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸⁸ As quoted in ST, Part I-II, Q 2, Art 3.

¹⁸⁹ Ibid.

¹⁹⁰ ST, Part I-II, Q 2, Art. 4.

¹⁹¹ Ibid.

¹⁹² Ibid.

ordained to happiness which is innate in him, whereas wealth, power, honour, glory, or fame are related to external causes which could be called fortune¹⁹³.

v) Physical abilities

The nature of happiness in human beings surpass all other animals existing in this world, where as the physical abilities of human beings are surpassed by many animals; for example an elephant has more longevity and a lion has more strength than human being; hence one cannot say that the happiness of the human being consists in the physical abilities¹⁹⁴. Last end cannot consist in the preservation of the physical abilities. “God made man from the beginning and left him in the hand of his own counsel”¹⁹⁵; therefore, man is given over to his will and reason. Since man is not the supreme good, he is ordained to something and the last end of man’s reason and will is not the preservation of his physical abilities; whereas physical abilities are an instrumental quality to the extent that they promote the good of the soul, which is found in the moral and intellectual virtues¹⁹⁶.

vi) Pleasure

Man is a mortal rational animal. He is a risible animal. Perfect good cannot consist in his bodily pleasure, because bodily pleasure results from a good apprehended by sense, which is a power of the soul¹⁹⁷. Rational soul excels the capacity of the corporeal soul, and immaterial things are in a way infinite as compared to material things. Therefore, bodily pleasure is not man’s perfect good compared to the good of the soul. It is neither happiness nor a proper accident of happiness¹⁹⁸.

vii) Some good of the Soul

St. Augustine says “that which constitutes the life of happiness is to be loved for its own sake. But man is not to be loved for his own sake, but whatever is in man is to be loved for God’s sake”¹⁹⁹. Therefore, happiness does not consist in the good of the soul. End is of two kinds; the thing which we desire to attain and the attainment of the thing. Since the soul, considered in itself, is something existing in potentiality. Therefore, happiness cannot consist in the soul. That which in itself is in potentiality cannot be the last end; therefore, soul itself cannot be its own last end²⁰⁰. Any good inherent to the soul is a participated good, which is a portioned good.

¹⁹³ Ibid.

¹⁹⁴ See: ST, Part I-II, Q 2, Art 5.

¹⁹⁵ See: Ecclesiasticus 15:14.

¹⁹⁶ Bradley J.M. Denis,. Aquinas on the Twofold Human Good. The Catholic University of America Press, 1997, p 402.

¹⁹⁷ See: ST, Part I-II, Q2, Art 6.

¹⁹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹⁹ As quoted in ST, Part I-II Q2, Art 7.

²⁰⁰ Ibid.

Yet man attains happiness through his soul. Attainment of the last end is called happiness. Therefore “happiness is something belonging to the soul, but that which constitutes happiness is something outside the soul”²⁰¹.

viii) Created good

St. Augustine says, “As the soul is the life of the body, so God is man’s life of happiness: of whom it is written: “Happy is that people whose God is the Lord”²⁰². Since happiness is the perfect good, it is impossible for any created good to constitute man’s happiness. Perfect good draws the entire appetite. Perfect good, which is the object of the appetite, is the universal good. This perfect good can be found in God alone because every creature has goodness by participation. Thus God alone constitutes man’s happiness²⁰³.

c) What is Happiness?

Aristotle defines happiness, “which in the opinion of everyone is the end of virtue”²⁰⁴. “The common people cannot determine by distinguishing this as good and that as evil, but without discrimination they accept what appears good in one instance”²⁰⁵. St. Augustine says, “those things are to be enjoyed, which make us happy.”²⁰⁶ Therefore, happiness is not something uncreated.

As it is already mentioned St. Thomas Aquinas sees end as twofold. First, there is the thing itself which one desires to attain. For example, the miser desires to attain money which is his end. Secondly there is possession and enjoyment of the thing desired. For example, the end of a miser is his possession of money. In the first sense man’s last end is uncreated; in the second sense, man’s last end is something created which exists in him²⁰⁷. If we consider man’s happiness consists in the cause²⁰⁸ or object²⁰⁹, then it is something uncreated. If we consider man’s happiness consists in the very essence of happiness, then it is something created²¹⁰. God is happy by His Essence. Men are happy as Boethius says, by participation²¹¹. In this sense it is something created. “Happiness as perfection is correlated with the more general idea of actuality as perfection- the happiness of the rational creature is nothing other

²⁰¹ Ibid.

²⁰² As quoted in ST, Part I-II, Q 2, Art.8.

²⁰³ Ibid.

²⁰⁴ Aquinas Thomas,. Commentary on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. Trans. by C.I. Litzinger, Dumb Ox Books, Notre Dame, Indiana 1964, p 589.

²⁰⁵ Ibid, p 591.

²⁰⁶ As quoted in ST Part I-II, Q 3, Art.1.

²⁰⁷ Ibid.

²⁰⁸ Cause means, the efficient cause, the agent, that which by its activity or exercise of power produces existence or change in another. See Wuellner Bernard,. Dictionary of Scholastic Philosophy. editions scholasticae, 2011, p 19.

²⁰⁹ Here object means anything to which action, thought, feeling, or willing is directed. See Wuellner Bernard,. Dictionary of Scholastic Philosophy. editions scholasticae, 2011, p 82.

²¹⁰ See: ST, Part I-II, Q 3, Art 1.

²¹¹ As quoted in ST, Part I-II, Q 3, Art 1.

than its way of being in act, of being perfect in accordance with its specific kind”²¹². “ No matter how perfection is understood, it will necessarily involve some degree of proper development and exercise of the capacities distinctive to us as creatures of a specific kind”²¹³.

i) Is Happiness an Operation?

When we consider that man’s happiness is something created, existing in him, then it is an operation. Happiness is man’s supreme perfection. It must consist in man’s last act. Operation is the last act of the operator. It is called second act²¹⁴ because that which has a form can be potentially operating²¹⁵. With regard to perfect happiness, the object fails, because in that state of happiness man’s mind will be united to God by one continual, everlasting operation. In the present life, as we fall short of the unity and continuity of that operation, we do fall short of perfect happiness²¹⁶. “Whatever anyone desires as a supremely fulfilling good can be regarded as a kind of happiness, albeit in a derivative sense”²¹⁷. Active life which is busy with many things has less happiness than contemplative life which is busied with one thing, contemplating of the truth²¹⁸.

ii) Of the Sensitive part or of the Intellective part?

“Irrational animals have the sensitive operation in common with us: but they have not happiness in common with us. Therefore, happiness does not consist in sensitive operation”²¹⁹. A thing may belong to happiness in three ways: essentially, antecedently, and consequently. Operation of sense cannot belong to happiness essentially, because man’s happiness consists essentially in his being united to the Uncreated Good, his last end, to which man cannot be united by an operation of his senses²²⁰. In like manner, man’s happiness does not consist in goods of the body. “Yet every human person necessarily desires his or her perfection, whether truly or falsely understood, and this is tantamount to happiness”²²¹.

²¹² Porter Jean,. *Nature as Reason. A Thomistic Theory of the Natural Law*, Wm.B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., Cambridge,2005, p 160.

²¹³ Ibid.

²¹⁴ First act is the intrinsic fundamental perfection of a being in any order. The first is actuality that determines any passive potency to be or to be something specific. Hence the same being may have several first acts, but each in different order. Existence will be first act in the order of being; substantial form will be first in the order of essence or nature. The power will be first in the order of activity. Second act is a determination or perfection added to a being which already possesses the first act, whether of existence, or of form or of a particular power, for example, intellect will with respect to the soul itself; act of the will with respect to the will itself. Second act presupposes and perfects another act. See Wuellner Bernard,. *Dictionary of Scholastic Philosophy*. editions scholasticae, 2011, p 3.

²¹⁵ See: ST Part I-II, Q3, Art 2.

²¹⁶ Ibid.

²¹⁷ Porter Jean,. *Nature as Reason. A Thomistic Theory of the Natural Law*, Wm B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, Cambridge, 2005, p 159.

²¹⁸ See: ST Part I-II, Q3, Art 2.

²¹⁹ See: ST, Part I-II, Q 3, Art 3.

²²⁰ Ibid.

²²¹ Porter Jeans,. *Nature as Reason. A Thomistic Theory of the Natural Law*, Wm B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, Cambridge, 2005, p 160.

The operation of the senses can nevertheless belong to happiness both antecedently and consequently. In respect of imperfect happiness it belongs antecedently, which can be had in this life, since the operation of the intellect demands a previous operation of the sense. In respect of perfect happiness it belongs consequently, which we await in heaven, at the resurrection²²². Then man's mind is united to God and will not depend on the senses. Through perfect happiness, the entire man is perfected. It is by an overflow from the higher to the lower part of his nature. In imperfect happiness, man advances from the perfection of the lower part to the perfection of the higher part.

iii) Of the Intellect or of the Will?

“And this is eternal life, that they know thee the only true God, and Jesus Christ whom thou hast sent.²²³” Eternal life is the last end. Man's happiness consists in the knowledge of God, which is an act of the intellect²²⁴.

The essence²²⁵ of happiness and the delight²²⁶ connected with it are needed for happiness. The essence of happiness does not consist in the act of the will. Happiness is the attainment of the last end, and attainment of the end does not consist in the act of the will. The will is directed to the end. The will is absent when it desires last end, and present when it is delighted by the last end²²⁷. It is like acquisition of money: the covetous man would have it from the very moment that he wished for it. Yet at that moment, it is far from him. But, when he attains it by grasping it, then he delights in the money he got. At first we desire to attain an intelligible end. We attain it through act of the intellect. Then the delighted will rests in the end, when end is attained²²⁸. Therefore, “the essence of happiness consists in an act of the intellect, but the delight that results from happiness pertain to the will”²²⁹.

iv) Of the Speculative or of the Practical Intellect?

“Happiness consists in an operation of the speculative rather than of the practical intellect”²³⁰. If man's happiness is an operation, it ought to be man's highest operation. The highest operation of man is that of his highest power in respect to its highest object. His highest power is the intellect. Highest object of the intellect is Divine Good which is the

²²² See: ST, Part I-II, Q 3, Art 3.

²²³ St. John 17,3.

²²⁴ See: ST, Part I-II, Q 3, Art 4.

²²⁵ Essence is the internal principle whereby a thing is what it is. See Wuellner Bernard,. Dictionary of Scholastic Philosophy. editions scholasticae, 2011, p 42.

²²⁶ It is joy in the possession of happiness. See Wuellner Bernard,. Dictionary of Scholastic Philosophy. editions scholasticae, 2011, p 34.

²²⁷ See: ST, Part I-II, Q 3, Art 4.

²²⁸ Ibid.

²²⁹ Ibid.

²³⁰ ST, Part I-II, Q 3, Art 5.

object of the speculative intellect. Therefore, happiness consists principally in such operation, in the contemplation of divine things²³¹.

Contemplation is sought principally for its own sake. But the act of the practical intellect is not sought for its own sake but for the sake of action. These actions are ordained to some end. Consequently, the last end cannot consist in the active life which pertains to the intellect²³².

In contemplative life, man has something common with God and angels, to whom he is made like by happiness. In the active life of man, other animals also have something in common with man although imperfectly²³³. Perfect happiness, which we await, consists entirely in contemplation. Imperfect happiness consists first and principally in contemplation, but secondarily in an operation of the practical intellect directing human actions and passions²³⁴. Man's last end is something outside him. Man's happiness consists in an operation of the speculative intellect rather than of the practical intellect.

v) Happiness in the Consideration of Speculative Science

Perfect happiness cannot consist essentially in the consideration of speculative sciences; consideration of a speculative science does not extend beyond the scope of the principles of that science. The first principles of the speculative sciences are received through the senses. The entire consideration of speculative sciences cannot extend further than knowledge of sensibles. Man's final happiness cannot consist in the knowledge of the sensibles, because a thing is not perfected by something lower, except in so far as the lower partakes in the higher. For example the form of a stone or of any sensible, is lower than man. Consequently, the intellect is not perfected by the form of a stone, but rather in as much as it partakes, of a certain likeness to that which is above the human intellect²³⁵. Man's happiness cannot consist in the consideration of speculative sciences. However, speculative sciences have a certain participation of true and perfect happiness.

vi) Knowledge of Separate Substances, namely Angels

Man's happiness consists only in the knowledge of God. "Man's perfect happiness consists not in that which perfects the intellect by some participation but in that which is so by its essence"²³⁶. Now the proper object of the intellect is the true. The contemplation of whatever has participated truth, does not perfect the intellect with its final perfection²³⁷. God alone is truth by His Essence. Angels have being by participation. Like speculative science, there is a certain amount of imperfect happiness in the contemplation of the angels.

²³¹ *Ibid.*

²³² *Ibid.*

²³³ *Ibid.*

²³⁴ *Ibid.*

²³⁵ See: ST, Part I-II, Q3, Art 6.

²³⁶ ST, Part I-II, Q3, Art 7.

²³⁷ *Ibid.*

vii) Vision of the Divine Essence

“Final and perfect happiness can consist in nothing else than the vision of the Divine Essence”²³⁸. Man is not perfectly happy so long as something remains in him to desire and seek. And the perfection of any power is determined by the nature of its object. Object of a thing is, what a thing is, that is the essence of the thing. Therefore, intellect attains perfection, in so far as it knows the essence of a thing²³⁹. When man knows an effect and knows that it has a cause, there naturally grows a desire to know the cause. Therefore, it is not yet happy. For perfect happiness, the intellect needs to reach the very essence of the First cause²⁴⁰.

d) Things Required for Happiness.

Thomas Aquinas considers that happiness is the goal of everyone. He teaches that salvation is perfect knowledge of God, which is happiness²⁴¹. Thomas Aquinas speaks about things that are required for happiness in eight questions.

i) Delight

“The complexity of the human creature implies that unlike other animals, we can attain perfection in diverse ways and at disparate levels, including some which go beyond our natural capacities”²⁴². Perfection involves some degree of proper development. Thomas Aquinas argues that one thing is necessary for another in four different ways namely, as an introduction, as an element of perfection, as an external helping agent, and as something which signifies its presence²⁴³. Just as heat is necessary for fire, delight is necessary for happiness, however delight is caused by appetite. Since happiness is attainment of perfect good, it cannot be without concomitant delight²⁴⁴.

ii) Vision

Vision is knowledge of the existent as immediately present to the knower²⁴⁵. Vision is the operation of the will whereas delight consists in certain repose of the will. When the will reposes in an operation, will’s repose is caused by the goodness of the operation. The operation, in which the will reposes, ranks above the resting of the will²⁴⁶. Vision, the knowledge of the existent, is the operation²⁴⁷ of the will; hence vision is the cause of delight.

²³⁸ ST, Part I-II, Q3, Art 8.

²³⁹ Ibid.

²⁴⁰ Ibid.

²⁴¹ See: Charry T. Ellen,. *God and the Art of Happiness*, Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co. Cambridge, 2010, p 91.

²⁴² Porter Jean,. *Nature as Reason. A Thomistic Theory of the Natural Law*, Wm B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, Cambridge, 2005, p 160.

²⁴³ See: ST, Part I- II, Q 4, Art.1.

²⁴⁴ Ibid.

²⁴⁵ See: Wuellner Bernard,. *Dictionary of Scholastic Philosophy*. editions scholasticae, 2011, p 134.

²⁴⁶ See: ST, Part I-II, Q 4, Art.2.

²⁴⁷ Here “operation“means act of the will, in fact it is this operation which means the will active.

Cause is greater than its effect. Thus vision ranks above delight²⁴⁸. “Beatific vision²⁴⁹ is completely satisfying, because it reflects the fullest possible development, that is to say, perfection, of our capacities for knowing and desiring; it is comprehensive and complete”²⁵⁰.

iii) Comprehension

Comprehension is the sum total of notes or essence actually represented in the concept²⁵¹. St. Paul says: “Do you not know that in a race all the runners compete, but only one receives the prize? So run that you may obtain it”²⁵². St. Paul again says: “I have fought the good fight, I have finished the race, I have kept the faith. Henceforth there is laid up for me the crown of righteousness”²⁵³.

Man is moved to an intelligible end partly through his intellect, because a certain imperfect end pre-exists in the intellect, and partly through his will because of love, which is the first movement of the will towards anything²⁵⁴. “Therefore, these three elements must concur in Happiness: vision, which is perfect knowledge of the intelligible end; comprehension, which implies presence of the end; and delight or enjoyment, which implies repose of the lover in the object beloved”²⁵⁵.

²⁴⁸ See: ST, Part I-II, Q 4, Art.2.

²⁴⁹ Thomas Aquinas defined the beatific vision (Latin: *visio beatifica*) as the human being's "final end" in which one attains to a perfect happiness. Thomas reasons that one is perfectly happy only when all desires are perfectly satisfied; to the degree that happiness could not increase and could not be lost. "Man is not perfectly happy, so long as something remains for him to desire and seek." ST, I-II, q., 3, a. 8. But this kind of perfect happiness cannot be found in any physical pleasure, any amount of worldly power, any degree of temporal fame or honor, or indeed in any finite reality. It can only be found in something that is infinite and perfect – and this is God (ST, I-II, q. 2, a. 8). And since God is not a material thing but is pure spirit, we are united to God by knowing and loving him. Consequently, the most perfect union with God is the most perfect human happiness and the goal of the whole of the human life. But we cannot attain to this happiness by our own natural powers; it is a gift that must be given us by God, who strengthens us by the "light of glory" so that we can see him as he is, without any intermediary. (Thomas quotes Psalm 35:10 on this point: "In your light we shall see light.") ST, I, q. 12, a.4. Further, since every created image or likeness of God (including even the most perfect "ideas" or "images" of God we might generate in our minds) is necessarily finite, it would thus be infinitely less than God himself (ST, I, q. 12, a. 2). The only perfect and infinite good, therefore, is God himself, which is why Aquinas argues that our perfect happiness and final end can only be the direct union with God himself and not with any created image of him. This union comes about by a kind of "seeing" perfectly the divine essence itself, a gift given to our intellects when God joins them directly to himself without any intermediary. And since in seeing this perfect vision of what (and who) God is, we grasp also his perfect goodness, this act of "seeing" is at the same time a perfect act of loving God as the highest and infinite goodness (ST, I-II, qq. 2–5.). See, Wikipedia, Beatific vision.

²⁵⁰ Porter Jean., Nature as Reason. A Thomistic Theory of the Natural Law , Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, Cambridge, 2005, P 156.

²⁵¹ See: Wuellner Bernard., Dictionary of Scholastic Philosophy. editions scholasticae, 2011, P 25.

²⁵² 1 Cor. 9, 24. As it is a spiritual race, here 'obtain' means also comprehend.

²⁵³ 2Tim. 4, 7-8. This spiritual race is also understood as comprehension.

²⁵⁴ See: ST, Part I-II, Q 4, Art.3.

²⁵⁵ Ibid.

iv) Rectitude of the Will

Rectitude²⁵⁶ is the due order of the will or the logical truth in mind to the ultimate end²⁵⁷. Thomas Aquinas says that rectitude of the will is necessary for happiness both antecedently and concomitantly²⁵⁸. The holy Bible speaks of rectitude of the will as "blessed are the pure in heart, for they shall see God"²⁵⁹; we read in the letter to the Hebrews, "strive for peace with all men and for the holiness, without which no one will see the Lord"²⁶⁰.

Jesus asserts the importance of righteousness by saying: "for I tell you that unless your righteousness surpasses that of the Pharisees and the teachers of the law, you will certainly not enter the kingdom of heaven"²⁶¹. Jesus also re-affirms the Laws of Moses by saying: "anyone who breaks one of the least of these commandments and teaches others to do the same will be called least in the kingdom of heaven, but whoever practices and teaches these commands will be called great in the kingdom of heaven"²⁶². God calls man to seek him, to know him, and to love him with all his strength²⁶³. We need to seek God. If our will is fixed on knowing, loving, and serving God, then we are approaching rectitude of the will.

v) Body and Soul

"Aquinas's reasoning crucially depends on an application of Aristotelian homonymy: that the parts of a human being exist only for as long as the human being exists. A corpse is not a human body, and so too for all the parts of that corpse"²⁶⁴. It is not evident from our ordinary ways of talking that this invocation of homonymy is correct; Socrates, for

²⁵⁶ Rectitude refers to behavior that is correct, upright and honorable. Rectitude, also called righteousness, is an important theological concept in Hinduism, Christianity, Judaism and Islam. It is an attribute that implies that a person's actions are justified, and can have the connotation that the person has been "judged" or "reckoned" as leading a life that is pleasing to God.

William Tyndale (/ˈtɪndəl/ c. 1494–1536, Bible translator into English in 1526) was an English scholar who became a leading figure in Protestant reform in the years leading up to his execution, remodeled the word "rectitude" after an earlier word *rihtwis*, which would have yielded modern English right-wise or right-ways. He used it to translate the Hebrew root דִּקְיָה (TzDYQ), *tzedek*, which appears more than five hundred times in the Hebrew Bible, and the Greek word δίκαιος (*dikaïos*), which appears more than two hundred times in the New Testament. See Wikipedia, Righteousness.

²⁵⁷ See: Wuellner Bernard, Dictionary of Scholastic Philosophy. editions scholasticae, 2011, p 106.

²⁵⁸ See: ST, Part I-II, Q 4, Art.4. 'It is antecedently necessary because rectitude of the will consists in being duly ordered to the last end. It is also concomitant because final happiness consists in the vision of the Divine Essence'.

²⁵⁹ Mt.5,8.

²⁶⁰ Heb.12,14.

²⁶¹ Mt. 5:20

²⁶² Mt. 5:19

²⁶³ „Gott ist in sich unendlich vollkommen und glücklich. In einem aus reiner Güte gefassten Ratschluss hat er den Menschen aus freiem Willen erschaffen, damit dieser an seinem glückseligen Leben teilhabe. Deswegen ist er dem Menschen jederzeit und überall nahe. Er ruft ihn und hilft ihm, ihn zu suchen, ihn zu erkennen und ihn mit all seinen Kräften zu lieben. Er ruft alle durch die Sünde voneinander getrennten Menschen in die Einheit seiner Familie, die Kirche. Er tut es durch seinen Sohn, den er als Erlöser und Retter gesandt hat, als die Zeit erfüllt war. In ihm und durch ihn beruft er die Menschen, im Heiligen Geist seine Kinder zu werden und so sein glückseliges Leben zu erben.“ Sehe, Katechismus der Katholischen Kirche, Prolog, Das Leben des Menschen.

²⁶⁴ Pasnau Robert, Thomas Aquinas on Human Nature. A Philosophical Study of Summa theologiae 1a 75-89, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2002, p88

instance immediately after deploring the effects of careless speech, is made to remark in the *Phaedo* that `it is only my body that you are burying'²⁶⁵; according to Aquinas, soul is the first principle, a substantial form and human being a substance²⁶⁶; in other words, "the soul is the substantial form of the body"²⁶⁷.

The intellect which is the principle of intellectual operation is the substantial form of the human body, for primarily anything acts is a form of the thing to which the act is to be attributed: for instance health is attributed to body and knowledge is attributed to soul; the intellect does not move the body except through the appetite, the movement of which presupposes the operation of the intellect; the nobler a form is, the more it rises above corporeal matter; the human soul is the highest and noblest forms, it excels corporal matter in its power by the fact that human soul has an operation and a power in which corporeal matter has nothing special to do²⁶⁸. "The human soul possesses, as an essential constituent principle of its reasonable nature, power to acquire by itself the knowledge of God, of the relations between Creator and Creature, and consequently of the moral order as based upon Divine Law."²⁶⁹

Although the soul which animates the human body differs essentially from the principle which gives life to the lower animals, the constitution of the human body subjects it to the laws and conditions of existence and development which rule the life of plants and animals, viz. the laws of nutrition, growth, and reproduction; the fact that life is dependent on a continual supply of external nourishment, shows that increase, decrease, and extinction are natural to it. The possibility and necessity of death are natural attributes flowing from the very constitution of human nature; the spiritual essence of soul in like manner cannot prevent the internal and external disturbances of the vital functions which lead to pain and suffering.²⁷⁰

The happiness of this life depends on the operation of the will either in a speculative way or in a practical way, for which body is necessary²⁷¹. However, there is happiness without body, of which we see in the book of Revelation, "and I heard a voice from heaven saying, write this: Blessed are the dead who die in the Lord henceforth. Blessed indeed, says the Spirit, that they may rest from their labors, for their deeds follow them"²⁷². We read in the letter to Corinthian, "so we are always of good courage; we know that while we are at home

²⁶⁵ Ibid.

²⁶⁶ See: ST, Part I, Q76, Art.8.

²⁶⁷ Scheeben Joseph Mathias,. A manual of Catholic Theology. Based on Scheeben's „ dogmatik“ Volume 1, Wilhelm Joseph and Scannell B.Thomas, Kegan Paul trench Truebener & Co, London, 1906, p 399. Council of Vienne against the errors of Peter of Oliva speaks: "Whoever shall presume to assert that the rational or intellectual soul is not directly and essentially (*per se et essentialiter*) the form (that is the life giving principle) of the body,, shall be deemed a heretic"

²⁶⁸ See: ST, Part I, Q 76, Art.1.

²⁶⁹ Scheeben Joseph Mathias,. A manual of Catholic Theology. Based on Scheeben's „ dogmatik“ Volume 1, Wilhelm Joseph and Scannell B.Thomas, Kegan Paul trench Truebener & Co, London, 1906, p 414.

²⁷⁰ Ibid, p418-419.

²⁷¹ See: ST, Part I-II, Q 4, Art.5.

²⁷² Book of Revelation, 14, 13.

in the body we are away from the Lord, for we walk by faith, not by sight. We are of good courage, and we would rather be away from the body and at home with the Lord²⁷³.

According to Aquinas, happiness is twofold: the one is imperfect which we have in this life, and the other is perfect, consisting in the vision of God; the body is necessary for the happiness of this life because the happiness of this life consists in an operation of the intellect, either speculative or practical and the operation of intellect in this life cannot be without a phantasm, which is only in a bodily organ; consequently, that happiness which can be had in this life, depends in a way on the body; but as to perfect happiness which consists in the vision of the Divine essence, which does not depend on the means of phantasms, without the body the soul can be happy²⁷⁴. However, as the operation of the will depends on the nature of a thing, the more perfect is the soul in its nature, the better it has its proper operation, in which its happiness consists. Therefore perfect disposition of the body is necessary, both antecedently and consequently, for that happiness which is in all aspects perfect²⁷⁵.

vi) External Goods

Aristotle says, “it is ridiculous that a man blame external goods and not accuse himself²⁷⁶. External goods are necessary as instruments to happiness of this life, but not as belonging to the essence of happiness²⁷⁷. Happiness does not lie in acquiring external goods; happiness is an activity, a way of doing things, a way of living one’s life well; happiness is not a matter of acquiring something outside us, but of adopting a particular way of life²⁷⁸.

Human beings need necessities of the body for the operations of contemplative virtue and active virtue. However, the felicity of contemplation as being more God-like approaches nearer to the likeness of perfect happiness, which stands in less need of goods of the body²⁷⁹.

vii) The Fellowship of Friends

For the operation of the will which may be delighted by seeing the friends doing good, that a person may do well, whether in the works of the active life or in the contemplative life, a person needs the fellowship of friends²⁸⁰; yet in perfect happiness the fellowship of friends is not necessary, since a person has the entire fullness in his perfection with God²⁸¹.

²⁷³ 2 Cor.5,6-8.

²⁷⁴ See: ST, Part I-II, Q 4, Art.5.

²⁷⁵ See: ST, Part I-II, Q 4, Art.6.

²⁷⁶ Aquinas Thomas,. Commentary on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. Trans. by C.I. Litzinger, Dumb Ox Books, Notre Dame, Indiana 1964, p131.

²⁷⁷ See: ST, Part I-II, Q 4, Art.7.

²⁷⁸ Charry T. Ellen,. God and the Art of Happiness. William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, Cambridge, 2010, p.89.

²⁷⁹ See: ST, Part I-II, Q 4, Art.7.

²⁸⁰ Aristotle says, “a friend is defined: (a) as one who wills and does what is good or apparently good for the sake of his friend; (b) likewise as one who wills that his friend exist and live for the friend’s sake- as mothers feel this towards their children, and former friends towards one another after a quarrel; (c) as one who lives

e) The Attainment of Happiness

Jesus Christ's frequent assertion that He knows the Father and is known by Him, and that He knows what the Father knows, admits of no satisfactory explanation without understanding of the beatific vision; Christ's soul certainly was conscious of its union with 'Father' whom it knew with perfection, that is intuitive science, and such science is identified with the beatific vision²⁸².

Human beings attain their end by the working of the power that is proper to each of them, but human beings have not in them the power sufficient to attain the vision of God. They are made to reach their destination by a special assistance from God; the way and the manner of this special assistance pre-exist in the Divine mind and constitute predestination, which is not a quality or an accident of the creature, but an idea of the eternal mind, like Divine providence leading rational creatures to their supernatural end, which is carried into effect, in time, by the vocation and glorification²⁸³. As we read in Romans, "and those whom he predestined, He also called; and those whom he called he also justified; and those whom he justified he also glorified."²⁸⁴

Thomistic School says that God "moves the will to act according to its own nature, that is, freely." With this single principle, Thomas Aquinas meets and solves all objections. God willed that there should be free agents, filling their own place in the universal order of things, and contributing to the perfection of the whole. That free agents exist, is a fact of our consciousness; that their freedom and its exercise are dependent- entirely – on God, is an elementary theological truth; that we are unable to understand how the first cause moves the free agent without prejudice to its freedom, is to be expected from minds as imperfect as ours. Our Knowledge of "force" is very limited. We know but obscurely how created causes produce their effects, e.g. how the mind moves the body. The way in which the First Cause moves the second cause lies beyond the sphere of human knowledge²⁸⁵.

Thomistic school explains the infallible efficacy of grace by "physical promotion": "Physical promotion is a Divine action, virtually transient, by which God as First Cause confers in each individual case on the second causes, already endowed by Him with the power of acting, the actual performing- free or necessary, according to the proper nature of each agent- of what He has decreed"²⁸⁶.

with another, (d) and has the same tastes, (e) or shares the same sorrows and joys with his friend. 1166a 2-3; 1798, 116a 4-6; 1799. See CAN, 547

²⁸¹ See: ST, Part I-II, Q 4, Art.8.

²⁸² Scheeben Joseph Mathias,. A manual of Catholic Theology. Based on Scheeben's „ dogmatik“ Volume 2, Wilhelm Joseph and Scannell B.Thomas, Kegan Paul trench Trubener & Co, London, 1906, p 147.

²⁸³ Ibid, .p267.

²⁸⁴ Romans 8, 30.

²⁸⁵ Scheeben Joseph Mathias,. A manual of Catholic Theology. Based on Scheeben's „ dogmatik“ Volume 2, Wilhelm Joseph and Scannell B.Thomas, Kegan Paul trench Trubener & Co, London, 1906, p273.

²⁸⁶ Ibid. Dr. Manser explains this definition as follows: "an action virtually transient" that is, different from the eternal promotion immanent in and identical with the Divine essence. "On second causes already endowed by God with the power of acting": these words discriminate promotion from other Divine other Divine actions virtually transient, viz. creation and conservation. "By which God confers the actual performing": these words give the *ratio formalis* (the essence) of promotion. For the giving the actual performing of an act implies an immediate motion of the will, by virtue of which the will from non-acting becomes acting, passes from the mere power to act into actual exercise of the act. Again, this immediate Divine motion and application of the

Happiness is the attainment of perfect good. Whoever is capable of attaining the perfect good can attain happiness; that human being is capable of perfect good because the intellect can apprehend the universal and perfect good, and the will can desire it²⁸⁷; since everything is knowable, God, Who is pure act without any admixture of potentiality, is in Himself supremely knowable, yet what is supremely knowable in itself, may not be knowable to a particular intellect, on account of the excess of intelligible object above the intellects; just as the sun which is visible cannot be seen by the bat on account of its excess of light. As the ultimate beatitude of man consists in the use of his highest function, which is the operation of the intellect, if we suppose that created intellect could never see God, it would either never attain to beatitude or its beatitude would consist in something else besides God, which is opposed to faith; and it must be absolutely granted that the blessed see the essence of God²⁸⁸.

“Happy are those whom you discipline, O Lord, and whom you teach out of your law...”²⁸⁹. “Knowing God is not information about God but an intimacy with divinity itself (the divine mind, essence or nature) that satisfies the soul’s deepest desire; it is simultaneously intellectual and emotional joy, in which love infuses Knowledge”²⁹⁰.

There is but one sovereign good by enjoying which human beings are made happy, but as for the attainment or enjoyment of this good, one can be happier than another because the more one enjoys this good the happier one is; this happens when one is better disposed to the enjoyment of sovereign good²⁹¹. It denotes that, “the moral and intellectual acumen require deliberation and practice”²⁹².

Happiness is a perfect and sufficient good, which excludes every evil and fulfills every desire; but in this life every evil cannot be excluded, while this present life is subjected to many unavoidable evils: to ignorance on the part of intellect, to inordinate affection on the part of the appetite, and to many penal ties on the part of the bodies. Since the goods of present life and life itself pass away, one cannot have true happiness in this life²⁹³.

Contemplative happiness could be lost by certain occupations through which one is completely withdrawn from contemplation; it could also be lost through forgetfulness, since knowledge could be lost through forgetfulness²⁹⁴. Again the outward changes in the will, in so

will to its proper exercise implies that the motion precedes the act as its cause. Hence it is called “previous” motion, or promotion.

²⁸⁷ See: ST, Part I-II, Q 5, Art.1.

²⁸⁸ See: ST, Part I, Q 12, Art.1.

²⁸⁹ Ps 94,12.

²⁹⁰ Charry. T. Ellen,. God and the Art of Happiness. William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, Cambridge, 2010, p.95.

²⁹¹ See: ST, Part I-II, Q 5, Art.2.

²⁹² Charry T. Ellen,. God and the Art of Happiness. William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, Cambridge, 2010, p.89.

²⁹³ See: ST, Part I-II, Q 5, Art.3.

²⁹⁴ See: ST, Part I-II, Q 5, Art.4.

far as they change the acts of virtue²⁹⁵, can disturb the active happiness. Just as false is the evil of the intellect, and true is the good of the intellect; one will no longer be happy if evil exists in him²⁹⁶. A happy man cannot forsake happiness of his own accord, except through fault²⁹⁷, and one who sees God cannot fall into fault because rectitude of the will of necessity results from that vision; nor can another agent withdraw happiness because the mind that is united to God is raised above all other things²⁹⁸. It depends on how deeply one desires and loves God because love increases understanding and comprehending of the things known, including God, thus love is a strong element of happiness²⁹⁹.

Perfect happiness consists in the vision of the divine essence, and the divine essence surpasses the nature of every creature; therefore, the natural knowledge of every creature, which is in keeping with the mode of its substance, falls short of the vision of the divine essence, which surpasses all created substance; consequently, creature cannot attain final happiness by its own natural powers³⁰⁰. Surpassing the created nature cannot be done by the power of any creature, but done by God; thus by God alone is a person made happy because everything that is above nature is done by God³⁰¹.

Rectitude of the will is the behavior that is correct, upright and honorable, an attribute that implies that a person's actions are justified, and can have the connotation that the person has been "judged" or "reckoned" as leading a life that is pleasing to God, which is the right order of the will to the last end, that is necessary for obtaining the last end just as the right disposition of the matter in order to receive the form³⁰². God can possess happiness without movement as happiness naturally belongs to God alone; it belongs to God alone not to be moved towards happiness by any previous operation; therefore, no creature can becomingly gain happiness without the movement of the operation, which man obtains by many

²⁹⁵ "For it is impossible, or at least difficult, for an indigent man to perform certain virtuous actions. Many good deeds become feasible, as we have pointed out, by the aid of friends and money and political influence. Then, too, the lack of other blessings, like noble birth, good children, and physical beauty spoil a man's happiness. One who is extremely ugly, lowborn, or alone in the world and without children cannot be entirely happy. Much less is he happy who is cursed with wayward children or evil associates or who has lost friends by death. In our opinion then it seems that happiness has need of external prosperity to a degree". Text of Aristotle, 1099a32-1099b6;163, See CAN, p 51 "For this reason some have identified good fortune with happiness. Others however prefer to place happiness in virtue". Text of Aristotle, 1099b6-8;164. See CAN, p 51.

²⁹⁶ See: ST, Part I-II, Q 5, Art.4.

²⁹⁷ "I am speaking of moral virtue, for it treats of passions and operations in which we find excess, defect and the mean. Thus aggressiveness, fear, concupiscence, aversion, anger, pity and in general, pleasure and sorrow take place with excess and defect. Both of these are evil; but to experience these passions at the right time, for the right objects, towards the right persons, with the right motive, and in the right way is the mean and the highest good of virtue. Similarly, excess, defect and the mean are to be found in actions. Now moral virtue is concerned with passions and operations in which excess is vicious, defect is reproachable, and the mean receives praise and shows the right path. These two (praise and righteousness) pertain to virtue. Moral virtue therefore is a kind of middle course and aims at the mean." Text of Aristotle, 1106b16-28;317-318. See CAN, p103

²⁹⁸ See: ST, Part I-II, Q 5, Art.4.

²⁹⁹ See: God and the Art of Happiness, Ellen T. Charry, Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., Cambridge,2010,p 108.

³⁰⁰ See: ST, Part I-II, Q 5, Art.5.

³⁰¹ See: ST, Part I-II, Q 5, Art.6.

³⁰² See: ST, Part I-II, Q 4, Art.4.

movements of works which are called merits³⁰³. Sometimes “a single human act contains many parts which are only potentially many; some of them actually come to be separate wholes when something goes wrong”³⁰⁴.

The general notion of happiness consists in the perfect good, and the perfect good of man is that which entirely satisfies his will, which means, to desire happiness is nothing else than to desire that one’s will be satisfied; owing to the ignorance of what thing is found in the general notion of happiness, many do not desire for it³⁰⁵. One cannot desire or pursue what one does not know because human act is one that proceeds from deliberate will, which desires for what is known³⁰⁶. T.S. Eliot wrote in one of the Four Quartets namely, East Coker “In my beginning is my end”; what is first in thought is the last thing to be realized³⁰⁷. Therefore, happiness is to be gained by means of certain human acts, because humans are bodies with souls, they have natural inclinations which cause both the body and the soul to perform their proper actions; among the interior principles of action, the power that distinguishes humans from all the other animals is the intellectual power and its corresponding appetite³⁰⁸.

1.1 Voluntary

“Some actions that in themselves are involuntary become voluntary in particular circumstances. Although of themselves involuntary, if their principle is in the agent who seeks them at this time and in these circumstances, they are voluntary”³⁰⁹.

There is a principle of movement in the thing which is moved and outside of the thing which is being moved; just as when a stone is moved upwards, the principle of movement is outside the stone and when the stone is moved downwards, the principle of movement is in the stone. Those things which are moved by an intrinsic principle have knowledge of the end and they move towards an end; thus, voluntary implies movements from their own inclination with knowledge of the end³¹⁰. Thus, voluntary pertains to any state of the will or moving one’s self to act, with knowledge of the action which proceeds from the will either freely or spontaneously³¹¹.

The knowledge of the end could be perfect or imperfect; an apprehension of the perfect knowledge leads to perfect voluntary and imperfect knowledge of the end leads to imperfect

³⁰³ See: ST, Part I-II, Q 5, Art.7.

³⁰⁴ McInerny Ralph,. Aquinas on Human Action. The Catholic University of America Press, 2012, p 69.

³⁰⁵ See: ST, Part I-II, Q 5, Art.8.

³⁰⁶ See: McInerny Ralph,. Aquinas on Human Action. The Catholic University of America Press, 2012, p 53.

³⁰⁷ Ibid, p 57.

³⁰⁸ Rziha John,. Perfecting Human Actions. ST. Thomas Aquinas on Human Participation in Eternal Law, The Catholic University of America Press, 2009, p 67.

³⁰⁹ Text of Aristotle, 1110b 1-9;398-399 ; CAN, p 131

³¹⁰ See: ST, Part I-II, Q 6, Art.1.

³¹¹ See: Wuellner Bernard,. Dictionary of Scholastic Philosophy. editions scholasticae, 2011, p134.

voluntary, which is even within the competency of irrational³¹² animals³¹³. When one decides not to act and not to will, then one can have the voluntary act without an act; sometimes without outward act, but with an interior act³¹⁴. “The acts of the will bearing on end and means are elicited voluntary acts, acts of the will itself; other acts are voluntary insofar as they are commanded by will”³¹⁵. In Aquinas’s view, voluntary activity comes with the responsibility that we are responsible for what we do voluntarily; but Aquinas takes us to be responsible for what we voluntarily do not do, since he thinks that we can will not to act as well as to act.³¹⁶

1.2 Involuntary

“Involuntary actions seem to be those that arise either from violence or from ignorance”³¹⁷. The act of the will is an inclination proceeding from the interior principle of knowledge; what is compelled or violent is an exterior principle; consequently, it is contrary to the nature of the act of the will to be subjected to compulsion and violence³¹⁸; for violence is directly opposed to voluntary because violence is not of intrinsic principle, but of extrinsic principle, which is against the will³¹⁹.

“Those things, then are thought involuntary, which take place by force or by reason of ignorance, and that is forced of which the moving principle is outside, being a principle in which nothing is contributed by the person who acts”³²⁰. “Sometimes ignorance makes what would have been a voluntary act involuntary, but not always, and then it is no longer to be appraised as human act, and is neither morally good nor morally bad”³²¹.

Ignorance has a threefold relation to the act of the will: concomitantly, when there is ignorance of what is done but even if it is known it would be done; consequently, in so far as ignorance itself is voluntary; antecedently, when it is not voluntary and yet is the cause of man’s willing what he would not will otherwise. Therefore if ignorance deprives one of knowledge, which is necessary condition of voluntariness, then what is done through ignorance is involuntary³²².

³¹² The word *voluntary* is derived from *voluntas* (will) and can be extended to those things in which there is some participation of will, by way of likeness thereto. It is thus that voluntary action is attributed to irrational animals, in so far as they are moved to an end, through some kind of knowledge.

³¹³ See: ST, Part I-II, Q 6, Art.2.

³¹⁴ See: ST, Part I-II, Q 6, Art.3.

³¹⁵ McInerney Ralph,. Aquinas on Human Action. The Catholic University of America Press, 2012, P68.

³¹⁶ See: Thomas Aquinas’s Summa Theologiae, Brian Davies, Oxford University Press, NY, 2014, p159.

³¹⁷ Aquinas Thomas,. Commentary on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. Trans. by C.I. Litzinger, Dumb Ox Books, Notre Dame, Indiana 1964, Text of Aristotle, 1109a35-1110a1; 386, p127.

³¹⁸ See: ST, Part I-II, Q 6, Art.4.

³¹⁹ See: ST, Part I-II, Q 6, Art.5.

³²⁰ Aristotle,. The Nicomachean Ethics,Trans. by David Ross, Oxford University press, 1110a-1-2,p 38.

³²¹ McInerney Ralph,. Aquinas on Human Action. The Catholic University of America Press, 2012, P94.

³²² See: ST, Part I-II, Q 6, Art.8.

That which is done through fear³²³ is partly involuntary because considered in itself fear is not voluntary, and partly voluntary when it avoids the evil feared; however we consider what is done through fear is essentially voluntary because its principle stays within, and when considered in as much as repugnant to the will, which is outside the actual circumstance of the case, then what is done through fear is involuntary³²⁴.

“Actions whose source is within man are in his power to do or not to do, and this belongs to the nature of the voluntary. But actions may be called involuntary in the abstract for no one would choose to do such a thing”³²⁵. “His basic position is that what we do voluntarily should be thought of either as bringing us closer to God or as alienating us from God; he presents this conclusion while speaking in terms of merit and sin”³²⁶.

1.3 Circumstances

The Latin word *circumstare* means to surround something³²⁷. Circumstance is “something that at times accompanies and at times is missing from some moral object or from some moral intention”³²⁸; “it is the particular conditions of each act; therefore, the circumstances are individual accidents of human acts”³²⁹. “In various factors which contribute to the goodness or evil of a human action, one sees circumstances listed right alongside end and object as being significant”³³⁰. Ignorance of circumstances causes an act to be involuntary; involuntariness excuses the act from sin, the consideration of which is a theological subject³³¹.

Since ignorance can be concerned with every one of the circumstances occurring with the action, that man seems to act involuntarily who is ignorant of one of them; this applies especially to ignorance of the most important circumstances: these seem to be the circumstances of action and its motives; for an action to be called involuntary in respect of such ignorance, it must be painful to the agent and cause repentance.³³²

³²³ “Some things are done because of the fear of greater evils or because of the hope of some good. Thus a tyrant, having in his power the parents or children of a certain man, commands him to do a disgraceful deed on condition that they will be spared if he does it but killed if he does not do it. Here a doubt arises whether his actions are voluntary or involuntary. A similar case is found in the decision to throw goods overboard during storms at sea. Absolutely speaking, no man would do so voluntarily, but if it means that his life and that of others are saved as a result, a sensible man will do it”. CAN, Text of Aristotle, 1110a4-11;388-389, p127.

³²⁴ See: ST, Part I-II, Q 6, Art.6.

³²⁵ Aquinas Thomas,. Commentary on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. Trans. by C.I. Litzinger, Dumb Ox Books, Notre Dame, Indiana 1964, (Text of Aristotle, 1110a11-19; 390-391), p 127.

³²⁶ Davies Brian,. Thomas Aquinas’s Summa Theologiae. A Guide and commentary, Oxford University Press, NY, 2014, p168.

³²⁷ Aquinas Thomas,. Treatise on Happiness. Trans. by John A. Oesterle, Prentice-Hall, USA,1964, p82.

³²⁸ Wuellner Bernard,. Dictionary of Scholastic Philosophy. editions scholasticae, 2011, p24.

³²⁹ ST, Part I-II, Q7, Art.1.

³³⁰ Pilsner Joseph,. The Specification of Human Actions in St Thomas Aquinas. Oxford University Press, New York, 2006, p173.

³³¹ See: ST, Part I-II, Q7, Art.2.

³³² Aquinas Thomas,. Commentary on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. Trans. by C.I. Litzinger, Dumb Ox Books, Notre Dame, Indiana 1964, (Text of Aristotle, 1111a15-21;424), p135.

Whatever conditions are outside the substance of an act, and yet in some way touches the human act, are called circumstances; what is outside a thing's substance, but belongs to that thing, are called accidents; therefore, circumstances of human acts should be called their accidents³³³.

1.3.1 Nature of Circumstances

Aquinas thinks that what he calls "circumstances" can be significant when it comes to what is going on in particular actions³³⁴. Circumstances called as accidents³³⁵ of a human action, are what *stands around*³³⁶ a material body, which helps one to describe and understand qualities which are associated with human action³³⁷, not as accidents are related to a substance, but as one accident is related³³⁸ to another³³⁹.

A human act is deemed to be voluntary or involuntary according to knowledge or ignorance of circumstances because human act is directed to happiness, they are found to be good or evil, better or worse and considered under the aspect of merit or demerit as an act directed to an end³⁴⁰.

Thomas has the additional task of identifying, arranging, and comparing them. Two listings of circumstances already in the tradition are important sources for him. The first is a list from Cicero's *De Inventione* 1.1.24; it contains circumstances a rhetorician has to keep in mind: who, what, where, by what aids, why, how, when. A second list is put forward by Aristotle in the *Nicomachean Ethics* in connection with moral acts: who, about what, in what, by what instrument, why, and how. ... In practice, Thomas then recognizes eight circumstances, even though he never explicitly presents such an expanded list as his own.³⁴¹

³³³ See: ST, Part I-II, Q7, Art.1.

³³⁴ See: Davies Brian,. Thomas Aquinas's Summa Theologiae. A Guide and Commentary, Oxford University Press, NY, 2014, p159.

³³⁵ Aquinas gives some what a typical meaning to the term accident when he uses it in this context that is, for him, a circumstance is not an accident of a human action in the same way that redness or sweetness is an accident of an apple.

³³⁶ The phrase *stands around* describes a situation where one body is situated outside another, yet touches it or is placed along side of it; although it is not a part of what is essential to an action, it has a close association with what is essential.

³³⁷ Pilsner Joseph,. The Specification of Human Actions in St Thomas Aquinas. Oxford University Press, New York, 2006, p174.

³³⁸ It is good to remember that for Thomas, circumstances are not just any sort of accident. The number of any action's properties can be infinite, so Thomas makes a distinction: those accidents which are in every way accidental to an act are not considered by the moral science, but only those which touch the act in some way, by being systematically related to it. These Thomas calls proper accidents, and he asserts that only they are rightly called circumstances. ST, Part I-II, Q7, Art. 2. In other texts Thomas will claim that circumstances are infinite, but only in possibility and not in any actual cases: see ST, Part II-II, Q39, Art. 2.

³³⁹ See: Pilsner Joseph,. The Specification of Human Actions in St Thomas Aquinas. Oxford University Press, New York, 2006, p176; ST, Part I-II, Q7, Art.1.

³⁴⁰ See: Aquinas Thomas,. Treatise on Happiness. Trans. by John A. Oesterle, Prentice-Hall, USA, 1964, p83; See also ST, Part I-II, Q7, Art. 2.

³⁴¹ Pilsner Joseph,. The Specification of Human Actions in St Thomas Aquinas. Oxford University Press, New York, 2006, p176-177. ` Thomas in his writings gives examples of circumstances which can be helpful in identifying them: 1.who: the dignity or lack thereof in the agent; 2.why:the liberation of the stat as the goal an agent is fighting for; 3. about what: father or a stranger as two possible victims of an assailant's attack; 4. what: injury or death as two possible outcomes or effects of an attack; 5. how: lightly or forcefully, frequently

The reason of this enumeration is that a circumstance is described as something outside the substance of the act, and yet in a way touching it; that is to say, in as much as it touches the act itself, it touches its cause and it touches its effect³⁴².

1.3.2 Role of Circumstances in Moral Evaluation

It is requisite for an act of virtue that not only should it fall on its own matter, but also that it should be endured with its due circumstances, whereby adapted to that matter, and directing the act to the last end³⁴³. Significant condition of act is due circumstances³⁴⁴, for Thomas observes that acts are proportioned to an end according to certain consummation which is accomplished through due circumstances³⁴⁵.

Aquinas's comparison of temperance and fasting is a good illustration of how a circumstance can proportion an action to its end. As an acquired virtue, notes Thomas, the end of temperance is a civil good, that is, a temporal or worldly good. When looked at from this perspective, a person who refrains from eating for a period of time (given no other supervening conditions) would be consuming less than moderation would allow for—he would be eating too little from the point of view of right reason, and therefore his action would be judged wrong.³⁴⁶

Thomas illustrates the use of the faculty of right reasoning in the teachings about self-intoxication, which shows the complexity of several circumstances of action relevant to its moral evaluation; for instance, the drinker must pay special attention to the wine's inebriating power; immoderate use of intoxication involve a special deviation from the standards for right action; impairing one's own reasoning capacity unnecessarily, even temporarily, is wrong, because reason directs human being to God, and helps them to avoid many sins; the drinker must therefore, strike a mean in the use of wine such that its benefits may be enjoyed without incurring any harm, including the disabling of reason³⁴⁷.

In this case, the mean is taken from the comparison of the wine to the drinker; the question is what is too much or the right amount for him or her?³⁴⁸ “In determining this mean, circumstances can play a crucial role: many conditions are capable of influencing how this commensuration is worked out”³⁴⁹. Thomas realizes that determining the exact proportion in a particular case is often difficult, while such calculating is by no means an exact science

or once as possible ways of attacking; 6. by what aids: an underling who assists; or attacking with a sword; 7. place: sacred as a possible condition of a location; 8. time: sacred as a possible condition of a moment’.

³⁴² See: ST, Part I-II, Q7, Art. 3.

³⁴³ See: ST, Part II-II, Q44, Art.4.

³⁴⁴ Due circumstances can refer to any morally relevant conditions of actions. See ST, Part I-II, Q18, Art. 3.

³⁴⁵ See: ST, Part I-II, Q7, Art. 2.

³⁴⁶ Pilsner Joseph,. *The Specification of Human Actions in St Thomas Aquinas*. Oxford University Press, New York, 2006, p181.

³⁴⁷ See: ST, Part II-II, Q149, Art.3; ST, Part I-II, Q88, Art.5.

³⁴⁸ See: ST, Part II-II, Q58, Art.10.

³⁴⁹ Pilsner Joseph,. *The Specification of Human Actions in St Thomas Aquinas*. Oxford University Press, New York, 2006, p183. For example according to Thomas some people are easily the worse for taking wine, some are bound by a vow not to drink, some hold an office which requires particular astuteness of mind, some uphold a vocation to pursue the perfection of wisdom or some suffer from certain illness. Each of these circumstances would have an influence over the determination of the mean.

because those who have cultivated prudence are able to judge actions and their circumstances better than those who have not³⁵⁰.

1.4 Cognitive Participation

Cognitive participation mirrors participation³⁵¹ by a principle of motion, in that all humans participate in the eternal law³⁵², in which the wicked participate imperfectly, because the natural inclination to virtue is corrupted by vicious habits, and the natural knowledge is darkened by passions and habits of sin, in which the good are perfected both naturally and supernaturally: naturally, by the natural knowledge of the good, with added motive of grace and virtue, and supernaturally, by faith and by the Holy Spirit's gifts of wisdom.³⁵³ Beings are directed by God to their particular actions, but what is distinct about humans is that they also freely direct themselves due to their ability to understand and reason³⁵⁴. Things that are possessed of reason move themselves to the end because they have dominion over their actions through their free will, which is the faculty of the will and reason³⁵⁵.

If an action is human, it must be rational, and therefore in every human action, humans are not only directed by the eternal law, but also have a certain knowledge of it, and it is impossible that heavenly bodies be the cause of human actions, since humans have a genuine knowledge of the eternal law³⁵⁶. "The eternal law directs all creation to its end, by cognitively participating in the eternal law humans are able to direct themselves in accord with divine wisdom; the more perfect this form of participation, the closer humans are to their ultimate end",³⁵⁷.

No one can know the eternal law as it is in itself, except the blessed who see God in His essence, but every rational creature knows the eternal law in its reflection, greater or less, for every knowledge of truth is a kind of reflection and participation of the eternal law, which is the unchangeable truth³⁵⁸. God is both efficient and exemplary cause of human understanding;

³⁵⁰ See: ST, Part II-II, Q158, Art.1; ST, Part II-II, Q33, Art.2.

³⁵¹ To participate is like taking part; when something receives a part of what belongs to another fully, it is said to participate in it. For example water is not hot by nature but is only hot by receiving heat by something that is hot. Thomas merged the Platonic notion of participation with the Aristotelian notion of act and potency in order to show the dependence of the creature on the Creator. Creatures are in potency to a divine perfection and through their actions they are able to share in an essential perfection of God without that perfection being part of the essence of the creature. See Rziha John,. *Perfecting Human Actions. ST. Thomas Aquinas on Human Participation of Eternal Law*, Catholic University of America Press, Washington D.C, 2009, p 9-11.

³⁵² The type of Divine wisdom as moving all things to their due end bears the character of law; accordingly eternal law is nothing else than the type of Divine wisdom as directing all actions and movements. See ST, Part I-II, Q 93, Art.1.

³⁵³ See: ST, Part I-II, Q 93, Art.6.

³⁵⁴ See: Rziha John,. *Perfecting Human Actions. ST. Thomas Aquinas on Human Participation of Eternal Law*, Catholic University of America Press, Washington D.C, 2009, p 184.

³⁵⁵ See: ST, Part I-II, Q 1, Art.2.

³⁵⁶ See: ST, Part I, Q 115, Art.4.

³⁵⁷ Rziha John,. *Perfecting Human Actions. ST. Thomas Aquinas on Human Participation in Eternal Law*, Catholic University of America Press, Washington D.C, 2009, p 187.

³⁵⁸ See: ST, Part I-II, Q 93, Art.2.

God is the efficient cause because God gives humans the intellectual power to understand and He is the exemplary cause because He gives the intelligible forms; thus, the act of human understanding as a whole can be said to participate in God³⁵⁹.

When God moves the intellect to understand something by giving it the power and impressing the intellectual form, He acts as the primary cause; whereas the human intellect acts as the instrumental cause because an instrumental cause always acts in accord with its form, the human intellect is moved by God according to its proper form³⁶⁰. The human intellect because of its weakness must abstract intellectual forms from phantasms, judging things, composing, dividing, and use of discursive intellectual operation in order to know things more perfectly; consequently, several steps are required within an intellectual act in order to make the intellect perfect³⁶¹.

Thomas notes that although speculative and practical intellects are not distinct powers, there is a distinction between practical intellect and speculative intellect; whereas the things apprehended by the practical intellect are directed toward operation, the things apprehended by the speculative intellect are directed towards consideration of truth³⁶².

1.4.1 Three Acts of the Speculative Intellect

The intellect has a complete knowledge of a thing when it contains a perfect likeness of the object known³⁶³. The perfect act of the intellect is the act of having complete knowledge of something³⁶⁴. In order to achieve complete knowledge of something, the intellect must usually perform actions which abstract intelligible forms from sensible phantasms, then join and divide these forms in order to form propositions, and finally move from these propositions to conclusions through discursive reasoning³⁶⁵.

a) Simple Apprehension

Sense is a passive power, and is naturally immuted by the exterior sensible, and the exterior cause of immutation is what is *per se* perceived by the sense, and according to the diversity of that exterior cause are the sensitive powers diversified, in which there are two types of immutation, one natural, the other spiritual; natural immutation takes place by the form of the immuter being received, according to its natural existence into the thing immuted, as heat is received into the thing heated; whereas spiritual immutation takes place by the form of the immuter being received, according to a spiritual mode of existence into the thing

³⁵⁹ See: Rziha John,. Perfecting Human Actions. ST. Thomas Aquinas on Human Participation in Eternal Law, Catholic University of America Press, Washington D.C, 2009, p 188.

³⁶⁰ Ibid, p 190.

³⁶¹ See: ST, Part I, Q 58, Art. 3 & 4.

³⁶² See: ST, Part I, Q 79, Art. 11.

³⁶³ See: ST, Part I, Q 12, Art. 9.

³⁶⁴ See: ST, Part I, Q 85, Art. 3.

³⁶⁵ See: Rziha John,. Perfecting Human Actions. ST. Thomas Aquinas on Human Participation in Eternal Law, Catholic University of America Press, Washington D.C, 2009, p 193.

immuted, as the form of color is received into the pupil which does not thereby become coloured, and for the operation of the senses, a spiritual immutation is required, whereby an intention of the sensible form is effected in the sense organ³⁶⁶.

The human intellect must of necessity understand by composition and division, since the intellect passes from potentiality to act, it has a likeness to things which are generated, which do not attain to perfection all at once, but acquire it by degrees. The human intellect does not acquire perfect knowledge by the first act of apprehension, which is a simple apprehension. However human intellect first apprehends something about its object, such as quiddity, and this is its first and proper object, and then it understands the properties, accidents, and the various relations of the essence³⁶⁷.

b) Judgement (composition and separation)

Act of apprehension gives knowledge of something, but this knowledge is imperfect because of the weakness of the human mind, that which is singular, diversified, and distinct is apprehended as universal and common³⁶⁸; therefore, the intellect must combine and separate the intellectual forms derived from simple apprehension in order to determine what forms are in reality together, and what forms are not; this act of combining and separating is judgement³⁶⁹.

When intellect judges something, it not only knows something, but knows it as it is in reality, then after the act of judgement that knowledge can be called true; truth is defined by conformity of the intellect and thing; therefore, to know this conformity is to know the truth, and the intellect can know its own conformity with the intelligible thing, but it does not apprehend it by knowing a thing, however it judges that a thing corresponds to the form which it apprehends about that thing, then it first knows and expresses truth, which done by composing and dividing³⁷⁰.

c) Discursive Reasoning

Once an intellectual truth is understood, the human mind is able to advance from one thing understood to another, in order to further know intelligible truth, and this movement from principles to conclusions could be called reasoning; like judgement, the acquisition of intelligible truth by moving from one truth to another is necessary because of the weakness of

³⁶⁶ See: ST, Part I, Q 78, Art. 3.

³⁶⁷ See: ST, Part I, Q 85, Art. 5.

³⁶⁸ See: ST, Part I, Q 14, Art. 6. There would be no need to compose and divide or judge a thing if by apprehending the essence of a thing we grasped belonged in it and what did not.

³⁶⁹ Thomas notes that to understand is to penetrate into the essence of a thing, since the object of the intellect is what a thing is. However, there are many different kinds of things that are hidden within. For example, under accidents are hidden the substantial reality, under words lies their meaning, under effects their causes etc. All of these things require the light of understanding to see and the stronger the light of understanding, the deeper it can penetrate into things. See: ST, Part II-II, Q 8, Art. 1.

³⁷⁰ See: ST, Part I, Q 16, Art.2.

the human intellect³⁷¹. Everything that can be attributed to something cannot be known by immediate understanding alone, the mind must reason to conclusions by means of a middle term³⁷². That means, in the joining and separating of the quiddities of different things, on some occasions the mind is able to immediately join and separate them, but normally in a discursive reasoning, the use of a middle term is needed in order to join or separate two particular things due to the weakness of the intellect³⁷³.

1.4.2 Three Acts of the Practical Intellect

The acts of the speculative intellect are ordered to the consideration of truth, but the acts of the practical intellect are directed toward operation³⁷⁴. When speaking about the practical intellect, Thomas nearly always compares it to the speculative intellect, and he argues that, reasoning is speculative and practical; in both we find the apprehension of truth and judgement concerning the truth; for the apprehension of truth, the speculative reason is perfected by understanding, whereas the practical reason is perfected by counsel; in order to judge aright, speculative reason is perfected by wisdom, and the practical reason is perfected by knowledge³⁷⁵.

a) Simple Apprehension

With regard to the act of apprehension, difference between the speculative intellect and the practical intellect is that, the speculative intellect orders what it apprehends to the consideration of truth, while the practical intellect directs what is apprehended to operation³⁷⁶. Human intellect knows directly the universal only. Therefore the choice of a particular thing to be done is a conclusion of a syllogism formed by the practical intellect: however a singular proposition cannot be directly concluded from a universal proposition, except through the medium of a singular proposition; hence, the universal principle of the practical intellect moves through the medium of the particular apprehension³⁷⁷; thus, the things that are simple in themselves are known by the intellect with a certain amount of complexity³⁷⁸.

³⁷¹ See: ST, Part I, Q 79, Art.8.

³⁷² An example of this process can be seen in using an argument to separate the terms spider and insect by use of the middle term eight legs: all spiders have eight legs; no insects have eight legs; therefore no spiders are insects. The term spider and insects are separated via the middle term eight legs. Thus the mind is able to separate the term spiders and insects in order to have a fuller understanding of reality, since in reality spiders are not insects. Mind judges, the truth of the proposition spiders are not insects by means of discursive reasoning.

³⁷³ See: ST, Part I, Q 58, Art.4.

³⁷⁴ Operation is activity; the second act of a power or intellect. See Wuellner Bernard,. Dictionary of Scholastic Philosophy. editions scholasticae, 2011, p84; Rziha John,. Perfecting Human Actions. ST. Thomas Aquinas on Human Participation in Eternal Law, Catholic University of America Press, Washington D.C, 2009, p 194.

³⁷⁵ See: ST, Part I-II, Q 68, Art.4.

³⁷⁶ See: ST, Part I, Q 79, Art.11.

³⁷⁷ See: ST, Part I, Q 86, Art.1.

³⁷⁸ See: ST, Part II-II, Q 1, Art.3.

b) Judgement (Joining and Separating)

The rule and measure of human acts is reason, which is the first principle of human acts, because it belongs to reason to direct an action to the end³⁷⁹. Reason directs human acts in accordance with two kinds of knowing, a universal and a particular kind, because in conferring about things to be done it makes use of a sort of syllogism, the conclusion of which is a judgement, or choice or operation; actions are concerned with singulars, and the conclusion of an operative syllogism is singular³⁸⁰. Every deduction of reason proceeds from certain statements which are taken as primary; therefore every process of reasoning proceeds from some understanding³⁸¹, and a choice results from the decision or judgement which is the conclusion of a practical syllogism³⁸².

c) Practical Reasoning

The first principle in practical reason is the one founded on the notion of good, viz., that good is that which all beings seek after; hence, it is the principle of law that good must be done and evil must be avoided, and all other precepts of natural law are based upon this, so that whatever the practical reason naturally apprehends as human being's good or evil, belongs to the precepts of the natural law as something to be done or avoided, and practical reason naturally understands these precepts to be human goods³⁸³.

Thomas argues from the basic principle that what is good always has the nature of the end to the conclusion that human beings seek to discover particular good acts as consequences of the determined end; since practical reason mimics the deductive process of theoretical reasoning, the term, '*ratio practica*', primarily refers to a type of human knowledge³⁸⁴. Since the goal of practical reason is action not knowledge, the truth attained by the intellect must be caused by its conformity to right desire. There can be no necessary science of practical reason, since virtuous activity allows for variety and derivation from the universal rule in particular instances³⁸⁵.

³⁷⁹ See: ST, Part I-II, Q 90, Art.1.

³⁸⁰ See: ST, Part I-II, Q 76, Art.1.

³⁸¹ See: ST, Part II-II, Q 49, Art.2.

³⁸² See: ST, Part I-II, Q 13, Art.3.

³⁸³ See: ST, Part I-II, Q 94, Art.2.

³⁸⁴ <http://plato.stanford.edu/entrie/practical-reason-med/>. 'There is a fundamental difference between the conclusions of theoretical and practical science, because speculative reason is especially concerned with what is necessary and cannot be otherwise, the truth found in its conclusions is without flaw, just in its general principles. But practical reason concerns what is contingent whose domain is human acts; and so even if there is some necessity in its general principles, the more one descends to its proper conclusions the more one finds a defect in truth. In speculative reasoning the truth is the same for all, both in principles and in conclusions. In operative reasoning there is not the same truth or practical rectitude according to its proper conclusions, but only according to its common principles'.

³⁸⁵ <http://plato.stanford.edu/entrie/practical-reason-med/>.

1.5. The Will

“Thomas argued that a well ordered will is needed for happiness in this life and in the next”³⁸⁶. “The will is the rational appetite”³⁸⁷, in other words, that power of the human soul or of the spiritual substance which tends towards a good apprehended by the intellect or away from an evil recognized by the intellect³⁸⁸. This rational appetite is an inclination of a person towards a desired end, which is generally understood as something good; however, the will could be referred both to good and evil. Therefore the will could have two forces; the actual desire of good is called *volition* and the actual desire of evil is called *nolition*³⁸⁹. “The will is moved in two ways: moving to the end and moving as a reason for willing the means; hence, the will is moved by one and the same movement”³⁹⁰.

1.5.1 Cause of the Movement of the Will

The good is the object of the will, and the object of the intellect is truth; as the end of the intellect, truth is a particular good falling under the general good that the will wants, and thus truth is the object of the will, not as truth but as good; here Thomas distinguishes between intellect as a nature, and intellect as intellect; as a nature intellect is determined to truth; as intellect, it has more variable object, and it can fall into falsity. Thus, there is a necessity of lengthy discursive acts to arrive at truth; so too, will as nature is ordered and determined to the good³⁹¹.

From Augustine, Thomas takes the idea, that divine illumination is the means to know God; Thomas goes beyond Augustine, when he adds that illumination is union with the divine mind; as a secondary agency of happiness, all behavior is purposeful, and its purpose is to seek goodness; even evil deeds intend some good, although they are thwarted and twisted³⁹². “One can know that it is bad to smoke and good to go for walks in the country; yet one might still smoke heavily and never take any exercise”³⁹³.

Since happiness is knowing the divine mind, we are hamstrung using our mind alone because our little minds cannot grasp the divine mind. They need help. God illuminates the mind and enables it to know him. Whether divine illumination is possible in this life is unclear; even that does happen, illumined minds cannot know God as they would wish. The full effect of God’s power, the extent of what he wills, and the full effects of what he does still escape us. In this life we can never understand

³⁸⁶ Charry T. Ellen,. *God and the Art of Happiness*. William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, Cambridge, 2010, p105.

³⁸⁷ See: ST,Part I-II, Q 8, Art.1. “The appetite is nothing else than an inclination of a person desirous of a thing towards that thing”.

³⁸⁸ Wuellner Bernard,., *Dictionary of Scholastic Philosophy*. editions scholasticae, 2011, p135.

³⁸⁹ See: ST, Part I-II, Q 8, Art.1. Just as volition is of good, nolition is of evil.

³⁹⁰ See: ST, Part I-II, Q 8, Art.3.

³⁹¹ See: McInerney Ralph,., *Aquinas on Human Action*. The Catholic University of America Press, 1992, p59.

³⁹² See: Charry T. Ellen,., *God and the Art of Happiness*. William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, Cambridge, 2010, p 94.

³⁹³ Davies Brian,., *The Thought of Thomas Aquinas*. Clarendon Press, Oxford, 2009, p141.

God as well as he understands himself, and this is precisely what Aquinas craves. He wants to share divine goodness. This is eternal life and it is the ultimate goal of life³⁹⁴.

“Motion of the subject itself is due to some agent and every agent acts for an end”³⁹⁵. Through all the vicissitudes, the career choices, the strange twists and turnings one’s life may take, there is finally only one end being sought, the good³⁹⁶. Power of the soul is seen to be in potentiality to different things with regards to acting or not acting, and with regard to its action; the first of these is on the part of the subject who acts or does not act, while the other is on the part of the object, by reason of which act is specified; the object moves by determining the act after the manner of a formal principle. Whereby in natural things, actions are specified, which is the universal truth, which is the object of the intellect.³⁹⁷ “Will moves the intellect to perform but intellect specifies the object of will.”³⁹⁸

As far as the will is moved by the object, it is evident that it can be moved by something exterior; that the intellectual appetite is moved in a fashion by the sensitive appetite, the movements of the heavenly bodies have an indirect bearing on the will, in so far as the will is moved by the passions of the sensitive appetite; as will is a power of the rational soul, and as will is ordained to the universal good, and as every other good is good by participation, God causes movement of the will³⁹⁹.

1.5.2 Manner in which the Will Moves

Will tends naturally to good in general which are all those things which belong to the person according to his nature; it is not only things pertaining to the will that one desires but also that pertaining to the entire human being⁴⁰⁰.

Will is not free with respect to goodness itself, to the ultimate, and it is not in one’s power to will anything other than the good, what is perfective of human being; this may seem tautological: one cannot yearn for something other than the point of yearning at all; whatever particular thing one wants would exhibit that note of what fulfills, what is good; the reason that somethings do not necessarily move the will, is that they are neither the end nor necessary constituents or conditions of the end⁴⁰¹.

³⁹⁴ Charry T. Ellen,. *God and the Art of Happiness*. William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, Cambridge, 2010, p 95.

³⁹⁵ ST, Part I-II, Q 9, Art.1.

³⁹⁶ See: Tekippe J.Terry,. *Lonergan and Thomas on the Will*. University Press of America, 1993, p4.

³⁹⁷ See: ST, Part I-II, Q 9, Art.1.

³⁹⁸ McInerny Ralph,. *Aquinas on Human Action*. The Catholic University of America Press, 1992, p59.

³⁹⁹ See: ST, Part I-II, Q 9, Art.4-6.

⁴⁰⁰ See: ST, Part I-II, Q 10, Art.1. Mann wills naturally not only the object of the will, but also other things that are appropriate to the other powers, such as the knowledge of truth, which befits the intellect, and to be and to live and other things which regard the natural well-being, all of which are included in the object of the will, as so many particular goods.

⁴⁰¹ See: McInerny Ralph,. *Aquinas on Human Action*. The Catholic University of America Press, 1992, p60-61.

“Will is moved in two ways: first as to the exercise of its act; secondly, as to the specification of its act, derived from the object”⁴⁰². As an exercise of the act, no object moves the will necessarily; it is in one’s power not to move, but as specification of act will is moved by one object necessarily; when will is offered an object that is not good from every point of view, it will not tend to it necessarily, whereas to a good that lacks nothing, it cannot but tend to it⁴⁰³. “The will as an agent moves all the powers of the soul to their respective acts, except the natural powers of the vegetative part, which are not subject to our choice”⁴⁰⁴.

The nature of human being is considered in two ways; first in its integral state as it was before the sin of our first parent; secondly corrupted as it is in the present state of being, following the sin of our first parent; now in both states, human nature needs the help of God as the Prime Mover to do or will anything good⁴⁰⁵. “Aquinas thinks God is the alpha and omega because he is the source of his creatures, and because all his creatures aim at what is first in Him and secondly to them”⁴⁰⁶.

1.5.3 Characteristics of the Act of the Will

“The act of the will is not an experience; it demands a subject, the willing subject, which is also the bearer of good and evil”⁴⁰⁷. On the assumption that human acts are made up of parts that have a moral unity, due to the intention that binds them together. Constitutive will acts as bearing either on an end that is the aim on the one hand, or on the means of achieving that end on the other⁴⁰⁸.

Thomas distinguishes actual and sanctifying grace, and further says that it can be seen as operative and cooperative; this gives four fold divisions: operative and cooperative actual grace, and operative and cooperative sanctifying grace⁴⁰⁹.

God is the mover, and the will is what is moved; in this case, the motion is attributed to God alone; thus, the grace is operative; in the cooperation, the mover is the will, and what is moved are the faculties of the soul; Nature of the will is to be free; and so God moves it to a free act.⁴¹⁰ “The will is an active principle, not determinate to one thing but having an indifferent relation to many things, God so moves it that he does not determine it of necessity

⁴⁰² See: ST, Part I-II, Q 10, Art.2.

⁴⁰³ Ibid.

⁴⁰⁴ Aquinas Thomas,. On Human Nature. Edited by Thomas S. Hibbs, Hackett Publishing Company, Cambridge,1999, p198.

⁴⁰⁵ Aquinas Thomas,. On Politics and Ethics. A Norton Critical Edition, Translated and Edited by Paul E. Sigmund, W.W Norton & Company, USA, 1988, p60.

⁴⁰⁶ Davies Brian,. Thought of Thomas Aquinas. Clarendon Press, Oxford, 2009, p147.

⁴⁰⁷ Hacker P.M.S,. Wittgenstein Mind and Will, Volume 4 of an Analytical Commentary on the Philosophical Investigations. Black well Publishers, Oxford UK, 2000, p208.

⁴⁰⁸ McInerney Ralph,. See: Aquinas on Human Action. The Catholic University of America Press, 1992, p55.

⁴⁰⁹ Tekippe J. Terry,. Lonergan and Thomas on the Will. University Press of America, 1993, p27.

⁴¹⁰ See: Ibid p 28.

to one thing but its movement remains contingent, except to which it moves naturally”⁴¹¹. “Sometimes the will can be compelled by an object, but not always; but to exercise its act it can never be compelled”⁴¹².

1.5.3.1 Enjoyment

“Enjoyment is the delight of an appetitive power in the attainment of an end”⁴¹³. The enjoyment is of something that promises to fulfill a possible object of the will; it is a pleasant experience that holds the promise of putting our desire to rest; as an object before mind and will, the enjoyment which an individual in a sense has, is an anticipation of the delight of having it in reality⁴¹⁴.

Happiness is an intellectual activity, and Thomas is clear that the same mind enjoys God both on earth and in heaven; therefore, while there is a distinction in happiness because bodily well-being is necessary in this world but not the next, there is also strong continuity between mundane and celestial happiness, the same person is happy in both cases, and virtue glues them together⁴¹⁵.

Thomas brings in the notion of fruit in his explanation of enjoyment; fruit is that which we expect the tree to produce at the last place, and in which a certain sweetness is to be perceived; thus, the notion of fruit brings in two things, first it should come last, second, it should calm the appetite with a certain sweetness and delight⁴¹⁶; hence “to enjoy implies a certain relation of the will to the last end”⁴¹⁷.

1.5.3.2 Intention

“Intention is the direction or application or causal power to an effect; the influence of the principle cause on the instrument”⁴¹⁸. “The final end will be the very last attained in the whole series of activities of a human life and yet it will be the very first in intention, preceding any meaningful human activity and ending it with that very meaning.”⁴¹⁹ Intention, the very word signifies, to tend to something; the will moves all the other powers of the soul

⁴¹¹ See: ST, Part I-II, Q 10, Art.4.

⁴¹² Aquinas Thomas,. Thomas Aquinas Selected Philosophical writing, Selected and Trans. By Timothy Mcdermott, Oxford University Press, New York, 1993, p180.

⁴¹³ Wuellner Bernard,. Dictionary of Scholastic Philosophy. editions scholasticae, 2011, p41

⁴¹⁴ See: McInerney Ralph,. Aquinas on Human Action. The Catholic University of America Press, 1992, p 62-64.

⁴¹⁵ See: Charry T. Ellen,. God and the Art of Happiness. Wm.B. Eerdmans Publishing Co, U.K, 2010, 106.

⁴¹⁶ See: ST, Part I-II, Q 11, Art.1-3.

⁴¹⁷ See: ST, Part I-II, Q 11, Art.4.

⁴¹⁸ Wuellner Bernard,. Dictionary of Scholastic Philosophy. editions scholasticae, 2011, p63.

⁴¹⁹ Tekippe J. Terry,. Lonergan and Thomas on the Will. University Press of America, 1993, p3.

to the end or intermediary end, and therefore, intention is an act of the will⁴²⁰. Aquinas regards intention as part of what is in play when we act voluntarily; to will something is to desire it, but acting voluntarily can also involve desiring an end and taking steps to achieve it⁴²¹.

“Good is to be sought and done, and evil is to be avoided”⁴²²; these principles themselves do not lead to action, much less generate norms for action, until they are engaged by desires prompting practical reflection and action; movement towards perfection or completion of a being’s nature is described by Thomas as attraction to the good; moral goodness is established in judgement about actions, but the motivation is attraction, not a sense of duty⁴²³.

“Aquinas understands practical reason to be calculative; it takes the form of identifying a particular course of action representing a sound or appropriate way to attain, safeguard, or enjoy some further end”⁴²⁴; action stems from desire, in such a way that both person and their acts take their moral character from the desires they hold or express⁴²⁵.

Aquinas explains his approach to practical reason with a distinctive account of desire; he holds the view, that will and passion are both forms of appetite and each is oriented towards some perceived good; the difference between them lies in the way in which each apprehends the good, the will is directed towards the good as apprehended by reason, that is to say, it takes its objects from a rational judgement according to which that is in some way good and therefore a fitting object for pursuit or enjoyment⁴²⁶; in contrast, the passions are oriented towards desirable or noxious objects as mediated by the apprehension of the senses and imagination⁴²⁷.

⁴²⁰ See: ST, Part I-II, Q 12, Art.1-4. Intention is not of only last end, but also of an intermediary end; one can intend at the same time, both the proximate and the last end; therefore one prefers one thing to another because it is better of the two and available for more purposes; thus one can intend several things at the same time.

⁴²¹ See: Davies Brian,. Thomas Aquinas’s Summa Theologiae. Oxford University Press, NY, 2014, p162.

⁴²² ST, Part I-II, Q 94, Art.2. This rules out any interpretation of right practical reason understood in Kantian terms as self-legislating reason.

⁴²³ Porter Jean,. Nature as Reason. A Thomistic Theory of Natural Law, Wm B. Eerdmans Publishing Co, Cambridge, UK, 2005, p 249. Here we see a rejection of a Kantian view of morality based on duty and opposed to inclination.

⁴²⁴ Ibid, p250.

⁴²⁵ See: ST, Part I-II, Q 56, Art. 3 ; Part II-II, Q 47, Art. 4.

⁴²⁶ See: ST, Part I-II, Q 8, Art.1; ST, Part I-II, Q 9, Art. 1-2.

⁴²⁷ See: ST, Part I-II, Q 22, Art.2-3.

1.5.3.3 Choice

“Choice is an act of the will selecting means to an end”⁴²⁸. The mediating function of reason guarantees the freedom of the will in a twofold way first of all, it leaves the will free with respect to its exercise, because the will cannot be oriented towards any object, even happiness, unless it is actively being considered; secondly, even when it is actively considering some particular object, which the intellect presents to it as good, the will is not compelled, because no finite object will be good in every respect and can therefore, be regarded by the reason as being in some way noxious, or at least deficient⁴²⁹.

What affirmation and negation are of thinking, pursuit and avoidance are in desire; so that since moral virtue is a state of character concerned with choice, and choice is deliberate desire, therefore both the reasoning must be true and the desire right, if the choice is to be good, and the latter must pursue just what the former asserts. Now this kind of intellect and of truth is practical; of the intellect which is contemplative, not practical nor productive, the good and the bad state are truth and falsity respectively; while of the part which is practical and intellectual the good state is truth in agreement with right desire⁴³⁰.

The word choice implies something belonging to the reason or intellect and something belonging to the will; in a sense, reason precedes the will and ordains its act: in so far as the will tends to its object according to the order of the reason, since the apprehensive power presents the object to the appetite; the substance of the act is as the matter in comparison to the order imposed by the higher power; therefore, choice is substantially not an act of the reason, but of the will⁴³¹. “The intellect’s grasp of the end is presupposed by will; so the mind’s quest for means of achieving the intended end is presupposed by choice”⁴³².

“The will can intelligibly turn from or even set itself against objects in specific instances of choice”⁴³³; the relevant choice may or may not be immoral; Aquinas holds that suicide is always a vicious choice, but self-sacrifice may be an act of virtue; but the point is, that they are not foreclosed by the natural orientation of the will towards those goods generically necessary for well-being and happiness⁴³⁴.

⁴²⁸ Wuellner Bernard, . Dictionary of Scholastic Philosophy. editions scholasticae, 2011, p23.

⁴²⁹ ST, Part I-II, Q 10, Art. 2.

⁴³⁰ Aristotle, . The Nicomachean Ethics, Trans.by David Ross, Oxford University Press, 2009, p103. *Truth in agreement with right desire*: one might expect the claim that as truth is what contemplative thought aims at, so good is what practical thinking aims at. Instead Aristotle makes truth the goal or proper work of each kind of thinking, adding the qualification in agreement with right desire to practical thinking’s goal. Perhaps we should understand as follows: the goal of practical thinking is to reach a true conclusion about what is to be done and to have a correct desire i.e. is a desire for the action specified.

⁴³¹ See: ST, Part I-II, Q 13, Art. 1.

⁴³² McInerny Ralph, . Aquinas on Human Action. The Catholic University of America Press, 1992, p66.

⁴³³ Porter Jean, . Nature as Reason. A Thomistic Theory of Natural Law, Wm B. Eerdmans Publishing Co, Cambridge, UK, 2005, p 259.

⁴³⁴ See: ST, Part II-II, Q 64, Art. 5.

Although in practical things the end stands in the position of a principle, choice results from the judgement which is the conclusion of a practical syllogism that is to say, the conclusion of the practical syllogism is the matter of choice; however, just as intention regards the end, so does choice regard the means; just as end is either an action or a thing, means must need be either an action or a thing; some human action must intervene in both end and means; therefore, choice is concerned with human actions which appear to be possible and which one chooses freely⁴³⁵.

The ongoing process of desire and aversion gradually take on coherence in the developing child, first through the discipline of caretakers and then through own reflection; this process in turn leads by its own dynamics to reflection on the relative importance of the diverse desires, ideas and other considerations as they come together to give shape to the individual's own life; at a certain point the child will attain the use of reason, at which point the first object of child's rational reflection will be some consideration of the overall purpose and direction of life and correlatively, the end towards which actions should be directed⁴³⁶.

1.5.3.4 Counsel

“Counsel is an inquiry concerning the right choice of means”⁴³⁷. “Counsel is an inquiry a questioning, what to do? In the precise sense: what to do if such and such is to be brought about?”⁴³⁸ Counsel belongs in a way both to the will, on whose behalf and by whose impulsion the inquiry is made, and to the reason that executes the inquiry; this inquiry is not of the end, but of the means, and that which is looked upon as the end in one inquiry may be looked upon as the means in another and it will become an object of the counsel⁴³⁹.

Inquiry of counsel which begins from some principle of the end is concerned with contingent singulars that proceeds both in knowledge and in being, through a synthetic process⁴⁴⁰. “Only the practically possible can be chosen and counsel is aimed at choice”⁴⁴¹. This is reflected in the words: “God made man from the beginning and left him to his own counsel”⁴⁴².

1.5.3.5 Consent

“Thomas distinguishes another act of will bearing on means that may precede choice, namely, consent; consent is the directing of the movement of appetite on something within the

⁴³⁵ See: ST, Part I-II, Q 13, Art.2-6.

⁴³⁶ See: Porter Jean,. *Nature as Reason. A Thomistic Theory of Natural Law*, Wm B. Eerdmans Publishing Co, Cambridge, UK, 2005, p 262; See also ST, Part I-II, Q 89, Art. 6.

⁴³⁷ Wuellner Bernard,. *Dictionary of Scholastic Philosophy. editions scholasticae*, 2011, p32.

⁴³⁸ McInerney Ralph,. *Aquinas on Human Action. The Catholic University of America Press*, 1992, p66.

⁴³⁹ See: ST, Part I-II, Q 14, Art. 1-2.

⁴⁴⁰ See: ST, Part I-II, Q 14, Art. 3-5.

⁴⁴¹ McInerney Ralph,. *Aquinas on Human Action. The Catholic University of America Press*, 1992, p66.

⁴⁴² Ecclesiasticus 15:14.

power of the one doing the directing”⁴⁴³. Consent implies the means of the application of appetitive power to something that is already in the power of the person who causes the application⁴⁴⁴; “it is a free act in which one agrees to do, accept or reject something”⁴⁴⁵.

Consent implies application of sense to something. Now it is proper to sense to take cognizance of things present; for the imagination apprehends the similitude of corporeal things, even in the absence of the things of which they bear the likeness; while the intellect apprehends universal ideas, which it can apprehend indifferently, whether the singulars be present or absent. And since the act of an appetitive power is a kind of inclination to the thing itself, the application of the appetitive power to the thing, in so far as it cleaves to it, gets by a kind of similitude the name of sense, since, as it were, it acquires direct knowledge of the thing to which it cleaves, in so far as it takes complacency in it. And on these grounds consent is an act of the appetitive power.⁴⁴⁶

The role of consent is distinguished from choice when counsel turns up a plurality of means and all of them attractive; then of course, the choice of one among them is an act of the will different from that which finds all the possible means attractive⁴⁴⁷. Voluntary activity of a person involves consenting to certain decisions to act with respect to various possible means, implying that acting voluntarily involves us in using our ability to reason, which is practical reasoning that is distinct from theoretical reasoning, in getting what we want, and in wanting to get what we want by certain means⁴⁴⁸.

