100 × RAMALLAH

imaginations, otherness, and (de)colonization in antispaces of sumud

1914 - 2014

NATASHA ARURI
DISSERTATION TITLE

100 × Ramallah

imaginations, otherness, and (de)colonization

in antispaces of sumud

1914 - 2014

AUTHOR

NATASHA ARURI

Doctoral Candidate at Advanced Research in Urban Systems, UDE
Matriculation Number: ES0 226 750 500

MSc. International Cooperation & Urban Development, TUD
M.Arch. Housing, Urbanization & Sustainability in Developing Contexts, UIC
BSc. Architectural Engineering, BZU

E. n.aruri@me.com
P. Leberstraße 6, 10829 Berlin
M. +49 (0) 151 42 41 42 91

SUPERVISOR

J. ALEXANDER SCHMIDT
Prof. Dr.-Ing., M. Arch.
Institute of City Planning + Urban Design
E. alexander.schmidt@uni-due.de

SECOND EVALUATOR

HANS-WERNER WEHLING
Prof. Dr.
Faculty of Humanities
E. hans-werner.wehling@uni-due.de

DEFENSE 14 AUGUST 2015

SUBMITTED 2 APRIL 2015

SUPPORTED by a generous grant from the Hans Böckler Stiftung
I would like to extend my gratitude to all those many persons who have helped me navigate through, collect, and assemble the different pieces of this work; from conceptualization and up to this shape. A heart-filled thank you to those who gave me some of their precious time in interviews, focus groups and brainstorming. No short or long words can express my appreciation for the contributions of all those who shared their ideas with me, helped improve my discussions, and eased my field and scholarly work.

Along this learning process I found myself being inspired, motivated and guided by my mother’s passion, perseverance and dedication; by my father’s wisdom, analytical teachings, and groundedness; by amo Atallah Hassan’s legacy that intellectualism needs to be relevant to the masses if it is to be relevant to progress; and equally, by Prof. Rainer Künzel’s life-lesson to me that for the ambitious to achieve they must be enabled, and have friends who will take a leap of faith with them.

To my enabler and best friend, Andi.
CONTENTS

Acknowledgment i
Table of Contents iii
Abstract xiii
Acronyms xvii
Terms xix
Preface: a note about this work xxv

1 | Protest Urbanism and the ‘New Comer’ Ramallah 1
1.1. Introducing Ramallah 1
1.2. Approach, Methods and Scale of 100 × Ramallah 15
1.2.1. Structure of 100 × Ramallah 18
1.2.2. Scaling Ramallah 20
1.2.3. Why Ramallah not alBireh, or both? 20
1.3.1. British Mandate of Palestine 22
1.3.2. Transit into Apartheid: 1948 - 1993 28
1.3.3. The Oslo Accords and the Peace Process 32
1.3.4. The Segregation Wall and Mobility 40

2 | The Colonial Project: Ethnocratic Territoriality and the Imagined Palestinians 45
2.1. Pre-Oslo Ramallah: from Village to City, and Roots of Contemporary Morphology 49
2.1.1. Late Ottoman and British Times: 1800s - 1948 49
2.1.2. The Mukata’a: a Corner-Stone of Colonial Morphology 53
2.1.3. Post 1948: Temporalization, Spatial Militarization, and Functionalist Morphology 56
2.1.3.i. Temporalization 57
2.1.3.ii. Architecture of Enmity: Evolution and Militarization of Colonial Geography 60
2.1.3.iii. Statics and Climatology of Ramallah’s Functionalist Morphology 65
2.2. Whose Nation? Allon & Dayan vs. Sumud & Civic Agency

2.2.1. Pandora’s Box: Nationalism, Exclusivism, and Ethnocracy

2.2.2. Colonial vs. Civic Agency and their Sociospatial Applications

2.2.2.i. The Sitting Room: Integrating the Mental- and Lived- Spaces

2.2.2.ii. Parliament or University? Palestinian Representational Spaces and their Connectors

2.2.2.iii. Land Alienation: the Drobbless Plan

2.3. Sumud: Framing pre-Oslo Fluid Socio-Economics and Counter-Insurgency

3 | Ramallah’s Oslo: Neoliberal State-Making and Socio-Relational Sensibilities

3.1. The Felicitous State: Bureaucratization, Corruption and the Circus Economy

3.1.1. The Autocracy of the Archipelagos: the OAs, Foreign-Aid and Nation-State Model

3.1.2. Framing the Neoliberal Development Industry, Decision Structures and Spatialization

3.2. Ramallites: NGO-ization, Otherness, and the Creative Yuppies

3.2.1. 1994-2000: Colonization is Provisioned Internally

3.2.2. 2001-2005: Sumud requires Morale, Avant-garde Sensibilities

3.2.3. 2006-2010: Otherness, new Solidarities, and the Culture engendered by the Anti-Politics Machine

3.2.4. 2011-today: ‘Moments’ of Human Labour and the Creative Class

3.3. Framing Ramallah’s Momentary Socio-Economics

4 | PA Institutions, Discourse, Projects, and Impacts

4.1. Brief Overview: Institutions and Decision-Making Hierarchy

4.2. MOPAD & MOLG’s Plan: RABMA

4.3. Ramallah Municipality: Role, Plans and Strategies

4.3.1. 2005/9 Master Plan: Expansion of Ramallah

4.3.2. Strategic Development and Investment Plan (SDIP), 2007-2011

4.3.3. Beyond Manuals: Municipal Programs, Approach and OAs Legacy

4.4. Alternatives to Hierarchy, generic Policy-Mobility and Antispaces

4.4.1. The Patriarchal Coterie, Construction Regulations and the Authority of the Master Plan

4.4.2. Resilience and Urban Commons as Anti-venoms to Policy-Mobility?
5 | Real-Estate Corporations and Urban Landscapes of Ramallah 243

5.1. Ramallah’s Most Affluent Visionaries 246

5.1.1. Palestinian Economic Council for Development and Reconstruction (PECDAR) 245

5.1.2. Palestine Development & Investment Limited Holding (PADICO) and the Palestine Real Estate and Investment Company (PRICO) 247

5.1.3. Palestine Investment Fund (PIF) 249

5.1.4. Massar International 256

5.2. Private Sector: Market Opportunities and denationalization 257

6 | What Foundations for the Future Ramallah? 279


6.1.1. Decolonizing Ramallite Governance through Social Learning 286

6.1.2. Who shares the Wealth of Ideas? Anti-Capitalist Struggles, Citizenship, and Ramallite Flourishing 295

6.2. Imagining a Future Morphology for Ramallah 304

6.2.1. Scenario – Remaking Ramallah through the Feet of Ramallites: Environmental and Climatological Risks and Opportunities 308

6.2.2. Scenario + – Discovering and Crafting New Corners, Perspectives, and Uses for Ramallah’s Landscapes 316

6.2.3. Scenario ++ – Nurturing Decolonization through Antivenoms to Emergency and Socialized Policies of Responsibilitization 322

6.3 Ramallah × 100 Scenarios Is Necessary 326

Notes 329

References 351

References of Illustrations and Visualizations 380

Annexes 381

A.1. FaceBook Search for Ramallah and alBireh 381

A.2. Table of Conducted Interviews and Focus Groups 382

A.3. Oslo(accords - Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements 384


A.5. Regulatory Framework and Authorities for Planning in the West Bank 395


DIAGRAMS

Diagram 2.1.  Frequency and number of earthquakes in Palestine up to 19th century A.D.  

Diagram 2.2.  Illustration of dynamics of Torque  

Diagram 2.3.  Illustration of the political history of the geography between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean between 2000 BC and 2000 A.C.  

Diagram 2.4.  Typical middle-class apartment in Ramallah, around 120 sq.m.  

Diagram 3.1.  Total MDLF allocations for the WB cities in 2012-2013, the corresponding value per capita, and the distribution of establishments per West Bank governorate for 2012  


Diagram 3.3.  Percentage Distribution of Employed Persons in the Palestinian Territory by Economic Activity, 1995-2011  

Diagram 3.4.  Average Daily Wage in NIS for Wage Employees by Governorate, 2000-2011  

Diagram 3.5.  Illustration of answers of 63 questionnaires  

Diagram 4.1.  Illustration of decision-making hierarchy on projects and programs relevant to (physical) urban development in areas under PA sovereignty  

Diagram 4.2.  Illustration of questionnaires: ‘most negative aspect of Ramallah’  

Diagram 5.1.  Illustration of main features of the pull-and-push between Ramallite stakeholders with PA and Visionaries as main opposing poles  

Diagram 6.1.  Conceptualization Framework to help determine foundations, parameters, and therewith accumulative impacts of undertakings within one space  

Diagram 6.2.  Wildflowers spaces for building socially sustainable community  

Diagram 6.3.  Schematic illustration of socialization spaces of the varied groupings of Ramallites in former times and now  

Diagram 6.4.  Illustration of questionnaires: ‘describe Ramallah in one word’, ‘most positive-’, and ‘most negative aspect of Ramallah’  

Diagram 6.5.  PA General Budget for 2014, selected items  

Diagram 6.6.  Schematic plan of a selected area from alQudaira basin  

Diagram 6.7.  Schematic plan of alQudaira basin as imagined in the future  

INFOGRAPHICS

Infographic 1.1.  Comparing Ramallah and Kreuzberg in terms of area and population size and density in 2009.  

Infographic 3.1.  Comparing net official development assistance received by WB & GS in the years 1993-2011 to settler colonialism tools of closure, demolition and illegal construction  

Infographic 3.2.  Comparing West Bank’s main governorates and their respective key urban agglomerates: population growth, economic weight and dynamics
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Image</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>October 2011, view direction north-west from Ramallah’s centre</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>A Photoshop-ed image for a public transportation van</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>UNRWA aid card for an 8-persons family</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>UNRWA camp, 1949</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>UNRWA camp, 1950s</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>Signature of the DOPs on the White House loan in Washington DC on September 13th 1993</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>The north Jerusalem neighbourhood of Kufur Aqab, October 2013</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>Jerusalem as seen from Kufur Aqab, October 2013</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>The DCO at Beit El colony and military base, north of Ramallah</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.10</td>
<td>The Beitunya ‘border point’ at Ofer Prison, west of Ramallah</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>Ramallah early 1900s</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>alManara Square in the 1950s</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>Cinema Dunia, 1950s</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>Shops at the Main Street of Ramallah, 1950s</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>Khalil Salah House 1926</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>Students of Friends Girls School, 1950s</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>View of Ramallah’s Centre as indicated in point A, Map 2.3</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>View of EinMinjed neighbourhood as indicated in point B, Map 2.3</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>Buildings in elTireh neighbourhood, October 2012</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.10</td>
<td>Building on parcel bordered by streets on both sides</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.11</td>
<td>Building on opposite side, demonstrating the absence of regulation of retention spaces</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.12</td>
<td>A typical 1970-80s unit in Ramallah</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.13</td>
<td>Batn elHawa neighbourhood, October 2012</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.14</td>
<td>Storm-water pudding in Ramallah’s anti-spaces, 2013</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.15</td>
<td>Storm-water streaming downhill in Ramallah, 2012</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.16</td>
<td>Snow at the centre of Ramallah, December 2013</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.17</td>
<td>Snow in Ramallah, December 2013</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.18</td>
<td>Abu Ghuneim Mountain in 1996, south of Jerusalem</td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.21</td>
<td>Abu Ghuneim Mountain in 2010</td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.22</td>
<td>Billboard campaigning in support of the PLO’s bid at the UN, October 2011</td>
<td>126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.23</td>
<td>Billboard with pictures and names of ‘martyrs’, February 2010</td>
<td>126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.24</td>
<td>Members of the Palestinian security forces attack demonstrators in Ramallah on 1 July 2012</td>
<td>126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.25</td>
<td>A view onto the Old City from alRaja’a Street</td>
<td>140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.26</td>
<td>Main Street, centre</td>
<td>140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.27</td>
<td>elTha’a Street, centre</td>
<td>140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.28</td>
<td>Main Street, city centre</td>
<td>140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.29</td>
<td>George elSaa’ Street, centre</td>
<td>140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.30</td>
<td>alNuzha neighbourhood, centre</td>
<td>140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.31</td>
<td>A view onto Ein Minjed from Omar alMukhtar Street</td>
<td>140</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Image 3.13. A guard outpost (red) in front of MOPAD (further to the left), facing the PA’s Prime Minister’s Office | 146
Image 3.14. Jabra alAnkar Street, centre | 146
Image 3.15. Beitunya as seen from elTireh neighbourhood, October 2012 | 155
Image 3.16. Im elSharayet, Ein Mishab, Kufur Aqab triangle as seen from west, October 2013 | 155
Image 3.17. A graffiti in Ramallah reading ‘queers passed from here’ | 162
Image 3.18. Part of the poster of the exhibition ‘Ramallah – the fairest of them all?’ | 162
Image 3.19. A banner prepared by Association for Arab Youth – Baladna | 163
Image 3.20. A digital advertisement for a literary evening by Shurouq Harb | 163
Image 4.1. Palestine Tower | 185
Image 4.2. Derivative edition from : Ramallah - Affordable Housing Crisis | 202
Image 4.3. alMa’are Street, city centre, September 2014 | 204
Image 4.4. alMa’are Street, city centre, wider view September 2014 | 204
Image 4.5. Yasser Arafat Square direction alManara Square, September 2014 | 205
Image 4.6. RM’s proposed alManara Parking Complex | 207
Image 4.7. Street network in elTireh neighbourhood, October 2012 | 210
Image 4.8. Exhibitions Street in Ramallah’s centre after extensive upgrading works (2010) | 210
Image 4.11. alKamandjati Music Conservatory (2008) | 210
Image 4.18. Wain ‘a Ramallah Festival (2011) | 211
Image 4.19. Winning design for the Exhibitions Centre | 212
Image 4.20. Design for the extension and upgrading of the municipal building | 212
Image 4.21. Re-design of alManara square | 212
Image 4.22. The traditional crafts alHarjja Market renovation and upgrading project | 212
Image 4.24. Main Street in Ramallah centre | 214
Image 4.25. Main Street in Ramallah centre | 214
Image 4.27. Grand Park Hotel, reopened in 2012 | 214
Image 4.28. PRICO headquarters, constructed in 2010 | 214
Image 4.29. Office building constructed in 2009 | 214
Image 4.30. Yasir Arafat Mausoleum within the Mukata’a | 214
Image 4.31. Prime Minister’s office and one of 3 buildings of the Ministries complex | 215
Image 4.32. Presidential Guest Palace under construction in 2014 | 215
Image 4.33. Birzeit University Housing Cooperative complex in elTireh neighbourhood | 215
Image 4.34. Diplomatic Quarter units (housing project) | 215
Image 4.35. Illustration of the Palestinian National Museum, construction start 2013 | 215
Image 4.36. Panorama of Ramallah westward, from elErsal Street | 216
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Image</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Image 4.37.</td>
<td>Panorama of elMasyoun neighbourhood, from EinMinjed neighbourhood</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Image 4.38.</td>
<td>Ramallah’s centre as seen from elMasyoun neighbourhood</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Image 4.39.</td>
<td>Ramallah centre as seen from elTireh neighbourhood</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Image 4.40.</td>
<td>elTireh neighbourhood as seen from the Diplomatic Quarter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Image 4.41.</td>
<td>elTireh neighbourhood as seen from its northern valley</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Image 4.42.</td>
<td>Im elSharayet &amp; Kufur Aqab neighbourhoods with Jerusalem in the back</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Image 4.43.</td>
<td>elTireh neighbourhood as seen from the Diplomatic Quarter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Image 4.44.</td>
<td>elTireh neighbourhood, October 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Image 4.45.</td>
<td>elTireh neighbourhood, October 2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Image 4.46.</td>
<td>elTireh neighbourhood, October 2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Image 4.47.</td>
<td>elTireh neighbourhood, October 2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Image 4.48.</td>
<td>elTireh neighbourhood, October 2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Image 5.1.</td>
<td>Master Plan of Palestinian National Garden</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Image 5.2.</td>
<td>elGhadeer Neighbourhood, October 2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Image 5.3.</td>
<td>elErsal Centre internal view</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Image 5.4.</td>
<td>elErsal Centre aerial view</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Image 5.5.</td>
<td>elErsal Centre site, October 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Image 5.6.</td>
<td>Internal view of elReehan Neighbourhood</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Image 5.7.</td>
<td>Plaza in elReehan Neighbourhood</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Image 5.8.</td>
<td>elReehan Neighbourhood, March 2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Image 5.9.</td>
<td>Animation depicting an aerial view of Rawabi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Image 5.10.</td>
<td>Animation depicting a street in a Rawabi neighbourhood</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Image 5.11.</td>
<td>Advertisement bearing the slogan ‘nicest view atop the hill’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Image 5.12.</td>
<td>Panoramic view of Rawabi’s Centre while under construction, October 2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Image 5.13.</td>
<td>A view into a street in Rawabi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Image 5.14.</td>
<td>A view over the Diplomatic Quarter from elTireh Neighbourhood</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Image 5.16.</td>
<td>View from point B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Image 5.15.</td>
<td>View from point A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Image 5.17.</td>
<td>View from point C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Image 5.18.</td>
<td>A view at alLi Street in alJabal Neighbourhood</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Image 5.19.</td>
<td>An abandoned typical 1970s house at the Library Street</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Image 5.20.</td>
<td>The Sanawbar Residential twin-villas complex</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Image 5.21.</td>
<td>A view on alMughtaribeen Neighbourhood at Ramallah’s centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Image 5.22.</td>
<td>Khalil alSakakini Cultural Centre, alHussein Neighbourhood</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Image 5.23.</td>
<td>Old and new constructions at Dar Ibrahim Neighbourhood</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Image 6.1.</td>
<td>alltihad residential cooperative, Surda, September 2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Image 6.2.</td>
<td>An 8-unit rowhouse residential project in alMasyoun, September 2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Image 6.3.</td>
<td>A row-house building in alReehan Neighbourhood (PIF), September 2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Image 6.4.</td>
<td>Bonyak Street, Haifa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Image 6.5.</td>
<td>Shifra Street, Haifa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Image 6.6.</td>
<td>A view eastwards from Hillel Street, Haifa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Image 6.7.</td>
<td>Koresh Street staircase, Haifa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Image 6.8.</td>
<td>An alley of successive staircases in the old harbour of Jaffa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Image 6.9.</td>
<td>A passage through the compact fabric of the old city of Jaffa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Image 6.10.</td>
<td>A row of buildings from the late 1970s at alMa‘ared Street, September 2014</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
MAPS

Map 1.1. 1916 | Sykes Picot Agreement, British Mandate post WWI
Map 1.2. 1920s | Palestinian localities and Zionist colonies in Palestine in
the first decade of British Mandate over Palestine
Map 1.3. 1937 | Palestine Royal (a.k.a Peel) Commission plan for partition
Map 1.4. 1938 | Palestine Partition (a.k.a Woodhead) Commission proposal
Map 1.5. 1946 | Jewish vs. non-Jewish land ownership
Map 1.6. 1947 | United Nations Partition Plan for Palestine
Map 1.7. 1948 | Directions of flight of Palestinian refugees during the Nakba
Map 1.8. 1948 | Establishment of Israel on 78% of historic Palestine, Jordan annexes West Bank, Egypt annexes Gaza Strip
Map 1.9. 1948-67 | Location of 418 Palestinian villages destroyed and/or depopulated by Israel between 1948 and 1967
Map 1.10. 2001 | UNRWA Recognized refugee camps and registered population
Map 1.11. 1956 | Tripartite Aggression on Egypt a.k.a Suez Crisis
Map 1.12. 1957 | Israel withdrew out of Sinai and back to its 1948 borders
Map 1.13. 1967 | Six-Day War
Map 1.14. 1967 | The Allon Plan
Map 1.15. 1973 | October War
Map 1.16. 1982 | Israel withdrawal from Sinai, and invasion of Lebanon up to Beirut
Map 1.17. 1993 | Declaration of Principles (Oslo Accords), Gaza-Jericho First.
Map 1.18. 1995 | Taba (Oslo II) Agreement
Map 1.19. 1995 | Israeli military bases, illegal settlements, and areas annexed to Israel
Map 1.20. 1995 | Taba Agreement territorial arrangements overlapped with built-up Israeli structures and the areas annexed to Israel
Map 1.21. 1997 | Netanyahu’s Allon Plus proposal
Map 1.22. 2000 | The Camp David proposal
Map 1.23. 2001 | The Taba proposal
Map 1.24. 2001 | The Ariel Sharon proposal
Map 1.25. Route of the Segregation Wall, 2011
Map 2.1. Spatial surveillance through a mobility network in Ramallah
Map 2.2. Distribution of Israeli illegal colonies, Ramallah agglomerate
Map 2.3. Nolli Plan of Ramallah’s centre along its Main Street
Map 2.4. Dobless’s ‘Master Plan for 2010’
Map 4.1. RABMA Centric-linear expansion mode
Map 4.2. Ring Road as suggested by the JCU
Map 4.3. Enlargements of Ramallah Master Plan demonstrating approved violations
Map 4.4. 2005 and 2009 Ramallah Master Plans combined
Map 4.5. Filter ‘1’ of Map 4.4: Spatial allocation for residential purposes
Map 4.6. Filter ‘2’ of Map 4.4: Spatial allocation for public open space, tourism and greenery
Map 4.7. Filter ‘3’ of Map 4.4: Spatial allocation for commercial areas
Map 4.8. An overlap of the nolli-plan of the (existing) agglomerate with that of the street network outlined by RM’s (future)Master Plan
TABLES

Table 3.1. Top ten recipients of net ODA per capita 121
Table 4.1. Suggested Zoning in Ramallah, Khamaisi 2006 192
Table 4.2. Spatial allocation for residential purposes for varying social strata 195
Table 4.3. Spatial allocation for public open space, tourism and greenery 196
Table 4.4. Spatial allocation for commercial purposes for varying forms of production 197
Table 4.5. Derivative edition from : Developmental Priorities, Vision & Strategies 199
Table 4.6. Derivative edition from : Capital Investment Plan, CIP 200
Table 4.7. 2008-2011 Projects Ramallah Municipality Projects 208
Table 4.8. Number of newly registering engineers at the Engineers Union per year 222
Table 4.9. Regulations on practice of urban design by the Engineers Union 222
Table 4.10. Regulations on ‘work load shares’ per project by the Engineers Union 222
Table 4.11. Site and construction regulation applied by Ramallah Municipality 224
Table 4.12. Alternative to current site and construction regulations applied by Ramallah Municipality for residential areas 224
Table 6.1. Site and construction regulation of Ramallah Municipality as categorized in the city’s Master Plan of 2009, and the respectively produced antispaces 311
Table A.1. List of interviews conducted between 2010 and 2012 382
Table A.2. List of Focus Groups conducted in October 2011 383
ABSTRACT

100 x Ramallah is an investigation of spatial (re-)imagineering of the city of Ramallah, Palestine since the demise of the Osmans and over the past century of Anglo-Zionist colonisation, and an exploration of what could follow. The line of evolution of successive Ramallite spacio-sensibilities transcribes the tensions of nonuniform yet cyclical tides of centralised hegemonic control and counter-resistance. By triangulating morphological and territorial shifts with socio-demographics and politico-economic orders this work argues through three hypotheses.

First, Ramallah’s city-space is a product of an articulate colonial project whose discourse promotes narrow homogenised imaginaries of ethnicities and national identities, and therewith sterilised, surveilled and securitized spaces. These concepts have been inducing variations of both, co-optation and opposition. In the same line, neoliberal development discourses continue to infantalize target populations as passive recipients. Hence, these are decisively myopic to the fact that the latter are capable of engendering alternative imaginations, and in cases where these materialise into realities they are rejected and combated as anomalies. The result has been the (intentional?) creation of a mutated system of bureaucratic, incompatible administration that repeatedly fails to provide for basic socioeconomic needs, therewith shared development and stability. In effect, what has been unfolding in Palestine is de-development.

Second, the dialectic Marxist discourse contends urbanities as natural decodings of psycho-ecological processes. Understood from this perspective, the post-Oslo contestation and frustration in the city can be traced to the exasperation of social otherness beyond regular metropolitan symptoms, due to the acute increase in scales of uncertainty (diminishing securities), inequality and spatial non-dignity. Through mapping the behavioural trend of re-making of sumud (social resilience) it can be concluded that tensions are bound to be released through (mostly ad hoc) techniques and formations of citizen mobilisations. Identified factors and scholarship indicate an elevated possibility of violence; whether due to high levels of militarisation by the nation-state policing discourses or its vulnerability to natural misfortunes. The scales and impacts of clandestine sub-group activities in turn depends on several factors, one of which is the manner by which the city-space will be produced in the coming, critical decades.

Third, urban design, planning, and management are tools often advocated as bearers of welfare and rarely admitted as enablers of mental as well as corporeal crisis. These are professions that by nature capitalise on and catalyse political ideologies which include/exclude anticonformist visionaries in/from formal processes of socio-spatial production. Here Ramallah presents no exception to the neocolonial rule, where its planners (rightfully) blame the failure in forging egalitarian urbanism on racial subjugation and instability, yet fall short of constructively labouring applicable alternatives that account for uncertainty. In cities like Ramallah where subjective temporalities constantly produce new risk-strategies and population flows, static frameworks of indexed mechanisms and hierarchies are rendered obsolete. In combination with today’s digitally-enabled
pseudo-concrete realities and heightened levels of privatization; Ramallah's resilience necessitates that it democratizes spatial production and therewith decolonize its spaces based on concepts of the civic right to flourishing. The future shape and degree of resilience/sumud depend on the ability of the (self-declared) Ramallites to spatialize (grant legitimacy to) their diversity, fluidity, and inter-relevance. To that end, an Umdenkenprozess about the role and range of fields of interventions of Ramallite urban visionaries is quintessential.

The outline of this work spreads over six chapters, starting with setting the parameters, territorial and temporal back-drop, and elaborates on the hypotheses. The second chapter focuses on tracing and understanding the spatial evolution of the city through cross-comparing those to political and socioeconomic elements; hence philosophically differentiating between projected (imagined, mental) and grounded (scientific, real) meanings, ideologies, and their economic, social and particularly spatial trails and implications. Chapter three expounds on the politico-economic factors fuelling Ramallah's spatial tendencies in the past two decades since the signature of the Oslo Accords in 1993. It simultaneously investigates the spacio-social relationalities and sensibilities legitimising and incubating these discourses. Chapters four and five proceed to map urban undertakings by both public and private parties (respectively); they feature the power and decision-making mandates and influence; modes of operation, structures and systematic variables; the most relevant projects and engagements; theoretical genealogies and comparative cases; foreseen sociospatial consequences, and; the underlying opportunities. Chapter 6 concludes this work with puzzling the findings of former chapters in variable imaginations of alternative urban realities that Ramallah could potentially produce. Through re-negotiating the existing colonial morphology and centralized, bureaucratic decision-making systems, this chapter explores opportunities for nurturing environmentally, economically and politically resilient, inclusive and progressive spaces of resistance and sociospatial decolonization. In the current critical moment for Palestine specifically and cities featuring anti-colonial revolutions generally; modes of spatial absorption, scaling, synthesis, and reimagineering of locational social ideologies and movements is essential for the quality of life and dignity.

Along the process arguments are based on scholarly review of a wide range of works from varying disciplines, both academic and otherwise. These were cross-analysed with empirical data collected through twenty qualitative interviews, eight focus groups, observations and quantitative indicators; collected through eight field-visits totalling thirty-two weeks and spanning over intervals of six months in average.

Aside the scientific motivations of this work, it desires to serve as a scholarly narrative that coalesces some facets of the momentary polemics, voiced aspirations and intellectual brainstorming about Ramallah. This five-year process has travelled through multitude of provocative and inspiring conversations, debates, and assemblies, and herewith aims at expounding on concepts of insurgent urbanism. The reflections outlined here do not claim premise to foreclosing or limiting differing understandings and interpretations; rather it calls attention to a selection of polychromic aspects requiring deeper investigation.
## ACRONYMS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BM</td>
<td>alBireh Municipality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BOD</td>
<td>Board of Directors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BZU</td>
<td>Birzeit University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B'Tselem</td>
<td>The Israeli Information Centre for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CECP</td>
<td>Central Elections Commission Palestine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEO</td>
<td>Chief Executive Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSOs</td>
<td>Civil Society Organizations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COGAT</td>
<td>Coordination of [Israeli] Government Activities in the Territories; a unit of the Israeli Ministry of Defence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFLP</td>
<td>Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DoPs</td>
<td>Declaration of Principles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAB</td>
<td>Foreign development-Aid Bingo (fashionable terminology)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FG</td>
<td>Focus Group (e.g. FG 2011, no. 2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GIZ</td>
<td>German International Cooperation Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GS</td>
<td>Gaza Strip</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HPC</td>
<td>Higher Planning Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICA</td>
<td>Israeli Civil Administration, a department of COGAT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICAHD</td>
<td>Israeli Committee Against House Demolitions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICBS</td>
<td>Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICPD</td>
<td>Israeli Central Planning Department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDF/IOF</td>
<td>Israeli Defence Forces a.k.a. Israeli Occupation Forces (see following section, Terms)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IFRC</td>
<td>International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INGO</td>
<td>International Non-Governmental Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JA</td>
<td>Jewish Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knesset</td>
<td>Israeli Parliament</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LGs</td>
<td>Local Governments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAS</td>
<td>Palestine Economic Policy Research Institute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDLF</td>
<td>Municipal Development &amp; Lending Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MENA</td>
<td>Middle East and North Africa Region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MNC</td>
<td>Multinational Corporation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOF</td>
<td>Ministry of Finance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOLG</td>
<td>Ministry of Local Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOPAD</td>
<td>Ministry of Planning and Administrative Development formerly known as MOP, MOPIC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAD</td>
<td>Negotiations Affairs Department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGC</td>
<td>National Guidance Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NLI</td>
<td>National Leadership of the Intifada (1987)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OAs</td>
<td>Oslo Accords</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCHA</td>
<td>Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, UN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PA (sulta)</td>
<td>Palestinian Authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PECedar</td>
<td>Palestinian Economic Council for Development and Reconstruction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PFLP</td>
<td>Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PIF</td>
<td>Palestine Investment Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PLC</td>
<td>Palestinian Legislative Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PLO</td>
<td>Palestine Liberation Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PNG</td>
<td>Palestinian National Garden</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PNGO</td>
<td>Palestinian NGO Project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PP</td>
<td>Peace Process</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| PPP     | Palestinian People's Party, formerly Palestinian Communist Party  
not to be mistaken with the PPP - Palestinian Peace Program |
<p>| PRDP    | Palestine Reform and Development Plan |
| PRICO   | Palestine Real Estate Investment Company |
| PWCs    | Popular (voluntary) Work Committees |
| RABMA   | Ramallah, Al-Bireh, Beitunya Metropolitan Area |
| RC      | Refugee Camp |
| RDPF    | Ramallah Developmental Planning Framework |
| RM      | Ramallah Municipality |
| SU      | Soviet Union |
| TNC     | Transnational corporation |
| UNOCHA  | UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs |
| UNDP    | UN Development Program for Palestine |
| UNHCR   | The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees |
| UNISPAL | United Nations Information System on the Question of Palestine |
| UNRWA   | United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East |
| USAN    | Union of South American Nations |
| USSC    | US Security Coordinator |
| WB      | West Bank |
| WZO     | World Zionist Organization |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>TERMS</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>1967 Borders</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Dayton Army</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Dunum</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Fatah</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Fayyadism</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Green Line</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Hamas</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>IDF/IOF</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
of this research, Palestinians do not enjoy protection from the IDF rather prosecution and repression. Hence, this work uses the Palestinian naming: Israeli Occupation Forces, IOF.

**Intifada**
- Arabic for ‘uprising’ or ‘rebellion’
- **First Intifada** 1987 - 1993
- **Second Intifada** 2000 - 2006 (estimated)
- also used in uprisings against the British Mandate in 1929, 1936.

**Jewish Agency**
- Originally named the “Palestine Zionist Executive”, later “Jewish Agency for Palestine”. It is the body that has been financing the agenda of the WZO, at the foremost of which lies a century of financing the emigration of world Jews to Palestine.

**Knesset**
- Israeli Parliament

**Mossad**
- is one of three principal organizations of the Israeli intelligence community which focuses on foreign intelligence service, alongside Aman (military intelligence) and the Shin Bet (homeland and occupied territories intelligence). The Mossad is responsible for intelligence collection, covert operations, and counterterrorism, as well as bringing Jews to Israel from countries where official Aliyah agencies are forbidden, and protecting Jewish communities (Wikipedia).

**Nakba**
- is Arabic for Catastrophe, used as naming for the events of 1947-1949 which resulted with the creation of the State of Israel and the expulsion of around one million Palestinians, the majority into today UNRWA-operated refugee camps in neighbouring countries (alKhalili 2009).

**Normalization**
- in Palestinian contexts is a term used to refer to engagements in joint relations and projects with Israelis, in ways that provide the false impression of normalcy despite the continuation of colonial oppression, inequality and racial discrimination.

**Outpost**
- An Israeli colony constructed in annexed territories that is neither legal by international law nor licensed by the Israeli Government, normally established by radicals. Many of the Registered Settlements commenced as outposts.

**Settlement**
- An Israeli colony constructed in annexed territories that is illegal by international law yet licensed by the Israeli Government, thence enjoying several benefits and subsidies. Smaller ones are predominantly residential, while larger ones include military bases and offices, industrial parks, farms, commercial centres and education facilities among others.

**Settler**
- An Israeli citizen that lives in a colony.
Shin Bet

a.k.a. Shabak is one of three principal organizations of the Israeli intelligence community, alongside Aman (military intelligence) and Mossad (foreign intelligence service). Its duties are safeguarding state security, exposing terrorist rings, interrogating terror suspects, providing intelligence for counter-terrorism operations in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, counter-espionage, personal protection of senior public officials, securing important infrastructure and government buildings, and safeguarding Israeli airlines and overseas embassies (Wikipedia).

Palestine

When mentioned alone, it refers to the geography between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea.

Palestine Liberation Organization - PLO

It was conceived at the first Arab League Summit in Cairo in 1964, and recognized as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian People by the UN, where it has enjoyed an observer status since 1974 and non-member state since 2012. It composes of 10 Palestinian parties amongst which Fatah, PFLP, DFLP, and PPP. Noteworthy, conservative Islamic parties are not members, neither Hamas nor aljihad alislami.

Legal Statuses / Classifications of Palestinians

_Laji'å (f) - Laji' (m) - Laji'een (pl)_ | Refugee, -s

UNRWA defines those as ‘persons whose normal place of residence was Palestine during the period 1 June 1946 to 15 May 1948, and who lost both home and means of livelihood as a result of the 1948 conflict’ (UNRWA 2014a). These Palestinians were forced to leave their homes at arm's point or through violent intimidation by Jewish militias e.g. the Deir Yassin Masacre on 9 April 1948 in which the Zionist paramilitary groups Irgun Zevai Leumi and Lohamei Herut Israel. In 1950 there were about 750,000 UNRWA registered Refugees, a number which has soared to 5 million. Refugee camps are scattered around Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, WB and GS. At the end of 2013 44% of Palestinians in WB & GS were refugees; 29.7% and 67.4% respectively.

_A'ida (f) - A'id (m) - A'ideen (pl)_ | Returnee, -s

Palestinians who up to the OAs lived in exile due to their right of residence being revoked by Israel over the years starting 1948, or escaped due to prosecution by its apparatuses. This term refers persons who returned to Palestine by power of the OAs (not to be confused with Mub’ad / Deportee).

_Mughtariba (f) - Mughtabrib (m) - Mughtaribeen (pl)_ | Expate,-riates

Palestinians which migrated to other countries (starting late 1800s) but maintain contact to Palestine.
Palestinians residing in a locality inside ‘Israel proper’ and possess an Israeli-issued (blue) ID i.e. Israeli citizenship, albeit an unequal one.

Displaced
A Palestinian who was displaced (lost her/his right to residency) as a result of the 1967 Six-Day War (Map 1.13; p. 30). These are not recognized by the UNRWA as refugees, and therewith their claims to compensation and return continue to be ignored.

Jerusalemites
Palestinians who have an Israeli permit to reside in Jerusalem but are neither considered citizens of Israel nor fall under the authority of the PA. Legally, they are equated to foreign residents of Israel, enjoy various systems of discrimination and possesses an Israeli-issued (blue) ID.

A Palestinian residing in a locality in the Gaza Strip and holds an Israel approved and PA-issued (green) ID.

A Palestinian residing in a locality in the West Bank and holds an Israel approved and PA-issued (green) ID.

Arabic for steadfastness, resilience. The term is commonly associated with the ethos of solidarity and cohesion that prevailed in Palestinian communities pre-OAs, particularly the 1980s.

Zionism
In 1897 the First Zionist Congress was held in Basel, Switzerland; where the attendants adopted the proposed program declaring that ‘Zionism seeks to establish a home for the Jewish people in Palestine secured under public law’ (Jewish Virtual Library 2012). The Britannica Encyclopedia defines Zionism as ‘Jewish nationalist movement that has had as its goal the creation and support of a Jewish national state in Palestine, the ancient homeland of the Jews (Hebrew: Eretz Yisra’el, ‘the Land of Israel’). Though Zionism originated in eastern and central Europe in the latter part of the 19th century, it is in many ways a continuation of the ancient nationalist attachment of the Jews and of the Jewish religion to the historical region of Palestine, where one of the hills of ancient Jerusalem was called Zion’ (Britannica 2012). Even though many scholars insist that Zionism is a national and not an ideological political movement, the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs defines Zionism as ‘an ideology which expresses the yearning of Jews the world over for their historical homeland - Zion, the Land of Israel’ (MFA 2012). The Israeli historian Shlomo Sand sees it as a political movement that incorporates traces of German Volkism. It ‘emulated the other nationalists in Europe and assumed an
ethnoreligious or ethnobiological identity to conceptualize their self-definition. Seeking to build a bridge that could connect Jewish believers – mainly former believers, whose languages and secular customs were polyphonous and diverse’ (Sand 2010:255; emphasis added; for more information see section 2.2.1; p. 75). Regardless of the definition, the Zionist movement has been a major player in the colonialism of Palestine for over a century today, and Palestinians regard it as the ultimate enemy. The name is used in day-to-day cursing, as well by younger generations whether knowing or not the history behind it.
This research has been an enamoured titillating journey both personally and academically. What I present in these pages is a testimony about my town which I escorted into global-hood; from social consanguinity to individuality, from political collectivism to post-nationalism, and from economic egalitarianism to extreme capitalism. It is my narrative of a provocative, charged, very confused and creative space. I do not claim that this work is objective for the Palestine question is congenitally political. The few past years have been a continued confrontation with my prejudices and entrenched impressions of the theatre of my life. This had to start with taming my impartiality and applying scrutiny to what otherwise seemed an orthodox conclusion. It was a process of constructing parallels, derivation of scales, dissection of characteristics, and redefinition of my relationship to this place that is home and now is a case in my laboratory.

With time this work turned enigmatic resembling the perplexity of my presence between Ramallah the passion and Berlin the freedom, and it held more questions than answers about the place that once was a certainty. I embarked on this journey driven by idyllic ardour to find myself in dismay and chagrin, only to then re-discover the inherent elements of imagination, receptiveness to change and the desire to indeed, make a change. Ramallah is not just an academic case. It is my battle field for freedom under continued colonialism, for individuality in a kindred and stereotyped context, and for endorsing native creativity and resilience in face of encroaching global policies and their unfavourable articulations. In these pages Ramallah becomes a comrade that shares her secrets with me, and we plot together.

This work is scientific in approach and methodology, and equally a narrative. It combines theory and analysis with events and anecdotes that construct the additional testimonial dimension. These are either embedded directly in the main text or can be found in the Notes of this work, which also give biographical synopsis about named characters –
whether Palestinian or Israeli – to help construct the setting and understand the politics of these actors. This is my narrative about my mentally-constructed and lived socio-political history as a Palestinian female in a patriarchal society; as a secular in the temple of monolithic religions; as a colonized subject who was raised to voice the claims of national freedom, only to find out that the frame and discourse, the ‘national dream’ promoted by Palestinian and international politicians, including my parents for the longest time, is not a goal that guarantees the promised and personal right to flourishing.

Over the past decade it became increasingly evident that the name of the ‘country’ is not relevant; you can call it Israel or Palestine or tomatoes. What matters is the right to live in a society that is confident of its Palestinian identity, historic traits of diversity, actively resisting its colonial subordination, and mostly, where persons are able to collectively exercise differentiated social ethos and practices. I do not encourage socio-political normalization of the abnormal Israeli colonialism. On the contrary, I am posing questions and discussions towards genuine rather than figurative spatial liberation. In what became one of his most known lyrics – and later consumed with exaggeration – Mahmoud Darwish wrote ‘Atop this Earth what is worth a life’. It is not the earth, rather, the people walking it that make life worth the hardships. So who are these people today? And what kind of behaviour could unfold tomorrow? These are the existential questions for my Ramallah.
With the shifts in and expansion of privatized global financial operations, digitalization of systems, virtual and physical communication and resource efficiency concerns; the ‘city’ has reclaimed the spotlight as prime nexus whether for economy, state monopoly, ‘national’ status, and among others, as battlefield of seemingly polemic sociopolitics. Principally these are antediluvian contestations of restrictive discourses versus the right to dignified and differentiated living irrespective of religion, ethnicity, race, cast, economic or political status or other. This dichotomy is reflected in the countless variables of the urban hitherto, e.g. capitalist, laissez-faire ‘formality’ de-legitimizing the proactive ‘informality’; philanthropic ‘urban renewal/regeneration’ as major cause of gentrification, internal displacement and exclusion; ‘traditional’, ‘sacred’ and ‘taboo’ as morality terms enacting imagined ‘collective’ mental borders, hence excuses to undermine alternative, avant-garde relational sensibilities and cultures. And among further examples, this dichotomy is enabled throughout the (self-ascribed) ‘democratic’ countries (e.g. USA, Mexico) whose legislation is centrally governed by the mono politics of ‘majority rule’, which is ontologically partisan and hence exclusive. While the grave impacts of the epidemic of ‘exclusion’ have been long deciphered and identified theoretically, the mounting numbers of failed prevention, containment and elimination policies indicate systematic deficiencies. Evidently, the causes and modes of operation differ with each particular case in relation to contextual elements, whereby the activities of occupy movements in the USA differ substantially between New York and Oakland, and further if compared with those of the Zapatistas in Tuxtla Gutiérrez and San Cristóbal in Chiapas.

The current moment of mobilized populations occupying public spaces for local, national, and global affairs has revealed an additional dimension to the construction of the lived space. Formerly imagination and enacting of alternative realities required physical contact and the construction of sensibilities through physical mediums. However, the ease of cross-border communication and visualization (whether through sharing of photographs on social media, watching films, animations and documentaries, playing a video-game that satisfies such fantasies, etc.) is providing the mental support necessary for exercising agendas defiant of the surrounding socio-political system. This behaviour is a double-edged sword; while in some cases it is used to fuel demands for equality, in others it is a tool of radical ideology. As Slavoj Zizek phrases it:

[The] *plague of fantasies* of which Petrarch speaks in *My Secret*, images which blur one’s clear reasoning, is brought to its extreme in today’s audiovisual media. Among the antagonisms that characterize our epoch (world-market globalization versus the assertion of ethnic particularisms, etc.), perhaps the key place belongs to the antagonism between the abstraction that increasingly determines our lives (in the guise of digitalization, speculative market relations,
etc.) and the deluge of pseudo-concrete images. In the good old days of traditional Ideologiekritik, the paradigmatic critical procedure was to regress from ‘abstract’ (religious, legal ...) notions to the concrete social reality in which these notions were rooted; today, it seems more and more that the critical procedure is forced to follow the opposite path, from pseudo-concrete imagery to abstract (digital, market ...) processes which effectively structure our living experience. (Zizek 2008: 1; emphasis in original)

Irrespective of size and type of enactment, mass-mobilization requires particular psychologies which downplay the phantasmic dimension of the ideology represented in their ‘motion’. Axiomatically neither acts of protest nor their accumulative effects are alien to cities as transcribed in volumes of history. However, the synthesis of solidarities, timely sharing of ‘know-how’, and staging simultaneity as tactic is furthering the internationalization of – particularly but not only – cities. Besides economic and political policy mobility, regional influences, and locational cosmopolitanisms, today trans-border ideological non-state alliances and ethos are making their claims through the direct space; targeting economic policies (e.g. Athens, London, São Paulo); social disenfranchisement (e.g. Paris, Tunis, Santiago de Chile); housing rights (e.g. Cape Town, Tel Aviv, Rome); political rights (e.g. Tehran, Cairo, Washington); anti-government groupings (e.g. Kiev, Caracas, Bangkok); separatist demands (e.g. Barcelona, Benghazi, Glasgow); and among many others, the terrorization of cities frequented by radical insurgent (and state) groups and powers in pursuit of their ideology e.g. Da’esh – Islamic State in Syria and Iraq, Boko Haram in Nigeria, and La Familia and Noar HaGva’ot (Hilltop Youth) in Israel.

In today’s reality where theories of Urban Psychogeographies by Guy Debord and Social Production of Space by Henri Lefebvre are receiving recognition and critical elaboration; the inquiry of urban planners is implored to, first, exercise ‘collective puzzling’ cross-discipline and specialty at the speed of progress of knowledge; second, track and decipher the growing inflow of information, and; third, ‘be one day ahead of them’ as Leó Szilárd was quoted in 1961. Yet, how does ‘inter-disciplinary’ exchange and flexibility function in the study of urbanisms? How can rhizomatous, bureaucratic, centralized systems involving countless actors be adapted to new knowledge in domain- and time-sensitive tempo? How can planners filter past-tense global data to envision future-oriented context-sensitive scenarios? How can planners break from today’s reactive and speculative ruling coalition to more proactive and rooted approaches? And down the line of variables involved in urban beau ideal sublimation of mass-mobilization and protest; could planners become the fortune-tellers they are presumed to be?

This work neither claims the ability to answer those questions nor ponders scope and impacts of centralized psychological projections and planning. However, it is concerned with and engages in discussing some of the opportunities underlying paradigms that consider cities as organic – macro and micro – ecologies whose biological processes are – to a great extent – calculable. This dialectical Marxist approach treats paradoxicality as rooted commonness rather than incidental abnormality. Also, neither mapping spaces, genealogies and histories of urban protests nor the investigation of the role and kinetics of social (resistance and radical) movements in inducing urban spatial change are per se the interest of this work. However, it recognizes and argues the postulate that roots, elements, methods, dynamics, articulations and fuel of popular and
social movements differ between a locality and another; including within a singular national territory, and equally, through the numerous urban layers that are combinations of political, economic, and social psychogeographies. Herein campaigns, rallies, festivals, access to resources and services, commuting and other structurations of daily practices are engendered, sized and projected through particular spatializations. Thus, urban morphologies are mediums of encouragement or impeding claims to social justice, negotiation of bureaucratic systems, compromising principles of equality, and possess an underestimated power in instilling feelings of satisfaction, dignity, belonging, disenfranchisement and contestation.

Regardless whether the central theme is ideology, security, sustenance or other; a main ingredient determining whether the ‘motion’ is peaceful or violent, constructive or destructive is the presence or absence of mediums of negotiation, neutralization of social tensions, and freedom of expression rather than oppression. This aspect constitutes a structural difference in dynamics of civic movements in countries – hence cities – featuring advanced democracies and those with imperial, post- and neocolonial heritage; those with dependent, compromised and authoritarian systems, and; those in geographies of ethnic and cultural mosaics of indigenous, immigrating, and annexing civilizations.

For example, Lebanon has a total area of 10,452 square kilometres, 17 official sects, half a million refugees and asylum seekers, and an estimated population of about 4.8 million. The last census took place in 1932, based on which the National Pact of 1943 was drafted placing a confessional ‘democratic’ political structure into government. Fears of altering the delicate political balance has translated with official abstinence from conducting a population census since. This heterogeneous ethnic patchwork of Lebanon is a specimen indicative of the composition of the Levant. Meanwhile, European colonial thought assumed its relatively limited ethnic and religious variations (until the early twentieth century) as universal, hence re-drew the political borders of the region upon conquering it accordingly; straight lines through mountainous landscapes, fluid socializations, macro and micro economies.

In the same line, following mythological maps wars in the Levante since World War II continue to physically reshuffle ethnic constellations. Thus, taking into consideration the polarizing role of mental and lived collective memory in shaping contestation, what are the urban, demographic, ethnic and ideological formations in place today? Why and how were they produced? What are the variables and tools sustaining them? And can those be manipulated?

The afore-described mutated colonial spatial reconfiguration was partly conceived by the assumption that military and technological supremacy is capable of disciplining and scaling indigenous resistance; complimented by economic and political tools whose agent is centralized autocratic regimes, and sustained through hegemonic executive arms and particular morphological and micro-spatial arrangements. Evidently, the short sightedness of this discourse gave rise to various forms of protest beyond political spheres; literature, arts and culture, and many others to which the urban space constitutes an incubator. Notwithstanding, the result has been the omnipresence of ‘shadow regimes’ to presumably independent nation-states; public and private foreign (nonnational) actors exasperating and factoring decision-making on internal (local-)government policy. Thus, while cities like Berlin plan their strategies bound with respective central governments, global private capital, and within some space extract policy-elements from civic
participation; on the other side, cities like Amman have to negotiate with respective central government, World Bank and IMF, donor countries, UN organizations, foreign aid private international subcontractors, and global private capital, leaving little (if any) space for civic participation on the crowded rectangular table. Thereof and in such particular ecologies, what and where are the systematic loopholes (spatial opportunities) that can be employed for empowering civic participation and case-sensitivity? Calculating that bureaucratic and social change require flexible, long-term, self-reinforcing processes and physical spatial articulation; what are the existing frameworks and resources through which channels for integration of public and private, local and international spheres in mutually constructive undertakings can be established?

Beyond issues of sovereignty and power structures, central to the practice of urban design and planning is the projected impacts of climate change, neoliberal crisis, resource efficiency, and technological advancement amongst others. Such tangible and administrative infrastructures are faced with the question of compatibility to mental and behavioural logic in general, and the relationalities within a (non-)collective mass specifically; what the behavioural economist Sendhil Mullainathan calls 'last mile problem'. He argues that typically the majority of effort in tackling phenomena is channelled to the development of the ointment – the thousands of inventions and policies that earmark the progress of man kind; however, often the component of behavioural compatibility is compromised by the inconsistency between rational thinking – hence planning and administration – models and persuasion, whether of individuals or groups. He explains:

Convincing people to do something -- take oral rehydration therapy, intercrop, whatever it might be -- is not an act of information: ‘Let’s give them the data, and when they have data they’ll do the right thing.’ It’s more complex than that. […] They are situations where the mental model doesn’t match the reality. […] That’s what I’m talking about as a last mile opportunity. You see, we tend to think the problem is solved when we solve the technology problem. But the human innovation, the human problem still remains, and that’s a great frontier that we have left. This isn’t about the biology of people; this is now about the brains, the psychology of people, and innovation needs to continue all the way through the last mile. (TEDIndia 2009: minute 7:30 and 15:53)

The last mile problem reiterates an old-new challenge for urbanists, namely, the question on applicability of plans, visions and policy beyond selective compatibility criteria that are predominantly statistical, economic and political. Global benchmarks routinely shed their weight on prioritization of elements, allocation of resources, administrative structures, and therein internationalize the local discourse by marginalizing components that constitute a ‘programming’ anomaly, including the range and stimuli of the ‘psychology of people’. Expressing the predicament, it remains customary to classify (reduce?) geographies through mythical, subjective, hypothetical, and numerical binaries through the employment of terminology such as the orientalist East and West, the hierarchical First and Third World, the infantalizing Developed and Developing, and the segregationist Global North and South. Recently the third category Emerging Economies was assumed a sufficient addition that depolarizes and instills credibility in the indiscriminate GDP scale. These patronizing paradigms are legible in the intensities and socioeconomic impacts of profusion, diversity
and extents of penetration of aforementioned neo-colonial ‘shadow regimes’ in geographies with particular historic contexts; constructing what Dipesh Chakrabarty describes as ‘imaginary waiting room of history’ (Harvey 2009:40). Consequently, how can reductionist urban modulations be resisted and coopted? What tools are needed to generate timely-sustainable, flexible, grounded, diverse and coherent city-spaces? And how would these hypothetical frameworks and spaces neutralize the schism between adopted policies that are overtly targeting improved living conditions, yet whose exercise involves restriction and/or violation of civic rights?

In the same line, while acknowledging the significance of futuristic and unrestrained imaginations to innovation and progress, the Palestinian philosopher and political scientists Mudar Kassis abstracts the challenge of the current moment by highlighting two truisms that factor the ongoing processes of intellectual production. First, we are rapidly approaching the threshold of the world order as we know it and are observing it labour a – structural/alternative or superficial/derivative? – shift in economic (post-capitalism?) and political (post-national?) systems. Logically we recognize that we ‘do not know’ what the new ‘post’ organisms and operating systems will be like. Second, although scholarship acquiesces the ‘non-knowledge’ of the future, nonetheless propositions on how the world could or should operate in the future are too often based on expertise obtained in former eras under ontologically varying conditions. Therein the prophecy question resurfaces albeit in philosophical contexts; can urbanists innovatively plan for socio-economically compatible and just future cities under proliferating uncertainty in spite of the conditioned and limited foresight?

In view of these debates on approaches to envisioning urban discourse and practice; the interest of this work lies in exploring the characteristics of potential resilient (social, environmental, financial) morphologies in urbanisms of continued colonialism, economic and political precariousness, namely the city of Ramallah, Palestine. It analyses the particular political, economic and social imaginations versus institutionalized and fluid mechanisms and types of actors and spaces propagating these positions. Thereupon, it discusses and explores spatial elements, requirements and alternative frameworks that could contribute to the decolonization and improvement of quotidian living conditions within the city.

Image 1.1. October 2011, view direction north-west from Ramallah’s centre.
1.1. INTRODUCING RAMALLAH

Ramallah stepped into the 20th century as a village and by the dawn of the 1980s it had wandered into a large town in the shades of Jerusalem. During the first Intifada (1987-1993) it claimed the role of a major political command centre, where the Palestinian collective motto was sumud which signifies ‘steadfastness’, ‘resilience’, and within its manifolds social solidarity. Following the launch of the Peace Process (PP) and the subsequent signature of the Oslo Accords (OAs) in 1993, Ramallah gradually gained increasing power as seat of the Palestinian Authority (PA); the executive arm of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO).

Today it is a contested urbanism resembling normalcy, quasi freedom, and enablement to some; and to others political hegemony, colonial agency, and neoliberal individualism. Palestinian popular associations in the second millennium depict Jerusalem as the precious prisoner in which right to self-determination is to be found; Gaza and Jenin as the battlefields of colonial militarism, counterinsurgency and the message of continued resistance; Nablus and Hebron as strongholds of extended family traditions and economic engines in spite of penetrative colonies and temporalization; and Ramallah is the bordel. The city’s association rapidly shifted from the ‘beautiful, lush, summer resort’ in 1994 (Barghouti 2005) to the ‘Green Zone’ (Massad 2006), ‘five-star prison’ (Taraki 2008), ‘bantustan sublime’ (Abourahme 2009), ‘coeur du mirage palestinien’ (Barthe 2011), ‘hornet’s nest’ (Yehya 2013), and ‘home’ by 18% of the participants in eight focus groups conducted by this work.

According to Ahmad Odaly, former head of the Engineers Union, Ramallah grew five-fold between 2002 and 2010 (Assadi 2010). While the accuracy of the number raises some questions, it is evident that Ramallah hosts both local and international, public and private institutions and organizations. The city is encapsulated and constrained in a mixed reality of direct and indirect colonization that rests on the periphery and through the vessels. Sous-prétext creation of necessary infrastructure for an independent state, foreign aid is provided since 1994 to stir the wheel of development in a process under which imposed neoliberal and global policies on one hand, and on the other mutated quasi-sovereignty, are deforming the space of the ‘district-size’ city, towards becoming what the town and regional planner Rassem Khamaisi (2006) described as ‘national core’, and what this work considers a pregnable cosmopolis. Hence, between enclavization and liberation of the market, the city is renegotiating its relationship to the wider liberation-movement context on one hand, and on the other reshaping the space within its agglomerate under continued precariousness and colonial systems.

Ramallah, the fourth largest city administered by Palestinians that has neither independent import-export potentials (e.g. Gaza), nor a strong economic production base (e.g. Nablus, Hebron); neither a history of wealth and bourgeoisie nor a location of any biblical mention (e.g. Jerusalem, Bethlehem); and whose myth of modern creation involves quasi refugees, new-comers from the east bank of the Jordan as its ‘original families’; Ramallah, the urb with one-fourth the size of Manhattan and the imagined role of New York is the unrivaled Palestinian star-city. It is internationally regarded as an agglomerate undergoing ‘plan-
boom’ (ARTE 2011), ‘bolstered by peace’ and ‘an uptick of investors’ (The Wall Street Journal 2010), whose recently inaugurated Mövenpick Hotel ‘is testament to political stability’ (Sherwood 2010), and whose economy was compared to that of the Asian tiger-economies in a quote by the Spiegel International (von Mittelstaedt 2011). Herein Taraki notes:

Western and Israeli journalists have been the most enthusiastic promoters of the new Ramallah, focusing on its cafés, restaurants, theatres, fitness centres and cultural venues; wonderment that Palestinians are capable of intelligible lives pervades these journalistic writings. Ramallah is variously depicted as proof of the resilience of the middle class, the victory of globalization, the defeat of the [Palestinian] resistance, or of the PA’s ability to assure normalcy in a time of conflict and strife. Palestinian sentiments about the city tend to be strong and are themselves indicative of emerging political and social divisions. (Taraki 2008:12)

Multiple interviewees of this work regard Ramallah as a ‘bubble’ that is bound to explode. It is heavily discussed, adorned, impugned and often calls for reminders that ‘Ramallah is not Palestine’ rather ‘a sliver of land’ that claims to be the ‘Liberty Enclave’ (Toalan 2010). Through its status as seat of the PA it has become the prime sociospatial battlefield due to the coincidence of five; First, the PA’s quasi-monopoly on the political and administrative discourses, whose ideology and tools are outdated, strategy disclosed, and factually unintelligent. This is enabled by, again, a quasi-monopoly on violence through the centralization of command of the policing apparatuses in the agglomerate, which has had significant spatial, societal and behavioural articulations; Second, the heavy-weight presence of agendas, agents and capital of subjective international aid institutions that enjoy impunity and limited-sightedness genealogically; Third, the high concentration of private capital whose accommodation is subsidized through unnecessary incentives, compromised judiciary system, and intimacy with decision-makers; Fourth, the early phases of the exponential growth of the city between 2000 and 2007 have created a mosaic where social, economic, political and ideological colours are highly mixed spatially, and whose interaction and settlement of locational differences is largely de-regulated. Prediction of future evolution potentials of this ecology is multifarious, requiring application of critical knowledge, on uncertain components, while following the dialectic logic of causality and nexus. The complexity of exercising urban envisioning in Ramallah – which is the focus of this work – is essentially due to the Fifth factor; the geopolitical condition of being under Zionist colonization which systematically nurtures Palestinian despotic politics, filters foreign aid from nutrients, tames the imagination of entrepreneurs and private capital keeping them predictable, and fragments Palestinians through legal codifications whose impacts are economic, corporeal and psychological.

Meanwhile, Ramallah seems to have a pact with new comers, therein otherness, and therewith simultaneously and sensitively redefining itself with such flows over the past century. In the 1920s Ramallah leaped from a farmer village to an administrative town concomitant with the inflow of Palestinians from other regions and British Mandate affiliates. In the 1950s it evolved into a city of tradesmen with the re-settlement of thousands of Nakba’ refugees in 1948. In the 1970s and in the aftermath of the 1967 Six-Day War it redefined itself into an
activist city with the reconnection of politico-intellectuals across the Green Line, and the growth of Birzeit University hence the number of its long- and short-term affiliates residing in the agglomerate. In the 1990s it became a diplomatic city with the arrival of Yasser Arafat and his coterie, hence the congregation of the two centres of weight of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), in addition to the World Bank family setting residence. In the early 2000s the closure of the West Bank (WB) by Israeli checkpoints triggered the centralization of the PA in Ramallah, which is turn resulted in an inflow of new comers who were initially predominantly public servants, and later seekers of blue- and white-collar work opportunities; turning the city into the *de facto* capital. Today with the death of the national movement, stagnation of the Peace Process, features of irk of international donors, and the ongoing inflows of new comers and capital into the *hauptstadt*, Ramallah is once again in-labour redefining the features of its persona for the coming era. Here a fundamental question crystallizes: in what direction?

the *Other*

Not to sound discriminatory, but seriously, all these people that are flooding Ramallah do not share our ideology. Neither you nor I will be able to continue our life-style soon. (Ramallah, male, 40s, Mar.2013)

When the people of Jenin all end up here then it will all be over. (Ramallah, female, 17, Oct. 2012)

They move to Ramallah for work like they would emigrate to the US, which is the enemy, yet one will go there to make a living. Considered from the same perspective, many of the people moving to Ramallah spend their years without developing any feelings of association or loyalty. If you visit the north and run a casual conversation you would be surprised that not only some regard it is an enemy, but even wish harm for it such as by an earthquake or the like. This estrangement between Ramallah and other West Bank cities is caused by the discrepancy in capital distribution where much of the wealth is concentrated in Ramallah. This aspect is exasperated by the fact that the PA has no resources, and has liquidated wealth from other regions and re-pumped it into Ramallah. All the aforementioned combined results with the regard for Ramallah being that of aggressiveness, absence of loyalty, and Ramallah will be targeted. (Barghouthi 2012)

Ramallah is not unique, it is uniquely complex. It is where Lefebvre’s (2009) social production of space meets Fanon’s (2008) ‘Black Men, White Masks’ on the grounds of Harvey’s (1990) ‘space-time’ compression to attend the debate of ‘globalization or denationalization?’ (Sassen 2003). According to 50% of participants of 8 focus groups (FG 2011) the most positive aspect of Ramallah is its living conditions, openness and pluralism, at a time the city lies at extreme odds to all other Palestinian localities with its doubling population. In Nablus and Hebron – the largest WB cities – 74.6% and 87.5% (respectively) of the population have been living within the locality since birth. In Ramallah-alBireh this figure stood at a mere 48% (PCBS 2007). Today it has surely sunken further.
Nevertheless, pluralism, access to opportunity, and social justice are results of—among others—failed attempts to eliminate the other as equal, an achievement that Ramallah cannot—yet—claim. It is grounds for contending ideologies, unfolding despotic power, ardent merchant warfare, and a birth place for old-new social associations and their attempts to climb the stage. As global processes and modern life-styles materialize within the city—emancipation from the clan, social otherness, internationalization of habits, and demands for civic rights—there is a lack of ownership, originality, perspective and freedom. The neoliberal patterns and dynamics of the Ramallite ‘new middle class’ (Taraki 2008); the outlawed yet practiced derelict labelling of persons from northern regions of the West Bank as Tailandieh (from Thailand, insinuating cheap mobile labour; see Image 1.2), and; the system by which ‘personal success is based on a collective destruction’ (alKhalili 2012) are manifestations of crucial shortcomings and what Adania Shibli (2012) calls the ‘limitations of imagination’ in the Palestinian crafting of discourse, amongst which the spatial. Here Anani notes:

There is a strong similarity with the colonial mechanism of gazing at space, fragmenting space, controlling the mountain tops, creating gated communities and fostering elitism in the planning of these housing projects. There is an obvious parallel, however, how we produce space in this neocolonial era is not acknowledged. (Anani 2011)

As Chapters 3 and 4 demonstrate, decisions on the city are taken mainly by a clique on the basis of interests of private investors, foreign donors and Israel through a highly centralized and hegemonic governing PA. In 2014 the international Official Donor Assistance (ODA) for Palestinian institutional, economic and social ‘development’, ‘peace-building’, and ‘conflict resolution’ approached the US$ 25 Billion benchmark, in a period of 21 years. This sum has earned Palestinians the fifth rank worldwide in ODA per capita after Palau, Tuvalu, Marshal Islands, and the Federal Republic of Micronesia; all of which combined amount to less than 5% of West Bank and Gaza in terms of population size (Table 3.1; p. 121). Along the course, the ‘goose laying golden eggs’—as described by the political scientist Rex Brynen—has proved the prophecy of capacity to ‘encourage both authoritarianism and neopatrimonial patronage-based politics’ (2000:28), as the coming pages will illustrate. Meanwhile, stories of cities that provide freedom, dignity and security to all citizens equally undeterred by the colonial, neocolonial and hegemonic reality are still to be told.

While Ramallah Municipality (2008) announced several programs aiming at increasing public participation, revolutionizing its administration systems,
revising its decision-making structure and articulating its support of higher social pluralism and civil engagement; nonetheless these frameworks remain exclusive, limited, and lacking rigour (Rayyan 2010; Taraki 2010). Expectedly, the emerging urban forms are mobilizing some civil society members and institutions to voice claims for a healthier city-discourse akin to Berlin and Río De Janerō7. Debates, exhibitions and acupuncture symposiums such as Ramallah Syndrome, Civic Encounter, Ramallah the Fairest of them all City's Exhibition and Qalandya International amongst others indicate social, economic and spatial reimagineering endeavours by local scholars and professionals. However, acupuncture can only achieve positive results if all needles work constructively. Further, a limited number of researchers and practitioners recognize the need for holistic analytical paradigms of ungoverned micro and macro ecologies, beyond the desultory official policy, bureaucratic regulations and master-plans. Proving to be no exception, Ramallah systematically renders efforts of experts obsolete in today's global, neoliberal, capitalist economy which propagates politics of mass-production, mass-consumption, and along the chain, mass-homogenization and -categorization in spite of apparent endemic biological differences.

From some perspectives, the city is caressing narratives of Paris in the 1960s, Beirut in the 2000s, and Barcelona since the 2010s. While voluminous constructions overshadow shrinking remainders of pre 1993 characteristic spatial features and ethos, here grave impacts of free-range capitalist economies are clamping sensitive nerves. Fragmented, vapid and monotonous urban landscapes house – the diagnosable – swelling of social tensions of exclusion (e.g. financially underprivileged), marginalization (e.g. ideological /stereotypical outcasting), isolation (e.g. oppression and absence of social securities), despair, optimism and vulnerable seeds of change. Yet, what is the orientation of this momentum? What are the factors, policies and resources stirring the course of developments? What are their ideologies, priorities, tools, economies and agendas?

Participation as a common practice and tool of decision-making – similar to pluralism – is a result of failed attempts to exclude the other. Herein, if Ramallah’s social development patterns (feelings of pluralism, ownership and purpose) could be positively influenced by enabling the involvement of average (diverse) citoyen in the ecosystem of the city-scape; then, planners need to develop tools for decision-making that; first, are flexible for the governing conditions of uncertainty; second, determine frameworks that naturally guide individual decisions – whether ideological or financial – to meet the larger ‘coalition’ strategy; and third, enable a resilient environment that is viable and rapidly as well as continuously adapting socio-economic urban systems. Would Ramallah’s growth patterns been different had the citoyen had a stronger influence on city-planning? Neither Yes nor No are here appropriate, because on one hand bottom-up influence requires incremental frameworks which neither the current nor the forthcoming constellations offer, and on the other, this would be an act of unnecessary speculation.

Notwithstanding, given the readiness of both parties – Ramallah Municipality and civil society – to engage on one hand, and on the other the continued enthusiasm of capitalists; there are grounded reasons to believe that Ramallah is fertile grounds for undertaking urban experimentation, namely; first, there is considerable receptiveness and institutional support for proposals targeting system-improvement particularly in light of the knowledge-based character of the Palestinian economy. E. e latter is de facto deprived of access to both natural resources and trading mechanisms (Palestine Reform &
Second, Ramallah is undergoing academically-revised—some even predictable—sociospatial contestation processes, thence delivering urgency for conception of endemic tools for translating achieved knowledge to applicable measures. And third, geographic fragmentation of the landscape and the militarization of space by Israel has resulted in the condensation of Palestinians—physically and mentally—inside the islands under PA-sovereignty. The national-space has been reduced to city-scale, and the paradoxical morphology is reflected in the attitudes of residents, chiefly in the form of acute otherness. This is accompanied by rapidly growing post-nationalistic sentiments, which are worth noting and investigating, particularly under the continued colonial conditions on one hand and on the other the dramatic shifts in the world economic structures.

**Purpose of this work**

Hitherto history has neither sustained political projects based on ethnic or religious superiority, nor in retrospect applauded them; the persecution of early Christians by the Roman Empire; Reyes Cathólicos’ expulsion of Muslims and Jews from Spain in the 15th century; The ethnic-cleansing of Caucasians in the 19th century; The British colonization of India; The South African apartheid... Why should the Zionist colonial project have a different fate? Why would humanity’s discourse veer at a project whose critical momentum and ordination was achieved corollary to the morbid ethnic cleansing of Jews by Nazism in the 20th century? Further; whose legitimacy was granted in the aftermath of its ethnic cleansing and displacement of about a million persons (Pappe 2007, alKhalili 2009), eradication of over 400 localities (Khalidi 2006, Pappe 2007), and continues in spite of more than 200 UN Security Council resolutions against it, a higher number of non-binding UN General Assembly and UN Human Rights Council resolutions (UNISPAL 2014), and a standing order since 2004 from the International Criminal Court of Justice de-legitimizing Israel’s—audaciously continued—construction of the Separation Wall. While the future and its dynamics are highly hypothetical, the nonce is poising critical problematics for Ramallah.

Following the postulate that behaviour shapes spaces while the latter is a tool of empowering the former; the purpose of this work is to conceptualize frameworks which reorganize the space of Ramallah through and beyond outlines engendered by official regulations and systems towards decolonizing the morphology of the urban sub-space of the neighbourhood. The approach triangulates knowledge-based and system-oriented participatory (insurgent) planning tools with decisive geopolitical conditions on one hand, and prevalent and rhizomatous economic systems on the other. The constellation is both individual and collective, capitalist and socialist. It is theoretically rooted in concepts of; first, urban social movements and social pluralism; second, geopolitical (de-)colonialism and it social, economic and spatial strategies; and third, contemporary urban decision-making mechanisms for uncertainty and towards attaining resilience. It is founded in the activist pursuit of transforming the barriers separating academia, practice, and the public realm into accessible points of exchange, critical discussion, and constructive discourse. It is not about creating a melting pot, rather, investigating a pilot for a block in the bee’s nest called Ramallah.
1.2. APPROACH, METHODS AND SCALE OF 100 × RAMALLAH

In 2010 study of official urban development and foreign aid policy seemed to be a favourable discourse to understanding the transitional character of Ramallah. The initial months focused on drawing connections between the case and theory on one hand, and investigating regional and global similarities on the other. Consequent findings and analysis indicated that the city space is dominated by colonial territorializations that enable surveillance, foreclose claims to the public realm, fragment economic logic, and entrench sociospatial discrimination to name a few. A preoccupation in Ramallah's vulnerability in the unfolding tolerance quiz and disaster-risk (environmental, economic, political) stimulated the venture into futuristic speculation. What does tomorrow hide for Ramallah?

Gradually the initially perceived research problematic deflated into one cogwheel in an intriguing ecology. Space as system became focal; past, present and future; constituents, engines and consequences; political, economic and social; perceived, lived and representational; and individual, relational and collective. Needless to point out the aforementioned encapsulates a scope beyond the capacity of any individual research. As a result, a process of reasoning, conditioning and prioritization took place. The later was factored by mainly three; first, access to information (e.g. limited access to cartographic data due to securitization, lack of transparency and access to public databases, poor spatial archiving, etc.); second, timely socio-political markers (e.g. events of spatial claiming and bending of discourse), and; third, detected tangible activities within the larger space (e.g. constructions, regulatory frameworks, announced programs and projects, etc.). Hence, this research followed flexible criteria and progressive re-evaluation in the process of defining the specific foci in which case-based empirical, statistical and narrative data pairs with rooted and speculative epistemological readings. This methodology culminated with the reorientation and specification of the research inquiries from focus on enacted policy (retrospective) to potential scopes of protest (decolonizing) urbanism through nonviolent insurgency tactics (prospective); as described earlier.

Over the course of this work eight field visits totalling 32 weeks were conducted, ranging between two to six weeks each, and spanning over intervals of 6 months in average. During these visits twenty qualitative interviews with practitioners and experts of varying backgrounds were conducted; public officials, private investors, urbanists and planners, politicians, economists, journalists and researchers. Interviews averaged around an hour in length and followed a semi-structured outline. The main tracks guiding the conversations were six questions:

- How do you perceive the change in Ramallah?
- What is your opinion about the emerging physical patterns and forms?
- Do you feel there is a social change? why/how?
- What is your opinion about the economic vehicles of the city?
- What is your opinion about the politics and governance of the city?
• Personal relation to the city: since when? relation to city’s core? to other spaces? favourite place? what do you find positive/negative in Ramallah?

With the exception of the last questions, interviews did not equally expound on all six items. Rather, topic-time allocation was scaled in reference to the experiences and field of expertise of the interviewee; which was reflected in the final compilation of transcripts. Further, the personal archive of interviewees varied in length, where 50% of the interviewees were above 50 years in age – those whose consciousness was shaped with the rise of the national liberation movement in the 1970s; 40% of interviewees were in their thirties or forties – those whose consciousness was shaped with the peak of societal collective disobedience in the 1980s; and only 10% with persons in their twenties – those whose consciousness was shaped with the slow death of the national liberation movement. This formula comes into balance through combining with eight focus groups where each of the first two age categories corresponds to one focus group, the third corresponds to two focus groups, and an additional fourth category of teenagers (17-18 years) corresponds to four focus groups – persons whose consciousness is being shaped at this moment under the currents of post-nationalism, where the collective political cause of a national state is significantly compromised by the corporeal and economic emergency. Focus Group participants were also requested to fill a questionnaire whose outline followed the afore-stated items. Tables with further details about conducted interviews and focus groups can be found in Annex.2; p. 382.

In parallel, observing banal behaviours and logic of socio-economic spatializations became an amusing and equally intimidating puzzling exercise; through legal documents, public announcements, market operations, quotidian comments, selection of courted spaces, mapping of varied reactions to same behaviour in different neighbourhoods and many more little things. Many of these observations had to be suspended pending further investigation, however some served as orientation sensors for the research discourse. Meanwhile, a four-year archive of over 8,000 items was constructed; images, maps, visualizations, flyers, data-sources, media articles, grey literature and publications.

In line with the goal of this work – contribute to the imagineering of discourses of sociospatial decolonization – the methodology sought to identify potential components of what Ferguson (2014) coined *makeshift city*. These are urban conditions under which *insecurity* and *scarcity* stimulate acts of ‘renegotiations in the forms of interventions – both temporary and permanent – that crack urban codes and regulations open up urban areas for reuse and for a previously un-thought condition of heterogeneity and diversity’ (ibid:15). These components where employed in an urban *speculation* tactic whose strategy capitalizes on morphological fluid re-territorialization as measure of countering the colonial temporalization (see section 2.1.3.i; p. 57). In its approach, it drew on the romanticism and contemporary sensibilities of *sumud* (see section 3.2; p. 132); seeking the psycho-spatial dignified collective in the varied, fragmented and disenfranchised ecology.

The targeted (grounded) imagined interventions had to therewith explore concepts and methods of *civic economies* and *urban recycling* on one hand, and on the other those of the socio-spatial impacts of the contextually often exercised *urbicide*; the logic of violence which if ‘understood as a distinct form of political violence’, then it represents ‘the destruction of the built environment *qua* that
which comprises the conditions of possibility of a particular existential quality: heterogeneity’ (Coward 2009:91).

Along this process it became evident that parameters governing Ramallah’s growth patters and ethos have their naissance in the British Mandate era, in spatial principles of counter-insurgency, and socializations of survivalism (see section 2.2.2; p. 82). Therein, following concepts of causality as analytical engine the historic time-frame of this work commences with World War I which marks the placement into effect of French and British regional colonial rapacity, as articulated in the Sykes Picot Agreement and brought about by the establishment of the British Mandate of Palestine (Map 1.1; p. 24). Hence the time-frame of 1914-2014 was determined as backdrop. This paradigm falls in line with the hypothesis of this work which stipulates that Ramallah’s urbanism is a product of its colonial genealogy since ‘all political and social projects are ecological projects, and vice versa’ (Harvey 2009:237). However, where and how do the futurist envisioned analysis-based interventions take place and how are they justified? While the aforementioned methods form the main tracks of this project, nonetheless, further specification was necessary.

**Conditionality as Criteria**

Assuming that decolonization requires socio-spatial intoxication from the narrow colonial, legal and economic parameters reproducing subsidiarity, and based on a universalist approach, the investigative discourse therein conditioned identification of relevant urban strategies for Ramallah as measured by two; first, improvement of quotidian living conditions, and second, the corollary balancing of access to resources (see section 2.2; p. 73). Within its manifolds, this work therewith places itself opposite to the PLO’s project of state-making arguing Ramallah’s sociospatial deformation as evidence of non-conformity as well as failure of the adopted discourse in respect to the claimed goal of attaining the right to self-determination and equality. Instead, through the dialectic argumentation of the following chapters I speculate on quasi-clandestine, incremental, fluid, private and public frameworks for spatial appropriation as a potential course for achieving those democratic targets. Therein and in light of the contextual socio-economic othering and relationalities, the city and neighbourhood spaces as mediums of behavioural (mental and material) engenderment compose the third condition of possibility (see section 2.1; p. 47). Borrowing the words of Martin Coward about the quintessence of morphological contours:

> [...]ince buildings are fundamentally public, this spatiality is always already shared with others and thus contains the possibility of heterogeneity. According to Heidegger and Nancy, heterogeneity comprises a Being-with, or sharing of the world with others. This Being-with, or sharing, is understood as a fundamental relationality in which identity (the presence of an entity) is constituted only in relation to difference. Self and other are not pre-existing entities that exist side-by-side (and thus are contingently forced to enter into a relation), but rather identities that are established in and through the constitution of a relation. These identities unfold from a shared boundary that marks where self finishes and other starts and vice versa. (Coward 2009:91; emphasis added)
Exploration of the \textit{where} that Coward names as pivotal produces an array of domains for physical urban \textit{makeshift}-interventions, whose categorization in terms of priority yields several legitimate arrangements. Upon investigating some constellations of fields posing relevance for Ramallah, the criteria of ‘what spatial components would always existentially condition any scenario?’ was applied (see section 3.2; p. 132). Combined once again with the two earlier conditions narrowed down the potential fields to a handful.

At this advanced stage of the research three more conditions inspired by the context of the work were adopted; \textbf{fourth}, low-bureaucracy given the centralized, hegemonic reality (see section 3.3; p. 173); \textbf{fifth}, pertaining to incremental-scale where small, varied individual items puzzle a continuum (see section 4.4; p. 220), and last; \textbf{sixth}, potentiality of outsourcing hence structural resilience and efficiency (see section ; p. 262).

Following this methodological framework through the 1914-2014 time-frame while factoring case-related social, economic and political components, resources and dynamics; this work determined the issue of \textit{mobility} within the city – particularly pedestrian and mental – as its central preoccupation, domain of makeshift interventions, and therein tool for the targeted sociospatial decolonization through morphological reconfiguration. As for the localization, \textit{antispaces} throughout the city space were determined as the mediums of feasible solutions given their characteristic dichotomy of posing a threat on one side, while on the other a semi-guaranteed financial (market) profitability (see section 2.1.3.iii; p. 65 and 4.4.1; p. 223).

1.2.1. Structure of 1\textsuperscript{st} × Ramallah

What we academics so often forget is the role played by the sensibilities that arise out of the streets around us, the inevitable feelings of loss provoked by the demolitions, what happens when whole quarters (like Les Halles) get re-engineered […], or the despair that flows from the glum desperation of marginalization, police repressions and idle youth lost in the sheer boredom of increasing unemployment and neglect in the soulless suburbs that eventually become sites of roiling unrest. (Harvey 2013:xii)

Affirming the definitive role of accumulative sociopolitical mentalities on urban policy and spatial formations, this work commences with a brief time-line that maps geopolitical events relevant to this work in the century between 1914 and 2014. In this chapter landscapes of collective memories, shifting borders, and spatial discourses are displayed to frame the Palestinian psyche and tempo of the era. In a sense, the following pages of Chapter 1 could be considered a framed geographic and political capitulation of the case at hand.

Knowing that policies are successful ideological and financial marriages that breed (multiple) urban ethos and ecologies, Chapter 2 investigates the political roots of nowadays morphology; therein spatial features, specificities, functions, dynamics, evolutions, economic, social and environmental ecologies, and equally importantly, the fuelling ideologies and politics. This chapter questions dominant theories, their propositions and terminology, and gives voice to alternative
interpretations. For example, general discourses regard the Israeli control over Palestine as an ‘occupation’, which is a term that implies limited intervention and temporality. Article 55 of the Laws and Customs of War on Land (Hague IV) of 18 October 1907 states:

The occupying State shall be regarded only as administrator and usufructuary of public buildings, real estate, forests, and agricultural estates belonging to the hostile State, and situated in the occupied country. It must safeguard the capital of these properties, and administer them in accordance with the rules of usufruct. (ICRC 2014)

It is not the interest of this work to state or detail the tens of violations of International Law that Israel has committed since 1948. However, one of the major reason for shortcomings of modern scholarship on Palestine is the narrowness of approach lined by – amongst others – the employment of incompatible definitions which distort vision and precision (Abourahme 2011, Hamami and Tamari 2008). Equations utilized to compose targets, policies, plans and legal justifications (e.g. Palestinian Reform and Development Plan, 2007) would have been variably different in scope, structure and tools had ‘occupation’ been replaced with ‘colonialism’, ‘state-building’ with ‘terminating colonial subsidiarity’, and ‘nationalism’ with ‘civic rights’ or ‘combating inequality’, among several other terms. Hamami and Tamari summarize the ongoing re-weighing of terminology employed for the case by writing:

Various conceptions of colonialism are increasingly gaining currency amongst critical Israeli and international scholars; Tony Judt has deemed Israel’s status as a ‘colonial state’ an anachronism. Israeli architect, Eyal Weizmann now calls Israel’s project in the occupied territories, ‘late-colonial occupation’, building on post-colonial theorist, Achille Mbembe’s theorization of it as a ‘modern colonial occupation’. And in various attempts to conceptualize the process of spatial control, territorial transformation and their effects, we have scholars using concepts such as ‘Bantustanization’; ‘carceral geography’; ‘spacio-cide’, ‘urbicide’ and ‘politicide’. That the nature of Israeli spatial strategies in the West Bank and Gaza is unprecedented is borne out by the interest it has garnered among non-Palestine specialists in issues of political geography. (Hamami and Tamari 2008:24)

This scholarly debate ensues decades of Israeli re-territorialization policies between maximalist and pragmatist Zionist political wings partnered in evading a ‘final status’ agreement while claiming its pursuit (see Chapter 2; pg. 45). The highly improbable ‘two-state solution’ clinches to the Westphalian concept of sovereignty and administration which assumes a homogeneous nation, and its ongoing application camouflages the ethno- and bio-politics at play in a geography (hence urbanisms) that sustained as communities of ethnic and cultural natural selection through 4,000 years of history. The significance of this linguistic scrutiny lies in accuracy of prognosis of (urban) phenomena at hand. Herein:

What is suggestive of the range of attempts to simply find concepts that can explain the current situation, under which Palestinians live under Israel’s rule, is that in terms of their sophistication and magnitude, Israel’s strategies of
control have reached a critical mass. At the same time, their logic as a political project has reached a critical impasse. Forty years of facts on the ground, premised on outmaneuvering a one or bi-national state solution have led to a situation in which Israel’s strategies have now reached far beyond a workable two-state option. Thus at this time, Palestinians and Israelis seem to face only two choices; a continuation ad-infinitum of the current state of emergency or an exit in the form of an implausible ‘transitional state’, with the latter likely to be simply a diplomatic cover for some version of the former. (ibid.)

Hence, it is quintessential for this work to philosophically differentiate between projected (imagined, mental) and grounded (scientific, real) meanings, ideologies, and their economic, social, and particularly spatial trails and implications. Chapter 2, hence, serves comprehension of the causes and game-rules of the contemporary ‘Oslo-Era’, to which the dramatic sociospatial change of Ramallah is attributed.

Chapter 3 expounds on the politico-economic factors fuelling Ramallah’s tendencies in the past two decades since the signature of the Oslo Accords (OAs) in 1993. It simultaneously investigates the spacio-social relationalities and sensibilities legitimizing and incubating these discourses. In the first half of the chapter, the OA’s state-making project is evaluated through capitulation of the international and local economic policies, administrative priorities, ‘securitization’ of domestic politics and their impacts on the city. In the second half of the chapter the spatial and social translations of this system are displayed, scrutinized and puzzled following dialectics of causality; establishing that socio-political consciousness of Ramallites and their spacio-economically articulated changed ethos – in both pre and post the Oslo era – constitute ecological processes whose birth-to-death cycle is aphoristic, and whose components and intensities are – largely – manipulations of ingredients determined by spatially-sensitive contesting ideological powers.

After addressing bionomic theory and debates relevant to Ramallah’s evolution; Chapters 4 and 5 proceed to map urban undertakings by both public and private parties (respectively). These chapters outline the power and decision-making mandates and influence; modes of operation, structures and systematic variables; the most relevant projects and engagements; theoretical genealogies and comparative cases to screened urban visions, policies, targets, and tools; foreseen sociospatial consequences for these strategies, and; the underlying opportunities. Therein, these chapters identify cross-sectoral spaces for profit-oriented (financial or mental) relational solidarities at liminalities of societal archetypal categorizations, leading the way to the following chapter.

Chapter 6 concludes this work with puzzling the findings of former chapters in variable imaginations of alternative urban realities that Ramallah could potentially produce. Through re-negotiating the existing colonial morphology and centralized, bureaucratic decision-making systems, this chapter explores opportunities for nurturing environmentally, economically and politically resilient, inclusive and progressive spaces of resistance and sociospatial decolonization. In the current critical moment for Palestine specifically and cities featuring anti-colonial revolutions generally; modes of spatial absorption, scaling, synthesis, and reimageeering of locational social ideologies and movements is essential for the quality of life and dignity.

Based on empirical findings, theoretical reviews, and acknowledging that economy has the upper hand over (particularly radical) ideology in politics; in
envisioning future scenarios for Ramallah this closing chapter sets ‘financial profitability’ and ‘social equality’ as conditions and target of proposed urban design strategies. Urban antispaces and vessels of mobility are assumed as landscapes of experimentation, and empowerment of low social and administrative hierarchies as methods. In the larger perspective, these propositions aim at revising and exploring possibilities of amelioration of the bureaucratic, capitalist and social systems of production of space in Ramallah, while recognizing the challenges of scale and subjectivity of the imagined civic commons.

Prior to advancing into the approaches and methods of this work; here it should be noted that aside the scientific motivations of this work, it desires to serve as a scholarly narrative that coalesces some facets of the momentary polemics, voiced aspirations and intellectual brainstorming about Ramallah. This five-year process has travelled through multitude of provocative and inspiring conversations, debates, and assemblies, and herewith aims at expounding on concepts of insurgent urbanism. The reflections outlined here do not claim premise to foreclosing or limiting differing understandings and interpretations; rather it calls attention to a selection of polychromic aspects requiring deeper investigation.

1.2.2. Scaling Ramallah

Work on the city therefore also frequently became ‘social work’; work on an urban ‘people’ who had apparently lost their ethics and morals in a big city [Berlin] environment allegedly bereft of traditions and taboos. (Kaschuba 2012:241; primary testimony on conditions in Berlin, end of the 19th century)

When asked about the most negative aspect of Ramallah 48% of participants in focus groups answered with ‘over-crowdedness’, ‘pollution’ and ‘traffic congestion’ as the worst aspect of the city. In reality and through a subjective comparison, Ramallah’s total area is 1.5 that of the district of Kreuzberg (Berlin), but has 20% of the population of the latter and 12.5% the population density (Infographic 1.1; p. 19). However, Kreuzberg has the Görlitzer Park (14 dunums), Viktoria Park (16 dunums), and Gleisdreieck Park (26 dunums) and countless neighbourhood gardens – not to mention its bordering of the Tempelhofer Feld (230 dunums). In contrast, Ramallah has the Radana Park (7 dunums) and less than a dozen of (much smaller) neighbourhood gardens; which is reflected in the higher demand for residential unit space per capita in Ramallah as compared to Kreuzberg. While in the former 120 sq.m. apartment for a family of four constitutes a basic space, in the latter it equates to comfort. Corollary, in place of the 1.2-meter average sidewalk with in the former the later has 3 meters, and while Kreuzberg boasts stretches of pedestrian areas Ramallah has none. Logically, comparison should keep in mind that – first – the morphology of Kreuzberg which was outlined by James Hobrecht in 1862 (akin the Ildefons Cerdà plan in Barcelona in 1860) was placed in effect prior the intensification of inflows of new-comers, integrated substantial geometric mobility axis long before the mass-production of automobiles, and targeted a topography of marginal elevations. The Cerdà plan remained limited to the coastal
plains of Barcelona and the Kreuzberg (mountain) rises 66 meters above sea level, while Ramallah rests on a series of hilltops whose contours range between 630 and 880 meters above see level, where a site-inclination of 30% is a standard, and often reaches 40%. Second, Kreuzberg’s experience with disenfranchisement terminated twenty-four years ago, in the pre-digital era. At the time, Ramallah was stepping into the ‘next level’ of the colonial game.

However, this comparison was employed to demonstrate two. On one hand, the feelings of spatial crowdedness in Ramallah are produced by many factors, some of which are physically tangible (e.g. congestions during rush hours due to weak and monotypic infrastructure), and other non-tangible ones whose weight is projected (e.g. absence of pedestrian and congregation spaces as overcrowding in spite of the relatively large undeveloped space). While the private sector caters for some of the spatial needs of the financially capable, the larger social strata compete over the scarce public services; feeding into the predictable phenomena of otherness, urban poor, and among others insecurity, which are highly associated with rapidly growing capitalist metropolises.

On the other hand, the Ramallah – Kreuzberg comparison was displayed to scale the case at hand. The rapid growth pace of Ramallah since the year 2000 is often cited as argument for the expansion of its municipal territory. This is in fact a policy that the Ramallah Municipality actively peruses as demonstrated in the

Infographic 1.1. Comparing Ramallah and Kreuzberg in terms of area and population size and density in 2009.
recent annexation of alReehan Neighbourhood that was built on lands under the
neighbouring Surda and Abu Qash Council (see section 5.1.3; p. 249). Although
concepts such as Jerusalem Metropolitan Area (Ramallah to Bethlehem), Greater
Ramallah and the Ramallah, alBireh, and Beitunya Metropolitan Area (RABMA;
elaborated in Chapter 4) are circulating in ministerial planning departments;
nonetheless Ramallah Municipality seems to remain focused on its statute in
spite of the melted borders between its fabric and those of Jerusalem, alBireh
and Beitunya.

Frameworks for integration of technical infrastructure (e.g. sewage system)
have indeed been agreed upon between the triplet municipalities. However,
considering that such works are predominantly executed by the Ministry of
Public Works and the testimonies of public servants reveal the cosmetic nature
of cooperation. As for social and administrative infrastructures, these remain
segregated as heretofore. While this topic is elaborated in Chapter 4, here it
should be noted that Ramallah Municipality is investing significant energy in
ameliorating its performance based on framed elements in place of factoring
its comprehensive posture as district in a pubertal metropolis rather than an
autonomous city. This scalar differentiation is calculated in the approach and
propositions of this work.

1.2.3. Why Ramallah not alBireh, or both?

In spite of the fact that alBireh Municipality is older, wealthier, and governs
larger geography than that of its twin; nonetheless, over the past century it has
remained quiet, giving the impression of being an extension to rather than a root
of Ramallah9. The majority of Palestinians – besides those of the twin cities – refer
to the region as Ramallah, a dominance further evidenced in the coinage of the
PA as the ‘Ramallah regime’ at a time its headquarters (Mukataa; see section 2.1.2;
p. 53), President Mahmoud Abbas’ residence and the bulk of ministries until 2013
were located within alBireh municipal territories.

The 1931 Census of Palestine by the British Mandate categorised the region
as the Ramallah Sub-district within the Jerusalem District (Mills 1932) with
no mention of alBireh. In the same line, a glance through recent research and
publications or simply a Google-search provides another indicator of Ramallah’s
precocious visibility over alBireh. Therein, Ramallah has evidently won the
spotlight and became a coinage for the ethos of residents and influential actors
whom are actively factoring the image of the agglomerate; the reputation, and the
form. In this view, it was decided to focus on Ramallah Municipality as institution
while eyeing the agglomerate as the geography of examination.

On a different level and while recognizing the unorthodoxy of this indicator,
entering ‘Ramallah’ as search item in Facebook provides ‘more than 1.000 pages’
(with tens of thousands of members), while alBireh (or Bireh) yields a mere
‘Fewer than 100 pages’ (Annex.1; p. 381). Noteworthy is the genre of namings of
these pages; Ramallah-ing [as verb], Ramallah Friendz, Ramallah loveers, and
365 things to do in Ramallah among many others the common characteristic of
which is the expression of affection to the place and its dynamism. Yet, more eye-
catching are the namings which translate a (nonerudite?) ideology of Ramallah
as superior to other localities e.g. First [comes] Ramallah (80.098 members), Dawlet Ramallah (state of-, 42.207 members), and Ramallah a7la (prettier, 19.581 members), among others. On the other side of the same coin, a page titled Ramallah liljamee’ (for everyone) attracted a mere 274 members. Noteworthy, the estimated population of Ramallah in 2014 is 33,218 (PCBS 2010).

While Facebook memberships and ‘likes’ cannot be considered statistically reliable neither in terms of correctness nor precision; notwithstanding, it is a valid social indicator of growing sentiments of differentiation among residents of this space in relation to other Palestinian localities; a post-nationalist process unfolding in parallel to the continuing and intensifying settler-colonial project of Israel.
1.3. VISUALIZING 1914-2014: BRIEF TIME-LINE OF POLITICAL EVENTS AND TERRITORIALIZATIONS

1.3.1. British Mandate of Palestine

The end of World War I marked two decades of the Zionist project's unfolding and more importantly its detrimental leap. Following the signature of the Sykes Picot agreement in 1916 (Map 1.1); on November 2nd 1917 the British Foreign Secretary at the time Lord Arthur James Balfour sent a letter to Baron de Rothschild (leader of the Jewish community in Britain) pledging British support for the establishment of a Jewish 'national home' in Palestine in what later became known as the Balfour Declaration (PASSIA 2012). The promise turned into an evident policy as the British Mandate over Palestine came into effect and emigration of Jews from Europe facilitated. In three decades the Jewish population in Palestine inflated from 8% in 1914 to 30% by 1941 (ProCon 2012).

By 1937 and 1938 the Peel and Woodhead Commissions (Map 1.3, Map 1.4) submitted partition proposals for the British Government based on the concept of creating two nation-states as legacy to the departing Mandate-regime: an Arab state for Palestinians, and a Jewish state for the multi-ethnic immigrants (Ashkenazi, Sephardi, Mizrahi, etc.). While these remained as proposals, the inherent colonial prejudice and disregard to realities liquidated and reduced Palestinians into 'Arabs' – assuming that the today 22 nations of the Arab League possess an individual horizontal identity – while concomitantly multi-national immigrants were bundled utilizing religion. The latter approach created the second predicament that nowadays remains increasingly convoluted: how to recalibrate a system that was founded on politico-religious basis? The latter is evident in the demands of the successive Israeli negotiating teams since 2009 to recognize Israel as a 'Jewish State', at a time a quarter of its population is non-Jewish15, not to mention non-Israeli Palestinians (ICBS 2013).