1.5.3.6 Use

“Use is an act of the will carrying out a command of reason in regard to the means already determined on to secure an end”⁴⁴⁹. The use of a thing implies the application of the same to an operation; it is indeed will which moves soul’s power to their acts to apply them to operation, hence the first principle mover is the will, whereas reason directs it and other powers executes the operation just as the instruments are compared to the principle agent⁴⁵⁰.

“As following choice, use refers to will’s moving the executive powers; use falls between choice and execution and the act of will it names would permeate the order of execution when having sought and found the means to our intended end”⁴⁵¹; therefore, use implies the application of one thing to another, which is applied as regarded in the light of means to an end⁴⁵².

⁴⁴³ McInerney Ralph,. Aquinas on Human Action. The Catholic University of America Press, 1992, p66.

⁴⁴⁴ See: ST, Part I-II, Q 15, Art. 1-3.

⁴⁴⁵ Wuellner Bernard,. Dictionary of Scholastic Philosophy. editions scholasticae, 2011, p28.

⁴⁴⁶ ST, Part I-II, Q 15, Art. 1.

⁴⁴⁷ See: McInerney Ralph,. Aquinas on Human Action. The Catholic University of America Press, 1992, p67.

⁴⁴⁸ See: Davies Brian,. Thomas Aquinas’s Summa Theologiae. Oxford University Press, NY, 2014, p163.

⁴⁴⁹ Wuellner Bernard,. Dictionary of Scholastic Philosophy. editions scholasticae, 2011, p128.

⁴⁵⁰ See: ST, Part I-II, Q 16, Art. 1.

⁴⁵¹ McInerney Ralph,. Aquinas on Human Action. The Catholic University of America Press, 1992, p67.

⁴⁵² See: ST, Part I-II, Q 16, Art.2.

“Use comes to be employed by the will as moving any other power and then the cognitive act whose realization is brought about by the will, will be an instance of use”⁴⁵³. Use follows choice, provided by use we mean the will’s use of the executive power in moving it, but since the will in a way moves the reason and uses it, we may take the use of the means as consisting in the consideration of the reason, whereby it refers the means to the end, in this sense use precedes choice⁴⁵⁴.

“Indeed, the will’s causing the activity of any faculty can be called a use of the faculty; in this extended sense, use shows up wherever there is an activity of any faculty that can come under our dominion”⁴⁵⁵. An Voluntary action proceeds by a combination of desire, attention to end, attention to means, decision to act, and choice of how in detail to act with an eye on means, as recognized and desired with respect to ends that we have; meaning and nature of our action comes from end⁴⁵⁶.

1.6 Human Acts Commanded by the Will

“Command is an act of the reason, prompted by the will, directing oneself in human activity or in the carrying out of one’s decisions and choices”⁴⁵⁷; since the power of the preceding act continues in the act that follows, it sometimes happens that there is an act of the will, in so far as it retains in itself something of an act of the reason. Here to command is to move by intimating or declaring to another, it follows that reason moves by commanding due to the power of the will; consequently it follows, that command is an act of reason, presupposing an act of the will, in virtue of which, reason by its command (command and commanded act are one human act) moves the power to the execution of the end⁴⁵⁸. The intention of the end prompts the search for means which lead on to choice, command, and execution, but these parts are embedded in the whole action⁴⁵⁹.

“An imperative or command is a strong prescription because of the volitional force it embodies; a command follows the volitional act of choosing what practical reason has concluded should be done”⁴⁶⁰.

Command has its natural application to the external acts which execute the choice; an act of the will bearing on means can be commanded; to command other acts of the will, presupposes previous willed acts, which lend their moving power to the command⁴⁶¹, and

⁴⁵³ McInerney Ralph,. Aquinas on Human Action. The Catholic University of America Press, 1992, p67.

⁴⁵⁴ See: ST, Part I-II, Q 16, Art.3.

⁴⁵⁵ McInerney Ralph,. Aquinas on Human Action. The Catholic University of America Press, 1992, p67.

⁴⁵⁶ See: Davies Brian,. Thomas Aquinas’s Summa Theologiae. Oxford University Press, NY, 2014, p164.

⁴⁵⁷ Wuellner Bernard,. Dictionary of Scholastic Philosophy. editions scholasticae, 2011, p24.

⁴⁵⁸ See: ST, Part I-II, Q 17, Art.1.

⁴⁵⁹ See: McInerney Ralph,. Aquinas on Human Action. The Catholic University of America Press, 1992, p69.

⁴⁶⁰ Bradley J.M. Denis,. Aquinas on the Twofold Human Good. The Catholic University of America Press, Washington D.C. 1997, p 353.

⁴⁶¹ Ibid.

some things which are apprehended do not convince the intellect to an extent, as not to leave it freely to assent or dissent, or suspend its assent or dissent on account of some cause or the other; therefore, assent or dissent is in our power which is subject to our command⁴⁶².

1.6.1 Good and Evil in Human Acts

Having commented on what it takes to be involved in true human action, and having explained that some of the human behavior does not amount to human action, but rather something instinctive and without thought, Aquinas proceeds to consider what is involved in willed human actions as being good and evil⁴⁶³.

We call things evil in two ways: things are evil in one way because they are intrinsically evil and such things are evil in an absolute sense; in a second way we call things evil for particular persons, and nothing prevents such things being good in an absolute sense and evil in some respect⁴⁶⁴. “Good in its formal nature is that which is suitable to or befitting a being⁴⁶⁵; and evil is the privation or lack of a good which naturally belongs to a nature, the absence of a good which is natural and due to a being”⁴⁶⁶. We need to speak of good and evil in action as of good and evil in things; every action has goodness in so far as it has being, whereas it is lacking in goodness in so far as it is lacking in something that is due to its fullness of being, the specific species, and thus it is said to be evil, if it lacks the quantity determined by reason, or its due place, or something of the kind.⁴⁶⁷

Aquinas thinks that human actions can be good or bad because of that at which they aim; he thinks that goodness and badness in human actions can depend on their circumstances⁴⁶⁸. “For plenitude of its goodness does not consist wholly in its species but also in certain additions which accrue to it by reason of certain accidents, and such are its due circumstances”⁴⁶⁹.

Aquinas thinks of goodness in creatures in terms of there being something, on its account; something is good, since it has what it needs to be itself, since it is perfect or actual

⁴⁶² See: ST, Part I-II, Q 17, Art.6.

⁴⁶³ See: Davies Brian,. Thomas Aquinas’s Summa Theologiae. Oxford University Press, NY, 2014, p165. In this part of 1a2ae, Aquinas does not bluntly speak of “moral goodness” or “moral badness”. His topic, however is the goodness and badness of human action, and he is concerned with them as subject to what I suppose we would now call moral praise or blame. One should also note that in 1a2ae, 18,8, Aquinas speaks of a human act as being a “moral act” (*actus moralis*).

⁴⁶⁴ Aquinas Thomas, . On Evil. Tans.by Richard Regan, Edited by Brian Davies, Oxford University Press, New York, 2003, p447.

⁴⁶⁵ Wuellner Bernard,. Dictionary of Scholastic Philosophy. editions scholasticae, 2011, p 52.

⁴⁶⁶ Ibid, p 43.

⁴⁶⁷ See: ST, Part I-II, Q 18, Art.1&2.

⁴⁶⁸ See: Davies Brian,. Thomas Aquinas’s Summa Theologiae. A Guide and Commentary, Oxford University Press, NY, 2014, p164.

⁴⁶⁹ ST, Part I-II, Q 18, Art.3.

in some way; to say something is bad is to say, not that it has something, but that it lacks something. As Aquinas puts it, badness is nothing positive, it is a privation of form; he does not mean that what is bad always lacks some bit or part; a thing may be bad because it has unwanted extras or because something which ought to be there is not there⁴⁷⁰.

An action though of a good kind under one description, might be described another way as a bad kind of action. Suppose one steals Fred's money, so as to distribute it to the poor. What is he doing here? Aquinas would say that person is stealing from Fred, which is bad even if the person is doing something that can be thought of as good, providing money for those in need⁴⁷¹; wherefore, to take what belongs to another in a large or small quantity does not change the species of sin, nevertheless it can aggravate or diminish the sin⁴⁷².

Some actions could be morally neutral; good actions accord with right reason, and bad actions are ones that do not; some kinds of acts are neither good nor bad kinds of acts, for example, plucking a blade of grass, something that one might do unthinkingly on a country walk; however, considered as actions in the life of an individual, there are no morally neutral human actions proceeding from deliberation; if we act on the basis of deliberation, then our actions have moral significance⁴⁷³.

1.6.2 Goodness and Malice in Human Acts

A general discussion of moral appraisal of human acts could be assigned in three categories: the Contractarian, the Utilitarian and the Divine Command theories⁴⁷⁴. Moral

⁴⁷⁰ See: Davies Brian,. *The Thought of Thomas Aquinas. A Guide and Commentary*, Oxford University Pres, New York, 2009, p90-91.

⁴⁷¹ See: Davies Brian,. *Thomas Aquinas's Summa Theologiae. A Guide and Commentary*, Oxford University Press, NY, 2014, p165. Aquinas makes it clear in 1a2ae 18, 8 that takes stealing to be as a matter of definition. He is thinking that stealing is a bad kind of action regardless of circumstances. Many moral philosophers would not, of course think in these terms, though they might thereby not really be disagreeing with Aquinas but might just be refusing to call certain actions example of what Aquinas means by stealing, which he takes to amount to depriving someone of what belongs to them by what justice demands and by God's law. At this point you should also note that Aquinas' thinking concerning the goodness and badness of human acts does not depend on what we might call consequentialist considerations. He thinks that I might act well even if my action has disastrous effect. He also thinks that I might act and by my action produce any number of good effects while still acting badly. He thinks goodness and badness of human action with an eye on the Ten Commandments (Exodus 20). He appears to think of these as positively ruling out certain actions as being good ones, as defining certain actions as bad kinds of action.

⁴⁷² See: ST, Part I-II, Q 18, Art.11.

⁴⁷³ See: Davies Brian,. *Thomas Aquinas's Summa Theologiae. A Guide and Commentary*, Oxford University Press, NY, 2014, p165

⁴⁷⁴ Davies Brian,. *The Thought of Thomas Aquinas*. Oxford University Pres, New York, 2009, p77. 'Any of various theories that justify moral principles or political arrangements by appealing to a social contract that is voluntarily committed to under ideal conditions for such commitment; also called **contractualism**. In political Philosophy the social contract or political contract is a theory or model, originating during the Age of Enlightenment that typically addresses the questions of the origin of society and the legitimacy of the authority of the state over the individual. Social contract arguments typically posit that individuals have consented, either explicitly or tacitly, to surrender some of their freedoms and submit to the authority of the ruler or

magistrate (or to the decision of a majority), in exchange for protection of their remaining rights. The question of the relation between natural and legal rights, therefore, is often an aspect of social contract theory. The Social Contract, created by Jean Jacques Rousseau was a book about government reforms and how it should change to suit the people instead of the government.

Although the antecedents of social contract theory are found in antiquity, in Greek and Stoic philosophy and Roman and Canon Law, as well as in the Biblical idea of the covenant, the heyday of the social contract was the mid-17th to early 19th centuries, when it emerged as the leading doctrine of political legitimacy. The starting point for most social contract theories is a heuristic examination of the human condition absent from any political order that Thomas Hobbes termed the "state of nature". In this condition, individuals' actions are bound only by their personal power and conscience. From this shared starting point, social contract theorists seek to demonstrate, in different ways, why a rational individual would voluntarily consent to give up his or her natural freedom to obtain the benefits of political order.

Hugo Grotius (1625), Thomas Hobbes (1651), Samuel Pufendorf (1673), John Locke (1689), Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1762), and Immanuel Kant (1797) are among the most prominent of 17th- and 18th-century theorists of social contract and natural rights. Each solved the problem of political authority in a different way. Grotius posited that individual human beings had natural rights; Hobbes asserted that humans consent to abdicate their rights in favor of the absolute authority of government (whether monarchical or parliamentary); Pufendorf disputed Hobbes's equation of a state of nature with war.

Locke believed that natural rights were inalienable and that the rule of God therefore superseded government authority; and Rousseau believed that democracy (self-rule) was the best way of ensuring the general welfare while maintaining individual freedom under the rule of law. The Lockean concept of the social contract was invoked in the United States Declaration of Independence. Social contract theories were eclipsed in the 19th century in favor of utilitarianism, Hegelianism, and Marxism, and were revived in the 20th, notably in the form of a thought experiment by John Rawls.

Utilitarianism is a theory in normative ethics holding that the proper course of action is the one that maximizes utility, usually defined as maximizing happiness and reducing suffering. Classic utilitarianism, as advocated by two influential contributors, Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill, is hedonistic. It is now generally taken to be a form of consequentialism, although when Anscombe first introduced that term it was to distinguish between "old-fashioned Utilitarianism" and consequentialism. According to utilitarianism the moral worth of an action is determined only by its resulting outcome, although there is debate over how much consideration should be given to actual consequences, fore seen consequences and intended consequences. In A Fragment on Government, Bentham says, "it is the greatest happiness of the greatest number that is the measure of right and wrong" and describes this as a fundamental axiom. In An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, he talks of "the principle of utility" but later prefers "the greatest happiness principle."

Utilitarianism can be characterized as a quantitative and reductionist approach to ethics. It is a type of naturalism. It can be contrasted with deontological ethics, which does not regard the consequences of an act as a determinant of its moral worth; virtue ethics, which primarily focuses on acts and habits leading to happiness; pragmatic ethics; as well as with ethical egoism and other varieties of consequentialism.

Utilitarianism has been considered by some to be the natural ethic of a democracy operating by simple majority without protection of individual rights, even though protecting individual rights would maximize happiness, thus it falls under the scope of Utilitarianism to protect those rights.

Divine command theory is a metathetical theory which proposes that an action's status as morally good is equivalent to whether it is commanded by God. The theory asserts that what is moral is determined by what God commands, and that to be moral is to follow his commands. Followers of both monotheistic and polytheistic religions in ancient and modern times have often accepted the importance of God's commands in establishing morality. Numerous variants of the theory have been presented: historically, figures including Saint Augustine, Duns Scotus, and Thomas Aquinas have presented various versions of divine command theory; more recently, Robert Merrihew Adams has proposed a "modified divine command theory" based on the omni benevolence of God in which morality is linked to human conceptions of right and wrong. Paul Copan has argued in favour of the theory from a Christian viewpoint, and Linda Zagzebski's divine motivation theory proposes that God's motivations, rather than commands, are the source of morality.

Semantic challenges to divine command theory have been proposed; the philosopher William Wainwright argued that to be commanded by God and to be morally obligatory do not have an identical meaning, which he believed would make defining obligation difficult. He also contended that, as knowledge of God is required for morality by divine command theory, atheists and agnostics could not be moral; he saw this as a weakness of the theory. Others have challenged the theory on moral grounds by arguing that, even if God's command and morality correlate in this world, they may not do so in other possible worlds. In addition, the Euthyphro

1.6.3 Impact of Interior Act

With respect to the interior act, the discussion can be reduced to three headings: The object of willing as source of its moral goodness or badness, bad conscience, and God's will as the measure of the goodness of our willing.

a) The Object of Willing

The object of willing, as source of its moral goodness or badness of an interior act depends solely on its object that is, the end in the case of simple willing, delight, and intention, and the means as ordered to the end in the case of consent, choice, and use. Since this object is proposed to the will by the intellect, we can say that in this sense, the goodness or badness of an interior act depends on the intellect or reason⁴⁸³. With respect to the act of the will, there is no difference between goodness taken from the object and goodness taken from the end⁴⁸⁴.

b) Bad Conscience

In order to count as an instance of human action, a deed must be knowingly done; in order for it be a good act, it must proceed from a judgment of what is the good thing to do; a person develops his own conscience, and the errant conscience tells a person to do what is specifically bad or not to do what is specifically good⁴⁸⁵. "Many men are apparently deceived because of pleasure. What is not good seems good, so they desire as good the pleasurable and seek to avoid the painful as evil"⁴⁸⁶.

Conscience errs when it tells one some indifferent act; when conscience commands or prohibits an indifferent act, then the will which departs from the judgment is bad.⁴⁸⁷ However, when an act is rendered involuntary by ignorance, it is no longer to be appraised as a human act and is neither morally good nor morally bad; but when ignorance itself is willed, whether directly or indirectly by choice or by neglect, there is moral fault⁴⁸⁸.

c) God and Goodness

"By analogy with human prudence, divine providence is understood to be essentially an act of intellect ordering means to end: God foresees the end of creation which is set forth in

⁴⁸³ See: ST, Part I-II, Q 19, Art.1-3.

⁴⁸⁴ See: ST, Part I-II, Q 19, Art.2.

⁴⁸⁵ See: Davies Brian,.The Thought of Thomas Aquinas. Oxford University Pres, New York, 2009, p90.

⁴⁸⁶ Aquinas Thomas,. Commentary on Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics. Trans. by C.I. Litzinger, Dumb Ox Books, Notre Dame, Indiana 1964, p159.

⁴⁸⁷ See: Davies Brian,. The Thought of Thomas Aquinas. Oxford University Pres, New York, 2009, p93.

⁴⁸⁸ Ibid., p94.

the eternal law”⁴⁸⁹. Now the goodness or badness of an act of will is a matter of its conformity to the standard of right reason, that is, practical reason insofar as it judges what is and what is not in accord with our ultimate end; however, practical reason is not itself the ultimate measure of goodness and badness; it is because of this, that St. Thomas here introduces for the first time the notion of law, which imposes obligations and prohibitions, thereby claiming that the regulative role of right reason is derived from the eternal law, which is God's reason, and so it is clear that the human will's goodness depends much more on eternal law than on human reason, and where human reason is defective, one must have recourse to eternal reason.⁴⁹⁰

“God is his own power and therefore exists within everything not as a part of its being but as holding it in existence, it follows that he is at work without intermediary in everything that is active but without excluding the activity of nature and free will”⁴⁹¹.

It is important to note that practical reason is a right reason, insofar as it judges correctly what is and is not in conformity with our ultimate end, and that the judgments of human reason regarding which acts are good and evil are themselves subject to error, where the true standard is the eternal law⁴⁹². Even though the eternal law is inaccessible to us insofar as it exists in God's mind, nonetheless it is in some way known to us, either through natural reason, which is derived from it as its proper image, or through some revelation that is added over and above natural reason.⁴⁹³

“Human will require it to be ordained to the Sovereign Good that is to God”⁴⁹⁴. But the object of the divine will is God Himself, thus in willing the highest good, the human will is measured by the divine will⁴⁹⁵.

1.6.4 Impact of External Acts

An external act can be called good or bad in two ways: first, according to its genus and circumstances considered apart from any end it might serve; secondly, insofar as it is ordered to an end⁴⁹⁶.

⁴⁸⁹ Bradley. M.J. Denis,. Aquinas on the Twofold Human Good. The Catholic University of America Press Washington,D.C. 1997, p364.

⁴⁹⁰ See: ST, Part I-II, Q 19, Art.4-6.

⁴⁹¹ AquinasThomas,. Selected Philosophical writing, Selected and Trans. By Timothy Mcdermott, Oxford University Press, New York, 1993, p304.

⁴⁹² Ibid.

⁴⁹³ See: ST, Part I-II, Q 19, Art.4.

⁴⁹⁴ See: ST, Part I-II, Q 19, Art.9.

⁴⁹⁵ See: Davies Brian,. The Thought of Thomas Aquinas. Oxford University Pres, New York, 2009, p96.

⁴⁹⁶ See: ST, Part I-II, Q 20, Art.1.

The goodness of the external act cannot depend on being ordered to a further good end alone; if what is done is not judged by reason to be a good act, it cannot be made good by being ordered to a good end, and a good kind of act is vitiated if it is ordered to a bad end; it must be observed for an act to be evil, one single defect suffice, whereas for an act to be good, it must be good in every respect, that is to say: an act must be good in terms of object, circumstances, and end⁴⁹⁷. The exterior action is the object of the will, in as much as it is proposed to the will by the reason, as a good apprehended and ordained by the reason, and thus it is prior to the good in the act of the will; but in as much as it is found in the execution of the action, it is an effect of the will, and is subsequent to the will⁴⁹⁸. “A man sins by his will, not only when he wills an evil end but also when he wills an evil act”⁴⁹⁹.

When the external act has no moral quality of its own, when it is morally neutral, then the goodness of the one moral act is read from the end intended; but the external act can be of a kind which of itself has moral quality, and then its goodness does not derive from the end⁵⁰⁰. A moral virtue is ordained to an end, and many virtues are necessary; however, the right reason in regard to the very end of a virtue has no other goodness than the goodness of that virtue, in so far the goodness of the reason is participated in each virtue⁵⁰¹.

1.6.5 Impact of Disposition

Good is to be done and evil is to be avoided: these principles are grasped by virtue of what Aquinas calls ‘synderesis’, which he thinks of as a disposition.⁵⁰² According to Aquinas, as the speculative reason argues about speculative things, the practical reason argues about practical things; therefore, we must have, bestowed on us by nature, not only speculative principles, but also practical principles; and the first speculative principles bestowed on us by nature do not belong to a special power, but to a special habit, which is called “the intuitive reason”⁵⁰³; wherefore the first practical principles, bestowed on us by nature, do not belong to a special power, but to a special natural habit, which we call ‘synderesis’; whence synderesis is said to incite to good, and to murmur at evil, inasmuch as through first principles we proceed to discover, and judge of what we have discovered, that is to say, synderesis is not a power, but a natural habit⁵⁰⁴.

Aquinas differentiates disposition from conscience; according to him, conscience is not a power, but an act; for conscience implies the relation of knowledge to something: for

⁴⁹⁷ See: ST, Part I-II, Q 20, Art.2; Davies Brian,. The Thought of Thomas Aquinas. Oxford University Pres, New York, 2009, p96.

⁴⁹⁸ See: ST, Part I-II, Q 20, Art.1.

⁴⁹⁹ ST, Part I-II, Q 20, Art.2.

⁵⁰⁰ See: Davies Brian,. The Thought of Thomas Aquinas. Oxford University Pres, New York, 2009, p96.

⁵⁰¹ See: ST, Part I-II, Q 20, Art.4.

⁵⁰² See: Davies Brian,. The Thought of Thomas Aquinas. Oxford University Pres, New York, 2009, p 233.

⁵⁰³ According to Aristotle it is *intuitive reason* that grasps the first principles. Aristotle,. The Nicomachean Ethics, Trans. by David Ross, Oxford University press, 1141a,p 106.

⁵⁰⁴ See: ST, Part I, Q 79, Art.12.

conscience may be resolved into knowledge applied to an individual case; but the application of knowledge to something is done by some act; wherefore conscience is an act.⁵⁰⁵

Conscience is said to witness, to bind, or incite, and also to accuse, torment, or rebuke; and all these follow the application of knowledge or science to what we do; this application is made in three ways: one way, in so far as we recognize that we have done or not done something; in another way, so far as through the conscience we judge that something should be done or not be done, and in this sense, conscience is said to incite or to bind; in the third way, so far as by conscience we judge that something done is well done or ill done, and in this sense, conscience is said to excuse, accuse, or torment; therefore, it is clear that all these things follow the actual application of knowledge to what we do; therefore, properly speaking, conscience denominates an act; however, since disposition is a principle of act, sometimes the name conscience is given to the first natural habit namely, synderesis.⁵⁰⁶

In matters of indifference and also in those that are good or evil in themselves, the will that is at variance with erring reason or conscience, is evil in some way on account of the object, on which the goodness or malice of will depends, not indeed on account of the object according as it is in its own nature, but according, as it is accidentally apprehended by reason, as something evil to do or to avoid; for not only indifferent matters can receive the character of goodness or malice accidentally, but also that which is good can receive the character of evil or that which is evil can receive the character of goodness, on account of the reason apprehending it as such⁵⁰⁷. “The will is evil because it wills evil, not indeed that which is evil in itself, but because it wills evil, but that which is evil accidentally, through being apprehended as such by the reason.”⁵⁰⁸

There is some merit in the natural preparatory disposition, and that is why it is said the root cause of the whole heresy lies in a false conception of free will.⁵⁰⁹ “Natural disposition would be a beginning of salvation, whereas this beginning must be supernatural; in fact such a disposition would constitute a positive participation in the acquisition of grace.”⁵¹⁰ According to Aquinas synderesis is a natural disposition of the human mind by which we apprehend the basic principles of behavior.⁵¹¹ The mind can directly grasp certain moral principles, but these principles need to be applied as we find ourselves in concrete

⁵⁰⁵ See: ST, Part I, Q 79, Art.13.

⁵⁰⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁰⁷ See: ST, Part I-II, Q 19, Art.5

⁵⁰⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁰⁹ See: Scheeben Mathias Joseph, . A manual of Catholic Theology. Based on Scheeben’s „ dogmatik“ Volume 1, Wilhelm Joseph and Scannell B.Thomas, Kegan Paul trench Truebener & Co, London, 1906, p 485. Both Semi-pelagians and Pelagians held that an act which depended on a previous Divine influence could not be a free act. It is however, evident that man’s free will, like all else in creation, is under Divine control, and therefore, can be moved by God to act according to its own free nature.

⁵¹⁰ Ibid.

⁵¹¹ See: ST, Part I-II, Q 20, Art.2; Davies Brian, . The Thought of Thomas Aquinas. Oxford University Pres, New York, 2009, p233.

circumstances; Aquinas, therefore, recognizes a stage in practical reasoning to which he gives the name conscience.⁵¹²

Conclusion

At least two distinct purposes may be discerned in Aquinas' various writings on human action. One is to complete and correct Aristotle's treatment of it in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, to which he of course pays close and respectful attention. A second purpose springs from his primary commitment to theology; reflecting on what is said in the Scriptures and the writings of the Fathers about such topics like the fall of Adam, sin, conversion, the operation of grace, and various doctrine produced by other theologians on the aspects of human acts.

Thomas Aquinas believed that human actions have kinds or species. He divided human actions into good, evil, or indifferent, and subdivided them into more particular kinds such as almsgiving, murder, fraternal correction, or theft. From his earliest consideration of this topic in the *Commentary on the Sentences* to his latest in the *Summa Theologiae*, he used five different terms end, object, matter, circumstance, and motive to identify what gives species to human actions.

In his *Summa Contra Gentiles*, Aquinas had taken a position similar to St. Augustine's, that perfect happiness is not possible in this lifetime. Aquinas takes seriously St. Paul's assurance in 1 Corinthians 13:12 that "for now we see only a reflection as in a mirror; then we shall see face to face". This world is too plagued with unsatisfied desires to achieve that ultimate good which we all seek by nature. Furthermore, God has basically created us with a desire to come to perfect knowledge of Him, but this is hidden from us while in our mortal bodies. True knowledge of God would require being able to see him directly, but this is only possible by a completely purified soul. When this occurs, we will experience the ultimate pleasure, a pure and everlasting bliss that will be the satisfaction of every human desire and the obliteration of every sadness or worry.

However, unlike St. Augustine, Aquinas goes on to maintain that we can achieve a kind of "imperfect happiness" here on earth. In this he is undoubtedly influenced by Aristotle, who argued that happiness depends on the actualization of one's natural faculties. The highest faculty the human being possesses is Reason, from which it follows that we can achieve happiness in this life in proportion to the level of truth accessible to Reason. While the perfect realization of Truth will only occur in heaven where we will perceive God "face to face," there is an imperfect counterpart of that vision here on earth. Thus Aquinas makes a distinction between "perfect happiness" which he calls *beatitudo*, and "imperfect happiness" called *felicitas*.

Anything that counts as a human act is undertaken with a view to some end. Contemplation, which is a means to attain perfect happiness, cannot occupy anyone all the

⁵¹² *Ibid.*, P 234.

time, it is engaged in episodically. The contemplative will need the virtues of the activities when the person is not contemplating. There is a perfect happiness attainable not in this life but in the next. God is the highest good, goodness itself and thus He is what objectively fulfills all our aspirations. Contemplation gets to Him via knowledge of sensible things and thus cannot achieve knowledge of the divine essence. A direct vision of God's essence without any dependence on sense images is perfect happiness. This has been promised us by Christ, the condition is to follow Him, and we have the ability thanks to the free will, to respond to this call for conversion.

An intellectual grasp of the good in general, implicit in the grasp of anything as good, provides the will with its object. The good, that is the object of this basic act of will, is the end. The intellectual activity, which presides over willing the means to the end, is what Thomas refers to as counsel. Counsel is an inquiry, a search for the way to achieve the end and it is a complex activity which is discursive. When its work is done the will chooses. The mind's perceptive, commanding act is the prelude to putting to use other powers and our bodily organs to execute the plan arrived at through the process of counsel. What is first in the order of intention, is last in the order of execution and of course vice versa. The end is first present to mind and having set off the search for ways and means of attaining it, we reach the point where the mental prelude gives way to execution. Counsel arrives at an action that can be done here and now, which eventually will realize the end. The doing or executing of that plan is what we first of all have in mind when we speak of action. What Thomas calls the external or commanded act, may seem to be the human or moral act. But insofar as it is a human act, it presupposes the internal origins Thomas has been at pain to analyze.

We may face an uneasiness likely caused by this discussion. Talk of what mind is doing or of what the will is doing, suggests an inner drama, as if there were rival moral agents within us. But when we say the mind or will does something, we mean of course that a given human being engages in mental activity, a given human being wants something and so forth. At the same time we should not allow this uneasiness, it may even become impatience, to lead us to sweep away all talk of different powers and faculties. Rather, we might take the occasion of our unease to reflect on how that talk of distinct powers of the soul came into currency.

The general rule then is that insofar as distinct activities of an agent are recognized, we recognize correspondingly distinct powers, or faculties, or capacities. However, it is wise to take note that Thomas does not regard all the faculties of the soul but mind and will, as Aristotle did heart and the pudenda.

The human voluntary act will be good insofar as will is measured by reason. The act of willing, in the first, instance bears on the end or good which has been first grasped by reason. The good is that which is desirable as perfective of the one desiring it. Only when mind judges that something is good, does the will, the intellectual appetite, have something to want.

Anything that the mind judges to be good, sees as good, is thereby brought under the common formality of goodness.

Reason is not an arbitrary measure of the will. The assumption is that true judgments, as to the human good, provide guidance to the will. These true judgements, as to what is to be done, are a measured measure and their ultimate measure is divine will or eternal law.

As we have seen, end and object can each be viewed as belonging to a certain broader scheme of explanation. Aquinas considers the action of intelligent agents to be more perfectly moved by ends than by any other kind of action, since intelligent agents alone can preconceive and freely will end. Consequently, Thomas thinks that the character of a human action is especially dependent on its end. Object is the term most frequently used by Thomas to describe what gives form and species to human action. An object's place in moral specification can best be understood by first considering its role in the related context of human powers and their proper actions. Each human power is defined by particular formal aspect in those realities to which it relates, as vision is defined by things precisely as coloured; intellect, by things precisely as true and so forth. The human power of will and its proper actions are defined in this way, since will relates to reality under the formal aspect of good. Human actions are principally attributed to the will. So in a context where Thomas is considering human action in view of this model for define powers and their proper actions, one can understand why he identifies object as what specifies human action.

Circumstance typically designates an individual property of an action. When a circumstance is said to specify a human action, it clearly takes a more significant role. How can a property be, both incidental to a human action yet essential to the determination of its species? The key to understand this seeming paradox lays in recognizing that the same human action can be viewed from two perspectives. This is considered apart from a comparison to right reason, but is essential when this standard is invoked. For instance, the fact that an item being stolen happens to be consecrated is just one circumstance among many until the action is compared to right reason, then this property consecrated is recognized as essential for defining the act as sacrilege, since sacrilege implies as disrespect towards something sacred.

Ethics is a study of human actions, their end and their principles; the passions, as Thomas says, are not properly human actions, but of the free act of the will, that is to say they are obstacles to the voluntary character of human actions. This states the relevance of the second Chapter on Thomas Aquinas's Cognition of Passion and Happiness.

Chapter II

Thomas Aquinas's Cognition of Passion and Happiness

Introduction

The development of a new mechanistic account of human nature, that is compatible with the mechanism of the new science by using a new term "passion", denoting a special experience now commonly called emotion in the modern period, had been a subject of debate among natural philosophers since the time of Plato, and the term became evident during the time of Aristotle. The medieval philosophers generally accepted two kinds of distinction between a number of principles and capacities that account for movement and sensation, known as the sensitive part of the soul, and a number of principles and capacities that account for thought and volition, known as the intellective part of the soul; the medieval philosophers also tried to make a distinction between the apparatus of powers whereby information about the world is acquired and assimilated, known as the cognitive or apprehensive potencies, and the apparatus of powers whereby one engages the world is known as the appetitive potencies.

The sensitive and intellective parts of the soul sit astride another fundamental cluster of principles accounting for nourishment, growth, and reproduction, known as the vegetative part of the soul. There are psychological experiences founded solely on the vegetative part, for instance hunger, thirst, and sexuality, merely as physical reactivity. But medieval philosophers, along with modern psychologists, do not classify these together with the passions of the soul or emotions: they are more primitive motivational forces, now called 'drives' or 'urges'. However, these distinctions cut across each other. The intellective and sensitive parts of the soul each have cognitive and appetitive faculties; cognition and appetite take place in both the intellective and sensitive parts.

The principle of cognition in the intellective part of the soul is the intellect itself, where thinking and reasoning take place; the principle of appetite in the intellective part of the soul is the will, responsible for volition and choice. The will is literally 'intellective appetite', and the principle of cognition in the sensitive part of the soul is commonly known as 'sensing,' where sensation and perception occur.

When we study the history of moral analysis, both in theology and in philosophy, we discover that we can divide this history into two great periods. During the period which stretches from Antiquity into the Middle Ages, the moral life was understood as a response to the question of happiness, a question posed sharply by the experience of evil and of suffering. All schools of thought accepted this starting point without discussion. They differed among themselves in the responses they gave to this question and among other things, in the role they afforded to pleasure. From the 14th century onwards, the question of happiness is quickly set

aside and the moral analysis increasingly focuses on the obligations imposed by law as the expression of the divine will; consequently, in their view one can construct an ethics and live a moral life without ever considering the question of happiness. Kant for his part, critiques what he calls “eudemonism” (the Greek word *eudaimonia* means happiness), criticizing a system that introduces into moral intention a consideration of happiness viewed as an end; he maintains that all eudemonists are practical egoists and asserts, that to make eudemonism the foundation of virtue is to euthanize morality. Kant was reacting against utilitarianism, which was just arising in England at that time, which proposed happiness as the end of moral action, but a happiness that was viewed as the well-being of the greatest number; he wanted to safeguard the excellence of the act of intention by making it a pure obedience to the categorical imperative⁵¹³.

Indeed isn't this problem present in moral questions? Don't we recognize that the moral law often demands that we renounce happiness understood as pleasure, comfort, or utility? Don't we sense that concern for happiness runs the risk of introducing into our lives an egoistic fervor capable of vitiating our best intentions?⁵¹⁴

In the second chapter of my thesis, the focus is on Aquinas's treatment of the principles of appetite in the sensitive part of the soul, the order of passions of the soul, and a description of the concupiscent and irascible passions of the soul. Directly or indirectly, modern thinkers are responding to the non-mechanistic, teleological conception of the passion articulated by Aquinas's account of the nature and structure of the passions as psychological phenomena, developed in his *Summa Theologiae*, especially in IaIIae.22–48 the so called treatise on the passions.

The trend of the time is that we discuss more frequently the emotions, rather than the passions. But most of the contemporary discourses about the emotions, which strongly emphasize their role as the source of many of our actions, descend directly from the fundamental psychological innovations of the seventeenth century; the *Summa Theologiae* is Thomas Aquinas' undisputed masterwork, and it includes his thoughts on the elemental forces in human life; feelings such as love, hatred, pleasure, pain, hope, and despair were described by Aquinas as ‘passions’, representing the different ways in which happiness could be affected.

But what causes the passions? What impact do they have on the person who suffers them? Can they be shaped and reshaped in order to better promote human flourishing? The aim of the second chapter is to provide a better understanding of Aquinas' account of the passions; it identifies the Aristotelian influences that lie at the heart of the *Summa Theologiae*,

⁵¹³ See: Pinckaers Servais, *Morality The Catholic View*. Trans. by Sherwin Michael, St. Augustine's Press, South Bend, Indiana, 2001, p 66.

⁵¹⁴ *Ibid.*

and it enters into a dialogue with contemporary thinking about the nature of emotion. At this point we can turn to exploring the ways in which passions are able to be controlled by us, if at all. The second chapter deals with the extent to which Aquinas's theory renders us passive phenomenon with regard to our passions, and examines his account of how reason controls the passions. I hope to comprehend and project that Aquinas deserves a distinguished place in debates over the passions or emotions.

This chapter argues that Aquinas' work is still important today, and shows why both the understanding and attainment of happiness, requires prolonged reflection on the treatise of passions by Thomas Aquinas. This chapter concentrates on making sense of Aquinas's theory; it explores his analysis of the nature of the passions, and investigates the structure of the passions by considering the complex ways in which they are related to one another and to happiness.

2. Passions

According to Thomas Aquinas, "passion is a movement of the sense appetite caused by imagining good or evil"⁵¹⁵, in other words, "Passion is a transitory sensible quality which moves or moved by the sensitive appetite"⁵¹⁶; "a passion is a physiological and psychological response to the apprehension of a sensible good or a sensible evil, that is an object that is known through the senses and judged either to be good or evil"⁵¹⁷; thus, there are two important elements in the structure of passion: the apprehension of an object and the passion itself, in which an object acts upon the sense appetite through this apprehension and elicit movement from the sense appetite⁵¹⁸.

"In 1a2ae,22-48, Aquinas turns to what he calls *passiones animae*, and he continues to discuss these up to the end of 1a2ae,48. The phrase *passiones animae* can be translated into English as "emotions" or in the German spoken language as 'feelings'⁵¹⁹ and it is commonly

⁵¹⁵ ST, Part I-II, Q 22, Art.3.

⁵¹⁶ Wuellner Bernard,. Dictionary of Scholastic Philosophy. Editiones Scholasticae, Heusenstamm, 2011, p89.

⁵¹⁷ Lombardo E Nicholas,. The Logic of Desire. Aquinas on Emotion, The Catholic University of America Press, Washington ,D.C. 2001, p20. When Aquinas discusses the passion, he often refers to the object of a passion without any qualifier such as 'sensible'; it is simply an object, or a good or an evil. However it is evident that for Aquinas the proper object of the sense appetite is a sensible object: first, in his view sense appetite responds to sense cognition(see ST, Part I, Q 81,Art.1), Aquinas makes it plain that objects of the sense appetite are known through sense cognition and thus must be sensible; second, Aquinas specifies the object of concupiscible passions as a straightforward sensible good or evil, and the object of irascible passions as a good or evil that is arduous or difficult(See ST, Part I-II, Q 2.Art.1), while he does not explicitly describe the object of irascible passion as sensible here, it is evident from the context that it is not just an arduous good or evil, but an arduous sensible good or evil; hence both sorts of passions have sensible objects according to Aquinas.

⁵¹⁸ Ibid.

⁵¹⁹ „Es handelt sich um eine detailliert ausgeführte Lehre von den *passiones animae*, jenen menschlichen Regungen, welche die Materie der dann im Anschluss von Thomas behandelten *habitus* bilden. Im Kern sind damit jene Phänomene gemeint, die in der heutigen Psychologie als Emotionen an gesprochen werden oder die wie in der deutschen Alltagssprache als Gefühle bezeichnen“; Brungs Alexander,. Thomas von Aquin: Die

as emotion translated”⁵²⁰. “Aquinas refers to emotions as passions of the soul, yet he does not believe that people are purely immaterial substances or, for that matter, souls”⁵²¹.

Emotions are important for Aquinas as he develops his account of what human beings are, and what is involved in human action, in which he increasingly speaks of human being in the light of what can be thought of as theological premises. But here, Aquinas proceeds in a largely philosophical manner, notwithstanding his various citations from scripture and theological authorities, because he considers that emotion has a bearing in the life of human beings considered as ordered to the beatific vision, and he thinks of human beings as creatures who experience emotions; he obviously believes that this truth, ‘creatures experiencing emotions’ is not particularly relevant, when it comes to understanding people as ordered to final happiness in the union with God; and people have emotion, it is something one needs to take into account of, as one considers human action in general⁵²².

2.1 The Meaning of Aquinas’s account of Passion

For Aquinas, the term passion does not carry the pejorative connotations that it acquired in the modern era, signifying a violent sentiment that overpowers reason; it simply concerns sensate movements; we could speak of the sentiments or the emotions, as either good or bad⁵²³. In order to understand Aquinas’s account of Passion, we need to appreciate the distinction between apprehension and appetite: apprehension refers very broadly to the power to acquire and process information, including the power to receive sensory impressions, to form and manipulate sensory images through imagination, to make sensory judgements, to think, to engage in reasoning, and so forth; appetite refers very broadly to the power to be moved or to move oneself interiorly or exteriorly, in relation to objects of

Summa Theologiae Werkinterpretationen. Die *passiones animae*, Speer Andreas, ed. Walter de Gruyter, Berlin, 2005, p199.

⁵²⁰ Davies Brian,. Thomas Aquinas’s Summa Theologiae. A Guide & Commentary, Oxford University Press, New York, 2014, p 171. There was no direct equivalent word for emotion in the thirteenth century Latin. And what Aquinas counts as *passiones animae* might for various reasons, be distinguished from what many people today mean by *emotions*. For example emotion in contemporary English is often used so as to suggest that an *emotion* is just a *feeling*, while Aquinas has quite a complex account of *passiones animae* that includes the thought that their occurrence can involve cognition and even moral worth. However the word emotion is a good word to use translating Aquinas’s *passiones animae* into English but recognizing that “passion” in contemporary English commonly has overtones of vehemence or disturbance that Aquinas does not take to be essential to *passiones animae*.

⁵²¹ Ibid.

⁵²² See: Ibid. The truth of the existence of emotions in human being could be relevant to the maxim that truth do not contradict each other that their mutual truth is not against reason, but this shall not be compared to the validity of the two truths of the freedom of man and the supremacy of the divine will, otherwise one may fall into the fallacy of Accidents. See: ST, Part I, Q 16, Art.5; Pope John Paul II,. ‘Truths cannot contradict Truth’. Address to the Academy of Sciences, Oct.22, 1996.

⁵²³ See: Pinckaers Servais,. The pinckaers reader. Renewing Thomistic Moral Theology, ed.by Berkmann and Craig Steven Titus, trans.by Noble Mary Thomas and others, The Catholic University of America Press, Washington D C, 2005, p 274.

apprehension, which tends in relation to mental representations which typically have a connection to actual things, persons, or situations in the world⁵²⁴.

Aquinas's concept of Passion is a kind of motion that a person experiences⁵²⁵; which he refers to as motion of the soul, precisely as a motion of the soul body composite or the human being as a whole⁵²⁶. Aquinas constructs his account of Passion primarily with reference to the sensory powers of the soul, namely, the powers of sensory apprehension and appetite⁵²⁷. As Aquinas puts it, it is not that the entire nature of a human being is seated in the soul, so that the soul makes use of the body as an instrument or as a sailor uses his ship,⁵²⁸ rather a human being is essentially an embodied soul⁵²⁹; which means first of all, the soul is the principle or cause of life which distinguishes a living material entity from a corpse⁵³⁰; secondly, it is the defining principle of a living entity wherein an intellectual or rational soul is what defines an entity as a human being⁵³¹; and thirdly, soul is the principle of the ordered operation that is by virtue of which, an entity is capable of functioning in a characteristic way⁵³². "The intellectual soul of a human being, in particular is that by virtue of which a being is capable of functioning, in the present life, as a subject of both intellect and sensory experience who has a typical bodily form"⁵³³.

According to Aquinas, in the movements of the appetite⁵³⁴ faculty, good has a force of attraction, while evil has a force of repulsion⁵³⁵; in the first place, good causes in the appetite power, a certain inclination, aptitude or con-naturalness in respect of good, and this belongs to

⁵²⁴ See: Fritz Cates Diana,. Aquinas on The Emotions. A Religious Ethical Inquiry, Georgetown University Press, Washington, D.C., 2009, p80.

⁵²⁵ See: ST, Part I-II, Q 23. Art.2.

⁵²⁶ See: ST, Part I-II, Q 22. Art.1.

⁵²⁷ Fritz Cates Diana,. Aquinas on The Emotions. A Religious Ethical Inquiry, Georgetown University Press, Washington, D.C., 2009, p86.

⁵²⁸ See: ST, Supplementary, 75, Art.1.

⁵²⁹ See: ST, Part I, 76, Art. 1 &5. An implication of this view is that at death the human being as such ceases to exist. That is the embodied soul ceases to exist .Yet a dimension of the human being survives namely, the intellectual soul. This soul does not change species; it does not cease to be human in some sense. Yet it is capable of only limited human operations until it is reunited at the resurrection with a glorified version of its body. Embodiment of some kind is essential to the normal operation of a human being. See also: Pasnau Robert,. Thomas Aquinas on Human Nature. A Philosophical Study of Summa Theologiae 1a 75-89, University of Cambridge, 2002, p 365-368; and Fritz Cates Diana,. Aquinas on The Emotions. A Religious Ethical Inquiry, Georgetown University Press, Washington, D.C., 2009, p81.

⁵³⁰ See: ST, Part I, Q 75, Art.1.

⁵³¹ See: ST, Part I, Q 76, Art.1. Aquinas thinks that generally speaking, humans and certain other animals have many similar powers not only within the sensory and vegetative domains but also with respect to basic intelligence. Yet he thinks that a typical human being is capable of many intellectual activities of which no other animals are capable.

⁵³² See: ST, Part I, Q 76, Art.1&3.

⁵³³ Fritz Cates Diana,. Aquinas on The Emotions. A Religious Ethical Inquiry, Georgetown University Press, Washington, D.C., 2009, p81.

⁵³⁴ Appetitive movement is also translated by some as 'orectic movement'.

⁵³⁵ The emotions are often described by Aquinas in terms of metaphors which suggest a similarity to the movement of physical objects (Q 37, 2); the reason for this is that *orectic* movement is analogous to the movement of the inanimate *orexis*. *Orectic* movement is explained on the model of the motion of bodies in nature: *orectic* movement is, in the operations of the soul, what physical movement is in the physical world.

the passion of love, the corresponding contrary of which is hatred in respect to evil; secondly, if the appetite is not yet possessed, it causes a movement in the appetite towards the attainment of the good beloved, and this belongs to the passion of desire, and contrary to it, in respect to evil, is aversion; thirdly, when good is obtained, it causes the appetite to rest, which leads to delight or joy, and contrary to it, in respect of evil, is sorrow or sadness⁵³⁶.

On the other hand, in the irascible passions, the aptitude or inclination to seek good or to shun evil, is presupposed as arising from the concupiscible faculty, and in respect of good not yet received, we have hope and despair, and in respect of evil that we have not yet received, we have fear or daring⁵³⁷, and in respect of the good already attained, there is no irascible passion, but evil already present gives raise to the passion of anger⁵³⁸.

2.1.1 The Appetitive Power in General

In order to approach Aquinas's account of passion, one must appreciate the distinction between apprehension and appetite. Apprehension refers very broadly to the power to acquire and process information, including the power to receive sensory impressions to form and manipulate sensory images through the use of the imagination, to make sensory judgements, to make higher, intellectual judgements, to think, to engage in reasoning, and the like; whereas appetite refers broadly to the power to be moved or to move oneself interiorly, and perhaps also exteriorly in relation to objects of apprehension, including the power to tend in relation to mental representations that typically have a connection to actual things, persons, or situations in the world⁵³⁹.

The dependence of appetite on apprehension is crucial for the teachings of Aquinas on the passions, and here dependence is passive⁵⁴⁰. The word passive is used in three ways; in a general way, it means that whatever receives something is passive; secondly, it means the situation when something is received or something is taken away, and thirdly, a thing is said to be passive when it is being drawn to the agent; passion accompanied by the loss of something is only in respect of a bodily transmutation quality, which means, so called passion cannot be in the soul, but accidentally in so far as the composite of the soul is passive, and when the transmutation is for the worse, it has more of the nature of passion, than when it is for the better; hence sorrow is more properly a passion than joy⁵⁴¹.

⁵³⁶ See: ST, Part I-II, Q 23, Art.4.

⁵³⁷ The appetite movement belongs rather to the order of intention than that of execution. Wherefore love precedes hatred, because each is an appetite movement. See: ST, Part I-II, Q 29, Art.2, ad 3.

⁵³⁸ See: ST, Part I-II, Q 23, Art.4.

⁵³⁹ See: Fritz Cates Diana, . Aquinas on The Emotions. A Religious Ethical Inquiry, Georgetown University Press, Washington, D.C., 2009, p80.

⁵⁴⁰ See: Miner Robert, . Thomas Aquinas on the Passions. A Study of Summa Theologiae 1a2ae 22-48, Cambridge University Press, 2009, p 15.

⁵⁴¹ See: ST, Part I-II, Q 22, Art.1.

“The word passion implies that the patient is drawn to that which belongs to the agent, and the soul is drawn to a thing by the appetite power rather than by the apprehensive power.”⁵⁴²

Aquinas suggests two reasons for distinguishing sensitive apprehension and sensitive appetite as powers; first, he observes that sensitive appetite is related to sensitive apprehension as moved as related to mover; without a prior apprehension, it is simply inert, and Aquinas expresses this by describing the sensitive appetite as a passive power ; however, before the sensitive appetite can be in action, it must be acted upon, that is to say, the sensitive appetite is naturally moved by the thing apprehended, whence the sensitive apprehension is a mover that is not moved, whereas the sensitive appetite is moved by a mover⁵⁴³. Secondly, the act of an apprehensive power is not the same as the act of an appetitive power; the operation of the apprehensive power is completed in the fact that the things apprehended are in the person who apprehends, while the operation of the appetitive power is completed in the fact that the person desiring is inclined towards the appetible thing, that is to say, apprehension brings the thing to the person as it were through its sensible or intelligible species; whereas appetite by contrast, moves the person towards the thing itself , and not merely its species⁵⁴⁴.

What is apprehended and what is desired are the same in reality, but differ in aspect: for a thing is apprehended as something sensible or intelligible, whereas it is desired as suitable or good; it is diversity of aspect in the objects and not material diversity which demands a diversity of power⁵⁴⁵.

Appetite is the natural inclination of a form to some term that completes that form because attainment of the term completes a being; and because any being naturally desires its own completion, the term of appetite is rightly identified with what is desirable, and what is desirable is therefore good; then goodness is understood in terms of desirability, desirability is understood in terms of completion, and completion is understood in terms of potency and act⁵⁴⁶. The nature of human being contains not only the vital perfections, which elevate him above the brute creation and make him the image of God, but also the imperfections inherent in the lower degrees of life⁵⁴⁷.

“In one sense, there are as many terms as there are appetites; beneath the multiplicity of material terms, however, stands a threefold structure. Any term of an appetite is sought as

⁵⁴² See: ST, Part I-II, Q 22, Art.2.

⁵⁴³ See: Miner Robert,. Thomas Aquinas on the Passions. A Study of Summa Theologiae 1a2ae 22-48, Cambridge University Press, 2009, p 15.

⁵⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁴⁵ See: ST, Part I, Q 80, Art.1.

⁵⁴⁶ See: Miner Robert,. Thomas on the Passions. A Study of Summa Theologiae 1a2ae 22-48, Cambridge University Press, 2009, p 15. This is precisely the order that Aquinas follows in ST, Part I. Q 3-5.

⁵⁴⁷ Scheeben Mathias Joseph,. A manual of Catholic Theology. Based on Scheeben's „ dogmatik“ Volume 1, Wilhelm Joseph and Scannell B.Thomas, Kegan Paul trench Truebener & Co, London, 1906, p 412.

either useful or intrinsically good or pleasant”⁵⁴⁸. This threefold division of formal aspects, under which anything is desired, bears a close correspondence to the three kinds of friendship identified by Aristotle in *Nicomachean Ethics* 8.3, namely friendship based on utility, pleasure, or virtue⁵⁴⁹. Aquinas’s threefold differentiation of good underlines the core notion of appetite, and it generates the fundamental distinction between the concupiscible and irascible powers of the sensitive appetite. Aquinas describes the sensitive appetite by setting it aside from two other forms of appetite, namely rational and natural appetite⁵⁵⁰. Since the sensitive appetite is an inclination following sensitive apprehension, as natural appetite is an inclination following the natural form, there must need be in the sensitive part two appetitive powers: one through which the soul is simply inclined to seek what is suitable, according to the senses, and to flee from what is hurtful, and this is called the concupiscible; and the other, whereby one resists these attacks that hinder what is suitable and inflict harm, and this is called the irascible⁵⁵¹.

2.1.1.1 Passion: A Movement of the Sense Appetite

As human being is a micro-cosmos, we can distinguish in the nature of human being, between three different degrees of life; the first is vegetative life, which performs the function of nutrition, growth, and propagation, and is common to human being, animal, and plant; next comes sensitive life, made up of the knowledge obtained through the senses and of the tendencies or appetites connected through the senses and of the tendencies or appetites connected therewith, this life is common to human being and animal; thirdly we have the intellectual or spiritual life, consisting in intellectual knowledge and volitions directed by the intellect, this life is in common with God and with angels, and it is the highest order of life in human being, the object and rule of other vital functions⁵⁵².

In God’s plan, creation is inherently dynamic: created imperfect and permeated with appetite, it cannot help but move towards its perfection⁵⁵³. A passion is the act of the sense appetite, a passive power, from dormancy to act, in response to the apprehension of an object to which the sense appetite is inclined⁵⁵⁴.

⁵⁴⁸ Miner Robert,. *Thomas on the Passions. A Study of Summa Theologiae 1a2ae 22-48*, Cambridge University Press, 2009, p 17.

⁵⁴⁹ See: Aristotle,. *The Nicomachean Ethics*. Trans.by Ross David, Oxford University Press, New York, 1980, p 144-145.

⁵⁵⁰ See: Miner Robert,. *Thomas on the Passions. A Study of Summa Theologiae 1a2ae 22-48*, Cambridge University Press, 2009, p 19.

⁵⁵¹ See: ST, Part I, Q 81. Art.2.

⁵⁵² See: Scheeben Mathias Joseph,. *A manual of Catholic Theology. Based on Scheeben’s „ dogmatik“* Volume 1, Joseph Wilhelm and Thomas B. Scannell, Kegan Paul trench Truebener & Co, London, 1906, p 412.

⁵⁵³ See: Lombardo E Nicholas,. *The Logic of Desire. Aquinas on Emotion*, The Catholic University of America Press, Washington ,D.C. 2001, p28.

⁵⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 34. See also: ST, Part I-II, Q 41. Art.1.

To be passive may be taken in three ways: firstly, when something is taken from a thing which belongs to it by virtue, either of its nature, or of its proper inclination (as when water loses coolness by heating or when a person becomes ill or sad), secondly a thing is said to be passive when something whether suitable or unsuitable is taken away from it (in this way not only he who is sad, is said to be passive, but also he who is joyful), thirdly a thing is said to be passive, from the very fact that what is in potentiality to something receives that to which it was in potentiality, without being deprived of anything, and accordingly, whatever passes from potentiality to act, may be said to be passive, even when it is perfected⁵⁵⁵.

One can speak of two aspects of a passion: receptivity to a sensible object's stimulation and apprehension of an intention being a necessary precondition for a passion⁵⁵⁶. Passion then is the act of being acted upon: it implies the potential to be actualized and thus perfected; in so far as this potential is bound up in the tendency toward something not yet attained, it also implies a metaphysical deficiency⁵⁵⁷. Deficiency and imperfections are technical terms that do not necessarily have negative connotations; for Aquinas, passion sometimes can be imperfect and deficient with respect to its ultimate end or compared to God, but nonetheless entirely intact and morally praiseworthy⁵⁵⁸.

Passion can be in the soul in each of these three ways: regarding the first sort of passion, which involves only reception, as Aristotle says that sensing and understanding are a kind of passion; the sort of passion that involves loss of something which always involves bodily change, passion in this strict sense is not in the soul, except in so far as the composite of body and soul undergoes it; when the change is for the worse, it has more of the nature of a passion, than when it is for the better, hence sorrow is more properly a passion than joy⁵⁵⁹.

According to Aquinas, as movements of an appetite power, they are both passive and active, that is to say appetite both moves and is moved⁵⁶⁰. Sense appetite encompasses the capacity to enjoy or suffer present sensible objects; it is principally an inclination towards sensible objects, irrespective of whether they are already possessed or not; that means sense appetite is an inclination responding to sense apprehension⁵⁶¹. "An act of appetite power is a kind of inclination"⁵⁶². Nonetheless, some passions considered individually have less of the

⁵⁵⁵ See: ST, Part I, Q79. Art.2.

⁵⁵⁶ For passion's dependence on apprehension, see ST, Part I-II, Q 17. Art.7; ST, Part I-II, Q 45. Art.4; ST, Part I-II, Q 62. Art.4; and for its specific dependence on the apprehension of intentions, see ST, Part I, Q 78. Art.4; ST, Part I-II, Q 22. Art.2.

⁵⁵⁷ See: Lombardo E Nicholas,. *The Logic of Desire. Aquinas on Emotion*, The Catholic University of America Press, Washington ,D.C. 2001, p35. Just as the term appetite encompasses many kinds of inclination, and not just the sense appetite, the term passion encompasses many kinds of receptivity.

⁵⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, 37. According to Aquinas God is the only being that does not need anything; every other being is deficient and imperfect in so far as it is dependent on God and other beings.

⁵⁵⁹ See: ST, Part I-II, Q 22. Art.1.

⁵⁶⁰ See: ST, Part I, Q 80, Art.2.

⁵⁶¹ See: ST, Part I, Q81, Art.2.

⁵⁶² ST, Part I-II, Q 15, Art.1.

aspect of movement and consist more in the quasi-contemplative experience of some object, whether that object is perfective of nature or repugnant to it⁵⁶³. However, the passions are not without an active element, since pleasure inclines the subject towards the maintenance of pleasure and sadness inclines the subject away from the cause of the sadness⁵⁶⁴

2.1.1.2 The Powers of Sensory Apprehension

The power of sensory apprehension is what makes it possible for a sensory being to acquire and process sensible information; the power of sensory apprehension takes the form of the exterior and interior senses, both of which Aquinas presumes to be exercised by means of a corporeal organ⁵⁶⁵. The exterior senses include the powers of sight, hearing, touch, smell, and taste⁵⁶⁶; and the interior senses include some version of the common sense, the imagination, and the estimative and memorative powers, all of which are exercised by means of the brain (and nervous system)⁵⁶⁷. The lower reason preceding the action of the higher intellect and supported by the imagination, directly excites in the will affections and desires for sensible goods, regardless of their moral value⁵⁶⁸.

The reason of the distinction and number of the senses has been assigned by some to the organs in which one or other of the elements preponderate, as water, air, or the like. By others it has been assigned to the medium, which is either in conjunction or extrinsic, and is either water or air, or such like. Others have ascribed it to the various natures of the sensible qualities, according as such quality belongs to a simple body or results from complexity. But none of these explanations is apt. For the powers are not for the organs, but the organs for the powers; wherefore there are not various powers for the reason that there are various organs; on the contrary, for this has nature provided a variety of organs, that they might be adapted to various powers⁵⁶⁹.

The interior senses are of special significance because they enable a sensory being to entertain various sensory images and impressions, and make sensory judgements; these forms of sensory apprehension make it possible for a being to undergo object-oriented, sensory-appetitive motions⁵⁷⁰.

⁵⁶³ See: Lombardo E Nicholas,. *The Logic of Desire. Aquinas on Emotion*, The Catholic University of America Press, Washington ,D.C. 2001, p39.

⁵⁶⁴ Sadness or the experience of frustration is a given desire of the sense appetite ,also inclines the human person to pursue those other desires, including desires of the intellectual appetite, that are still open to fulfillment. Hence the educative and self-transcending consequence often noted about suffering: it inclines us to consider other ways in which fulfillment is still possible despite the suffering. So Aquinas’s account, even the frustration of appetite (or at least some kind of frustration of appetite) ultimately moves us towards our end. See: Lombardo E Nicholas,. *The Logic of Desire. Aquinas on Emotion*, The Catholic University of America Press, Washington ,D.C. 2001, p40.

⁵⁶⁵ See: ST, Part I-II, Q 22, Art.3.

⁵⁶⁶ See: ST, Part I, Q 78, Art.3.

⁵⁶⁷ See: Fritz Cates Diana,. *Aquinas on The Emotions. A Religious Ethical Inquiry*, Georgetown University Press, Washington, D.C., 2009, p112; See also ST, Part I, Q 78. Art.4.

⁵⁶⁸ Scheeben Mathias Joseph,. *A manual of Catholic Theology. Based on Scheeben’s „ dogmatik“* Volume 1, Joseph Wilhelm and Thomas B. Scannell, Kegan Paul trench Truebener & Co, London, 1906, p 423.

⁵⁶⁹ ST, Part I, Q 78. Art.3.

⁵⁷⁰ See: Fritz Cates Diana,. *Aquinas on The Emotions. A Religious Ethical Inquiry*, Georgetown University Press, Washington, D.C., 2009, p113.

The first interior sense is the common sense; it is the common root and principle of the exterior senses; common sense is the power that makes it possible for a human being to have relatively complex sensory impressions. Whereas a power of exterior sense, such as sight, makes it possible to discern a particular visible quality and to discriminate one visible quality from another, and the common sense makes it possible to discern sensible qualities of multiple kinds so that an object can appear as white, sweet, soft, and fragrant, all at the same time⁵⁷¹.

The second interior sense is the imagination; it is the power that makes it possible for retention and preservation of the sensible forms of objects, which could also be called the store house of forms received through senses⁵⁷². By the power of imagination, one can apprehend a sensible object not only at the actual time of sensation, but also when it is absent⁵⁷³.

The third interior sense, which makes it possible to apprehend intentions, is identified by Aquinas, with a difference between nonhuman being and human being, namely as estimative power and cogitative power; we must observe that, as to sensible forms, there is no difference between man and other animals, for they are similarly immuted by the extrinsic sensible; but there is a difference as to the intentions, for nonhuman beings perceive these intentions only by some natural instinct, while human beings perceive them by means of coalition of ideas; therefore this power which is in nonhuman beings, is called the natural estimative, and in human being it is called cogitative, which by some sort of collation discovers these intentions⁵⁷⁴. Aquinas wants to say that a human being is by nature a rational animal, and that the sensitive power is at its highest in a human being, in whom sensitivity is joined to intelligence, and has a share in the life of intellect; even the basic sensory judgments of human being ordinarily reflect the influence of the intellect to some degree⁵⁷⁵.

The fourth interior sense is identified by Aquinas as memorative power, which is a store house of intentions that are perceived through the exercise of the estimative power in nonhuman being or the cogitative power in human being; as to the memorative power, human being has not only memory, as other animals have in the sudden recollection of the past, but also reminiscence syllogistically, as it were, seeking for a recollection of the past by the application of individual intentions⁵⁷⁶. By virtue of reminiscence, it is possible for one activity to seek out a range of sensory judgements that one made in the past, so that one can judge the

⁵⁷¹ See: ST, Part I, Q78, Art.4, ad 1&2.

⁵⁷² Ibid.

⁵⁷³ See: Fritz Cates Diana,. Aquinas on The Emotions. A Religious Ethical Inquiry, Georgetown University Press, Washington, D.C., 2009, p113.

⁵⁷⁴ See: ST, Part I, Q78, Art.4.

⁵⁷⁵ See: Fritz Cates Diana,. Aquinas on The Emotions. A Religious Ethical Inquiry, Georgetown University Press, Washington, D.C., 2009, p116.

⁵⁷⁶ See: ST, Part I, Q78, Art.4.

suitableness or unsuitableness of a particular item, in the present, in light of this storehouse of impressions⁵⁷⁷.

2.1.1.3 The Role of Cogitative Power

Aquinas says explicitly that the cogitative power is involved in the arousal of one type of emotion which he calls irascible, which resists the attacks that hinder what is suitable to appetite, and gives its objects a sensible good or evil, with a tendency to overcome and rise above obstacles⁵⁷⁸. Such emotions arise when one apprehends an obstacle to attaining what one wants, or avoiding what one wants to avoid; it involves a kind of spiritedness or struggle⁵⁷⁹.

Fear is an example of an irascible emotion; for example a sheep is alarmed and flees not because looking at the object is painful to its senses, or not because the object is disturbing to the eyes, rather the sheep is alarmed and flees because it makes a sensory judgement of danger⁵⁸⁰; such a judgment is informed by the exterior senses and common sense, but it involves more than these senses can deliver on their own for self-defense, and this is called irascible power⁵⁸¹.

The power to choose what is morally good is not given to man in such a way that, before the choice takes place, there is in him no inclination or direction towards what is good, and, consequently no goodness bestowed on him by the creator independently of man's free election. On the contrary, such choice would be impossible unless man already possessed a tendency to good. The actual goodness of the will is but the fruit of the habitual goodness received from God; the object of the choice is not the first production of moral goodness, but the development and the exercise of the goodness already bestowed on the soul by the creator⁵⁸².

Of the two appetitive powers, concupiscible and irascible, the concupiscible power is simply inclined to seek what is suitable according to senses⁵⁸³; it is not very clear in Aquinas's writings, whether he thinks the cogitative power is typically involved in the arousal of the major type of emotion, which he calls concupiscible⁵⁸⁴; according to Aquinas the concupiscible power is moved to enjoyments upon the mere apprehension of the pleasurable object, and at times Aquinas associates the concupiscible appetite with objects of five sensory

⁵⁷⁷ See: Fritz Cates Diana,. Aquinas on The Emotions. A Religious Ethical Inquiry, Georgetown University Press, Washington, D.C., 2009, p117.

⁵⁷⁸ See: ST, Part I, Q81, Art.2.

⁵⁷⁹ See: Fritz Cates Diana,. Aquinas on The Emotions. A Religious Ethical Inquiry, Georgetown University Press, Washington, D.C., 2009, p117.

⁵⁸⁰ See: ST, Part I, Q78, Art.4.

⁵⁸¹ See: ST, Part I, Q81, Art.2, ad 2.

⁵⁸² Scheeben Mathias Joseph,. A manual of Catholic Theology. Based on Scheeben's „ dogmatik“ Volume 1, Wilhelm Joseph and Scannell B.Thomas, Kegan Paul trench Truebener & Co, London, 1906, p 417.

⁵⁸³ Ibid.

⁵⁸⁴ See: Fritz Cates Diana,. Aquinas on The Emotions. A Religious Ethical Inquiry, Georgetown University Press, Washington, D.C., 2009, p118.

apprehensions; he seems to contrast the concupiscible and the irascible in ways that suggest that only irascible emotions require the engagement of the cogitative power⁵⁸⁵.

The use of food and the pleasure that essentially results therefrom pertain to the touch; that touch is the sense of food, for food is hot or cold, wet or dry; to the taste belongs the discernment of savor, which makes the food pleasant to eat, in so far as they are signs of its being suitable for nourishment⁵⁸⁶. Yet just because an object is pleasing to the exterior senses does not guarantee that it is edible or nourishing; apprehending this requires the exercise of the estimative or cogitative power⁵⁸⁷.

Human being has not only universal reason, pertaining to the intellectual faculty, but also particular reason pertaining to the sensitive faculty, so that even rational concupiscence may pertain to the sensitive appetite; moreover the sensitive appetite can be moved by the universal reason, through the medium of the particular imagination⁵⁸⁸. Whatever passions regarded as good or evil absolutely belong to the concupiscible power, for instance joy, sorrow, love, hatred, and such like; whereas those passions which regard good or bad as arduous, through being difficult to obtain or avoid, belong to the irascible, for instance daring, fear, hope, and such like⁵⁸⁹; this act of apprehending is cognition⁵⁹⁰.

2.1.1.4 Sensitive versus Natural Appetite

In light of the dependence of appetite on apprehension, it might appear that beings without sensation lack appetite, but plants, according to Aquinas, do not lack appetite; like any other creature marked by the real distinction between act and potency, they have a natural desire for their own flourishing; according to Aquinas the apprehension need not belong to the plant itself; beings that have natural forms but lack the capacity for apprehension are directed toward an end as apprehended by God, that is to say, they do not move themselves but are moved by another⁵⁹¹.

The appetite which arises from an apprehension existing not in the subject of the appetite, but in some other is called the natural appetite⁵⁹². There is also another appetite arising from an apprehension in the subject of the appetite, but from necessity and not from

⁵⁸⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁸⁶ See: ST, Part II-II, Q141, Art.5, ad 1.

⁵⁸⁷ See: Fritz Cates Diana, . Aquinas on The Emotions. A Religious Ethical Inquiry, Georgetown University Press, Washington, D.C., 2009, p119.

⁵⁸⁸ See: ST, Part I-II, Q30, Art.3 ad 3.

⁵⁸⁹ See: ST, Part I-II, Q23, Art.2.

⁵⁹⁰ See: Wuellner Bernard, . Dictionary of Scholastic Philosophy. editions scholasticae, 2011, p 24.

⁵⁹¹ See: Miner Robert, . Thomas on the Passions. A Study of Summa Theologiae 1a2ae 22-48, Cambridge University Press, 2009, p 21. Aquinas's favorite example is that of an arrow moving toward its target. Its act is directed not by its own apprehension, but by that of the archer.

⁵⁹² See: ST, Part I-II, Q 26, Art.2.

free will, which is called sensitive appetite; and Aquinas considers that sensitive appetite in human being has a certain share of liberty, in so far as it obeys reason⁵⁹³. Thus Aquinas differentiates sensitive appetite from natural appetite⁵⁹⁴.

2.1.1.5 Sensitive versus Rational Appetite

Intellectual appetite is a distinct power from the sensitive appetite, because the appetitive power is a passive power which is naturally moved by the thing apprehended; wherefore the apprehended *appetible* is a mover which is not moved, while the appetite is a mover moved⁵⁹⁵.

According to Aquinas, the irascible and concupiscible powers obey the reason in their own acts, because in other animals the sensitive appetite is naturally moved by the estimative power; for instance, a sheep esteeming the wolf as an enemy is afraid; whereas in man, the estimative power is replaced by the cogitative power, which is called by some the particular reason, because it compares individual intentions, wherefore in human being the sensitive power is naturally moved by cogitative power⁵⁹⁶.

A simple formulation of the distinction between sensitive and the rational appetite would be: the sensitive appetite tends toward concrete singulars that are apprehended by the senses, whereas the rational appetite tends toward universal goods that are perceived by the intellect; through its acts of cognition, the intellect does not merely know particulars, but also universal concepts by abstraction from concrete things apprehended by sensation⁵⁹⁷.

Passion is properly to be found where there is corporeal transmutation; this corporeal transmutation is found in the act of the sensitive appetite; there is no need of corporeal transmutation in the act of intellectual appetite, because this appetite is not exercised by means of a corporeal organ⁵⁹⁸.

A universal opinion does not move except by means of a particular opinion; and in like manner the higher appetite moves by means of the lower, and therefore there are not two distinct motive powers following the intellect and the sense⁵⁹⁹. Generally, the sensitive

⁵⁹³ See: *Ibid.*,

⁵⁹⁴ See: Miner Robert,. *Thomas on the Passions. A Study of Summa Theologiae 1a2ae 22-48*, Cambridge University Press, 2009, p 21.

⁵⁹⁵ See: ST, Part I, Q 80, Art. 2.

⁵⁹⁶ See: ST, Part I, Q 81, Art. 3.

⁵⁹⁷ See: Miner Robert,. *Thomas on the Passions. A Study of Summa Theologiae 1a2ae 22-48*, Cambridge University Press, 2009, p 21.

⁵⁹⁸ See: ST, Part I-II, Q 23, Art.3.

⁵⁹⁹ See: ST, Part I, Q80, Art.2.

appetite is the inclination in beings possessing sensation towards particular goods perceived as pleasant or useful⁶⁰⁰.

2.1.1.5 The Priority of Good to Evil

“Since human nature is made up of body and soul, of an intellectual and a sensitive part, human good demands that man should surrender himself in his totality to virtue; that is to say, both in his intellectual and sensitive part and with his body”⁶⁰¹. “God shall bring every work into judgement, whether it be good or whether it be evil”⁶⁰². The acts have merit or demerit as they are ordained with reference to one, either for one’s own sake, or for that of the community⁶⁰³. “Appetite is a kind of motion towards good”⁶⁰⁴. “Since the ratio of good is the ratio of appetibility, and since evil is opposed to good, it is impossible that any evil, as such, should be sought for by the appetite, either natural, or by intellectual appetite which is the will”⁶⁰⁵.

Nevertheless evil may be sought accidentally, so far as it accompanies a good, as appears in each of the appetites; evil does not operate towards the perfection and beauty of the universe, except accidentally; God neither wills evil to be done, nor wills it not to be done, but wills to permit evil to be done, and this is a good⁶⁰⁶.

Evil comes as object of the appetite only secondarily and indirectly, and that the act of will and appetite that regard good must naturally be prior to those that regard evil, as joy is prior to sorrow and love is prior to hate: since what exists of itself, is always prior to that which exists through another⁶⁰⁷.

It is one of Aquinas’s fundamental principles that all of creation tends towards the good; in the case of creatures that have at least sensitive abilities, he takes this principle to have the consequence that all action is directed to the apparent good; since the passions are part of the affective structure of living creatures, they tend towards something only to the extent that it is seen as a good; hence there cannot be any passion that tends towards apparent evil⁶⁰⁸.

⁶⁰⁰ See: Miner Robert,. *Thomas on the Passions. A Study of Summa Theologiae 1a2ae 22-48*, Cambridge University Press, 2009, p 25.

⁶⁰¹ Pieper Josef,. *The Human Wisdom of ST. Thomas. A Breviary of Philosophy from the works of St. Thomas Aquinas*, Trans. by, Maclaren Drostan, Ignatius Press San Francisco, London, 2002,p 60.

⁶⁰² Eccl. 12,14.

⁶⁰³ See: Elmendorf J. John,. *Elements of Moral Theology. Based on The Summa Theology of St. Thomas Aquinas*, General Books LLC, Memphis, USA, 2012, p 13.

⁶⁰⁴ *Ibid.*

⁶⁰⁵ ST, Part I, Q19, Art.9.

⁶⁰⁶ *Ibid.* When a lion kills a deer, he intends food, to which the killing of the animal is joined as an accompaniment.

⁶⁰⁷ See: ST, Part I, Q20, Art.1.

⁶⁰⁸ See: Miner Robert,. *Thomas on the Passions. A Study of Summa Theologiae 1a2ae 22-48*, Cambridge University Press, 2009, p 27.

The superiority of good over evil grounds the most basic hierarchy among the particular acts of the sensitive appetite: love is prior to hatred, desire is prior to aversion, and pleasure is prior to pain and sorrow⁶⁰⁹. The priority of love not only grounds the hierarchy within the concupiscible passions, but also informs the priority of the concupiscible passions, which in some way concern good as such, to the irascible passions, which are directed toward good as specified under the condition of the arduous or difficult; what gives Aquinas the confidence to order the passions in this manner is his metaphysical conviction that good is radically prior to evil, and evil is not intelligible except as a privation of good⁶¹⁰.

Our reason regarded as a power and tendency for truth, can remain and always does remain, however much we may err against it and abuse it. But the power and tendency for knowledge which accompany super-nature can never abide simultaneously in the soul with a formally opposite actual error⁶¹¹.

2.1.2 The Nature of Passion

“The word passion indicates that the soul is rather acted upon than exerting its spontaneous activity, while at the same time it undoubtedly reacts upon the external stimulus”⁶¹². Passion is an *object related non-volitional affective psychological* state, or, in medieval terms, emotion is an actualization of the sensitive appetite, which is a semi-autonomous faculty of the soul⁶¹³. Psychology, in the Aristotelian tradition, is a subordinate branch of natural philosophy, which identifies three kinds of clustered activities that living beings exemplify, stemming from three distinct principles, that is, from three types of soul: (a) nutrition, growth, and reproduction, typical of plants and trees, whose principle is the vegetative soul; (b) self-movement and perception of the world, typical of animals, whose principle is the sensitive soul; (c) thought and reasoning, typical of human beings, whose principle is the intellective soul with cognitive powers to acquire and assimilate information and with appetitive powers to move the subject. These kinds of soul are arranged in a hierarchy such that the latter include the former: anything capable of the sensitive soul is capable of the vegetative soul, and anything capable of the intellective soul is capable of the sensitive soul and the vegetative soul⁶¹⁴.

⁶⁰⁹ See: ST, Part I-II, Q26- 39.

⁶¹⁰ See: Miner Robert,. Thomas on the Passions. A Study of Summa Theologiae 1a2ae 22-48, Cambridge University Press, 2009, p 27.

⁶¹¹ Scheeben Joseph Matthias,. Nature and Grace. Trans. By Vollert Cyril, Wipf and Stock Publishers, Eugene, 2009, p 213.

⁶¹² Elmendorf J. John,. Elements of Moral Theology. Based on The Summa Theology of St. Thomas Aquinas, General Books LLC, Memphis, USA, 2012, p 13.

⁶¹³ King Peter,. Oxford Handbook to Aquinas. Aquinas on the Emotions, May 2012, p2; <http://dx.org/10.1093/oxfordhd/9780195326093.013.0017>.

⁶¹⁴ See: Ibid. Aquinas famously held that these clusters of principles were not really distinct when combined in the same subject that is his stand on the unicity, as opposed to the plurality, of substantial form but this metaphysical disagreement can be set aside in the subject of emotion, since all parties to the dispute agree

The cluster of powers associated with the sensitive and the intellective souls are not limited to Cognition; human beings do not merely acquire and process information about the world; they engage the world directly, being drawn to some things and driven away by others; therefore, with cognitive powers to acquire and assimilate information, there are appetitive powers to move the subject⁶¹⁵. “In medieval philosophical jargon, an emotion is a potency whose principle of actualization is external to its subject; in contemporary terms, an emotion is a reaction”⁶¹⁶.

An emotion is a reaction that may well have causal efficacy: for instance, a perceived insult causes the proud man to lash out in anger, the hope of winning motivates the runner to put on a final burst of speed at the end of the race; and emotion is fundamentally a type of motion, where the concerned person is moved by an emotion, or drawn towards an emotion, or driven from an emotion⁶¹⁷. Desire, the formal cause of psychological changes is a movement of the soul⁶¹⁸. In the passions of the soul, the formal element is the movement of the appetitive power, while the bodily transmutation is the material element⁶¹⁹.

To say that emotion is a motion of the soul is to say that emotion occurs in and through the coordinated exercise of various powers or capabilities; to say that emotion is a motion of the soul-body composite is to say that the main powers or capabilities that are involved in the production of an emotion are exercised directly by means of the body⁶²⁰. For Aquinas, passion is not found in the soul except accidentally: but the composite, which is corruptible, admits of it by reason of its own nature⁶²¹.

An emotion is aroused in any part by an act of sensory apprehension, and experiencing an emotion involves having a sensible object in mind, on some level of awareness⁶²². The sensitive faculties are moved before the intellectual, and by reason of the sympathy between various faculties, anticipating the judgement of the intellect, they awaken in the will so called *condelectation* – that is, they incline the will towards their own sensible object⁶²³.

that human beings, for instance, have intellective and sensitive capacities, whether they stem from a single unique principle or a pair of related principles; nature of emotion has cognitive and appetitive powers.

⁶¹⁵ See: King Peter, . Oxford Handbook to Aquinas. Aquinas on the Emotions, May 2012, p2.

⁶¹⁶ Ibid., 3.

⁶¹⁷ Ibid

⁶¹⁸ See: ST, Part I-II, Q 26, Art.2.

⁶¹⁹ See: ST, Part I-II, Q 44, Art.1. In the case of the emotions, the formal aspect is the motion of the appetitive potency and the material element is a physiological change, where the one is proportionate to the other.

⁶²⁰ See: Fritz Cates Diana, . Aquinas on The Emotions. A Religious Ethical Inquiry, Georgetown University Press, Washington, D.C., 2009, p81.

⁶²¹ See: ST, Part I-II, Q 22, Art.1&3.

⁶²² See: Fritz Cates Diana, . Aquinas on The Emotions. A Religious Ethical Inquiry, Georgetown University Press, Washington, D.C., 2009, p81.

⁶²³ See: Scheeben Mathias Joseph, . A manual of Catholic Theology. Based on Scheeben’s „ dogmatik“ Volume 1, Wilhelm Joseph and Scannell B.Thomas, Kegan Paul trench Truebener & Co, London, 1906, p 423.

An act of sensory apprehension might involve receiving and entertaining sensory impressions, making basic judgements of the significance of the impressions, associating these impressions with similar impressions from the past and creating sensory images by the power of imagination⁶²⁴; such acts takes place by means of bodily organs⁶²⁵; in some cases, they take place by means of the organs of interior sense, the eyes or the ears; these take place by means of the chief organs of interior sense, which Aquinas identifies with the middle part of the head⁶²⁶; it is explained today, that the acts of sensory apprehension take place by means of the brain and the rest of the nervous system, which extends throughout the body⁶²⁷.

2.1.2.1 Apprehension and Intentionality

There are two kinds of cognition: sense cognition and intellectual cognition, and each pertain to different aspects of the world⁶²⁸. Sense cognition pertains to the material aspects of reality, and intellectual cognition pertains to the immaterial aspects of reality by abstracting what is universal about material things⁶²⁹. Aquinas's identification of two different kinds of cognition does not imply that they function independently; it is a structural clarification, and they should be understood as usually simultaneous and mutually interpenetrating⁶³⁰.

The soul is drawn to a thing by the appetitive power, rather than by comprehensive power: because the soul has, through its appetitive power, an order to things as they are in themselves, that is, good and evil; the object of the appetitive powers are in themselves; the appetitive power is not drawn to a thing as it is in itself, but knows it by reason of an intention of the thing, the intention it has in itself or receives on its own way; hence true and false, which pertain to the knowledge, are not in the things but in the mind; consequently, it is evident that the nature of passion is consistent with the appetitive, rather than with the apprehension⁶³¹. This is not to say that the subject apprehends a miniature mental image of the object and not the object itself, because the apprehension of the object connects directly to the object itself and not just to a mental construct that could exist without external reality⁶³².

⁶²⁴ See: ST, Part I, Q 78, Art.4.

⁶²⁵ See: ST, Part I, Q77, Art.5.

⁶²⁶ See: ST, Part I, Q 78, Art.4.

⁶²⁷ See: Fritz Cates Diana,. Aquinas on The Emotions. A Religious Ethical Inquiry, Georgetown University Press, Washington, D.C., 2009, p82. For Aquinas, these acts are not simply acts or functions of a brain but they are functions of a brain that correlate with the consciousness or the awareness of a situation on the part of a personal subject. This is partly what the language of 'soul' allows Aquinas to capture.

⁶²⁸ See: Lombardo E. Nicholas,. The Logic of Desire. Aquinas on Emotion, The Catholic University of America Press, Washington, D.C. 2011, p21.

⁶²⁹ See: ST, Part I Q 78&79.

⁶³⁰ See: Lombardo E. Nicholas,. The Logic of Desire. Aquinas on Emotion, The Catholic University of America Press, Washington, D.C. 2011, p21.

⁶³¹ See: ST, Part I-II Q 22.Art.2.

⁶³² See: Lombardo E. Nicholas,. The Logic of Desire. Aquinas on Emotion, The Catholic University of America Press, Washington, D.C. 2011, p22. The way in which Aquinas's intentional theory can cast philosophical light on the nature of perception is best understood if we contrast it with a different philosophical theory, the representational theory of perception. According to some philosophers, in sense experience we do not directly

Similarly, after the subject apprehends an object as desirable via an intention, passion is evoked and draws the subject to the actual object itself, not to a mental image⁶³³.

Aquinas outlines a logical progression from raw sense data to the formation of an intention; however, this progression should not be understood as a chronological progression; the formation of an intension typically occurs simultaneously with perception through sense knowledge, which is first received through the five external senses⁶³⁴, each sense being a kind of passive power, which naturally responds to exterior sense objects⁶³⁵. The raw sense data obtained through the five external senses are cognized with the assistance of our internal senses, namely, the common sense, fantasy or imagination⁶³⁶, the estimative power, and the memorative power or memory⁶³⁷. The common sense synthesizes the raw sense data of the external senses, and any raw images produced by the imagination from memories of past sense perception into a coherent whole⁶³⁸.

Synthesized perceptions are simultaneously coloured by an evaluation of these perceptions through the interests of the perceiver, and thus formed into intentions; and the apprehension of intentions occurs through the estimative power, the power that colours perception with some evaluation of it⁶³⁹. Nonhuman beings perceive intentions through natural instinct, which is of their power of estimation that is called the natural estimative power, but human beings apprehend intensions by the cogitative power or particular power, which judges concrete particulars through a process of comparison⁶⁴⁰.

Unlike universal reason which involves intellectual cognition, the realm of thought where universals are abstracted from concrete particulars, the particular reason is not an immaterial power; Aquinas, with the best 13th century medical knowledge available to him

observe objects or properties in the external world; the immediate object of our experience are sense data, private objects of which we have infallible knowledge and from which we make more or less dubious inferences to the real nature of external objects and properties. In Aquinas's theory there are no intermediaries like sense data which come between perceiver and perceived. In sensation the sense faculty does not come in contact with a likeness of the sense object. Instead, it becomes itself like the sense object, by taking on the sense object's form; but it takes on the form not physically, but intentionally. This is summed up by Aquinas in a slogan which he takes over from Aristotle: the sense faculty in operation is identical with the sense object in action (*Sensus in actus est sensibilis in actu*).

⁶³³ "Through the appetitive power the soul is directed toward things as they are in themselves" (ST, Part I-II, Q 22, Art.2) Aquinas distinguishes the role of cognition and appetite as follows: the operation of the apprehensive power reaches its fulfillment when what is apprehended is in the one apprehending, while the operation of the appetitive power reaches its fulfillment when the one desiring is inclined towards the desiring thing (ST part I, Q 81, Art.1).

⁶³⁴ See: Lombardo E. Nicholas,. *The Logic of Desire. Aquinas on Emotion*, The Catholic University of America Press, Washington, D.C. 2011, p23.

⁶³⁵ See: ST part I, Q 78, Art.3

⁶³⁶ Aquinas considers both terms fantasy or imagination refer to the same faculty. See: ST part I, Q 78, Art.4.

⁶³⁷ See: Lombardo E. Nicholas,. *The Logic of Desire. Aquinas on Emotion*, The Catholic University of America Press, Washington, D.C. 2011, p23.

⁶³⁸ See: ST part I, Q 78, Art.4, ad 2.

⁶³⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁴⁰ See: ST part I, Q 78, Art.4 & Q 81, Art.3.

assigns particular reason to a bodily organ located in the middle of the head. However, despite its corporeality and its independence from universal reason, particular reason is nonetheless somewhat governable by universal reason⁶⁴¹.

Aquinas arrives at the concept of intention in order to explain how the passions operate; intentions are stored by memory, which Aquinas calls a treasury of these intentions. However, animals cannot call them to mind at will, nor do their intentions have any rational content, since they are shaped by instinct rather than reason, that is to say, animals have memory even without an immaterial intellect, their memory is a bodily power, but human memory involves the intellect as well as body⁶⁴². The free will of human being has an essential tendency to view all moral good as willed and commanded by God, and seek after it as such, for the sake of the high respect due to God and His law, and especially to direct the will to God as its ultimate object⁶⁴³.

Human being has the capacity of receiving and processing information⁶⁴⁴; in *De Anima* Aristotle says that the power of cognition includes the power of both thought and sensation⁶⁴⁵; similarly Aquinas refers to the cognitive power as the power of apprehension, which includes both intellectual and sensory apprehension⁶⁴⁶.

2.1.2.2 Objects of Passions

“Passion is an act of the sensitive appetite. Such acts are properly passive because they require something outside themselves to activate them”⁶⁴⁷. Passions differ in accordance with their active causes, which in the case of the passions of the soul, are their objects; here the difference in active causes are considered in two ways: from the point of view of their species or nature and from the point of view of the difference in their active power⁶⁴⁸. Such motions are rightly called “passions” because they result from an impulse received on the ground of some subjective want, and are more or less dependent on the excitability of the bodily organism⁶⁴⁹.

⁶⁴¹ Ibid.

⁶⁴² See: ST part I, Q 78, Art.4& Q79, Art. 6-7. See also: Lombardo E. Nicholas,. *The Logic of Desire*. Aquinas on Emotion, The Catholic University of America Press, Washington, D.C. 2011, p24.

⁶⁴³ See: Scheeben Mathias Joseph,. *A manual of Catholic Theology*. Based on Scheeben’s „ dogmatik“ Volume 1, Joseph Wilhelm and Thomas B. Scannell, Kegan Paul trench Truebener & Co, London, 1906, p 417.

⁶⁴⁴ See: Fritz Cates Diana,. *Aquinas on The Emotions*. A Religious Ethical Inquiry, Georgetown University Press, Washington, D.C., 2009, p65.

⁶⁴⁵ See: Aristotle,. *De Anima*. trans. J.A. Smith, *The Basic Works of Aristotle*, ed. Richard McKeon, New York, Random House, 1941, 432a15.

⁶⁴⁶ See: ST part I, Q 81, Art.1 & Q 64, Art.2.

⁶⁴⁷ Miner Robert,. *Thomas on the Passions*. A Study of Summa Theologiae 1a2ae 22-48, Cambridge University Press, 2009, p 58.

⁶⁴⁸ See: ST part I-II, Q 23, Art.4.

⁶⁴⁹ See: Scheeben Mathias Joseph,. *A manual of Catholic Theology*. Based on Scheeben’s „ dogmatik“ Volume 1, Wilhelm Joseph and Scannell B.Thomas, Kegan Paul trench Truebener & Co, London, 1906, p 419.

The general object of the appetite is good; any passion therefore, will formally be a motion either toward the apprehended good or away from a perceived evil, which occurs only on account of the appetite's inclination toward the contrary good⁶⁵⁰. Of course a positive force is required for action at the reception of the objective impulse, the imperfection of the sensitive faculty lies both in the inability to act without such impulse, and in the necessity to act in accordance with it⁶⁵¹.

According to Aquinas, the good which gives pleasure to the senses is the common object of the concupiscible faculty, hence the various concupiscible passions are distinguished according to the difference of that good; the diversity of this object can arise from the very nature of the object or from the diversity in its active power: the diversity derived from the nature of the active object causes a material difference of passions; whereas the difference in regard to its active power causes a formal diversity of passions, in respect of which the passions differ specifically⁶⁵².

The nature of the motive power of the good differs according to its being really present or absent, because when it is present, it causes the faculty to find rest in it; whereas when it is absent, it causes the faculty to be moved towards it; hence pleasurable good is the object of concupiscence, not absolutely but considered as absent – just as the sensible, considered as past is the object of memory, because these particular conditions diversify the species of passions and even the powers of the sensitive part, which regards particular things.⁶⁵³

Aquinas is not concerned with material difference, instead he looks for formal differences; he finds these differences in a diversity which is according to the activating power, the power of apprehension, and which makes a formal difference among the passions, according to which passions differ in kind; the most decisive factor is the capacity to apprehend a pleasurable good, either as present or absent: when apprehended as present, the result is pleasure and when apprehended as absent, the result is concupiscence or desire⁶⁵⁴.

Like the concupiscible passions, the irascible passions are also individuated according to a formal difference in their objects; hope, despair, fear, daring, and anger each have distinct formal objects⁶⁵⁵; irascible passions are tendencies towards appetites for something considered as arduous or difficult⁶⁵⁶, but worth pursuing for the sake of attaining the pleasant

⁶⁵⁰ See: Miner Robert,. Thomas on the Passions. A Study of Summa Theologiae 1a2ae 22-48, Cambridge University Press, 2009, p 59.

⁶⁵¹ Scheeben Mathias Joseph,. A manual of Catholic Theology. Based on Scheeben's „ dogmatik“ Volume 1, Wilhelm Joseph and Scannell B.Thomas, Kegan Paul trench Truebener & Co, London, 1906, p 419.

⁶⁵² See: ST part I-II, Q 30, Art.2.

⁶⁵³ Ibid.

⁶⁵⁴ See: Miner Robert,. Thomas on the Passions. A Study of Summa Theologiae 1a2ae 22-48, Cambridge University Press, 2009, p 60.

⁶⁵⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁵⁶ See: ST part I-II, Q 40, Art.2, ad 2.

good or avoiding the painful evil⁶⁵⁷. “ God refuses none the perfections required by their nature”⁶⁵⁸.

2.1.2.3 Sensation and Imagination

Aquinas distinguishes four apprehensive powers of the sensitive soul; the following powers are common to animals: sensation, including the proper senses and the common sense, the imagination, the estimative power, and the memorative power; each power is capable of activating the sensitive appetite⁶⁵⁹. The sensitive appetite has something of its own, by virtue whereof it can resist the commands of reason, because the sensitive appetite is naturally moved, not only by the estimative power in other animals, and in human beings by the cogitative power which the universal reason guides, but also by the imagination and sense⁶⁶⁰.

The natural appetite is that inclination which each thing has of its own nature for something; therefore by its natural appetite, each power desires something suitable to itself; although sense and appetite are principles of movement in perfect animals, sense and appetite as such are not sufficient to cause movement, unless another power be added to them; in fact, when the members are deprived of their natural disposition, they do not move in obedience to the appetite⁶⁶¹.

Images of both per se sense objects, and the things, in which they inhere, may be possessed, even when they are not directly present to sensation; the capacity of not only receiving forms but also retaining them is what Aquinas calls imagination⁶⁶².

Frequently sensation and imagination work together to produce a passion; when one has an immediate sensation of a waterfall that he has seen before, nothing precludes him from having images of that waterfall, stored in his imagination⁶⁶³. The first passion that imagination will produce is either pleasure or pain, but when the image is present and the object is absent, another passion will be experienced; if the image is experienced as pleasant, then the combination of the image's presence and the object's absence will produce desire; should the image be painful, the object's absence and the image's presence will yield aversion⁶⁶⁴.

⁶⁵⁷ See: Miner Robert,. Thomas on the Passions. A Study of Summa Theologiae 1a2ae 22-48, Cambridge University Press, 2009, p 61.

⁶⁵⁸ See: Scheeben Mathias Joseph,. A manual of Catholic Theology. Based on Scheeben's „ dogmatik“ Volume 1, Joseph Wilhelm and Thomas B. Scannell, Kegan Paul trench Truebener & Co, London, 1906, p 232.

⁶⁵⁹ See: ST part I, Q 78, Art.4.

⁶⁶⁰ See: ST part I, Q 81, Art.3,ad 2.

⁶⁶¹ See: ST part I, Q 78, Art.1,ad 3&4.

⁶⁶² See: Miner Robert,. Thomas on the Passions. A Study of Summa Theologiae 1a2ae 22-48, Cambridge University Press, 2009, p 67.

⁶⁶³ Ibid.

⁶⁶⁴ Ibid.

2.1.2.4 Estimative and Memorative Powers

According to Aquinas, if an animal were moved by pleasing and disagreeable things only affecting the sense, there would be no need to suppose that an animal has a power, besides the apprehension of those forms which the senses perceive, and in which the animal takes pleasure, or from which it shrinks with horror; the animal needs to seek or to avoid certain things, not only because they are pleasing or otherwise to the senses, but also on account of other benefits or harms, just like a sheep runs away when it sees a wolf, not on account of its colour or shape but as a natural enemy; therefore, animals need to perceive such intentions which the exterior sense does not perceive, and for the apprehension of intentions which are not received through the senses, the estimative power is appointed and for the preservation of it, the memorative power⁶⁶⁵.

Intentions perceived by the estimative power in non-rational animals are non-empirical evaluations of a perceived thing as either useful or dangerous, which are perceived by some natural instinct⁶⁶⁶. The estimative power does not apprehend an individual in terms of its being under a common nature, but only in terms of its being the end point or starting point of some action or affection; in this way, it recognizes grass in as much as it is its food⁶⁶⁷.

We must observe that as to sensible forms there is no difference between man and other animals, for they are similarly immuted by the extrinsic sensible; but there is a difference as to the above intentions, for other animals perceive these intentions only by some natural instinct, while man perceives them by means of coalition of ideas; therefore, the power which in other animals is called the natural estimative, in man is called the cogitative, which is also called particular reason⁶⁶⁸.

⁶⁶⁵ See: ST part I, Q 78, Art.4.

⁶⁶⁶ See: Miner Robert,. Thomas on the Passions. A Study of Summa Theologiae 1a2ae 22-48, Cambridge University Press, 2009, p 71.

⁶⁶⁷ See: Pasnau Robert,. Thomas Aquinas on Human Nature. A Philosophical Study of Summa Theologiae 1a 75-89, Cambridge University Press, USA, 2002, p 271. There arises a question of patterns and objects. Do animals perceive objects? Do they see for example just a pattern of colors and shapes? It is hard to believe that dogs and cats perceive nothing more than this, but Aquinas's account might plausibly be taken to suggest as much. Only human beings have the cognitive power that is responsible for our seeing things as individuals. Now one might think that in other animals the work of the cognitive power is performed by the estimative power. But Aquinas indicates otherwise when he says of sheep that its natural estimative power functions only when the stimulus triggers some sort of innate reaction, either fear or desire. Perhaps in these cases the animal can be described as seeing an object, not merely seeing a coloured visual field. But what happens in cases where the estimative power is not involved? For animals there seems to be no further capacity involved beyond the bare external senses and the common sense. And it seems that these faculties, by themselves, form no perceptual content beyond shape and colour. Implausible as it seems, then, that often may be all that the sheep sees.

⁶⁶⁸ Ibid. As to the *memorative power*, man has not only memory as other animals have in the sudden recollection of the past, but also *reminiscence* by syllogistically, seeking for a recollection of the past by the application of individual intentions.

Without the cognitive power, the external senses would apparently see nothing more than various patterns of sensible qualities; they would see no objects, no individuals; the external senses simply do not have the cognitive firepower to turn these shifting patterns into individual, enduring objects⁶⁶⁹. “Cognitive power seems to infringe on Aquinas’s division of labour between intellect and sense”⁶⁷⁰.

Human intellect does not immediately in its first apprehension acquire a complete cognition of a thing; instead, it first apprehends something about it, namely the quiddity of that thing, which is the first and proper object of intellect, and then it understands the proper attributes, the accidents, and the dispositions surrounding the things essence; thus it necessarily compares one thing with another by composition or division, and then proceeds to another, which is the process of reason⁶⁷¹.

Animals also have a power to store intention in memory, for example, when an animal estimates something as useful or dangerous, the principle for remembering is formed as an intention of a kind, that a thing is harmful or agreeable⁶⁷².

The irascible passions (hope, despair, fear, daring, anger) are generated from acts of the estimative and memorative powers. Because the estimative power may be activated without an initial sensation of something as pleasant or painful, pleasure and pain do not appear. But what becomes of Aquinas’ insistence that the irascible power begin from and terminates in the concupiscible passions? The origin of the irascible passions in the concupiscible means only that they presuppose some basic inclination toward what is suitable for the animal. The sheep will not perceive the wolf as repugnant evil to be fled, unless it has a prior connatural inclination toward its own preservation (a form of love). Nonetheless, while love is a universal cause of the other passions, it remains that no separate motion of the concupiscible is required to activate the estimative power. The sheep perceives a wolf by sensation, apprehends the wolf as dangerous by the irascible power, experiences the passion of fear, and flees as fast as its legs will carry it; here action immediately follows the motion of the irascible⁶⁷³.

In animals, motion follows at once from the concupiscible and irascible, as sheep, fearing the wolf, flee at once, because there is no higher appetite which opposes flight; but a human being is not moved at once, according to the irascible and concupiscible, rather he awaits the command of the will, which is the higher appetite⁶⁷⁴.

⁶⁶⁹ See: Pasnau Robert., Thomas Aquinas on Human Nature. A Philosophical Study of Summa Theologiae 1a 75-89, Cambridge University Press, USA, 2002, p 271.

⁶⁷⁰ Ibid. What the senses can never do because of their materiality, is grasp universal concepts.

⁶⁷¹ See: ST part I, Q 85, Art.5.

⁶⁷² Miner Robert., Thomas on the Passions. A Study of Summa Theologiae 1a2ae 22-48, Cambridge University Press, 2009, p 72. See also: ST part I, Q 78, Art.4.

⁶⁷³ Ibid., 72-73.

⁶⁷⁴ See: ST part I, Q 81, Art.3.

2.1.2.5 The Role of the Particular Reason

“Particular reason is the cogitative power; a sensory estimate of what is good or harmful to the organism in particular situations.”⁶⁷⁵ “Strictly speaking human beings do not have an estimative power. But they have something like it”⁶⁷⁶. According to Aquinas, other animals perceive intentions only by some natural instinct, but human beings perceives them by means of a kind of collation; in other animals, it is called the natural estimative power, in human beings, it is called cogitative power, which by a kind of collation discovers the intentions, hence it is called particular reason⁶⁷⁷.

The task of universal reason is to abstract from concrete objects perceived by the senses; according to Aquinas it does this by composing and dividing⁶⁷⁸. Particular reason does something analogous, but at a lower level, it discovers not universal concepts but individual intentions, because they are perceived by a power assigned to a bodily organ⁶⁷⁹; the particular reason is the power that enables a person to attach a set of particular sensible qualities to images stored in the imagination that are directly connected with experiences of pain⁶⁸⁰.

There is an order among a number of motive powers, the second only moves by virtue of the first, the lower appetite is not sufficient enough to cause movement, unless the higher appetite consents; in this way, the irascible and concupiscible are subject to reason⁶⁸¹. “Reason is a principle source of knowledge and possesses a domain of its own”⁶⁸².

⁶⁷⁵ Wuellner Bernard,. Dictionary of Scholastic Philosophy. editions scholasticae, 2011, p 105.

⁶⁷⁶ Miner Robert,. Thomas on the Passions. A Study of Summa Theologiae 1a2ae 22-48, Cambridge University Press, 2009, p 76.

⁶⁷⁷ See: ST part I, Q 78, Art.4.

⁶⁷⁸ See also: ST part I, Q 85, Art.5.

⁶⁷⁹ According to Aquinas, only a power whose act is not the act of a bodily organ is capable of apprehending immaterial species. See: ST part I, Q 78, Art.1; See also: ST part I, Q 79, Art.6.

⁶⁸⁰ See: Miner Robert,. Thomas on the Passions. A Study of Summa Theologiae 1a2ae 22-48, Cambridge University Press, 2009, p 77-78. When a child sees the fire, the child will probably touch the fire, since the child is naturally attracted to bright and warm objects. At some point the child will learn to make a collation, that is the child groups the fire with the images that she associates with pain, then the child will not be attracted to it, rather the particular reason will tell the child that the fire burning in the fireplace is dangerous; having made this estimation, the child will store it in the memorative power, on this basis the child will estimate other objects with like sensible features as dangerous; this example shows what the particular reason has in common with the estimative power; however unlike the sheep who avoids the wolf by instinct, the child learns this by collation of the sensible forms attached to the fire with other sensible images that have previously caused pain.

⁶⁸¹ See: ST part I, Q 81, Art.3.

⁶⁸² See: Scheeben Mathias Joseph,. A manual of Catholic Theology. Based on Scheeben’s „ dogmatik“ Volume 1, Wilhelm Joseph and Scannell B.Thomas, Kegan Paul trench Truebener & Co, London, 1906, p 148.

2.2 The Structure of Passions

Aquinas divides the questions on the particular passions into two parts, according to the distinction between the concupiscible and the irascible⁶⁸³. In his treatment of different types of elemental passions, the distinctions between them and their relations, Aquinas relies on the work of many predecessors⁶⁸⁴. However the foundation of his system is the classification of passions according to the species of their objects⁶⁸⁵. The kind of object that distinguishes passions is not the material object, that is the object as it is in itself, but the formal or intentional object, that is, the object as it is apprehended through an intention; Aquinas identifies eleven different passions of basic types: love, desire, joy, hate, aversion, sadness, hope, daring, despair, fear, and anger.⁶⁸⁶

Perfect subjection of the passions entails their responsibility to reason and will. It does not imply or even remotely suggest a life entirely free of the passions; for Aquinas, the passions are a fundamental part of human nature, and they are to be cultivated and directed, but not extirpated⁶⁸⁷.

Aquinas identifies two basic categories of sense appetite powers: the concupiscible power and the irascible power⁶⁸⁸. In the sensitive part of the soul, there are two appetitive powers: by one, the soul is simply inclined to pursue what is agreeable to the senses and to pull back from what is harmful, and this is called the concupiscible, by the other, the soul resists whatever attacks what it finds agreeable and causes harm, and this power is called the irascible; hence the irascible power's object is called arduous because it tends to rise above obstacles and overcome them⁶⁸⁹.

⁶⁸³ See: Miner Robert,. *Thomas on the Passions. A Study of Summa Theologiae 1a2ae 22-48*, Cambridge University Press, 2009, p 113. The division into concupiscible and irascible is not equal. There are fourteen questions on the concupiscible passions and nine questions on the irascible. This inequality is not accidental; it reflects the subordination of the irascible to the concupiscible. Another revealing inequality may be seen in the number of questions assigned to each passion. Since hate parasitically follows love, it receives but one question. As the contrary of desire, aversion receives not a single question. The radical priority of good to evil seems to inform the distribution of questions on the particular passions.

⁶⁸⁴ See: Lombardo E. Nicholas,. *The Logic of Desire. Aquinas on Emotion*, The Catholic University of America Press, Washington, D.C. 2011, p49.

⁶⁸⁵ See: ST part I-II, Q 23, Art.4.

⁶⁸⁶ See: Lombardo E. Nicholas,. *The Logic of Desire. Aquinas on Emotion*, The Catholic University of America Press, Washington, D.C. 2011, p50.

⁶⁸⁷ See: Miner Robert,. *Thomas on the Passions. A Study of Summa Theologiae 1a2ae 22-48*, Cambridge University Press, 2009, p 108.

⁶⁸⁸ See: Lombardo E. Nicholas,. *The Logic of Desire. Aquinas on Emotion*, The Catholic University of America Press, Washington, D.C. 2011, p50. Aquinas appropriates this division from Aristotle, *Nemesius of Emesa*, and John Damascene and makes it his own. He probably takes the idea of making an arduous object the defining characteristic of the irascible passions from John of La Rochelle.

⁶⁸⁹ See: ST part I, Q 81, Art.2.

Aquinas makes various distinctions among the passions, but only *concupiscibilis* and *irascibilis*⁶⁹⁰ constitute separate powers; the concupiscible passions concern first order desires and the irascible passions presuppose the concupiscible passions, and they are second order desires⁶⁹¹. The irascible power is a kind of defender and protector of the concupiscible power, rising against whatever gets in the way of what is agreeable, which the concupiscible power desires, and whatever threatens harm, at which the concupiscible power flees; thus all the passions of the irascible power begin in the concupiscible passions and then terminate in them⁶⁹².

2.2.1 The Concupiscible Passions

By the very constitution of the nature of human beings, they are liable to spontaneous motions in their sensitive tendencies, over which the will has, at best, but little control; in other words, concupiscence is an attribute of human nature: in animals which have no reason, concupiscence is the mainspring of activity; it is in harmony with their whole nature, whereas in human beings it is a disturbing element in the higher life of soul⁶⁹³.

The concupiscible passions concern the inclination to sensible goods, the repugnance to sensible evils, and the affective experience caused by either's presence. Aquinas emphasizes those passions oriented towards goods such as love, desire, and pleasure more than those concerned with evils such as hate, aversion, and sorrow, demonstrating again that he is primarily interested in happiness rather than its obstacles⁶⁹⁴.

Motions of the concupiscible appetite are distinguished in terms of the contrariety of their objects, namely, with respect to whether the motion regards a good or an evil, and whether the motion is a tending toward or a tending away from⁶⁹⁵. The object of the concupiscible power is sensible good or evil simply accepted as either pleasurable or

⁶⁹⁰ The technical Latin terms that Aquinas uses for the two powers of the sense appetite, *concupiscibilis* and *irascibilis*, are taken from William of Moerbeke's translation of Aristotle's *epithumetike* and *thumike*. These words have negative connotations in their etymological origins and associations that can obscure the meaning that Aquinas assigns them. The confusion escalates in English because only the negative connotations have survived for the rarely used cognates "concupiscible" and "irascible". Many contemporary scholars have proposed other translations because of the obscurity of these words and their negative associations. Alternative translations for "concupiscible" include: desirous, impulse, mild, affective, resting and pleasure. Alternative translations for irascible include: aggressive, contending, striving and utility. See: Lombardo E. Nicholas, *The Logic of Desire. Aquinas on Emotion*, The Catholic University of America Press, Washington, D.C. 2011, p54.

⁶⁹¹ See: ST part I-II, Q 23, Art.1.

⁶⁹² See: ST part I, Q 81, Art.2.

⁶⁹³ See: Scheeben Mathias Joseph, *A manual of Catholic Theology. Based on Scheeben's „ dogmatik“* Volume 1, Joseph Wilhelm and Thomas B. Scannell, Kegan Paul trench Truebener & Co, London, 1906, p 420.

⁶⁹⁴ See: Lombardo E. Nicholas, *The Logic of Desire. Aquinas on Emotion*, The Catholic University of America Press, Washington, D.C. 2011, p54.

⁶⁹⁵ See: Fritz Cates Diana, *Aquinas on The Emotions. A Religious Ethical Inquiry*, Georgetown University Press, Washington, D.C., 2009, p134.

disturbing; but sometimes the soul encounters difficulty or struggle in obtaining something good or in fleeing from something evil, because it is beyond its natural power to do so easily⁶⁹⁶. Because the concupiscible passions include pleasure and sadness, and thus actually rest in objects, they are more diverse than the irascible passions, which only seek or avoid objects⁶⁹⁷.

2.2.1.1 Love as a Passion

The passion of love (*amor*) spawns the other concupiscible passions, just as the concupiscible taken as a whole, spawn the irascible passions⁶⁹⁸; consequently, love is the first of the concupiscible passions.⁶⁹⁹ Love is the response elicited by a good when it is apprehended as convenience, that is as suitable or agreeable, and it implies that there is some kind of similarity between the apprehender and the apprehended object⁷⁰⁰. Aquinas describes love as complacency in something desirable⁷⁰¹; “love is a certain dissonance of appetite with something apprehended as agreeable”,⁷⁰².

“Love is one species of inclination or appetite for the good”⁷⁰³. Love is the first movement of the will and of every appetitive power; Aquinas extends the concept of love so broadly, he is forced at times to speak rather mechanically think about it⁷⁰⁴; at the most general level, love is an aptitude or proportion of an appetite to the good.⁷⁰⁵ To love someone is, for example to will the good for that person⁷⁰⁶.

There are some difficulties in understanding Aquinas’s account of the passion of love; his descriptions of love are evocative but also elusive, and Aquinas employs multiple phrases to characterize the passion of love⁷⁰⁷: affinity with or aptness to some good⁷⁰⁸; a certain consonance with something agreeable⁷⁰⁹; affective union⁷¹⁰; a change caused in the

⁶⁹⁶ See: ST part I-II, Q 23, Art.1.

⁶⁹⁷ See: ST part I-II, Q 25, Art.1.

⁶⁹⁸ See: Lombardo E. Nicholas,. *The Logic of Desire. Aquinas on Emotion*, The Catholic University of America Press, Washington, D.C. 2011, p55.

⁶⁹⁹ See: ST part I-II, Q 25, Art.2.

⁷⁰⁰ See: ST part I-II, Q 27, Art.3.

⁷⁰¹ See: ST part I-II, Q 26, Art.2.

⁷⁰² ST part I-II, Q 29, Art.1.

⁷⁰³ Elmendorf J. John,. *Elements of Moral Theology. Based on The Summa Theology of St. Thomas Aquinas*, General Books LLC, Memphis, USA, 2012, p 14.

⁷⁰⁴ See: Pasnau Robert,. *Thomas Aquinas on Human Nature. A Philosophical Study of Summa Theologiae Ia 75-89*, University of Cambridge, 2002, p 242.

⁷⁰⁵ See: ST part I-II, Q 25, Art.2.

⁷⁰⁶ See: Pasnau Robert,. *Thomas Aquinas on Human Nature. A Philosophical Study of Summa Theologiae Ia 75-89*, University of Cambridge, 2002, p 242.

⁷⁰⁷ See: Lombardo E. Nicholas,. *The Logic of Desire. Aquinas on Emotion*, The Catholic University of America Press, Washington, D.C. 2011, p55. See also: ST part I-II, Q 23, Art.4; Q 25.2; 26.1; 27.1; 27.4;28.1;29.1;29.2;32.3.

⁷⁰⁸ See: ST part I-II, Q 27, Art.4.

⁷⁰⁹ See: ST part I-II, Q 29, Art.1.

appetite by the appetible object⁷¹¹; movement towards good⁷¹²; complacency in some good⁷¹³; complacency in something desirable⁷¹⁴. These phrases communicate a general sense of Aquinas's account of the passion of love, which seems plausible enough, considered itself, however, because these phrases suggest features also associated with desire and pleasure⁷¹⁵, it is difficult to grasp what precisely these expressions could signify concretely, making them different from the psychological phenomena already staked out by the passions of desire and pleasure, and their respective striving and resting⁷¹⁶.

To discern the unity among the diverse types of love (*amor*) permits one to say precisely what the following have in common: a stone's love of downward motion, a dog's love of his master, a young man's love of his fiancée, a woman's love of chocolate, a drinker's love of wine, a mathematician's love of calculus, and a philosopher's love of wisdom; for each case, love names a basic inclination or adaptation of the subject toward an object is apprehended as naturally suitable to it⁷¹⁷.

One way to clarify Aquinas's account of love is to focus on its functional role in relation to other concupiscible passions, for Aquinas specifies that the first principle of appetite movement is love, which is the first inclination of the appetite toward the attaining of a good⁷¹⁸. Even though love is a movement in a general sense, love is not a movement in the more specific sense of being a movement toward a good; desire is the movement toward a good, while love is an inclination or a kind of complacency, as such, the principle of desire, pleasure, and the rest of the passions⁷¹⁹.

One might hold that one has to choose between rational love and sensitive love. These tendencies are amply attested in modern thought. To cite two examples: (1) Erich Fromm proposes that either love is something that requires knowledge and effort (i.e. an act of will) or it is a pleasant sensation that one experiences and falls into (i.e. a passion); (2) Kant argues in the first section of the *Grundlegung* that, as the activity of the good will, true love of neighbour occurs with no regard for the inclinations. In contrast to such positions, Thomas upholds the value of sensitive love. That Aquinas understands the importance of vindicating *amor* as a passion may be gathered from the fact that his defense appears in a gratuitous reply to an objection⁷²⁰.

⁷¹⁰ See: ST part I-II, Q 25, Art.2, ad 2.

⁷¹¹ See: ST part I-II, Q 26, Art.2.

⁷¹² See: ST part I-II, Q 29, Art.2.

⁷¹³ See: ST part I-II, Q 26, Art.1.

⁷¹⁴ Ibid., Art.2.

⁷¹⁵ The terms Aquinas uses to describe love convey a dual character that involves incipient enjoyment without excluding full enjoyment. Aquinas's choice of words underlines the role as the principle of both desire and enjoyment.

⁷¹⁶ See: Lombardo E. Nicholas,. *The Logic of Desire. Aquinas on Emotion*, The Catholic University of America Press, Washington, D.C. 2011, p58.

⁷¹⁷ See: Miner Robert,. *Thomas Aquinas on the Passions. A Study of Summa Theologiae 1a2ae 22-48*, Cambridge University Press, 2009, p 118.

⁷¹⁸ See: ST part I-II, Q 36, Art.2.

⁷¹⁹ See: Lombardo E. Nicholas,. *The Logic of Desire. Aquinas on Emotion*, The Catholic University of America Press, Washington, D.C. 2011, p59.

⁷²⁰ Miner Robert,. *Thomas Aquinas on the Passions. A Study of Summa Theologiae 1a2ae 22-48*, Cambridge University Press, 2009, p 121.

According to Aquinas, the reason why some held that even when applied to the will itself, the word love signifies something more divine than *dilection*, was because love denotes a passion, especially in so far as it is in the sensitive appetite; whereas *dilection*⁷²¹ presupposes the judgment of reason; but it is possible for man to tend to God by love, being as it were passively drawn by Him, more than he can possibly be drawn thereto by his reason; and consequently, love is more divine than *dilection*⁷²².

The movement of love has twofold tendency: towards the good which a man wishes to someone, to himself or to another, and towards that to which he wishes some good; here we find a primary and secondary division, since that which is loved with the love of friendship is loved simply and for itself; whereas that which is loved with the love of concupiscence, is loved, not simply and for itself, but for something else; however, love is not divided into friendship and concupiscence, but rather into love of friendship and love of concupiscence, because a friend is, properly speaking, one to whom we wish good; whereas we are said to desire, what we wish for ourselves⁷²³.

When friendship is based on usefulness or pleasure, a person does indeed wish his friend some good, and in this respect the character of friendship is preserved; but, since he refers this good further to his own pleasure or use, the result is that friendship of the useful or pleasant, in so far as it is connected with love of concupiscence, loses the character of true friendship⁷²⁴.

a) What Causes Love

“Knowledge, at least partial knowledge, is a pre-requisite and cause of love”⁷²⁵. According to Aquinas, as a passion, love is caused by a desirable thing acting upon the appetite⁷²⁶; and “good is the cause of love, as being its object; but good is not the object of love except as apprehended, and love demands some apprehension of the good that is

⁷²¹ Council of Trent, the heavenly commandment of love is expressed by the word *dilection* rather than by the word *love*; for although *dilection* is a kind of love, yet is it not a simple love, but a love of choice and election, which sense the word itself conveys, as the glorious. For example: If we love a friend without preferring him before others, the friendship is simple; if we prefer him, then this friendship will be called *dilection*, as if we said love of election, because we choose this from amongst many things we love, and prefer it.

⁷²² See: ST part I-II, Q 26, Art.3, Obj 4.

⁷²³ *Ibid.*, Art.4.

⁷²⁴ *Ibid.*

⁷²⁵ Elmendorf J. John,. *Elements of Moral Theology*. Based on The Summa Theology of St. Thomas Aquinas, General Books LLC, Memphis, USA, 2012, p 14.

⁷²⁶ See: ST part I-II, Q 26, Art.2. “The appetite moves towards the realization of the appetible object, so that the movement ends where it began. Accordingly, the first change wrought in the appetite by the appetible object is called love, and is nothing else than complacency in that object: and from this complacency results a movement towards that same object, and this movement is desire.”

loved⁷²⁷. We read in Nicomachean ethics ix.12 that bodily sight is the beginning of sensitive love:

As for lovers the sight of the beloved is the thing they love most, and they prefer this sense to the others because on it love depends most for its being and for its origin, so for friends the most desirable thing is living together. For friendship is a partnership is a partnership, and as a man is to himself, so is he to his friend; now in his own case perceiving his being is desirable, and so therefore is perceiving his friends being, and perceiving is active when they live together, so it is natural that they aim at this⁷²⁸.

In like manner, the contemplation of spiritual beauty or goodness is the beginning of spiritual love; accordingly, knowledge is the cause of love for the same reason as good is, which can be loved only if known⁷²⁹. For something to cause love, it must be a good, since appetite is the inclination toward the good which completes its possessor; in order for the good to exert its causal power in beings with sensation, it must somehow be cognized; thus cognition is a cause of love; here Aquinas claims it his own, the Aristotelian doctrine that any act of cognition involves contact between things that are like one another in some respect; hence likeness is also a cause of love, since love names the appetite's first inclination towards the good, no other passion can be prior to love in the casual order⁷³⁰.

An evil is never loved except under the aspect of good; if one loves iniquity, then one loves it only, provided that one sees it leading to a good, such as pleasure or money⁷³¹. Because evil in itself is nothing, it lacks any direct casual power. In so far as it can bring about anything, it can do so only by stimulating some good⁷³²; and if likeness is to produce love it must be decisive in a person's apprehension; if this condition is absent, the likeness loses its power to generate love⁷³³.

In love, the tendency to undergo responsive appetitive motion takes the initial form of resting in the awareness that a perceived object is suitable to oneself; it takes the form of appreciating the object's attractive properties; it takes the form of resonating with pleasure in the presence of an object, to which one is already united by a sensible suitability, and by the apprehension of this suitability⁷³⁴.

⁷²⁷ See: ST part I-II, Q 27, Art.2.

⁷²⁸ Aristotle, *The Nicomachean Ethics*. Trans by David Ross, Oxford University Press, New York, 2009, p 181 (ix.12).

⁷²⁹ See: ST part I-II, Q 27, Art.2.

⁷³⁰ See: Miner Robert, *Thomas Aquinas on the Passions. A Study of Summa Theologiae 1a2ae 22-48*, Cambridge University Press, 2009, p 126. See also: ST part I-II, Q 27, Art.1- 4.

⁷³¹ *Ibid.*, 127; See also: ST part I-II, Q 27, Art.1, Obj. 1.

⁷³² *Ibid.*

⁷³³ *Ibid.*, 129.

⁷³⁴ See: Fritz Cates Diana, *Aquinas on The Emotions. A Religious Ethical Inquiry*, Georgetown University Press, Washington, D.C., 2009, p160; See also: ST part I-II, Q 26, Art.1.

b) Effects of Love

According to Aquinas, love has a wide range of psychological and physical effects. They are in order of appearance: union, mutual inhesion, ecstasy, zeal, wounding of the lover, and all things done by the lover⁷³⁵. Union has a threefold relation to love: there is a union which causes love, this is substantial union, regarding the love with which one loves oneself; while regarding the love with which one loves other things, is the union of likeness, and there is a union which is essentially love itself, which is according to the bond of affection and is similar to substantial union⁷³⁶. “Love is a certain agreement of the desire with that which is apprehended as harmonizing with self and beneficial to self”⁷³⁷.

The effect of mutual dwelling may be understood as referring both to the apprehensive and appetite power because the beloved is said to be in the lover⁷³⁸. As the name ecstasy⁷³⁹ would suggest it is a condition whereby the lover stands outside himself, it literally means that lovers go out of themselves into the beloved⁷⁴⁰. The treatment of zeal completes the effects of love; zeal is the natural effect and trustworthy sign of love; where zeal is lacking, it is probable that either no real love exists⁷⁴¹.

In respect to the material element in the passion of love, that is, a certain bodily change, it happens that love is hurtful, by reason of this change being excessive: just as it happens in the senses, and in every act of a power of the soul that is exercised through the change of some bodily organ⁷⁴². Every agent acts for an end, the end is the good desired and loved by each one⁷⁴³. “Since there are evidently more than one end, and we choose some of these (e.g. wealth, flutes, and in general instruments) for the sake of something else, clearly not all ends are final ends, but the chief good is evidently something final”⁷⁴⁴.

2.2.1.2 Hatred as Passion

To different beings the same thing may be lovable or hateful: in respect of the natural appetite, due to one and the same thing being naturally suitable to one being and

⁷³⁵ See: Miner Robert., Thomas Aquinas on the Passions. A Study of Summa Theologiae 1a2ae 22-48, Cambridge University Press, 2009, p 132. See also: ST part I-II, Q 28, Art.1- 6.

⁷³⁶ See: ST part I-II, Q 28, Art.1.

⁷³⁷ Elmendorf J. John., Elements of Moral Theology. Based on The Summa Theology of St. Thomas Aquinas, General Books LLC, Memphis, USA, 2012, p 14.

⁷³⁸ See: ST part I-II, Q 28, Art.2.

⁷³⁹ *ex* = out of + *stare* = to stand

⁷⁴⁰ See: Miner Robert., Thomas Aquinas on the Passions. A Study of Summa Theologiae 1a2ae 22-48, Cambridge University Press, 2009, p 135.

⁷⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 136.

⁷⁴² See: ST part I-II, Q 28, Art.5.

⁷⁴³ *Ibid.*, Art.6.

⁷⁴⁴ Aristotle., The Nicomachean Ethics. Trans by David Ross, Oxford University Press, New York, 2009, p 10 (i.7).

naturally unsuitable to another⁷⁴⁵. Love is a certain consonance of the appetite; hatred is a certain dissonance of the appetite⁷⁴⁶. Dissonance is not a thing in itself; it presupposes a prior harmony that has been altered or distorted; it exists, but only parasitically; hatred is a loathing that cannot exist, except in a being that loves the contrary of what is loathed; love, by contrast is an affinity for something that exists in itself; it does not require as a precondition the loathing of any other being.⁷⁴⁷

In any particular thing, it is necessary first to consider what is suitable to it, before considering what is repugnant to it; because something is repugnant to another, since it corrupts or impairs what is suitable to it; whence it is necessary that love is prior to hatred, and that nothing is hated, unless it is contrary to a suitable thing that is loved; accordingly, every hatred is caused by love⁷⁴⁸. Love of one thing is the cause of one's hating its contrary; this principle seems straightforward, that, we do not hate to be poor, unless we love money; and a dirty office does not bother us, unless we care about a clean workplace⁷⁴⁹.

No substance admits contrary qualities at one and the same moment; if one wants to be healthy, one necessarily does not want to be sick; but what about the student who generally wants to be healthy but hopes to wake up sick on a particular day. This suggests that a temporal index must be concluded within the principle; one can not wish to be healthy and sick at the same time⁷⁵⁰. And this principle can be restated: if a person hates to possess one quality, he necessarily loves to possess its contrary; thus hatred of disease is caused by love of health⁷⁵¹.

When Aquinas says that, 'it is for the same reason that something is loved and its contrary is hated', we must understand the "something" with respect to a certain quality that is judged uniquely desirable for a particular thing to have, which corresponds to our experience⁷⁵². If a person hates to possess a certain quality, he necessarily loves either: 1) to have the contrary quality, if the quality does not admit intermediates, or, 2) to have either the contrary quality or a negation of that quality that approaches, but is not identical to the contrary quality⁷⁵³.

⁷⁴⁵ See: ST part I-II, Q29, Art.1.

⁷⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁷⁴⁷ See: Miner Robert., Thomas Aquinas on the Passions. A Study of Summa Theologiae 1a2ae 22-48, Cambridge University Press, 2009, p 141.

⁷⁴⁸ See: ST part I-II, Q29, Art.2. We cannot purely and simply hate ourselves, although we can will things that are bad for us. The extreme case would be suicide. Aquinas claims that suicide is not self-hatred "absolutely speaking" (Q.29.Art4.).It cannot be, since it is motivated by self-love.

⁷⁴⁹ See: Miner Robert., Thomas Aquinas on the Passions. A Study of Summa Theologiae 1a2ae 22-48, Cambridge University Press, 2009, p 142.

⁷⁵⁰ Ibid.

⁷⁵¹ Ibid., 143.

⁷⁵² See: ST part I-II, Q29, Art.2.

⁷⁵³ See: Miner Robert., Thomas Aquinas on the Passions. A Study of Summa Theologiae 1a2ae 22-48, Cambridge University Press, 2009, p 143.

According to Aquinas, passion does not move the will, but only indirectly, in two ways: first, the passions simply distract the will from its own operations; when one power of the soul is intently focused, the rest is distracted; second, the passions impede the judgement and apprehension of reason, and this in turn affects the will, which by nature always follows the judgement of reason⁷⁵⁴. Incontinence raises the further question of how it is possible for agents to act intentionally against what they know to be right; this is the phenomenon that recent philosophers refer to as weakness of will; since one wants to withhold deciding for a moment, on what role the will plays in such cases, one speaks for now of acting against reason⁷⁵⁵. According to Aquinas: since the will concerns the good or the apparent good, the will is never moved towards the bad, unless that which is not good somehow appears good to reason; therefore, the will never tends towards the bad, unless there is some ignorance or error of reason⁷⁵⁶.

2.2.1.3 Desire as a Passion

The function of an appetite power is to produce appetites or inclinations: the operation of an appetite power is completed when the agent is inclined towards its object; in the case of human being these inclinations come to the form of desires⁷⁵⁷; “because the pleasure intended causes desire and love”⁷⁵⁸.

The appetible object moves the appetite, introducing itself, as it were, into its intention, while the appetite moves towards the realization of the appetible object, so that the movement ends where it began. Accordingly, the first change wrought in the appetite by the appetible object is called love, and is nothing else than complacency results of a movement towards that same object, and this movement is desire⁷⁵⁹.

Aquinas often insists that it is the whole human being which moves, thinks, perceives, and so forth; but it is useful nevertheless, to discriminate between different internal powers; so we can say, that the will produces inclination and that those inclinations in turn lead some further agent to produce movement; this further agent is our internal motive power, the locomotive power that appears in Aristotle’s canonical list of the soul’s five capacities⁷⁶⁰.

⁷⁵⁴ See: ST part I-II, Q71, Art.1.

⁷⁵⁵ See: Pasnau Robert., Thomas Aquinas on Human Nature. A Philosophical Study of Summa Theologiae 1a 75-89, University of Cambridge, 2002, p245.

⁷⁵⁶ See: ST part I-II, Q71, Art.1.

⁷⁵⁷ Pasnau Robert., Thomas Aquinas on Human Nature. A Philosophical Study of Summa Theologiae 1a 75-89, Cambridge University Press, USA, 2002, p 200. For a detailed explanation on “desire” see the first chapter pages 12-13.

⁷⁵⁸ ST part I-II, Q 25, Art.2.

⁷⁵⁹ See: ST part I-II, Q 26, Art.2.

⁷⁶⁰ See: ST part I, Q 78, Art.1. (The soul’s five capacities are the vegetative, the sensitive, the appetitive, the locomotive and the intellectual.) *Appetitive* power is understood as in respect of which the soul is referred to something extrinsic as to an end, which is first in intention, whereas the *locomotive* power is understood as in

“Whereas cognitive powers are found only in higher order living beings, everything in nature has appetite”⁷⁶¹.

Desire is the movement of active directional tending in relation to something from which one is separated; when human beings or nonhuman beings apprehend a sensible object as suitable for them in some respect, they are typically drawn toward the object interiorly, in some cases they approach the object exteriorly or bodily by moving in the object’s direction⁷⁶².

An agent moves only from the intention for an end; `for if an agent were not determined to some effect, it would no more do one thing rather than another; so for it to produce a determined effect, it is necessary that it be determined to something certain, which has the character of an end⁷⁶³. On the sensory level, acting for an end does not imply acting for a reason as determined by an operation of the intellect, for that sort of action is reserved for a being in respect of his or her intellectual appetite; On a sensory level, acting for an end simply implies acting, because one apprehends as attractive the prospect of uniting or interacting in some way a sensible object; ordinarily, an animal seeks to unite with an object by acting on the object or allowing itself to be acted upon , so that the animal is perfected in some respect⁷⁶⁴.

A sensory desire is a state of the soul, but it is more precisely a state of the soul-body composite, and Aquinas holds that acts of sensory apprehension and appetite both involve bodily transmutation⁷⁶⁵. Of necessity, every human being desires happiness, and the general notion of happiness consists in the perfect good. However, since good is the object of the will, the perfect good of a human being is that which entirely satisfies their will⁷⁶⁶.

2.2.1.4 Aversion as a Passion

Aquinas posits a threefold structure not only with respect to the motions of love, desire, and delight, but also with respect to other appetitive motions, all of which are related to love, desire or delight; specifically, with respect to the concupiscible motions that regard an evil simply apprehended as such, he identifies the parallel motions of hatred, aversion, and

respect of which the soul is referred to something extrinsic as to the term of its operation and movement, for everyone is moved for the purpose of realizing its desires and inclinations.

⁷⁶¹ Pasnau Robert,. Thomas Aquinas on Human Nature. A Philosophical Study of Summa theologiae 1a 75-89, Cambridge University Press, USA, 2002, p 201.

⁷⁶² See: Fritz Cates Diana,. Aquinas on The Emotions. A Religious Ethical Inquiry, Georgetown University Press, Washington, D.C., 2009, p135. It can be defined also with reference to facial expression, posture, and the like, but our interest here is with relationship between desire and exterior motion in the form of action.

⁷⁶³ ST part I-II, Q1, Art.2.

⁷⁶⁴ See: Fritz Cates Diana,. Aquinas on The Emotions. A Religious Ethical Inquiry, Georgetown University Press, Washington, D.C., 2009, p135. See also: : ST part I-II, Q28, Art.1 & Q 31, Art.1.

⁷⁶⁵ See: ST part I-II, Q22, Art.1&2.

⁷⁶⁶ See: ST part I-II, Q5, Art.8.

sorrow⁷⁶⁷. Aquinas did not write a section of *Summa Theologiae* as a discussion of sensory aversion; he simply constructs this form of appetitive motion as the contrary of sensory desire⁷⁶⁸.

An aversion is a motion of tending away from a sensible object that one apprehends to be bad or unsuitable for oneself; more specifically, it is a motion of being repelled by or withdrawing from the prospect of uniting with an object in a hurtful way and thus being hurt or otherwise diminished⁷⁶⁹. Within the realm of the concupiscible, the object of an appetitive motion is regarded by the subject of the motion as simply good or evil simply rather than as posing a difficulty that requires a spirited response⁷⁷⁰.

An animal apprehends that some object is present to it in the sense of being near at hand and poised to unite with it in a way that is detrimental to the animal's life, well-being, or pleasure⁷⁷¹. Under this impression, the animal tends away from the object and the prospect of hurtful union⁷⁷². An aversion is structurally similar to a desire, except that an aversion regards an evil, rather than good, and it thus involves tending away from the object, rather than toward it⁷⁷³. An aversion commonly functions as a principle of aversive action, but one can undergo an aversion without fleeing or showing other external signs of the aversion; an aversion is more fundamentally a state of the soul, and it is an interior appetitive motion of which a human being or an animal is aware⁷⁷⁴.

2.2.1.5 Pleasure as a Passion

“Pleasure is a satisfaction or gratification of senses, emotions, mind or will having or using a good proportionate to a conscious power; it is a movement by which the soul as a whole is consciously brought into its normal state of being”⁷⁷⁵. Two things are requisite for pleasure: namely, the attainment of the suitable good and knowledge of this attainment; each of these consists in a kind of operation: because actual knowledge is an operation, and the attainment of the suitable good is by means of an operation; moreover the proper operation itself is a suitable good.⁷⁷⁶

⁷⁶⁷ See: ST part I-II, Q23, Art.2&4.

⁷⁶⁸ See: ST part I, Q81, Art.2; ST part I-II, Q23, Art.2&3.

⁷⁶⁹ See: Fritz Cates Diana,. *Aquinas on The Emotions. A Religious Ethical Inquiry*, Georgetown University Press, Washington, D.C., 2009, p143.

⁷⁷⁰ See: ST part I, Q81, Art.2.

⁷⁷¹ See: ST part I, Q35, Art.1 ad 3. Aquinas needs to say something like this in order to distinguish aversion (the interior motion behind the simple flight response) from fear (the interior motion behind the fright response). It is particularly when one is unable easily to turn away from a hurtful union that fear arises.

⁷⁷² See: ST part I, Q81, Art.2;

⁷⁷³ See: Fritz Cates Diana,. *Aquinas on The Emotions. A Religious Ethical Inquiry*, Georgetown University Press, Washington, D.C., 2009, p143.

⁷⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, 144.

⁷⁷⁵ Wuellner Bernard,. *Dictionary of Scholastic Philosophy. editions scholasticae*, 2011, p 92.

⁷⁷⁶ See: ST part I-II, Q32, Art.1.

Pleasure is the typical sign of virtue: a person who does what a virtuous person would do, but habitually fails to take pleasure in such actions, is continent rather than virtuous⁷⁷⁷. Pleasure is intimately connected with human nature: “in educating the young we steer them by the rudders of pleasure and pain”⁷⁷⁸.

In Aristotle’s defense, one may say that the *Ethics* accurately identifies some important characteristics of pleasure. Pleasures follow upon and complete activity; they are relative to character; they vary according to the kinds of beings; they differ even for the same person according to his condition. But none of this, as valuable as it may be, touches the question about pleasure’s essence. Arguably, the *Ethics* says far more about what pleasure is not – it is not a quality, not a motion, not a becoming, not the filling of a lack, not an activity, not thought, not perception – than what it is⁷⁷⁹.

According to Aquinas, pleasure is a passion in the strict sense and therefore a motion⁷⁸⁰, but it is also a terminus of motion and does not essentially occur in time⁷⁸¹. According to Aquinas, a twofold movement is to be observed: one according to the intention of the end, and this belongs to the appetite; the other, according to the execution, and this belongs to the external operation; although in him who has already gained the good, the execution ceases, yet the movement of the appetitive faculty does not cease⁷⁸².

The *Nicomachean Ethics* appears to deny that pleasure is a motion (see 10.4,1174a19). In the *Rhetoric*, however, Aristotle seems to leave room for the idea (1.II, 1369b33). In the *ST*, Aquinas sides with the perspective of the *Rhetoric*, quoting its dictum that “pleasure is a certain motion of the soul”. The apprehension of something as sensibly good moves the appetite: From this perception is caused a certain motion of the soul in the sensitive appetite, and this motion is pleasure⁷⁸³.

Aquinas distinguishes between natural and rational concupiscence, some pleasures are natural and some are not natural but are accompanied by reason. That is to say, certain pleasures are bodily and certain are of the soul: bodily pleasures require nothing but sensitive apprehension, which is an attribute of irrational nature, whereas rational animals experience both bodily pleasure and intellectual joy⁷⁸⁴.

Intellectual pleasures are greater than sensible pleasures, for man takes much more delight in knowing something by understanding it, than in knowing something by perceiving

⁷⁷⁷ See: Miner Robert,. *Thomas Aquinas on the Passions. A Study of Summa Theologiae 1a2ae 22-48*, Cambridge University Press, 2009, p 161.

⁷⁷⁸ See: Aristotle,. *The Nicomachean Ethics*. Trans.by Ross David, Oxford University Press, New York, 1980, p135 (X.1, 1172a22).

⁷⁷⁹ Miner Robert,. *Thomas Aquinas on the Passions. A Study of Summa Theologiae 1a2ae 22-48*, Cambridge University Press, 2009, p 161.

⁷⁸⁰ See: *ST* part I-II, Q31, Art.1.

⁷⁸¹ See: *ST* part I-II, Q32, Art.2. Change is pleasant to us because our nature is changeable; for which reason that which is suitable to us at one time is not suitable at another, thus to warm himself at a fire is suitable to man in winter and not in summer.

⁷⁸² See: *ST* part I-II, Q31, Art.1, ad 3.

⁷⁸³ Miner Robert,. *Thomas Aquinas on the Passions. A Study of Summa Theologiae 1a2ae 22-48*, Cambridge University Press, 2009, p 163. Aquinas does not identify pleasure with the apprehension itself, but rather with the motion of the sensitive appetite following upon the apprehension of having attained a suitable good.

⁷⁸⁴ See: *ST* part I-II, Q31, Art.3.

it with his senses; when intellectual spiritual pleasure is compared with sensible bodily pleasure then, absolutely speaking, spiritual pleasure is greater.⁷⁸⁵ However, bodily pleasures are more vehement for three reasons: firstly, because sensible things are more known to us than intelligible things; secondly, because sensible pleasures, through being passions of the sensitive appetitive are accompanied by some alteration in the body (whereas this does not occur in the spiritual pleasures, except by reason of a certain reaction of the superior appetite on the lower); thirdly, because bodily pleasures are sought as remedies for bodily defect or troubles where various grief arise⁷⁸⁶.

“According to Aquinas, the pleasures most in accord with rational nature are those which result from contemplating the truth and doing works of virtue”⁷⁸⁷. The person who tries to have all pleasures is doomed; he seeks to instantiate a metaphysical impossibility, since some bodily pleasures necessarily exclude others; some pleasures must be chosen and others forgone⁷⁸⁸.

Pleasure includes two things: rest in the good, and perception of this rest; as to the former, since it is more perfect to contemplate the known truth than to seek for the unknown, the contemplation of what we know is in itself more pleasing than the research of what we do not know; nevertheless as to the second, it seems that research is sometimes more pleasing accidentally in so far as it proceeds from a greater desire, for greater desire is awakened when we are conscious of our ignorance, and this is why man takes the greatest pleasure in finding or learning things for the first time⁷⁸⁹.

a) Cause of Pleasure

Attainment of the suitable good and the cognition of the suitable good are the two requisites for pleasure: each of these consists in a kind of operation, because actual knowledge is an operation, and the attainment of suitable good is by means of an operation, and

⁷⁸⁵ See: ST part I-II, Q31, Art.5. The superiority of intelligible pleasures emerges from considering the three things which are required for pleasure: they are 1) “the conjoined good”, that is present to the soul; 2) “that to which the good is conjoined”, that is the power of the soul united to the good; 3) “the conjunction itself”, the relation between 1 & 2. For spiritual good is both greater and more beloved than bodily good: a sign of which is that, men abstain from even the greatest bodily pleasures, rather than suffer loss of honor which is an intellectual good.

⁷⁸⁶ Ibid. The reason why more seek bodily pleasures is because sensible goods are known better and more generally, and because people need pleasures as remedies for many kinds of sorrow and sadness, and since the majority cannot attain spiritual pleasures which are proper to the virtuous, hence many people turn aside to seek those of the body.

⁷⁸⁷ Miner Robert,. Thomas Aquinas on the Passions. A Study of Summa Theologiae 1a2ae 22-48, Cambridge University Press, 2009, p 151.

⁷⁸⁸ Ibid., 172.

⁷⁸⁹ See: ST part I-II, Q31, Art.8, ad 2.

moreover, a proper operation itself is a suitable good⁷⁹⁰. The more is the ultimate end, the greater is our enjoyment⁷⁹¹.

Aquinas observes that whenever anything gives us pleasure, it does so because it is present in a certain measure; when that measure is exceeded, the thing no longer provides pleasure; the restoration of pleasure, in such case, can only come about by a change, namely by the removal of the thing whose measure has been exceeded⁷⁹². “But the pleasures that do not involve pains do not admit of excess”⁷⁹³.

Doing good to others may give pleasure in consideration of the following reason: because it confers good on another, it unites to another person in love, it expects a reward either from God or from the person, and inconsideration of the principle upon which the act is done; moreover expectation leads to hope and hope is a cause of pleasure⁷⁹⁴. Doing good to another may arouse in a man an imagination of abundant good existing in him, from which he can share with others; and thus men take pleasure in their children, in their own works, as things by which they share their own good⁷⁹⁵.

In consideration of the love’s intentional object, the intentional object of desire is an absent good, and the intentional object of pleasure is a present good; for Aquinas, love’s intentional object somehow incorporates both present and absent goods, and yet this intentional object cannot be identified with either category, otherwise love would simply be reduced to desire or pleasure, since passions are identified by their intentional object⁷⁹⁶. Only for love and hatred does Aquinas avoid the clarification of the nature of the intentional object with regard to presence and absence; the object of all the other passions is characterized by either presence or absence. As Aquinas notes, passions are distinguished by their objects.⁷⁹⁷

b) Effects of Pleasure

According to Aquinas, breadth is a dimension of the bodily magnitude; expansion denotes a kind of movement towards breadth, and it belongs to two things requisite for

⁷⁹⁰ See: ST part I-II, Q32, Art.1.

⁷⁹¹ Pasnau Robert., Thomas Aquinas on Human Nature. A Philosophical Study of Summa Theologiae 1a 75-89, Cambridge University Press, USA, 2002, p 242.

⁷⁹² See: Miner Robert., Thomas Aquinas on the Passions. A Study of Summa Theologiae 1a2ae 22-48, Cambridge University Press, 2009, p 174.

⁷⁹³ Aristotle.,The Nicomachean Ethics. Trans.by Ross David, Oxford University Press, New York, 1980, p 141(VII.14).

⁷⁹⁴ See: ST part I-II, Q32, Art.6.

⁷⁹⁵ Ibid.

⁷⁹⁶ See: Lombardo E Nicholas., The Logic of Desire. Aquinas on Emotion, The Catholic University of America Press, Washington ,D.C. 2001, p61.

⁷⁹⁷ See: ST part I-II, Q30, Art.2. However Aquinas distinguishes love and desire not by object, but by the object’s effect on the appetite- that is whether the object adapts the appetite to itself or attracts the appetite to itself - and so sidesteps any clarification of the precise nature of love’s intentional object. When the good is absent it leads to desire and when the good is present it leads to pleasure.

pleasure: one of these is on the part of the apprehensive power, which is cognizant of the conjunction with some suitable good, and as the result of this apprehension, man perceives that he has magnitude of the spiritual order, and in this respect, man's mind is said to be magnified or expanded by pleasure; the other requisite for pleasure is on the part of appetitive power, which acquiesces in the pleasurable object, and rests therein, offering as it were, to enfold it within itself, and thus man's affection is expanded by pleasure, as though it surrendered itself to hold within itself the object of pleasure⁷⁹⁸.

“When the appetitive power rests in the good, the affections of man are enlarged by pleasure”⁷⁹⁹. According to Aquinas, the most powerful agent for opening the heart's doors is joy; by expanding the affections, spiritual joys from this life prepare the heart to receive still greater pleasures in the next⁸⁰⁰. The term heart in the verse from Isaiah: “Thou shalt see and abound, thy heart shall wonder and be enlarged”⁸⁰¹, does not refer to any physical organ. Why is this expansion of the heart is so important? In order to attain the ultimate end, the enjoyment of God, and our heart must be opened; “he that takes pleasure in a thing holds it fast, by clinging to it with all his might, but he opens his heart to it that he may enjoy it perfectly”⁸⁰².

Moreover, they (Pleasure and pain) particularly admit of much uncertainty. Some people say that pleasure is a good, while others, on the contrary, maintain it is something very evil-some of them because they are convinced, and others because they think it better for human living to declare pleasure an evil, though it is not-for most are disposed to it and are in fact slaves of pleasure. Therefore they are to be induced to the opposite, since in this way they will attain the mean⁸⁰³.

If someone censuring all pleasure is seen to give way to a pleasure, he might give the impression that all pleasure ought to be chosen; the common people cannot determine by distinguishing this as good and that as evil, but without discrimination they accept as good what appears good in one instance.⁸⁰⁴

There is a distinction between pleasure in reality and pleasure in memory: when a person finds herself in a frame of mind that corresponds to some remembered pleasure, she naturally desires to experience it again, but if the present good is only incompletely possessed, then the pleasure generated by partial attainment of the good will generate desire for the

⁷⁹⁸ See: ST part I-II, Q33, Art.1.

⁷⁹⁹ Miner Robert,. Thomas Aquinas on the Passions. A Study of Summa Theologiae 1a2ae 22-48, Cambridge University Press, 2009, p 178.

⁸⁰⁰ Ibid., 179.

⁸⁰¹ Isaiah, 9.5.

⁸⁰² ST part I-II, Q33, Art.1, ad3.

⁸⁰³ Thomas Aquinas,. Commentary on Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics. Trans. By C.I. Litzinger, Dumb Ox Books, Notre Dame, Indiana 1964, p 589. (1172a27-33)

⁸⁰⁴ Ibid., 591.

additional pleasure that is promised by a fuller possession of the thing⁸⁰⁵; since our attainment of good is typically successive, it happens accidentally that our actual experience of pleasure causes desire in itself; while the last end is perfect in itself, our possession of it is successive and incomplete: one does not have it immediately, but acquires it little by little⁸⁰⁶.

Bodily pleasures cause no desire in themselves, once their natural limit has been reached; spiritual pleasures, by contrast, never grow beyond the natural condition, but rather perfect nature⁸⁰⁷. “A person who experiences genuine contemplative pleasure will thirst for more of the same”⁸⁰⁸. To underscore this point, Aquinas quotes scripture, “they that drink me shall yet thirst”⁸⁰⁹.

Bodily pleasures hinder the use of reason: firstly by distracting the reason, because human beings attend often to that which pleases, secondly by being contrary to reason, because some pleasures (especially those that are in excess) are contrary to the order of reason, and thirdly by fettering the reason – in so far as bodily pleasure is followed by a certain alteration in the body, greater even than in the other passions, in proportion as the appetite is more vehemently affected towards a present than towards an absent thing⁸¹⁰. However, appropriate pleasures increase activity⁸¹¹.

c) Good and Evil Pleasures

“The passions are in themselves neither good nor bad, since in man good and evil are determined according to the reason. Hence the passion, considered in themselves can be good as well as evil, according as they can correspond with the reason or be contrary to it”⁸¹². According to Aquinas, some pleasures are good and some pleasures are evil, because pleasure is a repose of the appetitive power in some loved good, and resulting from some operation: for good and evil in the moral order depend on agreement or disagreement with reason, and in considering the actions, some of which are good some evil; the temperate man does not shun all pleasures except those that are immoderate and contrary to reason⁸¹³.

⁸⁰⁵ See: Miner Robert,. Thomas Aquinas on the Passions. A Study of Summa Theologiae 1a2ae 22-48, Cambridge University Press, 2009, p 179.

⁸⁰⁶ See: ST part I-II, Q33, Art.2. It may happen that what is actually present is not perfectly possessed, and this may be on the part of the thing possessed, or on the part of the possessor; on the part of the thing possessed, this happens through the thing possessed not being a simultaneous whole, wherefore one obtains possession of it successively.

⁸⁰⁷ Ibid.

⁸⁰⁸ Miner Robert,. Thomas Aquinas on the Passions. A Study of Summa Theologiae 1a2ae 22-48, Cambridge University Press, 2009, p 180.

⁸⁰⁹ Eccl. 24,29.

⁸¹⁰ See: ST part I-II, Q33, Art.3.

⁸¹¹ Aristotle,.The Nicomachean Ethics. Trans.by Ross David, Oxford University Press, New York, 1980, p 190(10.5, 1175a36).

⁸¹² Pieper Josef,. The Human Wisdom of ST.Thomas. A Breviary of Philosophy from the works of St. Thomas Aquinas, Trans. by, Maclaren Drostan, Ignatius Press San Francisco, London, 2002,p 60.

⁸¹³ See: ST part I-II, Q34, Art.1.

There are actually pleasures that involve no pain or appetite (e.g. those of contemplation) the nature in such case not being defective at all. That the others are incidental is indicated by the fact that men do not enjoy the things that are pleasing without qualification, in the latter the contraries of these as well; for then they enjoy even sharp and bitter things, none of which is pleasant either by nature or without qualification. And so it is the same with the pleasure; for as pleasant things differ, so do the pleasures arising from them⁸¹⁴.

The virtuous and useful depend on accordance with reason, and consequently, nothing is virtuous or useful without being good; but the pleasant depends on agreement with the appetite, which tends sometimes to that which is discordant to reason; consequently, not every object of pleasure is good in the moral order which depends on the order of reason⁸¹⁵. To evaluate any pleasure as good or evil, one must examine both the operation and the good; good and evil in moral matters depend upon the relation of the attained good to reason; if the attained good agrees with reason, then the resulting pleasure will be good; if it is discordant with it, then the corresponding pleasure will not be good⁸¹⁶.

Moral goodness or malice depends chiefly on the will, and it is chiefly from the end that we discern whether the will is good or evil; all pleasures are uniform in the point of their being the repose of the appetite in something good: and in this respect, pleasure can be a rule or measure; because that man is good, whose will rests in the true good, and that man is evil, whose will rests in evil⁸¹⁷.

2.2.1.6 Sorrow as a Passion

Of all passions, sorrow or sadness is most properly said to be a passion; perhaps because the soul is most violently acted upon when it suffers, the phenomena denoted by sorrow and suffering overlap considerably⁸¹⁸. “Just as two things are requisite for pleasure namely, conjunction with good and perception of this conjunction; so also two things are requisite for pain, namely conjunction with some evil and perception of this conjunction”⁸¹⁹. Sorrow is a painful motion of the soul; we speak of pain of the body, because the cause of pain is in the body: as when we suffer something hurtful to the body; but the movement of pain is always in the soul; since body cannot feel the pain, unless the soul feels it⁸²⁰.

⁸¹⁴ Aristotle, *The Nicomachean Ethics*. Trans. by Ross David, Oxford University Press, New York, 1980, p 136(7.12, 1153a1-8).

⁸¹⁵ See: ST part I-II, Q34, Art.2.

⁸¹⁶ See: Miner Robert, *Thomas Aquinas on the Passions. A Study of Summa Theologiae 1a2ae 22-48*, Cambridge University Press, 2009, p 183.

⁸¹⁷ See: ST part I-II, Q34, Art.4. The good and virtuous person is he who rejoices in works of virtue, the evil person is he who rejoices in evil works.

⁸¹⁸ See: Miner Robert, *Thomas Aquinas on the Passions. A Study of Summa Theologiae 1a2ae 22-48*, Cambridge University Press, 2009, p 188.

⁸¹⁹ ST part I-II, Q35, Art.1.

⁸²⁰ *Ibid.*

There is a relationship that exists between a person and a given sensible object, whether the person is aware of the relationship or not, namely the aptitude of the person and the object to act on each other, and to be acted upon in determinate ways; with respect to certain interactions, the aptitude is a negative one for the person, that is, in some instances the person stands in relation to an object that has the ability to unite with the person in ways that injure the person or deprive of a good⁸²¹. If the evil conjunction of an actual union occurs anyway, and the person is deprived of a good, the person experiences pain at the awareness of this deprivation and experiences sorrow⁸²². “Of all the passions, sadness causes the most injury to the soul”⁸²³.

a) What Causes Sorrow

Aquinas has identified the basic cause of sorrow as the apprehension of a present evil; the primary subjective causes of sorrow are: the apprehension of a present evil, the presence of concupiscence, and the desire for unity. Sorrow is not simply privation of good but the apprehension of evil as such. The objective cause of sorrow is isolating the conditions under which an irresistible greater power exists outside the self that prevents the experience of pleasure; it is more about withdrawal of a good which one has already experienced⁸²⁴.

“Hatred, aversion, and sorrow form a triad parallel to love, desire, and delight; hatred, aversion, and sorrow are three moments in what is commonly a seamless process of tending”⁸²⁵. When a person has lost a genuine good, something bad has happened to him; but to comprehend the loss of the good as an evil, requires an additional movement; it is possible that he does not see the loss of the good as a loss, or that while he sees it as a loss he judges it to be compensated by the acquisition of a greater good; however in a person who both loses a good and comprehends that loss as an evil, the passion of sorrow necessarily follows⁸²⁶. Because comprehends of the lost good as an evil is required for the production of sorrow, the cause of sorrow or pain is more properly the conjoined evil than the lost good⁸²⁷.

When hope is removed through the presence of an impediment, then concupiscence causes pain and sorrow; however a person sorrows more about the withdrawal of a present good, in which the person has already taken pleasure, than about a future good that the person

⁸²¹ See: Fritz Cates Diana,. Aquinas on The Emotions. A Religious Ethical Inquiry, Georgetown University Press, Washington, D.C., 2009, p147.

⁸²² See: ST part I-II, Q36, Art.1.

⁸²³ Pieper Josef,. The Human Wisdom of ST.Thomas. A Breviary of Philosophy from the works of St. Thomas Aquinas, Trans. by, Maclaren Drostan, Ignatius Press San Francisco, London, 2002,p 61.

⁸²⁴ See: Miner Robert,. Thomas Aquinas on the Passions. A Study of Summa Theologiae 1a2ae 22-48, Cambridge University Press, 2009, p 197; See: ST part I-II, Q36, Art.1-4.

⁸²⁵ Fritz Cates Diana,. Aquinas on The Emotions. A Religious Ethical Inquiry, Georgetown University Press, Washington, D.C., 2009, p148.

⁸²⁶ Ibid., 198.

⁸²⁷ See: ST part I-II, Q36, Art.1.

desires to have⁸²⁸. Evil may be no existing thing, but this does not mean that I cannot end up coming to be pained or saddened by evil, since a privation can be thought of and recognized for what it is, whether present or past⁸²⁹.

b) Remedies for Sorrow

Aquinas considers five remedies for pain and sorrow; pleasure is the most basic remedy for sorrow, and there are three activities which bring about the replacement of sorrow by pleasure: tears and groans, the sympathy of friends, and contemplation of the truth; if contemplating truth does not avail, then sleep and baths may be appropriate⁸³⁰.

Pleasure is the remedy for sorrow; any pleasure offers a remedy for the mitigation of any sorrow, no matter where it comes from; the particular pleasure need not be specifically contrary to the particular sorrow; in the long term, the pleasure may be worse for the person than the sorrow it mitigates, nonetheless, pleasures are always effective while they last⁸³¹. The perception of the present moves more strongly than the memory of the past, and since love of self is more persistent than love of another, it is the pleasure that finally drives out the sorrow⁸³².

For the very presence of friends is pleasant, both in good fortune and also in bad, since grief is lightened when friends sorrow with us. Hence one might ask whether they share as it were our burden, or without that happening- their presence by its pleasantness, and thought of their grieving with us, make our pain less⁸³³.

“The qualities Aquinas attributes to the passion of love can be interpreted as a combination of apprehension, desire, and pleasure: apprehension subsuming the attentiveness of love; desire subsuming the movement of love; and pleasure subsuming the complacency of love”⁸³⁴. When friends of a person are sorrowful for him, he perceives that he is loved by them; this is pleasurable; since every pleasure mitigates sorrow, it follows that a sympathetic friend mitigates sorrows⁸³⁵.

The key to the elimination of sorrow is pleasure; Aquinas affirms this psychological truth without any suggestion that sorrow invariably requires remediation; on the contrary, in light of sorrow’s power to transform trivial voluptuaries into noble lovers of wisdom, not all

⁸²⁸ Ibid., Art.2.

⁸²⁹ See: Davies Brian,. Thomas Aquinas’s Summa Theologiae. A Guide & Commentary, Oxford University Press, New York, 2014, p 182.

⁸³⁰ See: Miner Robert,. Thomas Aquinas on the Passions. A Study of Summa Theologiae 1a2ae 22-48, Cambridge University Press, 2009, p 203; See: ST part I-II, Q38, Art.1-5.

⁸³¹ Ibid.

⁸³² See: ST part I-II, Q38, Art.1, ad3.

⁸³³ Aristotle,. The Nicomachean Ethics. Trans.by Ross David, Oxford University Press, New York, 1980, p 188,(9.11,1171a30).

⁸³⁴ Lombardo E Nicholas,. The Logic of Desire. Aquinas on Emotion, The Catholic University of America Press, Washington ,D.C. 2001, p62.

⁸³⁵ See: ST part I-II, Q38, Art.3.

sorrows should be eliminated⁸³⁶; “hence the contemplation of truth assuages pain or sorrow and the more so, the more perfectly one is lover of wisdom; and therefore in the midst of tribulations men rejoice in the contemplation of Divine things and of future Happiness”⁸³⁷. “My brothers, consider it a great joy when trials of many kinds come upon you, for you well know that the testing of your faith produces perseverance and perseverance must complete its work so that you will become fully developed, complete, not deficient in any way”⁸³⁸.

2.2.1.7 Concupiscence as a Passion

Aquinas establishes the notion of concupiscence that is common to animal nature, as a motion of the sensitive appetite; metaphorically, one may speak of acts of the rational appetite as instances of concupiscence, but in the precise sense, concupiscence is a part of the irrational soul⁸³⁹. Concupiscence belongs to the united body and soul, because sense is a power seated in a bodily organ; therefore concupiscence is in the sensitive appetite, and in the concupiscible faculty⁸⁴⁰.

The nature of the motive power of the end, differs according to it being present or absent: when it is present, it causes the faculty to find rest in it, whereas, when it is absent, it causes the faculty to be moved towards it; therefore the object of sensible pleasure causes love, in as much as it tunes and confirms the appetite to itself, it causes concupiscence in as much as when absent, it draws the faculty to itself⁸⁴¹.

Concupiscence is the craving for pleasurable good; a thing is pleasurable in two ways: first, because it is suitable to the nature of humans and animals, for example, food and drink, which are suitable to pleasurable according to nature that are common and necessary; secondly, a thing is pleasurable because it is apprehended as something suitable and good, beyond that which nature requires; hence the former concupiscence are irrational, but the latter rational, and because different people reason differently, the latter is also called peculiar and acquired⁸⁴². Natural concupiscence cannot be infinite, for nature always tends to something finite and fixed, these bodily good when obtained do not last forever⁸⁴³; as Jesus said “whoever drinks of this water shall thirst again”⁸⁴⁴.

⁸³⁶ Miner Robert,. Thomas Aquinas on the Passions. A Study of Summa Theologiae 1a2ae 22-48, Cambridge University Press, 2009, p 207.

⁸³⁷ See: ST part I-II, Q38, Art.4.

⁸³⁸ James,. 1.2.

⁸³⁹ See: Miner Robert,. Thomas Aquinas on the Passions. A Study of Summa Theologiae 1a2ae 22-48, Cambridge University Press, 2009, p 171.

⁸⁴⁰ See: ST part I-II, Q30, Art.1. Pleasurable good is the object of concupiscence, not absolutely, but considered as absent: just as the sensible, considered as past, is the object of the memory; for the particular conditions diversify the species of passions and even the powers of sensitive part, which regards the particular things.

⁸⁴¹ See: ST part I-II, Q30, Art.2.

⁸⁴² Ibid., Art.3.

⁸⁴³ Ibid., Art.4.

⁸⁴⁴ John 4,13.

Aquinas identifies rational element within the apprehension that generates concupiscence, while maintaining that concupiscence remains essentially a motion of the sensitive appetite: according to him “the sensitive appetite is naturally a moved, not only by the estimative power in other animals, and in human beings by the cognitive power which the universal reason guides, but also by the imagination and sense”⁸⁴⁵. Aquinas makes this point explicitly in the discussion of rational concupiscence: that man has not only universal reason pertaining to the intellectual power, but also particular power pertaining to the sensitive power, it follows that, even rational concupiscence may belong to the sensitive appetite, and the sensitive appetite can be moved by the universal reason through the medium of particular imagination⁸⁴⁶.

Rational concupiscence is a motion of the sensitive appetite toward a good perceived as pleasant, where the perception of the thing as pleasant involves not only the sense, but also an operation of reason that interprets the thing as pleasant⁸⁴⁷. As part of human nature, concupiscible desire for things pleasing to the senses, is in itself good; it goes wrong only when it refuses to be subordinated to the rational appetite for the immaterial good; concupiscence is a natural consequence of love which terminates in sorrow or pleasure⁸⁴⁸.

2.2.1.8 Delight as a Passion

According to Aquinas, when human beings or nonhuman beings attain an object that they apprehend as suitable to themselves, they perfect themselves in some way, they are thereby established in a state of completion of their nature; when this happens they tend to be aware that they are in a becoming state, and from this perception arises a certain movement of the soul in the sensitive appetite, this movement is called delight⁸⁴⁹. Although delight would seem to be the end of tending or the coming to an end of an active tending toward, it is more precisely the end of such tending in the sense of its culmination and completion; in this completion there is still a tending in the sense of an embracing and an enjoying of this completion⁸⁵⁰; and we do not ascribe joy to irrational animals, but only delight⁸⁵¹.

⁸⁴⁵ See: ST part I, Q81, Art.1.

⁸⁴⁶ See: Miner Robert., Thomas Aquinas on the Passions. A Study of Summa Theologiae 1a2ae 22-48, Cambridge University Press, 2009, p 154. See also: See: ST part I-II, Q30, Art.3.

⁸⁴⁷ Ibid., 157. Aquinas argues that rational concupiscence is infinite but only by succession: an animal is hungry, it eats its food, it is hungry again, it eats once more; the desire is limited by natural need, no animal desires infinite meat or infinite drink.

⁸⁴⁸ Ibid., 159.

⁸⁴⁹ See: ST part I-II, Q31, Art.1.

⁸⁵⁰ Fritz Cates Diana., Aquinas on The Emotions. A Religious Ethical Inquiry, Georgetown University Press, Washington, D.C., 2009, p141.

⁸⁵¹ See: ST part I-II, Q31, Art.3. Whatever we desire naturally can also be the object of reasoned desire and delight, but not vice versa. Consequently whatever can be the object of delight, can also be the object of joy in rational beings. And yet everything is not always the object of joy; since sometimes one feels a certain delight

“Although the name of passion is more appropriate to those passions which have a corruptive and evil tendency, such as bodily ailments, as also sadness and fear in the soul, yet some passions have a tendency to good, and in this sense delight is called a passion.”⁸⁵²

Love, desire, and delight are three moments that commonly occur in the course of tending toward what one apprehends as suitable for oneself or for those to whom one is attached; Aquinas construes these moments respectively as : a) an initial motion of being at ease with, opening to and being pleased at the impression that a particular object is such that it is possible for one to interact with it in a way that is suitable for oneself; b) a subsequent motion of activity tending or being drawn toward a union that usually goes beyond mental union; c) a motion of resting with pleasure and being expanded in the union effected⁸⁵³.

“Complete union with what is truly good for one is necessary for the fullness of sensory delight, but the very apprehension of that union as a possibility and the sense of being drawn toward something good can both yield a kind of delight”⁸⁵⁴.

2.2.2 The Irascible Passions

After analyzing each concupiscible passion in turn, Aquinas turns his attention to the irascible passions; irascible passions always involve the concupiscible passions, of which there is at least some distinct preliminary and partial awareness; for example, the fear that results from hearing a sudden noise in a dark alley is ontologically dependent on the accompanying passion of aversion; the irascible passions concern the interests of the concupiscible passions in the face of some difficulty: namely, the attainment of future goods (hope and despair), the avoidance or overcoming of future evils (daring and fear), and the elimination of present evils (anger)⁸⁵⁵.

According to Aquinas, sensitive appetite is one generic power and is called sensuality, but it is divided into two powers, which are species of the sensitive appetite, the irascible and the concupiscible⁸⁵⁶. Far from being cautious about extending the notion of appetite to non-cognitive things, Aquinas takes those cases as paradigmatic⁸⁵⁷. By virtue of the irascible power, a person tends in ways that are more complex; an act or motion of the

in the body, without rejoicing at them according to reason. And accordingly delight extends to more things than does joy.

⁸⁵² See: ST part I-II, Q31, Art.1, Obj.3.

⁸⁵³ Fritz Cates Diana,. Aquinas on The Emotions. A Religious Ethical Inquiry, Georgetown University Press, Washington, D.C., 2009, p142.

⁸⁵⁴ Ibid,. p 143.

⁸⁵⁵ See: Lombardo E Nicholas,. The Logic of Desire. Aquinas on Emotion, The Catholic University of America Press, Washington ,D.C. 2001, p 62.

⁸⁵⁶ See: ST part I, Q81, Art.2.

⁸⁵⁷ See: Pasnau Robert,. Thomas Aquinas on Human Nature. A Philosophical Study of Summa Theologiae Ia 75-89, University of Cambridge, 2002, p 202.

irascible appetite takes as an intentional object something that a person considers as suitable or unsuitable⁸⁵⁸, but the person takes it as an object which he considers under the aspect of difficulty or arduousness⁸⁵⁹.

An irascible motion is spirited⁸⁶⁰; it is a motion whereby a person resists corruptive and contrary agencies which are a hindrance to the acquisition of what is suitable, and are productive of harm⁸⁶¹. The irascible is the champion and defender of the concupiscible, in that the irascible power makes it possible for a person to overcome and rise above obstacles in achieving what the person regards as good and avoiding what the person regards as evil⁸⁶².

The etymology of concupiscence and irascibile reflect a structural distinction, since the former's derivation from *concupiscentia* suggests an emphasis on good objects (the object of desire), and the latter's derivation from *ira* suggests an emphasis on evil objects (the object of anger); moreover, just as Aquinas gives disproportionate attention to those concupiscible passions whose intentional objects are good, Aquinas also gives disproportionate attention to those irascible passions whose intentional objects are evils, particularly fear and anger, thus emphasizing that evils of one kind or another are more defining of the irascible passions than goods⁸⁶³.

2.2.2.1 Hope and Despair

Of the irascible passions, hope bears the simplest and most direct relation to the good; the other irascible passions have a less direct relation to good, despair regards the good as impossible⁸⁶⁴.

The object of hope cannot simply be other than the object of desire, as Aquinas argues, nothing can be the object of hope unless it first be desired; thus hope presupposes desire, just as all the irascible passions presuppose the concupiscible passions⁸⁶⁵. But the contrary is not true, one may desire something without having any hope for it; this is precisely what occurs in despair: despair presupposes desire, just as hope does, since for that which does not fall under our desire, we have neither hope nor despair⁸⁶⁶.

⁸⁵⁸ See: Fritz Cates Diana,. Aquinas on The Emotions. A Religious Ethical Inquiry, Georgetown University Press, Washington, D.C., 2009, p149.

⁸⁵⁹ See: ST part I-II, Q23, Art.2.

⁸⁶⁰ See: ST part I-II, Q40, Art.6.

⁸⁶¹ See: ST part I, Q81, Art.2,

⁸⁶² Ibid.

⁸⁶³ See: Lombardo E Nicholas,. The Logic of Desire. Aquinas on Emotion, The Catholic University of America Press, Washington ,D.C. 2001, p 62. There are four questions on fear, three on anger, one on daring and one split between hope and despair.

⁸⁶⁴ See: Miner Robert,. Thomas Aquinas on the Passions. A Study of Summa Theologiae 1a2ae 22-48, Cambridge University Press, 2009, p 216.

⁸⁶⁵ See: ST part I-II, Q40, Art.1.

⁸⁶⁶ Ibid., Art.4.

“We experience as many desires as there are faculties in us: the desire to see, to touch, to hear, to know, to read, to understand, to listen, to speak, or to keep silent, to walk, to run, to fly, or to do anything: in general, the desire to live, to be happy, and at times, to die”⁸⁶⁷. Hope adds to desire the sense of being able to obtain what one wants, either by oneself or with the help of another; hope is like the soul of action, one cannot act without a minimum of hope, hope supports the virtues, giving them breath and life, and hope is founded on faith⁸⁶⁸.

To become an object of hope in its proper sense, Aquinas says, a thing must meet four conditions: it must be perceived as a good, its attainment must lie in the future, it must be apprehended as a difficult and arduous good, and it must be seen as possible to attain⁸⁶⁹. Whereas desire requires only the first two conditions, hope demands all four; what distinguishes hope from desire is the character of hope’s object as an arduous thing, attainable with difficulty.⁸⁷⁰

Hope itself becomes an obstacle that must be overcome if the person is not to be tortured by continuing to reach out interiorly for what is impossible; in as much as the person, at any point in his withdrawing, re-apprehends the object as a good, without focusing on its unattainability, the person is to some extent re-attracted to the object, and this creates a new obstacle for what might otherwise be a straightforward withdrawal, which is despair⁸⁷¹.

However, one is not said to hope for some trifling thing, which is immediately in his power to have; if we apprehend a good as easily attainable, we are not moved by the passion of hope⁸⁷². The passion of despair in human being may signal the advisability of giving up when the arduous good proves impossible to obtain; rather than suppress despair, we should acknowledge that our efforts might be more profitably spent seeking a good that we can attain; despair about union with God is not a passion, but a perverse act of will caused by sin⁸⁷³.

⁸⁶⁷ Pinickaers Servais,. *Passions and Virtue*. Tans. By Guevin M Benedict, The Catholic University of America Press, Washington DC, 2015,p32.

⁸⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, 35.

⁸⁶⁹ See: ST part I-II, Q40, Art.1.

⁸⁷⁰ See: Miner Robert,. *Thomas Aquinas on the Passions. A Study of Summa Theologiae 1a2ae 22-48*, Cambridge University Press, 2009, p 217.

⁸⁷¹ See: Fritz Cates Diana,. *Aquinas on The Emotions. A Religious Ethical Inquiry*, Georgetown University Press, Washington, D.C., 2009, p150; ST part I-II, Q40, Art.4.

⁸⁷² See: ST part I-II, Q40, Art.1.

⁸⁷³ See: Miner Robert,. *Thomas Aquinas on the Passions. A Study of Summa Theologiae 1a2ae 22-48*, Cambridge University Press, 2009, p 220.

a) What Causes Hope

Aquinas distinguishes two ways in which something might cause hope: either because it makes something possible to a human being, or because it makes a human being think something possible; in the first way, experience causes hope exclusively: by experience, Aquinas means the repeated performance of action that creates a power or capacity for performing a certain kind of action; through experience, one acquires the faculty of doing something easily, and from this hope ensues.⁸⁷⁴

If a person improves her command of ancient Greek through experience, the despair she once felt about reading Greek yields to hope; after a certain point, she will no longer need hope to read Greek, since she will no longer perceive that good as something arduous; but the hope generated by experience does not disappear, it may provide her with confidence to attempt the arduous good of acquiring other languages⁸⁷⁵.

The second way in which experience causes hope is by causing a person to think something possible; such experience is generated not by the repetition of virtue – building acts, but through teaching and persuasion.⁸⁷⁶ But the contrary may also occur; experience can lead a person to regard something as impossible which he previously thought possible; if a person continues to perceive the impossible thing as a good, despair will replace hope⁸⁷⁷.

b) Interior and Exterior Effects of Hope

“Despair and false hope are two things that kill the soul”.⁸⁷⁸ We must observe that young people who drink too much alcohol are indeed unsteady in reality: but, in their own estimation, they are capable, for they know not their shortcomings; for youth has much of the future before it and little of the past, and therefore since memory is of the past, and hope of the future, it has little to remember and lives very much in hope; and it is owing to the heart being expanded that one tends to that which is arduous, therefore youths are spirited and hopeful⁸⁷⁹.