On Nov. 29th, 1947 the UN General Assembly passed resolution '181 (II) Future Government of Palestine' which suggested keeping Jerusalem and Bethlehem as corpus separatum under their umbrella apart from the two intertwining states illustrated in Map 1.6. The Palestinian population – 66% of total – was to have 43% of the lands of Palestine, while the Jewish population – 33% of total – were to receive 56% for their state (MERIP 2012, HPIP 2012). This proposition ignored that towards 'the end of the Mandate in 1948, the Jewish communities owned around 5.8% of the land of Palestine' (Pappe, 2008: 18, Map 1.5). According to the Israeli historian Ilan Pappé the Zionist leadership had an offense strategy designed over years: Plan Dalet; whose execution resulted in the establishment of the State of Israel on the ruins of expulsion of more than 700,000 Palestinians, the wiping out of over 400 villages, and significant altering of urban demographics (Khalidi
Map 1.7 demonstrates the directions in which the Palestinians fled, and thus places where refugee camps were eventually established (Map 1.10); in Lebanon (12 camps), Syria (12 camps), Jordan (10 camps), the West Bank (19 camps) and Gaza Strip (8 camps), as separate entities and remain as such nowadays. Almost all related affairs are handled by the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East¹⁶ (UNRWA); which in 2012 had 5,115,755 registered refugees (UNRWA 2012).

By early 1949 the newly established state of Israel on 78% of the lands of Palestine (Map 1.8) signed Armistice Agreements with Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan and Syria marking an end for the battles of 1948 on the official level without answering the Palestinian question. Later the West Bank was assigned to the custody of Jordan, and the Gaza Strip to that of Egypt.

**A note on the Na文化节**

The 1948 Na文化节 remains a fundamental unifying memory in the minds of Palestinians up to date where the Right of Return of refugees is declared inalienable. With the refugee camps scattered around – and even at hearts of – urban centres (inside and beyond Palestine) it is difficult to ignore the question of how those spaces can be integrated at a time their incorporation remains a politically rejected thought, for those are ‘temporary spaces’. The refugees will go ‘home’, the camps will be dismantled, and the lands will be returned to their owners. Notwithstanding, after 66 years and third- and fourth-generation refugees the temporality of those spaces of ‘territorial illegitimacy’ is highly questioned, and the living conditions in them continue to be troubling.
Map 1.1. 1916 | Sykes Picot Agreement, British Mandate post WWI. 1917 | Lord Balfour Declaration promising Palestine to Zionists

Map 1.2. 1920s | Palestinian localities and Zionist colonies in Palestine in the first decade of British Mandate over Palestine

Map 1.3. 1937 | Palestine Royal (a.k.a Peel) Commission plan for partition

Palestinian revolts against Mandate

Legend:
- British Mandate of Palestine territory
- British Colony territory
- Palestinian city / town
- Zionist city / town
- Mixed city / town
- Palestinian village
- Zionist village
- Proposed Palestinian state
- Proposed Jewish state
- Area to remain under British control
Map 1.4. 1938 | Palestine Partition (a.k.a Woodhead) Commission proposal

Map 1.5. 1946 | Jewish vs. non-Jewish land ownership

Map 1.6. 1947 | United Nations Partition Plan for Palestine
Map 1.7. 1948 | Directions of flight of Palestinian refugees during the Nakba (catastrophe) a.k.a. War of Independence for Israelis

Map 1.8. 1948 | Establishment of Israel on 78% of historic Palestine, Jordan annexes West Bank, Egypt annexes Gaza Strip

Map 1.9. 1948-67 | Locations of 418 Palestinian villages destroyed and/or depopulated by Israel between 1948 and 1967 (Khalidi 2006)
Registered refugee population since 2001
2001  |  3,926,787
2006  |  4,448,429
2012  |  5,271,893
(UNRWA 2013)

Map 1.10.
2001 | UNRWA
Recognized refugee camps and registered refugee population in the region.
1.3.2. Transit into Apartheid: 1948 - 1993

Between 1948 and 1967 the West Bank and Gaza Strip were respectively placed under the custody of the Kingdom of Jordan and the Republic of Egypt. This corresponded to the height of the Pan-Arabism period and the fight against the remaining traces of colonialism (not to be confused with imperialism which was picking momentum from the other side of the battle field); an example of which was the Tripartite Aggression on Egypt in 1956 (Map 1.11, Map 1.12).

In 1964 the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) was officially declared in the Arab League's summit in Cairo. As of that date the PLO continues to promote itself as the sole representative of the Palestinian people, yet it wasn't until ten years later – in 1974 – that it gained international recognition as such.

Three years after the establishment of the PLO Israel ended the months-long period of tension and armament with a grab-strike on the Egyptian airforce. Events followed and the war culminated merely 6 days later with Israel's victory and respective annexation of the West Bank from Jordan, the Gaza Strip and Sinai Peninsula from Egypt, and the Golan heights from Syria (Map 1.13). This is known today as the Six Days' war: between the 5th and 10th of June 1967.

Shortly after general Yigal Allon presented a plan to the Israeli Knesset proposing it keeps all areas occupied in the Six Day's war, thereof declaring them as the new borders. However, two islands within the West Bank which include the majority of Palestinian citizens were to be handed to Jordan (Map 1.14).

In 1973 the October War broke out. Even though it was Egypt and Syria who launched the surprise attack this time, yet they were defeated and Israel gained more territory (Map 1.15) as well as the image of being invincible. The importance of this event lies in the resulting shift in Egyptian political discourse whom signed the Camp David peace agreement with Israel in 1978/9. With that, the major Arab power was neutralized, and Pan-Arabism shelved.

By 1971 PLO presence in Jordan was terminated due to the events of Black-September (1970), cornering the former in Lebanon. With its entire eastern, southern and western borders at guaranteed calm, Israel focused its attention on eliminating the PLO and for that end invading Lebanon in 1982 (Map 1.16). Upon the signature of Camp David Israel withdrew from the occupied Sinai Peninsula, handing it back to Egypt. However, the Gaza Strip, the West Bank and the Syrian Golan Heights remain under Israeli colonization up to the date of this work.

Last, noteworthy is the correspondence of the aforementioned events to the quiet yet swift encroachment of the colonial settler-enterprise in all occupied areas: WB, GS, Sinai Peninsula and Golan Heights. This core concept of this dossier was that of creation of irreversible facts on the ground by colonizing the space; transforming it into an integral part of the lands of Israel. This topic will be re-visited and elaborated over the coming pages.
Map 1.11. 1956 | Tripartite Aggression on Egypt a.k.a Suez Crisis (Israel, France, UK)

Map 1.12. 1957 | in March, Israel withdrew out of Sinai and back to its 1948 borders
Map 1.13. 1967 | Six-Day War, Israel occupying Sinai peninsula from Egypt, West Bank from Jordan, Golan Heights from Syria.

Map 1.15. 
1973 | October War, resulting in Israel occupying further Sinai peninsula, Golan Heights territories.

1979 | Egyptian-Israel Peace Treaty after the Camp David Accords that were signed in 1978.

1981 | WZO Settlements Master Plan; see pg. 89

Map 1.16. 
1982 | Israel withdrawal from Sinai, and invasion of Lebanon up to Beirut. In 1985 Israel redeployed to South Lebanon.
1.3.3. The Oslo Accords and the Peace Process

The Government of the State of Israel and the P.L.O. team (...) representing the Palestinian people, agree that it is time to put an end to decades of confrontation and conflict, recognize their mutual legitimate and political rights, and strive to live in peaceful coexistence and mutual dignity and security and achieve a just, lasting and comprehensive peace settlement and historic reconciliation through the agreed political process. (Declaration of Principles, 13 September 1993, Washington; NAD 1993)

The Oslo Accords (OAs), also known as Declaration of Principles (DoPs), were signed on 13 September 1993 in Washington D.C. following a period of secret negotiations between the Israeli Government and the PLO in the Norwegian capital Oslo; at a time public negotiations were being held in Washington D.C. following the Madrid Peace conference in 1991. It was the first signed agreement between the two sides, and was intended as frame for an interim period of five years. Its 17 Articles and 4 Annexes were presented as the framework through which final status issues would be negotiated.

Article I of the DoPs defined the aim of the negotiations as that ‘to establish a Palestinian Interim Self-Government Authority’ that should facilitate reaching ‘a permanent settlement based on Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338’ in a period ‘not exceeding five years’ (NAD 1993); while article IV specified that the jurisdiction of the Palestinian Authority will be within areas specified in negotiations annexed to the agreement. The latter was further articulated and featured small-scale territorial redefinition over the following 7 years; in the Taba Agreement in 1995 (a.k. Oslo II), in the Wye River Memorandum in 1998, and the Camp David Summit in 2000. These were followed by multiple proposals such as the Clinton Parameters, the Arab Peace Initiative, and Bush’s Road Map, as well as others political endeavours but none crystallized.

Article V stated that core-conflict issues were to be sidelined and subsequently addressed in the permanent status negotiations. These issues were: Jerusalem, refugees, Israeli settlements, security arrangements, borders, relations and cooperation with neighbours. In relation to this, Article VIII underlined that the PA will have a strong police force for maintenance of public order, however, it shall establish no army and Israel shall remain in charge of overall security and defence against threats. Of the listed core-issues only that of security was detailed; initially through the joint patrolling units which did not live past the year 2000, then the Dayton Era, and most recently the EUPOL COPPS program.

Article VI defined the sectors in which transfer of powers and responsibilities from the Israeli authorities to the Palestinian ones was to take place; according to which the PA was to be in charge of education and culture, health, social welfare, direct taxation, and tourism.

Article VII outlined the path of the planned interim economic-based negotiations by naming the following projects: a Palestinian Electricity Authority, Gaza Sea Port Authority, Palestinian Development Bank, Palestinian Export Promotion Board, Palestinian Environmental Authority, Palestinian Land Authority and a Palestinian Water Administration Authority. This was further enforced in Article XI which re-affirmed the Israeli-Palestinian cooperation on economic issues via the establishment of a liaison committee. This article
Image 1.6. Former USA President Bill Clinton, former Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, and former PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat shaking hands upon the signature of the DOPs on the White House loan in Washington DC on September 13th 1993. (Edmonds 1993)

was further detailed in Annex III of the DoPs: Protocol on Israeli-Palestinian cooperation in Economic and Development Programs. The annex named 11 sectors of cooperation: water, electricity, energy, finance, transport and communications, trade, industry, labour, human resources development, environmental protection, and communication and media.

In short, the DoPs focused on the issues relevant to Israel, namely: security and economy, and sidelined those that were and are the *raison d’être* of the Palestinian claim to self-determination. In light of the above, the DoPs are widely considered as the process by which the Israeli Civil Administration was substituted by a similar apparatus yet with Palestinian personnel. According to political analysts, this arrangement on one hand produced the illusion that Israel was no more a colonizing power, and on the other, it was the fatal compromise that killed the Palestinian national resistance movement, with the following agreements as the nails in its coffin (Kassis 2010, alAtar 2010, Arouri 2010).
The Geography of the OAs

The territorial arrangements of the Oslo Accords took place in two-fold. At the time of the signature of the OAs in 1993 the Gaza-Jericho First arrangement was made, by which the leadership of the PLO would return to the occupied territories, organize their cadre, and prepare for general elections to take place in 1996 towards the official and democratic establishment of the PA.

Short before the elections, a second agreement: Taba (also known as Oslo II) Agreement was signed by which it was agreed to divide the West Bank into:
- Area A: PA administrative control and policing
- Area B: PA administrative control and Israeli security control
- Area C: full Israeli control
- Jerusalem: under Israeli control, to be decided upon in final status negotiations

These areas would be expanded and re-arranged and / or expanded gradually over the course of time, towards a final status agreement that would be reached at the end of the interim period of 5 years, namely, in 1998.

While the Taba Agreement presents the map on the right, the reality on the ground looked different, since it conceals the built-up Israeli illegal colonies and their declared territories. The practical reality of the territorial division is hence demonstrated on the following pages, along with further territorial propositions that were discussed in the various rounds of negotiations between 1997 and 2001.
Map 1.18.
1995 | on the right
Taba (Oslo II) Agreement
Map 1.19.
1995 | Israeli military bases, illegal settlements, and the areas annexed to Israel
Map 1.20. 1995 | Taba
Agreement territorial arrangements overlapped with built-up Israeli structures and the areas annexed to Israel
Map 1.21. 1997 | Netanyahu’s Allon Plus proposal for a final settlement with the Palestinians.

Map 1.22. 2000 | The Camp David proposal for a final settlement with the Palestinians.
Map 1.23. 2001 | The Taba proposal for a final settlement with the Palestinians.

Map 1.24. 2001 | The Ariel Sharon proposal for a final settlement with the Palestinians.
1.3.4. The Segregation Wall and Mobility

As chapters 2 and 3 expound, the Israeli strategies are territorialized and fluid, constituting a tactic of layered conditional controls, or valves. These systems are highly complex, hence while they are acknowledged and generally factored into the logic and methodology, nonetheless they will not be detailed or thoroughly addressed in this work.

Therein, the following and final pages of this introductory chapter visualize two aspects of the geography of Ramallah, namely; the Segregation Wall project which was long conceived yet placed into effect in 2002; and the road network restrictions and prohibitions against Palestinians.

Box 1.1. Israel’s Segregation Wall

‘Israeli authorities provided figures to the Association for Civil Rights in Israel regarding the number of permanent permits issued to Palestinian farmers who live east of the Separation Barrier and whose lands remain west of it: the number of permits allowing the farmers to work their land that was cut off by the Barrier dropped by 83 percent from 2006 to 2009 (from 10,037 to 1,640 permits). During this same period, Israel extended the amount of Palestinian land that remained west of the Barrier by 30 percent to approximately 119,500 dunams [11,950 hectares]. In addition, many Palestinians have to travel long distances, usually along unpaved roads, to get to the gate to their land. Because of the difficulty and expense in gaining access to their land, farming is not cost effective and many residents do not exercise the right to go to their land, thereby losing their primary source of livelihood. In setting the Barrier’s route, Israeli officials almost entirely disregarded the severe infringement of Palestinian human rights. The route was based on irrelevant considerations completely unrelated to the security of Israeli civilians. A major aim in planning the route was de facto annexation of part of the West Bank: when the Barrier is completed, 9.5 percent of the West Bank, containing 60 settlements, will be situated on its western, ‘Israeli’ side. Israeli politicians already consider the Barrier’s route as Israel’s future border’. (B’Tselem 2014e)
Map 1.25. Route of the Segregation Wall as documented in 2011, with an enlargement of the Ramallah agglomeration. Its construction commenced in June 2002, and was declared ‘illegal’ by the International Court of Justice ’The Hague’ in 2004. (B’Tselem 2014e)
Image 1.7. The north Jerusalem neighbourhood of Kufur Aqab, which is physically continuous with the Ramallah agglomerate, October 2013.


Image 1.9. (below) The DCO at Beit El colony and military base, north of Ramallah.
Image 1.10. (below) The Beitunya 'border point' at Ofer Prison, west of Ramallah.
Map 1.26.  
2001 | West Bank road network restrictions and prohibitions against Palestinians.
The tradition of the oppressed teaches us that the 'state of emergency' in which we live is not the exception but the rule. We must attain to a conception of history that is in keeping with this insight. Then we shall clearly realize that it is our task to bring about a real state of emergency, and this will improve our position in the struggle against Fascism.

Walter Benjamin

*Theses on the Philosophy of History, Spring 1940*

Palestine is one of the most and longest surveyed and researched geographies on earth. This slither on the land-route connecting ancient civilizations has not seized to be populated, contested, invaded, destroyed and recreated physically, politically and socio-demographically through flows and tides of ethnicities, powers, and narratives. In today’s pursuit of ‘lasting peace’, ‘security’ and ‘sustainable development’ local and international discourses tend to focus on selective, eurocentric parameters and interpretations of – predominantly but not exclusively – the events of the twentieth century. However, Palestine’s volumes of geopolitical shifts (e.g. wars, annexation) and the persistence of productive Palestinian livelihoods (e.g. identities, urbanisms) provides evidence to Walter Benjamin’s argument of integrability of uncertainty into civic struggles. As such, a re-examination of Ramallah’s history beyond commonly circulated analysis and opinions is necessary, and therewith the labouring of an alternative understanding of events and their (evident) past and (potential) future socio-spatial consequences.

The coming fifty pages analyse Ramallah’s politico-economic history and city-space through today’s perspectives; a sort of trail-tracing of the colonial thought and methodology through physical configurations and their respective socializations and spatializations. Why are there row-house structure and detached ones in such proximity and frequency? Why are there every now and then junctions with rounded buildings? How do people navigate and circulate? What were the spatial and behavioural evolutionary processes of Ramallah?

In the process this chapter discusses the role of transnational politics, happenings, and discourses of global powers in the shaping of Palestine’s image and space on one hand, and on the other its nature as a ‘process geography’, a space of ‘precipitates of various kinds of action, interaction, and motion’ in lieu of abstract and ‘relatively immobile aggregates of traits’ (Arjun Appadurai IN Collins 2011:4). Through this approach the conditions enabling the signature of the Oslo Accords are discussed – this event which is considered as the major turning point in Ramallah’s development trajectory. Therewith components and
game-rules of Ramallah’s fluid risk-strategies, survival tactics and urban (mental and physical) spatializations are linked to the ethnocratic systems governing the colonial ecology. This review is essential for understanding the Oslo Era discussed in the following chapter. Here the socio-political origins of the central concept of *sumud* as ethos are surveyed and the role of socioeconomic needs in the shaping of Ramallah’s insurgent behaviour are noted.

This chapter is divided into two main sections. The first focuses on the structure and network systems of the city, what can be regarded as a brief genealogical synopsis of the British colonial morphology and the locational ‘architecture of enmity’ as described by Gregory (2004). This overview includes both the hard and soft systems; the physical space and its conditionalities of temporalization, militarization, functionalist thought and urbicide.

The latter section of this chapter explores the characteristics of the exhibited system, their variables and players, their modes of operation and (re-)production. What are the econo-political relations that induced Ramallah’s varied forms and spaces? What were/are the obstacles to a healthy, rooted urbanism? And who are the Palestinians and what were/are their imaginations of liberation and post-liberation?
2.1. PRE-OSLO RAMALLAH: FROM VILLAGE TO CITY, AND ROOTS OF CONTEMPORARY MORPHOLOGY

Ramallah is situated on a series of mountain-tops parallel to the historic trade route running along the central mountain range from northern to southern Palestine. While its sister-city alBireh rests in proximity to the route, Ramallah's positioning deeper to the west kept it in the shadows of history until the late 19th century. Nonetheless, overlooking the old city in east Jerusalem from a mere distance of about 15 kilometres and an elevation difference of about 150 meters promoted it as the final halt for pilgrims before descending on the holy city at dawn. Bearing an elevation of 900 meters above sea level and an open window to the coastal planes of the Mediterranean Sea (40 kilometres away) further endorsed its reputation as a fine 'masyaf' – summer-tourism destination (Shaheen 1982; Barthe 2011). On the other side of the same coin, the Mediterranean summer breeze turns into bone-knocking winter winds, considerable rain, and – minimum once a year – snow storms streaming down the steep topography of the city causing erosions and oft, utter paralysis.

Archaeological remains indicate that Ramallah dates back to the Byzantine period (330–640 CE), though stronger indications point at the Crusade Period (1099–1187 CE). The oldest records of the city originate from the Ottoman Period: year 1596, where its production was indicated as agrarian, and population estimated at 400 persons: 71 Christian and 9 Muslim families (alJubeh & Bishara 2002). Socio-politically, records indicate that Ramallah has five clans stemming from the (re-)founding Christian family, nowadays three atop. Besides highlights on the official webpage of the municipality, the most visible tribute to these families is alManara square (Image 2.2 and Box 2.1); which today holds five lion-shaped statues (the original clans) and three fountains (the branching families).

Since its declaration as a Municipality in 1908 Ramallah has been steadily growing in spite of the successive occupations with which the city, every time, has re-adapted. Remaining a relevant geography along the past gruelling and detrimental century was enabled by the not necessarily intelligent periodic redefinition of its role and sociopolitical positioning. By early 20th century the village was an established 'education town' with multiple missionary schools to which pupils and educators alike converged from throughout the region and farther. Under British Mandate the town grew into an administrative and leisure 'hill station', from which it solidified its reputation as a masyaf in the region under the Jordanian annexation; a character accelerated by the arrival of intellectual and merchant urban refugees who were forced to leave their established cities in 1948's Nakba. The Israeli invasion and consequent subjugation and isolation of Palestinians from their Arab extensions on one hand and the servility of Jerusalem
Box 2.1. alManara Square

It was established in 1935/6 when the British Mandate connected Ramallah and alBireh with electricity. As the most-central border-point between the two cities it met the criteria for locating the pole with the common switch for the electricity lines, which in turn ran to both towns. In 1946 the Ramallah Municipal Council ordered the erection of alManara Square, commonly believed to have been an act of demonstration of power against the sister-rival city alBireh. The five lion-heads design though is believed to have been a message to Ramallah’s new residing families where each lion-head resembles one of the five original clans, and thus the claim to the city. Upon the Israeli Occupation in 1967 the square was to be demolished by Israeli orders, yet the lion heads were removed and remained hidden until 1996, when the PA arrived. The lion-heads were then placed at the Midan Square, while new full-sized 5 lions of marble were ordered from Japan and placed at the Manara Square with a new design. The presence of a visual testimony to privilege and otherness at the busiest junction is not necessarily an act of wickedness, yet certainly symptomatic to Ramallah’s persisting struggle to cope with its reality: the village is a city now.
on the other entrenched the organized anti-colonial underground political activism that had prior commenced in Ramallah. And by the end of the 1970s it had become a significant ‘operations room’ for the national liberation movement.

What are the accumulative spatial, social, economic and political legacies of these epochs that preceded the creation of the PA? How did they contribute to the choice of Ramallah as seat of the latter? And how do they relate to, and are influencing nowadays urban affairs?

2.1.1. Late Ottoman and British Times: 1800s - 1948

Throughout the 19th century increasing numbers of missionaries made residence in the village of Ramallah breaking grounds of systematic schools in accompaniment to the surfacing institutionalization and administrative functions. By the rise of the 20th century Ramallah had four nouveau Christian sects beside the dominant original Greek Orthodox, and considerable numbers of new functions and necessary constructions. While until then Ramallah was an agrarian community dependant on its crops of olives, figs, grapes, legumes and its famous spices, herbs, as witnessed by the \textit{Manateer}; this was gradually replaced with crafts, professions, and indoor alternatives. The wheels of change were set in motion in terms of both: urban and social morphology (alJubeh and Bshara 2002).

With the establishment of the Friends Schools (Quakers) in 1869 and 1901 – for girls and boys respectively – news spread about the land of dreams: America (as commonly referred to the USA; alJubeh and Bshara 2002). According to the Municipality’s website the first case of migration to the USA from Ramallah was in 1895, after which the wave continued to grow and multiply\(^4\). Ramallah’s expatriates – estimated around 30,000 persons – still maintain a close relationship with their hometown\(^5\), thus having a relatively considerable impact on Ramallah whether directly or indirectly (Ramallah Municipality 2013). Akin scholarly registered cases, the role of Ramallah’s diaspora remains fluid and reactionary rather than accumulative and adhering to defined processes. While ‘[t]he potentials of diaspora capital are valuable because they are non-competitive’ the extent of their impact is condition by ‘policymakers and practitioners’; while ‘diaspora matters, yet the potentials of diaspora capital remain unrealized’ (Aikins and Russel 2013:30).

In 1903 the area became connected to Jerusalem via a peddling \textit{carriole}, and two years later the Jerusalem - Nablus Road was paved (Barthe 2011), fulfilling the rooted prophecy that ‘socioeconomic development in remote and inaccessible mountains [sic] areas that are cut off from mainstream development’ is motorized through ameliorated accessibility (Rawat and Sharma 1997:117). Three years later the Ottoman \textit{qa’em maqam} (governor) declared Ramallah as town thence establishing the Ramallah Municipality in 1908, by 1910 it had an open clinic, and ‘\textit{peu à peu, le hameau agricole se transforme en une petite ville}’ (Barthe 2011:23).

A decade later the town experienced a major turn with the culmination of World War I and the consequent establishment of the British Mandate of Palestine
which arrived equipped with its experienced generals, determined theorists, and fermented volumes of colonization tools for taming the natives who are imagined as ‘backward’ and ‘underdeveloped’ (Harvey 2009:38). However, the image of the saviour was hard to argue having a year earlier published the Balfour Declaration.

In spite of political tension accompanying the arriving Mandate institutions, Palestinians were eager to fold the pages of years of economic stagnation produced by WWI and the consequent transition of power. Expatriates were again capable of resuming transfers of savings, and considerable numbers of Ramallah’s citizens were absorbed in the Mandate institutions in light of their intellectual abilities and fluency in foreign languages (catered for by the multiple foreign missionary schools). The growing significance of the region, population growth and the increased capital flow accelerated the process of urbanization of the area on one hand e.g. the opening of hotels like Odeh (Grand) Hotel in 1919 and establishment of cultural infrastructures such as the Radio Station whose staff was trained by the BBC in 1936 (Barthe 2011); and corollary on the other hand, the relocation of wealthier Ramallah families out of the old – morphologically Mediterranean – centre and into mansion-like houses that are colonially-inspired and enabled by pilgrimaging contemporary technology (Image 2.5, p. 48 and Image 2.7, p. 51). The expansion took place on peripheries of the old centre and along the newly paved axes in all directions, thereof planting the initial seeds from which today’s bridge-neighbourhoods – with alBireh and Beitunya – emerged (alJubeh and Bshara 2002). This pattern of linear expansion along ridges remains the main skeleton of the agglomerate, where with time, urban expansion materialized with streets paved and units erected in parallel to and around main arteries. Some of these mansions survive today, standing as random silent monuments from that era and the outline of the base layer of spatial formation in the area.

In spite of the institutionalization of Ramallah into an administrative urban centre; the city kept on losing numbers of its original families with rising political, security, and economic hardships associated with the colonial British Mandate and the Zionism-directed immigration of Jews to the region in correlation to their prosecution by anti-Semits and fascists in Europe (UNISPAL 2014a). New comers from other Palestinian regions – chiefly from Hebron – filled the vacancies the Ramallites left behind in terms of agriculture, crafts, and professions (alJubeh & Bshara, 2002).

The Nakba in 1948 formed a harsh turn of events for Ramallah akin the entirety of Mandate Palestine. In that year approximately 8,500 refugees arrived to the city at a time the original population was estimated at 4,500 i.e. double the size. According to Taraki (2008) Ramallah became home for Palestinians fleeing namely from Jaffa, alLidd, and Ramla. In a census by the Jordanian government in 1953 it was noted that 67% of Ramallah’s 13,500 inhabitants were refugees (Shaheen 1982). In narratives of the expulsion of 1948, Ramallah emerges as one of the localities that was friendliest to the refugees whom were able to – comparatively – swiftly resettle and integrate into the community spatially, socially, economically and politically (Taraki 2008a, Barthe 2011). This ability of absorption resurfaced with the arrival of the Returnees, and again with the centralization of the PA, but is currently being challenged, as transcribed in section 3.2, p. 132 of this work.
Image 2.7. Drawings of Ramallah structures by Riwaq Centre; (above) Plan of an area in Ramallah’s historic centre which is morphologically Mediterranean; (below) House of Salem Issa, 1911, one of the early constructed detached dwellings in Ramallah – using steel beams and pitched roofs rather than the traditional stone and earth dome – atop rooms dating back to mid 1800s, located at the periphery of the old centre. (alJubeh and Bshara 2002: 23 & 84)
Map 2.1. Spatial surveillance through a mobility network that embeds web-panopticons and enables passage of medium to large military vehicles and convoys. [1] Pre-Mandate axis along the mountain ridge and placement of Mukata’a; [2] Strategic ring roads along topography and through the morphology; and; [3] Contemporary breeding and branching of the city-surveillance and control network.
2.1.2. The Mukata’a: a Corner-Stone of Colonial Morphology

Twelve years prior the Nakba, in 1936 Ramallah was connected to electric power conjointly with alBireh, where the switch was placed at – what was later created and named as – alManara Square. Short after another spatial element was introduced to the area which dramatically influenced the cartography; a Mukata’a was constructed on a – then – secluded yet highly feasible plot in alBireh governorate (Map 2.1), where its longest edge borders the exposed limestone mountain-peeks of Ramallah and over-looks the coastal plains. A signature residuum of British colonialism is fifty Tegart-forts across Mandate Palestine including one in this agglomerate (Barthe 2011). These structures are derivatives of the hill stations which British colonialist employed as escapes from heat in warm climates, create environments resemblance of the homeland, cater for the population of European expatriates (emigrants) and business executives, and they were the ‘temporary home away from home’ (Ramachandrean 2004:65). The design of the Mukata’a was conceived by Sir Charles Tegart and inspired through his work in suppressing the Indian movements for independence. These bale reinforced-concrete headquarters served as command centres, residence, military bases, detention facilities, and defensive shelter with supplies sufficing for up to one month. Before the turn of the century they became statues of – continued – colonial oppression.

With the withdrawal of the British Mandate from Palestine in 1948 (the Nakba) and the consequent war and annexation of the WB by the newly born Kingdom of Jordan; the command of the new custodian moved into the constructs of the abdicating colonial, as foretold by Anderson (2006) and Fanon (2004). The Jordanian anti-leftist aegis – which operated and continues to operate under British patronage and in close alliance with the Saudi Kingdom and USA imperialist interests – could not be co-opted by the predominantly left-leaning Palestinian politicians. In that period the Jordanian government became the primary prosecutor of Palestinian politics and prison-guard of their cities. In those times, too, many Palestinians knew the insides of the Mukata’as.

In the aftermath of the 1967 Six-Day War Israel annexed the WB along with the Gaza Strip, Sinai Peninsula, and the Golan Heights (Map 1.13, p. 30). Here again the new occupier converged on the Mukata’a; in front of which I remember standing as a child with my mother for hours. I remember the unpaved side walk, metal rails, revolving doors, caged corridors and rusty waiting area. In those times, too, many Palestinians knew the insides of the Mukata’as.

Upon the signature of the Oslo Accords Yasser Arafat entered the WB airborne by a helicopter from the west and landing in the Tegart-fort, which he made his residence, and to which ten years later he returned – from the east – a corpse and remains buried in it. Rumours claim that his coffin is floating in a pond of water awaiting reburial in Temple Mount at the heart of the eternally contested city, Jerusalem. A monumental – but ‘temporary’ – mausoleum and museum have been erected for Arafat on the premise of the Mukata’a, and it remains an open question whether PA officials pondered the irony of; First having made residence of presidency of a liberation movement, and second, the burial place of the face of the PLO; both on an archaeological site of despotic power, which did not spare the PA in the era of which, too, many Palestinians knew the insides of the Mukata’a.
Practically and beyond political irony, the Mukata’a is the corner-stone in a much wider structure. It was placed at the heart of the strait formed by the two traditional axis, thence away from the inferior locals, yet in control of movement in the region and a stone-throw away from old centres (Map 2.1, p. 52). Colonial and European urban planning experiences – evolving with European political transformations of the 18th century – dictated a flexible mobility network, rendering urban planning tools ‘the expression of a new style of warfare – instead of the medieval walled town, cities must now be planned along broad formal avenues where mobile armies could deploy themselves’ (Hall and Jones 2011:12). Connections for motorized vehicles are straight lines in plain regions, and in mountains deform into topography-sensitive rings. In the same line and learning from the French Revolution and the Haussmann period, the spider-web network was integrated into the infrastructure to maximize mobility speed at one hand, and on the other to increase surveillance capabilities via employing the 18th century Panopticon Theory\(^{13}\) to the urban system (Jordan 2004). Zureik notes on the British colonial conduct in neighbouring Egypt by writing:

\[\text{The British and French aimed at imposing ‘order’ on the mind and body of nineteenth century Egyptian society by introducing surveillance and disciplining techniques in the monitorial educational system, military training, workplace environment, and the use of living spaces. It is no accident that Jeremy Bentham, who visited Egypt in the nineteenth century and advised Muhammad ‘All Pasha, drew up plans on how to instill obedience and discipline in the Egyptian population through the use of surveillance methods. Mitchell contends that Bentham’s ‘panoptic principle was devised on Europe’s colonial frontier with the Ottoman Empire, and examples of the panopticon were built for the most part not in Northern Europe, but in places like colonial India. (Zureik 2001:211)}\]

The command of Palestinian streets was complimented with two urban design elements; First, under British Mandate all buildings on corners of crossings were due to have an arced edge which constitutes an offset of the parallel sidewalk, serving wider angles of visibility and hindering ambushing. And second, starting under Israeli colonization major crossings were to host physical circulation regulators rather than traffic lights, thereof enabling personnel from rapidly claiming right-of-way thence avoiding the wait and risk of becoming a stationary target; the same reason for which the Israeli Coordination of Activities in the Territories (COGAT) deprived Palestinian localities from traffic lights until the signature of the OAs (alKhalili 2011).

Eighty years later the Mukata’a remains the pivotal point for controlling circulation in the agglomerate, a point which the Israeli army continues to employ post the signature of the OAs. In its multiple incursions over the past two decades Israeli military deployment around the Mukata’a was an orthodoxy. While some politicians argued it as siege against president Yasser Araft, in reality, it was the siege over the entire population of the agglomerate.

In its successive attacks on WB cities between the years 2000 and 2005, the Israeli army has either severely damaged or destroyed the majority of the Mukata’as which housed the PA security apparatuses. Meanwhile, among other items of its Palestine Reform and Development Plan – submitted to the December 2007 Paris Donor Conference – the PA requested and received funding for:
Security infrastructure: Substantial investments in security infrastructure are required. Eight governorate headquarters – Moqata’a (Mukata’as) – will be constructed. These will house detention facilities, barracks, and training facilities. A central prisoner rehabilitation facility will also be constructed. (MOPAD 2007:41)

While the reincarnation of these spaces of subordination is ontologically predictable (Fanon 2008, Lefebvre 2009), attempts at intellectual decolonization of space in Palestine surfaced – as topics often but not sufficiently discussed in the public realm – only in this millennium, e.g. Decolonizing Architecture Program (2006), Ramallah Syndrome (2008), and Civic Encounter (2011) a.o.

Acknowledging mechanisms of colonization does not suffice with visible symbols – e.g. the Mukata’a – rather investigates the roots catering for the continuation and reproduction of the former and its contemporary derivatives. Ramallah’s municipal plans and strategies (section 4.3, p. 190) translate a discourse traceable to British Mandate practices of spatial militarization, to which Ramallah’s current mobility system (Map 2.1, p. 52) presents evidence. In this context, while pathways for motorized vehicles are rhizomatous and preceding physical expansion (Image 4.7, p. 210), pedestrian routes are shrunken to remains and charity. Likewise, Ramallah’s Municipality has channelled significant resources since 2008 to the redesign and rehabilitation of tens of streets, crossings and squares around the city (Image 4.23, p. 213), none of which is ruled by pedestrians. In other words, the Mayadin which are supposedly destined for the public to exercise its right to the collective space are systematically granting superiority to the better equipped: a pedestrian is dominated by the civil vehicle, and the latter is in turn dominated by military vehicles. This arrangement equally entails the inability to accommodate public events – e.g. festivals and demonstrations a.o. – without the ‘interruption’ of traffic. The indirect consequence is the framing of public expression as a prerogative to quotidian systems rather than integral, and thereof the Cartesian fortressing of hegemonic regimes against mobilization of masses and change; as Lefebvre wrote:

A revolution that does not produce a new space has not realized its full potential; indeed it has failed in that it has not changed life itself, but has merely changed ideological superstructures, institutions or political apparatuses. A social transformation, to be truly revolutionary in character, must manifest a creative capacity in its effects on daily life, on language and on space. (Lefebvre 2009:54)

Thereof, to achieve its potentials Ramallah is required to question and tackle spaces that have become customary and are forging and entrenching the colonial state whether physically or mentally, directly or indirectly, and whether social, economic, or political. Hence, how has this colonial reconfiguration of space evolved since? What are its contemporary dimensions and characteristics?
2.1.3. Post Nakba: Temporalization, Spatial Militarization, and Functionalist Morphology

The first decade following the Nakba was that of coping with the aftermath of what Israel refers to as the War of Independence. The resettling of Palestinian refugees across the region18: Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, the West Bank and Gaza Strip overwhelmed Palestinian and regional populations which had to redefine their existence: social spectrum, economic dynamics, and political regimes. The 'Palestine Question' that was deliberated at a Special Session of the UN General Assembly in 1947 had become a regular file with two platforms dedicated solely to it in additional to the customary regional chapters; the United Nations Information System on the Question of Palestine (UNISPAL) and the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), which began operations on 1 May 1950 (alKhalili 2009).

Through the support of the United Kingdom and the framework of the Armistice Agreement of 1949 the newly-born Jordan Kingdom annexed the WB. While PA politicians remain defensive of the role of the Hashemites in the region, the reality remains that their first monarch – King Abdullah bin elHussein – was assassinated by a Palestinian complot soon after, on 20 July 1950 at Temple Mount. This event exposed the colonially – still – underplayed political antagonism between the two banks of the river which reached its peak with the events of Black September between 1970 and 1971. Here it should be noted that social connections across the Jordan River have been proximate along history. Notwithstanding, the Palestinian-Jordanian dynamic was not solely factored by political ideologies, but additionally and equally by the 20th century byproduct of colonially imagined and projected nationalisms which in turn argued legitimacy through presumed differentiation, and thereof politically instigated social othering (Anderson 2006). On 31 July 1988 – two decades post the Six Day War – Jordan ceded its claims to the WB and recognized the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of Palestinians, thence ending the publicized confrontation between the two.

This ethos was reflected in Ramallah’s form of urbanity: extrovertedly interested in the bon viveur and consumed with enjoying its fashionable provincial personagrate; while introvertedly producing spatial and social mechanisms and sub-infrastructures to manipulate the colonial morphology of their existence. In the 1950s Ramallah had three operating cinemas: alWaleed, alJameel, Dunia and a bustling re-opened Grand Hotel (Barthe 2011) which often presented musical concerts, dance balls, ceremonies, and in its rooms hosted international guests, prominent political and financial elites, as well as Arab and Western cinema and music celebrities of the epoch (Hutchison 2014). That was also the era in which over several nights the Jordanian Army force-deployed corporate Atallah Hassan (from Ramallah agglomerate) smuggled the type-writer of his command centre – at nowadays Water Authority headquarters at the heart of Ramallah – taking it to a nearby safe-house of a comrade that awaited him to commence the night shift: producing a copy of the Arabic translation of the censored Marxist Manifesto. While tunnels, off-grid and back-yard pathways over dwarfed parcel markers were being plotted à pied women and children additionally strolled the surveyed streets as the secret mail service of the national movement.

By the time Israel annexed the WB in 1967 Ramallah had formed a solid and politically intellectual and diverse community, whose solace with the defeat
– that ‘brought about a second exodus of Palestinians, estimated at half a million’ (UNISRAL 2014a) and the Israeli occupation of the WB among other regions – was found in the ability to collaborate with the other half: Palestinians who were citizens of Israel since two decades past. Mobilized communities in Nazareth and Haifa and figures such as Tawfiq Zayyad and Emil Habibi became an accessible extension and reference when needed, and vice versa (PBC 2014). On another level, the 1967 War had furthered the Zionist predicament of achieving a predominantly Judaized landscape, where amongst Israelis ‘the debate was between those who looked back to the exclusivism of the past and those who see forward to exploitation of the Arab [Palestinian] people in the future’, where ‘traditionalists’ such as Finance Minister Pinhas Sapir feared ‘that if Israel tries to swallow the new territories, it will choke’ (Ryan 1974:7).

2.1.3.i. Temporalization

While in 2014 we know that Israel has indeed bit more than it can swallow, at the time, General Yigal Allon’s response to the threat was launching the – by now extensive – Israeli discipline of drafting spatial proposals for creating expellable enclaves of dense Palestinian population (see Map 1.14, p. 30). In parallel, then Israel’s president Golda Meier baptised the – according to Article 47 of the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 – illegal colonial settlement enterprise in captured territories. By the time she left office in 1974 a total of 19 colonies had been established. In the Ramallah agglomerate this policy translates with over 20 registered colonies and their tentacle neighbourhoods (some of which extend over several hilltops) within the radius of 15 km from the central alManara Square (Map 2.2, p. 59). The Psagot colony (founded 1981), in fact, lies at less than 2 km and a mere 20 minutes spaziergang from alManara Square, where in aerial images it can be mistaken for a peripheral neighbourhood whilst being a gated and highly militarized space that is off-limit to the residents of the area. Noteworthy, the Israeli settler colonialism should not be reduced to the its physical boundaries, whereby:

[I]t is necessary to conceive of ‘conquest to colonization’ as involving an entire gamut of means, ranging from brute force and primitive might, at one extreme, to resource deprivation and economic sanctions at the other end, passing through gradations of quasi-legal to ‘legal’ subterfuges. Throughout, it is important to bear in mind that while methods vary, the non-negotiable goals remain the same: namely, the incorporation and eventual annexation of the occupied lands. (Abu-Lughod 1982:18)

Recognized from this perspective, these superstructures compose regional pillars and markers of extensive mobility infrastructures throughout the WB. By the end of 2012 there were 137 Israeli government sanctioned colonies (of which some are ‘settlement blocs’) and over 100 Outposts (B’Tselem 2013). The population of these colonies has exceeded half a million – significant numbers of which are armed – and since the signature of the OAs tens of thousands of additional units have been approved by successive Israeli governments. According to Weizman (2007) the settler enterprise which was launched short after the Six Day war serves five; first, establishment of early ‘defence’ lines deep within occupied territories employing Israel settlers as surveyors and guards...
(civilian militias?) or what Allon called ‘frontiersmen’ and ‘rearguard’ (Abu-Lughod 1982:18); second, eliminating the contiguity of Palestinian populated territories and apprehending organic regional networks; third, appropriation of valuable material and human resources in the occupied territories to the discriminate benefit of Israelis; fourth, rooting colonization as endemic culture to Israelis by involving the population in the act, where ‘war was only over because it was now everywhere’ (Weizman 2007:85); and fifth, creation of irreversible facts on the ground that inhibit any political propositions of withdrawal from annexed areas. Weizman elaborates:

In total, by the early 1990s, more than 38 per cent of the land area of the West Bank, comprising this patchwork quilt of isolated plots and non-contiguous pockets of land, as well as tracts of desert, were registered under Israeli ownership. If by this time, one were to slice the terrain of the West Bank along an invisible horizontal datum line a few hundred meters above sea level, almost all the land over this line was settler territory annexed by the Israeli state; the valleys below it remained ‘occupied territories’. The topographical folds, summits, slopes, irrigation basins, valleys, rifts, cracks and streams, were no longer seen simply as naïve topographical features, but as signifiers to a series of legal manipulations. Many of the complex borderlines of the present-day West Bank were thus generated by the application of the principles of a nineteenth-century land law to the particular nature of mountain topography. Latitude became more than a mere relative position on the contoured surface of the terrain. The colonization of the mountain regions created a vertical separation between two parallel, overlapping and self-referential ethno-national geographies, held together in startling and horrifying proximity. (Weizman 2007:117)

Towards the end of the 1970s the Israeli Supreme Court of Justice was forced into addressing the illegality of the settlement enterprise. The tactical solution was found in the temporalization of the problematic, whereby the Israeli side justified its mechanism through characterising it as a ‘temporary intervention’ to meet timely ‘pressing security needs’; thus yielding the approval of the court which revoked the Palestinian accusation of settlements being ‘permanent community’ through regarding the latter as a ‘purely relative concept’ (Weizman 2007:103). Yet, the judges conditioned the life of settlements to the deployment of the Israeli Defence Forces (from here onwards: Israeli Occupation Forces, IOF; see Terms, see pg. xix) in the territories, which in turn was subject to outcomes of political negotiations. Based on the aforementioned, the colonies which are constructed to instill security require, first, the continuation of violence as justification of persistence; while the former is counter-intuitive, the latter is quintessential for the voluntary relocation of average – non-radical – Israeli families28 to occupied territories. And second, that peace should not be achieved, at least not in accordance with what Palestinians refer to as alThawabet alWatanieh, the unalienable rights29.

While the fragmentation of regional – and additionally in the cases of Hebron, Jerusalem and soon Ramallah the urban – space is achieved through settlements and road networks, in parallel, the population of Palestinian islands is controlled through soft systems of spatial regulations and legislations that extended into their localities. For example, up to the signature of the OAs Palestinian drivers (white plate) followed conditional regulations whereby right
Map 2.2. Distribution of Israeli illegal colonies within the vicinity of the Ramallah agglomerate.

Chronology of ten colonies near Ramallah

1. Ofer, pre-Israel base / prison since 1988
2. 1977 – Beit El
3. 1977 – Beit Horon
4. 1981 – Psagot
5. 1982 – Giv’at Ze’ev
6. 1983 – Dolev
7. 1984 – Geva Binyamin
8. 1984 – Nahliel
9. 1985 – Kokhav Ya’akov
10. 1989 – Talmon
of way while driving on a freeway had to be ceded on nearing exits of colonies to Israeli vehicles (yellow plate), and urban traffic arrangements were referenced to locations of colonies rather than physical elements and local mobility needs. In Palestine ‘mundane elements of planning and architecture have become tactical tools and the means of dispossession’ (Weizman 2007:5), where ‘the transformation of the built environment constitutes acts of organized violence’, and therewith ‘the work of architects and planners’ could be ‘equated with those terrorists’ (ibid 2006:172).

The marrying of the spatial settler colonialism with the time element of temporalization produced an ecosystem whose organisms are militarized (Abourahme 2011). The temporary became the physical and lived political mien, corresponding to Walter Benjamin’s description of the temporality of the oppressed as ‘a present which is not a transition, but in which time stands still and has come to a stop’ (Abourahme 2011:455). Here Barghouthi writes:

In the disaster of 1948 the refugees found shelter in neighboring countries as a ‘temporary’ measure. They left their food cooking on stoves, thinking to return in a few hours. They scattered in tents and camps of zinc and tin ‘temporarily.’ The commandos took arms and fought from Amman ‘temporarily,’ then from Beirut ‘temporarily,’ then they moved to Tunis and Damascus ‘temporarily.’ We drew up interim programs for liberation ‘temporarily’ and they told us they had accepted Oslo Agreements ‘temporarily,’ and so on, and so on. Each one said to himself and to others ‘until things become clearer.’ (Barghouthi 2005:26)

2.1.3.ii. Architecture of Enmity: Evolution and Militarization of Colonial Geography

Complementary to colonies and their bifurcating infrastructures, planning and administration of the WB and GS was – and remains – assigned to the Israeli Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories Unit (COGAT), seated under the Israeli Ministry of Defence. Whether through theory or its experience in the 1948 Nakba the IOF had recognized that cities are engines of social transformation and political change (Knox and McCarthy 2005) on one hand; and on the other that persistence of domination entails the saturation of such adverse loci with surveillance and targeting systems, which in turn materialize through the physical space (Graham 2006a). Hills elaborates:

Cities represent a complex blend of horizontal, vertical, interior, and external forms, superimposed on natural relief. Ground manoeuvre becomes multidimensional. Structural density requires precise small-unit location capabilities within a three-dimensional puzzle. Such terrain provides cover, concealment, and sustainment but it also limits observation distances, engagement ranges, weapons effectiveness, and mobility. (Hills 2006:236)

Morphologically, the British had introduced the panopticon infrastructure and rounded junctions which contributed to the ‘securitization’ of Ramallah. This tool was inherited and reproduced by the COGAT (Map 2.3). Moreover, British spatial plans endorsed the rowhouse alignment of constructions at the city centre (efficient land use; integrated filtering of space: public, semi-public, private) and
detached housing in peripheries (lower land values; larger estates). In contrast, the COGAT regarded alleys, courtyards and back-paths as clandestine spaces that require elimination. Spatially this translated with the abolishment of the public and semi-public space (Davis 1992) through the expansion of zones where licensing of detached buildings is enacted, including at the centre. Excluding those along Ramallah’s Main Street, necks of crossings of the former and few older blocks (e.g. in Ramallah el-Tahta30); buildings in Ramallah are detached with regular retention spacings that constitute militarily – first – predictable corridors and – second – archetypal entrapments at the copious points of extreme topographical differences. Herein, pedestrian mobility in the city is limited to visually open and vehicle-accessible roads. In the same line, parcels possess singular access points enabling higher precision surveillance and the oft subsequent chase of targets.

Further, detached buildings facilitate military occupation of the city through enabling rapid creation of ad hoc locational IOF bases. The city is thence infiltrated by instantaneous outposts and barracks in pre-defined strategic building31 whose tenants are maimed32 in the process. This temporary annexation and infiltration mechanism necessitates pliability of space to disassembling and reconfiguration of singular units in accordance with timely military tactics, what Weizman refers to as Ariel Sharon’s33 legacy of ‘ever-flexible internal frontiers’ (2006:173). Throughout half a century of urban warfare the IOF has repeatedly established acupuncture outposts over durations varying from hours to months, not to mention permanent appropriation.

Demonstrating the relevance of permeable morphology to military operations; in the IOF Operation Defensive Shield in April 2002 Palestinian ‘cities were not just the environment in which attacks occurred, they were often the explicit target, along with the governmental and security infrastructure that they house’ and in the process causing – much of which avoidable – material damages estimated at US$ 342 million (Allen 2008:453). In Jenin, the IOF levelled the compact Jenin Refugee Camp to the ground using missiles and bulldozers over weeks of fierce combat with Palestinian resistance militias; as a driver of an IOF D-9 armoured bulldozers testifies:

For three days I just destroyed and destroyed. The whole area. Any house that they fired from came down. And to knock it down, I tore down some more. They were warned by loudspeaker to get out of the house before I came, but I gave no one a chance... Many people were inside houses we started to demolish... I didn't see houses falling down on live people. But if there were any, I wouldn't care at all. I am sure people died inside these houses... I found joy with every house that came down, because I knew they didn't mind dying, but they cared for their homes. If you knocked down a house, you buried 40 or 50 people for generations. If I am sorry for anything, it is for not tearing the whole camp down. (Gregory 2004:114)

Here urbicide is a tactic for subordination through devastation which deprives a locality of its modernity (Coward 2009), and equally a tool for three-dimensional ‘reconfigurations to maintain and deepen Israel’s geopolitical advantage’ as part of the ‘broader strategy of the annihilation of landscape’ (Graham 2006:197-199). In the aftermath Israel conditioned UNRWA’s reconstruction of the scourged camp with the securitization of the space by replacing the formerly dense and vernacular fabric with wide systematic streets and rectangular detached units; a policy
Map 2.3. (left) Nolli Plan of Ramallah’s centre along its Main Street (based on a Google-Maps satellite image as available online in 2013).

Image 2.8. (above) View of Ramallah’s Centre as indicated in point A, Map 2.3.

Image 2.9. (below) View of EinMinjed neighbourhood as indicated in point B, Map 2.3. Notice the spacing and lack of coherence as well as identity of units.
simulated by the Lebanese Government in the reconstruction of the Palestinian Nahr elBared refugee camp post the 2007 events (Hassan and Hanafi 2010).

From this perspective, spatial securitization is a concept that enables military domination and materializes with what Gregory calls ‘architecture of enmity’; physical representations that ‘give shape and substance’ to fears and desires, and ‘inhabit dispositions and practices, investing them with meaning and legitimation’ towards cementing the ‘difference of others’ through spacial dynamics and aesthetics (Gregory 2004:20). This representation of space is ‘conceived of not as the building of a particular structure, […] rather as a project embedded in a spatial context and texture which call for ‘representations’ that will not vanish into the symbolic or imaginary realms’ (Lefebvre 2009:33; emphasis added). Thereof, through pre-determining the constituents of the triad of the perceived, conceived and the lived space (Lefebvre 2009) in the occupied territories the IOF is sustaining the colonial mode of (re-)production of space and social behaviour (Gregory 2004; Harvey 2009). In an interpretation to Said’s work on orientalism, the IOF had ‘lived in, studied [and] imagined’ the ‘geographical space’ of the occupied territories which ‘was penetrated, worked over, taken hold of’ and turned into ‘colonial space’ (Said 1979:211).

Since urban space is a source of oppositional politics (Harvey 2009), from an ontological perspective a Palestinian strategy of decolonization requires the dismantlement of the colonial fragmentation mechanisms and the conception of channels commissioning of endemic social production of space. In this context, the public space – in its wider meaning – is the mirror of the militarization of a specific space (Trancik 1986); as Davis narrates on Los Angeles:

The universal consequence of the crusade to secure the city is the destruction of any truly democratic urban space. The American city is being systematically turned inward. The ‘public’ spaces of the new megastructures and supermalls
have supplanted traditional streets and disciplined their spontaneity. Inside malls, office centres, and cultural complexes, public activities are sorted into strictly functional compartments under the gaze of private police forces. This architectural privatization of the physical public sphere, moreover, is complemented by a parallel restructuring of electronic space, as heavily guarded, pay-access databases and subscription cable services expropriate the invisible agora. (Davis 1992:155; emphasis in original)

This does not justify the radical regressive call of reverting to methods of past centuries; rather, it is an argument for intellectual exploration of possible case-sensitive solutions that capitalize on contemporary knowledge, tools and needs. This process commences with the identification of the latter: the needs; thence the gap between status quo and the desired form and kind of resilience should be explored. Ergo, what is the gap between the current urban geography of Ramallah and the desired – sociospatially resilient – one?

2.1.3.iii. Statics and Climatology of Ramallah’s Functionalist Morphology

The aforementioned process of spatial militarization had found some of its tools in principles of Functionalist architecture, that ‘of pure forms and unbounded, democratic, or flowing space’ (Trancik 1986:21). The fortunate alliance with emerging technologies of high-rise construction and the argument of economic advantage endorsed its attitude of ‘start from a clean slate’ where:

In the triumph of Modernism, regionalism and environmental identity were ignored. The very term ‘International Style’ suggested that ‘buildings in
the Nubian Desert in Sudan and Northern Canada had much in common. Architects and landscape architects reduced the conditions to formal, abstract considerations, resulting in exciting designs on paper, but yielding segregated urban buildings and spaces. Somehow, without any conscious intention on anyone’s part, the ideals of free-flowing space and pure architecture have evolved into our present situation of individual buildings isolated in parking lots and highways. Public urban space merely serves the utilitarian function of accommodating roads to get quickly from A to B with little regard for the quality of the trip. Sigfried Giedion, the enthusiastic spokesman for the Functionalists, expresses their almost mystical fascination with the freestanding building in his *Space, Time and Architecture* – presenting this approach as the sine qua non of modern architecture and urban planning. (Trancik 1986:21)

Under Functionalism transitional public and semi-public spaces were rendered an optional accessory, and in the case of Ramallah, an economic disadvantage. The freedom to treat a parcel irrespective of the surrounding ‘environmental identity’ enabled investors to increase the built-up area by excavating the site until levelled at its lowest end e.g. in A-classified residential areas where structures are allowed a maximum elevation of four floors and a roof above street-level, developers are able to add any number of ‘basement’ floors. As demonstrated in Image 2.10, the building to the right has a total of seven basement floors (yellow line indicates ground-floor level), constituting a 60% increase in total built-up area as compared with the envisioned two-dimensional master-plan and corresponding construction laws. Assimilation of topography into design through transition elements would translate with – first – higher execution costs resulting from landscaping works, and – second – reduce the ‘additional gain’ to half – 30% instead of 60% – where the built-up area shaded with fading red would have been spared excavation.

Diagram 2.1. Earthquakes in Palestine. This diagram illustrates the frequency and number of earthquakes in Palestine up to the 19th century A.D. based on data by Willis (1928).
The triangulation of abolishment of transition spaces, the contemporary functionalist form of construction, and the absence of strong civil-rights legislation in Palestine is producing environments hazardous to citizens. Referring again to Image 2.10, buildings typically have a maximum of two exits, one at ground floor level and the other at the lowest point of the construction, here level -7. There are no external fire-escapes, and typically there is only one central staircase. In other words, in case of fire at the ground floor, the 120 tenants of the 23 apartments in this building have one escape option, which is somehow making it to the garden at level -7. Here one should also notice that the latter is as well isolated from surroundings. What if a fire ignites at the -7 floor? Will all tenants – including the old, differently-abled and young – be able to climb the smoke-filled staircase to the street level (yellow line)? How will the fire department contain and eliminate the threat? As demonstrated in Image 2.11 the aforementioned problem reiterates across the city.

The marriage of colonial geopolitics and Functionalism has rendered the archetypal elements of neighbourhood staircases and – the regionally sociospatially characteristic – hosh (courtyard) obsolete, in utter disregard to the fact that they are structurally rooted in geological and climatological specifications and social habits. In terms of geology, the fault-line along the African and Arabian tectonic plates runs along the north-south axis of Palestine marking the four regional earthquake provinces. Up to the 19th century the area survived a mean frequency of 5.4 and a median of 4 earthquakes annually (Diagram 2.1). Noteworthy is that these values exclude shocks, e.g. between the 17th and 19th centuries 206 earthquake shocks were registered in the region (Willis 1928). As illustrated in Diagram 2.1, the seismic cycle is sinusoidal in terms of intensity over time, whereby every six centuries the region experiences a climax that materialises through relatively higher rates of activity. Could the forthcoming peek culminate in the 24th century?
Whether rural or urban, Palestinian localities predominantly composed of continuous morphologies of back-to-back structures. Among others, Jerusalem, Acre, Nablus and Hebron retain up to date historic cores of continuous fabric dilating over hundreds of meters. While earthquakes are frequent visitors and research has established an understanding of the interaction between them and built structures; nonetheless, the application of this knowledge is limited to materials and design of individual structural elements while the accumulative dimension seems to be absent. It is not the intent of this work to revise the mathematics of construction codes applied in the occupied territories; however, assessment of spatial resilience – from a planning perspective – necessitates the comparison of the observed built up ecology with basic laws of physics.

Compactness served the reduction of earthquake-induced torque36 on structural elements by statically reframing it into a linear momentum that is in turn curtailed through employing Newton’s third law of motion37. As illustrated in Diagram 2.2, p. 67, earthquakes apply three-dimensional forces on built structures: Fx, Fy and Fz. Since Fz will have an equal impact on structures whether attached or detached, it is ignored in this conceptual analysis.

While junctions at the base constitute the fixed foundation (pivot, point ‘A’), parallel junctions in upper floors have to survive the planar torque \( \tau \) resulting from the coinciding of Fx and Fy. In the event of an earthquake torque forces on detached buildings operate in free space unopposed which creates an increased chance of structural failure. In contrast and employing Newton’s third law of motion, in case of row-housing Fx will induce a reactionary force in the opposite direction. In reality this translates with a significant reduction in the impact of Fx on the particular pivot. In this context, one could compare this scene with the strategy for breaking five wooden sticks individually or collectively. Also relevant to the dynamic is – thence – the height of the building i.e. the distance ‘r’ between the pivot and point at which force is applied. Returning to the latter example, the longer the stick, the easier it is to break. In physics, this relationship is expressed by \( \tau = F \times r \times \sin \theta \); thus, the higher the building the larger the torque produced by the same force ‘F’, and as the value of \( \theta \) decreases so does \( \tau \). In line with the aforementioned, torque produced by Fx in detached buildings is higher than that in row-buildings, i.e. \( \tau_1 > \tau_2 \).

Besides torque curtailment, in the event of structural failure detached units would collapse irregularly in any direction. Disintegrating elements are thence momentarily transformed into projectiles whose momentum (\( P = \text{mass} \times \text{velocity}; \text{kg} \cdot \text{m/s} \)) is higher than that of free-falling debris (\( mv > mg \) where ‘g’ is acceleration of gravity); therein creating additional hazard to surroundings38. Meanwhile, in the case of row-buildings adjacent units mold a partially introverted collapse of the failing structure and thereof reduce damage by debris. Naturally, in the event of an earthquake a structure’s stability is conditioned by scores of forces and factors, of which the alignment and distancing of buildings is only one. In addition, there are advantages for the detachment of buildings as well such as the frequent view points and higher exposure of surfaces to sun and light. The combination of the reality of predominantly detached structures and the advantages of attached systems provides, thus, argument for investigation of nouveau interpretations.

In terms of climate, Ramallah is warm and dry in summer and cool and wet in winter with mean air temperatures ranging – in 2010 – between 18.6°C and 31.0°C in the months of July to September, and 9.5°C to 16.3°C in the months of December to February (PCBS 2014a; PCBS 2014b). It has an annual mean wind
speed of 10.7 km per hour and a mean sunshine duration of 9.1 hours per day (PCBS 2014c; PCBS 2014d). As the data indicates Ramallah’s pleasant climate which is relatively free of clouds and disturbing ranges is an unwaning factor in the city’s allure and the appetite of people to spend their time in open spaces; which are often climatologically more pleasing than the masonry indoors. The practice can be authenticated by the hard and soft systems of the Mediterranean disposition. On one side the obvious archaeology, and on the other, the social mien which often incorporates a myriad of persons whose overlapping conversations could turn deafening when trapped in the corporeality of a room.

As in every transformation process, early interpretations of functionalist architecture under the COGAT followed local scales, proportions, and related to sociospatial needs; Image 2.13, p. 70 demonstrates a typical 1970-80s unit. Early manifestations were two to three floors in elevation, and incorporated large verandas, terraces, gardens, or a combination of the three. In addition, notice the path that runs through the property connecting it to its surroundings in both directions. Notwithstanding, the fruits of the entrenchment of the indicated form of architecture arrived in the advanced stage of the ’marriage of Functionalism and private enterprise’ (Tancik 1986:36); in the case of Ramallah, in the post-Oslo era. As Image 2.14 exhibits, gardens are reduced to minimum side-retention antispaces39, verandas are shrinking, and connection paths are replaced with vertical retention walls totalling 12 meters in height in this image, and a staggering 20 meters in Image 2.10, p. 64. As Anani states:

The hegemony of exchange value makes the city mobile, movable and transformative like a container harbor, but at a slower rate. When a society loses its organic connection with its history, geography, climate, tradition, language and values, urban space becomes a purely functional setting, like the container, based primarily on utilitarian considerations that can be easily copied and transferred from one place to another. This containerization of urban space, and the fragmentation of the humane, essential for the production of urban space, has its root in the history of colonial policies fragmenting and separating the Palestinians from their geography, society, culture and environment. This phase, which I call the neocolonial era and which happens to coincide with neoliberalism, is marked by a systematic fragmentation of what remains of Palestine. It transforms the long history of political resistance and struggle against occupation into a neoliberal project, to the point of presenting itself as the project for achieving the Palestinian dream. (Anani 2011; emphasis added)

Essential to the production of space that Anani envisions is the encountering of and engagement with the elements of space, the primitive and universal mode of which is walking. On one hand, this new – mutated – morphology has rendered walking in Ramallah a risky practice; threats of sweat, sun-strokes and bad smell in summer and wetness, sickness and mud in winter. This contemporary predicament is multiplying in scope due – essentially – to the elimination of the local and environmentally customised pedestrian networks in favour of motorized routes, as showcased in multiple cities around the Mediterranean specifically, and the globe generally. In humid Barcelona people are often apt to walking 1.5 - 2 km from the barrio of Gracia to that of Raval through the pedestrian stretch of Rambla de Catalunya a.o. This is promoted by

Image 2.14. Demonstration of growing scale of Functionalist construction in Ramallah; Batn elHawa neighbourhood, October 2012.
the higher quality of the journey where walking along the scene of tree-shed benches, small-shops and cafés is pleasing while using the metro at peak hours is disturbing, and strolling is sometimes faster than driving along the three to six lanes-wide, congested and additional-heat-radiating roads. This behaviour has been further encouraged since the introduction of the shared bicycle system 'Bicing' in 2007. The same applies to Nablus, where people would cross the entire old city on foot, but revert to motorized vehicles within few tens of meters from leaving the continuous fabric. The self-enforcing concatenation of expansion of motorways and marginalization of pedestrian networks is a scholarly established vicious cycle (Trancik 1986), whose debilitation necessitates a change in urban policy-making mechanisms towards incorporation of adaptive epistemologies which progressively enable resilient urban ecologies (Evans 2010).

On the other hand, the materialization of this twentieth-century genre of urbanism today is exposing the extent of damage induced by the COGAT policies of dwarfing public social infrastructures; namely, the absence of public parks, playgrounds and promenades. While Ramallah’s elTireh Street is turning into the informal deck of wanderers; the few gardens that the Municipality of Ramallah has managed to provision in the past few years are facing higher demand than their absorption abilities. This reality leaves scores of citizens with the sole option of turning to private service providers, namely, restaurants and cafés with gardens and terraces. Getting a table in Sangrias, Azur or Reef often requires prior reservation, as testified by the snakes of cars parked in vicinities of such places. With the disappearance of the extended family hosh (courtyard), gardens, and municipal strangulation due to land ownership limitations; it is legitimate to assume that the luxation lies in the suspension of concepts of ‘element integration’ from spaces newly ejaculated by the distancing of buildings from one another; what Trancik refers to as antispaces. As he explains:

The usual process of urban development treats buildings as isolated objects sited in the landscape, not as part of the larger fabric of streets, squares, and viable open space. Decisions about growth patterns are made from two-dimensional land-use plans, without considering the three-dimensional relationships between buildings and spaces and without a real understanding of human behavior. In this all too common process, urban space is seldom even thought of as an exterior volume with properties of shape and scale and with connections to other spaces. Therefore what emerges in most environmental settings today is unshaped anitspace. (Trancik 1986:1)

While Functionalism had argued its principles through hygiene, sanitation and decay reduction a.o.; in Ramallah the produced antispaces are themselves loci of disintegration as demonstrated in Image 2.15, p. 72. In 2012 the agglomerate witnessed 58 days of rainfall, 860.8 mm of rain, and a mean relative humidity of 59% (PCBS 2014e; PCBS 2014f; PCBS 2014g). Every year the natural soil erosion process dawns on the city closing streets and causing settlement, cracking, and in the worst cases collapse of retention walls. How many earthquakes, rain seasons and snow storms will the retention walls in images on former pages survive? What is the cost of their failure? What is the cost of their post-disaster rehabilitation? And meanwhile, what is the cost of researching, designing and implementing resilience-oriented adaptive measures, both, prospectively and retrospectively?... A precise and comprehensive feasibility study falls beyond the scope of this work, however,
coming chapters assume and appropriate the Cartesian argument of profitability – whether financial, political, human casualties, etc. – as achieved through adhering to disaster risk reduction measures into urban management systems.

In the close: the built-up, contained and residual spaces of Ramallah – akin other mundane localities – were and continue to be conceived through overlapping and interdependent systems whose comprehension entails attention to case-specific biology and genealogy – as elaborated hitherto in this section. Notwithstanding, decision-making as expression of locational epistemology materializes in the binary of place-making and articulated political strategy whether official or clandestine (Escobar 2001). Indispensable, thence, is the mapping of the city from the perspective of what Appadurai refers to as ‘process geographies’ which are ‘precipitates of various kinds of actions, interaction, and motion’ in lieu of the treatise of ‘relatively immobile aggregates of traits’ (Appadurai IN Collins 2011:4). In other words, what ideologies and politics have and are reproducing and enforcing the aforementioned physical crystallizations? And foremost, what are the Palestinian political shackles and shortcoming preventing the conception of contemporary spatial thought (e.g. post colonial-functionalism?), resilient evolution, and decolonization?
2.2. WHOSE NATION?
ALLON & DAYAN VS.
SUMUD & CIVIC AGENCY

The urban form and formation of Palestinian localities cannot be suspended from elapsing politics. The churches of Holy Seculpture and Nativity (Jerusalem and Bethlehem) are neither ordained with large glass windows nor inviting ample entrances; rather, they modulate fortresses capable of enduring long-term siege. The back-to-back morphology of cities stemmed from identical rationale that remains compelling, as demonstrated by the IOF’s bombing of the historic cores of Nablus and Bethlehem during its operation Defensive Shield, April 2002; as air-borne (or bulldozer) destruction was ‘safer’ than a chase in the mazes and alleys of such Palestinian localities (as elaborated in section 2.1.3.ii, p. 60). Herein, discussion of Ramallah’s urbanism in suspension of its political pedigree delineates an obsolete undertaking, as in Palestine ‘frontiers are deep, shifting, fragmented and elastic territories’ (Weizman 2007:4), and since:

elastic geographies respond to a multiple and diffused rather than a single source of power, their architecture cannot be understood as the material embodiment of a unified political will or as the product of a single ideology. Rather the organization of the Occupied Territories should be seen as a kind of ‘political plastic’, or as a map of the relation between all the forces that shaped it. (Weizman 2007:5)

Before World War I had elapsed the ‘question of Palestine’ was posed and remains subject to and of global negotiation and (re-)imagination. Zionism wished the resurrection of the Kingdom of Israel from 3,000 years past in audacious disregard of history, happenings and lives since. The British Mandate attempted a long-term colonization through infantilization of the ‘rude’ Palestinians and propagation of the *sui generis* Zionism. In its turn, the United Nations and in the name of its constituent nation-states hypocritically promoted a ‘balanced’ proposition of two-states whilst ignoring legal parameters, population composition43, and describing one as Jewish (religion) and the other as Arab (imaginary ethnicity). As for Palestinians, gradually over decades of time they locked themselves into the imagined narratives of so-called nationalisms thereof reducing their claims to the ‘relatively narrow context of national liberation struggles focused on the taking of state power’ (Collins 2011:3). Integrating the eurocentric rhetoric of nation-states as territorialization of claimed democracies whom in reality constitute exclusive systems (e.g. EU asylum and immigration policies); Palestinian politics – as mirrored in its urbanity – marginalized the question of ‘who are the Palestinians’ in favour of a ‘construct of a flat, one-dimensional, monolingual identity’44. Seen from this perspective, Zionism (and western politics) was undermining Palestinians through the construction of:

binary logic that splits the world [local geography] into hierarchically ordered halves (us/them, [...] developed/developing, terrorism/legitimate state violence,
etc.), and with the stale language of *realpolitik* and ‘national interests’. All of these have served to lock Palestine into restrictive patterns of familiarity and unfamiliarity that reflect and reinforce prevailing global hierarchies. (Collins 2011:x; emphasis in original)

The PLO’s implicit recognition of a two-state solution in its 12th Palestinian National Conference in 1974 marks the commencement of a long and slow Palestinian political crisis, which was articulated in the 1988 Declaration of Independence, materialized with the establishment of the PA, and whose effects are surfacing today. In this regard and on 9 April 2014 as the latest round of USA sponsored negotiations between Israel and the PLO stalled yet again, the Palestinian urbanist, researcher and educator at Birzeit University Dr. Yazid Anani wrote:

I personally have a different perspective regarding the current overwhelming global fashion of ‘let’s have a dialogue between Israelis and Palestinians’. I’m not quite sure that the current schizophrenic conditions now can be superficially countered by a ‘dialogue’ as a trajectory of political change. This is not only due to the ongoing global crisis of parliamentary democracy and its failure in delivering the people’s voice through its institutional representation; and defiantly not because we keep on forgetting the history of ‘dialogue’ that we have had in the 80’s and 90’s, while most of the visiting internationals keep on dismissing it and defiantly [sic] don’t have the chance to probe and understand the history of ‘dialogue’ that took place in that era, in relation to its social historical moment; finally it is also not due to the ample literature on the epistemology of the ‘dialogue’ in colonial condition!

To me, it’s more complex than that. The post-Oslo era is exactly like a nauseating blow on the head, where it left us knocked unconscious. What I think I need in this phase is to wake up and try to stand up, and figure out who we are as Palestinians? *What are our aspirations and dreams? What are our imaginations of liberation and postliberation? What is our construct of society, geography, landscape, nature, diaspora, the rural, the urban, and economy within the current political delirium?* To me at this particular moment, it’s defiantly [sic; definitely] not at all a priority to engage in ‘dialogue’ with Israelis, as much as, it’s rather a moment of internal dialogue with ourselves that we haven’t historically had the chance to explore and understand. So lets understand the current fashion of ‘dialogue’ from the latter perspective. (Yazid Anani, 9 April 2014, Facebook; emphasis added)

Anani’s questions – shared by several young Palestinian scholars e.g. Shibli 2012, alKhalili 2012, Abourahme 2009 – reflect a growing debate in Ramallah whose aesthetics are those of layered sociopolitical contestation, and its translation is spatial polarization, exclusion, and securitization. Hence, what are the *current* sociopolitical constructs and what needs are they articulating? What are the ideologies and factors hindering the conception and labour of future-oriented sociopolitical – thence spatial – imaginations of liberation and post-liberation? How can Palestinians plan for their precariousness and how can they capitalize on – rather than being reduced by – global knowledge and experiences?
Herein and as indicated in the previous section, when Israel commenced its perpetual reign as official custodian over the occupied population – and as it was (remains?) inspired by the exodus of Palestinians in 1948 and 1967 – it embarked on voiced strategies of impoverishing localities in the WB and GS towards inducing further emigration (Abdulhadi 1990). To this end, Israeli control strategies have at core involved three main necessities: [first] demographic containment; [second] land alienation and colonization; and [third] the subversion of Palestinian political independence; where the contours of these strategies ‘have undergone radical revision in response to two main challenges; Palestinian resistance and Palestinian demographics’ (Hamami and Tamari 2008:26). Through addressing those strategies this work seeks to answer the collective questions stated by Anani earlier.

2.2.1. Pandora’s Box: Nationalism, Exclusivism, and Ethnocracy

One of the doctrines that nationalism has turned into a feature of our ordinary common sense is that the world is divided into nations, so that every person, under normal circumstances, is born into a nationality. (Chatterjee 2001:10336)

The ‘nation’ concept is deeply rooted in the consciousness of everyday people: the passport, the flag, and the visual symbols and representations. This postulate is a by-product and a fertilizer of the truism ‘that the proper form of modern politics is to be found where the political unit of the state coincides with the cultural form of the nation’ (Chatterjee 2001:10336). While some scholars argue nationalism through historic vestiges of ethnic, linguistic, religious or dynastic communions, a second opinion associates it to the German Romantic movement, the French Revolution, or even the Latin American movements of independence. In contrast to the former and in line with the latter, a third crowd of scholars argues lineages to history as – predominantly – a product of nonuniversalist ideologies courting concepts of social justice whereby ‘Nationalism was the form in which democracy appeared in the world contained in the idea of the nation as a butterfly in a cocoon’ (Greenfeld IN Sand 2010:23). Regardless of the origins and excuses, do democracies at large and global cities in particular tolerate the persistence of such a swathe in the climate of the 21st century?

Internationalization of nation-based politics commenced in the 17th century with the emergence of the Westphalian System (Jones & Jessop 2010) and the definition of national sovereignty as the ‘unique jurisdiction of a single state over a territory’. In the 18th century this concept embedded the notion that the centre of sovereignty lies in the masses as bearers of rights and entitled to expression of opinion. Yet under parliamentary democracy authority is hegemonized to claimed majorities. By the 20th century wars of independence were fuelled by the resonant title of ‘right to self-determination’ which was associated with the individual nation (Chatterjee 2001), and remains the refrain of Palestinian politics today.
Notwithstanding, nationalism is chiefly organic and seldom universal. While the latter believes that the ‘right to self-determination’ should include choice of one’s affiliations and loyalties; in contrast the affluent organic nationalism claims the fundamentalism of culture and ‘collective’ history for such an entitlement. In this regard, Anderson (2006) argues that the nation is an imagined political community for which the act of imagination lies in four; first, through the repetitive use of the term ‘community’ which embeds the idea of collective space and fate; second, that the sovereignty of the community falls in line with the modern political notions; third, that the community is limited and unique among the others; and fourth, it is imagined as a force creating ‘deep, horizontal, comradeship’. This ‘imagined’ paradigm - according to Anderson (2006) - is like any other, created with tools. It is embodied and stressed through written and oral mediums, emblematic representations, and is regularly dogmatized via the use of language, museums, maps, censuses, anthems and memorials.

Whilst ‘nation-states’ were battling the constituents of the persona, the anima of Palestinians inhabiting the holy land remained multi-ethnicity, religious diversity, and cultural pairings. Up to date Palestinian Muslims bury their dead in fondled graves with biographic headstones and commence their holy celebrations of elFiter and alAdha by visiting the dead immediately after morning prayers (similar to Christian traditions). In contrast, in Saudi Arabia Islamic preachings of human mortality are sociospatially enacted, where graveyards are abandoned extra urbs, lifeless, and graves lie unidentified and forgotten. Palestinian cultures and ethnicities – hence symbols, applications and spaces of constituents of morals and faith – are gradations of many, as Sand writes:

[O]ver thousands or even hundreds of years almost any population, especially in such geographic junctions as the land between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean, mingles with its neighbors, its captives or its conquerors. Greeks, Persians, Arabs, Egyptians and Crusaders had all come to the country and always mingled and integrated with the local population. (Sand 2010:183)

This dynamic of the seemingly aeonian cultural and religious re-adaptation of the Philistines (Diagram 2.3, p. 76) was alien to modern Zionism which was reborn in the late 18th century in Central and Eastern Europe. Although the majority of Jewish intellectuals had been ‘eager supporters of the new [European] states’ (Sand 2010:251), rising anti-Semitism and the depiction of Jews as the ‘ultimate other’ (ibid. 253) by European Christians gave excuse for the Zionist exclusivism:

[ ]ust as Germanity at some stage needed abundant Aryanism to define itself, so Poln[ishness needed Catholicism and Russianness needed Orthodox pan-]Slavism to swaddle their national identities and imagery. Unlike the Jewish religious reform movement, or the liberal and socialist intellectual groups that sought participation in the emergent national cultures [in Europe], Zionism borrowed extensively from the dominant nationalist ideologies flourishing in the lands of its birth and infancy, and integrated them into its new platform. It included traces of German Volks[ism, while Polish romantic nationalist features characterized much of its rehtoric. But these were not mere imitations – it

Diagram 2.3. (right) Illustration of the political history of the geography between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean between 2000 BC and 2000 A.C.
was not a case of an agonized victim taking on some features of his smiling executioner. [...] educated Zionists emulated the other nationalists in Europe and assumed an ethnoreligious or ethnobiological identity to conceptualize their self-definition. Seeking to build a bridge that could connect Jewish believers – mainly former believers, whose languages and secular customs were polyphonous and diverse – they were unable to build on the lively popular mores and turn them into a homogeneous, domesticated modern culture, as the Bund tried to do. To achieve their aim, the Zionists needed to erase existing ethnographic textures, forget specific histories, and take a flying leap backward to an ancient, mythological and religious past. (Sand 2010:255; emphasis added)

Through this approach ‘Zionism secularized’ and nationalised Judaism’ (Pappe 2007:11); rejected the integration of post World War I Jewish emigrants from Europe with the ‘strangers’ in Palestine in contrast to the pre-World War I organic emigration, and; re-imagined the native population in respect to its exclusive doctrines which considered irrelevant the reasons for which the delicious Ma’moul is the celebratory sweet across regional faiths. According to Pappe only few of the local elites had recognized the threat of Zionism, and majority of those fell short of recognizing its ‘destructive potential’ as they considered it merely a ‘part of the European missionary and colonialist drive’ (ibid).

Thereof and while limiting to the twentieth century, in terms of the First strategy of ‘demographic containment’ the British, Zionists and recently Palestinian politicians as well – all fulfilled and repeatedly re-framed Anderson’s (2006) and Fanon’s (2004; 2008) postulates of colonial discourse and agency in imagining indigenous communities. The Britons faced difficulty in indulging the rapid integration of Palestinians into their Mandate system. The anti ‘Mohammedan’ (Pappe 2007), orientalist and colonialist (Said 1979) stratification of Palestinians composed the main argument for ‘custody’ over the people that ‘were not civilized enough to rule themselves’ where:

Some historical time of development and civilization (colonial rule and education, to be precise) had to elapse before they could be considered prepared for such a task. Mill’s historicist argument thus consigned Indians, Africans and other ‘rude’ nations to an imaginary waiting room of history. In doing so, it converted history into a version of this waiting room.’ (Chakrabarty IN Harvey 2009:40)

Following their ‘common sense’ the British Mandate Government – with West European consent – opted to solve two predicaments in one operation; First, solve the mounting restlessness across the old continent whose fuel was the presence of the Jews by facilitating the transfer of the latter; and Second, guarantee its geographic persistence at the neck of the Suez Canal (connection to far-east colonies) through trapping the Mediterranean natives and thence exiled European minority in politics of animosity that renders the presence of a ‘referee’ empirical. Herein, Collins regards both Palestinians and Jews ‘as populations whose shared vulnerability derived directly from the perpetuation of European anti-Semitism’ (2011:47) which in turn was ‘grounded both in the discourse of sovereignty’ and that of ‘permanent war’ (ibid:57). From this perspective, British colonialism had also constructed an ‘imagined’ partner, a Jewish Agency (JA, arm of WZO in Palestine) that shared the European ‘civility’ and blissfully played the
content servant and ideological missionary. The roles were clearly defined, the ‘rude nation’ and the ‘agent’, rendering Palestinian ethos of assimilation irrelevant.

In the wake of the Palestinian uprisings of 1929 the British Mandate gradually increased its deployment on one hand, and on the other the India-born chargé d’affaires Lord Charles Wingate who took onto himself the assignment to ‘transform the principal paramilitary organization of the Jewish community in Palestine, the Hagana’ (Pappe 2007:16); he:

made the Zionist leaders realise more fully that the idea of Jewish statehood had to be closely associated with militarism and army, first of all to protect the growing number of Jewish enclaves and colonies inside Palestine but also – more crucially – because acts of armed aggression were an effective deterrent against the possible resistance of the local Palestinians. From there, the road to contemplating the enforced transfer of the entire indigenous population would prove to be very short indeed. (Pappe 2007:15; emphasis added)

By the 1936 Palestinian uprising the British had stationed ‘more troops in Palestine than there were in the Indian subcontinent’ (Pappe 2007:14), and the Hagana Jewish paramilitias were attached to the Mandate’s forces on ‘punitive missions’ (ibid:16). While the coloniser imagined the subordination of its agent, the latter had integrated the tools of its custodian and produced its differentiating goal: the referee was no longer desired.

In preparation for the upcoming battle Zionists conformed as well to imaging the geography and population. Their first project was The Village Files⁴⁸, which were complete by the time World War II irrupted, where:

precise details were recorded about the topographic location of each village, its access roads, quality of land, water springs, main sources of income, its sociopolitical composition, religious affiliations, religious affiliation, names of its mukhtars, its relationship with other villages, the age of individual men (sixteen to fifty) and many more. An important category was an index of ‘hostility’ (towards the Zionist project, that is) decided by the level of the village’s participation in the revolt of the 1936. (Pappe 2007:19)

Zionism convinced the Jewish Community – which by the end of Mandate in 1948 owned a mere 5.8% of the territory (Pappe 2007; Map 1.5, p. 25) – that they are trapped in a predicament whereby ‘to become indigenous: ‘they’ [Palestinians] must die so that ‘we’ [Israeli settlers] may live’ (Collins 2011:58); where salvation necessitates aggression. The military, intelligence and political advantages enabled the relatively swift ethnic cleansing of Palestinians between 1947 and 1949; 80% of Palestinians living in the area designated for the Jewish State – by the 1947 partition plan (Map 1.6, p. 25) – were displaced and countless killed. This marked the switching of roles, where Israel assumed the role of ultimate coloniser and instated sui generis ideology, systems, and agents.

Three months after the Six-Day War, Israel conducted a comprehensive census of land and population and their respective bureaucratic and legal codifications. This population registry – actively or passively – displaced between 182,000 and 355,000 Palestinians, and ‘continues to determine the right [of Palestinians] to ‘legally’ reside in the occupied territories as concretized through Israeli identity cards’ (Hamami and Tamari 2008:26). This registry tinctured
Palestinians into several categories and subcategories to which legal titles were attached (Weizman 2007). For example, a Jerusalemite (for non-Jews the status can only be claimed by living pedigree) is given an Israeli residency that is obstinately a subject for abrogation, and requires a *Laissez-Passer* permit to leave the country\(^49\), since:

Palestinians [in Jerusalem] hold the status of ‘permanent resident’ of the State of Israel. This is the same status granted to foreign citizens who have freely chosen to come to Israel and want to live there. Israel treats Palestinian residents of East Jerusalem as immigrants who live in their homes at the beneficence of the authorities and not by right. The authorities maintain this policy although these Palestinians were born in Jerusalem, lived in the city, and have no other home. Treating these Palestinians as foreigners who entered Israel is astonishing, since it was Israel that entered East Jerusalem in 1967. (B’Tselem 2014c)

Then there are the West Bankers, the Gazans, the 1948-Palestinians, the exiled, the expatriates, the returnees, the UNRWA registered refugees inside the WB and GS and in a different category those who are in exile (see pg. xxi). The legal status of Palestinians – with the exception of expatriates and the 1948-Palestinians – is Stateless\(^50\). Notwithstanding, if they pursue a foreign citizenship their Israeli residency permit – referred to as ID – becomes subject to repeal\(^51\). Highlighting the employment of judiciary systems and legislation for quasi-legitimation of its colonial mechanisms, Yiftachel identifies Israel as an *ethnocracy* which is:

> a specific expression of nationalism that exists in contested territories where a dominant ethnos gains political control and uses the state apparatus to ethnicize the territory and society in question. Ethnocracies are neither democratic nor authoritarian (or ‘Herrenvolk’) systems of government. The lack of democracy rests on unequal citizenship and on state laws and policies that enable the seizure of the state by one ethnic group. (Yiftachel 1999:730)

Herein and akin past conquerors of Palestine, Zionism planted its seeds of the imagined ethnography and exclusive ideology, whose fruition blossomed when it found its compatible agent; the Arafat-PLO which ‘blissfully played [though ignorant] the content servant and ideological missionary’ through its signature of the OAs in 1993. This harvest was enabled by the Third Israeli strategy of ‘subversion of Palestinian political independence’ (Hamami and Tamari 2008:26) which fostered the ridge between the exiled PLO leadership in Tunisia on one side and on the other the National Guidance Committee (NGC) of inland Palestinian politics.

In order to understand Palestinian politics and hence government policy today, scholarship has to note that ontological scrutiny into Palestinian post-1948 nationalism and political-psych yields ideological geographies matching those of Zionism, namely, Central and East Europe. The termination of World War II and the resulting Cold War not only placed the Allies and Soviets at cannon-ends, but equally, redefined the relationship of the latter with Zionists and Palestinians. According to Arouri (2013) the Soviets had articulated their pro-Palestinian stance as early as 1919. Whereas this expounds Israel’s proximity to the Allies, it does not rule out the indications that the Soviets as well ‘imagined’ a Palestinian nation with an individual and horizontal identity.
Throughout the Cold War and as Israel gained fame and footing amongst the alliance of ‘settler international’ as Collins coins it (2011:58), the Soviets provided network, grounds and channelled resources for the PLO on one hand, and on the other assumed responsibility for the majority of inland Palestinian higher education, as Palestinians with no Israeli citizenship were limited by the Zionist regime to universities outside of Israel. Yet it was not merely logistical support, but ideological patronage to those who wished to face their colonization. For example, Tayseer Arouri studied Physics in Moscow officially between 1966 and 1973, but had secretly – in a location he remains ignorant of – preceded his academic education with two-years of underground political training on strategy construction and mass mobilization among other leadership skills. He narrates that along were Jordanians, Italians, Syrians, Palestinian refugees and exiled persons as well as other nationalities but no Israelis. There, the combination of the Soviet Pan-Slavism and unfolding heights of Pan-Arabism rendered exclusive (mono) national constructions and preachings inapplicable; more so in the suspended space and time of the secret facility and amongst the regional and ethnically differentiated ‘classmates’.

As Israel was carving its first decade into history, Gamal AbdelNasser – second President of the Republic of Egypt, 1956 to 1970 – became the symbol of anti-imperialism throughout the Arab World. His regional econo-political agenda mirrored those of the Soviet and European Unions, where he recognized the importance of border permeability for socioeconomic progress and pursued it. A comparable history and discourse can be found in the development of the Union of South American Nations (USAN), enacted since March 2011. AbdelNasser was a propagator of Pan-Arabism that evolved in the prelude to WWI, which is a school of thought defining ‘Arabs’ as ‘people linked by special bonds of language, history and religion, and that their political organization should in some way reflect this reality’ (Khalidi et al 1991:vii; emphasis added). His target of – a prosperous and ethnically diverse political entity through – amputating the arms of former regional colonialists and imperialist from the region starting with the Suez Canal was met by the UK, France and Israel with the Tripartite Aggression (also known as Suez Crisis, Map 1.11, p. 29) against Egypt four months after AbdelNasser assumed office. His sudden death in 1970 was the first nail in the coffin of mid-20th century inclusivist Pan-Arabism, while later ones were delivered through the USA’s sponsorship of anti-socialist and ideologically radical minorities such as the Taliban and Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood - alikhwan; which in turn conceived the Islamic Resistance Movement - Hamas in 1987 and the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant - Da’esh (ISIL a.k.a. ISIS) in 2014.

In relation to Palestine and contrary to other ‘socialist’ trainees, following their academic studies, political training and otherwise; Palestinian politicians did not conjoin in a singular territory. Whereas inland politicians returned to the native colonized yet still socially plural space, exiled ones referred to a varying number of countries. Whether in Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, Yemen or an East European country, Palestinian politicians lived the unfolding social-space of post-Nasserism nationalist politics; which in essence was eurocentric in definition, imperial in its concepts of territory and population, and ideologically exclusive. This mutated political discourse was enabled through the pseudo-marriage of concepts of right to self determination with the narrow concept of the ‘nation’. This difference in geography of evolution, fine-tuning and operation
bred the corrugation in Palestinian politics, which was sparked with the Camp David Egyptian-Israeli peace-treaty in 1978, articulated in the PLO’s Declaration of Independence of Palestine on 15 November 1988 in Algiers, and staged to contest through the signature of the OAs in 1993 as elaborated over coming pages. Thereof, how did the political ridge materialize in Palestinian decision-making? And how does this Palestinian nationalism(s), Zionist ethnocracy and the colonial stratification of Palestinians relate to the sociospatial transformation of Ramallah? These fundamental questions lead us to the next section.

2.2.2. Colonial vs. Civic Agency and their Sociospatial Applications

As aforementioned and under the Third strategy; Israel militarized the 1967-occupied geographies (see section 2.1.3.ii, p. 60) and reduced its provision of public services and – social and physical – infrastructural investment in localities to speculative minimums, while existential resources of water, power and road infrastructures were integrated into Israeli systems (AbuHelu 2012). Meanwhile, the PLO was gaining global attention and visibility that followed it through the chase; out of Amman to Beirut in 1971, and by 1982 further away from the homeland to Tunis. Given the PLO’s implicit recognition of a two-state solution in its 12th Palestinian National Conference in 1974, it was recognized by the Arab League as the sole representative of the Palestinian people, its chair Yasser Arafat was invited to speak at its General Assembly meeting in November 1974, and a year later it was granted an observer status at the UN. Arafat’s unilateral concession to the Zionist state made the Palestinian ‘nationalist activity’ appear and be ‘treated as a form of outside infiltration into a population that was perceived as largely quiescent,’ where:

quiescence during this period was not only due to the immaturity of the national movement on the ground, or to the use of brute force (where and when necessary) but most overwhelmingly to the ‘life giving’ power (or biopower) of Israeli governmentality over Palestinian lives. Health insurance, school certification, car licensing, applications for birth certificates and death certificates, permits to build or extend a house, tax receipts, permits for visiting relatives – all the necessities of quotidian life compelled the residents of the occupied territories to depend on the bureaucratic apparatus of the military government. Thus much political suppression took place not [only] through the visible threat of deportation, house or town arrest, but [also] through threat of bureaucratic disenfranchisement. (Hamami and Tamari 2008:28)

As an extra-territorial political representative, the Tunis-PLO had free space to employ the militarization of the Palestinian anti-colonial discourse, which did achieve visibility, recognition, international solidarity and momentum amongst Palestinians regardless of geography. Yet, these operations ‘represented the particular response of a group of revolutionaries to a set of circumstances
they did not choose’ and constituted ‘acts of war without war’ (Collins 2011:70). Hence, this mode of operation was also episodic, reactionary and short-term. Meanwhile, inland politicians – whom congregated under a sub-PLO framework named the National Guidance Committees (NGCs) – recognized their military detriment and followed the only path possible: unarmed mass mobilization which in its early stages operated undetected by the radars monitoring the PLO and its command centre in Tunis.

Inland politicians in cities e.g. Ramallah were leading the charging of local masses for rebellion54 through nurturing a collective sense of purpose which was in turn promoted through socialist and liberal concepts that appeased the ethnically and socially plural and institutionally disenfranchised colonized subjects. This mobilization was achieved through complimentary systems of civic agency that countered Israel’s colonial policies of isolation, fragmentation and weakening. Examples are the Palestinian Agriculture Relief Committees (PARC, mobilised in 1970s and registered in 1983) which worked against land confiscations, conspired shortages, etc.; the Palestinian Medical Relief Society (PMRS, 1979) as supplement for the insufficient provision of medical services; and the Popular Work Committees (PWCs) as well as scores of varying forms of unions which catered for needs such as orphanages, day-care, clandestine supply pipelines to besieged areas55, and other civil services (PBC 2014; Fasheh 2010).

Faced with the tag of insurgency lead Palestinian domestic politicians – regardless whether voluntarily or involuntarily – to appropriate the will of the masses, whom constituted its only medium and source of legitimation. This dynamic of conditionality and swift accountability in which Palestinian politics peddled translated in a distinct arena of urban warfare whose spatial precipitations remain in circulation. Palestinian localities were a battlefield on which Israel – akin the British – was blinded by its militarism to the social chromosome of resilience and its topography. This arena is fluid, uncategorised, and nowadays an account of the sine qua non sociospatial shifts assimilating the ideological contestation over the mental and lived spaces of Palestinians.

2.2.2.i. The Sitting Room: Integrating the Mental- and Lived- Spaces

Elaborating the afore-described space in reference to Lefebvre’s (2009) triad; the dichotomy of the ‘mental space’ of Zionist versus indigenous ideological contestation – between exclusivism and inclusivism respectively – materialized in the progressive shifting and re-identification of the ‘lived’ and representational ‘spaces’. For example, in the pre-mandate Palestinian architecture (of peasant and middle classes which composed the majority of population and is typologically comparable to other Mediterranean cases), single family units either had one room for all purposes within the space of the extended family, or one multi-use living room, or depended on the shared hospitality facilities of the hosh (or Diwan in villages). The pre-industrial optimal use of resources and space is inscribed in the nolli-plans of Palestinian villages and towns. The impact of availability of steel load-bearing elements under the British Mandate is not limited to enabling multi-story construction and the relatively lower costs. These two factors catalyse but alone fall short of inducing the rapid and widespread mental and behavioural shift from minimal living spaces to the modern spatial program. Nowadays, archetypal Palestinian single-family units include – amongst other spaces – a ‘living’ room and
a ‘sitting’ room (Diagram 2.4). While the etymology is irrelevant the ontology is. The combination of moving beyond extended family hosh along with the persistence of social habits of assembly necessitated the presence of hospitality spaces, thence the adoption of the English living room as quintessential space. However, why is there a – no matter how small – ‘sitting room’? Some could argue that ‘sitting’ rooms replaced the courtyard, yet this argument abates when faced with the complete enclosure of the space which could have equally been a terrace, or large balcony with latticework along the lines of the mashrabiya

Herein, the aforementioned civic agency can be argued as the modem that created the ‘sitting room’ by translating the mental- into the lived-space. As public spaces (streets, restaurants, cultural centres, etc.) were compromised or red-tapped by Israel (elaborated below), the semi-private ‘living’ room had to be redefined into public use as meeting place of comrades, and the concept of a minimal, private, family-sitting-room was conceived. Hence, every private family unit (the lived) catered for a semi-public space (the mental) on its own expense; from a conceptual perspective, the individual produced and financed the collective. As a female participant in the +50 years-old Focus Group testifies:

In the period in which the political parties were strong, there were social factors acting against any droop. And our houses, they were the cafés and loci of congregation. Did either of you ever hold a meeting in a café? Or when a journalist called for an interview with a politician? Or the members of a party meet?.. There were no headquarters for parties and our houses were the hotels and the cafés. (FG 2011, no.6; +50 yrs)

Thereof, the rapid integration of the ‘sitting’ room into Palestinian and regional single-unit construction was a byproduct of – among others – the crowding of the urban public spaces by the colonial. The ‘simultaneity’ of sumud as ‘national consciousness’ was also enabled by the print industry which had commodified, made accessible, and therein internationalized knowledge and ideology barter in a demonstration of the ‘primacy of capitalism’ to political systems (Anderson 2006:37). However, vital to metabolism of ideological scripts was – and remains – communication whether in the form of public talks, debates, visual and acoustic arts among many others. Given the Israeli surveillance of the streets and public facilities of Ramallah and other cities induced the development of alternative lived as well as representational spaces and their connectors.