Although people who drink lack steadiness in reality, they are steady in their own estimation, for they think that they will steadily obtain that which they hope for; those who have not suffered defeat nor experience of obstacles to their efforts, are prone to count a thing

⁸⁷⁴ See: ST part I-II, Q40, Art.5.

⁸⁷⁵ See: Miner Robert., Thomas Aquinas on the Passions. A Study of Summa Theologiae 1a2ae 22-48, Cambridge University Press, 2009, p 221.

⁸⁷⁶ See: ST part I-II, Q40, Art.5.

⁸⁷⁷ See: Miner Robert., Thomas Aquinas on the Passions. A Study of Summa Theologiae 1a2ae 22-48, Cambridge University Press, 2009, p 222.

⁸⁷⁸ Augustine, *Sermones* 87.8, quoted by Miner Robert., Thomas Aquinas on the Passions. A Study of Summa Theologiae 1a2ae 22-48, Cambridge University Press, 2009, p 223.

⁸⁷⁹ See: ST part I-II, Q40, Art.6.

possible to them, and consequently are of good hope; these causes are also found in intoxicated people, thus foolish and thoughtless persons attempt everything and are full of hope⁸⁸⁰.

It happens that sometimes what is arduous becomes possible to us, not through ourselves but through others; this communitarian adjustment of the picture shows that hope regards not only the arduous good, but also that by which something becomes possible to us; with regard to arduous good, the objectors are absolutely correct: hope is caused by love, since hope does not exist, except with respect to the desired and loved good; however in so far as hope regards one through whom something becomes possible to us, love is caused by hope and not conversely⁸⁸¹.

“As natural passions, hope and despair are directed to the attainment of particular goods. When hope and despair regard the universal good, they cease to be passions. In relation to God, hope is a theological virtue, and despair a sin”⁸⁸². According to Aquinas, passion and virtue have the same formal object: the future good that is difficult, but possible to attain; materially, however, the objects differ as finite and infinite⁸⁸³. The relation between the two, however, is not so direct; what perfects the passion of hope is not theological virtue, but the acquired virtue of magnanimity.⁸⁸⁴

Superficially, the perfection of natural hope and the possession of theological hope may appear to be in tension, as Aquinas says: magnanimity tends to something arduous in the hope of attaining something that is in one’s power, wherefore its proper object is the doing of great things; on the other hand hope, as a theological virtue, regards something arduous, to be obtained by the help of another⁸⁸⁵.

People who are in despair are infected with love of bodily pleasures, among which sexual pleasures are primary, and they perceive spiritual goods as tasteless or insignificant⁸⁸⁶; that those consumed by lust are generally unaware of their despair, does not make it any less real⁸⁸⁷. Without the virtue of magnanimity, such a person will be particularly susceptible to the opinion that he can accomplish nothing; the name of this condition is sloth; since sloth is a

⁸⁸⁰ Ibid.

⁸⁸¹ See: ST part I-II, Q40, Art.7. Aquinas’ analysis has practical implications: if another person makes something possible for us, that person causes us to hope. Because he has given us a good (that is, hope) we proceed to love him as we did not love him before. In this case hope causes love.

⁸⁸² Miner Robert,. Thomas Aquinas on the Passions. A Study of Summa Theologiae 1a2ae 22-48, Cambridge University Press, 2009, p 227.

⁸⁸³ See: ST part II-II, Q17. (“God is the principle object of hope” 2-2.17.5)

⁸⁸⁴ See: ST part II-II, Q129, Art.2.

⁸⁸⁵ See: ST part II-II, Q17,Art.5,ad 4.

⁸⁸⁶ See: ST part II-II, Q20, Art. 4.

⁸⁸⁷ In *The Sickness unto Death*, Kierkegaard (1980) writes: “It makes no difference whether the person is in despair is ignorant that his condition is despair- he is in despair just the same” (p.44). More dramatically “ to be ignorant of being in despair is the specific feature of despair” (p.45); Miner Robert,. Thomas Aquinas on the Passions. A Study of Summa Theologiae 1a2ae 22-48, Cambridge University Press, 2009, p 228.

sorrow that casts down the spirit, in this manner despair is generated out of sloth⁸⁸⁸. When a person does not even attempt to cultivate the virtue of magnanimity⁸⁸⁹, he exponentially increases his vulnerability to either lust or sloth, both of which are primary causes of despair; the virtue of magnanimity is the perfection of natural hope⁸⁹⁰.

Presumption seems to imply immoderate hope; as to the hope whereby a person relies upon his own power, there is presumption if he tends to a good as though it were possible to him, whereas it surpasses his powers; this presumption is contrary to the virtue of magnanimity which holds to the mean in this kind of hope⁸⁹¹.

Hope is fundamentally personal, tied to the feeling of our strength. At the same time, it is social because we spontaneously count on collaboration with others in many situations, beginning with our parents, then our teachers, our leaders, and our friends; still this hope is first of all oriented towards ourselves, towards what is useful for us and our plans⁸⁹².

2.2.2.2 Daring, Fear and Anger

When a person has the impression that averting injury will be difficult, but not impossible, the person assesses that he has enough power, relative to the evil object, to challenge the object directly, to fend it off or overcome it; in as much as the person is drawn toward, rather than repulsed by, the prospect of attempting something arduous, the person tends towards the evil object under the aspect of good. Aquinas calls this irascible emotion daring (*audacia*)⁸⁹³.

When a person encounters an evil object that appears to be superior in power, the person has only one direction in which it can tend, which is away from the object. Yet the object is so imposing that it seems to the person that even this tending away is all but impossible, then the person withdraws into himself in an attempt to create some distance between himself and the evil object. Yet when he tries to pull back interiorly, he apprehends that his back is up against the wall; if the person manages under this sort of internal pressure to flee, it seems to the person that the evil object is right at his heels, then the person experiences this being pinned or hemmed in to be terribly arduous, Aquinas calls this irascible

⁸⁸⁸ See: ST part II-II, Q20, Art. 4.

⁸⁸⁹ "Magnanimity by its very name denotes stretching forth of the mind to great things". ST part II-II, Q129, Art.1.

⁸⁹⁰ See: Miner Robert., Thomas Aquinas on the Passions. A Study of Summa Theologiae 1a2ae 22-48, Cambridge University Press, 2009, p 228.

⁸⁹¹ See: ST part II-II, Q21, Art.1. 'That a man tends to some good as though it were possible by the power and mercy of God, whereas it is not possible, for instance, if a man hopes to obtain pardon without repenting, or glory without merits. According to Aquinas this presumption is sin against the Holy Spirit'.

⁸⁹² See: Pinckaers Servais., Passions and Virtue. Tans. By Guevin M Benedict, The Catholic University of America Press, Washington DC, 2015, p36.

⁸⁹³ See: ST part I-II, Q45, Art.1.

emotion fear (*timor*)⁸⁹⁴, which has four effects in a person: contraction, susceptibility to counsel, trembling, and hindrance to operation⁸⁹⁵.

Daring and fear are directed to some great danger⁸⁹⁶; yet “if fear is moderate, not perturbing the reason much, it conduces to good activity, in as much as it causes a certain solicitude, and makes a man more attentive to deliberation and operation”⁸⁹⁷. Aquinas defines the object of fear as a threatening future evil not easily resisted or even irresistible⁸⁹⁸. When the object of fear is judged to be conquerable, it elicits daring instead; whereas fear shrinks from a threat, daring advances and seeks to overcome it⁸⁹⁹.

According to Aquinas, fear is a passion which belongs to the appetitive power, it pertains to the sensitive appetite in particular, and it involves our being acted upon in the most palpable sense that we find ourselves at the mercy of a future evil⁹⁰⁰; the evil is present to the imagination according to the apprehension of the soul; if the evil were to become materially present, the result would be not fear but sorrow⁹⁰¹. As far as the species of fear is concerned sloth, blushing, and shame derive from a person’s apprehension of his own acts and capacities; and astonishment, stupefaction and anxiety derive from a person imagining things outside himself to surpass his power of resistance⁹⁰². “All fear arises from the love of something”⁹⁰³.

Fear, not despair is the proper contrary of daring; according to Aquinas, daring stands furthest from fear because it has the same term, but differs in the direction of its motion, both passions concern harm about to come⁹⁰⁴; the difference is that “fear turns back from the harm about to come on account of its victory over the one in fear, but daring attacks the imminent danger, on account of its own victory over that very danger, therefore manifestly daring is contrary to fear”⁹⁰⁵. “Fear makes man more deliberative than hope”⁹⁰⁶.

⁸⁹⁴ See: Fritz Cates Diana,. Aquinas on The Emotions. A Religious Ethical Inquiry, Georgetown University Press, Washington, D.C., 2009, p151; ST part I-II, Q41.

⁸⁹⁵ See: ST part I-II, Q44, Art.1-4.

⁸⁹⁶ See: ST part II-II, Q123, Art.3.

⁸⁹⁷ See: ST part I-II, Q46, Art.4.

⁸⁹⁸ See: Lombardo E Nicholas,. The Logic of Desire. Aquinas on Emotion, The Catholic University of America Press, Washington ,D.C. 2001, p65.

⁸⁹⁹ Ibid.

⁹⁰⁰ The object of fear is the future difficult evil which cannot be resisted; See: ST part I-II, Q41, Art.2.

⁹⁰¹ See: Miner Robert,. Thomas Aquinas on the Passions. A Study of Summa Theologiae 1a2ae 22-48, Cambridge University Press, 2009, p 233.

⁹⁰² See: ST part I-II, Q41, Art.4.

⁹⁰³ Pieper Josef,. The Human Wisdom of ST.Thomas. A Breviary of Philosophy from the works of St. Thomas Aquinas, Trans. by, Maclaren Drostan, Ignatius Press San Francisco, London, 2002,p 62.

⁹⁰⁴ See: Miner Robert,. Thomas Aquinas on the Passions. A Study of Summa Theologiae 1a2ae 22-48, Cambridge University Press, 2009, p 255.

⁹⁰⁵ ST part I-II, Q45, Art.1.

⁹⁰⁶ Pieper Josef,. The Human Wisdom of ST.Thomas. A Breviary of Philosophy from the works of St. Thomas Aquinas, Trans. by, Maclaren Drostan, Ignatius Press San Francisco, London, 2002,p 62.

Irascible power takes its name from *ira* (anger), not because every movement of that power is one of anger, but because all its movements terminate in anger, and because of all these movements, anger is the most patent; from the very fact that anger is caused by contrary passions that is, by hope which is of good, and of sorrow which is of evil, it includes in itself contrariety; and anger includes several passions not as a genus, but rather according to the inclusion of cause and effect⁹⁰⁷. Anger is caused by sadness, it reaches out in hope for the elimination of that sadness, attacking what frustrates desire and seeking to eliminate it⁹⁰⁸. “Anger, like all other movements of the sensitive appetite, is useful from the fact that when angry a man does more readily what reason commands⁹⁰⁹. Otherwise the sensitive appetite in man would be in vain, whereas it remains true that nature makes nothing in vain”⁹¹⁰.

The movement of anger has a twofold tendency: such as, to vengeance itself which it desires and hopes for as being a good wherefore it takes pleasure in it, and to the person on whom it seeks vengeance, as to something contrary and hurtful, which bears the character of evil⁹¹¹; the movement of anger does not arise, unless there be some magnitude about both these objects, hence anger is not in the concupiscible but in the irascible faculty⁹¹². Hope is also important to anger, without the hope for revenge- for example, when facing a vastly more powerful enemy- an injury inspires not anger but only sadness⁹¹³. Aquinas regards anger as particularly dependent on reason⁹¹⁴. “He who is angry or afraid is not praised or blamed, but only he who, while in this state, behaves either properly or not”⁹¹⁵.

If Aquinas’s axiom, that the object that evokes a passion is the same object that moves the passion towards or away from, is seen as applying to the material objects of passions, then it could not accommodate the passion of daring with its two material objects; however, daring has only a single intentional object, that is, evil perceived to be conquerable and therefore a good, and in this sense daring moves forward the same object that evokes it; when Aquinas’s axiom is seen as applying to intentional objects, and not the sheer ontological reality of the objects themselves, it can apply to the irascible passions, otherwise it runs into intractable difficulties⁹¹⁶.

⁹⁰⁷ See: ST part I-II, Q46, Art.1.

⁹⁰⁸ See: Lombardo E Nicholas,. *The Logic of Desire. Aquinas on Emotion*, The Catholic University of America Press, Washington ,D.C. 2001, p66.

⁹⁰⁹ Though anger coming after a rational judgement upsets the reason, nevertheless it is useful because it gives greater promptitude in carrying out the commands of the reason. Coming before a judgement, however, anger is bad, as it makes a true judgement almost impossible.

⁹¹⁰ Pieper Josef,. *The Human Wisdom of ST.Thomas. A Breviary of Philosophy from the works of St. Thomas Aquinas*, Trans. by, Maclaren Drostan, Ignatius Press San Francisco, London, 2002,p 61-62.

⁹¹¹ See: ST part I-II, Q46, Art.2.

⁹¹² See: ST part I-II, Q46, Art.3.

⁹¹³ See: Lombardo E Nicholas,. *The Logic of Desire. Aquinas on Emotion*, The Catholic University of America Press, Washington ,D.C. 2001, p66.

⁹¹⁴ Ibid.

⁹¹⁵ Pieper Josef,. *The Human Wisdom of ST.Thomas. A Breviary of Philosophy from the works of St. Thomas Aquinas*, Trans. by, Maclaren Drostan, Ignatius Press San Francisco, London, 2002, p 61.

⁹¹⁶ Ibid., 67.

2.3 The Passions and Happiness

The object of the concupiscible (joy, sorrow, love, hate, and the like) is the sensible good as pleasurable or painful; but sometimes the soul undergoes difficulty or conflict in obtaining some such good or avoiding some such evil; and so the same good or evil, with the added quality of special difficulty, is the object of irascible (courage, fear hope etc.) passions⁹¹⁷. According to Aquinas, “the emotions are a necessary component to human agency: they depend on the acts and on their interior principles, the virtues, in view of attaining beatitude”⁹¹⁸.

His analysis is precise, detailed, and well-articulated, a masterpiece in the manner of the building of his time. By contrast, beginning in the following century, morality concentrates progressively on two poles: liberty and law, competing with each other through the intermediary of obligation. The consideration of beatitude became very marginal in morality and the treatise on beatitude disappeared from the manuals. As a logical consequence, emotions were given a minor role in the study on human acts. The emotions are considered henceforth as a threat to the sovereignty of liberty and reason, since they originate from obscure regions of human senate knowledge. We are in the age of rationalism and voluntarism. Sensate knowledge and emotions no longer have the right to a place in a morality that only concerns itself with establishing and defending restrictive laws. Nevertheless, they will assert themselves in hidden ways, and even find their way into the exercise of human freedom⁹¹⁹.

According to Aquinas, the irascible and concupiscible powers can be subjects of virtue, but only for human beings; though non rational animals have sensitive appetites, these powers are not in them as the subjects of virtue, because they are not amenable to perfection; but in human beings, the irascible and concupiscible can be perfected, according to their capacity to participate in reason; because they can participate in reason, they are fit to serve as subjects of moral virtues⁹²⁰; any moral virtue that is subjects in the irascible or concupiscible is nothing other than a certain habitual conformity of either of these powers to reason.⁹²¹

Grounding the moral virtues in the passions illuminates the structure of the 1a2ae; Aquinas places the twenty seven questions on the passions before the questions on the virtues, because understanding the former is a precondition of grasping the virtues⁹²². Whether it be reason or something else that is the element which is thought to be our natural ruler and guide and to take thought of things noble and divine, whether it be itself also divine or only

⁹¹⁷ See: Elmendorf J. John., *Elements of Moral Theology*. Based on The Summa Theology of St. Thomas Aquinas, General Books LLC, Memphis, USA, 2012, p 13.

⁹¹⁸ Pinckaers Servias., *The pinckaers reader. Renewing Thomistic Moral Theology*, ed.by Berkmann and Craig Steven Titus, trans.by Noble Mary Thomas and others, The Catholic University of America Press, Washington D C, 2005, p 275.

⁹¹⁹ Ibid.

⁹²⁰ See: Miner Robert., *Thomas Aquinas on the Passions. A Study of Summa Theologiae 1a2ae 22-48*, Cambridge University Press, 2009, p 288.

⁹²¹ See: ST part I-II, Q56, Art.4.

⁹²² See: Miner Robert., *Thomas Aquinas on the Passions. A Study of Summa Theologiae 1a2ae 22-48*, Cambridge University Press, 2009, p 294.

the most divine element in us, the activity on this in accordance with its proper virtue will be perfect happiness; that this activity is contemplation⁹²³.

There is a more direct way to connect knowledge of the passions with the attainment of happiness; each of the eleven basic passions has something vital to contribute to human flourishing; when experienced in the appropriate manner, hatred, sorrow, fear, and anger are useful; Aquinas considers that without adequate grasp of the passions, we can neither know what happiness is nor attain it⁹²⁴.

For Aquinas, passions enable our first glimpse of spiritual happiness: sensibility supplies man with a first image and a fundamental vocabulary for the expression of spiritual realities; sensitive love and pleasure function as images of their spiritual originals; without the experience of pleasure (*delectatio*), it would be difficult to have any grasp of what Aquinas means by *gaudium* and *fruitio*, associated with the last end; as composites of form and matter, the passions lie on the boundary of the sensible and the spiritual⁹²⁵.

Passion completes the activity not as the corresponding permanent state does, by its immanence, but as an end which supervenes as the bloom of youth does on those in the flower of their age; then both the intelligible or sensible object and the discriminating or contemplative faculty are as they should be, and will be involved in the activity⁹²⁶. Passions constitute a first image of a beatitude that transcends the passions; but this does not imply that the passions are solely a means to happiness, conceived as an end existing separately from the means; however, the passions are partly constitutive of the happiness available in this life⁹²⁷.

In the first place a supernatural illumination of the mind is needed to assist the mind in overcoming the difficulties which arise from the nature of the human mind, which draws its notions from the sensible world, and is subjected to the influence of passion and prejudice⁹²⁸. “The unspiritual man does not receive the gifts of the Spirit of God, for they are folly to him, and he is not able to understand them because they are spiritually discerned”⁹²⁹; “and you

⁹²³ Aristotele., The Nicomachean Ethics. Trans by David Ross, Oxford University Press, New York, 2009, (X.7) p 194.

⁹²⁴ See: Miner Robert., Thomas Aquinas on the Passions. A Study of Summa Theologiae 1a2ae 22-48, Cambridge University Press, 2009, p 295.

⁹²⁵ Ibid.

⁹²⁶ See: Aristotele., The Nicomachean Ethics. Trans by David Ross, Oxford University Press, New York, 2009, (X.4) p 189.

⁹²⁷ See: Miner Robert., Thomas Aquinas on the Passions. A Study of Summa Theologiae 1a2ae 22-48, Cambridge University Press, 2009, p 295-296.

⁹²⁸ See: Scheeben Mathias Joseph., A manual of Catholic Theology. Based on Scheeben's „ dogmatik“ Volume 1, Wilhelm Joseph and Scannell B.Thomas, Kegan Paul trench Truebener & Co, London, 1906, p 150.

⁹²⁹ 1 Cor.2,14.

have no need that any one should teach you; as his anointing teaches you about everything, and is true, and is no lie, just as it has taught you, abide in him”⁹³⁰.

2.3.1 The Spiritual and Animal Side of Human Nature

The exterior and interior powers of sensory apprehension, is what makes it possible for a sensory being to acquire and process sensible information: the exterior powers include powers of sight, touch, hearing, smell, and taste, the interior senses include some version of the common sense, the imagination, and the estimative and memorative power⁹³¹. With regard to the third interior sense identified by Aquinas, the difference between the nonhuman and the human are more notable: in a nonhuman animal, this sense or power is called the estimative power, and in human beings it is called cognitive power⁹³².

The constitution of the human body subjects it to the laws and conditions of existence and development which rule the life of plants and animals such as the laws of nutrition, growth, and reproduction⁹³³. Although man is of the same genus as other animals, he is of a different species⁹³⁴; the Catholic Church teaches that the human soul possesses, by reason of the act of creation, an active force and tendency to lead a moral and religious life, in accordance with the soul’s essential character of image of God⁹³⁵.

The relation of the sensitive faculty to the sensible object is, in one way, the same as that of the intellectual faculty to the intelligible object, in so far as each is in potentiality to its object; but in another way their relations differ, inasmuch as the impression of the object on the sense is accompanied with change in the body; so that excessive strength of the sensible corrupts sense; a thing that never occurs in the case of the intellect; because an intellect that understands the highest of intelligible objects, is more able afterwards to understand those that are lower⁹³⁶: if, however, in the process of intellectual operation the body is weary, this result is accidental, inasmuch as the intellect requires the operation of the sensitive powers in the production of the phantasms⁹³⁷.

⁹³⁰ 1 John 2,27.

⁹³¹ See: Fritz Cates Diana, . Aquinas on The Emotions. A Religious Ethical Inquiry, Georgetown University Press, Washington, D.C., 2009, p112.

⁹³² Ibid., 113. The estimative power makes it possible to perceive intentions, which the exterior sense does not perceive. (ST part I, Q78, Art.4.)

⁹³³ See: Scheeben Mathias Joseph, . A manual of Catholic Theology. Based on Scheeben’s „ dogmatik“ Volume 1, Wilhelm Joseph and Scannell B.Thomas, Kegan Paul trench Truebener & Co, London, 1906, p 418.

⁹³⁴ See: ST part I, Q75, Art.3.

⁹³⁵ See: Scheeben Mathias Joseph, . A manual of Catholic Theology. Based on Scheeben’s „ dogmatik“ Volume 1, Wilhelm Joseph and Scannell B.Thomas, Kegan Paul trench Truebener & Co, London, 1906, p 413.

⁹³⁶ Even the lower appetitive powers are called rational, in so far as they participate in reason in some way; See: ST part I-II, Q24, Art.1 ad2.

⁹³⁷ See: ST part I, Q75, Art.3.

The principle way in which one can influence the shape of an emotion is by using one's intellect; the intellect operates in conjunction with the will; by the power of one's intellect, one can interpret and if one wishes, alter one's interpretation of the way in which an object bears on one's own or another's flourishing; in the process, one can sometimes alter one's emotional state⁹³⁸.

The faculty and tendency of the human will to love and respect rational beings, and especially God, implies that the freedom of the will is not only physical but also moral; a human being has not only the power to determine his own and other forces and to direct them to an end, but also the power of willing them to an end for their own goodness and the power of rejecting or avoiding them⁹³⁹. "This power in human being is affected by a deficiency in determination for what is good and by the possibility of willing evil"⁹⁴⁰.

"Concupiscence is an attribute of human nature; in animals which have no reason, concupiscence is the mainspring of activity; it is in harmony with their whole nature, whereas in man it is a disturbing element in the higher life of the soul"⁹⁴¹. All the imperfections and defects to be found in the animal part of human beings are not the result of the destruction and perversion of human being's original state, but the necessary natural result of the constitution of human nature⁹⁴².

2.3.2 Passion and Temptation

The will's immateriality entails that it has no passions in the strict sense of the term; the will does have desires that appear to count as concupiscible and irascible⁹⁴³: but such desires are merely analogous to the kind of craving and anger present in sensory appetite; in sensory appetite, such affections or emotions are passions, and passion, in the strict sense, involves some sort of change in the body⁹⁴⁴.

"Every movement of sensitive appetite is called a passion"⁹⁴⁵; irascible and concupiscible appetites are responsible for all the passions, from anger to love, and even some bodily states that we might not count as passions such as pain⁹⁴⁶. The passions are unavoidable for human beings in this life; the mere fact that we have passions is in itself

⁹³⁸ See: Fritz Cates Diana, . Aquinas on The Emotions. A Religious Ethical Inquiry, Georgetown University Press, Washington, D.C., 2009, p214.

⁹³⁹ See: Scheeben Mathias Joseph, . A manual of Catholic Theology. Based on Scheeben's „ dogmatik“ Volume 1, Wilhelm Joseph and Scannell B.Thomas, Kegan Paul trench Truebener & Co, London, 1906, p 415.

⁹⁴⁰ Ibid., 416.

⁹⁴¹ Ibid., 420.

⁹⁴² Ibid., 421.

⁹⁴³ See: ST part I, Q82, Art.5.

⁹⁴⁴ See: ST part I, Q75, Art.5 ad 3.

⁹⁴⁵ ST part I-II, Q35, Art.1.

⁹⁴⁶ See: Pasnau Robert, . Thomas Aquinas on Human Nature. A Philosophical Study of Summa Theologiae 1a 75-89, Cambridge University Press, USA, 2002, p 243.

neither good nor bad; unregulated passion is a sin, but because the sin is unavoidable, it is merely a venial sin; even so, the passions are of tremendous significance, because of their effects, they cause irrationality, and irrationality causes to perform wrong actions.⁹⁴⁷

Aquinas distinguishes between intemperance and incontinence, each a vice that comes from pursuing the objects of the concupiscible power; the fundamental difference between the two vices is that the intemperate person embraces his appetites, whereas the incontinent person succumbs only for a moment: `in the intemperate person, the will is inclined to sin from its own choice, which arises from a disposition acquired through habituation, whereas in the incontinent person, the will is inclined to sin by a passion; and since passion soon passes, whereas a habit is a disposition difficult to remove, the result is that the incontinent man repents at once as soon as the passion has passed, but not so in the intemperate man, in fact he rejoices in having sinned because the sinful act has become connatural to him by reason of his habit⁹⁴⁸. They rejoice in doing evil and delight in the perverseness of evil.⁹⁴⁹

Since the object of the will is good or an apparent good, it is never moved to an evil, unless that which is not good appears good in some respect to the reason; the will would never tend to evil, unless there were ignorance or error in the reason⁹⁵⁰; they err who works evil⁹⁵¹. `A person is directed to right action by universal and particular knowledge; a defect in either of them suffices to hinder the rectitude of the will and of the deed⁹⁵².

The passions simply distract the will from its own operations; when one power of the soul is intently focused, the rest are distracted; and the passions impede the judgement and apprehension of reason, and this in turn affect the will, which by nature always follows the judgement of reason⁹⁵³; so the immediate internal causes of sin and of wrong action more generally are will and reason, the passions are a remote cause⁹⁵⁴.

The choice of a particular course of action serves as the conclusion of a syllogism of practical intellect; but something singular can be the direct conclusion of a universal proposition only on the mediating assumption of some singular proposition; so the universal reason of practical intellect can produce movement only through the mediation of a particular apprehension belonging to the sensory part⁹⁵⁵.

⁹⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁹⁴⁸ See: ST part II-II, Q156, Art.3.

⁹⁴⁹ Prov.2,14.

⁹⁵⁰ See: ST part I-II, Q77, Art.2.

⁹⁵¹ Prov. 14,22.

⁹⁵² ST part I-II, Q77, Art.2.

⁹⁵³ See: Pasnau Robert., Thomas Aquinas on Human Nature. A Philosophical Study of Summa Theologiae 1a 75-89, Cambridge University Press, USA, 2002, p 245; See: ST part I-II, Q77, Art.1.

⁹⁵⁴ See: ST part I-II, Q75, Art.2.

⁹⁵⁵ See: ST part I-II, Q86, Art.1.ad2.

The acts and choices of human beings concern singular things; since sensory appetite is a particular power, it has a great capacity to make a person disposed in such a way that, with regard to singulars, matters appear to him one way or another⁹⁵⁶. Sin occurs in one's actions when an opinion about particular things to be done is corrupted on account of some pleasure or some other passion, although still that passion does not corrupt the universal opinion⁹⁵⁷.

2.3.3 Emotion and Discernment

Sensory appetite is naturally moved not only by the estimative power and by the cogitative power, or directed by universal reason, but also by the imaginative power and by sense; thus we experience that the irascible and concupiscible clash with reason, because we sense or imagine something pleasant that reason forbids, or something unpleasant that reason demands⁹⁵⁸.

A perennial topic of Christian spirituality is discernment, that is, the task of determining through reflection and prayer; although Aquinas does not explicitly write about discernment, his anthropology provides theological principles: for Aquinas, God's will is manifested in our desires and so the discernment of God's will coincides with the discernment of our deepest desires, and the deepest desire of human being is the experience of interior peace⁹⁵⁹. "Interior peace consists in the harmony of our desires, rather than the conscious experience of any particular emotion"⁹⁶⁰.

When reason is impeded by passion, it is not enough simply to use the reason; one of the cures is correction and admonishment from others; through this one begins to resist one's passions, and the resistance itself weakens those passions; the second cure is the interior gift of divine grace, so as to ally the passions. This does not look encouraging from the perspective of the incontinent or intemperate agent, but it affirms the importance of grace, that is to say, without grace human beings inevitably stray from the good⁹⁶¹. The action of the Holy Spirit (grace of God) is required, at least morally, to produce that purity of disposition and humility of heart which are indispensable for all moral and religious knowledge; this assistance is often so effective, that it contributes more to the perfection of spiritual science than the best-developed natural abilities⁹⁶².

⁹⁵⁶ See: ST part I-II, Q9, Art.2 ad2.

⁹⁵⁷ See: Pasnau Robert., Thomas Aquinas on Human Nature. A Philosophical Study of Summa Theologiae 1a 75-89, Cambridge University Press, USA, 2002, p 257.

⁹⁵⁸ See: ST part I-II, Q81, Art.3 ad 2.

⁹⁵⁹ See: Lombardo E Nicholas., The Logic of Desire. Aquinas on Emotion, The Catholic University of America Press, Washington ,D.C. 2001, p250.

⁹⁶⁰ Ibid. p 251.

⁹⁶¹ See: Pasnau Robert., Thomas Aquinas on Human Nature. A Philosophical Study of Summa Theologiae 1a 75-89, Cambridge University Press, USA, 2002, p 260; ST part II-II, Q156, Art.3 ad 2.

⁹⁶² See: Scheeben Mathias Joseph., A manual of Catholic Theology. Based on Scheeben's „ dogmatik“ Volume 1, Wilhelm Joseph and Scannell B.Thomas, Kegan Paul trench Truebener & Co, London, 1906, p 150.

Grace is supernatural and brings about a supernatural perfection in human being; this perfection nonetheless remains a human perfection, in so far as the supernatural elevation is still positively founded upon one's integral nature and is perfective of his nature⁹⁶³. Grace alone cannot give the first capacity for the spiritual life or union with God; it is a higher perfect form that is not acquired by internal development, but comes to the natural power and disposition from outside; the dispositions of the person must be essentially spiritual, intellectual, and capable of love, before the person can receive a higher spirituality, intelligence, and love⁹⁶⁴.

Conclusion

Aquinas's analysis of the passions is far more thorough and meticulous than those of his predecessors, and is worked out with a fervent attention to detail to which none of them aspired. Rather than simply listing the principle passions, each one is examined and anatomized in best Scholastic style. In this way, the relevant sections of the *Summa* set a standard for later discussions of the subject and established a format that endured into the seventeenth century. Long after philosophers ceased to organize their works into *quaestiones*, treaties on the passions still opened with a section on the passions in general, and followed this up with elaborate chapters on individual passions, in which interpretation is mixed with assessments of various authorities, summaries of other writers, and instructive anecdotes. Both as to form and content, the influence of Aquinas was, therefore, enormous.

Considered as a person's total perfection, happiness cannot be limited to the actualization of a part. It must include the whole of his basic powers and appetites. A person who somehow manages to avoid particular sinful volitions, but neglects his passions, cannot be described as flourishing. The full notion of happiness includes the well-being of the sensitive appetite; the attainment of happiness requires knowledge of the passions. Right reason is required to perfect the acts of the sensitive appetite. One implication is that reason must know the passions, in order to direct them, just as those who govern must understand the nature of the governed.

Knowledge of happiness, whether theoretical or practical, requires the appropriate cultivation of the sensitive appetite. This conviction animates Aquinas's decision to devote more than one quarter of the *1a2ae* to an extended treatment of the passions. Aquinas takes seriously the notion that it is possible for a person to acquire insight into the multiple ways in which the person is acted upon, and even change those ways, should they lead the person away from the beatitude. There is a link between happiness and cultivation of the passions;

⁹⁶³ See: Swafford Dean Andrew, *Nature and Grace. A new Approach to Thomistic Ressourcement*, Pickwick Publications, Eugene, Oregon, 2014, p 156.

⁹⁶⁴ See: Scheeben Joseph Mathias, *Nature and Grace*. Trans. by Vollert Cyril, Wipf & Stock, Eugene, Oregon, 2009, p 322.

Aquinas says, we proceed from the perfection of the lower part to the perfection of the higher part.

Aquinas's account of emotions is obviously offered by him, so that we might be able to understand something about ourselves as we react and act. It focuses on feelings and on actions resulting from them. But our feelings, one might think, have to arise in us because of what we are disposed to like or dislike. One might also think that our feelings and actions must derive from what we are disposed to think, and from ways in which we are disposed to behave. One might say that our personality and the tendencies we have because of it, have to enter into an account of what we are actually doing at any given time, and Aquinas would agree with that. That is why he moves in 1a2ae,49 to a consideration of the notion of disposition. In the next chapter, I would like to discuss how he thinks of habits and how he goes on to connect the notion of disposition to the notions of virtue and vice.

Chapter III

The Ethical Perspective of Happiness in Internal and External Principles of Human Act.

Introduction

Generally, Christians are accustomed to examining their conscience by referring to the Ten Commandments, and for Roman Catholics the commandments of the Church also play an important role in analyzing and examining human act. Contemporary debate about the principles of moral theology, the role of an ecclesiastical magisterium, the prerogatives of personal conscience and other matters have surely altered the manner in which a believer undertakes this examination of conscience, although it still remains rule centered.

The Christian tradition enumerates seven primary virtues, which comprise the substance of an authentic life: faith, hope, charity, prudence, justice, fortitude, and temperance. First of all, Christian doctrine considers the theological or divine virtues; since their exercise relates the believer directly to God, these virtues: faith, hope, and charity occupy a principal place in Christian living. “Strictly speaking no human analogues exist for the theological virtues; only the justifying power of the Holy Spirit causes them to come about in the believer”⁹⁶⁵. About these virtues St. Paul testifies: “for now we see in a mirror, dimly, but then we will see face to face. Now I know only in part; then I will know fully, even as I have been fully known. And now faith, hope, and love abide, these three; and the greatest of these is love”⁹⁶⁶.

The theological virtues alone cannot sufficiently inform a believer of what is required to act properly in every situation; Christian tradition incorporates the moral virtues of prudence, justice, fortitude, and temperance. These cardinal virtues, as they are called, provide the focal points for many other allied and auxiliary virtues. Altogether, these moral virtues constitute the substance of a happy life, which embodies every quality required for a complete and flourishing human existence; in other words, the moral virtues embrace as their proper matter all the ordinary and extraordinary affairs, which comprise an ethical life. This chapter aims at a discussion of an ethical perspective of internal and external principles of human act from the standpoint of happiness; hereby, I try to study the ethical perspective of happiness through the *Summa Theologiae* and through the teachings of the New Testament as developed within the interpretive tradition of the Catholic Church.

⁹⁶⁵ Cessario Romanus, *The Moral Virtues and Theological Ethics*. The University of Notre Dame, Notre Dame, Indiana, 2013, p 4.

⁹⁶⁶ 1 Corinthians 13:12, 13.

3. Ethical Perspective of Human Act

Strictly speaking, human action concerns two conceptions, that is, two systematizations of morality, one based upon the beatitude and the other based upon obligation; Aquinas is the spokesman for ancient thought, which conceived of morality as a response to the question of beatitude⁹⁶⁷. Indeed the first experience of beatitude that is offered to human being is that of pleasure, to which are linked the other sentiments that form the different emotions:

The moral adjudication of `act` is determined in the major schools of philosophy in antiquity. The epicureans place their beatitude at the level of the emotions, in a calculated search for pleasure and the absence of pain. The Stoics consider, on the contrary, emotions as disorders and propose the ideal of *apatheia*, that is, of the soul as indifferent to emotions. The Platonists favour the overcoming of the sensible pleasures in order to attain the joy caused by contemplation of ideas. Aristotle's thought is more nuanced. It puts at the center of its perspective human action, with the virtue that renders it perfect. Beatitude consists in the highest human activity that achieves the best kind of pleasure... Fathers of the Church vigorously lead a spiritual combat against the flesh, in the manner of St. Paul, they adopt in general a line of balanced conduct concerning the emotions that resembles the Aristotelian position. The example of Christ, who experienced sadness, joy, pain, and anger, keeps them from Stoic rigorism. St. Thomas follows this same line while constructing the *Summa theologiae*. The emotions are a necessary component, to human agency: they depend on the acts of the interior principles, the virtues, in view of attaining beatitude⁹⁶⁸.

Thoughts of morality began to concentrate on two poles: liberty and law, competing with each other through the intermediary of obligation; the consideration of beatitude became very marginal in Morality, and the treatise on beatitude disappeared from the manuals; as a logical consequence, emotions were given a minor role in the study of human acts⁹⁶⁹.

`Morality is partly a practice in which persons give and demand reasons of one another; yet this implies that it is also a practice in which persons hold themselves accountable for their own attitudes and actions'⁹⁷⁰. "We speak of someone leading a good life or a bad life, and when we do, we have in mind more than a single act. Only human acts, not acts of humans make up one's moral life"⁹⁷¹. "Morality is, in part, an ongoing activity of thinking about what is important in life, trying to make good choices and taking responsibility for one's choices"⁹⁷².

⁹⁶⁷ See: Pinckaers Servais, . The Pinckaers Reader. Renewing Thomastic Moral Theology, ed. by Berkmann John and Titus Craig Steven, trans. by Noble Mary Thomas and others, The Catholic University of America Press, Washington, D.C, 2005, p 274.

⁹⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, 275.

⁹⁶⁹ *Ibid.*

⁹⁷⁰ Cates Fritz Diana, . Aquinas on The Emotions. A Religious Ethical Inquiry, Georgetown University Press, Washington, D.C. 2009, p 22.

⁹⁷¹ McInerney Ralph, . Aquinas on Human Action. A Theory of Practice, Catholic University of America Press, Washington D.C. 2012, p 10.

⁹⁷² Cates Fritz Diana, . Aquinas on The Emotions. A Religious Ethical Inquiry, Georgetown University Press, Washington, D.C. 2009, p 22.

“A religious world view is one that answers basic metaphysical questions about the nature of things: it interprets the basic element and cause of everything, within or beyond the cosmos, one or many, hidden or revealed, unified or fragmentary”⁹⁷³. “A religious morality is a set of prescriptive practices that function in coordination with a view of the fundamental constituents and powers of things”⁹⁷⁴. “Religious ethics takes as its subject matter people’s ways of thinking, feeling and acting in relation to what they regard as right or good, where their view about what is right or good are connected in some way to views about the limits and the possibilities of real”⁹⁷⁵.

3.1 Orientation of Human Act

Aquinas maintains that the acts human agents perform are moral acts, which is why the theory of them is moral theory; to understand this requires comprehension of the distinction Aquinas makes between human acts⁹⁷⁶ (*actus humani*) and acts of a human being (*actus hominis*); acts of human being are all activities or operations that can be truly attributed to human beings, but not in so far as they are human, not directing to human act⁹⁷⁷. “So it seems that among the activities truly ascribed to human agents, we can distinguish those they do from others they don’t do or, rather, the doing of which does not depend upon them; not every activity that is truly ascribable to a human being is a human act”⁹⁷⁸. “Such like actions are not properly human actions, since they do not proceed from deliberation of the reason, which is the proper principle of human actions; therefore they have indeed an imaginary end, but not that is fixed by reason”⁹⁷⁹.

“Every human act aims at some good, and for this reasons the good has rightly been declared to be that at which all things aim”⁹⁸⁰. “Although the end be last in the order of execution, yet it is first in the order of the agent’s intention. And it is this way that it is a cause”⁹⁸¹. “There is some end of the things we do, which we desire for its own sake, and if we do not choose everything for the sake of something else, clearly this must be the good and the chief good”⁹⁸². Repeated acts form habitus that resolve the various desires of the sense appetite and the will into stable dispositions; this formation of character in turn redounds back

⁹⁷³ Reeder P John,. “What is a Religious Ethics“, in Oxford Handbook of the Sociology of Religion, ed. Clarke Peter, Oxford University Press, 2009, p 163.

⁹⁷⁴ Ibid., 164.

⁹⁷⁵ Cates Fritz Diana,. Aquinas on The Emotions. A Religious Ethical Inquiry, Georgetown University Press, Washington, D.C. 2009, p 23.

⁹⁷⁶ Although, the subject human act is discussed in the first chapter, here I would like to discuss it only as a prelude to the internal and external human acts, which discusses about habits and virtues.

⁹⁷⁷ See: McInerny Ralph, “Ethics”, The Cambridge Companion to Aquinas. ed. by Kretzmann Norman and Stump Eleonore, Cambridge University Press, 1993, p 196.

⁹⁷⁸ McInerny Ralph,. Aquinas on Human Action. A Theory of Practice, Catholic University of America Press, Washington D.C. 2012, p 7.

⁹⁷⁹ ST, Part I-II, Q 1, Art 1, ad 3.

⁹⁸⁰ Aristotle,. The Nicomachean Ethics. Trans by Ross David, Oxford University press, New York, 2009, p 3.

⁹⁸¹ ST, Part I-II, Q 1, Art 1, ad 1.

⁹⁸² Aristotle,. The Nicomachean Ethics. Trans by Ross David, Oxford University press, New York, 2009, p 3.

to our desires: it confirms them, propels us towards action, and embeds them in us⁹⁸³. And “the will is naturally inclined to the good and the beautiful”⁹⁸⁴.

“A religious ethical life or moral life typically includes explicated or codified norms, by which persons orient themselves, as they seek to hold themselves and others accountable to a common way of life”.⁹⁸⁵ “It is obvious that whatever actions proceed from a given power, are caused by it in accordance with the nature of its object. But the object of will is the end and good. That is why all human acts are for the sake of an end”⁹⁸⁶. “With respect to the act of the will there is no difference between goodness taken from the object and goodness taken from the end.”⁹⁸⁷

3.1.1 Human Being and Human Action

The human composite is not formed of two substances that are artificially united, but often continue to oppose one another; according to Aquinas, there is a substantial union and natural harmony between the body and the soul, between sensation and spirit, in spite of the frictions that we can experience⁹⁸⁸. “We can find the same harmony in the interplay of the human faculties: reason, will, sensation and sense perception; they tend to function together in coordination, for example, in free choice”⁹⁸⁹.

“Soul is not moved essentially but is moved accidentally; whereas body is moved essentially”⁹⁹⁰.

Since, however, the soul has not quantitative totality, neither essentially, nor accidentally, as we have seen; it is enough to say that the whole soul is in each part of the body, by totality of perfection and of essence, but not by totality of power. For it is not in each part of the body, with regard to each of its powers; but with regard to sight, it is in the eye; and with regard to hearing, it is in the ear; and so forth. We must observe, however, that since the soul requires variety of parts, its relation to the whole is not the same as its relation to the parts; for to the whole it is compared primarily and essentially, as to its proper and proportionate perfectible; but to the parts, secondarily, inasmuch as they are ordained to the whole⁹⁹¹.

⁹⁸³ Lombardo E Nicholas,. *The Logic of Desire. Aquinas on Emotion*, The Catholic University of America Press, Washington, D.C. 2011, p 103.

⁹⁸⁴ Scheeben Mathias Joseph,. *A manual of Catholic Theology. Based on Scheeben’s „ dogmatik“* Volume 1, Wilhelm Joseph and Scannell B.Thomas, Kegan Paul Trench Truebener & Co, London, 1906, p 422.

⁹⁸⁵ Cates Fritz Diana,. *Aquinas on The Emotions. A Religious Ethical Inquiry*, Georgetown University Press, Washington, D.C. 2009, p 24.

⁹⁸⁶ ST, Part I-II, Q 1, Art 1.

⁹⁸⁷ McInerny Ralph,. *Aquinas on Human Action. A Theory of Practice*, Catholic University of America Press, Washington D.C. 2012, p 90. See also: ST, Part I-II, Q 19, Art 2 ad 1.

⁹⁸⁸ See: Pinckaers Servais,. *The Pinckaers Reader. Renewing Thomastic Moral Theology*, ed. by Berkmann John and Titus Craig Steven, trans. by Noble Mary Thomas and others, The Catholic University of America Press, Washington, D.C, 2005, p 278.

⁹⁸⁹ Ibid.

⁹⁹⁰ ST, Part I, Q 75, Art 1.

⁹⁹¹ ST, Part I, Q 76, Art 8.

Thus one can say, sensation is perfected by serving the spirit with the aid of the virtues that educate it; and further understand that owing to the natural union between body and soul, and to the fundamental harmony that it creates between various faculties, human being can spontaneously move from the emotions to the spiritual and on the contrary, the spiritual can rebound through sensation, for good and for bad⁹⁹².

3.1.2 Virtue and Passion

Virtuous habitus are perfective not just of reason and will, but of the passion as well: “virtue in the irascible and concupiscible powers is nothing other than a certain habitual conformity of these powers to reason”⁹⁹³. “This view crystallizes in Aquinas’s claim that the sense appetite can be the subject, that is, the seat or location of virtue”⁹⁹⁴. Aquinas qualifies his claim by observing that virtue is in the passions only, in so far as they participate in reason⁹⁹⁵: virtue can be in the irrational part of the soul, except to the extent that it partakes in reason; therefore he explains, reason or mind is the proper seat of virtue⁹⁹⁶.

In choice, there are two things with respect to intention of the end and to the preferential choice of that which is unto the end, the first belongs to moral virtue, but the later belongs to prudence; the irascible and concupiscible powers have a right intention of the end in regard to the passion of the soul, because of the right disposition of these powers; therefore, those moral virtues that are concerned with the passions are in the irascible and concupiscible powers, but prudence is in the reason⁹⁹⁷.

If virtues are concerned with actions and passions, and every passion and every action is accompanied by pleasure and pain, for this reason also virtue will be concerned with pleasures and pains. This is indicated also by the fact that punishment is inflicted by these means; for it is a kind of cure, and it is the nature of cures to be effected by contraries.⁹⁹⁸

“Passion is not just tamed by virtue; ordinate passion helps the execution of reason’s command and thus positively assists the performance of virtuous acts.”⁹⁹⁹ A rightly ordered appetite is a precondition to the virtue of prudence¹⁰⁰⁰. According to Aquinas, if the passions be taken for inordinate emotions, they cannot be in a virtuous person, so that he consents to

⁹⁹² See: Pinckaers Servais,. *The Pinckaers Reader. Renewing Thomastic Moral Theology*, ed. by Berkmann John and Titus Craig Steven, trans. by Noble Mary Thomas and others, The Catholic University of America Press, Washington, D.C, 2005, p 278.

⁹⁹³ ST, Part I-II, Q 56, Art 4.

⁹⁹⁴ Lombardo E Nicholas,. *The Logic of Desire. Aquinas on Emotion*, The Catholic University of America Press, Washington, D.C. 2011, p 104.

⁹⁹⁵ In so far as virtue participates in the reason, it is the principle of a human act.

⁹⁹⁶ Ibid; See also ST, Part I-II, Q 56, Art 4 ; Q 55, Art 5.

⁹⁹⁷ ST, Part I-II, Q 56, Art 4.

⁹⁹⁸ Aristotle,. *The Nicomachean Ethics*. Trans by Ross David, Oxford University Press, 2009, p 26(1104b, 13-18).

⁹⁹⁹ Lombardo E Nicholas,. *The Logic of Desire. Aquinas on Emotion*, The Catholic University of America Press, Washington, D.C. 2011, p 105; ST, Part I-II, Q 59, Art 2 ad 3.

¹⁰⁰⁰ ST, Part I-II, Q 57, Art 4 & Q57, Art 5.

them deliberately; but if the passions be taken for any movements of the sensitive appetite, they can be in a virtuous person, in so far as they are subordinate to reason.¹⁰⁰¹

According to Aquinas, if by passion we understand any movement of the sensitive appetite, the moral virtues, which are about the passions as about their proper matter, cannot be without passions; the reason for this is that otherwise it would follow, that moral virtue makes the sensitive appetite altogether idle: whereas it is not the function of virtue to deprive the powers subordinate to reason of their proper activities.¹⁰⁰² `Passion has grown up with us from our infancy; this is why it is difficult to rub off this passion engraved, as it is in our life. And we measure even our actions, by the rule of pleasure and pain, for to feel delight or pain rightly or wrongly has effect on our actions¹⁰⁰³.

`It is harder to fight against pleasure than anger, but virtue is concerned with what is harder; for even the good is better when it is harder; for the whole concern of virtue is with pleasures and pains, for the man who uses these will be good, and he who uses them badly will be bad¹⁰⁰⁴. `Aquinas's focus on virtue reflects his desire to frame the moral life in terms of human flourishing, and not in terms of avoiding vice; therefore, he does not discuss virtue and vice in separate sections¹⁰⁰⁵.

3.1.3 Goodness of Human Action

“Thomas says a few things by way of reminder about the way in which anything that exists can be called good”¹⁰⁰⁶. “Evil occurs when a thing does not have something which it ought to have, given its nature. Thus blindness is an evil, the lack of a capacity the thing should have. The goodness and badness of actions is first spoken of in these terms.”¹⁰⁰⁷

“It should be said that any action has goodness to the degree that it has being, and in so far as there is lacking to it anything of the fullness of being that human action ought to have, it is called bad”¹⁰⁰⁸. `Moral goodness and badness are being seen on the model of ontological or transcendental goodness, but the special character of the moral is in play:

¹⁰⁰¹ See: ST, Part I-II, Q 59, Art 2.

¹⁰⁰² See: ST, Part I-II, Q 59, Art 5.

¹⁰⁰³ Aristotle., *The Nicomachean Ethics*. Trans by Ross David, Oxford University Press, 2009, p 27(1105a,2-7).

¹⁰⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, 1105a, 8-13

¹⁰⁰⁵ Lombardo E Nicholas., *The Logic of Desire. Aquinas on Emotion*, The Catholic University of America Press, Washington, D.C. 2011, p 107. Virtues most characteristic affections are joy and pleasure. Virtue generates joy because the will attains goods that it desires through virtue, and when the will attains some desired good, the volitional affection of joy necessarily results. ST, Part I-II, Q 32, Art 6; Q 34 Art 4; Q 59 Art 5.

¹⁰⁰⁶ McInerney Ralph., *Aquinas on Human Action. A Theory of Practice*, Catholic University of America Press, Washington D.C. 2012, p 79.

¹⁰⁰⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁰⁸ ST, Part I-II, Q 18, Art 1.

secundum rationem. But when the morally bad action is said not to preclude all goodness, this goodness is not moral goodness¹⁰⁰⁹.

“A bad action can have a *per se* effect in so far as it possesses goodness and being, just as adultery is the cause of new human life, in so far as it involves the union of male and female, not in so far as it lacks the order of reason.”¹⁰¹⁰ As far as the order of reason is concerned, “the form of rational *animality* does not determine that one will exercise the power of reason with excellence. It determines only that one has (or can acquire) this power and one can, in principle improve one’s ability to exercise this power.”¹⁰¹¹

“A human action is judged good or bad first of all because of its object; what one sets out to do, makes the action to be the kind of action it is. It gives it its species or form”¹⁰¹². “What pertains to the fullness of being seems in the first place to be that which makes the thing to be of a given kind. Just as natural things have species from their given form, so action has its species from the object”¹⁰¹³. “Just as the first goodness of the natural thing is read from its form, which puts it in a species, so is the first goodness of the moral act read from the appropriate object”¹⁰¹⁴.

This is not to say, that the goodness or badness of the action is drawn from its consequences, but it is to say that an action is called good in so far as it can bring about a good effect, that means, the potential result; actions are good or bad when they are performed; we do not have to wait for the returns to find out what they are¹⁰¹⁵.

Accordingly a fourfold goodness may be considered in a human action. First, that which, as an action, it derives from its genus; because as much as it has of action and being so much has it of goodness, as stated above. Secondly, it has goodness according to its species; which is derived from its suitable object. Thirdly, it has goodness from its circumstances, in respect as it were, of its accidents. Fourthly, it has goodness from its end, to which it is compared as to the cause of its goodness¹⁰¹⁶.

“The act of generation can be successful or good in so far as an action is begun; there is nothing moral in this appraisal, this goodness is ontological, just as the formation of a defective child would be an ontological not a moral evil”¹⁰¹⁷. “The goodness or badness of

¹⁰⁰⁹ McInerny Ralph,. Aquinas on Human Action. A Theory of Practice, Catholic University of America Press, Washington D.C. 2012, p 80.

¹⁰¹⁰ ST, Part I-II, Q 18, Art 1, ad 3.

¹⁰¹¹ Cates Fritz Diana,. Aquinas on The Emotions. A Religious Ethical Inquiry, Georgetown University Press, Washington, D.C. 2009, p 244.

¹⁰¹² McInerny Ralph,. Aquinas on Human Action. A Theory of Practice, Catholic University of America Press, Washington D.C. 2012, p 80.

¹⁰¹³ ST, Part I-II, Q 18, Art 2.

¹⁰¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁰¹⁵ See: McInerny Ralph,. Aquinas on Human Action. A Theory of Practice, Catholic University of America Press, Washington D.C. 2012, p 81.

¹⁰¹⁶ ST, Part I-II, Q 18, Art 4.

¹⁰¹⁷ McInerny Ralph,. Aquinas on Human Action. A Theory of Practice, Catholic University of America Press, Washington D.C. 2012, p 82.

human acts always involves reason, since to act well is to act according to reason and to act badly is to act against reason.”¹⁰¹⁸

3.2 Role of Internal Principles of Human Act

‘Certain principles of human acts are internal or personal; these are the virtues or dynamic qualities that are brought to perfection by the gifts of the Holy Spirit, along with the beatitudes and the fruits of the Spirit, including the contraries which are the vices and sins.’¹⁰¹⁹

“In the voluntary act, two acts are found, namely the interior act of the will and the exterior act, and each of these has its own object. The end is properly the object of the interior voluntary act”¹⁰²⁰. “In the order of intention, of the interior act, the end is first and characterizes what the agent is about to do, the kind of the act he is about to perform.”¹⁰²¹

3.2.1 Nature of Habitus

“One might translate habitus as employed by Aquinas with the words disposition and dispositions; in 1a2ae, 49-54, Aquinas gives a variety of examples of what he takes to be habitus, he cites health, sickness, virtue, vices, knowledge of facts and languages”¹⁰²². A precise equivalent translation of habitus in the English language is perhaps not available, however many writers in English language prefer using the word habit instead of disposition.

‘The word *habitus* (habit) is derived from *habere* (to have); it has two dimensions: either one is said to have something, or one is said to have a particular relation to something’¹⁰²³; ‘when it is taken as a relation to something, it is a quality, which means habit is a disposition, whereby that which is disposed is disposed well or ill, and this either in regard to itself or in regard to another: thus health is a habit’¹⁰²⁴.

A correlation between virtue and habit goes back to ancient philosophy; Aristotle, whom Aquinas frequently quotes, says: “for happiness in states, the legislators make the citizens good by forming habits in them, and this is the wish of every legislator, and those who do not effect it miss their mark, and it is in this that a good constitution differs from a bad

¹⁰¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁰¹⁹ Pinckaers Servais,. *Morality The Catholic View*. Trans. By Sherwin Michael, St. Augustine’s Press, South bend, Indiana, 2001, p 27.

¹⁰²⁰ ST, Part I-II, Q 18, Art 6.

¹⁰²¹ McInerney Ralph,. *Aquinas on Human Action. A Theory of Practice*, Catholic University of America Press, Washington D.C. 2012, p 84.

¹⁰²² Davies Brian,. *Thomas Aquinas’s Summa Theologiae. A Guide & Commentary*, Oxford University Press, NY, 2014, p 189.

¹⁰²³ ST, Part I-II, Q 49, Art 1.

¹⁰²⁴ Ibid.

one”¹⁰²⁵. “Habit is a permanent quality according to which a subject is well or badly disposed in regard to either its being or its operations”¹⁰²⁶. “The word habit implies a certain lastingness: while the word disposition does not”¹⁰²⁷.

“Aquinas’s understanding of *habitus* in 1a2ae, 49-54 frequently corresponds to what Aristotle says about *hexis*; both of them think that our acting well or badly can derive or spring from settled ways of behavior that we have built up over years”¹⁰²⁸. “None of the moral virtues arises in us by nature; for nothing that exists by nature can form a habit contrary to its nature”¹⁰²⁹. “Neither by nature, then, nor contrary to nature do the virtues arise in us; rather we are adapted by nature to receive them, and are made perfect by habit.”¹⁰³⁰

There is a difference of understanding, in what we now tend to comprehend as the word habit, from what Aquinas means by *habitus*; Aquinas thinks of *habitus* as making it easy for us to do something, that it indicates what one wants; in contrast, by *habitus* many people relate the meaning of it with addictions; *habitus* puts our activity more under control than it might otherwise be¹⁰³¹. Aquinas concerns himself with *habitus*, as governing or accounting for what we do voluntarily¹⁰³².

“The word *voluntas* sometimes designates the power of the will, sometimes its act. Accordingly, if we speak of the will as a power, thus it extends both to the end and to the means.”¹⁰³³ “We speak of the will in regard to its act, then, properly speaking, volition is of the end only. Because every act denominated from a power, designates the simple act of the power: thus to understand designates simple act of understanding”¹⁰³⁴. “Not everything that diversifies habits, diversifies the powers: since habits are certain determinations of powers to certain special acts.”¹⁰³⁵

“Any pattern of behaviour strengthens if we repeat it and weakens if we don’t repeat it. Repetition is food for the habits”¹⁰³⁶. Initially, the current habits were learned by a conscious mind that learns the behaviour, and then decided to transfer the learned habits to the

¹⁰²⁵ Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics. Trans by Ross David, Oxford University press, New York, 2009, p 23.

¹⁰²⁶ Wuellner Bernard, Dictionary of Scholastic Philosophy. editiones scholasticae, UK, 2011, p 54.

¹⁰²⁷ ST, Part I-II, Q 49, Art 2.

¹⁰²⁸ Davies Brian, Thomas Aquinas’s Summa Theologiae. A Guide & Commentary, Oxford University Press, NY, 2014, p 189.

¹⁰²⁹ Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics. Trans by Ross David, Oxford University press, New York, 2009, p 23.

‘For instance the stone which by nature moves downwards cannot be habituated to move upwards, not even if one tries to train it by throwing it up ten thousand times’.

¹⁰³⁰ Ibid.

¹⁰³¹ Davies Brian, Thomas Aquinas’s Summa Theologiae. A Guide & Commentary, Oxford University Press, NY, 2014, p 189.

¹⁰³² Ibid., 190.

¹⁰³³ ST, Part I-II, Q 18, Art 2.

¹⁰³⁴ Ibid.

¹⁰³⁵ ST, Part I-II, Q 18, Art 2, ad 3.

¹⁰³⁶ [https://www.google.com/“Why habits get formed? The nature and purpose of habits”, by Parvez Hanan.](https://www.google.com/“Why habits get formed? The nature and purpose of habits”, by Parvez Hanan)

subconscious mind, which enables a person to repeat the learned habits again and again; the pattern of behaviour learned consciously, could be unlearned consciously too¹⁰³⁷.

The concept of *habitus* does not express the strength of a person's resolve to behave in a particular way, much less in some empirical estimation of future actions: "*habitus* shape our entire psychological structure, not just the rational powers: they modify all faculties that have some capacity for being shaped by reason, and actually penetrate and subsist in them"¹⁰³⁸.

There seems to be also another irrational element in the soul- one which in a sense, however, shares in reason. For we praise the reason of the continent man and of the incontinent, and the part of their soul that has reason, since it urges them aright and towards the best objects; but there is found in them also another natural element beside reason, which fights against and resists it. For exactly as paralysed limbs, when we intend to move them to the right, turn on the contrary to the left, so is it with the soul; the impulses of incontinent people move in contrary directions. But while in the body we see that which moves astray, in the soul we do not. No doubt, however, we must none the less suppose that in the soul too there is something besides reason, resisting and opposing it. In what sense it is distinct from the other elements does not concern us. Now even this seems to have a share in reason, as we said; at any rate in the continent man it is obey reason- and presumably in the temperate and brave man it is still more obedient; for in him it speaks, on all matters with the same voice as reason.¹⁰³⁹

According to Aquinas, the powers of the nutritive part have not an inborn aptitude to obey the command of reason, and therefore there are no habits in them; but the sensitive powers have an inborn aptitude to obey the command of reason, and therefore habits can be in them, for in so far as they obey reason, in a certain sense they are said to be rational¹⁰⁴⁰.

3.2.2 The Relevance of Formation of Habits

'The person, as person, does not receive anything, but in so far as he moves through being moved by another he receives something from that which moves him: and thus a habit is caused in him'¹⁰⁴¹. "An individual responds to particular events and establish patterns of interaction between passion and reason, character traits emerge. Through their past actions, individuals become disposed to act freely in certain determinate ways."¹⁰⁴² 'An individual becomes habitually alert to opportunities for sarcastic remarks, and skilled in their delivery; the Boy Scout is quick to help an elderly woman cross the street'.¹⁰⁴³

¹⁰³⁷ Ibid.

¹⁰³⁸ Lombardo E Nicholas,. The Logic of Desire. Aquinas on Emotion, The Catholic University of America Press, Washington, D.C. 2011, p 103.

¹⁰³⁹ Aristotle,. The Nicomachean Ethics. Trans by Ross David, Oxford University Press, 2009, p 21(1102b, 13-29).

¹⁰⁴⁰ See: ST, Part I-II, Q 50, Art 3, ad 1.

¹⁰⁴¹ ST, Part I-II, Q 51, Art 2.

¹⁰⁴² Lombardo E Nicholas,. The Logic of Desire. Aquinas on Emotion, The Catholic University of America Press, Washington, D.C. 2011, p 101.

¹⁰⁴³ Ibid.

In these above examples, what we see derive from “determinations of powers towards specific actions”¹⁰⁴⁴. Determining power is necessary because the rational powers “are not determined towards one particular action, but rather are indiscriminately oriented towards many; they are determined towards particular actions by habitus”¹⁰⁴⁵. For example, a person is not equipped from birth to speak in a particular language: the capacity for communication must be specified and developed over time; “just as we learn languages over time, in a process that requires our rational engagement, so too are habitus in general formed by repeated rational and voluntary acts”¹⁰⁴⁶.

a) Stabilizes Quality

“Habit is a quality which is difficult to change”¹⁰⁴⁷; this stability allows human being to resist inadequate change and develop specific character¹⁰⁴⁸. “For no function of man has so much permanence as virtuous activities, and of these themselves the most valuable are more durable because those who are blessed spend their life most readily and most continuously in these”¹⁰⁴⁹.

It is essential to habit to imply some relation to a person’s nature, which is the end of generation, is further ordained to another end, which is either an operation or the product of an operation¹⁰⁵⁰. Habits are attributes of a person which define the person’s nature; habits, in effect, stabilize the quality and forms what a person is, because they are lasting and stable within us¹⁰⁵¹.

b) Orients Action

Habit is an act, in so far as it is a quality: and in this respect it can be a principle of operation; it is, however, in a state of potentiality in respect to operation, therefore habit is

¹⁰⁴⁴ ST, Part I-II, Q 18, Art 2 ad 3; See also: Lombardo E Nicholas,. The Logic of Desire, p101. Aquinas turns to the subject of *habitus* immediately after finishing his catalogue of passions (questions 22-48), having spent the earlier portions of the *Prima secundae* framing moral action as the pursuit of happiness, and discussing the will and its acts. This structure accurately suggests that *habitus* naturally emerge from the interactions of the will and the sense appetite (that is, from the interactions of will’s affections and the soul’s passions), and their mutual shaping of each other. It also suggests the danger of viewing the Treatise on the Passions as an isolated tract without reference to the seamless connections Aquinas makes between the will, the passion, and their specification into character traits.

¹⁰⁴⁵ ST, Part I-II, Q 55, Art 1.

¹⁰⁴⁶ Lombardo E Nicholas,. The Logic of Desire. Aquinas on Emotion, The Catholic University of America Press, Washington, D.C. 2011, p 102.

¹⁰⁴⁷ ST, Part I-II, Q 49, Art 1.

¹⁰⁴⁸ See: Dobson L Melanie,. Health As A Virtue. Thomas Aquinas and the Practice of Habits of Health, Pickwick Publications, Eugene, 2014, p 18.

¹⁰⁴⁹ Aristotle,. The Nicomachean Ethics. Trans by Ross David, Oxford University Press, 2009, p 16(1100b, 12-17).

¹⁰⁵⁰ ST, Part I-II, Q 49, Art 3.

¹⁰⁵¹ See: Dobson L Melanie,. Health As A Virtue. Thomas Aquinas and the Practice of Habits of Health, Pickwick Publications, Eugene, 2014, p 18.

called the first act and operation, the second act¹⁰⁵². Intrinsically, every habit is in some way connected with action, and human being has the capacity to initiate habit's potential to live more virtuously¹⁰⁵³.

“A faculty or a science which is one and the same is held to relate to contrary objects, but a state which is one of two contraries does not produce the contrary results; as a result of health we do not do what is opposite of healthy, but what is healthy.”¹⁰⁵⁴ “Habitus for Aquinas is half-way between a capacity and an action, between pure potentiality and full actuality”¹⁰⁵⁵.

c) Consistency and Repetition

Health is said to be a habit, or habitual disposition, in relation to nature, but in so far as nature is a principle of act, it consequently implies a relation to act; therefore, one person can be called healthy when he can perform the operation of a healthy man¹⁰⁵⁶. We need to learn things before we can do them, we learn by doing them, men become builders by building, and lyre players by playing the lyre; so too, we become just by doing just acts, temperate by doing temperate acts, courage by doing courageous acts¹⁰⁵⁷. “Dispositions enable us to act well or badly, therefore, seem to be chiefly concerned with habitus as governing or accounting for what we do voluntarily”¹⁰⁵⁸.

When an act is repeated, a certain quality is produced in the passive potentiality which is acted upon, ‘for everything that is passive and moved by another, is disposed by the action of the agents; wherefore if the acts be multiplied, a certain quality is formed in the power which is passive and moved, this quality is called a habit¹⁰⁵⁹. “For Aquinas like Aristotle, our actions and behavior mark us with certain traits over time so that we become what we most consistently and repeatedly do.”¹⁰⁶⁰

¹⁰⁵² ST, Part I-II, Q 49, Art 3 ad 1. Aquinas also states that habit is a disposition whereby that which is disposed is well or ill disposed, either in regard to the habit itself or in regard to the end.

¹⁰⁵³ See: ST, Part I-II, Q 50, Art 3. Aquinas clarifies that habit as part of human nature is not equivalent with natural instinct or powers; sense powers operating according to natural instinct cannot possess habit because they are oriented only to one thing.

¹⁰⁵⁴ Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics. Trans by Ross David, Oxford University Press, 2009, p 30(1129a, 12-15).

¹⁰⁵⁵ Davies Brian, Thomas Aquinas's Summa Theologiae. A Guide & Commentary, Oxford University Press, NY, 2014, p 190.

¹⁰⁵⁶ ST, Part I-II, Q 49, Art 3 ad 3.

¹⁰⁵⁷ Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics. Trans by Ross David, Oxford University Press, 2009, p 23(1103a 33-b2).

¹⁰⁵⁸ Davies Brian, Thomas Aquinas's Summa Theologiae. A Guide & Commentary, Oxford University Press, NY, 2014, p 190.

¹⁰⁵⁹ ST, Part I-II, Q 51, Art 2.

¹⁰⁶⁰ Dobson L Melanie, Health As A Virtue. Thomas Aquinas and the Practice of Habits of Health, Pickwick Publications, Eugene, 2014, p 19.

d) Synderesis and Conscience

There is a difference between an intrinsic power and a habit: the first practical principles bestowed on human being by nature, do not belong to a special power, but to a special natural habit, which we call *synderesis*¹⁰⁶¹. “*Synderesis* is said to incite to good and murmur at evil, in as much as through first principles we proceed to discover and judge of what we have discovered”¹⁰⁶². “Character is important for Aquinas when it comes to habitus since he thinks of virtues and vices as displaying and springing from character.”¹⁰⁶³

‘Conscience is an act: it may be resolved into knowledge applied to an individual case; but the application of knowledge to something is done by some act; conscience is said to witness, to bind or incite, to accuse, torment or rebuke; this follows the application of the knowledge’¹⁰⁶⁴.

‘Although an act does not always remain in itself, it always remains in its cause, which is power and habit; all the habits by which conscience is formed, although many, nevertheless have their efficacy from one first habit of first principles, which is called *synderesis*’¹⁰⁶⁵.

e) Constitutes Good Disposition

“The word disposition seems to cover a lot of what Aquinas seems to have in his mind when speaking of habitus”¹⁰⁶⁶. According to Aquinas, habit is a disposition, which consists principally in relation to an act, which means it is a quality, and in this respect it can be a principle of operation, whereby habit is called the first act and operation is called the second act¹⁰⁶⁷. It is not the essence of habit to be related to power, but to be related to nature; “of all the things that come to us by nature we must first acquire the potentiality and later exhibit the activity; but the virtues we get by first exercising them, as also happens in the case of Arts as well”¹⁰⁶⁸. “Dispositions can be involved in how we think and choose”¹⁰⁶⁹. ‘It is

¹⁰⁶¹ See: ST, Part I, Q 79, Art 12.

¹⁰⁶² Ibid.

¹⁰⁶³ Davies Brian, . Thomas Aquinas’s Summa Theologiae. A Guide & Commentary, Oxford University Press, NY, 2014, p 190.

¹⁰⁶⁴ ST, Part I, Q 79, Art13.

¹⁰⁶⁵ ST, Part I, Q 79, Art13, ad 3.

¹⁰⁶⁶ Davies Brian, . Thomas Aquinas’s Summa Theologiae. A Guide & Commentary, Oxford University Press, NY, 2014, p 189.

¹⁰⁶⁷ See: ST, Part I-II, Q 49, Art 3.

¹⁰⁶⁸ Aristotle, . The Nicomachean Ethics. Trans by Ross David, Oxford University Press, 2009, p 23(1103a, 27-33).

¹⁰⁶⁹ Davies Brian, . Thomas Aquinas’s Summa Theologiae. A Guide & Commentary, Oxford University Press, NY, 2014, p 191.

important to understand, that human being has the capacity to detach from many of their emotions and evaluate them prudently and morally¹⁰⁷⁰.

We must take as a sign of states of character the pleasure or pain that supervenes upon acts; for the man who abstains from bodily pleasures and delights in this very fact is temperate, while the man who is annoyed at it is self-indulgent, and he who stands his ground against things that are terrible and delights in this or at least is not pained is brave, while the man who is pained is a coward. For moral virtue is concerned with pleasure and pains; it is on account of the pleasure that we do bad things, and on account of the pain that we abstain from noble ones. Hence we ought to have been brought up in a particular way from our very youth, as Plato says, so as both to delight in and to be pained by the things that we ought; this is the right education¹⁰⁷¹.

“Aquinas expands Aristotle’s point that the exercise of good habits equals virtue by requiring integrity all the way through the action. Not only must the external act be good, but for Aquinas even the interior commitment behind the act must be good.”¹⁰⁷² It is not the ability to do good that makes the person virtuous, rather the use of aptitude and abilities rightly toward the good; therefore, ‘we must examine the nature of actions, namely how we ought to do them; for these determine also the nature of the states of character of the person, from whom the acts that are exercised’¹⁰⁷³. “Aquinas thinks that virtues are dispositions that serve us well in the business of living and that vices serve us badly”¹⁰⁷⁴. “Habit provides the metaphysical basis for elaborating a moral theology confident enough to give a serious attention to personal transformation.”¹⁰⁷⁵

f) Strengthening of Action through Infused Habit

“There are some habits by which a person is disposed to an end, which exceeds the proportion of human nature, namely the ultimate and perfect happiness of man; such habits can never be in a person except by Divine infusion, as is the case with all gratuitous grace”¹⁰⁷⁶. “God fixed a certain order in beings in such a way that at the same He reserved to Himself whatever he intended to do otherwise than by a particular cause”¹⁰⁷⁷. “And I have filled him with the Spirit of God, with ability and intelligence, with knowledge and all

¹⁰⁷⁰ Cates Fritz Diana,. Aquinas on The Emotions. A Religious Ethical Inquiry, Georgetown University Press, Washington, D.C. 2009, p 157.

¹⁰⁷¹ Aristotle,. The Nicomachean Ethics. Trans by Ross David, Oxford University Press, 2009, p 26(1104a, 4-14).

¹⁰⁷² Dobson L Melanie,. Health As A Virtue. Thomas Aquinas and the Practice of Habits of Health, Pickwick Publications, Eugene, 2014, p 21.

¹⁰⁷³ Aristotle,. The Nicomachean Ethics. Trans by Ross David, Oxford University Press, 2009, p 24(1103b, 29-33).

¹⁰⁷⁴ Davies Brian,. Thomas Aquinas’s Summa Theologiae. A Guide & Commentary, Oxford University Press, NY, 2014, p 190.

¹⁰⁷⁵ Cessario Romanus,. The Moral Virtues and The Theological Ethics. University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame, Indiana, 2013, p 40.

¹⁰⁷⁶ ST, Part I-II, Q 52, Art 4. According to Aquinas: because God can produce the effects of second causes, without the second causes; Just as, in order to show His power, He causes health, without the natural cause, but which nature could have caused, also at times for the manifestation of His power, He infuses into a person even those habits which can be caused by a natural power. Thus He gave to the apostles the science of the Scriptures and of all tongues, which the people can acquire by study or by custom, but not so perfectly.

¹⁰⁷⁷ ST, Part I, Q 105, Art 6.

craftsmanship”¹⁰⁷⁸. “The natural imperfection of man’s nature and wonderful composition, offer the Creator an opportunity of glorifying Himself in man in quiet a peculiar manner, partly by supernaturally correcting the defects of human nature, partly by assisting man in his conflict against them.”¹⁰⁷⁹

“Through a gift of grace, God can add to one’s wherewithal certain higher order virtues. In receiving and consenting to these virtues, one is healed of some of the distortions to which one has become accustomed through the misuse of one’s powers.”¹⁰⁸⁰ The infused habits, such as the theological virtues of faith, hope, and charity, are given to us as gifts that draw us near to God; habits that dispose to a superhuman end must exceed the power of human nature, since habits must be proportionate to what a person is disposed to by them.¹⁰⁸¹ “Acts produced by an infused habit, do not cause a habit, but strengthen the already existing habit, just as the remedies of medicine given to a man who is naturally healthy, do not cause a kind of health, but give new strength to the health he had before”¹⁰⁸².

g) Teleological End

“Habit is a disposition of a subject which is in a state of potentiality either to form or to operation.”¹⁰⁸³ “There are some habits by which a person is disposed to an end.”¹⁰⁸⁴ ‘Habits lead a person to proximate end; for example, from the practice of the habit of health, a person could lose weight, lower their blood pressure, gain fitness, reconcile with an estranged family member, and so forth.’¹⁰⁸⁵ “Diversity of ends demands a diversity of virtues, even as diversity of active principle does; moreover the ends are objects of the internal acts, with which above all virtues are concerned”.¹⁰⁸⁶ “Habitus reflects our desires, and it can lead us easily or spontaneously to pursue goals that reflect what we are”¹⁰⁸⁷.

¹⁰⁷⁸ Exodus, 31: 3.

¹⁰⁷⁹ Scheeben Mathias Joseph,. A manual of Catholic Theology. Based on Scheeben’s „ dogmatik“ Volume 1, Wilhelm Joseph and Scannell B.Thomas, Kegan Paul Trench Truebener & Co, London, 1906, p 424.

¹⁰⁸⁰ Cates Fritz Diana,. Aquinas on The Emotions. A Religious Ethical Inquiry, Georgetown University Press, Washington, D.C. 2009, p 245. Although one is still finite and prone to moral failure and sin; one undergoes an elevation or extension of one’s powers, so that one is able to tend toward God, not only as God is apprehended through the exercise of natural reason, as a first and final cause of being, but also as God is apprehended through faith and final cause of being, but also as God is apprehended through faith as Friend. See also ST,Part II-II, Q 23&24.

¹⁰⁸¹ See: Dobson L Melanie,. Health As A Virtue. Thomas Aquinas and the Practice of Habits of Health, Pickwick Publications, Eugene, 2014, p 22. “By strengthening our ability to practice habits of love and goodness, God enables us to be people of habit who live our life toward our Creator in the world”.

¹⁰⁸² ST, Part I-II, Q 51 Art 3 ad 3.

¹⁰⁸³ ST, Part I-II, Q 50, Art1.

¹⁰⁸⁴ ST, Part I-II, Q 51 Art 4.

¹⁰⁸⁵ Dobson L Melanie,. Health As A Virtue. Thomas Aquinas and the Practice of Habits of Health, Pickwick Publications, Eugene, 2014, p 37.

¹⁰⁸⁶ ST, Part I-II, Q 54, Art2 ad 3.

¹⁰⁸⁷ Davies Brian,. Thomas Aquinas’s Summa Theologiae. A Guide & Commentary, Oxford University Press, NY, 2014, p 189.

h) Entitative and Operative Habit

Entitative habit is the sanctifying grace as a permanent quality added to human nature and directly modifying its being (entity) rather than its operations, as in the case of virtues.¹⁰⁸⁸ “A habit implies a certain disposition in relation to nature or to operation.”¹⁰⁸⁹ As much as habit directly affects the person in well-being or ill-being, it extends to his operations: a habit which affects the person himself (such as health, or overweight) is called an entitative habit; a habit which affects the person in his operation (such as the acquired skill of playing a musical instrument) is called an operative habit¹⁰⁹⁰.

Habits are distinguished in relation to nature, from the fact that one habit disposes to an act that is suitable to a lower nature, while another habit disposes to an act befitting higher nature; and thus human virtue which disposes to an act befitting to human nature, is distinct from godlike or heroic virtue, which disposes to an act befitting some higher nature¹⁰⁹¹.

i) Health and Habit

According to Aquinas, health is a habit; he means that health is in the first species of quality that is difficult to change; it is an integral part of habits¹⁰⁹². “A person is healthy according to how his condition compares to what a healthy human is determined to be, but a person can cultivate a greater or lesser degree of health according to how he participate in his own health”.¹⁰⁹³ “The same proportion is not found in all things, nor a single proportion always in the same thing, but it may be relaxed and yet persist up to a point, and it may differ in degree.”¹⁰⁹⁴

There is a certain natural habit demanded by the human species, so that no man can be without it; and this disposition is natural in respect of the specific nature, but since such a disposition has certain latitude, it happens that different grades of this disposition are becoming in different men, in respect of the individual nature¹⁰⁹⁵. Regardless of the current health status, heredity, disease, or disabled condition, a person is supposed to take care of his health, that means the person is called upon to cultivate whatever the health he has and

¹⁰⁸⁸ <https://www.catholicculture.org/culture/library/dictionary/index.cfm?id=33334>.

¹⁰⁸⁹ ST, Part I-II, Q 50, Art 2.

¹⁰⁹⁰ See: <https://www.google.com/>“Habits in General - A Tour of Summa”, by Paul J Genn.

¹⁰⁹¹ See: ST, Part I-II, Q 54, Art 3.

¹⁰⁹² See: ST, Part I-II, Q 49 Art 1-4; see also: Dobson L Melanie,. Health As A Virtue. Thomas Aquinas and the practice of habits of health, Pickwick publications, Eugene, 2014, p 26.

¹⁰⁹³ Dobson L Melanie,. Health As A Virtue. Thomas Aquinas and the Practice of Habits of Health, Pickwick Publications, Eugene, 2014, p 27.

¹⁰⁹⁴ Aristotle,. The Nicomachean Ethics. Trans by Ross David, Oxford University Press, 2009, p 183 (1173a 26-8).

¹⁰⁹⁵ ST, Part I-II, Q 51, Art1.

improve his health through healthy habits, otherwise the person capitulates to the forces of death¹⁰⁹⁶.

j) Habit could be Increased, Decreased, or Corrupted

Nature is not equally inclined to cause all the various kinds of habits, some can be caused by nature and some not; and so it does not follow that because some habits are natural, therefore all are natural¹⁰⁹⁷. In respect of the individual nature, a habit of knowledge is natural as to its beginning, but in appetite powers, however, no habit is natural in its beginning, on the part of the soul itself, as to the substance of the habit¹⁰⁹⁸. “The weakness of the will constitutes a weakness in our moral liberty, inasmuch as it places obstacles in the way of its free exercises. Compared to angels, men’s free will is attenuated and bent, and not only defective in its action, but likewise subject to corruption.”¹⁰⁹⁹

Even though habits provide stable qualities, habits can increase, decrease or be corrupted: habits increase only when the intensity of the act equals or exceeds the intensity of the existing habits; a less intensity than the existing habits would result in diminishing the habit; and through the way in which a person participates, the habits are susceptible to corruption; repeated acts cause a habit to grow, but if the acts fall short of the intensity of the habit, such acts do not dispose to an increase of that habit, but rather to a lessening effect.¹¹⁰⁰ Habit as a quality can be increased, that is why the apostles felt that they were not strong enough in the habit of faith, and they prayed to Jesus: “Lord increase our faith”¹¹⁰¹. A habit could be removed, though with difficulty; the intellectual movement of the reason can corrupt the chemistry of habit, even the very root of habit, thus a habit of virtue can be corrupted¹¹⁰². “Living well involves developed skills just as does playing certain games well”¹¹⁰³.

3.2.3 Function of Virtue in Human Act

“Human virtues are firm attitudes, stable dispositions, habitual perfections of intellect and will that govern our actions, order our passions, and guide our conduct according to reason and faith.”¹¹⁰⁴ “Virtue is a dynamic human quality acquired through education and

¹⁰⁹⁶ Dobson L Melanie,. *Health As A Virtue. Thomas Aquinas and the Practice of Habits of Health*, Pickwick Publications, Eugene, 2014, p 27.

¹⁰⁹⁷ ST, Part I-II, Q 51, Art2.

¹⁰⁹⁸ ST, Part I-II, Q 51, Art1.

¹⁰⁹⁹ Scheeben Mathias Joseph,. *A manual of Catholic Theology. Based on Scheeben’s „ dogmatik“* Volume 1, Wilhelm Joseph and Scannell B.Thomas, Kegan Paul Trench Truebener & Co, London, 1906, p 423.

¹¹⁰⁰ See: ST, Part I-II, Q 52, Art2&3; ST, Part I-II, Q 53, Art 2&3. Dobson L Melanie,. *Health As A Virtue. Thomas Aquinas and the Practice of Habits of Health*, Pickwick Publications, Eugene, 2014, p 19.

¹¹⁰¹ Lk, 17: 5.

¹¹⁰² ST, Part I-II, Q 53, Art 1 ad 2-3.

¹¹⁰³ Davies Brian,. *Thomas Aquinas’s Summa Theologiae. A Guide & Commentary*, Oxford University Press, NY, 2014, p 190.

¹¹⁰⁴ Catechism of the Catholic Church, 2nd, sec. 1804.

personal effort. It forms character and assures continuity in action, it is set within the framework of community and a strong tradition, to whose development it contributes.”¹¹⁰⁵ ‘Virtue builds up a moral system around those qualities inherent in human being that enable them to perform with freedom good actions involving continuity and development’¹¹⁰⁶.

“Virtue, being of two kinds, intellectual and moral, intellectual virtue in the main owes both its birth and its growth to teaching, while moral virtue comes about as a result of habit, hence its name (*ēthikē*) is one that is formed by slight variation from the word *ethos*(habit).”¹¹⁰⁷ “By definition *habitus* are informed by reason, but they are not necessarily informed by right reason. Depending on the choices that formed a particular *habitus*, the rational powers may or may not tend to guide particular passions effectively towards virtue and happiness”¹¹⁰⁸. ‘The human agent is precisely one who performs human actions with a view to the good. If we want to know whether something or someone is good, then we ask about its function’¹¹⁰⁹. ‘The ‘well’ of an action, its adverbial mode, is the ground form of talk of any virtue. The ‘virtue’ of any person is to perform his natural function or proper task well’¹¹¹⁰.

If the function of man is an activity of soul which follows or implies reason, and if we say a ‘so-and-so’ and ‘a good so- and –so’ have a function which is the same in kind, e.g. a lyre-player and a good lyre player, and so without qualification in all cases, eminence in respect of goodness being added to the name of the function (for the function of a lyre-player is to play the lyre, and that of a good lyre player is to do so well): if this is the case (and we state the function of man to be a certain kind of life, and this to be an activity or actions of the soul implying a rational principle, and the function of a good man to be the good and noble performance of these, and if any action is well performed this is the case), human good turns out to be activity of soul exhibiting virtue, and if there are more than one virtue, in accordance with the best and most complete. But we must add ‘in a complete life’. For one swallow does not make a summer, nor does one day; and so too one day or a short time does not make a man blessed and happy.¹¹¹¹

Human virtue is a habit perfecting human being in view of doing good deeds; in human being there are two principles of human actions, they are intellect or reason and appetite; therefore, every human virtue must needs be a perfection of one of these principles; accordingly, if the human act perfects speculative or practical intellect in order that the act may be good, it will be an intellectual virtue, whereas if the human act perfects the appetite, it will be a moral virtue¹¹¹². ‘Habits of the appetite part are caused and moved by reason;

¹¹⁰⁵ Pinckaers Servais, . The Pinckaers Reader. Renewing Thomastic Moral Theology, ed. by Berkmann John and Titus Craig Steven, trans. by Noble Mary Thomas and others, The Catholic University of America Press, Washington, D.C, 2005, p 288.

¹¹⁰⁶ Ibid., 290.

¹¹⁰⁷ Aristotle, . The Nicomachean Ethics. Trans by Ross David, Oxford University Press, 2009, p 23(1103a, 14-18).

¹¹⁰⁸ Lombardo E Nicholas, . The Logic of Desire. Aquinas on Emotion, The Catholic University of America Press, Washington, D.C. 2011, p 103.

¹¹⁰⁹ McInerny Ralph, “Ethics”, The Cambridge Companion to Aquinas. ed. by Kretzmann Norman and Stump Eleonore, Cambridge University Press, 1993, p 202.

¹¹¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹¹¹ Aristotle, . The Nicomachean Ethics. Trans by Ross David, Oxford University Press, 2009, p 12(1098a, 8-19).

¹¹¹² See: ST, Part I-II, Q 58, Art 3. As for virtues, some of them are intellectual, residing in reason itself, some however are moral virtues, in the appetitive part of the soul; and the same may be said of the contrary vices.

therefore, a habit either of virtue or of vice, may be corrupted by a judgment of reason, whenever its motion is contrary to such vice or virtue, whether through ignorance, passion or deliberate choice¹¹¹³.

3.2.3.1 Role of Theological Virtue

The human virtues are rooted in the theological virtues, which adapt man's faculties for participation in the divine nature: for the theological virtues relate directly to God. They dispose us to live in a relationship with God, and their origin, motive, and object is God¹¹¹⁴. "Theological virtue is a good infused habit whose immediate object is God"¹¹¹⁵. "And now faith, hope, and love abide, these three; and the greatest of these is love"¹¹¹⁶. Faith, hope, and charity are the three theological virtues, the foundation of Christian moral activity; they animate and give special character to human act; they are the pledge of the presence and action of the Holy Spirit in the faculties of the human being.¹¹¹⁷

The Old Testament emphasizes on virtues like *habitus* as righteousness¹¹¹⁸, mercy¹¹¹⁹ and fidelity¹¹²⁰; first Corinthians 13 states charity constitutes the best virtue that extends to both God and neighbour, and that faith and hope remain directly related to charity¹¹²¹. Faith is belief in God, and in the truth of His revelation as well as obedience to Him; hope is the expectation and desire of receiving, refraining from despair and capability of not giving up, the belief that God will be eternally present in every human's life and never giving up on His love; charity is a supernatural virtue that helps us love God and our neighbours, more than ourselves¹¹²². "In the history of moral theology, these three virtues, traditionally called the

¹¹¹³ ST, Part I-II, Q 53, Art 1.

¹¹¹⁴ Catechism of the Catholic Church, 2nd, sec. 1812.

¹¹¹⁵ Wuellner Bernard,. Dictionary of Scholastic Philosophy. Editiones Scholasticae, Heusenstamm, Germany, 2011, p 132.

¹¹¹⁶ 1 Corinthians 13:13.

¹¹¹⁷ Catechism of the Catholic Church, 2nd, sec. 1813.

¹¹¹⁸ 'The word Righteousness comes from the Hebrew word "Tzadik" means "straightness or "firmness." It is employed for justice, right, equity, uprightness; a concept of relationship that he who is righteous has fulfilled in the demands laid upon him by it.' See: <http://artkatzministries.org/articles/righteousness-in-the-old-testament/>; 'David was righteous because he refused to slay Saul with whom he stood in covenant relationship' (I Sam.24:17; 26:23).

¹¹¹⁹ Thirteen attributes of mercy in the Old Testament are based on Exodus 34: 6-7 "The Lord, the Lord, a God merciful and gracious, slow to anger, and abounding in steadfast love and faithfulness, keeping steadfast love for the thousandth generation, forgiving iniquity and transgression and sin, yet by no means clearing the guilty, but visiting the iniquity of the parents upon the children and the children's children, to the third and the fourth generation."

¹¹²⁰ "Fidelity is the virtue of consistency. It is the basis for reliable thought, reason, morality, trust, and loyalty. It allows us to predict future behaviour based the history of past behaviour. Fidelity is most valuable when it is applied to the most worthy ideas, deeds, principles, or affiliations". <https://en.wikiversity.org/wiki/Virtues/Fidelity>.

¹¹²¹ Cessario Romanus,. The Virtue or the Examined Life. Continuum, Lit Verlag, Muenster, 2002, p 11.

¹¹²² https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Theological_Virtues.

theological virtues, have always been regarded as providing the whole shape of Christian ethics and with full biblical warrant”¹¹²³.

3.2.3.1.1 Effect of Faith in Human Act

“In faith we are made acquainted by anticipation with God’s knowledge, which is to become ours in the beatific vision; the beatific vision is caused, not by our light, but by God’s light; the knowledge we receive through faith is a preparation leading to future knowledge.”¹¹²⁴ Aquinas opens *Secunda secunda* with questions on faith that provide the foundation for all other virtues, and underscores his intention to situate his ethics within the context of Christian faith; “according to him it is through faith that God is known, and so it is through faith that God becomes the intentional object of hope and charity, and all other virtues are dependent on these three theological virtues”¹¹²⁵. “The act of any power or habit depends on the relation to its object; since to believe is an act of the intellect, in so far as the will moves it to assent, the object of faith can be conserved either on the part of the intellect or on the part of the will that moves the intellect”¹¹²⁶.

Perfection of human being consists not only in what belongs to them in respect of their nature, but also in that which they acquire through a supernatural participation of Divine goodness; that is to say, that human being’s ultimate happiness consists in the vision of God, and to this vision human being cannot attain unless he be taught¹¹²⁷ by God; a person acquires a share of this learning, not at once but little by little, according to the mode of his nature; therefore, everyone who learns through a participation of Divine goodness needs to believe, so that he may acquire the knowledge in a perfect degree¹¹²⁸; “for matters of faith surpass natural reason”¹¹²⁹. “Nothing more sublime or profound can be said about faith than it is a preparation and anticipation of the beatific vision.”¹¹³⁰

¹¹²³ Cessario Romanus,. *The Virtue or the Examined Life*. Continuum, Lit Verlag, Muenster, 2002, p 11.

¹¹²⁴ Scheeben Joseph Matthias,. *Nature and Grace*. Translated by Vollert Cyril, WIPF & Stock, Eugene, Oregon, 2009, p 240.

¹¹²⁵ Lombardo E Nicholas,. *The Logic of Desire. Aquinas on Emotion*, The Catholic University of America Press, Washington, D.C. 2011, p 150.

¹¹²⁶ ST, Part II-II, Q 5, Art 2. “The intellect of the believer is determined to one object, not by the reason, but by the will, wherefore assent is taken here for an act of the intellect as determined to one object by the will.” ST, Part II-II, Q 5, Art1 ad 3.

¹¹²⁷ See: John 6, 45 “It is written in the prophets, ‘And they shall all be taught by God.’ Everyone who has heard and learned from the Father comes to me”.

¹¹²⁸ See: ST, Part II-II, Q 2, Art 3. Simple persons should not be put to the test about subtle questions of faith, unless they be suspected of having been corrupted by heretics, who are wont to corrupt the faith of simple people in such questions. If however, it is found that they are free from obstinacy in their heterodox sentiments, and that it is due to their simplicity, it is no fault of theirs. See ST, Part II-II, Q 2, Art 7.

¹¹²⁹ ST, Part II-II, Q 2, Art 6.

¹¹³⁰ Scheeben Joseph Matthias,. *Nature and Grace*. Translated by Vollert Cyril, WIPF & Stock, Eugene, Oregon, 2009, p 235.

The council of Orange in the year 529 proclaimed affirmation on the necessity of God's grace for the virtue of faith by quoting Saint Paul, "and I am sure that he who began a good work in you will bring it to completion at the day of Jesus Christ"¹¹³¹; and again, "for by grace you have been saved through faith; and this is not your own doing, it is the gift of God"¹¹³². According to Aquinas, "it is the grace of the Holy Spirit, given through faith in Christ, which is predominant in the law of the New Covenant, and that in which its whole power consists"¹¹³³. The Holy Spirit leads a person into truth and makes one in fellowship and ministry, instructing and directing through a diversity of gifts both hierarchical and charismatic, and adorns with fruits¹¹³⁴.

"The importance of affection in Aquinas's account of faith is highlighted by his discussion of the faith of demons. Aquinas denies that the demons have the infused virtue of faith precisely because their knowledge of God does not involve affection"¹¹³⁵. Since the infused virtue of faith implies an affective inclination toward the divine good, and the demons lack any such affection, Aquinas argues that their faith is not a gift of grace, rather they are compelled to believe from the sharpness of their natural intellect.¹¹³⁶

To think is considered, properly speaking, a movement of the mind, an act of the deliberating intellect, and an act of the cogitative power; the intellect of the believer is determined to one object, not by the reason, but by the will; this assent is taken as an act of the intellect¹¹³⁷. An act of faith is to believe in God, and unbelievers cannot be said to believe in a God as we understand it in relation to the act of faith¹¹³⁸. A believer requires the grace of God, so that a virtuous Christian life may achieve perfect happiness; in the daily experience, even engaging in the pursuit of created goods, as subjective beatitude remains proportionate to one more easily than aspiring to divine good¹¹³⁹. According to Aquinas, moving of the reason alone is not sufficient to direct us to our ultimate and supernatural end¹¹⁴⁰.

The seven gifts of the Holy Spirit wisdom, understanding, counsel, fortitude, knowledge, piety, and fear of the Lord belong in their fullness to Christ, complete and perfect the virtues of those who receive them and make docile in readily obeying divine

¹¹³¹ Phil. 1,6.

¹¹³² Eph. 2,8; See also http://www.reformed.org/documents/canons_of_orange.html.

¹¹³³ ST, Part I-II, Q 106, Art 1.

¹¹³⁴ *Gaudium et spes*, no. 4.

¹¹³⁵ Lombardo E Nicholas., *The Logic of Desire. Aquinas on Emotion*, The Catholic University of America Press, Washington, D.C. 2011, p 151.

¹¹³⁶ See: ST, Part II-II, Q 5, Art 2 ad 2. Aquinas considers, faith implies an affective appreciation for divine good, and not just sheer knowledge of supernatural realities.

¹¹³⁷ ST, Part II-II, Q 5, Art 1.

¹¹³⁸ ST, Part II-II, Q 5, Art 2.

¹¹³⁹ Cessario Romanus., *The Virtue or the Examined Life*. Continuum, Lit Verlag, Muenster, 2002, p 17.

¹¹⁴⁰ See: ST, Part I-II, Q 68, Art 2.

inspirations¹¹⁴¹. Gifts of understanding, and knowledge consolidate theological faith, sustain the human act of faith that represent the mysteries of Christian religion¹¹⁴²; Gifts of the Holy Spirit leads a Christian unto truth, and “there exists a close connection and communication between sacred tradition and Sacred Scripture, for both of them, flowing from the same divine wellspring, in a certain way merge into a unity and tend toward the same end”¹¹⁴³. Saint Paul rightly says: “we are justified by faith”¹¹⁴⁴, and “in justice is every virtue comprehended”¹¹⁴⁵.

3.2.3.1.2 Impact of Hope in Human Act

“Aquinas uses the same word, *spes*, for both the passion of hope and the theological virtue of hope; his view of theological hope, moreover, is deeply informed by his understanding of the passion of hope, and vice versa”¹¹⁴⁶. The passion of hope is a movement of the sense appetite, and the theological virtue of hope is an intellectual appetite; and without a cognitive appraisal of the desired good as attainable, the passion of hope would not be elicited and theological hope could not be sustained¹¹⁴⁷.

“Christian hope has the distinguishing mark of not only aiming at the loftiest goal, the possession of God, but of relying directly on the infinite, omnipotent, unconquerable might of the divine nature itself to attain its objective”¹¹⁴⁸. The principle object of hope is eternal happiness; eternal happiness does not enter into the heart of a person perfectly, as to possibly knowing its nature and quality, yet it is possible to be comprehended by a person, and in this way, the movement of hope towards happiness arises¹¹⁴⁹. “We have this hope, a sure and steadfast anchor of the soul, a hope that enters the inner shrine behind the curtain, where Jesus, a forerunner on our behalf, has entered, having become a high priest forever according to the order of Melchizedek”¹¹⁵⁰. The virtue of hope responds to the aspiration to happiness, it inspires activity and purifies them so as to order them to beatitude; hope keeps a person from discouragement, sustains him during times of abandonment, and opens up his heart in expectation of eternal beatitude¹¹⁵¹.

¹¹⁴¹ Catechism of the Catholic Church, 2nd, sec. 1831.

¹¹⁴² See: Cessario Romanus, . The Virtue or the Examined Life. Continuum, Lit Verlag, Muenster, 2002, p 19.

¹¹⁴³ *Dei verbum*, no. 9.

¹¹⁴⁴ Romans 5.1.

¹¹⁴⁵ Aristotle, . The Nicomachean Ethics. Trans by Ross David, Oxford University Press, 2009, p 81(1129b, 29-30).

¹¹⁴⁶ Lombardo E Nicholas, . The Logic of Desire. Aquinas on Emotion, The Catholic University of America Press, Washington, D.C. 2011, p 154.

¹¹⁴⁷ Ibid. The parallel between the passion of hope and the virtue of hope, and the reliance on the Treatise on the Passions to explain theological hope, are further indications that Aquinas’s theory of the passions plays a central role in his theological anthropology. Furthermore, by locating hope in the will, Aquinas unequivocally defines the virtue of hope as a perfection of human affectivity, and not as a perfection of human cognition.

¹¹⁴⁸ Scheeben Joseph Matthias, . Nature and Grace. Translated by Vollert Cyril, WIPF & Stock, Eugene, Oregon, 2009, p 281.

¹¹⁴⁹ ST, Part II-II, Q 17, Art 2.

¹¹⁵⁰ Hebrews 6, 19-20.

¹¹⁵¹ Catechism of the Catholic Church, 2nd, sec. 1818.

Faith is brought to its consummation in the state of beatitude; it passes over into vision and comprehension, immediately through not adequately embracing the object of faith, God. Love is united with the highest good; it returns to its principle, which is now its end, and so arrives at the summit of all its longing. Straining hope comes to rest in this union, and wins sternal, inseparable possession and fruition.¹¹⁵²

The theological virtue of hope orients one's will toward God for the sake of one's own personal happiness, and the object of happiness includes both eternal happiness in loving union with God, as well as any created good that may help us attain this union¹¹⁵³. According to Aquinas, theological hope corresponds with the gift of fear, because the gift of fear encourages filial fear of God, since reverent submission to God implies an attitude of trust in God and a simultaneous acknowledgement of dependence¹¹⁵⁴. Filial fear and hope complement and strengthen each other¹¹⁵⁵. "There is an internal coherence to this position, since both affections pertain to the future: hope is a desire for a future good, and filial fear is a desire to avoid a future evil"¹¹⁵⁶.

Aquinas distinguishes two ways in which one may fear God; firstly, one may fear the punishment justly inflicted by God upon sinners, which he calls servile fear; secondly, one may fear separation from God through one's sinful fault after union with God has become the object of one's hope, which he calls filial fear;¹¹⁵⁷ it is filial fear that he reckons to be a gift of the Holy Spirit, since this type of fear is not based merely on one's self-interested desire to avoid punishment, but rather one's desire for a union with the object of hope¹¹⁵⁸; the servile fear decreases when one's loving orientation towards God increases, whereas the filial fear increases, the closer one draws to loving God, and the more one fears any potential separation from God¹¹⁵⁹.

The contrary vices of hope are despair and presumption; Aquinas characterizes despair as not only a sinful vice, but as "the origin of other sins"¹¹⁶⁰. Despair is based on a wrong opinion that refuses pardon to the repentant sinner, or that of a false consideration that God does not turn sinners to Himself by sanctifying grace; Aquinas considers that the three vices opposed to the three theological virtues are the greatest of all sins: disbelief opposed to faith

¹¹⁵² Scheeben Joseph Matthias, . *Nature and Grace*. Translated by Vollert Cyril, WIPF & Stock, Eugene, Oregon, 2009, p 286.

¹¹⁵³ Eberl T Jason, . *The Routledge Guidebook to Aquinas' Summa Theologiae*. Taylor & Francis Group, New York, 2016, p196.

¹¹⁵⁴ See: ST, Part II-II, Q 19, Art 12.

¹¹⁵⁵ See: ST, Part II-II, Q 19, Art 9 ad 1.

¹¹⁵⁶ Lombardo E Nicholas, . *The Logic of Desire. Aquinas on Emotion*, The Catholic University of America Press, Washington, D.C. 2011, p 157. In the *Treatise on the Passions* he opposes the passions of hope and fear, and his placement of the two passions in opposition to each other makes it more natural for him to draw a connection between the virtue of hope and the gift of fear. See also ST, Part I-II, Q 23, Art 2.

¹¹⁵⁷ See: ST, Part II-II, Q 19, Art 10.

¹¹⁵⁸ See: Eberl T Jason, . *The Routledge Guidebook to Aquinas' Summa Theologiae*. Taylor & Francis Group, New York, 2016, p197.

¹¹⁵⁹ See: *Ibid*; see also ST, Part II-II, Q 19, Art 10.

¹¹⁶⁰ ST, Part II-II, Q 20, Art 1& Q 21.

in God's own truth, hatred of God opposed to God's goodness itself, and despair opposed to one's hope of sharing in God's goodness; disbelief and hatred of God are objectively more grievous, in so far as their object is the more dangerous vice from the point of view of human act, since hope of eternal happiness is given up; `a person may rush heading into sin and be drawn away from good works'¹¹⁶¹. `Presumption is another vice opposed to hope, not due to despair, but due to immoderate hope, that is, one presumes divine mercy in forgiving sinners, while despising divine justice in punishing sinners'¹¹⁶²; `hope is a desire for an arduous possible good, whereas presumption ignores the arduousness of attaining eternal happiness by means of God's gracious mercy to which sinners must open themselves up, to receive it through repentance'¹¹⁶³.

3.2.3.1.3 Bearing of Charity in Human Act

`God has admitted us to participation in His nature and has called us to His beatitude; God by destining us to His life and beatitude, and by communicating His nature to us in the gift of super-nature, becomes our Father and most intimately united to us; this is our love by faith.'¹¹⁶⁴ The theological virtue of charity is an infused supernatural virtue, whereby man loves God above all things and his neighbour for the sake of God; it is a habitual will to desire and advance another person's good by giving him more than what is his due in justice'¹¹⁶⁵. `The subject of charity is the intellective appetite, that is, in the will'¹¹⁶⁶. `As a movement of the intellectual appetite, charity responds to cognition, and so every act of charity requires cognition; consequently, love of God presupposes knowledge of God; and charity is dependent on the knowledge that comes through faith'¹¹⁶⁷.

`God is the primary object of charity, but he is not the only object of charity; the theological virtue of charity is also directed toward others and oneself, in so far as they are loved in God and for God'¹¹⁶⁸. `Charity logically proceeds from faith and hope; charity is a habitual disposition that provides a stable shape to a person's character and act, influences concrete acts organically, and by permeating in the soul deeply, it is said to increase in intensity'¹¹⁶⁹.

¹¹⁶¹ ST, Part II-II, Q 20, Art 3; Eberl T Jason,. The Routledge Guidebook to Aquinas' Summa Theologiae. Taylor & Francis Group, New York,2016, p197-198.

¹¹⁶² ST, Part II-II, Q21, Art1.

¹¹⁶³ Eberl T Jason,. The Routledge Guidebook to Aquinas' Summa Theologiae. Taylor & Francis Group, New York,2016, p 198.

¹¹⁶⁴ Scheeben Joseph Matthias,. Nature and Grace. Translated by Vollert Cyril, WIPF & Stock, Eugene, Oregon, 2009, p 249.

¹¹⁶⁵ Wuellner Bernard,. Dictionary of Scholastic Philosophy. editiones scholasticae, UK, 2011, p 23.

¹¹⁶⁶ ST, Part II-II, Q 24, Art1.

¹¹⁶⁷ Lombardo E Nicholas,. The Logic of Desire. Aquinas on Emotion, The Catholic University of America Press, Washington, D.C. 2011, p 159; ST, Part II-II, Q 27, Art4 & Q 24 Art 1.

¹¹⁶⁸ Ibid; ST, Part II-II, Q 25, Art1.

¹¹⁶⁹ Lombardo E Nicholas,. The Logic of Desire. Aquinas on Emotion, The Catholic University of America Press, Washington, D.C. 2011, p 160; ST, Part II-II, Q 17, Art8 & Q 23 Art 6-8 & Q 24, Art 5.

“Though Charity is love, yet love is not always charity; and it must be understood of the love of charity, it does not mean that every other virtue is charity essentially, but that all other virtues depend on charity in some way”¹¹⁷⁰. “Perfection of charity in the beatific vision constitutes the perfect attainment of happiness, once a person is resting in God, there is no other good which he would desire”¹¹⁷¹; as the preeminent virtue aimed at the ultimate end, that all human moral actions, and the virtuous dispositions from which those actions arise, ought to be aimed to the last end, “that it is possible for a human act without charity to be generally good, but not perfectly good, because it lacks its due order to the last end”¹¹⁷². “Theological love is known exclusively by the name of charity, because it is exercised on a good that is singularly valuable and precious.”¹¹⁷³

According to Aquinas, the primary spiritual benefits of charity are joy, peace, mercy towards sinner or one’s enemies, beneficence, almsgiving, and fraternal correction.¹¹⁷⁴ It may seem as if some of these should be categorized under the virtue of justice, however, “while the demands of justice regulate harmonious relationships among persons, the demands of charity exceed the demands of justice; in short, one may minimally treat another person justly without going that extra mile for him, which charity would compel one to do”¹¹⁷⁵.

“Since charity essentially involves the will’s orientation toward God, even after its infusion, this virtue can be lost by intentionally turning one’s will away from God, that is, by mortal sin; even a single mortal sin suffice for a person to lose the infused virtue of charity.”¹¹⁷⁶ According to Aquinas, the specific vices opposed to the virtue of charity include hatred of God or neighbour, sloth¹¹⁷⁷, envy of another’s good, discord¹¹⁷⁸, contention¹¹⁷⁹,

¹¹⁷⁰ ST, Part I-II, Q 62, Art 2 ad 3.

¹¹⁷¹ Eberl T Jason, . The Routledge Guidebook to Aquinas’ Summa Theologiae. Taylor & Francis Group, New York, 2016, p 199.

¹¹⁷² ST, Part II-II, Q 23, Art 7.

¹¹⁷³ Scheeben Joseph Matthias, . Nature and Grace. Translated by Vollert Cyril, WIPF & Stock, Eugene, Oregon, 2009, p 271.

¹¹⁷⁴ See: ST, Part II-II, Q 28- Q 33.

¹¹⁷⁵ Eberl T Jason, . The Routledge Guidebook to Aquinas’ Summa Theologiae. Taylor & Francis Group, New York, 2016, p 201.

¹¹⁷⁶ Ibid.

¹¹⁷⁷ Sloth is defined as oppressive sorrow for spiritual good, which results in, not the outright rejection of one’s friendship with God, but rather the dejection occasioned by one’s apathetic attitude toward friendship. See ST, Part II-II, Q 35.

¹¹⁷⁸ Discord is opposed to concord. Concord results from charity, in as much as charity directs many hearts together to one thing, which is chiefly the Divine good, secondarily, the good of our neighbour. Wherefore discord is a sin, in so far as it is opposed to this concord. But it must be observed that this concord is destroyed by discord in two ways: directly and accidentally. Human acts and movements are said to be direct when they are according to one’s intention. Wherefore a man directly disaccords with his neighbour, when he knowingly and intentionally dissents from the Divine good and his neighbour’s good, to which he ought to consent. This is a mortal sin in respect of its genus, because it is contrary to charity, although the first movements of such discord are venial sins by reason of their being imperfect acts. The accidental in human acts is that which occurs beside the intention. Such like discord is neither sinful nor against charity, unless it be accompanied by an error about things necessary to salvation, or by undue obstinacy. See ST, Part II-II, Q 37.

schism¹¹⁸⁰, strife¹¹⁸¹, sedition¹¹⁸², war¹¹⁸³, and scandal¹¹⁸⁴. Aquinas's analysis of the theological virtue of charity may be summed up in the words of Jesus "you shall love the Lord your God with all your heart, and with all your soul, and with all your mind. This is the greatest and first commandment. And a second is like it: You shall love your neighbour as yourself."¹¹⁸⁵

"Charity is not any kind of love of God, but that love of God, by which God is loved as the object of bliss, to which object we are directed by faith and hope."¹¹⁸⁶ "This brief definition captures and underscores the unique character of the love of divine friendship as well as its relationship to the other virtue of the Christian life. Charity is first of all a sharing in the very love of God himself."¹¹⁸⁷ "It is through the infused virtue of charity that we

¹¹⁷⁹ To contend is to tend against someone. Wherefore just as discord denotes a contrariety of wills, so contention signifies contrariety of speech. For this reason when a man contrasts various contrary things in a speech, is called contention, where it consists in developing a speech from contrary things," for instance: "Adulation has a pleasant beginning, and a most bitter end." Now contrariety of speech may be looked at in two ways: with regard to the intention of the contentious party, and with regard to the manner of contending. As to the intention, we must consider whether he contends against the truth, and then he is to be blamed, or against falsehood, and then he should be praised. As to the manner, we must consider whether his manner of contending is in keeping with the persons and the matter in dispute, for then it would be praiseworthy, for contention is a sharp speech suitable for proof and refutation, or whether it exceeds the demands of the persons and matter in dispute, in which case it is blameworthy. See: ST, Part II-II, Q 38.

¹¹⁸⁰ Schism takes its name "from being a scission of minds," and scission is opposed to unity. Wherefore the sin of schism is one that is directly and essentially opposed to unity. The sin of schism is, properly speaking, a special sin, for the reason that the schismatic intends to sever himself from that unity which is the effect of charity: because charity unites not only one person to another with the bond of spiritual love, but also the whole Church in unity of spirit. See: ST, Part II-II, Q 39.

¹¹⁸¹ While contention implies a contradiction of words, strife denotes a certain contradiction of deeds. Strife is when persons strike one another through anger. Hence strife is a kind of private war, because it takes place between private persons, being declared not by public authority, but rather by an inordinate will. See: Galatians 5,20; ST, Part II-II, Q 41.

¹¹⁸² Sedition is a special sin, having something in common with war and strife, and differing somewhat from them. It has something in common with them, in so far as it implies a certain antagonism. War and strife denote actual aggression on either side, whereas sedition may be said to denote either actual aggression or the preparation for such aggression. Seditions are tumults tending to fight, a number of people make preparations with the intention of fighting. Secondly, they differ in that war is, properly speaking, carried on against external foes, being as it were between one people and another, whereas strife is between one individual and another, or between few people on one side and few on the other side, while sedition, in its proper sense, is between mutually dissentient parts of one people, as when one part of the state rises in tumult against another part. Since sedition is opposed to a special kind of good, namely the unity and peace of a people, it is a special kind of sin. See: ST, Part II-II, Q 42; 2 Corinthians 12, 20.

¹¹⁸³ Aquinas lists war among the vices opposed to charity, and this makes perfect sense insofar as war essentially involves the most violent and widespread disruption of social unity. Nevertheless, with an historical understanding of the unfortunate necessity of war at times in order to bring about peace war may be necessary; Aquinas rejects absolute pacifism and allows that there may be just war, which includes authority of the sovereign, a just cause and a rightful intention. See: ST, Part II-II, Q 40.

¹¹⁸⁴ While going along the spiritual way, a man may be disposed to a spiritual downfall by another's word or deed, in so far, as one man by his injunction, inducement or example moves another to sin; and this is scandal properly so called. Scandal is, therefore, fittingly defined as something less rightly done or said, that occasions another's spiritual downfall. See: ST, Part II-II, Q 43.

¹¹⁸⁵ Mathew 22: 37-39.

¹¹⁸⁶ ST, Part I-II, Q 65, Art 5.

¹¹⁸⁷ Cessario Romanus, *The Virtue or the Examined Life*. Continuum, Lit Verlag, Muenster, 2002, p 62.

actually attain God and begin to possess Him in this life; the union that charity establishes is a union of friendship, which involves a love that is mutual.”¹¹⁸⁸

3.2.3.2 The Role of Moral Virtues in Human Act

According to a fundamental postulate of the *Summa Theologiae*, the human person stands between God as creative source, and God as beatifying goal; and Aquinas placed the affirmation of the human act, that the beatific vision serves as the ultimate happiness of each human person at outset of his treatment of the moral life and virtues.¹¹⁸⁹ Human resources alone cannot accomplish this goal, this implies the hope that those who lead morally good lives can expect a divine reward of the grace of God, which in a life of virtue profoundly alters the substance of a person’s moral life and guides to beatific vision¹¹⁹⁰.

Aquinas divides moral virtue into the four cardinal virtues of prudence, justice, fortitude, and temperance, and reinterprets them according to his anthropology; for Aquinas, virtues are not classifications of external behavior, they are appropriate ways to talk about the perfection of particular aspect of human act¹¹⁹¹.

3.2.3.2.1 Influence of Prudence in Human Act

“Prudence is the habit of right reason that knows the right things to be done and the right way of doing them; it is the habit of desiring, finding, and choosing the right means for worthy human ends”¹¹⁹². A prudent man is one who perceives as it were from afar, for his perception is keen, and he foresees the event of uncertainties; prudence belongs directly to the cognitive faculty, and properly speaking, it is in the reason¹¹⁹³. Prudence is not only concerned with knowledge, rather involves the execution of a rational judgement about what is to be done; in fact, the implementation of a prudential decision is the principal act of prudence, and someone who executes a poor decision is more prudent than someone else who fails to execute a good decision.¹¹⁹⁴

Practical wisdom, then, must be reasoned and true state of capacity to act with regard to human goods. But further, while there is such a thing as excellence in art, there is no such thing as excellence in

¹¹⁸⁸ McManaman Douglas,. *A Treatise on the Four Cardinal Virtues*. Amazon Fulfillment, Poland, 2013, p 77.

¹¹⁸⁹ See: ST, Part I-II, Q 3, Art 8.

¹¹⁹⁰ Cessario Romanus,. *The Moral Virtues and Theological Ethics*. The University of Notre Dame, Notre Dame, Indiana, 2013, p 44.

¹¹⁹¹ See: Lombardo E Nicholas,. *The Logic of Desire. Aquinas on Emotion*, The Catholic University of America Press, Washington, D.C. 2011, p 170.

¹¹⁹² Wuellner Bernard,. *Dictionary of Scholastic Philosophy*. editiones scholasticae, UK, 2011, p 101.

¹¹⁹³ ST, Part II-II, Q 47, Art 1.

¹¹⁹⁴ See: Lombardo E Nicholas,. *The Logic of Desire. Aquinas on Emotion*, The Catholic University of America Press, Washington, D.C. 2011, p 171.

practical wisdom; and in art he who errs willingly is preferable, but in practical wisdom, as in the virtues he is the reverse. Plainly, then, practical wisdom is a virtue and not an art¹¹⁹⁵.

Prudence is right reason applied to action; there are mainly three acts of prudence: `it takes counsel´, which moves an act of inquiry; `it judges of what one has discovered´, which subsists an act of speculative reason; `it makes command´, which consists in applying to action the things counselled and judged¹¹⁹⁶. `Prudence is not lost when memories are forgotten, because prudence consists chiefly not in the knowledge of universals, but applying them to action, therefore the effects of prudence remain even after specific relevant memories are forgotten, but hinders it somewhat¹¹⁹⁷. “For Aquinas, prudence is more than technical knowledge and the volitional readiness to execute decisions; it involves also the shaping of dispositions by reason and grace”¹¹⁹⁸.

God has endowed us with certain infused virtues which perfect us in the ordering of our actions to their end, which is happiness; `human act needs to be conformed toward eternal happiness, and neither charity nor faith in itself suffices to transform every feature of the moral life but by prudence and grace of God, so that our choices become more centered on God and directed toward him¹¹⁹⁹. It is necessary to fill our minds with “whatever is true, whatever is honorable, whatever is just, whatever is pure, whatever is pleasing and whatever is commendable and worthy of praise”¹²⁰⁰. “The magnanimous¹²⁰¹ person is said to be `slow and leisurely´ not because he is solicitous about nothing, but because he is not over-solicitous about many things, and is trustful in matters where he ought to have trust, and is not over-solicitous about them”¹²⁰². “Each human person possesses an instinctive understanding of the principles of practical action, the scholastics called this capacity *synderesis*”¹²⁰³. “Moral virtues are helped by prudence, which prepares the way for them, by disposing the means. Hence it follows that prudence is more excellent than the moral virtues, and moves them: yet “*synderesis*” moves prudence, just as the understanding of principles moves science”¹²⁰⁴.

¹¹⁹⁵ Aristotle,. *The Nicomachean Ethics*. Trans by Ross David, Oxford University Press, 2009, p 106(1140b, 20-24).

¹¹⁹⁶ ST, Part II-II, Q 47, Art 8.

¹¹⁹⁷ ST, Part II-II, Q 47, Art 16.

¹¹⁹⁸ Lombardo E Nicholas,. *The Logic of Desire. Aquinas on Emotion*, The Catholic University of America Press, Washington, D.C. 2011, p 173.

¹¹⁹⁹ Cessario Romanus,. *The Virtue or the Examined Life*. Continuum, Lit Verlag, Muenster, 2002, p 103.

¹²⁰⁰ Philippians 4:8.

¹²⁰¹ Aquinas defines magnanimity as a certain straining of the soul to great things. It is concerned particularly with hope of something difficult. See: ST, Part II-II, Q 126 & 129.

¹²⁰² ST, Part II-II, Q 47, Art 9 ad 3.

¹²⁰³ Cessario Romanus,. *The Virtue or the Examined Life*. Continuum, Lit Verlag, Muenster, 2002, p 111; see also: ST, Part II-I, Q 79, Art 12.

¹²⁰⁴ ST, Part II-II, Q 47, Art 6 ad 3.

3.2.3.2.2 Impact of Justice in Human Act

“Generally, justice is the virtue that makes a man’s actions habitually conformed to the law; it is a particular form of human goodness, the perpetual and constant will to render to another his right”¹²⁰⁵. According to Scholastic philosophy, the virtue of justice in human act could be classified into: ‘civic justice’ i.e. justice in civic or state matter; ‘commutative justice’ i.e. the justice of exchange of rights between individuals or equals, and measure by strict equality of the goods rightfully transferred; ‘distributive justice’ i.e. justice of the community in dealing with its members proportionately to their capacities, merits, and needs; ‘legal justice’ i.e. justice to the community to be paid by its members, both rulers and ruled, in obeying the laws for the sake of the common good; ‘natural justice’ i.e. justice as prescribed by the natural law; ‘social justice’ i.e. any act of justice which has important social or general effects, in this sense, commutative, distributive and legal justice are included¹²⁰⁶.

“Every day human interdependence grows more tightly drawn and spreads by degrees over the whole world. As a result the common good, that is, the sum of those conditions of social life which allow social groups and their individual members relatively thorough and ready access to their own fulfillment, today takes on an increasingly universal complexion and consequently involves rights and duties with respect to the whole human race. Every social group must take account of the needs and legitimate aspirations of other groups, and even of the general welfare of the entire human family”¹²⁰⁷.

‘Justice directs man in his relations with other men, regards his relation with individuals and others in general, and in so far as man serves a community, serves all those who are included in that community’¹²⁰⁸. Human act of justice has a tremendous social relevance, “then a thorough treatment of the concrete issues involved in the virtue of justice would require much scientific investigation and analysis”¹²⁰⁹. Then a ‘truly responsible person must take account of the neighbour; for no individual, even if lives alone, can escape from being involved in some form of human relationships’¹²¹⁰. “For a man’s act is made good through attaining the rule of reason, which is the rule whereby human acts are regulated; since justice regulates human operations, it renders man’s operations good”¹²¹¹.

In this way, Pope Leo XIII, in the footsteps of his Predecessors, created a lasting paradigm for the Church. The Church, in fact, has something to say about specific human situations, both individual and communal, national and international. She formulates a genuine doctrine for these situations, a corpus which enables her to analyze social realities, to make judgments about them and to indicate directions to be taken for the just resolution of the problems involved¹²¹².

¹²⁰⁵ Wuellner Bernard,. Dictionary of Scholastic Philosophy. editiones scholasticae, UK, 2011, p 66.

¹²⁰⁶ Ibid.

¹²⁰⁷ *Gaudium et spes*, chap. 2.no.26.

¹²⁰⁸ ST, Part II-II, Q 58, Art 5.

¹²⁰⁹ Cessario Romanus,. The Virtue or the Examined Life. Continuum, Lit Verlag, Muenster, 2002, p 127.

¹²¹⁰ Ibid., 128.

¹²¹¹ ST, Part II-II, Q 58, Art 3.

¹²¹² Pope John Paul II,. Encyclical Letter *Centesimus Annus* (On the Hundredth Anniversary of *Rerum Novarum* May 1st 1991) no.5.

“This means that the Christian theologians and other members of the Church rightly confront social justice issues, but always with an eye to the larger perspective of the sacred doctrine¹²¹³, as Jesus himself teaches, “but strive first for the kingdom of God and his righteousness (justice), and all these things will be given to you as well”¹²¹⁴.

Aquinas describes justice as a quality of soul, “for virtue is a habit that is the principle of a good act, a virtue must be defined by means of the good act bearing on the matter proper to that virtue, and Aquinas defines justice as the habitus by which someone renders to each his due with a constant and perpetual will¹²¹⁵. “All men mean by justice that kind of state of character which make people disposed to do what is just and makes them act justly and wish for what is just; and similarly by injustice that state which makes them act unjustly and wish for what is unjust.”¹²¹⁶

3.2.3.2.3 The Meaning of Fortitude in Human Act

“Fortitude is a courage which is the habit of restraining fear and moderating rashness in the presence of dangers so that a man follows the rules of reason in doing good and enduring evil in spite of the dangers”¹²¹⁷. A person needs to be strengthened against the fear or danger or toil for that which reason dictates, lest the person turn back, and to this end there is Fortitude.

According to Aquinas, at times human will is hindered and being declined to follow that which is in accordance with reason, on account of some difficulty that presents itself; in order to remove this obstacle fortitude of the mind is necessary, to resist the aforesaid difficulty, to overcome and remove bodily obstacles¹²¹⁸. “Considered according to the power of the soul that it perfects, fortitude is the virtue located in the irascible passions; from this perspective, fortitude is about ordering the irascible passions to correspond with our goal”¹²¹⁹.

According to Aquinas, the irascible and concupiscible powers can be considered in two ways; first, in themselves, in so far as they are parts of the sensitive appetite: and in this way, they are not competent to be the subject of virtue; secondly, they can be considered as participating in the reason, from the fact that they have a natural aptitude to obey reason; thus the irascible or concupiscible power can be the subject of human virtue: because, in so far as it participates in the reason, it is the principle of a human act¹²²⁰.

¹²¹³ Cessario Romanus,. *The Virtue or the Examined Life*. Continuum, Lit Verlag, Muenster, 2002, p 127.

¹²¹⁴ Mathew 6, 33.

¹²¹⁵ ST, Part II-II, Q 58, Art 1.

¹²¹⁶ Aristotle,. *The Nicomachean Ethics*. Trans by Ross David, Oxford University Press, 2009, p 80(1129a, 7-10).

¹²¹⁷ Wuellner Bernard,. *Dictionary of Scholastic Philosophy*. editiones scholasticae, UK, 2011, p 49.

¹²¹⁸ See: ST, Part II-II, Q 123, Art 1.

¹²¹⁹ Lombardo E Nicholas,. *The Logic of Desire. Aquinas on Emotion*, The Catholic University of America Press, Washington, D.C. 2011, p 178.

¹²²⁰ See: ST, Part I-II, Q 56, Art 4.

Aquinas places the `moderation of sadness falls under fortitude according to its material principle of perfecting the irascible passions, he places it also under the virtue of patience; and he places the restraint of immoderate anger under temperance, and under the virtue of gentleness¹²²¹. According to Aquinas, the annexing of secondary to principal virtues depends not only on the matter, but also on the mode, because in everything, form is of more account than matter; as to matter, perseverance seems to have more in common with temperance than with fortitude, yet, in mode, it has more in common with fortitude, in the point of standing firm against the difficulty arising from length of time¹²²². Aquinas means that it belongs to the virtue of fortitude to remove any obstacle that withdraws the will from following the reason; fortitude is chiefly about fear of difficult things, which can withdraw the will from following the reason; it helps one not only firmly to bear the assault of these difficulties by restraining fear, but also moderately to withstand them, when it is necessary to dispel them altogether in order to free oneself, which seems to come under the notion of daring; therefore, fortitude is about fear and daring, as curbing fear and moderating daring¹²²³.

Two virtues associated with fortitude are magnanimity and magnificence: magnanimity is concerned particularly with the hope of something difficult, it is characterized by confidence because confidence implies a certain firmness of hope, coming from some consideration that forms a vehement opinion that the good in question is attainable¹²²⁴; whereas magnificence concerns expenditure in relation to hope, and attaining of something difficult with regard to expenditure.¹²²⁵

`A few secondary virtues of fortitude, such as patience, are directed to the endurance of suffering and sadness, in order to assist the overcoming of obstacles, and thus patience is annexed to fortitude as secondary to principal virtue¹²²⁶. “Fortitude is more about the restraint of fear than the moderation of daring, since it is more difficult to overcome fear than to moderate daring”¹²²⁷. “The gift of fortitude corresponds to the beatitude `blessed are those who hunger and thirst for justice’, because fortitude is concerned with what is difficult and it is very difficult to perform works of virtue with an insatiable desire for justice”¹²²⁸.

¹²²¹ Lombardo E Nicholas,. *The Logic of Desire. Aquinas on Emotion*, The Catholic University of America Press, Washington, D.C. 2011, p 179.

¹²²² See: ST, Part II-II, Q 137, Art 2.

¹²²³ See: ST, Part II-II, Q 123, Art 3.

¹²²⁴ See: ST, Part II-II, Q 129, Art 6.

¹²²⁵ See: ST, Part II-II, Q 134, Art 4 ad 1.

¹²²⁶ ST, Part II-II, Q 136, Art 4.

¹²²⁷ Lombardo E Nicholas,. *The Logic of Desire. Aquinas on Emotion*, The Catholic University of America Press, Washington, D.C. 2011, p 180.

¹²²⁸ *Ibid.*, 185; ST, Part II-II, Q 139, Art 2.

3.2.3.2.4 The Meaning of Temperance in Human Act

“The cardinal virtue of temperance is a habitual moderation in the use of sensibly pleasurable things according to the rule of reason; it is the reason’s control of the concupiscible appetite¹²²⁹. “Desire for sensible goods is good in its essential nature, but it requires the guidance and direction of the reason and will; the virtue of temperance is nothing other than the quality of having the desires of the sense appetite permeated with reason¹²³⁰. According to Aquinas, temperance is a kind of moderation principally concerned with passions that tend towards sensible goods viz. desire and pleasure, and consequently with the sorrow that arises from the absence of those pleasures¹²³¹.”

“Aquinas synthesizes two views of temperance: he sees temperance under the formal principle of moderating those passions that urge us towards something against reason, and from another perspective, he sees temperance as the harmonious ordering of the concupiscible passions towards our ultimate end¹²³². Aquinas explains the virtue of humility in relation to temperance acknowledging that awareness of one’s deficiency is a condition of humility; however, humility is a virtue of appetite, and especially of hope, and the function of humility is to temper and restrain the soul, so that it does not tend immoderately to elevated things; humility is a part of modesty and temperance because it operates in the same way¹²³³.”

Intemperance results from the pursuit of sense pleasures outside the order of right reason; handicapped by lust, the person becomes morally immature and typically manifests unreasonableness and resistance to correction.¹²³⁴

3.2.4 Sin and Vice in General

“Every substance is in itself good; it becomes bad only when it is itself deprived of some perfection or when it deprives another substance of some perfection; hence evil is the privation of some good or corruption of good, and negation of a positive perfection.”¹²³⁵
 “Accepting the teaching of Augustine, Aquinas says that sin is a word, deed, or desire which is against eternal law; by eternal law Aquinas means, God as governing and directing all

¹²²⁹ Wuellner Bernard,. Dictionary of Scholastic Philosophy. editiones scholasticae, UK, 2011, p 122.

¹²³⁰ Lombardo E Nicholas,. The Logic of Desire. Aquinas on Emotion, The Catholic University of America Press, Washington, D.C. 2011, p 185.

¹²³¹ See: ST, Part II-II, Q 141, Art 3.

¹²³² Lombardo E Nicholas,. The Logic of Desire. Aquinas on Emotion, The Catholic University of America Press, Washington, D.C. 2011, p 187; ST, Part I-II, Q 61, Art 2.

¹²³³ See: ST, Part II-II, Q 161, Art 1-4.

¹²³⁴ See: Cessario Romanus,. The Virtue or the Examined Life. Continuum, Lit Verlag, Muenster, 2002, p 192-193.

¹²³⁵ Scheeben Joseph Matthias,. A manual of Catholic theology; based on Scheeben’s “Dogmatik” Volume 2. Wilhelm Joseph and Scannell B. Thomas, Kegan Paul Trench Trubner and Co. London 1908, p 3.

creatures; sin is a turning away from the goodness of God¹²³⁶. Aquinas considers a vice to be a disposition or habitus; in the same way, he takes virtue to be a disposition aimed at action that is good and reflective of God; he understands vice as contrary to virtue because it is action opposed to that to which virtue is directed, and even he considers vice as contrary to nature, since it is contrary to reason.¹²³⁷ “Sin is an evil human act; a word, deed, or desire in opposition to the eternal law; a deliberate offense by thought, word, deed, or omission against the law of God, an inordinate human act”¹²³⁸. “One can sin by omission, as well as by commission, that is, by refusing to act as well as by acting; there is always some doing bound up with what we do not do”¹²³⁹.

All the imperfections hitherto set down as resulting from the constitution of human nature, or from the union of a spiritual soul with a corruptible body, are defects in the realization of the Divine idea of man as the visible image of God; or rather, are defects of the likeness of God in His image. That human nature should imperfectly represent the Divine Ideal is not to be wondered at. The idea of a visible image of God is realized in a being partly spiritual, partly material, which on account of its animal nature, cannot be as like to God as pure spirit. Hence the perfect likeness of man to God can only be attained by spiritualizing the animal part- that is, by converting the ‘animal man’ into a ‘spiritual man’.”¹²⁴⁰

“Sin, in its theological and proper sense, consists in the conscious and voluntary transgression, lesion, or denial of the moral order imposed upon the creature by Divine law.”¹²⁴¹ According to Aquinas, whenever a man is ill-disposed inwardly, through some inordinate affection, he is rendered thereby unfit for fulfilling his duties: since a tree is known by its fruit, (Matthew 12:33) i.e. a person by his works; but vice of the soul is a habit or affection of the soul, discordant and inconsistent with itself through life, and this is to be found even without disease and sickness, e.g. when a man sins from weakness or passion; consequently vice is of wider extent than sickness or disease; even as virtue extends to more things than health; for health itself is reckoned a kind of virtue, and as a result, vice is reckoned as contrary to virtue, more fittingly than sickness or disease.¹²⁴² “One might continue to possess a virtue even if one commits a sin that is contrary to that virtue, Aquinas means that, doing one unjust action need not render someone entirely lacking the virtue of justice”¹²⁴³.

¹²³⁶ Davies Brian,. Thomas Aquinas’s Summa Theologiae. A Guide & Commentary, Oxford University Press, NY, 2014, p 202.

¹²³⁷ See: ST, Part I-II, Q 71, Art 1; Q 31 Art 7.

¹²³⁸ Wuellner Bernard,. Dictionary of Scholastic Philosophy. editiones scholasticae, UK, 2011, p 116.

¹²³⁹ Davies Brian,. Thomas Aquinas’s Summa Theologiae. A Guide & Commentary, Oxford University Press, NY, 2014, p 203.

¹²⁴⁰ Scheeben Joseph Mathias,. A manual of Catholic Theology. Based on Scheeben’s „ dogmatik“ Volume 1, Joseph Wilhelm and Thomas B. Scannell, Kegan Paul Trench Truebener & Co, London, 1906, p 424.

¹²⁴¹ Scheeben Joseph Matthias,. A manual of Catholic theology; based on Scheeben’s “Dogmatik” Volume 2. Wilhelm Joseph and Scannell B.Thomas, Kegan Paul Trench Trubner and Co. London 1908, p 4.

¹²⁴² See: ST, Part I-II, Q 71, Art 1.

¹²⁴³ Davies Brian,. Thomas Aquinas’s Summa Theologiae. A Guide & Commentary, Oxford University Press, NY, 2014, p 203.

Subtly differentiating the very nature of act and habit, Aquinas maintains that habit causes act by way of efficient causality, but act causes habit by way of final causality. In respect of which, we consider the nature of good and evil, that act surpasses habit both in goodness and in badness; whereas the fact that habit is more lasting than act, is accidental to them, and is due to the fact that they are both found in a nature, although it cannot always be in action, and whose action consists in a transient movement; consequently, act simply excels in goodness and badness, but habit, in a certain respect excels virtually in several acts.¹²⁴⁴

3.2.4.1 Distinctions among Sins

“From a theological point of view, evil may be divided into two classes: voluntary evils (sins) and involuntary evils (pain and suffering); evils of the first class are really evil and are to be avoided and hated.”¹²⁴⁵ Aquinas maintains distinctions among sins, since sinners can be doing different things at different times and with different intentions; that, although sin is not a pure privation but an act deprived of its due order, two things concur in the nature of sin, namely, the voluntary act, and its inordinateness which consists in departing from God's law; voluntary act is referred essentially to the sinner; while the inordinateness of the act, is referred accidentally to the intention of the sinner; sins differ specifically on the part of the voluntary acts, rather than of the inordinateness inherent to sin, while voluntary acts differ in species according to their objects; thus it follows, that sins are properly distinguished in species by their objects.¹²⁴⁶

Human being commits sin by settling for a lesser good than they should while they are acting, and every sin consists in the pursuit of some passing good that is inordinately desired; one sin differs from another because of the object of the action, and not in terms of their causes¹²⁴⁷.

According to Aquinas, spiritual sins are worse or involve more guilt than carnal sins because carnal sins involve a turning to bodily good, rather than a spiritual turning away from God, since they generally involve us in loving ourselves at the bodily level which is less grievous than failing to love God and our neighbor, and because carnal sins arise from bodily passion that can affect the degree to which we are responsible for such sins; the gravity of sin can increase, depending on how focused we are on willing to sin, or on the circumstances, or depending on whom and how many, and how excellent a person is when he commits sin¹²⁴⁸.

¹²⁴⁴ See: ST, Part I-II, Q 71, Art 3.

¹²⁴⁵ Scheeben Joseph Matthias, A manual of Catholic theology; based on Scheeben's "Dogmatik" Volume 2. Wilhelm Joseph and Scannell B.Thomas, Kegan Paul Trench Trubner and Co. London 1908, p 4.

¹²⁴⁶ See: ST, Part I-II, Q 72, Art 1.

¹²⁴⁷ Davies Brian, Thomas Aquinas's Summa Theologiae. A Guide & Commentary, Oxford University Press, NY, 2014, p 204.

¹²⁴⁸ See: Ibid, p 205; See: ST, Part I-II, Q 73, Art 5-10.

3.2.4.2 Causes of Sin

“The will in failing to apply the rule of reason or of the Divine law, is the cause of sin; this act has not in itself the nature of evil, or of punishment, or of guilt, before it is applied to the act; accordingly, evil is not the cause of the first sin, but some good lacking some other good¹²⁴⁹. The cause of sin is not something evil in itself; evil can only be produced accidentally by a cause which is itself good; the cause which inflicts bodily suffering does so in the exercise of forces which are good in themselves, but which come into conflict with other forces.¹²⁵⁰ We may distinguish a twofold interior cause of sin: one proximate, on the part of the reason and will, the other remote, on the part of the imagination or sensitive appetite¹²⁵¹. “The fact that sin has an internal cause does not prevent its having an external cause; for nothing external is a cause of sin, except through the medium of the internal cause.”¹²⁵²

“The will cannot turn to that which is absolutely unknown: but if something be known in one respect, and unknown in another, the will can will it. It is thus that ignorance is the cause of sin¹²⁵³; however, not every kind of ignorance is the cause of a sin, but that alone which removes the knowledge which would prevent the sinful act; if a man's will be so disposed that he would not be restrained from the act of parricide, even though he recognized his father, his ignorance about his father is not the cause of his committing the sin, but is concomitant with the sin: wherefore such a man sins, not through ignorance, but in ignorance.¹²⁵⁴

Everything that is done by reason of ignorance is not voluntary, it is only what produces pain and regret that is voluntary, for the man who has done something by reason of ignorance, and feels not the least vexation at his action, has not acted voluntarily, since he did not know what he was doing, nor yet involuntarily, since he is not pained. Of people, then, who act by reason of ignorance he who regrets is thought an involuntary agent, and the man who does not regret may, since he is different, be called a not voluntary agent; for since he differs from the other, it is better that he should have a name of his own... Now every wicked man is ignorant of what he ought to do and what he ought to abstain from, and error of this kind makes men unjust and in general bad; but the term involuntary tends to be used not if a man is ignorant of what is to his advantage- for it is not mistaken purpose that makes an action involuntary, nor ignorance of the universal, but ignorance of the particulars, i.e. is of the circumstances of the action and the objects with which it is concerned¹²⁵⁵.

¹²⁴⁹ ST, Part I-II, Q 75, Art 1 ad 3. Aquinas maintains that, the will lacking the direction of the rule of reason and of the Divine law, and intent on some mutable good, causes the act of sin directly, and the inordinateness of the act, indirectly, and beside the intention: for the lack of order in the act results from the lack of direction in the will.

¹²⁵⁰ Scheeben Joseph Matthias, A manual of Catholic theology; based on Scheeben's "Dogmatik" Volume 2. Wilhelm Joseph and Scannell B.Thomas, Kegan Paul Trench Trubner and Co. London 1908, p 3.

¹²⁵¹ ST, Part I-II, Q 75, Art 2.

¹²⁵² ST, Part I-II, Q 75, Art 3.

¹²⁵³ ST, Part I-II, Q 76, Art 1.

¹²⁵⁴ Ibid.

¹²⁵⁵ Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics. Trans by Ross David, Oxford University Press, 2009, p 39-40(1110b, 18-35).

Sin deserves punishment, and ignorance deserves punishment as well, Apostle Paul says: ‘if any man be ignorant, let him be ignorant’¹²⁵⁶.

Ignorance differs from nescience, in that nescience denotes mere absence of knowledge; wherefore whoever lacks knowledge about anything, can be said to be nescient about it: On the other hand, ignorance denotes privation of knowledge, i.e. lack of knowledge of those things that one has a natural aptitude to know. Some of these we are under an obligation to know, those, to wit, without the knowledge of which we are unable to accomplish a due act rightly. Wherefore all are bound in common to know the articles of faith, and the universal principles of right, and each individual is bound to know matters regarding his duty or state. Meanwhile there are other things which a man may have a natural aptitude to know, yet he is not bound to know them, such as the geometrical theorems, and contingent particulars, except in some individual case. Now it is evident that whoever neglects to have or do what he ought to have or do, commits a sin of omission. Wherefore through negligence, ignorance of what one is bound to know, is a sin; whereas it is not imputed as a sin to man, if he fails to know what he is unable to know. Consequently ignorance of such like things is called "invincible," because it cannot be overcome by study. For this reason such like ignorance, not being voluntary, since it is not in our power to be rid of it, is not a sin: wherefore it is evident that no invincible ignorance is a sin. On the other hand, vincible ignorance is a sin, if it be about matters one is bound to know; but not, if it be about things one is not bound to know¹²⁵⁷.

Aquinas maintains that, in matters of action, the passion acts counter to universal knowledge, if the consideration of particular knowledge be lacking; just as in the body, the stronger the movement against the order of nature, the greater the weakness, so likewise, the stronger the movement of passion against the order of reason, the greater the weakness of the soul¹²⁵⁸. `Sin can be found in our sensual appetites, in so far as these can express the characters that we are and can account for some of the wrong that we choose to do, and we can sin inordinately and voluntarily desiring what right reason would advise us to refrain from¹²⁵⁹.

`Pride makes the person turn away from God, and for this reason, it is called the beginning of all sins because the beginning of evil consists in turning away from God¹²⁶⁰. `Well-ordered self-love, whereby man desires a fitting good for himself, is right and natural; but inordinate self-love, leads to contempt of God, and reckons to be the cause of sin; Concupiscence, whereby a man desires good for himself, is reduced to the cause of sin.¹²⁶¹

Virtue and sin do not arise from the same source. For sin arises from the desire of mutable good; and consequently the desire of that good which helps one to obtain all temporal goods, is called the root of all sins. But virtue arises from the desire for the immutable God; and consequently charity, which is the love of God, is called the root of the virtues, according to Ephesians 3:17: "Rooted and founded in charity." The desire of money is said to be the root of sins, not as though riches were sought for their own sake, as being the last end; but because they are much sought after as useful for any temporal end¹²⁶².

¹²⁵⁶ 1 Corinthians 14:38; ST, Part I-II, Q 76, Art 2.

¹²⁵⁷ ST, Part I-II, Q 76, Art 2.

¹²⁵⁸ See: ST, Part I-II, Q 77, Art 2&3.

¹²⁵⁹ Davies Brian,. Thomas Aquinas’s Summa Theologiae. A Guide & Commentary, Oxford University Press, NY, 2014, p 206.

¹²⁶⁰ ST, Part I-II, Q 84, Art 2.

¹²⁶¹ ST, Part I-II, Q 77, Art 4.

¹²⁶² ST, Part I-II, Q 84, Art 1.

There can be several causes of sin like will, reason, ignorance, sense appetite, sense perception, and malice which can all account for sin through different ways¹²⁶³. Genesis 3 describes Adam and Eve disobeying God by eating from the tree of the knowledge of good and evil and being punished accordingly; Apostle Paul compares Adam and Christ drawing attention to a certain contrast: sin, condemnation and death came into the world through Adam, while grace, rightness with God, and life came into the world through Christ.¹²⁶⁴

3.2.4.3 Consequence of Sin

“Some sins cause the loss of eternal life and entail eternal punishment, they are immediately followed by loss of grace and cause the spiritual death of the soul; others coexist with graces, supernatural life of holiness and justice, of which grace is the principle.”¹²⁶⁵ According to Aquinas, the natural inclination to virtue will be diminished by sin, although the principles of which nature is constituted and the properties that flow from them are neither diminished or destroyed by sin; however, the gift of original justice, conferred on the whole human nature in the person of the first human being which is called a good of nature, was entirely destroyed and forfeited through the sin of the first parent, thereby all powers of the soul are left destitute of their proper order, which are naturally directed to virtue, and this destitution is called a wounding of nature¹²⁶⁶. Philosophically, sin is something contrary to reason, and theologically, it is an offense regarded as against God, not merely against human nature; therefore sin weakens the relation with God¹²⁶⁷.

“The wages of sin is death”¹²⁶⁸, “your iniquities have been barriers between you and your God, and your sins have hidden his face from you so that he does not hear”¹²⁶⁹, “and be sure your sin will find you out”¹²⁷⁰, “before him no creature is hidden, but all are naked and laid bare to the eyes of the one to whom we must render an account”¹²⁷¹, then “do not be deceived; God is not mocked, for you reap whatever you sow, if you sow to your own flesh, you will reap corruption from the flesh; but if you sow to the Spirit, you will reap eternal life

¹²⁶³ Davies Brian, Thomas Aquinas’s *Summa Theologiae*. A Guide & Commentary, Oxford University Press, NY, 2014, p 207.

¹²⁶⁴ See: Romans 5, 1-21. According to Paul Just as one man’s trespass led to condemnation for all, so one man’s act of righteousness leads to justification and life for all; for just as by the one man’s disobedience the many were made sinners, so by the one man’s obedience the many will be made righteous. But law came in, with the result that the trespass multiplied; but where sin increased, grace abounded all the more, so that, just as sin exercised dominion in death, so grace might also exercise dominion through justification leading to eternal life through Jesus Christ our Lord.

¹²⁶⁵ Scheeben Joseph Matthias, A manual of Catholic theology; based on Scheeben’s “Dogmatik” Volume 2. Wilhelm Joseph and Scannell B.Thomas, Kegan Paul Trench Trubner and Co. London 1908, p 6.

¹²⁶⁶ See: ST, Part I-II, Q 85, Art 1-3.

¹²⁶⁷ Wuellner Bernard, Dictionary of Scholastic Philosophy. editiones scholasticae, UK, 2011, p 116.

¹²⁶⁸ Romans 6:23.

¹²⁶⁹ Isaiah 59:2.

¹²⁷⁰ Numbers 32:23.

¹²⁷¹ Hebrews 4:13.

from the Spirit”¹²⁷². Sin leaves behind it certain real and permanent effects, commonly designated as an impairing of natural goodness; sin cannot destroy the substance or the faculties of the soul in themselves, but affects the perfection of exercise and their supernatural endowment.¹²⁷³

According to Aquinas, soul of human being has a twofold comeliness, one from the refulgence of the natural light of reason, whereby he is directed in his actions; the other, from the refulgence of the Divine light, viz. of wisdom and grace, whereby a person is also perfected for the purpose of doing good and fitting actions; when the soul cleaves to things by love, there is a kind of contact in the soul: and when man sins, he cleaves to certain things, against the light of reason and of the Divine law, and the loss of comeliness occasioned by this contact, is metaphorically called a stain on the soul; stain denotes a privation of the soul’s brightness in relation to its cause, which is sin; then diverse sins occasion diverse stains; it is like a shadow, which is the privation of light through the interposition of a body, and which varies according to the diversity of the interposed bodies; that the soul is stained, when it cleaves inordinately, according to Hosea “like grapes in the wilderness, I found Israel. Like the first fruit on the fig tree, in its first season, I saw your ancestors. But they came to Baal-peor, and consecrated themselves to a thing of shame, and became detestable like the thing they loved”¹²⁷⁴.

“For what the flesh desires is opposed to the Spirit, and what the Spirit desires is opposed to the flesh; for these are opposed to each other, to prevent you from doing what you want”¹²⁷⁵; “the works of the flesh are obvious: fornication, impurity, licentiousness, idolatry, sorcery, enmities, strife, jealousy, anger, quarrels, dissensions, factions, envy, drunkenness, carousing, and things like these..: those who do such things will not inherit the kingdom of God”¹²⁷⁶, then “they are darkened in their understanding, alienated from the life of God because of their ignorance and hardness of heart; they have lost all sensitivity and have abandoned themselves to licentiousness, greedy to practice every kind of impurity”¹²⁷⁷ because they are spiritually discerned, and the good of the natural inclination, which also has its mode, species and order, is diminished by sin¹²⁷⁸.

“The moral effects of an act are those which the act causes another person to produce; hence the moral effects of a sinful act are the pains and penalties which it causes God to

¹²⁷² Galatians 6:7-8.

¹²⁷³ Scheeben Joseph Matthias, A manual of Catholic theology; based on Scheeben’s “Dogmatik” Volume 2. Wilhelm Joseph and Scannell B.Thomas, Kegan Paul Trench Trubner and Co. London 1908, p 9.

¹²⁷⁴ Hosea 9:10.

¹²⁷⁵ Galatians 5:17.

¹²⁷⁶ Galatians 5:19-21.

¹²⁷⁷ Ephesians 4:18-19

¹²⁷⁸ ST, Part I-II, Q 85, Art 4.

inflict upon the sinner.”¹²⁷⁹ “Therefore God gave them up in the lusts of their hearts to impurity, to the degrading of their bodies among themselves, to degrading passions; consequently, they were filled with every kind of wickedness”¹²⁸⁰, then “it is possible for one sin to be the cause of another, in the same way as one human act is the cause of another, because acts cause dispositions and habits inclining to like acts”¹²⁸¹.

“A just punishment may be inflicted either by God or by human being; this is the dispositive effect of sin; punishment of inordinate affection is due to sin as overturning the order of reason; sin incurs punishment, through disturbing the order of the Divine or human law”¹²⁸². “It is only the person who sins that shall die”¹²⁸³. Peter said to them, repent, and be baptized every one of you in the name of Jesus Christ so that your sins may be forgiven; and you will receive the gift of the Holy Spirit; for the promise is for you, for your children, and for all who are far away, everyone whom the Lord our God calls to him;¹²⁸⁴ “for God so loved the world that He gave His one and only Son, that whoever believes in Him shall not perish but have eternal life”¹²⁸⁵; “the consequence of sin is death, but the free gift of God is eternal life in Christ Jesus our Lord.”¹²⁸⁶ “This spiritual death is a kind of losing of the original innocence, which Aquinas believes to have preserved Adam from death as long as he persevered in it”¹²⁸⁷.

3.3 Role of External Principles of Human Act

Certain principles of human act have a source external to them namely, law and grace; law is the work of a wisdom endowed with an impelling force, and it is multifaceted; however, grace, which is revealed in the Gospel and received through the sacraments, becomes a second principle of action, exterior in its origin, but profoundly interior through the depth of its penetration within us¹²⁸⁸.

“The object of the exterior act is that on which it bears; the exterior act is the kind of act it is because of its object, and the exterior acts have the notes of morality, in so far as they

¹²⁷⁹ Scheeben Joseph Matthias, A manual of Catholic theology; based on Scheeben’s “Dogmatik” Volume 2. Wilhelm Joseph and Scannell B. Thomas, Kegan Paul Trench Trubner and Co. London 1908, p 11. “The chief object is to avenge the injury done to God’s dignity and holiness by afflicting the sinner with evils affecting his own dignity and well-being.”

¹²⁸⁰ Romans 1:24-30

¹²⁸¹ ST, Part I-II, Q 75, Art 4.

¹²⁸² ST, Part I-II, Q 87, Art 1 ad 2&3.

¹²⁸³ Ezekiel 18:4.

¹²⁸⁴ Acts 2:38-39.

¹²⁸⁵ John 3:16.

¹²⁸⁶ Romans 6:23

¹²⁸⁷ Davies Brian, Thomas Aquinas’s Summa Theologiae. A Guide & Commentary, Oxford University Press, NY, 2014, p 209; ST, Part I-II, Q 85, Art 6.

¹²⁸⁸ See: Pinckaers Servais, Morality The Catholic View. Trans. By Sherwin Michael, St. Augustine’s Press, South bend, Indiana, 2001, p 28.

are voluntary¹²⁸⁹. “The species of human act is formally taken from the end and materially from the object of the exterior act.”¹²⁹⁰ “The external act is the execution, the upshot of the interior acts, and it is as if we think backward from it in order to recognize them.”¹²⁹¹

3.3.1 The Principle of Law

“Law is an extrinsic principle of acts because it is promulgated by God, and in this sense come from outside us, however in another sense it is inside us, for it finds an echo in our own created being; natural law is the participation of the rational creature in the eternal law”¹²⁹².

Taking up the words of Sirach, the Second Vatican Council explains the meaning of that "genuine freedom" which is "an outstanding manifestation of the divine image" in man: "God willed to leave man in the power of his own counsel, so that he would seek his Creator of his own accord and would freely arrive at full and blessed perfection by cleaving to God". These words indicate the wonderful depth of the sharing in God's dominion to which man has been called: they indicate that man's dominion extends in a certain sense over man himself. This has been a constantly recurring theme in theological reflection on human freedom, which is described as a form of kingship. For example, Saint Gregory of Nyssa writes: "The soul shows its royal and exalted character... in that it is free and self-governed, swayed autonomously by its own will. Of whom else can this be said, save a king?... Thus human nature, created to rule other creatures, was by its likeness to the King of the universe made as it were a living image, partaking with the Archetype both in dignity and in name". The exercise of dominion over the world represents a great and responsible task for man, one which involves his freedom in obedience to the Creator's command: "Fill the earth and subdue it" (Gen 1:28). In view of this, a rightful autonomy is due to every man, as well as to the human community, a fact to which the Council's Constitution *Gaudium et spes* calls special attention. This is the autonomy of earthly realities, which means that "created things have their own laws and values which are to be gradually discovered, utilized and ordered by man".¹²⁹³

Pope John Paul II affirms that obedience to God is not, a heteronomy, as if the moral life were subject to the will of something all-powerful, but *theonomy* or participated *theonomy*, since man's free obedience to God's law effectively implies that human reason and human will participate in God's wisdom and providence.¹²⁹⁴

According to Aquinas, law is a rule and measure of acts whereby a person is induced to act or restrained from acting; law binds one to act, and the law belongs to that which is a principle of human acts; and he says a rule or measure is imposed by being applied to those who are to be ruled and measured by it; such application is made by law being notified to people by promulgation; the natural law is promulgated by the fact God instilled it into human being's mind so as to be naturally known.¹²⁹⁵ Grace is a gift of God, not that we have earned

¹²⁸⁹ ST, Part I-II, Q 18, Art 6.

¹²⁹⁰ ST, Part I-II, Q 18, Art 6.

¹²⁹¹ McInerney Ralph,. Aquinas on Human Action. A Theory of Practice, Catholic University of America Press, Washington D.C. 2012, p 84.

¹²⁹² Budziszewski. J,. Commentary on Thomas Aquinas's Treatise on Law. Cambridge University Press, New York, 2014, p 7.

¹²⁹³ John Paul II,. Encyclical Letter, *Veritatis Splendor*, (6 August 1993), Section 38.

¹²⁹⁴ Ibid., Sections 41.

¹²⁹⁵ See: ST, Part I-II, Q 90 Art 1-4.

it, but gratis; though nature is different from grace, it is made for and anticipates grace; our participation in the eternal law is itself an undeserved gift; divine help enables us to unfold this participation¹²⁹⁶.

3.3.1.1 Eternal Law

Eternal law is identical to the divine reason, that the whole community of the universe is governed by divine wisdom; the very idea of the government of things has the nature of law, and since the divine reason's conception of things is not subject to time, but is eternal, it is called eternal law¹²⁹⁷. We read in Proverbs about the divine wisdom's part in the creation:

The Lord created me at the beginning of his work, the first of his acts of long ago. Ages ago I was set up, at the first, before the beginning of the earth. When there were no depths I was brought forth, when there were no springs abounding with water. Before the mountains had been shaped, before the hills, I was brought forth when he had not yet made earth and fields, or the world's first bits of soil. When he established the heavens, I was there, when he drew a circle on the face of the deep, when he made firm the skies above, when he established the fountains of the deep, when he assigned to the sea its limit, so that the waters might not transgress his command, when he marked out the foundations of the earth, then I was beside him, like a master worker; and I was daily his delight, rejoicing before him always, rejoicing in his inhabited world and delighting in the human race. "And now, my children listen to me: happy are those who keep my ways. Hear instruction and be wise, and do not neglect it. Happy is the one who listens to me, watching daily at my gates, waiting beside my doors. For whoever finds me finds life and obtains favour from the Lord; but those who miss me injure themselves; all who hate me love death."¹²⁹⁸

"Eternal law is the plan of divine wisdom inasmuch as it is directive of all acts and motions; it is the immutable, effective decree of God binding the whole universe to its end and to the use of the means for attaining this end, as these are adapted to each nature"¹²⁹⁹. According to Aquinas, the type of the divine wisdom, inasmuch as by it all things are created, has the character of art, exemplar or idea; so the type of the divine wisdom, as moving all things to their end, bears the character of the law; accordingly, the eternal law is nothing else than the type of divine wisdom, as directing all actions and movements¹³⁰⁰.

God imprints on the whole of nature the principles of its proper actions, and in this way God commands the whole of nature; and thus all actions and movements of the whole nature are subject to the eternal law¹³⁰¹. Every knowledge of truth is a kind of reflection and participation of the eternal law which is the unchangeable truth; in this respect more or less cognizant of the eternal law, we know the truth to a certain extent, at least as to the common

¹²⁹⁶ Budziszewski, J., *Commentary on Thomas Aquinas's Treatise on Law*. Cambridge University Press, New York, 2014, p 8.

¹²⁹⁷ See: ST, Part I-II, Q 91, Art 1.

¹²⁹⁸ Proverbs 8: 22-36.

¹²⁹⁹ Wuellner Bernard, *Dictionary of Scholastic Philosophy*. editiones scholasticae, UK, 2011, p 68.

¹³⁰⁰ See: ST, Part I-II, Q 93 Art 1.

¹³⁰¹ ST, Part I-II, Q 93 Art 4.

principles of the natural law¹³⁰². `Human being has a share of the eternal reason, and has a natural inclination to its proper act and end, and this participation of the eternal law in the rational creature is called the natural law¹³⁰³.

3.3.1.2 Natural Law

Nature is understood primarily both by Albert and Aquinas in terms of the natures of specific kinds of creatures, regarded as the intelligible principles of their existence and their causal powers; the orderly interrelationships of creatures are thus to be explained in terms of their casual interrelationships, stemming from the specific natures proper to each kind¹³⁰⁴. “Nature is reason in the sense that reason is itself a natural capacity, and in its functioning it is informed or mirrored by the intelligible order manifested in our own humanity, and in the world within which our lives are embedded.”¹³⁰⁵ The link between nature and reason is constituted by the intelligibility of nature, rather than the naturalness of reason; in virtue of its intelligibility, nature broadly construed is open to comprehension by human reason, moreover, since intelligibility implies purposiveness, human nature in particular provides reason with aims which provide starting points and goals for its practical operations¹³⁰⁶. Philosophy of nature as a systematic field of “thought developed out of attempts to harmonize the Genesis account of creation with Plato’s seemingly parallel account in the *Timaeus*, and as a result nature tended to be Platonic in its general orientation, regarded as a cosmos of intelligibly interrelated things”¹³⁰⁷.

The comprehension of Aquinas’s remarks on natural law rests on a particular understanding of what is required for human act to be fully reasonable: according to him, “each thing is inclined naturally to an operation that is suitable to it according to its form, thus fire is inclined to give heat; wherefore, since the rational soul is the proper form of man, there is in every man a natural inclination to act according to reason”¹³⁰⁸. “Since the precepts of the natural law are sometimes considered by reason actually, while sometimes they are in the reason only habitually, in this way the natural law may be called a habit”¹³⁰⁹. It can also be

¹³⁰² ST, Part I-II, Q 93 Art 2. According to Aquinas, `human law has the nature of law in so far as it partakes of right reason; and it is derived from the eternal law. But in so far as it deviates from reason, it is called an unjust law, and has the nature, not of law but of violence´. ST, Part I-II, Q 93 Art 3 ad 2.

¹³⁰³ ST, Part I-II, Q 91 Art 2.

¹³⁰⁴ See: Porter Jean,. *Nature As Reason. A Thomastic Theory of the Natural Law*, William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, Grand Rapids, Cambridge, U.K, 2005, p 69.

¹³⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, 71.

¹³⁰⁶ See: *Ibid.*, 72.

¹³⁰⁷ Porter Jean,. *Nature As Reason. A Thomastic Theory of the Natural Law*, William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, Grand Rapids, Cambridge, U.K, 2005, p 68.

¹³⁰⁸ ST, Part I-II, Q 94 Art 3. `By human nature we may mean either that which is proper to man--and in this sense all sins, as being against reason, are also against nature or we may mean that nature which is common to man and other animals; and in this sense, certain special sins are said to be against nature; thus contrary to sexual intercourse, which is natural to all animals, is unisexual lust, which has received the special name of the unnatural crime.´ ST, Part I-II, Q 94 Art 3 ad 2.

¹³⁰⁹ ST, Part I-II, Q 94 Art 1.

argued that natural law is held habitually because “synderesis is said to be the law of our mind, because it is a habit containing the precepts of the natural law, which are the first principles of human actions”¹³¹⁰.

Aquinas holds, human act is directed toward certain human goods, like , life, knowledge, and practical reasonableness; although knowledge of these goods is not innate, once experienced they are immediately grasped by the intellect as good in themselves, apart from their emotional appeal or their instrumental value; hence they can also be explained as primary or basic human goods, for any human act, which aims at one of these goods, is to that extent intelligible, because the basic goods are said to provide intelligible ends or basic reason for alternative action¹³¹¹; “good is to be done and pursued, and bad is to be avoided”¹³¹².

It is proper to human being to be inclined to act according to reason; in matters of action, truth or practical rectitude is not the same for all, as matters of detail, but only regarding the general principles; and where there is the same rectitude in matters of detail, rectitude is not equally known to all; consequently, we must say that the natural law, concerning general principles, is the same for all, both regarding rectitude and knowledge, however, in certain matters of detail, it may fail by reason of certain obstacles since in some people the reason could be perverted by passion, or evil, or by an evil disposition¹³¹³.

Aquinas explains that passion hinders reason from applying universal rules to particular things in three ways: first is distraction, the mind is absorbed with passion and there is no room for rational consideration; second is opposition, there may be a wrong in general which one is strongly attracted to and as a consequence, the imagination leads judgment astray; third is bodily change, one may be so moved by passion that one is unable to reason correctly, like a situation of drunkenness or sleep wherein one loses the power of reasoning altogether.¹³¹⁴

The fundamental approach to moral reasoning should be upon the conviction that moral norms are to be analyzed in terms of the basic goods to be pursued through action, disagreeing primarily over what should count as “acting against” a basic good¹³¹⁵. “The act whereby the doctrine of the consensus is formulated is not the act of inquiry into the facts, nor the act of reflection on the experience. It is an act of judgement, an exercise in moral

¹³¹⁰ ST, Part I-II, Q 94 Art 1 ad 2.

¹³¹¹ See: Porter Jean,. *Nature As Reason. A Thomastic Theory of the Natural Law*, William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, Grand Rapids, Cambridge, U.K, 2005, p 38.

¹³¹² ST, Part I-II, Q 94, Art 2.

¹³¹³ See: ST, Part I-II, Q 94 Art 4.

¹³¹⁴ See: Budziszewski. J,. *Commentary on Thomas Aquinas’s Treatise on Law*. Cambridge University Press, New York, 2014, p 295; See also ST, Part I-II, Q 77 Art 2.

¹³¹⁵ Porter Jean,. *Nature As Reason. A Thomastic Theory of the Natural Law*, William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, Grand Rapids, Cambridge, U.K, 2005, p 39.

affirmation or denial”¹³¹⁶. The metaphysical foundation of the natural law asserts “that in its ontological aspect, natural law is an ideal order relating to human actions, a divide between the suitable and the unsuitable, the proper and the improper, which depends on human nature or essence and the unchangeable necessities rooted in it”¹³¹⁷. “Although grace is more efficacious than nature, yet nature is more essential to man, and therefore more enduring”¹³¹⁸. “From the view point of Christian ethics anyone who admits human reason as a source of moral wisdom adopts a natural law perspective”.¹³¹⁹

“Natural law can be blotted out from the human heart, either by evil persuasions, just as in speculative matters errors occur in respect of necessary conclusions or by vicious customs and corrupt habits”¹³²⁰.

3.3.1.3 Human law

“Let every person be subject to the governing authorities. For there is no authority except from God, and those that exist have been instituted by God. Therefore he who resists the authorities resists what God has appointed.”¹³²¹ According to Aquinas, we draw conclusions of various sciences with acquired efforts of the reason, for the knowledge of which is not imparted to us by nature; so too from the precepts of the natural law, as from general and indemonstrable principles, the human reason needs to proceed to the more particular determinations of certain matters; these particular determinations devised by human reason are called human laws.¹³²² “It is nothing other than an ordinance of reason for the common good, made by a person who has care of the community, and promulgated”¹³²³; promulgation is necessary for the law to obtain its force.

“The eternal law is inscribed in the heart of the human person as the natural law, which human laws apply and make more precise”¹³²⁴. Human law partakes in the eternal law, since all laws, in so far as they partake of right reason, are derived from the eternal law¹³²⁵. “Since the acquired virtues direct civil life because they have the civil good as an end, the human law can lead a person to acquired virtues”¹³²⁶.

¹³¹⁶ Murray Courtney John, *We Hold These Truths*. Sheed and Ward, New York, 1960, p 122.

¹³¹⁷ Maritain Jacques, *Man and the State*. University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1951, p 88.

¹³¹⁸ ST, Part I-II, Q 94 Art 6 ad 2.

¹³¹⁹ Porter Jean, *Nature As Reason. A Thomastic Theory of the Natural Law*, William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, Grand Rapids, Cambridge, U.K, 2005, p 39.

¹³²⁰ ST, Part I-II, Q 94 Art 6.

¹³²¹ Romans 13: 1-2.

¹³²² See: ST, Part I-II, Q 91 Art 3.

¹³²³ ST, Part I-II, Q 90 Art 4.

¹³²⁴ Pinckaers Servais, *Morality The Catholic View*. Trans. By Sherwin Michael, St. Augustine’s Press, South bend, Indiana, 2001, p 28.

¹³²⁵ See: ST, Part I-II, Q 93 Art 3.

¹³²⁶ Cessario Romanus, *The Moral Virtues and Theological Ethics*. The University of Notre Dame, Notre Dame, Indiana, 2013, p 110.

The practical reason is concerned with practical matters, which are singular and contingent: but not with necessary things, with which the speculative reason is concerned. Wherefore human laws cannot have that inerrancy that belongs to the demonstrated conclusions of sciences. Nor is it necessary for every measure to be altogether unerring and certain, but according as it is possible in its own particular genus¹³²⁷.

“The human person ought to love what is larger than himself, namely truth and justice; in other words, he ought to love the good of the entire civil community and greater goods besides, so much as to be willing to expose himself to difficulties¹³²⁸. “Perfection of virtue consists in withdrawing from undue pleasures and training; men who are well disposed are led willingly to virtue by being admonished better than by coercion: but men who are evilly disposed, are not led to virtue, unless they are compelled¹³²⁹. “A training which compels through fear of punishment is the disciple of the laws; the law of nature has it that the evil doer should be punished, but that he be punished in this or that way, is a determination of the law of nature¹³³⁰.”

“Likewise, the confident claim that a virtue constitutes something, of which no one makes bad use, rests upon the fact of the real transformation of our intellectual, volitional, and emotional power which a *habitus* accomplishes¹³³¹. It belongs to the notion of human law, to be ordained to the common good of the state; in this respect, human law may be divided according to the different kinds of people who work in a special way for the common good¹³³².”

The purpose of human law is to lead men to virtue, not suddenly, but gradually. Wherefore it does not lay upon the multitude of imperfect men the burdens of those who are already virtuous, viz. that they should abstain from all evil. Otherwise these imperfect ones, being unable to bear such precepts, would break out into yet greater evils: thus it is written (Proverbs 30:33): "He that violently blows his nose, brings out blood"; and (Matthew 9:17) that if "new wine," i.e. precepts of a perfect life, "is put into old bottles," i.e. into imperfect men, "the bottles break, and the wine runs out," i.e. the precepts are despised, and those men, from contempt, break into evils worse still¹³³³.

From a theological perspective “virtue amounts to possessing a talent or genius for doing the good human action in the same way that a true artist possesses a creative spirit that defies description according to the conventional norms¹³³⁴. “Human law does not forbid all vicious human act, by the obligation of a precept, as neither does it prescribe all acts of virtue;

¹³²⁷ ST, Part I-II, Q 91 Art 3.

¹³²⁸ McManaman Douglas,. A Treatise on the Four Cardinal Virtues. Amazon Fulfillment, Poland, 2013, p 96.

¹³²⁹ ST, Part I-II, Q 95 Art 1.

¹³³⁰ ST, Part I-II, Q 95 Art 2.

¹³³¹ Cessario Romanus,. The Moral Virtues and Theological Ethics. The University of Notre Dame, Notre Dame, Indiana, 2013, p 53.

¹³³² See: ST, Part I-II, Q 95 Art 4.

¹³³³ ST, Part I-II, Q 96 Art 2.

¹³³⁴ Cessario Romanus,. The Moral Virtues and Theological Ethics. The University of Notre Dame, Notre Dame, Indiana, 2013, p 53.

but it forbids certain acts of each vice, just as it prescribes some acts of each virtue¹³³⁵. A deliberate and efficacious modification of a person's capacity is necessary for performing human act well¹³³⁶.

The classical maxim *Necessitas legem non habet* literally means necessity has no law, but the classical canonists and the natural law thinkers never intended the maxim to be taken to mean that one may commit evil for the sake of an end¹³³⁷, for their tradition also insisted following Apostle Paul that evil must not be done that good may come.¹³³⁸

3.3.1.4 Divine law

According to Aquinas, besides the natural and the human law it is necessary to have a divine law for directing human act towards supernatural end, the beatific vision; it is necessary to recognize the fact that divine law includes both the old testament and the new testament laws; divine law was necessary because there needed to be a law given by God, proportionate to man's supernatural end because of the uncertainty of human judgment; because human law cannot curb or direct interior acts, whereas divine law judges man's interior movements, and because human law cannot punish or forbid all evil deeds, and consequently for this purpose, it is necessary for divine law to supervene, so that all sins are forbidden¹³³⁹.

The law of the Lord is perfect, reviving the soul; the decrees of the Lord are sure, making wise the simple; the precepts of the Lord are right, rejoicing the heart; the commandment of the Lord is clear, enlightening the eyes; the fear of the Lord is pure, enduring forever; the ordinances of the Lord are true and righteous altogether. More to be desired are they than gold, even much fine gold; sweeter also than honey, and drippings of the honeycomb¹³⁴⁰.

Hence the Apostle Paul elucidates: "therefore the law was our disciplinarian until Christ came, so that we might be justified by faith. But now that faith has come, we are no longer subject to a disciplinarian, for in Christ Jesus you are all children of God through faith."¹³⁴¹ Apostle Paul compares old Law and new law in the letter to the Galatians:

Now before faith came, we were imprisoned and guarded under the law until faith would be revealed. Therefore the law was our disciplinarian until Christ came, so that we might be justified by faith. But now that faith has come, we are no longer subject to a disciplinarian, for in Christ Jesus you are all children of God through faith. As many of you as were baptized into Christ have clothed yourselves with Christ. There is no longer Jew or Greek, there is no longer slave or free, there is no

¹³³⁵ ST, Part I-II, Q 96 Art 3 ad 1.

¹³³⁶ Cessario Romanus, . The Moral Virtues and Theological Ethics. The University of Notre Dame, Notre Dame, Indiana, 2013, p 53.

¹³³⁷ Budziszewski. J., Commentary on Thomas Aquinas's Treatise on Law. Cambridge University Press, New York, 2014, p 414; See also ST, Part I-II, Q 79 Art 4.

¹³³⁸ See: Romans 3:8.

¹³³⁹ See: ST, Part I-II, Q 91 Art 4&5.

¹³⁴⁰ Psalm 19: 7-10

¹³⁴¹ Galatians 3:24-26

longer male and female; for all of you are one in Christ Jesus. And if you belong to Christ, then you are Abraham's offspring, heirs according to the promise¹³⁴².

Promises of temporal goods are contained in the Old Testament, for which reason it is called old; but the promise of eternal life belongs to the New Testament: according to Matthew: 5:20 "Unless your justice abound more than that of the Scribes and Pharisees, you shall not enter into the kingdom of heaven;" hence the saying that the Old Law restrains the hand, but the New Law controls the mind; the Old Law induce men to observe its commandments by the fear of punishment: but the New Law, by love, which is poured into our hearts by the grace of Christ, that is bestowed in the New Law, but foreshadowed in the Old, that there is little difference between the old Law and the Gospel, fear and love.¹³⁴³

3.3.2 Influence of the gifts of the Holy Spirit

Apostle Paul says that, "there are varieties of gifts, but the same Spirit; and there are varieties of services, but the same Lord; and there are varieties of activities, but it is the same God who activates all of them in everyone. To each is given the manifestation of the Spirit for the common good"¹³⁴⁴. Aquinas reads this text and texts like –"there is one body and one Spirit, just as you were called to the one hope of your calling"¹³⁴⁵ and Luke 10: 38-42¹³⁴⁶ in what we may call an ecclesiological way, as a comment on how the Christian Church is structured under God's grace¹³⁴⁷.