2.2.2.ii. Parliament or University? Palestinian Representational Spaces and their Connectors

The signature of the Camp David Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty in 1978 brought the – hitherto considered marginal – NGCs to the attention of Israeli decision-makers with announcing their rejection of the treaty in a series of public events throughout the territories controlled by Israel. The NGC had captured the spot-light as Yasser Arafat – in Beirut – was calculating potential consequences of criticising the most regionally influential Arab state on the PLO which he chaired. This revelation of mobilization capabilities had advantages, namely the as of then the NGC was able to claim its weights and thence role in determining the course of the national liberation struggle; and disadvantages, of which the NGC attracted
Israel's attention and hence became a target of liquidation attempts (PBC 2014). This pivotal shift in Palestinian political dynamics marked the first incident of the aforementioned ridge between exiled and inland parties, and concomitantly induced two major changes in Israel's colonial methodology.

First, the inversion of the IOF policy of ‘the invisible occupation’ whose tactic was such that ‘a local Arab can live his life... without needing to see or speak to an Israeli representative’ (Weizman 2006:142). This policy had originated with the birth of Israel and its lack of interest in integrating the 150,000 – then and today 1.658 million57 (CBS 2014) – Palestinians whom had survived displacement attempts during the Nakba and were ultimately granted second-class citizenship in the ethnocratic Israel (Yiftachel 1999; Sand 2010). Under the new strategy the Israeli Civil Administration (ICA) was established in 1981 with its headquarters in the Beit El colony, 4 km north east of alManara Square (Map 2.2, p. 59). It operates – still – within the larger framework of the COGAT in order to:

administer the civilian affairs in the region [...], for the well-being and good of the population, and in order to supply and implement the public services and [...] maintain an orderly administration and public order in the region (Shehadeh 1985:70; emphasis added)

To this goal, the ICA added another dimension to mobility restrictions. As of that moment growing numbers of average – politically uninvolved, ‘law-abiding’ – Palestinians required permits as well for movement within the one territory, between the Jordan and Mediterranean. This tool was introduced at a time the COGAT had compromised the communication systems of post and telephone;
thus propagating the ulteriority of Palestinian anticolonial political action and correspondence in a predigital era where the physical realm was quintessential. In this light Israel considered necessary more:

radical and comprehensive containment strategies [...] which came to focus on three main tracks. On the one hand was the destruction of the external organization of the national movement [PLO] in Lebanon [1982 invasion], while internally, was the destruction of its representatives, and in place of both was the attempt to develop a local class of quislings – empowered by being middlemen to crucial services of the Civil Administration. (Hamami and Tamari 2008:30)

In regards to the first track the Israeli government commissioned the Mossad, for the second it gave a free hand to the Shin Bet (a.k.a Shabak), while the third target swayed until it found a stable course through the fitting format of the OAs and the customized clone of the ICA, the PA.

Utilizing – then and today – the tactic of ‘denial of privileges’ (Weizman 2006:142) students were banned from leaving the country to pursue higher education while others were denied return afterwards. People waited for years to get a driver’s license or a telephone line, volunteering in the PWCs in the provision of social services accounted to a misdemeanor, and hundreds of unindicted ‘suspects’ served extended terms in Israeli prisons without charges, presenting justifications such as: ‘they [Israeli security apparatuses] think that you were thinking about doing something, and they arrested you to prevent you from doing that something. They arrested you for your own good’ – as explained to Arouri by his prison-ward after 30 of the total 45 months of administrative detention in 1974-78 (Arouri 2013:157).

The second tactic that Israel placed into effect to counter the home-grown resistance was partial and complete curfews and closures of Palestinian localities, which became a common IOF practice e.g. in the year 1988 over 1,600 curfews were imposed and therewith '60 per cent of the population had been confined in their homes for extended periods of time' (Neve Gordon IN Weizman 2006:289), and for the duration of the 1991 Gulf War Yitzhak Shamir ordered the closure of the entire Occupied Territories for the first time from Israel and the rest of the world’ (ibid:142). The permit manuscript which was launched in the early 1980s was physically placed into effect by the signature of the OAs in 1993, after which:

[...] the politics of closure was further extended, perfected and normalized. During 1994, Israeli security control retreated into the roadways that connected centres of Palestinian population. Between 1994 and 1999, Israel installed 230 checkpoints and imposed 499 days of closures. Israeli sovereignty was exercised in its ability to block, filter and regulate movement in the entire Occupied Territories, and between it and the 'outside'. The occupation effectively shifted to [...] working as a system of on / off valves [...]. Even the level of flow in the water pipes connecting the separate Palestinian enclaves throughout the territories was controlled by the Civil Administration. (Weizman 2006:142)

The Israeli restriction on Palestinian movement is ‘enforced by a system of fixed checkpoints, surprise ‘flying’ checkpoints, physical obstructions, roads on which Palestinians are forbidden to travel, and gates along the ‘Separation Barrier’
In February 2014 there were 99 fixed checkpoints – of which 59 are internal – in the WB, while ‘flying’ ones registered a peak with a monthly average of 495 surprise checkpoints from January through September 2011 (B’Tselem 2014). This process was accompanied by the weakening or complete liquidation of Palestinian public transportation systems by inducing their disadvantageous privatization. And as the Israeli Egged buses placed stations in colonies it deflected from passing through Palestinian localities.

The urban-management version of this system of ‘filtration’ was – as well – piloted in the 1980s. At the time, Palestinian representational spaces shifted constantly in relation to the Israeli tactic of ‘denial of privileges’. Ability and parameters of operation of Palestinian civil bodies were scaled against the level of complicity of the particular institution with the colonial. That was when the Grand Hotel and elHamra, Ramallah’s three Cinemas, some newspapers, bookshops, and several neighbourhood-clubs and cultural-centres were forced to close their doors (Barthe 2011). In the 30-40 years-old Focus Group conducted by this work Birzeit University’s role as a representational space during the 1980s was described as:

[Birzeit U]niversity used to be the compass for the political scene, and its lecturers enjoyed a symbolic social respect and status. The students of the university were regarded as the leaders of tomorrow who are fighting and learning despite the closure of their university by the occupation. (FG 2011 no.2)

Legitimacy of representation – whether human or spatial – amongst Palestinians of the 1980s was corollary to the duration of imprisonment or closure whereby ‘the number of years spent in an Israeli prison was a reflection of his or her value’ (FG 2011 no.2). For the only higher education institution in the agglomerate and surroundings – Birzeit University, this translated with 4 closures (8 months) in 1980-82; then 7 closures (11 months) in 1984-87; and in 1989 – at the peak of the First Intifada – the university was closed down by Israel for the 15th time and a total duration of 51 consecutive months until 29 April 1992. In this period the campus was substituted with ‘makeshift arrangements’ for small study groups, where ‘many students require [sic] 10 years to complete their four-year degree programs’ (BZU 2014).

Thereof and in spite of the incarceration of spaces of Palestinian collective sociopolitical production; the framework of the aforementioned voluntary civic-service providers (which had commenced in the 1970s) served as an adhesive against isolation of individuals in the private space and the consequent social dissolution. Spatially, it was an ongoing process of discarding formal public spaces (whether a university campus or restaurant) and in parallel the appropriation of the private as the informal substitute. In turn, this process reconfigured the private ‘living room’ space into the representational space of the collective political demarcated with the omni presence of hanging embroidered maps of Palestine and pictures of family prisoners and martyrs (Anani 2013).

The afore-described geographies and mechanisms ‘were responsible for the forging of new identities that made possible sustained collective action’ (Robinson 1993:302). They were enabled by the underground discourses conceived and entrenched prior the 1967 War on both sides of the Armistice line (see section 2.1.3, p. 56). Spatially, these networks constituted an intransigeant shadow layer on the maps, against those of interrupted and surveyed infrastructures. Amongst
other aspects, these – political, social, and economic – systems became substitute connectors reinforcing rural regions against Israeli colonisation on one hand, and on the other enforcing comradeship between rural and urban. This erudite strategy was produced by the virtue of the post-Nakba Palestinian political consciousness regarding relevance of the rural to regional connectedness, mass-mobilization, and later, the holistic and integrated national development. Its politics was facilitated by the post-Israel transfigured socioeconomic order of Palestinians, where the break of ‘traditional patron-client relations that had been the social base of the old elite’ had in effect:

[... ] paved the way for the rise of a more extensive, better educated, more rural, and nonlanded elite. [...] In its essence, the social mobilization of Palestinian society after 1967 was about breaking old forms of identity, creating new ones, and, as a result, changing patterns of political behavior. (Robinson 1993:301; emphasis added)

This description of inland Palestinian politics by Robinson in 1993 attests to Sand’s (2010) diagnosis of Palestinians as a population that endured through assimilation, as manifested – for example – through the creation of the Rakah socialist party in 1965 by both, Palestinian and Israeli communists that opposed Zionism. Rakah and later the Hadash – The Democratic Front for Peace and Equality in Israel – collaborated with the NGCs and its various constituting parties in the mobilisation and civic engagement of the population between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean e.g. the annual commemoration of Land Day on the 30th of March through voluntary service activities and the coordination of the International Workers Day every 1st of May demonstrations. This nouveau Palestinian – inland – political identity allowed the emergence of the Israeli leftists human rights organizations such as Peace Now in 1978 (with international chapters) and B’TSELEM – The Israeli Information Centre for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories in 1989. The height of this ‘integration’ was reached in the Israeli 1992 election when the Likud was outset after fifteen years in office in favour of the Labour Party with an Israeli cabinet majored by politicians that recognised the ‘demographic threat’ and supported the disengagement from Palestinians through a two-state configuration. However, this ostensibly liberal political discourse was not that of the majority, lost footing with the end of the Cold War. Moreover, it came twenty-five years too late, tens of colonies too late, and hundreds of quasi-legal military orders and by-laws too late, and a ‘Drobless Plan’ too late.

The Drobless Plan (coming section) had fantasized Palestinian state-borders to include 65% of the WB and GS, which combined constitute 22% of historic Palestine i.e. less than 15% of the total. The fictional territory excluded Jerusalem, and envisioned to house a nation reduced to Palestinians already residing in the WB and GS, i.e. less than 50% of those who identify themselves as Palestinians. A decade prior to the OAs, Zionism – which according to Avi Shlaim has never been liberal (Head to Head 2014) – required a certain genre of Palestinian identity, and found its inspiration in USA and UK neoliberal policies of marginalization of middle classes. Given its inability to outcast unions and similar frameworks due to its socialist constitution, Israel sought a local commissioner, as revealed later.
2.2.2.iii. Land Alienation: the Drobless Plan

Referring back to Hamami and Tamari’s second named Israeli strategy of ‘land alienation and colonization’ which underwent ‘radical revision in response to two main challenges; Palestinian resistance and Palestinian demographics’ (2008:26, see pg. 73); within twelve months of the Six Day War the survey of WB territories by the Israel Lands Administration and the General Staff’s Settlement Department was completed, along with a set of recommendations for the use of state-lands. This was accompanied by sequential IOF military orders sanctioning prompt and prospective usurpation of public as well as private ‘absentee’ property which therein cleared 20% of the WB for settler colonialism, and a further 26% a decade later through the employment of the mirì⁵² land classification (Hamami and Tamari 2008). The Israeli land-grab culminated with the institutionalization of Israel’s settler colonialism via its request of a new master settlement plan from its spiritual patron, the World Zionism Organisation (WZO). In 1981 the plea was answered with the Drobless Plan⁶³ which stated that:

[T]here is to be not a shadow of doubt regarding our intention to remain in Judea and Samaria. A dense chain of settlements on the mountain ridge running southwards from Nablus to Hebron will serve as a reliable barrier on the eastern front. This buffer zone of settlements will also create security for settlers in the Jordan Valley. Both areas between concentrations of the minority [Palestinian] population and the area around them must be settled to minimize the danger of the rise of another Arab state in the region. (Dobless IN: Abdulhadi 1990:48)
The Israeli government whose Prime Minister at the time was Yitzak Shamir needed no convincing. Shamir said: ‘The settlement of the Land of Israel is the essence of Zionism. Without settlements, we will not fulfil Zionism. It’s that simple’ (21 February 1997 in Maariv IN NAD 2014). Two years later the plan was refined and re-presented as the ‘World Zionist Organisation Development Plan for 1983-86’ a.k.a. ‘Master Plan for 2010’ (Map 2.4, p. 89); which was designed to:

’disperse maximally large Jewish populations in areas of high settlement priority using small national inputs and in a relatively short period by using the settlement potential of the West Bank and to achieve the incorporation into the national [Israeli] system’. According to the plan, about 6,000 housing units, 23 settlements, 20 strongpoints, 500 dunums of industrial zones, and 100-150 kilometers of paved roads were to be constructed each year of the plan at a total expenditure of about $2.6 million. (Abdulhadi 1990:48)

These plans constituted the shift from the pre-1978 ‘pragmatist camp’ – as referred to by Hamami and Tamari (2008:24) – whose orientation leaned towards Allon’s proposals (Map 1.14; pg. 30) of concession of minimal territory in favour of higher Jewish demographic representations; to the post-1978 ‘maximalist’ ideology of apartheid promoted by the radical Gush Emunim movement (Arij 2014). The Israeli chief political columnist and editorial writer Akiva Eldar described such radical groups – whom Hamami and Tamari (2008) refer to as the ‘Greater Israel Movement’ – with:

For them it is God that gave them the land and the Arabs have nothing to do here, besides if they would be willing to be servants. I’ve visited South Africa recently and I spoke to black people who still remember the Apartheid. This is the South African Apartheid, this is Rhodesia. Actually the Palestinians in the best case are transparent; they don’t see them, they don’t exist. (Akiva Eldar IN alAtar 2006: minute 34)

While local planning frameworks within Palestinian localities were abolished Settlement Regional Councils were established, provided simplified alternative paths to formal planning procedures, and granted jurisdictions in Palestinian populated areas through a series of military orders. In 1981 the Partial Regional Master Plan 1/82 for Jerusalem was drafted proposing the further annexation of 446,270 dunums – including the Ramallah agglomerate – to the Jerusalem Municipality in addition to the 70,000 dunums annexed in 1967 (Abdulhadi 1990). On one hand this constituted the first recognition of Ramallah as a natural urban extension of Jerusalem, on the other, the plan wasted no effort in concealing its ethnocratic character. It is based on a Palestinian population projection of 272,000 persons in the year 2002 (twenty years in the future), while in the year of publication there were 275,000 Palestinians residing within the annexation area. Moreover, the total area designated for their development was limited to existing cores and their timely makeup of 13% of the total area; thence ‘placing 90 percent of the lands remaining in Palestinian hands off-limits to Palestinian construction’ (Abdulhadi 1990:53). Map 2.2, p. 59 demonstrates the realization of the Drobes plan on the Ramallah agglomerate which within one decade became surrounded with colonies from all directions. Therein, work on the city cannot be limited to its borders be they cartographic or physical, old or new. Understanding
the why and how behind Ramallah’s growth patterns requires the acknowledgment of the ‘enforced invisibility’ on Palestinians and their localities, a strategy amongst a copious sum that ‘sustains an Israeli system neither interested in killing nor in assimilating the Palestinians’ (Hanafi 2009); an opinion often resonated by Zionist politicians e.g. in the Head to Head (2014) interview:

Mehdi Hasan [Moderator]: Paul, it’s a very simple question. Are Palestinians immigrants in their own land?
Paul Charney: [chairman of the Zionist Federation of Great Britain and Ireland since October 2012] Non-Israelis, which is fundamentally part of Judaism, are limited in the amount of people that can come into Israel. [sic]

2.3. SUMUD: FRAMING PRE-OSLO FLUID SOCIO-ECONOMICS AND COUNTER-INSURGENCY

As Israel was nationalising the settlement enterprise throughout the 1970s and 1980s; Palestinian inland factions were synthesizing Sumud (Arabic for steadfastness, resilience) through cross-geography systems of supply and demand. From this perspective both Palestinian and Israeli discourses conform to what Pickerill and Chatterton (2006) describe as sociopolitical survival tactics which ‘combin[e] resistance and creation’ with ‘challenging dominant laws’; therein, localities were loci of both conception and materialisation of ‘politics of difference’ as ‘space constitutes a mediating dimension of the transformative processes through which the symbolic potential of movement discourses may be manifested’; thence giving rise to ‘alternative spatialities’ which consolidate as well as socially legitimize political agendas (Feldman 2002:31). Interviewees who lived and played part in the shaping of the late 1980s inland Palestinian ethos (+20 years-old in the 1980s) confirmed this politicization of the quotidian life:

For us, 90% of our time in that age-period [youth] was about either reading or politics or both. Whether we are in a friends’ place or in one of the few cafés, the main concern was always the political one, nothing else. From that perspective, if you say we are going to take youth and give them money to do things [e.g. per diums], at that time, we called this grand treason. (FG 2011, no.6; +50 years old)

[...] my main point is ‘Social Values’. In the First Intifada when the Israeli army used to wander into town on a day of strike, and used to break the locks of the
chains of the various shops, there used to be numerous 13-14 year old kids that would very soon after go around and re-lock the shops with new locks, and find a way to send a key of the new lock to the owner. [...] Second issue is the commitment. When there was a strike everyone, literally everyone abided by the commands of the United Leadership of the Intifada [an arm of the NGCs]. I am not saying that shop owners did not want to sell, or pondered raising the prices on limited commodities, they did, but never dared to bring those thoughts into action due to the over all collective. (FG 2011, no.6; +50 years old)

Whether Palestinian or Israeli, up to the 1990s politics and spatial practices of communities were ruled by fluid alliances of its constituent minorities; as remains reflected by the Israeli cabinets which constitute of coalitions of 4 - 6 political parties. The Israeli settler colonialism would not have become a widespread infectious frenzy had Ariel Sharon not been in office on one hand, and on the other had he not distanced the colonies from limited political ideology while marketing them as the prime affordable housing solution of average middle-class Jewish families (Shehade 1985; Weizman 2006), where:

Settlements were now a new ‘neighborhood’ within reach of Jerusalem or Tel Aviv where average Israelis could enjoy a better quality of life suddenly made affordable through generous government subsidy. Thus, by changing the spatial nature of settlements, and naturalizing them as Israeli suburbs, it became possible to vastly widen the political constituency for them – by giving ‘mainstream’ Israelis a stake in the settlement enterprise. (Hamami and Tamari 2008:29)

On the Palestinian front, the aforementioned tactics functioned predominantly due to their effect as antibiotic against the contrived economic strangulation by the colonialist custodian. Returning to the example above, the shop owner whom wished additional profit had also recognized that his shop could have been looted had the kid – who is encouraged by one of the multiple civic frameworks – not relocked it. In financial terms, merchants – irrelevant whether voluntarily or involuntarily – accepted a winning trade-off: they abstain from avoidable price elevation, and in exchange receive the free-of-charge protection of their shops and get to assemble with the heroes. Hence, in both cases the approach to socioeconomic needs was quintessential. This conformity of the contesting politics of Palestinian liberation movement and Zionism should be of no surprise as both – at the time and as explained on pg. 53 and pg. 84 – had received their infantile training predominantly from Marxist patrons that advocated ‘internationalism’, as elaborated in section 5.2, p. 263.

Further, in terms of administration dynamics of both the colonizer and the colonized; the aforementioned demonstrates that sociopolitical resilience in ecosystems of mental warfare – where the war is everywhere and nowhere (Abourahme 2009) – requires customized courses of treatment. In order for policies to be nationalized amongst populations that are genetically diverse (the Bedouin and the urban Palestinians; the Polish and Ethiopian arriving Jews) decision-making systems operated through fluid, context- and locality-sensitive representations. Hebron’s spatial dilemma (social, economic, political) created by the presence of the Tomb of Patriarchs at its heart is variably different – for both Israel and the Palestinians – than that of Ramallah which has no mention neither as locus in holy scripts nor its records tell of a presence of Jewish believers.
The Israeli land-grab policy in Hebron is exercised through the Palestinian fabric and population, in Nablus it penetrates at tangential points, while in Ramallah it remained peripheral. These strategies were case-sensitive, and ironically remain in operation uncombated. Hebron, the second largest Palestinian city which ‘traditionally served as the commercial centre for the entire southern West Bank’ was put under an Israeli ‘policy [that] led to the economic collapse of the centre of Hebron and drove many Palestinians out of the area’ (B’Tselem 2014d). The Israeli government sponsors a cell of few hundred aggressive settlers through a colony – Tel Rumeida – inserted at the heart of the old city, along with the corollary tentacles through the everyday streets and lives of the 150,000 Palestinian dwellers (alAtar 2006). In Nablus the largest Palestinian city whose economy (akin Hebron) is manufacturing-based, the policy of economic strangulation focuses on the city’s supply valves e.g. for the decade between 2000 and 2010 Nablus was a closed military zone with no vehicles allowed in or out. Permits for a vehicle were a diamond’s worth. Meanwhile, Ramallah has a considerably varied experience due to the reality that its pre-Oslo town-economy had neither a national extension nor impact; and its post-Oslo donor-economy can be sentenced into crisis from Tel Aviv by blocking a bank transfer. Mentally, these differently scaled military strategies correspond respectively – on the Israeli side – to settlers of radical aggressive ideology, economically-motivated settlers, and the ‘more liberal-minded Israeli Jews who’ prefer to avoid direct engagement with the occupation yet ‘are ready to drop the principles of democracy when faced with the prospect of a demographic majority of non-Jews in the country’ (Pappe 2007:13).

On the other side of the same coin, for Palestinians up to the establishment of the PA, the political ‘production’ of anticolonial socioeconomic strategies was decentralized, case-sensitive, and horizontal in dynamic. Rising tension between Palestinians and their occupiers over the 1980s provided fertile grounds for the outbreak of the First Intifada on 8 December 1987 in the GS. On that day an IOF vehicle struck a civilian Palestinian car killing four Palestinian workers. This reiterating incident of Israeli disregard to Palestinian lives ignited the WB and GS in the form of mass civic disobedience. As events intensified the inland Palestinian politicians of the NGCs expanded their mission through a cross-faction coordination committee, a framework comparable to modern-day disaster response operation rooms. This National Leadership of the Intifada (NLI) designed what could be referred to as the anticolonial action program. On timely basis regionally varied strikes, demonstrations and civic service events were planned and announced through the numerous voluntary arms. These ‘pressure’ variables utilized the cover of informality, resilience of multi-pillar and horizontal leadership, and responsiveness. Releases by the NLI fraternized the envisioned activities away from factionalism, Israeli detaining of individuals had minimal impacts on persistence, and relief was swiftly delivered encouraging further sumud. In this process, cities – e.g. Ramallah – were quintessential:

Even though peasant uprising drove decolonisation across the Third World, it was elements of this urban comprador class that defined the nationalist project and appropriated the vestiges of the colonial state. (Moxham 2008:4)

The collectivity of the aforementioned processes is evidenced through the composition of the initial Palestinian negotiations team sent to Washington in 1992; the team included amongst others Haydar AbdulShafi from Gaza, Ghassan
elKhatib from Nablus, and Hanan Ashrawy from Jerusalem. This dynamic was also the reason why in the early years of the PA ministries were spread throughout multiple cities of the WB and GS, and while Arafat resided in Ramallah the Parliament was constructed in AbuDies, Jerusalem.

Further, the absence of rigid representational spaces indirectly served as a shield against mental demoralization. The Israelis had no iconic presidential palace to defile, no parliament which they could freeze the operation of, and when Birzeit University was red-taped living rooms became temporarily the symbolic class rooms; a spatial dynamic that has been laid to rest in the post OAs era. The pre-Oslo political flexibility of Palestinians was achieved through what Hall calls ‘policymaking as a social learning’ (1993:275). He quotes:

Politics finds it sources not only in power but also in uncertainty – men collectively wondering what to do... Governments not only ‘power’... they also puzzle. Policy-making is a form of collective puzzlement on society’s behalf...

Much political interaction has constituted a process of social learning expressed through policy. (Heclo IN Hall 1993:275; emphasis in original)

On one hand, this argument extends legitimacy to the call of contemporary Palestinian intellectuals for re-negotiating, re-imagining, re-defining, and re-puzzling the presence, principles and aspirations of the indigenous population. On the other hand, it disqualifies the claim of democracy as byproduct of the political structure of a state. For Palestinians, this lesson is transcribed through the inverse realities of the pre-Oslo denial of nationality and concomitant fluid politics that is socially produced, and on the other side its later substitution with the post-Oslo recognition of Palestinians as a nation and the corollary institutionalization of their politics and the establishment of a PA monopoly over policymaking. Starting 1996 the furnishing of a neighbourhood garden has to await municipal approval and PA or donor financing; a demonstration is conditioned by a clearance from PA policing apparatuses, and; Birzeit University gets closed for extended periods by Palestinian hands; those of its own students.

In the pre-Oslo era the sumud of the citoyen and support of locally produced politics against Zionism was associated with sociospatial ‘dignity’ in spite of the continued humiliation through ‘denial of privileges’ (As'ad 2010; Kassis 2012). Phenomena of homelessness and shortages were absent, as social solidarity and accountability of politics was both, swift and collectively exercised (FG 2011, no.2; 30-40 years old; FG 2011, no.6; +50 years old). It was a process of de-naturalization of dependence on (the state) Israel ‘through active disengagement from the Civil Administration and a boycott of Israeli products’, where the ‘spatial side of this resistance aimed at de-normalizing Israeli access to Palestinian space – through blocking the army’s ability to routinely patrol Palestinian communities’ and where ‘the strategy of the mass insurrection generally defined the strategy of counter-insurgency’ (Hamami and Tamari 2008:31, 32).

Seen from this perspective, sociopolitical resilience necessitates a governance system where the majority of social groups (the self, the Others, and their variations) feel represented on matters they regard of prime importance, while the delicate balance is sustained through shifting concessions of secondary ones in a mutually agreed-upon trade-off. Once more, such non-centralized and non-static politics lie in contrast to majority-representation parliamentarian systems which operate in power of the ‘binary logic that splits the world
into hierarchically ordered halves’ (Collins 2011:x), herein, the majority vs. minority(ies). Here it must be asked, if Palestinians had a resilient system as claimed hitherto in this work, then why did it seize to exist? Why are the post-Oslo (today’s) social, political as well as economic structures regarded negatively? The answer is multifold, and to be found in the transmogrification of Palestinian political ideology in the late 1980s, which in turn staged the OAs and outlined – among other frameworks – its spatial blueprints whose translations are mapped in the following chapters. So what was this turning point or threshold?

Less than a year post the outbreak of the First Intifada and on 15 November 1988 the PLO adopted the Palestinian Declaration of Independence (Annex.4, p. 392), which was written by the renowned poet Mahmoud Darwish who was often described as the ‘voice of Palestine’. Proclamation of the script was achieved through a vote at the 19th session of the Palestinian National Council in Algiers; where 253 voted in favour, 46 against and 10 abstained. The statement – which was passed with 82% of the votes of various political parties in both, exile and inside Palestine – evidenced the entrenchment of the narrow ‘national’ terminology and ideology in the Palestinian mindset, which conforms the cornerstone of exclusive politics i.e. non-collectivity. It was not a theory of the left or right, rather, that of a plenary system of alliances whose adhesive lineament was the targeted ‘complete equality of rights’; or in urbanity terms, dignified living conditions (Hamami and Tamari 2008; Collins 2011, Kassis 2012). This testament describes Palestinians as ‘people’ of ‘national genus’, for whom Palestine is the ‘state’ in which they ‘enjoy their collective national and cultural identity’. Beyond the institutional orientation replacing hitherto social accountability, noteworthy is the singular form of ‘identity’ which is elaborated in the designated ‘means of a parliamentary democratic system of governance’ under which ‘minorities must abide by decisions of the majority’; the latter again in singular form, expressing the assumption of permanence of a distinctive and homogeneous social order over a definite territory and indefinite time.

On practical levels, the need to remain relevant – in terms of timely messages and needs – forced the NGCs to favour responsiveness on official Palestinian political unity, as the latter necessitated a time-extensive and compromised predigital consultation with the exiled PLO comrades in Tunis. Over the seven years of the First Intifada, the NLI delivered three jolts to Arafat’s leadership, upon which and blinded by confidence (arrogance?) they handed him the keys to the house and an agenda to their neutralization. This ‘malentendu tragique’ (Barthe 2011:67) shaped Arafat’s spatial policy which he brought into action with the OAs, and whose spatial manifestations in Ramallah are the loci of nowadays political, social, and economic contestation.

The first stroke was delivered in 1990 when Arafat – given the PLO’s weakened ‘status and legitimacy at the regional and international levels’ (Shikaki 1996:8) – leaned towards a USA sponsored de-intensification of the Intifada. This was the prime – and later proved fatal – occasion of Palestinian politics agreeing to USA monopoly as broker between them and Israel. However, the NLI declared its opposition and refrained from cooperating on the matter (PBC 2014). This rejection was followed by open calls for the reform of the PLO and the reduction of what was referred to as ‘bureaucracy’, and in reality constituted – among its noble goals – a diplomatic phrasing for the desire to override the existing hierarchy. In an article published in the popular journal Sawt elWatan (Voice of Homeland) in October 1990 Arouri wrote:
The central concern and compass for a nonmistakable Palestinian programme capable of freeing the Intifada from most, if not all negative aspects and encroachments [...] to that end, quintessential is the maintenance of the routed democratic character of the Intifada as a popular rebellion operation. The latter has significantly receded [lately...]. The aforementioned compass necessitates that Palestinian fronts in the inside [WB, GS] or outside [exile], and at its front the PLO and its composing parties and operating systems; all parties must first - halt the ongoing processes of bureaucrat-ization of the Intifada; and second, need to take the necessary measures for dismantling and restructuring such existing frameworks. [...] Hence the question, why do reform measures remain undiscussed in PLO meetings? (Arouri 2013:248 and 256)

This call for reform was accompanied by the – second jolt to Arafat through – rejection to have the activities of the NLI in Palestine pre-approved by the PLO in Tunisia. This over-ride of hierarchy was argued through efficiency and vulnerability of communication to Israeli espionage (PBC 2014). In other words, the role of the PLO in Tunisia in the shaping of domestic policy was marginalized, and the overall work of the exiled organization was to focus on (be limited to?) foreign relations. In other words, the NLI utilized public support for it and the border control of Israel to play a (non-planned and non-articulated) political coup inside the PLO. As history insists on repeating itself, this same strategy was utilized less than two decades later by Hamas in its coup against Fatah in the GS in 2007.

The third stroke was delivered in the aftermath of the 1991 Madrid Peace Conference which marked the launch of Israel-Palestinian direct negotiations towards reaching a political settlement to the predicament of colonization. Thence Israeli government blackmailed the PLO through insisting on having the Palestinian representation composed of inland politicians only. While they upheld the claim of the PLO as sole representative of Palestinians with Yasser Arafat as Chair, notwithstanding, NLI politicians where in the driver’s seat of the PLO politics, in a further – regardless whether intelligent or not – undermining of Arafat’s gist to Palestinian decision-making. In an opinion published about the events in Sawt elWatan in January 1993 (before the Oslo process came to public knowledge); Arouri stated:

There was an advantage for having the Palestinian negotiating team formed from within the occupied Palestinian territories, a condition by Shamir and his government in order to serve Israeli goals, of which fragmenting the Palestinian people to ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ [...] yet the magic turned on its executor, [...] where Shamir found himself facing a Palestinian team in Madrid that was more [than Tunis-PLO?] knowledgeable of and experienced in Israeli and Palestinian affairs; and whose loyalty to the PLO was guaranteed. (Arouri 2013:334)

In the 8th session of the Washington negotiations the Israeli team handed the Palestinian one an ‘Interim Self Government Arrangements’ proposal – can be called an early and a significantly more generous version of the OAs. The scenario gave sovereignty to the PLO over 60% of the WB and GS, a joint Israeli-Palestinian command of 30%, while Israel retains the remaining 10% which correspond to built-up areas of colonies and East Jerusalem (Arouri 2013). The Palestinian team rejected this proposal, and soon after were handed another
insult: Israel breached the truce agreement by ruling the deportation of more than 400 Palestinians to Marj Zhour in southern Lebanon. As a result, leftist politicians of the Palestinian negotiation team decided to withdraw from the ‘peace process’ in spite of Fatah’s opposition, thence handing the driver’s keys to the latter whose uncontested leader was Arafat. In his turn, Arafat recognized that this uncoordinated withdrawal is an echo of the earlier ‘PLO reform coup’, whose elimination necessitates his control over domestic policymaking. While the politicians of the NLI convinced themselves that their withdrawal will halt the negotiations and pressure Israel, Arafat had already agreed to a Plan B and sentenced the Washington Negotiations to what it remains to be today, the pre-band from the concert that nobody remembers.

Seen through those internal PLO power contestation and the omnipresence of ideology of national-institutionalisation, the terms of the OAs and Arafat’s PA politics become a Cartesian concatenation of events. Israel recognized Arafat’s weakness, hence in January 1993 and as the Washington sessions were still being held it shifted its dialogue from the radical ‘anti territorial compromise’ charactereed inland politicians in Washington to the exiled and vulnerable ones, inviting Arafat to commission his right hand Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen) to conceive the Oslo Accords in back-channel talks. While ‘only a decade earlier the Israeli leadership had embarked on a war to annihilate the PLO as political entity’, by 1993 they ‘undertook its exact opposite’ (Hamami and Tamari 2008:33). A common opinion amongst observers stipulates that during the Washington Negotiations the Israeli team recognized the limited knowledge of exiled politicians of the geography, hence used the withdrawal of the NLI to trap the PLO into the illusion of expressions such as ‘dismantling the settlements’ – a term that remains in heavy circulation. In reality:

Statistics are meaningless. Discussions and speeches and proposals and condemnations and reasons and maps for negotiation and the excuses of negotiators and all we have heard and read about the settlements, all this is worth nothing. You have to see them for yourself. [...] If you hear a speaker on some platform use the phrase ‘dismantling the settlements’, then laugh to your heart’s content. These are not children’s fortresses of Lego or Meccano. These are Israel itself; Israel the idea and the ideology and the geography and the trick and the excuse. It is the place that is ours and that they have made theirs. The settlements are their book, their first form. They are our absence. The settlements are the Palestinian Diaspora itself. I said to myself that the negotiators of Oslo were ignorant of the true meaning of these settlements, otherwise they would never have signed the Agreement. (Barghouti 2005:29)

Not surprisingly, Hilde Waage who investigated the Oslo process from the framework of ‘third-party mediation in highly asymmetrical conflicts’ found ‘not a single scrap of paper for the entire period from January to September 1993 – precisely the period of the back-channel talks’ between Palestinians and Israelis in Oslo (Waage 2008:54, 56). She elaborates:

In the end, I had not a single original Norwegian document to work with. This was an obstacle, to be sure, but not insurmountable. Through scores of interviews with key players (Norwegian, Israeli, Palestinian and American), excerpts from key missing documents published elsewhere, and a good dose
of common sense, it was possible to put together a comprehensive picture of
the back channel, its pitfalls, and its limitations, focusing on Norway's role.
My book caused a considerable stir when it came out in April 2004. I had
challenged the prevailing myth by demonstrating that Norway had acted very
much as the United States had acted (albeit for different reasons): Norwegian
facilitators, anxious to bring the agreement to conclusion, had consistently
sided with Israel, shared information with them, and leaned on the Palestinians
to give in at crucial moments. (Waage 2008:56)

This Norway sponsored peace process (entrapment?) 'came at a time when
many were expecting the demise of the existing Palestinian political centre'
(Shikaki 1996:8), and it:

had a negative impact on national reconstruction by leaving unresolved the major
issues of the conflict, including the future of Arab Jerusalem, Jewish settlements,
and Palestinian refugees, to say nothing of the question of sovereignty over the
land and the nature of the Palestinian political entity. Deferral of these issues to
future negotiation has created serious defects in the state-building process and
deeplened Palestinian divisions regarding the Palestinian political order and the
consensus on which it was built. (Shikaki 1996:8)

The claim that an agreement negotiated by the inland NLI politicians
would have had a better outcome than the Oslo Accords which were signed
upon by Arafat's wing in the PLO remains an unevidenced speculation, whose
relevance seized to exist with the signature of the Declaration of Principles on
the White-House lawn on 13 September 1993. Moreover, nationalism-based
regional governments (whether Arab, Persian or Turkish) provide no support for
the hypothesis that Palestinian in-house policymakers would have conceived a
'more inclusive' version of the equally wished – and delivered – parliamentarian
governance. This is evidenced with the reality that the – still in operation –
National Council (PNC) of the PLO which is composed of all Palestinian parties
and happens to be capable of exercising power on the politics; the PNC did not
fend off its marginalization under and post Arafat's leadership; rather, they joined
in the journey; as AbuSyrrieh writes:

We watch AbdulAziz Boutafliqa placing a ballot from a wheelchair, and accepts
nomination for presidency at a time he is approaching eighty; same age as
King Abdullah Bin AbdelAziz [Saudi Arabia] whose two throne-heirs have
passed away already, akin the Prince of Kuwait. In reality, aging is not the main
problem, rather, the reality that all Arab regimes are based on the hegemony and
centrality of an individual. As these rulers age on their positions the situation
intensifies. Since about three decades when the PNC held its 16th session its
steering committee has not changed. In other words, symptoms of Arab and
Palestinian dictatorships are not limited to the term they spend in office,
rather, it extends through every pillar of the system. Hence one should repeat,
by observing how this discourse has emptied the Arab liberation movements
from their essence, components, and failed its goals; it is easy to deduce the fate
of the Palestinian revolution which no longer enjoys neither the freshness nor
dynamic of its youth in the 1960s and 1970s. (AbuSyrrieh 2014)
The transition that the Palestinian political discourse underwent was from creation of new identities, social structures and spatialities up to the late 1980s as afore-described, to the forthcoming exploration of post-Oslo exclusivism, agency, and deterioration, death and reconception of resistance practices and thought. Here political policy-making as a financially-sensitive process of social learning becomes a condition for resilience against uncertainty and marginalization. Beyond theory and before delving into detailed discussion; in Palestine this has been demonstrated practically twice; in the pre-Oslo activities of liberal politics in the face of colonialism and again in the post-Oslo contestation of Hamas against Fatah placing at fire-ends insurgency and institutionalisation. Both happenings further assert the necessity of fluid alliances (horizontal administration), urban media (the space and features), and the elastic reconfiguration of both to unfolding processes of political, geographic and social consolidation in face of systematized disenfranchisement.

In the close:

The shift from horizontal, informal and fluid spacio-politics to that of centralized, static and exclusive state-institutions served as a catalyst for the contested growth of Ramallah in the post-Oslo era and the realities faced throughout the agglomerate today. Arafat’s need to control local policymaking eliminated frameworks of civic agency on one hand (alAtar 2010; A’sad 2010, a.o), and on the other favoured decision-making based on political loyalty rather than knowledge, as Zananiri testifies:

[T]here were two mentalities involved in the [post-Oslo, PA] planning process. The first was that of professionals who had training in foreign countries, past experiences, and actually knew what they were doing. The second and the more powerful of the two, was those affiliated with the politics and the processes of Oslo. They came from their exile with projects and plans to build a state, but it seems a compatibility study was not conducted to check the correctness of those proposals or approaches on how to deal with the situation. (Zananiri 2010)

The impacts of Arafat’s strategy of incredulity on discourses of public (mis)management, policy-making and spatial organization of Ramallah in the post-Oslo era are elaborated progressively over coming chapters. These concomitantly demonstrate that comprehension of and attempts to improve the forms of created urbanism can neither be achieved in suspension of the lineages of Palestinian political ideologies and contestation, nor while ignoring global imperial forces described in this chapter. In contrast, it asserts that the ‘strategies – the land confiscation, the settlement colonies, the assassinations and the perpetual [Palestinian] counterinsurgency – have relied on money, machines and manpower from outside Israel’ (Collins 2011:5). In the same line, the program of the PA remains largely dictated by Israel and foreign players through the post-Oslo entrenchment of economic dependency (Abdullah 2010; Khoury 2010; Botmeh 2012; a.o). Before the OAs the PLO was indebted, today a whole population is indentured.

The political precariousness of Palestinians is a defining factor of – as well as continuously re-shaped by – space, time, and changing social ethos. Therefore, the OAs should not be reduced to an ideological or political ‘peace process’ between two ‘nations’. Rather, this agreement outlined the mechanisms and geographies
that nurtured the fundamental shifts of glocalization of Ramallah’s economy and the cosmopolitanism of social ethos and solidarities, as well as their opposition. Addressing the physical urban transformation of Ramallah under continued colonial and neocolonial practices necessitates taking into perspective the economic and social dimensions and ideologies elaborated in this chapter; more so as urban politics and policymaking is the direct product of both.
Palestine is located at the intersection of two sets of global processes that symbolize not only the profoundity of the structural injustices that are being confronted today, but also the resilience and creativity with which many people are confronting those injustices. (Collins 2011:2)

The concept of state-building has been the preoccupation of several populations upon the collapse of the last soldiers of the classical empires in the 20th century. Theories have been drafted, recipes prepared, strategies followed, and nation-states fulfilled. However, the story does not end with the formation as revealed in the postscript. In this respect, the international community has invested heavily in the reconfiguration of the occupied Palestinian Territories (OPTs) sous-prétext the formation of the physical and institutional foundation necessary for the future independent Palestinian state. In the decade between 1994 and 2004 about US$ 8 billion in foreign aid was pledged to the PA, ‘averaging roughly between $250 and $400 per capita over this period, and equivalent to 10-30% of GDP per year’ (Brynen 2005:1); and delivered US$ 6.2 Billion (World Bank 2014). In December 2007 the Paris Donor Conference pledged further US$ 7.7 billion in support of the Palestine Reform and Development Plan, at a time the proposal requested 37.5% less, US$ 5.6 billion to be precise; according to Dr. Samir Abdullah (2012), former Minister of Planning and Administration.

Twenty years erstwhile, making the Palestinian state and gathering international funds for that end remains the main postulate. On May 26th 2013 the U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry declared an economic plan to attract further US$ 4 billion in investment to boost the Palestinian economy through the sectors of tourism, construction, and information technology, because:

If we don’t eagerly grab this moment we will condemn ourselves to a future conflict. [...] The current situation endangers the economy and the social fabric of both nations, and may render the two-state solution unattainable. (John Kerry IN AFP 2013)

On one hand, the choice of sectors reflects the colonially-conditioned approach of the USA government to the development of Palestinians. Tourism and construction require minimal access to resources outside of areas A hence avoiding the debate on the territorial sovereignty of this assumed state; while information technology constitutes the only viable economic sector for Palestinians given the continued denial of control over space and borders (movement, import, export, etc.), raw materials and resources. On the other hand, the plethora of similar
statements implying a Palestinian state ‘in the coming future’ has rendered the latter a comic rhetoric. Such proclamations are coupled with reference to what is considered the foundation; the Peace Process that was launched with the Madrid Conference in 1991 and phrased in the OAs in 1993. Noteworthy, the ‘interim self-governance agreement’ (Annex.3, p. 384) within its ten articles and many pages of annexes does not mention once a ‘State of Palestine’. Instead, when needed, the term ‘Palestinian Authority’ (PA) is applied. Later, the newly founded PA unilaterally added the adjective ‘national’ making it the Palestinian National Authority, fulfilling the prophecies of Anderson (2006) as he notes ‘that since World War II every successful revolution has defined itself in national terms [...]. ground[ing] itself firmly in a territorial and social space inherited from the prerevolutionary past’ (Anderson 2006:2, emphasis in original). This naming was not adopted by any other official body or government, keeping this entity as an authority over a population but not necessarily a nation, up to 27 November 2012 when the UN General Assembly passed resolution 67/19 accepting Palestine as a ‘non-member observer state’, hence seating the PLO aside of the Holy See.

The importance of this reality lies in the – non-intelligent and non-planned – re-orientation of the Palestinian political leadership from leading a struggle for the acclaimed ‘right to self determination’, to the post-revolution preoccupation of territorial administration in spite of the continuation of their subjugation (Fanon 2008; Lemke 2003; Kassis 2010). In other words, from preoccupation in combating colonialism to an alleged freedom materialized in the lived illusion of state-building. In this regard scholarly work demonstrates that western models of democracy and their promotion employ sociopolitically incompatible goals, systems, time-frames and indicators. These imaginaries are consumed with complicit regimes against endemic alternatives under the politics of ‘infantilization’ which is myopic to locational specificities (Harvey 2009, Escobar 2012, Martin 1998, Lemke 2003).

Under these dynamics conceived regimes typically inherit a foreign system of claimed democracy, which is normatively desirable yet significantly vulnerable and often hegemonic (Moxham 2008). Herein, the PA administers the Palestinians, who remain subjects under the custody of the state of Israel while neither enjoying the status of Israeli citizens, nor are they acknowledged as citizens of another country (Israeli military law and tribunals apply to Palestinians under all conditions). In this position they are similar to their representing authority, which is presumed autonomous, but enjoys neither sovereignty nor freedom of decision-making, a fact underlined in the headline, in its naming as an ‘authority’. Thereof Palestinians are a ‘nation’ whose nationality remains legally unrecognised, and live the imaginaries of revolutionary state-formation as heard in tales of post-colonial communities (Collins 2011; Escobar 2012). The aforementioned befalls simultaneously with – since mid 1990s – increasingly right-wing Israeli governments of what Hamami and Tamari (2008) describe as maximalist-Zionists, who openly express objection for a Palestinian state or the normalization of Palestinians into its population. While MK Danny Danon (deputy Defence Minister) argued that there is a majority amongst Israeli legislators opposing a two-state solution (Ahren 2013), the current Minister of Economy Naftali Bennet stated that the home of Palestinians is in Jordan, and:

> The attempt to establish a Palestinian state in our land has ended. [...] Everyone who wanders around Judea and Samaria [WB] knows that what they say in the
corridors of Annapolis and Oslo is detached from reality. [...] It must be said that this land has been ours for 3,000 years, [...] there was never a Palestinian state here and we were never occupiers. (Ravid 2013)

Within this condition of ‘seeming-post-colonial’ colonialism the underlying terms of nation, state, territoriality and security are the dominant in the jukebox of policy makers regarding city development, planning, and the corresponding strategies with little regard to the specific sociopolitical circumstance of being hitherto colonized and temporalized; as if ‘conducted in an international vacuum’ (Ayoob IN Lemke 2003:3) whilst ignoring that ‘When no heed is paid to the relations that inhere in social facts, knowledge misses its target’ (Lefebvre 2009:81). In the same line, the nationalist political paradigm continues to draw Ramallah further from resilient urbanity, and closer towards militarized spaces and neoliberal totalitarianism. While several local scholars are re-investigating the existential questions and mechanisms of their decolonization, Palestinian politics remains trapped. The PLO’s dogma and the PA’s policies for administering the Palestinians are both limited to the narrow scope of the imagined homogeneous identity (as elaborated in section 2.2, p. 73), whose unmatching population is undergoing serious fragmentation as a result of this non-compatibility. In this context Ramallah should base its development strategies on primary investigations of the factors amidst which it is growing, where even though territoriality is regarded as kernel to political sovereignty (Taylor 1994), nonetheless:

The isomorphism of people, territory, and legitimate sovereignty that constitutes the normative character of the modern nation-state is under threat from the forms of circulation of people characteristic of the contemporary world. It is now widely conceded that the world we live in is one in which human motion is more often definitive of social life than it is exceptional. [Moreover,] modern conceptions of citizenship, tied up with various forms of democratic universalism, tend to demand a homogeneous people with standardized packages of rights. Yet the realities of ethnoterritorial thinking in the cultural ideologies of the nation-state demand discrimination among different categories of citizens even when they all occupy the same territory. The civil status (or nonstatus) of Palestinians in respect to the Israeli state is only the extreme example of this contradiction. (Appadurai 2003:38-39)

In this context Lefebvre contends that the ‘space that homogenizes’ in effect ‘has nothing homogeneous about it’, rather, the state-tools of mass treatments of urban planning and the development enterprise are territorial processes that produce ‘a shapeless mixture, in chaos, despite the administrative order and spatial logistics of the state’ (2009:308;85). In a round-table discussion at the Joschka Fischer & Company consultancy in Berlin on 14 November 2013, the urban strategist and Chief Urban Designer of Portland (Oregon, 2002-2009) Arun Jain argued that master plans and zoning schemes are outdated and incompatible urban management practices. They are two-dimensional impositions on a four-dimensional context; they are generic rather than locational; their integration of corollary and varied economic and social systems is cosmetic; they require extensive preparation durations that dilute their relevance as they are based on start-line knowledge while intelligence is continuously and rapidly evolving
and shifting; they assume stability at a time uncertainty is the global prevalent circumstance, and; such tools lack the flexibility and re-adaptation features necessitated by mechanisms of resilience. Can Ramallah become resilient?

Up to date no system has managed to account for all variables shaping the urban, however the lack of utopias neither abates the positive experiences of some cities, nor excuses those whom seem to continue to encumber. Ramallah, in spite of the pessimism of many, has just entered the epoch of metropolitanism and global relations, as such, decision-makers do have the choice between entrenching systems of urban vulnerability or convert to principles of resilience via employing need-based innovation. Through the work of the urban theorist Jane Jacobs on the relevance of human scale to urban life and his own research and various projects, the Danish architect and urban strategist Jan Gehl (2011) advocates the development of urban form and space through gradual incremental improvements, given that these measures are conceived through research and documentation pre and post the operation. He argues the centrality of location-sensitive documentation to urban planning, as influencing variables and their intensities vary across urban subdivisions, where he quotes the Dutch architect Van Klingeren as having ‘summarized his experience of city-activities in the formula ‘one plus one is three – at least’ (ibid:73). Gehl also adds that:

Life between buildings is potentially a self-reinforcing process. When someone begins to do something, there is a clear tendency for others to join in, either to participate themselves or just to experience what the others are doing. In this manner individuals and events can influence and stimulate one another. Once this process has begun, the total activity is nearly always greater and more complex than the sum of the originally involved component activities. (Gehl 2011:73)

Within the context of this work which aims at contributing to the imagineering of discourses of sociospatial decolonization through investigating and developing fluid and relational concepts for the morphological re-configuration of the antispaces of Ramallah; therein, the mapping of spatially dominant social groups (whether by vested power or size, physical or mental occupation of space), and their dynamics, systems, aspirations and imaginations constitutes a corner stone to understanding the logic of their undertakings and behaviour. Hence, this chapter resumes the discussion from the former one, yet frames itself for the period following the signature of the Oslo Accords, i.e. 1994 - 2014. The first section focuses on two; first, analysing the mode and impact of change in the political (hierarchy of colonial decision-making) system on the various scales of stakeholders, particularly, the bureaucratic and financial re-arrangements of the peacebuilding as state-making discourse. And therewith, second, it maps the processes that lead to the dismantling of sumud. The following section then builds the arguments further through focusing on the successive socio-economic adaptation and coping tools that were employed by Ramallites under the new mutated (fremd) system. It elaborates on the mentalities of Palestinians as risk-society through the psycho-geographies of Ramallites. Along this exploration the four phases of transmogrification of the city-landscape features are surveyed. Thereupon, what are the politico-economic factors stirring Ramallah's tendencies over the past two decades? And what are the physical and mental spacio-social relationalities and sensibilities legitimizing and incubating happenings?
3.1. THE FELICITOUS STATE: BUREAUCRATIZATION, CORRUPTION AND THE CIRCUS ECONOMY

Some narrations claim Ramallah had no significance for former PLO chairman Yasser Arafat who chose to return to Gaza first (father’s birthplace), spread the PA ministries across the WB and GS (coopting local leaderships?), and placed the Palestinian Parliament in the Jerusalem district of AbuDeis – where no session took place and four families have squatted the building (Mottelson 2013) as this locality enjoys very limited PA policing abilities (Area B; see pg. 34). Scholars, observers and average citizens concur that the fate of the borough was rewritten due to Arafat’s choice of its hill-station – alMuqata’a – as his WB residence and command centre, and the consequent economic, demographic, and structural changes the agglomerate had to process. The neither economically nor socially nor biblically significant Ramallah and alBireh were favoured by account of four; first, the Jerusalem towns of elRam and AbuDies are categorized under Area B where Arafat’s security apparatuses cannot deploy (Barthe 2011); second, they are the closest and relatively least Israel-militarized localities to Jerusalem with Area A classification (neither Gush Etzion nor Maale Adumim blocks of colonies) and the valve to the north (Barghouthi 2012); third, in contrast to the larger cities this area possessed no entrenched sociopolitical structures and ‘had become an important node in national politics’ by the 1980s (Taraki 2008a:66), and; fourth, Ramallah enjoyed a romantic echo for the returnees from Beirut and Tunisia – amongst which Arafat – where diversity, liberalism and joie de vivre were elements of the setting (Taraki 2008; Barthe 2011). Therein, the early years of the OAs had little impact on Ramallah which next to the natural population growth experienced minimal additional influx; few of the returnees¹ who anomalistically refrained from pursuing residence in the ancestral locality, or curious expatriates, or the pioneers and scouts of the development-aid industry.

Two years after Arafat’s entry to Gaza, in June 1996 the Likud party candidate Benjamin Netanyahu was elected Prime Minister of Israel. Three months later Palestinians took to the street again, a wave of civil disobedience in protest of the excavation works under the Temple Mount Mosque of alAqsa by Zionist groups searching for the remains of the Second Temple and the confiscation of the Abu Ghunaim natural reserve for the purpose of the construction of a new colony (Image 3.2, p. 106). Palestinian cities were caught once more in cross-fire with the IOF, scores were killed and injured breaking the illusion of retracting colonialism, and Ramallah for the first time became political command ghetto as PLO echelons pilgrimaged to the Mukata’a to consult with Arafat after waiting on checkpoints and manoeuvring around closure zones. This non-PLO invoked event exposed the PA’s territorial non-sovereignty, economic vulnerability⁵, and non-monopoly over violence, as well as prompted two; first, a rise in the intensity of centralization of PA-institutions and the corollary emigration to Ramallah
including agents of foreign representation offices, and; **second**, the World Bank launched its Palestinian NGO Project (PNGO) which served as a main incubator during the future rise for what Taraki (2008a) calls the ‘new middle class’. In this regard testimonies attribute major post-Oslo changes in Ramallah’s ethos primarily to the returnees arriving during the mid to late 1990s and abetted by Palestinians of other regions post the year 2000, indirectly assuming that Ramallites would not have altered otherwise. In the Focus Group no.2 (30-40 years old) the post OAs change of Ramallah was expressed as:

There were lots of new people arriving into the city, leading to its physical growth. There were also numerous investments [...] accompanied by the arrival of a political elite and a change in awareness. Awareness not particularly in positive terms. There was an image of a different living style that arrived, politically, economically, construction, built environment, cafés and entertainment, which all led to a mutation in the track of the resistance. (FG 2011, no.2, 35-45 yrs old)

Confirming that the impact of a particular social group is not necessarily relevant to its size, Gehl argues that the ‘self-reinforcing’ ‘positive-’ or ‘negative-process’ of urban dynamics are a ‘product of number and duration of the individual events. It is not the number of people or events, but rather the number of minutes spent [...] that is important’ (2011:77; emphasis in original). As an elaboration on this stipulate and while avoiding the cliquish example of new-comers, in Ramallah the projected ‘threat’ of the Tahrir Party – radical pro-Caliphate and Shari’a6 Islamists – is dilating by power of the time it consumes of the lived- and mental-spaces of the Ramallites on the street, in café discussions, and in social media; rather than the generally claimed growing size (visible segments) of the group which remains comparatively small in spite of surging. Beyond direct discussion of the phenomena liberal patrons request of their minor and adult associates to be discrete and cautious (more than otherwise) in their activities to avoid potential retaliation from the ‘violent party. The dynamic that the Tahrir Party has on Ramallah can be compared to provincial European politics which constantly attempts to find and or expand footing in larger mixed cities, although their centre of weight lies in rural areas. That said, the repetitive – and sharpened – passive preoccupation with or consumption of actions of ‘other’ groups (ideology, authoritarianism, etc.) and speculation over their real size and future ‘crime [...] becomes a problem, everyone stays away from the streets – with good reason. The vicious circle is complete’ (Gehl 2011:77).


Image 3.2. ibid in 2010 (Nadel 2010).
Ramallah’s sociospatial change – the emergence of new social ethos and lived spaces in the post-Oslo era (FG 2011, no.2; no.6; As’ad 2010; Taraki 2010) – is in essence endemic to its persona of short hierarchies and features of re-adaptation. Notwithstanding, the preeminence of contestation (inter- and intra-the agglomerate) is a result of the mutation factors that reversed the trend from positive (pre-Oslo) to negative processes (post-Oslo); to which PA systems served as accelerators and the Zionist colonial geographies and tools as dissever. In the same line, the criticism of Ramallah’s growth can be attributed to the schism between spatial materializations and varied micro socio-economic aspirations; whereby ‘people and events are so spread out in time and space that the individual activities almost never get a chance to grow together to larger, more meaningful and inspiring sequences of events’ (Gehl 2011:75). Under the same logic, it is valid to assume that the problematic of Ramallah lies neither in the coincidence of social antagonisms, nor and the barter of alliances, nor the sharing of spaces; rather, in the lack of corollary development of essential frameworks of deliberation and accumulation whose absence eliminates positive exchange in favour of contestation, and diversity in favour of fragmentation. Combining the aforementioned with the reality that resilience necessitates ‘ability of systems to respond and adapt effectively to changing circumstances’ (IFRC 2012:7), the investigation of whether Ramallah is able to develop a social ethos of scaling (vis-à-vis elimination) of contending ideologies commences with identifying the dominant systems of policymaking sustaining the mutation factors.

3.1.1. The Autocracy of the Archipelagos: the OAs, Foreign-Aid and Nation-State Model

‘Ripeness’ for negotiations is not the same as ripeness for conflict resolution. This was the situation with regard to the Oslo Accords. [...] The act of mutual recognition embedded in the Oslo Accords masked this critical flaw in the Oslo process. [...] This meant that peace, rather than being associated with justice, was associated with capitulation or at best pragmatism. (Rynhold 2008:9-11)

Common discourse and literature on the European state model as a political entity link it to the ability to control resources, economic profit and the cornering of non-state entities, bringing forth what is referred to as the Westphalian Sovereignty (Lemke 2003). In the same line, the foreign-aid for peacebuilding policy postulates conflict resolution via economic development and mutually-constructive partnerships among contesting parties (Moxham 2008). Through the signature of the OAs Israel retained control over majority of tradeable market-resources by locking 60% of the WB territory into the Area C category, and cornered the PLO (through its executive arm the PA) into 18% that correspond to the built-up areas (Tamari 2002; Map 1.20, p. 37). While pre-Oslo Palestinian attitudes and sociopolitical associations extended over the geography between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea, in the aftermath it rapidly shrunk into 3.3%7 of the geography (FG 2011, no.6; Anani 2010); as As’ad testifies:
I personally believe that Israel has occupied us today, more than any other point in history. Before 1993/4 Israel could not claim a full occupation because it was still unable to occupy us mentally and intellectually. Today we are definitely occupied, that’s why we find it hard to get out, leave our ghettos [Area A] and enjoy the country. Before we had a clear identity and clear priorities, so even when the Israeli army units were in the city centre, we were able to go around and connect with the spaces as ours. [...] What really hurts is that Israel has succeeded in diverting us from the path the Palestinian community was progressing along into that of compromise, individuality, and foreign-hood within our own space. We became a subsidiary company, no matter what sector it is you are talking about. My husband is originally from Gaza and has been living in Ramallah since the signature of Oslo. Since that date he has not seen his parents or siblings not a single time, and they have not met my children, their grandchildren. My kids think Ramallah is Palestine. I am a Jerusalemite, but with all the trouble I have to go through every time I want to enter Jerusalem my visits have become very limited, to the extent that my kids deal with going to Jerusalem as a trip to another country. And as they are in an age of becoming aware of their surroundings it is becoming increasingly difficult to explain to them why their father cannot accompany us, why we cannot just decide to go to the beach as a family. [...] do you have any idea how frustrating that is? (As'ad 2010)

What Anani (2010) refers to as the ‘shrinking mental space of Palestinians’ is as well a ‘self-reinforcing process’ (Gehl 2011), stimulated through Israel’s optical settler colonialism which changed latitude from a ‘mere relative position on mountain topography’ to ‘a vertical separation between two parallel, overlapping and self-referential ethno-national geographies, held together in startling and horrifying proximity’ (Weizman 2007:117).

Besides the geography, the maximalist Zionists discourse had laid the WB and GS as ‘captive markets’ (Lagerquist 2003) to Israeli entrepreneurs whom capitalized on the access to both, cheap human and material resources. By 1991 a third of the WB and GS workforce was operating inside the Green Line (Roy 1999), accounting to 28% of the GNP (Brynen 2000). Zionism envisioned the dynamic to be that of expanding mental space of Israeli entrepreneurs beyond the legal borders while increasing dependence of the Palestinians on their economy. In reality the product was a the growth of both – mental space and economic interdependence – in both directions across the invisible border, which in turn stimulated the re-bridging of social ties as well as politics between WB and GS Palestinians on one side and on the other those with Israeli citizenship. The need to re-limit the mental geography of Palestinians while maintaining Israeli economic profit lead the Israeli government to search for alternatives.

Reminding yet again of the quiddity of the urban and regional planning discipline to the Zionist strategy; in 1989 the Israeli Defence Minister Moshe Arens commissioned the director of the Ministry of Finance Ezra Sadan to draw up a ‘development’ plan for the WB and GS, whose goal ‘was to build up a domestic industrial base, first in Gaza and then in the West Bank, which, linked to the Israeli economy, could absorb Palestinian workers’ (Lagerquist 2003:7). These zones would maintain advantages of the Israeli businessmen while avoiding the entry (hence visibility) of Palestinian workers into the Israeli social and mental spaces (interacting with the general Israeli public on bus stations, in workplace, marriage of Palestinians of different legal statuses, etc). Capturing
the spirit of infrastructural design by the Israeli government, Jeff Halper – an Israeli anthropologist and co-founder of the Israeli Committee Against House Demolitions (ICAHD) in 1997– stated:

Here is where the highway system feeds in and the whole infrastructure, because you create a landscape in which you’re in Ma‘ale Adumim in the middle of the West Bank, but with a beautiful highway you go to work in Jerusalem and back to home in 15 minutes [...], never encounter an Arab, obviously – God forbid! – you never go through an Arab village or neighbourhood or anything else, you stay completely in a Jewish Israeli environment. So you come from Jewish Jerusalem, you go down the beautiful Jewish highway, through a Jewish landscape of the land of Israel which is all idyllic because you don’t see Arabs, you get into your Jewish dormitory suburb, go to your Jewish swimming pool at the end of the day, and everything is normal, is banal, it’s not an issue, it is not political at all! (Halper IN alAtar 2006: minute 16:00)

The contours of the archipelagos outlined by the OAs were aimed at naturalizing the imagined Palestinian identity between the people and a reduced territory, where ‘the enclosure, measurement, and commodification of space have been key for the production of the modern notion of a national territory bounded by frontiers that sharply distinguish inside from outside’ (Alonso 1994:382).

In the same context Edmund Burke adds that this distinguishing of territory ‘is a fundamental condition of collective and individual political identity’ since it ‘constitutes the ground through which notions such as duty, obligation, order and freedom come to have the political meaning that they do’ (Burke, in: Harvey 2009:42). Herein, Israel utilized the psycho-epistemological variation materializing from adding an ‘inverse factor’ to the existing equation. Through the OAs citizens ‘duty’ is proclaimed by the ‘representative’ Palestinian PA rather than the occupying Israeli ICA; the ‘obligation’ to the rule of law is stated in the constitution by the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) while the military system of the IOF maintains invisible supremacy through hidden Annexes; ‘order’ is imposed by Palestinian policemen and frames of locally (rather than externally) supported hierarchies; and claims for ‘freedom’ are redirected from the powering colonial to that against the self-representing, colonial-middleman, the agent-state. The advancement of this irreversible process of quivering power structures, symbols of oppression/freedom, and the subsequent redefinition of sociopolitical priorities are crystallizing in the approach of Ramallites to the –mentally bounded and shrunken – city-space.

Under the same equation of the OAs Israel was freed of its internationally stipulated duty9 of provision of basic services and administration of the – in 2013, 4.5 million (PCBS 2013c) – Palestinians as operations were transferred to the subsidiary PA whilst withholding decision-making at the COGAT (Barghouthi 2012). Further, the US$ 3 billion nowadays annual expenses (Times of Israel 2014) of the continued colonization of Palestinians have been outsourced to the international community at a time prior to the OAs these were affixed to the national budget of Israel (Roy 1999; As‘ad 2010). Greater dividends were atop ensured as Israel allowed its private as well as public sectors to engage in the development and provision of systems that had been hitherto withheld from Palestinian communities e.g. Israeli telecommunication companies allow the created Palestinian quasi subsidiaries – albeit legislatively independent – to use
their infrastructures (not *pro bono*), whereby the permissible network coverage range is a variation of Oslo’s territorial contours. Power, water, fuel, import and export are few sectors among others of basic and secondary commodities whose Palestinian entrepreneurs generate a negatively factored profit due to the obligatory subservience to colonial ones (Roy 1999; Samara 2000). These as well as other biased economic policies were placed into effect through the Paris Economic Protocol (Oslo II) on 29 April 1994, an agreement which ‘is, in fact, worse than the Oslo Accords that laid the groundwork for it’ (Samara 2000:23). Over thirty-five pages it details the PA’s economy whose every element is conditioned by Israeli consent: coordination committees, import and export, monetary and financial policies, taxation systems, labour, agriculture, industry and even insurance systems (NAD 1994). Although implicated in the negotiation of this protocol, hence PA Minister of Economy and Trade Maher alMasri noted that ‘All economic agreements following the Declaration of Principles were dangerous and have had a negative impact on the economy’ (Samara 2000:23). Two decades past, this is proving to be ‘an enduring legacy’ by which ‘development came to mean that Palestinians became closely monitored guests in their own economy’ (Lagerquist 2003:8).

This non-winning trade-off is often referred to as ‘Economic Peace’ by Israeli politicians10 (or as ‘hush money’ by Amira Hass and as ‘pacification money’ by Jeff Halper). These arrangements could be considered derivatives of Tilly’s stipulate that ‘war makes states’, where monopoly over violence remains a priority post the establishment, while governments gradually espouse characteristics of entrepreneurs and ‘legitimate racketeers’ (Tilly 1985:170). The neoliberal economic policies which celebrate the free-market ideology and were ‘admired deeply’ by the ‘PA leadership’ conceived what Samara calls a ‘casino economy’. Citing data which indicated unemployment rates amongst Palestinians sextupling from 5% to 30% in the years between 1994 and 1996, plundering GDP rates and the corresponding US$ 2.45 billion in disbursements by international donors between 1993 and 1996, Samara indicated the obvious:

The PA’s corruption, by now almost universally recognized, and financial mismanagement of donor funds flow from the mentality of a guerrilla organization that continues to prevail, wherein the leadership cannot be questioned and operates in secrecy and without accountability. Hence the PA’s parallel budgets, one public and one covert, the latter containing hundreds of millions of dollars of public money distributed to buy loyalty for the regime rather than going into development or building infrastructure. Hence, too, the PA’s creation of a huge bureaucratic structure, now [year 2000] numbering more than 100,000 civilian and military personnel totally depend on and therefore loyal to the regime. In this the PA resembles the Arab regimes, but unlike them, it lacks the resources to sustain such a ‘state’ apparatus. (Samara 2000:24)

The same guerilla mentality has significantly limited private investments to a coterie of ‘profiteers’ whose interests coincide with the discourse of the PA leadership. Atop the investment risks poised through political instability and corruption, investors have to navigate through legal and regulatory mélange of Turkish, British, Jordanian, Egyptian, Israeli and PA legislation. Moreover, they have to manoeuvre the ‘excessively interventionist policies of the PA’ which translated with quasi coercive partnerships in the form of semi-public
or semi-private monopolies over basic economic sectors among others (Brynen 2000:119).

While pre-Oslo domestic politics and policies were sustained by swift accountability to the public, the bureaucratic mechanisms of quasi state-institutions dismantled the trust in the PA and corollary PLO figures. In 2010, 13% of Palestinians claimed to have witnessed an act of corruption, 76% said it is difficult to report a case, and 60% of public officials in the WB assessed the reporting between difficult and very difficult (PCBS 2010a; 2010b; 2010c). Siding opinion statistics, the corruption of the PA is conclusive in discrepancy in figures of expenses; were in 2011 the PA had a total of US$ 3,403.5 million in expenses of which 92% spent by the central government and less than 8% by local ones (PCBS 2011a). Palestinians find themselves caught between the anvil of their political actuality as colonized subjects of Israel and the hammer of the PA which exercises a mutated form of guerilla-state-power and perpetuates its subsidiariness through policies of decision-making centralization, uncalculated dependency, and socioeconomic stratification. Prior to the OAs it was the occupier against the losing occupied, while in the Oslo era there are the winners and the losers (Bryner 2000; Lagerquist 2003) – the ones powering and those being squelched. In reference to the financial crisis which was triggered in 2011 with the retraction of foreign aid, Dr. Samir Abdullah – former Minister of Planning and Administration and Director of Palestine Economic Policy Research Institute (MAS) – clarifies:

The status quo is prone to continue, as such the danger lies in the fact that in spite of the financial deterioration there are still people with consumption power, indicating the widening economic gap between social strata. This gap is more tangible in Ramallah than in other WB cities, and is fuelling feelings of jealousy and anger. Prior to the OAs the economic range was not large, whereby persons in camps, villages and cities lived in proximity, endured same conditions of oppression and the dominant behaviour was that of social solidarity. Today the colonial Israeli is not part of our daily screen in the sense that their physical presence has diminished; one doesn't see the IOF taunting and fining Palestinian traders. This has been replaced by the image of public-sector clique and top-tiers of associates living extravagantly, and this is very dangerous as I strongly believe that the PA security apparatus is incapable of handling the outbreak of riots in protest of corruption and discrepancy. Under such a scenario initial targets will most probably be the nouveaux- riches of PA elites and rich businessmen. (Abdullah 2012)

Ramallah has numerically benefited from being the status quo capital: leisure possibilities, lower unemployment- and higher growth rates than other PA-administered localities (Khoury 2010; Huleileh 2012). Nonetheless, these non-qualitative figures diverge from calculating the discrepancy in distribution of wealth between higher and lower strata of the city and equally ignore the resulting process of reinforcement of feelings of marginalization (alKhalili 2012; Shaheen 2012). Ramallah’s configuration as seat of PA and locus of horizontal sociopolitical relations is rendering its spaces the front lines of the battle against the PA’s systems of power – whether direct or indirect ones, public and private. Herein, the historical sociologist Michael Mann postulates the arrangement of any state around two power-trajectories (components determining the type): despotic and infrastructural. While despotic power is more involved with the extent of
impunity of state elite; infrastructural power ‘denotes the power of the state to penetrate and centrally coordinate the activities of civil society through its own infrastructure’ (Mann 2003:55). This is accomplished through ‘mundane registers, such as tax papers, census data and identity documentation, which predispose society towards certain forms of regulation’ (Neep 2013:4). As alAtar phrases it: ‘we never had it that whenever an official steps out of the Muqata’a the entire city is shut down. What is the story? Are they trying to give us a new perspective, a new images of things? How to deal with those people [in power] and how our country should be like?’ (2010).

The PA as envisioned in the OAs is presumably an interim (five years, expired since 1998) operation system that would enable the emergence of a Palestinian state/government through gradual assumption of tasks relinquished by the COGAT, i.e. by stepping into the shoes of the ICA. Two decades erstwhile, in 2014, the PA has not been able to grow beyond this hypothesis. The ICA remains in operation, has not relinquished its kernel tasks nor superiority on decision-making, is maintaining the PA as a subdivision to which it can outsource tasks, as a front desk sort-to-speak which caters for the necessary initial processing of applications by the general Palestinian public (Kassis 2010; Barghouthi 2012). Rephrasing the aforementioned using the terminology of Mann: the PA enjoys limited infrastructural power hence radiates impressions of state-bureaucracy through the application of despotic power (neo-feudalism?), which in turn is a product of the marriage of colonial politics and economics of free market (Brynen 2000).

Abrams (1977) describes the idea of the state as a ‘message of domination – an ideological artefact attributing unity, morality and independence to the disunited, amoral, and dependents workings of the practice of government’, where the state is a ‘mask’ for the contested ‘exercise in legitimation, in moral regulation’ (Abrams 1977:81, 77). This idea has found resonance in scholars of liberation movements, where Alvaro Reyes argues that ‘for many liberation movements striving for sovereignty, the assumption remains that exercising political power must translate into exercising a power that dominates’ which in turn entails ‘a radical separation between the government and the governed, whereby those that govern must comprise a privileged political class, wholly distinct from those they purport to represent’ (IN Quiquivix 2013:3). In this regard, the PA operates 12 official policing institutions14 conceived by the OAs and whose headquarters and highest concentration rest at the seat of the PLO, Ramallah. These apparatuses are estimated to compose of a total of 58,000 official members15 (Elgindy 2013), excluding the paramilitias (Bocco et al. 2006). These conform with what Lefebvre described as the ‘hegemony of one class’, by which this class solicits persistence of its dominion via utilization of influence, repressive violence, and political policy (2009; and later elaborated and expanded by Harvey 1990, 2009). This hegemony ‘is exercised over society as a whole, culture and knowledge, [...] therefore, over both institutions and ideas’ (Lefebvre 2009:10). The PA extends its legitimacy and continuation through loyalties whose kernel is dependency (fear), rather than successful politics (ideology). For significant numbers of Palestinians the PA is the last line before falling under poverty line (Botmeh 2012, FG 2011, no.6).

The security programs of the PA and its power structures lie at odds with its mantra of ‘plurality; accountability; equal opportunity; the empowerment of [citizens]’ (Khalidi et al. 2011:9). Between its Palestinian Reform and Development Plan (PDRP) which was presented in 2007, and the more frequent two-year program
of ‘Ending the Occupation, Establishing the State’ in 2009 the PA articulated four components imbricate with the Israeli-American criteria of qualification for statehood hence supporting Tilly’s (1985) aforementioned hypothesis: 1. Security and the rule of law (36% of annual PA budget); 2. Commitment to building accountable institutions for higher transparency, efficiency and eradication of corruption; 3. Effective public service delivery to encourage investment towards fulfilling the fourth element, and; 4. Growth of private sector (Khalidi et al. 2011). The higher preoccupation with ensuring a Palestinian neoliberal economy than a reliable government is elaborated by Khalidi et al.:

Even if the PA had wanted to pursue an alternative strategy [to neoliberal economic structures], it would have been stymied by U.S. pressure, the structural realities of Israel’s occupation, dependence on donor money, and BWI [Bretton Woods Institutions] advocacy. All these factors contributed to minimal ‘policy space’ – the freedom to determine economic policies without external constraints being binding. This remains the situation today. [...] Remarkably, then, what the PA statehood plan represents, at best, is a strategy to expand policy space for the further implementation of the neoliberal framework in policy areas over which it has currently no control within the existing configuration of Israel’s occupation. In one sense, the current historic moment echoes the transfer in an earlier era of limited economic governance authority (within the Israeli occupation envelope) to the newly created PA. As has since become clear, the 1994 transfer amounted to little more than transferring the burdens, obligations, and financing of occupation to local shoulders. (Khalidi et al. 2011:12)

Fulfilling Abrams’ (1977) prophecies of the ‘disunited’ and ‘dependents’, the OAs have succeeded in transforming the Palestinian national movement from a popular collective struggle for liberation to a system of bureaucratic political organization and horrific economic dependency. The OAs legalized what Beall et al. (2011) describe as the post-conflict continuation and expansion of alliances between local political elites and the external power which remains in control over access to capital and local resources, which includes Palestinian ‘national bourgeoisie’ and the international investors as beneficiaries from the political and economic status quo (Khalidi & Samour 2001). After two decades of planning, implementing, amending and financing the state-model envisioned for Palestinians, growth has been found to be highly limited to non-tradable sectors such as government services and real estate, while manufacturing and agriculture continued to decline (AP 2012). Meanwhile, ‘the disparity between Israel’s per capita GDP and that of the Palestinians has doubled, to $30,000’ (Cook 2013). In this regard the World Bank has admitted that:

By 2012, however, foreign budget support had declined by more than half, and GDP growth has fallen from 9 percent in 2008-11 to 5.9 percent by 2012 and to 1.9 percent in the first half of 2013 (with negative growth of - 0.1 percent in the West Bank). This slowdown has exposed the distorted nature of the economy and its artificial reliance on donor-financed consumption. For a small open economy, prosperity requires a strong tradable sector with the ability to compete in the global marketplace. (World Bank 2013:vii; emphasis added)
Over a decade before the World Bank, Roy (1999) described the Palestinian post-Oslo discourse as that of de-development which ‘not only distorts the development process but undermines it entirely’ whereby such economies are systematically ‘deprived of its capacity for production, rational structural transformation, and meaningful reform, making it incapable even of distorted development’ (ibid:65). Herein, the triangulation of the global economic neoliberal discourses, colonialism and the local attitudes and (re)actions to both is causing an ‘urban-regional restructuring’ which involves ‘transformations in the nature of state power, [...] citizenship, nationalism, politico-cultural identities, localities, and architectural forms, among many others’ (Brenner 1999:39).

The elevated growth rates and the fusion of the localities of the Ramallah agglomerate – physically but not operatively – into one another invited concepts of metropolitanism. For the homogenising state discourse found in the PA's Ministry of Local Governance (MOLG) the favourite proposal grants the area the status of an Amaneh akin Amanet Amman elKubra (Amman Greater Municipality) (Barghouthi 2012). In contrast to the declared policy of decentralization (MOPAD 2007), this proposition centralizes the circumscribed operations of Local Governments (LGs) of the agglomerate under one body which would substitute existing ones.

Whereas the European greater municipality model generally centralizes regional politics, infrastructural projects, and administrative coordination amongst constituents while district-municipalities retain considerable power and relevance to locational policymaking; the MOLG systematically ignores the existing differences between the constituents whose centralization would only exasperate the contestation. For example, Ramallah Municipality allows trade with and consumption of alcohol in liquor shops, hotels and restaurants, recognizes and boasts its regional sociopolitical lead, and its mayor-seat is reserved to Christians whom constitute a minority in the agglomerate. On the other side, alBireh Municipality prides its conservative-Islamic ethos and enjoys greater territory, population and accumulated capital. Herein, in place of cornering the municipalities at a negotiation table whose mechanism is compromise, the MOLG should seek a system that allows fluid-alliances that advocate coexistence of the different other. The exclusive nation-state apparatus which imagines a horizontal identity across the subjects it governs argues that minorities should respect the majority (e.g. Palestinian declaration of independence, Annex.4, p. 392). In contrast, contestation-reduction in scenes of nonconformity of social ideologies and behaviour (hence needed spaces, social freedoms, self-image, etc.) requires the ruling majority to accommodate the varied needs of the state's (political framework's) constituent minorities.

Through a detailed study AbdelAaty (2005) traces the aforementioned narrow approach of the PA to LGs and defines it in four; first, the marginalization of LGs is sustained through their legal status as hay'at, bodies rather than sultat, authorities; second, their budgets remain fractional; third, their administration systems underdeveloped, and fourth; their operations are limited to construction, licensing transportation-infrastructure and green space while policy-essential sectors such as education, social affairs, health services and decisions on taxation and fees as income generation methods have all been suspended to other bodies. Even regional political positioning is suspended from municipalities in favour of an ambiguous body referred to as the Governor’s Office whom has a FaceBook page as its sole online presence.
When inquired about, answers range its duties between those of a Mukhtar (borough chief), liaison officer between LGs and security apparatuses, and a Public Relations department. According to Roy (1999), these PA frameworks which restrict the operation of its departments whilst systematically weakening nodes of communication and accumulation (through aggregations of rives) amount to a policy of de-institutionalization. The system remains justified under the misleading slogan of efficiency through specialization, in place of the evidenced ineffective bureaucratization.

This internationally-financed operation continues in spite of both worldwide scholarship and practice evidencing that varied locational needs cannot be nationally factored. Borrowing an example from Europe, responding to social demand and the goal of increasing women’s participation in the labour market, on 1 August 2013 a new republic-wide legislation by the German Central Government came into effect which increased provision of Kitas (nurseries) for children under 3 years. The program pumps €5.4 billion into the sixteen states that compose the federation between 2013 and 2014, and commits to €845 million as continued annual financing starting 2015 (BMFSFG 2014). Nonetheless, on 3 March 2014 a Spiegel Online coverage titled ‘Die 24-Stunden-Kita’ demonstrated that the central allocation of capital which largely corresponded to quantitative statistical data has resulted in a discrepancy between locational level of demand and that of supply. While some districts have received more Kitaplätze than their current need, others received too little.

While Israel operates decentralized and geopolitically-sensitive systems, the PA has coalesced that of the PLO, assuming e.g. that the needs of the education systems in Ramallah (where missionary private schools occupy a significant space) and that of Tulkarem (who has none) can be met under the same general policies. Arafat’s need to control internal political opposition has laboured a governing system that is suspended from reality. For example and as illustrated in Diagram 3.1, for the fiscal year 2012-2013 the Municipalities Development and Lending Fund16 (MDLF) allocated 42% and 27% more for the municipalities of Qalqilya and Tulkarem (respectively) than that for Ramallah. If approached from the projected number of residents for the year 2012, then Ramallah ranks at second place with US$ 10.6 per capita. However, this analysis ignores factoring the accumulative pressure produced by hosting establishments (e.g. 41% of all WB establishment with more than 100 employees; PCBS 2013a) and the in- and outflow of about 100,000 additional persons whom live in other localities yet depend on Ramallah for public, financial and administrative services as well as work, retail and leisure among other aspects (Abdullah 2010). The intensity of population flow and corollary pressure on infrastructures and spaces of Ramallah is incongruous to that of Qalqilya and Tulkarem. While some argue further criteria as components of decision-making in regards to capital allocation by PA institutions, there are no public accounts on the process.

In the same context, the PA constitution conditioned LGs’ financial strategies to the consent of the Minister of Local Government, whether in terms of budget allocation; adjunct expenses; internal by-laws; purpose, duration and payments mechanisms of loans; sale, rent or purchase of non-transferable property; etc. As for revenue through taxes and fees the LGs are limited to property tax, license fees, and transportation fines whereby some of these are collected by the central government which in turn deducts processing charges. Further, the central government which beholds the decision on the sizes of the anaemic budgets often
Diagram 3.1. *(below)* Illustration of total MDLF allocations for the WB cities in 2012-2013 (MDLF 2014) and the corresponding value per capita (demographic data from PCBS 2012a). On the map of the WB, the distribution of establishments per governorate for 2012 is demonstrated (PCBS 2013a).
falls short of collecting due taxes from citizens and timely delivering the agreed upon amounts to the LGs (Abdullah 2010, AbdelAaty 2005).

Herein, it should be recognized that the failure of Palestinian politics to decelerate the Israeli colonial project is intensely connected to the distancing of LGs from policy-making. Central governments are elected every 4-5 years typically and in the case of Palestinians twice over two decades. Meanwhile, quotidian priorities are time-factored, hence constantly shifting. LGs remain the major bridge between central governments and the population, they cushion differences and incubate pilot socioeconomically-led strategies for the axiomatically dynamic spatial as well as political policymaking. Under the auspices of this argument, in recent years international donors have been allocating considerable sums for the capacity-building of the LGs in programs such as the SDIP (see section 4.3.2, p. 198) and put into force systems of fund transfers that detour from the PA treasury. Whereas the concept is plausible, the methods remained erroneous and counter-effective (the dynamic and impact of these flawed cash-flow systems are addressed in the coming section).

Further, it should be recognised that development cannot occur without accountability. Deferral from the PA does not solve the corruption furcating from it into the larger ecosystem any more than deferral from direct association with the Mafia has helped Sicily rise from its economic decline. World Bank indicators on governance (Diagram 3.2) demonstrate that after pumping US$ 23 billion in foreign aid to Palestinians, ‘Rule of Law’ declined from -0.11 in 1996 to -0.46 in 2012 (-2.5 lowest, 2.5 highest), placing WB and GS at the 40th percentile rank (0 lowest, 100 highest). In the same time period ‘Voice and Accountability’ experienced a marginal improvement from -1.10 to -1.02, corresponding to the 18th percentile rank; and ‘Control of Corruption’ likewise slightly rose from -0.93 to -0.78, hence 24th percentile rank. In financial terms, this would be called a losing investment.

While the political tiers continue to follow the neoliberal discourse of nation-state, urban cosmopolitan societies – the loci of concentration of capital and political power – are questioning the need for such a political framework and even actively campaigning against it. On Tuesday 6 May 2014 and as Israel celebrated its 66th Independence Day under the echo of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s motion to amend the Israeli Basic Law to ‘sufficiently express’ that

![Diagram 3.2. Aggregate governance indicators for WB & GS 1996-2012. Graph illustrates Percentile Rank among all countries; ranges from 0 (lowest) to 100 (highest) rank (World Bank 2014b).](image)

- Control of Corruption
- Voice & Accountability
- Rule of Law
Israel is ‘the nation-state of the Jewish people’ and not a ‘bi-national’ one (MEMO 2014a); in the Galilee about 8,000 Palestinian-Israelis gathered in Lubya (near Tiberias) which was ethnically cleansed in 1948, raising tens of Palestinian flags and names of other destroyed villages, demanding the right of return of refugees, and chanting their anthem, Mawtini (Khoury 2014). As Halper describes the current standings:

The Palestinians, Netanyahu [Israel’s prime minister] reckons, have nowhere to go. On the ground they are exhausted, politically and physically fragmented, and cannot resist to any significant degree; politically their cause is steadily losing ground as it ceases to be an international flashpoint and disappears from view – despite periodic initiatives [...]. Israeli leaders calculate, we can either enter into negotiations that will lead to de facto apartheid-by-consent, the preferred outcome, or drag them out interminably. It really doesn’t matter since either scenario leaves Israel in control, our major settlements intact. And if [no negotiations take place], well, we [Israel] can easily blame the Palestinians for that and return peacefully to the status quo ante. (Halper 2013)

In conclusion, the geopolitics of Palestine is incompossible with classical eurocentric definitions of political power-structures that emphasize ‘bureaucracy, territory, and the monopoly on legitimate violence’ (Neep 2013:3) as basis of functioning. The Palestinian state-making project has proved to be politically futile, economically deleterious, and socially derogatory. Comprehension of this notion is requisite shall Palestinian city-strategies aspire to be spatio-temporally relevant. Rephrasing Quiquivix (2013) contra Palestinian leadership-class work19 while employing urban terms: practitioners and scholars seeking an urbanism of decolonization in Palestinian cities should manoeuvre, weaken and neutralize (where elimination is not feasible) the rigid frames of nationalism-oriented political parties/agendas, institutions, and curricula; as well as doctrines that dismiss planning possibilities and spatial reconfiguration beyond the colonial, functionalist and geopolitically militarized imaginations and tools. Decolonization commences in the cradle – the quotidian space whose extension is regional (whether Assyrian, Arab or Mediterranean). Hence, what are the specific systems of decision-making that have been shaping Palestinian urbanity since the OAs? What are the dominant power structures beyond those of the colonizer? And what are the economic features of the Palestinian economy today and that necessary for a viable and resilient (decolonized) economy?

3.1.2. Framing the Neoliberal Development Industry, Decision Structures and Spatialization

Palestinian localities – e.g. Ramallah – are shaped and operated through colonial (national?) imagination, legal temporalization, spatial militarization, economic dependency, political precariousness and social diversity. As chapters four and five demonstrate, the post-Oslo Palestinian state-building project
employed neoliberal (imperial) development and urban planning process whose doctrines assimilate the Palestinian case to that of Iraq or Bosnia or Afghanistan a.o. These systems of hegemony (World Bank, IMF, UN Security Council, a.o.) assume that the shared characteristics of, first, political discourse (imposed institutionalization of western democracy), second, religion (predominance of Islam among population seen as singular social dynamic by orientalists), and third, spatially enacted contestation (militarization and armed violence). The coincidence of these three variables (of the pool of hundreds) is argued legitimate grounds for ‘mass treatments’ that are aesthetically customized while essentially invariable (Anani 2010; Shaheen 2012).

The OAs between the PLO and Israel are dominated by concepts of development economics whose main component is Palestinian urbanity; where it occurs (Area A, starting at 3% of total territory, now 18%), how it occurs (neoliberal development aid mechanisms), and the behaviour of the imagined Palestinian society (which partially coincides with what Taraki 2008a calls the ‘new middle class’). Herein, the coming pages examine the Oslo Era as a project of development politics and economics which continues to perform through policy importation, while concomitantly producing new urban geographies and sociospatial dynamics. Ramallah is often – disingenuously – presented as the master-piece of foreign-aid-financed development in Palestine citing comparative lower rates of unemployment, cultural dynamic, and similar generic quantitative indicators rather than qualitatively relevant ones. Such claims are formed with audacious disregard to the frequently proven irregular local behaviour in response to, with, and against the imaginaries of colonial discourses, and continue to feed the accrued sociospatial contestation amongst the multiple forces. Escobar (2012) marks the arrival of the development industry and birth of the World Bank mission at Bogotá in 1979, where he quotes the Harvard economist Lauchlin Currie (Roosevelt administration) stating:

[...] Colombia affected me. Such a marvellous number of practically insoluble problems! Truly an economic missionary’s paradise. I had no idea before I came what the problems were but that did not dull for a moment my enthusiasm nor shake my conviction that if only the Bank and the country would listen to me I could come up with a solution of sorts to most. I had my baptism of fire in the Great Depression. I had played some role in working out the economic recovery program in the New Deal for the worst depression the United States had ever experienced. I had been very active in government during the Second World War. (Currie IN Escobar 2012:55; emphasis added)

World powers returned Currie’s call, ‘economic missionaries’ were given license and operating systems, enormous fluid budgets, and political cover through what Margaret Thatcher called ‘popular capitalism’:

From France to the Philippines, from Jamaica to Japan, from Malaysia to Mexico, from Sri Lanka to Singapore, privatisation is on the move...The policies we have pioneered are catching on in country after country. We Conservatives believe in popular capitalism—believe in a property-owning democracy. And it works! ... The great political reform of the last century was to enable more and more people to have a vote. Now the great Tory reform of this century is to enable more and more people to own property. Popular capitalism is nothing
less than a crusade to enfranchise the many in the economic life of the nation. We Conservatives are returning power to the people. That is the way to one nation, one people. (Thatcher 1986; emphasis added)

While those words are echoed with frowns, it would be ludicrous to beguile that development discourse has bequeathed its spirit, to the contrary, the international and local private ‘development agents’ are implicit beyond any fathomable imagination of Currie. Equally, as bitter as it happens, neoliberalism would not have ‘gone viral’ (akin the Palestinian sumud and the Israeli settler enterprise) had it solely appeased the profiting few and ignored caressing the reverie of the proletariat; a chain process through socioeconomic systems that culminates with the present-day globalization of national discourses (Martin 1998). While Palestinian PLO politics was focused on achieving a recognition for the ‘nation state’, global players were already tailoring its figure and characteristics through systems of mass-solutions, and Israel concretized its Droless Plan.

Neoliberalism echoes Zionism which sought to create a Jewish nationality that suits the reincarnation of an ancient mythology negligent of diverse loci-induced cultures and insurgent sensibilities. Sous-prétext ‘liberation’ and ‘its underlying ideology of progress, that is, its implicit claim to be a neutral, value-free mechanism to help Third World countries to modernize themselves in order to catch up with West’ (Martin 1998:43); neoliberal development economics created national imaginations, which in turn engender the speculative mass-programming of worldwide policymaking (Ferguson 2009); Here it should be noted that:

It might well be the case that development economics is nearly dead, and that neoliberal economics has been shaken to core by the financial crisis, but the economic imaginary in terms of individuals transacting in markets, production, growth, capital, progress, scarcity, and consumption goes on unhindered. (Escobar 2012:xii)

The perversity of this globalization of econo-politics can be compared to the 2007 financial crisis that culminated as a result of exponential speculation which nonetheless remains in practice post the crisis (Collins 2011, Escobar 2012). In terms of urban administration, this dynamic is embodied through, on one hand, the resonant failures of speculation on western parliamentary-democracy, its form of (de-)institutionalization, and nation-state-building projects as quintessential motors of socioeconomic prosperity (Jo Beall et al 2011); an on the other, the rise of de-centralized, multiethnic, global-cities. Thereof, the growth and gradual structural change in the administration of Ramallah since the signature of the OAs should be seen in reference to processes of ‘rescaling of production’ where ‘the metropolitan scale is an expression of change’ (Smith 2002:434).

Failures collected in Palestine by the imperial development economics have surfaced throughout the globe albeit in different contexts, variables and intensities. The common denominator remains though the byproduct of factional and sectarian violence in Iraq, Egypt, Bahrain, Yemen, Syrian, Lebanon, Sudan, Lybia, India, Pakistan, Burma, Tibet, Mali, Central African Republic, Georgia, Turkey, Ukraine, and the list continues. Longevity of faith of populations in improved living conditions emerging in the near future is herein as well a subject of speculation, equal to that of investors with risky undertakings; to persist, both have to assume that speculative promises will deliver.
Naming ‘immediate and visible benefits to the population’ (World Bank 2002:10) as goal for the PP in general and the corollary Official Donor Assistance (ODA) in particular; between 1994 and 2000 the international community channelled annual sums equivalent to US$ 500 million (US$ 150 per person) to Palestinians through the various channels. In 2001 and 2002 this number doubled to US$ 1 billion, which equalled US$ 300 per person annually. To place matters into perspective; during the Bosnia War (1992 - 1995) foreign donors contributed what is equivalent to (current-) US$ 215 per person per annum (Barthe 2011). In 2006 annual foreign aid to Palestinians reached US$ 1.36 billion at a time the Gaza Strip was repudiated in the aftermath of the coup by Hamas. Upon the approval of the PDRP in 2007 the ceiling was raised scoring close to US$ 3 billion – US$ 750 per person – in 2009 (Barthe 2011). According to World Bank data (2014a; Table 3.1) Palestinians have received an ‘unprecedented amount of funding’ for the period between 1993 and 2011 (World Bank 2002:10; also see Infographic 3.1, p. 130).