Jesus promised that, "when the Spirit of truth comes, he will guide you into all the truth; for he will not speak on his own, but will speak whatever he hears, and he will declare to you the things that are to come. He will glorify me, because he will take what is mine and declare it to you."¹³⁴⁸ The saving grace of Christ is considered chiefly as actual grace; it differs from habitual grace; both are gifts of God, whereas habitual grace connotes an enduring state of the soul, actual grace connotes a passing act produced in it by the gratuitous operation of God.¹³⁴⁹ Aquinas thinks that God sometimes works to help members of the

¹³⁴² See: Galatians 3:23- 29

¹³⁴³ See: ST, Part I-II, Q 91 Art 5.

¹³⁴⁴ 1 Corinthians 12: 4-7.

¹³⁴⁵ Ephesians 4:11

¹³⁴⁶ But the Lord answered her, "Martha, Martha, you are worried and distracted by many things; there is need of only one thing. Mary has chosen the better part, which will not be taken away from her."

¹³⁴⁷ See: ST, Part II-II, Q 171.

¹³⁴⁸ John 16:13-14.

¹³⁴⁹ Scheeben Joseph Matthias, A manual of Catholic theology; based on Scheeben's "Dogmatik" Volume 2. Wilhelm Joseph and Scannell Thomas, Kegan Paul Trench Trubner and Co. London 1908, p 229. The term actual grace designates all graces other than habitual grace: operating, cooperating, helping, assisting, moving awakening graces- the term serve to describe the working and work of God in the soul as distinct from habitual grace. Actual grace enables us to act, the strength that God gives us to act according to his will. Sanctifying grace is a state in which God allows us to share in his life and love.

Church by giving special gifts or graces to certain people; the more spectacular ones among them are prophecy, ecstasy, tongues, speech, and miracles¹³⁵⁰.

Apostle Paul says, to one is given through the Spirit the utterance of wisdom, and to another the utterance of knowledge according to the same Spirit, to another faith by the same Spirit, to another gifts of healing by the one Spirit, to another the working of miracles, to another prophecy, to another the discernment of spirits, to another various kinds of tongues, to another the interpretation of tongues¹³⁵¹. We read in book of Jeramiah, “this is the covenant that I will make with the house of Israel after those days, says the Lord: I will put my law within them, and I will write it on their hearts; and I will be their God, and they shall be my people”¹³⁵².

The notion of moral and theological virtues infused in us by God, so as to lead us to the beatific vision, differentiates Aquinas from Aristotle that, he writes as someone believing that human fulfilment lies in union with God as revealed by Jesus Christ¹³⁵³. According to Aquinas, the gifts are habits, dispositions given by God, perfecting man so that he is ready to follow the promptings of the holy spirit, even as the moral virtues perfect the appetitive powers so that they obey the reason; just as it is natural for the appetitive powers to be moved by the command of reason, so it is natural for all the forces in man to be moved by the instinct of God, as by a superior power; therefore whatever powers in man can be the principle of human actions, can also be the subject of gifts, even as they are virtues, and such powers are reason and appetite; and the gifts orient people towards God as revealed in Christ¹³⁵⁴. The gifts of the Holy Spirit perfect people when it comes to right action, as does virtue, and they are habitus that stand in union with God, somewhat as moral virtues stand in our embracing of reason¹³⁵⁵.

3.3.2.1 Beatitude and the Fruits

“The primary object of the saving grace of Christ is to restore and to foster in man that life of holiness and justice which was lost through original sin, and thereby to enable him to secure his supernatural end, the beatific vision of God”¹³⁵⁶.

¹³⁵⁰ Davies Brian,. Thomas Aquinas’s Summa Theologiae. A Guide & Commentary, Oxford University Press, NY, 2014, p 283.

¹³⁵¹ See: 1 Corinthians 12: 8-10.

¹³⁵² Jeremiah 31:33.

¹³⁵³ Davies Brian,. Thomas Aquinas’s Summa Theologiae. A Guide & Commentary, Oxford University Press, NY, 2014, p 198. Although Aquinas’s thinking on virtues and human beings has frequently been compared to that of Aristotle and the comparison is a fair one since Aquinas frequently agrees with Aristotle about virtue and human nature, in a serious sense however it could be said that Aquinas is no Aristotelian’.

¹³⁵⁴ See: ST, Part I-II, Q 68 Art 4.

¹³⁵⁵ Davies Brian,. Thomas Aquinas’s Summa Theologiae. A Guide & Commentary, Oxford University Press, NY, 2014, p 200; ST, Part I-II, Q 68 Art 1&3.

¹³⁵⁶ Scheeben Joseph Matthias,. A manual of Catholic theology; based on Scheeben’s “Dogmatik” Volume 2. Wilhelm Joseph and Scannell Thomas, Kegan Paul Trench Trubner and Co. London 1908, p 227.

“Happiness is the last end of human life, and one is said to possess the end already when one hopes to possess it”¹³⁵⁷; “for we are saved by hope”¹³⁵⁸. “Happiness seems even if it is not god-sent but comes as result of virtue and some process of learning or training, to be among the most godlike things, for that which is the prize and end of virtue seems to be the best thing in the world, and something godlike and blessed”¹³⁵⁹. “The fruit of the Spirit is love, joy, peace, patience, kindness, generosity, faithfulness, gentleness, and self-control; and those who belong to Christ Jesus have crucified the flesh with its passions and desires; if we live by the Spirit, let us also be guided by the Spirit”¹³⁶⁰, “the sending of the Holy Spirit was promised by Christ as a fruit of His saving work on earth.”¹³⁶¹

Blessed are those who mourn, for they will be comforted. Blessed are the meek, for they will inherit the earth. Blessed are those who hunger and thirst for righteousness, for they will be filled. Blessed are the merciful, for they will receive mercy. Blessed are the pure in heart, for they will see God. Blessed are the peacemakers, for they will be called children of God. Blessed are those who are persecuted for righteousness' sake, for theirs is the kingdom of heaven. Blessed are you when people revile you and persecute you and utter all kinds of evil against you falsely on my account¹³⁶².

“A person is moved towards the happy end by works of virtue, and by the works of the gifts, if we speak of eternal happiness, for which human reason is not sufficient, for we need to be moved by the Holy Spirit, to be perfected with his gifts that we may follow and obey him”¹³⁶³. “Drawing from the passages Galatians 5: 22-24 and Matthew 5: 3-11, Aquinas holds that there are eight beatitudes and twelve fruits, and he takes them to be states in which people can be drawn close to God”¹³⁶⁴. “Beatitude implies something ultimate, not in the acts of those gifts which direct man in the active life, but, on the other hand, they include those operative acts of which the gifts have the direction, like, mourning in respect of knowledge, and mercy in respect of counsel”¹³⁶⁵. “In general, Aquinas takes both the beatitudes and the fruits to be the gifts of God that lead us to become attuned to God in the present life; in this sense he assimilates them to the gifts of the Holy Spirit”¹³⁶⁶. “The renovation of the interior man is not the complete restoration of that state in which God created Adam, but only of a part, viz. supernatural sanctity, free will remains bent towards the earth and weakened in its power for

¹³⁵⁷ ST, Part I-II, Q 69 Art 1.

¹³⁵⁸ Romans 8: 24.

¹³⁵⁹ Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics. Trans by Ross David, Oxford University press, New York, 2009, (1099, 14-18) p 15.

¹³⁶⁰ Galatians 5: 22-24

¹³⁶¹ Scheeben Joseph Matthias, A manual of Catholic theology; based on Scheeben's "Dogmatik" Volume 2. Wilhelm Joseph and Scannell B. Thomas, Kegan Paul Trench Trubner and Co. London 1908, p 228.

¹³⁶² Matthew 5: 3-11

¹³⁶³ ST, Part I-II, Q 69 Art 1.

¹³⁶⁴ Davies Brian, Thomas Aquinas's Summa Theologiae. A Guide & Commentary, Oxford University Press, NY, 2014, p 200; ST, Part I-II, Q 69 Art 3& Q 70 Art 3.

¹³⁶⁵ ST, Part I-II, Q 69 Art 3. “Gifts which direct a person in the active life are act elicited by those gifts, for example, to counsel is the act of counsel, and to judge is the act of knowledge’.

¹³⁶⁶ Davies Brian, Thomas Aquinas's Summa Theologiae. A Guide & Commentary, Oxford University Press, NY, 2014, p 201.

good’;¹³⁶⁷ “on this infinity the grace of Christ acts like wholesome on a convalescent; without restoring health altogether and at once, it prevents relapses, and helps the invalid to go through his duties until he reaches his final goal.”¹³⁶⁸ “The fruit of eternal life is ultimate and perfect simply: hence it nowise differs from future beatitude. On the other hand the fruits of the present life are not simply ultimate and perfect; wherefore not all the fruits are beatitudes”¹³⁶⁹.

3.3.2.2 The Necessity of Grace

John the Baptist prophesied, “I baptize you with water for repentance, but one who is more powerful than I is coming after me; I am not worthy to carry his sandals. He will baptize you with the Holy Spirit and fire.”¹³⁷⁰ We read in the book of Ezekiel “a new heart I will give you, and a new spirit I will put within you; and I will remove from your body the heart of stone and give you a heart of flesh; I will put my spirit within you, and make you follow my statutes”¹³⁷¹. The psalmist prays “o God, you are my God, I seek you, my soul thirsts for you; my flesh faints for you, as in a dry and weary land where there is no water.” The Lord promised through Isaiah “for I will pour water on the thirsty land, and streams on the dry ground; I will pour my spirit upon your descendants, and my blessing on your offspring.”¹³⁷² One of the last things that Jesus said to Apostles was “receive the Holy Spirit”¹³⁷³. “The necessity of grace for the performance of salutary acts, either before or after justification, is physical, absolute, and unconditional; it is necessary to man while yet in the state of nature, to elevate him to the plane of supernatural.”¹³⁷⁴

Aquinas sites an example using the metaphor of Sun: the material sun sheds its light outside us, but the intelligible Sun, Who is God, shines within us; hence the natural light bestowed upon the soul is God’s enlightenment, whereby we are enlightened to see what pertains to knowledge; and for this there is required no further knowledge, but only for those things that surpass natural knowledge; we need God’s help for every thought, in as much as He moves the understanding to act¹³⁷⁵.

“While people can know some truth without grace, there are truths to which only grace can lead them to assent, they need grace to act perfectly; we need God’s grace in order to be

¹³⁶⁷ Scheeben Joseph Matthias,. A manual of Catholic theology; based on Scheeben’s “Dogmatik” Volume 2. Wilhelm Joseph and Scannell Thomas, Kegan Paul Trench Trubner and Co. London 1908, p 227.

¹³⁶⁸ Ibid.

¹³⁶⁹ ST, Part I-II, Q 70 Art 2.

¹³⁷⁰ Matthew 3:11

¹³⁷¹ Ezekiel 36: 26-27.

¹³⁷² Isaiah 44:3

¹³⁷³ John 20: 22.

¹³⁷⁴ Scheeben Joseph Matthias,. A manual of Catholic theology; based on Scheeben’s “Dogmatik” Volume 2. Wilhelm Joseph and Scannell B. Thomas, Kegan Paul Trench Trubner and Co. London 1908, p 242.

¹³⁷⁵ See: ST, Part I-II, Q 109 Art 1 ad 2&3.

morally perfect and to act in accordance with ways in which God has taught us by revelation”¹³⁷⁶. “Human being cannot even know truth without divine help; human nature is more corrupt by sin in regard to the desire for goods, than in regard to the knowledge of truth”¹³⁷⁷. “Happiness is consummate perfection, which excludes every defect from the happy, and therefore whoever has happiness has it altogether unchangeably, this is done by divine power, which raises man to the participation of eternity which transcends all change.”¹³⁷⁸ “The will of man is unsteady, and constantly waves between good and evil; the infused habits of virtue, though they add strength to the will, do not limit its inclinations to good alone; in order to secure necessary goodness, a special Divine assistance is necessary.”¹³⁷⁹

3.3.2.3 Grace and Human Act

God draws us spiritually to Him with Holy Spirit, through Jesus Christ; Jesus says: “no one can come to me unless drawn by the Father who sent me; and I will raise that person up on the last day”¹³⁸⁰. Apostle Paul explains it: that God chose you as the first fruits for salvation through sanctification by the Spirit and through belief in the truth; for this purpose he called you through our proclamation of the good news, so that you may obtain the glory of our Lord Jesus Christ, and through grace may give us eternal comfort and good hope, comfort your hearts and strengthen them in every good work and word¹³⁸¹. And he testifies: “But when God, who had set me apart before I was born and called me through his grace, was pleased to reveal his Son to me, so that I might proclaim him among the Gentiles”¹³⁸². “Then God has given even to the Gentiles the repentance that leads to life.”¹³⁸³

The grace of the Holy Spirit confers upon us the righteousness of God. Uniting us by faith and Baptism to the Passion and Resurrection of Christ, the Spirit makes us sharers in his life; it justifies a person, that means moved by grace, one turns toward God and away from sin.¹³⁸⁴ “Justification includes the remission of sins, sanctification, and the renewal of the inner man”¹³⁸⁵. Jesus said: “Be perfect, as your heavenly Father is perfect”¹³⁸⁶. “We have known and believe the love that God has for us. God is love, and those who abide in love

¹³⁷⁶ Davies Brian, . Thomas Aquinas’s Summa Theologiae. A Guide & Commentary, Oxford University Press, NY, 2014, p 225.

¹³⁷⁷ ST, Part I-II, Q 109 Art 2 ad 3.

¹³⁷⁸ ST, Part I-II, Q 5 Art 4.

¹³⁷⁹ Scheeben Joseph Matthias, . A manual of Catholic theology; based on Scheeben’s “Dogmatik” Volume 2. Wilhelm Joseph and Scannell B. Thomas, Kegan Paul Trench Trubner and Co. London 1908, p 243.

¹³⁸⁰ John. 6:44.

¹³⁸¹ See: 2 Thessalonians 2:13-17.

¹³⁸² Galatians 1:15-16.

¹³⁸³ Acts 11:18.

¹³⁸⁴ Catechism of the Catholic Church, 2nd, sec. 2017-2018.

¹³⁸⁵ Catechism of the Catholic Church, 2nd, sec. 2019.

¹³⁸⁶ Matthew 6:48.

abide in God, and God abides in them”;¹³⁸⁷ “and hope does not disappoint us, because God's love has been poured into our hearts through the Holy Spirit that has been given to us”.¹³⁸⁸

...that all the faithful of Christ of whatever rank or status, are called to the fullness of the Christian life and to the perfection of charity; by this holiness as such a more human manner of living is promoted in this earthly society. In order that the faithful may reach this perfection, they must use their strength accordingly as they have received it, as a gift from Christ. They must follow in His footsteps and conform themselves to His image seeking the will of the Father in all things. They must devote themselves with all their being to the glory of God and the service of their neighbour. In this way, the holiness of the People of God will grow into an abundant harvest of good, as is admirably shown by the life of so many saints in Church history¹³⁸⁹.

“The same Divine Spirit works in faithful but to everyone He divides His gifts according to His will and to the measure of their receptivity; with Him the justified freely cooperate and thus works are performed meritorious of eternal life.”¹³⁹⁰

God is love, and he who abides in love, abides in God and God in Him. But, God pours out his love into our hearts through the Holy Spirit, Who has been given to us; thus the first and most necessary gift is love, by which we love God above all things and our neighbour because of God. Indeed, in order that love, as good seed may grow and bring forth fruit in the soul, each one of the faithful must willingly hear the Word of God and accept His Will, and must complete what God has begun by their own actions with the help of God's grace¹³⁹¹.

“A movement of free-will is required for the justification of the ungodly, God moves one's soul by turning it to Himself ; now the first turning to God is by faith, that is to say for the justification of the ungodly, a movement of the mind through faith is required”.¹³⁹² “We are said to be justified by faith because faith is the beginning and the foundation of man's salvation, and the root of all justification, without which it is impossible to please God.”¹³⁹³ “The grace of the Holy Spirit has the power to justify us, that is, to cleanse us from our sins and to communicate to us the righteousness of God through faith in Jesus Christ and through Baptism.”¹³⁹⁴

“An act is said to be right or wrong in connection with its object, meritorious or demeritorious in connection with the reward it deserves; in order to be meritorious, an act must be free, good, and supernatural.”¹³⁹⁵ Aquinas explains about the necessity of grace for remission of sin in the following way: God's love, considered on the part of the Divine act, is

¹³⁸⁷ 1 John 4:16.

¹³⁸⁸ Romans 5:5.

¹³⁸⁹ Second Vatican Council. Lumen Gentium, (Dogmatic Constitution on the Church, November 21, 1964) Section 40.

¹³⁹⁰ Scheeben Joseph Matthias, A manual of Catholic theology; based on Scheeben's "Dogmatik" Volume 2. Wilhelm Joseph and Scannell B. Thomas, Kegan Paul Trench Trubner and Co. London 1908, p 256.

¹³⁹¹ Ibid, Section 42.

¹³⁹² ST, Part I-II, Q 113 Art 4.

¹³⁹³ Scheeben Joseph Matthias, A manual of Catholic theology; based on Scheeben's "Dogmatik" Volume 2. Wilhelm Joseph and Scannell B. Thomas, Kegan Paul Trench Trubner and Co. London 1908, p 251.

¹³⁹⁴ Catechism of the Catholic Church, 2nd, sec. 1987.

¹³⁹⁵ Scheeben Joseph Matthias, A manual of Catholic theology; based on Scheeben's "Dogmatik" Volume 2. Wilhelm Joseph and Scannell B. Thomas, Kegan Paul Trench Trubner and Co. London 1908, p 256.

eternal and unchangeable; whereas, as regards the effect it imprints on us, it is sometimes interrupted, inasmuch as we sometimes fall short of it and once more require it; that is to say the effect of the Divine love in us, which is taken away by sin, is grace, and it is by grace a person is made worthy of eternal life, from this grace sin shuts him out; as a consequence, the person cannot conceive the remission of guilt, without the infusion of grace.¹³⁹⁶ Therefore Apostle Paul says: “you must consider yourselves dead to sin and alive to God in Christ Jesus.”¹³⁹⁷

The principle distinction of the free gift of God, grace, is between habitual or sanctifying grace and actual grace¹³⁹⁸. Sanctifying grace is the gratuitous gift of His life that God makes to us; it is infused by the Holy Spirit into the soul to heal it of sin and to sanctify; God also acts through many actual graces, to be distinguished from habitual grace which is permanent in us.¹³⁹⁹ “The practice of the life of grace naturally tends to the increase of grace, and ultimately to the crowning grace, which is the participation in the Divine life through the Beatific Vision.”¹⁴⁰⁰

According to Aquinas, human being's meritorious work may be considered in two ways: first, as it proceeds from free-will; secondly, as it proceeds from the grace of the Holy Spirit; therefore human acts have the nature of merit from two causes: first, by virtue of the Divine motion which we merit condignly, inasmuch as acts are said to merit that good to which a person is divinely ordained; secondly, on the part of free-will, inasmuch as man, more than other creatures, has the power of voluntary acts by acting by himself, and thus they have congruous merit, since it is congruous that when a person makes good use of his power, God should by His super-excellent power work still higher things, and each one of us is moved by God to reach life everlasting and perfect happiness through the gift of grace.¹⁴⁰¹

Conclusion

Virtues, vices and matters that pertain to a worthy life are topics to be considered as having a bearing on every individual because everyone needs to be virtuous and avoid vice, in order to attain perfect happiness. Human act is guided and helped by grace or charism given by God, which can be enriched by an active contemplative life, but could be lost or hindered by sin.

Sin is a turning away from God, and the person who commits sin orients himself gradually against eternal law, as a consequence the person distances from God; this type of

¹³⁹⁶ See: ST, Part I-II, Q 113 Art 2.

¹³⁹⁷ Romans 6:11.

¹³⁹⁸ Wuellner Bernard,. Dictionary of Scholastic Philosophy. editiones scholasticae, UK, 2011, p 53.

¹³⁹⁹ Catechism of the Catholic Church, 2nd, sec. 2023-2024.

¹⁴⁰⁰ Scheeben Joseph Matthias,. A manual of Catholic theology; based on Scheeben's "Dogmatik" Volume 2. Wilhelm Joseph and Scannell B. Thomas, Kegan Paul Trench Trubner and Co. London 1908, p 260.

¹⁴⁰¹ See: ST, Part I-II, Q 114 Art 1-6.

human act that is contrary to goodness has to be corrected with good dispositions and orientation; the very desire to unite to higher goodness that is God, enables a person, through the grace of God to do human acts contrary to sin; thereby good dispositions aimed at virtue develop, which have the capacity to transform the person through reviving the grace with the help of the Holy Spirit. Hence one needs to understand that habit, which is a disposition, is good or evil because of the acts that tend towards good or evil; disposition occurs through repetition of human act, it could be good or bad, and this disposition changes the entire person toward good or bad, either uniting to God or distancing from God.

Perfect dispositions lead a person to beatitude, the perfect happiness; a single smart human act cannot bring about beatitude, except through the special grace of God; constant desire motivated by faith, for a union with God, would lead a person to perfect disposition, and thereby gradually with the help of the grace of God one prepares oneself to enjoy the beatific vision. Beatitude, the perfect happiness is not something that a person would psychologically feel; it is more than a psychological feeling. In order to understand this deeper I would like to discuss the concept of happiness in psychological studies, in the next chapter.

Chapter IV

The Psychological Perspective of Happiness

Introduction

The search for happiness as a human endeavour is studied by many psychologists throughout the world, and in this chapter I would like to discuss the theme of happiness from a psychological perspective. A comprehension of the scientific pursuit of positive emotion and happiness would guide us to attain a reflective understanding of the human act theory brought out by Aquinas, which also explains the elements of the psychology of human act. Obviously, a short description of the concept of soul will further enable us to perceive psychological traits in the *Summa Theologiae*.

Psychological researchers assess people's happiness with varied measures, and there are so many different definitions of what makes people happy; these definitions are mostly based on certain needs that must be satisfied or fulfilled in order to achieve the emotional state of happiness; one should here cautiously differentiate the thoughts which refer to long-term happiness from the momentary feelings of joy which one experiences in daily life.

A positive attitude to life can bring about optimistic emotions and positive behavioural patterns which could be strengthened by virtues and habits. In this chapter, I would like to discuss the psychological perspective of happiness and traits of psychology in the concept of soul by Aquinas.

4. Psychology of Happiness

One of the reasons why a lot of people from India go to Gulf countries in search of work is to earn a better salary, while hoping to increase their standard of living which is founded on the belief upon a prospective future life. We see however, in a lot of cases those dreams are not often fulfilled. Most of these people are not internally satisfied, because they are worried about many factors, including losing their jobs or missing their beloved ones; when they earn some amount of money, they no longer want to remain in Gulf countries, but leave in search of higher salaries and higher jobs, or they return to India. After coming back to India, they invest their earned money, borrow from the bank to strengthen their investment, and finally end up in debt. Wealth itself has only a small direct effect on happiness because it so effectively speeds up the hedonic routine. For instance, even though the standard of life and level of wealth has doubled or tripled in the last fifty years in many industrialized nations,

the level of happiness and satisfaction of life that people report has not changed much, and depression has actually become even more common¹⁴⁰².

In 2015 and 2016 we found a large number of people migrating to Europe. This incident of migration did not take place only because of war in Iraq, Syria, and Egypt. Of course many refugees from war hit areas escaped to Europe. However, we found a lot of people from Pakistan, Bangladesh, Africa, and even from India in the mass floating migration- these places were not hit by war, but by many other social and economic issues that prevented them from enjoying their lives and achieving their goals in a happy mood of mind. One person from northern Pakistan was in Kamp Lintfort in Germany. He explained that he had paid almost ten thousand Euros to reach Europe. In the beginning, he was happy, but his lack of knowledge of the German language and work restrictions, due to inadequate qualifications, slowly changed his ever smiling confident face. Thus, happiness has something to do with psychology and aspects of personality. It is said that the level of happiness that you actually experience is determined by your biological set point, disposition and the condition of your life, and the voluntary activities you do.¹⁴⁰³

One cannot simply neglect the role of virtue in building up a disposition promoting happiness. Across the ages, religion and philosophy have stressed the need of a virtuous life to keep intact a perfect life, and there is astonishing convergence across the millennia and across cultures about virtue and strength. The teachings of Confucius, Aristotle, Aquinas, the Bushido samurai code, the Bhagavad Gita, and other venerable traditions disagree on the details of virtue, but all of these codes include six core virtues: wisdom, courage, love, justice, temperance, and spirituality.¹⁴⁰⁴

Human beings are often unable to comprehend an absolute perspective of happiness; rather they constantly draw comparisons with their environment, that is, comparison of past and future, comparison with neighbours, comparison with peer groups and comparison of present life with the expectations of the future. Thus there is a constant deviation and aspiration in altitudes which influence the behavioural patterns¹⁴⁰⁵.

4.1 Broad Assessment of Happiness

The term happiness, the core of psychological wealth, extends beyond the material riches, emotional intelligence, and social capital; psychological wealth includes attitude

¹⁴⁰² See: Haidt Jonathan,. The Happiness Hypothesis. Putting Ancient Wisdom and Philosophy to the Test of Modern Science, Arrow Books, London 2006,p 89

¹⁴⁰³ Ibid, p 91.

¹⁴⁰⁴ See: Seligman E.P. Martin,. Authentic Happiness. Using the New Positive Psychology to Realize Your Potential for Lasting Fulfillment, Atria Paperback, New York, 2013 p11.

¹⁴⁰⁵ See: Frey S Bruno and Others,. Happiness. A revolution in Economics, The MIT Press Cambridge, Massachusetts London, England, 2010, p 30.

towards life, social support, spiritual development, material resources, relationships, positive attitude, health, habits, and life satisfaction.¹⁴⁰⁶

Human wants and desires are sometimes described as an unlimited constantly existing principle within an individual, and some would define happiness within this general perception, stating broadly, that the fulfillment of desire follows happiness, and the nonfulfillment of desire leads to unhappiness; here one may have to discover the elements that drive the person towards satisfaction and fulfillment, in order to categorize the nature of happiness that the person is desiring for.

Philosophers, over the years, have reduced desire into four categories: (1) desire connected with biological opportunities and dangers, (2) ego-comparative desires, (3) contributive-empathetic desires, and (4) transcendental desires; they have their corresponding faculties: brain and sensory faculties, self-consciousness, empathy, and conscience and transcendental awareness¹⁴⁰⁷.

Brain and sensory faculties are connected with biological instincts necessary for survival, propagation of species, recognition of affection and danger: however, when human beings do not experience biological opportunities and dangers, their minds become engaged with thoughts about the ego-comparative, contributive, and transcendent; it is self-consciousness which gives rise to ego-comparative desires referring to the human ability of simultaneously being inside oneself and being present to oneself, both as the thinking subject and as the object of thought; at times, one focuses into a world of comparison, seeking advantage in the areas of status, popularity, achievement, intelligence, athletics, beauty, control, power, and a lot of other domains of comparison; whereas contributive empathetic desires which are also a part of self-consciousness, work just as one may desire in order to bring things under the influence of the inner world, desiring to invest one's inner world in the outer world to help and enhance it, even to the point of self-sacrifice.¹⁴⁰⁸

The notion of self-consciousness is typically modern; the equivalent word in classical philosophy is, in some sense, the notion of self-knowledge; the semantic difference between these terms is that consciousness connotes more of a psychological state, while self-knowledge, although it denotes more or less the same meaning, has a wider meaning and is related more to knowing the truth about the state of one's being. The classical ontological approach to self-knowledge is compatible with modern discoveries in neuroscience and cognitive sciences on consciousness, even with certain correlative phenomenological accounts in the philosophy of mind, provided an impractical interpretation is shunned.

¹⁴⁰⁶ See: Diener Ed and Diener Biswas Robert,. Happiness. Unlocking the Mysteries of Psychological Wealth, Blackwell Publishing, USA, 2008, p 3.

¹⁴⁰⁷ See: Spitzer Robert,. Finding True Happiness. Satisfying Our Restless Hearts, Ignatius Press, San Francisco, 2015, p33.

¹⁴⁰⁸ Ibid., p 34-38.

Aquinas elaborates the idea of self-understanding based on the Aristotelian account of human self-consciousness with elements taken from Augustine, namely the insight of the self-understanding of the human soul, and from the Neoplatonic tradition, particularly the notion of cognitive reflection; he explains it as an act of the moral judgment in ethical knowledge which is performed principally with the help of the habit of *synderesis*, and is associated with the intellectual and moral virtue of prudence. The analogy between will and intellect gives rise to further analogy between practical and speculative intellect. Just as there are starting points of reasoning generally, so too there are starting points of the practical reasoning that guides choice and action¹⁴⁰⁹.

Man's act of reasoning is a kind of movement, proceeds from the understanding of certain things--namely, those which are naturally known without any investigation on the part of reason, as from an immovable principle--and ends also at the understanding, inasmuch as by means of those principles naturally known, we judge of those things which we have discovered by reasoning. Now it is clear that, as the speculative reason argues about speculative things, so that practical reason argues about practical things. Therefore we must have, bestowed on us by nature, not only speculative principles, but also practical principles. Now the first speculative principles bestowed on us by nature do not belong to a special power, but to a special habit, which is called "the understanding of principles," as the Philosopher explains (*Ethic. vi, 6*). Wherefore the first practical principles, bestowed on us by nature, do not belong to a special power, but to a special natural habit, which we call "*synderesis*". Whence "*synderesis*" is said to incite to good, and to murmur at evil, inasmuch as through first principles we proceed to discover, and judge of what we have discovered. It is therefore clear that "*synderesis*" is not a power, but a natural habit¹⁴¹⁰.

In speaking of a principle, all that Aquinas is looking for is the cause of life, or the internal source from which life springs; in order for something to be known, one must grasp the causes, for to know is to grasp the cause¹⁴¹¹.

According to Aquinas, the natural law is not a habit, for the natural law is something appointed by reason, just as a proposition is a work of reason; because that which a man does is not the same as that whereby he does it: for he makes a speech by the habit of grammar; then a habit is that by which we act, a law cannot be a habit properly and essentially¹⁴¹². Natural law is reason's natural grasp of certain common principles which should direct our acts, just as speculative intellect moves from common and certain truth toward ever more particular truths about the things that exist; in this way, practical reason moves off from basic or common directives toward ever more particular guides for choice and action¹⁴¹³. Aquinas held that a vast majority of people know general precepts by nature, but must be taught more specific precepts, thereby desires are oriented to a specific habit, and ultimately attains happiness¹⁴¹⁴.

¹⁴⁰⁹ McInerny Ralph,. Aquinas on Human Action. A Theory of Practice, The Catholic University of America Press, Washington, D.C, 2012, p109.

¹⁴¹⁰ ST, Part I, Q 79, Art 12.

¹⁴¹¹ See: Pasnau Robert,. Thomas Aquinas on Human Nature. Cambridge University Press, 2002, p 28.

¹⁴¹² See: ST, Part I-II, Q 94, Art 1; ST, Part I-II,Q, 90, Art 1 ad 2.

¹⁴¹³ See: McInerny Ralph,. Aquinas on Human Action. A Theory of Practice, The Catholic University of America Press, Washington, D.C, 2012, p110.

¹⁴¹⁴ See: ST, Part I, Q 79, Art 12.

The first three kinds of desires are relatively easy to comprehend: they are our biological desires, our self-consciousness, and our capacity for empathy and conscience. Whereas in understanding the fourth type of desire, the transcendental desires, encounter us with hesitancy from within ourselves and also from our surrounding culture. However, it is worth a while to make a pause for a moment in order to find an answer for transcendental desires, then one will understand that transcendent domain is as real as the physical world around us, and this hesitancy would lead one to true happiness, a true awareness of one's transcendent and eternal destiny, a true appreciation of the other mysteries around us, and a relationship with perfect and unconditional love, goodness, and God¹⁴¹⁵.

The Materialistic influence of contemporary culture makes the idea of transcendent happiness seem a rather far-fetched domain into which rational people tread lightly; frequently, scientists are enlisted to support this viewpoint, giving the impression that natural science has discredited God, a soul, a human spirit, and spiritual fulfilment¹⁴¹⁶.

Albert Einstein, the father of the general theory of relativity, the comprehensive theory of the macroscopic universe, was perhaps the most cautious of great thinkers; he viewed God as a principle of intelligibility and rationality, a superior mind, stating: "certain it is that a conviction, akin to religious feeling, of the rationality and intelligibility of the world lies behind all scientific work of a higher order...this firm belief, a belief bound up with a deep feeling, *in a superior mind* that reveals itself in the world of experience represents my conception of God."¹⁴¹⁷

Max Planck, the originator of the quantum theory, which completely revolutionized our view of the microscopic world- the domain of atomic and subatomic fields and particles, was not only convinced of the existence of God and the human soul, but also of the veracity and importance of religion: "religion is the link that binds man to God, resulting from the respectful humility before a supernatural power, to which all human life is subject and which controls our weal and woe."¹⁴¹⁸ "Planck manifests a genuine sense of humble reverence before the supernatural power, indicating not only his prayerfulness but also his sense of being subject to an authority and providential control greater than that of physics or the human will"¹⁴¹⁹.

¹⁴¹⁵ See: Spitzer Robert,. Finding True Happiness. Satisfying Our Restless Hearts, Ignatius Press, San Francisco, 2015, p 47.

¹⁴¹⁶ Ibid, p 48.

¹⁴¹⁷ Albert Einstein,. Ideas and Opinions. Trans. by Sonja Bargmann, Crown Publishers, New York, 1954,p 262. Though Einstein had a conviction, feeling, and belief about a superior mind that reveals itself in the world of experience, he did not believe in a personal God, and he does not comment on the status of human soul; however , two of his colleagues, who developed the quantum theory, completing the scientific picture of the modern universe, did believe.

¹⁴¹⁸ Raymond J.Seeger,. "Planck ,Physicist", The Journal of the American Scientific Affiliation. 1985, 232-33.

¹⁴¹⁹ Spitzer Robert,. Finding True Happiness. Satisfying Our Restless Hearts, Ignatius Press, San Francisco, 2015,p 48-49.

Werner Heisenberg, the father of the matrix formulation of quantum mechanics and the uncertainty principle, indicated that faith goes beyond having a conviction about the existence of God and a soul, noting that faith entails trust, which moves us to action: “faith requires trust, we must believe in – not just about. If I have found faith, it means I have decided to do something and am willing to stake my life on it”¹⁴²⁰.

Sir Arthur Eddington, the astrophysicist responsible for the early astronomical confirmation of Einstein’s general theory of relativity, as well as other theories integral to the conception of the modern universe, wrote a curious chapter called “A Defence of mysticism” in which he said the following:

We all know that there are regions of the human spirit untrammelled by the world of physics. In the mystic sense of the creation around us, in the expression of art, in a yearning towards God, the soul grows upward and finds the fulfilment of something implanted in its nature. The sanction for this development is within us, a striving born with our consciousness or an Inner light proceeding from a greater power than ours. Science can scarcely question this sanction, for the pursuit of science springs from a striving which the mind is impelled to follow, a questioning that will not be suppressed. Whether in the intellectual pursuits of science or in the mystical pursuits of the spirit, the light beckons ahead and the purpose surging in our nature responds¹⁴²¹.

Eddington believed not only in a trans physical spirit, but in the presence of God to that human spirit, drawing it to ever greater heights, not only of beauty, art, and the spiritual life, but science itself; he understood this transcendent horizon in the human spirit, implying the presence of a light greater than ours which is God¹⁴²².

The observations made by Kurt Gödel, one of the twentieth century’s most prominent mathematicians and logicians, showed that the human capacity to understand the rule upon which any set of algorithms is founded cannot be explained by the algorithms themselves; this shows that individuals transcend not only rule based thinking, but also any mechanism that is bound by such rule based thinking; this points at least incipiently to the existence of a transphysical dimension of human being.¹⁴²³ Kurt Gödel did believe in a personal God unlike his friend Albert Einstein, and expressed his thoughts as follows:

Of course this supposes that there are many relationships which today’s science and received wisdom haven’t any inkling of. But I am convinced of this (the afterlife), independently of any theology. It is possible today to perceive, by pure reasoning that it is entirely consistent with known facts. If the world is rationally constructed and has meaning, then there must be such a thing (as an afterlife).¹⁴²⁴

¹⁴²⁰ Raymond J. Seeger, The Journal of the American Scientific Affiliation. “Planck ,Physicist”,. 1985, 231-32.

¹⁴²¹ Arthur Eddington,. The Nature of the Physical World. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1928. P 127-128.

¹⁴²² See: Spitzer Robert,. Finding True Happiness. Satisfying Our Restless Hearts, Ignatius Press, San Francisco, 2015, p 50.

¹⁴²³ See: Kurt Goedel,„Über formal unentscheidbare Sätze der Principia Mathematica und verwandter Systeme 1, Monatshefte für Mathematik und Physik 38, 1931, p 173-198.

¹⁴²⁴ Quoted in Hoa Wang,. A Logical Journey: Gödel to Philosophy, MIT Press, Cambridge 1996, p 104-105; Quoted in Spitzer Robert,. Finding True Happiness. Satisfying Our Restless Hearts, Ignatius Press, San Francisco, 2015, p 51.

Human intellect is not reducible to rule based structures in the physical world, it has the capacity to transcend all such structures, it has a transphysical quality to know beyond the current state of our knowledge; if one does not see beyond his knowledge, he could never understand the inadequacy or imperfection of it, and he would never ask a question, and he would never discover the spiritual dimension of the human being.¹⁴²⁵

When one fails to acknowledge the desire for perfect and unconditional justice or goodness, instead of being open to a transcendent reality that can truly satisfy his desire for happiness, he tries to extract it from justice and goodness in the world, such as from the judicial, political, educational, and economic systems; thus creating grand ideologies that the world of finite and conditioned ideals and systems can never reach, he becomes a dashed idealists, and as a consequence he grows cynical and unhappy.

4.1.1 The Meaning of the Word Happiness

A great variety of denotations of happiness exist in common language and scientific language, while every writer of the theme happiness interprets and tends to delineate their own definition and terms; interestingly it is difficult to find out a concrete psychological description of its meaning in a single term. One of the general notions of happiness is that, “it is a subjective well-being in scientific parlance”¹⁴²⁶, because subjective well-being encompasses life satisfaction, evaluation of important domains of life such as work, health relationship, and thinking positively about one’s life. `Optimism should produce good health concerns, sticking to health regimens, and seeking medical advice, but a pessimistic person who believes that sickness is permanent, pervasive, and personal, is less likely to improve his health situation.¹⁴²⁷

According to Ruut Veenhoven, “happiness is the degree to which an individual judges the overall quality of his life as a whole favourably”¹⁴²⁸. Veenhoven elucidates his definition saying: the term happiness denotes only a relative appreciation of life, and it depicts a degree of concept that would explain more or less of the state of being; in its particular meaning, it describes the state of an individual, that is to say it is a subjective appreciation of life; it is an overall judgement about the quality of life, assessing past experiences and estimating future ones, and a cognitive construction, which the individual puts together from his various experiences of life as a whole covering past, present, and anticipated experiences of his life.

¹⁴²⁵ See: Spitzer Robert,. Finding True Happiness. Satisfying Our Restless Hearts, Ignatius Press, San Francisco, 2015, p 52.

¹⁴²⁶ Diener Ed and Diener Biswas Robert,. Happiness. Unlocking the Mysteries of Psychological Wealth, Blackwell Publishing, USA, 2008, p 4.

¹⁴²⁷ Seligman E.P. Martin,. Learned Optimism. How to Change Your Mind and Your Life, Vintage Books, New York, 2006, p 173.

¹⁴²⁸ Veenhoven Ruut,. Conditions of Happiness. D Reidel publishing Company, Netherland,1984, p 22.

A subjective notion of happiness understood by a person is a cognitive process by which he or she evaluates happiness compared to other persons, past experience, and expectation of the future; whereas objective happiness which identifies extent of happiness, is objective in the sense that the judgement of happiness is made according to external rules. Moreover, the objective understanding methods reduce the memory biases that affect retrospective reports of experience, and this approach has the advantage of being precise in terms of intensities measured, because these measures assess an individual's level of affect; whereas subjectively oriented concepts are necessarily less precise, because cognitive processes differ among individuals, and these cognitive factors enter into subjective understanding of happiness, which may be more useful for a society as a whole than to an individual¹⁴²⁹.

4.1.2 Influencing Factors of Happiness

Life within the family, in school, among peers, in the workplace, and on the sports ground etc. is involved with various arenas and interpersonal moods. It could be an immensely joyful, exciting, and motivating experience that contributes to goal attainment, self-evaluation, development and improvement of the individual, the group and the society. Nevertheless, it could also be an anxiety provoking, stressful, and exhausting negative experience that leads to interpersonal conflicts and has destructive consequences. There are certain basic elements that evoke happiness in life. Wisdom or knowledge, courage, love or humanity, justice, temperance, and spirituality or transcendence are six virtues named as the core characteristics endorsed by almost all religious and philosophical traditions, and taken together they could build up a good foundation for a happiness¹⁴³⁰.

a) Attention, Interpretation, and Memory

Some psychological studies describe happiness as a qualitative composition of attention, interpretation, and memory; these basic components are represented often with an acronym AIM. These three components help a person to develop an attitude which can increase the psychological wealth; and attitudes to life are central to happiness. A reasonably good interpretation triggers energy to recast the negative thinking, and develops a positive attitude, and this element 'interpretation' is central to the concept of AIM, because it is more than simply looking on the bright side, it means paying attention to successes and blessings, and being open minded to a positive explanation of events, as well as recalling the good memories.¹⁴³¹

¹⁴²⁹ See: Frey S. Bruno and Stutzer Alois, . Happiness and Economics. How the Economy and Institutions Affect Well-Being, Princeton University Press, USA, 2002, p 6.

¹⁴³⁰ See: Seligman E.P. Martin, . Authentic Happiness. Using the New Positive Psychology to Realize Your Potential for Lasting Fulfillment, Atria Paperback, New York, 2013 p 133.

¹⁴³¹ See: Diener Ed and Diener Biswas Robert, . Happiness. Unlocking the Mysteries of Psychological Wealth, Blackwell Publishing, USA, 2008, p 183-184.

Buddha says: “what we are today comes from our thoughts of yesterday, and our present thoughts build our life of tomorrow: our life is the creation of our mind”¹⁴³². This idea explains that the events in the world affect us only through our interpretations of them, so if we can control our interpretations, we can control our world and mind, and consequently become happy.

Boethius had the best available education of his time and a prosperous career; however he was accused of treason, was stripped of his wealth and honour as consul, and was thrown into a remote island. As he was in the prison, he wept and wrote poems about weeping, he cursed injustice and the goddess of fortune. But ‘lady philosophy’ guided Boethius through reinterpretations of his life, and that foreshadowed modern cognitive therapy; she drew Boethius’s imagination far up into heavens, so that he could look down on earth and see it as a tiny speck, on which even tinier people play out their comical and ultimately insignificant ambitions. She got him to admit, that riches and fame bring anxiety and avarice, not peace and happiness; after being shown these new perspectives and having his old assumptions challenged, Boethius finally prepared to absorb the greatest lesson of all, the lesson Buddha and Aurelius had taught centuries earlier: “nothing is miserable unless you think it so, and on the other hand, nothing brings happiness unless you are content with it”¹⁴³³.

b) The Hedonic Level of Affect and Contentment

According to Ruut Veenhoven, the assessment of happiness of a person largely depends on two sources of information: how well the person feels most of the time, and secondly, to what degree the person gets what he wants from life. In the overall evaluation of life, these appraisals are seen as special components of happiness. How well we feel is called the hedonic level of affect, and referred to as the affective component of happiness. Perception of getting what we want could be named contentment, and it is referred to as the cognitive component of happiness. In other words, a person may feel generally happy, nevertheless be aware that he failed to realize his aspirations, or he may have surpassed his aspirations but nevertheless feel miserable; these two types of result are labeled as the hedonic level of affect and contentment¹⁴³⁴.

The concept of hedonic level concerns the pleasantness experienced in affects - the pleasantness in feelings, in emotions, as well as in moods, or even passing emotions of love, as well as on moods of steady calmness. Contrary to the concept of happiness and contentment, the concept of hedonic level does not cover anticipated experience; it may

¹⁴³² As Quoted in Haidt Jonathan,. The Happiness Hypothesis. Putting Ancient Wisdom and Philosophy to the Test of Modern Science, Arrow Books, London 2006,p 23.

¹⁴³³ Boethius, 1962/c.522 CE, 29 - As Quoted in Haidt Jonathan,. The Happiness Hypothesis. Putting Ancient Wisdom and Philosophy to the Test of Modern Science, Arrow Books, London 2006,p 25.

¹⁴³⁴ See: Veenhoven Ruut,. Conditions of Happiness. D Reidel publishing Company, Netherland,1984, p 26.

probably be a constituting factor in the overall evaluation of life, and it denotes the affective reaction, which contains affective experience including the raw experiences that exist more or less independently of cognitive appraisals, on the awareness of being either happy or unhappy.

“Contentment is the degree to which an individual perceives that his aspirations are being met”¹⁴³⁵. When a person assesses the degree to which his wants are met, he may look at both present and future, he may also assess his life and his expectations, and he may estimate what is likely to yield in the future; this assessment leads to contentment.

Contentment requires self-reflection, a real thinking activity; it is the result of the deliberate setting of aspirations and the inspection of their realization. Overall happiness is more than mere contentment, because it requires generalized affect, and naturally overall happiness involves more than merely hedonic level.

c) Intensifying Optimism

“Building optimism consists in recognizing and then disputing pessimistic thoughts”¹⁴³⁶. The ability to dispute is a natural skill of an individual which a person normally uses when false accusations are labeled against him. However, a person often fails to use this skill of disputing against him. The strategy to disputing our own pessimistic thoughts exists in first recognizing them and then in treating them as if they were articulated by an external person, a rival whose enterprise was to make you miserable. “By effectively disputing the beliefs that follow as adversity, you can change your reaction from dejection and giving up to activity and good cheer”¹⁴³⁷.

d) Contiguous Factors

Just as the term happiness is a broad concept, the terms like well-being, satisfaction, positive mental health, adaptation, and morale, which are closely associated with happiness, carry a broad meaning. These terms could be generally understood from the view point of individual perspective and from the stand point of the state of affairs of social systems; as far as individual happiness is concerned, it refers also to health, freedom, and self-actualization; whereas a social perceptive would describe overall evaluations, self-esteem, and political order. The concept of well-being extends its evaluation to the state of work life, social relations and economic situation as basic elements that provide a way to happiness; this idea

¹⁴³⁵ Ibid, p 27.

¹⁴³⁶ Seligman E.P. Martin, . Authentic Happiness. Using the New Positive Psychology to Realize Your Potential for Lasting Fulfillment, Atria Paperback, New York, 2013 p 93.

¹⁴³⁷ Ibid.

does not have a strong hold in the present conception of happiness, because a poor person can also be happy.¹⁴³⁸

Self-confidence to adjust to the present situation and possible future problems could boost the morale of an individual, and could be also defined as self-reliance rather than happiness; self-confidence constitutes vitality, competence, flexibility of goals and means of achieving them, and the capability to choose achievable goals. A pleasant meaningfulness of life is achieved through contentedness, and contains a characteristic syndrome involving the positive evaluation of life as a whole; however one cannot say that a lacking sense of purpose will lead to unhappiness.

4.1.3 Living Conditions of Happiness

Everyone wants to be happy; however happiness is not necessarily the goal of life, most people look for physical well-being, comfort, status, and social well-being; here personal freedom is considered sometimes more important than happiness. In this way, it seems that happiness is a byproduct of a good life which produces sustained satisfaction over a long period. Certainly a comprehensive relationship between various actions, and how the individuals make use of the knowledge of well-being in relation to his various actions in life could be considered as a static goal to happiness. There could be three levels of happiness:

Momentary feelings of joy and pleasure, referred to in psychology as positive and negative affect. These are often called “happiness”. Overall contentment with life, which is normally called “life satisfaction”. The quality of life achieved by developing and fulfilling one’s potential, which has been called “the good life”¹⁴³⁹.

There is a traditional tendency of equating the concept of utility with happiness; the concept of utility means the tendency which approves or disapproves of every action whatsoever, according to the predisposition to augment or diminish the happiness of the individual. It means that it tends to result in benefit, advantage, pleasure, and good or prevent evil, pain, and unhappiness of the individual. However, there is danger in associating utility with happiness, because the principle of marginal utility explains that an individual will tend to consume different sorts of things rather than consuming repeatedly the same sort of things¹⁴⁴⁰.

World value studies and various other studies find that on an average level, the people living in developed and politically stable countries are happier than those living in poor and politically instable countries. An environmental impact builds up various textures of attitude and desire levels that would create strong depositions which will change the character and

¹⁴³⁸ See: Veenhoven Ruut,. Conditions of Happiness. D Reidel publishing Company, Netherland,1984, p 33

¹⁴³⁹ Frey S Bruno and Others,. Happiness. A revolution in Economics, The MIT Press Cambridge, Massachusetts London, England, 2010, p5.

¹⁴⁴⁰ See: Kimball Miles and Robert Willis,. Utility and Happiness. Working Paper, University of Michigan, 2006, p 4.

aspiration of a person. Generally developed countries are known for their purchasing capacities and living standards; it includes also the per capita income, monthly salaries, job possibilities, and cost of living¹⁴⁴¹.

4.1.4 Happiness and Well-Being

We cannot specify a single element which defines a comprehensive meaning of well-being. Seligman classified an abbreviation for well-being as PERMA, saying that the concept of well-being has five basic elements: positive emotion, engagement, relationships, meaning and achievement¹⁴⁴²; here understanding of the measure of well-being is derived from a subjective view point of life satisfaction in reporting one's state of affairs in relation to positive emotion, engagement, and relationships, and the objective understanding of universal paradigm in relation to meaning and achievement.

A positive engagement of life into the social situation involves virtues like kindness, social intelligence, humor, courage, and integrity; these virtues support an individual as strengthening elements toward the challenges of life situation, and through the strengths of these virtues one engages with positive emotion, finding positive meaning out of challenging situations and creating better social relationships.

This delineates that elements of well-being have both objective and subjective components, which means one may believe that he has engagement, meaning, best relations, and great accomplishment; however he could be incorrect or even deluded. Well-being cannot exist, just remaining as a personalized concept in one's own head: it is a combination of feeling good as well as actually having meaning and healthy relationships; the way one chooses his course in life, when expanding an objective and subjective harmony of elements such as positive emotion, engagement, relationships, meaning, and achievement, could pave way for well-being¹⁴⁴³.

Classical welfare economics have for a long time, raised fundamental concerns against using concepts of aggregate social welfare, rather than the concept of individual welfare; it is based on two understandings, that, it is almost impractical to use empirical observations to produce an absolute ethically satisfactory categorization of behavioral patterns and their influence on happiness, let alone universal guidelines of the human value system; secondly

¹⁴⁴¹ See: Frey S Bruno and Others,. Happiness. A revolution in Economics, The MIT Press Cambridge, Massachusetts London, England, 2010, p 41.

¹⁴⁴² See: Seligman E.P. Martin,. Flourish. A Visionary New Understanding of Happiness and Well-Being, Atria Paperback, New York, 2011, p 24.

¹⁴⁴³ Ibid., p 25.

interpersonal comparisons make no betterment of the individual happiness, but are only for the purpose of public policies¹⁴⁴⁴.

4.2 Positive Attitude

The life of a person is tremendously influenced through his own attitude. Taking into consideration the environment in which the person is living, his exposure to and interest in the vast programme of media, and his capacity to analyse and positively derive at a probable conclusion to the critics and comments of media in relation to the objective of life, influence and form an attitude, even without his conceived knowledge; this special energy, attitude, is contagious in its nature, which means it affects the entire perspective, impacting positive or negative habits and thinking. There is a need to check one's own attitude and put it on an appropriate track. The goal of positive attitude is to increase the extent of happiness in one's own life and in his living conditions¹⁴⁴⁵.

The optimistic or pessimistic nature of a person almost determines the mode of attitude he may develop: "Optimistic people tend to interpret their troubles as transient, controllable, and specific to one situation. Pessimistic people, in contrast, believe that their troubles last forever, undermine everything they do, and are uncontrollable"¹⁴⁴⁶. Looking at the more favourable side of events, that is optimism, alone do not suffice to form a healthy positive attitude, it requires many strengths like altruism¹⁴⁴⁷, the ability to postpone gratification, future-mindedness, virtue¹⁴⁴⁸, and humour¹⁴⁴⁹; these qualities are measurable, universal, and self-justifying¹⁴⁵⁰.

These moral strengths orient a person to a balanced attitude in times of better moments, as well as misfortune. "The philosopher Henry Sidgwick was first to note in "*The Methods of Ethics*" that the paradox of hedonism¹⁴⁵¹ is that, pleasure cannot be acquired

¹⁴⁴⁴ See: Frey S Bruno and Others,. Happiness. A revolution in Economics, The MIT Press Cambridge, Massachusetts London, England, 2010, p 162-163.

¹⁴⁴⁵ Ibid., p 26.

¹⁴⁴⁶ Seligman E.P. Martin,. Authentic Happiness. Using the New Positive Psychology to Realize Your Potential for Lasting Fulfillment, Atria Paperback, New York, 2013 p 10.

¹⁴⁴⁷ Altruism or selflessness is the principle or practice of concern for the welfare of others. It is a traditional virtue in many cultures and a core aspect of various religious traditions and secular worldviews, though the concept of "others" toward whom concern should be directed can vary among cultures and religions. Altruism or selflessness is the opposite of selfishness. See: <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Altruism>.

¹⁴⁴⁸ There are six core virtues which influence a person in forming a positive attitude: wisdom or knowledge, courage, love or humanity, justice, temperance, and spirituality or transcendence. These virtues could also be further subdivided into many other classifications.

¹⁴⁴⁹ Seligman E.P. Martin,. Authentic Happiness. Using the New Positive Psychology to Realize Your Potential for Lasting Fulfillment, Atria Paperback, New York, 2013 p 10.

¹⁴⁵⁰ Corresponding strength has its own end; it is not just a means to achieve another end.

¹⁴⁵¹ The paradox of hedonism, also called the pleasure paradox, refers to the practical difficulties encountered in the pursuit of pleasure. Unfortunately for the hedonist, constant pleasure-seeking may not yield the most actual pleasure or happiness in the long run—or even in the short run, when consciously pursuing pleasure interferes with experiencing it. See also https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Paradox_of_hedonism.

directly. Variations on this theme appear in the realms of ethics, philosophy, psychology, and economics.”¹⁴⁵²

It is not about surviving and enduring situations of adversity, even healthy people could think about improving positive attitude in order to attain a qualitative equilibrium. Positive Psychology brings forth three main elements for achieving happiness: the first one deals with the concerns positive elements or the determinants of why one element is better than another; the second concern is based on aspects of personality as self-organizing¹⁴⁵³, self-directed, and adaptive entities; the third concern is based on the recognition of people and experience which is embedded in a social context¹⁴⁵⁴. Positive attitude could be increased by constructive and creative thinking with a motivation towards achieving the goal.

4.2.1 The Scope of Positive Attitude

Applying positive attitude is not only challenging and uplifting, but also personally transformative and occupying. Education is the best means to apply positive attitude into one's life. This could be through self-education or guided education from a trusted person. In order to apply positive attitude, it is necessary that a person analyzes his own behaviour covering both positive aspects and negative aspects. Here the person wants to remove the deteriorating characters of negative emotions like prejudice, anxiety, anger, aggression, depression, etc., and concentrating on the positive side of life, he tries to apply or educate himself with strengthening emotions like objectivity, courage, joy, hope, meekness, amicability, satisfaction, etc.

The Impact of attitude, whether positive or negative, leaves durable behavioural traits in an individual's thought patterns, and has an influential bearing on the total functioning of his life, because it causes activity or passivity which determines the spirit of motivation, the strategy for action, and the method through which the goal is attempted to realize. Positive attitude has the ability to transcend one's own restraints whereas negative attitude, being overwhelmed by helplessness, makes a person feel inferior.

Applying a positive attitude is necessary to initiate change which strengthens reorientation of life in a positive objective way. It aids the recovery from shock, transcending a person's mind towards developing his best qualities. The scope of applying positive attitude depends upon exploring positive emotions, positive personality traits, and positive social relations. In order to explore positive emotions and positive personality characters, a person should be able to critically analyse himself, uncovering the factors influencing his behavioural patterns; however without a knowledge of theoretical basis and practical solutions, an

¹⁴⁵² https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Paradox_of_hedonism.

¹⁴⁵³ See: Self-organizing is understood in relation to human needs of competence, a sense of belonging, and autonomy, which lead a person to achieving personal well-being.

¹⁴⁵⁴ See: Frey S Bruno and Others,. Happiness. A revolution in Economics, The MIT Press Cambridge, Massachusetts London, England, 2010, p153.

individual in a less mental well-being may find it difficult to reorient his life objectively. The job is to analyse in rigorous and minute detail the basic underpinning of reality and of language. The larger issues that concern free will, God, ethics, happiness cannot be tackled until this preliminary analysis succeeds¹⁴⁵⁵. When the individual has explored his positive emotions, it leads him to positive social relations.

Seligman has stressed that the Positive psychology is not to be seen in terms of a paradigm shift, it would be a mistake to try to reduce the idea to the mere assumption that once positive attitude has been identified, all that is outside its area of interest would belong to a different type of negative psychology¹⁴⁵⁶.

These suggestions brought forward by positive psychology to maintain and increase one's happiness are not undisputed, because at its fringes it has become a quasi-religious movement that does not always meet the stringent requirements of scientific discourse¹⁴⁵⁷. "Positive psychology is about the meaning of those happy and unhappy moments, the tapestry they weave, and the strengths and virtues they display that make up the quality of your life."¹⁴⁵⁸

4.2.2 Building Positive Attitudes

Building Positive attitude, as the phrase suggests, is in general a slow and steady unfinished life long process concerning happiness in life, which may go beyond the theoretical and conventional educational understanding of life. There is a huge possibility of practical implementation of ideas evolved out of one's experience and conviction based on a wider concept of life; however the practical implementation depends on the affective, cognitive, and social competence of an individual. Therefore, building positive attitude should focus on strengthening self-esteem, finding meaning of life, and stabilizing confidence to face the different realities of life.

Facing different realities of life could provoke pessimistic and positive assumptions in an individual; at this juncture, only a strong determination can facilitate the progress of building an apt attitude. In this dimension, a strong determination converges with the conventional assumptions, and practical and theoretical knowledge based on a wider concept of life. At times, a person may discover original theoretical models of applying positive attitude to his life, concerning a good life in general; however, in implementing positive

¹⁴⁵⁵ Seligman E.P. Martin,. *Flourish. A Visionary New Understanding of Happiness and Well-Being*, Atria Paperback, New York, 2011, p 56.

¹⁴⁵⁶ [https:// Anna.Pluskota.com](https://Anna.Pluskota.com)/The application of positive psychology in the practice of education.

¹⁴⁵⁷ Frey S Bruno and Others,. *Happiness. A revolution in Economics*, The MIT Press Cambridge, Massachusetts London, England, 2010, p154.

¹⁴⁵⁸ Seligman E.P. Martin,. *Authentic Happiness. Using the New Positive Psychology to Realize Your Potential for Lasting Fulfillment*, Atria Paperback, New York, 2013, p7.

attitude in a range of contexts related to a wider concept of life a person needs to be cautious of going beyond the objective of life and universal truth. Positive determination facilitates the progress of an individual whereas pessimistic determination about the future could obstruct progress of building a positive attitude, and the entire development of the individual, with regards to happiness would be at stake.

A positive determination postulates an understanding of an individual as having a positive aptitude, possessing positive habitual personality traits and virtues. Looking at future and having a wider concept of life can generate positive emotions, social commitments, desire for meaning in life, and a harmony in human relations. One should give a strong emphasis to the principle of strengthening character through virtues; that means wisdom, courage, humanity, justice, temperance, and transcendence are abstract human traits which help in building positive attitude¹⁴⁵⁹.

4.2.2.1 The Resilience Training

The core to the development of the resilience training depends on the understanding that existing optimistic attitudes and pessimistic attitudes are learned predispositions, are a relatively permanent part of character, and are being carried out habitually with or without the knowledge of an individual¹⁴⁶⁰. The personality trait of involvement or non-involvement of an individual determines his motivation and his option of strategy for action, and the way in which objectives are being endeavoured to achieve. Both optimism and pessimism existing in an individual cause an ability to transcend his own limits; in all probability pessimism will lead to depression and optimism will lead to a wider understanding of life.

Even the understanding of good events by optimists and pessimists are different: “the optimist believes good events will enhance everything he does, while the pessimist believes good events are caused by specific factors”¹⁴⁶¹. “Positive mood produces broader attention, more creative thinking, and more holistic thinking. This is in contrast to negative mood, which produces narrowed attention, more critical thinking, and more analytic thinking.”¹⁴⁶² A negative mood enables the person to think about what does not exist; whereas a positive mood enables the person to experience what exists. Pessimistic individuals “tend to under consume goods and activities with strong intrinsic attributes, in a comparison with those with strong

¹⁴⁵⁹ See: Seligman E.P. Martin,. *Authentic Happiness. Using the New Positive Psychology to Realize Your Potential for Lasting Fulfillment*, Atria Paperback, New York, 2013, p 133.

¹⁴⁶⁰ <https:// Anna Pluskota/The application of positive psychology in the practice of education.>

¹⁴⁶¹ Seligman E.P. Martin,. *Authentic Happiness. Using the New Positive Psychology to Realize Your Potential for Lasting Fulfillment*, Atria Paperback, New York, 2013, p 90.

¹⁴⁶² Seligman E.P. Martin,. *Flourish. A Visionary New Understanding of Happiness and Well-Being*, Atria Paperback, New York, 2011, p 80.

extrinsic attributes. According to their own subjective evaluation, such individuals make distorted decisions when they choose between different options.”¹⁴⁶³

Evaluation and guidance from a trusted person can create room for resilience, and reduce depression, hopelessness, anxiety, and aggression. Healthy dialogue with the conception of the necessity of constructing or reconstructing an effective intervention into the total life of the individual will further diagnose possible developing strengths of the individual, and this intervention would make strong impact on the resilience capacity of the individual.

4.2.2.2 Renewing Strength and Virtue

An anthropological understanding throws light upon unity as a strong character which builds human relation and community. In ancient times human beings were able to connect themselves to social groups in a particular way of living, and those communities with conventional norms existed in small groups with their natural instincts, in harmony with nature and tradition. In contemporary life, this small community perspective has evolved to a global perspective, which remains no longer in a particular line of thought or tradition but fragmented in so many directions, holding many cultures, traditions and beliefs. Because the directions are many, and obligations to culture and tradition are numerous, we need to equip ourselves with an attitude of harmony toward nature and tradition, respecting other cultures and beliefs, to make the world a global village.

In order to bring in unity and an optimistic approach into the political system of that time Abraham Lincoln¹⁴⁶⁴ introduced in his inaugural speech, a much discussed philosophy in his closing words.

We are not enemies, but friends. We must not be enemies. Though passion may have strained it must not break our bonds of affection. The mystic chords of memory, stretching from every battlefield and patriot grave to every living heart and hearthstone all over this broad land will yet swell the chorus of the Union, when again touched, as surely they will be, by the better angels of our nature¹⁴⁶⁵.

¹⁴⁶³ Frey S. Bruno and Stutzer Alois,. Happiness and Economics. How the Economy and Institutions Affect Well-Being, Princeton University Press, USA, 2002, p 128.

¹⁴⁶⁴ Abraham Lincoln as a Republican candidate won the presidential election in 1860. During this time, seven Deep South cotton states—South Carolina, Mississippi, Georgia, Florida, Alabama, Louisiana and Texas—would secede from the Union. Lincoln's predecessor, James Buchanan, had deplored secession as illegal, but had insisted that the Federal government could do nothing to stop it. Lincoln's speech was an effort to answer this question, as well as an attempt to reach out to what he called his 'dissatisfied fellow-countrymen' in an effort to avoid the awaiting conflict. He had held to a strict policy of silence during the months leading up to his inauguration, carefully avoiding making any statements that could be misconstrued by either North or South, prior to becoming the legal leader of the nation. Lincoln's intention was that no statement of his specific policy toward the South should be made available before he had taken office. Lincoln's soon-to-be Secretary of State, William Seward, helped him to re-edit and forms the famous closing words of the inaugural speech on 4th of March 1861. See: [https://en.wikipedia.org/ Abraham Lincoln's first inaugural address](https://en.wikipedia.org/Abraham%20Lincoln's%20first%20inaugural%20address).

¹⁴⁶⁵ Abraham Lincoln, First Inaugural Address, Monday, March 4, 1861.

Many people have made three basic assumptions out of these concluding words of Abraham Lincoln: `that there is a human nature, that action proceeds from character, that character comes in two forms, both equally fundamental bad character, and good or virtuous character. It simply says that good character is a core assumption of positive attitude¹⁴⁶⁶.

“The obvious explanations of bad behaviour to the man in the street were entirely characterological: moral defect, sin, viciousness, mendacity, stupidity, cupidity, cruelty, impulsiveness, lack of conscience-the panoply of the worst angels of our nature.”¹⁴⁶⁷ Bad character will cause bad actions, and each person shoulders the responsibility of executing good actions.

Generally philosophers and theologians endorse six virtues as fundamental to good human life: wisdom and knowledge, courage, love and humanity, justice, temperance, and spirituality or transcendence. Although the nuance of these six virtues in relation to various cultures, traditions, beliefs, and professions are different, taken together they portray the notion of good character. There are several ways through which a person may achieve good and respectable character; strength of character by which one achieves virtue helps him in building positive attitude.

4.2.2.3 Optimism and Pessimism

Optimism and pessimism could be understood as a mental attitude. One of the common methods used to illustrate optimism versus pessimism is a glass with water at the halfway point, where the optimist is said to see the glass as half full and the pessimist sees the glass as half empty. A dispositional concept would distinguish optimism and pessimism typically based on the life orientation assessment whether a person expects future outcomes to be beneficial or negative; whereas an explanatory concept distinguishes optimism and pessimism on attributive reflections of the ways in which people explain events¹⁴⁶⁸.

According to Seligman the defining traits of pessimists are that they tend to believe bad events will last a long time, they will undermine everything that they do, and things happened are their own fault; the optimists, who are confronted with the same difficult the situation, think about misfortune in the opposite way, they tend to believe defeat is just a temporary setback, that its causes are confined to a particular case, and they believe defeat is not their fault, but due to circumstances, bad luck, or other people brought it about; optimists seem to be unfazed by defeat.¹⁴⁶⁹

¹⁴⁶⁶ Seligman E.P. Martin,. *Authentic Happiness. Using the New Positive Psychology to Realize Your Potential for Lasting Fulfillment*, Atria Paperback, New York, 2013, p 125.

¹⁴⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, 126.

¹⁴⁶⁸ <https://en.wikipedia.org/Optimism>.

¹⁴⁶⁹ See: Seligman E.P. Martin,. *Learned Optimism. How to Change Your Mind and Your Life*, Vintage Books, New York, 2006, p 5.

These two habits of thinking about causes have consequences. Literally hundreds of studies show that pessimists give up more easily and get depressed more often. These experiments also show that optimists do much better in school and college, at work and on the playing field. They regularly exceed the predictions of aptitude tests. When optimists run for office, they are more apt to be elected than pessimists are. Their health is unusually good. They age well, much freer than most of us from the usual physical ills of middle age. Evidence suggests they can even live longer¹⁴⁷⁰.

“Pessimistic attitude which seems to be deeply rooted as to be permanent, is avertable, by learning to be optimists through new sets of cognitive skills¹⁴⁷¹. When a person recognizes that he has a pessimistic attitude of thinking, he needs to learn a new set of positive habits of thinking and doing, that is, involving oneself a set of action patterns determined by the strengthening and reinforcement of habits in concord with generally conceived positive human action. “Insufficient appreciation and savoring of the good events in your past and overemphasis of the bad ones are the two culprits that undermine serenity, contentment, and satisfaction.”¹⁴⁷²

The brain and the immune system are connected not through nerves but through hormones, the chemical messengers that drift through the blood and can transmit emotional state from one part of the body to another. It has been well documented that when a person is depressed the brain changes. Neurotransmitters, which are hormones that relay messages from one nerve to another, can become depleted. One set of transmitters, called catecholamines, becomes depleted during depression. It turns out that when catecholamines get depleted, other chemicals called endorphins- your body’s own morphine-increase activity. Cells of the immune system have receptors that sense the level of endorphins. When catecholamines are low, as in depression, endorphins go up; the immune system detects this and turns itself down..... If depression and grieving temporarily lower immune activity, then pessimism, a more chronic state, should lower immune activity in the longer run.¹⁴⁷³

“You can change your affective style, but you cannot do it by sheer force of will. You have to do something that will change your repertoire of available thoughts through meditation and cognitive therapy¹⁴⁷⁴.”

According to Seligman, there are five tactics in order to apply cognitive therapy: an individual needs to recognize the automatic thoughts flitting through his consciousness at the times when he feels worst; secondly, he should learn to dispute the automatic thoughts by marshalling contrary evidence; thirdly, he should learn to make different explanations and use them to dispute the automatic thought; fourthly, he should distract himself from depressive thoughts; fifthly, he should learn to recognize and question the depression sowing assumptions. However in all these tactics, it is important that a person uses a learned set of skills which are to be used whenever he is faced with failure or defeat¹⁴⁷⁵.

¹⁴⁷⁰ Ibid.

¹⁴⁷¹ Ibid.

¹⁴⁷² Seligman E.P. Martin,. *Authentic Happiness. Using the New Positive Psychology to Realize Your Potential for Lasting Fulfillment*, Atria Paperback, New York, 2013, p 70.

¹⁴⁷³ Seligman E.P. Martin,. *Learned Optimism. How to Change Your Mind and Your Life*, Vintage Books, New York, 2006, p 176-177.

¹⁴⁷⁴ Haidt Jonathan,. *The Happiness Hypothesis. Putting Ancient Wisdom and Philosophy to the Test of Modern Science*, Arrow Books, London 2006,p 35.

¹⁴⁷⁵ See: Seligman E.P. Martin,. *Learned Optimism. How to Change Your Mind and Your Life*, Vintage Books, New York, 2006, p 89-91.

4.2.2.4 Acquiring Optimism

Optimism could be a learned habit which is positively contagious; that means if one is surrounded by people with positivity, he could be infected with a positive approach whereas if one is always surrounded by pessimistic people, he can rarely be optimistic. It is normal that a person comes across difficulties and successes, therefore it is necessary that a person develops skills to strengthen his abilities to combat the challenges he faces. To this end, he should be remain hopeful and positive, looking for new opportunities in the days to come, understanding that set backs are inevitable and temporary.

Focusing on the present and avoiding obsession with the past and the future enables an individual to appreciate and count the blessings of life, and to avoid worrying about the negative things that have not yet happened. One's determination with positive decision shifts his focus in a positive and optimistic direction.

In order to develop skills of optimism, one should minimize exposure to negative influences such as watching, reading, or listening to the news which are thrusting with negative influence can change one's positive outlook on life; without such pervasive regular inputs of despair, a person will discover it much easier to be optimistic and to converge on positive things in life.

An approach of correcting one's weakness might not change a person's disposition and increase one's strength; it is better to think of increasing strengths than to be preoccupied with the difficulties of overcoming weakness. Emotional well-being has a corresponding relationship with spiritual well-being; reading spiritual inspirational books on a daily basis can inspire a person with thoughts, and bestow new inspiration which enables one to in deliberately shift the perspective of life towards a positive approach.

4.3 Appreciating the Level of Happiness

Based on experience, a person tends to rely upon objective goods that render happy feelings; it may be a loving relationship, inspiring knowledge, an interesting sport, the thrill of achieving something, or even having fun in a group. Understandably, these positive experiences constitute well-being which has essential features of reciprocal love, which means, it involves a level of objective judgement about well-being, and those objective considerations involve appropriately justified belief with basic goods of positive attitudes and meaningful experiences among their essential features. There is a kind of motivational internal movement and an a priori argument for the justified belief about well-being. A hypothetical argument is reasoned after a good or bad experience, and then the person longs to enjoy a good experience and tries to avoid a negative experience. An individual may also judge that a certain condition in life would contribute to well-being on account of foreseen objective features, just as a boy who wishes to marry, looks for a girl.

The method of analyzing the activities and experiences of a particular day, through a systematic thought of evaluation and with a desire to plan of the activities to be undertaken the following day, can work as a self-evaluation system which automatically collects experience for a better prospective of happiness and fulfilment¹⁴⁷⁶.

4.3.1 Pleasure or Pain

The definition of happiness in terms of pleasure and pain as the only important elements of whatever situation they are designed to describe would lead to a hedonistic understanding, which has its modern conceptual roots in Bentham's utilitarian focus on values, especially of well-being, that only pleasure is intrinsically valuable and all pain is intrinsically not valuable.; it defines pleasure and pain broadly, including physical and mental phenomena, and nearly all contemporary treatment of well-being allocate at least some space for treatment of hedonism¹⁴⁷⁷.

It could be traced that the earliest written record of hedonistic perspective comes from Charvaka, meaning uncertain or agreeable (which is credited to Ajita Kesakambali as the forerunner, while Brihaspati is usually referred to as its founder), an Indian philosophical tradition based on *Barhaspatya sutras* (sutra means theories), which persisted form about 600 – 800 BCE ; Charvaka advocated that right action brings most pleasure, and defined human life in terms of pleasure and pain; by means of scepticism or doubting one infers a truth from a set of observations or truths for right action, however, the inferred knowledge is conditional. The Charvaka epistemology advocates that external perception from the interaction of five senses and worldly objects and internal perception of inner sense that is the mind as the primary and proper source of knowledge, while inference is held as susceptible to being either right or wrong, and therefore conditional or invalid. Their classical epistemological argument is the example of fire and smoke – “when there is smoke there is fire”, which is often true, but need not be universally true. Charvaka philosophy propagated that there was nothing wrong with sensual pleasure, since it is possible to have pleasure without pain, and followers believed wisdom lay in enjoying pleasure and avoiding pain as far as possible, and they did not believe in austerities or rejecting pleasure for fear of pain.¹⁴⁷⁸

The Cyrenaic philosophy was supposedly founded by Aritipuss of Cyrene, a pupil of Socrates, and formalized by his grandson Aristippus the Younger; it was a sensual hedonistic Greek school of philosophy, and they taught that the only intrinsic good is pleasure, which meant not just the absence of pain, but positively enjoyable sensations; they believed in momentary pleasures, especially physical ones, as stronger than those of anticipation or past

¹⁴⁷⁶ See: Frey S Bruno and Others,. Happiness. A revolution in Economics, The MIT Press Cambridge, Massachusetts London, England, 2010, p 21.

¹⁴⁷⁷ <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hedonism>.

¹⁴⁷⁸ <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Charvaka>.

memory; however, recognizing social obligation, they accepted that pleasure could be gained from altruistic behaviour too¹⁴⁷⁹.

Epicurus, who founded epicureanism developed his philosophy in contrast to that of Aristippus, and believed that pleasure was the greatest good, but that the way to attain such pleasure was to live modestly, to gain knowledge of the workings of the world, and to limit one's desires; for Epicurus, happiness was the complete absence of bodily and mental pains, including fear of the Gods and desires for anything other than the bare necessities of life; he believed that experience of unnecessary pleasures would change the mental disposition of a person, and then he would suffer from pain, and it would be hard to satisfy his desires for more and better pleasures; his desire would eventually outstrip his means, and interfere with his ability to live a tranquil and happy life¹⁴⁸⁰.

4.3.2 Desire and Reason

The concept of desire is reflected in Aristotle's *De Anima*, which explains that the soul is seen to be involved in motion, because animals desire things, and locomotion is the result of desire; the interactions and the tendency of animals to motion is implicated to desire, however, Aristotle distinguishes desire between appetite and volition, and regards that desire cannot account for all effective movement towards a goal; he brings the role of reason and imagination in conjunction with desire, which makes it possible for one to apprehend an object of desire, as desirable; that is to say, reason and desire work together to determine what is a good object of desire. This idea is reflected in the chariots of Plato's *Phaedrus*; in the *Phaedrus*, the soul is guided by two horses, a dark horse of passion and a white horse of reason; Plato depicts together passion and reason. Realizing the role of passion, Socrates does not suggest the dark horse in *Phaedrus* be done away with, because it is passion which makes a movement towards the objects of desire possible, but Socrates qualifies desire and places it in a relation to reason, so that the object of desire can be discerned appropriately, in order for an individual to have the proper and right desire¹⁴⁸¹.

Siddhartha Gautama, founder of Buddhism, advocated that craving is the cause of all suffering, and the extinction of this leads a person to ultimate happiness or Nirvana; according to Buddha, the attachment to pleasures, the craving for worldly pleasures of all kinds and clinging to one's self, things, or people, due to delusions, cause one's respective happiness or unhappiness. That means, suffering ends when craving and desire ends, and one is freed from delusions. Buddha advocated an eightfold path to accomplish nirvana and end suffering; they are actually eight lessons: right view, right resolve, right speech, right conduct, right livelihood, right effort, right mindfulness, and right "samadhi" (meditative absorption); this eightfold path teaches that by restraining oneself, cultivating discipline, and practicing mindfulness and meditation, one can attain nirvana and stop craving, clinging, and

¹⁴⁷⁹ <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cyrenaics>.

¹⁴⁸⁰ <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Epicureanism>.

¹⁴⁸¹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophy_of_desire.

accumulating, thereby liberating himself and ending the suffering¹⁴⁸². “It is important to distinguish momentary happiness from enduring level of happiness; momentary happiness can easily be increased.”¹⁴⁸³

4.3.3 The Equilibrium Level of Well-being

The idea of the equilibrium level of well-being is based on set point concept that explains a stable dynamism of the level of the happiness in an individual; this dynamic equilibrium concept could be seen as a further development of the set theory.

Set theory is a branch of mathematical logic that studies sets¹⁴⁸⁴, which is informally considered as collections of objects; although any type of object can be collected into a set, set theory is applied most often to objects that are relevant to mathematics. The set-point theory is a scientifically controversial thesis, according to which the human body weight is genetically programmed, and cannot be changed intentionally¹⁴⁸⁵. According to this theory, most people have a relatively stable set-point, which is automatically controlled by the weight when deviating upwards or downwards. Just as a heater regulates the temperature in a room, in adults there is an individual weight that the body wants to maintain. This weight is called set point weight.

In the same way there is a ‘Set Point’ theory of happiness and well-being which assumes that every individual has a fixed ‘average’ level of happiness around which his happiness varies with his temperament, mood, and emotion. According to set point theories of happiness and well-being, each individual possesses a specific equilibrium level of well-being that is relatively stable throughout life; it is proposed that even after experiencing major life events either of positive or negative in nature, individuals will fight to return to their average set point level; therefore, drastic changes in life circumstance may have a short term impact, but not a long lasting and sustainable effect. After experiencing events that decrease or

¹⁴⁸² <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Buddhism>.

¹⁴⁸³ Seligman E.P. Martin, . Authentic Happiness. Using the New Positive Psychology to Realize Your Potential for Lasting Fulfillment, Atria Paperback, New York, 2013, p 45.

¹⁴⁸⁴ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Set_Theory. The ‘Set theory’ was founded by a single Article known as “On a Property of the Collection of All Real Algebraic Numbers” in 1874 by Georg Cantor”, which refers to its first theorem- ‘the set of real algebraic numbers is countable’. It began with a discussion of the real algebraic numbers and a statement of his first theorem: “the set of real algebraic numbers can be put into one-to-one correspondence with the set of positive integers”. Cantor's proofs are constructive and have been later used to write a computer program that generates the digits of a transcendental number; this program applies Cantor's construction to a sequence containing all the real algebraic numbers between 0 and 1; and the article that discusses this program gives some of its output, which shows how the construction generates a transcendental. Since 1856, Dedekind had developed theories involving infinitely many infinite sets—for instance: ideals, which he used in his theories known as “algebraic number theory”, and “Dedekind cuts”, which he used to construct the real numbers. This work enabled him to understand and contribute to Cantor's work. Dedekind's first contribution concerns the theorem that the set of real algebraic numbers is countable. Cantor's article introduced the un-countability theorem and the concept of countability; the uncountability theorem demonstrated that one-to-one correspondences can be used to analyse infinite sets.

¹⁴⁸⁵ <https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Set-Point-Theorie>

increase their well-being, individuals adapt to these new life circumstances and return to their habituated stable level of well-being or happiness; that means, happiness and well-being are determined by internal factors, and the life circumstances do not have a long lasting consequence because individuals continually adapt to changing circumstances; however, there could be exceptions due to accumulating contextual effects on life situation which may impact a radical change¹⁴⁸⁶.

According to Seligman, criminal parents might pass on genes that predispose to crime, and that the children's felonies and their tendency to mistreat their own children might stem from nature than nurture; adopted children are much more similar, as adults, to their biological parents than they are to their adoptive parents¹⁴⁸⁷.

4.3.4 Cognitive Assumption

Positive attitude, well-being, and happiness cannot be understood as just accident happenings in the life of an individual, since they involve a process of reasoning, judgement, and knowledge, and this process I would like to name as cognitive assumption. Cognition is generally understood as a process of acquiring knowledge through information processing, which embodies reasoning, attention, judgement, evaluation, knowledge, memory, and many other mental capacities. It could be understood as a problem solving conscious or unconscious reasoning using the existing knowledge for generating new knowledge¹⁴⁸⁸.

An approach to cognition and emotion based on neural mechanisms could conceivably provide a common conceptual ground that would enrich our understanding of cognition, emotion, their relationship, and their place in a model of mind. To this extent that the brain can be viewed as an information processing system, cognition and emotion can be viewed as information processing function of neural subsystems. While it is commonplace to view cognition as a processing function, this is less for emotion. Information processing analyses focus on afferent mechanisms, tracing the flow and fate of input¹⁴⁸⁹.

Aristotle's idea of cognitive spheres was pertained to memory, perception, and mental imagery. Although traditionally emotion was not considered as a cognitive faculty, Aquinas divided the enquiry of human behavioral pattern into cognitive and affective categories, namely, how a person understands his living situation and the world at large, and how a person is influenced by his own emotions, and how habitual subjective personality traits play a role in attaining happiness¹⁴⁹⁰.

Psychodynamics held that, depression could be treated by getting patients to open up about the past, and ventilating cathartically on all the wounds and losses that had been

¹⁴⁸⁶ https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Set_Point according to set point theories of happiness and well-being.

¹⁴⁸⁷ See: Seligman E.P. Martin,. *Authentic Happiness. Using the New Positive Psychology to Realize Your Potential for Lasting Fulfilment*, Atria Paperback, New York, 2013, p 69.

¹⁴⁸⁸ <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cognition>.

¹⁴⁸⁹ https://link.springer.com/Joseph_E_LeDoux/Handbook_of_Cognitive_Neuroscience/Springer_Science_and_Business_Media_New_York/ 1984, 357-358.

¹⁴⁹⁰ See: ST, Part I-II, Q 90.

suffered, was the best possible method of therapy for depression; but Aaron Beck's invention of cognitive therapy, explained that, depressive people often unraveled as they spoke, and he found that cognitive therapy for depression, developed as a technique to free people from their unfortunate past by getting them to change their thinking about the present and the future was very effective. Cognitive therapy technique works well, producing relief from depression as the use of antidepressants; but cognitive therapy is more successful at preventing recurrence and relapse.¹⁴⁹¹

As a large body of theorising and research documents, moods and emotions can profoundly influence cognitive processes. First, individuals are more likely to recall information from memory that is congruent rather than incongruent with their current feelings. Second, individuals may use their apparent affective response to a target as a basis of judgement, essentially asking themselves: "How do I feel about this?" Because it is difficult to distinguish one's pre-existing feelings from one's response to the target at hand, individuals are likely to evaluate about any target more positively when they are in a happy rather than sad mood. Such mood congruent evaluations are not obtained, however, when individuals are aware that their feelings are due to a source unrelated to the target, thus rendering them uninformative for the judgement at hand. Both mood-congruent recall and the use of one's feelings as a basis of judgement may influence decision making by influencing the accessibility and evaluation of valued¹⁴⁹² features of the decision situation. Moreover, individuals in a happy mood tend to overestimate the likelihood of positive, and to underestimate the likelihood of negative outcomes and events, whereas the reverse holds for individuals in a sad mood. In addition, affective states influence which strategy of information processing individuals are likely to adopt¹⁴⁹³.

Cognitive assumption tries to process and comprehend information by decoding the syntax of the message with its nuances; it constructs hypotheses and inferences which supports the action of the individual; however, there is a danger of comprehending evil as good; for example, a person who plays cards may continuously cheat others in order to win the game and make himself happy; or in an extreme example, a terrorist may kill other human beings and feel himself happy without any guilt conscience.

4.3.5 Affective Analysis

"Personality traits are either negative or positive characteristics that recur across time and different situations, and strengths and virtues are the positive characteristics that bring about good feelings and gratification."¹⁴⁹⁴ It may be interesting to know that there are many ideals that are being proposed throughout the ages in order to define what makes a person universally acceptable and respectable. But a serious analysis of the character of a person would reveal that, that person may never have been influenced by Aristotle, or Plato, or other Philosophical writings. The personality traits of that person gradually grew along with his interests, and he never realized that his interests would impact in him a particular character. As his affections and aversions to things and themes were formed, so were many of his

¹⁴⁹¹ See: Seligman E.P. Martin,. *Authentic Happiness. Using the New Positive Psychology to Realize Your Potential for Lasting Fulfillment*, Atria Paperback, New York, 2013, p 69.

¹⁴⁹² It is the relative capacity to unite, react, or interact; or it can be understood as the degree of attractiveness an individual possesses as a behavioural goal.

¹⁴⁹³ <https://Cognition and Emotion/Norbert Schwarz/ 2000,14, 433-434>

¹⁴⁹⁴ Seligman E.P. Martin,. *Authentic Happiness. Using the New Positive Psychology to Realize Your Potential for Lasting Fulfillment*, Atria Paperback, New York, 2013, p 9.

personality traits formed. Naturally, education can influence a person in forming and controlling personality traits, that the nonconscious affect clearly separates from the cognitive processing of stimuli, however, the internal personality trait depends on his habitual affection which arises from an individual's perception of himself and his relation to the community he belongs to.

An analysis of affect would reveal that, a person develops his own strategies in his method of choosing the stimuli according to his affection; that educating oneself can be a training to bring out a controlled behaviour pattern; that the expectation of the family, community and his religious knowledge have consequence in the creation of affective paths, thereby influencing the personality traits; the consistence of controlled behaviour largely depends on values that an individual holds and the goal he has in mind; the response of the person, whether negative or positive, depends on his affective nature. "The thoughts of depressed individuals are dominated by negative interpretations of the past, of the future, and of their abilities, and learning to argue against these pessimistic interpretations relieves depression to just about the same extent as antidepressant drugs."¹⁴⁹⁵

The inherent self constantly regulates affections effectively in individuals who have developed positive attitude, and most people are obviously positively oriented than negatively. However, extreme persistent levels of anticipatory expectation could cause burnout, which means that it triggers a sense of emotional fatigue or collapse, imbalanced attitude and aptitude, decline in perceiving capacity, and sudden obvious change in character; in other words it could cause stress and unhappiness.

4.3.6 Transforming Oneself

"The major traumas of childhood may have some influence on adult personality, but only a barely detectable one. Bad childhood events, in short, do not mandate adult troubles."¹⁴⁹⁶ Involving oneself in a more optimistic approach is a possible method of preventing depression, helping oneself achieve more, and improving one physical health; this process of learning optimism is a response from the individual who has understood that he is affected by pessimistic approach, and it is also a response to the different adversities that the individual has gone through. "There is no justification for blaming your adult depression, anxiety, bad marriage, drug use, sexual problems, unemployment, aggression against your children, alcoholism or anger on what happened to you as a child."¹⁴⁹⁷

¹⁴⁹⁵ Ibid, p 65.

¹⁴⁹⁶ Seligman E.P. Martin,. *Authentic Happiness. Using the New Positive Psychology to Realize Your Potential for Lasting Fulfillment*, Atria Paperback, New York, 2013, p 67.

¹⁴⁹⁷ Ibid.

Martin Seligman proposes that an analysis and repetition of reply to the three basic questions regarding adversity, belief, and consequences will initiate the way to learning positive approach¹⁴⁹⁸. Here the person tries to learn the adversity that he is facing, and how he believes that adversity has affected him, and what are the consequences involved in that adversity. These three questions on adversity, belief, and consequences are to be repeatedly analysed and answered; then the individual will gradually find new answers by doing this exercise, which will progressively change his perspective.

After doing a repeated analysis on adversity, belief, and consequences, the person can do a disputation and energization of the result, meaning that the self-proclaimed understanding on adversity, the belief thereof, and the presupposed consequences of it could be disputed, and could be seen from another angle; disputation intermediates on creating counter evidence to the negative beliefs in general, the causes of the happening or the implications, and it reminds oneself of any potential practical usefulness or efficiency of moving on from the adversity. The responses in the disputations are predicted to change feelings by motivating oneself to be more hopeful and positive; decisive steady disputation leads to energization, thereby disputation motivates the person to actively celebrate the positive feeling and sense of accomplishment, resulting from positive disputation of negative beliefs¹⁴⁹⁹. When the person, in his thoughts and words, disputes the adversity, then a gradual energization takes place.

4.4 The Trend of Psychology in Summa

Although many scholars contributed considerably to the field of psychology, Aquinas, who recovered the works of Aristotle, is considered as one of the great contributors to the discipline of psychology with his emphasis on the reconciliation of supernaturalism with rationalism. Aquinas attributes human being with rational soul, the *anima rationalis*, that human beings are essentially different from other kinds of being, because they have a mind, and it is the soul the core of human identity, which makes human beings different from other beings. For Aquinas, there existed a clear difference between body and soul, however, he is neither a Cartesian dualist nor a materialist; his view had a middle position between these options.¹⁵⁰⁰

Thomas Aquinas wrote a classic Christian virtue theory drawing from classic philosophy, the Holy Bible, and patristic sources on virtue. Aquinas is an authentic reference on virtues for Catholic Christians; however, it is understood in a different way than the Sacred Scriptures and the Patristic tradition; the virtue theory of Aquinas paved way for positive

¹⁴⁹⁸ See: Seligman E.P. Martin, *Learned Optimism. How to Change Your Mind and Your Life*, Vintage Books, New York, 2006, p 236.

¹⁴⁹⁹ *Ibid.* 241.

¹⁵⁰⁰ <http://edwardfeser.blogspot.de/2012/09/was-aquinas-dualist.html>.

psychology. Today we read thoughts of positive psychology in the writing of Seligman, who emphasised that there is a virtue, action proceeds from character, and action fundamentally proceeds from good character or from bad character¹⁵⁰¹. I would say, in this sense, positive psychology is an expansion of Aquinas's theory of virtue; and an understanding of his theory of passion and beatitude will enable us to learn the approach of positive psychology better.

The larger vision of Aquinas, as a whole, is creation, fall, and redemption; in fact, we need to look into four other areas in order to discover the elements of positive psychology in his writings.

4.4.1 The Virtue Theory and Human Habits

Aquinas considers that the virtue of anything must be understood in terms of the good and meaning; human virtue which is an operative habit, is a good habit which is capable of producing positive works¹⁵⁰²; for example, if healthy habits orient an individual to good health, and health represents a good, then health must be worthy of consideration and practice¹⁵⁰³; it emphasizes the cultivation of positive habits which are capable of improving a healthy atmosphere and ultimately improving the health of the person. The cultivation of good habits can change a person, just as regular professional coaching can improve the efficiency of an athlete; here one sees a professional transformation which gives the ability to pursue meaningful goals and an understanding of their role in one's daily achievement and happiness¹⁵⁰⁴.

Virtue is an improved capacity of a person, and his improved capacity or perfection is considered with regard to his goal; however, the goal is achieved through human act, meaning the improvement of the capacity towards perfection is carried out according to determinate action; the rational powers which are suitable to the person are not determinate to one particular act, and they become determinate to acts by means of repetition; therefore, human virtues are habits¹⁵⁰⁵. Elements of positive attitude or psychology could be taught in the early years of education, and then the student could cultivate regular positive attitude which would be an antidote to the runaway incidence of depression, a way to increase life satisfaction, and an aid to better learning and more creative thinking, thus enabling a better cultivation of good habits that lead to achievements and happiness¹⁵⁰⁶.

¹⁵⁰¹ See: Seligman E.P. Martin,. *Authentic Happiness. Using the New Positive Psychology to Realize Your Potential for Lasting Fulfillment*, Atria Paperback, New York, 2013, p 125.

¹⁵⁰² See: ST, Part I-II, Q 55, Art,2.

¹⁵⁰³ See: Dobson L. Melanie,. *Health As A Virtue. Thomas Aquinas and the Practice of Habits of Health*, Pickwick Publications, Eugene, Oregon, 2014, p 24.

¹⁵⁰⁴ See: Seligman E.P. Martin,. *Flourish. A Visionary New Understanding of Happiness and Well-Being*, Atria Paperback, New York, 2011, p 72.

¹⁵⁰⁵ See: ST, Part I-II, Q 55, Art,1.

¹⁵⁰⁶ See: Seligman E.P. Martin,. *Flourish. A Visionary New Understanding of Happiness and Well-Being*, Atria Paperback, New York, 2011, p 80.

The simple qualities of the elements, which suit the natures of the elements in one single fixed way, are not called dispositions or habits, but simple qualities: but we call dispositions or habits, such things as health, beauty, and so forth, which imply the adjustment of several things which may vary in their relative adjustability. For this reason habit is a disposition: and disposition is the order of that which has parts either as to place, or as to potentiality, or as to species. Wherefore, since there are many things for whose natures and operations several things must concur which may vary in their relative adjustability, it follows that habit is necessary¹⁵⁰⁷.

Moreover, for each virtue, one can think of several ways to achieve it, and the goal of achieving and building up habit leads a person to focus on the specific route which is convenient to the person, taking into consideration the environment in which he lives. “For example, the virtue of humanity can be achieved by kindness, philanthropy, the capacity to love and be loved, sacrifice, or compassion. The virtue of temperance can be exhibited by modesty and humility, disciplined self-control or prudence, and caution”¹⁵⁰⁸.

The determination in perfecting the human act makes it possible to cultivate a positive power, and when this positive power becomes an operative disposition, it will become a rational power within the person, and then the person acts in accord with this positive rational direction which will be a virtue; this rational power is different from some active natural powers which are themselves virtues, because rational power is not determinate to one single action, but is inclined indifferently to many acts¹⁵⁰⁹.

4.4.2 The Normative Understanding of Nature and Natural Law

There are two important elements of natural law which Aquinas explains¹⁵¹⁰, that when we focus on God’s role as the giver of the natural law, the nature is just one aspect of divine providence, and in this way, the theory of natural law is just one part among other explanations of the theory of divine providence; secondly, when we focus on the human role as recipient of the natural law, the natural law constitutes the principles of practical rationality, by which human action is to be judged as reasonable or unreasonable, and in this way, it involves practical rationality.¹⁵¹¹ “The natural law is something appointed by reason, just as a proposition is a work of reason.”¹⁵¹² “Certain axioms or propositions are universally self-evident to all, but some propositions are self-evident only to the wise, who understand the meaning of the terms of such propositions.”¹⁵¹³

¹⁵⁰⁷ ST, Part I-II, Q 49, Art 4.

¹⁵⁰⁸ Seligman E.P. Martin, . Authentic Happiness. Using the New Positive Psychology to Realize Your Potential for Lasting Fulfillment, Atria Paperback, New York, 2013 p 133.

¹⁵⁰⁹ ST, Part I-II, Q 54, Art 4; ST, Part I-II, Q 55, Art. 1.

¹⁵¹⁰ See: ST, Part I-II, Q 94.

¹⁵¹¹ <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/natural-law-ethics>.

¹⁵¹² ST, Part I-II, Q 94, Art 1.

¹⁵¹³ ST, Part I-II, Q 94, Art 2.

Aquinas considers that there is a core of practical knowledge that all human beings have, even if the implications of that knowledge can be hard to work out due to hindrance of reason, or the efficacy of that knowledge can be impeded by strong emotions from an evil disposition, or the understanding of this practical knowledge can be blotted out of the perspective of a person by evil persuasions and corrupt habits.¹⁵¹⁴ This sense of practical knowledge remains as a standard for personal valuing of behaviour and outcomes, and this sense of practical knowledge, as a norm, is not evaluative or a basis for judging behaviour, it is simply a fact or observation of behavioural outcomes, without judgment, and that it simply refers to the description of behaviour and recognition of positive behavioural patterns. Valuing of the positive behavioural patterns could be conceivable through their object, purpose, and circumstance¹⁵¹⁵; thus not all virtuous acts are prescribed by the natural law: for many things are done virtuously, to which nature does not incline at first; but which, through the inquiry of reason, have been found by men to be conducive to well-living.¹⁵¹⁶ Natural law gives us precepts, and precepts of natural law are to be the practical reason¹⁵¹⁷.

Human voluntary act will be good, in so far as the will is measured by reason. The act of willing, in the first instance, bears on the good which has been first comprehended by the reason; the good is that which is desirable as perfective of the one desiring it, and only when the mind judges that something is good, does the will, the intellectual appetite have something to desire; here, anything that the mind judges good is accepted as good; in seeing things as good, the mind is implicitly grasping that, and in virtue of this understanding good things are comprehended as good, and the will desires the same thing as desirable good¹⁵¹⁸.

One of the core elements of psychology is to avoid all that causes negative energy which Aquinas names as evil, and to nurture all that causes positive energy, which Aquinas names as good, because by trying to nurture causes of positive energy, one will be transformed with positive energy, and thereby positive behavioural patterns will be developed.¹⁵¹⁹ Whereas, if a person continues to adhere to elements of negative energy, because of the fact that those negative powers, of which the person is engaged with, will determine his action¹⁵²⁰ and behavioural patterns, he will develop a negative outlook and negative behavioural patterns. “Good has the nature of an end and evil the nature of a contrary.”¹⁵²¹

¹⁵¹⁴ See: ST, Part I-II, Q 94, Art 6.

¹⁵¹⁵ See: ST, Part I-II, Q 18.

¹⁵¹⁶ ST, Part I-II, Q 94, Art 3.

¹⁵¹⁷ ST, Part I-II, Q 94, Art 1.

¹⁵¹⁸ See: McInerney Ralph, . Aquinas on Human Action. A Theory of Practice, The Catholic University of America Press, Washington, D.C, 2012, p102.

¹⁵¹⁹ See: ST, Part I-II, Q 94; ST, Part I-II, Q 18; ST, Part I-II, Q 55.

¹⁵²⁰ See: ST, Part I-II, Q 55, Art 1.

¹⁵²¹ ST, Part I-II, Q 94, Art 1.

4.4.3 Flourishing or Eudemonic Happiness

Eudaimonia is a Greek word commonly “translated as happiness or welfare; however, ‘human flourishing’ has been proposed as a more accurate translation. Etymologically, it consists of the words ‘eu’ (good) and ‘daimōn’ (spirit). It is a central concept in Aristotelian ethics and political philosophy.”¹⁵²² Study of Psychology ‘defines Eudemonia as a self-discovery, perceived development of one’s best potentials, a sense of purpose and meaning in life, intense involvement in activities, investment of significant effort, and enjoyment of activities as personally expressive’.¹⁵²³ ‘Will is the starting point of action, but it receives its starting point from reason. The starting points or certain meaningful principles that reason grasps and will is guided by are accordingly referred to as Laws’¹⁵²⁴.

All knowledge and every pursuit aims at some good, what it is that we say, political science aims at and what is the highest of all goods achievable by action. Verbally there is very general agreement; for both the general run of men and people of superior refinement say that it is happiness, and identify living well and faring well with being happy; but with regard to what happiness is they differ, and the many do not give the same account as the wise. For the former think it is some plain and obvious thing, like pleasure, wealth, or honour; they differ, however from one another- and often even the same man identifies it with different things, with health when he is ill, with wealth when he is poor, but, conscious of their ignorance, they admire those who proclaim some great thing that is above their comprehension.¹⁵²⁵

According to Aquinas, every law is ultimately derived from the eternal law¹⁵²⁶, which he refers to as God’s providential ordering of all created things to their proper end. Human being participates in that divine order in virtue of the fact that God creates in us a natural capacity of reason, by the light of which one desires for good and discerns what is good; and this participation in the eternal law by human beings, Aquinas calls the natural law.¹⁵²⁷ By reason of this, Aquinas considers, through the natural law which is not an external source of authority, but precepts of practical reasoning, and an extension of the eternal law, God guides us to perfect happiness by implanting in us an inclination for goodness. That means, natural law is a fundamental principle the very existence of human being, which facilitates practical reasoning to act virtuously for a flourishing well-living or well-being.¹⁵²⁸

Natural law is reason’s natural understanding of certain common principles which should direct our acts, just as speculative intellect moves from common and certain

¹⁵²² <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eudaimonia>.

¹⁵²³ Ibid.

¹⁵²⁴ McInerny Ralph,. Aquinas on Human Action. A Theory of Practice, The Catholic University of America Press, Washington, D.C, 2012, p108.

¹⁵²⁵ Aristotle,. The Nicomachean Ethics. Trans by David Ross, Oxford University Press, New York, 2009, (1095a15–25), p 5.

¹⁵²⁶ See: ST, Part I-II, Q 93, Art 3, ad 1.

¹⁵²⁷ ST, Part I-II, Q 91, Art 2; ST, Part I-II, Q 93, Art 6..

¹⁵²⁸ See: ST, Part I-II, Q 94, Art 3.

knowledge toward ever more particular knowledge, so practical reason moves off from basic, common, and certain directives toward ever more particular guides for choice and action.¹⁵²⁹

The discussion of well-living and happiness, like the discussion of voluntary action and the various acts of will that make up voluntary action, puts the emphasis on will, since the good is the object of will. Nevertheless, we need to understand that the good must be first grasped as an object of life, before it is realized in life. That is, cognitive activity is a continuing complement of will, intending, choosing etc. The activity in which the perfect happiness is achieved, which Aquinas names as contemplation, is theoretically a use of mind¹⁵³⁰.

4.4.4 Animating Principle of Life

Aquinas's concept of human nature in general is based on his understanding of the foundation laid by Aristotle in his book 'Physics', and he considers the distinction between soul and body is just a special case of the distinction between form and matter¹⁵³¹. 'Soul is first in terms of being that which is primarily responsible for the existence of a living being, and it is also first in terms of what it contributes to the purpose of a living being'¹⁵³². "Life is displayed above all by two functions: cognition and movement"¹⁵³³, so to speak of soul, as the first principle of life, is to say that it is primarily responsible for cognition and movement¹⁵³⁴.

Aristotle describes his notions of matter and form in the first book of Physics, his work on natural science, which is concerned with things that change, and Aristotle divides change into two main types: accidental change and substantial change; an example for accidental change is that when I fall into a tub of blue paint, I will become blue, and an example for substantial change could be birth, death, or fatal accident. Aristotle explains in 'Physics', that in any change, there must be three things: something which underlies and persists through the change; secondly, a lack, which is one of a pair of opposites, the other of which is the form, thirdly, a form acquired during the course of the change.¹⁵³⁵ Thus, for example, in an accidental change, the person acquires a new accidental property. For instance, when I learn to play the flute, a transition from a state of being unmusical (the lack of the capacity) to a state of musicality (the form) takes place; but for one to be able to understand that there is something which has changed (musicality), and there is something which remains the same throughout the change, and in this case obviously the candidate is myself, who is one and the

¹⁵²⁹ See: McInerney Ralph,. Aquinas on Human Action. A Theory of Practice, The Catholic University of America Press, Washington, D.C, 2012, p110; ST, Part I-II, Q 91, Art 2.

¹⁵³⁰ Ibid, p105-106.

¹⁵³¹ See: Feser Edward,. Aquinas A Beginner's Guide. Oneworld Publications, London, 2009, p 132.

¹⁵³² Pasnau Robert,. Thomas Aquinas on Human Nature. Cambridge University Press, 2002, p 29.

¹⁵³³ ST, Part I, Q 75, Art 1.

¹⁵³⁴ See: Pasnau Robert,. Thomas Aquinas on Human Nature. Cambridge University Press, 2002, p 29.

¹⁵³⁵ See: Barnes Jonathan,. Complete Works of Aristotle. The Revised Oxford Translation, Vol. 1, 1991, p 13-15, (i 7, 190a13–191a22).

same person throughout my musical training¹⁵³⁶. I remain being the same person but my capacity has been changed, and then I am animated by musicality.

The term soul translates the Latin word *anima*, and from *anima* comes the word *animate*, which is often attributed to an active person, as opposed to a depressed person who is inanimate and needs constant support to be animated; the term also translates the Greek *psuche*, and from this term comes the word *psychology*, which is for Aristotle and Aquinas not merely the study of the mind, but the study of that which makes the organism which affects the entire living being.¹⁵³⁷

“Form is the cause of the matter; it is on account of form that the matter realizes the nature of what it is.”¹⁵³⁸ While explaining about the soul, Aquinas states that “there are two kinds of contact, of quantity and of power; by the former, a body can be touched only by a body, by the latter, a body can be touched by an incorporeal thing, which moves that body”¹⁵³⁹. Aquinas means that even understanding and feeling can cause movement of the soul.¹⁵⁴⁰ According to him, soul is a force and viewed as the first source of cause or principle of life, which is primarily responsible for animation; this first principle of life is not a body, but the actuality of a body, and this is so, just the way that heat, which is the principle of heating, is not a body, but the actuality of a body.¹⁵⁴¹

4.4.5 Affections of the Will

According to Aquinas, there is an intrinsic principle in human being which discovers suitable elements that are the natural necessity of life, and anything composed contrary to the necessities of healthy life are corruptible; that a person accepts an extrinsic factor by reason of suitability to life, is not necessarily the very end, but without those affections the end is not attained or not well attained; the very movement of the will is an inclination toward a factor or something; inclination is the precept telling us how to act and how not to act.¹⁵⁴² However, the necessities of coercion is repugnant to the will although necessity of end is not repugnant to the will; and just as it is impossible for a thing at the same time to be natural and violent, so it is impossible for a factor to be absolutely coerced or violent and voluntary, and every movement is related to the internal inclination.¹⁵⁴³ Ultimate end and happiness, like the

¹⁵³⁶ <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/form-matter>.

¹⁵³⁷ See: Feser Edward, . Aquinas A Beginner’s Guide. Oneworld Publications, London, 2009, p 133.

¹⁵³⁸ Pasnau Robert, . Thomas Aquinas on Human Nature. Cambridge University Press, 2002, p 35.

¹⁵³⁹ ST, Part I, Q 75, Art 1, ad 3.

¹⁵⁴⁰ See: ST, Part I, Q 18, Art 1.

¹⁵⁴¹ See: ST, Part I, Q 75, Art 1.

¹⁵⁴² See: McInerny Ralph, . Aquinas on Human Action. A Theory of Practice, The Catholic University of America Press, Washington, D.C, 2012, p136.

¹⁵⁴³ See: ST, Part I, Q 82, Art 1.

voluntary action and the various acts of will that make up the voluntary action, puts emphasis on will, since the good is the object of the will.¹⁵⁴⁴

The idea of the will proposed by Aquinas involves a complex of three powers of the human soul, described as intellect, will, and passion. Intellect and will are engaged in a dynamic, complex interaction, with multiple stages between an initial perception and cognition by the intellect to the final action of the will, with occasional interruptions or overrides by the passions which may happen in a fraction of a second or in a long process. Movements at times do not remain in the sensitive appetite, but deflect the reason, and existence of good dispositions, which are gradually attained by good habits or received as grace, would not make hindrance in doing what is right.¹⁵⁴⁵

Love is the first of affections, the first movement of the will, and of the appetite power¹⁵⁴⁶. Affections of the will respond to the cognition, and in the case of the affection of love, will responds to the intellectual apprehension of a good. The intellectual affection of desire occurs when a good is absent, and joy occurs when good is present and when the will can rest on it.¹⁵⁴⁷ Intellect and will are, then the key to the human soul's superiority, it is by virtue of these that humans are distinct from animals¹⁵⁴⁸; and the behavior of a person is something connected to his own will¹⁵⁴⁹, because will is the starting point of action¹⁵⁵⁰.

4.4.6 Immateriality and immortality

The term soul, Germanic in origin, was on hand from the earliest period of the English language, and was viewed as an acceptable translation for *anima*; it seems likely that our thinking about the soul would be dramatically different, and closer to Aristotle's, if we hadn't lost the etymological connection between soul life¹⁵⁵¹. Aquinas argues for the immateriality of the intellect, and employs his argument in particular, in order to prove his stand, which he had also attributed to Aristotle; he explains it, as follows in his Commentary on the *De Anima* (Bk. III, Lect. 7, no. 680): according to him, anything that is in potency with respect to an object, and able to receive it into itself is as such without that object; thus if the pupil of the eye being potential to colours and able to receive them, is itself colourless, then the intellect

¹⁵⁴⁴ See: McInerny Ralph,. Aquinas on Human Action. A Theory of Practice, The Catholic University of America Press, Washington, D.C, 2012, p105.

¹⁵⁴⁵ See: ST, Part III, Q 15, Art 4.

¹⁵⁴⁶ See: ST, Part I, Q 20, Art 1.

¹⁵⁴⁷ See: ST, Part I-II, Q 31, Art 3.

¹⁵⁴⁸ See: Feser Edward,. Aquinas A Beginner's Guide. Oneworld Publications, London, 2009, p 143; ST, Part I, Q3, Art1.

¹⁵⁴⁹ See: ST, Part I, Q 83, Art 1.

¹⁵⁵⁰ See: McInerny Ralph,. Aquinas on Human Action. A Theory of Practice, The Catholic University of America Press, Washington, D.C, 2012, p108.

¹⁵⁵¹ See: Pasnau Robert,. Thomas Aquinas on Human Nature. Cambridge University Press, 2002, p 27.

which naturally understands all bodily things, must be lacking in bodily nature; just as the sense of sight, being able to know colour, but lacks all colours¹⁵⁵².

It should be noted that not every principle of vital action is a soul, for then the eye would be a soul, since it is a principle of vision; soul is the first principle of life, which is not a body, but act of the body¹⁵⁵³. “The intellectual principle which we call the mind or the intellect has an operation *per se* apart from the body.”¹⁵⁵⁴

Aquinas argues that from the fact that the human soul knows the universal nature of things, we can perceive that the species by which we understand is immaterial, otherwise, it would be specifically individualistic, and so would not lead to knowledge of the universal; from the immateriality of the species by which we understand, we can know that the intellect is independent of matter¹⁵⁵⁵.

4.3.7 Thomastic Dualism

Aquinas held that the intellect is immaterial, and that the soul survives the death of the body- this understanding of dualism between body and soul is neither Cartesian dualism¹⁵⁵⁶ nor property dualism¹⁵⁵⁷, but it is Thomastic dualism or hylemorphic¹⁵⁵⁸ dualism. Aquinas

¹⁵⁵² See: ST, Part I, Q 75, Art 2, ad 3.

¹⁵⁵³ See: ST, Part I, Q 75, Art 1.

¹⁵⁵⁴ ST, Part I, Q 75, Art 2.

¹⁵⁵⁵ See: ST, Part I, Q 75, Art 5.

¹⁵⁵⁶ Cartesian substance dualism holds that the mind or soul on the one hand and the body on the other constitute two complete substances rather than (as Aquinas’s view does) two components of one complete substance. The body is defined in terms of the mechanistic conception of matter, as inherently devoid of formal or final causes and operating entirely in terms of stripped down notion of efficient cause. The mind apart from its being a thinking thing is characterised in negative terms by denying of it any of the properties typical of the matter as mechanistically defined. In particular it has no length, width, depth, or position in space could get in any sort of cause and effect relationship with a material world defined in entirely quantificational terms is notoriously mysterious, however, and this interaction problem has always been the central objection to Cartesian dualism. (See: Feser Edward,. Aquinas A Beginner’s Guide. Oneworld Publications, London, 2009, p 164)

¹⁵⁵⁷ Edward Feser explains that, property dualism denies that the mind is non-physical substance of the Cartesian sort. It accepts the materialist view that material substances are the only substances there exist. But it disagrees with materialism and agrees with Cartesian dualism in holding that mental properties, or at least some of them are nonphysical properties, and it takes these properties to inherent somehow in the physical substance of the brain. Some property dualists would include intentionality among these non-physical mental properties. The mental properties that most property dualists focus on, however, are qualia or sensory qualities, those features of a conscious experience that are directly knowable only to the person having the experience and which are thus inherently subjective, just as colours look, the way things taste, which is different for someone whose tongue is in good working order, and so forth. The early modern philosophers and scientists who put forward a mechanistic conception of matter tended towards the view that colours, tastes, odours, sounds, and the like as we subjectively experience them, since they are qualitative rather than quantitative and vary from observer to observer, cannot be real features of material objects. For scientific purpose, then colour, and so on as objective physical properties were redefined in entirely quantifiable terms, and the residual elements of these properties that could not be captured in a quantifiable way were characterized as existing only in the mind, as sensory qualities that we tend to project on to the physical world but which do not really exist there at all. Property dualism also faces a version of interaction problem, insofar as the idea that nonphysical properties could have any causal influence on the physical world is as mysterious

upholds that the soul is capable of existing apart from the living body after the death of the body, because the soul is incorruptible. We see a kind of substance dualism, the soul being one substance and the body another, with the soul interacting, as it were, with the other substance, the body. However, this picture fails to recognize the Aristotelian terms of the account that Aquinas provides of soul and body. Aquinas knows and accepts Aristotle's assertion (*in De anima II.1*) that it is as pointless to ask whether soul and body are one, as it is to ask whether the wood and the table are one. They are one, but in different form.

While it is appropriate to label Thomas as a sort of dualist, we must distinguish his brand of hylomorphic dualism from Plato's thesis that a human being is her soul, meaning that one is identical to her soul and is merely casually related to her body-akin to how a driver is connected to her car by being in the driver's seat. Thomas unequivocally asserts the contrary thesis that a human being is not identical to her soul (q.75, a.4). Identifying a human being with her soul would render one more akin in nature to an angel; angels are defined by Thomas as pure intellects without bodies. The essential nature of human being, however, is to exist as composed of both an intellectual soul and a material body of which it is the substantial form. Thus, even a subsistent human soul existing without its body would be quite different in nature from an angel (q.75, a.7)¹⁵⁵⁹.

Aquinas looks like a substance dualist, inasmuch as he explicitly identifies the rational soul as a subsistent form and even as a substance. However, it brings us to a stop, pondering about his idea about his willingness to make similar claims about other parts of the body. We know that there are crucial differences in the substance of the soul, because other parts of the body are not an essential part of the human being like soul, and soul is an incorporeal form; a hand is a corporeal part of the body which is perishable, whereas, soul is imperishable and can exist apart from substance of the body¹⁵⁶⁰.

The soul in human being is spiritual, in that it has a power completely surpassing any sort of bodily limitations or activities; it is a kind of form united to a body, but it is not immersed into the body just like the hand or leg of the body; instead, it exceeds the capacity of all corporeal matter¹⁵⁶¹. Aquinas explains about a substance dualism, meaning human beings are not the composite of two fundamentally different kinds of entities, and it is not a materialistic understanding either, because the rational soul is both incorporeal and subsistent; a modern materialist might identify the soul with a certain brain structure of functional

as the idea that a non-physical substance could. (See: Feser Edward, *Aquinas A Beginner's Guide*. Oneworld Publications, London, 2009, p 164-165)

¹⁵⁵⁸ Hylomorphism or hylemorphism is a philosophical theory developed by Aristotle, which conceives a being (*ousia*) as a compound of matter and form. The word is a 19th-century term formed from the Greek words *hyle* which means wood or matter and *morphē*, which means form. Aristotle defines matter as that out of which a thing or something is made. For example, letters are the matter of syllables. Thus, matter is a relative term - an object counts as matter relative to something else. For example, clay is a matter relative to a brick because a brick is made of clay, whereas bricks are matter relative to a brick house. Change is analysed as a material transformation - matter is what undergoes a change of form. For example, consider a lump of bronze that is shaped into a statue. Bronze is the matter, and this matter loses one form and gains a new form, that of a statue. <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hylomorphism>.

¹⁵⁵⁹ Eberl. T. Jason, *The Rutledge Guidebook to Aquinas' Summa Theologiae*. Rutledge, New York NY, 2016, p 89.

¹⁵⁶⁰ See: Pasnau Robert, *Thomas Aquinas on Human Nature*. Cambridge University Press, 2002, p 66.

¹⁵⁶¹ *Ibid.* P 71.

disposition, so the soul would be incorporeal, but non-subsistent, inasmuch as structures and dispositions exist in a person, and the mind would be corporeal and subsistent, inasmuch as the mind would be a corporeal organ; Aquinas would reject this form of materialism because he believes that the soul alone performs the functions of mind,- mind is a form , a subsistent form, and hence an incorporeal substance¹⁵⁶².

The influence of Aristotelian hylomorphism and Christian dogma made Aquinas to combine his view, that he wanted to explain the soul as the body's form, yet at the same time he wanted it to be subsistent, capable to exist and to operate independently of the body. Therefore, Aquinas avoids any sort of mind-body dualism.

Psychologically considering, when Aquinas understands mind as a form, it opens scope for changes in the form of the mind, and I would say positive or negative form, active or indifferent form, occupied with good habits or habits of evil. This understanding also gives scope for healing therapy, that is, a form can be changed or remodified.

Conclusion

Pessimistic and optimistic habits of thinking have totally different consequences; the pessimists give up more easily and suffer from depression more often than the optimistic person, and the optimistic people do much better in almost every field of work and throughout all stages of life. Pessimistic attitude is said to be deeply rooted as to be permanent. However pessimistic people can become optimistic, once they have recognized their pessimistic nature, and by learning a new set of cognitive skills, and by practicing them daily. An ardent desire to overcome the depression is necessary to change the pessimistic elements into an optimistic perspective.

There is a need to think about individual human action, because people are not just products of their environment, neither are they just merely pushed by their internal drives nor pulled by external stimuli; there is a role of decision making and internal influence of habits. It is more evidently seen to us because we live in a society that grants us powers to decide, to choose, and to exercise, and we live in a society that considers individual opinion, pleasure, and pain very seriously and respectfully, our modern society exalts the individualistic self serenely and regards personal fulfilment as a legitimate purpose of life.

Feeling positive emotion is important not just because it is pleasant in its own right, but because it causes much better interaction with the world, and developing more positive emotion would allow for more friendship, better physical health, and greater achievement.

¹⁵⁶² Ibid. p 71-72.

Positive feelings will maximize the physical, social, intellectual, and spiritual benefits and increase the opportunities of pleasant life.

The immaterial form of the psyche of a person can be positively transformed or negatively deformed; this nature of psyche needs to be understood, not merely as a functional perspective, but rather as a fundamental principle of life.

Chapter V

Multidimensional Perspective of Perfect Happiness

Introduction

When Aquinas identifies ultimate end of human being with happiness, he distinguishes man's pursuit of the ultimate end from creature in the world. His distinction of two ends, namely the thing in which the notion of good is found and the use or attainment of that thing¹⁵⁶³, broadly establishes that God is the ultimate end of all beings. When he establishes that God is the ultimate end of human being, he presupposes the Aristotelian universal teleology, and the term beatitude expresses the difference of the ultimate end of human being with other creatures, because human being pursue the ultimate end by knowing and loving God, then beatitude and the ultimate end of human being are identical in meaning¹⁵⁶⁴.

The theory of authentic happiness is that happiness could be analyzed into three different elements that are chosen for its own sake: positive emotion, engagement and meaning. It is a positive emotion because the person feels pleasure, rapture, ecstasy, warmth and comfort. It is an engagement because it is about flow: like being one with music, sense of time stopping and absorbing into it. Thirdly it is meaningful because the pursuit of engagement and the pursuit of pleasure are often solitary, solipsistic endeavors; meaningful life consists in belonging to and serving something that you believe is bigger than the self.¹⁵⁶⁵

The human intellect does not immediately in its first apprehension acquire a complete cognition of a thing. Instead it first apprehends something about it so as to say its quiddity, which is a first and proper object of intellect, and then acquires intellectual cognition of the properties, accidents, and dispositions associated with the thing's essence. In doing so it has to compound one apprehended aspect with or divide one from another and proceed from one composition or division to another that is the process of reasoning. This intellectual cognition may be either theoretical or applied.¹⁵⁶⁶ In the same way like intellectual cognition, attaining happiness is also a process.

¹⁵⁶³ See: ST, Part I-II, Q 18, Art 8.

¹⁵⁶⁴ See: McInerney Ralph, . Aquinas on Human Action. A Theory of Practice, Catholic University of America Press, Washington D.C. 2012, P 171.

¹⁵⁶⁵ See: Seligman E.P. Martin,. Flourish. A Visionary New Understanding of Happiness and Well-Being, Atria Paperback, New York, 2011, p 12.

¹⁵⁶⁶ See: ST, Part I, Q 85, Art 5.

5. Nature of Happiness

Aristotle's most significant work *Nicomachean Ethics* describes the theory of happiness as the ultimate purpose of human existence. Everywhere people seek pleasure, wealth, and a good reputation; although each of these has some value, none of them can occupy the place of the chief good for which human being aims. To be an ultimate end, an act must be self-sufficient, and perfect final end that which is always desirable by its very experience and never for the sake of something else. Aristotle claims that happiness is the end which meets all the requirements; it is easy enough to see that we desire money, pleasure, and honour only because we believe that these goods will make us happy; it seems that all other goods are a means towards obtaining happiness, while happiness is something final and self-sufficient, and is the end of action.¹⁵⁶⁷

The desire for natural riches is not infinite: because they suffice for nature in a certain measure. But the desire for artificial wealth is infinite, for it is the servant of disordered concupiscence, which is not curbed, as the Aristotle makes clear (*Polit.* i, 3). Yet this desire for wealth is infinite otherwise than the desire for the sovereign good. For the more perfectly the sovereign good is possessed, the more it is loved, and other things despised: because the more we possess it, the more we know it. Hence it is written (*Sirach* 24:29): "They that eat me shall yet hunger." Whereas in the desire for wealth and for whatsoever temporal goods, the contrary is the case: for when we already possess them, we despise them, and seek others: which is the sense of Our Lord's words (*John* 4:13): "Whosoever drinks of this water," by which temporal goods are signified, "shall thirst again." The reason of this is that we realize more their insufficiency when we possess them: and this very fact shows that they are imperfect, and the sovereign good does not consist therein.¹⁵⁶⁸

Happiness forms the central theme of Buddhist teachings that encompasses a variety of traditions, beliefs and spiritual practices largely based on original teachings attributed to the Buddha and resulting interpreted philosophies. It teaches ultimate freedom from suffering through noble eightfold path which consists in eight practices: right view, right resolve, right speech, right conduct, right livelihood, right effort, right mindfulness, and right *Samadhi* (contemplation). According to Buddhism ultimate happiness is achieved by overcoming all cravings. It also considers mundane happiness for lay people as a worthy goal. The Eightfold Path teaches that by restraining oneself, cultivating discipline, and practicing mindfulness and meditation, monks and nuns attain nirvana and stop their craving, clinging and karmic accumulations, thereby ending their rebirth and suffering and they achieve perfect happiness.¹⁵⁶⁹

In advaita Vedanta a school of Hindu philosophy which is one of the classic Indian paths to spiritual realization advocates the ultimate goal of life is happiness, in the sense that duality between Atman and Brahman is transcended and one realizes one's self. It advocates the soul or the true self or atman is the same as the highest metaphysical reality namely

¹⁵⁶⁷ See: Aristotle, *The Nicomachean Ethics*. Trans by David Ross, Oxford University Press, New York, 2009, p 10-11.

¹⁵⁶⁸ ST, Part I-II, Q 2, Art 1 ad 3.

¹⁵⁶⁹ <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Happiness>.

Brahman. The followers of this philosophy seek spiritual liberation through acquiring knowledge of one's true identity as atman, and the knowledge of the identity of atman and Brahman. The liberation of soul after the death, that is transcendence of soul to Brahman leads to freedom (*moksha*). This ultimate liberation for the followers of advaita philosophy is happiness.¹⁵⁷⁰

5.1 Desire for Happiness

Concept of appetite is essential to Aquinas's metaphysical questions on human being and to his anthropological understanding of human act. Appetite is the principle that seeks toward something good, it is a kind of inclination towards something desirable¹⁵⁷¹, and it functions as an essential constituent of a person that directs the mind toward perfection and completion. An individual is potentially capable of the perfect good, because his intellect can apprehend the universal and perfect good, and his will can desire it, that means there is always an inclination towards perfect good¹⁵⁷². The appetite is evoked by goodness, and this word appetite is used as a connecting conceptual terminology in order to distinguish different aspects of the same reality 'being and goodness', that would mean to be good is to be able to evoke appetite, that is, desirable¹⁵⁷³. People wish to induce children to good and restrain them from evil by trying to please the well behaved with small praise or gift and those misbehaved with scolding or rebuking or even with tiny punishment; it shows the moral science treat pleasure or happiness; thereby later the child desires to do good and avoid evil.¹⁵⁷⁴ Here one needs to understand that the cause of evil is not something evil in itself. On the contrary evil can only be produced accidentally by a cause which is itself good and aims at some good object. In bodily evil this is manifest. The causes which inflict bodily suffering do so in the exercise of forces which are good in themselves but which come into conflict with other forces.¹⁵⁷⁵

Book of Genesis explains that God loves everything that He created; it brings in the understanding that being and goodness is interrelated not only because God created it but also because any kind of being that exist is necessarily good; it could also be inferred that perfection of anything is also good, thereby an appetite could also be evoked as an inclination towards that perfection.¹⁵⁷⁶ We understand that creation is inherently dynamic, that means, 'created imperfect and permeated with appetite, it cannot help but move toward its perfection; without appetite there would not be this dynamic movement, and creation would not move

¹⁵⁷⁰ <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Advaita-Vedanta>.

¹⁵⁷¹ See: ST, Part I-II, Q 8, Art 1.

¹⁵⁷² See: ST, Part I-II, Q 5, Art 1.

¹⁵⁷³ See: Lombardo E Nicholas,. The Logic of Desire. Aquinas on Emotion, The Catholic University of America Press, Washington, D.C. 2011, p 27.

¹⁵⁷⁴ See: Aquinas Thomas,. Commentary on Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics. Trans. By C.I. Litzinger, Dumb Ox Books, Notre Dame, Indiana 1964, p 590.

¹⁵⁷⁵ See: Scheeben Joseph Matthias,. A manual of Catholic theology; based on Scheeben's "Dogmatik" Volume 2. Wilhelm Joseph and Scannell Thomas, Kegan Paul Trench Trubner and Co. London 1908, p 3.

¹⁵⁷⁶ See: ST, Part I, Q 20, Art 2.

towards its perfection, instead creation would stagnate.¹⁵⁷⁷ Understanding of dynamic nature of creation necessarily confirms that appetite is not only just intrinsically good but also it is an integral part of the inherent dynamic nature of creation.

Appetite could be called as desirability which functions indivisibly as associated force of an individual and his goodness; appetite, as a defining character of goodness, is in itself good, however the quality of the capacity of desire is confined with the goodness of a person. This appetite involves reasonable passivity in an individual because he has the potential to become something other than his present efficiency. Appetite has a nature of *exitus-raditus*, because it comes from the act of the will and deemed to be returned to the person as enrichment.¹⁵⁷⁸

What affirmation and negation are in thinking, pursuit and avoidance are in desire; so that since moral virtue is a state of character concerned with choice, and choice is deliberate desire, therefore both the reasoning must be true and the desire right, if the choice is to be good, and the latter must pursue just what the former asserts. Now this kind of intellect and of truth is practical; of the intellect which is contemplative, not practical not productive, the good and the bad state are truth and falsity respectively; while of the part which is practical and intellectual the good state is truth in agreement with right desire.¹⁵⁷⁹

Perception and reason are related to desire because choice of the person regarding a foreseen object is progressed through perception and reason, that is to say a positive choice will lead to positive desire and a negative choice will lead to a negative desire; that means work of a good or faulty desire is in the speculative rather than practical order¹⁵⁸⁰. Theoretical and practical are analogous terms; there is paradigm cases of purely theoretical or purely practical intellectual activity, most of our actual thinking is both theoretical and practical. The primary grasp of what is good is more of a practical grasp.¹⁵⁸¹

5.1.1 Pleasure Centered

Pleasure centred happiness have generally three kinds of movements, one from the part of the appetite in accordance to the intention towards the end, and the other movement is an external operation according to the execution; thirdly, even after the execution of the end, the movement of the appetite faculty does not cease¹⁵⁸², there is a kind of enjoyment of that which the person experienced or achieved, and the person will desire its repetition or continuity.

¹⁵⁷⁷ Lombardo E Nicholas,. The Logic of Desire. Aquinas on Emotion, The Catholic University of America Press, Washington, D.C. 2011, p 28.

¹⁵⁷⁸ Ibid, p 30.

¹⁵⁷⁹ Aristotle,. The Nicomachean Ethics. Trans by David Ross, Oxford University Press, New York, 2009, (1130a, 21-30), p 103.

¹⁵⁸⁰ See: Thomas Aquinas,. Commentary on Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics. Trans. By C.I. Litzinger, Dumb Ox Books, Notre Dame, Indiana 1964, p 360.

¹⁵⁸¹ See: McInerney Ralph,. Aquinas on Human Action. A Theory of Practice, Catholic University of America Press, Washington D.C. 2012, P 185.

¹⁵⁸² ST, Part I-II, Q 31, Art 1.

The attainment of the excepted good, and the knowledge of having attained it, is an operation, because actual knowledge is an operation and the attainment of a suitable good is by means of an operation, and the every movement is a pleasure, therefore every pleasure must be the result of some operation, although they are apprehended as possessed by the person.¹⁵⁸³ “Pleasure completes the activity not as the corresponding permanent state does, by its immanence, but as an end which supervenes as the bloom of youth does on those in the flower of their age”.¹⁵⁸⁴

Sources of pleasure centred happiness are brain and sensory faculties; it gives a kind of satisfaction in food, drink, shelter, affection, clothes, house, car and jewellery and in many such matters; this happiness has a problem of superficiality and being reduced merely to material things; it is a kind of external pleasure centred happiness. The sense appetite of the person inclines him toward expected good that is apprehended through sense cognition, and the person develops corresponding desire, then he will be drawn towards this end. This movement of sense appetite is a passion which creates pleasure even in the very movement.

Pleasure is one of the interior dimensions of emotion, a kind of positive feedback mechanism of subjective experience, which is enjoyable and entertaining, and most of the pleasurable experiences are associated with satisfying biological desires. There could be a motivational or consummatory inability or an ascetical determination which prevents experience of pleasure from activities usually found enjoyable; one can distinguish many kinds of pathological depression, sometimes it is mere passive joylessness and dullness, discouragement, dejection, lack of taste and zest, or ascetical abstinence, this state of being is called as anhedonia a term coined by Theodule Armand Ribot.¹⁵⁸⁵

5.1.1.1 Stimulus Synchronized

Pleasure oriented human act directed by the Will is regulated with corresponding bodily senses, which means those acts are invariably set in motion either by present stimuli or by the memory of a stimulus or by speculative assumptions, and the strength of the surge of this motion depends on the faculty of the sense organs. Significance of the feelings of pleasure and displeasure which imperatively acts upon the person is also influenced by moral principles and moral hypothesis understood and practiced by the person; this is an obscure and inaccessible impact of the will which a person normally cannot avoid, then a flexible hypothesis present in the mind which is not any way bound would be best at operation.

Pleasure or displeasure although influenced by genetic and physical features of a person could be regarded as having a psychological fixture to conditions of stability or instability of pleasure with regard to the quality and quantity of pleasure. Pleasure or

¹⁵⁸³ ST, Part I-II, Q 32.

¹⁵⁸⁴ Aristotle, *The Nicomachean Ethics*. Trans by David Ross, Oxford University Press, New York, 2009, (1174b, 31-33), p 189.

¹⁵⁸⁵ <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anhedonia>.

displeasure needs a corresponding regulation in the quantity of stimulation in given amplitude, because beyond a certain limit the consciousness of pleasure deviates from stability, as a consequence when the quantity of pleasure present maintained as possible as low then the quality of pleasure will be maintained high.

Inclination to pleasure is being regularly sought after however the tendency towards pleasure does not mean experiencing the pleasure itself but a person would find himself in a secure ground when he finds out an analytic answer to the question of what force or circumstance is preventing him the pleasure principle from being carried into effect¹⁵⁸⁶. The understanding of the inhibitions of pleasure leads to a state of reality principle which does not abandon the inclination to obtaining pleasure but leads to postponement of attaining pleasure or abandoning a number of possibilities of pleasure which in a way is an indirect effect of pleasure; such abandoning or postponing of attaining the pleasure principle do not contradict the tendency to pleasure but the person would experience a perceptual un-pleasure.

5.1.1.2 Wealth Synchronised

Money has necessarily become part of life; it is the means for exchange or purchase of commodities that are beneficial to life. Practically, the world has developed to a situation in which without money nothing is purchasable. Those who earn more money has better capacity to purchase better commodities that could raise the standard of life to a higher level in comparison to an individual who earns merely his pocket money which is just enough to purchase commodities to sustain necessities of his life. From this point, sometimes those who do not have sufficient money could think that if they were rich, they could lead a happy life.

It could also be comprehended that the rich people are too busy in their life; that they have to really plan out when they could take free time out of their tight schedule, thereby most of their time they are merely mechanically happy. In other words, the flow of consumeristic attitude, the law of marginal utility explains that the substantial goods will not fully satisfy human wants and desires. However, the people in poor part of the world who are leading a life in extreme poverty are typically less happy than people leading an affluent life; “happiness appeared typically lowest in the nations where malnutrition is most frequent.”¹⁵⁸⁷

An individual who has no money can lead to a life of suffering ,poverty or even misery, and about an individual who has too much money brings into consideration the law of diminishing marginal returns, eventually there will be a point where the yield rate after a certain level will not increase proportional to the investment. Money or wealth is considered as a device to get through in life and to facilitate a person with necessities of life, and it cannot be substantially considered as a fundamental pursuit of life.

¹⁵⁸⁶ See: Sigmund Freud,. Collected Writings. Trans. by A.A. Brill, Pacific Publishing Studio, US, 2010, p 221.

¹⁵⁸⁷ Veenhoven Ruut,. Conditions of Happiness. D.Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht, Holland, 1984, p150.

5.1.1.3 Aridity in Materialistic Pleasure

Aridity in Materialistic pleasure is an indicator of the degree of dryness or dissatisfaction derived out of thoughts of meaninglessness. It is a state of feeling dullness or a state devoid of sensible consolation. We could also consider aridity in materialistic pleasure as an advantage to make a person go further in finding perfect happiness. There could be three signs of aridity in materialistic pleasure. Firstly, the person would find no pleasure or consolation in the material things. He fails to find pleasure in the things he is having. He receives no delight in the things he does, although he looks for human satisfaction. Secondly, the person suffering from insensibility develops a habitual sense of lukewarm and he will dream about other options in the life. He may also read about stories of successful people in the world. If he is a rich man he may also think about doing social works or doing charity for other, thereby he searches a joy in being with people and helping them. Thirdly, the person will no longer have interest in material possession, he will change his way of life in search of greater happiness. This intensity of aridity could be short or long: a short feeling of aridity might have developed from a special single experience and would last only for a short time and may have a lesser intensity, whereas a long aridity last for a long time with a profound intensity.

A person taking happiness in material objects incurs some impurity of affection from being engrossed with inferior things, and a person taking happiness in changeable objects cannot have lasting enjoyment, when the object affording happiness is changed or destroyed or denied, the happiness itself ceases and sometimes becomes painful.¹⁵⁸⁸ The experience of aridity in materialistic pleasure which sees pleasure as a fanciful illusion and as mere emotion is a time for reorienting; it is an opportunity to follow God with resolution. This state will affect his will as he is distracted and unable to concentrate. As the person reaches this state of absence of solace in pleasure, he finds nothing to demand then he may incline towards God and righteousness.

5.1.2 Ego Centered

Consciousness is one of the properties in the mind which may co-exist along with other properties or may be absent; an idea which is an element is not as a rule permanently conscious, an idea may be conscious now but a little later no more, although it can become once again an active idea, as a conscious, under another conditions of life; `in a sense the idea which was absent but again retrieved as active conscious is named as latent, then it was absent form conscious, and the state in which the idea existed before being made again conscious is called repression;¹⁵⁸⁹ thus repression of a latent is part of the inactive nature of conscious, that also means conscious can make in an appropriate condition again an inactive idea active.

¹⁵⁸⁸ See: Thomas Aquinas,. Commentary on Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics. Trans. By C.I. Litzinger, Dumb Ox Books, Notre Dame, Indiana 1964, p 625.

¹⁵⁸⁹ Sigmund Freud,. Collected Writings. Trans. by A.A. Brill, Pacific Publishing Studio, US, 2010, p 271-272.

Self-consciousness is commonly understood as “conscious of one's own acts or states as belonging to or originating in oneself : aware of oneself as an individual”¹⁵⁹⁰ ; it is an ability to be aware of what is at hand and knowing what is simultaneously happening in and around him.¹⁵⁹¹ Self-consciousness involve a state of being wherein an individual as a thinking subject is aware of the object of thinking. In this sense this individual gets a relative control on the object of thinking, if then, this individual can build a private inner world where he is the thinking subject who knows about the object of thinking; in this case the private inner world will be a circle of inner world which is distinct from the outer world, and this circle of inner world can be named as ego¹⁵⁹² world of this individual.

This has become clear in more ways than one; but the decisive instance is as follows. We have formulated the idea that in every individual there is a coherent organization of mental process which we call his ego. This ego includes consciousness and it controls the approaches to motility, i.e. to the discharge of excitations into the external world; it is the institution in the mind that regulates all its own constituent processes, and which goes to sleep at night, though even then it continues to exercise a censorship upon dreams.¹⁵⁹³

An individual comes to the recognition of his inner world as a result of constant comparison and analysis of the people with whom he comes regularly in contact. Gradually the individual recognizes it due to constant interaction of difference in the attitude and aptitude in the people or individuals with whom he comes into contact, thereby he owns a realization of other inner world. This recognition of the reality of difference stabilizes his inner private world which is independent of other individuals or other inner world that has different perceptive. However the individual also comes into a gradual understanding that an action of other inner world or other subjects, that is, other individual with whom he comes into contact, considered in the milieu of living organism, causes reaction in his own inner world. This leads to the realization that the inner ego world of the individual is not absolute but is related to other inner ego world with whom he comes into contact.

Having recognized other inner world and its difference, he tries to safeguard his own inner world, consequently tries to control and gain dominion over his own inner world in order to get its best feeling and best performance. Here it could also be understood that this process of persuasion to possess control and dominion over his inner world and its safeguarding can lead to a positive development as well as a negative manipulation.

¹⁵⁹⁰ <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/self-conscious>.

¹⁵⁹¹ Spitzer Robert,. Finding True Happiness. Satisfying Our Restless Hearts, Ignatius Press, San Francisco, 2015, p 35.

¹⁵⁹² Ego is distinct from id, because in ego perception plays a great role whereas id devolves upon instinct, i.e. ego represents perception and reason whereas id represents passions.

¹⁵⁹³ Sigmund Freud,. Collected Writings. Trans. by A.A. Brill, Pacific Publishing Studio, US, 2010, p 273.

5.1.2.1 Superman Feeling

Intensive thought of inner world will lead to a kind of comparison with other inner worlds of other individuals; thereby the person will not only consider that he is different from other inner world but also he may conclude that he is much better than other individuals; this perception could be named as a feeling of superman. `Superman feeling is always in close touch with id and can act as its representative, in relation to the ego; it reaches deep down into the id and is, for that reason further from consciousness than the ego¹⁵⁹⁴.

This superman feeling would deepen a sense of self praise, that he is free of error, special at every occasion, capable of any type of work, much better than any individual in his peer group, all others need to respect and consult him, and he will adorn an understanding that whatever he does is recognized and appreciated by his group and all those who know him.

5.1.2.2 Vacillating Ambivalence

`Understanding a troubled situation is a worthy goal.¹⁵⁹⁵ Regular criticism and unsuccessful performance of his own works will put him into a state of coexistence of opposing feelings or attitudes, questioning his own capabilities. It is a state of coexistence of winner and loser emotion which could be named as vacillating ambivalence, there the individual is really caught between the dilemmas of superman feeling and loss of self-esteem. `Descent of superman feeling, which brings in thoughts of weakness and dependence, connects it with the phylogenetic acquisitions of the id and makes it a reincarnation of former ego structures that have left their precipitates behind in the id¹⁵⁹⁶.

Vacillating ambivalence can lead to coexistence of good and evil, truth and lie, love and hate, honesty and dishonesty, and good nature and criminal mentality, because the individual wants to establish somehow that he is better than others; to this end he will try anything and everything to prove himself and win a point in the judgment of others; negative traits will not be mere semblance evoked by aggressive regression but an actual substitution of, for example, hate for love.

5.1.2.3 Subjugated Fiasco

Receiving regular criticism, disrespect and avoidance from the people instead of regularly expected praise and superman feeling will lead to arrogance, contempt and resentment; thereby the person will develop inferiority complex, manifesting loneliness and

¹⁵⁹⁴ Sigmund Freud,. Collected Writings. Trans. by A.A. Brill, Pacific Publishing Studio, US, 2010, p 295.

¹⁵⁹⁵ Seligman E.P. Martin,. Learned Optimism. How to Change Your Mind and Your Life, Vintage Books, New York, 2006, p 96.

¹⁵⁹⁶ Sigmund Freud,. Collected Writings. Trans. by A.A. Brill, Pacific Publishing Studio, US, 2010, p 295.

emptiness, explaining himself as a self-pity condition, and withdrawing into small comfort zone or even avoid meeting people. This worse defeated self-sense could be called as subjugated fiasco wherein the person will lose control over his own emotions, feel himself worthless, and may even turn to violence out of desperation and despair of his own life. An individual who got into subjugated fiasco will seek for any kind of sensual pleasures, he will try to defend himself searching new inception through cathexes, and he will get acquiesces in them, which will be a relief for his inner crisis and he will not be ashamed of anything because of his self-pity consideration. As by product of subjugated fiasco there could emerge many disoriented personality traits.

Restitution of his positive ego needs at this stage continuous resistance against negative ideas which are active in him; through regular continuous resistance those negative active ideas need to be put into a state of repression, if at all the person wishes to redeem himself from the state of subjugated fiasco. The force that institutes the repression of idea is perceived as resistance¹⁵⁹⁷; however the resistance against negative idea which is active in conscious needs voluntary acts of the will.

5.1.3 Charity Centered

An individual after knowing his own interests begins to compare and analyse his privileges with other people, and at times an idea which he thought was central to his ego, could look completely paradoxical, and having analysed his interests to experimental situations, he begins to recognise the need of sharing his privileges with other people. This interpretation of his privilege optimizes an agreement within his inner world and he develops a readiness to accommodate another person into his inner world. `Charity has an affective dimension; it orders all of passions and affections, generating joy and peace to the higher part of the soul.¹⁵⁹⁸

The individual tried to alleviate his personal suffering from his own inner world as he was safeguarding his ego perceptive and as he tried to maintain his own definition of happiness. Discovery of paradoxes existing between his inner world and inner world of a person or a group which he knows, makes him to redefine his definition of happiness; in the process of redefinition of his happiness, he thinks that he cannot alone lead a happy life when the known inner world is suffering; this urges him to do something to alleviate the suffering of other inner world.

The famous ancient thought in Bhagavat Gita, do your duty without expecting anything in return, in broad sense recommended charity. Stoicism a school of thought dating back to 300 BC, which taught development of self-control and cultivation of virtues (The four

¹⁵⁹⁷ See: Sigmund Freud,. Collected Writings. Trans. by A.A. Brill, Pacific Publishing Studio, US, 2010, p 272.

¹⁵⁹⁸ See: Lombardo E Nicholas,. The Logic of Desire. Aquinas on Emotion, The Catholic University of America Press, Washington, D.C. 2011, p 158.

cardinal virtues of the Stoic philosophy - wisdom, courage, justice and temperance - is a classification derived from the teachings of Plato) as a means of overcoming destructive emotions, is sometimes cited as a pre-Christian line of thought which recommend doing good to one's fellow being without expecting anything in return.

Following the example given in the parable of the Good Samaritan, Christian charity is first of all the simple response to immediate needs and specific situations: feeding the hungry, clothing the naked, caring for and healing the sick, visiting those in prison, etc. The Church's charitable organizations, beginning with those of Caritas (at diocesan, national and international levels), ought to do everything in their power to provide the resources and above all the personnel needed for this work. Individuals who care for those in needs must first be professionally competent: they should be properly trained in what to do and how to do it, and committed to continuing care. Yet, while professional competence is a primary, fundamental requirement, it is not of itself sufficient. We are dealing with human beings, and human beings always need something more than technically proper care. They need humanity. They need heartfelt concern. Those who work for the Church's charitable organizations must be distinguished by the fact that they do not merely meet the needs of the moment, but they dedicate themselves to others with heartfelt concern, enabling them to experience the richness of their humanity. Consequently, in addition to their necessary professional training, these charity workers need a "formation of the heart": they need to be led to that encounter with God in Christ which awakens their love and opens their spirits to others. As a result, love of neighbour will no longer be for them a commandment imposed, so to speak, from without, but a consequence deriving from their faith, a faith which becomes active through love (cf. Gal 5:6).¹⁵⁹⁹

The "formation of heart" begins at a stage where one recognizes his inner world and accepts recognition of the other inner world and finds the existence of paradoxes between them. According to Albert Einstein, the highest principles for our aspirations and judgements are given to us in the Jewish-Christian religious tradition; it is a very high goal which, with our weak powers, we can reach only very inadequately, but which gives us a sure foundation to our aspire actions and valuations; if one were to take that goal out of its religious form and look merely at its purely human side, one might state it perhaps thus: free and responsible development of the individual, so that he may place his powers freely and gladly in the service of all mankind; it is only to the individual that a soul is given; and the high destiny of the individual is to serve rather than to rule, or to impose himself in any other way¹⁶⁰⁰.

Understandably, people can certainly maintain ethical perspectives in order to enrich themselves and endorse themselves to behaviour based on ethical principles of charity without any engagement or commitment in religious beliefs; although religious organizations have a wide variety of comprehensive services, educative programmes, lectures, commentaries, and models that can regularly impart, support, and provide corrective guidance about ethical principles and strategies to form their hearts.

A Chinese proverb says: "if you want happiness for an hour, take a nap; if you want happiness for a day, go fishing; if you want happiness for a year, inherit a fortune; if you want happiness for a lifetime, help somebody."¹⁶⁰¹

¹⁵⁹⁹ Pope Benedict XVI., *Deus Caritas Est* - Encyclical Letter. 2005, 30.

¹⁶⁰⁰ <http://www.sfheart.com/einstein.html>.

¹⁶⁰¹ https://greatergood.berkeley.edu/article/item/happiness_for_a_lifetime.

5.1.3.1 Empathetic Altruism

Empathetic altruism denotes to a change in the emotional inner world that develops as a consequence of recognition of paradoxes between his inner world and someone else's inner world. Empathetic altruistic emotion notices suffering of another person and tries to help him out regardless of any returns. An empathic altruistic change in emotional state of the individual occurs when an internal idea of the inner world finds a corresponding idea that stays in a miserable state or want of help which is considered as the target and a feeling is generated along with goodwill in the individual.

Once such a dual representation is formed in the mind of the individual there develops a new circle of inner world connecting his inner world with the other inner world. The formation of this dual inner world results from the partial merging of one's own inner idea, which includes the feeling of happiness and well-being in addition to any other type of ethical consideration and the state of inner world of another person. It calls for tendency to become the object of his own inner idea, i.e., he is ready to part with something in order to enrich the other person thereby the other person become the subject, and cognitive flexibility to reduce his personal interest for the betterment of other.

5.1.3.2 Affective Cognition

This affective cognition is a dual activity which understands another's states of affair that is in need of help and a simultaneous response with an appropriate emotion which renders empathetic service as a conclusion of cognition of the problem. At times affective and cognitive empathy could stand as independent entity from one another that means affective empathy could be reduced to a mere emotional activity in a particular situation or in a particular activity without involving rapid cognitive analysis, however such single stances of charity is indirectly connected with preunderstanding of ethical notions of charity. Affective cognition of empathetic action is an evoked response to another's suffering in the context of cognitive evaluation.

Affective cognition stands against cognitive dissonance which is a psychological stress experienced by a person who simultaneously holds more than one contradictory hypothesis, ideas, or values; in other words, criticizing and deciding the object of desire as worthless is known as cognitive dissonance. One of the famous fables of Greek fabulist Aesop on fox and grapes is an example for cognitive dissonance, wherein the fox unable to reach the grapes decides, that grapes are not worth eating and the fox justified his reasoning by concluding that grapes are unripe and sour.

Three elements are involved in the affective cognitive charity the individual, the other individual or group and the object of action. The necessary balanced state of relation among

these three elements is attained through affection. This affection is positioned at one point of this triangle and share two relations. It is a positive stimulus that makes this affection active. Charity is oriented towards a good, and the supreme good is God. Charity loves God for his own sake and attains God himself in order to rest in him, not in order that we might get something from him;¹⁶⁰² this theological charity by attaining God and resting in him causes joy and peace. Just like sense appetite reaches its fulfilment in the passion of pleasure and the intellectual appetite reaches its fulfilment in the virtue of charity which give joy and peace to the person who practices it.¹⁶⁰³

5.1.3.3 Faith and Charity

`Faith has a radical meaning of accepting willingly, holding fast, and approving.¹⁶⁰⁴
 `Faith is a theological virtue by which one believes in God and believes all that He has said and revealed to us; by faith man freely commits his entire self to God. For this reason a believer seeks to know and do God's will; he will try to live by faith through charity.¹⁶⁰⁵
 Charity is a theological virtue by which one loves God above all things and loves his neighbour for the love of God. The practice of all the virtues is animated and inspired by charity, which binds everything together in perfect harmony. It is one of the beginning forms of all virtues. `God is the primary object of charity but he is not the only object of charity, it is also directed towards other people and oneself insofar as they are loved in God and for God.¹⁶⁰⁶ The virtue of charity articulates and morally orders a person to perform charitable acts. It is the source and the goal of the Christian practice of theological virtue. Charity upholds and purifies human ability to love, and raises it to the supernatural perfection of divine love.¹⁶⁰⁷ Faith with reason nourishes integral human development through works of charity. Faith is an act of the intellect as well as an act of the will and is influenced externally by divine authority and internally by divine grace.¹⁶⁰⁸

The theme of integral human development takes on an even broader range of meanings: the correlation between its multiple elements requires a commitment to foster the interaction of the different levels of human knowledge in order to promote the authentic development of peoples. Often it is thought that development, or the socio-economic measures that go with it, merely require to be implemented through joint action. This joint action, however, needs to be given direction, because "all social action involves a doctrine". In view of the complexity of the issues, it is obvious that the various disciplines have to work together through an orderly interdisciplinary exchange. Charity does not exclude knowledge, but rather requires, promotes, and animates it from within. Knowledge is never

¹⁶⁰² See: ST, Part II-II, Q 23, Art 6.

¹⁶⁰³ See: Lombardo E Nicholas,. *The Logic of Desire. Aquinas on Emotion*, The Catholic University of America Press, Washington, D.C. 2011, p 159.

¹⁶⁰⁴ Scheeben Joseph Matthias,. *A manual of Catholic theology; based on Scheeben's "Dogmatik" Volume 1.* Wilhelm Joseph and Scannell Thomas, Kegan Paul Trench Trubner and Co. London 1908, p 113.

¹⁶⁰⁵ *Catechism of the Catholic Church*, 2nd, sec. 1814.

¹⁶⁰⁶ ST, Part II-II, Q 25, Art 1; See Lombardo E Nicholas,. *The Logic of Desire. Aquinas on Emotion*, The Catholic University of America Press, Washington, D.C. 2011, p 159.

¹⁶⁰⁷ *Catechism of the Catholic Church*, 2nd, sec. 1827.

¹⁶⁰⁸ See: Scheeben Joseph Matthias,. *A manual of Catholic theology; based on Scheeben's "Dogmatik" Volume 1.* Wilhelm Joseph and Scannell Thomas, Kegan Paul Trench Trubner and Co. London 1908, p 116.

purely the work of the intellect. It can certainly be reduced to calculation and experiment, but if it aspires to be wisdom capable of directing man in the light of his first beginnings and his final ends, it must be “seasoned” with the “salt” of charity. Deeds without knowledge are blind, and knowledge without love is sterile. Indeed, “the individual who is animated by true charity labours skilfully to discover the causes of misery, to find the means to combat it, to overcome it resolutely”. Faced with the phenomena that lie before us, charity in truth requires first of all that we know and understand, acknowledging and respecting the specific competence of every level of knowledge. Charity is not an added extra, like an appendix to work already concluded in each of the various disciplines: it engages them in dialogue from the very beginning. The demands of love do not contradict those of reason. Human knowledge is insufficient and the conclusions of science cannot indicate by themselves the path towards integral human development. There is always a need to push further ahead: this is what is required by charity in truth. Going beyond, however, never means rescinding from the conclusions of reason, or contradicting its results. Intelligence and love are not in separate compartments: love is rich in intelligence and intelligence is full of love.¹⁶⁰⁹

In the face of the enormous problems surrounding human integral development, which almost make one yield to discouragement through troubles of daily life, only with the help of theological virtues, as individuals and as a community, to be able to trust in God, will be able to generate a new vision and muster new energy in the service of a truly integral humanism. The greatest service to development, then, is faith and hope that enkindles charity and takes its energy from truth, accepting both faith and hope as a lasting gift from God. Openness to God through prayer makes us open towards one’s brothers and sisters and towards an understanding of life as a joyful task to be accomplished in a spirit of solidarity. Human development requires attention to the spiritual life, faith with reason, a serious consideration of the experiences of trust in God, spiritual fellowship in Christ, reliance upon God’s providence and mercy, love and acceptance of others, justice and peace; this is essential if one wants a transformation of hearts of stone into a hearts of flesh¹⁶¹⁰. “The human soul bears a likeness to God in the spirituality of its substance¹⁶¹¹; and this is the principal point of similarity, from which all others spring. The soul is created a spirit on order to be like to God; its spirituality implies incorruptibility and immortality.”¹⁶¹²

“Faith is primarily a virtue of the intellect, though it also involves the will. The virtue of faith is established when, by consent of the will, the intellect receives supernatural knowledge of God that is dark and obscure but also certain.”¹⁶¹³ When something is grasped as good, it is grasped as something and as perfective or fulfilling of us in some way; such a judgement embed in it knowledge of the thing itself and of himself; it is in a way a practical judgement to find one particular human act is good for me¹⁶¹⁴.

¹⁶⁰⁹ Pope Benedict XVI., *Caritas in Veritate*- Encyclical Letter. 2009, 30.

¹⁶¹⁰ See: Ezekiel 36:26

¹⁶¹¹ Spiritual substance is the life giving principle of the body.

¹⁶¹² Scheeben Joseph Matthias., *A manual of Catholic theology; based on Scheeben’s “Dogmatik”* Volume 1. Wilhelm Joseph and Scannell Thomas, Kegan Paul Trench Trubner and Co. London 1908, p 392.

¹⁶¹³ Lombardo E Nicholas., *The Logic of Desire. Aquinas on Emotion*, The Catholic University of America Press, Washington, D.C. 2011, p 150.

¹⁶¹⁴ See: McInerny Ralph., *Aquinas on Human Action. A Theory of Practice*, Catholic University of America Press, Washington D.C. 2012, P 192.

5.1.4 Transcendent

Transcendent dimension of happiness of an individual denotes not only to the individual or the community in which he lives but to a domain above, the totality of everything, to God. When a person involves himself to the totality of the spacious perspective above visible realities, he has a wider effect than any other sphere of happiness¹⁶¹⁵. The transcendent happiness has a higher hemisphere in comparison with pleasure centered happiness or ego centered happiness or even charity centered happiness. In a transcendent domain, satisfaction which develops into happiness is above the principle of marginal utility; it lasts forever, it goes beyond climbing up further.

How transcendent develops in a person is explained by Pope Francis in his encyclical letter “Lumen Fidei” taking the example of Saint Augustine. According to Pope Francis in the life of Saint Augustine we find a significant example whereby reason, with its desire for truth and clarity, was integrated into the horizon of faith and thus gained new understanding. Augustine accepted the Greek philosophy of light, with its insistence on the importance of sight. His encounter with Neoplatonism introduced him to the paradigm of the light which, descending from on high to illumine all reality, is a symbol of God. Augustine thus came to appreciate God’s transcendence and discovered that all things have a certain transparency, that they can reflect God’s goodness. This realization liberated him from his earlier Manichaeism, which had led him to think that good and evil were in constant conflict, confused and intertwined. The realization that God is light provided Augustine with a new direction in life and enabled him to acknowledge his sinfulness and to turn towards the good. All the same, the decisive moment in Augustine’s journey of faith, was not in the vision of a God above and beyond this world, but in an experience of hearing. In the garden, he heard a voice telling him: take and read. He then took up the book containing the epistles of Saint Paul and started to read the thirteenth chapter of the Letter to the Romans. He began to understand a God who is able to speak to us, to come down to dwell in our midst and to accompany our journey through history, making him known. Augustin integrated the two perspectives of hearing and seeing, constantly guided by the revelation of God’s love in Jesus. Thus Augustine developed a philosophy of light capable of embracing both the reciprocity proper to the word and the freedom born of looking to the light. Just as the word calls for a free response, so the light finds a response in the image which reflects it. The light becomes the light of a word, because it is the light of a personal countenance, a light which, even as it enlightens us, calls us and seeks to be reflected on our face and to shine from within us. Yet our longing for the vision of the whole, as Augustine says, we will see and we will love, not because we will be able to possess all the light, which will always be inexhaustible, but because we will enter wholly into that light¹⁶¹⁶.

¹⁶¹⁵ See: Spitzer Robert,. Finding True Happiness. Satisfying Our Restless Hearts, Ignatius Press, San Francisco, 2015, p 69.

¹⁶¹⁶ See: Pope Francis,. Lumen Fidei- Encyclical Letter, 2013, 33.

5.1.4.1 Transcendent Search for Perfection

We can distinguish in human life three different degrees of life. The first is vegetative life, which performs the functions of nutrition, growth and propagation, which is common to all living beings including plants. Secondly, the sensitive life made up of the knowledge obtained through the sense and of the tendencies or appetites, which is common to all creatures. Thirdly, the intellectual or spiritual life consists in intellectual knowledge and volitions directed by the intellect. This level of life human being has in common with God and with angels; it is the highest order of life in human being, the object and the rule of the other vital functions.¹⁶¹⁷

There are normally five types of search for perfection. As the years go by an individual recognizes, that he does not know many things and he has not yet reached a perfect understanding of his life and about his existence in this world, and then he begins to seek meaning of his existence, more knowledge to understand the world. In this search for perfect truth he acknowledges that his knowledge is incomplete. This awareness deepens his search for perfect knowledge.

The power to be naturally connected to other human beings with strong empathy and emotional care, the interpersonal connections for a pursuit of human relation, and even the pursuit of his own betterment appears to have a sense of search for unconditional love. This search could be deepened in a person as he comes across dissatisfaction, imperfect contact with other human beings, and change of his mood, getting irritated and anger with people. He develops gradually a search for unconditional perfect love.

Human experience of negative feeling of guilt and positive feeling of nobility, sense of good and sense of evil, reflection of moral conscious and deprivation of morality, justice gained and justice denied manifest a sense search for justice. As he comes across the experience of violation of justice in the social justice system he thinks about perfect justice system, a striving for even more better social order, which is often almost impossible to be attained in this conditioned and imperfect world. As with the desire for perfect knowledge and perfect love, gradually develops a desire for perfect justice.

Musical composition of beauty by poets is a personified beauty wherein a better beauty than what a person is having in his garden or at his home is idolized into a beauty which could be always a little better; it includes for instance thoughts of a little better rose, a little finer painting, a little more sun shine. A poet seems to have an awareness of what is better beautiful and ideal. Rabindranath Tagore an Indian poet says “beauty is in the ideal of perfect harmony”. Experience of frustration, imperfect beauty, continuous desire to improve

¹⁶¹⁷ See: Scheeben Joseph Matthias, A manual of Catholic theology; based on Scheeben's "Dogmatik" Volume 1. Wilhelm Joseph and Scannell Thomas, Kegan Paul Trench Trubner and Co. London 1908, p 412.

himself and his environment, experience of tragedy and dissatisfaction with even more beautiful things reveal the ability of human mind to go beyond these limits, thus the human mind tries to discover perfect beauty.

Search for harmony with all human being and things, search for a suitable environment, search for transcendent joy, sense of emptiness and lack of peace create a feeling of yearning to be at home with the totality, and gradually he searches for a perfect home. Search for perfect truth, perfect love, perfect justice, perfect beauty and perfect home at its perfect possible level manifest search for transcendent happiness.

5.1.4.2 Physical and Intellectual Transcend

12th Standard girl Reha from Mariapura in India where I was Parish Priest lost her father just after completing her final examinations. She became extreme depressive. A kind of white foam continually came out of her mouth. She collapsed completely to the floor. I came to know about it after three weeks. Then I could understand the root cause of it; I just took the girl into my hand and said to her: “why are you afraid? I know you want to be a teacher. Do not worry I will take care of all the expenses.” These simple three sentences gave her a new energy. She got up and never become sick, and she is now a happy teacher who is already married. Transmission of my hope into her intellect turned her completely into physical and intellectual transcendent domain which lasts forever and goes beyond.

When I was a kid I got a squirrel, it was not at all friendly and the squirrel was not happy with me. I got angry with the squirrel, got a bucket full of cold water and just put the squirrel into cold water and whirled the water for some time. The squirrel was fighting for its life, then I got sympathy with it, I just stretched out my hand to the squirrel and lifted it out of water. Morally I did something which was not good but the squirrel believed that I rescued it out of death. This squirrel became extremely friendly with me. It always climbed up and down of my body. This transcend domain of the squirrel was going beyond until it was killed by an eagle.

5.1.4.3 Transcendent Spiritual Domain

Journalist Malcom Muggeridge writes about his encounter with a very simple Mother Teresa of Kolkata, whose actions with the poorest of the poor manifested what he called in his title “something beautiful of God”. He describes about the beauty of her action towards the poor, the beauty of her genuine love for them, and her beauty of seeing Jesus in them. Muggeridge tried to suggest that it did not make much difference amid the sea of poverty in India but the beauty of her conviction was glazing through her eyes, and her spiritual

discipline, a many sided prettiness which manifested her love for God animated the mind of Muggeridge with spiritual conversion¹⁶¹⁸.

A spiritual idea struck deep into the mind can incite an experience of positive energy which will manifest a special beauty that goes beyond, in the case of Mother Teresa, the idea of serving the poor incited her with a beauty which is above physical beauty. This idea of serving the poor in her capacity out of faith and spiritual depth fascinated her aesthetically and moved her spiritually into a spiritual transcendent domain.

I would say that there are five characteristics in her growth into spiritual transcendent domain. Firstly, she had knowledge about spiritual life, that as a religious person she had some knowledge about spiritual life and moral values, and she had the knowledge about existing poverty in the slams of India. Secondly, she found a new meaning in her life, that the purpose of her life is not to teach in the school but to serve people in the slams. This spiritual awareness was characterized with humility in knowing her limited resources, inner freedom in carrying out her conviction, her intuition of providence of God, creativity in founding a new society and joy in carrying out each service. Thirdly, she integrated and merged her idea and resource into her service. It became communal in service that is, she learned a new art of living suiting to the culture of the land, she developed a strong interpersonal relation with people and organizations, her heart reached out to all possibilities of service and her love for the mission was manifested through her words and acts. Fourthly she connected her conviction with her social and political environment. In her connecting to the environment she saw a new beauty of creation and a new strength in holding the value of human life. Fifthly, she attained a transcendent force that guided her beyond. This transcendent force gave her a cosmic energy in finding love as the essence of creation and tuned her love for human being with prayer and meditation. She found presence of God in her love for service. The innate spiritual motive was interrelated between these five elements.

5.1.4.4 Contemplative Prayer

The Gospel scene of Christ's transfiguration, in which the three Apostles Peter, James and John, who saw the face of Jesus shine like the sun¹⁶¹⁹, were fascinated by the beauty of the Redeemer, could be seen as an icon of Christian contemplation. To look upon the face of Christ, to recognize its mystery amid the daily events and the sufferings of human life, and then to grasp the divine splendour revealed in the Risen Lord is the task of every follower of Christ¹⁶²⁰. In contemplating Christ's face we become open to receiving a new experience ever anew the love of the Father and delighting in the joy of the Holy Spirit. "Beholding the

¹⁶¹⁸ See: Spitzer Robert,. Finding True Happiness. Satisfying Our Restless Hearts, Ignatius Press, San Francisco, 2015, p 135.

¹⁶¹⁹ Mathew 17:2.

¹⁶²⁰ Pope John Paul II,. Apostolic Letter Rosarium Virginis Mariae. 2002, 9.

glory of the Lord, we are being changed into his likeness, from one degree of glory to another; for this comes from the Lord who is the Spirit”¹⁶²¹

In order to supply a foundation and greater depth to meditation, it is helpful to follow a related Biblical passage, long or short, depending on the circumstances. No other words can ever match the efficacy of the inspired word. As we listen, we are certain that this is the word of God, spoken for today and spoken for me¹⁶²². “In solitude and silence, by listening to the word of God, participating in divine worship, personal asceticism, prayer, mortification and the communion of fraternal love, one directs the whole of life and all the activities to the contemplation of God”¹⁶²³.

According to the rules of modern historical science holy Bible do not present a complete biography of Jesus, nevertheless the evangelists have presented him on the basis of trust worthy testimonies which they gathered from the community of early Christians. Pope John Paul says: the contemplation of Christ's face cannot fail to be inspired by all that we are told about him in Sacred Scripture, which from beginning to end is permeated by his mystery, prefigured in a veiled way in the Old Testament and revealed fully in the New Testament, so that Saint Jerome can vigorously affirm ignorance of the Scriptures is ignorance of Christ¹⁶²⁴. “Contemplative prayer is a union with the prayer of Christ insofar as it makes us participate in his mystery”¹⁶²⁵.

5.2 Enabling into Happiness

Creating an appetite for perfect happiness and maintaining this created desire through the privations of pleasantness of life calls for healthy understanding of oneself, because perception, reason and desire control human action¹⁶²⁶. Human desire to perfection could face obstacles in the form of physical privations, moral privations¹⁶²⁷ and metaphysical privations. These are situations of commonly expected good being impeded from the completion of its suitable disposition. When we say that a person's disposition manifests his appetite, it is a claim that implicitly defines also evil in terms of appetite; in this way evil can be defined not only as a privation of goodness but also as a frustration of appetite, and the consequent disintegration of the person, insofar as evil blocks his appetite from attaining natural end.¹⁶²⁸

¹⁶²¹ 2Cor 3:18.

¹⁶²² Pope John Paul II., Apostolic Letter Rosarium Virginis Mariae. 2002, 30.

¹⁶²³ Pope John Paul II., Post Synodal Apostolic Exhortation Vita Consecrata.1996, 8.

¹⁶²⁴ Ibid., 17.

¹⁶²⁵ Catechism of the Catholic Church, 2nd, sec. 2718.

¹⁶²⁶ See: Aristotle., The Nicomachean Ethics. Trans by David Ross, Oxford University Press, New York, 2009, (1130a, 20), p 103.

¹⁶²⁷ See: ST, Part I, Q 43, Art 1 explains “since every nature desires its own being and its own perfection, it must be said that the being and the perfection of any nature is good. Hence it cannot be that evil signifies being, or any form of nature. Therefore it must be that by the name of evil is signified the absence of good”.

¹⁶²⁸ See: Lombardo E Nicholas., The Logic of Desire. Aquinas on Emotion, The Catholic University of America Press, Washington, D.C. 2011, p 30; See also ST, Part I, Q 49, Art 1.

Physical privations of goodness denote anything that causes physical harm to a person by preventing all-round development of his individual powers, which includes social conditions like poverty or disease and his own physical condition like physical injury and mental condition like anxiety or depression which may be congenital forms that prevents him from attaining a full comprehension of the environment of his life.

Moral privations denote a deviation of the preference of the person from the prescribed or generally accepted moral order and action of the will that results from that volition. `Deep within one's conscience discovers a person a law which he has not laid upon himself but which he must obey. Its voice, ever calling him to love and to do what is good and to avoid evil, for man has in his heart a law inscribed by God, a secret core and his sanctuary'¹⁶²⁹. The scope of moral order primarily includes influence of religion, involvement and knowledge of individual in welfare programme, and knowledge and respect of social justice.

Metaphysical privations denote limitations caused to an individual from the components of natural world like catastrophes or climate change that may be also understood as limitation by analogy, which prevents the individual from attaining his ideal perfection. "Metaphysical opposition between appetite and evil has implications for the moral reliability of appetite in human action, insofar as appetite by pointing the way to human nature's completion, also points the way to moral goodness"¹⁶³⁰.

5.2.1 Understanding Existential Emptiness

The experiences of desire exist in human being as a permanent operative nature; it is a kind of pursuit for fulfilment, and the continuous dearth of fulfilment may lead to loneliness and emptiness, as a consequence the individual will initiate personality traits of compulsive manifestation of a restless heart; the person experience a kind of existential emptiness if the downward momentum of lack of fulfilment is not complimented by the upward momentum of happiness derived out of fulfilment and contentment. This experience of emptiness is a universal human experience, which is not without cause or purpose, for through it God directs our attention towards a transcendent experience, towards Himself, that `we may have life, and have it abundantly.'¹⁶³¹ Unfulfilled desires cause a kind of emptiness, an void in the person, an emptiness about life which inevitably surfaces in the mind of the person, a kind of existential emptiness arising from self-conscious comprehension that he is fulfilling only part of himself, creating only part of his essence while neglecting the most important parts of his potential being; when this happens there may arise a guilt of throwing one's life away, a sense of great potential and destiny that one is ignoring or even destroying oneself, and this feeling of guilt causes the angst of beholding the tragedy of wasting life and oneself, that could be named as existential emptiness which refers to this complex sense of self alienation and self-negation. Individuals are called to create their own meaning and essence, not only through

¹⁶²⁹ Catechism of the Catholic Church, 2nd, sec. 1776.

¹⁶³⁰ Ibid.

¹⁶³¹ John 10,10.

their thoughts and beliefs, but also from their decisions and actions, and this is a kind of life's project towards realization of a higher transcendent joy;¹⁶³²

“When we try to stop doing something that has tremendous momentum inside our psyche, we find that after a short time the very psyche energy we were using to stop our momentum turns against us and starts fuelling the desire we want to suppress.”¹⁶³³ The presence of emptiness felt within oneself will normally be fought by the person by increasing the pursuit of pleasure centred and ego centred happiness, which will function as a cover or block to the feeling of emptiness. A constant emptiness developed into self-alienation and self-negation could take evasive actions of seeking increased altitudes of pleasure centred happiness even at the cause of damaging or risking one's own life in order to satisfy his cravings.

Dominant nature of intensively creased level of pleasure seeking creates a compulsive trait, which is an external expression of internal cosmic emptiness that could be named as restlessness or feeling of meaninglessness. Compulsive quest for pleasure centred or ego oriented happiness becomes self-destructive, for example more and more consumption of alcohol will lead to an intensive addiction to alcoholism, evidently that will cause malfunction of the physical body and destruction of his own health; the individual will continue consumption of more alcohol, and this quest performs as a concealment above the sense of emptiness; however the individual will have a justification for his action.

5.2.2 Resisting Passivity of Appetite

Created appetite towards an end does not move by itself, it is a kind of tendency and power of act towards a goal either by natural appetite or by sense appetite or by the appetite of the will that could be called as rational appetite. The genre of appetite will depend upon the source of desire, and it will also be distinguished by the knowledge or ignorance of the goal, from which has evolved the tendency of the person as a human act. Although the created appetite after being activated moves towards perfection, they depend upon their source appetite.

Some are inclined to good by their natural inclination, without knowledge, as plants and inanimate bodies. Such inclination towards good is called "a natural appetite." Others, again, are inclined towards good, but with some knowledge; not that they know the aspect of goodness, but that they apprehend some particular good; as in the sense, which knows the sweet, the white, and so on. The inclination which follows this apprehension is called "a sensitive appetite." Other things, again, have an inclination towards good, but with a knowledge whereby they perceive the aspect of goodness; this belongs to the intellect. This is most perfectly inclined towards what is good; not, indeed, as if it were merely guided by another towards some particular good only, like things devoid of knowledge, nor towards some particular good only, as things which have only sensitive knowledge, but as inclined towards good in general. Such inclination is termed "will."¹⁶³⁴

¹⁶³² See: Spitzer Robert,. Finding True Happiness. Satisfying Our Restless Hearts, Ignatius Press, San Francisco, 2015, p 81.