Table 3.1. Top ten recipients of net ODA per capita, 1993-2011 (World Bank 2014a)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Palau</td>
<td>20,956</td>
<td>1,330,90</td>
<td>50,662,13</td>
<td>945 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tuvalu</td>
<td>9,860</td>
<td>4,323,45</td>
<td>22,578,87</td>
<td>238 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marshall Islands * est. 68,000</td>
<td>1,567,58</td>
<td>21,567,12</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,196 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federal Republic of Micronesia</td>
<td>106,104</td>
<td>1,294,48</td>
<td>18,823,71</td>
<td>2,113 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Bank * &amp; Gaza Strip</td>
<td>3,927,068</td>
<td>615,37</td>
<td>6,842,85</td>
<td>24,722 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tonga</td>
<td>103,036</td>
<td>895,80</td>
<td>6,317,88</td>
<td>711 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cape Verde</td>
<td>531,046</td>
<td>511,28</td>
<td>6,278,46</td>
<td>3,105 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominica</td>
<td>71,293</td>
<td>341,17</td>
<td>5,945,82</td>
<td>446 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sao Tome and Principe</td>
<td>187,356</td>
<td>408,24</td>
<td>5,409,32</td>
<td>842 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samoa</td>
<td>194,320</td>
<td>532,15</td>
<td>5,184,55</td>
<td>1,046 million</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Number excludes Palestinians living in annexed East Jerusalem

In the initial phase after the signature of the OAs, foreign aid to Palestine was coordinated by the structure outlined in Annex 6, p. 397, whereby the Ad-Hoc Liaison Committee (AHLC) conducted the major decisions and investment-trailing (Brynen 2000, Barthe 2011). However, as PA corruption augmented and the desired ‘immediate and visible benefits to the population’ were progressively yonder, the international community sought an alternative for its direct entanglement with both, the dissolute PA and the undetected fraudulent NGOs. This became increasingly exigent with questions of association to financing of terror, as well as the growing account of foreign assistance, and corollary, its management.

Consequently, donors referred to a Temporary International Mechanism (TIM) which contracts private international companies to manage the allocated foreign assistance (Le Monde, 2008; Barthe 2011). Citing inefficiency, over-sized public institutions and corruption of PA amongst other factors, the international
community declared that financial assistance will derail from PA treasuring and instead be delivered directly to beneficiaries. Proclaiming effectiveness and transparency in management of complex and extended economic operations, global private players became subsidiaries for the World Bank; companies whose capital is flowing rather than accumulating, fragmented rather than calculated, and constituting an emergency-assistance rather than development (Zananiri 2010; Barghouthi 2012; Shaheen 2012; a.o.); as the former PA Minister of Planning (MOPAD) and Advisor to the Palestine Investment Fund (PIF; see section 5.1.3, p. 249), Dr. Samih el-Abed (1996 - 2007) states:

In regards to international organizations and the donor community I understand that their intervention is based on a desire to help the Palestinians. However, they do not approve the implementation of any project without previous coordination with Israel. If Israel says ‘no’, regardless of how vital the project is, the donor community will not take a step further. They do spend millions on diverse projects, but those do not necessarily fall under a strategy whether short or long term, except seldom. (elAbed 2010)

The aforementioned financiers promised good governance, capacity-building of local professionals and security sector reform. They flashed their FAB terminology: state-building, bottom-up, local ownership, sustainability, transparency, accountability, participation and outreach. Over the past years several of these management systems proved incompatible, consequentially wasting valuable resources and deepening bureaucratic barricades. Others openly granted supremacy to foreign consultants over local experience, squandering dazzling sums on hotels, translators, and fuelling the mechanisms of policy mobility, their mutated assemblages, and the corollary incompossibility to context. These processes have been described by Clarke as ‘(dis)organized, geographically extensive, fast, and anti-political’ (2012:25), an opinion with which local observers agree (Anani 2010, Rayyan 2010, Kassis 2010, and Barghouthi 2012 a.o.). The operations of these private third-party companies have played a significant role in cementing the PA’s central government systems of monopoly over targets of public-spending on one hand (in place of the regionally-sensitive LGs), and on the other aggravated the negative trends of socioeconomic – hence sociospatial – transformation of Ramallah.

In terms of public spending, under the new arrangements the PA treasury receives sums designated specifically for its budget (central government & LGs) which mainly compose of salaries of public servants and government expenses. Meanwhile the larger sums designated for social, operational, economic, infrastructural and other sectors of development are disseminated through – mainly eminent international – third-parties depending on sector targeted by the grant e.g. IMG (Europe), Adam Smith International (UK), ICON (Germany), CHF and Chemonics (USA); and various other large, medium and small national bodies e.g. UNDP, EuroMed, USAid, SIDA, KfW etc. These bodies determine priority sub-themes in consultation with PA institutions, based on which involvement of predominantly-private sub-contractors is attended, in reference to selected proposals from prospective local beneficiaries (e.g. small NGOs, CBOs, LGs, etc) (Abdullah 2010, elAbed 2010, Barghouthi 2012).

Along the course, neither the selection of priorities nor the application process are conditioned by neither pre nor post operation transparency to the
public. Clauses regarding project-justification and post-operation evaluation bind the involved parties to incorporate external and local stakeholders and sometimes a strategy for dissemination. However, this work has found neither a systematic nor a binding mechanism for the verification of the criteria of evaluation, nor its palpable (virtual?) relevance, not to mention publication and sharing as measures essential for synergy or involvement of institutionalized Palestinian think-tanks and CBOs in both ex ante and ex post evaluations. The German Development Bank (Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau, KfW) – for example – publishes its ex post reports on its web-page demonstrating transparency, nonetheless, their criteria of evaluation of funding programs is generic and statistical rather than qualitative; utilizing the OECD-DAC criteria which composes of six groupings of 19 indices: relevance, effectiveness, impact, efficiency, sustainability and gender equality, and overall assessment, on a scale of 1 (Very Good) and 6 (no impact or deterioration). Chianca summarizes22 the critique against this evaluation system citing its insensitivity to case-based needs, fragmented rather than integrated, cost-effective rather than systematically efficient, and lacking contextual variables of relevance such as ‘quality of process’ and ‘exportability’ (2008:44). Assessment of the DAC-criteria is not the interest of this work, however, it should be noted that although thousands of such reports have been produced theoretically, neither PA LGs nor Ministries have samples on their web-pages. E.g. the MDLF publishes its narrative and financial reports, few technical studies, some generic LG ranking criteria23, ‘success stories’, and claims to ‘lead local governments toward an exemplary level of transparency and draw the citizenry into active participation in municipal/town planning’ (Daoud 2008:3). Bearing in mind that 92% of its budget in 2012 was financed by international donors (MDLF 2012:12), notwithstanding, neither ex post nor critical comparative studies are available. Meanwhile, those published by the top-tier (e.g. World Bank) remain a partial selection by non-Palestinian parties.

Indeed, standards of micro-level management are equally applied in the donor countries, hence the conspiracy theory can be laid to rest. However, the neoliberal market-terminology which blends out geographically-sensitive variations (Anderson 2006; Ferguson 2009; Fainstein 2009) has on one hand systematically marginalized Palestinian knowledge, decisions and hence endemic, need-based design and prioritization of strategies. Dr. Samir Abdullah who directed the drafting of the PDRP in 2007, subsequently served as Minister of Planning and Administration between 2008-2009, and is currently a member of the Palestinian Monetary Authority stated in an interview with him:

The Fayyadism era was coined as such and marketed under this naming mainly by Fatah personnel who wanted to blame him [thence Prime Minister Dr. Salam Fayyad] as a party-outsider for the shortcomings and failures of the PA. They want to blame him for the dependency that was forged by Yasser Arafat and to do so accused him of having institutionalised the neoliberal economy and some go as far to call him a ‘neo-con,’ neo-conservative. The plan that brought for Fayyad US$ 7.7 billion in 2007 was prepared by myself. We had prepared this plan already three years earlier in 2004, in which we argue that the Palestinian economy is not able to be competitive solely by the commodities it produces. Due to its attachment to and dependency on Israel the costs of production are high rendering cheap labour commodities non-profitable. Thereof we conclude that in order to succeed we need to move towards high-value-products.
and gradually to knowledge-based economy, given that our only capital is the human-capital. This was our vision for which we got the money but not the approval for application. Today as the 2007-funds are paid out we are starting to hear international endorsements to this plan. (Abdullah 2012; emphasis added)

On the other hand, the neoliberal paradigm metaphysically re-asserts the incompossibility of the present-day European nation-state model, where beyond the aforementioned structural lacunae and under the slogan of ‘sharing of know-how’ and ‘capacity-building’, international agents assume the ability to shorten the duration of the ‘journey into democracy’ neglecting the biological cycles of processes (Escobar 2012). Clarifying with another deutsch example; the relatively contemporary governmental transparency, data-sharing and participatory urban decision-making (e.g. Tempelhofer Feld referandum) in Germany was produced by merit of three; First, by the early 1990s the Cold War was over, significant numbers of surviving Nazis had aged or passed away, and the majority of voters and those elected into office believed in the principality of civil rights organizations as guard against radical groups and governments straying again. In other words, civic rights had become governmental, popular, and foremost constitutional priorities. The geo-temporal socioeconomic factor of preoccupation with victims of Nazism was the timely motive, yet given the tree-effect (or again, Gehl’s concept of self-reinforcing processes) these extended to other civic rights such as employment conditions, consumer-rights, and freedom of expression and diversity among many others. Palestinians generally feel as victims, not as guilty. Second, the former was enabled by its economic compatibility with the endemic systems which historically invested heavily in research and development – laboratories, think-tanks, research institutes, universities, etc. New knowledge (which requires varying perspectives) was and remains the fuel for this production-based economy which enjoys freedom of decision-making and free access to resources, intra- and extra-territorially, in stark contrast to that of the socio-economic conditionality of Palestinians. And third, over the four decades preceding the surge in so-called political transparency and participatory democracy (post GDR and FRG24), the predominant social ethos of guilt had nurtured an independent judiciary system enforcing accountability. The post World War II generations were burdened by the racism and failures of their forefathers, and recognized the importance of locational civic agency as early detection and hindering systems against radical (and economically destructive) ideologies.

In financial terms, a decision on an investment is based on marketability (achieved through locational socioeconomic demand, supply and cultural-sensitivity feasibility studies), ability to operate in the particular sector (existing networks, infrastructures, limitations), and the trust in the capacity of the system to hold contract-breachers to their terms hence protecting one’s capital. Investment necessitates speculation whose patterns are factored by intensities of uncertainty. In Palestine and under the auspices of the World Bank the item of ‘security’ (sharing of monopoly over violence) is omnipresent in the politics and budgets of the ODA (ratio of civilian to security public servants is 3 : 235). Meanwhile, the Palestinian constitution remains a patchwork of six regimes, basic education stagnant26 while higher education limited to private providers, public R&D departments predominantly cosmetic, human rights considered an NGO preoccupation (rather than governmental or popular), accountability is conditioned by loyalties of a hegemonic regime, and the colonial project continues
It’s like a cake of which each person wants a piece. Foreign cultural centres here are mainly European, there is no share for the Americans in that piece. Those are the people who are paying money, but are not being an effective force. They decided to be effective in ‘culture’, but what do they do? Some film screens, exhibition’s, but they introduce nor induce a change, they are more like the cultural officers in an embassy, nothing more. They do not ask what are our needs, or what is the approach we prefer. Someone has decided that those are the kinds of activities that should run, and that’s the direction in which the wheel spins. The main sector into which the majority of foreign funds are directed is that of construction, but not the individual. Fine, they do contribute somehow, but they do not help in changing the bitter in our reality because they are a component within the crisis if not a driving force in it. (As’ad 2010)

Through an extensive review of works on post-Oslo power structures, economic shifts and the sociopolitical transformations, Tamari (2002) identifies the Palestinian decision-making elites (hegemonic class) in four: 1. PA-affiliated executives and heads of PLO market arms e.g. Petroleum Authority, PECDAR; 2. PLO and PNC members and executives; 3. heads of security apparatuses, and; 4. the Council of Governors and Mayors. While no clarification has or is being provided on ‘how presidential decision making is exercised within this elite given its contending factions and competing loyalties’ (ibid:105), ten decades post Tamari’s analysis, elites of the PLO, PNC and the PLC have been progressively marginalized and de facto losing relevance in favour of a growing coterie of private investors. The 2007-coup polarized the Palestinian politics into Fatah (WB, backed by World Bank, Saudi Arabia) and Hamas (GS, backed by Muslim Brotherhood, Qatar). It suspended the activities of the PLC and contending parties instated emergency laws to justify their violations against civic rights, and among many other aspects, created a back-channel allowing private investors to court the PA (see chapter 5, pg. 243).

Meanwhile, the hegemony of the ‘Old Guards’ on decision-making is under attack from the amorphous ‘Young Guards’ who are contending their peripheral placement in regards to political hierarchies (Tamari 2002:107). This is emphatic in the ongoing public confrontation of PLO President Mahmoud Abbas and the former National Security Advisor (a.o.) Mohammad Dahlan. The latter had enjoyed a ‘supreme reign’ on the GS between 2000 and 2007, when he fled to the WB in the aftermath of the coup and found it difficult to retreat to the second row of command (Baroud 2014). This confrontation of two elite divisions (and subgroups) translates with a substratal spatial contestation throughout the de facto political and economic capital. These are marked by concentrations of arms and security personnel, whether public or private, overt or covert.

Summoning (irrespective of group size) near either of the geographically central governmental properties will swiftly be attended, and photographing buildings and personnel is prohibited and has lead to arrest. Neighbourhoods of PA personnel are regularly patrolled, and the romantic solitude of persons on any of Ramallah’s peripheral ridges (enjoying raw nature given the lack of public spaces) will rapidly be censored against political or social ‘mischief’. While PLO institutions and loyalists enjoy free range to practice and propagate their opinions
(Image 3.3), demonstration by opposition is either neutralized by counter-rallies or violent termination by police as witnessed in July 2012\(^{30}\), July 2013\(^{31}\), and December 2013\(^{32}\) (alAtar 2010, Halevi 1998, Image 3.5). Some interviewees described the intensity of policing as proportional to the political size and argued an improved rule of law (Zananiri 2010, Khouri 2010). Nonetheless, this opinion does not take into perspective neither the fact that systems relevant to civic ‘rule of law’ such as traffic police have failed to turn timely campaigns\(^{33}\) into sustainable systems, and that the proportion of armament associated to the non-civic security apparatuses neither prohibits nor solves contestation, yet certainly intensifies the militarization of the semi- eminent confrontation.

As for Tamari’s (2002) fourth group of elites and given the paradigm of the 2003 compromise by Arafat of appointing a Prime Minister, the hitherto bureaucratic disjunction of LGs from politics was institutionalised, downscaling these bodies to administrative and technical concerns as exampled over the recent past months\(^{34}\). Moreover, the financially deprived municipalities (such as that of Ramallah) are further weakened by the growing pressure of the rapidly urbanizing A-Areas; a conditioned worsened by the crowding of their shrunken decision-making space by progressively affluent private investors (Anani 2010; Shaheen 2012). As former Mayoress of Ramallah Jeanette Michael (in office 2005-2012) stated: ‘The normal trend is that investors seek the change and we follow’, where ‘as a municipality, we do not have the legal power to force an investor in a direction instead of another, or against his/her will’ (Michael 2010).

In conclusion, PLO and PA policymaking lies in the hands of two: that of the former PLO guerillas who are in average more than sixty in age, and the PA’s young ‘generals’ whose maturity culminated in the Dayton Era\(^{35}\) and continues along the
EUPOL COPPS program (Barthe 2011). Both advocate nation-state programs and terminology, security as kernel achievement, and in effect are leading the de-development process of de-institutionalization through bureaucratization (Roy 1999; Tamari 2002). Meanwhile, spacio-economic policies remain factored by donor and private agendas (emergency- and profit- characterized respectively), within parameters laid out by Israel, and through non-transparent generic TIM systems of decision making. In this equation LGs – and hence the wider public – remain a minor variable.

In contrast to the numerous official statements and programs by international parties demanding the reform of the PA, respect rule of law, expanding roles of local governments, reduce corruption and hold elections; nonetheless, no punitive measures have been exercised in response to the PLO’s continued disregard of fundamental concepts of democracy. Further, international politics did not hesitate in refusing to financially support or diplomatically engage with the democratically elected Hamas government in 2006; sending the Palestinian economy into crisis for some months before offering to compensate the WB-bound PLO with US$ 7.7 billion in December 2007, at a time the PDRP had requested US$ 2.1 billion less. While frameworks such as the MDLF have been established to improve the performance of the financially and administratively marginalized LGs, their work remains dominant by imperial agency tools and discourses which are incompossible to locational geographic, economic and social complexities and variations; as expounded in global scholarly work (Fanon 2004; Martin 1998; Escobar 2012; Shaheen 2012; a.o).

Although local economic studies stipulate a viable Palestinian economy under the continued colonization can only be achieved through investment in human capital towards a knowledge-based economy of high-value products; nonetheless, foreign aid investment in essential infrastructures such as research, health, education and vocational training remain limited while shares of the inflated public (and highly militarized) sector loiter. Since the coup in 2007 scores of Fatah-loyal employees in the GS continue to receive benefits from the WB-PA in spite of being dismissed from service in the aftermath of Hamas’ ascension into hegemonic power. Beyond circumstantial in- or under-productivity significant numbers of public servants – amongst which those of LGs – constitute what is often described as ‘masked unemployment’, where the capacities of the employee fall short of these necessitated by the attributed position (FG 2011, no.6; Anani 2010; Huleileh 2012). As Diagram 3.3 demonstrates, since the signature of the OAs the only sector which has experienced considerable growth in terms of size of employment is that of services (bureaucratization?). Sectors of communication and commerce grew slightly, while construction, manufacturing and agriculture (tradable sectors) declined significantly. In this regard Abdullah elaborates:

According to our plan [the PDRP] the education sector was to receive higher budgets, yet the problem lies in the PA budget, 60% of which is salaries (40% is security-apparatus salaries), 15% for education and 7% for the health sector. The human capital lies in the latter two, and to increase expenditure in health and education the budgetary increase can only be done gradually; for example by raising the share of education from 15% to 20% over a ten-year period. This is caused by the fact that reform includes public servants whose capacity building and/or early retirement comes at a high expense and cannot be conducted in short periods of time. And we are stuck in this process. (Abdullah 2012)
Here it should also be noted that the growth in the services sector has chiefly been in either central government bureaucracy apparatuses, security, or private business services, whereas basic civic services have in effect contracted; e.g. while in 1994 the per capita governmental expenditure on healthcare amounted to US$ 42.70, it deflated to US$ 30.40 in the year 2000, which is lower than that of the ICA rate of US$ 33.80 in 1993. Like transportation, education and research the health sector is dramatically dependent on the nongovernmental sector which had emerged in the pre-Oslo era ‘in order to fill acute needs that were not satisfied by the Civil Administration while simultaneously serving as a form of resistance’ (Gordon and Filc 2009:467).

Notwithstanding, as Halevi wrote sixteen years ago, ‘the question is not how to rationalize a state of affairs that is in itself perfectly unacceptable and unjustifiable, but to understand its genesis and identify the conditions needed to transcend it’ (1998:48). Therein, Ramallites in general and municipalities of the agglomerate in particular enjoy a minimal formal decision-making space, which is highly militarized and crowded due to the customary concentration of elites, their symbols and subgroups in the quasi capital. Thus, strategies aiming at enhancing resilience should develop mechanisms that overtly respect the present-day hegemonic power structure, yet covertly aim at reducing spatial monopoly and sociopolitical contestation through endorsing endemic ‘neutralizing agents’. The significance of these is highlighted in the normalization of social ethos of Ramallah post the OAs, where:

In the entire world, the upper hand is for economy over politics. The latter follows the earlier but not vice-versa. What conditions the USA politics is its economic interests, same with China, etc. Here our situation is a bit
different, but not the extreme. Because of the occupation politics plays a big role, but never underestimate the role of the economic aspects. I would like to remind you about the fights that broke out between Palestinians here after the establishment of the PA, about who will take the agency contracts for the Israeli companies; starting with the prime minister and the ladder down. And what is happening today is connected to this. We cannot remain nostalgic to the political work, dedication of the masses, the secret underground activism and the romance of the process [of the First Intifada]. This was an exceptional process and happening, but not the norm. The norm is what we are gradually heading to, particularly here in Ramallah, with freedom of expression and choice amongst other aspects. This is not as rosy or romantic as the times of the 1980s, but it is nevertheless the human norm that is dictated by human nature; the human wants to relax and enjoy his or her time, and if that means they will have to overlook the occupation, they will. (FG 2011, no.6; +50 yrs)

Although continuation of despotic power and decision-making dependency of the PA is socio-economically threatening, notwithstanding, attempts at direct elimination from within are likely to result in high casualties whether human or capital given the alarming levels of armament of the post-colonial regimes – as recently exemplified in Egypt, Bahrain, Yemen, Libya and Syria; a risk that Ramallah is aware of and prefers to avoid. In this context neutralization (hence balanced sociospatial transformation) necessitates gradual cooptation of three economic groupings; first, powerful private investors who are married to the PA which composes the ‘most privatized political entities in the world’ (Gordon and Filc 2009:467), whom are concerned about the growing risks thence ‘looking for a role to play’ according to Khoury (2010), and whose ambition remains profit accumulation; second, ‘the intellectuals, professionals, business people, and others who have hitched their fortunes to Ramallah’ and are ‘in fact underlying its secularism’ (Taraki 2008:14), who are genuinely concerned about the regionally growing radicalism and are primarily concerned with maintaining their sociospatial freedoms whether ideological or behavioural, and; third, the rapidly growing poor strata whose existential worriments are those of improving their living conditions. Systematically similar to nationalism and neoliberalism yet parametrically varied, a viable resilience strategy should orient the role and gain of the powerful, be popular as capitalism yet inclusive as socialism, and grant space and access – not virtual hope – to the underprivileged and marginalized.

Whereas speculation on Ramallah’s financial elite defending its ethos is legitimate, none should be placed on neither a ‘potentially’ rationalizing foreign aid nor the non-democracy (hence political promises) of the colonizer. On one hand, the past two decades have proven the state-building in Palestine to be an ‘expérience virtuelle’ (Barthe 2011:82). In practice, Palestinian development plans and budgets are periodically and systematically rendered obsolete whereas Israeli colonization progresses unhindered, as illustrated in Infographic 3.1, p. 130. Short after the PA elections in 1996 MOPAD conducted studies and developed a proposal for a Jerusalem metropolitan area bound by Bethlehem in the south and Ramallah in the north. The intensified colonization around Jerusalem had this proposal shelved by 1998. The Sharm elSheikh Memorandum of September 1999 and the consequently lined development projects were suspended a year later with the outbreak of the Second Intifada in 2000. Similarly, plans prepared following the redeployment of the IOF outside Areas A in 2004 were shelved by
the coup in 2007. In its turn, the extensively financed PDRP of 2007 has been devoid by 2012 with the Israeli sanctions on the PA in response to the PLO’s bid to the UN, the retraction of international funding starting 2011 with the outbreak of the so-called ‘Arab Spring’, and the resulting financial crisis which the WB has been enduring since. The proposal of US Secretary of State John Kerry’s of US$ 4 billion (announced in May 2013) did not evolve beyond that state. Infographic 3.1 and Diagram 3.3 illustrate this futile process, which Le More summarizes with:

The result has been an incredible amount of tax payers’ money being wasted on attempting to keep the peace process politically alive and to cushion the shocks to the Palestinian economy induced by Israeli policies rather than on fostering growth, development and the institutional basis for a state. There has also been a failure of ‘chequebook diplomacy’ to induce major policy change on the part of the parties. In so doing, the international community has absolved Israel of its obligations vis-à-vis the Palestinian civilian population as the Occupying Power under international law, encouraging further Israeli violations of humanitarian norms and condoning Israeli territorial expansion into the Palestinian territories. In the process also, the international community’s intervention and assistance programme has turned increasingly surreal: donors are today providing short-term, unsustainable emergency assistance and pumping large sums of money into an ever more aid-dependent territory which has become ever less viable geographically, economically and politically. (Le More 2005:998)

In view of this, the epistemological difference between the candidates of the proposed speculation lies in a the simple equation: while Palestinian private investors ‘have a lot to lose’39, Zionists and international donors ‘have little to lose’. Herein, average Ramallites and their LGs would have improved chances of a balanced bargain with the – in any event – sine qua non local private investors. This is further rationalized by the current standings, where social inequalities are deepening and ‘wealth is increasingly being confused with corruption, business with theft. For if wars always find their profiteers, reconstruction does too’ (Halevi 1998:42).

Thereof, what are the current social dynamics, outlines and imaginations in Ramallah? How do citizens perceive their city-space and what are their timely socioeconomic characteristics and needs? And which points constitute potential common grounds for the diverse Ramallites and investors under a future scenario that aims at decolonizing the quotidian space and social ethos within this locality?
Ramallah’s Oslo: Neoliberal State-Making and Socio-Relational Sensibilities

Net Official Development Assistance (ODA) received by WB & GS 1993-2011 (World Bank 2014)

Statistics on demolition of houses built without permits in the WB (excluding East Jerusalem) (B’Tselem 2014)

Number of Settlers in the illegal Israeli colonies in the West Bank (PCBS 2014)

Comprehensive Closure Days (B’Tselem 2014a)

During a comprehensive closure, all permits previously issued to residents of the Occupied Territories for purposes of work, trade, or medical treatment are invalid.

Statistics on demolition of houses built without permits in the WB (excluding East Jerusalem) (B’Tselem 2014)
3.2. RAMALLITES: NGOIZATION, OTHERNESS, AND THE CREATIVE YUPPIES

The hitherto elaborated political, territorial, structural and economic shifts of Palestinian livelihoods over the past century have expectedly been accompanied and factored by social adjustments; which are globally tempered and locally engendered. Dominant ideologies perceive nations, states, and cities as homogeneous units, where stereotypes are casually constructed and furthered (among other processes) through traditional urban planning and zoning tools that institutionally homogenize zones whose contours are referenced to topography, infrastructures and quantitative statistics. These two-dimensional visions have little (if any) consideration to social sub-categories although accumulated knowledge has established urban conflicts as predominantly ‘internal to what on the surface appears homogeneous and coherent - and presents itself and behaves as though it were’ (Lefebvre 2009:352).

In analysing its urbanity ‘most scholarship on Palestine remains caught up in reductive binaries’ that are ‘heavily reliant on rigid and aggregated categories, the bulk of it unable to capture entire assemblages of action, subjective dissonance, productive ambiguities and contingent vitalities that inflect so much of contemporary quotidian life’ (Abourahme 2011:453). Beyond the routine of ad hoc manoeuvring of rooted and branching colonial systems, nouveau-Ramallites remain what Gordon and Filc call a ‘risk society’, where:

By risk society, we mean a society that develops a system of strategies and technologies to secure and manage the lives of its members by anticipating hazards, in this way surviving to domesticate the future. Regardless of whether risks are real or constructed, they are rendered calculable and governable, and the calculability of risks has become an important element of the rationality through which society and its institutions are organized, monitored, and regulated. (Gordon and Filc 2009:458)

Herein, Gordon and Filc argue Israel’s responsibility for the systematic undermining of calculability of risk for the colonized subjects and the exasperation of uncertainty as causes of the (assumed) destruction of Palestinians as a risk society, hence giving rise – among other impacts – to the Palestinian ‘postmodern religiosity’ embodied in Hamas. They claim that ‘most Palestinians are currently driven by the imperative of securing life’s necessities – defence, food, shelter, and reproduction – a task that is accomplished on a day-to-day basis by the family, which is frequently aided by charity organizations’ while ‘work and action, are, in turn, undermined’ (2009:479). Their myopic hypothesis accentuates the inapplicability of established risk prediction and management paradigms on one hand, while on the other the failure of the PA to provision parameters for the curtailment of uncertainty (e.g. healthcare infrastructure). Nonetheless, this opinion is based in reference to eurocentric logic on strategy, planning and
accountability at a time the majority of the world’s populace lives the realities of limited governments and affluent sedition; e.g. lobbyists working the US Capitol, proliferation of armed groups e.g. the maras in central America, etc. Further, it falls short of factoring the nonconformity of the ‘quotidian Palestinian’ which is axiomatic in casual comparisons of Gaza, Jerusalem, Hebron and Ramallah; not to mention the urban, rural, Bedouin communities and refugee camps; the areas A, B and C. Reiterative to the trend, their work – though interesting in terms of approach – relies on subjective generic discourses which depict Palestinians – not only as conforming to horizontal identity and ethos, but also – as passive victims rather than active subjects, denying their ability to engender endemic forms of risk calculation, prediction and management (alKhalili 2009). Herein Abourahme challenges such approaches by arguing that ‘people are using the different constitutive nodes of the present — even the checkpoint — to reproduce their lives in ways that do not correspond to anything we might recognize as resistance or anything we can reduce to survivalism’ (2011:455). Highlighting the rise of new modalities of production and relationalities, he writes:

> How do we make sense of the colonial subject that is neither in revolt nor in open crisis? How do people reproduce their lives, fashion routines, etch out some meaning when the political is evacuated, when time is on hold? These questions loom over a contemporary disjuncture in Palestine, marked in part by the splintering and opening up of the field of subjective bonds, attachments and associations to new modalities of production, less circumscribed by previous normative parameters and engendering a host of complexities and ambivalences in politico-social relationalities. (Abourahme 2011:453)

In her study of the Ramallah agglomerate Taraki (2008; 2008a) trails the evolution of social ethos in Palestine in general and in this *mise en scène* in particular. The Nakba marks the ‘abortion’ of Palestinian modernity through the hijacking and subjugation of their main cosmopolitan cities along the Mediterranean coastline, the erasure of their identity through looting and enshrouding (Pappe 2007; Brunner 2010), and the militarization of their geographies intra- and extra-localities in utter disregard to the resilient power of memory, narrative and continued regeneration of conceptions of space. However, after the spacio-cultural marginalization was cemented through the COGAT first and later jointly with the ICA, Palestinians laboured the afore-described civic mobilization, the ‘politico-social relationality’ of *sumud*, and brought about the sitting room as living space substituting for the red-tapping of the Grand Hotel, Cinema Dunia, and Birzeit University campus (see section 2.2.2.i, p. 83).

The launch of the Peace Process in 1991 was a logical consequence following two and a half decades of settler colonialism, and four years of the First Intifada’s intensive civic disobedience which exasperated the precariousness of the population, and lowered their morale. The scores of materials from local intellectuals and politicians highlighting the perils of the OAs – under Cartesian logic – should have caused the reception of Yasser Arafat in Gaza in July 1994 to be a protest had the population not been, in effect, enervated. The schism and fatigue of the Palestinian national liberation movements (inside and outside, upper and lower tiers) alongside the collapse of the Soviet Union brought about the USA monopoly over international politics and the marriage-arrangements between the ideologies of the pragmatic and maximalist Zionists. Following the
outlines of the decade-earlier prepared Droobless Plan of 1983, the Palestinians were given a nonsovereign authority and no territorial concessions. According to interviewees the population, in spite of the contra evidence, wanted to believe that they found the end of the tunnel. In spring 1993 Palestinians from the WB and GS – though banned from changing locus of residence – still casually strolled the Mediterranean coast, conjoined with their relatives and political comrades who had been classified as Israeli citizens, and familiarized with the non-Palestinian Israelis either through politics or work (see section 2.2.2.ii, p. 84). The applications of a shrunken geography while at the time a third of Palestinian active labour force was operating within the Israeli economy, the thought was not on the discussion table. Further, the four main Palestinian parties pronounced the same target, a nation-state, albeit with different arrangements. Therein, ‘government’ was both popularly and politically perceived as the panacea, where:

The mentality of the Cold Way required that people in both the East and West subscribed daily to the myth that power resided with central governments, while the life of cities was understood narrowly as an arena of municipal affairs under central control. It was this same mentality, in many respects, that blinded the modern dictators of the Middle East and the urban renewal planners of America’s inner cities, to the shifting sociopolitical tectonics of the Urban Revolution. (Brugmann 2009:76)

The combination of weariness and forlorn faith allowed the disclosure of the – till then – secret OAs and the popular adoption of its politics of unintelligent compromise, signifying that the politicians of the NGCs had overestimated the people’s capacity to endure evermore deteriorating living conditions; even sumud has needs. This strategic failure remains the congenital trait of Palestinian political paradigms, which Ramallah is contending today. The transition from the 1993 state-making to today’s -unmaking has occurred over four phases, in each of which a particular social risk-strategy was identified, social behaviour prevailed, and a spatial translation constructed; as alKhalili narrates:

There are several of these moments with the city, but are they emotional moments, those of reference through which I define my relationship to the city? No, they aren’t. I am observing this gradual change of pivotal spaces such as the Muqata’a whose history for me started in 1995 when I visited it as Arafat arrived and the festivities over the departure of the Israeli army from it were taking place. The second instance was in the year 2000 with the visit of the French Foreign Minister Lionel Jospin in the aftermath of which I was imprisoned in it. Then I witnessed its destruction over the years from 2001 to 2003 until it was turned into rubble atop which the new monumental compound continues to be erected. Each of these phases lasted over a couple of years thence forging some kind of ease with the happenings, and eliminating reminiscence that would’ve been lasting if produced under shock. Part of the normalization of these event in the memory is one’s integration into the processes unfolding within the space. (alKhalili 2012)

In two decades Ramallah matured from disjointed boroughs to a cosmopolis. Akin humans, as this era turns twenty it is questioning and re-defining its distinctive persona. Hence, how did Ramallah evolve into its nowadays character? What were the main political-, economic-, and spatial- components of the social
behaviour producing the new agglomerate? What are the lessons learned and predictable future processions of events? And thereupon, what could possibly await Ramallah at the end of its current chapter? What elements of today's precarity can planners integrate into their spatial approaches to scale tomorrow's uncertainty? The coming pages address those issues while integrating contributions and narrations of a selection of the interviewees of this work, with an accentuation on that with the architect, curator, and artist Yazan alKhalili.

3.2.1. 1994-2000: Colonization is Provisioned Internally

I came back to Ramallah when I was 15 years old in 1996 [...]. For me it was not about moving to a city since as a child my family relocated a number of times. It was about the return to Palestine, and the aura not only of the supposed end to the gipsyesque trail, but more importantly, of arriving to the place that is supposedly my homeland. (alKhalili 2012)

The early years of the OA's featured the confusion and chaos of tailoring the Palestinian government and the subject of its operation; the readjustment of affinitive politicians from guerrilla-insurgency to audited bureaucracy, and the readaptation of a citoyen whose colonial presence is managed by a suited comrade. This (new) politico-social discordance materialized spatially in the postscript of the settling of PA returnee top-tier politicians in existing neighbourhoods in proximity to brethrens (e.g. Mahmoud Abbas in elBalou', alBireh; Nabil AbuRudaineh in elTireh, Ramallah); while Arafat resided in the fortified British hill-station and the few of them who feared Israeli assassination appointed mêlée guards. This illusion of integration of authority (nonerudite colonial agency) and populace would disintegrate by the turn of the century. In Ramallah more than any other city in the WB, the 'elaboration and normalization of a hierarchical culture of officialdom', corruption and hegemony fuelled cultural and ideological differences, hence exasperating social disparities, where 'Palestinians who had spent all their lives under occupation were especially unnerved by the plethora of bodyguards, security men, aides, doormen, chauffeurs, and coffee servers springing up in and around official institutions' (Taraki 2008a:68).

As aforementioned, Ramallah's geography, low social hierarchy, moldability and inherent diversity where the elements enabling initially the placement and later the expansion of PA apparatuses within its space. As its economy was predominantly reliant on low-scale commerce and white-collar employment, the distress caused by the Israeli closure of the WB and the replacement of Palestinian labour in Israel with imported ones from – chiefly – south-east Asia had negligible impact on the living conditions of Ramallites. This was due to four; first, the establishment of the PA granted an alternative for those who worked in (as of then) inaccessible Jerusalem and the unemployed; second, typically some of the flowing capital into the treasury of the PA from the international community was spent in the spaces of the city e.g. purchase, rental, and services; third,
enthusiastic and patriotic Palestinian bourgeoisie had confidence in their ability to play a role in the construction of a strong economy and were starting to make investments, and; fourth, the real estate market had all conditions necessary to boom: high demand, available capital, and the ICA’s restrictions on construction in the islands of Area A were suspended (Taraki 2008a; Khoury 2010 a.o).

Notwithstanding, within these few years the combination of the Arafatian autocracy and absence of both strategy and depth in the PA’s decision-making resulted in the alienation and/or marginalization of, again, four; first, private investors that refused to associate with the profits of engagement with the PA’s corruption e.g. Hasib Sabbagh (Brynen 2000; Arouri 2010); second, local governments had to forsake more of their aspiring decision-making capabilities to the central government that possessed minimal authority beyond the very same spaces of LGs (Barghouthi 2012); third, youth and civic voluntary frameworks whose operations were either annexed by the PA or as of then categorized, institutionalized and archived in ministerial files (A’sad 2010), and; fourth, intellectuals and opposition politicians who refused cooptation, some of whom consequently assumed that they could continue their constructive involvement in the stirring of the course of Palestinians through creation of NGOs for ‘human rights’, ‘democracy’, ‘social justice’, ‘rule of law’, ‘social services’ and similar concepts; whose ideological agendas were soon after subjugated by dependency on continuation of external funding and lack of constitutional systems of accountability (Barthe 2011). Kassis (2010) describes these entities as pertaining to ‘high employment, low productivity, and expenditure on areas that are not exactly clear’, where:

The problem is the perception of what is an NGO. Palestine has no NGOs; what is in Palestine are vehicles and drivers of foreign aid. They are not voluntary nor sustainable. Their Agenda in the best scenario is a compromise between the local and the international ones. They are solidarity components in regards to the relationships between the Palestinian and international organizations; a role that they played much more than they did with the assumed business component. If you examine the NGOs, their role is actually insignificant when it comes to the business attitude in development of the services sector. The NGOs think and plan in the terms: ‘We have a project which we can finish, we have criteria and indicators which should show a success story, and we have to make sure this project runs so that we get money for the next one so that we can expand horizontally and vertically, etc.’ (Kassis 2010)

The World Bank argued its large allocation to Palestinian NGOs by citing their essential role in alleviating the impact of Israeli colonization on quotidian lives pre-OAs, their assumed ability to enhance the capacities of the PA, and the politico-economic rationale of inability of the latter to meet its responsibilities (Sullivan 2001). In presented justifications then and today the Bank systematically refrains from recognizing the idleness of transfer of neither know-how, (see section 3.1.2, p. 118) nor exchange of capacities and skills between government bodies and NGOs. Barthe cites a Palestinian former NGO worker on a USAID-financed nursing workshop in Ramallah at the time Hamas (considered as ‘terror organization’ and hence boycotted) commanded the PA:

I asked them [two attendants] where they work. They answered ‘in the Ministry of Health’. I had to ask them to leave, and that I am unable to allow their
attendance. I hated myself, and that was the most bitter moment of my career. Nonetheless, it is not easy to leave such a position, because one gets used to a very high income and accordant living standards. Ministries and even [average] NGOs pay two to three times less. People like myself, who were trained outside, move from one such project to another. We are supposed to develop the public sector, but under no circumstance would we agree to work in it. Our competences are used in serving the donors more than Palestine. It is sad, but this is the reality. (Barthe 2011:116)

Although the impact of the NGO industry in Palestine became tangible only in later phases of the Oslo era (post 2000), nonetheless, its seeds were planted already in 1995 with the design – and by 1997 the establishment – of the Palestinian NGO project (PNGO) by the World Bank; an event that Sullivan describes as ‘groundbreaking’ where ‘For the first time in its history, the World Bank established a project to support NGOs directly, without going through ‘normal’ channels - i.e., representatives of a State’ (2001:1). While scrutinizing this particular project is not an interest of this work, the change in living standards – the socioeconomic polarization – resulting from the exasperated financing of NGOs (beyond this one project) is.

The salaries of the NGO sector in Ramallah average around US$ 1,500 monthly and reach up to five-digits. In comparison, the average public salary ranges between US$600 - US$700 and e.g. newly graduating architects have their union-approved minimum salary starting at less than US$ 300. Further and in contrast to logic and established knowledge, expert opinions for evaluation of performance, strategy and relevance of these NGOs are customarily produced by foreign consultants whose analysis is unable to surpass the narrow recycling of materials compounded in genealogically different geographies (Escobar 2012; Martin 1998). The drive of Palestinian NGOs to contract internationals is, like many Israelis moving to the colonies, chiefly budgetary; whereas payment scales of local consultants are relatively low, those of foreign experts are three to four times more. In combination with the thence justifiable logistical expenses of transportation and accommodation, NGOs are able to inflate their budgets and therewith the real-value of the 5% ‘running costs’ or ‘contingency’ items whose purpose of expenditure is mercurial (Barthe 2011; Kassis 2010).

Beyond de-development of economy (Roy 1999), these mechanisms have far reaching negative impacts on the living conditions and sociospatial dynamics of Ramallah, internally and regionally. While no data is available on neither Consumer Price Index (CPI) in relation to governorate nor wages paid by NGOs, statistics on average daily wage of wage-employees are implicit (Diagram 3.4). In 2011 average daily wage in Ramallah had reached, respectively, 7%, 32%, 28%, and 18% more than those in Bethlehem, Hebron, Nablus, and the WB in general (PCBS 2011b). Combined with the increased presence of agents of international organizations whose salaries are scaled to western standards (e.g. diplomats, UN officers, GIZ staff a.o.) and in the absence of strong consumer protection apparatuses; the high purchase power of the few became the benchmark for costs of services and commodities throughout the city. While annual apartment rents average around US$ 1,500 in Hebron in 2013, in the Ramallah agglomerate this figure stands at US$ 3,600 and in Ramallah-city it rises to US$ 6,000.42 Whereas the costs are shared by all residents of the space, the wealth is the privilege of a clique; as one participant in the FG 2011, no.2 expressed:
With Oslo and the creation of the NGO industry, a new class of citizens was founded that differs from the hitherto norm or average [...] for they have a particular mode of life, mode of consumption, mode of thinking. [...] They enjoy an income that is significantly higher than the average, and that in addition to their closeness to the ‘foreign’. They visit a different set of cafés and restaurants, and enjoy activities that are catered for by their level of income and the accompanied privileges. (FG 2011, no.2; 35-45 yrs)

As mentioned, these expressions of the socioeconomic and corollary spatial polarization resulting from the expansion of the NGO sector commenced in this period but materialized in later phases of the Oslo era.

In this prime phase, 1994-2000, the spatial change was chiefly in the skyline. Given the (then still) limited banking services, investment required availability of capital before commencement. As a town, Ramallah’s tall buildings ranged between three and four stories while the built-up surfaces were scattered. Moreover, given the pre-OAs shortage produced by ICA repression and the post-OA increase in demand, construction in this period had the character of deregulated ubiquitous infill regardless of the surroundings (Image 3.6 - Image 3.12). Designs were mirrorings of the entrenched austerity through half a century of Zionist colonialism. Therein, buildings generally composed of a ground floor with shops, repetitive apartments atop, carefully calculated sizes of openings and highly resemblant of the architecture employed in rural areas. Here Anani remarks that ‘for a long time I was wondering why are people constructing in villages using the same pattern present in Ramallah, until I looked at it from a different angle, and the opposite is the reality’ (Anani 2010). Investors were chiefly wealthy diaspora arriving from the USA, stemmed from surrounding villages, and the demands of whose younger offspring soon had the first chain
branch opened, Checkers hamburger and real American doughnuts. In the city centre and in light of the PA’s laissez faire policy many characteristic modern and historic buildings were demolished to make space for dumb buildings dubbed ‘commercial centres’, that were then perceived by pre-OAs residents as skyscrapers and today an average.

In regards to the cultural scene, this period was that of reopening and gradual expansion. Cinema’s like elWalid and elJameel (a.k.a. alSiraj) resumed screening in their halls which had been vandalized by the decay of years of abandonment. Baladna Cultural Centre renovated its early twentieth century building and reopened its doors. The National Conservatory of Music and the Centre for Popular Art elFunoun expanded their operations. The latter established the Palestine International Festival for Music and Dance bringing to entire generations the experience of large-scale concerts for the first time. In June 2000 the meticulously refurbished alKasaba Theatre and Cinematheque celebrated their opening, and a month later the Khalil elSakakini Cultural Centre followed course under the auspices of Arafat, whose popularity had plunged by that time as poverty levels amongst Palestinians rocketed. Observers argue that Palestinians were frustrated with the deteriorating living conditions, increasing socioeconomic gaps, expanding colonialism and political stagnation whose latest round of diplomacy brought about the nonviable Clinton Parameters (Map 1.22, p. 38). They indicate that streets were charged, and Ariel Sharon’s armed entry into Temple Mount on 28 September 2000 deflected the target to Israel thence saving the PA the embarrassment of an open internal confrontation (as Anderson 2006 predicts) which could have replaced what is known as the Second Intifada (Kassis 2010; Arouri 2010 a.o.).

Here it should be noted that although the aforementioned various cultural institutions as well as leisure facilities (restaurants, hotels and its Rumors discotheque) were rooted the 1980s acquired ‘collective symbolic capital’ and culture; owned and managed by and served a crowd of Ramallites (Taraki 2008a; FG 2011, no.6); notwithstanding, these spaces and activities were soon commonly attributed to the returnees whom in reality composed a minority, were not sufficiently strong socially to induce such a scale, and where onto themselves different within the imagined category (liberal, conservative, (non)engagement with the PA, etc). According to Harvey this schism in perception resulting from the socio-ecological transformations of communities can be explained through the Marxist ‘relational, process-based, and dynamic’ dialectics, which concedes that the relation between environment and culture is shifting and ‘apt to produce contradictions and continuities’ (2009:233). Thereof, the ‘coevolution of nature and culture’ should be recognized, wherein:

Environment may initially shape the range of choices available to a people at a given moment but then culture reshapes environment responding to those choices, the reshaped environment presents a new set of possibilities for cultural reproduction, thus setting up a new cycle of mutual determination. Changes in the way people create and re-create their livelihood must be analyzed in terms of change not only in their social relations but in their ecological ones as well. (Harvey 2009:233; emphasis in original)

Lefebvre (2009) indicates that as a transposing medium (city-)space is a tool, factor and target onto itself. Similar to and as constituent of social – collective
Image 3.6. A view onto the Old City from alRajaa' Street.
Image 3.7. Main Street, centre.
Image 3.8. elItta’a Street, centre.
Image 3.9. Main Street, city centre.
Image 3.10. George elSaa’ Street, centre.
Image 3.11. alNuzha neighbourhood, centre.
and individual – identity, it is constructed, shaped, presented and manipulated using mythology and ideological symbols, beliefs and practices. These tactics of producing and defining space and identity are often employed in reductionist paradigms in a process that Chardin dubs ‘reflexive invention’ (Harvey 2009:235), where prerogatives and markers of inclusion/exclusion are rendered non-negotiable behavioural parameters. As such, ‘each social formation constructs objective conceptions of space and time sufficient unto its own needs and purposes of material and social reproduction and organizes its material practices in accordance with those conceptions’ (Harvey 1990:419). Harvey elaborates that ‘personal space and time do not automatically accord with the dominant public sense of either’ and further, ‘class, gender, cultural, religious and political differentiation in conceptions of time and space frequently become arenas of social conflict’ (ibid:420).

The first phase of the Oslo era marks three; first, the exposure of the short-sightedness, unpreparedness and narrow concepts of Palestinian factional and PA politics; second, fostering the first calls for the abandonment of the Peace Process, its exclusive devices and czarist symbols – inducing (a.o.) Fatah’s defensive employment of the slogan ‘guard of the national project’; and third, harbouring the aggressive imposition of the exclusive neoliberal socioeconomies, thence exasperating Palestinian premonition of disenfranchisement, thereof distrust and uncertainty. In contrast to the script, the ‘threat’ was emanate from within, erecting a second (akin the colonial first) existential predicament. The centre of radiation, exposure, and thereof highest intensities of alteration in the WB continue to unfold in Ramallah; as Abourahme phrases it: ‘If the occupation has been subcontracted to the Authority then Ramallah is the factory’ (2009:503). In a sardonic turn of events, this constellation laboured a redefinition of ‘risk strategy’ from the collective state-building as mechanism of controlling uncertainty, to the prioritization of the individual resilience through the eminent internal contestation of Palestinian ideologies. Ramallah’s transforming middle class had in effect adopted a new strategy, as the sociologist and researcher Dr. Lisa Taraki stated in an interview with her and in reference to her study of the agglomerate:

The nationalist movement like the Communist Party and others played a significant role in the creation of this educated class [...]. However, the Oslo process has led to a transformation and change in the awareness and consciousness of the people. Here I would like to emphasize the role of education in the formation of this new middle class, and not any education, it is the education that you received and I gave to my son, which is a globalized education. You are capable of travelling anywhere and communicate with others using the same language in the sense of concepts. We send our children to private schools, but also not any private schools, not the Islamic private schools or like those in Nablus and Hebron. In Ramallah some of the private schools which the new middle class associate with are of a different sort, they promote a different culture in terms of connection and orientation. If we are talking about social groups and how they can define the character of a city or a space, those active agents whom I describe in my work as the ‘new middle class’, they are also not homogeneous. They truly grasped what this stage in the history of Palestine requires. The national movement died, Oslo is over, and it is the same in every other country in the region, people are starting to think individually and about guaranteeing their own future instead of the past collective. For example, the
Conservatory of Music, why was there no conservatory 30 years ago here in Ramallah? Go and look who is studying there. Based on my research, the children studying there are mainly composed of those springing from new-coming families to the city and not the traditional bourgeoisie; those are people who have a believe in this education, and that is why they send their kids to the conservatory, and to private schools and often another third activity. It is all part of the whole thing, of the new vision and mode of social behaviour. While some people perceive those families as a product of Oslo, personally I have a different opinion. Personally I think this is a process taking place in cities all over the Middle East, look at Amman and the events there which are far more exaggerated than the case of Ramallah, or Cairo. This is due to the state-building project, there is a transformation going on and not only in Palestine. And I do refer these shifts to education, because without education of a certain kind these changes in social behaviour would not take place. In Egypt, Jordan, Beirut and Syria there is a significant independence as well as tendency towards foreign schools, particularly those with connections outside. High school diplomas with international recognition such as IB and IGCSE, the ones people could use outside of national boundaries are becoming more attractive. And this is not a coincidence. It is an expression of global and regional development, and Ramallah is not isolated from this world. (Taraki 2010)

3.2.2. 2001-2005: Sumud requires Morale, Avant-garde Sensibilities

The new-comers of which Taraki narrates her observations are a major factor in Ramallah's transformation; they were the drivers of its growth in this period as other WB cities stagnated, they engendered its cosmopolitan mien, and are actively claiming the right of participation in reshaping its spaces. However, why did they relocate into the city? What keeps them in it? Their aspirations? The outbreak of the Second Intifada in September 2000 gave the short-after elected Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon the excuse to place into effect a strategy for the de-moralization of Palestinians. Starting towards the end of 2000 and exponentially intensifying in 2001, a chain of physical translations of the Oslo maps commenced. The IOF deployed outside of cities (Area A), erected basic and elaborate checkpoints, dug up streets, placed mounds of earth, cement blocks and metal gates caging Palestinians in their localities according to IOF temper. Airborne assassinations and bombing of PA facilities became a periodic event, and locals gained knowledge of the various kinds of military aircrafts: the spying plane (a.k.a im Rabee') whose presence is detected by the interruption of waves of television receivers meant an attack is under planning; the Apache helicopter indicated either a manoeuvre or a limited target; and a circulating F16 meant an eminent and highly destructive raid. Tens of days of curfew and 244 days of closure were imposed on the WB and GS in this one year (B’Tselem 2014a), sentencing the weak Palestinian economy into crisis and inviting a 45% increase in international aid for the emerging humanitarian crisis (Infographic 3.1, p. 130).
In response and focused on highlighting himself and the PA as pivotal for Israel’s security on one hand and on the other wishing (or not?) the depletion of internal opposition to his rule; Arafat (proving yet again his inability to conduct long-term impact analysis of his strategies) granted free range to all forms of resistance in spite of their axiomatic incompatibility. Here Hamami and Tamari note:

> Stone throwing kids, mass peaceful marches echoing the strategy of the first intifada, and military attacks targeting the army or settlers in the occupied territories contrasted with Hamas suicide bombings inside Israel – and then got overtaken by them. Not reigning in the latter before September 11th 2001, was already a huge miscalculation but after it – one of catastrophic proportions. (Hamami and Tamari 2008:37)

The militarization of Palestinian resistance by Fatah and Hamas (opposite to the First Intifada) gave the IOF the immoral excuse to respond to popular demonstrations with live ammunition, causing severe losses in lives, incapacitating injuries, and thereof rapid withdrawal of quotidian Palestinians from the scene. This failure of synchronizing the political and quotidian components of Palestinian pursuits for equality are eloquently captured by Yazan alKhalili, where he stated:

> A couple of weeks ago it was – 28 September – the anniversary of the Second Intifada. I browsed through YouTube material of both the First and Second Intifadas, and I realised that the captured images bear high resemblance of the two events. In the process I became convinced that the Second Intifada is a replica of the image of the First, but lacked the structure and depth of the latter. As a child in the end of the 1980s – as I was 8 to 9 years old – too often I heard the phrase ‘you are the children of stones’ in reference to the stone-throwing at the IOF. I believe this is due to the fact that this was the only aspect they were able to capture in an image at a time everything else – the non-photographable elements – were the essence of the First Intifada; the reclaiming of lands, refusal to pay taxes to Israel, boycotting COGAT-affiliated institutions, etc. Thus when the PA leadership – which in 2000 was composed mainly of returnees – attempted to repeat the events of the First Intifada, they pushed the only image they knew, which was far from the reality. This explains why the Second Intifada lacked political, economic and social projects and thus failed to have an impact beyond the destruction inflicted by the Israeli brutality. The pivotal element that lead to the success of the First Intifada was the conscious and planned creation of alternatives. People were not just asked to boycott the Israeli economy and its products solely for the ideology of weakening the occupation; rather, the strategy stretched further. People were given commodity-alternatives through whose production neighbourhoods were consolidated by the forged cross-dependency. A Hara [neighbourhood] raised a few sheep together for the milk, planted and harvested the close-by lot of land together; in short, the Hara worked, produced and existed as a unit with a consciousness of its impact... I visited Bil’in [village] once, and I was shocked. There was a powerful revolutionary surge aimed at reaching and breaking through the Separation Fence. As we returned to the village, all shops were full of Israeli products!! I wondered how these two aspects function alongside one another, and I wonder if the Bil’in process is that of creating a mere image of a political struggle. They
understand that there are cameras capturing images, and those images create pressure. But what is this pressure for? In order to move the Separation Wall few hundred meters backwards onto other lands that actually are also yours? What is the purpose of this weekly exercise? (alKhalili 2012)

The election of George W. Bush, the events of 11 September and the subsequently justified ‘war on terror’ provided Sharon with the political cover he needed to push the Palestinians into primal fear through what the IOF calls Operation Defensive Shield (ODS), and what West Bankers46 still refer to as their worst trauma since the Nakba. Holding the mantra of ‘Arafat is no partner for peace’ and a ‘sponsor of terror’, on 29 March 2002 and employing a deadly suicide attack in Netanya (coastal Israeli city) as justification, Sharon commanded ODS into execution, effectively redeploying Israel’s army in Palestinian cities, starting with Ramallah and spreading into all major localities. This transgression manifested Israel’s spaciocide strategy, at the time focusing on compromising PA institutions and infrastructures (Hamami and Tamari 2008; Weizman 2007).

Enjoying an unprecedented impunity, IOF imposed a strict full-scale curfew banning Palestinians from leaving their homes while soldiers raided random selections of houses, held tenants of entire buildings hostage in single rooms, used civilians as human shields, displaced families while converting their homes to encampments and defecating everywhere except inside the toilet. Soldiers vandalized and looted private and public properties alike, homes, shops, and workplaces. Tanks drove over vehicles rather than the empty streets, deliberately destroyed basic infrastructures, and injured and arrested civilians, reporters and armed men with neither reference nor accountability. The Jenin Refugee Camp was literally razed. A neighbourhood of Nablus’s dense historic centre was targeted with an F16 missile. Internal walls of dwellings became the new deployment IOF route, with no regard to the massive destruction of habitats (Graham 2006a). This was an all-out war by a highly advanced military against a predominantly bare population and handful of under-equipped militias; a thoroughly planned and meticulously executed tragedy that today still haunts the traumatized generations of Palestinians. No international ‘condemnation’ or monetary aid or projects of reconciliation can undo the, still, living trauma of the collective trepidation and de-moralization of April 2002. This traumatic experience fostered new sensibilities, mutant references to logical analysis, and hence risk strategies that are alien to eurocentric paragons.

This assailment shattered the illusion of the PA’s mastery on the dwarfed territory and the preparedness of its various heavily-financed security apparatus to deter the violations against the population it represents; a reality that has been repetitively on exhibit since (Hamami and Tamari 2008; Weizman 2007). In the same line, Arafat’s popularity continued to plunge, the diplomacy of the OAs and what Hamimi and ‘Tamari call the ‘lynchpin of bilateralism’ commenced its deliquesce. Utilizing the shock and focus of Palestinians on rehabilitation in the aftermath of their anew calamity and geographic shrinkage; the Israeli government put forth its newest installation in June 2002, the apartheid Separation Wall (Map 1.25, p. 41; Image 1.7 - Image 1.10, p. 43). This wall which was first deliberated in the mid 1990s had its western front detailed to stretch over 709 kilometres, double the length of the Green Line, while its eastern segments continue to be deliberated47 (B’Tselem 2014e) in correspondence with the politico-territorial concepts in Map 1.21 - Map 1.24, p. 39. On the southern edge of
Ramallah, between elRam and Kufur Aqab (Image 1.7, p. 42) the wall is composed of concrete blocks ranging between 6 and 9 meters in height (for comparison, the Berlin Wall was 3 meters). Towards the west, on the lands of Beitunya it composes of trenches, fences, and a buffer stretch averaging 60 meters in width. This wall should be understood as an element complementary to the earlier elaborated colonies and checkpoints, which combined form a closed system.

For Ramallah, the outbreak of the Second Intifada and the ODS marked the commencement of three; first, the USA designed re-organization and physical materialization of its PA-provisioned militarization; second, the alteration of its demographics and sociospatial dynamics, and; third, the fortification of the neoliberal nonproduction-based – thence inferior – economy, which was introduced in the former phase. While Israel up scaled its strategies of obliteration of Palestinian modernity and the PA proved the incompossibility of state-building and continued colonization; notwithstanding, the economic project was to resume its course in a criminal careless ness to the evident induction of treacherous sociospatial contestation (alAtar 2010; Anani 2010).

As a result of George W. Bush’s Road Map which was signed on 4 June 2003, a year later the US Security Coordinator (USSC) team was agreed upon between the PA, USA and Israel. Residing in Tel Aviv and setting main camp in the knelt Jenin, the USSC generals supervised the ‘re-construction’ and re-organization of the Sharon-decapacitated and -delegitimized PA security apparatuses, or what Palestinians refer to as the Dayton Army. The fine training of this sector which enjoys more than a third of the PA’s budget was – and progressively continues to be – articulated in the de facto capital.

In this phase the division between commander and the commanded crystallized through – among others – the accentuated deployment of guards within Ramallah; a security apparatus whose mission was chiefly the protection of a coterie rather than the whole. The Dayton era calibrated these genealogically self-targeting systems of monitoring and abortion of resistance through personnel deployment plans; which pseudo-comically parade the movement of assumed important PA personnel through the limited street networks of the agglomerate, casually hindering that of the average citizen. In terms of physical structures, while sidewalks narrowed the Palestinian generals oversaw the instalment of metal-sheet eyesore cabinets as guard posts throughout the city; in front of PA facilities, foreign agencies, and dwellings of officials and few of the private clique. These – akin their occupants and the properties they guard – have proliferated the agglomerate yet can only be photographed illicitly, as in Image 3.13. Noteworthy, to the left of the PA’s Prime Minister’s Office shown in the image lies the Ministry of Justice and the Nations Garden (one of the largest of the few green spaces provisioned by the municipality). The sidewalks leading to it are 50-60 cm wide, barricaded from the street, and blocked with a power pole (Image 3.14). Although this arrangement most probably resulted from an unintelligent planning rather than intentionally, and whether former Prime Minister Dr. Salam Fayyad or nowadays Dr. Rami Hamdallah did not notice or did and ignored this failure in their front-yard; under either scenario, this demonstrates the irrelevance of public accessibility to decision-makers. The epitome of intra-city securitization can be found within a radius of ± 300 meters around the villa of President Mahmoud Abbas, where multiple checkpoints and barriers heavily control every movement; searching cars, identification papers, and banning both, vehicle and pedestrian access except to (unlucky?) neighbours of the President and their confirmed
Image 3.13. *(above)* A guard outpost (red) in front of MOPAD (further to the left), facing the PA’s Prime Minister’s Office.

Image 3.14. *(left)* Sidewalk at Jabra alAnkar Street, which connects the Ministry of Justice with the Ministries Complex, The Prime Minister’s Office, a UN training facility and two banks.
guests. Herein, as the archetypal authoritarian Arab political scene gained shape and presence through ‘surreptitious arrests, torture, beatings’ and a ‘draconian overview’ in a process of ‘derationalization of a coherent Palestinian national political community’, and while this process has been an ‘overriding imperative of the Israeli colonial regime’; nevertheless, ‘that the current movers and shakers, policymakers and powerbrokers in Ramallah passively or actively feed into this logic, however, is a shocking development’ (Abourahme 2009:503).

The events of the two years between September 2000 and 2002 put forth, and the following years stigmatised Palestinian security apparatuses as ‘against’ rather than ‘for’ the people; the ODS had effectively and irreversibly destroyed the respect for and faith in – fellow – members of these systems. As alAtar states:

93,000 Policemen serving the PA, when you calculate that number per capita it turns out higher than that in Germany and France and the majority of the countries; and those are there to provide security to whom? We the citizens pity them when the IOF decides to take a stroll into town. I was coming back from Qalandia one time and there was a Palestinian patrolling unit down here around the corner, so I rolled down my window and informed them. They jumped into their Jeep and went off. And this is our dilemma, I wish they were for my protection, but I also understand their conditions and that’s why I warned them. (alAtar 2010)

In the same line As’ad said:

In regards to the security apparatuses, unfortunately I do not feel that they are there for my service as a citizen. When I look into a policeman’s eyes I see two things: First, that he is there because he needs the salary at the end of the month for the entire family relying on him for food and shelter; and Second, they know that we as citizens know that they have no authority; like the woman who gets beaten up by her husband every night and each morning tries to play an authority role with the children who hear her screams every night. (As’ad 2010)

Therein, the first decade of this millennium tailored a burlesque costume to the hegemonic PA whose response to the evident nonmonopoly over violence was higher investments in policing apparatuses sous-prétext reform. Commencing then, exasperating in the third phase with the coup of Hamas, and continuing through the fourth phase; the PA has been resonating the conduct of the soldiers of the Soviet Union in their fall and that of the USA (even more post 11 September 2001). Brugmann writes:

The final collapse of the world’s most authoritarian regimes was a logical consequence of their own centralized designs. Though state police tried to track every movement, open every letter, and record every conversation, the uncontrollable life of the city and its raw economics of association just unfolded around them. […] For the sake of official status within the system, most people played along, but their hearts were no longer in it. When they went home from the May Day parades they resumed the constant probing of the system’s limited control over their increasingly bolder forms of independent association, weaving myriad parallel webs of unofficial social life and political thought at the system’s margins. (Brugmann 2009:76)
Although Ramallites are, indeed, weaving parallel webs against those of the system, nonetheless, these remain highly determined by their preganbility and economic vulnerability. While the future is unpredictable, the contemporary translations of regional feudalism, nepotism, dependency and fear have revived the pre-OAs dynamic of fluid alliances, albeit, from an individual rather than collective perspective. The lack of even political accountability for involvement in partnerships of colonial profit under the post-trauma politico-social relationality freed and gave excuse to the (till then relatively) controlled commercial opportunism, as prophesied in classic scholarship over colonizer and subject binaries (Fanon 2004; Anderson 2006; Escobar 2012). While PA figures such as once Prime Minister Ahmad Qurei sold cement to Israeli developers of colonies through the company his family owned, Palestinian businessmen such as Bashar alMasri hired radical Zionists – e.g. Dov Weissglass – as legal advisors and middlemen. In this context, scholars, intellectuals and anti-PA politicians alike tend to focus on the destructive impacts of this conduct onto Palestinian politics, relate it to the demise of the Palestinian state-project, and point accusations of exclusive conspiracy rather than invoke the inclusive right to varied sensibilities. These intellectuals debate the shape of the weed, in place of tackling the root that is the absence of accountability. Therewith, exploration of post-national political paradigms remains anaemic and limited in scope, imagination and audience.

Definitive to the unfolding political, social, economic and spatial contestation in Ramallah has been its demographic reconfiguration. As elaborated in section 2.1, p. 47, Ramallites have been and continue to be a mixture of backgrounds: few original families from the time of its establishment, new comers in the early 1900s with the expansion of its Friends Schools, more new comers in the 1930s under increased British institutionalization, refugees escaping the terror of Jewish militias in 1948, educated professionals in the 1970s, and the returnee and diaspora families arriving in the 1990s. As Taraki notes in this context, ‘the intellectuals, professionals, business people, and others who have hitched their fortunes to Ramallah are in fact underlying its secularism’ (2008:14). The outbreak of the Second Intifada in 2000, akin former events, played out demographic – therefore social – transformations within the city.

The combination of Arafat’s confinement in Ramallah (as the IOF deployed at entrances and peripheries of Areas A and destroyed his helicopter) and his fixation on control rapidly lead to the centralization of PA ministries and departments in the city starting winter 2000. Employees initially attempted to commute, yet the high costs of privatized public transport systems and risks of the long waiting hours at checkpoints invited the relocation into the seat of government (Khoury 2010). The colonial strategies of territorial fragmentation, land alienation, militarization, political- and demographic control (Graham 2006a; Hamami and Tamari 2008; see section 2.2, p. 73) succeeded in convincing Palestinians into a self-censored confinement in the shrunken loci of their livelihoods. In this regard the various participants of FG 2011, no.6 confirmed their mentally exercised spatial dismemberement as transcribed in Box 3.1, p. 149. Control over the basic right of movement through an ethnocratic logic (Yiftachel 1999), complex systems of inclusion and exclusion (Ophir, Givoni and Hanafi 2009), and spatial valves of unpredictable nature (Weizman 2007) incubated ‘distorted basic conceptions of time and space’; where ‘even during curfews, when people are confined to their homes, uncertainty is not as potent as it is at the
checkpoint [...] one tends to lose one’s sense of control. It is as if one is left at the mercy of fate, charity, and faith’ (Gordon and Filc 2009:471).

The relocation of government necessitated that of its officials as well as clerks. Whereas for the former the process was catered for by their relatively high levels of income, for the arriving proletariat ‘fate’ is the hymn for the broken dignity under a hegemonic regime and another colonial one; ‘charity’ is what many have to accept in this city where living costs seem to double annually and concepts of social welfare are a distant memory; and ‘faith’ in the ability to change one’s future within these very same spaces is what keeps the internal emigration train running. Beyond the quotidian aspirations of the ‘new middle class’ transcribed by Taraki, ‘it was in the ambience of Ramallah that many youths from villages first

---

Box 3.1. Extract from conversation amongst participants of FG 2011, no.6

Question: what do you think about the territorialization of the WB?

- It is the case, we are now accustomed to limit our thinking, plans and actions within the cities. We do not think about leaving them because with that comes the question of how many checkpoints, the mood of the Israeli settlers, whether I will make it to my destination or not, etc.
- But this is indeed a factor of what I was referring to earlier, in the sense that because of this state of normalcy within the borders of the city, people do not leave it, and hence their expenditure remains within Ramallah, and this contributes to the circulation of capital within Ramallah causing it to grow at this rate.
- Indeed, people who do not have to leave Ramallah for some need, months could pass before they actually reach the checkpoints around it. I myself is the biggest example, I postpone leaving Ramallah as much as I can every time.
- Before the Intifada Nablus was very prosperous financially and lively, countless people went there for visiting, shopping or eating Knafeh regularly. But then with the checkpoints all those trends seized. Today with the checkpoints having become relatively easier some people resumed the practice of going to Nablus, but it is only those who have some work or commitment to carry out, at a time Nablus geographically is not that far, it is a mere half hour. My family is from Al-Thahrieh near Hebron. Before the outbreak of the Second Intifada I used to go back to visit twice and minimum once a week. In the first 5 years of the Intifada I did not go there once. Since a couple of years I have to force myself to think about visiting it every 3–4 months.
- We have a psychological change regarding travelling, you can even call it a phobia.
- I always have a question on my mind: I keep on saying that people lived between 1994 and 2000 as if they were in a dream. People were forthcoming towards life, the country open to one another and to the outside, investments, etc. Simply, people wanted to live and were open to whatever is coming their way. On a random morning on the 29th of September 2000 the Intifada breaks out, daily clashes, checkpoints start to pile up, and we start literally to get screwed. We have seen such misery in the 5 years up to 2005, that when later things came better we all started claiming we’re alright; at a time if we compare it to the early years post Oslo, we are now miserable. We were open and full of hope, where are we now from there? and why? why? why this 2000?
experienced the heady mix of politics, urban lifestyles, and different sensibilities’ (Taraki 2008:11).

Between 1997 and 2014 the population in the Ramallah agglomerate increased by 81%, while those of Bethlehem, Hebron and Nablus grew, respectively, by 46%, 77% and 46%; as demonstrated in Infographic 3.2, p. 177. The 2007 population census had established that internal migration rates remain rational when compared to regional ones. The same study revealed that whereas in Nablus and Hebron (the largest WB cities whose economy is highly production-based) the population living in the locality since birth stood at 74.6% and 87.5% respectively, in contrast, only 48% of Ramallah's population in 2007 was born in it. Following physiological logic in 2014 this number must have further decreased. Here Taraki also highlights that ‘for each ascending age group, the proportion of the population resident in the city since birth decreases, with the highest proportion (73 percent) in the zero-to-fourteen age group and the lowest (16 percent) in the population over fifty’ (2008a:67). A similar observation was produced by the participants of the eight focus groups conducted within the course of this work, and 60% of the interviewees stemmed from other areas. As in other cases of societal and demographic change the othering of new comers gained resonance with time, thereof shall be discussed in the coming section.

Before ending this section two auxiliary happenings during the ODS must be highlighted. First, for the first time operations of evacuation of ‘foreign nationals’ from the endangered zone were declared. Although negligible in size, nonetheless, these strongly echoed the salient new reality of individual differentiation under colonization. In the same sense, IOF administration and soldiers consciously invoked religious tension by occasionally allowing Palestinian Christians to pass at checkpoints while leaving Muslims to wait for hours, and granting the former extended permits to enter areas beyond the Green Line on their holidays while depriving the latter of a similar opportunity. Attacks by Zionist radicals on Christians on both sides of the Armistice Line reveals the synthetic favouritism. However due to: first, the absence of a conscious PA; second, the dominance of compromised perfunctory public education; third, false presentations of those as non-Arabs (despite the significant role of their intellectuals in the evolution of Pan-Arabism and historic lineage to the birthplace of their faith); and fourth, the emergence of traits of Talibanism encouraged by Hamas's lineage to the Muslim Brotherhood; combined, these are creating an imagined Palestinian Christian community whose projected ethos are presumably closer to western rather than regional ones. Preachers of such reductionist binaries downplay the role of class, gender, environment and education in the formation of behavioural patterns, hence intentionally or otherwise forging new solidarities amongst seculars of either religion and of any multiple possible spatial backgrounds. Such relational alliances dominate the sociospatial dynamic of Ramallah since and forth, manoeuvring the incalculable risks through rapidly changing politico-social sensibilities.

The second happening worthy of notice; during and after the ODS several NGOs were caught under accusations of partisan provision of emergency relief and / or exploitation of circumstances for accumulation of either gains or favours. Such incidents accelerated the stigmatisation of the wider NGO sector – the implicated and innocent – under an industry of opportunism, or Dakakeen as commonly referred to them. On the margins, there were groups of youths that mobilized themselves to voluntarily aid in tackling the physical and mental
damages bestowed by the IOF while borrowing frameworks metaphorical of civic engagement in the First Intifada. Expectedly, as the trauma moved from actuality to memory the romantic exercise followed course. However, these experiences gave birth to a new consciousness that grasped the politico-economic as well as sociospatial incompossibility of former civic engagement tools to contemporary ecologies. These understood the importance of positive morale for endurance under heightened uncertainty, and the need for avant-garde sensibilities for the creation of a new self-identity, where:

In reality, and despite its small size, Ramallah is acquiring most of the attributes of contemporary metropolises in the region, including a visible globalized lifestyle and new sensibilities whose most enthusiastic carrier is the aspiring new middle class. This is happening despite the fact that death and destruction are not far away; in some respects, the new urban ethos in Ramallah is reminiscent of the mythic resilience of Beirut, a war-ravaged city that nevertheless ‘knows how to live’. (Taraki 2008:11; emphasis in original)

3.2.3. 2006-2010: Otherness, new Solidarities, and the Culture engendered by the Anti-Politics Machine

The death of Yasser Arafat in November 2004 and the ousting of Ariel Sharon from office fourteen months later by the power of a hemorrhagic stroke brought into office politicians that enjoy less popular support amongst voters and political comrades and (hence?) higher belief that sustainment of their positions requires de-escalation, or to phrase it differently, better living conditions. The Israeli-Lebanon War in summer 2006 had left the Israeli economy and confidence in Ehud Olmert’s leadership shaken. Meanwhile and akin his counterpart Mahmoud Abbas, he recognized that the exhausted Palestinian economy loomed with vengeance for both, colonial and subsidiary.

The peril in effect materialized in the 2006 PLC elections which pitied the evermore diminishing Palestinian Leftist parties with 4.73% of the votes while granting independents 8.05%, Fatah 41.43%, and a crowning 44.45% of the votes to the presumed uncorrupted and resistance-embowing opposition party Hamas (CECP 2014). In an explicit demonstration of the fragmentation of the ruling party, its swollen numbers of regional candidates dissipated the ratios of direct votes, resulting in 34% of parliamentarian seats, while Hamas mistakenly thought it could enjoy the stable majority of 56% (ibid). Upon its continued cornering by Fatah cohorts, in 2007 Hamas lead a coup thence triggering the dichotomization of the PA between WB and GS, respectively. Gazan top-tier and some of the agents of Fatah were soon after relocated (expelled?) chiefly to the city of new comers, Ramallah.

As aforementioned, against this backdrop the PRDP was adopted by international donors, triggering the flow of unprecedented amounts of capital into the WB, and therewith the growth of services and real estate sectors. As all interviewees and FG 2011 no.2, no.3, no.6 and no.8 indicated, a coherent
official strategy by either central government or LGs cannot be identified, and municipalities suffered exasperated pressures that overburdened their limited capacities (Khoury 2010; Huleileh 2012). Anani described the municipal methodology as that of ‘patching’ where:

[…] we need to expand, ok let’s go in this direction, we need more commercial space, ok change the classification of this street, we need to expand more, then go in that direction, and so on. In terms of problem treatment I personally do not see attempts by the municipality to understand existing problems. E.g. people do not want to build in the city centre because land prices are sky high, so the municipality provided alternative territory instead of addressing the growing phenomenon of rocketing land prices. There should be attempts to understand the existing context and the complex, and then planning an appropriating for solving existing problems instead of ignoring them, and instead creating new problems elsewhere. (Anani 2010)

On the other side of the same discourse, Ramallah Municipality (RM) and in spite of statistically articulated growing numbers of its lower and middle class strata in correlation to expanding economic disparities; notwithstanding, in the revision of its Master Plan between 2005 and 2009 it requested preserving the ‘uniqueness’ of the city via allocating space for low density housing, and particularly ‘villas’, while not bearing mention of affordable housing areas (Khamaisi 2006; see section 4.3.1, p. 191). In other words, Ramallah Municipality unilaterally decided to export the affordable housing responsibility to its neighbouring municipalities of alBireh and Beitunya. While public policies and private undertakings are elaborated in the coming two chapters, here it should be noted that the marginalization of underprivileged strata is not limited to selective temper, rather, articulated by public figures. In an interview at the Policies Department of the MOLG its head described Ramallah’s problem as the lack of class-based spatial differentiation, where he said:

Ramallah is indeed expanding in the direction of a metropolitan region nonetheless it does not conform to standard patterns, making it impossible for municipalities to set criteria for the growth. Another result is the lack of geographic traits for social strata, for example in Amman the western part of the city is designated and regulated to suit the desires of the upper-middle and higher classes, where the neighbourhoods gradually rise in value until ultimately one reached Abdoun and DeirGhbar which are inhabited by rich families. Popular strata are oriented towards the east. Together, this assembles as a clear geographic distribution. In Ramallah we lack this. You can live in elTireh neighbourhood and build a high-class villa, yet if you stroll short down the street you will find popular neighbourhoods. The Masyoun neighbourhood has turned the same. So there is no room for us to make an urban or metropolitan plan that tackles this negative aspect which disrupts the socioeconomic consistency and harmony between residents of the same area. […] A method of limiting the differences lies in equal provision of services across the city. Yet again, members of the upper class have the right to live – and this is an international phenomena – in organized neighbourhoods that one finds in the countryside or suburbs. The city becomes the locus of work, but not living. (Barghouthi 2012)
This physiologically impaired hypothesis of separation creating harmony rather than the scholarly and empirically exhibited alienation, otherness and ultimately violence are commonplace amongst decision-makers and marketeers of investors, yet weakly shared by citizens and strongly opposed by researchers. Here it should be noted that such practitioners – in the largest part – received their education in past eras of suburbanization, master-planning, and today work in organizations (public and private alike) where R&D is an alien concept and practices such as ‘continued education’ are associated to interest and luxury rather than professional essentials; as equally demonstrated in the medical and education sectors. Fatalities due to newly-established incompatibility of prescribed medication is not an accident in Palestine. Preaching rather than exercising remains the main education tool as exampled through the fact that up to the date of this work the leading Palestinian university – Birzeit University – has not adapted its accreditation system to accept workshops and excursions as scholarly activities. Here it is important to recognize the responsibility of the system rather than the individual in breeding shortcomings and failure, and this is where Taraki’s focus on education choices of the nouveaux-Ramallites gains an additional dimension of importance.

In FG 2011; no.3 (25-30 years old) a participant said: ‘We as people are miles ahead of the planning processes, and as long as this pattern remains we will always end up with negative results’. When asked about their opinion regarding the rapidly emerging phenomenon of exclusive satellite neighbourhoods (e.g. Diplomatic Quarter, elReehan Neighbourhood, alGhadeer Neighbourhood; see chapter 5, pg. 243) the vast majority of interviewees and participants of focus groups described them as potential reducers of intra-city elevating densities, yet more intensely criticised them as financially, contextually and ecologically uncalculated, and constituting a reflection of the ‘ongoing processes of segregation within the community and the rise of individuality’ (FG 2011, no.3; 25-30 yrs). The architect Ali Ziadeh stated:

Given the price range they offer they attract certain social strata but repel others. An established person is able, but his son or daughter still can’t purchase in these neighbourhoods in spite of the prices being tangible lower than those in Ramallah. I don't think these neighbourhoods are a result of social change, rather, due to geopolitical conditions. If Ramallah had the potential to grow freely then the next expansion areas would have been Ramallah’s C-Areas and not these satellite neighbourhoods, and Ramallah’s prices would not have inflated this much. […] The location of alReehan is simply a result of financial calculations – a good deal that PIF stumbled on – and not some spatial plan that someone had in mind. (Ziadeh 2012)

Low (2000), Lefebvre (2009) and Gehl (2011) and others demonstrate that spatial boundaries are not necessarily physically articulated (e.g. masonry barriers); rather, could be ideological, financial, or judiciary. Abourahme adds that disparities between Palestinian official discourse and the quotidian space have laboured an ‘acute break in the representational landscape’ whereby ‘political culture itself can no longer produce spaces’ that are ‘capable of supporting mutuality, solidarity and productive intersubjectivity’ (2011:455). The direct impact is the alienation of social groups who are unable to entertain the lifestyle of the wealthy and powerful. The selective amnesia of Ramallites oft limits
victims of PA policy in their city to new comers, at a time several pre-Oslo neighbourhoods still stand witness to continued financial aridity in the various liminal valley-fringes of Ramallah-city; in Ein Misbah, elTireh, and Ein Minjed – not to mention the refugee camps. Inquiry over spaces of disenfranchisement yield naming of neighbourhoods chiefly in alBireh and Beitunya (Image 3.15, Image 3.16), and seldom in the direct space. Describing them as ‘scary shantytowns’ inhabited by ‘Ru’a’ (mobs), a participant in a focus group said:

In world-cities they call them shanty-towns, the Ru’a’ within a city space, like in Im elSharayet, Beitunya, and others. These are not exactly shanty towns with tin roofs, but the living environment reminds me of such, [...] where the worker cannot afford bringing his family with him, and hence we find entire streets where there are only males. (FG 2011, no.2; 35-45 yrs)

Confirming what Taraki refers to as ‘the salience of place-based class and status differentials’ (2008:15), another participant in the same activity added:

The Ramallites including those who came and have been living in the city since 20 years, are now subtly fighting against the intruders. It has become about maintaining a form of existence. Loci in which the so-called intruders inhabit, are deserted by those who consider themselves natives to the space. Some openly say that they do not want the culture of Jenin or Hebron or other moving to Ramallah. (FG 2011, no.2; 35-45 yrs)

The intensity of othering of post-2000 newcomers was inversely proportional to age in the conducted focus groups. Although these nouveaux-Ramallites include businessmen, professionals as well as proletariat, younger generations focused on a presumed inferiority as explicit in Box 3.2, p. 156. In contrast, older ones described the dynamic as idiosyncratic – e.g. ‘we are all refugees or emigrants or newcomers!’ (FG 2011, no.6) – and regarded the systematic disenfranchisement of disadvantaged ones as a collective shortcoming. The main concern for those was not the act of relocation, rather, the fear of a changed ethos and nostalgia to the intimacy and familiarity of the town, as expressed in Box 3.3, p. 157. In the same context the financier Samir Huleileh who moved to Ramallah in 1972 stated:

If I want to speak of most notable changes [...] I would also talk of the social freedoms that were present within its manifolds; all these delightful aspects have receded now. There are large numbers of strangers – allow me to use the term strangers, by which I mean non-locals; whether from villages or other regions. The former social harmony and consistency has seized to exist, rather, it has become more cosmopolitan composing of varying genres, classes, individuals and families that had no history in this region. Hence Ramallah has become a large mixed city, which comes at the price of losing what once-upon-a-time was its characteristic feature. [...] I don't feel estranged, but I do feel to an extent lost in its missing harmony. It is neither as small as it was, nor as consistent as it was, and that's it, now why does one romanticize about what once was, the answer is simple: it was easier, more comfortable, more secure, safer for the children and family. But now it is over, it is becoming a big city now, and that means grandeur and extravagance on one side, and on the other corruption and diminishing morality. It is quiet a divergence from the past. (Huleileh 2012)
Such testimonies of othering and societal evolution are classical for human scientists whom also stress that ‘for ‘the stranger’ all the locals are strangers as well’ (Yuval-Davis 2003:316). Ramallah’s dilemma with its newly crystallizing modernity lies in two: the relationality between social-identity and sacrifice on one hand, and on the other the persistence of the town-mentality of consistency as the utopian. Regarding the first, aspirations to as well as systems of normalcy – vis-à-vis the pre-Oslo austerity – are required to intelligibly demonstrate an anti-colonial relevance, or are otherwise – too often – framed as delinquency; as idealized in focus groups no.2 and no.6. The chiefly urban-based (post-) colonial hegemonic regimes – which boast the mantra of sui generis nationalism imagined through narrow selections from cultural and / or religious symbols (ibid) – continue to employ concepts of what Anderson cynically refers to as ‘the beauty of gemeinschaft’; wherein through language the ‘nation’ is invoked as ‘interestless’ and thereof drawing grandeur and purity to ‘self-sacrificing love’ and ‘dying for the revolution’ (2009:141-4). Thereof, it indirectly criminalizes the – in parallel praised – freedoms and alteration. In other words, while decolonization necessitates imagination beyond the constraints of the colonial, dominant discourses demand conformity to compromised game-rules. AlKhalili captures the ongoing casting of the ‘national concern’ by stating:

For a long period of my life I got an edge of identifying myself as a Palestinian, an additional dimension that is different from being – for example – a Jordanian. It stemmed from the conviction that the individual carried a concern larger than the self, by which any step was weighted against its political interpretations and its relevance to the cause, etc. This feeling doesn’t exist today, or if it does, then it is paralyzed while undergoing a slow death process. One wants to live as the person, the individual, as Yazan, as Natasha as anyone.
else. This is concomitant with the estrangement from the Palestinian cause on which we throw glances from afar; we speak about it, we produce art about it, we conduct research about it, but the direct political relationship with it is diminishing. (alKhalili 2012)

In regards to the second fold of the dilemma, the nation is neither homogeneous nor consistent. The Cold War has laboured – and the succeeding intensification of globalization of econo-politics has given rise to – new generations of political leaders; whom re-employed the same limited ‘national’ features to argue and encourage the imposition of alternative radical constructions, which reject symbols of cosmopolitan modernity as western imperialism; e.g. Hamas. These, akin their preceding ‘national liberation’ constructs do not relate to the ways people used to live historically in these societies’ nor have as political projects ‘abandoned modernity and its tools, whether they be modern media or high-tech weaponry’ (Yuval-Davis 2003:315).

Through the dialectic mapped in this work hitherto, it is legitimate to conclude that the partial cover of anonymity in the big city-space has in effect

Box 3.2. Extract from conversations amongst participants of focus groups who are 17-18 years old, regarding Ramallah’s new-comers.

PS: These were born around the same time the OAs were signed, thence gaining consciousness in the period post the entrenchment of its systems and ethos.

FG 2011, no.2:
- Yes, when the people of Jenin all end up here then it will be over.
- Instead of making the State larger we make it smaller: Ramallah becomes the whole thing - the State of Ramallah.

FG 2011, no.4:
- Life is differing. Before we used to do almost whatever we want. Now family says ‘don’t dress that short, because there are people in the streets that are ‘mish hal ‘ad’ (Arabic for: not as worthy) that will start looking at you and harassing you, and this could lead to bad things.
- The main reason is not that we cannot dress short. When they come from Nablus and other areas it is because they are being suppressed by the Israelis. So we host them to help them make their lives easier... but dressing shorter or not is not what disturbs me (emphasis added).
- Here is a set of traditions and habits that the original families of Ramallah have abandoned. But then there are those who come from villages or other places more conservative, and then they start imposing on us some of their traditions. Both of us should adapt to one another, to be able to live together.

FG 2011, no.5:
- In Ramallah our intellectual abilities grow faster than in villages for example.
- In other cities like Hebron the majority of the girls are veiled and the families are generally more ‘committed’ or ‘conservative’, while here in Ramallah, it is the opposite.
and in contrast to the majority of interviewed opinions – given rise to new ‘freedoms’ and sensibilities in Ramallah in both antagonistic directions, liberal and conservative. For example, on one side ideologies entertaining long-term dating, or pre-marital sex, or accepting homosexuality are planting their pioneer seeds in selected micro-ecologies, and on the other side a tangible increase in rates of registered incidents of forced veiling of women, ‘honour-killing’ and group verbal- and physical-confrontations due to a casual expression of differentiated opinions on religious and political figures. Traditionalists on both sides of the spectrum view their chosen social ethos as threatened by the ‘new other’. This is paralleled on the political dimension with pro- and an-agonists of the nation-state project and militarization of government.

Exemplifying the problematic of the ‘system’ yet again, seculars flash historic accounts of Ramallah’s liberal provincial mien often as justification for the lived contemporary translations, in place of emphasising the timely constitutionally-protected right of choice and differentiation. This conduct appeases social and ideological nepotisms and furthers dependence rather than invoking an individual culture of freedom and accountability; thereof forging a mutated ‘normalcy’.

Box 3.3. Extract from conversations amongst participants of focus groups who are +50 years old (FG 2011, no.6), regarding Ramallah’s new-comers.

- I am the daughter of Ramallah, I like walking in it, I have my memories here. The streets of Ramallah are where I walked as little scouts-group girl, walked in funerals and attended weddings and lovely occasions. But today, it is impossible to walk in these streets, we became strangers in our own city. Even the names of the streets are changing. I live in this paradox, in this conflict with myself. On one side this is my city, on the other I do not relate to the people walking in its streets. Even though the city has grown a lot and now there are many more options whether for shopping or leisure, I find myself visiting only those places and shops which have always been there, the old ones with the memories. In former times when one bought a commodity but realized s/he is short on cash, the seller used to say ‘it is okay, no trouble, we’ll deal with the money later!’, there was trust amongst the people, but that is almost in-existent today.... Lovers used to have the Library Street as their promenade. Today with the cars parked on both sides, a Ministry here and a multi-story building there, taking a stroll there has lost its joy... And this is what on the other side of the coin makes this residential complex special. The streets are not crowded, they are wide and clean. One can walk at ease and enjoy the nature and trees, also feel assured about the kids on the streets, and that the girls will not be harassed... I think I can summarize my point with ’the opportunity to exercise some normalcy of life’. Our friend here described pre-Oslo Ramallah as ‘romantic nostalgia’, but nonetheless, the relationships between the people were real, based on pure emotions not profit. We might be romanticizing about it now but it was real.

- At some point it was a struggle to get my children to escort me when I needed to run some errands in the centre. I would repeatedly voice their annoyance that every couple of meters I stop to great someone, or enter a shop just to say ‘hello’. Is familiarity within the space, recognizing people and getting recognized, this does not exist anymore.
classical reaction, conservatives use those as evidence as well, albeit, of endemic moral corruption thus propagating the ‘Change and Reform’ – electoral-list name used by Hamas in the 2006 legislative elections.

One’s fear of the other and being othered and the shrinking of familiar mental and lived space within the city-scape (due to public space erasure, militarization and privatization) has lead the varying ideological camps to circulate symbols praising the one and denying the lineage of the imagined other’s ideology; a terrifying city-dynamic that demonstrates the depth of infiltration of the Zionist colonial thought into the everyday perception, terminology and logic of argumentation of Palestinians. Today Palestinian popular politics, too, takes selective leaps into the mythical past to justify mutated politics as representations of aspirations of an imagined population, and thereof distancing itself from the complex realities and sensibilities most exhibited in Ramallah.

Although roots of the alarming rise in Ramallah’s sociospatial contestation have been repeatedly diagnosed and traced back to the ‘development industry’, up to date participatory non-eurocentric spatial treatments to civic marginalization aspects described by this work remain absent (Rayyan 2010; Anani 2010). LGs are still holding the course outlined by the central government, with which their work is presumed technical, suspended from ‘interim’ timely geopolitics and constraints, and focused on ‘fostering’ the prosperous post-colonial state. Their discourse is based on the economic prescriptions of the World Bank in continued disregard to intensifying politico-social opposition to the nation-state model. This foreign-aid financed system is in effect producing what Ferguson (2009) calls the ‘anti-politics machine’. Through his examination of the impact of the intervention of the international community in the conceptually comparable case of state-making and development practices in Lesotho, he concludes that poverty was merely a ‘point of entry’ to an operation of ‘reinforcing and expanding the exercise of bureaucratic state power’ (2009:255). Here he argues that by, first, ‘uncompromisingly reducing poverty to a technical problem’ through de-politicizing it; second, ‘by promising technical solutions to the sufferings of powerless and oppressed people’, and; third, through ‘making the intentional blue-prints for ‘development’ so highly visible; therewith, ‘development’ projects had in effect performed ‘extremely sensitive political operations involving the entrenchment and expansion of institutional state power almost invisibly, under cover of a neutral, technical mission to which no one can object’, at least not officially (ibid:256).

Expectedly, similar ‘development’ operations in Palestine have mobilized excluded social groups in Ramallah into elaborate or casual ‘rallies against the hypocrisies’ of presumed horizontal national-citizenship, therewith making new claims to the ‘ideology of universal equality and respect’ (Holston and Appadurai 2003:296). Herein Holston and Appadurai describe the role and impact of these groups on the urban by arguing that:

[T]hey generate new kinds of citizens, new sources of law, and new participation in the decisions that bind. As much as anything else, these conflicting and disjunctive processes of change constitute the core meaning of modern citizenship, constantly unsettling its assumptions. […] Herein] concentrations of the nonlocal, the strange, the mixed, and the public, cities engage most palpably the tumult of citizenship. Their crowds catalyse processes which decisively expand and erode the rules, meanings, and practices of citizenship. Their streets
conflate identities of territory and contract with those of race, religion, class, culture, and gender to produce the reactive ingredients of both progressive and reactionary political movements. Like nothing else, the modern urban public signifies both the defamiliarizing enormity of national citizenship and the exhilaration of its liberties. (Holston and Appadurai 2003:296)

In agreement with Holston and Appadurai’s claim that twentieth-century concepts of national societies have been discredited by cosmopolitan forms of urbanity, Ferguson states that in the particular case of post-colonial state-making projects: ‘if the ‘instrument-effect’ of a ‘development’ project end up forming any kind of strategically coherent or intelligible whole, this is it: the anti-politics machine’ (2009:256). Further, the inflated size the PA encouraged it to retained monopoly on territorial decision-making minimalizing role of independent parties; as elaborated in the coming chapter. Besides the voiceless researchers and practitioners; the CEO of Palestine Development and Investment Ltd. and Vice-Chairman of the BOD of Palestine Real Estate Investment Company (PADICO, PRICO respectively; chapter 5, pg. 243); Mr. Samir Huleileh stated in this regard:

In our market the municipalities and relevant ministries have a monopoly on the provision of urban infrastructures, thence PRICO does not provide infrastructure services. In some cases, they approach us for partnership, but only after the bold lines have been predefined. [...] Legally, the laws are neither coherent nor regular regarding public-private partnerships in the provision of public services. Hence in my personal opinion, joint undertakings with local authorities, particularly municipalities, is a very risky business. In the same line of the aforementioned, we as PRICO have never been approached by any municipality to provide a neutral or independent professional consultancy on any of the projects they decide to undertake. We are approached if they are looking for implementers, but not in the conceptualization phase. (Huleileh 2012)

On the other hand, this approach of the PA to managing the city-space does not factor the new risk-strategy – hence spacio-economic behavioural logic – of Ramallites. These re-employ re-configured fluid alliances in socially kosher and non-kosher forms under arguments that are economically calculable. Beyond aforementioned examples here are a few more; while association with Israelis is frowned upon as an act of normalization of colonization, nonetheless, the weekly demonstration against the Separation Wall in Bil’in prides itself with Israeli ‘peace activists’ who engage in co-resistance; while a significant number of the PFLP members and leaders are Christians, nonetheless, they signed an alliance with Islamic Shari’a propagating Hamas in the 2006 LG elections; while NGOs and neoliberal corporates are customarily cursed as organisms of entrenching economic exclusion yet these remain the favoured job-providers; while the Boycott Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) campaign is gaining footing and generating pro-Palestinian empathy globally indirectly serving the declared agendas of the PLO, the PA arrests and trials its members on refutable charges of ‘disturbing public peace’, and not last; while suffering from othering is a copious common, nonetheless many nouveaux-Ramallites have a particular attachment to this city as expressed by a participant in FG 2011, no.2; 35-35 yrs: ‘I only like the atmosphere of Ramallah!.. Even when I am in Jenin with my family, I constantly have the feeling that I need to get back to Ramallah. I have been in Ramallah for 12 years now’.
This participant belongs to a pre-Oslo established group that has been gradually growing over a century of time. She explained those sentiments with the classical arguments of social dynamics, openness and concentration of opportunity in contrast to other WB localities. What is significant here is that those same genomic traits started – in this phase of 2006-2010 – engendering similar sensibilities with yet another newly nascent Ramallah-minority: Palestinian-Israelis. The unintelligently invited and hitherto officially unaddressed (by neither the PLO nor Israel) political impact of increased presence of 1948-er voices (as commonly referred to them) in the lived spaces of Ramallites is that of reactivation of solidarities with the larger geography of Palestine. Today the mental spaces of some Ramallah sub-groups spacio-economically overlap with those of the unappointed ambassadors; cross-border, against hierarchies and physically materializing (Image 3.19, p. 163).

Beyond re-familiarizing the sequestered landscape, this synthesis is down-scaling and neutralizing archetypal associations to ‘self-sacrificing heimat love’ as Anderson (2006:141) depicts it. Their mundane narratives of search for spaces of individuality and expression against the limiting social-familial (Holston and Appadurai 2003) and the exclusive colonial-state (Anderson 2006) are bridging the categorical differences that the Israeli administration logic of imaginary ethno-fragmentation induces; through what Chardin calls ‘reflexive invention’ as elaborated earlier in this section (Harvey 2009:235). The names of 1948-er performers whose ‘gigs’ are frequent in Ramallah (e.g. Toot-Ard reggae band from Golan; Walla’at popular music band from Acre; DJ Bruno from Haifa; Dam HipHop band from Jaffa, a.o.) have indeed become a cognizant association whose presence embolders works of Ramallite counterparts (e.g. Asifeh-Stormrap; DJ Marwan As’ad; Y alalan Choire; a.o). Relevant to this process is the tedious work of a handful of artists, scholars and intellectuals who are mobilizing opinions of micro-freedoms through critical exhibitions, biennales, and street-art installations (The Cities Series by Vera Tamari and Yazid Anani; Civic Encounter Symposium by Shurouq Harb; Qalandia International by seven leading foundations and centres a.o).

The articulated coalesces of some Ramallites niches with their 1948-er parallels is highly factored by shared socioeconomic needs; first, the need for spaces of empathy that enable both survival and evolution under the restrictions of resonant accusations of ‘alien ethos’ and ‘corruption of traditions’, and; second, the need to access larger crowds that cater for financial feasibility for both, performer and incubating spaces. Herein it should be noted that the othering of emerging groups of alternative sensibilities is not unique to Ramallah, as evident in volumes of scholarship, e.g. in his work on Berlin’s turn into metropolitanism in the late nineteenth century Kaschuba notes on political mechanisms of administering the city stating that ‘work on the city therefore also frequently became ‘social work, Work on an urban ‘people’ who had apparently lost their ethics and morals in a big city environment allegedly bereft of traditions and taboos’ (2012:241; emphasis added). In the same context and describing following decades:

This omnipresence of ‘strangers’ and ‘otherness’ became a sort of Berlin trademark, albeit one apparently taken quite lightly, because in Berlin, this constant coming and becoming now seemed almost normal. [...] [C]hange had come to define the rhythm of the city, and it could be felt in the streets, squares, railway stations, and newsstands; in the department stores and
pubs; everywhere people, groups, and languages gathered and attempted to communicate. In many cases, the milieus and differences mixed in such a way that in some districts, it was precisely this social blend that became the new common ground: a demonstrative unity of difference. (Kaschuba 2012:240)

Agreeing with Kaschuba in his analysis of Ramallah’s evolution patterns alKhalili adds:

The new Palestinian is a breed of his/her city and not his/her Palestinian-ship. Ironically, for the longest time I’ve had this imagination: the very next moment after Israel withdraws from the WB, Ramallah draw the Separation Wall to wrap itself tight, and will appropriate – yet reverse – the checkpoint structure making the exit from Ramallah uncontrolled but the entry scrutinized. In my mental trip Ramallah will find itself one day in need of protecting its political, economic and cultural receptiveness from the new comers who desire to benefit from the opportunities it offers, and this is particularly the catch point: Ramallah’s continued economic susceptibility relies on its political castration. The Palestinian economy is relatively a rich one; whether due to in-house capitalists, expatriates that regularly make transfers, or the international donor that has been pumping considerable amounts of cash. Ramallah’s economic prominence originates from all three, and their continued flow is factored by the ongoing political castration. Ramallah cannot end the latter without reinventing itself economically, and in turn, this requires a political decision. (alKhalili 2012)

Sharing the conviction that decolonization requires the questioning of entrenched systems, The Decolonizing Architecture programme (stationed in Beit Sahour, Bethlehem Governorate) was launched by three architects: the Palestinian Sandy Hilal, the Italian Alessandro Petti, and the Israeli Eyal Weizman. Empowered by a network of colleagues and intellectuals they have been re-addressing and re-engaging with concepts of territory and borders through a discourse that combines ‘spatial intervention, education, collective learning, public meetings and legal challenges’ (DAAR 2014). In Ramallah, the ‘Ramallah Syndrome’ forum commenced holding unorchestrated meetings between scholars, intellectuals and artist many of which interviewed in this work. They produced discussions over their lived spaces, opinions and aspirations which they later transcribed and published online. In this phase Palestinians did not just survive, rather, they actively appropriated a new perspective on their subsistence.

Today, liberals and Talibanists, globalists and conservatives, original families and new comers, refugees, returnees, expates, 1948-ers, internationals, profiteering businessmen, anti-colonial intellectuals, anti-nation-state politicians and many others are all minorities of varying scales, perceptions and operations in Ramallah. Whereas the PLO is typically exasperating its hegemony through unlawful oppression of expression, prosecution of activists, and red-tapping of their potential representation spaces through centralist policies of imagined homogeneity; meanwhile, these minorities are forging highly unpredictable, rapidly shifting alliances (and spaces) that are quintessentially based on fundamental – and to an extent predictable – socioeconomic needs. Hence and in effect they are driving ‘a deeper wedge between national space and its urban
Image 3.17. A graffiti in Ramallah reading ‘queers passed from here’ (Hilal 2013). This image is taken from an article titled ‘Eight questions Palestinian queers are tired of hearing’ by the activist Gaith Hilal.

Image 3.18. Part of the poster of the exhibition ‘Ramallah – the fairest of them all?’ which was curated by Vera Tamari and Yazid Anani over five months in 2010.
Image 3.19. A banner prepared by Association for Arab Youth – Baladna which was established by Palestinian Israelis and with its headquarters in Haifa. The text reads: ‘No borders for our identity, mobilized for Palestine’. The signs carried by those in the image read their first name and locality of origin; Palestinian cities on both sides of the armistice line (Baladna 2014).

Image 3.20. A digital advertisement for a literary evening by Shurouq Harb, that chose to place itself beyond organized space, in the relevant, residual and liminal urban space of a neighbourhood staircase.
centres’ (Holston and Appadurai 2003:297) where cities like Ramallah which conform to what Appadurai (2003) calls translocalities; these demonstrate:

a growing number of societies in which cities have a different relationship to global processes than the visions and policies of their nation-states may admit or endorse. [...] Cities have always been stages for politics of a different sort than their hinterlands. But in the era of mass migration, globalization of the economy, and rapid circulation of rights discourse, cities present the localization of global forces as such as they do the dense articulation of national resources, persons, and projects. (Holston and Appadurai 2003:297)

This calls back the hypothesis of this work which stipulates that Ramallah's urbanism is a product of its colonial genealogy and existence, and thereof its spatial decolonization requires socio-political intoxication from the limiting colonial imaginations, paradigms and tools. The afore described de novo interpretations of sumud have the potential of growing into dynamic engines of decolonized (non-hegemonic, -militarized, -exclusive, -centralized) production of lived, mental, and representational space, in face of what alKhalili (2012) coins fremd politics. However, what are their characteristic sociospatial dynamics, approach, and weaknesses?

3.2.4. 2011-today: ‘Moments’ of Human Labour and the Creative Class

As Abourahme (2011) elaborates Ramallah's unfolding ambivalence is unorthodox – hence uncalculable – given the ecology of complex filters, valves, and stratified systems of colonial administration. Thereupon, what is needed in place of the rigid spatial and master-planning is a ‘cybernetics-based’ systems of decision-making on case-specific issues. These operate through continuously growing sets of flexible parameters and conditionality (Hall and Jones 2011) which in turn gain their orientation from socio-ecological transformations (Harvey 2009). In this regard Harvey argues that Karl Marx suggested ‘six distinctive and identifiable ‘moments’ revolving around the organization’, i.e. planning, ‘of the human labour process’ (ibid:237). He lists these as:

- **Technology**: encompassing both hard- and soft-ware, equipment and intelligence which are constantly re-defining challenges, limits of human knowledge and innovation;
- **Nature**: wherein urbanism and its sociospatial manifestations are seen not as synthetic rather as integral process of natural history in which intended and unintended consequences and risks of human undertakings are examined as byproducts and retrospectively traceable practices;
- **The activity of production**: as processes that labour utility and market-value; from raw or pre-processed material to tools whether mechanic (e.g. hardware), administrative (e.g. programming), symbolic (e.g. art objects), infrastructures (e.g. connecting urban resources), etc;
The sustenance of daily life; quotidian processes ‘both social and ecological, through which individuals and social groups reproduce themselves and their social relations, […]’ what Gramsci refers to as the ‘practical activity’ of ‘the man in the mass’, Lefebvre refers to as ‘everyday life’, Braudel calls ‘material life’, and Hebermas depicts as ‘the lifeworld’ (ibid);

Social relations; the mediums and doctrines channelling behavioural patterns whether hierarchies; gender and racialized distinctions; place-, family-, and political-loyalties; religious and linguistic affiliations, a.o.; and,

Mental conceptions of the world; which ‘refers not only to how individuals think on a day-to-day basis but to the whole inherited arsenal of language, concepts, and stored symbolic, cultural, religious, ethical, scientific and ideological meanings and aesthetic and moral judgements’ which ‘guarantee not only a remarkable amount of conflictual intellectual activity, but also a capacity for thought experimentation that has powerful reverberations across all the other moments’ (ibid).

In regards to establishing comprehension of process whether in terms of ingredients, scale, timing, length and intensity of impact among other constituents of a happening; Harvey argues the quintessence of a logic of causality that observes and maintains the listed six ‘moments’ in ‘dialectical tension’ with each other while factoring their asymmetries. To demonstrate this logic the problematic of narrowness of the cultural sector is examined. Herein, all opinions collected through this work whether scholarly or empirical indicate that although foreign aid for cultural foundations, centres and activities is relatively high, nonetheless their outreach is limited in range, wherein the larger sum of events is geographically limited to Ramallah, and significant segments of the crowd are ‘frequent visitors’. Interviewees described the cultural scene as an unsustainable bubble, a crowd of an elite minority, composed predominantly of non-endemic forms that appeasing and conform to donor’s sensibilities, and are conducted in exclusive spaces. Through the coming paragraphs and following the Marxist dialectic of ‘moments’ it is argued that Ramallah’s cultural scene is; first, not a bubble rather a scene of nascent seeds that are both pregnant and highly pregnable; second, not an elite crowd rather assemblages of solidarities; third, that the initial exclusivity of spaces is an essential condition of ecology, and; fourth, that indeed the donor-culture has mutated the process and impeded the organic growth of this sector, nonetheless, rooted and innovative concepts have been evolving and increasingly taking shape.

Taking Marx’s ‘technology’, a necessity for the advancement of the majority of arts genres is the availability of infrastructures whose provision, maintenance and growth is costly. The decision on whether to assume financial risk is based on a calculation of the projected return in investment, which in turn is factored by the five other domains of analysis. First and starting with the element of ‘nature’; the plethora of archaeological and architectural evidence supporting the argument that Palestinian cities had a form of cultural scene before the Nakba (many of which are abandoned structures) falsifies the argument of lack of fertile grounds, more so as statistically speaking, Ramallah has lower numbers of both events and registered cultural spaces when compared to Nablus, Hebron and Bethlehem. In order to scale the setting, Tulkarem will be borrowed as a socio-demographically comparable case. The 1931 British Mandate Census indicates that it was a typical pre-Nakba Palestinian city with a majority and minorities, where it counted 4,540
Muslims, 255 Christians, 18 Jews, 12 Samaritans and 2 Druze (Mills 1932:58). At the time Ramallah had 519 Muslims and 3,766 Christians (ibid:50). Tulkarem has an iconic theatre with elaborate and rare woodwork on its facade eyeing the city’s main street. Attracting funds for its renovation and reactivation – as was the case with the majority of cultural spaces in Ramallah – is theoretically strongly justifiable by its heritage and socio-economic components. Nonetheless it has not, yet. The causes of this disparity can be traced to the varying topographies of the Zionist colonial geo-economy – as explained in section 2.3, p. 91 – which incubated disparate and sometimes antithetic ecologies.

The logic of causality points towards the second line of ‘tension’ – the ‘sustenance of daily life’, wherein Tulkarem’s economy was and remains based on blue-collar labour. Agriculture, its largest home-sector, has not stopped shrinking since the 1967 Six-Day War, and the signature of the OAs triggered the same effect into its functioning as cheap-labour reservoir for Israel as the latter intensified its closure policy and revoking of working permits (here it should be noted that Tulkarem lies at 15 kilometers from the Mediterranean coastline, spearing deep into Israeli concepts of geographical buffering). In contrast, Ramallah’s white-collar economy was growing as explained in section 3.2.1, p. 135. Hence while there was and remains a wide segment of Ramallites who can afford NIS 10 (€2) for the public transportation to attend a donor-sponsored free-entry cultural event, the same did not and does not apply to Tulkarem whose average daily wage in 2011 was 42% less, and whose unemployment rate was 35% more than Ramallah’s respectively (PCBS 2011b, 2011). Further, the response of local decision-makers to the closing of markets of ‘blue-collar’ jobs was the switching to exportation of ‘white-collar’ labour. Tulkarem has four universities within its agglomerate, Ramallah has only one. Ontologically, large segments of the youth of the former has migrated to the latter, amongst which those aspiring for engagement in cultural production and consumption. Formations of ‘places-of-origin’ of members of Ramallite performing arts groups is an omnipresent testimony of the mixture of the city, and an indicator of the growing number of Ramallah’s ‘yuppies’, young urban (upwardly mobile) professionals.

This brings us to the third element of ‘social relations’. Tulkarem’s tight family structures are sustaining vertical social hierarchies, which when combined with its contemporary conservative nature yields the framing of cultural events as ‘luxury’ rather than ‘need’. This creates an order by which – the indeed possible – self-financing of a personal ‘hobby’ is socially judged as ‘Aib’, a shame, given the shadow of an unemployed cousin, a neighbour, a friend, or the needy family of a ‘martyr’ from the city. Palestine is a ‘aib’-culture, one word serving as universal answer: it is aib for men to cry, it is aib to disobey wishes of elderly, it is aib not to help a person in need, it is aib for a girl to walk alone after dark, and it is aib to engage with cultural forms that are not approved by the tribesmen. In contrast, Ramallah’s horizontal social hierarchies and absence of regencies of extended families is enabling the continued challenging of austerity and self-sacrificing discourses. In the same line, while politicians – whether of the central government or LGs – are often seen enjoying the front-rows of Ramallah’s events, however, they are reluctant in assuming similar stances of public demonstration of support of cultural production in other regions, hence enabling the persistence of a conservative grip on forms of societal interaction and production.

Feeding into this dynamic is the fourth point of ‘mental conceptions’. Performing arts are a central object in depictions of Ramallah as a morally
corrupt habitat, given the close and sometimes physical interaction of both sexes. Unlike Tulkarem, in Jenin considerable financial as well as human investments by local artists and enthusiasts were made in its cultural infrastructure. In 2006 the Freedom Theatre was established and Jenin’s old cinema was restored with a budget exceeding €400,000 between 2009 and 2010. However, incitement against these institutions culminated with the assassination of the Palestinian-Israeli director and activist Juliano Mer-Khamis on 4 April 2011, and a line of accusations of mischievous conduct against the cinema which has had to shrink the scope of its activities since. Moreover, arts and culture are not perceived as a life-sustaining, ‘real’ profession. One of Ramallah’s leading pianists today is a son of an elite Jerusalem family that refused to allow him to accept scholarships for further mentoring, insisting that he acquires a ‘profession’ first. After serving the sentence of five years of Architectural Engineering studies he was able to gain the confidence necessary to pursue his passion. Being an artist, including in Ramallah, is not an easy choice regardless of financial status, however, the essential difference between it and other WB localities is the presence of micro-solidarities that challenge societal norms; as Rayyan (2010) stated, the growth of the cultural sector in Ramallah was fuelled by foreign aid, yet was enabled due to ‘the presence of people with such tendencies, who wanted to pursue such an agenda.’

Arriving at the fifth element of ‘activity of production’ and in line with Gehl’s postulate on the self-reinforcing character of urban happenings; the compatibility of nature, availability of engaged persons, higher individuality and lower hierarchy, and the ability to challenge common paradigms; together these have created a system where enacting solidarities is considered the motor for their sustenance first, and second, the hope of their expansion. While various WB cities periodically organize events that include cultural paragraphs e.g. the omnipresent Dabke (Palestinian folklore dance) performance by a school’s group in the event of a graduation ceremony; nonetheless, classical arts such as orchestra or jazz concerts remain almost entirely limited to the geography between Ramallah and Bethlehem, with an outward reducing intensity. Ramallah’s domination on this form of expression is a product of the ‘labour processes’ of its minorities. Examining such an event in Ramallah one notices that the demand for afore-stage prosecco has not accumulated sufficient momentum yet. The result is that during the thirty minutes preceding the commencement of the performance the space – whether auditorium, hall or garden – radiate the impression of a university reunion; people constantly squeezing between shoulders and chairs, shaking hands, smiling, kissing, laughing, and occasionally hugging. In the one space gradually highly differentiating relationalities emerge. Whereas the summoning occasion remains fondness of the advertised product; for a nouveaux-Ramallite or a tourist, at most, the contours of an indistinct relationship are detected through the salutations. For romantics, these resemble a flashback down the memory-lane of social intimacy. For cultural practitioners, this is an assembly, a proof of presence by the few hundreds of dedicated comrades. For those involved at higher tiers of the PA this is an uncommon setting of intense concentration of opposition intellectuals. For former leftist who are predominantly graduates of European universities and the generation of commonly accessible classical arts – whether western or oriental – this is the unintelligent contemporary replacement of collective and political-party activities and meetings, along with now-adult offspring, and with calculated exchanges about the political. For a couple of hours these sub-groups enact and
actively reproduce a shared ethos publicly. It is effortless to limit the justification of the frequent visitation of this particular (non-homogenous) audience to this expression of arts to taste. However, the additional perspective is the Marxist determinate, which argues that ‘labour processes’ are ‘required to produce and maintain spaces, places and built environments’ (Harvey 2009:238), here active labour rather than taste is the central concept. Other constellations of varying relationalities and enactment of social ethos surfaces in hiphop events, theatre pieces, modern-dance shows, and sports events. The prominence of activities in Ramallah was triggered by the ‘chance’ of availability of donor money as Rayyan (2010) describes it, however, its continuation and growth over the past decade is a direct product of the ability of different minorities to interact and reproduce their interests at overlapping spatial points.

Calculating these five ‘moments’, the forces sustaining the concentration and higher growth rates of cultural infrastructures in Ramallah become lucid, and beyond being reduced to the donor-effect, as Bethlehem and Jenin demonstrate. For provision of costly ‘technology (the sixth moment), indicators of risks and return on investment are not only most comforting in Ramallah, but also fall deep into the minus in few other localities thence feeding into the vicious cycle.

As noted, the primitive spaces of organized cultural activities which were established in the first three phases of the OAs in Ramallah are indeed exclusive as described by some interviewees. Their advertisement circulates in certain networks but fails to reach others, they appease selective tastes rather than popular ones, and participation entails a particular cost beyond the capacity of many of the agglomerate’s inhabitants. Notwithstanding, following ecological patterns which advocate careful and protected nurture of nascent living systems, cultural practices in Ramallah needed some years to grow a base sufficient for adventurous discovery of new territories. Over the past few years and beyond the countless micro to small scale cultural undertakings by private parties throughout the city-space; the Municipality of Ramallah has been organizing increasing numbers of street festivals for children, trade and celebration of religious occasions which extend over several days and whose accessibility is equal for all social strata. A new street-culture is starting to emerge in the city, whereby pedestrians and informal economies reclaim the streets from vehicles on periodic bases e.g. in the final nights before alAdha or alFiter celebrations.

Abourahme notes that ‘the most fetishized of contexts, the art scene, a bit deradicalized but diverse and markedly contemporary, buzzes and shoots above its weight, and the parameters of a kind of subculture, even a counter-culture can be traced’ (2009:502). Predictably, the spatial articulation of the ethos of a minority draws a reaction from its opposition. On 21 April 2014 and following the termination of the traditional Easter scouts groups parade, about two-dozen females and male dancers from the First Ramallah Group surprised the compact masses at alManara Square with a flash-mob performance that employed folklore moves on the tunes of the scouts-band which played the tunes of ‘Wain A Ramallah’ (popular song ‘Where? to Ramallah’). Flash-mobs are hardly known to Palestinians, and the (naturally) unannounced introduction of this form of expression yielded two main reactions; from one side a hail of praise of Ramallah’s openness, innovation and joie de vivre, and from the other an avalanche of accusations of further breaching of ‘traditional norms’, of bringing ‘disgrace’ to the ‘sacrifices’ made for the ‘homeland’ by these girls dancing on open streets and under the eyes of hundreds of stranger males. This episode of contestation
was not the first and along with the preceding dozens provides promises of many to follow. Ironically, the colonial geo-fragmentation and the ODS in 2002 have unintelligently created a protective ‘dome’ (to invoke the Israeli Iron Dome anti-missile system) around the city. The trauma of checkpoints and closures has rendered Ramallah a distant geography rather than an easily accessible place whose ethos can be corrected through engagement. A tangible deterrent for regional conservative groups however is the city’s high militarization through the deployment of the Dayton Army in this quasi-capital. An attack on an event would be considered an attack on the state’s sovereignty, as exampled in the arrest and prosecution of contending BDS activists in April 2014.

In her study in Costa Rica, Low (2000) found that the word ‘culture’ is used as an expression for subjectively desired and romanticised conceptions of social values from the past. Cities become havens for individuals escaping commitment to that same ‘culture’, utilizing social anonymity and the fluidity of exposed and hidden space. According to Lefebvre (2009) counter-culture and -space as expressions of resistance to prevailing orders are onto themselves articulations of overbearing neo-bourgeoisie. He maintains that spaces of leisure are a form of division between social and mental spaces and realities, between the censorship and intellectuality, and between everyday modes of life and those considered out of the ordinary. Lefebvre considers these spaces as revealing of the schisms between traditional and contemporary modes of life, describing them as the ‘epitome of contradictory space’ (2009:385).

As scholars have repeatedly showcased, the relationship of tensile induction between socio-economic needs and practices on one side and on the other people’s attitudes to events of history breeds collective memory and fluid transitional spaces. These ‘collective’ perceptions are sensitive to space-time dimensions, personal ideology, and ethos of the social medium of circulation (Lefebvre 2009; Harvey 2009). When activism, cross-cut social solidarity and sacrifice for the collective cause were central to socio-economic sustenance, refugee camps were depicted as central spaces of sumud; a perception partly encouraged by the cover their morphologies gave to the production of resistance practices. The death of the national movement, the shift to preferential neoliberal economics and the rise of class-based spatialization (among a complex web of other factors) has reproduced the conceptions of refugee camps to spaces of disorder, chaos and insecurity (alKhalili 2009, Anani 2010). These spaces of exception from – among others – PA services and engagement are also reproducing a new kind of counter-culture and -space within the agglomerate based on a risk-strategy that no longer factors the PLO as its protagonist, as painfully exhibited by the documentary ‘A World Not Ours’ by Mahdi Fleifel (bearing in mind the contextual elements of Ein elHilwe camp in Lebanon).

Gordon and Filc argue that the new alliances ‘represent a form of interage, interclass, intergender and interethnic solidarity’ in face of exasperated uncertainty (2009:460). These are nonetheless ‘contractual’ solidarities ‘based on narrow interests’, a situation under which ‘accentuation of faith becomes commonsensical’, feeding into a ‘fundamentalist worldview based on the adoption of a logic’ that ‘highlights divine ordinance’ (ibid). In turn, this renders the new prudential ‘conception of the individual as a free agent who can both choose among different providers of risk-management services while at the same time managing himself or herself becomes meaningless’ (ibid). Thereupon they conclude that the ‘destruction’ of Palestinians as a ‘risk society and the emergence
of a postmodern religiosity’ lead to the ‘de-individualization’ of Palestinians and the rise of Hamas (ibid:461). Appealing to the same concepts utilized by Gordon and Filc this work has hitherto contended that the convergence of neoliberal systems; dense hegemonic national politics; social diversity; low social hierarchies, and colonial strategies have together induced diverse, inverse and individualized sets of ethos in Ramallah. What is herein referred to as new ‘sensibilities’ and ‘solidarities’ combined with the unfolding of ‘postmodern religiosity’ in the Gaza Strip, Tunisia, Egypt, and Syria have in effect broken Hamas’ monopoly on ‘selling hope’, as proven by the – since 2009 growing – attempts by the long-contending Fatah and Hamas to unify against the growing popular opposition to both; culminating in the recent signature of a reconciliation agreement by the two on 23 April 2014.

Indeed, Hamas’ popularity stems largely from its ‘social security’ services as Gordon and Filc elaborated with statistical numbers; including among certain groups in Ramallah. However, their claim that the Oslo Era conditions and events have ‘diversified the social groups requiring such assistance’ where ‘these new groups are not just the poor’ (Ibid:473); this argument reflects the widespread myopia of main-stream scholarship whose generalist paradigms fail to factor quintessential sociospatial determinants; namely, the pre-Zionist Palestinian traits and contemporary socio-economic contexts of Ramallah. The birth of the State of Israel has long-marked the entrenchment of Palestinian cross-class dependency: starting in 1948 and continuing through the 1950s fleeing Palestinians – rich and poor – needed the assistance of the natives of their places of refugedom; since the 1960s Palestinian families – rich and poor – search for assistance to receive confirmations whether their missed loved-ones are buried in Israel's number-graveyards; since the 1970s university students – rich and poor – studying abroad need assistance to guarantee returning home; since the 1980s Palestinian economic labourers – rich and poor – need assistance to acquire permission of life for their intended production; since the 1990s every Palestinian – rich and poor – requires a form of assistance to access care-intensive medical services for complex cases (e.g. Cancer treatment), and; since the 2000s every Palestinian – rich and poor – needs the continued flow of foreign capital. Dependency in Palestine is not just financial or bureaucratic, rather, it is a genealogically colonial, socially lived, and spacio-economically reproduced system. In his work ‘Global Palestine’ John Collins postulates that:

Far from simply being shaped by global and globalizing processes, Palestine has been and continues to be an often prophetic index of and shaper of these processes, a kind of monadic unit that contains important clues to a series of much broader realities. [...] the two basic sides of this complex relationship: the globalization of Palestine and the Palestinization of the globe. (Collins 2011:2)

As a work that seeks to contribute to investigations of future forms of urbanism based on ontological and Marxist dialectics; here I argue that – in an abstract paradigm – what Palestine is exhibiting through the intra- and extra-relationalities of Ramallah is a micro-ecology of lived post-nationalism. While this field has been long discussed and its elements surveyed; nonetheless, its urban translations (revolutions) are just starting to unfold in Ramallah’s pre-state reality. Here it might be important to note three; First, up until the signature of the OAs WB and GS Palestinians were only exceptionally allowed to officially
change locus of living from that of birth; Second, the banking system was kept in primitive state and the financial sector of stock-markets was inexistent, and; Third, overt profiting from economic engagement with the colonial faced swift popular prosecution.

The commercialization of technology in the 1990s and subsequent space-time compression (as coined by David Harvey) added an exponential multiplier to the equation of globalization which had commenced with human history (Smith 2002; Sassen 2000). That was the era of translocalities, multiplying numbers of mega-cities, the emergence of the urban-poor, the devaluation of the rural in favour of the urban, and the era of ‘cherry-picking’ of investors regardless of political borders (Appadurai 2008). In today’s post-national era capitalism bends bureaucratic systems of organic nationalism, expands scholarship and incubation programs, traineeships and multi-national innovation centres. Frameworks such as the ‘World Social Forum,’ ‘Cities Alliance’ and ‘United Cities and Local Governments’ indicate a changed dynamic in creation of official (non-state) consciousness. The ‘city’ which marries regionally supplied production to the demand of global markets is able to press claims to political decision making, and mayors today are leading the ‘decentralization’ camps through direct partnerships with the private sector.

The 2007 international financial crisis placed post-nationalism in face of an embryonic challenge that the neoliberal system survived, yet with permanent impairments and an irreversible reality of extra and intra contestation; whose kernel is economic disparities and political expressions are territorial. Impoverished provincial areas are voicing their opposition to globalized urban systems which ‘allow emigrants to steal the opportunities of the local; wherein upgrade and infrastructures programs close several cycles in the urban while the rural receives budgetary residuals (Beall and Fox 2010; Escobar 2012). This is giving rise to conservative opposition politics as demonstrated in the latest EU Parliament elections in May 2014 whose results are highly resemblant of the Palestinian Legislative Elections of 2006. Another rising force is that of the urban-poor whose socio-economic conceptions adhere to globalized systems; whose named offender is neoliberal coteries; and whose omnipresent motto is that of ‘the right to the city’. The ‘Occupy’ movements in New York and Frankfurt could find some resemblance in the growing anti-Oslo activism. Whereas Fatah and Hamas loyalists are maintaining a relatively strong grip on localities, Ramallah’s awareness has grown to recognize the fremd politics and economy of the PA and their consequences; as alKhalili (2012) describes:

[1]n my opinion Ramallah – in its current political and cultural dynamic and positioning – allows for and is on itself an opportunity. There is a comfort in this city that originates from a self-enforcing reality: if you are doing well, you are doing well. If one is able to differentiate oneself a little from the common then s/he will not be hindered by masses of competition, because the latter does not exist, at least not as in global metropolises. Notwithstanding, these offered opportunities do come at a price, where these individual successes are built on a collective destruction, namely, the failure of the Palestine project. [...] At the same time, does consciousness to this reality translate in naming Ramallah as culpable and leaving it? This is possible. It is not the physical space of the city that is to blame, but the new fremd political project inhabiting it with its economic as well as social folds. Ramallah is not the only Palestinian
city with an economy, but it is the one that will be affected most shall political
turbulences occur because its growth is neither natural nor sustainable; it is
merely political, and this sad reality is common consciousness. As an individual
I oppose this project, nonetheless I am not oblivious to the fact that I am a
beneficiary of its presence. Further, my ability to criticise it emerges from
my presence within the city; derived from the reality that the highest level of
Palestinian youth activism is located within this space. Here you might ask
me: ‘how come Ramallah features the highest level of youth activism opposed
to this alien political project at a time it is the prime beneficiary? Shouldn’t
other areas that are benefiting less lead the opposition?:’. In reality, each project
creates its opposite as well as internal problematic as defects in systems are
internal not external. In other words, Ramallah as a city with certain economic
susceptibility retains a particular cultural receptivity, and thus political
permissiveness that were all enabled by being devoid of influential rhizomatous
families such as elNatsheh in Hebron or AbdelHadi in Nablus. If you are from
Rafidia then you are a stranger in Nablus, while this is not the case in Ramallah
as the opposite is the truism. [...] Thus, this fremd political project was able to
make footing and exist because of this social abnormality, and concomitantly
created its antagonism. On the other side of the same coin, the anti movement
is genuine as youth is not mobilized by considerations of family and its power.
Naturally these youth are partial, but here the differentiating factor – from the
wider Palestinian context – is that it is not tribal. This opposition is weak and
small but growing and developing. (alKhalili 2012)

While alKhalili belongs to a Ramallite clique of intellectual pessoptimists,55
Newton’s Third Law of Motion has long indicated that each action has a reaction
equal in magnitude and opposite in direction. The post-national surge of politics
of cosmopolitan urbanism has laboured its opposition of exclusive provincialism.
Issacharoff (2002) describes the contemporary gerrymandering of electoral zones
in the USA as driven by ‘perverse incentives’ of ‘political cartels’ whose pretense
is freedom through exclusivism. The Catalan plight for independence from Spain
and the desire of Marie Le Penne to withdraw France from the EU pertain to the
same discourse. Thereupon, the rise of conservative, anti-national, anti-neoliberal
and anti-‘foreign’ ethos in Palestine and their accented sociospatial articulations
in Ramallah should not be suspended from global events. Concomitantly,
comprehensions of the determinants labouring the particular processes, their
characteristics and (in-)predictable behavioural patterns can only be achieved
through the lens of the colonial ecosystem.

Dependency cannot be reduced to a top-down process, and it is not just
Palestinian. Without foreign aid and capitalist investments Israel, too, could
and can not finance its colonialism, a premise which bred and fuels the BDS
Movement. These politically antagonistic tides have configured a manoeuvre
space wherein Palestinians can experiment urban systems of decolonization
through the employment of (temporal, makeshift) antivenoms which could
tame and reorient the Palestinian-Israeli-International interdependency. The
coming two chapters will identify such possible points through revision of
works on this era of trans-territorial socio-economic alliances, whose epitome
is found in the urban.
It is in Ramallah with its myriad of international (and internationalizing) organizations that a kind of diversity, even cosmopolitanism some would (hyperbolically) say, inflects the social atmosphere. In the haunts of the upwardly mobile, bilinguality and macaronic exchanges are commonplace and inebriated conversation flows and oscillates freely and late into the early hours of the morning. Musicians, intellectuals, artists, filmmakers, activists pepper the place all centrally situated to ride the fundraising 'gravy train' that a distilled, serially imaged and feverishly peddled 'Palestine' has become. In this, the most fetishized of contexts, the art scene, a bit deradicalized but diverse and markedly contemporary, buzzes and shoots above its weight, and the parameters of a kind of subculture, even a counter-culture can be traced. (Abourahme 2009:501)

The pioneer flash-mob in Ramallah was an extension of the decades-old parade and borrowed its moves. The question is, will it happen again? And if so, will it evolve to include other Ramallite minorities or will it remain limited to the few? The number of restaurants, bars and luxury services has grown sharply in the third phase of the OAs (2006-2010) and has – among others – encouraged the behavioural framing of Thursday nights as the time to shed-off the week’s work through partying; a highly visible activity yet shared amongst very small groups. The most recent economic crisis which commenced in 2011 is echoed with the stagnation of this sector and a tangible increase in levels of hostility against its highly exclusive spaces, prompting the widespread employment of private security. Few tens of meters from such places young males of excluded strata meander, observe the alien ethos, and sometimes vandalize. Thereof, was the growth of liberal leisure spaces in Ramallah a temporary out-surge or are there indicators that these forms of spaces will persist? And more importantly, is this sector capable of growing a wider base, or will it remain exclusive?

Constructing a cynical yet metaphoric scenario, in the third phase of the OAs the archetypal old house which for decades hosted the Communist Party’s headquarters at the heart of the Ramallah agglomerate was demolished. The excavated site which reached approximately 10-12 meters in depth accumulated rainwater for years as the investor pondered the next move; he who is said to be a heavily USA funded former party member and head of an NGO. Regardless of the truth of the rumours; questions of how will the cultural practices and scene evolve in Ramallah mirror those of the site of the once-upon-a-time popular headquarters. The socio-political consciousness of Ramallites and their spacio-economically articulated changed ethos should be understood as ecological processes whose birth-to-death cycle is aphoristic, and whose components and intensities of processes are manipulations of contesting ideological groups. Abourahme notes that ‘how we plan and articulate Ramallah has much to do with how we construct and articulate ourselves. The design of this city and its
relation to Palestine’s other urban spaces is inexorably linked with, not only how we confront an inescapable ‘colonial present’, but also with what kind of society we end up living and dying in’ (2009:508).

As Taraki (2008, 2008a) indicates, regional sociospatial happenings in Beirut, Cairo and Amman provide strong evidence that suggests the persistence of these exclusive spaces, in direct relation to widening economic gaps. In context of the cultural sector, yet another form of solidarity is emerging between Palestinian artists and intellectuals of varying genres with their counterparts from neighbouring Arab capitals. Internationally active musicians such as elFar3i, Maryam Saleh, 3al Raseef and Su’ad Massi among others have found eager ears in Ramallah and thereof setting in motion the sustainable cycle of positive trade-off. While Ramallah is gradually yet systematically divorcing from its ‘national’ surroundings, it is actively constructing new commons with urbanisms of similar ecologies. In a questionnaire distributed at the end of every Focus Group participants were asked to arrange four categories in order of importance: Palestinian, Arab, Ramallite and (one’s) Religion. While acknowledging that a more diverse sample is needed for the data to be representative; within this sample the largest group, 22.2% of questionnaires ordered them as listed earlier. Whereas 63.5% placed ‘Palestinian’ first, 31.7% placed ‘Arab’ first, and while 38.1% placed ‘Ramallite’ fourth, 34.9% did the same for ‘religion’. These numbers do not proof but do attest to the aforementioned argument that Ramallites are rooted in their local and regional identity, where religion plays an important but not leading role.

The creation of spaces of entente cordiale and quasi freedoms and their propagation is a natural product of the globalized and cosmopolitan generations (Harvey 2009) whose socio-economic cliquish characteristics, mechanisms and outputs exasperate the phenomenon of the urban-poor. The latter are persons whose average income is above regional poverty ranges, yet insufficient for a
The decade-long military closure of the largest WB city of Nablus at the beginning of this millennium weakened its economy, where it lost much of its contracts to Hebron and significant segments of its wealthy and educated strata to Ramallah. In contrast and as the rise of the so-called Arab Spring diverted the attention of the international donors away from the PA; starting 2011 Ramallah’s economy has entered a progressively aggravating crisis. The continued colonial piracy over Palestinian growth resources, the shrinking size of aid and the occasional withholding of PA import/export tax money by Israel who collects it has indebted the PA to implementing private parties, while aid-dependent organizations had to curb their operations and expenditures. The crisis which infected the services-sector first was soon after contracted by others in the locality, and later throughout the WB. In this phase the repertoire of punitive measures by Israeli government (e.g. IOF demolishing monadic infrastructures) and private actors (e.g. radical settlers’ periodic vandalism of agricultural fields) reached a new level with the collapse of the latest round of negotiations, where additionally in May 2014:

Israel informed the Palestinian side that it would no longer allow Palestinian banks to transport their surplus Israeli currency to the Israeli Central Bank, an act that is unheard of in the world of banking. Israel is refusing to serve its own currency. In effect, Israel is declaring war on the Palestinian economy, risking the collapse of the thriving Palestinian banking sector, and disrupting the flow of basic goods such as electricity, petroleum, and natural gas into Palestine. (Bahour 2014)

While Israel might retract this decision, the message has been re-conveyed. The economy of Ramallah is controlled from Tel Aviv. Therein, the Palestinian
**BETHELHEM – 659 sq.km.**

- 2014: 130,361 *
- 1997: 102,087 *

**HEBRON – 997 sq.km.**

- 2014: 274,434 *
- 1997: 155,116 *

### # of establishments in WB

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Size</th>
<th>% of WB total</th>
<th># of establishments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>+100</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50-99</td>
<td>32.8%</td>
<td>177</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20-49</td>
<td>13.2%</td>
<td>844</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-19</td>
<td>23.7%</td>
<td>2,097</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-9</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>6,561</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-4</td>
<td>13.2%</td>
<td>79,700</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Labour size, gender distribution

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Size</th>
<th>% of WB total</th>
<th># of persons</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>+100</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>130,361</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50-99</td>
<td>32.8%</td>
<td>274,434</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20-49</td>
<td>13.2%</td>
<td>102,087</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-19</td>
<td>23.7%</td>
<td>844</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-9</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>2,097</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-4</td>
<td>13.2%</td>
<td>6,561</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Economic establishments: # of persons

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Size</th>
<th>% of WB total</th>
<th># of persons</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>+100</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>130,361</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50-99</td>
<td>32.8%</td>
<td>274,434</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20-49</td>
<td>13.2%</td>
<td>102,087</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-19</td>
<td>23.7%</td>
<td>844</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-9</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>2,097</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-4</td>
<td>13.2%</td>
<td>6,561</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Sources:**
1. GeoHive 2014
2. PCBS 1999a: 49; 1999b: 49; 1999c: 49; 1999d: 49 respectively
3. PCBS 2013
4. PCBS 2013a: 193
5. PCBS 2013d: 68
6. PCBS 2013a: 71, 128, 143, 158, and 163.
7. PCBS 2013a: 53

**Key:**
- * Population in agglomeration
- ** Population in governorate
- ° Unemployment amongst females, 2012
- °° Unemployment amongst males, 2012
Infographic 3.2. Comparing West Bank's main governorates and their respective key urban agglomerates: population growth, economic weight and dynamics.
economy tailored by the World Bank is a system where any shiver in Ramallah’s politics and / or its sectors due to internal or external factors resonates throughout the entire WB. Hence the same questions posed pre the OAs remain open: how can Palestinians decrease their dependence on Israeli authorization? Particularly, how can the financially strangulated LGs in the Ramallah agglomerate foster a resilient urbanism?

Former UN secretary-general Boutrous Ghali had defined post-conflict peacebuilding as ‘action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid relapse into conflict’ (Brynen 2000:7). Nonetheless, as Roy phrased it, ‘peace must be predicted on dignity, but Oslo has never been that kind of peace’ (1999:79); rather, an unjust and partisan ‘trade-off that happened between what we refer to as right to self determination with the improvement of living conditions’ (Kassis 2010).

In reference to the hitherto mapped and discussed ontological analysis of the ecological evolution of Ramallah’s urbanity; this work expands its kernel postulate to argue that future planning (imagining) of Ramallah’s resilient urbanism should recognize the rapid pace of reconfiguration of social ethos and risk strategies of Palestinians, and thereof seek to create personalized understandings of frameworks that are:

First; characterised by policy-making as a process of social-puzzling and -learning as argued by Hall (1993);
Second; guided by Gehl’s (2011) methods of incremental undertakings with careful scrutiny and constructive critique;
Third; employing Trancik’s (1986) principles on antispaces as abundant loci of socio-economic synthesis, and Abdullah’s (2012) identification of high-value products and knowledge-based economy as the only viable options under colonial precariousness;
Fourth; taming neoliberal practices through cooptation, thereof creating a positive trade-off and coalesces between the public good and private benefit (Brugmann 2009);
Fifth; foreshadowing the impacts of the ‘anti-politics machine’ (Ferguson 2009) and nurturing them in micro-ecologies of fluid sensibilities, relationalities and temporalities (Taraki 2008, 2008a; Abourahme 2011);
Sixth; factoring the space-time compression of globalized localities and policy-mobility (Harvey 1990), and the symbiosis of decolonization on one hand and the hegemonic colonialists and their – willing or unintelligent – agents on the other (Appadurai 2003, 2008); and,
Seventh; oriented towards improving the mental (security, accountability, freedom), lived (dignity, connectivity, satisfaction) and representational (rooted, inclusive, accessible) spaces of Ramallites.

Whereas these frameworks will be put to test in the last chapter of this work; the following two chapters focus on mapping, visualizing and discussing the physical spatialization of Ramallah, the decision-making systems, actors of formal production of space and their projects. In the close of this chapter, the following extract from the interview with Yazan alKhalili captures the sentiments of this work:
In the same line of thoughts, it must be noted that in the post Oslo era Ramallah experienced a number of lapses; in 2001-2002 with the massively destructive military operations and again in 2006 with the election of Hamas and the halting of international funds. In both cases the city found ways to cope and re-adapt with the evolving program whose sustainability depends on factors other than the Palestine project. We are threatened with being cut off from this international program, but we also know that this is equally their program as much as it is ours. Ramallah is not just a PA project, but equally an Israeli one under which economic gains are conditioned with the political stagnation. And in spite of the estrangement of Ramallah in comparison to the wider WB geography, it has become the model other cities look up for. In the current composition, cities like Nablus and Hebron are restricted by the status quo which is limiting their economic potential that is production-based while equally catering for Ramallah’s economic growth; yet here also it is only a matter of time until this same status quo turns non-satisfactory to Ramallah as well. What will Ramallah do then? And this is the missing link, which is the discussion on alternatives. This does not mean that the general Palestinian public has no alternatives, rather, that there is fear of them. Alternatives require turning to times of hardships.

[...] Ultimately, what is the goal of all of this? There is an unfolding futility in the sense of ‘what is next?’. Let another thirty bars and forty Shawarma shops open doors, and then what? We have neither accomplished a State and ended our existential enigma, nor are we a non-state. Consequently, we are at a stand still, here, in the middle. We must recognize that since we are unable to move forward, we need to regress. Moving backwards does not mean retreating, rather, making a move. At some point we must make a move. We need to abandon the futile absurdity of the laissez faire mechanism. Yes, one could get a newer car, but one should instead worry about the persisting wider concerns; and this is what I mean when I say there is a cross-cut collective destruction. The lived individual success is based on the collective destruction. At a certain point the common consciousness should prevail over the individual gain, thence will a movement emerge in one form or another.

[...] What scares me most is the stagnation; the political castration; and the collective destruction. This constant uncertainty by the force of which one is fearful of making a move in either direction. I want the fremd political project to come an end, yet scared of the consequences as it is bound to create a void, and I doubt our ability to stir and govern this void into the better next phase. We are living the evolving of critical awareness, but this is not accompanied by a practical political movement, and this is scary... I am afraid change will arrive and we are still not prepared for it. (alKhalili 2012)
In Palestine the decision-making matrix is quiet complex, bureaucratic, chaotic and social. While official levels may assimilate aspects of state apparatuses, a stark multiplicity in roles and responsibilities is omnipresent, and overruling manoeuvres via caudal paths seem to be the norm rather than the exception. Corruption in PA institutions can be directly linked to the lack of accountability produced by the systematic weakening of the judiciary system (Kelly 2004). It is also rooted in popular conceptions which lack respect for and trust in the capacities of the PA on one hand; on the other, it could be understood as the expression of incompossibility of central government with continued metamorphosing colonialism, where the absence of sovereignty induces sociospatial counter-currents to the establishment of quasi monopoly over violence, which in turn impedes the development of nonpartisan systems for judiciary accountability.

Recognizing the quintessence of equitable accountability to human-security and economy, in the first phase of the OAs (1994-2000) a coalesces of professionals-practitioners and institutions of law produced scripts for improving the civil character of the Palestinian constitution therein the modernization and unification the Ottoman, British, Jordanian, Egyptian and Israeli components which hitherto were the reference. Here Dr. Mudar Kassis – Director of the Faculty of Law and Administration at BZU and Prof. of Philosophy and Political Science – narrates:

The Europeans came towards the end of the 1990s to Abu Ammar [Yasser Arafat] – who was receiving the laws and putting them in his desk drawer instead of passing them – and told him that this will not work: ‘the Legislative Council is working and you are stopping the processes instead of signing the papers and making the laws public’. After some pressure and indirect threats in cash flow related to the wages of the PA employees; Abu Ammar had to give in, but fought them on the priorities, choosing from the list the ones common to both [parties]. As a result of those happenings the Base Law was not passed, the law related to judicial independence did not pass either, Labour law neither. On the other hand, within that package the law of marking precious metals was passed. Turned out to be a priority!.. I personally found it strange, so upon examination it turned out that there was a problem in smuggling cheap gold from Jordan into the Israeli market through the WB. Since there are tax-mandated borders between the WB and Jordan, but none between the WB and Israel, and since the gold made in Ramallah cannot be banned from being sold in Tel Aviv but that made in Jordan is; thus, it became necessary to mark the gold produced in the Palestinian Territories. So the solution was found: to protect the Israeli market of precious metals the Palestinians had to introduce a law! This is one of the extreme and absurd models, but it demonstrates what kind of development was taking place. What is noteworthy here is that it wasn’t the Israelis who asked Abu Ammar in this case, rather the EU on behalf of
Israel. [...] Europe is not obliged to defend Israel’s interests on the expense of Palestinian interests, and nobody can stop them from doing so, but it doesn’t have to be on the Palestinians’ bill. Here we start talking about lobbies and balance and issues that do not necessarily have to make sense or be convincing. (Kassis 2010)

Upon its establishment the PA maintained the native system of arbitration referred to as ‘Asha’iri (pertaining to the ‘clan’), whose dynamics are sensitive to social conceptions and hierarchies. In case of dispute contenders are given a choice between the constitutional or ‘Asha’iri tracks, wherein regulation is limited to the binding nature of the final ruling and inability to switch tracks or appeal to the second system post verdict. The Asha’iri system has a wealth of knowledge, heritage and tradition and it’s elimination would constitute a loss of popular intellectualism. Nonetheless, the colonially-inherited PA legacy of fragmentation has effectively sustained a legal disjuncture whose impacts on urban governance are catastrophic. In 2011 a scandalous corruption case caught fire in Ramallah, where a Christian member of the Municipal Council was caught red-handed in blackmail and religious incitement. The successful real estate broker was identified beyond doubt by the criminal police as the author of threat-letters to the – also – Christian owner of a valuable piece of land while posing as a radical Muslim. The involvement of the police came as the victim is socially tied to a respected and high-ranking judge. In a surreal turn of events, no charges were pressed at the Attorney General’s office, the ‘Asha’iri system was enacted with the presence of several progressive intellectuals, and the collective sin was rapidly brushed under the carpet of newer misdemeanors against the public-good of citizens.

A study of Systems of Integrity in LGs (i.e. accountability and rule of law at municipal levels) states that although Anti-Corruption Law stipulates a verdict within ten days, nonetheless this has not been applied (AMAN 2014). By the end of 2012 sixty-six cases were presented to the Municipal Court, of which only eighteen were processed with accusations standing grounds in seventeen. Further, delays in executions of verdicts and lack of cooperation between bodies of the judiciary and penal systems have severely shaken citizens’ trust in state-institutions and the rule of law.

The majority of Ramallites cross-faction do desire the long-term security of the universal definitions of citizenship as status that ‘erodes local hierarchies, statuses, and privileges in favour of national jurisdictions and contractual relations based in principle on an equality of rights’ (Holston and Appadurai 2003:296). However under hegemonic forms of accountability and the colonially-catered eternal temporalization, the socio-economic web of fluid interdependencies is exasperated. Decision-makers, employees of LGs and professionals alike are members of this self-reinforcing ecology. The uncongeniality of central authority model to spaces of uncertainty and disparate relationalities is herein placed on public exhibit. Not only in the arid mountains of Hebron but also in the quasi capital there are clans, tribes, and semiopaque associations governing decisions, employing networks and influence to achieve partisan best-interest, indirectly feeding into the destruction of the collective. Thence, chaos in Ramallah is a result of shortcomings by legislative, judicial and executive arms of government that are socially reproduced through engendering nepotism, fear, rationalized (limited) vision and disqualification of rule of law (Kassis 2010, Shaheen 2012).
Achieving a safe – hence resilient – urbanism commences with nurturing awarenesses that are able to conceive and foster positive spatial trends, which can be measured through accessibility to service-providers; quality and security of journey; availability of integrated emergency and support frameworks; socio-economic compatibility of private and public realms; forging constructive relationships between built and natural landscape; between the local and the regional among many other aspects which fall within the mandate of and range of influence of LGs. However, these bodies lie at the bottom of PA command chains which itself composes the third tier of overall decision making. The second conforms to donor agenda and their respective priorities, while the first tier and ultimate decision maker on the ground remains the Israeli government and its specialized arm: the COGAT (Annex 5 Regulatory Framework and Authorities for Planning in the West Bank, pg. 395). Therein, proposals aiming at the reform of LGs in terms of approach and operations must take their inferiority into account.

In addition, analysis of Ramallah’s city-discourse should establish the causality between chronology of individual happenings and their conditioning factors. While these shall be gradually constructed over the sections of this chapter, here it should be taken into account that prior to the signature of the OAs and within the processes of the Partial Regional Master Plan for Jerusalem1 in 1981, the Shamshoni2 local planning schemes were produced categorizing the territory into: 1. Arab Development area; 2. Special Use; 3. Future Planning; 4. Nature Reserve; 5. Agricultural; and, 6. Roads. While categories two to six are designated to the use of the colonial, the first category – the only space in which Palestinians can operate – was restricted to timely either built-up areas or even cut into them3. These plans served – in combination with COGAT overall activities – preventing horizontal expansion and socioeconomic growth of Palestinian villages, towns and cities. Needless to say, the Shamshoni plans were produced with neither reference to surveys, nor statistics, or consultation with local councils. Due to the fierce Palestinian response4 the Shamshoni plans were officially shelved, yet ‘have in fact been put into effect by the Israeli Central Planning Department; building permits have been and continue to be granted on the basis of its regulations and restricts (Abdelhadi 1990).

The Oslo Accords did not eliminate the planning parameters set by the successive colonial regimes, rather, it cemented and politically legitimized them as foretold by accounts of post-colonial regimes (Fanon 2008; Harvey 2009), with the anomaly of persistence of the colonial condition (Anani 2011). While anteriorly the comparative and (informal) professional space for Palestinian planners and architects extended over historic Palestine, the OAs reduced this sphere (Anani 2010) and locked it into the cantons of 1981 Drobless Plan5. This dogma is prescribed in the post-Oslo limited imagination of average Palestinian planners and decision-makers – of the various PA institutions operating within the urban landscape – in terms of both schemes and ventures; as demonstrated in this chapter which maps two: the Palestinian public actors and in parallel the most important of their undertakings within the realm of the Ramallah agglomerate since the signature of the OAs.
4.1. BRIEF OVERVIEW: INSTITUTIONS AND DECISION-MAKING HIERARCHY

There are 15 PA ministries in total, amongst which are the Ministries of Planning and Administrative Development (MOPAD) and that of Local Government (MOLG). While the MOPAD is the entity setting the overall government priorities and strategies pertaining to development (in the wider definition of the term), the MOLG is the entity in charge of detailing those strategies in light of the allocated funds, and supervising the work of municipalities. Floating in an opaque legal space under the MOPAD and above municipalities, Governorates exercise planning-related decision-making (Anani 2010; Abdullah 2010). Acquiring information about the exact role of the Governorates was impeded by the lack of transparency of these units, which was demonstrated in the limited knowledge of this works’ interviewees about its operational scope, and whose singular online presence is a FaceBook page which announces the Governor’s meetings agenda, but no other substantial information.

Within MOPAD there are two bodies that highly influence decisions made: The Higher Planning Council (HPC), and the Municipal Development & Lending Fund (MDLF). The latter is a semi-governmental bureau that was established in 2008 in line with the Palestine Reform and Development Plan, PRDP6. It is solely concerned with municipal projects, their respective funding from international donors, and the enhancement of municipal capacities7. Meanwhile, the HPC was formed through a presidential decree in 1999 (MOLG 2013a), at the time to facilitate acquisition of properties for public benefit. Its mandate reaches beyond though, giving it the cogency to make binding recommendations, revise and amend approved urban projects, and overturn decisions pertaining to licenses, programs, etc. Both – the MDLF and HPC – have the power to influence decisions made by MOLG departments and Municipal councils8. For example, in 2009 albireh Municipality declined to grant license for the construction of the 26-floor Palestine Tower (Image 4.1) on elErsal Street due to concerns over pressure on the already fragile infrastructure and mobility in the vital urban vein. The investor appealed to the Presidential Office and was granted permission (Shaheen 2012).

On the level of municipalities, departments of Engineering Works and Projects are responsible for preparing Master Plans (under supervision and conditioned with the approval of the MOLG and MOPAD) and monitoring the physical growth of cities accordingly. Notwithstanding, the Municipal Council has the power to influence and change decisions made by this department. Thus, even though decisions on individual projects are the domain of the Engineering Works and Projects Department at the municipal level, those decisions can be appealed at any of the higher levels whose hierarchy is illustrated in Diagram 4.1, pg. 186. As indicated in section 4.1.2, pg. 126; former Mayoress of Ramallah Jeanette Michael9 (2010) stated: ‘The normal trend is that investors seek the change and we follow’, where ‘as a municipality, we do not have the legal power to force an investor in a direction instead of another, or against his/her will’. In this context member of Municipal Council Mahmoud Abdullah10 elaborates:
The city is developing at a speed beyond the control of the municipality. [...] The factors behind these developments are mainly external and not internal, which makes the control impossible e.g. when foreign donors support the Fayyad government in a certain project; which has been happening on more than one level lately; we as a municipality cannot reject that. In addition, there is the human factor in play where project proposition takes place based on personal perception and conviction. (Abdullah 2010)

Inspired by the repetitive complaints of RM and its exchange of accusations with the MOLG regarding responsibility for the disarray of growth patterns of Ramallah – chiefly and alBireh and Beitunya in a lesser degree; a plan to render the agglomerate an Amaneh (i.e. Greater Municipality similar to that of Amman, capital of Jordan) is said to be well underway by Dr. Bashir Barghouthi (head of Policies Department at MOLG; 2012), wherein this status would grant municipalities independence from the MOLG. Nonetheless, this is easier said than done. The three municipalities of Ramallah, alBireh, Beitunya and councils of neighbouring towns and villages have – at some points – antagonistic regulations and by-laws. Combined with socio-political power-balance considerations, a merger into a single entity is remote if not futile.

Analysis of happenings cannot disregard the imbalance between the growth of the Ramallah region in terms of size and population on one hand, and on the other that of institutional capacity. Beyond aforementioned institutional and sociopolitical limiting factors, it is important to recognize that the pace of growth reached radical records (Barghouthi 2012, Shaheen 2012). As Anani states:

[... The] increased capital in the city and expansion in real estate construction [has] increased the pressure on the municipality who had a capacity of ‘X’ persons corresponding to a growth speed of ‘Y’, and suddenly had to deal with a growth speed to ‘10 × Y’. So basically there was a gap between the speed of growth of the city and the municipal capacity to understand and administer those processes. (Anani 2010)

Similar experiences worldwide – from Amman to Mumbai – have showcased that under such conditions the bureaucracy of governmental organizations paves way for the private sector to take command of the wheels of growth.
Diagram 4.1. Illustration of decision-making hierarchy on projects and programs relevant to (physical) urban development in areas under PA sovereignty.
4.2. MOPAD & MOLG’S PLAN: RABMA

Soon after the signature of the OAs Norway financed the preparation of the National Policies for Physical Development (NPPD) proposal. Nonetheless, this study remained ink on paper in the archives of MOPAD as it was never detailed to applicable scales and areas of jurisdictions. This further encouraging municipalities to continue using their Master Plans as major reference (Anani 2010). In light of the densification of Palestinian localities in the OA’s A-Areas, MOPAD and MOLG prepared the ‘Ramallah, AlBireh & Beitunya Metropolitan Area’ Plan (RABMA) in 2009. This proposal includes municipalities: Ramallah, alBireh and Beitunya; and six villages: Rafat, Ein Areek, Ein Qinya, Surda, Beiteen, and Kufur Aqab (Map 4.1). While the study emphasizes the contiguity from southern Bethlehem – through Jerusalem – to northern alBireh/Surda, given the geopolitical conditions this pilot plan restricts its parameters to OAs-outlined loci of influence and activity.

According to the publication, the synthesis of; first, the RABMA agglomerate into a physically continuous fabric; second, the ongoing accumulation of population; third, the centralization of major economic decision makers within its geography; fourth, its retail and leisure vents and cortege, and; fifth, being the mart of public service qualifies its coinining as a metropolitan area. Thereupon, beyond the need for a contiguous local government, the study proposes:

• Unification of regulations and governing laws;
• Establishment of a Metropolitan Council with representatives in each of the RABMA local government units (LGUs) with ten tasks the main of which are: synchronized provision of infrastructure; maintenance of a unified database; representation of RABMA’s LGUs at the MOLG; and management of joint finances; and,
• The Metropolitan Council consists of 21 members, proportional to population size of each of the LGUs.

While the RABMA plan presents a vision for the area and elaborate proposals (particularly on technical matters such as management of waste water, unification of industrial zones, etc.); the established Metropolitan Council – whose executive arm is called the Joint Coordination Unit, JCU – remains weak, ineffective, and in reality absent (Shaheen 2012). This unfolding was transcribed within the plan itself, where differences and the prioritized individuality is evident as exampled in Box 3.1.

Beyond executive shortcomings, the RABMA proposal fails to strategize beyond the narrow geography dictated by Israel. While proponents a Centric-Linear expansion pattern (Map 4.1; was considered a challenge by the three municipalities in their SDP document; section 4.3.2, pg. 198), the designers also criticize its incompatibility, surprisingly, attributing it to these disadvantages: ‘Traffic jam; Dense corridors between the city and the village [sic]; mixing identities of the city and the village [sic]; Problems from the social aspect [sic]’ (MOPAD 2009:29). While the first argument is capable of standing scientific argumentation, the latter two have been falsified by Chapters 2 and 3 of this work.
Box 3.1. Outlines for future development of the three RABMA cities as stated in MOPAD’s publication (2009:39):

- Ramallah’s vision is to be an administrative, services, and cultural centre.
- alBireh’s vision is to be an administrative city and trading centre.
- Beitunya’s vision is to be a recreational and attraction centre for diversity of services, investments, and future development projects [...].

While the three visions might sound different, in context they are not. First, both Ramallah and alBireh want to be administrative centres, which they are already. Second, all three wish to be centres for services, where alBireh named it ‘trading’ though knowing that over 60% of the economic activity in the area lies in the services sector. Last, cultural activities (term used by Ramallah) cannot be stripped of their recreational (term used by Beitunya) dimension. In addition, these visions coincide with those officially stated on the web-pages of those entities prior to the RABMA plan.

In conclusion, the pre-existing visions and self-definitions of the three municipalities have been carried through without alteration, reflecting limited willingness to compromise on this issue, and probably in scope of visions as well. The question remains whether the weakness and relative absence of the JCU is caused by similar stances on other issues.
These named disadvantages demonstrate that; **first**, the RABMA planners have neither theoretically nor cognitively understood the modes of functioning of social pluralism within growing metropolitan areas. Village and city identities in large urbanisms that encompass both geographies are constantly redefined in a wider spectrum of spacio-relational alliances that are interest-, ideology-, and finance-dependent, amongst other equally important factors (Lefebvre 2009). This aspect of planners’ shortcoming grows increasingly problematic when examining spaces this proposals featured as necessary along the coming process of (what in reality is a socio-) spatial transformation.

**Second,** the geographic vision for the growth pattern limits itself to the legally-rational scenario within geo-temporal colonial parameters. This approach unintelligently reproduced mutated imaginations of urban ecology on one hand; and on the other ignored the condition of absolute precariousness that governs the geography, by which criteria and parameters are constantly shifting. This methodology could be explanatory for the disjuncture between the RABMA proposal and the sidelined – pending Israeli consent – Ring Road proposal (Map 4.2). Noteworthy, the latter conforms as well to Oslo’s A-, B-, C-Areas, distancing itself from crossing geopolitical lines wherever possible (e.g. some segments run parallel to the Israeli Segregation Wall) rather than assuming the optimal course for integrated long-term development.

This evaluation of failure of the RABMA plan is shared beyond these pages (as aforementioned), where both MOPAD and MOLG are currently drafting a new plan in which the Metropolitan Council is not an element, rather, the merger of all LGUs into a singular unit. The features of this proposal remain concealed.
4.3. RAMALLAH MUNICIPALITY: ROLE, PLANS AND STRATEGIES

In light of the OAs municipalities in Areas A experienced considerable shifts in role and morale, yet not as significant in terms of mandate. Pre-Oslo these bodies answered to the ICA and followed the narrow policies set by the Israeli COGAT. As such, Mayors – though officially elected by population – are in reality figures far from the PLO and generally perceived by the population as collaborators with the occupation regime; which intentionally and systematically deprived Palestinian localities from resources and infrastructures necessary for healthy integrated growth (Zananiri 2010, Barghouthi 2012).

Today municipalities fall under the garment of the ‘national project’ of establishing a Palestinian State and boast images of leadership. Nonetheless, their mandate remains highly restricted and limited in scope where; first, general strategies are set by MOPAD and MOLG; second, significant infrastructure projects are dictated by donor priorities, MOLG partnerships and Israeli consent if they extend beyond the contours of Area A; third, collection of taxes, fines and enforcing respect of urban construction regulations is managed by the MOF and police departments; fourth, though municipalities are in charge of issuing licenses for construction and urban projects in general, the MOLG’s HPC has the power to overrule decisions made at municipal levels, and; fifth, decision making regarding urban basic services sectors (e.g. education, health, environmental programs, etc.) has been suspended to other PA institutions leaving LGs with the role of providing the real-estate property.

In the case of metropolitan Ramallah these aspects are exasperated due to its character as seat of government and the accompanying influential entourage and persuasive investors (Michael 2010, Abdullah 2010). These aforementioned aspects – particularly with the persistence of patronage – render municipalities futile, serving as an interim offices rather than cogent decision makers. This constellation could be argued as motive for Ramallah Municipality’s (hereafter referred to as ‘RM’) increased focus on social, cultural, and spatial organization programs. The latter activities are relatively more independent of PA hierarchies, and their financing is provisioned via direct partnership whether with local or international parties.

RM’s Engineering Works & Projects Department is constantly labouring to maintain a footing via preparation of physical expansion plans and the like. Nonetheless, beyond the pressure of subjugation and scarcity of finances, the departments operate under internally-generated sociopolitical coercion. Given socio-political dependencies, RM’s staff features many creative hard-workers yet also a significant number of free-riders who fill positions for considerations other than productivity. This has been further limiting the municipality’s efficiency as well as effectiveness (Khamaisi 2006, Arouri 2010).

The aforementioned does not refute the implementation of positive projects and strategies, some of which mapped in the following pages that summarize the planning-related highlights since the signature of the OAs. This section addresses
municipal official strategies and plans, in the process revealing deficiencies in comprehension of scale, scope, orientation and potential impacts of happenings. Thereupon, the last section focuses on the established municipal shortcomings in terms of invoking a proactive and resilient city-space, and argues alternative frameworks through a discourse of causality.

4.3.1. 2005/9 Master Plan: Expansion of Ramallah

Ramallah’s pace and conditions of growth translated with limited history of Master Plans. Under the Ottoman Empire it was an insignificant village, under the British Mandate some start-up growth and expansion plans were drafted, but it wasn’t until the Jordanian custody (1948-1967) that it received its first city-scale Master Plan. The following 37 years of Israeli administration featured minimal provision or urban services and thorough strategies for disintegrated and fragmented development, or as Roy (1999) coins it: de-development. Up to the date of entry into force of the PA the escorting Master Plan was that set by the Jordanian Government in 1967 (Anani 2010, Abdullah 2011). In 1997 RM requested the revision and expansion of its Master Plan. The Nazareth-based Rassem Khamaisi was the contracted planner who considered the rapid unplanned construction following the signature of the OAs and the decades-long absence of system-based regulation as major obstacles; he states:

Many private and public developers initiated preparations for a local and detailed plan of their private land [sic]. The municipality lacks a general plan to cope with the increase of building permit applications, nor does it have a mechanism for accepting or rejecting, or giving guidelines for local public and private developers [sic]. (Khamaisi 2006:11)

Later on in the process RM restricted the mission to unplanned expansion areas opting to maintain the city core unaltered. The deficits of the former Master Plan turned bearable when compared with the necessity of managing legal consequences that accompany alteration. Beyond the city-core, RM placed the following guiding principles for the development of the new Master Plan (Khamaisi 2006:14):

- Preserving the ‘uniqueness’ of the city via allocating space for low density housing, and particularly villas;
- Physical expansion should avoid valleys which shall remain as green zones for environmental considerations;
- Avoid creation of a new centre which could compete with the existing core. As such, expansion shall be chiefly for residential purposes which in turn remain dependant on the existing core;
- Expansion and adaptation of transportation arteries from the varying neighbourhoods to the core as well as the regional and national networks;
- Development of a regional government and public service centre;
- Re-parcelation; and,
- Phasing of execution.
The planning team used these seven principles to construct their ten-point program, which culminated with the Master Plan shown in Map 4.4, pg. 194 and the spatial allocation for the varying zones in Table 4.1 (derivative editions from original by author) in 2006. This incremental plan was approved in 2009 rendering the planned area of the city about 10,000 dunoms (10 sq.km.) of the total 18.6 sq.km (Abdullah 2011).

The first principle set for this Master Plan encourages suburbanization and hence pressure on mobility infrastructures in spite of the continued absence of coherent and efficient public transportation systems. The second point provides excuse for delayed provision of open spaces in the current built-up areas sentencing those to the waiting room of the future – when Ramallah’s urbanisation reaches the valleys. The third principle which resembles the decision to retain a singular centre has no logical explanation, as the urban strategist Jan Gehl states:

They [Copenhagen City] decided very early that we are not doing highrise. They refused to densify the centre and by doing that all the offices and administrations have been scattered around, which also scatters the traffic. If you build up a fantastic centre, then of course there will be a lot of traffic going to the centre, and thus high concentration. (Discovery World 2012, minute 7:00)

It should be noted that in their initial proposal in 2006 the planning team indicated that in the year 2004 the services sector grew to occupy 33% of the

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 4.1. Suggested Zoning in Ramallah (Khamaisi 2006:16; expanded version of original)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Category</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residential-AA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residential-A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residential-B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residential-C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residential-Agriculture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commercial zone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exhibitions zone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industrial zone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mixed uses zone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public building zone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Open public zone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cemetery zone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tourist facilities zone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Archeological zone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technical Engineering z.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transportation center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roads</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Existing roads</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pedestrian roads</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Future development zone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
overall economic activity of the city from a mere 8% in 1996. As a result several areas were re-classified from residential to commercial or office-areas. As for construction licenses issued between 1994 and 2004 they totalled 2,343 licenses, of which 2,021 were residential and 135 commercial; forming an approximate ratio of 15:1 respectively (Khamaisi 2006).

Meaningful analysis of impacts of the Master Plan requires addressing its dynamic with other regulatory components and strategies, hence is conducted in the closing section of this chapter. Here it should nonetheless be noted that in spite of the organizational character of the exercise the Master Plan is an exhibit of five; first, the limited ability of the many Palestinian planners to envision three and four dimensional urbanisms, not to mention the incorporation of non text-book factors. The expansion of retail services and relief of congestion in mountainous topography cannot coincide with the endorsement of a singular area (in this case Ramallah’s core) or few distanced nodes; not to mention the ongoing socioeconomic processes and their respective spatial requirements e.g. the growing demand on mixed-use areas corresponding to the size of Micro, Small, and Medium Enterprises (MSMEs). Second, influential stakeholders are able to lobby irregular changes to the Master Plan hence diluting its organizational character as demonstrated in Map 4.3. Third, in spite of the incompossibility of conditions and rigidity of the outdated Master-Planning tool nonetheless it remains the ideology though which the spatial needs of Ramallites is tackled. Fourth, an acute lack of open public space including green areas, which justifies itself with land ownership complications rather than labouring an alternative as outlined in Map 4.6 and Table 4.3. And fifth, the systematized spatial marginalization through designating a mere 5% of the total residential zones to low-income housing, as demonstrated in Map 4.5 and Table 4.2.

Map 4.3 Selected enlargements from Master Plan demonstrating approved violations.
above: In 2005 this neighbourhood was planned as Residential-AA corresponding to low-rise villas. In 2011 the owner constructed high residences in violation of the regulations for this area without attaining the necessary licenses either. In retrospect the classification of his property was changed to Residential-A rather than issuing a correction / demolition order.
below: responding to the request of the investor, the lot was reclassified from Residential-A to Office-buildings in spite of mass public objections as well as the fragility of present infrastructure.
Map 4.4. 2005 and 2009 Master Plans combined (RM 厉害). This edited version of the plans narrows down the number of zones from 厉害 typologies to 厉害 by clustering zones with highly similar regulations. This applies chiefly to commercial areas represented below using shades of blue.
The map and table below demonstrate that the financially underprivileged have a mere 5% of the total residential area of Ramallah designated for them. This translates in their absolute exclusion from about 55% the city-space, hence they are cornered to search for housing in other localities (mainly the poor neighbourhoods of alBireh and Beitunya).

Table 4.2. Spatial allocation for residential purposes for varying social strata (corresponding to regulations and value).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Master Plan 1999 + 2009</th>
<th>% of Residential area</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Area dunom</td>
<td>% of city area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residential-AA</td>
<td>1882</td>
<td>14.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residential-A</td>
<td>1943</td>
<td>15.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residential-B</td>
<td>1681</td>
<td>13.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residential-C</td>
<td>370</td>
<td>2.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residential-Agri.</td>
<td>1527</td>
<td>11.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>7403</td>
<td>57.3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Map 4.6. Filter ‘2’ of Map 4.4 : Spatial allocation for public open space, tourism and greenery (RM 縻).

The map and table below demonstrate two: 1. As lands in Ramallah are chiefly privately owned, public open spaces and gardens are modest and limited extracts through reparcelation that fall below conservative urban needs, where they spread over a mere 0,6% of the total city-area and amount to 0,03 sq.m. per person (Ramallah, alBireh & Beitunya 2006); 2. Assuming that tourism spaces can be used by city-inhabitants as public space for leisure purposes – which is not necessarily true and again excluding the financially underprivileged – nonetheless this is also a narrow 0,6% of the total city space.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Master Plan 1999 + 2009</th>
<th>% of</th>
<th>Public-use area</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Area</td>
<td>% of city area</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public facilities &amp; services</td>
<td>920</td>
<td>8,1%</td>
<td>86,1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public open space</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>0,6%</td>
<td>6,8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tourism zones &amp; archeological sites</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>0,6%</td>
<td>81%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1068</td>
<td>8,1%</td>
<td>100,0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.6. Spatial allocation for public open space, tourism and greenery (corresponding to regulations and value).
Map 4.7. Filter 3 of Map 4.4: Spatial allocation for commercial areas (RM 3). The map below reflects the planner’s concept of creating nodal commercial points around the city while maintaining the old-city-core as the chief retail area. One could argue that this arrangement protects residential neighbourhoods against traffic pollution. On the other side of the same coin, given the acute lack of a public transportation system such a model becomes the particular engine behind the continued traffic jams and accompanying forms of pollution. Meanwhile, the PCBS (2013) data on forms and characteristics of commercial activities in the city calls for a spatial arrangement that aligns office and commercial areas along existing traffic arteries; which reduces commuting distances and simultaneously contributes to balancing real-estate values.

Table 4.4. Spatial allocation for commercial purposes for varying forms of production (corresponding to regulations and value).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Master Plan 1999 + 2009</th>
<th>% of Residential area</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Area dunom</td>
<td>% of city area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exhibitions zone</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>1,1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commercial zone</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>0,8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Office + Mixed uses</td>
<td>665</td>
<td>5,1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industrial zone</td>
<td>379</td>
<td>2,9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1287</td>
<td>9,9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3.2. Strategic Development and Investment Plan (SDIP), 2007-2011

While MOPAD and MOLG drafted their RABMA proposal, at a lower level of the command-chain the German International Cooperation Agency (GIZ) conducted a WB-wide program through which the municipalities of Ramallah, alBireh and Beitunya held joint meetings facilitated by a team of GIZ and alNajjah University experts, towards setting a SDIP for the three municipalities. The priorities of the strategies were named as: 1. Infrastructure, Services and Environment; 2. Institutional Structure and Public Partnership; 3. Sociocultural Aspects; and 4. Economic Aspects. Through a series of workshops and meetings – following eurocentric guidelines on strategic urban development practices – the three partner cities articulated their vision as:

Together we seek a prosperous area built on service-based economy with reliable infrastructure, adopts good governance and assures efficient public participation, respects diversity and citizens’ rights, and preserves its environment and heritage. (Ramallah, alBireh & Beitunya 2007:10)

Translating their vision and named priorities the partners agreed on a set of goals and strategies (Table 4.5). Corresponding to the four-pillar framework a total of 36 projects were identified (Table 4.6) for the period 2007-2011 with an approximate total budget of US$ 64 million. Potential sources of funding varied between inhouse, private sector, donor community, and mixture variations of the three (Ramallah, alBireh & Beitunya 2007). The named strategies and goals might seem coherent and founded at a first glance, nonetheless this impression is reversed once the plan falls under scrutiny. First, regarding the thematic pillar of infrastructure and environment; while traffic continues to form a circadian nuisance the SDP doesn’t include any proposals regarding provision of efficient public transportation. Although this problematic falls under the mandate of the Ministry of Transportation and Public Works, municipalities should participate in the articulation of approaches and implementation of schemes hence integrating the efforts of the two bodies. Rather, a number of points address the issue of waste management at a time decision in this regard lies exclusively in the hands of Israel’s COGAT which in turn has repeatedly turned down relevant proposals. Notwithstanding, up to this date neither issues have bordered a solution. It is not a matter of prioritizing either subject over the other; rather, about planning action in accordance with available tools and within the continued colonial conditions in lieu of standardized guidelines.

Second, while the partners are indiscreet about the inefficiency of their institutional structures and ‘lack of qualified employees’ at their departments (an opinion shared also by Anani 2010, Kassis 2010, Huleileh 2012, Shaheen 2012), six years later the change has been minimal. The JCU remains absent, planning joint organizational structures – e.g. joint Master Plan, traffic plan, cultural programs, etc. – are frozen, and therewith the joint Capital Investment Plan (CIP, Table 4.6) has turned obsolete.

The third pillar which is concerned with sociocultural activities and forging feelings of belonging to the wider city-space was appropriated by RM which as of 2010 has been increasingly investing in organizing public events; such as the
Table 4.5. Derivative edition from: Developmental Priorities, Vision & Strategies (Ramallah, alBireh & Beitunya 2003:10)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Development Priorities</th>
<th>Infrastructure, Services and Environment</th>
<th>Institutional Structure and Public Partnership</th>
<th>Sociocultural Aspects</th>
<th>Economic Aspects</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Main Challenges</td>
<td>• Radial-concentric road network resulting in problems; • Inefficient transportation infrastructure; • Insufficient waste water treatment; • Weak solid waste collection system; • Mixed land use (recreational and industrial) resulting in environmental problems; • High rates of migration to the cities.</td>
<td>• Weak institutional structure; • Lack of cooperation between municipalities; • Absence of joint strategic planning policies; • Unavailability of municipal programs targeting the community; • Lack of qualified employees at the municipalities; • Low citizens’ trust &amp; loyalty to cities.</td>
<td>• Lack of green and public spaces (0.06 sq.m./person); • Limited social and cultural activities services (around 6 cultural societies, 2 public libraries, 3 cinemas and 12 sport clubs).</td>
<td>• Very limited municipal income sources; • Inability of the municipalities to operate and maintain large-scale projects; • Israeli restriction on expansion and accessibility; • Absence of penalty regulations for unpaid revenues; • Few light industries and lack of job opportunities; • High land prices.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Targets by 2013</td>
<td>• Develop an efficient and joint infrastructure for the three cities; • Contribute in providing a better environment.</td>
<td>• Enhance integrated, mutual, and sustainable developmental work.</td>
<td>• Capitalize on the cultural and social diversity; • Preserve cultural heritage / seek social equity.</td>
<td>• Promote the area as an attractive service-center; • Improve municipalities’ financial sustainability.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategies</td>
<td>• Upgrading and developing joint integrated master plan for the cities; • Developing and executing comprehensive traffic plan; • Focusing on implementing joint infrastructure projects.</td>
<td>• Institutionalizing mutual cooperation between the municipalities; • Implementing institutional development in the municipalities; • Institutionalizing councils’ relations with CSOs and the public; • Building the capacity of municipal employees.</td>
<td>• Establishing cultural &amp; social facilities to be distributed equally in the cities; • Raising citizens’ awareness of their rights and responsibilities in the framework of diversity; • Organizing cultural and recreational activities in partnership with cultural organizations.</td>
<td>• Developing municipal regulations that provide incentives for investment in Service Economy; • Promoting the area as an attractive and integrated services center; • Building human capacity in fields related to service economy and municipal self financing.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 4.6. Derivative edition from: Capital Investment Plan, CIP (Ramallah, alBireh & Beitunya 2007:11)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Priority</th>
<th>Project Title</th>
<th>Implementation 2008</th>
<th>Implementation 2009</th>
<th>Implementation 2010</th>
<th>Implementation 2011</th>
<th>Completed in 2014?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Solid waste collection, treatment, &amp; management program</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>×</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Establishing a Joint Cooperation Council</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Preparation of a comprehensive traffic plan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>×</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Preparation of a joint Master Plan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>×</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Establishing children branch libraries</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Waste water network and treatment plant</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>×</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Constructing public parks in marginalized areas</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Institutional development and capacity building for the municipalities</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>×</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Establishing a National Museum</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>×</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Establishing an investment incubator</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>×</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Construction of a slaughter house</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>×</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Computerization of municipal database &amp; service systems</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Execution of joint streets</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Improving traffic environment on Yafa-Irsal street</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Construction of an international stadium</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>×</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Activation of Schools's sociocultural role</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Campaign to change the renting/leasing regulations</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>×</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Establishing &quot;Partnership with Public&quot; unit at each municipality</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Developing building regulations</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>×</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Establishing a joint cultural and social activities database</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>×</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Storm-water Master Plan for the cities</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>×</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>Cleaning walls &amp; signs from posters &amp; stickers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>Construction of the National Park</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>×</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>Establishing a unified industrial zone for the cities and reorganizing the existing areas</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>×</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>Constructing a commercial centre for the cities</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>×</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>Study of handicapped accessibility &amp; rehabilitation structures</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>Joint cemetery</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>×</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>Arts and culture show</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>×</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>Establishing a joint Voluntary Works &amp; Public Services unit</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>×</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>Construction of a new vegetables market</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>×</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>Study the potential use of storm-water</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>×</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>Organizing cultural festivals in public areas</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33</td>
<td>Construction of tourist resort area</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>×</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34</td>
<td>Central children facility for culture &amp; art activities</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>×</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>Wireless internet services for the cities</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>×</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36</td>
<td>Construction of a municipal buses &amp; trucks station</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>×</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
annual illumination of the Christmas Tree, Local Crafts Festival, and *Nunwar Nisan* (April's Blossom) educational and entertainment festival for children, to mention a few. While this aspect is making progress towards meeting needs, the creation of necessary social infrastructures has fallen short of expectations.

In the fourth – economic – pillar of the SDIP challenges are coherently articulated yet remain unresolved in the strategies and planned projects. In the absence of a genuine will to forge a balance, prices of property in Ramallah continue to inflate under speculation reaching levels comparable to Berlin and Beirut while salaries stagnate, thence placing hundreds of vacant apartments beyond the feasible range of the majority of seekers (Image 4.2, pg. 202). By 2014 the pace of penetration of the city-skyline by apartment buildings has slowed down; but not that of the violations to the construction regulations which awaits an applicable penalization scheme that would hinder violations on one hand, and generate revenue to the municipalities on the other.

Under the same strategy-category the partner municipalities agreed on ‘providing incentives for investment in Service Economy’. This ignores the reality by which over 60% of the total employment in the area lies in the – naturally and rapidly growing – services sector (MOPAD 2009, Huleileh 2012). Further, deepening entanglement with the donor-dependent services sector compromises rather than endorses financial sustainability and expanding municipal returns. Such a policy aggravates the status quo of the city lying hostage to political wishes of Israel and western priorities (alKhalili 2012, Shaheen 2012). Examples of such incidents include the year 2006 when Palestinian localities found themselves at an impasse as the elected government of Hamas failed to receive the blessing of neither Israel nor the international community, and consequently economic agreements were annulled causing an extreme financial crisis¹⁹. Similarly, starting 2011 as the Arab Spring events unfolded the donor community had their attention caught away from Palestinians, triggering a diminuendo in aid and equally a perpetuating crescendo of crisis by which unemployment rate increased from 20.9% in 2011, to 22.0% in 2012, to 22.1% by the third quarter of 2013 (PCBS 2011, 2012, 2013b). Meanwhile, industry and production are further constrained by the geopolitics of the Israeli colonial discourse of closures, confiscation of resources, denied access to international markets, repeated destruction of infrastructures, etc.²⁰. Thereof, the geopolitical and economic conditions of Palestinian localities dictates pursuit of stability beyond conventional neoliberal tools, and maybe taking the PRDP advice of re-orienting towards high-value, knowledge-based economy.

Last in this limited revision of the SDIP it ought to be noted that the CIP’s (Table 4.6) ranking of priorities lacks traceable logic. For example, while waste treatment and traffic are evident priorities, scientific and logical arguments fail to provide explanations for why the construction of an International Stadium (rank 15) is of higher priority than preparing a storm-water master plan (rank 21) and the corollary study of the potential use of storm-water (rank 31) – nor does it explain why the planning of the ‘use’ is ten ranks below that of provisioning the infrastructure. Scientific and professional logic would have, at least, reversed the order of these two. This ranking becomes increasingly puzzling when taking into consideration that, first, the three cities spread over a series of hilltops and valleys which witness annual losses, damages, and occasionally human casualties in winter seasons as water accelerates down steep cliffs and roads which often lie
at inclination reaching 40% (see section 2.1.3.iii, pg. 65); and second, as these cities happen to suffer greatly from Israel-induced water shortages.

In the same line of thought – given the shortage in land, swelling of population, poverty of municipalities and high values of property – it is incomprehensible why new unified industrial zone (rank 24), shared commercial centre (rank 25), and vegetables market (rank 30) have to be established rather than sufficing with reorganizing and enhancing the connectivity and performance of existing ones. Nonetheless, when re-examining these three along with projects in ranks 9, 15, 20, 22, 23, 28, 32, 33 and 35 (a third of CIP); a non-declared strategy crystallizes by which the cities are striving for higher visibility driven by the conviction that an image of uniformity and tidiness is essential for international promotion of the space (further elaborated in following section).

Before closing this section, it is worthy to note that the SDIP process – under the leadership of the GIZ and alNajjah University experts, being financed by generous donors – lacked the quintessential customization to context and capacity building (Shaheen 2012), and equally the realism of urban strategies (Barghouthi 2012) – as exhibited in the fact that the majority of named projects were not executed up to date (Table 4.6, pg. 200). When asked about the program Shaheen stated that ‘our problem [as Palestinians] remains that we have been importing models and pasting them into our very different context’ (Shaheen 2012), while the head of the Policies Department at the MOLG answered:

The SDIP Program is nothing more than a donor-imposed fashion. The program made LGs draft five-year strategic plans. Meanwhile, the PA – under which these LGs operate – does not know whether it will be able to pay the public-salaries next week! It is no more than an exercise in writing standardized proposals. It is a theatre play in which everyone involved is happy about the character they play, and meanwhile valuable financial and human resources are wasted. These plans will remain on shelves accumulating dust, simply because these LGs have
no financial resources to execute. Furthermore, normally strategic plans are made based on studies of resources in order to manage efficient and effective allocation. Here I will ask; what are the resources of the Palestinian LGs? [...] So they ran this program and got everyone excited about participatory approaches, meetings between X and Y, priorities, PRA - Participatory Rural Appraisal, SDIP and ‘you have to follow the manual’, etc. I do believe in the importance of dreaming and future visions, and I also believe in the importance of being realistic and true to existing conditions. (Barghouthi 2012)

4.3.3. Beyond Manuals: Municipal Programs, Approach and OAs Legacy

Following the municipal eras of pre-Oslo institutionalized discrimination (by ICA), the 1994-2000 confusion\(^{21}\), and the 2001-2005 emergency\(^{22}\); in 2006 the first Palestinian municipal elections – based on agendas and targets – took place. The elected RM Council perceived institutional and spatial organization and order as the kernel of their role (Michael 2010, Abdullah 2010). This ideology translated in pursuit and accentuation of projects contributing to – what they perceive as – an image of modernity (Anani 2010). In 2008 and after three years in office the municipal council capitalized on the occasion of the centennial to announce 58 projects varying across six themes (Ramallah Municipality 2008:11):

[1] Development of infrastructure and environment;
[2] Protection of cultural heritage;
[3] Promotion of culture and science;
[4] Strengthening of pluralism and community participation;
[5] Comprehensive institutional development of RM; and,

Within the framework of the ‘Development of Infrastructure and environment’ category RM proposed and conducted numerous projects that classify under infrastructure-upgrade, service-provision, and beautification. Some of these projects are: rehabilitation of water networks (significant stretches of which dated back to the 1960s-Jordanian era); rehabilitation of existing streets and provision of new vital connections; side walks, and illumination; designing and implementing comprehensive street-naming, house numbering and a postal-code systems; traffic re-organization and installation of parking meters; rehabilitation and creation of new connecting staircases, public (vehicle not pedestrian) squares and several neighbourhood gardens; comprehensive revitalization of city core, and the 15,000 Trees campaign (Ramallah Municipality 2008:12). The implementation of these projects has had a significant impact on the livelihood of residents and within parameters forged feelings of pride and reference as articulated in focus groups and by some interviewees (Abdullah 2010, Zananiri 2010, a.o). On the other side of the same coin these projects coupled with demand on the city further encouraged the orthodox price inflation and initiation of socio-spatial segregation.
Projects planned within the second theme of ‘Protection of cultural heritage’ are in fact limited to archaeological preservation and city-image presentation as a space with lineage. Beyond the enriching ability to trace and consciously experience the growth and layering of an urban space, there is another factor feeding this emphasis on the physical heritage; namely, the sociopolitical conditions created by the ongoing colonization which tallies the length of mythological narrative of a space as equivalent to the depth of its legitimacy. While Ramallah is being coined as the newly established locus of ‘fremd politics’ (alKhalili 2012) and corruption (Kassis 2010, Shaheen 2012), RM is resisting this branding by articulating the journey of the city into the present. However, the mental limitation is exposed by the fact that the concept of ‘architectural heritage’ remains short of including the characteristic modernist villas of the 1960s, nor the romantic Balcony-Street design of the fabric of the centre that developed chiefly in the 1970s; Image 4.3 to Image 4.5 below.

The ‘Promotion of culture and science’ and ‘Strengthening of pluralism and community participation’ categories are focused on establishment of – much needed – social infrastructures and frameworks: theatre; library; two museums; school; media, sports and recreation centres, and four parks. The soft-side of these tracks include the formation of neighbourhood committees, an open wireless internet city-wide network (the digital stage), and organizing an undetermined number of arts and youth programs (Ramallah Municipality 2008:18–21). Whereas pre-Oslo social activities took place predominantly in the private and semi-private spaces away from the eyes of the colonizer and under
the socio-political ethos of austerity; nowadays the differing spatial morphology, household typology and socioeconomic ideologies and dynamics are gradually forging the emergence of public social spaces, services and infrastructures (Taraki 2008a, Anani 2010); in a process resemblant of Lefebvre’s ‘social production of space’. While the larger segment of these projects is still pending, the municipal articulation of a policy prioritizing the provision of such social infrastructures reflects an evolution in administrative perception of the ‘common’ social and equally spatial spheres. On the other side of the same coin, the publications of the RM might give these undertakings an impression of developmental top-down led initiatives, here it should be recognized that they are induced by socio-economic needs and emergence of new variations of cultural ethos. Further, the absence of frameworks regulating, and channels connecting undertakings with other elements of the municipal system is narrowing the impact and growth possibilities of this sector; whereby programs of the cultural department might be growing and gaining a rhythm, nonetheless, they remain isolated from the spatial and infrastructural planning departments.

The fifth category ‘Comprehensive institutional development of RM’ is neither comprehensive nor developmental, rather, pertaining to partial organization activities. The rehabilitation of the municipal building, creation of One Stop Shop for municipal services, establishment of a GIS Unit and Total Quality Management system are items that serve in-house spatial, information and procedural organization. Meanwhile, the 2008-2010 Strategic Plan and the Ramallah Zoning projects target city-wide spatial planning, and Measuring

Image 4.2 A view over the Yasser Arafat Square direction alManara Square, city centre, September 2014. Notice the Balcony-Street design, and the rounded edges of the crossing.
Citizen’s Satisfaction project is simply a performance indicator. The label of this category is tailored for the ‘FAB’ – Foreign development Aid Bingo\textsuperscript{24} – tautologic linguistic criteria, as is the sixth theme of ‘Promotion of Tourism and Investment’. The projects of the latter focus on forging a modern and attractive city image, hand in hand with private investment incentives through spatial enhancements. Herein, the Industrial Zone Rehabilitation and the alHarajah Commercial Area projects are clearly concerned with ameliorating spatial, infrastructural and aesthetic conditions for investors; while the National Exhibition Centre, Tourist Information Centres, Restaurants & Cafés, and alManara Parking Complex are concerned with investment-relevant factors of market visibility and facilitated client accessibility. Examination of each of the projects in both the fifth and sixth themes provides further evidence of the eclectic mode of decision-making within Ramallah’s municipality, as well as the depth of influence of mobile non-customized international city-marketing policies, whether through international organizations such as the World Bank or dominant Eurocentric city management-and image-discourses (Colomb 200\textsuperscript{6}).

While RM remains distant from exhibiting capabilities of endemic analysis and customization of vision, nevertheless, these projects do constitute a step towards change. No observant can deny its organizational progress starting 2006. At the time cash flows and pressure on services augmented with the signature of the PRDP (200\textsuperscript{7}) the municipality started replacing the archaic public administration systems with those of the twenty-first century. Herein, its approach is based on a target which they phrase as:

To achieve the goal of transforming Ramallah into a model city in the region, and a city of international caliber, it was imperative that Ramallah experience a comprehensive renaissance. (Ramallah Municipality 2008:11; emphasis added)

RM’s target exhibits the product of what Ferguson coined as the ‘anti-politics machine’ (section 3.2.3, pg. 151); wherein it assumes political ability to exercise normalcy and economy, and thereof induce a ‘renaissance’ – assimilating free cities – regardless of the continuation of the colonial project. This is the byproduct of decades of shrinking and coping, and the corollary production of pedigree spaces. The post-colonial promotion of separation of national political affairs from the administration of milieus is astoundingly echoed in the terminology of municipal politicians and policies. Besides the incompatibility of the simile, this enthusiasm towards progress is fuelling process of re-invention of the wheel of urban cycles rather than innovation of new forms. Amman, Barcelona, Beirut, Cairo, Rome and others have all featured one or several of Ramallah’s physical trends and mistakes. For example, a Parking Complex at the busiest geography of the city has indeed in some cases contributed to alleviating parking shortages e.g. the subterranean Marktplatz Parking in Bonn or that beneath the busy Plaza Cathedral in Barcelona. Nevertheless, extensive available research has proven similar projects to be causes of further congestion where neither surrounding context nor traffic circulation knots were addressed concomitantly. RM’s proposed parking lies at the sole and busiest narrow artery of the city, and few hundred meters away from alBireh Municipality’s parking complex; a project that continues to form significant burden on the limited infrastructure and equally devastating impacts on the aesthetics and environment of the vital elManara
The National Exhibition Centre is another project with significant perplexity the least of which is the geographic isolation and impeded accessibility of the city. While the municipality has advanced on issues of service provision and administration, they remain oblivious to principles of customized, systematic, timely-sensible and integrated urban planning, and a fortiori, planning for uncertainty.

On another level, this municipality has been target of heavy criticism by practitioners, scholars and citizens (majority of focus groups participants and interviewees) for lack of regulation of form, location, economic characteristics and time of placement of investments. On one hand, indeed in cities worldwide a process of ‘responsibilisation’ is taking place by which urban spacio-economic affairs are 'left to the vagaries of market mechanisms and individual action [... where] the role of the state [is seen] as one of an enabler rather than a direct manager' (Raco et al. 2013:4). On the other hand, RM suffers from significant shortage in financial liquidity due to inability of LGs to exercise direct taxation and their non-monopoly over income generation and expenditure methods (AbdelAaty 2005, AMAN 2014, Barghouthi 2012). Municipalities – akin their government – are highly dependent on foreign aid in the provision of their services and thereof the scope of their regulation power. Table 4.7, pg. 208 summarizes RM’s expenditure plan as outlined in their Centennial Project, demonstrating how its budgetary contribution falls below 20%, and even then 70% of this contribution is in the form of either real estate or land (Ramallah Municipality 2008). As such, dominion of private and foreign agendas can be neither capped nor altered. This reality invokes one of the central arguments of this work, whereby urban morphological change towards environmental and social resilience can only be achieved if made lucrative, and practicable by the masses not only a coterie.

Table 4.7 also highlights a municipal expenditure discrepancy, which in turn is an indicator of the OAs legacy. While high expenses of infrastructure provision are customary, the four categories – 2 to 5 – of public social and institutional infrastructures combined sum up to US$ 47.23 million; hence accounting to 85% of the amount planned for expenditure in the sixth sector of tourism and private investment incentives, to which US$ 55.8 million have been allocated.