¹⁶³³ Ibid, p 82.

¹⁶³⁴ ST, Part I, Q 59, Art 1.

There is always a string of desires of species which could be defined in its relation to its objects towards which they incline because the object is foreseen as suitable end; the sort of knowledge about the object or the ignorance about the object brings in the salient feature of the appetite¹⁶³⁵.

Contra effect of pleasure will be experienced by the person when the created appetite signifies passivity, then the act is being acted upon him, is bound up in the tendency towards something not yet attained, that are unpleasant because they intrude against his tendencies and inclinations; in the passivity his desire shall have its fill of them¹⁶³⁶, then patience will play a prominent role in giving him again the power of right cognition.

5.2.3 Eliminating Cosmic Loneliness

An individual is interpersonal, that when he is not related to others, he feels like a segment of himself, the more he relates himself to others the deeper will be his experience of life; the relationship with others makes him alive, draw him into deeper experience of significance and purpose of life. This interpersonal personhood has two layers, which could be described as worldly, here a person relates himself to other persons, and a transcendent layer, which is a relationship with God; human existence is in a way conditioned by the need for both of these worldly and transcendent layers. Karl Rahner postulates some insight into this distinctive experience; he asserts that God creates us in relationship to Himself from the first moment of our existence.¹⁶³⁷ When one enters into this relationship with God he would feel himself normal or supernormal, however, if he ignores this relationship with the creator he would feel a cosmic loneliness.¹⁶³⁸

Relationship with God is fundamentally intimate which could be compared to the relationship with parents, the more we enter into it the better we feel, but if we ignore or avoid this relationship we feel an acute loneliness. As per the understanding of Karl Rahner no human relationship can substitute transcendent relationship with God, and continuing to ignore it makes the loneliness more acute, thereby a conscious desire of search for meaning of life increases.¹⁶³⁹

God do not want us to be in loneliness: `I will pray to the Father, and he will give you another Counsellor, to be with you for ever, the Spirit of truth, whom the world cannot receive, because it neither sees him nor knows him; you know him, for he dwells with you, and will be in you. I will not leave you desolate¹⁶⁴⁰; Jesus promises that his presence will

¹⁶³⁵ See: Lombardo E Nicholas,. *The Logic of Desire. Aquinas on Emotion*, The Catholic University of America Press, Washington, D.C. 2011, p 32.

¹⁶³⁶ See: Exodus 15,9.

¹⁶³⁷ See: Karl Rahner,. *Foundation of Christian Faith: An Introduction to the Idea of Christianity*. Trans. William V. Dych, New York, Crossroads, 1982, p 128.

¹⁶³⁸ Spitzer Robert,. *Finding True Happiness. Satisfying Our Restless Hearts*, Ignatius Press, San Francisco, 2015, p 120.

¹⁶³⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁶⁴⁰ John 14:16-18.

continue through the help of the Holy Spirit. God is present in our troubled situations, “God is our refuge and strength, a very present help in trouble.”¹⁶⁴¹ The love of God remains with us tenderly takes care of us and safeguards our needs; even when my father and my mother forsake me, the Lord will take me up.¹⁶⁴² “I am with you always, to the close of the age”¹⁶⁴³; as long as you desire God’s presence, He will never leave you alone. “Fear not, for I am with you, be not dismayed, for I am your God; I will strengthen you, I will help you, I will uphold you with my victorious right hand.”¹⁶⁴⁴ “In my distress I called upon the Lord; to my God I cried for help. From his temple he heard my voice, and my cry to him reached his ears.”¹⁶⁴⁵ “For the mountains may depart and the hills be removed, but my steadfast love shall not depart from you, and my covenant of peace shall not be removed, says the Lord, who has compassion on you.”¹⁶⁴⁶ “Be strong and of good courage, do not fear or be in dread of them: for it is the Lord your God who goes with you; he will not fail you or forsake you.”¹⁶⁴⁷ Augustine expresses the moment of cosmic loneliness in his prayer as follows:

Late have I loved you, Beauty so ancient and so new,
late have I loved you!
Lo, you were within, but I outside, seeking there for you,
and upon the shapely things you have made I rushed headlong misshapen.
You were with me, but I was not with you.
They held me back far from you,
those things which would have no being were they not in you.
You called, shouted, broke through my deafness;
you flared, blazed, banished my blindness;
you lavished your fragrance, I gasped; and now I pant for you;
I tasted you, and now I hunger and thirst;
you touched me, and I burned for your peace.¹⁶⁴⁸

In his autobiography Augustine describes that in his early life he had ignored the relationship with God, then he considered fulfilment of worldly desires will give him true happiness, and a feeling of loneliness within him then remained exposing imperfect nature of this happiness, however, with the help of faith and resting upon the love of God he realizes the beauty of happiness.

5.2.4 Sublime Relationship

Prayer is considered as a communion, the `living relationship of the children of God with their Father who is good beyond measure, with his Son Jesus Christ and with the Holy Spirit. The grace of the Kingdom is the union of the entire holy and royal Trinity with the

¹⁶⁴¹ Psalm 46,1.

¹⁶⁴² Psalm 27,10.

¹⁶⁴³ Mathew 28,20.

¹⁶⁴⁴ Isaiah 41,10.

¹⁶⁴⁵ Psalm 18,6.

¹⁶⁴⁶ Isaiah 54,10.

¹⁶⁴⁷ Deuteronomy 31:6

¹⁶⁴⁸ Augustine, Confessions. Trans. Chadwick Henry, Book X, Chapter 27, New York, Oxford University Press, 1991, p 296.

whole human spirit.¹⁶⁴⁹ St. John says, “He was in the world, and the world was made through him, yet the world knew him not ... but to all who received him, who believed in his name, he gave power to become children of God.”¹⁶⁵⁰ “And without faith it is impossible to please him. For whoever would draw near to God must believe that he exists and that he rewards those who seek him.”¹⁶⁵¹ “Behold I stand at the door and knock; if any one hears my voice and opens the door, I will come in to him and eat with him, and he with me.”¹⁶⁵² “I am the vine, you are the branches. He who abides in me, and I in him, he it is that bears much fruit, for apart from me you can do nothing.”¹⁶⁵³ “For I know the plans I have for you, says the LORD, plans for welfare and not for evil, to give you a future and a hope.”¹⁶⁵⁴ “Draw near to God and he will draw near to you. Cleanse your hands, you sinners, and purify your hearts, you men of double mind.”¹⁶⁵⁵ St. Paul says, stand therefore, having girded your loins with truth, and having put on the breastplate of righteousness, and having shod your feet with the equipment of the gospel of peace; besides all these, taking the shield of faith, with which you can quench all the flaming darts of the evil one. And take the helmet of salvation, and the sword of the Spirit, which is the word of God. Pray at all times in the Spirit, with all prayer and supplication¹⁶⁵⁶.

Sublime relationship with God happens only through prayer. I would say that one need to understand that there are five elements involved in prayer. Firstly Recognising God’s help, that is a person need the help of God to pray. “The Spirit helps us in our weakness; for we do not know how to pray as we ought, but the Spirit himself intercedes for us with sighs too deep for words.”¹⁶⁵⁷ Willingness of a person for a sublime relationship with God is supported by God. Secondly making a habit of prayer that means one need to regularly pray so that in him develops in the conscious mind and unconscious mind a habitual desire for prayer. In order to create a habit there is no other mechanism better than repetition of the act. Thirdly seeking the will of God, that is through the prayer one tries to discover what God wants but not what the person wants. However a person can bring in all the matters related to his life in the prayer, including his problem and joyful moments. This is a type communication, and this conversation with God deepens the relationship with God. Fourthly coping with difficulty in Prayer, that means the difficulties in prayer life has to be managed. The feeling of aridity in prayer needs to be supported by reading of Bible or other books for spiritual reflection. A faith with reason can float through any aridity in spiritual life. Fifthly finding a role model for personal prayer life, that is one need a life history and thought pattern of another person as a helping tool to strengthen his own prayer habits. Jesus is the perfect role model for prayer life. Personally I

¹⁶⁴⁹ Catechism of the Catholic Church, no: 2565.

¹⁶⁵⁰ John,1,10-12.

¹⁶⁵¹ Hebrews, 11,6.

¹⁶⁵² Revelation 3, 20.

¹⁶⁵³ John 15,5.

¹⁶⁵⁴ Jeremiah 29,11.

¹⁶⁵⁵ James 4,8.

¹⁶⁵⁶ See: Ephesians 6, 14-18.

¹⁶⁵⁷ Rom8:26.

try to imbibe energy from my role models Thomas Aquinas and Vincent de Paul. These five simple elements can guide an individual into sublime relationship with God.

5.3 Replacement Therapy

Replacement therapy involves in creating positive thinking. Three reasons that well-being should be taught are the great number of depression, the nominal increase in happiness over the last two generations, and greater well-being enhances learning and attitude; positive mood produces broader attention, more creative thinking, and more holistic thinking.¹⁶⁵⁸

Pope Johannes Paul in his encyclical letter “*Evangelium Vitae*” said about two types of forces in the world, one is a moral force of reason and another is legal force of reason.

...that there is no place in the world for anyone who, like the unborn or the dying, is a weak element in the social structure, or for anyone who appears completely at the mercy of others and radically dependent on them, and can only communicate through the silent language of a profound sharing of affection. In this case it is force which becomes the criterion for choice and action in interpersonal relations and in social life. But this is the exact opposite of what a State ruled by law, as a community in which the "reasons of force" are replaced by the "force of reason", historically intended to affirm.¹⁶⁵⁹

As a replacement therapy programme an individual need to analyse whether he is simply guided by force of reason or reasons of force. Force of reason is something like a finished product which merely executes the letter of the law. Here an individual need to understand that at various stages of his life he came across many rules and regulation and some of them knowingly or unknowingly became his personal conventional norms for his way of life. If his inner conventional norms simply act as force of reason, then he needs to analyse his way of life once again, that only a convergence of force with reason that means act guided and supported by reason can strategically transform the person, in other words, reasons of force can transform an individual to new horizon.

Replacement therapy worked very well for Paul who was on the way to Damascus and he “heard a voice saying to him, Saul, Saul, why do you persecute me? And he said, who are you, Lord? And he said, I am Jesus, whom you are persecuting; but rise and enter the city, and you will be told what you are to do.”¹⁶⁶⁰ He transformed and became great advocate of love, faith and kingdom of God. Paul commanded himself through transformation from the stage of super ego to the stage of charity and into transcendent experience. This therapy is similar to resiliency program; it involves assertiveness and decision making, prevents depression and anxiety, builds character strengths and meaning of life, and reduces negative emotion.¹⁶⁶¹

¹⁶⁵⁸ See: Seligman E.P. Martin,. *Flourish. A Visionary New Understanding of Happiness and Well-Being*, Atria Paperback, New York, 2011, p 80.

¹⁶⁵⁹ Pope John Paul II,. *Evangelium Vitae*, Encyclical Letter, 1995,9.

¹⁶⁶⁰ Acts:9,4-6.

¹⁶⁶¹ See: Seligman E.P. Martin,. *Flourish. A Visionary New Understanding of Happiness and Well-Being*, Atria Paperback, New York, 2011, p 81.

Paul transformed his fundamental attitude by changing his purpose of life, by changing what he looked in others and by changing what he saw in himself. Transformation of attitude has three elements, firstly, transformation at the objective of life, secondly renewing the comprehension about other human being, and thirdly understanding one's own limitations. One needs to reform his conscious on the basis of three dimensions in order to bring into effect replacement therapy in his way of life.

The notorious internet game "Blue Whale Challenge" which is created by Philipp Budeikin, a Russian national, a former psychology student who was expelled from his university, is being played now in several countries. The game allegedly consists of a series of tasks assigned to all its players during a period of fifty days, with the final challenge requiring the player to commit suicide. Many students in India in 2017 have committed suicide by following this game. This is a notorious example of how a programme or even a game can absolutely control a person and change him completely. Unfortunately "Blue Whale Challenge" is a negative and destructive one.

Listening to the story of Jesus and by reading Bible thousands of people over the years have changed their life positively beyond the materialistic perspective; trying to understand Jesus is one of the perfect ways for replacement therapy for a transcendent experience.

5.3.1 Strengthening Kinetic Force

It is well accepted that the releasing height of a pendulum will be the finishing height of the pendulum in curve provided the releasing speed is zero. It also considers that the kinetic energy possessed by the pendulum because of its movement gradually developed from the realising point is influenced by no other forces other than the weight of the pendulum ball and its velocity. If the releasing point in a curved line is equal to the finishing point in that curved line then there is no transcendent effect. Here the conversion of gravitational potential energy to kinetic energy (which is explained as $KE = \frac{1}{2}m v^2$, where $\frac{1}{2}m$ represents half of the mass of the object and v^2 is the square of its velocity) is remaining equal to the releasing point and finishing point. This finishing point of the gravitational potential energy could be higher due to two causes. Firstly if the releasing speed is more than zero then the finishing point will be higher than the releasing point in the curved line. Secondly if the velocity of the movement is increased by another force then the potential finishing point will be higher in the curved line.

I would say human mind has the potency to transcend beyond provided if we take into consideration the speed of releasing energy of the thought that is increasing the concentration and focusing on the theme and giving supportive force to the kinetic energy of the thought that is maintaining a repeated effort so as to create dispositions. It could be argued that, if intended, the releasing speed of a thought in human being could be more than zero because his thought is influenced by his knowledge and experience. However there could be a problem to the kinetic energy of the same thought, it could face many obstacles in the kinetic

movement because of his other occupations and engagement. But if he could either enable a free movement of kinetic energy of the thought or increase the force of kinetic energy then he will transcend his thought beyond.

When the kinetic energy increases it breaks though the normal rhythm of releasing point and finishing point in a curve diagram. When the thought moves further than zero point, say backward movement, it will discover a deeper insight regarding self in relation to the subject matter of the thought. In the same when the thought moves further than supposed finishing point due to increase in the kinetic energy, say upward movement, it will discover some more insight regarding the unknown self in relation to the subject matter of the thought. Thus to know myself and to know beyond myself I need to increase my kinetic energy.

5.3.2 Incompetent Nature of Unhappiness.

The first and second chapter of book of Genesis explains that God created everything good. "All things were made through him, and without him was not anything made that was made."¹⁶⁶² In essence everything is good, and it is often considered that goodness in physical, economic, social and environmental dimensions lead to happiness. I would say then we are a little hectic to attribute happiness to benefits of goodness und unhappiness to deprivation of those benefits or experience. Deprivation of a particular good cannot be considered as an entity, and unhappiness is not an entity.

Every art and every inquiry, and similarly every action and choice, is thought to aim at some good; but a certain difference is found among ends; some are activities, others are products apart from the activities that produce them.¹⁶⁶³ What is contrary to a desirable good is not an entity and cannot be attributed to unhappiness. All desirable things have a feature of an end. Oder of an end is like the order of efficient cause, the more universal an efficient cause is the more universal is the end towards which the efficient cause acts which is good. It is similar even in the case of central government and local governing body; central government looks at more universal things than the local governing body, although their affairs strive for good. There need to be a universal good to which we trace back all goods, and this universal good can only be the very thing that is first and universal efficient cause; and everything that is real needs to be a particular good and by reason of what exists cannot be contradictory to good, a privation is attributed to particular good or unhappiness.¹⁶⁶⁴

If unhappiness were a real thing, it would never be desired by anyone. It is not an entity which can move itself or activate someone because nothing acts or moves except because of the desire of an end which desired by a person. By existing itself chiefly has the nature of being desirable, and one perceive that everything by nature desire to conserve its

¹⁶⁶² John 1,3.

¹⁶⁶³ Aristotle., *The Nicomachean Ethics*. Trans by David Ross, Oxford University Press, New York, 2009, (1094a-1095), p 3.

¹⁶⁶⁴ See: Aquinas Thomas., *On Evil*. Translated by Regan Richard, Oxford University Press, 2003, p 58.

existence and avoid things destructive of its existing and resists them as far as possible. Unhappiness which is contrary to happiness is necessarily also contrary to existing, which cannot be a nature or an entity because it is contrary to existing itself.

Since one contrary is always imperfect in relation to another, as black in relation to white and bitter in relation to sweet, in this way happiness and unhappiness could be considered in relation with regard to contraries, because happiness has the nature of good and unhappiness has the nature of privation of good.¹⁶⁶⁵ Happiness has a nature of an end and unhappiness has the absence of that end, but the absence of due end cannot constitute a species or entity.

5.3.3 Knowing Unhappiness

State of unhappiness cannot have an intrinsic cause that means unhappiness is not caused by unhappiness. Because unhappiness is not an aim of human act but an accidental effect, it is not as such intended by the individual. Search for pleasure or joy or comfort is the intrinsic cause which resembles the effect of unhappiness; an individual becomes unhappy when he receives lesser quality of pleasure or joy or comfort that was sought after by him. Each intrinsic human act pertaining to pleasure or joy or comfort has an ordination to its fulfilment. The result of this ordination is happiness. But if the ordination is neglected unhappiness will be the accidental effect. Therefore search for pleasure is an accidental cause for unhappiness. In other words the first cause of unhappiness is desire for pleasure although it could also be noted that morally a lesser good human act can also cause unhappiness¹⁶⁶⁶.

It must be said that every evil in some way has a cause. For, evil is the absence of the good, which is natural and due to a thing. But that anything fail from its natural and due disposition can come only from some cause drawing it out of its proper disposition. For a heavy thing is not moved upwards except by some impelling force; nor does an agent fail in its action except from some impediment. But only good can be a cause; because nothing can be a cause except inasmuch as it is a being, and every being, as such, is good¹⁶⁶⁷.

Unhappiness seen as something not good does not exist as an entity. Nobody desires unhappiness but happiness. Happiness is sometimes seen as the greatest extension of well-being, which is a human imagination of absoluteness. `When a desirable end is foreseen by an individual, the individual finds a means ordained for the desired end; the means ordained for the end from the very fact that they are ordained for the end, gain the nature of good´.¹⁶⁶⁸ As the means taken by the individual has the ordination to happiness, it has the nature of happiness. Accurate vision of happiness with proper perfection or a potentiality for perfection avoids unhappiness. `Present inclinations of the cause produce its effect´¹⁶⁶⁹.

¹⁶⁶⁵ See: ST part I, Q 48, Art.1 ad1.

¹⁶⁶⁶ Aquinas Thomas,. On Evil. Translated by Regan Richard, Oxford University Press, 2003, p 71-72.

¹⁶⁶⁷ ST part I, Q49, Art.1.

¹⁶⁶⁸ Aquinas Thomas,. On Evil. Translated by Regan Richard, Oxford University Press, 2003, p 71-72.

¹⁶⁶⁹ Ibid,. P 486.

5.4 Virtue and Happiness

Understanding of human act is intrinsically normative then the norms and conventions for human life are built upon concept of ethics which have attributes of goodness as objective. Those ethics of goodness are socially embedded moral acts. Moral life is made up of moral acts because of the character of the constitutive acts. When someone leads a good or bad life, we have in mind more than a single act. However only human acts, not acts of a man, make up one's moral life,¹⁶⁷⁰ which are understood and justified in believing flourishing human life includes not only economical and physical prosperity but also participation in social life. Social life in India, social life in Germany and social life in Africa do have considerable differences because they grew up in different cultural traditions, and they express social interactions of distinctive social experience. Specifications of moral guidelines have been spread around the world through religious teachings and education as a persuasive effect on building up a global moral perspective. As a result a general normative ideal of human ethical or virtuous act was conventionally formed in order to qualify the wellbeing and happiness of people. Age old normative ideal of well-being includes all components related to human life including health, security, work atmosphere, economy, family life and standard of social life.

Concept of happiness takes a central position in Summa Theology and this idea is specifically projecting in Aquinas's explanation of moral life. Along his guidelines of teleological account of natural law, although they are complicated at times to comprehend, they reflect two dimensions of human life that is human life as an existing human being and human reason as a distinct character, and they also bring out two distinct moral reflections ethic of virtue and ethic of law. Law is comprised of concrete duties established by an authority that are necessary for maintaining social order and resolving disputes, as well as for maintaining peace and harmony and for distributing social resources according to what people need or deserve. Ethics of law hold accountability for collective responsibility that prevent harms and argues for participatory intentions in order to serve as the basis for legitimate duty as objects of accountability.

Since true peace is only about good things, as the true good is possessed in two ways, perfectly and imperfectly, so there is a twofold true peace. One is perfect peace. It consists in the perfect enjoyment of the sovereign good, and unites all one's desires by giving them rest in one object. This is the last end of the rational creature, according to Psalm 147:3: "Who hath placed peace in thy borders." The other is imperfect peace, which may be had in this world, for though the chief movement of the soul finds rest in God, yet there are certain things within and without which disturb the peace.¹⁶⁷¹

Aquinas's meta-ethical thought of virtue and happiness involves a merger of Aristotelian eudemonism and Christian theology. He thinks that an act is good or bad depending on whether it contributes or deters a person from attaining goal of human act. Here goal is Eudaimonia or happiness; it is understood as a state of perfection. Obtaining happiness

¹⁶⁷⁰ See: McInerney Ralph,. Aquinas on Human Action. A Theory of Practice, Catholic University of America Press, Washington D.C. 2012, P9-10.

¹⁶⁷¹ ST part II-II, Q29, Art.2 ad 4.

requires a range of intellectual and moral virtues that motivates a person to seek perfect happiness. However final happiness consists in beatitude which lies beyond what a natural human capacity can achieve. Virtue is understood as a helping quality to enable a person to redeem himself from the diminishing stains of sin¹⁶⁷² and gradually transform his nature open to the grace of God and transcend to participate in the divine beatitude.

Acts of the will results in joy only when they attain their desired object; acts of charity however always attain their desired object, because the virtue of charity implies the presence of God in the soul through sanctifying grace and thus acts of charity always attain their proper end of God, that is to say acts of charity always produce joy even if imperfectly in our present condition.¹⁶⁷³ “So we know and believe the love God has for us. God is love, and he who abides in love abides in God, and God abides in him.”¹⁶⁷⁴

“We must examine the nature of actions namely how we ought to do them, for these determine also the nature of the states of character that are produced.”¹⁶⁷⁵ A person approaches the happy end through rectifying his conduct by works of virtue, because when a man begins to make progress in the acts of the virtues, it is to be hoped that he will arrive at perfection. It could be observed that beatitude consists in one of three levels: for some have ascribed it to a sensual life, some, to an active life, and some, to a contemplative life. These three levels of happiness stand in different relations to future beatitude, by hoping for which we are said to be happy; because sensual happiness, being false and contrary to reason, is an obstacle to future beatitude; while happiness of the active life is a disposition of future beatitude; and contemplative happiness, if perfect, is the very essence of future beatitude, and if imperfect, is a beginning of it¹⁶⁷⁶.

And so Our Lord, in the first place, indicated certain beatitudes as removing the obstacle of sensual happiness. For a life of pleasure consists of two things. First, in the affluence of external goods, whether riches or honours; from which man is withdrawn--by a virtue so that he uses them in moderation--and by a gift, in a more excellent way, so that he despises them altogether. Hence the first beatitude is: "*Blessed are the poor in spirit,*" which may refer either to the contempt of riches, or to the contempt of honours, which results from humility. Secondly, the sensual life consists in following the bent of one's passions, whether irascible or concupiscible. From following the irascible passions man is withdrawn--by a virtue, so that they are kept within the bounds appointed by the ruling of reason--and by a gift, in a more excellent manner, so that man, according to God's will, is altogether undisturbed by them: hence the second beatitude is: "*Blessed are the meek.*" From following the concupiscible passions, man is withdrawn--by a virtue, so that man uses these passions in moderation--and by gift, so that, if necessary, he casts them aside altogether; nay more, so that, if need be, he makes a deliberate choice of sorrow [Cf. I-II:35:3]; hence the third beatitude is: "*Blessed are they that mourn.*" Active life consists chiefly in man's relations with his neighbour, either by way of duty or by way of spontaneous

¹⁶⁷² ‘In mortal sin a person turns away from God as his last end and seeks felicity in another end, whereas in venial sin a person only loses sight of God, the last end. Then he walks outside the road but not in opposite direction’. Scheeben Joseph Matthias,. A manual of Catholic theology; based on Scheeben’s “Dogmatik” Volume 2. Wilhelm Joseph and Scannell Thomas, Kegan Paul Trench Trubner and Co. London 1908, p 7.

¹⁶⁷³ See: Lombardo E Nicholas,. The Logic of Desire. Aquinas on Emotion, The Catholic University of America Press, Washington, D.C. 2011, p 165; See ST part I-II, Q70, Art.3.

¹⁶⁷⁴ 1 John 4,16.

¹⁶⁷⁵ Aristotle,. The Nicomachean Ethics. Trans by David Ross, Oxford University Press, New York, 2009, (1103b, 29-31), p 24

¹⁶⁷⁶ See: ST part I-II, Q69, Art.2&3.

gratuity. To the former we are disposed--by a virtue, so that we do not refuse to do our duty to our neighbour, which pertains to justice--and by a gift, so that we do the same much more heartily, by accomplishing works of justice with an ardent desire, even as a hungry and thirsty man eats and drinks with eager appetite. Hence the fourth beatitude is: "*Blessed are they that hunger and thirst after justice.*" With regard to spontaneous favours we are perfected--by a virtue, so that we give where reason dictates we should give, e.g. to our friends or others united to us; which pertains to the virtue of liberality--and by a gift, so that, through reverence for God, we consider only the needs of those on whom we bestow our gratuitous bounty: hence it is written (Luke 14:12-13): "When thou makes a dinner or supper, call not thy friends, nor thy brethren," etc. . . "But . . . call the poor, the maimed," etc.; which, properly, is to have mercy: hence the fifth beatitude is: "*Blessed are the merciful.*" Those things which concern the contemplative life are either final beatitude itself or some beginning thereof: wherefore they are included in the beatitudes, not as merits, but as rewards. Yet the effects of the active life, which dispose man for the contemplative life, are included in the beatitudes. Now the effect of the active life, as regards those virtues and gifts whereby man is perfected in himself, is the cleansing of man's heart, so that it is not defiled by the passions: hence the sixth beatitude is: "*Blessed are the clean of heart.*" But as regards the virtues and gifts whereby man is perfected in relation to his neighbour, the effect of the active life is peace, according to Isaiah 32:17: "The work of justice shall be peace": hence the seventh beatitude is "*Blessed are the peacemakers.*" . . .The eighth beatitude is a confirmation and declaration of all those that precede. Because from the very fact that a man is confirmed in poverty of spirit, meekness, and the rest, it follows that no persecution will induce him to renounce them. Hence the eighth beatitude corresponds, in a way, to all the preceding seven.¹⁶⁷⁷

According to Aquinas the acts of the virtues and gifts which belong to the active life are indicated in the merits, but the acts of the virtue and gifts connecting to the contemplative life are indicated in the rewards. Because to see God corresponds to the gift of understanding and to be like God by being adoptive children of God corresponds to the gift of wisdom. In things pertaining to the active life, knowledge is not sought for its own sake but for the sake of operation. Since beatitude implies something ultimate, it do not include the acts of those gifts which direct man in the active life as are elicited by those gifts for example to counsel is the act of counsel and to judge the act of knowledge, but on the other hand, they include those operative acts of which the gifts have the direction like mourning in respect of knowledge and mercy in respect of counsel. In this way all the first five beatitudes may be assigned to knowledge and counsel as to their directing principles. All the beatitudes mentioned in Bible could be related either as to the merits or as to the rewards because they all belong either to the active life or to the contemplative life.¹⁶⁷⁸

5.4.1 Wellbeing and Happiness

The term wellbeing and happiness are intrinsically different although many use these terms as synonyms. A single complete definition for the term happiness is understandably a difficult task. People often mistake definitions of happiness with what causes happiness, like having good job, having wealth and having good friends. These are probable instrumental causes that lead a person to happiness but not necessarily. Happiness could be seen as a state of mind, a sense of tranquillity, a state of bliss, a positive emotional condition, a feeling of satisfaction and an enjoyment of reaching your goal. Often it is easy to say what is not happiness rather than what happiness is, and a single element that one takes as happiness would later be discovered that this element is just one of the aspects of the broader meaning of

¹⁶⁷⁷ ST part I-II, Q69, Art.3.

¹⁶⁷⁸ Ibid.

happiness, however happiness is certainly against anxiety and depression. It is commonly understood that `no one would call a person happy who is leading a life of suffering and misfortune unless he were maintaining a thesis¹⁶⁷⁹.

The concept of wellbeing is a value which considers the things that are beneficial to life and things or circumstances that flourishes a person and facilitates a subjective welfare. Thoughts of wellbeing are being influenced by cultural, economic and educational backgrounds. For instance the concept of wellbeing in Asian countries will be different from that of Germany, while the whole concept of wellbeing in Asian countries depends on financial stability, because the economic standard of life in Asian countries is much below than Germany. The concept of wellbeing of a mountain climber who is climbing Everest is certainly different from a person who sits at home and watches television. Some find wellbeing in achieving goals or things and some find wellbeing in enjoying things in their life. Wellbeing involves value judgment, feeling of security, autonomy of life and good relationship.

As we learn issues of human rights violation and news about concerns of social justice being deprived, a thought of wellbeing and its relevant moral reflection would surely arise. `The pervasive potentialities and limitations of human existence provide the conditions within which morality is meaningful, and this wellbeing morality provide a necessary context for formulating substantive norms of non-maleficence and beneficence¹⁶⁸⁰. Prohibitions about harm and instilling promotion of doing good are fundamental to the wellbeing moral concept. An understanding of wellbeing on this line provides one some guidance in order to assume moral responsibility and motivate him to bring into practice in his social relations.

The last end of human life is more than just wellbeing; the last end of human being is happiness, perfection in its fullest possible development. When a person acts for himself for an end, he knows what he is doing and he knows the end but when he is being directed by another force or being led by another he may not know the end, then he is under compulsion and it is not necessary that he understands comprehensively the end.¹⁶⁸¹ Object of the will is the end and each person desires and does everything on account of this last end¹⁶⁸²; all human beings have this end in so far as each person desires for the perfection.¹⁶⁸³ `Aptitude, motivation and optimism determine the progress of an individual in challenging situation.¹⁶⁸⁴ God is the last end of human being, however each person desires and pursues the perfection in

¹⁶⁷⁹ Aristotle, *The Nicomachean Ethics*. Trans by David Ross, Oxford University Press, New York, 2009, (1096a, 1-3), p 7.

¹⁶⁸⁰ Porter Jean, *Nature and Reason. A Thomistic Theory of the Natural Law*, William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, Cambridge, U.K, 2005, p146.

¹⁶⁸¹ See: ST part I-II, Q 1, Art.2.

¹⁶⁸² See: ST part I-II, Q 1, Art.6.

¹⁶⁸³ See: ST part I-II, Q 1, Art.7.

¹⁶⁸⁴ Seligman E.P. Martin, *Learned Optimism. How to Change Your Mind and Your Life*, Vintage Books, New York, 2006, p 101.

a distinctive way, through deliberate actions, by knowing and loving God and happiness means acquisition of the last end.¹⁶⁸⁵

The term happiness is understood as the ultimate perfection of a rational nature, it is something that is desired just as everything naturally desires its perfection. According to Aquinas the final end of human life can only be vision of God, attained through contemplation. The beatific vision meets the criteria for this perfect happiness, which is completely satisfying. Aquinas does not argue that man has two ends, the one natural and the other supernatural; rather he speaks of a single end that is twofold which is realized at both a natural and a supernatural level, which is described as imperfect and perfect beatitude respectively¹⁶⁸⁶. Considered from the perspective of human state of attainment happiness is something created, existing in him, and it is a kind of operation insofar as the happiness of the person is a supreme perfection, which is the ultimate end of human act.¹⁶⁸⁷

Terrestrial form of wellbeing is connected to natural law and normative ideals; they are proximate origin for natural law. Terrestrial wellbeing understood in its natural and graced forms are equivalent to practice of virtues, and precepts stem from virtues. Virtues in turn are dispositions perfecting our capacities for knowledge and love, necessary to sustaining human life.¹⁶⁸⁸

5.4.2 Practice of Virtue

Moral virtues are habits or dispositions of the human capacities for intellectual activity, judgment and desire through which the human person is disposed to act in good and appropriate ways, and disposed to avoid vicious kinds of actions that deter the harmony of the society and disown positive perspective.¹⁶⁸⁹ The good dispositions or habits increase capacity for knowledge or desire and give determination to human act and enable the person to lead a virtuous life. However it should be noted that the dispositions of a person with regard to his nature can be well-disposed or ill-disposed, and every disposition has three significant characters namely: a distinct efficiency related to his potentiality to act, a distinct capability of determining in several ways what to be done and what should be avoided, and this disposition which is more than a simple quality orients the person through operations of human act to his potentiality.¹⁶⁹⁰ Virtues are operative habits oriented towards producing good kind of actions. `Virtue is a good quality of the mind, by which we live righteously, of which no one can make bad use, which God brings about in us, and without us in case of infused virtues which have

¹⁶⁸⁵ See: ST part I-II, Q 1, Art.8. Aquinas remarks, that imperfect happiness consist primarily in the operation of the speculative intellect, and secondly in the operation of the practical intellect.

¹⁶⁸⁶ See: Porter Jean,. *Nature and Reason. A Thomistic Theory of the Natural Law*, William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, Cambridge, U.K, 2005, p158.

¹⁶⁸⁷ See: ST part I-II, Q 3, Art.1&2.

¹⁶⁸⁸ Porter Jean,. *Nature and Reason. A Thomistic Theory of the Natural Law*, William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, Cambridge, U.K, 2005, p162-163.

¹⁶⁸⁹ See: ST part I-II, Q 55, Art.1.

¹⁶⁹⁰ See: ST part I-II, Q 49, Art.4.

union with God as their direct or indirect aim.¹⁶⁹¹ Whereas acquired virtues are directed towards the attainment of the human good as discerned by reason and can be attained by human action.

The distinction between perfect and imperfect happiness in human life leads to twofold virtues: the natural virtues and the theological virtues. Natural virtues are virtues that pertain to the happiness of this life which is proportionate to human physical nature and related to sensitive appetite. Natural virtues could be further divided into moral virtues and intellectual virtues. The intellectual virtues guide an individual in perfecting the intellect in thought pattern and they confer an appropriate idea for good works of the intellect which enable the individual in developing a perfect intellectual disposition to the search for truth. The moral virtues are operative habits that format an individual in repetition of those virtues to instil perfect dispositions for carrying out various powers concerned with human appetites; it includes also rational appetite because the faculty of will confers upon them suitability for the right use of those appetites in its operation so as to train the individual in accepting good things, rejecting things that are not worthy to life or avoiding unnecessary things.

Excellence of an individual could be increased in two ways: by applying rational rule and principle to the habitual subordination of the senses and tendencies, it will lead to moral virtue; secondly in the exercise of reason in search for contemplation of truth, it will lead to intellectual virtue. Practice of moral virtue and intellectual virtue are mandatory for improving the spiritual excellence of an individual, and an improved stabilized moral and intellectual virtue will lead a person to the path of happiness.

The two specific sensitive appetites the concupiscent power and the irascible power are guided and controlled by four special natural virtues also known as cardinal virtues namely prudence, justice, courage and temperance, which have in a board sense different functions in relation to human action. Concupiscible power and irascible power support one another. The object of the concupiscible power is apprehending sensible good or evil, which causes pleasure or pain. A person might of necessity, experience difficulty or struggle at times, in acquiring those good or in avoiding those evil; therefore this very good or evil, inasmuch as it is of an arduous or difficult nature, is the object of the irascible faculty. Therefore whatever passions which apprehends good or evil absolutely, belong to the concupiscible power; for instance, joy of celebrating birthday, sorrow at a funeral, love for partner, hatred for terrorism, and such like; whereas those passions which regard good or bad as arduous, that is, being difficult to obtain or avoid, belong to the irascible faculty; such as daring, fear, hope and the like.¹⁶⁹²

Each virtue is connected with other virtues and other powers, but they are primarily associated with one specific power of the soul that is to say, prudence perfects the intellect,

¹⁶⁹¹ Porter Jean,. *Nature and Reason. A Thomistic Theory of the Natural Law*, William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, Cambridge, U.K, 2005, p165.

¹⁶⁹² See: ST part I-II, Q 23, Art.1.

justice perfects the will, fortitude perfects the irascible passions and temperance perfects the concupiscible passions; virtues are not categories of external behaviour, they are convenient ways to talk about the perfection of particular aspect of a person.¹⁶⁹³ Thanks to prudence, practical reason issues the command on which use follows, it may be well to schematize the interplay of mind and appetite of the complete human action including, synderesis, will's natural desire of end, counsel, choice, command and use.¹⁶⁹⁴

Prudence is an intellectual virtue because it takes up the role keeping in focus the goal of truth with regard to the action that is being carried out. Prudence does not determine the ultimate end of human striving, which is implicit in the structure of human nature, but rather determines the proper means to that end.¹⁶⁹⁵ Concupiscent appetite apprehends what is suitable and what is harmful, and the virtue temperance inclines an individual to what is good and keeps away from what is not fitting or harmful. Temperance is developed with the help of prudence. Those who lack temperance will not be able to get away from vices rather they are involved in vices even though such individuals might sometimes show signs of other virtues. Temperance and prudence function hand in hand; they are complimentary to each other. The virtue courage helps irascible appetite; it functions like temperance for the perfection of goodness of individual, whereas justice perfects the good of other persons in relation to the individual who practices it. Virtue of justice is "habitus by which some one renders to each his due with a constant and perpetual will."¹⁶⁹⁶ Fortitude puts the rule of reason into passion that otherwise might draw away from what reason dictates through fear of danger of hardships.¹⁶⁹⁷

Theological virtues pertain to the beatitudo that is not proportionate to human physical nature; it is proportionate to spiritual life, the supernatural goodness of life with God. Spiritual life of a person could be diminished due to lack of devotion, and lack of devotion results from spiritual apathy.¹⁶⁹⁸ Beatitudo is not foreign to natural happiness; it is a kind of surpassing perfection of natural happiness. The effort of human being in practicing theological virtues faith, hope and love is helped by the grace of God, which could also be infused virtue. Even the natural virtues are being helped by the grace of God, which could also be infused. However the specific role of the will in the execution of the moral, intellectual and theological virtue, emphasis the fact that in order to strengthen the virtues an individual need to put a lot of his own effort to make them a habit. In a broad sense I would say that all virtues are in a way infused in all human being, but without human effort one cannot discover them, and without

¹⁶⁹³ See: Lombardo E Nicholas,. *The Logic of Desire. Aquinas on Emotion*, The Catholic University of America Press, Washington, D.C. 2011, p 170.

¹⁶⁹⁴ See: McInerney Ralph,. *Aquinas on Human Action. A Theory of Practice*, Catholic University of America Press, Washington D.C. 2012, P 153.

¹⁶⁹⁵ See: ST part II-II, Q 47, Art.6.

¹⁶⁹⁶ ST part II-II, Q 58, Art.1.

¹⁶⁹⁷ See: Lombardo E Nicholas,. *The Logic of Desire. Aquinas on Emotion*, The Catholic University of America Press, Washington, D.C. 2011, p 178. See also ST part I-II, Q 61, Art.2.

¹⁶⁹⁸ See: Aquinas Thomas,. *On Evil*. Translated by Regan Richard, Oxford University Press, 2003, p 364.

discovering them one cannot strengthen them, and without strengthening them one cannot make it a habit against evil.

5.4.3 Active Use of Faculties

After learning to walk, you are expected to walk regularly; by walking regularly you will strengthen your muscles and knee. Suppose if you do not walk for a year, due to lack of exercise, the muscles in your leg would shrink out and you will develop stiffness in your knee. Stretching, walking and strengthening exercise help to improve the flexibility, strength and stability of the knee and leg.

The virtue for a person is an active use or exercise of those faculties which are distinctively related to human act; it is the powers of mind and will, distinct from the lower faculties of feeling. In a broad sense virtue is of two kinds: intellectual and moral¹⁶⁹⁹. Virtue begins in the intellect and develops through reasoning in the mind and is being carried out in the operation of the act. It is exercise of reason in respect for search of truth. Whereas moral virtue grows up as a result of disposition or habit; it could also be a learned virtue through education, in that case it is a disposition through education, which could be self-training and self-formation. “A composer can have all the talent of a Mozart and a passionate desire to succeed, but if he believes he cannot compose music, he will come to nothing.”¹⁷⁰⁰ “The part which is essentially rational is perfected by the intellectual virtues. But the irrational part, which participates in rationality, is perfected by the moral virtues.”¹⁷⁰¹ Therefore it could be said the moral virtues do not develop in a person by his very nature. It is habitual subordination of the senses and tendencies to rational principle; when the action becomes a habit rational faculty collaborates with senses and tendencies.

We should consider that nothing prevents a person from being particularly good, something that is general end of many people. Charity for example is a particular virtue, since it is first and chiefly love of the divine good and secondly love of one’s neighbour’s good, and such good is the end of all or many other goods. Therefore an act of special virtue, for example chastity, can be loveable and pleasurable in two ways: the act of the divine virtue and this belong to this virtue namely chastity, secondly the act is ordained for the divine good, and it belongs to charity. And to be saddened over a special virtue that has been practiced upon being found as a special good that is interior and divine good, causes spiritual apathy to the person.¹⁷⁰²

The existence of a virtue in a person needs to be practiced by the person if it is to be attributed to the person. Before a virtue is being practiced it exists in a person as idea or

¹⁶⁹⁹ See Aristotle, *The Nicomachean Ethics*. Trans by David Ross, Oxford University Press, New York, 2009, p 22.

¹⁷⁰⁰ Seligman E.P. Martin, *Learned Optimism. How to Change Your Mind and Your Life*, Vintage Books, New York, 2006, p 101.

¹⁷⁰¹ Aquinas Thomas, *Commentary on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics*. Trans. By C.I. Litzinger, Dumb Ox Books, Notre Dame, Indiana 1964, p 355.

¹⁷⁰² See: Aquinas Thomas, *On Evil*. Translated by Regan Richard, Oxford University Press, 2003, p 365.

knowledge. The processes of converting the idea into practice deepen the disposition of the virtue. The idea or knowledge can be called a virtue only in its practice. When the idea is executed we come to know how well the idea is being practiced; if the corresponding idea in its practice is good then it is a virtue. This is a stable disposition of a human capacity for knowledge or desire through which the capacity is given sufficient determination to be exercised through some action.¹⁷⁰³

A virtuous living leads to happiness, that is to say virtues are instrumental means to the attainment of happiness and attaining some of the feelings of wellness necessary to lead a happy life. Virtues are normally exercised in and through the pursuit of discrete good, and therefore they cannot be understood without some reference to these good; it should be understood as one attains terrestrial happiness with the practice of virtues; one might even consider that these foreseen goods are means toward the practice of virtue.¹⁷⁰⁴

It is the practice of virtue that holds happiness at times of loss or deprivation of some particular good; concept of happiness and deprivation are not strictly correlative because happiness remains in the perfection of virtue rather than in the possession of something. Happiness consists in the practice of virtues because it calls for a life oriented towards development and appropriate use of one's active powers. The objective or subjective orientation of a person that provides motivation for operation of a capacity is presupposed by the determination of habits based on perfection. The perfection of the capacity brought about by the practice of virtue should be competently a perfection of a capacity which is oriented towards happiness, otherwise it would not be considered as perfection of action but as destruction of the well-being of the person.

5.4.4 Mean of Human Act

Regular practice of an idea creates a habit and gradually it becomes a virtue. Too much of the practice of the idea would make it excess and rare practice of the idea would cause defect. Practice of the idea between excess and defect is the mean of the idea, and virtue stays in the mean of the idea. Practice of the act in excess or defect brings direct corresponding consequences "as we see in the case of strength and of health, exercise either excessive or defective destroys the strength, and similarly drink or food which is above or below a certain amount destroys the health".¹⁷⁰⁵ The mean is relative indicating that one person's mean may be another person's extreme.

Moral virtue derives goodness from the rule of reason, while its matter consists in passions or operations. If therefore we compare moral virtue to reason, then, if we look at that which it has of reason, it holds the position of one extreme, viz. conformity; while excess and defect take the position of the other extreme, viz. deformity. But if we consider moral virtue in respect of its matter, then it

¹⁷⁰³ See: ST part I-II, Q 49, Art.3 ad 4.

¹⁷⁰⁴ See: Porter Jean, Nature and Reason. A Thomistic Theory of the Natural Law, William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, Cambridge, U.K, 2005, p 164-166

¹⁷⁰⁵ Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics. Trans by David Ross, Oxford University Press, New York, 2009, (1104a, 12-15), p 25

holds the position of mean, in so far as it makes the passion conform to the rule of reason. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 6) that "virtue, as to its essence, is a mean state," in so far as the rule of virtue is imposed on its proper matter: "but it is an extreme in reference to the 'best' and the 'excellent,'" viz. as to its conformity with reason.¹⁷⁰⁶

Aquinas considers that each of the moral virtues is a mean between excess and defect. Thus courage is a mean between cowardice and rashness, and liberality is a mean between stinginess and prodigality. Excess or defect form of the subject matter related to a moral virtue could be attributed to extreme nature of deformity, whereas moral act has to take a form of conformity rather than deformity, that means moral virtue confirm to the reason of goodness in its operation.

Moral virtue is connected to religious ethics. A person who believes in Jesus Christ connects his virtue to the teachings of Jesus Christ. He will have a subjective understanding of the virtue and an objective effect of the virtue in his action. This subjective understanding of the virtue is a kind of personal prayer, personal reflection, and a type of contemplation. Objective effect of the virtue is the way he brings out the idea of virtuous act in his social relations. If his personal prayer and personal reflection diminishes but he gives too much importance to the aspect of the virtue in social relations, it will result in excess of the virtue. If he gives a lot of care in his personal prayer and personal reflection but he gives not much attention to the aspect of social relation of the virtue, then it will result in defect of the virtue. A virtue can transform the person into happiness when he strikes a balance between excess and defect.

5.5 Contemplation

Moral virtue can refine a person and instil sustainable changes through formation of habit in doing good works. Each virtue is based on an idea which is either discovered or learned by the person, that is to say, every virtue has tremendous relation to intellectual comprehension of the idea and it is being executed in virtuous human act. Virtue is a disposition of a habit of good action that is subject to the rule of human reason and will. Taking this into consideration, the highest good of a person cannot exist in the virtues that are being carried out as a human act, because they are external expression of internal decisions evolved out of intellectual analysis. The highest good consists in the theoretical inquiry of the idea which is least dependent on externals; it exists in the contemplation of truth, the intuitive reasoning of intellect. This highest activity of human capacity can guide a person to happiness.

When we consider happiness is related to virtue, it is reasonable that this virtue should be in a highest virtue because we want the best happiness. This virtue need to be a force which guides our natural human act with a consideration to the divine perspective, whether it be thinking of God or searching the presence of God in and around us; this continuous

¹⁷⁰⁶ ST part I-II, Q 64, Art.1 ad1.

activity of the mind wherein the object of reason is searching the most perfect truth is contemplation. This virtuous activity of gaining knowledge is deeply mingled with happiness in its pursuit of thought with purity and enduringness, those who know the truth will have more happiness than those who inquire.¹⁷⁰⁷

In men, according to their present state of life, the final perfection is in respect of an operation whereby man is united to God: but this operation neither can be continual, nor, consequently, is it one only, because operation is multiplied by being discontinued. And for this reason in the present state of life, perfect happiness cannot be attained by man. Wherefore the Philosopher, in placing man's happiness in this life (Ethic. i, 10), says that it is imperfect, and after a long discussion, concludes: "We call men happy, but only as men. But God has promised us perfect happiness, when we shall be as the angels ... in heaven" (Matthew 22:30). Consequently in regard to this perfect happiness, the objection fails: because in that state of happiness, man's mind will be united to God by one, continual, everlasting operation. But in the present life, in as far as we fall short of the unity and continuity of that operation so do we fall short of perfect happiness. Nevertheless it is a participation of happiness: and so much the greater, as the operation can be more continuous and more one. Consequently the active life, which is busy with many things, has less of happiness than the contemplative life, which is busied with one thing, i.e. the contemplation of truth. And if at any time man is not actually engaged in this operation, yet since he can always easily turn to it, and since he ordains the very cessation, by sleeping or occupying himself otherwise, to the aforesaid occupation, the latter seems, as it were, continuous.¹⁷⁰⁸

A realistic experience of happiness in this life is also necessary for a healthy life here on earth. It may not be fitting to confirm only the happiness after death while denying the happiness in present life. There is level of happiness experienced by a person in this life which is interrupted and imperfect, which is felicity. Here raises the question how can we have a better felicity? One need to come to an answer which is in effect less interrupted in felicity and the best felicity is experienced in contemplation which gives even a foretaste of beatitude. `Happiness from contemplation is less interrupted, but it is always going to be an imperfect happiness; what man can attain in this life is a share of happiness, a less participation in beatitude.¹⁷⁰⁹

`Contemplative activity obviously belongs to the intellect in accordance with its proper virtue, principally in accordance with wisdom which includes understanding¹⁷¹⁰ and practical wisdom¹⁷¹¹. Contemplation is the highest human activity by reason of excellence of activity and from the part of the object determining the species of the activity. It is a continuous activity of all human activities because the human capacity to persevere in contemplation of truth is more than other activities. Contemplative activity alone would seem

¹⁷⁰⁷ See: Aristotle,. *The Nicomachean Ethics*. Trans by David Ross, Oxford University Press, New York, 2009, p 194.

¹⁷⁰⁸ ST part I-II, Q 3, Art.2 ad 3&4.

¹⁷⁰⁹ McInerny Ralph,. *Aquinas on Human Action. A Theory of Practice*, Catholic University of America Press, Washington D.C. 2012, P 37.

¹⁷¹⁰ Aquinas Thomas,. *Commentary on Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics*. Trans. By C.I. Litzinger, Dumb Ox Books, Notre Dame, Indiana 1964, p 624.

¹⁷¹¹ It is part of practical wisdom to know how to secure real benefits effectively; those who have practical wisdom will not make the mistake of concealing the hurtful truth from the person who really needs to know it in the belief that they are benefiting him. Generally the good intentions are intentions to act well or do the right thing; we may say that practical wisdom is the knowledge or understanding that enables the person, unlike the nice adolescents, to do just that, in any given situation.

See: <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ethics-virtue>.

to be loved for its own sake; for nothing arises from it apart from the contemplating; this activity of reason seems to be superior in worth and to aim at no end beyond itself, and to have the feature of self-sufficiency, leisureliness and a possible unweariedness proper to itself.¹⁷¹²

Contemplation leads to happiness with purity and permanence, the purity of pleasure lies in the immateriality of object and its permanence lies in the object of contemplation which is unchangeable. An individual taking happiness in material objects incurs some impurity of affection from being engrossed with inferior things, and a person taking happiness in changeable objects cannot have lasting enjoyment since, when the object affording happiness is changed or destroyed then the happiness is also changed or destroyed.¹⁷¹³

Contemplation is like a calling and not a job or career. You do a job for money and when the money stops, you stop working; you pursue a career for the promotions and when the promotions stop, you quit. A calling in contrast is done for its own sake.¹⁷¹⁴ When you feel it as a calling there is difference in understanding its role in daily happiness and it becomes a full time engagement, a subjective and objective measure of positive emotion.

Contemplation of truth is twofold: investigation of truth and reflection of truth. Investigation is an intellectual process of searching or longing for the perfect truth whereas reflection is the reflection of the truth already partially or fully discovered, which is the end of investigation. People who have either some knowledge of the truth or people who know the truth can enter better into contemplation than the people who do not have any idea or proposition regarding the truth. Thereby one can say that perfect happiness in contemplation is not discriminatory rather perfect happiness corresponds to practicing proper virtue which is acquired as well as infused by God¹⁷¹⁵. Contemplation enables a person to practical and theoretical knowledge.

A person may contemplate deeply in truth even if he lives alone by himself because contemplation of the truth is entirely internal activity not proceeding externally, and the more the person can contemplate the truth the more perfect he will be in wisdom and he gains much knowledge and may need little help or instruction from others.¹⁷¹⁶ “God is distinct from our intellect, and He is our ultimate end, but we attain Him through the activity of speculative

¹⁷¹² See: Aristotle,. *The Nicomachean Ethics*. Trans by David Ross, Oxford University Press, New York, 2009, p 195.

¹⁷¹³ See: Aquinas Thomas,. *Commentary on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics*. Trans. By C.I. Litzinger, Dumb Ox Books, Notre Dame, Indiana 1964, p 625.

¹⁷¹⁴ See: Seligman E.P. Martin,. *Flourish. A Visionary New Understanding of Happiness and Well-Being*, Atria Paperback, New York, 2011, p 75.

¹⁷¹⁵ Aquinas Thomas,. *Commentary on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics*. Trans. By C.I. Litzinger, Dumb Ox Books, Notre Dame, Indiana 1964, p 625.

¹⁷¹⁶ Aquinas Thomas,. *Commentary on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics*. Trans. By C.I. Litzinger, Dumb Ox Books, Notre Dame, Indiana 1964, p 626.

mind, namely, contemplation. Practical intellect is ordered to the directing and perfecting of activities other than its own activity".¹⁷¹⁷

Contemplation of wisdom is loved for itself and not for anything else, and it adds nothing to a person apart from knowing the truth, that means nothing other than the object of contemplation. Any external activity offer a person greater or lesser benefit beyond the action, but a contemplator acquires only the object of contemplation, the knowledge of God; here the external benefits are indirect insofar as he communicates his experience or knowledge to others.¹⁷¹⁸

The ultimate beatitude could be grouped into three patterns. First of all it could be understood from the pattern of the coincidence of efficient and final causality. This argument presupposes that knowing is the proper activity of an intelligence and human beatitude is concomitant of this proper activity. Since God is the efficient cause of the human intellect the human intellect can only attain its perfection by being joined to God. The human intellect, if it is to attain perfection must also be joined to its active source. An intellect of human being can only be joined to God by knowing God. The ultimate beatitude or felicity of man consists in his most noble operation, which is to understand. Secondly it could be understood from the pattern of the nature of exemplar causality. It is based on the argument that an effect has its cause and it holds the analogy that human being is created in the image and likeness of God. `The image of God is seen from the fact that man is able and is destined to rule the whole visible world and to turn it to his service, this dominion is an imitation of Divine Providence, with the limitations that necessarily distinguish a creature from that of creator.¹⁷¹⁹ Because human being is an image of God, it can be said on the strength of this analogy, that an image represents its exemplar by sharing in its species of essence and by knowing and loving they share in an imperfect likeness to the divine intellect and will, that human beatitude in intellectual contemplation resembles divine beatitude. Thirdly it could be understood from the pattern of the ultimate fulfilment of the human desire to know God in as much as they have a natural desire for ultimate beatitude and this natural desire cannot be in vain¹⁷²⁰, that it is possible for human being to see God¹⁷²¹

¹⁷¹⁷ McInerny Ralph,. Aquinas on Human Action. A Theory of Practice, Catholic University of America Press, Washington D.C. 2012, P 107.

¹⁷¹⁸ Aquinas Thomas,. Commentary on Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics. Trans. By C.I. Litzinger, Dumb Ox Books, Notre Dame, Indiana 1964, p 626.

¹⁷¹⁹ Scheeben Joseph Matthias,. A manual of Catholic theology; based on Scheeben's "Dogmatik" Volume 1. Wilhelm Joseph and Scannell Thomas, Kegan Paul Trench Trubner and Co. London 1908, p 392.

¹⁷²⁰ See: ST part I, Q 12, Art.1.

¹⁷²¹ See: Aquinas on the Twofold Human Good, Bradley J.M. Denis, The Catholic University of America Press, 1997, p 431-436. Aristotle explains in Physics II, 8 that all natures are teleologically ordered, action for an end is present in things which come to be and are by nature. An individual of a given nature may, of course, be prevented by misfortune or defect from attaining its proper end. But an allegedly -natural desire- of a universally unattainable end is not in fact a natural desire. The contrary proposition that a vain natural desire is possible, repudiates the universal teleology of nature; it is equivalent to the assertion that nature is fundamentally unintelligible or is ruled by chance and not intelligence. But such a view of nature is impossible because God's providence extends to all beings, particulars as well as universals; that is to say a vain natural

There could be four technical dimensions of contemplation: gaining wisdom by learning about God, good relation with God and community, attitude of helping people, and adoring God through constant prayer. Bible reading is a great source of gaining wisdom by learning about God. A lot of scripture interpretation is transmitted to us through oral traditions, literary genre and commentaries. Authority of the church helps us to get into proper literary genre and commentaries on various scriptural passages that could confuse a learner. There are multitudes of personal images of God in the Bible that help us to develop special devotion to God (for example sacred heart); consequently it will help us to establish better relationship with God and community. Serving or helping someone is a human act of love. Repetition of those human acts of love would generate an intrinsic empathy, attentiveness to unique goodness strengthens positive relationship by recognizing the lovability of others. Adoring God through constant prayer involves private and public worship which is the celebration of being called by God to share with other in His unconditionally loving providence and eternity.¹⁷²² Personal prayer includes giving praise to God, thanking Him for all the gifts, singing song, hearing word of God, meditation, chanting of short prayers like 'Hail Mary', prayer of petition and supplication and entering into conversation. Eucharistic celebration is the best form of public prayer of unconditional love of God and recognition and acceptance of the real presence of God.

Conclusion

'The life in accordance with virtue is happy because the activities in accordance with this benefit our human estate.'¹⁷²³ Human beings have not only a physical and organic nervous system and intellectual powers, but they have the power of self-consciousness that enable them to create their own inner world. The power of empathy and love enable them to connect with others through the emotion of sympathy and care. The power of conscious which not only informs and incites them to avoid evil but also help them to pursue the heights of goodness and social justice, and thereby lead them to happiness.

Some people do not acknowledge their transcendental dimension. Consequently they do not investigate the evidence for transcendental dimension or even reflect on their restricted assumptions about their existence. The more they open themselves to a transcendent power, the more will the response. One can only know this by trusting in the testimony of those who have experienced it or by doing themselves. There need to be a personal decision as for the transcendental desires guided by faith to go beyond to leap into contemplation and to see God.

Happiness in the contemplation of wisdom is loved for itself and not for something else. The contemplation of truth adds nothing to the person apart from the wisdom of truth,

desire is impossible because such an alleged desire would fall outside the order of God's providential governance of creation.

¹⁷²² Spitzer Robert., *Finding True Happiness. Satisfying Our Restless Hearts*, Ignatius Press, San Francisco, 2015, p 163.

¹⁷²³ Aristotle., *The Nicomachean Ethics*. Trans by David Ross, Oxford University Press, New York, 2009, p 196.

but external activity secures for him a greater or less benefit beyond the action like favour from others, and this is not acquired from the contemplation and incidentally when he communicates about his contemplation to others. Perfect happiness is discovered and consists in contemplation.

General Conclusion

The philosophers and the theologians consider causes and judge in two different ways. A philosopher considers and judges according to caused causes, and a theologian judges according to uncaused causes. In this research, the concept of human act is given a specific relevance in order to understand the concept of happiness in *Summa Theologiae* with reference to contemporary psychological studies. An individual is master of his actions through his reason and will. Those actions alone are properly called human which proceed from a deliberate will. Other possible acts found in an individual can be called acts of human, but not human acts.

Human acts do not have substantial forms to determine their species as plants and animals do, the closest analogue will be that human act plays a comparable role. The end seems to an individual to be the corresponding principle, because whatever human act proceeded from a power is caused by a power, in accordance with the nature of its object; therefore, all human actions must be for an end. An action proceeded without the deliberation of reason has an imaginary end, but not one that is fixed by reason. In order to produce a determined effect, it must be determined to something, which has a nature of an end. This determination is effected in the rational nature by the rational appetite.

The operation of the will takes place by producing desires. These desires in turn lead to action on the part of our mind or body, and as an individual desires for his own crowning good, it is next to impossible to direct his will at diverse last ends. Human action aims for an end perceived as goodness, which is perfective or fulfilling; therefore, human action is a movement to what is fulfilling or perfecting.

According to Aquinas, in beatitude (*beatitudo*) lies human fulfillment, by which he means union with God, the beatific vision; the word *beatitudo* can be translated into English as “happiness”, as can the Latin word *felicitas*, thus Aquinas holds that human good ultimately lies in being happy; when Thomas Aquinas uses the term *felicitas*, however, he is thinking of what we might call “earthly happiness” which can be lost, and it is not *felicitas* that he has in mind when saying that our fulfillment lies in *beatitudo*; while rejecting different forms of *felicitas* in favour of the answer *beatitudo*, Aquinas states that perfect happiness of human being lies in *beatitudo*.

The intellect which is the principle of intellectual operation is the substantial form of the human body, for primarily anything acts is a form of the thing to which the act is to be attributed: for instance health is attributed to body and knowledge is attributed to soul. The intellect does not move the body except through the appetite, the movement of which presupposes the operation of the intellect; the nobler a form is, the more it rises above corporeal matter. The human soul is the highest and noblest forms; it excels corporeal matter in its power by the fact that human soul has an operation and a power in which corporeal matter has nothing special to do.

According to Aquinas, happiness is of twofold: the one is imperfect which we have in this life, and the other is perfect, consisting in the vision of God; the body is necessary for the happiness of this life because the happiness of this life consists in an operation of the intellect, either speculative or practical and the operation of intellect in this life cannot be without a phantasm, which is only in a bodily organ; consequently, that happiness which can be had in this life, depends in a way on the body; but as to perfect happiness which consists in the vision of the Divine essence, which does not depend on the means of phantasms, without the body the soul can be happy. However, as the operation of the will depends on the nature of a thing, the more perfect is the soul in its nature, the better it has its proper operation, in which its happiness consists. Therefore perfect disposition of the body is necessary, both antecedently and consequently, for that happiness which is in all aspects perfect.

Good is to be done and evil is to be avoided: these principles are grasped by virtue of synderesis, which is a practical habit, a disposition. Synderesis is different from conscience, because conscience is not a power, but an act. Conscience implies the relation of knowledge applied to an individual case. This application of knowledge to something is done by human act. However, since disposition is a principle of act, sometimes the name conscience is given to the first natural habit synderesis.

People have passion, a sensate movement; it is something one needs to take into account of, as one considers human action in general. Emotion has a bearing in the life of human being considered as ordered to the beatific vision. Human being is inherently dynamic: born imperfect and permeated with appetite, one cannot help but move towards perfection. A passion is the act of the sense appetite, a passive power, from dormancy to act, in response to the apprehension of an object to which the sense appetite is inclined.

The soul is drawn to a thing by the appetitive power, rather than by comprehensive power: because the soul has, through its appetitive power, an order to things as they are in themselves, that is, good and evil; the object of the appetitive powers are in themselves; the appetitive power is not drawn to a thing as it is in itself, but knows it by reason of an intention of the thing, the intention it has in itself or receives on its own way; hence true and false, which pertain to the knowledge, are not in the things but in the mind; consequently, the nature of passion is consistent with the appetitive, rather than with the apprehension.

Human intellect does not immediately in its first apprehension acquire a complete cognition of a thing; instead, it first apprehends something about it, namely the quiddity of that thing, which is the first and proper object of intellect, and then it understands the proper attributes, the accidents, and the dispositions surrounding the thing's essence. It necessarily compares one thing with another by composition or division, and then proceeds to another, which is the process of reason. Knowledge of happiness, whether theoretical or practical, requires the appropriate cultivation of the sensitive appetite.

Understanding of human act is intrinsically normative then the norms and conventions for human life are built upon concept of ethics which have attributes of goodness as objective. Those ethics of goodness are socially embedded moral acts. Moral life is made up of moral acts because of the character of the constitutive acts. When someone leads a good or bad life, we have in mind more than a single act. However, only human acts, not acts of a man, make up one's moral life.

The acts that human being performs are moral acts, which is why the theory of them is moral theory. There is distinction between human acts and acts of a human being. Every human act aims at some good, and for this reason the good has rightly been declared to be that at which all individuals aim. Virtuous habits are perfective not just of reason and will, but of the passion as well. Virtue in the irascible and concupiscible powers is nothing other than a certain habitual conformity of these powers to reason. Passion is not just tamed by virtue. Ordinate passion helps the execution of reason's command and thus positively assists the performance of virtuous acts. Virtue is normally grown in a person through internal and external principle. Virtue is also developed in a person through grace of God, which is necessary to enter into beatitude.

Virtue is an improved capacity of a person, and his improved capacity or perfection is considered with regard to his goal; however, the goal is achieved through human act, meaning the improvement of the capacity towards perfection is carried out according to determinate action; the rational powers which are suitable to the person are not determinate to one particular act, and they become determinate to acts by means of repetition; therefore, human virtues are habits.

The term happiness, the core of psychological wealth, extends beyond the material riches, emotional intelligence, and social capital; psychological wealth includes attitude towards life, social support, spiritual development, material resources, relationships, positive attitude, health, habits, and life satisfaction. Human wants and desires are sometimes described as an unlimited constantly existing principle within an individual, and some would define happiness within this general perception, stating broadly, that the fulfillment of desire follows happiness, and the nonfulfillment of desire leads to unhappiness; here one may have to discover the elements that drive the person towards satisfaction and fulfillment, in order to categorize the nature of happiness that the person is desiring for. Philosophers, over the years, have reduced desire into four categories: desire connected with biological opportunities and dangers, ego-comparative desires, contributive-empathetic desires, and transcendental desires; they have their corresponding faculties: brain and sensory faculties, self-consciousness, empathy, and conscience and transcendental awareness.

Creating optimism is important to live in *felicitas*, which is also an important element in spiritual life. Building optimism consists in recognizing and then disputing pessimistic thoughts from daily activities. The ability to dispute is a natural skill of an individual which a

person normally uses when false accusations are labeled against him. However, a person often fails to use this skill of disputing against him as a habit. The strategy to disputing our own pessimistic thoughts exists in first recognizing them and then in treating them as if they were articulated by an external person, a rival whose enterprise was to make you miserable. By effectively disputing the beliefs that cause adversity, one can change his reaction from dejection and giving up to activity and good cheer, thereby growing in optimism and living in *felicitas*.

Everyone wants to be happy; however happiness is not necessarily the goal of life, most people look for physical well-being, comfort, status, and social well-being; here personal freedom is considered sometimes more important than happiness. In this way, it seems that happiness is a byproduct of a good life which produces sustained satisfaction over a long period. Certainly a comprehensive relationship between various actions, and how the individuals make use of the knowledge of well-being in relation to his various actions in life could be considered as a static goal to happiness. Positive psychology is not to be seen in terms of a paradigm shift, it would be a mistake to try to reduce the idea to the mere assumption that once positive attitude has been identified, all that is outside its area of interest would belong to a different type of negative psychology; what is important is to develop a positive attitude, and the goal of positive attitude is to increase the extent of happiness in one's own life and in his living conditions.

The concept of wellbeing is a value which considers the things that are beneficial to life and things or circumstances that flourishes a person and facilitates a subjective welfare. Thoughts of wellbeing are being influenced by cultural, economic and educational backgrounds. The last end of human life is more than just wellbeing; the last end of human being is happiness, perfection in its fullest possible development. When a person acts for himself for an end, he knows what he is doing and he knows the end, but when he is being directed by another force or being led by another he may not know the end, then he is under compulsion and it is not necessary that he understands comprehensively the end. Creating an appetite for perfect happiness and maintaining this created desire through the privations of pleasantness of life calls for healthy understanding of oneself, because perception, reason and desire control human action. Object of the will is the end and each person desires and does everything on account of this last end; all human beings have this end in so far as each person desires for the perfection. Aptitude, motivation and optimism determine the progress of an individual in challenging situation. God is the last end of human being, however each person desires and pursues the perfection in a distinctive way, through deliberate actions, by knowing and loving God and perfect happiness means acquisition of the last end.

The highest good consists in the theoretical inquiry of the idea which is least dependent on externals; it exists in the contemplation of truth, the intuitive reasoning of intellect. This highest activity of human capacity can guide a person to perfect happiness.

Human beings have not only a physical and organic nervous system and intellectual powers, but they have the power of self-consciousness that enables them to create their own inner world. The power of conscious which not only informs and incites them to avoid evil, but also help them to pursue the heights of goodness and social justice, and thereby lead them to happiness. Felicitas is necessary but that is not perfect happiness. Beatitude is the perfect happiness; it is discovered through contemplation of various methods through which the interiority of an individual is opened towards God and to world through love beyond the grasp of mere sensation. I am convinced that Thomas Aquinas experienced a similar kind of happiness after writing down the treaties on human act.

Human act caused by deliberate reason and will involves knowledge and movement based on natural and supernatural principles; is guided by intention and desire; and is with an inclination for enjoyment that has a movement to what is fulfilling or perfecting. Perfection in human act is correlated with the idea of actuality as perfection, way of being in act, voluntarily moved by the act of the will with a knowledge of the end, encouraged by volitional deliberation and practice, and created by cognitive participation as an operation of the speculative intellect than of the practical intellect, not essentially but antecedently and consequently, and results in achievement of happiness.

Passion, developed through the human act, is a movement comprising apprehension of the object; it is a movement of the sense appetite and intellectual appetite, with concupiscible and irascible powers, obtained through external senses; it is cognized with the assistance of internal senses, and formed into intentions by means of coalition of ideas through cognitive and particular reason. This movement of the will with consonance and dissonance of the appetite produces inclination which leads internal motive power and becomes a fundamental part of human nature as passion. It is to be cultivated and directed, as necessary component to human being, because it depends on the acts of the interior principles in view of attaining beatitude and is partly constitutive of the happiness available in this life.

Internal and external principles of human act resolve through various desires of the appetite and the will into stable disposition of habits of certain determining powers directing to certain special acts, as a quality to principle of operation; it is a metaphysical basis for elaborating the firm attitude towards virtues and to develop transformation of habitual perfection of intellect and will that govern actions; it alters the substance of a person's moral life and guides to beatific vision, the last end of human life. Spiritual and carnal transgressions affect the perfection of exercise and their supernatural endowment, and impede the congruous merit of participation in the plan of divine wisdom.

Psychological development of happiness by means of human act involves orienting desire and being open to transcendent reality through qualitative composition of interpretation to increase psychological wealth by way of an overall appreciation of life through objective evaluation as a result of recognizing and disputing pessimistic thoughts. Cultivating positive

attitude through cognitive and affective categories animated by virtues as operative discipline leads to happiness.

Voluntary human acts strengthened with transcendent dimension enable one to attain happiness, by overcoming privations, through an appetite for above pleasure centred and beyond ego or charity centred perfection of happiness.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Aquinas, St. Thomas. *Summa Theologica*. Complete English Edition in Five Volumes, Trans. by Fathers of the English Dominican Province, Christian Classics (Series). Notre Dame, Ind.: Benziger Bros., 1948.
- _____. *Treatise on Happiness*. Trans. by Oesterle A. John. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1964.
- _____. *Commentary on Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics*. Trans. by C. I. Litzinger. Notre Dame, Ind.: Dumb Ox Books, 1993.
- _____. *On Human Nature*. Edited by Hibbs S. Thomas. Indianapolis, Ind.: Hackett Publishing Company, 1999.
- _____. *On Evil*. Trans. by Regan Richard. Edited by Davies Brian. New York: Oxford University Press, 2003.
- _____. *On Love and Charity. Readings from the Commentary on the Sentences of Peter Lombard*. Trans. by Kwasniewski A. Peter, Bolin Thomas and Bolin Joseph. Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2008.
- Anderson, F. James. *St. Thomas Aquinas. Treatise on Man*. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1962.
- Aristotle. *The Nicomachean Ethics*. Trans. by David Ross. New York: Oxford University Press, 2009.
- Augustine, of Hippo. *Confessions*. Trans. Chadwick Henry. New York: Oxford University Press, 1991.
- Avabhasa, Da. *Feeling Without Limitation. Awakening to the Truth Beyond Fear, Sorrow, and Anger*. Clearlake, California.: The Dawn Horse Press, 1991.
- Ayloff, W. *The Government of the Passions According to the Rules of Reason and Religion viz, Love, Hatred, Desire, Eschewing, Hope, Desire, Fear, Anger, Delight, Sorrow, & 1700*. London: J. Knapton, 2014.
- Baars, W. Conrad. *Feeling & Healing Your Emotions. A Christian Psychiatrist Shows You How to Grow to Wholeness*. Alachua, Fl.: Bridge Logos, 1979.
- Budziszewski, J. *Commentary on Thomas Aquinas's Treatise on Law*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014.
- Bradley, J. M. Denis. *Aquinas on the Twofold Human Good. Reason and Human Happiness in Aquinas's Moral Science*, Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1997.
- Cantalamesa, Raniero. *Beatitudes: Eight Steps to Happiness*. Trans. by Williamson Daigle Marsha, W. Liberty St. Cincinnati: Servant, an Imprint of Franciscan Media, 2009.
- Cates, Fritz Diana. *Aquinas on the Emotions. A Religious-Ethical Inquiry*. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2009.
- Catechism of the Catholic Church*. Bangalore: Theological Publications in India, 1993.
- Cessario, Romanus. *The Virtue or the Examined Life*. New York: Continuum International Publishing Group Inc., 2002.

- _____. *A Short History of Thomism*. Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2003.
- _____. *The Moral Virtues and Theological Ethics*. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2009.
- Cessario Romanus, Titus Steven Craig and Vitz C. Paul (eds.) *Philosophical Virtues and Psychological Strengths*. Manchester, NH: Sophia Institute Press, 2013.
- Charry, T. Ellen. *God and the Art of Happiness*. Grand Rapids, Mi.: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2010.
- Davies, Brian. *The Thought of Thomas Aquinas*. Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 2009.
- _____. *Thomas Aquinas's Summa Theologiae. A Guide & Commentary*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2014.
- Diener, Ed and Biswas-Diener Robert. *Happiness. Unlocking the Mysteries of Psychological Wealth*, Malden: Blackwell Publishing, 2008.
- Dobson, L. Melanie. *Health as a Virtue. Thomas Aquinas and the Practice of Habits of Health*. Eugene: Pickwick Publications, 2014.
- Eberl, T. Jason. *The Routledge Guidebook to Aquinas' Summa Theologiae*. London: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 2016.
- Einstein, Albert. *Relativity. The Special and the General Theory*. Trans. by Lawson, W. Robert. London: Marino Publishing Mansfield Centre, 2010.
- Elmendorf, J. John. *Elements of Moral Theology Based on the Summa Theologiae of St. Thomas Aquinas*. Memphis: General Books LLC, 2012.
- Feser, Edward. *Aquinas. A Beginner's Guide*. London: Oneworld Publications, 2009.
- _____. *Scholastic Metaphysics. A Contemporary Introduction*. Heusenstamm: Editions Scholasticae, 2014.
- Freeman, Dillet James. *Happiness Can Be a Habit*. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1966.
- Freud, Sigmund. *Sigmund Freud Collected Writings: The Psychopathology of Everyday Life, The Theory of Sexuality, Beyond the Pleasure Principle, The Ego and the Id, The Future of an Illusion*. Trans. by A. A. Brill. New York: Pacific Publishing Studio, 2010.
- Frey, Bruno S., and Stutzer Alois. *Happiness and Economics. How the Economy and Institutions Affect Well-being*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002.
- Frey, S. Bruno. *Happiness. A Revolution in Economics*. Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 2008.
- Greer, A. Rowan. *One Path for All. Gregory of Nyssa on the Christian Life and Human Destiny*. Eugene, Or.: Cascade Books, 2015.
- Gianopoulo, Andrea. *Isaac Newton and the Laws of Motion*. Minnesota: Capstone Press, 2007.
- Hacker, P. M. S. *Wittgenstein: Mind and Will. Volume 4 of an Analytical Commentary on the Philosophical Investigations*. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2000.

- Haidt, Jonathan. *The Happiness Hypothesis. Putting Ancient Wisdom and Philosophy to the Test of Modern Science*. London: Arrow Books, CPI Group, 2006.
- Keller, Timothy. *Walking with God through Pain and Suffering*. New York: Dutton, Penguin Group, 2013.
- Keller, Timothy. *Prayer. Experiencing Awe and Intimacy with God*. New York: Dutton, Penguin Group, 2014.
- Kilby, Karen. *Karl Rahner. Theology and Philosophy*. New York: Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, 2004.
- King, Peter. *Oxford Handbook to Aquinas. Aquinas on the Emotions*. URL: <http://dx.org/10.1093/oxfordhd/9780195326093.013.0017> (May 2012). (Accessed on 10th December 2016).
- Kreeft, Peter. *A Shorter Summa. The Most Essential Philosophical Passages of St. Thomas Aquinas' Summa Theologica*. San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1993.
- Kretzmann, Noman and Stump, Eleonore (eds.). *The Cambridge Companion to Aquinas*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993.
- Lombardo, E. Nicholas. *The Logic of Desire. Aquinas on Emotion*. Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2011.
- McDermott, Timothy (Selected and Trans.), *Selected Philosophical Writings*. Walton Street, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993.
- McInerney, Ralph. *Aquinas on Human Action. A Theory of Practice*. Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2012.
- McManaman, Douglas. *A Treatise on the Four Cardinal Virtues*. Wroclaw: Amazon Fulfilment, 2013.
- Minner, Robert. *Thomas Aquinas on the Passions. A Study of Summa Theologiae Ia2ae 22-48*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010.
- Pilsner, Joseph. *The Specification of Human Actions in St. Thomas Aquinas*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2006.
- Pasnau, Robert. *Thomas Aquinas on Human Nature. A Philosophical Study of Summa Theologiae Ia 75-89*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002.
- Pieper, Josef. *The Silence of St. Thomas*. Trans. by John Murray and Daniel O'Connor. South Bend, Ind.: St. Augustine's Press, 1963.
- _____. *Four Cardinal Virtues*. Trans. by Coogan F. Daniel, Lynch E Lawrence, Richard and Clara Winston. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1965.
- _____. *An Anthology (Title of the German Original: Lesebuch)*. Trans. by Leiva Merikakis Erasmo. San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1989.
- _____. *Happiness & Contemplation*. Trans. by Richard and Clara Winston. South Bend, Ind.: St. Augustine's Press, 1998.
- _____. *The Human Wisdom of St. Thomas*. Trans. by Maclaren Drostan. San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2002.

- _____. *The Christian Idea of Man*. Trans. by Farrelly Dan. South Bend, Ind.: St. Augustine's Press, 2011.
- _____. *Von der Pflicht zur Freude*. Christliche Literatur Verbreitung: Bielefeld, 2006.
- Pinckaers, Servais. *Morality. The Catholic View*. Trans. by Sherwin Michael. South Bend, Ind.: St. Augustine's Press, 2001.
- _____. *The Pinckaers Reader. Renewing Thomistic Moral Theology*. Trans. by Sr. Thomas Mary Noble. Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2005.
- _____. *The Pursuit of Happiness – God's Way. Living the Beatitudes*. Trans. by Sr. Noble, Thomas Mary. Eugene, Or.: Wipf & Stock, 2011.
- _____. *Passion and Virtue*. Trans. by Guevin, M. Benedict. The Catholic University of America Press, Washington, D.C, 2015.
- Porter, Jean. *Nature as Reason. A Thomistic Theory of the Natural Law*. Grand Rapids, Mi.: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2005.
- Pope John Paul II. *Encyclical Letter Centesimus Annus. On the Hundredth Anniversary of Rerum Novarum*. 1. May 1991.
- _____. *Evangelium Vitae*, Encyclical Letter, 1995.
- _____. *Truths Cannot Contradict Truth*. Address to the Academy of Sciences. 22. October, 1996.
- _____. *Post Synodal Apostolic Exhortation Vita Consecrata*, 1996.
- _____. *Apostolic Letter Rosarium Virginis Mariae*. 2002.
- _____. *On the Christian Meaning of Human Suffering*. Boston: Pauline Books & Media, 2014.
- Pope Benedict XII. *On the Beatific Vision of God*, Papal Encyclicals Online, 1336. URL: <http://www.papalencyclicals.net/ben12/b12bdeus.htm> (Accessed on 12th May 2017).
- Pope Benedict XVI. *Deus Caritas Est*. Encyclical Letter, 2005.
- _____. *Caritas in Veritate*. Encyclical Letter, 2009.
- Pope Francis. *Lumen Fidei*. Encyclical Letter, 2013.
- Rahner, Karl. *Hearer of the Word. Laying the Foundation for a Philosophy of Religion*. Trans. By Donceel Joseph. Edited by Tallon Andrew. New York: Continuum International Publishing, 1994.
- Ratzinger, Joseph. *What It Means to Be a Christian*. Trans. by Hendry Taylor, San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2006.
- _____. *Value in a Time of Upheaval*. Trans. by Brian McNeil. San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2006.
- Rziha, John. *Perfecting Human Actions. St. Thomas Aquinas on Human Participation in Eternal Law*. Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2009.
- Seligman, E. P. Martin. *Learned Optimism. How to Change Your Mind and Your Life*. New York: Vintage Books, A Division of Random House, Inc., 2006.
- _____. *Flourish. A Visionary New Understanding of Happiness and Well-being*. New York: Atria Paperback, 2013.

- _____. *Authentic Happiness. Using the New Positive Psychology to Realize Your Potential for Lasting Fulfilment*. New York: Atria Paperback, 2013.
- Scheeben, Joseph Mathias, Wilhelm Joseph and Scannel T.B. *A Manual of Catholic Theology Based on Scheeben's Dogmatik*, Vol. 1. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner, 1908.
- _____. *A Manual of Catholic Theology Based on Scheeben's Dogmatik*, Vol. 2. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner, 1908.
- Scheeben, Joseph Mathias. *Nature and Grace*. Trans. by Vollert Cyril. Eugene: WIPF & Stock, 2009.
- Sigmund, E. Paul (trans. & ed.). *St. Thomas Aquinas on Politics and Ethics*. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1988.
- Soderstrom, Karl Clifton. *The Cardinal and the Deadly. Reimagining the Seven Virtues and Seven Vices*. Eugene: Cascade Books, 2015.
- Spitzer, Robert. *Finding True Happiness. Satisfying Our Restless Hearts*. San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2015.
- Speer, Andreas (ed.). *Thomas von Aquin: Die Summa Theologiae. Werkinterpretationen*. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2005.
- Swafford, Dean Andrew. *Nature and Grace. A New Approach to Thomistic Ressourcement*. Eugene: Pickwick Publications, 2014.
- Tekippe, J. Terry. *Lonergan and Thomas on the Will. An Essay in Interpretation*. Lanham, Md.: The University Press of America, Inc., 1993.
- The Holy Bible*. The New Revised Standard Version, Catholic edition. Bangalore: Theological Publications in India, 1993.
- Veenhoven, Ruut. *Conditions of Happiness*. Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1984.
- Wilhelm, Joseph and Scannell, B. Thomas. *A Manual of Catholic Theology Based on Scheeben's Dogmatik*. Vol. 1. New York: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner, 1906.
- Wuellner, Bernard. *Dictionary of Scholastic Philosophy*. Heusenstamm: Editions Scholasticae, 2011.
- URL: <https://www.google.com/>“Why habits get formed? The nature and purpose of habits”, by Parvez Hanan. (Accessed on 23rd March 2015).
- URL: <http://edwardfeser.blogspot.de/2012/09/was-aquinas-dualist.html>. (Accessed on 9th November 2015).
- URL: [https://link.springer.com/Joseph E LeDoux/Handbook of Cognitive Neuroscience/Springer Science and Business Media New York/](https://link.springer.com/Joseph%20E%20LeDoux/Handbook%20of%20Cognitive%20Neuroscience/Springer%20Science%20and%20Business%20Media%20New%20York/) 1984, 357-358. (Accessed on 9th December 2015).
- URL: [https:// Anna Pluskota/](https://Anna.Pluskota.com/)The application of positive psychology in the practice of education. (Accessed on 4th February 2016).
- URL: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Paradox_of_hedonism. (Accessed on 9th February 2016).
- URL: <http://plato.stanford.edu/entrie/practical-reason-med/>. (Accessed on 10th February 2016).
- URL: <https://www.google.com/>“Habits in General - A Tour of Summa”, by Paul J Genn. (Accessed on 15th February 2016).

- URL: http://www.reformed.org/documents/canons_of_orange.html. (Accessed on 20th February 2016).
- URL: <http://artkatzministries.org/articles/righteousness-in-the-old-testament>. (Accessed on 5th March 2016)
- URL: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Theological_Virtues. (Accessed on 8th March 2016).
- URL: <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/natural-law-ethics>. (Accessed on 9th March 2016).
- URL: <https://en.wikiversity.org/wiki/Virtues/Fidelity>. (Accessed on 16th March 2016).
- URL: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Abraham_Lincoln%27s_first_inaugural_address. (Accessed on 21st March 2016).
- URL: <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Altruism>. (Accessed on 15th April 2016).
- URL: <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/form-matter>. (Accessed on 17th April 2016).
- URL: <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eudaimonia>. (Accessed on 19th April 2016).
- URL: [https://Cognition and Emotion/Norbert Schwarz/ 2000, 14, 433-434](https://Cognition and Emotion/Norbert_Schwarz/ 2000, 14, 433-434). (Accessed on 2nd June 2016).
- URL: <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Optimism>. (Accessed on 19th June 2016).
- URL: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophy_of_desire. (Accessed on 23rd July 2016).
- URL: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Set_theory. (Accessed on 29th July 2016).
- URL: <https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Set-Point-Theorie>. (Accessed on 29th July 2016).
- URL: <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hedonism>. (Accessed on 29th July 2016).
- URL: <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Charvaka>. (Accessed on 17th July 2017).
- URL: <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Happiness>. (Accessed on 20th August 2016).
- URL: <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cognition>. (Accessed on 20th August 2016).
- URL: <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Happiness>. (Accessed on 24th August 2016).
- URL: <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anhedonia>. (Accessed on 25th September 2016).
- URL: <http://www.sfheart.com/einstein.html>. (Accessed on 24th October 2016).
- URL: <https://www.catholicculture.org/culture/library/dictionary/index.cfm?id=33334>. (Accessed on 18th November 2016).
- URL: https://greatergood.berkeley.edu/article/item/happiness_for_a_lifetime. (Accessed on 3rd March 2017).
- URL: <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ethics-virtue>. (Accessed on 7th May 2017).
- URL: <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/self-conscious>. (Accessed on 12th June 2017).
- URL: <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cyrenaics>. (Accessed on 18th July 2017).
- URL: <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Epicureanism>. (Accessed on 19th July 2017).
- URL: <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Buddhism>. (Accessed on 23rd July 2017).
- URL: <https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hylemorphismus>. (Accessed on 9th August 2017).
- URL: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Advaita_Vedanta. (Accessed on 19th August 2017).