Also quintessential to planning endeavours in Ramallah is comprehension of the tensile contemporary politics of its municipality. Embedded deep in the agenda and programs of the municipal council of 2006-2012 is a quiet – yet not necessarily intelligent – insubordination against the PA that had stripped
As mentioned elsewhere, according to the PA’s arrangements the main task of Palestinian municipalities is concerned with regulating the built environment, and even then municipalities serve as a front-desk and liaison officers, as Barghouthi elaborates:

> [customarily] the central authority’s job is to plan, administer and decide on budgeting while municipalities and LGs deal with populations and their needs. In our case, in order to justify their presence and size – while using the existing geographic fragmentation as grounds – ministries appropriated municipal powers. [...] This limited municipal powers and their development. Municipalities are unable to set future growth visions because simply they don’t call the shots. [...]. The situation is exactly like that of the terms of the OAs: Israel contracted the establishment of the PA but gave it only the dirty work of the COGAT, and in its turn, the PA contracted with the municipalities and left the latter with the dirty work. So practically, the PA is unable to develop itself due to the terms of contraction it undersigned with Israel, and simultaneously, it is maintaining legitimacy of continuity by having appropriated powers of municipalities rendering itself of necessity. If anyone speaks of visions s/he would either be delusional or lying, we are trapped at a point where moving forward necessitates breaking this vicious cycle. (Barghouthi 2012, Head of Policies Department at MOLG)

Through implementing soft programmes (e.g. Environment Friendly Schools Project; running the hitherto most regionally advanced Palestinian ‘Emergency Operations Centre’ for the massive 2013 snow storm) RM is crossing fences into mandates of other public bodies in pioneer steps towards reclaiming the confiscated dimensions of their institutional role. It has developed close ties to the much-larger Jordanian counterparts, improved their transparency by regularly publishing minutes of their council meetings and decisions online, holding public

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>[1] Development of infrastructure &amp; environment</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>69.00</td>
<td>1.30</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[2] Protection of cultural heritage</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9.90</td>
<td>0.90</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[3] Promotion of culture &amp; science</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>26.10</td>
<td>6.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>2.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[4] Strengthening of pluralism &amp; community participation</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10.64</td>
<td>0.84</td>
<td>2.10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[5] Comprehensive institutional development of RM</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2.49</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[6] Promotion of tourism &amp; investment</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>22.00</td>
<td>10.40</td>
<td>10.40</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>172.03</td>
<td>29.42</td>
<td>18.20</td>
<td>2.40</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4. 2008 - 2011 Projects as stated in the Ramallah Municipality (2008) publication
opinion assemblies, and receiving international guests with whom political and economic partnerships are explored. With the commencement of the ongoing financial crisis in 2011, the municipality has been increasingly outsourcing internal responsibilities (decision-making?) to the private sector manoeuvring around the legal and financial obstacles created by its subsidiary status.

Like others, these processes are gaining size as that of a downhill rolling snow-ball, yet synergy-threads are absent. For example, lately the ‘Ramallah Developmental Planning Framework 2016-2035’ (RDPF) project has been declared which aims at re-designing municipal strategies and targets, for the coming twenty years. The images captured at the launching event and published on the municipality’s FaceBook page reflect the involvement of several public- and private-sector institutions with their higher and lower tiers of command. What images also reveal is the absence of involvement of non directly-affiliated practitioners, researchers and scholars, which compose the larger pool of nonpartisan knowledge. Further, details beyond the caption under the name of the event are nowhere to be found, raising genuine concerns about the participatory dimension and the ability of this exercise to grow beyond the course of the SDIP; an attractive document structurally, yet technically void of relevance. Having said that, and while Ramallah’s growth and municipal policies are no paragon, nonetheless, assembling the pieces of the puzzle provide an image of a ‘legacy in the forming’, whereby Ramallah’s peu-à-peu social, economic and political divorce from the wider national context constitutes the initiation of the Palestinian post-national era.

The one variable that has been a constant in the life of Ramallah – citizens and municipal approach – is its rapid responsiveness to change. When the British eyed it as a ‘hill station’, the town grasped its tourism and administration potential as the viable alternative to its non competitiveness in either agriculture, or manufacturing, nor mythology. While Nakba fleeing Palestinians were allowed to settle close to the agricultural Jenin-city, the trade-centre Nablus pushed them as far away as humanly acceptable, whereas the wealthy Hebron denied them permission to approach city territory and peripheries. In that same event, provincial Ramallah opened arms to double its size integrating refugees into its labour- and intellectual-capital. This unorchestrated, varied, and paradoxal behaviour could – from a conceptual perspective – draw some parallels with the current dynamics in EU politics on emigration. While British politics is turning increasingly Zionist exampling higher levels of xenophobia and scripting mythological racial criteria for emigration (who is not British?); in contrast, Swedish politics is echoed in the Ramallite discourse, where today it is leading the efforts in the EU towards reducing border offensiveness and expanding the paths for legal emigration and therewith swifter integration.

Although one of the smallest in size and shortest in age, nonetheless throughout the 1980s and 1990s Ramallah assumed a major seat in producing a new Palestinian consciousness which was rooted in comprehension of and responding to socio-economic needs (section 2.2.2, pg. 82). And again, although neither Ramallah’s municipality nor its citizens had planned to serve as seat for a hegemonic and centralized quasi authority; nonetheless they have identified the potential benefits, nurtured new risk strategies, and endured resulting problematics; which in turn today are pressing for solutions as the trajectory is posing genuine threats. How Ramallah designs its exit from the current financial and socio-political crisis is detrimental to the quality of life it would be able to offer to its citizens, hence its continuation as an attractive ecology.
Image 4.7. Street network in elTireh neighbourhood (Oct.2012). RM is preempting the rapid growth in the area, in a mode reminiscent of the ‘urbanizaciónes’ in Spain.

Image 4.8. Exhibitions Street in Ramallah’s centre after extensive upgrading works (2010); walls were cleaned, sidewalks widened, trees planted, and subterranean infrastructures placed anew (Agroffman2013).

Image 4.9. Qadura Garden in city centre (2011). This is one of a dozen small gardens and playgrounds established around the city between 2008 and 2012.

Image 4.10. Radana Park (2012); spreading over 7,000 sq.m. it is the only park in the city (RMfb 2013).

Image 4.11. alKamandjati Music Conservatory in one of Ramallah’s old-city extended family house (2008); what is locally referred to as ‘hosh’. This was a pilot after which the renovation of a couple of other hosh’s was conducted by Riwaq Centre.


Image 4.13. [right] Street Naming project (2008). After a long pause the committee was re-formed and an extensive process was launched that included street naming, house numbering, and application of postal codes.
Image 4.14. Memorial site of the late poet Mahmoud Darwish (2012). It includes a museum, the Birweh (village of origin near Acre from which he was displaced in 1948) Garden, and the tomb of the poet.

Image 4.15. Ramallah Cultural Palace (2004). When constructed it was at the outskirts, adjacent to the solid-waste collection point, and criticized by locals for being ‘too far out’. Today this area is under heavy urbanization.

Image 4.16. Ramallah’s popular Market (2012). It was established for street vendors simultaneously with the passing of laws banning their activities on streets and sidewalks (RMfb 2013).

Image 4.17. Nuwwar Nisan Children’s Festival (2012). This took place throughout the old city core in an attempt to revitalize it on one hand, and on the other cater for emerging and changing social needs (RMfb 2014).

Image 4.18. Wain ‘a Ramallah Festival (2011). Many similar arts festivals are taking place throughout the city, throughout the year (RMfb 2014).

Image 4.20. Illustration of chosen design for the extension and upgrading of the municipal building and surrounding area (Ramallah Municipality 2011)

Image 4.21. Illustration of proposed redesign of alManara square to incorporate subterranean passages and a tunnel connecting to the nearby Parking Complex (Ramallah Municipality 2010a:78).

Image 4.22. Illustration of the traditional crafts alHarija Market renovation and upgrading project; located at outskirts of Ramallah’s old city (Ramallah Municipality 2010a:77)
Mahmoud Darwish Square (2010). This is one of 14 squares around Ramallah (map above) that were either established or upgraded between 2008 and 2013. Errection of squares falls under the larger framework of traffic organization. Given the topography, the decades of COGAT deprivation, the incompatibility of morphology and spatial characteristics, and the uncontrolled growth in the early years of the OAs the city is suffering from a genuine mobility crisis which the squares fall short from addressing. Notwithstanding, the squares are indeed serving as landmarks for orientation and—through their names—proponents of the city identity that RM wishes to consolidate; which is that high political and cultural consciousness as well as presence.
Image 4.24. Main Street in Ramallah centre (Odeh 2012). Two high-rise commercial buildings erected short after the signature of the OAs, notice how basic the designs are.


Image 4.28. PRICO headquarters, constructed in 2010.

Image 4.29. [centre] Office building constructed in 2009, first to be cladded with metal sheets in place of the traditional stone.

Image 4.25. Main Street in Ramallah centre. Image demonstrating contrast in height, form and finishing between former and new constructions.

Image 4.30. [right] Yasir Arafat Mausoleum within the Mukata’a (Wikipedia 2013). Significant sections of the Mukata’a have been reconstructed following flagship designs by the renowned architect Jafar Tukan. Noteworthy, taking photographs of the compound is banned.
Image 4.31. Prime Minister’s office (left) and one of the massive buildings forming the Ministries complex.


Image 4.33. Birzeit University Housing Cooperative complex in e’Tireh neighbourhood. Composes of 89 units, even though it is not the first housing cooperative to be constructed in Ramallah, nonetheless, many consider it the inspiration for the following wave of similar mass housing projects.

Image 4.34. Diplomatic Quarter units (housing project). Noteworthy, this project is an exclusive gated community for persons affiliated with PA top tier, or wishing foreign diplomats.

Image 4.35. [bottom] Illustration of the Palestinian National Museum (designboom 2013). Following an international competition the design of the Irish architects Heneghan Peng were chosen. Construction commenced in 2013.
Image 4.36. [above] Panorama of Ramallah westward, taken from atop Palestine Tower, elErsal Street.

Image 4.37. [below] Panorama of elMasyoun neighbourhood, taken from EinMinjed neighbourhood.
Image 4.38. [left] Ramallah's centre as seen from elMasyoun neighbourhood.
Image 4.39. [right] Ramallah centre as seen from elTireh neighbourhood.

Image 4.42. [above] elTireh neighbourhood as seen from the Diplomatic Quarter.
Image 4.43. [below] elTireh neighbourhood as seen from its northern valley.
Image 4.40. [left] Im elSharayet & Kufur Aqab neighbourhoods with Jerusalem in the back.
Image 4.41. [right] elQudaira neighbourhood.
4.4. ALTERNATIVES TO HIERARCHY, GENERIC POLICY-MOBILITY AND ANTISPACES

As confirmed in each of the eight focus groups and the twenty interviews conducted within the framework of this work; Ramallah’s municipality and citizens are – legitimately – more concerned with the quotidian and individual welfare than the revolutionary collective cause of achieving statehood. While the Palestinian official political discourse and politicians remain unaltered since the Cold War, nonetheless, the residents of Ramallah – regardless of origin and status – are pursuing socioeconomic norms of the twenty-first century that include – among other aspects – right to ideological differentiation, where one of every two participating in the focus groups named freedom (from social pressures), openness, pluralism and living conditions as ‘the most positive aspect of Ramallah’. While the municipality seems to be aware of this reality, yet it needs to fathom that endorsing these aspects is neither limited to sporadic and confined spaces as it proposes in its fourth category, nor to private leisure and entertainment spaces. The private sector is universally the largest provider of socially- and culturally-exclusive services particularly because they are free to chose their sectors. Yet each municipality beholds the responsibility for establishing positive connections and thereof the decision-making on regulations for sectoral prioritization, subsidization programs, and detailed licensing and construction parameters. Here Trancik points out:

Most striking has been the unwillingness or inability of public institutions to control the appearance and physical structure of the city. This has resulted in the erosion of a collective framework and visual illiteracy among the public. The government must institute strong policies for spatial design, the public must take part in shaping its surroundings, and designers must understand the principles underlying successful urban space. (Trancik 1986:18)

Knox and Ozolins (2008) describe the built environment as bearer of the *zeitgeist*, the ‘spirit’ that evolves through events and accumulation of souvenirs from passing times and changing relationships, wherein they equate city-space to a readable ‘biography of urban change’ (ibid:313). Negating the ‘readability’ of Ramallah, a participant in the FG 2011, no 3 said:

Normally if the planning process is correct, then the image of the space is also correct. For example when one says New York, one immediately thinks of the skyscrapers regardless of whether this is a positive thing or not. Here we ask: where is the identity of Ramallah? the image? how do I feel when I am in the city?... In Ramallah I jump from an old-city area, to high traffic zone, then I get to Masyoun, an area that is ‘wow’, then to the refugee camp, then back to elTireh which is split between nice areas and not exactly nice, etc. So what is
Diversity is good, but there should be a common title to all of this, not like now, not like a text with no title.

Another participant elaborated:

I agree with you on the issue on the 'title', but I disagree with that being as 'planning'. It is not about the processes of growth and whether they are spontaneous or planned, it is about how much awareness is there. What is missing is a collective sense that articulates the identity of this city.

Financial power resembles the electric switches in a circuit, which in the absence of a network are neutralized. In this sense, RM should relinquish its proponing of financial strangulation as excuse for its weak command on the impacts of private initiatives. Sometime between 2008 and 2010 an investor was granted (or almost granted) permission to construct a high-rise of 15-20 stories on a site located at the Library Street; one of the few remaining tree-shed stretches and the one coined as the most romantic in the city. It became public that safety regulations would necessitate enlarging some segments of the street and hence the destruction of its atmosphere. As a result of popular pressure the municipality had to withdraw its approval and the investor had to change his plans. This event demonstrates the significant power of the masses in taming the direction of change pursued by private investors, if they find the chance. The Neighbourhood Committees suggested by the municipality are similar to the inactive Ramallah Beautification Committee, wherein the role imagined for them is that of consultants whose opinions are not binding. If RM wishes to utilize the masses, it has to give its representatives a share in executive decision-making power. As Rayyan notes:

There are lots of committees and they are trying to involve people, but it was more about taking part in the activity rather taking part in the decision making. And yes, at the municipal level there might be some of these rare occasions where the public is involved, but on the higher levels of governance and political-decision, they are still hesitating to give this to the public. (Rayyan 2010)

Yet again, decentralization does pose the threat of discontinuity equal to that by bureaucratic systems. Hence what channels and frameworks are necessary for the utilization of the power of the masses without causing territorial and administrative fragmentation? How can the various urban layers be consolidated into self-reinforcing cycles? What elements are necessary for time-sensitive systems that adapt to changing socio-economic needs? How can RM bridge locational economic production modes with factors of improving living conditions of the various social strata? These are voluminous questions that no singular party can answer, yet must be digested. The final chapter exhibits few exemplary alternative approaches to framing time-sensitive channels of positive spatial (hence social, economic and political) relations. Meanwhile, based on the conclusions of the precedent chapter of Ramallah's transformation into a globalized translocality; therein, the coming pages establish the argumentative base for the forthcoming conceptual proposals through discussing; first, dynamics and shortcomings of existing planning systems employed by RM, and; second, the limitations of employed policies.
Table 4.8. Number of newly registering engineers at the Engineers Union per year (Engineering Union 2014)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2012</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No. of newly registered engineers</td>
<td>922</td>
<td>737</td>
<td>878</td>
<td>764</td>
<td>1198</td>
<td>1209</td>
<td>1092</td>
<td>1344</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New registration as comparative percentage with preceding year</td>
<td>104%*</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>119%</td>
<td>87%</td>
<td>157%</td>
<td>101%</td>
<td>90%</td>
<td>123%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* in 2004 there were 450 newly registered engineers.

Table 4.9. Regulations on practice of urban consultation and design by the Engineers Union (Engineering Union 2009:22-26, 46).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>No. of years of experience</th>
<th>Minimum staff size / specialty-unit</th>
<th>Maximum area / project (sq.m.)</th>
<th>Max. area / year: Architecture, Urban (sq.m.)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Consultant Office (only category authorized to conduct urban-scale projects)</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8,000</td>
<td>40,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eng. Office 1st level</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6,000</td>
<td>20,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eng. Office 2nd level</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>18,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eng. Office 3rd level</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>12,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opinion Office</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.10. Regulations on ‘work load shares’ per project by the Engineers Union (Engineering Union 2009:42).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Qualification</th>
<th>Arch. Eng.</th>
<th>Civil Eng.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bachelors of Engineering</td>
<td>6,000</td>
<td>8,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Per year since graduation (max. 10 yrs)</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Per year of experience since graduation (max. 10 yrs)</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Per year of experience post 10th year (max. 10 yrs)</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Per year of experience since graduation and affiliation to an office (max. 10 yrs)</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Per year of experience in public sector or abroad (max. 10 yrs)</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Per year of experience in discipline-related practices of management, teaching, subcontracting regardless of geography (max. 10 yrs)</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Masters Degree</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doctoral Degree</td>
<td>1,200</td>
<td>1,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upper limit per engineer</td>
<td>18,000</td>
<td>24,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
4.4.1. The Patriarchal Coterie, Construction Regulations and the Authority of the Master Plan

Quintessential for resilient planning is flexibility as highlighted by the IFRC (2012) among several specialized organisations, practitioners and scholars (e.g. UCLG's annual Global Forum on Urban Resilience & Adaptation; Anani 2010; Gehl 2011, etc). As elaborated in the previous chapter and evidenced in this one; master plans and zoning schemes are outdated and incompatible urban management practices. They are two-dimensional impositions on a four-dimensional context; they are generic rather than locational; their integration of corollary and varied economic and social systems is cosmetic; they require extensive preparation durations that dilute their relevance as they are based on start-line knowledge while intelligence is continuously and rapidly evolving and shifting; they assume stability at a time uncertainty is the global prevalent circumstance, and; such tools lack the flexibility and re-adaptation features necessitated by mechanisms of resilience. While RM’s recent RDPF project indicates a positive shift towards discussing ‘frameworks’, yet the selected time-frame of two decades seems to miss the annual breakthroughs of the technology sector, its rapidly unfolding management potentials, newly introduced fields of customized optimization, and mostly, since 1914 no political strategy – hence relationalities between economy, society and space – survived its decade.

The exclusion of young independent professionals from the RDPF meeting can be traced back through the Marxist dialectics of ‘moments’ elaborated in section 3.2.4, pg. 164. Mental conceptions of planning regard it as limited task executed by engineering professionals, just like baking is conducted by a baker. As a result, the nature of the field is patriarchal and exclusive which in turn is (re-) produced by hierarchical relations. While the minimum salaries for the sustenance of life start at less than US$ 300 monthly (45 hours per week) for graduates, they only rise to US$ 930 by the sixth year of experience (less than what a junior coordinator at an NGO, regardless how productive, would typically earn). This feeds into an ecology of self-reinforcement which nurtures and re-breeds the protagonists of this system of hierarchical and financial discrepancy. Living at existence minimums is normalized, ability to self-invest and co-create is curbed, and the ongoing braindrain will persist unless the cycle of tensions is interrupted.

While there is no statistical data enabling the comparison of numbers of university graduates with those licensed by the Engineering Union, it might be helpful here to note three; first, that the percentage distribution of persons with minimum a Bachelors Degree in the West Bank has grown from 5.3% in 1997 to 10.8% in 2012 i.e. a rise by 104%, while population increase for the same period accounted to less than half, 48% (PCBS 2014h, 2013); second, a study by the Union had registered the number of licensed engineers as shown in Table 4.8, which corresponds to a mean value of 102% annual increase in number of registered engineers between 2005 and 2012; and third, the continued strangulation of the Palestinian economy has been mirrored with a 27.6% decrease in the percentage distribution of employees in the construction sector, as Diagram 3.3, pg. 128 demonstrates (ibid: 2012b). Following economic fundamentals, the combination of high supply and low demand yields a low market-price i.e. range of salaries for engineers. On the other side of the same coin, this yields high vulnerability
Table 4.11. Site and construction regulation applied by Ramallah Municipality (Khamaisi 1998, 2005). These dimensions are ultimately proportional to the end value of properties due to the inflated land values in Ramallah.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Minimum Area of plot (sq.m)</th>
<th>Minimum Length of plot facade (m)</th>
<th>Lower Limit (m)</th>
<th>Upper Limit</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Side retention</td>
<td>Rear retention</td>
<td>Front retention</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residential-AA</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residential-A</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residential-B</td>
<td>750</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residential-C</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residential-Agric.</td>
<td>5000</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Office Buildings</td>
<td>a.a.</td>
<td>a.a.</td>
<td>a.a.</td>
<td>a.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commercial Buildings</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commercial Compound</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exhibitions Buildings</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industrial zone</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industrial compound</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industrial/crafts</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Buildings</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tourism Buildings</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.12. Alternative to current site and construction regulations applied by Ramallah Municipality for residential areas, while maintaining the same upper limits.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Minimum Area of plot (sq.m)</th>
<th>Minimum Length of plot facade (m)</th>
<th>Lower Limit (m)</th>
<th>Upper Limit</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Side retention</td>
<td>Rear retention</td>
<td>Front retention</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residential-AA</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residential-A</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residential-B</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residential-C</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residential-Agric.</td>
<td>5000</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
which reduces articulated objections to the hierarchical system. As patriarchalism is not limited to the Engineering Union rather spread throughout the majority of city-systems; of those answering the questionnaire inquiry ‘do you think you have the possibility for a prosperous career in Ramallah’ two out of each five replied with ‘No’ citing nepotism and structural restrictions as cause. Further, excluding participants above 50 years in age; i.e. youth, each fourth participant indicated the possibility of emigration.

Under the same discourse, the activity of production in the field of urban planning is highly regulated, whereby ability to practice is defined by the numerical value of years of experience, capital and compliance to accredited practice parameters (Table 4.9). Herein precedence becomes a determinant for the ‘working load share’ per project (hence financial remuneration) inside the practice itself, as demonstrated in Table 4.10. The various clauses and paragraphs in the 184 pages Manual of Engineering Practice (2009) reveals a system that does not consider urbanists and researchers who did not practice two-dimensional design – regardless of accumulated knowledge – as apt to setting urban strategies and schemes; because the end-product of Master Planning is two-dimensional. In other words, the technical pre-digital tool continues to have a higher order of importance over cognitive analytical abilities. Visualization of relations, overlays, distribution and other aspects are axiomatic to comprehensive analysis and communication; however, when the flow of lines in a visualization overrides the specificities of the four-dimensional reality – which cannot be captured only in drawings – the results are often catastrophic.

Three decades ago Trancik argued while echoing Lefebvre’s (2009) critique on homogenization practices of planners:

> Zoning legislation was drafted to protect citizens under the slogans of ‘health, safety, and welfare’ – as perceived by the planners. The result has been cities subdivided into homogeneous districts separated by traffic arteries. [...] The social impact has been to ban ‘non-conforming’ activities from each district, thereby excluding the variety that gives life to the traditional, pre-industrial city. Bureaucratic rigidity forbids Mom and Pop from living above their shop. Zoning operates under normative assumptions about human welfare and happiness. The complexity of social and functional relationships in the urban setting was incompatible with Modern Movement planning, which required aesthetic completeness for visual graphic effects. The ‘messy vitality’ that is the essence of urbanism has been sterilized by holistic planning models. Whatever could not be drawn in plan was omitted. (Trancik 1986:12)

Car-mechanics plan their interventions, entrepreneurs plan their risks, and families plan the balance between resources, wishes and needs – yet the Engineering Union by-laws (which stem from pre the Oslo era) limit decision-making over the collectively lived space to a handful of persons. While on 16 December 2010 Austria appointed then 28 years old Sebastian Kurz as its Minister of Foreign Affairs and Integration; meanwhile, the only authority providing urban planning practice rights necessitates that independent planners are at least 35 years old – assuming one graduates with a Bachelor’s degree in Engineering when 23 years old and faces no obstacles in her/his career. This feeds into the sixth Marxist ‘moment’, technology, whereby the aforementioned engenders a self-reinforcing system of technological-gap (soft and hard). While locationally-
available, sectorally-diverse, present-day, case-sensitive knowledge in Ramallah is comparatively advanced and experimentation of new concepts is popular; nonetheless the lack of trust in (fear of competition from-?) the capacities of 'start-ups' is systematically hindering the evolution of channels of cross- and multi-disciplinary operation and management.

RM's urban planning operations and management approaches are extensions of the aforementioned programming failure, as evident in the features of its spatial regulation paradigms. Elaborating on the analysis of the impact and dynamics of the Master Plan coupled with spatial regulations, the current site-retention and height upper and lower limits (Table 4.11, pg. 224) practically translate with a formula that provides better sun-exposure and air-circulation environments for the rich in comparison to the poor. Beyond the fact that the basic right of equal protection to all citizens is violated by such laws, and although engineers are mathematicians, physicists, and knowledgeable of dynamics and impacts of climatological forces; nonetheless, the planners who set those parameters ignore the banal knowledge that larger volumes with narrower retention spaces induce compressed wind flows at the ends and through the 'tunnel effect'. While few households might tolerate the slamming doors – by daily western winds of the Mediterranean – for the sake of a breeze in the summer, all through the year these are currents of street-trash and sometimes harmful projectiles. In the same discourse, front retention in Residential-Agricultural areas is specified at a minimum of 12 meters, meaning those planning to construct should calculate an additional cost of at least 240% more extra meters of infrastructural connections to outlets than other residential areas. A safer (social guarding of low-populated areas), space-efficient approach (non fragmentation of space), cheaper and more environmentally friendly (efficient resource use) would have been to place those buildings at a minimum distance from the street.

A distancing of built-up volumes based on principles of resource-efficiency, spatial integrity, and socializing the impact of nature e.g. wind, would have produced a different numbering, as shown in the example of residential areas in Table 4.12, pg. 224. This suggestion (which is neither based on studies nor promoted as the best-solution by this work) advocates the creation of morphological pockets which would; first, cater for higher levels of contiguity of non-built volumes, pedestrian mobility; second, neutralization of accelerating currents (wind, stormwater, etc.), and; third, takes into account higher prices of square meter of living space and the concomitant increased appreciation of public events and spaces, which induces spatial austerity for private-use in urban areas. These concepts and their potential employment modes are further explored later in this work.

In terms of built-up versus open volumes, under current regulations 60%, 64%, 68% and 72% of Residential-AA, -A, -B, and -C site volumes respectively are not addressed. These antispace – as Trancik (1986) refers to them – correspond to 28.80% of the total city area. As Image 4.46 pg. 229 demonstrates, they are predominantly abandoned excavations with load-retention walls reaching alarming heights (e.g. 20 meters, Image 2.11, pg. 66).

Meanwhile, when asked about 'most negative aspect of Ramallah' (Diagram 4.2, pg. 223), an overwhelming majority of almost 60% of participants in Focus Groups answered by naming spatial issues, chiefly describing it as 'overcrowded' and 'congested'. A glance at Map 4.8, pg. 227 would clarify beyond doubt that Ramallah's density is comparatively (e.g. to Nablus, Hebron, Beirut or Tunis) low
Map 4.8. A rough overlap of the nolli-plan of the (existing) agglomerate with that of the street network outlined by RM's (future) Master Plan.
Image 4.44. elTireh neighbourhood, October 2012.

Image 4.45. elTireh neighbourhood, October 2012.

Image 4.46. elMasyoun neighbourhood, October 2012.
with majority of neighbourhoods featuring sporadically built-up areas or none still. Excluding the two historic cores of Ramallah, alBireh and few stretches around alManara Square and the Main Street, the agglomerate constitutes a provincial distribution of buildings. Nonetheless, feelings of tightness are constructed by the reduced space of movement of individuals. The new economy and demography of the agglomerate lowered rates of social-visitations; former back-paths within neighbourhoods have been eliminated by ever-higher walls and mounted spear-headed fences between neighbours; open public spaces remain deep below satisfactory rates; alternatives offered by the private sector are costly, and; sidewalks have been placed ‘out of service’ by trees which are customarily centred on the pedestrian path whose average width is 1.2 meters.

As explained in section 2.1.3.ii, pg. 60, the Israeli militarization of the geography and surveillance policies impeded the expansion of the pedestrian network of vertical connections around the concentric rings carved by asphalt streets along ridges. Concomitantly, the absence of a coordinated public transportation system has exasperated the use of cars on an infrastructure that converges at alManara Square and its liminal surroundings.

For further discouragement, the PA police has made it a duty to chase Ramallites who use the city-space in modes that cannot be contained in a legal clause. Ramallah’s west-facing ridges are 900-meter-high balconies over a breathtaking view of a landscape that dips its feet into a sparkling horizon of the Mediterranean, and later the lights of coastal Jaffa and Tel Aviv. Enjoying the largest open-air theatre in the agglomerate should be a public right, however, the PA police patrolling units are on constant search for friends, lovers and meditators who sought change from the walled private spaces; those exploring the view from one of the many lots to whom construction and fencing has not arrived yet. Reminding of its evolution under and as an element in the colonial system, Ramallah is cloning and re-scaling the Zionist strategies of land alienation and surveillance. It’s citizens whose mental space shrunk to 22% of the British-
imagined size and shape of Palestine and down-scaled further to the OAs cantons starting in 2000, they are now being chased throughout the city-scape by agents of ‘law and order’ and pushed into discontinuous pockets.

According to the Master Plan of Ramallah, 28.9% of the city’s area has been reduced to deregulated retention, 22.4% dedicated to vehicle-roads, 0.6% to open public spaces, a mere 0.2% to pedestrian networks, and while the majority of the city-space has not been developed still the police apparatus bans citizens from interim, passive use; or what in the case of Berlin was called Zwischennutzungen (elaborated in the following section).

Under the same discourse RM prides itself for the design and execution of about a dozen ‘squares’ around the city. As Image 4.23, pg. 213 demonstrates, in reality these are lifeless traffic roundabouts whose characteristics are antithetic to those of public squares, where people congregate and engage with the space and one another.

In 2013 Copenhagen earned the title of the ‘World’s Most Livable City’. One of its lead-planners Jan Gehl describes the dramatic shift in the friendliness of the city-space as unexpected, where ‘nobody had believed such events were possible’ (2011:50) in the once automobile-dominated city. While Gehl advocates the concept of ‘cities for people not cars’ through various concepts of enabling healthy living between buildings; former Mayor of Bogotá and President of the Board of Directors of the Institute for Transportation and Development Policy, Enrique Peñalosa underlines that mobility networks are expressions of democracy or its absence. Pointing at images of extensive asphalt-paved vehicle roads and their narrow, unpaved, assumed-pedestrian, liminal shoulders while speaking of his experience, Peñalosa states:

We fought not just for space for buses, but we fought for space for people, and that was even more difficult. [...] Here, what you see is a picture that shows insufficient democracy. What this shows is that people who walk are third-class citizens while those who go in cars are first-class citizens. In terms of transport infrastructure, what really makes a difference between advanced and backward cities is not highways or subways but quality sidewalks. Here they made a flyover, probably very useless, and they forgot to make a sidewalk. This is prevailing all over the world. Not even schoolchildren are more important than cars. (Peñalosa 2013)

In light of the aforementioned, feelings of overcrowdedness in Ramallah are a result of the Modern Movement which regards city-space as a static object that could and should be tamed, categorized, and given definitive utilizations. Under such planning approaches, ‘mobility’ in the neoliberal ethos is limited to its technical dimension of getting from point A to B regardless of the quality of the journey (Trancik 1986). It conceives Ramallites as a society of distinct homogeneous classes, where the ones whose satisfaction is sought are the few of the coterie rather than the masses of proletariat. Regulations curtail the involvement of the informed quotidian residents and trap technical engineers into a mission of predetermined failure. Rassem Khamaisi has a record of success, however the continued deterioration in Ramallah’s living environment over a time-lapse in which he has prepared three proposals and designs (first one submitted May 1998) is an accumulating evidence that neither the produce nor its maker are compatible for the goal.
Ramallah’s fame as the masyaf (summer residence) was attributed to its pleasant climate and flâneur, and up to date it forms a reiterating argument by RM which periodically highlights tourism potentials as central to official spatial policy. Nevertheless the city’s landscape is becoming increasingly discontinuous, obstructed with high walls and deep excavations; and the omnipresent panopticon-surveillance of the street network is discouraging to engage with the city-space, hence familiarization with the ‘other’ (section 3.2, pg. 132). Herein, the municipality seems to undermine the relationship between crowds of tourists, their spending into local economy, and their ability to enjoy the walk and making several stops between their destinations.

When asked about the significance of the city-centre to them, participants of focus groups aged 35 years and older described the triangle composed of alManara Square, the Main Street and the Mughtaribeen Square (Arabic for ‘expatriates’, recently re-named into Yasser Arafat Square) as their frequent and Mecca-style pilgrimage course, of lingering and socialization as youth. However, today it has been reduced to an unattractive services centre visited when alternatives secede. Younger generations (who predominantly do not own a car, yet) described it as an unpleasant transit connection, a narrow stretch of abuse for the economically underprivileged masses and those whose livelihoods are earned within the vicinity. The alienation of the city’s heart from the mentalities of its residents as a common, and the lack of substitutes hinders the establishment of relational solidarities.

Underlining today’s dynamics of post- (continuing) crisis of neoliberalism, the rise of cities as independent decision-makers, and the technical breakthrough of cyber-operation and -collaboration. Inderpaul Johar notes in a piece on the changing tools, roles and forms of planning, architecture and civic economy – as substitutes for ‘popular capitalism’ – by writing:

This is a future focused on ‘more operational ingenuity, less three-dimensional ingenuity, and more social structure’, to quote Cedric Price. This future is not for the proponents of ‘committees’ and decision-making power brokers, but [...] where social validation is an integral part of every step of the process: conception, investment, execution, and governance – not only of the decision making. This is a future driven by the rapid and liquid democratisation of the means of production [... and] consumption. [...] This is a future in which architecture and our role as designers are changing; we are being invited to be protagonists, to be the change-makers and the propositioners. This is a future where we must become the makers of platforms – not the designers of containers for corporations. (Johar 2014:204)

Among others in Ramallah, the urbanist, curator and architect Yazid Anani is embodying this contemporary approach to the practice, where he reduced detailed design to the minimum while dedicating the larger segments of his time to researching, curating, education and public-debate. Anani enabled by and along with a handful of self-motivated colleagues and comrades are stimulating new perspectives and conceptions for Ramallah’s space, whose evolution is dependent on the ability to co-opt existing power and policy-making structures. While the coming section will elaborate on contemporary global approaches to urban policies; here it should be noted that the variety of socio-economic ethos and capabilities of Ramallites compose a potential for alternative forms of spatial
utilization and organic economic production that are worth investigation. Against the 'backdrop of crisis and austerity', the new formations, re-adaptation, and re-orientation of 'approaches to spatial design' are bound to 'disrupt the 'normal' logic of development; seeking to rewrite the standard urban scripts pertaining to property, credit, labour, and housing'; hence tools and organisational structures of decision-making, property forms and ownership, and what constitutes legitimate resources and modes of their employment (Tonkiss 2014:166).

Starting in 2008 the 'dual crisis – of property and credit – has shown the extent to which 'normal' urban development processes have been financed by debt all along the speculative chain: from sub-prime mortgage lenders to insolvent developers, bad banks, and overleveraged governments' (ibid). For Ramallites, the financial crisis that commenced in 2011 can be traced on its streets – dozens of either semi- or completely finished apartment-buildings pending tenant and buyers. An experienced civil engineer indicated in October 2013 that although the high demand for apartments in Ramallah persists, nonetheless there are about 1,000 empty units whose construction came as a result of the wide-spread speculation on real estate; a phenomenon that echoes too many places around the world.

The site construction regulations – namely, parcelling laws which identify minimum values for length of front façades and plot area – distributes investors into distinctly segregate and imbalanced categories, wherein the minimum baseline-investment (size and hence value of land) in areas categorized as 'A' or 'AA' is too high for middle income families (51.6% of total housing areas). Similarly and given the current land values which average around US$ 100 per square meter of land in Ramallah, those desiring to live in Residential-Agricultural areas must own or purchase a property of at least $0.000 square meters, hence US$ 0.5 million in land value only. This category constitutes 11.8% of the total area of the city, and 20.6% of the total residential areas. In comparison, areas categorized as Residential-B and -C are 22.8% and 10.0% of the total residential areas, respectively (Table 4.2, pg. 198). That said, the current system (whose accreditation lies in the hands of the municipality but the responsibility is shared across the planning community) in effect places more than two thirds of the areas designated for residential purposes (41% of total city-space) effectively beyond the reach of middle and lower classes of Ramallites.

The current morphological dichotomy of either suburban spacings or discontinuous rows of crowded matchboxes is evidence that the variety of circulating citizens and their needs is not equalled in legal construction parameters. Change of minimum site-area and facade length criteria is necessary – but not sufficient – for achieving higher levels of social justice, access to the land resource, improved living conditions, and would give rise to more individualized, carefully-calculated, need-based purchases, and designs. This process of re-imagination of shapes and four-dimensional characteristics of components of the city landscape necessitates the rescaling of Master Plans to their real size, from being 'spatial solutions’ to constituting a piece of the much larger puzzle. Regardless of the adopted approaches and employed concepts, a review of Ramallah's morphology is a prerequisite for generating rhythm, harmony, and environmental resilience to built-up and free-space volumes (as elaborated in section 2.1.iii, pg. 68).

Here and to bring this chapter to a close, the coming few pages frame Ramallah's official urban development practices in relation to global ones, and therewith the contemporary discussions and concepts being debated in the field.
Resilience and Urban Commons as Anti-venoms to Policy-Mobility?

If we talk about governmental procedures and measures one feels as if there is a catalogue and people are trying to follow instructions, the only problem is that the catalogue is for a different kind of device that the one we are trying to run and nobody is noticing that problematic. There is a clear case of antagonism and conflict between the surgery and the case of the patient, but the operation is still going further without anyone screaming ‘stop!’ (As’ad 2010)

Tools and strategies of urban design and planning principles are continuously evolving, gaining and losing importance in response to changing modes of economic production, social norms and political priorities. In the aftermath of the suburbanization surge in preceding decades, many communities of the 1980s (whose memories of cities as loci of urbicide were faint and ethos of bon vivre intense) raised the battle-flags of urban regeneration to reinstate the city as space for dignified living. These ultimately fuelled existing engines of sociospatial exclusion giving rise to the widely researched term ‘gentrification’ (Smith 2002). In this period Ramallah’s socio-politics of austerity and its colonial isolation from the global impeded its participation. The 1990s era which laboured the OAs was that of ‘participatory’ and ‘developmental’ planning in which societies (including Ramallah’s citizens and municipality) enacted their reductionist convictions of the need to ‘de-underdevelop’ oneself (Escobar 2012), hence feeding into oriental, colonial and neoliberal approaches of mass-treatments under persistent imperial imaginaries and politics of ‘infantilization’ (Harvey 2009). By the turn of the millennium ‘sustainability’, ‘good governance’, ‘decentralisation’ and ‘participation’ became the key words and universal answers to accumulating perils of corruption, disenfranchisement and globalization. This phase featured accentuating urban-power and acceleration of processes of detachment from the ‘national’ (Sassen 2008; Appadurai 2008; Ferguson 2009). In this 2010s phase where economic – hence political – strategies continue to progressively down-scale from the national to the locational; vulnerability to components of the – still relevant macro and increasingly complex micro – ecology are advocating ‘resilience’ as the panacea for financial dependencies, environmental impacts of climate change, and ideological otherness, exclusion, and ultimately radicalism.

While the trend indicates that by the turn of this decade a new set of terminology and tools will evolve and assume lead in operations, Ramallah’s presence in the caravan of globalized translocalities yields participation in its activities. Exemplary, Ramallah is part of the ‘100 Resilient Cities’ program of the Rockefeller Foundation, where Byblos (Lebanon) and Ashkelon (Israel) are the only other cities from the region among the selected league of 32 from nearly 400 applications. Expectedly yet still disappointingly, its profile has been hitherto focused on technical infrastructures of storm water. The ‘moments’ of causality of the infrastructure that are to be found in the ecology (social-economic-spatial) breeding and governing it nonetheless are not named as priorities. There is little doubt that engagement in a scholarly activity of such a scale will produce new knowledge hence adding a dimension to the scope of those involved in the planning scene in Ramallah. However, the SDP, RABMA, Amanet Ramallah,
recently the RDPF and many others are proposals that have and are being
developed through varying initiatives and stakeholders are also pending answers
to the same questions: Why does it matter? and Then what?

This calls back Escobar’s argumentation (2012; see section 3.1.2, pg. 118) that
although neoliberalism has received a significant gust, it remains the governing
ideology, structure and overall system. Since 2008 the anathema of banking
systems and neoliberal corporations whose greed has triggered this modern
tragedy of shattered livelihoods has become a global prayer. Nonetheless,
austerity measures composed of cuts into rights and securities of average
citizens are expanding while the financial coterie continue their operations
uninterrupted. In Ramallah, the bearers of the PA’s financial mal-planning
and crisis are the lowest tiers of civil servants e.g. municipal staff. Meanwhile,
international organizations whose mechanisms have hijacked the development
process remain in operation employing NGO-ized modes of production of
‘specific targets’, standard procedures and ‘check-boxes’. Starting in January 2014
and over three years the ‘100 Resilient Cities’ program in which Ramallah is
taking part will enable cities:

to better address the increasing shocks and stresses of the 21st century [...]
wherein they] receive technical support and resources to improve their urban
resilience over three years. In addition to membership in the newly formed
100 Resilient Cities Network, the selected cities will receive support from the
Rockefeller Foundation to create and implement a resilience plan and to hire a
Chief Resilience Officer (CRO) to oversee the resilience strategy. The first class
of cities was announced on December 2013, selected by judges with unique
expertise on tools and strategies that make a city better prepared to face natural
and manmade disaster. (Rockefeller Foundation 2014; emphasis added)

Akin the RDPF, up to date there is no available information about the
details of the project from RM, and local observers know about this happening
are few. Items available on the official website of the program constitute – at
best – a medium-sized library of scholarly and blog opinions on the topic of
urban resilience. Unintelligently echoing Lauchlin Currie’s approach of the
knowledgeable-givers, yearning-receivers, and the end-form product, the
program named five ‘pillars’ for resilience:

- Constant Learning: The ability to internalize past experiences linked with
  robust feedback loops that sense, provide foresight, and allow new solutions.
- Rapid Rebound: The capacity to re-establish function, re-organize, and
  avoid long-term disruptions.
- Limited or ‘Safe’ Failure: Prevents failures from rippling across systems.
- Flexibility: The ability to change, evolve, and adapt to alternative strategies
  in the face of disaster.
- Spare Capacity: Ensures that there is a back-up or alternative available when
  a vital component of a system fails. (Rockefeller Foundation 2014a)

Under each of these pillars few dozens of short pieces on experiences of
some cities can be found. Embodying the anaemic, philanthropist neoliberal
attempts to tame urbanisms, the available information features neither the
concept of ‘integrity of strategy and urban ecology’ nor that of ‘civic equality’
or synonyms among keywords, menus and subtitles. Combined with the wording of identified pillars, a silhouette of a corporal risk management strategy emerges whose essence is containment of events rather than preventing them via treatment of the source. Through expounding the leading global initiatives on urban resilience, Evans argues that the neoliberalisation of resilience is calculable, where:

[T]here is a clear political ecology to resilience. Transformed from an ecological theory into a socio-ecological governance framework in some 20 years, it constitutes a pseudo-scientific policy discourse that (wittingly and unwittingly) exerts considerable power over how things should be done. For example, in presenting us with a world in constant flux, where periodic crisis and change are inevitable, it accepts change somewhat passively. Rather than question the all too-human causes of crises (whether of the climatic or economic variety), resilience emphasises the need for individuals, communities or cities to simply get on with adapting to them. This tendency to naturalise crises resonates with neoliberal discourses of capitalism, which preclude political debate concerning the wider causes and desirability of change. (Evans 2010:224)

Neoliberalisation of professional practices – including municipal policies – in Ramallah is provisioned through the political discourses on the varying levels. The strategy of normalization of crisis – rather than eliminating its causes – constitutes the spine of Zionist ethnocratic systems which continue to dominate operations on both sides of the Armistice Line as showcased in preceding chapters. The trickle-down effect nurtured a PA that suffices with pointing the obvious blame over shortcomings – irrespective of nature – on Israeli colonialism; falling short of pursuing alternative solutions, and sentencing change to an imaginary waiting room, until a sovereign and independent Palestinian state is established.

RM’s overall choices of strategies and projects brings forth the increasingly discussed ‘policy mobility’. It promotes its generic ‘profile projects’ (e.g. National Exhibition Centre, Stadium) as building-blocks of ‘distinctive aspects’ which are necessary for ‘transforming the city into an attractive city for investment’ (Ramallah Municipality 2008:24). The policies and marketing rhetoric discussed through this chapter reflect eagerness for joining the ‘pop-culture’ of uncalculated Guggenheim-experiences, at a time Valencia is staring from the other side of the Mediterranean with its deserted America’s Cup sailing-harbour, it’s underused Convention & Exhibition Centre – Feria Valencia, and the lavish Calatrava-landia – City of Arts and Sciences complex – whose maintenance costs exceed revenues by scores. The disintegrating Seville-Expo pavilions, the desolate Amman Expo Centre, and the controversial London’s Olympic complex are few of hundreds of constructions that were inspired by the aforementioned ‘standardization’ and ‘check-box’ discourses, where marketing of international cities is reduced to monumental architecture and mega events; rather than existent engines of differentiated economic competitiveness, and the attractiveness harnessed by virtue of a cosmopolitanism enabled by civic rights and accountability (Colomb 2012; Escobar 2012). For Lefebvre monumental architecture is a tool for enforcing a collective identity that citizens might not feel so attached to after all, where such projects ‘bestow a cohesiveness it utterly lacks upon a totality which is in fact decidedly open – so open, indeed, that it must rely on violence to endure’ (2009:11).
While it is effortless to attribute this typical example of policy-mobility to ingenuity and globalization; in reality these processes are engendered through the many tentacles of neoliberalism which has succeeded in penetrating all mundane aspects of living and the making of lived space. Herein ‘professionalization’ has conceived ‘subdisciplines’ e.g. ‘development studies’ which tackle ‘the new problems which the discourse has constructed’ as definite sets with prescription treatments (Martin 1998:45). Through elaborate capacity building programs higher education institutions in countries of the Global South have been reorganized to the intellect of World Bank missions, while scholars from these geographies are socialized ‘in the West into the developmentalist paradigm’ (ibid); as formerly discussed in section 3.1.2, pg. 118.

Through revision of a wide range of relevant scholarship Colomb (2012) summarizes criticism of aforementioned neoliberal city-development and marketing policies in five:

First, eclectic commodification and sanitization of some local expressions of identity(s) and history(s), causing the loss of authenticity, outright displacement of the disenfranchised, and the suppression of socio-historical characteristics that are deemed ‘undesirable’; E.g. starting February 2013 the municipalities of Ramallah, alBireh and Beitunya, the Governorate, Police and Trade Chamber launched the ‘Our Country is an Image of Ourselves’ campaign, which primarily sought to erase the presence of the vernacular street vendors, whose operations were deemed as ‘crowding’ of side-walks and posing a threat to public health as quality is not institutionally controlled – in spite of increasing economic disparities and acute lack of social securities.

Second, articulation of ‘city vision’ – hence order of prioritization of particular economic domains and spatial characteristics – is typically conducted by few affluent stakeholders while public involvement is either marginal or absent. Therein, marketing projects and activities remain restricted to public-private partnerships which are exclusive in nature and lack transparency; E.g. the RM Centennial Projects (section 4.3.3, pg. 203) were centrally designed and announced as a package with no deliberation with neither nonpartisan professionals nor the public.

Third, impacts of these kinds of activities are socially and geographically uneven, concentrating investments in certain sites – and gains to exclusive parties – rather than equitable and balanced distribution throughout city-space and social strata. For example, at the time pressure on pedestrian mobility has reached alarming levels in built-up areas, heavy investments are wasted in opening streets in liminal uninhabited areas in place of re-designing an ameliorating the basic space. What Image 4.7, pg. 210 demonstrates is an activity of inflating property value speculation, rather than controlling it to affordable and economically healthy levels.

Fourth, such policies and activities are mainly ‘geared’ to external parties whether investors, tourists or certain groups of prospective residents. Along the process local communities are homogenized through imagined ‘collective’ identities that are in effect globalized and ‘place-less’, while claiming a socialization of benefit that neither materializes nor produces long-term solidarities. In this respect, Ramallah provides many exhibits through the afore-discussed spacio-economic segregation mentalities, the logic of residential zoning of Ramallah, and the following chapter which elaborates on the undertakings of the private real estate sector.
And Fifth, neoliberal place-marketing policies are ‘highly inefficient and speculative’ in nature whereby paradigms endanger and too-often erase endemic ‘monopoly advantages’ that evolve through place-sensitive urban entrepreneurialism. These policies replicate urban development undertakings that homogenize urban landscapes, thereof reducing competitiveness and attractiveness (Colomb 2012:22).

While RM’s quest for international positioning continues along the aforementioned tracks unhindered, Evans (2010) emphasises the quintessence of integrated social-ecological systems to emerging futuristic forms of governance and claims of resilience. Here Francesca Ferguson argues that accentuation in perceptions and management of cities ‘as enterprises for economic growth, creative entrepreneurship, and competitiveness’ constitutes a ‘strategic turn’ in hierarchies and tools of governance; where success in converting ‘public responsibility’ into an ‘economic ally’ necessitates ‘making social engagement profitable’ (2014:14,16).

Citing a number of interventions in European cities, she showcases that premature gratification strategies can channel civic participation into following profit-driven logic of investors, hence engendering ‘more persuasive, lasting claims’ to experimental urban disruptions.

Coined by Katherine Shonfield, premature gratification describes activities which are propositional, locational, seek long-term consequences while constituting ‘brief disobedience’ undertakings as ‘means to advance proposals in advance of advancing proposals’ (Thomas 2014:180). For Ferguson (2014) urban interventions of this nature are platforms for the urgent renegotiations of resource-allocation, social and political principles in spaces that are both real and symbolic. While the former is acquired from their interactive characteristics, the latter radiates from their success (or failure) in forging new solidarities amongst the variety of ethos occupying the particular micro-space. In some respects, these concepts echo Trancik’s (1986) advocacy of producing ‘figurative space’ out of the ‘lost landscape’ through an urban design attitude of urbanism as connections. In her argumentation Ferguson elaborates on the concept of gemeinschaffen, or ‘commoning’, as a process emerging from conditions of exasperated precariousness, insecurity, and scarcity. Here Harvey (2016) points out that this term is a descendent from a ‘history of arguments and debates concerning the creation and utilization of common property resources’ where it:

[...] reflects the seemingly profound impacts of the recent wave of privatizations, enclosures, spatial controls, policing, and surveillance upon the qualities of urban life in general, and in particular upon the potentiality to build or inhibit new forms of social relations (a new commons) within an urban process influenced if not dominated by capitalist class interests. (Harvey 2016:69)

While urban commons are often presented by leftists as nonhierarchical; Harvey points out that ‘collective organization of small-scale solidarity economies along common-property lines’ under larger scales requires coordination, hence hierarchy (ibid:69). Herewith, the binary of either state or market monopoly is also dismantled through the ‘scale problem’ where ‘what looks like a good way to resolve problems at one scale does not hold at another’ (ibid:69). While mixtures of economic public and private instruments are the systematic spaces in which commons could arise, these are a two-edged sword that can serve in either direction; inclusion (community urban garden) as well as exclusion (gated
rich communities), liberal or radical. Ultimately, commons are laboured through social practices and political action by citizens who have to decide ‘whose side are you on, whose common interests do you seek to protect, and by what means?’ (Ibid:71). Here Harvey also highlights that the rise of commoning as alternative is a Cartesian product of the scarcity of public goods orchestrated by neoliberalism. Activities of commons could be seen as appropriation of responsibility, as decentralization, privatization, hence capitalism at its lowest scales. So how effective are insurgent urban commons as antivenoms to disenfranchisement?

Unfortunately the idea of the commons (like the right to the city) is just as easily appropriated by existing political power as is the value to be extracted from an actual urban common by real estate interests. (Harvey 2013:87)

Contemporary urban experiments on commons should not claim the creation of a new discourse of negotiation with the larger city space; for like globalization is historically traceable in internationalisation and trade, urban commons are rooted in centuries of social practice and fluid civic economies. Therein, the problematic does not lie in the presence or absence of commons; rather, in the unbalanced channelling of the produce between capital holders and its labourers. The social creation of support alternatives to public services in some sense invokes the Marxist notion of ownership as ‘vested in the collective labourers producing for the common good’ (ibid:77). Here he explains:

While this idea sounds outrageous, it lay behind the Swedish Meidner plan proposed in the late 1960s. The receipts from a tax placed on corporate profits, in turn for wage restraint on the part of unions, were to be placed in a worker-controlled fund that would invest in and eventually buy out the corporation, thus bringing it under the common control of the associated laborers. Capital resisted this idea with all its might, and it was never implemented. But the idea ought to be reconsidered. The central conclusion is that the collective laboring that is now productive of value must ground collective not individual property rights. (Harvey 2013:77)

The mutated separation of the soft and hard infrastructure management and planning systems under the PA has resulted in spatial policies (and therewith practices of developers) that further disenfranchise a growing urban poor on one hand, and exasperated the inefficient use and destruction of expensive resources; particularly land and the city’s marketing engines of attractive environment and ethos (drivers of speculation and investment). Climate change is translating (a.o.) with rise in global temperatures and – without doubt – the circulation of more (liquid) water at a still (if ever) shaping rhythm (frequency and volume of storm-water in the varying areas of the earth). Unless the city has a desire to undermine itself, it is time that both official and private practitioners pay more attention to micro and macro morphological features and systems, particularly those concerned with; first, heating vs. cooling (e.g. wide asphalt roads or narrow shaded passages), and; second, storm-water canalization vs. absorption (e.g. integration of different scales of channels and wells into city’s private and public infrastructures). Up to date Ramallah continues to exhibit Harvey’s argument that ‘capitalist urbanization perpetually tends to destroy the city as a social, political and livable commons’ (Harvey 2013:80). The dynamics of the quartet of the PA, foreign donors, Israel and private investors (as aforementioned and elaborated
further in the coming chapter) is structurally incapable of driving the much needed morphological change. What about paradigms of urban commons?

Investigating the strategies and politics of urban reinvention in Berlin since the German reunification, Colomb (2012a) highlights the significant role of the policy of Zwischennutzung (interim-, temporary- use) in enhancing attractiveness as well as living conditions in several neighbourhoods. She found the main actors to be non-institutionally motivated Berliners who could be categorized under start-ups where persons seek innovation and economic advancement; part-time activists seeking to enrich their lives; migrants searching for methods of employment and social integration; drop-outs who constitute institutional outcasts and are rejected in common spaces, and; system refugees which are persons or groups creating an ideologically-motivated ‘alternative universe’ (ibid:136). Under this framework, about a hundred initiatives were (sometimes retrospectively) granted permission to establish temporary uses of otherwise-abandoned sites with minimal regulatory conditions. The novelty of the unintended policy – which evolved from the squatting ideology and over a period of time – lies in having activated otherwise marginalized actors (therein enabling public satisfaction and reduction of unemployment) to produce neighbourhood-based services (relevant to varying spacio-social needs). This system manoeuvres around exclusive property prices while politics lingers on addressing the topic, and it reduces intensity of demands on municipal offices without additional public expenditure. While this strategy has its vulnerabilities (e.g. can be liquidated by property owner), it has demonstrated considerable ability to induce a constructive negotiation in appropriate scales.

Organized experiments and informal cases of urban commons in the twenty-first century invoke Anderson’s (2006) theories on the dismantling of the national-gemeinschaft in favour of localized solidarities, such as the sub-Ramallite sensibilities traced by Taraki (2008, 2008a) and Abourahme (2009, 2011) among others. Combined with Lefebvre’s (2009) postulates on the necessity of spatial articulation for social movements to sustain, persuade and evolve on one hand, and on the other the centrality of socio-economic needs to discourses of production of space; it can be concluded that the ecology of Ramallah is ripe grounds for what Brugmann (2009) would call an ‘urban revolution’ that materializes the articulated contention of the polemic OAs legacy.

While it is still to be witnessed whether ‘urban commons’ are able to sustain longer than precedent policies; Ramallite variations of ‘urban commoning’ could serve as catalysts for reinstating a shared sense of purpose, a new breed of sumud that spatially transcribes democratic engagement. Essential to this processes is the reconfiguration of the system, whereby up to date urban planning education and practice is provisioned through the study of architecture at a time ‘It takes more than good architects and landscape architects to create good cities’ (Trancik 1986:20). Johar argues that ‘this is a future’ of knowledge-based creativity, puzzling, and innovative crafting beyond rigid disciplinary boundaries; where:

This is a future in which we must address the challenges and responsibility of soft power – architects and all those who practise this architecture we will need to rediscover the essence of ‘professionalism’ [...] towards the public value of welfaregood [sic]. This is a future of design and architecture that is both open and data-driven – which are becoming iterative, and curative, and micro-evolving continuously to optimise their performative impact. This is a future
where we are invited to be craftsmen and craftswomen, not designers from a distance; where we are invited to continuously evoke, discover, and curate [...] (Johar 2014:204-205)

The curation that urbanists today are requested to perform will not stop global urban policy mobility, and in the case of Palestinian official planning bodies, neither their inferiority in face of Israel’s fragmentation and containment strategies. However, successful curation means taming them. The unfolding technologies since the popularization of the digital world akin former ones are inducing an economic shift by which for the first time natural, tangible, and mobile resources are not an absolute requirement for economic production. This financial system is part of the larger urban ecology in which the individual is mobilized for discussing his/her role in (micro) city-formation; voicing relational claims of space and ethos. How protest urbanisms operate in a digital ecology is fresh grounds for scholarship of spacio-behaviour and tactic, nonetheless, ‘there are abundant signs in the urban social movements occurring around the world that there are plenty of people and a critical mass of political energy available to do it’ (Harvey 2013:88). Meanwhile and taking the larger perspective, contemporary history evidences that a city's ability to be and remain successful (attractive and dignified living conditions) is conditioned by its competences in re-adapting to changing politico-economic orders as they unfold.

That said, Ramallah’s future will be largely shaped by the ability of the municipality to grasp the new circumstance, namely five; first, its limited infrastructures and resources; second, its structurally fragmented and outdated nature of operation; third, the current spacio-political relations as the state-making project is declared clinically-dead, and features of a more acute system of apartheid are looming; fourth, the shifting socio-economic priorities of its residents with the shrinking of public-provisioned services, higher diversity and lower social hierarchy, and heightened otherness and contestation, and; fifth, its ability to understand, negotiate and process contemporary debates and variables of city discourse and changing roles of urbanists are all essential factors for its sustenance as an attractive district within the Jerusalem metropolitan area.

In light of the discussions of this chapter, it is trivial to conclude that the bulk of physical change in Ramallah was and is being created by – relatively free-handed– private actors. There are countless small- and medium-scale developers and investors whose projects are chiefly (one after and/or next to the other) singular apartment buildings whose accumulative impact on the city-space is dramatic. Yet as the operation of these can be re-oriented through systematic planning reform – which is not per se the interest of this work – the coming chapter will be limited to projects that are conceived and executed by influential real estate corporations whom are genealogically reliant on innovation, hence co-optable.
As indicated in the previous section, the emerging patterns and physical forms of spatial development in Ramallah were led by private initiatives. A fast play of the past twenty years reveals three main – and tangibly phased – urban development typologies. The first phase spanned from 1993 until 2003, where the predominant pattern was that of mushrooming amorphous matchbox-shaped multi-story apartment buildings. It was a period of significant population growth where fast solutions were necessary; the existing shortage in housing units produced over four decades of Israeli COGAT rule was deepened upon the seating of the PA in the city, the rejoinder of the returnees, and the influx of international offices and NGOs. Pressure was furthered when PA-institutions – thence employees – were centralised in Ramallah with the outbreak of the Second Intifada at the end of 2000 (see Chapter 2). In spite of the construction boom the dominant social discourse was still fixated on austerity rather than luxury-oriented mode of life, rendering exterior features of secondary relevance even to the architect who most probably wished for looser budgets. This shape of neighbourhoods was neither erudite nor intentionally solicited; yet social articulation of claims regarding spatial preferences and quasi-normalcy arrived only later. Further evidence is exampled in the uniformity of form between urban and rural spheres, whereby in the early post-Oslo years the majority of construction was conducted by tenants of Ramallah’s surrounding villages and towns whom have long standings of wealth accumulated through emigration and business in – mainly but not solely – the USA. As Anani notes:

Ramallah was created through a village mentality, and the architecture we have today is a reflection of this reality. Upon Oslo many people from the villages moved to the city and invested their assets in our main industry: construction. For a long time I was wondering why are people constructing in villages using the same pattern present in Ramallah, until I looked at it from a different angle, and the opposite is the reality. The architecture of Ramallah is just starting to change due to increased exposure and mingling with the international markets and communities. They are just starting to discover that by using some beautification elements the financial gain would be much higher than the traditional ground floor of stores and then repetitive apartment floors. This is like any process is demand-led by companies who are also just starting to realize that the shape of their headquarters is a reflection of them as well, and also to a lesser extent led by the city’s demand to compete globally. (Anani 2010)

Indeed, by 2005/2006 the second phase was institutionally grounded and confident of showing face as the culture of leisure and capital accumulation had found a footing and was bound to expand. With a solid neoliberal economic
system in place, by 2008 Ramallah put on its long-fantasised cocktail dress to attend the all-American ball taking place on its own grounds. It was time for monumental governmental buildings of the strong (non-)state (Image 4.31, Image 4.32, p. 215); iconic office towers for the companies whose values mount to millions of dollars (Image 4.26, Image 4.28, p. 214); exclusive leisure spaces and fancy service possibilities for the bustling crowds (Image 4.27); and last but not least, peaceful suburban complexes of detached houses with the fence, lawn, and pet that are enabled by an easily obtainable bank credit (Image 4.33, Image 4.34, p. 215). While apartment buildings continued to mushroom and be occupied (Image 4.38 - Image 4.43, p. 218), by this point in time architectural attractiveness was a requirement for accommodating the clearly articulated desires of the emerging ‘new middle class’ as Taraki refers to it (2008, 2008a, Abourahme 2009, Anani 2010, Shaheen 2012). In turn, this mentality and mode of expenditure gave further impetus and momentum to the growing real estate corporations.

The third and last phase commenced soon after the second, around 2008/2009 resulting in yet again different typologies that could be described as in-vitro cloned satellite townships. Here real estate development is driven by a coterie of Palestinian heavyweight financial players who understood the limitations and bureaucracy governing the Ramallah area and the shortcomings of local institutions in responding to growth pace and pressures. They also foresaw what they consider a non-utilised potential for investment. This phase is a derivative of the second and a reinterpretation of the first. The named clientele remains the coined ‘middle class’. Yet in order to achieve financial targets, these mass projects could not take place within or close to built-up areas due to the aforementioned bureaucracy and institutional limitations, as well as the established urban regulations, restrictions, and the inflated land values, among other factors. Thus, bidders chose to construct beyond, in the only direction allowed by the Israeli colonial infrastructure – locations of settlements, military bases, C-Areas – that being northwards. This move is conditioned by speculations of Ramallah remaining attractive for Palestinian internal relocation and continued horizontal northward expansion. Examples are presented in this chapter.

Following the entrenchment of geographic fragmentation and incarceration of Palestinian population mentally and physically in cantons; the second main impact of the OAs has been the creation and entrenchment of a coterie whose interests are not hindered by the continuation of the colonial project, as Fanon’s (2004, 2008) theories of (post-)colonialism stipulate. Besides the tangible socioeconomic stratification resulting from the presence and practices of this clique, those involved in real estate and public spaces have been at the forefront of forging new urban forms in the Ramallah region. The coming pages hence map the most notable actors of this voluntary sector; namely, the principal four companies and corporations involved in the transmogrification of the urbanity of Ramallah. Therein, their visions, heavy operations and respective projects are discussed.
5.1. RAMALLAH’S MOST AFFLUENT VISIONARIES

The phenomenon of large and transregional real-estate corporations is not new, it was born with the first colonialists. Like any organism, it requires agents for its motors to operate. Until the 1980s the maximalist Zionists were focused on inducing Palestinian emigration, a point at which their infrastructure had reached maturity and their state-affairs became stable with the signature of the Camp David treaty with Egypt in 1978. Here Israel discovered that it could also mass-capitalize on their established supremacy. However, with the exasperated emergency and the by-produced ethos of sumud, the neocolonial agency failed to find footing inside Palestinian urbanisms. In that decade of the Drobless Plan Zionists focused their attention on rural areas, establishing tens of small-sized colonies and hundreds of kilometres of exclusive road networks, farms and factories that are subsidized with capital and cheap labour (Hamami and Tamari 2008). As time lapses the colonial organism grows and throws its tentacles deeper into Palestinian presence, and it was time to tap into the urban wealth of Palestinians, which up to that point was stashed in the Khabieh. There were neither banking systems nor a stock-market, no permits for construction and open borders giving Palestinian leisure destinations within 15 kilometres in either direction. The low levels of investment were imposed not chosen, nonetheless, this did not impede the accumulation of wealth.

As former chapters discussed, this reality underwent the failing plastic surgery of the Oslo Accords, which created many blisters. In addition to the socio-economic transformation outlined in Chapter 3, the OAs created a significant – and irreversible – shift in the mode of production of quotidian Ramallite space; the pillar of which was the licensing of large-scale real-estate corporations. As Diagram 3.3, p. 128 demonstrates, this sector – which is the third largest in the Palestinian economy – had a dramatic boom in the early years following the signature of the OAs, then plunged with the outbreak of the so-called Second Intifada. While statistics prove that the growth of this sector is negligible, the significant expansion of Ramallah’s landscape provides an argument for the geographic imbalance of distribution of resources. That said, what are the visions of some of these bodies? How do they operate and what were their major projects?

5.1.1. Palestinian Economic Council for Development and Reconstruction (PECDAR)

PECDAR was established in 1993 short after the signature of the OAs by the PLO. It was provisioned as the transitional conduit for international assistance in support of the peace process, pending the establishment of the agreed upon governmental institutions. Meanwhile, it has been over eighteen
years since the establishment of MOPAD, MOLG, MOF and other public offices and the registered private investment company PECDAR remains unresolved, in operation, and a beneficiary of uncontested direct contracting from the PA. According to its home page, PECDAR's domains of work cover:

[...] a wide range of responsibilities including aid coordination, economic policy, project management, coordination with NGO'S and UN specialized agencies, technical assistance and training as well as IT. (PECDAR 2013)

Also on its website PECDAR names its objectives³ which resemble an arbitrary mixture of tasks – ranging from provision of mega non- and infrastructural projects, to coordination of international aid and further to social, economic and capacity building programs – all currently falling under mandates of operating PA ministries. Even though PECDAR was established by- and receives its official directives from the PLO, it still is a private company with an independent hierarchy and non-government supervised decision-making. It portrays an example of the PA-orchestrated potpourris of influential – not necessarily allied – actors, the list of which continues in this section.

In the specific context of Ramallah PECDAR has provisioned the implementation of several landmarks (e.g. Arafat's Mausoleum; the Prime Minister's Office; the Presidential Guest Palace) and social infrastructures (e.g. National Medical Compound, vocational training centres) and publications. More importantly, PECDAR is in charge of the development of the Palestinian National Garden (PNG) which lies at the highest point and heart of Ramallah-alBireh and extends over an area of 210 dunums⁴. This exorbitant state-owned land was in-arrears dedicated to this vital urban function by power of a presidential decree by President Mahmoud Abbas in 2005 (PECDAR 2013). Through an open competition PECDAR acquired a master plan (Image 5.1) for the project and described it as:

A beautiful design has been prepared through which a number of entertainment and recreational facilities will be constructed such as restaurants [sic], cafeterias, an amphitheatre [sic], a swimming [sic] pool, an aviary, camping area, tennis courts, a cycling route, a handicrafts market, an open park area, a barbecue [sic] area, and a botanical garden featuring the wild flora of Palestine. (PECDAR 2013b)

The project was welcomed by all sectors as this – physically and demographically – rapidly growing agglomeration remains scene to acute lack of open public spaces; a deficit caused by lack of governmental strategy and furthered by the reality that inside localities majority of lands remain privately owned. Notwithstanding, today about 30% (officially, and initially) of the area of the PNG – estimated to exceed US$ 50 million in value – has been already withdrawn in favour of the private business district proposal by PIF (section 5.1.3). Meanwhile, one of the four planned entrances has been executed, though it constitutes a dead-end as no segment of the park has been opened to public yet.

PECDAR's role and significance lies in its control over capital flow, the designation of it, and the power to disregard LGs in decision-making over public urban projects. Its continuation as a framework is one of many living testimonies incriminating the PA in using gratuitous politics for personal economic gains of its top tiers. The latter was an argument for many independent businessmen
to create private frameworks for the circulation of their capital and further accumulation of wealth. These structures present themselves as non-PA-related, nevertheless, they sustain strong lobbies and remain the chief beneficiaries of continued and unjustified proximity of private capital and government. PADICO and its arm PRICO are an example.

5.1.2. Palestine Development & Investment Limited Holding (PADICO) and the Palestine Real Estate and Investment Company (PRICO)

PADICO is a public shareholding company established in 1993 with a capital of US$ 250 million (PADICO 2013). It collocates a significant number of Palestine’s wealthiest as its board of directors. In 2013 it had acquired total assets of US$ 775.18 million, and total equity of approximately US$ 498 million (PADICO 2013a). It operates in the five main sectors of Palestinian economy: Real Estate; Financial & Services; Infrastructure, Environment & Agriculture; Tourism; and, Industry. Within its framework and corresponding to each of the sectors PADICO owns either shares in or the entirety of a number of companies, the most notable of which are ’PALTEL Group (32% ownership), PRICO (71%), Palestine Industrial Investment Company (57%), Jerusalem Development & Investment Company (100%) Palestine Exchange (76%), and Palestine Poultry Company (89%)’ (PADICO 2013a). PADICO is, indeed, the heavy-weight champion of the Palestinian league of affluent private investors.

Of PADICO’s multiple tentacles PRICO is the one most relevant to this work. It was established in 1994, and in 2011 became ‘[...] PADICO HOLDING’s investment arm in the real estate sector. PRICO now specializes in three main areas:
real estate development, property management, and contracting' (PADICO 2013b). In this system PADICO's projects are implemented quasi internally, and PRICO's involvement in the shaping of the spatial environment is rendered imperative. The CEO of PADICO and vice president of PRICO Samir Huleileh said:

Larger investors have clear visions and strategies. [...] In my opinion, without a doubt the larger investors do play a role – not in the formation of the official city-strategy, but – in influencing the form of growth of the city. Simply, the scale of these investments is too large to be ignored. These conditions induce an obligatory process of deliberation while acquiring the necessary licenses, etc. (Huleileh 2012)

The profile of PRICO exhibits its vision and scope of impact where it has designed and implemented several voluminous projects such as residential neighbourhoods with capacity reaching close to 2000 persons5 in the West Bank (Image 5.2), while in Gaza the exclusive compound of 162 Chalet's directly at the shores in addition to the 550 apartments (approximately 3,300 persons6) in the Pearl Towers. In terms of heavy infrastructure it has constructed the Poultry Slaughter House for the National Poultry Company and it is well underway with the execution of the Jericho Agro-Industrial Park over an area of 615 dunum7 (expandable to reach 1115 dunum) as well as the Gaza Industrial Park over an area of 485 dunum (PRICO 2013).

PRICO's significant real estate development remains thematically limited within residential, industrial and office-space. However, it has also executed – as contractor – numerous flagship- and ponderous projects in the public services and tourism sectors such as the Prime Minister's Headquarter's, the Presidential Guest Palace, the Ministries Compound in Ramallah; the Central Stations in Nablus and Bethlehem; a number of office towers throughout the city; in addition to several hotels like the Mövenpick, Days Inn, and the recently concluded renovation and expansion of the Grand Park Hotel (Image 4.27, p. 214) earning the latter the 5-star title. PRICO was also the implementer of PIF's (section 5.1.3) sizable elReehan residential neighbourhood (a mere 6 km away from Ramallah's centre) which has a total capacity of 2,000 units corresponding to 10,000 residents. PRICO has concluded and signed off Phase one, which corresponds to 400 units and respectively 2,000 residents (Image 5.8). As for its third pillar – property management – the company remains the operator of a number of public service
facilities such as Bethlehem’s Tourism Compound, alBireh’s Commercial Centre, and a Parking Compound in Amman, among others.

While the aforementioned is evidence of the level of affluence and influence of PADICO and its arm PRICO, connections between executed projects that could attest the claimed ‘strategy’ remain undiscovered, if we exclude the shared geography and profit production. This constellation is exemplary of reiterative partnering systems that operate within the city-scape of Ramallah. Inquiry about cooperation and exchange of knowledge between corporations and municipalities were answered by Huleileh (2012) through citing political strife, institutional bureaucracy and PA hierarchy as obstacles to achieving municipal visions and necessary competitiveness; where according to his estimate ‘an organized and clear vision was lacking’ (Huleileh 2012) – an opinion reiterated by Kassis (2010), Khoury (2010), Shaheen (2012) and Barghouthi (2012) among others.

Huleileh added that PADICO and PRICO have indeed negotiated with PA institutions on implementation of projects conceived by either party, yet he confirms that they were not invited to give consultancy to LGs in neither strategy nor technical aspects (Huleileh 2012). Meanwhile the term Public-Private-Partnership is fashionably flagged at events of commissioning or coercion, and social responsibility programs are flowing according to personal winds. On the other side of the same coin, heavy-weight investors practice urban eclecticism and repetition of inveigling models that captured their interest and imaginations in the absence of ‘curators’ who investigate whether the particular piece suits the collection or not. These hasty – and not necessarily educated – processes are enabled by the minimal (if any) regulation-induced deceleration. These voluminous urban projects are disconnected from context, partial in character and extent, and pertaining to fragmented development (Scholz 2002). Their main product is the physical translation of the corollary socioeconomic polarization (Graner 2008), rather than the provision of need-based, integrated and complimentary spaces. These dynamics, aspects, and resulting spaces are echoed in the yet higher level of capital and business complicity, in the Palestine Investment Fund.

5.1.3. Palestine Investment Fund (PIF)

As the peace process approached the age of 10 international donors expressed increased discomfort with the unmasked corruption of the PA. In a move to regain trust former president Yasser Arafat appointed Dr. Salam Fayyad as Minister of Finance in June 2002. In light of the targets for his recruitment he restructured the Palestine Investment Fund (PIF) which was initially established in 2000 by the power of a presidential decree, yet remained ineffective until Fayyad’s financial reform plan came into effect (AbuKhater 2003, Khatib 2012, Abdullah 2012). PIF was provisioned as the framework which would assemble the countless, uncontrolled and unaccounted for assets and investments of the PLO. In 2003 a statement by Fayyad declared that the capital channelled into PIF exceeded US$ 600 million in value (AbuKhater 2003). Dr. Ghassan Khatib – former Minister
When Fayyad was appointed Minister of Finance [...] he ran the financial reform project. This project covered the unification of bank accounts, termination of monopoly-supporting regulations, and many others. One of the pivotal moves was that of the creation of the Palestine Investment Fund (PIF) which in its forefront served to tackle corruption and mismanagement. For example, there was an arrangement by which the PA established a company called the Palestinians Services Company (PSC). This private company had a monopoly on importing some commodities such as petroleum products, cement and tobacco. These basic commodities composed naturally a significant market and generated immense profits. These sums were not part of the PA budget, and this company did not answer to neither the Legislative Council nor MOF. This generated accusations of lack of transparency, corruption and the like. The reform processes banned monopolies – with the exception of petroleum – and the PSC was transformed into an investment fund that has known boards of directors and trustees, its accounts are audited by internationally accredited companies, and whose budget pumps into that of the PA by which any profits are transferred to the PA Treasury.

PIF as the PSC is a private company owned by the PA. At the beginning the Minister of Finance filled the duties of the head of board of trustees of PIF, which lead to harmony between- and integration of PIFs projects with plans of relevant ministries and LGs, by which the relationship was complementary. Nonetheless when Hamas won the elections in 2006 – to ban the latter from controlling the fund – PIF was detached from the cabinet; the Minister of Finance had no more powers over its work while it became attached directly to the president's office. I believe the consequence of this move is the nowadays distancing of PIF's operations from debates ongoing in ministries and LGs. (Khatib 2012)

In other words, by 2006 PIF became legally beyond answering neither to the PA, nor its parliament, nor the people that legally own it, and by default beyond being influenced by LGs whom have no representative amongst the eleven members of its board of directors. In the same line, the formulation of the vision falls short of mentioning LGs as partners in the process, hence re-casting shadows of earlier forms of biased capital circulation and neoliberal management in the era of the PA. In this regard Anani points out that

After the creation of PIF with one year, a law was passed rendering all state-owned property under the custody of PIF for investment one way or another. So PIF basically has the power to decide on urban projects such as residential neighbourhoods, industrial zones, whatever, and no one could or would object, for even though it is a private company it has governmental blessing and a carte blanch. And whether PIF likes this or not, but their independence in terms of decision making from the planning authorities limits the capacity of the latter in terms of comprehensive planning in addition to cutting down resources that should be theirs. (Anani 2010)
On the ground PIF has indeed executed countless heavy projects across six main categories: 1. Micro, Small and Medium sized Enterprises Portfolios (MSMEs); 2. Real Estate and Hospitality; 3. Infrastructure Program; 4. Large Caps; 5. Capital Markets Portfolio; and, 6. Aghwar (Jordan Valley) and Dead Sea Development Initiatives. According to its 2012 Annual Report PIF had transferred a total of US$ 30 million in the form of dividends to the Palestinian Treasury, rendering its contribution to the latter since inception at approximately US$ 683 million (PIF 2012). Further, ‘PIF’s assets have reached US$ 782.8 million by the end of 2012, while owner’s equity reached US$ 709.4 million’ (PIF 2012:10), and through the process of re-orienting its investments (PLO had considerable assets in different and remote places around the world, see Calabresi 2002) by the end of the same year 84% of the accounted PIF investments were in Palestine. In practical terms this translates into the investments described in the coming paragraphs.

Under its first category PIF has committed to US$ 90 million over the span of five years from 2012 to 2017. This fund will be utilized in either of two forms: investment in or loan for MSMEs which today constitute 85% of the total employment in private sector, and contribute 55% to the Palestinian GDP. Beyond the numbers, PIF justifies its program by stating that ‘MSMEs have managed to build significant resilience in the face of political uncertainty and volatile market conditions’ (PIF 2014a:18). While this vitality touches on topics addressed in this work, it gains further value when considered in light of three; first, the policy papers highlighting the significance of the Palestinian social capital and the corollary knowledge-based economy which were produced by MAS; second, the statistics which indicate that 55% of the Ramallah-alBireh governorate economy lies in the private services sector (TVET Labour Market Program 2011), many of which correspond to PIF’s thematic criterion; and third, the relative competitive capacity of this region in comparison to others in the WB (Infographic 3.2, p. 177). Thus, even though the Ramallah region is not a declared PIF priority in its MSMEs program, nonetheless, there are strong indicators that it shall emerge as a primary beneficiary, thence bringing forth questions of potential forms of utilization and modes of capitalizing on spatial impacts.

The paramount impact of PIF on the city-scape of Ramallah was achieved through two of its multiple projects under its second category ‘Real Estate and Hospitality’. Like PADICO – whether in terms of themes addressed or modus operandi of ensuring profit remains in-house – PIF established a real estate investment and development arm called Amaar Real Estate Group (AREG). Today the highlight is elErsal Centre which is under construction (since 2012) following designs by the internationally renowned architect Jafar Tuqan on grounds originally designated for the Palestinian National Garden (Image 5.1, p. 247). In spite of its scale and predicted impact, up to date details of the project have not been disclosed to public, and the only trace is few images (with no description) on the web-page of AREG. Notwithstanding, this work was able to acquire an unaccounted-for copy of the Design Proposal dating to May 2010, herein referred to as ‘CCC & Jafar Tuqan 2010’.

The CEO of PIF referred to elErsal Centre as the future prime ‘point of attraction for the financial and commercial institutions in Palestine’ (PIF 2014b). In technical terms, this project aims at creating a Central Business District (CBD) in line with examples such as the Potsdamer Platz in Berlin and La Defense in Paris. For this purpose PIF has allocated US$ 45.5 million as start-up capital
(AREG 2014a) in a bet on the willingness of local and international investors to acquiesce covering the remaining significant costs. It is provisioned to include 13 towers with varying heights reaching up to 20th floors for office, retail, residential and pedestrian purposes as well as a hotel (Image 5.3, Image 5.4). In total, the project envisions 224,948 sq.m. of constructed space, and a population of 11,907 persons (CCC & Jafar Tuqan 2010), i.e. 10% of the population of the Ramallah agglomerate today.

Spatially, elErsal Centre consolidates a change in construction regulations that has been crawling onto the city for a couple of years whereby skyscrapers and towers are becoming a norm; e.g. Palestine Tower (Image 4.1, p. 185) and the Media Tower with their 23 and 12 floors respectively. Further, it penetrates a neighbourhood of relative quiet – where the main characteristic is low-rise residential units – that hitherto has been concealed by the low-profile and activity commercial buildings situated linearly along elErsal Street. Given the rapid pace of urban transformation across the agglomeration the alteration of the trend was bound to take place sooner or later, thence the fact that elErsal Centre is the ground-breaker constitutes a void reason for criticism. However, developers again fail to provide solutions for worries created by their projects beyond their marked borders. The property lies at elErsal street (Image 5.5) which is the narrow yet main artery of the agglomerate direction north, and the runway for over 30,000 vehicles on Thursdays between 14:00 and 17:00 – according to the survey of Khaled Batrawi in 2012 (Civil Engineer, co-founder of the Palestinian Centre for the safety on Roads and Environment, and consultant for alBireh Municipality). Since the reopening of
the Nablus Road traffic levels have decreased, yet remain problematic given the inadequate infrastructure and augmenting pressures. elErsal Centre designs fall short of addressing or proposing solutions to this traffic predicament, and similarly, to the expected significant increase in demand on the currently limited water supply, waste-water management, and electric power provision in this neighbourhood of underdeveloped infrastructure. Given PIF’s status, declared vision, capital in possession, its claimed work in infrastructures (addressed later in this section), and having obtained licenses through the HPC in defiance of alBireh municipality; given those aspects, failing to declare a position in regards to potential impact on living conditions in the surrounding neighbourhood leaps beyond the label of a shortcoming to that of indifference and impunity.

Beyond the various criticism of CBDs, the execution of the latter was generally promoted under the headlines of accreted productivity rates and the parallel provision of lacking and quintessential – both soft and hard – infrastructures in the targeted regions (Hall and Tewdwr-Jones 2011, Knox and McCarthy 2005, BPF 2008). Evaluated from this perspective, elErsal Centre proves to follow the aforementioned mode of eclectic, partisan and fragmented rather than the sustainable, inclusive and integrated form of urban development; evidenced through the neither partial nor complete incorporation of the PNG in the master plan of the project.

Geographically, elErsal Centre constitutes first steps towards creating the proxily deliberated de novo commercial centre for Ramallah-alBireh; albeit, with PIF as vanguard, private investors as choir, PA delivering the oration, and the
respective municipalities axed and confined to the mission of policing existing (expired?) regulations. Regardless of dynamics of operation and consummation, this construction catalyses and materializes the – hitherto chiefly residential – ongoing crawl towards the proximate northern localities. Further, it provides a physical reference for the true scaling for Rawabi (section 5.1.4, p. 256) which is hitherto presented and promoted as an independent city, while in reality it configures into a satellite-neighbourhood of the Jerusalem Metropolis.

PIF’s contribution to the northward sprawl is bolstered through its elReehan Neighbourhood which in 2012 delivered keys to some of its Phase One venturing residents. The neighbourhood lies mezzo between the (nowadays) northern edge of the Ramallah agglomerate and its main higher education institution, namely, Birzeit University (BZU). At approximately 6 km and 10-12 minutes from Ramallah’s centre, the neighbourhood extends over 250,000 sq.m. more than half of which is dedicated to residential purposes, while the remainder is ‘dedicated to commercial and community facilities, green open spaces and utilities, and residual land’ (elArd and CEP 2010:1-1). Noteworthy is the urban design and spatial distribution of this suburb (Map 5.1), whereby the best view location is utilized for the II-storied hospital, the high-school, the community services lot, and 80% of apartment buildings rather than the presumably higher-priced villas. In addition, rather than the typical two-direction short-intervals concentric rings of vehicle networks, in place, every second ring was interrupted by a pedestrian space thereof minimizing vehicle movement distances and periods within the residential space. Foremost, elReehan Neighbourhood sets precedence in its incorporation of a rhizomatous network of plazas, pedestrian passages and staircases which in total comprise almost 15% of the total project area (elArd and CEP 2010:3-2). Given the aforementioned factors as well as the incorporation of ten housing typologies; adequate commercial and open spaces; the scarce
service of a hospital; proximity to a leading higher education institution; lying ten minutes from Ramallah’s centre yet surrounded by nature and premium scenery; and the attraction of an archaeological site are adroit promises of – comparatively – meritable living conditions.

Unlike elErsal Centre, elReehan Neighbourhood was designed, calculated and executed as an urban-growth catalyst project. In terms of infrastructure, this neighbourhood has introduced a valuable bypass vein for vehicles traveling through the north-west quarter of the agglomerate or further northwards. It has also incorporated water-recycling systems, waste-water collection network and treatment plant, and facilities for social services that can be shared by neighbouring localities (elArd and CEP 2010). Combining these two factors with its strategic location, it forms a balanced bridge between the formerly dead-end peninsular elTireh neighbourhood and the southwards growing AbuQash village, which in turn is an extension of Birzeit University and the town of Birzeit.

On financial levels, having incorporated varying housing typologies could seem as commission for accessibility among wider social strata, nonetheless, this impression is dubious as market price per unit remains the privilege of upper-middle-class and yonder. In terms of morphology, the neighbourhood has re-incorporated the socially-demanded pedestrian connections and social pockets. However, it remained hostage to parcel-borders and parameters of dominant construction regulations, namely, repetitive rows of buildings separated by a regular retention space. The combination of these two equations has physically translated in a space that considers pedestrian and open spaces as; first, additional rather than integral; second, external rather than internal; and third, as defined rather than diffusing and permeable.

In spite of named shortcomings elReehan Neighbourhood resembles missionary steps in revising and re-defining the dominant urban morphology in the Ramallah agglomerate, and has the potential of serving as a catalyst for municipal revision of construction regulations; particularly those pertaining directly to the city’s morphology. Even though it officially lies within borders of the town of Surda, nonetheless, it has recently requested and received consent for annexation to Ramallah’s municipal boundaries (AREG 2013). Given that elReehan Neighbourhood’s site borders Ramallah’s mandate area, this operation of custody transfer will provide legal precedence for other land owners to request the same in plight of the corollary increase in property-value and thus return on investment. While this will accelerate the process of legally merging the localities composing the Ramallah agglomerate thus reducing administrative bureaucracy and improving efficiency; on the other side of the same coin, without erudite and conspicuous by-laws this could result in the erasure of characteristic sociospatial identities of the involved localities, and furthering of inflation of property prices.

Seen from aesthetic and geographic perspectives, elErsal Centre and elReehan Neighbourhoods are significant contributors to the modern outline, image and spatial distribution of the Ramallah agglomerate. On one hand they provide reference points for Ramallah’s urban-scale and constitute powerful transit nodes. On the other, they propel the re-examination of dominant urban morphology apropos economic and social changes and newly arising needs. They are physical translations of the social values of individuality and the corollary spatial exclusion, thus bringing back to the forefront demand for spatial justice.

Beyond these two projects; within the framework of its second category ‘Real Estate and Hospitality’ PIF either owns the entire or majority of shares in hotels
in Ramallah (Grand Park Hotel), Jericho (Intercontinental Hotel), Bethlehem (Jacir Palace Intercontinental Hotel), and Gaza (Arc Med Hotel) (AREG 2014). In addition to the two categories featured here PIF has ‘Infrastructure Programs’ which includes a number of profit generating basic services as in telecommunications and power30; ‘Large Caps Investments’ which stands for market shares in existing institutions31; ‘Capital Market Portfolio Management’ which operates within the framework of financial management32; and last, ‘Aghwar and Dead Sea Investments’33 which involves – among other projects – the planning and execution of a new city in Jericho (PIF 2014c).

Aside from reservations and shortcomings articulated over the past pages; the combination of the six tracks – impact of projects as well as the directly and indirectly involved personnel and capital – renders PIF an eminent actor in the local context, while its nature as an investment company – for the benefit of Palestinian people – could be considered as both opportunity and obstacle for inducing financially resilient urban undertakings.

5.1.4. Massar International

Massar Associates, the predecessor organization of Massar International, was founded by Palestinian businessman Bashar Masri in 1994 as a vehicle to promote sustainable economic development in Palestine. Massar is an Arabic word meaning ‘path’. The name symbolizes the vision of its founder – to create a company which would successfully link the very best of local professionalism in Palestine with international best practices and an understanding of Western management perspectives in order to integrate the Palestinian economy fully into the global economy. (Massar 2014)

Massar spreads over 15 subsidiary companies in the MENA region and eastern Europe (nine in Palestine), through which its core values of ‘honesty in decision-making, personal responsibility and accountability, and leadership by example [...] lie at the heart of our ability to create and respond to market opportunities and have fueled [sic] our dramatic expansion’ (Massar 2014a). In an exception (?) to these ‘core values’ Massar’s transparency is regularly placed under doubt34 given the orchestrated cloud – of bureaucracy and market manoeuvres – disguising its real capital size and extents of leverage on elites of national politics. An example is demonstrated through its Palestine Investment and Development Company (PID) which ‘owns a number of strategic plots of land mainly in the Ramallah area, earmarked for real-estate development projects’ and ‘is a major shareholder in a number of Palestinian companies’ as described on the Massar website (Massar 2014b). Nonetheless, there is no trace of PID anywhere else, neither on the world-wide-web nor in the Palestinian yellow pages.

Massar’s subsidiary companies operate in; first, Financial Services (e.g. Sahem Trading & Investment Company for brokering); second, Services & Development (e.g. Publicis Zoom for marketing and advertisement; ASAL Technologies for IT support systems and services; and Alpha International
which focuses on data management and processes, including a.o. surveys and polling); and third, Massar is involved in Real Estate mainly through Bayti Real Estate Development Company (Bayti) whose ‘mission is to create affordable, accessible, family-friendly communities for Palestinians’ (Massar 2014b). Similar to aforementioned examples, Bayti-Palestine was established to oversee a pronounced project, in this case neither a neighbourhood nor a business centre, rather, a new city from cipher. Soon after, the Qatari real estate developer Diar joined the venture.

In the peak of the financial bubble that fayyadism created – and as Ramallah’s residents were for the first time confronted with the social transformation of their city and as construction sites seemed to add in numbers by the week – rumours of ‘Palestine’s first planned city’ started to spread and be confirmed by popular news reporting significant purchase of land from the villages of ‘Atara, ‘Ajjul and ‘Abwein (17 km north from Ramallah’s centre) by a member of ‘le Rothschild palestinien’ (Shaked 2006, Kristellimages 2011); namely, alMasry family. Similar to other countless local and international media reports (Davis 2011, Yehya 2012, a.o.), The Guardian stated:

Legal proof of ownership [of land] is almost impossible to come by in the West Bank, where 70% of land is unregistered and ancestral property is inherited by dozens of heirs. [...] The urban project [Rawabi] benefited from major international support, primarily from USAid and Qatar, and Israeli cooperation. Bashar al-Masry, the Palestinian businessman behind the private venture, was allowed exceptional privileges. The bureaucratic challenges [...] Palestinians face were pushed aside and title deeds for Rawabi land were granted in one bundle. Locals who owned land in three villages on the proposed site and refused to sell were forced to accept the market rate by the Palestinian Authority. A row about preferential treatment to well-connected individuals ensued. (Greenwood 2013)

Indeed, following the official announcement of Rawabi in 2008 and news spreading around the region, many owners refrained from selling their lands to Bayti whether out of principle or speculation over higher gains. These positions were shattered through a presidential decree by Mahmoud Abbas on 15 November 2009 enabling Bayti’s sequester of approximately 118,000 sq.m. from ‘Abwain, 122,00 sq.m. from ‘Atara, and a swapping 1,532,000 sq.m. from ‘Ajjul (Davis 2011, Greenwood 2013). Under the frequent descriptions of it being a ‘national project for Palestine’ (Purkiss 2013) and statements such as ‘increase affordable quality housing for low and middle income families’ Bayti was able to secure further privileges from the PA such as the signature of an MoU (20 April 2008, Grand Park Hotel) with the Ministry of Public Works and Housing (Bayti 2014) through which Rawabi was declared as a Public-Private-Partnership (PPP) program:

The PA committed to the funding of necessary public services and off-site infrastructure development in Rawabi as promised in its pledge to ‘increase affordable quality housing for low and middle income families’ in the context of the Palestinian Reform and Development Plan (PRDP). The partnership highlights PA guarantees of a government-supported enabling business environment to ensure Rawabi’s economic development. This partnership
will instill confidence in investors, business owners and entrepreneurs and hopefully facilitate rapid economic growth. (Bayti 2014)

From among the truncated observers following granules of information rose three major opinions; first, some propagate the pact as a conventional good-governance practice; second, others down-played its importance as the PA is financially strangulated, which was also used by some Rawabi-affiliates as argument for construction delays; or a third group whose argument was that closeness of capital and politics in Palestine provides the permit for the private investment – Rawabi – to jump the waiting line for the scarce public services. The last opinion was the closest, as this PPP grants Rawabi the legal cover to apply for foreign aid that is targeted for PA public service provision, such as its current plight for the USAid to construct a portion of the eight schools provisioned in Rawabi (Rosen 2013). Yet foremost, regardless of the outline of the PPP and its legal parameters, through this official politics of propagating and promoting Rawabi as a PPP for a national project of affordable housing; Massar and Bayti have secured an exit shall this rashest venture miss its target. This conclusion implores the larger perspective over Rawabi.

Creation of new cities has been a core characteristic of humanity’s stories of achieved progress, a few aspects of which are eloquently captured in Lefebvre’s masterpiece ‘The Production of Space’ (1974; here 2009). Measured against this characteristic as well as the context of shock – that Palestinian urbanity experienced in 1948 – and the corollary subjugation to systems of mutation that Israel has been knitting hitherto; together, these compose a ‘chapeau!’ for the enterprisers of Rawabi. This Palestinian project has crossed into a territory denied for sixty-two years, as this right was and remains – with Rawabi as sole exception – an exclusive privilege for Israelis. Yet, while one might be able to accommodate the ‘means’, however, one decidedly shall not habituate a compromised ‘end’. Rawabi is envisioned to spare its residents the annual disruption of power- and telecommunication-lines accompanying the seasonal snow as they are utilizing the late 20th century – strategy of subterranean infrastructure. It promises to provide order, organization, safety and quiet in contrast to the continued pollution, aesthetic mélange, endangerment to public safety and traffic disruptions caused by the random construction sites arising apace throughout Ramallah. It is testing and incorporating green materials and systems, and it has accounted for sufficient open and green space towards providing healthy living conditions and a sense of community (Rawabi 2014a). The city composes of 23 neighbourhoods with ‘modern amenities’ and facilities such as:

- Ample, well-lit and secure underground parking areas with elevator access
- Neighborhood playgrounds
- Wide sidewalks and outdoor walking trails
- Pocket parks and green areas
- Convenience retail stores such as neighborhood minimarts and dry cleaners (Rawabi 2014a).

In its claim for diversity Rawabi incorporates seven main typologies of housing buildings and more than forty apartment patterns and sizes (Ziadeh 2012) whereby the latter varies between 92 sq.m. and 340 sq.m. (Rawabi 2014). Nonetheless, and similar to eReehan Neighbourhood, the prices remain relatively
Real-Estate Corporations and Urban Landscape  

exclusive for lower-middle and underprivileged strata. As for elevation, buildings range between 8 and 10 floors⁴⁶, corresponding to 24 to 30 meters in height. The buildings are aligned in concentric rows (Image 5.12) that constrict and converge to create neighbourhood spaces (Image 5.9).

This model of mass-production of housing and the morphology of repeating residential high-rises has been applied several instances previously (e.g. Marzahn-Berlin; Banlieues-Paris; among other post WWII districts in Europe which emerged in *les trentes glorieuses*⁴⁷) and continues today (e.g. new districts and cities in China). What these typologies also share is functionality, uniformity, the cumbersome scale, and sub-optimal environmental conditions. In relation to the time of conception, these models were considered well designed and equipped, and were predominantly shaped by varying interpretations of utopia, philanthropy, and market-economics thus attracting working- and middle-classes. Nonetheless, given the distance from working place (economic centres), lack of customization and the aforementioned physical factors rendered these neighbourhoods soon after into milieus of underprivileged strata (Wacquant 2008; Lévy-Vroelant et al 2008; a.o.).

While Rawabi lies at a mere 15 minutes from the nowadays borders of the Ramallah agglomerate (Map 5.2) there are a couple of factors acting against it. First, the combination of poor public transportation, the dormant⁴⁸ Israeli checkpoint to the north of Birzeit (‘Atara Checkpoint), and the fact that its main access road is conditioned by a yearly permit⁴⁹ from the COGAT pose a threat to the accessibility of Rawabi (PBS 2013); and corollary, its attraction for middle-class employees and public-sector servants whose work is situated inside the Ramallah

Map 5.2. Location of Rawabi in respect to Ramallah and other Palestinian localities [red colour], as well as Israeli illegal settlements [blue colour] in the WB.
Image 5.9. Animation depicting an aerial view of Rawabi (Rawabi 2014b).
Image 5.10. Animation depicting a street in a Rawabi neighbourhood (Rawabi 2014b).
Image 5.11. Advertisement bearing the slogan ‘nicest view atop the hill’ (Rawabi 2014b).

Image 5.13. A view into a street in Rawabi. Notice the proximity of towers and resulting shade. PS. Image taken around noon on a typical sunny day in October 2013.

Map 5.3. Rawabi Master Plan (Shoshan 2013:5)
- Mixed use
- Residential
- Retail
- Schools
- Worship Places
- Civic services, Health Centre, Police & Fire Stations
agglomerate. **Second,** given its placement on the northern slopes of the mountain alongside the east-west orientation of its towering buildings renders exposure – of majority of apartments – to direct sunlight minimal, its streets often shaded, and thus concomitantly a high likelihood of accelerating wind-pull generated by the combination of shade, heat, and the typical western winds of the region.

Shall Rawabi achieve its goals and prosper, it will likely induce higher rates of development along the route connecting it to the Ramallah agglomerate; thence presenting further arguments for the pronounced demand of higher distribution of urban-development oriented investments beyond the northern municipal boundaries of Ramallah and alBireh (Shaheen 2012, Barghouthi 2012). However, shall Rawabi – given the aforementioned factors – face difficulties in recruiting residents, there is a high probability that it will employ the PPP signed with the PA to secure a profitable exit for Massar. In light of the slogans of the project of being a ‘national project’ and ‘affordable housing’ on one hand, and on the other the intimacy between capital and politics in Palestine, the doors remain wide-open for the possibility of this satellite neighbourhood becoming the first state-owned property for social housing in an operation similar to the purchase of the Mash'al-Tower by the PA\(^5\). Regardless of the end-form of Rawabi, Ramallah has to recognize and negotiate with this space as the former is bound to impact the latter, whether through forms of stimulus and complementarity, or through becoming the first *banlieue* of the region.
5.2. PRIVATE SECTOR: MARKET OPPORTUNITIES AND DENATIONALIZATION

PECDAR, PADICO, PIF and Massar’s structures – neoliberalism as system, capitalism as ideology – are exclusive, limited, and fail to articulate a social vision along the economic. Their upper tier belongs to a global coterie\(^{51}\) whose continued accumulation of wealth is symbiotic to absence of liability, and freedom to engage with oppressive, authoritarian and – in the non-exclusive case of Palestine – colonial regimes and imperial systems (Arouri 2010; As’ad 2010; alAtar 2010; Kassis 2010; alKhalili 2012; Fanon 2008; Escobar 2012; a.o.). Mechanisms sustaining these systems deprive the locality and its natives of their defining characteristics limiting them to the narrow perspective of market-value; the coins and bills that differ in the size and engravings, but remain, predominantly, a coin and a bill. This ideology – equal to others – translated onto the spaces which lent them a footing; in hundreds of cities there is a Zara, an Ikea, a trade centre, financial districts, and monumental phallic towers overlooking the landscape of their wealth; akin the enduring \textit{étoile centrale} of colossal avenues dotted along the stretches of the puissant Greek Empire (Rossi 1982, Anderson 2006, Fainstein 2009). Anani notes of the architecture of Ramallah by saying:

We suddenly woke up after nearly a decade of the Oslo Agreements to find out that architecture has become a means of transforming the urban realm into an assemblage of containers, stacking people, homes, businesses and companies on top of each other, and branding the city with what is available only via liberal market forces. The temporality of the urban space and the tendency to replace has become a norm. The liberal destruction of what has no exchange value strengthens and furthers this constancy of disposal and renewal. (Anani 2011)

Here Brugmann argues:

A suburban residential city model might be called Deer Path Village, a shopping mall is now a ‘town center’, a multi-theatre movie complex is an ‘entertainment district’, or an office park an ‘innovation district’, but this landscape is not the carefully crafted product of a community that has a shared strategy and method for building and maintaining urban advantage in the world. [...] The momentum of development has steadily shifted to the city, a territory still poorly understood by most nations [...] throughout the world they have generally lacked a sufficient sense of urbanism to solve urban problems rather than creating new ones. (Brugmann 2009:273)

Brugmann points to considerations of densities, scale and relationality for urban economies as systems of either producing differentiation or ineptness, hence city-competitiveness or the absence of it. In effect there are no ‘world-class standards’ and in order to ‘truly secure advantage, corporations must also
practice urban strategy’ (2009:275; emphasis in original). Global players have and are creating the – extensively scholarly discussed – global cities which in turn are charging the – neoliberal economy led – widening gap between the devaluing rural and the appreciating urban. This appreciation is factored by:

[the] multiple processes that constitute economic globalization [which in turn] inhabit and shape specific structurations of the economic, the political, the cultural, and the subjective. Among the most vital of their effects is the production of new spatialities and temporalities. These belong to both the global and the national, if only to each in part. This ‘in part’ is an especially important qualification, as in my reading the global is itself partial, albeit strategic. The global does not (yet) fully encompass the lived experience of actors or the domain of institutional orders and cultural formations; it persists as a partial condition. This, however, should not suggest that the global and the national are discrete conditions that mutually exclude each other. To the contrary, they significantly overlap and interact in ways that distinguish our contemporary moment. (Sassen 2000:215)

This postulate is achieved through Sassen’s reading of – among others – the Marxist Manifesto’s dialectic view of internationalism as inherently generated by localities whose aspired prosperity is conditioned by merits of production and trade (Sassen 1999, 2000, 2003). Auxiliary to profit opportunity, the same discourse requires thence urban cosmopolitanism as environment for attraction of desired alien resources whether human or capital; a concept that reaped the consent of Islamic preachers and Shari’a radicalists in Gulf countries to the consumption of alcohol within their territories by alien agents of TNCs and MNCs, proving that ‘the bourgeoisie has through its exploitation of the world market given a cosmopolitan character to production and consumption in every country’ (Marx and Engels, IN: Harvey 2000:530). On another levels, such examples of adjunct accommodation of behavioural variation reveal the shortcoming of Martha Nussbaum’s postulate of practices of cosmopolitanism as ethos and a universal moral standpoint, and consequently the inability of such generic concepts to reduce neither social otherness nor (spatial-) conflict; whether within a locality or internationally (Appiah 1997, Harvey 2009, Nassem and Margison 2006). The latter is furthered in works on colonialism (e.g. Fanon 2008), and in the particular case of Palestine it encroaches on ‘normalization’ and therewith equate the colonised subject, the Palestinian, with the colonizing institution, Israel.

As borders of territories are predominantly porous the culture, politics, ideology and their corollary translations in milieus are fluid rather than permanent (Lefebvre 2009, Harvey 2009). This constitutes one of the foundations on which Appiah (1997) writes his ‘Cosmopolitan Patriots’ in which he transcribes the concept of ‘rooted cosmopolitanism’ through an approach that differentiates it from ideology in favour of it constituting a sentiment (Box 5.1, p. 265), thence variable in relation to individual circumstances, experiences, and – akin patriotism – is assumed to be a choice (Appiah 1997). The concept of rooted cosmopolitanism opposes the mutated capitalist consumption of cosmopolitan features, and follows a trajectory similar – but not identical – to Sassen’s (2005) global and national as ‘discrete conditions’ that are not mutually exclusive, and Appadurai’s work (2003, 2008) on translocalities and cultural dimensions of globalisation. In this regard Appadurai explains:
Box 5.1. Extract from Appiah’s (1997) Cosmopolitan Patriots.

My father was a Ghanaian patriot. He once published a column in the Pioneer, our local newspaper in Kumasi, under the headline ‘Is Ghana Worth Dying For?’ and I know that his hearts answer was yes. But he also loved Asante, the region of Ghana where he and I both grew up, a kingdom absorbed within a British colony and, then, a region of a new multiethnic republic: a once-kingdom that he and his father also both loved and served. And, like so many African nationalists of his class and generation, he always loved an enchanting abstraction they called Africa.

When he died, my sisters and I found a note he had drafted and never quite finished, last words of love and wisdom for his children. After a summary reminder of our double ancestry-in Ghana and in England – he wrote: ‘Remember that you are citizens of the world.’ And he went on to tell us that this meant that – wherever we chose to live, and, as citizens of the world, we could surely choose to live anywhere – we should make sure we left that place ‘better than you found it.’ ‘Deep inside of me,’ he went on, ‘is a great love for mankind and an abiding desire to see mankind, under God, fulfil its highest destiny.’

The favourite slander of the narrow nationalist against us cosmopolitans is that we are rootless. What my father believed in, however, was a rooted cosmopolitanism, or, if you like, a cosmopolitan patriotism. Like Gertrude Stein, he thought there was no point in roots if you couldn’t take them with you. ‘America is my country and Paris is my hometown,’ Stein said. My father would have understood her.

We cosmopolitans face a familiar litany of objections. Some, for example, have complained that our cosmopolitanism must be parasitic: where, they ask, could Stein have gotten her roots in a fully cosmopolitan world? Where, in other words, would all the diversity we cosmopolitans celebrate come from in a world where there were only cosmopolitans?

The answer is straight forward: the cosmopolitan patriot can entertain the possibility of a world in which everyone is a rooted cosmopolitan, attached to a home of one’s own, with its own cultural particularities, but taking pleasure from the presence of other, different places that are home to other, different people. The cosmopolitan also imagines that in such a world not everyone will find it best to stay in their natal patria, so that the circulation of people among different localities will involve not only cultural tourism (which the cosmopolitan admits to enjoying) but migration, nomadism, diaspora. In the past, these processes have too often been the result of forces we should deplore; the old migrants were often refugees, and older diasporas often began in an involuntary exile. But what can be hateful, if coerced, can be celebrated when it flows from the free decisions of individuals or of groups.

In a world of cosmopolitan patriots, people would accept the citizen’s responsibility to nurture the culture and the politics of their homes. Many would, no doubt, spend their lives in the places that shaped them; and that is one of the reasons local cultural practices would be sustained and transmitted. But many would move; and that would mean that cultural practices would travel also (as they have always travelled). The result would be a world in which each local form of human life was the result of long-term and persistent processes of cultural hybridization: a world, in that respect, much like the world we live in now.

Behind the objection that cosmopolitanism is parasitic there is, in any case, an anxiety we should dispel: an uneasiness caused by an exaggerated estimate of the rate of disappearance of cultural heterogeneity. In the global system of cultural exchanges there are, indeed, somewhat asymmetrical processes of homogenization going on, and there are forms of human life disappearing. Neither of these phenomena is particularly new, but their range and speed probably is. Nevertheless, as forms of culture disappear new forms are created, and they are created locally, which means they have exactly the regional inflections that the cosmopolitan celebrates. The disappearance of old cultural forms is consistent with a rich variety of forms of human life, just because new cultural forms, which differ from each other, are being created all the time as well (Appiah 1997:617; emphasis in original).
The isomorphism of people, territory, and legitimate sovereignty that constitutes the normative character of the modern nation-state is under threat from the forms of circulation of people characteristic of the contemporary world. It is now widely conceded that the world we live in is one in which human motion is more often definitive of social life than it is exceptional. [... M]any such locations create complex conditions for the production and reproduction of locality, in which ties of marriage, work, business, and leisure weave together various circulating populations with various kinds of ‘locals’ to create localities that belong in one sense to particular nation-states but are, from another point of view, what we might call translocalities. (Appadurai 2003:338)

Regarded from this perspective, projects pursued by the Palestinian private actors can be understood as materializations of globalized mindsets that are enabled and entrenched through the economy of the OAs. In the same line, their scale is factored by the socio-economic aspirations and conditionalities of Ramallites. Scholars often recount recently constructed neighbourhoods (e.g. elReehan) as ‘settlements’ in juxtaposition to the illegal Israeli colonies where the main argument relies on the aesthetics and spatial configurations of these residential areas. Indeed, modes and characteristics of space production in Palestinian cities are not institutionally acknowledged as mediums of questioning, negotiation, and customization. Rather, the built environment continues to be governed through eclectic sets of laws, regulations and supplements inherited chiefly from the British Mandate (1918-1948), the Jordanian annexation (1948-1967), and the Israeli COGAT (1967-present). However, the new emerging neighbourhoods cannot be reduced to mere copies of colonial spatialization and the psycho-behaviour of the oppressed internalizing features of authority. The mansions that are considered characteristic of Ramallah were conceived through the environment of the British Mandate, does that make them colonial spaces? The specific detached-units suburbanization has also existed in Ramallah since over three decades; e.g. the Doctors and Engineers complexes are examples from elTireh neighbourhood, both executed in the 1980s. As the names suggest, these were conceived through frameworks of unions, mirroring the politico-economic hierarchy of the time where socio-spatial enablement stemmed from unions rather that today’s neocolonial networks.

The dialectic of urbanisms as ecologies suggests that the different kinetics of Ramallah compared to that of the nearby colony of Mod’in produces distinct procedures, and hence varied end-products although employing similar strategies. Re-employing Marx’s six moments (see section 3.2.4, p. 164); in regards to the nature of the process of suburbanization, this practice is rooted in the industrial revolution which laboured worker-towns around sites of production, and these evolved in shape, scale and function over the course of history and changing economic orders. Akin to their predecessors and associates, residential suburbs (be they gated communities, banlieues, or favelas) are the natural spatial articulation of particular social needs and modes of economic production (see section 2.3, p. 91). While the different typologies correspond to scaled stratifications, nonetheless, they all depend on functioning mobility infrastructures that connect them to the agglomerate’s centre(s). Here, a characteristic difference lies in the form of activity producing colonies in comparison to that of Ramallite suburbs. While the former is a centralized and subsidized colonial strategy of land-alienation aimed at furthering Palestinian fragmentation (see section 2.2.2, p. 82); on the other
side, the latter is a product of de-regularized capitalist speculation whose indirect impact is the further encouragement of re-expansion of Ramallite mental and lived geography (see section 3.2.3, p. 151). This translates with the fundamental difference of fencing and armament of colonies vis-à-vis the open borders of the – nonetheless policed – suburbs. This in turn lies in tension with the evolution of social relations within these spaces. While the success of this model in both, Israeli colonies and Ramallite suburbs, is due to the individualization and hence mobility of the citizen; yet, the aforementioned differences yield the exasperation of narrow Zionist biopolitics and fear in colonies, while suburbs are normalizing the death of the Palestinian politics of national-homogenization, and incubating the naissance of new relationalities (see section 3.3, p. 173).

In both cases these forms of urbanization sustain through marketing themselves as extensions of cities and their ability to cater for particular living conditions that are on demand. While doing so, the market-process necessitates considerations of maximization of profit, which too often lead to discourses of mass-production (see section 4.4.1, p. 223). The fact that there are aesthetic similarities is largely caused by the fact that both Israeli and Palestinian operations pump their elements from the same pool of construction technology, hence they assemble similar resources in highly comparable topographies. Naturally, this in turn induces the contesting mental perceptions of these spaces. Protagonists focus on provincial (non urban) features of landscape romanticisms and controlled population features (lower diversity, spatialized familiarity, hence reduced otherness) as advantages of these micro districts. Contenders on the other side focus on their spatio-economic and social exclusivism and elevated rates of consumption of capital and natural resources. In Tel Aviv the majority of opposition to the settler project is based on economic considerations, since significant portions of annual national budgets are diverted to the exclusive benefit of groups that accept the village-like suburban trade-off. The same applies to the case of Ramallah.

There is no doubt about Ramallah's continued northward expansion. The intense relationship between Ramallah's horizontal orientation and the largest (nearby) singular institution – Birzeit University – has been nurturing this pattern since the 1970s. The Israeli militarization and dissection of the Qalandia and elRam areas to the south, the construction of colonies to the east and west, and the placement of headquarters (e.g. Jawwal), representatives (e.g. German House), and commercial activities (e.g. elErsal Centre) in the northern parts of the agglomerate all feed further into this trend. Hence suburban projects that include vital regional infrastructural elements (e.g. elReehan Neighbourhood) could actually serve as advantageous stimuli, where the degree of advantage or its opposite depends on the value of the trade-off. Here the question is whether the value of public funds diverted for the operation of the particular private project shared or partisan?

Hence, returning to commentaries over post-OAs large-scale urban projects; first, the criticism of Ramallah's suburbs based on their aesthetic similarity to Israeli colonies is too narrow and distracting from the real problematic. A drive to Haifa along Highway 1 then 2 provides an album of typological similarities with Ramallah; its rich and poor, and its older, middle-aged and newer neighbourhoods. The difference though is that while pedestrian connections are abundant in areas under Israeli civil legislation, they cease in territories under its military rule. In addition, one of the main problems of suburbs such as the
Image 5.14. (above) A view over the Diplomatic Quarter (centre of image) from the highest point of elTireh Neighbourhood. In the background lies Birzeit.

Image 5.16. View from point B – showing the Diplomatic Quarter as seen from the (still unurbanized) valley road that connects to elTireh and elReehan neighbourhoods.
Image 5.15. (below) View from point A – within the Diplomatic Quarter towards the west, bringing into sight ElReehan N. and others of smaller scale, some abandoned others under construction.

Image 5.17. View from point C atop a tower at Ramallah’s centre direction north-west, showing the city’s old core, followed by ElReehan N. and the Diplomatic Quarter.
Diplomatic Quarter (Image 5.14 - Image 5.17, p. 269) if compared to elReehan is that and although considerably closer to the built-up areas, it did not bother to create common infrastructures where it is designed as an alien enclave with no connections to the existing fabric except through a policed gate. On the other side, elReehan features the – to be – largest hospital building in the area, a small and open commercial area, an archaeological site, pedestrian areas and no gates. While the architect of the Diplomatic Quarter boasts that ‘its main problem is also its advantage, where the incredible steepness (almost 42%) has resulted with all houses having open views’ (Ziadeh 2012), his eye-sore tactic of hundreds of +10 meters-high retention-walls has to still stand the test of time.

Second, in plight of the iconic image as marketing tool for attracting visitors, investors, the TNC clientèle and parties that contribute to positioning and visibility (Ramallah Municipality 2010a; Burbank, Andranovich, and Heying 2002); municipalities in the Ramallah agglomerate and other PA-tiers have been granting licenses for voluminous real estate projects. Akin development policies in Valencia (Brück 2010), private investors are granted privileges on the expense of the average citizen; e.g. elErsal Centre in the PNG vis-à-vis construction in the huerta lands; and, Rawabi’s forced land appropriation from owners vis-à-vis institutionalized mechanisms enabling developers from appropriating lands in Valencia. Hence, the depiction of Ramallah’s patterns as Amman-ization or becoming like Dubai is also narrow, because it obscures the fact that these neoliberal spatializations are global on one hand; and on the other the fact that unlike the two examples, Ramallah is not a monarchy rather a walled-in enclave under extensive systems of colonial rationalization. Hence, the fact that glass-towers are rising in the warm and extra-sunny climate of Ramallah should be of no surprise, although not recommended. However, what should be addressed is the fact that these structures are subjugated to the same regulation parameters as those of residential units at a time the scale, resource impact and circulation pressure are significantly higher.

This calls back the discussions of chapters 2, 3, and 4 regarding the incompatibility of the political, economic, urban and regulatory systems of decision-making in Ramallah. The visionaries stirring the motors of Ramallah’s growth potentials are (not absolutely but largely) over-aged men of guerilla-revolutions and nation-state imaginaries, middle-aged businessmen with careers in Dubai-making and master-planning, and young professionals nurtured in neoliberal development discourses of manuals and statistics. The ontological translations of their visions are therewith attempts to normalize their respective pseudo-concrete spatial fantasies which among other impacts ‘promotes the false construct of a flat, one-dimensional, monolingual horizontal identities’ (Jacir 2013); as described in the introduction of this work.

The pull-and-push dynamic – between these camps and their significant physical undertakings on one side and on the other proponents of re-imagination of the direct space free of the blemished of borders and limitations of present geopolitical and economic realities e.g. Anani (2010), Petti (2011), Shibli (2012) – is feeding into the growing sentiments of othering and disenfranchisement within the larger space of Ramallah. Under neoliberal austerity investors receive subsidies and citizens lose their securities. In the short history of the PA many PPPs have been signed whose declared aims are positive change, however, whose impacts have been adverse. These projects whose ultimate target is profitability ‘produce a landscape that does not encourage urbanity’ and the spread of
whose gains amongst society ‘depends on the size of the direct governmental commitment to public benefits’ (Fainstein 2009:768); which in Ramallah lie below minimums of human dignity. That said, the reality that Palestinian private sector – local or glocal – is conceiving and implementing mega-projects is neither pioneer nor alarming; ultimately, development and progress entails investment. However, the failure and danger lies in two; first, the absence of future vision in decision making, as stated by Khoury (and endorsed by Anani 2010, Kassis 2010, Barghouthi 2012, Shaheen 2012) who describes Palestinian private investors as:

[T]hey are noble people and quite respectable. In my opinion, they are looking for a role to play. You think they do have a role, but surprise or not, they don’t have one; which is unfortunate. You know what, I wish there was a conspiracy and those private investors are a part of it, I wish! because at least if there was a conspiracy, then that implies that somebody is thinking! (Khoury 2010)

The combination of the laissez faire mentality of the PA and the socio-economic psychology of existential emergency due to continued colonization has led to a real-estate market dynamic similar to the board-game Risk. Friends and acquaintances voluntarily engage in a sport where to survive one has to conquer, and to conquer one has to keep shifting allies for the momentary goal of staying in the game for five more minutes, and then another five. What this implies is that the corporations exampled in this chapter and others have been and will continue to constantly shift their tactics. Thus, calculating trends and mindsets of spatial consumption by the varied Ramallites, can the local urban intellect influence the discourse of the private, profit-oriented sector? Could new imaginaries of socio-spatial equalities engage in the temporal speculation industry? Can fluid groupings compete against exclusive PPPs through projects of urban commons? (see section 4.4.2, p. 234).

This brings forth the second shortcoming; Ramallah’s mutated transformation is largely caused by the appointment of private investors as uncontested visionaries for the diverse space while – atop – freed from accountability to legal, public and differently-educated opinions. Besides the fact that the systems grants investors and developers free-range; discussions over patterns of Ramallah’s evolution are absent from the public realm. Beyond a (small but growing) nucleus of academics and artists this research failed to find any local critical journalistic investigation or media report that questions the physical spaces of the city and its features – yet. While complaints are echoed daily on the streets of the city, there is a lack of attempts to knit webs of solidarities (alAtar 2010, Barthe 2011, As’ad 2010). In comparison, e.g. Berlin’s communication of its transformation processes post its reunification in 1990 was extensive:

[Debates] took place over more than a decade, on what the urbanism of the new Berlin should be about and what it should look like. Such debates were omnipresent in the city’s physical and virtual public sphere: in the numerous planning and architectural exhibitions displayed in public buildings or private art galleries, in the public debates between built environment experts and politicians, in the daily articles of the press reporting planning and architectural controversies. [...] Alternative visions of the future of Berlin were debated, and communicated, through words, ‘maps, models of the city, virtual-reality simulations, newspaper articles, planning codes, architectural sketches, and even tourism practices’ (Colomb 2012:3)
Berlin’s transformation over the past decade is naturally contested (Colomb 2012; Kappan 2002), more so, as ideology, perception of value and taste are subjective elements – an argument in defence of the controversial choices of the Palestinian private sector. The sentiments of Berliners about *Potsdamer Platz* or Parisians about *La Défense* vis-à-vis tourists will probably re-assemble in Ramallah with its forthcoming eErsal Centre. Nonetheless, the difference in Ramallah in comparison to Berlin is (as detailed in section 3.1.2, p. 118) the absence of mediums of stakeholder conversation and negotiations due to the colonial legacy on one hand, and on the other the Arafatian legacy of absence of principles of debate and the culture of differences (Abdulhadi 2014). In turn this elevates levels of tension and contestation between the stakeholders detailing the spatialization (morphology) of Ramallah. In the opposite corners sit the (discourse-defender) PA and (its current main opposition) the educated elite. To win each needs the voice of at least two of the three referees: the average citizens, transnational capital and ideologies, and private capital (real estate corporations); each of which practices a different dynamic with the main contenders; as shown in Diagram 5.1.

Hitherto the PA has been empowered by its ability to win the real estate coterie through providing them with access to resources (a.o.), as well as the donor financing of its neoliberalized system of government. This has been enabling it to control the average citizen (poor and middle-classes) through extensive and expensive policing and illusions of PPPs as collective opportunities from the other; i.e. through repressive hierarchies and dependency. On the opposite corner of the ring sits the educated elite with their significantly diverse fantasies of utopian social hierarchies and connections inspired from exposure to – and on itself being part of – varying sets of transnational (global, denationalized) self-reinforcing ideologies. These, as afore-discussed, have hitherto not been able to forge significant channels that enable tapping into resources for engendering negotiated location-based innovation. While many debates are taking place advocating the different models, the outreach of these voices of alternatives remain limited in narrow (non-overlapping, yet) relationalities with the average citizens; whose access to resources and improved living conditions form the official *raison d’être* of the demanded administrative (political) change. The success or failure in forging additional points of cross-ideological solidarities – whether with real-estate corporations or the average citizens – determines the outcome of the current struggle of these visionaries against the threshold of mobilizing a critical mass and/or capital capable of pressuring political decision-making.

Influence over decision-making and its diversification and customization is conditioned by the interest of the larger public to directly engage in the process; which in the case of the Ramallah can only be partly blamed on the municipality, while mostly, on the public whose concern and engagement have been occasional and minimal (Kassis 2010, Rayyan 2010, alKhalili 2012, AMAN 2014). However and as this work has showcased hitherto, the breeze of protest has indeed found echoing corners in Ramallah. Evidently, the geopolitical dimension creates an equation different than that of Hong Kong56 nor Barcelona57. The web of relations is far more complex than this schematic Diagram 5.1, p. 273, and at each of the layers the forces of the fluid colonial system shift the chemical reactions. Whether Ramallah’s desires for change will evolve to engendered currents and spatializations is the fundamental question of the moment (see section 3.2.3, p. 151). Phrased differently, the ability of Ramallites to continue their twentieth
century behaviour of synthesising regional conditions and elements to produce a compatible, shared environment is detrimental.

While only the future can answer how the current politico-economic dynamics will translate in Ramallah; nonetheless, here speculators should factor the impact of the so-called Arab Spring on the sensibilities of the five illustrated stakeholders (Diagram 5.1). The still ongoing displacement of millions in Syria and Iraq, the urban crisis and rising insecurities of Cairo and Tripoli, and the Israeli policies of spatial appropriation versus annihilation in the WB and GS respectively; together these happenings have detrimentally altered the variables of Palestinian-Israeli politics and economics. They are the finishings of a two-decade long process of dismantling of the nation-state imaginaries of freedom and security. The ongoing neoliberalization of professions and marginalization of the public sector has hitherto provided a critical opportunity for the private sector. However, continuation is conditioned on the load-bearing capacity of a compromised system that likely will not be able to contain the charged citizens within ‘movements that lack overall political coherence’ as described by Harvey (2013:119) who also notes:
If urbanization is so crucial in the history of capital accumulation, and if the forces of capital and its innumerable allies must relentlessly mobilize to periodically revolutionize urban life, then class struggle of some sort, no matter whether they are explicitly recognized as such, are inevitably involved. This is so if only because the forces of capital have to struggle mightily to impose their will on an urban process and whole populations that can never, even under the most favorable of circumstances, be under total control. An important strategic political question then follows: To what degree should anti-capitalist struggles explicitly focus and organize on the broad terrain of the city and the urban? And if they should do so, then how and exactly why? (ibid:115)

And he answers:

The urban obviously functions, then, as an important site of political action and revolt. The actual site characteristics are important, and the physical and social re-engineering and territorial organization of these sites is a weapon in political struggles. In the same way that, in military operations, the choice and shaping of the terrain of action plays an important role in the determining who wins, so it is with popular protests and political movements in urban settings. The second major point is that political protests frequently gauge their effectiveness in terms of their ability to disrupt urban economies. (ibid:117)

These discussions which are gaining more ears with every new urban protest are inviting investors in Palestine (whether real estate corporations or transnational capital) to choose: does one continue with the tactic of five-minute survival through association with the hegemonic central government? Or does one bet on experimental (subversive, alternative) modes of decision-making and government? In financial terms, should one seek profit by investing in risky stocks, or buy a lotto ticket. Investors have already commenced weighing their options of how to sustain and further their gains shall the PA’s feet slip. The fact that PIF as well as many other donor programs have in the past few years allocated millions in credits and grants for the development of MSME’s is an indicator of a changed economic structure that reduces the power of exclusive oligopolies in favour of higher democratization of production (Colomb 2012, Johar 2014). The cafés of Ramallah are the scenes of increasing numbers of free-lancers hoping to be able to afford the expensive commercial rent values. This sub-group of Ramallite average citizens forms a strategic opportunity for both, the educated elite recruiting for an urban revolution and the real estate corporations that are searching for new markets. Here it is largely the choice of independent visionaries to continue observing and commenting, or publicly engage with practical proposals in spite of absence of official invitations; to push open channels of contiguity, negotiations, and re-modelling through voluntary compromise, or watch the city as it turns into sets of incoherent, or discontinuous, or sometimes lifeless spaces as shown in Image 5.18 - Image 5.23, p. 277.

The masses of refugees from atrocities of war in Syria and Iraq have created many ripples, one of which is the suspension of the Palestinian regional monopoly on the phenomenon which directly reduces the weight of the claim of the latter for the return of their refugees. However, currently there is no Palestinian political party or figure who has either the power or the suicidal wish necessary to sign-off this unalienable right in a treaty with Israel. Combined with the demands of
Zionist maximalists for their government to annex the WB, the sweeping protests within Israeli cities by its Palestinian nationals and sympathizers, and the fatigue of the PA from chasing separatists and shrinking capital; together these are forcing the re-definition of the PA and questioning the relevance of the PLO in general. In the particular case of Ramallites, their reactions to the genocide committed during Operation Protective Edge in Gaza in summer 2014 revealed the heterogeneity (and schism) in socio-political principles and the absence of leadership frameworks. In spite of the trauma, anger and depression, in this agglomerate the majority decided to be no hero, rather, remain composed and focused on the day following the settling of the rubble. There were nonetheless two noteworthy activities within the city, with very clear messages to the political and capitalist tiers.

The first one was the ‘48,000 March’ which took place on 24 July 2014 and brought together 15,000 protesters. The naming comes from the 1948 Nakba re-instating this historic event again as the focus rather the 1967 project, and the declared goal was the breaking through Qalandia checkpoint at the south of Ramallah and (re)entering Jerusalem. Besides the fact that this was the largest demonstration to take place in Ramallah since the signature of the OAs in 1993, it has confirmed that Ramallites are highly charged, and capable of mobilization. The inability of the organizers to build on the momentum of the event is a result of the afore-discussed detrimental absence of broad solidarities and strategists. Yet, indicators point to that this could alter with passing time. The second activity, which was the multiple popular campaigns pressuring merchants and

Image 5.18. A view at alLid Street in alJabal Neighbourhood, which in the Master Plan of the city is divided between Residential A and B regulations, which typically should respond to 4 floors or an elevation upper limit of 15 metres, see Table 4.11, p. 224.
Image 5.19. An abandoned typical 1970s house at the Library Street (alNuzha Neighbourhood) whose plot is classified as Residential B. The voluminous commercial building rising directly behind it stands on a lot classified as ‘Office - Retail - Tourism’.

Image 5.20. (below left) The Sanawbar Residential twin-villas complex of 12 units which was the first to be built in this area in the late 1990s is now being curtained from view by multi-story apartment buildings from front and behind.

Image 5.21. (below right) A view on alMughtaribeen Neighbourhood at Ramallah’s centre. Notice the lack of spatial connection of these constructions which accumulated over time.

Image 5.23. Old and new constructions merging in the absence of regulations at Dar Ibrahim Neighbourhood, whereby the further part lies under the classification of Linear Commercial while the closer segment lies under Residential C.
businessmen to divest from Israeli counterparts, which was much stronger in Ramallah than any other WB city. On one side, at the end of a dialectic logic this movement is representative of voiced rejection for partisan economics which diverts winnings from Palestinian pockets to Israeli ones. The sociology of the oppressed and the history of urban revolutions suggests that among the coming protests will be those demanding access to resources. As such and in the absence of functioning state-apparatus and subsidiarity to colonial counterparts, the politics of real-estate corporations (whom traditionally set the scale of applied standards and forms) has to widen its base of loyalties if it desires to remain in-balance. As alKhalili argues:

The identity of this city is not elaborated in the architecture – including planning – rather, in the anti of architecture. The architecture we see is a reflection of the political conditions we are living: a neoliberal economy, quasidictatorship politics, absence of democracy, social stratification, and presence of a coterie that is ‘rich and able’ that is having an affair with this political regime: capital has found union with political authority. This constellation is producing a certain kind of space as well as a human. The new Palestinian is a breed of his/her city and not his/her Palestinian-ship. [...] It must be noted that the donor capital is designed such that the current political stagnation persists: it doesn’t die, but doesn’t prosper either; in the interim plane under life but above death. The resulting economy – bars, restaurants, new cars and houses – is that of being cyclically in debt. Profit is made and spent in the consumption possibilities Ramallah is increasingly providing; you have a number of bars not just one, diverse culinary experiences, varying settings and acoustics, etc. And each of these sub-spaces attempts to attract a share of the circulating capital and maintain a seat on the revolving table. [...] One is an employee at an institution that produces elements with no market value; so-called studies, publications and basically ink on paper that is void of reinvestment possibilities. Then one spends the money for rent or construction, a beer, a pair of pants from suppliers that in turn depend on that person cashing in on a salary paid – by the external donor – for producing a zero market-value product. [...] And as such, Ramallah’s viability relies on political stability that caters for remaining resource-dependent. On the other side of the same coin, even if political stability persists, this economic trend is bound to reach saturation that triggers a lapse. (alKhalili 2012)

In other words, private investors should investigate making profits through selling citizen satisfaction. This brings about the other side of the same coin; similar to the bio and organic markets, this demand will induce the creation of alternatives to existing products. This market opportunity and its derivatives could be many different things, depending on multiple subjective variables. Here innovation lies in the ability to re-arrange the elements that Ramallah has today to produce a different range of spaces than those exampled here. Hence, are there any – logical and also innovative – concepts for forging different spatial trends and an integrated resilient morphology in Ramallah? And how are these rationalized?
6 | WHAT FOUNDATIONS FOR THE FUTURE RAMALLAH?

‘What separates the worst of architects from the best of bees’, says Marx, is ‘that the architect erects a structure in imagination before realizing it upon the ground.’ (Marx IN Harvey 2009:236)

It is also scarcely realized that demographers, statisticians, geographers, architects, and planner have been central to Israel’s efforts to deepen its control over the three dimensional spaces of the Occupied Territories. Their analyses and prescriptions have helped to shape the annexing of Palestinian land, the construction of walls and 'buffer zones', the mass bulldozing of houses and olive groves, the demodernization of Palestinian cities, the ethnic cleansing of selected areas, the construction of carefully located Jewish settlements and access roads, and the appropriation of water and airspace. (Graham 2006a:35; emphasis added)

Even though Palestinians in the Occupied Territories have become accustomed [...] to the wanton destruction of buildings and infrastructure, extrajudicial executions, acute poverty, random checkpoints, and the draconian permit regime, their intimate familiarity with this reality does not yet entail that they can carry out the kind of planning that diminishes and distributes risks. (Gordon and Filc 2009:478)

Although no official date has hitherto been named as the end of the so-called Second Intifada (illusion of continuation? prolongation of emergency?); in effect it has lapsed in the months following Mahmoud Abbas’s election to preside the PLO, where he coupled with the first-class financier Dr. Salam Fayyad who was described as the Palestinian Ben Gurion by Akiva Eldar¹. Together they put forth an agenda to ‘discipline’ the unruly and superfluous PA towards building the institutions of the State of Palestine by 2011; a task Abbas declared his government has fulfilled in an address at the UN General Assembly meeting on 29 November 2012, and there has been much noise since. Countless statements from foreign ministers and politicians warning of the catastrophe, the demise of the imaginary two-state solution, and in the months between October 2014 and January 2015 several European parliaments and/or governments announced they would recognize a State of Palestine. Whereas the particular parameters of these positions are irrelevant here; one might view them as expressions of growing solidarity with Palestinians and the desire to pressure Israel into changing its politics. On the other side of the same coin these happenings cynically mirror the early 1990s where two years after the PLO made its Declaration of Independence, western democracies rushed to embrace the (neoliberal) diplomatic discourse – what later would become the Oslo Accords – as the bearer of remedies for decades of colonization.
Here the importance of employed terminology re-appears. Involved world governments are not expected to choose the course of ‘diplomatic crisis’ by voicing support to e.g. a one-state solution that advocates a united geography. However, opting for the ‘state’ term implies the legitimacy of ongoing ethnocentric separation. In place one could easily resort to general principles of justice instead, e.g. expression of support for ending the Palestinian statelessness. Haste to recognize a State of Palestine again blatantly and audaciously sidelines the immobility of about 600,000 settlers in the illegal colonies, and more importantly, their economies, not to mention other colonial webs which are best expressed in the Israeli proposals made between 1997 and 2001 (see Map 1.21 - Map 1.24; pg. 39). Eight decades passed since the Palestine Question was put on the agenda of global forums and the (oft self-describing) ‘enlightened’ world is still evading articulating the obvious; the reality that the Zionist project gives Palestinians the choice ‘between inferiority and dependency[, o]utside these options there is no salvation’ (Fanon 2008:74). As the current Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Ya’alon frankly stated it: ‘We need to free ourselves of the conception that everything will enter the framework of a state. From my perspective, let them call it the Palestinian empire. What do I care? It’s autonomy’ (Newman 2014). Any serious work about Palestinian localities in general cannot claim to be apolitical, and the case of Ramallah in particular research has to acknowledge that it ‘is not just the story of new urban identities and possibilities, it is also story of class, and still more a story of colonialism’ (Abourahme 2009:502).

Israel’s ethnocentric ideology, drive and mechanisms have been scholarly explored and are progressively accumulating evidence (e.g. Yiftachel 1999, 2000; Weizman 2006; Graham 2006; Pappe 2007; Hamami and Tamari 2008 a.o.). The spatializations of doctrines and methodologies of the WZO, IOF, COGAT, urban planners, global financial and political players have been reviewed, as well as those of the changing role of the Palestinian liberation movement, PLO, PA institutions, the coterie and their oppositions. In light of the discussions of former chapters, it is painless to accuse Mahmoud Abbas with lethal compromise of the Palestinian unalienable rights, his PA with imperial agency, and his security apparatuses of being a quasi colonial brigade. However, here ontological approaches could provide perspective to more complex chemistry, whose understanding is a condition for educated future imaginations of modes of producing urbanity in Ramallah; which is the goal of this chapter.

Discussion over the PA’s agency is highly controversial for Palestinians, exceptionalised by nationalized discourses, and is hampered by Israeli politics as its confrontation entails a finale to the variably employed ‘politics of denial’ by Israeli governments since the declaration of their state; denial of ethnic cleansing; that the land had natives; sumud possibilities; and recently, the ability of the globalization of the Palestinian question to delegitimize the Zionist project. On the other side of the same coin, thirty five years of Arafat’s monopoly over the PLO created a centralized, fragmented, and highly militarized politics whose hierarchies contain the ambitious, belligerent and disunited coterie. From amongst those a leader had to rapidly emerge after the abrupt death of Arafat, at a time the latter had systematically undermined any competition including that of Abbas.

The not-so-popular statesman who – akin his contending comrades – has a significant number of competitors was thereof to operate a polemic environment of politico-economic alliances on which he had and has little leverage. The public showdown between him and Mohammad Dahlan (former Fatah politician)
is a case to point: Abbas is not Arafat. Thankfully? Abbas’s initial moves were indeed focused on curbing the tentacles of patronage e.g. reclaiming state property, revoking of (actually illegal) diplomatic status privileges, prosecution of corruption and combating other tools of cooptation utilized by his successor. Nonetheless soon after – irrelevant willingly or otherwise – he stepped into the pre-(co-)tailored shoes.

While this might explain the limited performance of Abbas it does not exonerate him from not having changed the design after almost a decade in office. Here it should be acknowledged that he belongs to his generation of politicians and revolutionaries; their memories, education and ideology of disciplined guerilla revolutions which fail to recognize the thin line between struggling for the people and turning into the dictators, e.g. Saddam of Iraq, alAssad of Syria, Ben Ali of Tunisia, alGaddafi of Libya, and Mubarak of Egypt among many other similar cases worldwide. Abbas is a believer in the power of the nation-state as apparatus of order and protection against racist dominion. This mentality prevents him (and his troupe of politicians) from recognizing that the state and state-making politics of his young days were severely undermined by the technological advancements in (physical) mobility possibilities, and buried with the digital breakthrough (mental and information mobility). The impacts of these are not pressuring the state-politics of the PLO only, but also those of centralized regimes throughout the world. Post-nationalism may have been born in the 1990s, but it is only now that cities are recognizing the significant political shifts it brings about. As cross-border solidarities and urban movements gain momentum, it is imperative to ask how these processes will translate in localities where Cold War politicians still hold decision-making monopolies? How could PA institutions, particularly Ramallah Municipality re-organize in this era of protest?

The inconclusive clauses of the OAs (see Annex.3; pg. 384) have translated with the PA operating in what Šhalidi et al. call ‘minimal policy space’ (2011:12), labouring an autocracy whose continuation depends on an exchange, loyalty to the regime for a title (e.g. diplomatic passport), capital (e.g. expensive health treatments), or position in any of the countless tentacles of this institution as asserted by Shikaki (1996), Brynen (2000), and Samara (2000) among many other works. Beyond the biology that purchasable loyalties will always change to the higher bidder; these and other investigations of the PA have been limited to its function as colonial subcontractor and its corollary tools, aesthetic and behaviour. The political impotency, corruption, lack of sovereignty, dependency, neoliberalism and various failures of the PA are often flagged. Yet, the triangulation of these aspects with their epistemologies on one hand and on the other their locational sociospatial (hence micro-political) impact remains curbed, particularly the reality that the PA has also been a producer of an imagined ‘ethnicity’ and ‘nationalism’ of Palestinians. The system which assumes a homogeneous society in which ‘minorities must abide by decisions of the majority’ (Palestinian National Council Declaration of Independence; Annex.4; pg. 392) has generated a dynamic in Ramallah – the city of new comers – whereby the majority is many groups, and the othered minorities are considered bacterial infections that can be ‘corrected’.

Perhaps the most significant impact of the OAs – and certainly a detrimental one – is the amorphous social change across localities, where one of the few commons is aberration from the political liberation movement and preoccupation with quotidian emergencies. The discordant trajectories of the
various localities stand witness to the failure of the old guard in building a social national strategy in support of their political national project. How did and does the PLO plan to achieve economic and structural independence when it advocates Israel’s colonialism as a passing event that will be resolved through the magic of PA politics and diplomacy – rather than being approached as a phenomenon necessitating cross-sector, targeted economic and spatial innovation?

Regardless what protagonists of the PA and PLO claim, it is quite evident that the deliberate and systematic suspension of the resistance and liberation movement from being the responsibility of the individual and doyens (the Hara and its motors) has in effect resulted in the removal of the major adhesive of the various Palestinian communities and sub-cultures. As Chapter 2 elaborated, the low-hierarchy and fluid politics of the NGCs and their varying elements resulted in progressive strategies in which the individual and representational-spaces were both dependent on and creators of a functioning social order; a flowing system of (arguably) balanced trade-offs (cross-dependencies) of responsibility, accountability, and relative security. The PA monopolized these roles and barricaded them behind bureaucratic, eclectically-efficient, and hence psychosociologically imbalanced procedures, which in turn lead to the disintegration of the foundations of twentieth century Palestinian ‘collective’ political power. While the popular struggle before the OAs was motivated by the desire for inclusion under the umbrella of beneficiaries of civic rights; in a cynical turn of events the PLO politics has de facto and de jure laboured a partisan system of exclusive rights that is morbidly similar to that of the enemy, therewith exasperating the precariousness and pregnability of average Palestinians. Here naturally the average citizen moved her/his attention to the following item on the priority-list, landing at the human preoccupation with financial prosperity and normalcy.

Ramallah has normalized its colonial reality, but that does not make it a disappointing exception rather the reliable rule, and therewith re-points to the central concern of this work. Building on this interpretation of politics, relationalities and economic-conditionalities of socializations of Ramallites over the past century, this closing chapter elaborates on the curator role that Ramallite visionaries are implored to assume. In this process there are three fundamental postulates:

First, the combination of historic patterns, contemporary regional and global events, and Oslo’s dismantling of Palestinian channels of commoning are opening the possibility for a new Palestinian project. While alFhalili states that ‘At a certain point the common consciousness should prevail over the individual gain, thence will a movement emerge in one form or another’, Harvey asserts that ‘commons’ in a culturally mixed urban environment are typically ‘contradictory and therefore always contested’ (2013:71).

Second, a ‘common consciousness’ can only mentally prevail (become popular) through lived individual gain (positive trade-off). Hence, Palestinian decolonization can only be achieved through (among other elements) the democratization of production, therein access to resources, opportunity, and the right to flourishing. And,

ird, I argue that Ramallite civic liberation (equality) cannot be achieved through rigid political structurations and exclusive national emblems and labels; rather, it necessitates reduction of sociospatial othering through
conditional (mercurial) decision-making mechanisms that accumulatively serve diluting the PA’s infrastructural power, the lifeline of the despotic power. Decolonization of Ramallites starts inside their city, in its heavily surveilled, fragmented and controlled everyday-spaces, in creating a socially resilient (as opposite to fearful, compromised) community.

Here it would be ludicrous to assume that the PA would concede its centrality, or that its politico-ideological allies (e.g. Hamas) would not attempt to place their grip on the failing system. Hence a central question that future scenarios must attend to is: What incremental, progressive and insurgent urban policymaking frameworks should be employed to eliminate threats of creating cloned replacements, and guaranteeing success in coopting stakeholders into the suggested system of mutually accepted and beneficial compromise? In particular, what are examples of morphological strategies that scale, contextualize, and orient the varied pseudo-concrete social imaginaries overlapping in Ramallah into complementary units that together produce coherent and representative spaces? And what kind of morphological game-rules (flexible regulations) can be employed to ensure capacity to variably capitalize on the rapid technological and social changes as powerful elements in producing different yet economically and environmentally resilient sub-ecologies?

These questions are laboured through some morphological imaginations of future Ramallah in the second section of this chapter. I will not be proposing particular solutions nor spatial re-arrangements. Indeed, over the past months I have puzzled with several potential spatial alternatives, how their economies would flow, their environmental characteristics, and the socio-political ‘step in the right direction’ they could, potentially, bring about. The combination of the methodological dialectics of this project and my work-logic as an architect rendered issues of incremental applicability a requirement for validity. In other words, for each of the broad-line morphological arrangements I am suggesting in this closing chapter I have conceptualized technical, measured urban proposals of micro-, mes-, and exo-scale interventions. They are applicable under today’s parameters, and arguably bear the potential for contributing towards a positive transition of Ramallah (with all its citizens in their various roles and hopes) into the definitively coming positioning as district-city within the continuous, varied, contested Jerusalem metropolis.

As the principles I state earlier warn, monopolization of spatial imagination is not a discourse that is limited to those who had or today have decision-making power, but also too often extends to those who contend the latter (e.g. professionals, educators, activists, etc). In excluding my visions of Ramallah’s future scenarios I am differentiating between the plausible analysis, conclusions and recommendations that this work places at hands of interested urbanists and visionaries on one hand; and on the other, my subjective interpretation of this information as a secular urbanist, a leftist scholar, and a woman who – borrowing Yazan Khalili’s (2012) self-description – ‘lives and works in and out of Palestine’. When and how will I share those visions – as contributions to the necessary combinations of Ramallite imaginations – are questions that lie beyond the scope and goals of this work.

Thereupon, this concluding chapter presents a conceptualization framework that links the political, economic, social and spatial discussions of 100 × Ramallah with foundations that are necessary under visions / scenarios that aims at
engendering a resilient and healthy city-space; regardless of specific designs and tastes, and in spite of the over-whelming uncertainties determining a city's course of evolution. This framework (Diagram 6.1) is based on universal principles and hence can be appropriated and customized to varying urbanities in and beyond Palestine. However and as could be expected, this framework is justified, elaborated and argued as potential tool for city-space (re)imagination from the specific perspective of Ramallah and its geopolitical context and variables.

Diagram 6.1. Conceptualization Framework to help determine foundations, parameters, and therewith accumulative impacts of undertakings within one space.

- What are the physical and mental accumulations up to date?
- What are the direct and indirect tensions and what are their psychogeographies? (technology, nature, laws of production, sustenance of daily life, mental conceptions, and social relations)
- What are the desires (long- and short-term objectives and priorities) of the varying citizens?
- ... etc.

- How do proposals function under existing parameters e.g. legal, financial, social, etc.?
- What is/are the critical scales, time/duration, and (conditional) increments of the experiment?
- How do these connect with / build on existing realities, desires, and prospects in the space relating to / affecting the experiment?
- ... etc.

What socio-economic strata and which of the different locational sensibilities will be involved or first: minimize threats and second, socialize risks, resources, and benefits of this particular undertaking?
6.1. **CITIZEN’S AGENCY AND RIGHT TO FLOURISHING: WHAT CRITERIA?**

In an address at the Urban Futures 2050 conference in Lisbon, October 2014, the geographer and planner Mee Kam Ng stated that the recent Umbrella Movement in Hong Kong and similar social movements can be seen as protests against a perceived collusion between the government and the capitalist sector in transforming all sorts of different spaces for the market, for exchange values (2014:40). Through expounding on the concepts of *rights*, *flourishing*, the human threshold of ‘capability to function and the somewhat higher threshold that constitutes a good human life’ (ibid:41); she argues that the ‘pressure cooker’ environment of many cities can only be brought under control when citizens are:

[...] 'authors of their own conception' rather than passive receivers of ideologies implanted into their mind. In other words, the rights to human flourishing require subjective efforts as well as a nurturing objective environment. These can only be realized through a value transition or a reframing process of what community psychologists would call the ecosystem of our lives from individual to micro- (family, schools, work units), meso- (combination of micro-systems), exo- (neighbourhoods, world of work, district cities) and macro-systems (cultural values, customs and institutions). At the personal level, the practice of mindfulness can develop our moment-to-moment awareness and the insight into patterns of thoughts, feelings and interactions with others, thereby skilfully choosing helpful responses rather than automatically reacting. [... Therein,] strength involves the capacity to cope with difficulties, to maintain functioning in the face of stress, to bounce back in the face of significant trauma, to use external challenges as a stimulus for growth, and to use social supports as a source of resilience. (NG 2014: 42)

Explaining the tensile relationalities involved in creating a healthy community Ng borrows Diagram 6.2; pg. 286. As the diagram illustrates, in the absence of mediums of negotiations and compromise, levels of competition and preoccupation with personal interest lie at their highest values, hence predominantly creating spaces of wealth, and occasionally one of the other three forms; public services, personal growth, and replenishment spaces. Each locality has its varied set of criteria whose fulfilment is necessary to creation of balanced environments. In the case of Ramallah there are three main pillars; first, understanding society as an assembly of differentiated subgroups rather than a ‘national genus’ which necessitates fluid systems of local government that could cater for personal and need-based replenishment spaces; second, access to space, resources, and democratization of production which socializes spaces of wealth and services; and third, environmental, climatological, and geopolitical criteria which are central to the continued liveability (attractiveness) of the city. The first two sets of criteria are elaborated here, while the third is expounded in the following section which utilizes those as arguments for exampled future morphological foundations.
6.1.1. Decolonizing Ramallite Governance through Social Learning

Today one of the most universal debate-topics is the rise of neoreligiosities, their ultra-conservative politics, and the potential impacts these could have – among many other levels – on globalized cities and economies (e.g. AfD in Germany, Front National in France, Tea Party in USA). In countries of the Arab League a vocal opinion attributes the rise of Islamic neoreligiosity – namely Da’esh and the Muslim Brotherhood from which Hamas stems – to the colonial legacy of the Sykes Picot agreement of 1916. These claim that the borders of Arab nations as drawn up by colonialists had cut through ethnic regions and created unstable systems of rule by minorities, making today’s separationist politics a normality. Dissecting this logic, Dodge (2014) contends this opinion by stating that the ‘settlements that created the majority of states in the Middle East had little connection with the Sykes–Picot agreement’ which had ‘to be consigned to the Diplomatic lumber-room’ created by ‘the Russian Revolution and America’s entry into the war’ (ibid:8). Using this narrative encourages commentators ‘to see the current crisis in a specific and inaccurate way’ where; first, the post-colonial origins of a state do not in any way nullify its ability to function; and; second, by ‘identifying faith as the key factor in the Middle East, an unchanging essence
that traces back centuries, proponents of the Sykes–Picot narrative are guilty of *primordialisation* (ibid:9, emphasis in original). While Dodge falls short of acknowledging that colonial legacies have proven to be destabilizers of off-spring states; notwithstanding, the wars and civil wars in the Middle East over the past century on one hand and the other the economy of oil industries have significantly shifted the population compositions of the entire region, and interaction has altered the practice of cultural activities and equally religions; the Sunnis of Beirut are not one, and their quotidian practices differ from faith brethren in Baghdad, Jedda and Casablanca. Today’s demonstrations, revolutions and wars should not be, again, narrowed to imagined mythologies. To these arguments I would add; third, this logic (unintelligently?) attributes the failure of Arab governments (of which the PA) to the absence of balanced political representation as function of pliable cultural differences hence in effect marginalizing the concrete common of disenfranchisement. It feeds into excusing state and religion’s roles in the destruction of life (violently or otherwise) on basis of (non)affiliation, rather than condemning government structures and preachings of exclusion which through their various scales cause the failure of political systems. The difference between Tunisia and Egypt stands as evidence; since the former enjoys a relatively more advanced system of plurality it has been able to force Ennahda Party into comparatively nonviolent compromise up to the moment, while in the latter the Muslim Brotherhood (together with former regime operatives) are garnishing a corporeal crisis.

Critical analysis of city-dynamics (production of politics) entails factoring social ethos (spacio-behaviour) into understandings of happenings and decision-making (Amin and Graham 1997, Jessop et al. 2008). Ramallah’s old city is a mere 20 minutes walk (1.7 km) from that of alBireh, yet the two are worlds apart. Besides the evident reality that Hamas’s activities are significantly wider in the latter than in the former; further, the ability to cohabitate Ramallah’s oldest mosque with its surroundings of alcohol vendors and growing leisure corners has little to do with the legal framing of Christian practices and character, and much to do with the strata sustaining this dynamic. As detailed elsewhere, these crowds are limited to neither a religion nor particular places of origin (Taraki 2008, 2008a). The normalization of otherness and behavioural variance was laboured through everyday encounter, at the hand of the same temporalized mental-frameworks that normalized the colonial enclavization of Ramallah.

That said, the spaces which served in familiarization and internalization of socio-behavioural discordance are not growing and evolving at a pace compatible to that of the population. As the urban planner Shaheen explains:

[S]ocial change is a continuous process. In each phase we need to examine the factors causing the change and direction. The OAs launched the individualism era in Palestine, particularly in the centre area around Ramallah. This is linked to [...] the promotion of certain concepts of life-style which are exampled all around the city through billboards; the image of supposedly self-owned apartment overlooking the landscape, the image at the coffee shop having a drink, etc. I am not against these practices, yet one should recognize that these images represent a reality that did not naturally evolve into a dominant social behaviour, rather, they are being artificially promoted. [...] Countless cities went through these gradual processes of change into the modern form of urbanity, nonetheless, what is happening here in Ramallah is that we are trying to leap ahead rather
than change gradually, and this is caused by the imposition of ideas; whether elaborated economic systems or media-driven inspiration. This of course has an impact on the way people perceive the city and interact with its spaces, which in turn is linked to and influenced by the increasingly visible social stratification [...]. One could imagine Ramallah as a series of bubbles which correspond to the varying ideologies. [...] While Ramallah continues to expand it is noteworthy that these bubbles do not overlap. Conservative new-comers still arrive in Ramallah among other ideologies, yet they choose to either blend in – where some succeed while other don’t and thus their relationship with the plural spaces remains superficial – or choose their geography carefully and attempt to solidify their presence via marking their territory. [...] What is particular about Ramallah today – in contrast to pre-Oslo times – is that it is no more the space of Ramallites only, and this is a very natural condition of large cities globally whereby the city is the container for people of all walks of life. (Shaheen 2012)

Schematically and without factoring scale, the change in socializations of the varied groups of Ramallites can be represented in Diagram 6.3. In former pre digital, mass-media times and given the socio-politics of austerity, sumud as well as economic quasi-isolation from the world; in those times, the fewer groups had their centre of mass (productive activity) in the public sphere and hence through collective weight individuals were able to be part of and influence decision-making on the level of local politicians (NGCs and the similar). On the other side of the same coin, this translated with fluid practices of negotiations and compromise. In contrast, with the turn of the millennium the political, economic, and social shifts described through this work induced a spatial reconfiguration by which the centres of mass of social production lie chiefly in semi-private and private spaces, while the public sphere is dominated and produced by the affluent few. Concomitantly, as the spaces of overlapping (exchange) of the various groups shrink, their defining borders are becoming less permeable and more rigid.

Diagram 6.3. Schematic illustration of socialization spaces of the varied groupings of Ramallites in former times (left) and now (right).

Social grouping, its centre of weight and permeability
- Public Spaces – services, political ideology and commercial activities
- Semi-Private Spaces – wealth production and personal growth opportunities
- Private Spaces – residence and social circulation
Therewith, today Ramallites as a bundle of transnational ethos in a militarized enclave of relational loyalties are staging subterranean fault-lines whose seismic activity depends on the city’s ability to reduce tensions, which are intra- as well as inter-group. Taking an example from within the assumed liberal and tolerant sub-groupings of cosmopolitan Ramallites and internationals; in the first two phases of the OAs (1994-2005) the latter were spoiled with generous hospitality as their presence was framed as political solidarity. However, the systematic, legal and economic privileges separating them and their Ramallite equals on one hand, and on the other their continued profiting in spite of the impasse of the political process have been feeding into sentiments of resentment. The combination of double-standards, preferential treatment and salaries of internationals whose presence exasperates competition over resources and opportunities for local yuppies (spaces of personal growth and wealth accumulation) is alienating the two currents, where many feel that ‘Ramallah is more embracing of internationals than its children, everything here appeases them and aborts us, starting with the operating systems of NGOs, through apartment advertisements, and ending with culinary rituals’ (Yehya 2013:115). The othering of internationals in Ramallah – including by persons whom themselves lived or are living abroad – is a direct byproduct of the constraints placed on Ramallite’s right to flourishing; a chemical reaction that also feeds into other expressions of othering.

Questionnaires filled by participants of the eight focus groups conducted within the framework of this work confirm the aforementioned (Diagram 6.4; pg. 290). The named most negative aspects of Ramallah are largely spatial (69%) and poverty-related (16%), while positive ones range between the romanticised social ethos of pluralism and modernity (48%) and opportunity (36%) – the two domains that lie under particular threat at the moment. Noteworthy, the non-mentioning of matters of corporeal security in the questionnaires reflect the tone of the preceding conversations, wherein emergency and pregnability are tangible, depressing and angering, but contained and suspended by fear of traumas of the past fourteen years landing within the direct space.

The hegemonic politics of the PA is ‘concretizing the imagined community of the nation by articulating spatial, bodily and temporal matrixes through the everyday routines, rituals, and policies’ of the collective space (Alonso 1994:382). These constrictive measures are reproducing dissatisfaction in a ‘pressure-cooker’ process of forces acting in two directions; against the container (political authorities) and the othered groupings with which friction (competition) is present, as exampled above. Unlike civic protests in countries of advanced democracies, in cities like Ramallah such expressions through claiming of (surveilled) public space face many obstacles, and as ‘there is no agreement on the symbolic and actual act of sharing public space, the unrest is more likely to spill beyond the familiar or easily managed spatial bounds’ such as those of squares (Davis and Raman 2012:29). If the current trend of bypassing negotiations in claim-making continues, it is highly likely that Ramallite ‘efforts’ for equality ‘are directed towards more rebellious and unconstrained insurgent action’ where citizens do not employ (cannot enjoy the physicality of) sites that are officially categorized for such purposes; rather, revert to back-streets and the underground. As such, the physicality of insurgency will be constructed in ‘interstitial, marginal, peripheral, dispersed, and less easily controllable spaces where the state’s power and authority is less easily wielded’ (ibid). While the relative enclosure of such acts of protest caters for their nurturing, at the same time it isolates them from
Diagram 6.4. Illustration of answers of a focus groups questionnaire items ‘describe Ramallah in one word’, ‘most positive aspect of Ramallah’, and ‘most negative aspect of Ramallah’.
exchange (negotiation) and co-mobilization possibilities. In the absence of ‘balancing elements’ of otherness, the result is growing radicalism equally in liberal and conservative realms.

In light of this, Ramallah Municipality’s quest for larger power-range (see section 4.3.3, pg. 203) is approaching a critical point, whereby its success or failure is largely determined by its consciousness and ability to be among the lead in tackling the rising socio-economic polarization. Its official goal of becoming an international city can find its foundations in the denationalized ethos and networks of its nowadays residents. However, the stability of this infrastructure is dependent on the municipality’s understanding of its two-edged positioning at the bottom of a long command chain.

On the negative side its political subsidiarity to the MOLG, MOPAD, and partisan presidential office interventions, the dominance of neoliberalized administration and planning tools (master plans and manuals), and the withdrawal of several of its civic duties into mandates of other bodies; combined, these have detrimentally (logistically and bureaucratically) compromised discourses of progress through linking ‘initiatives to education, job training and placement, or social services’ (Fainstein 2009:770) and equally those of legal reform e.g. new spatial organization, regulations and decision-making proposals. The Ramallah Developmental Planning Framework (RDPF) will prove case to point, akin the preceding exercises. Hence, municipal strategy should shift its focus from work on regulatory reform – state-legislation which is hostage to the military administration of the COGAT and the monopoly of Fatah and Hamas politics – to inquiry about the case-based needed forms of reform. The municipality should be collecting the pieces of the puzzle of what do Ramallites think they need? How could it capitalize on this civic mobilization? Equally, what do non-partisan educated opinions suggest? And therein, how can the municipality practice policy-making as a social learning process as Peter Hall (1993) suggests?

The evident incapacity of the municipality to provision city-wide participatory decision-frameworks is on itself the potential, if recognized; the positive side of its positioning as the front-desk of the city-management and planning apparatuses within the PA. Being the body closest to the masses and the processor of their claims and complaints, it is the one capable of determining which regulations to concretize and which to place under questioning and re-examination through pointing un-expecting petitioners to systematic loopholes. Here Ramallah Municipality has to decide whether it wants to try to orient insurgent urban endeavours (through e.g. premature gratification spatial experiments; see section 4.4.2, pg. 234) or waste valuable resources trying to contain them. In other words, it could either continue to operate as an administrative arm of the PA only, or add to that the function of advocacy and enablement of ideas debated in platforms such as Qalandia International and Civic Encounter symposiums that are focused on alternative imaginations of space and society, among others; i.e. being the pivot of a dignified ‘balance of power’ between classes and fractions of classes, as between the spaces they occupy’ (Lefebvre 2009:280; emphasis added). In this regard Abourahme states:

The question that remains is whether Ramallah will reinforce the colonial–neoliberal logic of space and entrench this particular brand of ‘post-colonial colonialism’, or whether the city will use the inevitable openings that colonial performativity leaves behind to force genuine ‘newness,’ to manifest an
alternative political project in the interstices between colonial design and the failure of a national elite. (Abourahme 2009:508)

The difference here lies in institutional engagement in the shaping of the spill-out (physicalities of) protests to right of flourishing that are erupting throughout the city or delegitimize them; hence exasperating the inter-group contestation among Ramallites, or alternatively, force mediums of exchange, negotiation, empathy-construction, and within the manifolds spaces of normalization of otherness through co-gratification. Architecture, urban volumes and morphologies are expressions and generators of hierarchies and corollary privileges, thence intensities of socio-spatial polarisations (Alonso 1994, Davis and Raman 2012); a reality that implores the municipality to grow beyond discourses of spatial speculation in terms of market-value to the larger scale of speculation on social ecologies as the loci of profit and attraction.

Beyond the orthodox arguments concerning the role of attractiveness of large-scale urban environments to creative yuppies and therewith regional and global weight (e.g. Mayer 2012, Colomb 2012); Ramallah’s geo-temporal enclosure renders obsolete eurocentric urban policies and management systems, which have proven over two decades to be ‘political subjectivication writ large’ (Abourahme 2009:505). It’s growth into the significant Jerusalem metropolis (whether Israel recognizes this or not) rests on its ability to consolidate and reproduce the genetic elements of its resilience in the hundred years past, namely its ethos of pluralism, opportunity and joie de vivre. Shall Ramallites and their transnational solidarities find systematic channels of coexistence, the city might be able to reap the benefits of a pool of sociospatial decolonization (shared flourishing) principles. In case of failure, it should brace itself for violent confrontations triggered by the imminent crossing of the red-line of sustenance needs of the masses, the ‘restive populations’ (Harvey 2013:117). In some sense, the battle for the civic right of flourishing in Ramallah has been announced, and here institutions and intellectuals are faced with the challenge of timely tailoring the battlefield, whose features are detrimental of the outcomes. Will Ramallah labour a Friedliche Revolution (DDR, autumn 1989)? A Jasmine Revolution (Tunisia, 2010)? A Euromaidan Revolution (Ukraine, 2014)? Or a more destructive version? In other words, what kind of political identities do parties of influence want to actively or passively endorse? As Uday Mehta writes, ‘space is discontinuous, social, and relational, and […] it is just as important as time in the shaping of political identities’ (Mehta, IN: Harvey 2009:41).

The aforementioned requires a fundamental shift in the logic of Ramallite stakeholders, regardless of their sub-groupings. At the moment the absence of social justice is largely associated to the narrow perspective of failed state-making, camouflaging the fact that conquest and colonization have been regular uninvited tenants since the Iron Age, while the recent scales and intensities of disenfranchisement are the new phenomenon that is undermining and re-defining resistance potentials. Over the twentieth century the Palestinians constructed the individual sense of purpose – sumud – through collective concepts of national statehood. The clinical-death status of this politics has dismantled – but did not find replacements for – the paradigms which rationalize and orient the objective individual sensibilities, and it is particularly those adhesive spacio-relationalities that Ramallah has to re-configure and engender. These processes of Umdenken, of rethinking the status quo advocate broadening perspectives and therewith opportunities, as explained by Quiquivix:
The Palestinian liberation movement is not alone in coming up against these limits. In Latin America in particular, many have responded by shifting away from prescriptions, whether they be recipes for revolution or dictates on living life. This has entailed a rejection of a Left ‘from above’ that focuses on Party doctrine and the taking of State power, and toward a left ‘from below’ that affirms peoples’ collective capacities to self-determine in their contextually specific settings. The Zapatistas in Chiapas, who began as Marxist–Leninists and remade themselves after undergoing a long period of questioning, are exemplary in this regard. A politics ‘from below and to the left’ as they term it; coupled with a desire to ‘create a new world where many worlds exist’. It is a world that comes into being not by given prescription, but by ‘asking questions as we walk,’ caminando preguntamos. Through their own analyses, the Zapatistas have found that these practices and desires are irreconcilable under the project of sovereignty. Accordingly, they reject seeking it. They recognize that their participation in sovereignty’s relation of command–obedience itself helps perpetuate the oppressive relation; thus, they seek to dismantle it by disengaging and simultaneously going on to create the world anew. (Quiquivix 2013:5; emphasis in original)

For Palestinians the word *Oslo* is rapidly associated to the failed state-making project and its legacies. However, there is a different O.S.L.O. emerging which resembles the Zapatistas’ caminando preguntamos that this work encourages Ramallites to take notice of; which according to Inderpaul Johar stands for Open, Social, Long-term, and Organized. Achieving a safe urbanism commences with nurturing public behaviour and awarenesses that conceive and foster positive self-reinforcing trends (Gehl 2011, Quiquivix 2013, Davis and Raman 2012). These can be measured through accessibility to service-providers and resources; quality and security of journey; availability of integrated emergency and support frameworks and infrastructures; socio-economic compatibility and integration of private and public realms; forging constructive relationships between built and natural landscape among many other aspects which fall within the mandate and limited range of influence of Ramallites and their municipality regardless of positions of the PA, donors and Israel. Such domains of activity would in effect re-frame and re-size the political alongside the social, economic and environmental through nurturing new forms of representative spaces; wherein elements of visions are timeless, and methods are adaptive to new knowledge, happenings and scale. In technical terms, what the city needs is the re-calibration of its ‘code of rules’ in order to produce ‘visible connections between new and old uses, buildings and activities’ (Trancik 1986:19-20).

Like the sitting room emerged through a process of discarding the formal public space and appropriating private informal substitutes between the 1960s and 1980s (see section 2.2.2.ii, pg. 84), a reverse process should be anticipated. The inflation of property prices, reduction in intensities of family-based social activities, the new modes of societal interdependency, and the emerging perspectives on claiming of city-space will ultimately induce the shrinking of private living space, substituting the spatial demand elsewhere. Whether this shift in demand ends up feeding into a collective (public, e.g. *hara*) or exclusive (semi-private, e.g. *club*) spaces, the answer and its relative scales will be factored by the city’s undertakings – whether institutional or clandestine – and the following reactions to materializations; i.e. the employed discourses in the production of
new representational space which is not necessarily monumental (e.g. square), but surely behavioural (e.g. inter-property sharing).

For example, in 1993 the Wogeno München eG (Germany) was founded by an independent group of citizens not as a political act, rather, simply as claiming responsibility to one’s direct environment. The founders wanted concrete social-solidarity-based spatial alternatives against segregation, shareholder-value and social erosion (Wogeno 2014). Under the motto of ‘self-governd, social and ecological living’ the cooperative states that ‘for people in Wogeno buildings, home starts not at the door of the apartment, rather beforehand at the gate of the court, on the street, in the neighbourhood’ (ibid). The various projects of the cooperative that contribute with a third to social-housing and are based in principles of micro social ecologies and resource efficiency, which among their manifolds include the maximization and socialization of use of infrastructures, e.g. at ground-floor levels gardens are not parcelled and privatized, rather maintained as large units for all tenants. Through its various components, this framework is contributing to what Ng (2014) categorizes as the micro, meso, and exo levels of space.

The rise in the number of housing cooperatives and multi-unit projects in Ramallah mirrors a similar process, albeit with less maturity. Ramallite non-corporate complexes (by cooperatives) are strictly residential which – with their image of wealth – has made them target for securitization and segregation, and within the micro borders they are parcelled rather than continuous (e.g. alItihad project, Image 6.1). Notwithstanding, the current legal loophole which allows the bundling of smaller properties into management entities whose peripheries are regulated but internals free, this gives room for new ideas of spatial production. Here the threshold towards change is less legal, and more about socio-economic perceptions, knowledge, and innovation. Hence, assuming that the first determinant is met i.e. processes of social learning are understood and given their size on decision-making tables; then, what are the other determinant factors?

Image 6.1. alItihad residential cooperative, north of Ramallah (Surda), September 2014.
6.1.2. Who shares the Wealth of Ideas? Anti-Capitalist Struggles, Citizenship, and Ramallite Flourishing

In an series of 12 episodes stretching over 720 minutes the documentary series *Mankind the Story of All of Us* (directed by Dan Clifton and Hugh Ballantyne) trails the development of homo sapiens from creation to modernity. It showcases that humanity’s evolution and prosperity have been determined by our ability to perceive surrounding elements and happenings, conceive and construct derivative *ideas*, and plan their applications (Du Preez and Rafiq 2014). The cyclical processing of inputs using tools and artefacts has been the constant in the changing forms and scales of wealth generation. Here, life-sustenance motivates technological creativity aimed at exploiting particular opportunities in both forms, soft and hard; governance skills and equipment. In turn, changing perceptions of wealth in relation to life-sustenance have constantly driven politics of societies, which essentially is a domain of management concerned with regulating shares of wealth; who receives what and why? The answers to these questions determine the volatility or stability of an ecology of production, whether wealth accumulation is continuous or interrupted with e.g. strikes, revolutions. As debated in countless liberal and conservative scholarship alike; *capital* and *ideas* will always remain key in our day-to-day life activities, and among many aspects, the making of cities (Lefebvre 2009, Harvey 2013, Amin and Graham 1997, Jessop et al. 2008).

Up to the signature of the OAs colonial stratification had secondary impacts on Palestinians who in spite of their differentiating conditions were dominated by politics of austerity and accountability; and whose economy was isolated and introverted. Nonetheless, the ‘intranational and intrastate disparities and cleavages’ created by what Yiftchel calls Israel’s ‘ethnocracy’ (1999:729; emphasis in original) surfaced and intensified after 1993. The combination of insecurity (high risk) and planning and construction regulations (see section 4.4.1, pg. 223) erected an invisible yet efficient barrier that in effect de-democratised city-production; now only the rich can concretize their visions in Ramallah. That said, the local financial elites - the bourgeoisie of Fanon (1963) - tend to avoid risks hence preferring investments securitized by coincidence with colonial interests or the opposite, but refrain from staging a challenge (Abourahme 2009, Anani 2011, Shaheen 2012). For Fanon, in geographies where ‘enormous wealth rubs shoulders with abject poverty’ (1963:117) one of the main problematics of the large range of influence of this clique lies in their incapacity to conceive new worlds, where he argues that the bourgeoisie ‘is lacking ideas, because it is inward looking, cut off from the people, sapped by its congenital incapacity to evaluate issues on the basis of the nation as a whole’ (ibid:102), and there with in practice their roles are those of subsidiary managers rather than entrepreneurs.

The politics of *infantilization* (Harvey 2009, Anderson 2006) has nurtured a system of *opportunism* (Fanon 1963, Brugmann 2009) which has unfolded into the only form possible; the ‘businessman mentality’ that engenders discriminatory loyalties rather than the very much needed ‘captain mentality’ that balances the ship against tipping. Seen from this perspective, the mobile characteristic adds to the worrimentes, whereby the city’s nature as a translocality suggests that the vulnerability of its economy reaches deeper beyond dependency, as the cherry-picking ability of large capital makes those unreliable. In every case of war the
affliction of cities is engraved by the rapid loss of significant capital as those with means for decent relocation into safety exit borders. In the years between 2001 and 2004 scores of Ramallites emigrated carrying their wealth elsewhere, and the deteriorating conditions in the West Bank have driven many riches into the city of newcomers. Is Ramallah ready for the predictable unfoldings of its current economic stagnation which may not balance out as the former one?

While large capital enjoys relative freedom of choice, small and medium capital have narrow options; either in savings and securities, or in buying a piece of land – which is considered the most secure investment in Palestine. As for the Ramallite rising middle-class (in-born and newcomer white-collars), the shift in economic orders has replaced the clan with the bank. Through *popular capitalism* the bulk of the local market’s stable capital (that of less mobile strata) is largely locked away from circulation, either in the form of inflexible securities or debt. The result is the absence of financial *shock-absorbers*, which in turn examples itself with the growing stagnation of Ramallah’s economy since 2011. Tonkiss writes:

> The economic crisis that has disfigured so many cities in the last half a decade broke out along twin fault lines. This dual crisis – of property and credit – has shown the extent to which ‘normal’ urban development processes have been financed by debt all along the speculative chain: from sub-prime mortgage lenders to insolvent developers, bad banks, and overleveraged governments. (Tonkiss 2014:165)

The most circulated concept in face of the financial-crisis-exposed vulnerability of large-scale transnational economies is that of the ‘creative city’ which advocates cultural innovation as high-value market product (Colomb 2012a, Ferguson 2014). In Berlin, the crisis had decelerated the neoliberal appropriation of the ‘poor but sexy’ city giving rise to the new motto of ‘sei stadt, sei wandel, sei berlin’ (*be* city, *be* change, *be* berlin; Colomb 2012:259). Local government politics is claiming desire to engage with its ‘creative’ citizens in redefining its strategies and spaces, where in Regula Lüscher (Senate Building Director of Berlin) announced that ‘[c]ultural strategies are able to attain accomplishments above and beyond those of planning’ (*IN* Ferguson 2014:10). Debates over urban commons (see section 4.4.2, pg. 234) are based on such discourses which advocate ‘making social engagement profitable’ (ibid:16). While the compatibility of Berlin’s most recent strategies cannot be determined with certainty yet, here Brugmann warns that urban decline cannot be reversed with ‘corporate city models – even with the best technology and infrastructure designs’ (2009:274).

As every change in discourse – whether societal or spatial – requires investment, ‘there is no getting around the fact that the bourgeoisie still has the initiative in its struggle for (and in) space’ (Lefebvre 2009:56). In light of the current poverty and fragmentation levels it is highly unlikely that the Ramallah’s poor alone will be able to forge the necessary debate, although they definitely compose the charged – yet unorganized– critical mass. Equally, it would be ludicrous to assume that the PA could assume command. As Diagram 6.5; pg. 297 demonstrates the PA’s 2014 General Budget (akin former ones) regards the sector of Planning and Administration as less important than Border Control (which receives 2.5 times more and is anyway decided upon by the Israeli Army); the Council of Ministers (which receives 3.4 times more at a time its function as the cabinet does not justify the allocated capital); the PLC (which receives 5.4 times
more at a time it has been inactive since 2007); and the Ministry of Waqf and Religion Affairs (which receives a staggering 12.4 times more and whose absence of services are neither collectively felt nor as destructive as planning shortcomings). Similarly, the PLO Institutions (hard to determine what these do) receive almost double and the President’s Office 30% more than the budget of the Ministry of Local Government. In another comparison, the Ministry of Interior and National Security (whose security?) receives almost 23 times more than the MOLG. Finally and beyond numerical considerations, ‘studies convincingly’ demonstrate that it is ‘much easier [...] to organize and enforce collective and cooperative action with strong participation of local inhabitants in smaller jurisdictions’, as well as
‘the fact that the capacity for participation diminishes rapidly with larger sizes of administrative unit’ (Harvey 2013:81).

In this context neutralization (hence balanced sociospatial transformation) necessitates gradual cooptation of three economic groupings and their organization into co-dependent (cooperative) systems of space production. These are; First, powerful private investors who are married to the PA which composes the ‘most privatized political entities in the world’ (Gordon and Filc 2009:467) and along with those the petite bourgeoisie whom are troubled by growing risks and are ‘looking for a role to play’ according to Houry (2010), whose ambition remains profit accumulation; Second, ‘the intellectuals, professionals, and others who have hitched their fortunes to Ramallah’ and are ‘in fact underlying its secularism’ (Taraki 2008:14), who are alarmed about the rising contestation and radicalism which threaten their sociospatial freedoms, whether ideological or behavioural, and; Third, the rapidly growing poor strata whose existential worriment are those of improving their living conditions.

Systematically similar to nationalism and neoliberlism yet parametrically varied, a viable resilience strategy should orient the role and gain of the powerful, be popular as capitalism yet inclusive as socialism, and grant space and access – not virtual hope – to the underprivileged and marginalized. Its respective vision should be concerned with re-puzzling the relations of varied groups and stakeholders to reveal and consolidate overlapping, multi-charactered commons, while concomitantly move the centre of mass (activity of production) out of the segregated private and closer into the visible public and semi-public spheres.

To achieve co-dependence planners have to become miners that excavate precious stones from seemingly effete elements that conceal significant profit opportunities; both in social and financial terms. For example, elBireh Municipality held its battle against the spatially problematic Palestine Tower from the standpoint of an administrative arm and through the lens of pressure on and cost of infrastructure; giving excuse for the investor to attain the needed licenses from the higher (corrupt) authorities therewith side-lining the municipality altogether. Meanwhile, had a co-dependence relation between the municipality and the local small scene of innovative and motivated urbanists and social activists been in place, the latter could have advised of alternative methods which deprive the investor from the opportunity to grab permit elsewhere. Alternatives (proposals to commence negotiations rather than employing the proven compromised sovereignty) could have been granting the permit as conditioned with e.g. financing of infrastructural solutions, aesthetic amendments to the design, and/or the supervised furnishing of parts of the bordering (closed and unlandscaped) Palestine National Garden (see section 5.1.1, pg. 245) – akin the Barcelona Olympics urban strategy of conditioning the development of private commercial spaces to their surrounding public (social and spatial) infrastructures.

The addition of independent urbanists and activists into the formula moves the concern – the responsibilitization – from the government-investor monopoly into the public realm, hence enabling the masses from exercising power as showcased in the example of the Library Street project in Ramallah, whose course was forced into a compromise through the incident of information spill (see section 4.4, pg. 220). Here and as AMAN’s study (2014) of LGs integrity explains, the lack of transparency creates a void in place of public opinion due to the lack of interest of both, LGs to publish and discuss their operations and the journalists to ask. In the case of Ramallah, the problematic lies more in
the latter than the former, as Ramallah Municipality voluntarily publishes its
selected highlights on its FaceBook page daily. Here the fact that these ‘post-
it’ style of announcements neither reveal technical and pivotal details nor are
archived on the official website (to create coherent order of happenings) has
yet to be questioned by the hundreds of local journalists, whose work is mainly
that of collecting press releases and statements rather than serious investigation
of happenings. On their part, corporations and investors have little reason to
publish their plans, since secrecy allows e.g. the tens of millions of dollars worth
project of elErsal Centre to be executed without having to neither negotiate nor
compromise with neither LGs nor local communities, although the detrimental
chunk of project-capital, the site is public property (see section 5.1.3, pg. 249).

Further, as detailed in section 4.3.3; pg. 203, the municipal welcome of
non-binding, free-of-charge, often disregarded consultancies from its creative
visionaries is neither attractive nor sufficient for those to engage with these
bureaucratic and complicit bodies. To bring the equation of co-dependency
into functioning municipalities have to share some of their decision-making
power with the inventors. Under such conditions there are several Ramallite
professionals and educated activists willing (at least initially) to volunteer their
time; not out of charity or philanthropy, rather, by power of the individual sense
of purpose – be that psychological or professional satisfaction (profit) – and
the ‘start-up’ economic mentality. In the absence of R&D departments in their
houses the municipalities of the Ramallah agglomerate should be celebrating this
resource which is not as abundant in other cities under the authority of the PA,
and activists and urbanists in turn should understand that municipalities could
be their legitimation and whistle-blowers in their struggle against the free-reign
of neoliberals and the hegemony of their politics.

Harvey notes that while history provides many examples of trials for
autogestión (self-management) by worker movements through cooperatives
and the like, these ‘have not so far proved viable as templates for more global
anti-capitalist solutions’ (Harvey 2013:122). He argues that the main reason for
this failure is that ‘all enterprises operating in a capitalist economy are subject
to ‘the coercive laws of competition’ that ‘undergrid the capitalist laws of value
production and realization’, which down the ecological cycle create a dynamic by
which often ‘workers end up in a condition of collective self-exploitation that is
every bit as repressive as that which capital imposes’ (ibid). The Engineers Union
in Palestine is evidence (see section 4.4.1, pg. 223). Unless a movement is able
to encapsulate all three basic elements of the circulatory process – monetary,
productive, and commodity capitals – its chances of success are accidental. Hence:

Anti-capitalist struggle must not only be about organizing and re-organizing
within the labor process, fundamental though that is. It must also be about
finding a political and social alternative to the operation of the capitalist law
of value across the world market. While worker control or communitarian
movements can arise out of the concrete intuitions of people collectively
engaging in production and consumption, contesting the operations of the
capitalist law of value on the world stage requires a theoretical understandings
of macroeconomic interrelations along with a different form of technical and
organizational sophistication. [...] De-coupling from these relations, as some
now propose, is close to impossible [...]. (Harvey 2013:123)
The outcomes of the Cold War attend to this premise, and the embrace of radical capitalism by former socialist countries (e.g. Russia, China) has significant numbers of revolutionists propagating change through either the *termite theory* of ‘smashing of the state’ which has proven counter-effective; or autonomous organization of production by localized communities and controls which do function in ‘small groups but are impossible to operationalize at the scale of a metropolitan region’ (ibid:125). Here, to succeed urban protest movements should labour overarching organizational frameworks whose resilience is grounded in sets of temporal, intuitive practices. Revolutionary principles that cannot integrate into the larger economic, social and/or political systems are bound to fail, sooner or later. Hence, imaginaries of a future Ramallah have to define both, their elements and how they function – particularly, how they integrate into capitalist laws of value and feed of them to create alternatives. In the same line, concepts that plan the socialization of Ramallite spaces of wealth production without catering for a corollary empowerment and reform of official institutions of planning and local government are unlikely to sustain. The failure in this attempt at state-making does not make the state a failing system of management and administration.

Class struggles are often equally citizenship struggles and vice versa, and both have their physicalities within the totality of the urban landscape, which on itself is the locus of capitalist vulnerability. Awareness to the reality that disruptions of status quo jeopardize the capitalist process has had elites ‘gearing up’ for confrontations through association with and endorsement of curtailment state apparatuses (whether oppressive securitization or parliamentarian lobbying). On the other side of the equation, protesters are capitalising on the advantage of mass-claiming of vital connections whether through acts of protests e.g. demonstrations and encampments, or those of insurgency e.g. hijacking of supply lines. The blocking of the vital Highway 60 and Road 446 among others in the West Bank on 14 November 2012 by activists contending the colonization could be regarded as example of an insurgent spill-out that employed anti-capitalist pressure in a carefully chosen, and unexpected, territorialization.

Amongst some capitalists and colonialists there are pioneers that foresee the impossibility of *compound growth* and are seeking alternatives. Maximalist Zionists like the Israeli Minister of Economy Naftali Bennett comprehend that the continuation of compound growth of colonies is exasperating urban poverty in Israel proper. For him, the goal of demographic superiority can only be achieved through annexation of the West Bank and its de-segregation from the rest of the geography. This strategy is further justified by Israel’s need to provide stability and a new lease of life to the economic infrastructures in the colonies of the West Bank which are starting to suffer at the hands of internationally growing boycott movements as attested by the Israeli Finance Minister Yair Lapid; e.g. In 2013 SodaStream became target of extensive pro-Palestinian campaigns’s, 18 months later the stock of the company had tumbled 17%6, and on 29 October 2014 the company declared relocation into southern Israel (Reich 2014). The compound growth of the settlement enterprise is reaching an inflection point.

Some Palestinian capitalists and economists have grasped that the compound growth of their mass-scale undertakings is reaching a similar faith. The circulating rumours of bankruptcy of Rawabi (see section 5.1.4, pg. 256) and the hundreds of empty apartments around Ramallah (in spite of continued need) are indicative, and forgers of a change in the economic and spatial discourses, which hitherto
independent visionaries are not part of. The current standings where Micro, Small and Medium sized Enterprises (MSMEs) 'employ 85% of the private sector labour force and contribute more than 55% to the country’s GDP' (PIF 2014c) on one hand, and on the other the PDRP (MOPAD 2007) and Abdullah’s (2012) naming of high-value and knowledge-based economic sectors as most viable for Palestinians; combined these constitute an under-explored domain for nurturing an anti-capitalist mode of city-production that socializes spaces of wealth accumulation in Ramallah. As numbers clearly indicate, it is not singular parties that are producing wealth, but those are the ones that succeed in appropriating the surplus of city-wide labour through e.g. rent, costs of services, etc. One of the most crucial challenges for Ramallah therein is the re-configuration of the system to allow larger groups of the society to keep and share the capital of their labour, and therein gain leverage necessary for participation in decision making on how this capital is re-employed within the city-space.

Neoliberal institutions are already exploring the potentials of MSMEs (e.g. FastForward program by Leaders NGO; Sharakat Fund by PIF among others), however, discussion over how these operate collectively and in relation to the wider city-space and/or city-vision is absent. The acute lack of engagement of private capital and corporations in the reform and amelioration of performance of the public sector through joint undertakings is justified by Huleileh (2012) as being ‘a very risky business’ since ‘laws are neither coherent nor regular regarding public-private-partnerships’. While this argument stands ground of truth on short-term fiscal-year balances, it decomposes when regarded from the larger biological lens, as market value of singular projects is directly dependent on the spatial conditions and values of its direct as well as indirect surroundings. Yet again and as argued in the earlier section, the bourgeoisie are always relevant for the financing and enablement of positive change, but are seldom the drivers.

Giving a spatial example, the inflated values of property have recently inspired several investors to employ the row-house model (Image 6.2, Image 6.3; pg. 302). They are able to implement these singular constructions due to the fact that regulations govern the surfaces of the volume of the property from the perspective of two-dimensional maps – retention from four sides and overall height from street level – leaving the insides to the wishes of owners. Through this same rule developers of the past decade have been excavating into mountain-ridges erecting (legally) twelve and thirteen floors in zones marked as four or five stories only. Meanwhile, up to date discussion on whether row housing at city-scale (rather than only within sporadic parcels) are compatible solutions is absent, and the same applies to the decade-old flagrant risks of six basement floors. Had the bourgeoisie been less focused on the day-to-day bank account balance and more engaged with the future, they would’ve already financed a municipal reform of regulations to allow them to extract the discussed higher, longer-term gains from their undertakings.

That said, the continuation of the status quo is largely caused by the domination of reductionist utopia vs. dystopia comparisons as mutually exclusive realities, rather than integrative constructs that draw on the ontological relations conjoining and scaling the two poles. Just like utopias are products of human fantasy, dis-topias – which are unstable – are sustained by the collective failure in re-organizing the present to produce a different future. The inability of majority of visionaries to translate their ideas into practical measures can be directly linked to the fact that these have to grow from within the existing ecologies and systems.
Image 6.3. A row-house building under construction within the second phase of alReehan Neighbourhood (PIF), September 2014.
In place of dismissing present-day components on the basis of their complicity in the discriminate system, proposals have to encompass and re-orient these into the larger collective. This necessitate engagement and negotiation with power holders, whether the financial elite or the average citizens beholding the necessary critical mass. In turn, such processes of negotiation require both, soft and hard systems of operation; assemblies that synthesize inter and intra group interests on the various scales (micro, meso, exo and macro), as well as physical spatializations of these relations as essential for nurturing progressive re-production. Under this logic the reform of Ramallah municipality (whose politics is supportive; pg. 203) to act as an accountable conductor for the orchestra of stakeholders is essential, and the history of ‘municipal socialism’ that catered for nested hierarchies presents many examples to draw inspiration from (e.g. Paris Commune in 1987, Red Bologna in 1970s, and the Bolivian El Alto in the 2000s among others).

In conclusion, co-dependency, -gratification, and hence wealth-sharing are relationships and engagements whose evolution is dependent on progressive re-tuning and incremental re-configuration of exchange and negotiation mediums, whose soft side is the concatenation of various sets of assemblies of spatial management across the scalar spectrum; from the neighbourhood scale (average citizens), to that of the district (larger private capital), agglomerate (local governments), the national (central government and other localities), and the trans-border (international actors). As Chapter 3 demonstrates Ramallah's prosperity rests on actors and supply lines (whether goods or human capital) beyond its own territory, and as Chapter 4 showcases, the centralization of decision-making in upper tiers has led to the suspension of programmed undertaking from the tangible location-based needs; which in turn has provided room for eclectic corporate-led urban development policies – Chapter 5 – by power of relational fantasies inspired elsewhere.

Ramallah's ability to remain attractive and liveable rests in the hands of all its stakeholders who must collectively labour a long-term vision that integrates timely concerns yet whose focus lies beyond, e.g. year 2100. Such time-frames leave the doors wide-open for methodologies to evolve, while ensuring that these draw a contiguity through the certainly changing components and tools. The damage of decades of British and – more importantly – Zionist colonization cannot be reversed through ‘swift’ global state-political and neoliberal economics, and certainly, these are not limited to Area C and the colonies. Rather, decolonization necessitates solutions whose foundation lies in the everyday lived as well as symbolic / representational space; in understanding that how Palestinians organize their everyday practices and economies has a direct impact on the strength of the colonial project of systematic fragmentation through disenfranchisement. Antivenoms to colonial strategies have to be extracted from within, thereby, temporality should be redefined from being the domain of the colonizer, to being the very strategy of the colonized in their sustenance. Ramallah does not need Master Plans and twenty-year frameworks such as the RDPF. Instead, through the all-encompassing right to flourishing as opposed to the partial state-making, Ramallite politics could employ frameworks of anti-capitalist struggles to forge a healthy urbanity that is routed in citizenship, which in turn regulates the ongoing denationalization; because ‘all those whose labors are engaged in producing and reproducing the city have a collective right not only to that which they produce, but also to decide what kind of urbanism is to be produced where, and how’ (Harvey 2013:137, 150).
6.2. Imagining a Future Morphology for Ramallah

Neither cities nor places in them are unordered, unplanned; the question is only whose order, whose planning, for what purpose? (Peter Marcuse)

Social pluralism, economic equality and political reform are operational systems whose installation requires the provision of a compatible hardware. The morphology of Ramallah is rejecting the heavily-financed development policies and programs not out of (the interruptible) corruption and mismanagement, but due to the fact that their methodologies are discontinuous through the varying detrimental levels of space, which among other impacts reproduces the former.

Borrowing an example from the WB at large, school-buildings at EU-standard for girls throughout the area will not change the gender-prejudice and the socio-behavioural system of memorization (obedience, rigid hierarchies) with a desired critical thinking (labouring democratic process). Rather, investment in infrastructures that induce a collective re-questioning of the norm will evidently employ endemic innovation in determining and financing need-based facilities. Empirical data collected through three assignments within six-years for a leading donor revealed that significant numbers of aspiring girls successfully finishing their high-school education do not enrol in higher education (whether technical or academic) predominantly due to the costs these entail, hence ending up as dependent (not free) housewives, which feeds into the discrimination against them. Tracing the devil's cycle rapidly leads to the logic by which indeed, women's empowerment requires their financial independence, yet concomitantly, the inability of impoverished areas to finance long-term education implores shorter tracks between training and actual production, and a direct relation to the timely lived space. What is needed is enabling popular access into the pool of unprocessed resources to collectively (hence many individuals) construct the locationally-needed productive (and hence symbolic) space. Compulsory systematic high-school education for girls of impoverished strata defeats its purpose because it doesn't translate into swift generation of income, hence sustenance, hence flourishing whether in terms of basic rights or personal growth; The 'realm of freedom' Marx said 'begins when the realm of necessity is left behind' (IN Harvey 2013:127).

Re-scaling to Ramallah, in response to the commercialization and internationalization of tourist-taste culture, during the past few years there has been a 'back to the roots' form of cosmopolitanism, a process of re-discovering and re-integrating the traditional into the contemporary (which is happening in many other cities as well). The enablement of cross-border trade by the OA's had led to a standardization of – among many other sectors – clothing. In response, today there is a surge in demand for hand-made and customized wear and accessories, paralleled by artistic re-questioning of such elements e.g. Omar Joseph Nasser-Houry's exhibition The Ceremonial Uniform (March-April 2014, Birzeit University Museum). Unfortunately, the inflation of commercial space values makes it difficult for entrepreneurs (amongst which designers) to make their products accessible (e.g. show-room) to those willing to purchase the eccentric, higher-value
product; which and in the absence of online banking possibilities and functioning postal systems (imposed by Israel) is curtailing their growth into meaningful cells of employment and production. This is feeding into two; the majority of products with traditional expressions retain older forms (lack innovation due to isolation from further processing), and crafting and tailoring remain under-paid professions due to their need to compete with the imported as well as locally mass-produced goods – which as explained earlier are incapable of innovation and production of new forms. In this process, the surplus that Ramallites produce is appropriated by large-scale importers and factory-owners rather than being circulated among the larger local strata through supply and demand of alternatives.

Hence, while investment in MSMEs and financing of start-ups through e.g. shared office-space by the FastForward project of Leaders (NGO) is important, nonetheless, without solving the kernel problem of market and resource accessibility success stories will always be considerably fewer than the actual potential, and the same applies to Ramallah’s project within the Rockefeller Foundation’s 100 Resilient Cities program (see section 4.4.2, pg. 234). Here ‘more attention to geographical rather than sectoral forms of organization’ is needed, a discourse the maturity of which is expressed through ‘values and ideas’ being ‘articulated through popular cultural events and activities’ (Harvey 2013:134, 148). These produce collective memories and engender a sense of citizenship, which is an operation that several Ramallite intellectuals (particularly contemporary artists) have grasped, and are attempting to translate into an agenda through invoking open discussions. Speaking about the Qalandiya International (QI) 2014 series of contemporary art and discussion events which describes itself as ‘collective creative resistance’ (QI 2014); The urbanist and curator Yazid Anani states in a televised interview that:

We had a crisis in the period following the period of committed art of artists like Suleiman Mansour and Nabil Anani. From there we leaped into contemporary art rapidly […]. People were accustomed to fine arts paintings […] which contain all familiar symbols. Now there is a significant group of young artists employing the tools of contemporary art to express themselves in attempts to connect locally as well as internationally. In my opinion, people are gradually accepting these materials that are critical and highlighting of particular present-day problematics, whereby ideas and questions about the society we live in are being presented. These are not just a visually appealing painting that is framed on the wall, rather, they are materials that invoke discussion. (PBC 2014a: minute 5:35)

Talking specifically about the Archives, Lived and Shared series of exhibitions, Anani states that ‘artists focused on less known periods of our lives, which have been referenced to distinct moments, the 1967, the 1948; the in-between is as if lost, forgotten’ (ibid: minute 3:50). Here his colleague Sally AbuBaker (Programs Officer at Ramallah Municipality’s Department of Culture) notes that:

The idea behind the exhibitions was such that, since these are based on materials extracted out of their cabins in municipal archives, also the works have to leave their conventional spaces – into homes, historical buildings, etc – and be exhibited in a form different than that of a museum, thence avoiding framing the art in spaces that could be fenced from citizens. (ibid: minute 5:00)
Ramallah does not suffer the absence of alternative (sectoral) knowledge whether regarding the political, economic or social, rather, an entrapment that the post OAs reality created; geographic cantons, ideological landscapes, and the missing mobility network inter- and intra- the dozens of divisions of both, which initiatives such as Qalandiya International aim at breaking. Mobility – physical and mental – has become kernel to the contemporary Palestinian liberation movement. While physical mobility inter-localities remains hostage to systems of colonial-fragmentation, nonetheless, mobility intra-localities – and hence intra-residents – is an urban design domain welcoming intervention.

In the post-Oslo era walls between neighbours gained height and speared metal fences – formerly spared to enable activists from commuting in shadows, escaping a chase by the military, and the families sharing gardens and scarce resources. Can-sprayed political slogans became acts of vandalism and infringement on public space – formerly symbols of daily victories and continued resistance, hence in effect delegitimizing acts of protest as harmful to public order and safety. Refugee camps became liminal sites of poverty; lack of order and chaos – formerly the fortress of the national movement and the sumud of the people. These are but few examples of many others unfolding in the corners of Ramallah.

While the state-making project has failed, the slogan of the Palestinian liberation movement of ‘right to self-determination’ remains present and within its multi-layers lies the right to desire and choose – regardless of ideology – the characteristic-elements of one’s city-space as an imperative right to freedom of activity in a just democracy. This right is systematically compromised by the locally imposed and sustained construction and planning regulations detailed in section 4.4.1; pg. 223. Here Abourahme’s question about whether Ramallah is able ‘to force genuine ‘newness’, to manifest an alternative political project’ (2009:508) is rather dependent on its success in reforming the game-rules of spatial decision-making, and therewith socialization of access to resources necessary for translation and nurturing of ‘genuine’ ideas. In view of this, the pace of growth and degree of collectivity of the current debates on space and societal problems depends on the physicality into which they materialize. Evolution processes necessitate offshoot initiatives that complement and feed into this root by spatializing the exhibitions into e.g. installations that familiarize acts of questioning of norms, followed by interim projects that are ‘planned from the outset to be impermanent’ and characteristically ‘seek to derive unique qualities from the idea of temporality’ (Haydn and Temel IN Colomb 2012a:135); that is, the ability to investigate the applicability, potentials and harms of ideas ahead of granting them license, which among its manifolds serves training a sense and logic of experimentation and creation of new micro-systems (concepts of Zwischenutzungen, premature gratification; see section 4.4, pg. 220).

Shall Ramallite visionaries succeed in these two levels of temporality, they might be able to reap the fruits of their creativity in the form of legislation, which by nature is fostering of progressive reform. This process underpins the difference between revolutionary acts of protest, and those which could be described as reformist – the upward mobility of the former is limited by scalar determinants, while the influence of the latter reaches deep into ‘layers of possibility’ (Harvey 2013). Hence here the central question – of this section – becomes: what available components from within the present-day system can be employed by visionaries and planners to foster alternative, resilient urbanism in Ramallah?
The IFRC defines resilience as ‘[t]he ability of individuals, communities, organisations, or countries exposed to disasters and crises and underlying vulnerabilities to anticipate, reduce the impact of, cope with, and recover from the effects of adversity without compromising their longterm prospects’ (2012:7). As demonstrated through this work for Ramallah the anticipatable ‘adversity’ has many forms and tentacles, yet here I focus on three main paradigms that visionaries can employ, and whose tackling aims at labouring alternatives from within the capitalist market towards cross-strata satisfaction.

First, I address topographical and climatological incompatibility of planning and construction regulations (including circulation/mobility concepts) that are threatening of public safety, well-being, attractiveness, and constitute onto themselves a waste of valuable resources which also exasperates the following two points. Second, since threats to social pluralism (inclusion versus exclusion) in Ramallah are mainly produced by lack of spaces of elimination of otherness and nexus (assimilation) of diversity into a web of relational co-dependency and -gratification; hence this sub-section proposes alternative forms of geographical organization and the corollary potential impacts on creation of cooperatives that on one side engender dialogue, and on the other collectively balance the weight of corporations in decision-making over city-space. And third, the reoccurrence of natural and man-made emergencies implore a new approach to the city’s infrastructure that factor those into the making of lived-space. Together these imaginaries aim at tackling roots (ecological sources) of vulnerability of the city, rather than the neoliberal methodology of containment and damage-control.

Suggestions featured on the following pages synthesis the findings of this work into spatial proposals that are rooted in the belief that ideas (of which revolutionary political discourses are one) are inspired by socioeconomic needs and phenomena. The formulation and change in individual’s sense of purpose is variable across temporal and ecological scales, and their expression or repression is reflected by the form and intensity of activities of protest and their materializations through space. The aspired future, decolonized, resilient Ramallah and a widely shared ethos of sumud and pluralism therewith necessitate timeless principles whose parameters are fluid, adaptive and steered towards labouring systems of progressive:

- reform of policy- and decision-making apparatizes through incremental processes of claiming and sharing political power through social-learning and -puzzling, which among their manifolds include the empowerment of municipalities into becoming bastions of democratic dialogue and achievements;
- educated makeshi spatial engagements and longer-term experiments that employ careful scrutiny, constructive critique, new knowledge and technologies;
- factoring of the space-time compression of globalized localities and the resulting policy-mobility by power of pseudo-concrete fantasies. ñ erewith, gradual and perpetual taming of capitalist practices through cooptation and assimilation under new game-rules which foster positive trade-offs and coalesces between the public good and private beneficence, hence nurturing micro-ecologies of varied yet complementary sensibilities;
- employment of principles on antispaces as abundant loci with significant potentials for socioeconomic synthesis and extraction of the collective
symbolic out of the individual lived space, which can be connected with identification of high-value products and knowledge-based economy as the most viable options under colonial precariousness; and,

- Fine-tuning and re-orientation of undertakings towards improving the mental (security, accountability, freedom), lived (dignity, connectivity, satisfaction) and representational (rooted, inclusive, accessible) spaces of Ramallites.

Combined, these principles and the forthcoming morphological scenarios showcase urban planning and design parameters that reduce and gradually eliminate the herein established sociospatial fragmentation of Ramallah, elements of systematized disenfranchisement and denial of access to resources, and what al-Khalili calls the ‘political castration’ that characterizes the Oslo era.

6.2.1. Scenario – Remaking Ramallah through the Feet of Ramallites: Environmental and Climatological Risks and Opportunities

Every city has an amazing amount of vacant, unused land in its downtown core. [...] The highway, the Modern Movement in architecture, urban renewal and zoning, competition for image on the part of private enterprise, and changing patterns of land use in the inner city have [...] together created the dilemma of modern urban space [... A] code of rules should accommodate a diversity of building styles and forms. It should also express the rules of scale and character for making coherent, visible connections between new and old uses, buildings, and activities. [...] In the end, the streets and squares of our cities should once again become spaces for social discourse, taking precedence over the movement and storage of automobiles (Trancik 1986:1, 18, 19, 20)

The official systems of planning in Ramallah which are rooted in Functionalist Movement ideologies consider work, mobility and socialization as distinct domains rather than continuous units of life. Their combination with colonial strategies of maximized surveillance and swift repression on one hand and capitalist greed on the other have fragmented the city into discontinuous islands and normalized inefficient use and unjust distribution of resources as detailed in section 4.4.1; pg. 223. Beyond economic loss, disregard to climatological elements is threatening the lives and well-being of persons as detailed in section 2.1.3.iii; pg. 65; as do the predicted climatic shifts to Ramallah’s oldest gratis charm, its mild summers. Meanwhile, the city is facing annual challenges with ponding storm water and wadi-s (streams), and equally, water shortages due to Israeli discrimination. As this work repeatedly argued, LGs have to revise and modernize their construction regulations; the fact that buildings reach 25 and 30 meters in elevation at a time the code marks upper limits at e.g. 15 meters in B and C residential areas are not accidental, rather perpetuated by shortcomings of executive apparatuses.

Noteworthy, about 150 kilometres northwards Haifa presents a case proving that Ramallah’s regulation could produce a much healthier environment in an
equally steep topography. From walking around it becomes clear that the city curtailed the carving of the mountain ridge by simply upholding the upper limits indicated in scripts. The average height of buildings around Haifa is also 4 stories. However, unlike Ramallah, on plots west of streets (mean plot elevation lower than street) the majority of buildings conform to one basement floor and three atop. On the opposite side (mean plot elevation higher than street), the ground floor generally rises at two meters above street level, hence conforming to four regular stories and no basement. Further, Haifa has numerous public and countless semi-private staircases which extend all along the ridge, making it possible to walk from the tip of the mountain to the seaside – or in the other direction – with minimal contact with vehicle-roads, their noise, pollution and stress (Image 6.4 - Image 6.7; pg. 311). Besides their mobility function, these staircases are efficient, affordable, and low-technology channels of storm-water which significantly reduce ponding. This modern interpretation of pedestrian mobility (which conforms to better land use as well) finds its roots in older Mediterranean urban fabrics, such as those of Nablus, Bethlehem and Jaffa (Image 6.8 - Image 6.9); whose cisterns in the various neighbourhoods of their old cities testify of the importance of incorporation of water collection infrastructures for the survival of urban residents of this region.

The decreasing ratio of private wells throughout Ramallah is often defended as natural shift of citizen’s dependency to modern, more comfortable infrastructures. However, while this logic might be pardoned in geographies of stable politics, it certainly is, at best, naïve in colonial settings. It is an established fact that clients in Ramallah are willing to bridge the establishment costs for – particularly – water reserves. Here the fact that in spite of marketability the production of these infrastructures is suffering has more to do with the non-tailored mass-production mentality of developers who prefer to avoid the non-additionally profitable hassle of constructing wells. The municipality’s reluctance to tackle this phenomenon is hard to justify, particularly given its struggles with low-supply in summers, and flooding by storm-water. The chosen path of provision of city-wide networks is highly costly, vulnerable to failure of singular elements, and a time-extensive process which caters for only one side of the water problem: the release. Meanwhile, the problem of capturing water remains open.

In Table 6.1; pg. 311 I list the dominant construction zones which correspond to 62.8% of the city’s total area. Bearing in mind that not all these areas have been developed yet; notwithstanding, three fifths of these are municipally deregulated retention (Diagram 6.6; pg. 315). For visionaries pondering the future of the city, these correspond to significant landscapes of opportunity. From such a perspective and considering that existing regulations allow owners to employ retention zones for technical infrastructures under the condition that these do not rise above ground level; therein, an easily applicable and technically simple suggestion would be the licensing of – and conditioning of licenses with – construction of cisterns in definable segments of the retention antispaces, whose ceiling is inclined with the original topography of the site. Such a system would catch and store water throughout the city, hence sparing the need to create large-scale collection networks, treatment plants and re-distribution pumps and infrastructures. The surfaces of these (terraced, spill-system) cisterns complement side-walk channels and absorption holes for water, as well as pedestrian mobility. Elaborating the idea further; these infrastructures could provision private entrances for apartments at the corresponding levels of multi-story buildings, which directly translate as
Image 6.4. The Bonym Street in Haifa which is one of many public staircases that snake through residential parcels. Some are connectors while others are semi-private dead-ends.
Image 6.5. (right) Shifra Street, Haifa.
Image 6.6. A view eastwards from Hillel Street, Haifa; notice how staircases are omnipresent.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>% of Area of City</th>
<th>Min. Area of plot (sq.m)</th>
<th>Min. Length of plot facade (m)</th>
<th>Lower Limit</th>
<th>Upper Limit</th>
<th>Retention Area as % of total city area</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Side retention</td>
<td>Rear retention</td>
<td>Front retention</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residential AA</td>
<td>14,6%</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residential A</td>
<td>15,0%</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residential B</td>
<td>13,0%</td>
<td>750</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residential C</td>
<td>2,9%</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commercial and mixed-use</td>
<td>5,9%</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exhibitions buildings</td>
<td>1,1%</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industrial zone</td>
<td>2,9%</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public buildings</td>
<td>6,9%</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tourism buildings</td>
<td>0,5%</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total area in question</td>
<td>62,8%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antispaces respective to selected zones</td>
<td>37,5%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- Residential Agricultural: 11,8% 5000 50 7 7 12 8 2 20% 10% n.a.
- Roads: 22,4% n.a.
emergency escapes whether in cases of fire, earthquakes or other. As the images of e.g. Jaffa’s dense fabric demonstrate (comparable materials and conceptions), facade features of windows and doors would have to be laboured in parallel. Here I should clearly state that I am not advocating neither this proposal as the only option, nor that of making Ramallah a copy of either of the exampled cities. Rather, I am providing an example for the extraction of lessons from regionally comparative cases and their adaptation into the desires and needs of Ramallites today, and the modern technologies available in (can be developed by) their local markets. Here for example, prolonging location-based cycles of grey water should also be incentivized and developed.

While laws and protagonists consider retention as catering of privacy and necessary for adequate ventilation and light, Ramallah renders this logic void through the way investors capitalize on its steep topography. The man-made canyons (Image 2.12; pg. 65, and several others in Chapter 4, pg. 216) place people’s bedrooms in one another, block casual breezes, stream ground-winds at high thresholds, and trap dampness in the cold months therewith endangering the long-term stability of the site. The solution for the locally needed deceleration of winds in winter and entrapment of humidity and cool breezes in the summer has been long found – internal courts. This concept can be utilized at the various morphological scales, whether in the future in newly-organized areas, or in the present-day built-up ones albeit in its smaller scale – shafts.

In pondering alternative spatializations to those of the past two decades alMa’ared Street (front, Image 4.3; pg. 204; back, Image 6.10; pg. 313) at the city’s centre could serve as inspiration, where a set of varying larger volumes are connected by (protrude from) a narrower one whose course parallels that of the street. While the municipality should study this model for re-employment in areas yet to be developed (elaborated later); nonetheless, the fact that the majority of hundreds of existing buildings have depths exceeding twenty meters equally implores a treatment, as well as the volumetric character and relations along the runways of neighbourhoods. Here the suggested concept of shafts could be applied partially or completely into the retention zones along with water and mobility treatments, e.g. in the form of protruded balconies or bridged-elements that filter and moderately circulate winds in varied mechanisms over the seasons. The characteristic of these elements can also be varied, whereby an option could be encouraging the re-interpretation and production of the balcony street rhythm of volumes, among other suggestions (Diagram 6.6 - Diagram 6.7; pg. 315).

Through the logic of improved ventilation, water channelling and capture infrastructures, mobility and disaster-evacuation, the municipality can allow immediate experimentation to test and identify the healthy parameters of such a change in construction forms and elements. The outcomes of the tests could then induce or save the conduction of expensive legislation reform. Under such scenarios the mode of application and produced end-forms will constitute reflections of the ability of Ramallites to communicate and negotiate. As a significant portion of the apartment buildings are owned by their tenants, the implementation of depth-long interventions necessitate that all owners agree, otherwise application will remain limited. For rented buildings, property laws protect tenants against elevation of rent, which by macro-economic logic and the current poor standing of apparatuses of customer rights protection will together translate with majority of owners refraining from the upgrading of their buildings.
What Foundations for the Future?

unless tenants concede to contribute financially; whether directly or indirectly, immediately or over longer periods.

Like any urban upgrading and renewal scheme, unless it is escorted with protection legislation it shall lead to gentrification. For these to crystallize Ramallites will have to – sooner or later, with or without such a scenario – organize their positions on matters of dignity and life-sustenance, which in turn necessitates frameworks such as neighbourhood committees or the smaller-scale cooperatives that congregate multiple properties. It should be noted that a handful such frameworks exist around the city today, amongst which the Birzeit University Teachers and Employees Housing Cooperative (BZU-HC in elTireh neighbourhood) which has achieved decision-power and recognition within the municipality. This project which composes of 89 units (Image 4.33; pg. 215) hosts a couple of operative committees which internally decide on compatibility of unit-extension proposals by its individual members, employ a gardener who is the caretaker of shared spaces, and finance public infrastructures within its vicinity; hitherto a multi-purpose hall, two staircases, and two out of the total four open gardens. Unfortunately, the level and nature of this cooperation between the housing cooperative and the municipality is not matched elsewhere, which indicates that this form of city-management has not matured into a significant scale, yet; but that grounds are fertile, the tools are familiar, and potentials are tangibly evident.

The conception and growth of such work-groups in Ramallah will come as a result of growing threats and/or desire to ameliorate one’s direct space, however, their efficiency and impact will be proportional to two; first, the amount of ideas and options developed by or shared with them – as indicated in the case of BZU-HC whose employed patterns lack imagination of alternatives. In addition to segregation of various spaces through walls, members of this collective did not explore construction spatialization alternatives to those of the municipality although they had the opportunity, as demonstrated by the nearby (and younger in age) Tal alSafa complex whose morphology is inspired from traditional regional cities of back-to-back fabric, overlapping of units, and tens of staircases and alleys. And second, the growth and efficiency of this city-management discourse depends on the availability or absence of future prospects. The Ramallah Beautification Committee is case to point (see section 4.4, pg. 220),

Image 6.10. A row of buildings from the late 1970s at alMa‘ared Street from the back, Ramallah, September 2014. Notice how some bodies protrude from a main linear volume.
whereby unless people are able to influence spatial decision-making to suit their desires, over the long term motivation – which could be high at beginnings – will recede, or translate into insurgent forms of urbanism.

The details over scale, hierarchies, and mechanisms of operation of community-based cooperatives and neighbourhood committees in relation to municipal offices on one hand, and the particular roles of bourgeoisie and visionaries on the other are vast and detrimental domains welcoming an exploration that I will not undertake on the few remaining pages. However, here I would like to invite visionaries of Ramallah to note that beyond traditional principles of democracy, decolonization necessitates the dismantlement of armaments around social and institutional mandates, enabling permeability of ecological relations and therewith overlapping of competences beyond the artificial sectoral borders. A political shift has to materialize through the features of lived space, and extract newness from it. Herein labouring of alternative elements for and use of retention antiscapes is one and many from amongst a bundle of city-wide elements requiring revision.

To the right I schematically and randomly spatialize the suggestions of this section within alQudaira neighbourhood of Ramallah. These are based on the conclusion that Ramallah’s climatological resilience as well as sociospatial decolonization can be guided by the feet of its citizens. The larger the ratio between areas for shared-use in favour of those for exclusive purposes (e.g. financial threshold), then the higher the sociospatial and resource fragmentation, and hence the lower the ability to make investments in social and climate-control infrastructures profitable; and down the line, stage and gradually normalize meaningful and progressively constructive activities of protest through nonviolent critical mass.

Under current construction laws and the cover of temporality, and before initiating legislation reform; both municipalities and visionaries of Ramallah are invited and implored to engage in cross-group urban imagination, experimentation, and exploration. At this stage it would be speculative to indicate a particular geo-demographic scale as the most suitable for reorganization of management and construction elements. The colonial geopolitics of Ramallah stipulates that these can only be determined through trial and error, the outcomes of the push and pull between the geographically varying constituents e.g. is the neighbourhood in question that of Ramallah elTahta (old city) which composes of relatively intense social ties and dense layers of historical spatial value, or is it the Im elSharayet neighbourhood which composes mainly of differentiated newcomers whose arrival over the past decade was the motor of its modern geometry?

**Scenario / fantasy Ramallah 2030**

It is the city of dreams for those with time to linger, a smell for hidden short-cuts, or a crave for re-discovery. Its shadows are hardly mellow, smell of garlic and cooking meat, fresh laundry, herbs on thresholds, damp and mossy concrete, and occasionally of bathroom odours. It is hard to generalize a compliment for all, as the different courses interplay varying melodies of shade and sun, of coolness and heat, of noise and tranquility, of greenness and aridity, of boredom and exhilaration, of stairs that are of calculated sizes and others that you cannot avoid tripping on. Just when you think you’ve seen it all, you discover another version, of creativity at times, and of confusion at others; of a cliché at times and that of hallucinations at others.
What Foundations for the Future?

Existing antispace that could be employed for benefit / at wish of tenants

Spaces of potential physical interventions for vertical pedestrian mobility and storm water channelling (at ground level) and climatic treatments (within higher elevations of the antispace volume)

Diagram 6.6. Schematic plan of a selected area from alQudaira basin which borders the old-city at its western and southern ends. The map highlights strips between existing buildings whose total retention antispaces reach 52% of plot areas, as this basin is primarily classified as Residential C in the Master Plan.

Diagram 6.7. Schematic plan of a selected area from alQudaira basin as imagined in the future, e.g. in 2030 when new constructions and connections are implemented.
6.2.2. Scenario\textsuperscript{+} – Discovering and Crafting New Corners, Perspectives, and Uses for Ramallah’s Landscapes

It is important to be in the room long enough to make a contribution – temporary steps can be a way to build trust with a sceptical client. A successful process means that everyone is implicated: the activist, the developer, the designer. The value of the participative practice is that architecture develops slowly. Urban regeneration professionals, planners, architects, and developers are serial monogamists. Someone has to stay to see the whole process through. (Thomas 2014:151)

The map of the street-network of Ramallah is very expressive of the city’s lived reality where motorized vehicles have eased access to every doorstep. Ramallah spends significant portions of its annual budgets on provision of additional such streets, continuously ignoring lessons of larger and older cities which stipulate that the more roads and parking places there are, the higher the inclination of citizens to drive rather than to walk or use public transportation. Indeed, the extensive use of vehicles by Ramallites is encouraged by the absence of reliable and significantly cheaper public transportation on one hand, and on the other its steep topography which necessitates a shower after a walk in its hot summers, and drying in its wet and windy winters. As discussed earlier, while the former requires a large scale sectoral reform, the latter can be induced with simple morphological treatments. Assuming that the city engages in the redefinition of its antispaces, what are the larger-scale, temporally longer consequences of such a Scenario\textsuperscript{+} experimentation beyond the afore-speculated climatological and pedestrian mobility amelioration?

One of the most tangible impacts of functioning mobility networks is the creation of a lived democracy; for pedestrians, skaters, cyclists, riders and drivers alike. In such geographies citizen’s right to security (predictability, safety) and inclusion (equality) are enacted. The latter has several definitions and corollary scales, expressions and materializations. It is considered as a lived state wherein the number of obstacles facing desirers of particular city-activities and -elements are limited, if any. The higher the number of persons theoretically able to fulfil a recognized appetite that coalesces with particular spatializations, the higher the city’s levels of inclusion and vice versa. At the base of the democratic ladder lies the right to free movement. Withstanding the fact that Israel continues to expand its elaborate system of territorialized and hard-to-predict controls; this logic of exclusive privileges and discriminatory rights has to be uprooted from the cartography of the stranded haven, Ramallah.

As detailed in section 2.1.2; pg. 53 and concluded from a glance at Map 6.1; pg. 318 of Ramallah’s streets, the city relies on a radial network of major connections with concentric rings whose course parallels that of ridges of mountains. The panoptical surveillance and swift oppression paradigms underline the out-timed Palestinian official planning rhetoric of rapid commuting; which shatters daily with the tempers of drivers locked in traffic-jams; pedestrians rubbing shoulders along the liminal spaces separating heat-generating motors, shop-windows, and branches of trees lining the centres of the narrow sidewalks, atop which cars crowd as well. In the past few years Ramallah’s municipality has applied several proposals
for re-organizing the flow of traffic through designating roads in one direction only. Needless to elaborate, this helps in reducing nodal and momentary traffic jams but does not solve the problem because ultimately the roots have remained intact. In addition, under the new systems mental maps of parking possibilities for drivers are now spilling into hitherto relatively under-discovered areas within the centre, while walking remains a practice that street engineers clearly do not understand its flow and kinetics.

As Chapter 4 argues, to reduce the pressure on street-infrastructure the appeal of car-use has to be tamed through encouragement of more responsible and rational choices of commuting methods by residents and visitors. The municipality should invest less money on proposals for parking buildings and provision of new streets into still uninhabited slopes (see pg. 207, pg. 210; Ramallah Municipality 2010a), and more into creating genuinely egalitarian spaces which car non-owners and their opposite can equally enjoy and employ. Almost every resident walks, but not everyone owns a car. The fact that the Master Plan of the city designates 22% of its total area to cars and a malnutritioned 0.3 to pedestrian (see pg. 192) is at best a miscalculation, and in reality, growing monuments for disenfranchisement. In an enclave where demographic growth feeds into evermore inflating property prices and colonization into economic stratification and emergency; it is hard to find excuses for a discourse that prioritizes parking lots over productive spaces of resilience, whether in non-monetary (social, mental) terms or those calculable by the market (economic, lived).

There is no specific evolutionary biology for the employment of pedestrian connections whose conception could materialize with any of many possible realities. Marginal aesthetic and physical differentiation of spatial allocations of the different modes of commuting generates fluid, swift negotiations relative to the momentary rationalities of mass and scale. In Ramallah urban miners have to labour and tailor their discoveries. Again, one of the most efficient and least costly policies has been that of resource re-distribution, which essentially conforms to releasing exclusive spaces for shared purposes; e.g. parklets, kiosks, mini-plazas, promenades, gardens, etc. The ingredients behind the success of this tool are, first, its compatibility to the market logic of value, and second, its ability to rapidly create appealing alternatives. In cities which employ such policies (e.g. San Francisco, Seville, Berlin) municipalities are generating additional income through leasing pre-installed basic infrastructures, lessees garnish higher profits through resource-accessibility and visibility, and residents enjoy less pollution, easier access to services, and generally more comfortable circulation – and hence socialization – environments.

To sustain as an attractive and widely appropriated practice the imagination and provision of new networks through antispaces of Ramallah are undertakings that have to fulfill the same equation. Under Scenario developers and investors triangulate, first, the locally growing demand for MSMEs spaces, second, the (neoliberalized, capitalist) public sector's support for those, and third, the current market-reality that grants retail and commercial spaces higher values than residential ones. Municipalities welcome the neoliberal practice as it saves them infrastructural investment costs, generates additional income through taxes, and outsources some of the managerial load aside of other complimentary gains. In their turn, Ramallites puzzle with the opportunities underlying the higher supply which brings about relative lower leasing prices (affordability of spatialization of production cells, hence optimization and possibly spaces of personal growth,
wealth creation, or replenishment – see Diagram 6.2; pg. 286); the hybridization of space which indirectly yields higher security and efficiency (policing through presence of civilians rather than militarized officers; and less commuting distance, time and cost necessary to run errands), and; the translations of the re-integration of the three aspects of lived space – production, mobility, and privacy – into overlapping rather than segregated uni-function formations. As the city of newcomers and refugees Ramallah contains significant imports of memories of hybridized city-space and its codes of rules; whether from ancient centres such as Nazareth, Nablus, Jaffa and Bethlehem, or from refugee camps such as Dheisheh, Qalandiya, alAm'ary, and 'Askar among others.

Nonetheless, like rivers through cities require basins that absorb the numerous in-spills, resist changing of paths and seasonal flooding; likewise, future currents of Ramallite circulation, employment and consumption of space require thought-through channelling amid the unfamiliar volumes of antispaces. Herewith, stakeholders are likely to redefine (reduce or intensify) the present-day sociospatial contestations as these condense within the directly lived space of one's neighbourhood, at the doorstep, below the window.

The profit-led (re-)design of (formerly abandoned) retention ontologically caters for breaking the current dichotomy of either public or private spheres by amplifying the semi-private dimension, which down the evolutionary cycle of urban spatial production could conceive a fourth level, the semi-public. The balance of ratios between the four is sensitive to the maturity of Ramallite mechanisms of commoning, sharing of decision-making power, and within the manifolds legislation; detriments all of which perquisite funnelling of pseudo-concrete perceptions and behaviours through compatible – hence temporal and fluid – self-reinforcing partnerships of co-gratification. As Harvey notes, 'Organizing the neighbourhoods has been just as important in prosecuting labor struggles, as has organizing the workplace; and ‘building bridges between the two, becomes even more crucial’ in today's internationalized dynamics of cross-border economies and solidarities (2013:132, 133).

To nurture resilience (as opposite to socioeconomic fragility) Ramallah has to allow the appropriation and re-definition of its streets, along with the walled-in retention antispaces. It should test and develop licensing parameters for physical, nodal re-arrangements that interrupt hegemonic surveillance and repression networks, and induce cross-group socialization, co-mobilization, solidarity, and a reform-focused revolutionary logic; hence mental and physical mobility alike. In an optimistic imaginary, a Scenario+ treatment of Ramallah’s morphology would likely result with a number of patterns of public, semi-public, semi-private and private gradients that are enacted through the feet of circulating persons and the modes in which they employ vehicles. In combination with the varying ethos and sensibilities of the agglomerate and hierarchies of organization (e.g.

Map 6.1. (right) Ramallah’s street-network as existing today. (map is a combination of the municipal file which has many technical errors and is not up to date, and second, tracing by author from an aerial image obtained from Google Maps)
What Foundations for the Future?
neighbourhood committees) these would formally and informally territorialize and express some of today’s and tomorrow’s Ramallite metanarratives through webs of new representational and lived spaces, labouring Lefebvre’s ‘from things in space to the actual production of space’ (Lefebvre 2009:37, emphasis in original).

**Scenrio** / fantasy Ramallah 2040

Inner-ring Jerusalem is a cable-car, fifteen minutes, and canyons of biblical antitheses away. Jaffa, a fisherman’s pendulum and several degrees of humidity and heat away. Ramallah, meanwhile, dances on a very, very thin line, between aggressiveness and inviting open arms as well as charms. Without mastery of navigation in hilly topographies, the chances of a newcomer spending a lifetime of stranger-hood surges. Seniors speak of the big wave of human colours, their clash, mixing and territorial markings. On those markings new-comers are now rapidly dissolving. Change is exponential you know, and Ramallah now is not itself in the 2010s, and definitely not Berlin of the 1990s. If you decide to come here, don’t build your hopes up, none will tell you where the peak-holes are. Don’t be naïve, only few will send you the announcement for apartment swapping. Be an optimist, a couple will take a leap of faith with you.

Map 6.2. (right) Schematic illustration of today’s mobility network in Ramallah as imagined in the future, e.g. in 2030 when a culture of claiming of space has developed, and Ramallites enact the public, semi-public, semi-private, private gradients of spatializations with their feet and mode of use of vehicles.

- Connections that prioritize pedestrians, enable tenants and lessees from reaching their properties comfortably, yet obstruct movement of transiting vehicles with e.g. dead-ends at crossing reclaimed into public spaces. The areas suggested here behold particular characteristics of attraction that visionaries can capitalize on in the creation of new representational spaces.
- Connections that ration use between pedestrians and vehicles either through temporal or permanent measures and rules of organization; which filter transit drivers into main streets away from the ‘protected’ yellow connections.
- Streets for rapid transit which grant priority to vehicle movement and filter pedestrians into orange or yellow alternatives.
6.2.3. **Scenario**++ – Nurturing Decolonization through Antivenoms to Emergency and Socialized Policies of Responsibilitization

A revolution in temporal and spatial relations often entails, therefore, not only the destruction of ways of life and social practices built around preceding time-space systems, but the ‘creative destruction’ of a wide range of physical assets embedded in the landscape. (Harvey 1990:425)

In his book *The Prince* (written ca. 1505), the Florentine political philosopher Niccolò Machiavelli argued that destruction of life, i.e., murdering individuals, could aid in upholding societal order as it instils fear yet does not amount to systematic – hence unforgettable and unforgivable – suffering. However, destruction of livelihood (e.g., source of income, accumulated wealth, securities, etc.) and hence infliction of long-term systematically regenerated suffering breeds desperation, and perpetuates desires of vengeance and the mentality of crisis, amongst others. The deprivation of Palestinians from elements of dignified life and modernity through spatial – hence social, economic, and ideological – disenfranchisement and annihilation has been quintessential to the Zionist colonial discourse, as transcribed by Machiavelli centuries prior the birth of the former and expounded in countless volumes of works by others since (e.g. Graham 2006a; Hamami and Tamari 2008; Ophir, Givoni, and Hanafi 2009). Israel justified and continues to justify its undermining and destruction of homes, neighbourhoods, and communities for reasons of ‘security’; using bulldozers, segregation walls, tightened economic valves, and advanced weaponry. These highly expensive operations of intensive and extended, direct and indirect sustenance of Palestinian emergency are an existential requirement for the continuation of its colonial superiority; therein maintaining a Palestinian inferiority and impeding the re-emergence of a societal modernity capable of leading a successful revolution. While the erasure of over 400 villages and the confiscation of land throughout and after the Nakba is often displayed, the hijacking of the major Palestinian urban centres of modernity is underplayed. Subsidiarity is not only financial or legal, as often discussed, but ultimately and more importantly, intellectual and therein societal. Economic dependency – e.g., through taming and destruction – is predominantly a tool for ideological co-optation which in this case is two-fold: first, enabling self-imposed socio-economic shackling through perpetuation (self-reinforcement) of non-individuality, and second, political castration (see Chapter 3).

Through citing history academia has shown that modernity and civic freedom, as well as decolonisation, require flexible, locational, and relational solidarities whose emergence is highly linked to alternative economies and societal practices, and therein the ability to choose beyond limited norms. Akin to other earthly processes, these require incubation and nurturing, hence partnerships, trust, and inspiring examples of fruition. Why would an inventor undertake the risks of start-up investment under conditions of blockade and periodic obliteration? How will new solidarities – hence ideas and practices – emerge under repeated displacement and societal amputation? The calculated urban mutations and occasional spatial annihilation of Palestinian communities has little to do with security and a lot to do with impeding organic – and strategic
– social development in favour of hegemonic (and even fascist) socio-political systems such as the PA.

In a parallel dimension, the World Bank mentality is an anti-politics machine forcing a discourse which sidelines the detrimental colonial reality, convincing real-estate corporations to pump ‘unimaginable amounts of investments’ in projects such as those described in Chapter 5 by logic of ‘a detected strategic location and the underlying potential’, according to Huleileh (2012). The eagerness of such actors to ‘seize the opportunity’ down-play the anticipatable vulnerability to disconnection shall Israel close-off Ramallah another time – as it repeatedly did in the 1990s and extensively in the early 2000s – or shall the annual snow-storm set foot. On one side these undertakings could be argued as proactive beyond the imposed precariousness and breakers of discriminatory territorializations rather than caving inwardly. On the other, the fact that the processes bringing these to light fell short of creating the necessary emergency infrastructures reflects the scholarly transcribed comfort of the bourgeoisie in the limitations of fiscal logic in geographies of corporeal and mental crisis. Thereupon, distancing clouds of man-made political and economic theories and grounding analysis on biology of organisms brings to light the concept of vaccinations in treatment of pathologies. If poison can be treated by its kind, can colonization be disheartened by its own mechanisms?

Whether it is a snow-storm, earthquake, or yet another Israeli incursion, curfew, or assault, Ramallah’s current morphology exasperates the city’s vulnerability due to the concentration of services and activities of production in few areas; e.g. in old centres, concentrations of PA institutions, etc. Seen from the perspective of resilience, the city should instead seek to create complimentary networks as well as layers that cater for needs at the scale of neighbourhood based on the worst-case scenarios of dismemberment.

To clarify I will refer to the example of bakeries and crisis. During the 2002 incursion of Operation Defensive Shield (see section 3.2.2, pg. 142) the IOF imposed curfew for forty consecutive days, catching Ramallites by surprise, and for the first eight days denying them a break to re-stock their drained supplies of basic goods such as bread. In the absence of bakeries which typically store reserves of flour in peripheral neighbourhoods the suffering of countless families was engraved. This ordeal of many Ramallites could have been significantly reduced in intensity had the municipality set a strategy to encourage newly opening bakeries to place themselves at regular, walkable distances throughout the city. From the centre of the old city (crossing of Deir elRoom Street and alBaladieh Street) and within a radius of 400 meters there are eight bakeries. In comparison, the significantly populated basins of Khillet el’Adas and alKarmel have none.

Hence, quintessential to Ramallah’s resilience in the short-term and decolonization in the longer is the lining of its landscapes with shock-absorbing infrastructures that reduce impacts of emergencies, whether natural or man-made. In the 2013 snow-storm Alexa Ramallah’s municipality earned the respect of hundreds of citizens and professionals due to its ability to integrate its in-house technologies with disaster response activities; and equally, the number of tolerated cases of abuse of its hotline by citizens who complained of unmoved snow at their private entrances. Thus and in line with earlier suggestions, under Scenario++ Ramallah would have learned about and developed many applications to further capitalize on the opportunities of its recently established, expensive and well-funded and maintained GIS system.
Besides data-sharing which empowers neighbourhood-based committees to act as support-units, such systems could improve the balance of distribution of investments and growth. For example, through the simple addition of a ‘contribution to resilience’ factor the municipality can legitimately collect higher taxes from less helpful entrepreneurial proposals to subsidize ones of priority. While the specific criteria for determining such an index has to be locally and relationally factored and scaled; nonetheless, one of those should definitely be closeness to nearest alternative. Under such parameters licensing of new spaces that could serve as supply lines in times of crisis such as bakeries and markets would be considered in reference to short radii like 500 meters, while response units such as medical clinics and pharmacies to less-intense radii of 1000 meters, and investment-extensive shelter infrastructures such as schools and hotels would therewith be referenced to wider radii of 2000 meters. The full-scale utilization of such systems that combine compatible hard- and soft-ware directly feeds into neighbourhood-based and -co-financed disaster response-plans, whose progressive enactment exhibit what Gehl (2011) describes as positively self-reinforcing urban patterns which ultimately help non-partisan socialization of responsibility for provision of services, while keeping LGs in the driver’s seat. Municipalities should not have their arms bent by capitalist, but to stand their grounds they require anti-capitalists for cover.

**Scenrio++ / fantasy Ramallah 2050**
The panic is starting to settle as the sixth day of this year’s snow-storm kicks in. The main water supply-pipe which burst on the third day cannot be fixed, but the neighbourhood’s reserves can sustain another week or two, depending on how responsible people are in their consumption. In our building we haven’t discussed it. Should I be worried? I’ve been spending the hours by going around with Dr. Toubasi, who is actually a retired ninety-year-old dentist but knows his way around with general medicine and hence been keeping up with some of the sick. I think he’s mostly bored and wants to walk his legs, and I have nothing better to do. My flatmate Nura tells me there was a woman that went into labour in our building while I was away, and that she helped the husband and four neighbours carry her for three kilometres where finally an ambulance was waiting. She described the comedy with her usual style, whereby she laughs herself out before you get the full sentence. Apparently the coordination of carrying a person on a blanket through staircases is a sport people should pay more attention to in this city. So that’s how we are sitting-in the hours of this storm. Apropos passing time; Some of the neighbours are starting to make business out of the lock-down. Remember Ayyoub? The Tunisian old man who lives in the basement? Well, anyway, he’s baking and selling Baharat cookies, while my other flatmate Raji sells glühwein. With them around, the tiny Kahwe at the corner is doing business better than usual, since people are locked to the distances their feet could carry them.

Map 6.3. (right) Schematic and approximate illustration of a selection of today’s emergency infrastructures in Ramallah, demonstrating the unbalanced spatial distribution of bakeries, pharmacies and schools. The indicated radii are scaled to the size of the illustration as indicated in the key below.

- Bakeries [supply], radius of 500 meters
- Pharmacies [response], radius of 500 meters
- Schools [shelter], radius of 1,000 meters
What Foundations for the Future?
6.3. **RAMALLAH × 100 SCENARIOS IS NECESSARY**

[E]very society produces a space, its own space, [...] Any ‘social existence’ aspiring or claiming to be ‘real’, but failing to produce its own space, would be a strange entity, a very peculiar kind of abstraction unable to escape from the ideological or even the ‘cultural’ realm. It would fall to the level of folklore and sooner or later disappear altogether, thereby immediately losing its identity, its denomination and its feeble degree of reality. (Lefebvre 2009:53; emphasis in original)

Ramallah is not unique, but uniquely complex. It is a product of its colonization, but has created what some call hallucinations of freedom, and others regard as spaces of opportunity. It show-cases the pitfalls of mass-tailored neoliberal development, but does not lack persons willing to engage in its re-making. The importance of visions, imaginations, and factoring of relational, cross-border psycho-geographies in the processing of urban futures is starting to receive recognition, but remains isolated from the collective realm. Yet the city has accomplished initial steps towards, **first**, exercising ‘collective puzzling’ cross-discipline and specialty, but whether this will accelerate to the speed of progress of knowledge remains doubtful, and; **second**, it has been tracking and deciphering the growing inflow of information, but has yet to forge mediums for their negotiation, compromise and utilization. That said, through its course over the past hundred years, one could speculate that Ramallah is able to ‘be one day ahead of them’ as Leo Szilárd was quoted in 1961, shall its various tides of protests be able to co-enforce some of their shared claims.

To achieve this the city has to re-negotiate its morphological norms. Why does Ramallah’s old city constrict to its pre-1920s core, in place of being demarcated along the outlines of its modernity hence up to the 1970s? Shouldn’t the balcony streets of alMa’ared, Ghassan Harb, AbdelRahim Haj Muhammad, and Palestine Street be protected against the crawling monstrous commercial centres? Shouldn’t their former character of hybridization of residence and merchant’s promenades be protected against the slow evacuation of its citizens?

Conceptions of history are engendered by monumentalization, whether through folklore, literature, art, or/and space. Ramallites here should ask whether the current version of history suits them; whether they want a city (state) less morphologically (less ethnically) mixed and therefore geographically fragmented, limited, incoherent; or the opposite? The question about Ramallah’s future spatial organization is directly tied to its political ideology, hence behavioural patterns, which in turn are glocal and many. Here city officials and decision-makers have to understand that – in Bruno De Meulder’s words⁹, ‘city is not about order’, rather, it ‘is about chaos, difference, and thus violence’. The less the city’s ability to tame its sources of violence, the dimer are its chances of stability.

The fact that urban violence predominantly stems of poverty is elementary, as well as its impacts of withdrawal to privatized spaces, segregation, securitization,
What Foundations for the Future?

and therewith otherness, inequalities, and contestation enter a vicious cycle. Ramallah's historic attractiveness of being the better home for newcomers – its bearers of new wealth – is threatened. Hence what will Ramallah do to downscale its current discrepancies? Will Ramallite officials recognize that their own wealth depends on that of the masses and not the subsidized coterie? Will Ramallah's Municipality accord the opinion of Nabil Hamdi that 'when people are poor, governments are poor; simply, there are no taxes to collect'10? Ramallah's Municipality should understand that the expansion of its own power, hence budget, necessitates that they – legitimized by the citizens they represent – tap into the wealth appropriated through quotidian consumption.

Every city has a history of violence in one form or another, as well as threatening fault-lines. The degree of vulnerability – threshold at which tangible protests are released – depends on two; first, the length of the duration in which the masses are able to endure a crisis (economic, political, environmental, etc.) before means of basic sustenance are broken (security, poverty, dignity, etc.), and; second, the progressive ability of the city to re-adapt into new (compatible) forms of urbanism that consolidate attractiveness and relevance to mobile wealth, hence curtailing the chances of crisis occurring in the first place. This continuous diversification and making-anew of cities (industrial cities, financial capitals, 'smart' districts, a.o.) reduces the strains and weights on the individual composing systems (economic sectors and their off-shoots). So what are the models – and their adaptations – that Ramallites think their city should incorporate? Why and How?

Regardless of what these are, Ramallah's future forms of urbanism cannot be suspended from its current ecology of compromised executive systems of democracy and the hijacking of wealth (by Israel and international donors alike). Herein decolonization starts with building a resilient society that is capable of anticipating, balancing and taming risk collectively and relationally. The death of the PLO politics and the national liberation movement was eminent given its losing bets on many things, but mostly, the prolonged 'self-sacrificing love' and the ability of quotidian Palestinians to internalize precariousness. If one should name one lesson learned it would be the importance of fluid strategies that are rooted in evolving socioeconomic needs of sub-groupings of popular movements, be those anti-capitalist or -colonial or other. Visionaries, urbanists and planner's have the detrimental role here of moulding the channels for the rising tides, to influence their volumes, scales, and orientation and therewith accepting diversity of individual sense of purpose as the new collective that consolidates the needed self-sensorship and co-security. Where do the parameters of this collective lie? What are the principles, typologies and time-scopes of co-habitation that this city wants to enact and engender, and how?

Visionaries – innovators, theorists, entrepreneurs, etc. – remain the most equipped for detection and optimization of the discoveries of the coming century and the re-definition of its economies, to the better or worse. In our approaches we should keep in mind what Mudar Kassis said: we cannot solve the problems of the future through selective ointments of the past, at least not solely, as these require couplings into present ecologies and bridges into those impending. Here is where creative destruction of norms (way we think, plan, act) again re-appears as kernel. Will the anti-PA and state-politics tides in the city gain momentum? Or will they break at the spatial fortifications? Which battlefields will the rising new Ramallite ethos construct and manipulate to ensure sustenance and growth?
How do these translate physically and morphologically? How can these be made fashionable for wide-spread, voluntary adoption? How does this benefit and co-opt present-day decision-makers yet equally contributes to empowering the rise of new ones? What kind of street-, neighbourhood-, district-culture does the municipality want to adopt? In the (re)drafting of those necessary hundred or more visions of their city, Ramallites should follow the questions and their branches, fuse scenarios and let others fade.

The ecological cycle of nature suggests that the momentary political and economic impasse will conclude with the birth of replacement systems; hence inviting Ramallah to broaden its horizons, re-size technical planning and development paradigms into their real power-dimensions, and labour an attractiveness based on endemic urban assets rather than those of neoliberal manuals and donor economies. ‘How, then, does one organize a city?’, writes Harvey, ‘we simply do not know’ (2013:140).

Ramallah should experiment, discuss and pursue the creation of a new collective ethos of Ramallite sumud that socializes spaces, risks and benefits, and reproduces the cohesive joie de vivre as tool for decolonization. History and contemporary political shifts alike teach us that liberation is an accumulative, hence continuous process whose stability is relative to levels of satisfaction of the critical mass, thus wealth sharing. The city has significant reserves of antispaces which visionaries could capitalize on in many directions, the better and worse. The latter will depend on the ability of all Ramallites to negotiate their differences, and therewith reduce the cancerous otherness. To this end many contributions are necessary, among the lead of which those of sharing and connecting of ethos and sensibilities in the district-city; hence making scenarios from imaginations, existing and forthcoming. Genuine participation (democratization of production) requires less technical vocabulary and more urban planners who understand their role not as fortune-tellers, but as curators. Today’s urban visionaries are implored to become combiners of the different perspectives finding the multiple interpretations in the one, and generators of more elaborate, integrated processes; a category with which this project hopes to have contributed.

That said, to communicate and relate the various singular pieces of the puzzle it would be helpful to have an open and overarching platform that archives debates of critical perspectives’ questioning of norms; hence in pondering whether the coming hundred years of Ramallah will tell stories of continued assimilation, resilience and making new, or those of destruction, and how either could be influenced. While Ramallah’s future will not be determined by this or any singular work, I would like to close with an echo of Ramallah:

There is a balad* that is growing in us,  
As the world gets smaller on us and on our wishes,  
We raise hope, until it gets greater,  
And in us gets greater a longing,  
As that of a sailor to the harbour, close to which the winds abandoned his sail,  
So he sang,  
Keep me in mind, you far away balad,  
I don't have a harbour in you, nor a girl or a boy [offspring],  
What I have is friends and songs,  
So I did what I can do, my hand in my guitar and to you I sang,
I sang about a sky and the facade of my window,
Singing about the sea till the salt in my nets melted,
Me, to whom my sea is *haram**,
Yet, still it grows, still a balad is growing in us.,
As the world gets smaller on us and on our wishes,
We raise hope, until it gets greater.

Shadi Zaqtan and Imad Sayrafi

from the song *Fi Balad* [there is a balad],
album released in 2010

*balad: country, also used to indicate locality
**haram: sin, here used to indicate forbidden
CHAPTER 1 | PROTEST URBANISM AND THE ’NEW COMER’ RAMALLAH

1. Chiapas is the southern most state in Mexico, and home to the Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional (EZLN, the Zapatista Army of National Liberation), which has been resisting the ‘Spaniard’ regime since 1994 demanding basic rights for the indigenous population. Although some politically classify their discourse as Libertarian Socialism and Marxist thought, the movement emphasized the centrality of the Mayan beliefs to Zapatismo thought. In the past few years its strategy has been based on mass mobilization for non-violent civil disobedience. The capital of Chiapas is Tuxtla Gutiérrez while the stronghold of the Zapatistas is the city of San Cristóbal, former capital until 1892, continued cultural capital, and located within the central mountain region of the state.

2. see ‘Annex.2 Table of Conducted Interviews and Focus Groups’; pg. 382.

3. see Terms section; pg. xx.

4. See Map 1.13 ; pg. 30.

5. see Terms section; pg. xix.

6. see Terms section; pg. xxi.

7. For example, in Berlin projects such as the New Schönefeld-Airport, Stadttschloss, Media Spree, Tempelhofer Feld, and the Potsdamer Platz are the most known of a growing list of projects to which many Berliners are claiming an opinion and protesting a perspective (Colomb 2012). This phenomenon is taking place in countless other cities from Mumbai (Industrial Corridor Project), through Beirut (Solidere downtown) and reaching Rio de Janeiro (anti-Olympics city plans).

8. Usufruct (noun): ‘the right to use and derive profit from a piece of property belonging to another, provided the property itself remains undiminished and uninjured in any way’ (British Dictionary).

9. When the (alleged) contemporary founder of Ramallah Rashed elHaddadin arrived to the region, he chose the location due to several factors, one of which was the availability of infrastructure due to the presence of the established alBireh town (Shaheen 1982, Barthe 2011, Ramallah Municipality 2013).

10. PA official websites are generally either limited in terms of contents and/or are outdated, e.g. the website of the Ministry of Economy, under the Studies sub-menu, latest upload for a Study was in 2005.

11. For example, the nolli plan employed for the city of Ramallah in this work is largely drawn from aerial images obtained from Google Maps, as the municipality’s AutoCAD drawings of the city were incomplete; not to mention the technical shortcomings of these files whose correction consumed several weeks from the time of this work.

12. Sykes Picot was signed on 9 May 1916 in a secret convention during World War I between Great Britain and France pre-empting the fall of the Ottoman Empire. The agreement stipulated the division of Turkish-held Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, and Palestine into various French- and British-administered areas. It took its name from its negotiators, Sir Mark Sykes of Britain and François Georges-Picot of France.
13. see Terms section; pg. xix.
14. see Endnote 12; pg. 329.
15. According to ICBS (2013) the number of Jews in Israel in 2013 totalled 6.042 million persons, 1.658 million Israeli-Palestinians, and 0.318 million non-Jewish Internationals. According to the PCBS (2013) population in WB (including East Jerusalem) and Gaza Strip numbered 4.42 million. If East Jerusalem Palestinians are deducted from the latter to avoid the double-counting from the figures of the ICBS (2013), then the numbers add up to 6.042 million Jews, 5.858 Palestinians, and 0.318 non-Jewish internationals. As such, Jews form 49.45%, Palestinians 47.95%, and non-Jewish internationals are 2.60%.
16. In 1948 in the UN established the UNRPR for immediate response to the Palestinian calamity in cooperation with the ICRC. Upon the persistence of the situation, in December 1949 the UN Assembly issued resolution 302 (IV) through which the UNRWA was formed.
17. Pan-Arabism is ‘Nationalist notion of cultural and political unity among Arab countries. Its origins lie in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, when increased literacy led to a cultural and literary renaissance among Arabs of the Middle East. This contributed to political agitation and led to the independence of most Arab states from the Ottoman Empire (1918) and from the European powers (by the mid-20th century). An important event was the [...] founding of the Arab League in 1945. Pan-Arabism’s most charismatic and effective proponent was Egypt’s Gamal Abdel Nasser’ (Britannica 2011).
18. U.N. Security Council Resolution 242, November 22, 1967: The Security Council [...] 1) Affirms that the fulfillment of Charter principles requires [...] the application of both the following principles: (i) Withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict; [...] 2) Affirms further the necessity [...] (b) For achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem [...] (UN 1967).
19. UN Security Council Resolution 338: October 22, 1973: The Security Council [...] 2) Calls upon the parties concerned to start immediately after the cease-fire the implementation of Security Council resolution 242 (1967) in all of its parts; 3) Decides that, immediately and concurrently with the cease-fire, negotiations shall start between the parties concerned under appropriate auspices aimed at establishing a just and durable peace in the Middle East (UN 1973).
20. For details please check the Taba (Oslo II) Agreement of 1995.
21. Dayton Era: Formally known as the US security assistance to the Palestinian Authority (USSC). Officially, the mission of the USSC is ‘to coordinate various international donors under one plan of action that would eliminate duplication of effort. It was to mobilize additional resources and to allay Israeli fears about the nature and capabilities of the Palestinian security forces. The USSC was to help the Palestinian Authority to right-size its force and advise them on the restructuring and training necessary to improve their ability, to enforce the rule of law, and make them accountable to the leadership of the Palestinian people whom they serve’ (USSC 2009). Nonetheless, Palestinians in general view the Dayton Era as the time where the PA Police was turned from ‘for the people’ to ‘against the People’, up to using the term ‘Dayton Police’. The naming ‘Dayton Era’ was coined by mainstream Palestinians who viewed the actions of the US Lt. Gen. Keith Dayton with suspicion, particularly in light of his former missions in former Yugoslavia and Afghanistan amongst others.
22. ‘EUPOL COPPS is the European Union Co-ordinating Office for Palestinian Police Support. [...] The aim of the Mission is to contribute to the establishment of sustainable and effective policing arrangements and to advise Palestinian counterparts on criminal justice and rule of law related aspects under Palestinian ownership, in accordance with the best international standards and in co-operation with the EU institution-building programmes conducted by the European Commission and with other international efforts in the wider context of the security sector, including criminal justice reform.’ Duration: Jan.2006-Jun.2013 (EUPOL 2013).
23. The Israeli Civil Administration is an arm of the Israel Army that caters for limited civil services - collection of taxes and few basic services such as education and health - within the territories that Israel occupied in 1967.

CHAPTER 2 | THE COLONIAL PROJECT: ETHNOCRATIC TERRITORIALITY AND THE IMAGINED PALESTINIANS

1. The name of the city comes from Canaanite where ‘ram’ means the high edge, since Ramallah is the highest in the central region. It is commonly believed that the suffix ‘-allah’ (god) was added later by the Arab inhabitants as it oversees Jerusalem.

2. Information about the ‘Founding Families’ can be found on the Ramallah Municipality webpage under: http://www.ramallah.ps/ar_page.aspx?id=XZm5Mea174170799aXZm5Me.

3. Plural for Mintar, which is also known as Kasser. This is a tower-like construction of vernacular stones from the fields where these constructions are located. Normally they are formed of 2 floors for functional purposes. These are used for guarding the fields during harvesting seasons, for storing and processing the collected crops, as well as for living during that period (al-Jubeh & Bshara, 2002).

4. ‘The number of emigrants from Ramallah to the United States reached 2,580 people in 1953 at a time when the total population of Ramallah was 4,500. In 1961, the number of immigrants reached 2,027’ (Ramallah Municipality 2013).

5. For more information about the relationship of the Expatriates with the city please visit the Municipality’s web-page (http://www.ramallah.ps/ar_page.aspx?id=TXpt3Ha166556775aTXpt3H&m_id=240) or that of the American Federation of Ramallah (http://www.afrp.org).

6. see section 1.3.1; pg. 22.

7. In 1919 Pension Odeh was established and hosted mainly Lebanese teachers working at the Friends Schools. In the 1931 it was renovated by the returning son, enlarged and renamed to the Grand Hotel (Barthe 2011). While both names remain in circulation, the Odeh family retains many firsts: first Ramallite emigrant to the USA was Yousef Odeh elDibbiny; first Mayor of Ramallah in 1908 was Elias Odeh elDibbiny; first Ramallite female to inherit was from this family and the first registered hotel was the Grand Hotel which was also the first to be connected to electricity and installed a telephone (alJubeh and Bshara 2002).

8. Records uncovered in Riwaq’s (2006) project for the Registration of Historic Buildings in Ramallah indicate that by 1930 half of Ramallah’s – traceable – historic structures (176 units) were already in place, making constructions in the decade 1921 to 1930 account for 14% of the total built heritage through 49 documented items (alJubeh and Bshara 2002).

9. Taraki points out that the ‘[r]epresentations of Ramallah as a tolerant and open town have a great deal to do with the fact that it was originally a predominantly Christian town. In the wake of the Nakba of 1948, Ramallah’s native Christian population was augmented somewhat by Christian refugees from Jaffa and Jerusalem, and also (in larger numbers) from the smaller towns of alLidd and Ramla. This infusion of Christians cemented the Christian cast of the town, even though in subsequent decades the original Christian population of Ramallah was greatly reduced due to emigration’ (Taraki 2008a:66).

10. see Terms section; pg. xxi.

11. The closest building to the Mukata’a (at the time, at a distance of about 300 meters) is alHambra Palace Hotel which was constructed in 1926 employing several English construction
techniques in combination with regional elements (alJubeh and Bshara 2002). During the Mandate period this hotel often hosted administration and government personal.

12. Arour (2013) argues that the siding of the USSR with Palestinians during the Cold War was not subsequential rather ideological. For more please refer to his article 'October Principles and the stance of the Soviet Union regarding the Palestinian Cause between 1917 - 1949'.

13. In 1971 the British philosopher Jeremy Bentham published a proposal as part of a legal and social reform agenda. The kernel argument was discipline through the established possibility of surveillance. In his model an entire prison population could be projected to the possibility of being surveyed through an individual point that lies at the centre of the cylindrical alignment of prison cells.

14. 'The Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories Unit is subordinated to the Minister of Defense and is part of the General Staff. The unit carries out and implements civilian policy of the Government of Israel in the West Bank and vis-à-vis the Gaza Strip in coordination and conjunction with the Prime Minister's Office, other government ministries, the security forces and the IDF General Staff’ (COGAT 2014).

15. The Decolonizing Architecture Program crystallized in the aftermath of the unilateral withdrawal of Israel from the Gaza Strip to its periphery, where it ‘deals with a fundamental question: how Israeli colonies and military bases – the architecture of Israel’s colonization – could be reused, recycled or re habited by Palestinians, at the moment it is unplugged from the military/political power that charges it’ (Decolonizing Architecture 2009:7).

16. Within its Centennial Program (see section ; pg. 189) the municipality rehabilitated a number of Ramallah’s pre-OAs staircases. However, provision of new pedestrian connections has been very limited. For example, in the case of the Staircase Garden in elTireh neighbourhood, it was enabled by the owner of the property’s relinquishment of ownership in favour of the municipality.

17. Mayadin is plural of Maydan, which is Arabic for ‘square’. This is the term used by the Ramallah Municipality to describe what in reality constitute traffic roundabouts.

18. UNRWA services in 2014 are provisioned in 1) 12 camps in Lebanon, with 444,480 registered refugees (r.rs.); 2) 9 camps in Syria, with 507,904 r.rs.; 3) 10 camps in Jordan (of which 5 as a result of the Six-Day War of 1967), with 2,034,641 r.rs.; 4) 8 camps in the Gaza Strip, with 1,221,110 r.rs.; and, 19 camps in the West Bank, with 748,899 r.rs.; hence totalling 58 UNRWA camps and a registered population of 4,957,034 persons (UNRWA 2014). For geographic visualization refer to Map Map 1.10 ; pg. 27.

19. For more information about the Six Days War of 1967 refer to section 1.3.2 ; pg. 28.

20. Tawfiq Zayyad was born on 7 May 1929 in the Galilee in Mandate Palestine, and he was one of the 10% of Palestinians who managed to stay in historic Palestine during the 1948 Nakba. Upon completion of studies in the USSR and returning home he was – to the surprise and alarm of Israeli Government – elected as Mayor of the major city Nazareth on 9 December 1973, as head of the Palestine 48 Rakah communist party. From his seat at the Knesset he worked on pressuring the Israeli Government towards changing its racially discriminatory policies towards its Palestinian population on both sides of the Armistice Line. A report he co-authored on Israeli prison conditions and the use of torture on Palestinian inmates was reprinted in the Israeli newspaper Al HaMishmar. It was also submitted to the United Nations by Tawfik Toubi and [Zayyad] after their visit to Al-Far’ah prison on 29 October 1987. It was subsequently quoted from at length in a UN General Assembly report dated 23 December 1987, where it was described as ‘Perhaps the best evidence of the truth of the reports describing the repugnant inhumane conditions endured by Arab prisoners.’ Zayyad was also a poet whose work was described as ‘poetry of protest’. He ‘died on 5 July 1994 in a head-on collision [...]. At the time of his sudden death, he was still Mayor of Nazareth, a member of the Knesset and a ‘leading Arab legislator’ (www.zayyad.com).
21. Emil Habibi ‘was born in Haifa on 29 August 1922 [in Mandate Palestine...]. In his early life, he worked on an oil refinery and later was a radio announcer. Under the Mandate he became one of the leaders of the Palestine Communist Party. Having endured the Nakba and stayed in Haifa, ‘Habibi was eventually granted Israeli citizenship. After the war, he helped to create the Israeli Communist Party and established the communist paper Al-Ittihad. He stayed in Haifa his whole life. His gravestone reads (at Habibi’s own request): ‘Emile Habibi – Remained in Haifa.’ [...] He served in the Knesset between 1951 and 1959, and again from 1961 until 1972, first as a member of Maki, before breaking away from the party with Tawfik Toubi to found Rakah. Habibi was also a novelist, where he ‘began writing short stories in the 1950s, and his first story, ‘The Mandelbaum Gate’ was published in 1954. In 1972 he resigned from the Knesset in order to write his first novel: The Secret Life of Saeed the Pessoptimist, which became a classic in modern Arabic literature. The book depicts the life of an Palestinian, employing black humour and satire. It was based on the traditional anti-hero Said in Arab literature. In a playful way it deals with how it is for Arabs to live in the state of Israel, and how one who has nothing to do with politics is drawn in to it.’ Habibi died on 2 May 1996 (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Emil_Habibi).

22. ‘The Alon Plan of 1967 recommended that some 20 ‘agricultural’ villages, designed to contain some 7,000 ‘frontiersmen’, be established within fifteen years. A string of settlements near the Syrian ‘border’ was clearly devised as a border ‘maker’ and as a first line of defence. The settlements near Lake Tibrerias, on the other hand, were to constitute a rearguard defence as well as an economically profitable set of investments. By 1969 plans had exploded to a more ambitious (but then unrealistic) scale which foresaw a resident population that would reach 45,000-50,000, in industrial and service towns and agricultural villages, within ten years. It should be pointed out that in 1969, when such plans were being set forth, only 300 Jewish ‘settlers’ had actually been implanted, scattered in 11 ‘settlements’ that were mere military outposts’ (Abu-Lughod 1982:18).

23. The Fourth Geneva Convention, Article 47 ‘proscribes the annexation of occupied territory, and the United Nations has repeatedly condemned Israel’s precipitous annexation of East Jerusalem and a wide belt of surrounding suburbs, villages and towns. Article 49 of the same convention prohibits the forcible transfer or deportation of residents from an occupied area, regardless of motive. And yet thousands of Palestinians have been expelled while many more have been [...] ‘pressured’ to leave. The same Article expressly forbids the transfer by an occupying power of any of its civilian population into occupied areas. And yet, at most recent count, over 90,000 [in 1982] Israeli Jews have been officially ‘settled’ within the illegally-annexed Jerusalem district, and more than 30,000 other have been ‘settled’ in some 100 nahals (military forts), villages and even towns that the Israeli government has authorized, planned financed and built in unannexed zones beyond the 1949 cease-fire line that Israelis refer to not as a border, but euphemistically a ‘green line’ (Abu-Lughod 1982:17).

24. The illegal Israeli colonies established in occupied territories while President Golda Meir was in office are as follows; Argaman and City of David in 1968; The French Hill (Giv‘at Shapira) in 1969; Alon Shvut, Massu‘a, Mevo Horon, Ramat Eshkol and Givat HaMivtar in 1970; Hamra and Mizpe Shalem in 1971; Bek‘ot, Har Gilo, Kiryat Arba, Neve Yaakov and Ma‘alot Dafna in 1972; Mechora, East Talipot and Gilo in 1973; and Ramot Alon in 1974 (B’Tselem 2013).

25. There are multiple kinds of Israeli colonies in the WB, while under international law these settlements are illegal, however they are categorized as either Registered Settlements thence making them legal from the perspective of the Israeli government; or, there are Outposts which are considered – even by Israeli law – illegal. Notwithstanding, in reality many of the former were initially established as the latter and Israeli legalisation arrived in retrospect.

26. see Terms section; pg. xx.
While of OAs stipulate that Israel will refrain from construction of new settlements, since then Israeli governments have exponentially intensified their settlement activities sous prétexte natural growth. While there are no official accumulative statistics available, news of additional units has become regular headlines. Sampling the intensity, few days after the launch of the latest – USA imposed and brokered – round of negotiations between Israel and the PLO in August 2013; President Netanyahu declared the approval of about 900 additional units in settlements (Sterman and Stoil 2013), followed by another 3,500 in October 2013 (AbuGaneyeh 2013), and further 2,268 units in March 2014 (MEMO 2014).

Observers confirm that the majority of Israeli settlers (70-80%) describe themselves as ‘economic settlers’ i.e. relocation due to achieved financial advantage; in contrast to ‘ideological settlers’ whose purpose of residing in colonies is the fulfilment of the claimed Eretz Israel via demographic Jewish domination (alAtar 2006). ‘Rather than concentrate on ideologically motivated settlers, the Likud government (1977-1984) sought to attract average Israelis interested in improving their quality of life. It was hoped that these suburban settlers in order to protect their economic investment in the higher quality of life, would create a strong lobby that would prevent any political solution based on territorial compromise’ (Shehadeh 1997:5).

The Palestinian unalienable rights are 1. An independent and sovereign state in the borders of 1967 which constitute 22% of historic Palestine; 2. The return of refugees, and; 3. Annexed East Jerusalem as capital.

Ramallah elTahta is the neighbourhood encapsulating the historic centre thus constituting its natural direct extension, and in turn, highest density of structures constructed up to the 1970s.

E.g. at central crossings and in terrains enabling strategic vision.

In the IOF incursions into Ramallah (as other Palestinian cities) since the year 2000 it has systematically converted residential buildings into barracks, a process through which tenants of the multiple apartments are either temporarily displaced (left to seek refuge somewhere else) or imprisoned forcefully in one or more rooms under sever conditions (primary testimonies).

Ariel Sharon is former Israeli Hagana militant – 1947, appointed company officer in 1949, and in 1950 promoted to intelligence officer. In 1952 he became Major General and focused on prosecution of Palestinian resistance cadre. After several operations and growing controversy around his character he was released from military duty in 1974. He turned to politics and worked as aid to then Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin. Three years later he returned to prime position as Minister of Agriculture under the Menachem Begin government 1977-81, and in the second term as Minister of Defence 1981-82. This was the era in which Sharon’s ideology had begun to crystallize, making him the godfather of the Israeli settler colonialism and the mastermind behind the geography and infrastructure of the illegal colonies (Weizman 2007). Ideologically he belonged to the extreme right politics which opposed integration of Palestinians into Israel on arguments of ethnicity and religious inferiority. An official Israeli government investigation committee found Sharon responsible for the massacres against the Palestinian refugees of Sabra and Shatila, which were committed as he led the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982 (Anziska 2012). In the aftermath of the Lebanon Invasion and over the years 1983-84 Sharon was minister without portfolio, then Minister for Trade and Industry 1984-90, Minister of Housing Construction 1990-92, Minister of National Infrastructure 1996-98, Foreign Minister 1998-99, and ultimately Prime Minister in 2001 and until his stroke in January 2006 placing him in vegetative state until his death in 2014. He is responsible for sparking the wave of uprisings in September 2000 which were later called the Second Intifada. In 2002 he led Operation Defensive Shield in which the IOF reoccupied all of the WB, placed the entire population under curfew for six months, granted Israeli soldiers the green light to sabotage, loot, intimidate and murder. Under this operation the Church of Nativity was
placed under siege and was targeted by snipers in an audacious violation of international law and in the absence of articulated objection from the Vatican. In Jenin the IOF levelled the refugee camp killing scores of civilians. In Bethlehem and Nablus the historic dense centres were targeted with Apache and F16 missiles. Sharon imposed strangulating checkpoints in the WB, and turned the GS into an open prison after unilaterally withdrawing Israelis in colonies in 2005. For Palestinians, Ariel Sharon remains the number one War Criminal.

34. Given that Ramallah’s governorate’s average family size (lowest in Palestine) is 5.1 (PCBS 2013c:20); thereof, the capacity of this building is 23 apartments × 5.1 = 117 persons.

35. ‘Some account of the geographical conditions which appear to be related to the distribution of seismic activity follows, and it is indicated that there are at least three distinct earthquake provinces in Palestine and Syria. The southern one corresponds to the plateau of Palestine and is of moderate activity. A central one comprises the arcs of the Lebanon and Anti-Lebanon ranges and centres in Damascus. The northern one coincides with the distinct arcs between Homs and Aleppo. A fourth, which may be regarded as belonging to Asia Minor, is the arc of the Giaour Dagh and Cyprus that has been the origin of the many destructive shocks recorded in the history of Antioch’ (Willis 1928).

36. Torque is also referred to as ‘Moment of a Force, in physics, the tendency of a force to rotate the body to which it is applied. The torque, specified with regard to the axis of rotation, is equal to the magnitude of the component of the force vector lying in the plane perpendicular to the axis, multiplied by the shortest distance between the axis and the direction of the force component. Regardless of its orientation in space, the force vector F can always be located in a plane parallel to the axis (Solarbotics 2014).

37. Newton’s third law stipulates that ‘when a force acts on a body due to another body, then an equal and opposite force acts simultaneously on that body’ (www.dictionary.com).

38. The impact force of projectile debris against surfaces is called Impulse (I), and it equals the difference in linear momentum (P); I = ΔP = mv_f - mv_i.

39. ‘antospace’ was coined by Trancik (1986) in reference to ‘lost space’; term elaborated upon in coming pages.

40. This observation was established through the author’s one-year residency and studies in Barcelona between 2009 and 2010.

41. see ‘4.3.3. Beyond Manuals: Municipal Programs, Approach and OAs Legacy’; pg. 203.

42. see ‘’; pg. 189.

43. By the end of the British Mandate emigrating Jews owned a mere 5.8% of the territory, and Jews composed a minority in all districts as demonstrated by the table below (Pappe 2007:295):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>Palestinian Land ownership (%)</th>
<th>Jewish Land ownership (%)</th>
<th>Public &amp; Other Land ownership (%)</th>
<th>Palestinian Population (%)</th>
<th>Jewish Population (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Acre</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baysan</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beersheba</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>&lt;1</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>&lt;1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gaza</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haifa</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hebron</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>&lt;1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>&lt;1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jaffa</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jerusalem</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jenin</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>&lt;1</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nablus</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>&lt;1</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nazareth</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ramla</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ramallah</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>&lt;1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Safad</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tiberias</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tul-Karem</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
44. Expression borrowed from Jacir (2013), in her 'Letter from Roma', where she writes about 'What's left of the Left in Italy'.

45. Taking healthcare and medical infrastructure as an example; 'By virtually any measure, the standard of health care in the Israeli-occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip from 1967 to 1987 lagged well behind those in both Israel and Jordan. For example, in 1985 infant mortality in the occupied territories was 70 per 1,000 live births, while it was 55 in Jordan and 14 in Israel. In the occupied territories there were between 6 and 8 doctors for every 10,000 Palestinian inhabitants in 1986, while Israel had 28 and Jordan 22.6. From 1974 to 1985 the ratio of the number of hospital beds to population in the occupied territories actually decreased from 2.2 to 1.6 per 1,000 individuals. By comparison, in Israel in 1985 there were 6.1 hospital beds per 1,000 people. Other problems included the virtual absence of adequate health care in rural areas, the lack of coordination between health care providers, and the low levels of health insurance' (Robinson 1993:302).

46. 'Eretz Israel, the name for Palestine in the Jewish religion, had been revered throughout the centuries by generations of Jews as a place for holy pilgrimage, never as a future secular state. Jewish tradition and religion clearly instruct Jews to await the coming of the promised Messiah at 'the end of times' before they can return to Eretz Israel as a sovereign people in a Jewish theocracy, that is, as the obedient servants of God (this is why today several streams of Ultra-Orthodox Jews are either non or anti-Zionist)' (Pappe 2007:10).

47. "Strangers" here meant everyone not Jewish who had been living in Palestine since the Roman period: (Pappe 2007:11)


49. Besides the Lassez-Passer a Jerusalemite can obtain a Jordanian Passport which states that the holder is actually not a citizen of Jordan. Herein, note that the status, living conditions and legal mazes surrounding Jerusalemites are complex, extensive, and beyond the clarification capacity of this work.

50. From a primary experience, in Darmstadt the nationality was stated as 'ungeklärt' (not clarified), in Barcelona it was 'no diplomatic relations'; and in Berlin it is 'Other Asian Nationality' (author).

51. For more information refer to Campaign for the Right to Enter The Occupied Palestinian Territories: http://www.righttoenter.ps/index.php.

52. 'Settler international' as coined by Collins (2011:58) is 'a term designating the convergence of interest and action among settler colonial states'. Through this naming Collins is appealing for critical analysis 'beyond the self-representations of the powerful [e.g. NATO] and opens up new analytical possibilities' (ibid).

53. 'Nasserism is a socialist Arab nationalist political ideology based on the thinking of Gamal Abdel Nasser, one of the two principal leaders of the Egyptian Revolution of 1952, and Egypt's second President. Spanning the domestic and international spheres, it combines elements of Arab socialism, republicanism, nationalism, anti-imperialism, Developing World solidarity, and international non-alignment. In the 1950s and 1960s, Nasserism was amongst the most potent political ideologies in the Arab World. This was especially true following the Suez Crisis of 1956 (known in Egypt as the Tripartite Aggression), the political outcome of which was seen as a validation of Nasserism, and a tremendous defeat for Western imperial powers. During the Cold War, its influence was also felt in other parts of Africa, and the Developing World, particularly with regard to anti-imperialism, and non-alignment.' (Wikipedia)

54. As indicator of this mobilization, 'in 1973 and 1976 Labor had allowed local municipal elections in the West Bank, in the hope of blunting and re-directing political aspirations away from the PLO. By the second election round, the populace overwhelmingly elected nationalist
figures who began to coordinate as a block under the umbrella of the National Guidance Committee’ (Hamami and Tamari 2008:29).
55. Curfew and closures is a classic tool of the IOF (B’Tselem 2014a). According to primary testimonies when neighbourhoods were placed under e.g. curfew for extensive periods of time, the aforementioned frameworks worked on smuggling supplies in support of the sumud of that particular area.
56. Mashrabiya is a ‘projecting oriel window enclosed with carved wood latticework located on the second storey of a building or higher, often lined with stained glass’ (Wikipedia).
57. In 2013 Israelis of Palestinian origin composed 20.7% of total population of Israel. This statistic does not take into account Palestinians in West Bank and Gaza Strip, or the refugees (CBS 2014).
58. see Terms section; pg. xx.
59. see Terms section; pg. xxi.
60. Yitzhak Shamir was born in 1915 in Ruzhany, Belarus. In 1935 he emigrated to Palestine and two years later he joined the Irgun militias which carried out terrorist activities against the British Mandate and Palestinian natives. Samir said: ‘we didn't take any action blindly or automatically or just for the sake of violence. Our aim was to intimidate rather than to punish’ (Lis 2012). In 1940 Shamir left the Irgun militias and assumed the leadership of a yet more extreme one, the Lehi a.k. by the British as Stern Gang. With charges of terrorism Shamir was arrested in 1941 and imprisoned in the Acre prison ‘Mizra’, from which he escaped a year later. The militia he continued to lead assassinated Lord Moyne, the British minister of state in the Middle East in 1944. As a result, the British Mandate deported him to Eritrea in 1946. A year later he escaped his exile back to Palestine where he picked up arms and fought among the militias again. in 1955 he joined the Israeli intelligence agency Mossad, where he served for ten years. In 1970 Shamir switched from being a ‘field agent’ to politics, and was first elected into the Knesset in 1973 with his Zionist Likud Party (Lis 2012). With his right arm Ariel Sharon he changed the face of the occupied territories, the most articulate of the scares is his colonialist settler enterprise where by the time he left office the numbers of colonies in occupied territories had tripled (alAtar 2006). For more on the marriage of the two, see Endnote 33; pg. 334. and see Endnote 18; pg. 330.
61. Avi Shlaim is an Iraqi-born British/Israeli historian.
62. The miri classification enabled the concealment of land appropriation until commencement with physical works, thence minimizing the space for Palestinian ‘legal’ objections (Weizman 2006).
63. Named after its author Matitiyahu Drobbelss, head of the WZO’s Settlement Division.
64. see Endnote 60; pg. 337. this chapter.
66. see Regulatory Framework and Authorities for Planning in the West Bank; pg. 395
67. see Terms section; pg. xix.
68. In his paper ‘Ethnocracy’: The Politics of Judaizing Israel/Palestine’ the Israeli researcher Oren Yiftachel states that ‘ethnocratic regimes, which are neither authoritarian nor democratic. Such regimes are states which maintain a relatively open government, yet facilitate a non-democratic seizure of the country and polity by one ethnic group. [...] Ethnocracies, despite exhibiting several democratic features, lack a democratic structure. As such, they tend to breach key democratic tenets, such as equal citizenship, the existence of a territorial political community (the demos), universal suffrage, and protection against tyranny of the majority’ (Yiftachel 1999:364). Thereof, ‘[t]he fact that in Israel’s fiftieth year the state’s highest legal authority still finds it difficult to protect a basic civil right such as equal access [of Palestinian-Israelis] to state land’ (ibid.) provides evidence to Yiftachel’s postulate.
69. Partial Regional Master Plan 1/82, 1981 (Abdulhadi 1990:52)
### 3 | RAMALLAH’S OSLO: NEOLIBERAL STATE-MAKING AND SOCIO-RELATIONAL SENSIBILITIES

1. Non-member sovereign states are free to submit a petition to join as a full member at their discretion. The petition is then evaluated by the United Nations Security Council and the General Assembly. For example, Switzerland was a permanent observer state from 1948 to 2002, until becoming a full member on September 10, 2002. Currently, there are two observer non-member states: the Holy See and Palestine. They are both permanent observers, described as ‘Non-member States having received a standing invitation to participate as observers in the sessions and the work of the General Assembly and maintaining permanent observer missions at Headquarters.’ (Wikipedia)

2. Since 1974 the PLO has been considered the ‘legitimate representative of the Palestinian people’ (UN Resolutions 3210, 3236, and 3237), which includes all Palestinians around the world and in UNRWA refugee camps through the near-east. The PA on the other hand is an administrative governing body of some of the territories in the WB and GS. As such, the PA is officially neither concerned with nor representative for any Palestinian other than those present within the territory of historic Palestine and holding an Israeli-issued Palestinian identity card. Within this specific territory, the PA excludes Palestinians holding an UNRWA refugee status, and the territory of the camps themselves. This becomes further problematic when taking into perspective that a core principle of the Palestinian liberation movement is the return of the refugees.

3. Authority is ‘a person or body of persons in whom authority is vested, as a governmental agency’ (dictionary.com); in contrast to concepts of sovereignty and independence of decision. The French journalist Benjamin Barthe describes the Palestinian president Mahmoud Abbas as Qai‘emmaqam (governor of provincial district in the Ottoman empire period), while the actual authority rests in the Israeli Civil Administration offices within the settlement of Beit El, on the outskirts of Ramallah (AlQuds 2013).

4. see Terms section; pg. xxi.

5. According to Roy ‘During the spring 1996 total closure, for example, approximately 30 percent of households in the Gaza Strip were compelled to use savings or sell jewellery in order to buy food and other essential items; and ‘in 1997, at least 8 percent of the total Palestinian population (approximately 200,000 people) received critically needed relief assistance’ (Roy 1999:77).

6. Shari‘a is Islamic ‘law, seen as deriving from the Koran, hadith, ijma‘, and qiyas’ (www.dictionary.reference.com).

7. Areas A compose less than 15% of the WB and GS, which in turn correspond to 22% of Palestine.

8. ‘The centrepiece of Sadan’s plan was the construction of specially sealed industrial zones that would provide infrastructure and easy and secure access to the Israeli market for investors in the Strip. The result was the development of an industrial site at Beit Hanun (Erez) on Gaza’s border, with five additional estates being planned. In support of the project, Military Order 105, issued in 1991, ‘permitted for the first time free Palestinian investment in Gaza,’

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Zone</th>
<th>Area (dunums)</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arab Development</td>
<td>58,940</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Use &amp; Future Planning</td>
<td>76,600</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nature Reserve</td>
<td>28,820</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agricultural</td>
<td>263,570</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roads</td>
<td>18,270</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>446,270</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
while the Civil Administration began to expedite new licenses and provide subsidies and benefits to expatriate Palestinian investors, including the right of residency in the territories. This policy was coupled with the bureaucratization of Palestinian life, among the most notable instruments of which were the by now infamous magnetic IDs [...]. A key advantage of these enclaves [for the Israeli economy] was that they would be closure-proof, allowing the free movement of workers and goods. By mid-1994, discussions had yielded tentative agreements on the eventual establishment of three industrial estates, one in Gaza and two in the West Bank’ (Lagerquist 2003:7-8).


10. Israeli politicians stipulated that they can foreclose the Palestinian demand for statehood through achieving an ‘economic peace’ with the Palestinian political and economic elites (Khalidi et al 2011; Halper 2013; Vlazna 2013; al-Masri 2013; Ravid 2009). Khalidi et al elaborate: ‘Earlier episodes have included Moshe Dayan’s policy of open bridges and cooptation of traditional elites in the 1970s and Menahem Milson’s Israeli Civil Administration and Palestinian Village Leagues in the 1980s. The Israel–PLO Protocol on Economic Relations of 1994 added a whole new meaning to pacification with its promised ‘peace dividend’ and the material benefits it bestowed on a new class of PLO bureaucrats who had returned from exile and on their Oslo-inspired “self-government” structures’ (2011:7).

11. Government expenses refers to: Compensation of employees; Use of goods and services; Consumption of fixed capital; Interest; Subsidies; Grants; Social benefits; and Other expenses such as ‘scholarships, NGOs support and emergency expenses for central government, and insurance & maintenance of vehicles, workers allowances, expenses for executing local projects, promotional discounts to repay debts for local government’ (PCBS 2011a).

12. In 2011 and with the outbreak of what is commonly referred to as the ‘Arab Spring’, foreign donors reduced their contributions to the PA as they remobilized considerable sums in favour of the other contesting areas.

13. Mann illustrates the two dimensions of state-power vis-à-vis the four ideal types of state as follows (Mann 2003:55):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Infrastructural Coordination</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Despotic Power</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Feudal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>Bureaucratic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Imperial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Authoritarian</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


15. While conservative estimates indicate the ratio of security personnel to civilians at 1:110, here are the ratios of some of the countries of the world: US 1:390, Germany 1:336, Mexico 1:273, Jordan 1:248, Turkey 1:206, Russia 1:183 (Eurostat 2013).

16. For more on the MDLF see section 4.1; pg. 184.


18. On May 15th 2013 prominent Fateh (ruling party) as well as independent politicians and businessmen launched the ‘Popular Movement for One Democratic State in Historic Palestine.’ Their agenda consists of lobbying and mass-mobilization in support of this concept across the WB, GS, as well as inside Israel proper (Prusher 2013).

19. Quiquivix wrote: ‘Might we then find it analytically useful to also distinguish between the party-centred Left (that has been similarly taken by the conservative project of independence) and those leftist Palestinian desires that continue to persist? Those Palestinians, as George
Jackson might put it, who need liberation? If so, we should make these distinctions and be prepared to hold onto them. We cannot begin this work, however, by continuing to mirror our scholarship and action with a leadership class that (1) dismisses self-organized action outside of traditional organizational structures and (2) cannot see how the capacity of people to resist also can translate into the creation of new organizational structures. But this will need to go well beyond denouncing these prejudices and blind spots, for they are difficult to shake off. This is especially so for those of us who make a living from their existence’ (2013:6).

20. The PA employs about 140,000 public servants which correspond to approximately one third of the total workforce in the WB. These include close to 60,000 security officers (Elgindy 2013).

21. see Terms section; pg. xvii.

22. ‘The definition of relevance currently focuses primarily on the goals and priorities of donors or country/local governments, instead of focusing on meeting the needs of the targeted population. [...] Similarly to relevance, the definition of effectiveness focuses on determining the extent to which the intervention met its goals, and not the needs of aid recipients. [...] The current definition of sustainability is limited to prospective (likelihood of) sustainability and do not make any reference to retrospective sustainability (how sustainable it has been). Furthermore, it only mentions the need to consider environmental and financial aspects of sustainability, leaving out other essential elements to the sustainability of interventions such as political support, cultural appropriateness, adequacy of technology, and institutional capacity. Efficiency even though tackling some of the right issues, falls short on the coverage of costs (e.g., non-monetary costs) and comparisons (e.g., creative alternatives). Furthermore, the term efficiency often gets defined as least costly approach, but it is a limited definition given the way evaluations are structured. Cost-effectiveness seems a better term to define this criterion. Two key criteria are missing: quality of process (e.g., ethicality, environmental responsibility) and exportability of whole or part of the aid intervention, meaning the extent to which it could produce important contributions to other aid interventions’ (Chianca 2008:44; emphasis in original).

23. For example, the ranking of LGs is factored by ‘Satisfactory Collection Efficiency and own Revenue Generation’ with three main categories: ‘A’, ‘B’ and ‘C’ which correspond to ‘specified own revenues’ are either ‘> 100 NIS per capita or 10% above last two years’ average’; ‘> 50 NIS per capita or 5% above last two years’ average’; and ‘> 25 NIS per capita or above last two years’ average’ respectively. Under this equation, both Ramallah and Tulkarem are ranked as ‘B’, at a time a single serving of Hummus costs an average of 15 NIS in Ramallah, which is equivalent to the price of 1 kilogram of Hummus in Tulkarem. In other words, the statistical criteria of the MDLF omits the stark differences in living costs and inflation levels among localities.

24. GDR: German Democratic Republic; FRG: Federal Republic of Germany.

25. see Endnote 20; pg. 340.

26. In the WB the school curriculum is based on the Jordanian system, while in GS it is based on the Egyptian. As such, the material and final examination is not unified across the presumed one-nation. Needless to say, these curricula contain marginal – if any – information about the history of the Palestinian liberation movement, and its trajectory. The high-school diploma (examination) system ‘Tawjeehi’ has been criticized for years – even before the PA – as mind-crippling in terms of emphasizing memorization and marginalizing critical thinking and skills of questioning and construction of individual opinion. These problems are further entrenched on the following levels. The vocational training centres are limited in terms of number as well as professions on offer due to restrictions imposed by Israel, thus maintaining this trajectory as basic. Universities meanwhile are all private institutions with relatively high fees due to the anaemic support of the PA. The continuous cuts in the budget of the PA for
universities has pushed the latter into crisis, resulting in tangible drop in quality of services in comparison to pre-OAs times.

27. Under 'Old Guard' Tamari places senior PLO figures (predominantly returnees) such as 'the troika of Mahmud Abbas, Ahmad Qurai', and Nabil Shaath' (2002:107).

28. Under the 'Young Guard' Tamari names Mohammed Dahlan, Jibreel alRjoub, Tawfiq Tirawi and 'gangsters and warlords', such as Sami Abu Samahdaneh in the Rafah area and the late Atef Ebit [... ] in Bethlehem, as well as Fatah radicals, such as Marwan Barghouti and Husam Khader (opposition PC members, respectively, from Ramallah and Nablus). It also includes liberal Arafat loyalists such as Sari Nusseibeh, holder of the Jerusalem portfolio in the Palestinian cabinet' (ibid).

29. Mohammad Dahlan 'managed the affairs of the ruling Fatah movement, coordinated with Israel regarding matters of security, and even wheeled and dealt in issues of regional and international affairs. [...] Dahlan – a former Palestinian Authority (PA) minister, a former National Security advisor and a former head of Gaza's PA Preventative Security Service (PSS)- was king of the hill. All of his rivals were conveniently or by chance out of the picture. Arafat was then imprisoned in his office in al-Muqata'a, and Dahlan's toughest contender, Jibril Rajoub, leader of the West Bank PSS, was discredited' (Baroud 2014).

30. July 2012, demonstration condemning President Abbas' planned meeting with Israeli Vice (and former general and hard-liner) Premier Shaul Mofaz.


32. December 2013, cross-factional Palestinians protested the Prawer Plan which was passed by the Israeli Knesset few months earlier, aiming at displacing Beduins.

33. Traffic police has launched many campaigns such as enforcing use of seat-belt, prohibition of using of cellphones by drivers, reducing congestion by regulating parking, etc. Nonetheless, non of them surpassed the adjective of 'campaign' into becoming a 'behaviour'.

34. Between July 2013 and May 2014 the WB-bound PLO has been involved in negotiations under USA monopoly on mediation, and recently signed a reconciliation agreement with Hamas in the GS. In spite of colonial escalations (e.g. expansion of colonies, attacks by radical settlers), the Council of Governors and Mayors has not made any official statements in the indicated period nor publicly presented its position on any of the happenings.

35. see Endnote 21; pg. 330.

36. see Endnote 22; pg. 330.

37. In an interview with Dr. Samir Abdullah who directed the drafting of the PDRP, was subsequently Minister of Planning and Administration between 2008-2009, and is a member of the Palestinian Monetary Authority; he has testified that the proposal request US$ 5.6 billion in place of the granted US$ 7.7 billion at the Paris Donor Conference in December 2007 (Abdullah 2012).


39. In this regard alAtar (2010) narrates: 'Tony Blair decided that he wants to work with the Art Community, and a meeting with him was set up in the American Colony in Jerusalem. From the beginning he gave us the speech of we being the artist, the voice of the people and the persons most capable of influencing politics and that entire repertoire we hear all the time.
After a long discussion he said: ‘We have to give the Palestinians something to worry about losing.’ His justification was that in order for the Palestinians to start calculating their actions and be more rational they have to have something that they would worry about losing. In other words, I will open a factory for you in Ramallah under strict apolitical slogans and rules, and then we as Palestinians would always want to make sure that there are no demonstrations around the facility with at least 2km in order to protect it.’

40. While Zionists have widely claimed that they established a ‘state for a people without land in a land without people’, scholarship, records and governmental archives (whether Ottoman or British) reveal a socially and economically vibrant Palestine whose interruption was brought about by the neocolonial project. For more information please refer to Jumana Manna’s ‘A Sketch of manners’ (2013; www.jumanamanna.com) and Benny Brunner’s (2010) ‘The Great Book Robbery’.

41. Fateh; Communist Party; Palestinian Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), and; The Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PDLP).

42. No official records and statistics about rent values could be found during this work, and as such these numbers are based on primary research and observations.

43. Khalili elSakinini was a Palestinian teacher, scholar, poet, and Arab nationalist. ‘In 1909, Khalil Sakakini founded the Dusturiyyah school, which became known for its Arab nationalist approach. Sakakini pioneered an progressive education system: no grades, prizes or punishments for the students, and emphasis being placed on music education and athletics. He also introduced new methods of teaching Arabic, and made it the primary language of instruction instead of the Turkish. Sakakini led a movement to reform and change into a more Arab approach to what he considered to be a corrupt Greek Orthodox Church of Jerusalem, and wrote a pamphlet in 1913 titled ‘The Orthodox Renaissance in Palestine’, which led to his excommunication from the Greek Orthodox Church. He later became Inspector for Education in Palestine, a post he held for 12 years, until his resignation in protest of the appointment of a Jew as High Commissioner of the Palestine Mandate, Herbert Samuel. After working as a school principal in Cairo, he returned to Palestine in 1926 and became a school inspector. [...] During the [Nakba], the Sakakini’s were one of the last families to leave the Katamon neighborhood [Jerusalem]. A few days before the city was divided, the Sakakini family fled to Cairo. [...] Khalil Sakakini died three months later [after son’s death], on August 13, 1953.[8] Sakakini’s two daughters, Dumya and Hala, lived together in Ramallah until their deaths, in 2002 and 2003; and Khalil elSakakini Cultural Centre in a mansion that ‘was the former family home of Khalil Salem Salah, the mayor of Ramallah between 1947/1951, [it] is now owned by the Palestinian Ministry of Culture’ (www.wikipedia.org).

44. see Endnote 33; pg. 334.

45. Curfews are imposed in individual cities or neighbourhoods, sometimes multiple, sometimes centrally coordinated, in others decision is taken by a low-rank regional commander, sometimes for hours others for days, etc. Hence curfews are difficult to quantify.

46. For Gazans, the worst contemporary attack was the latest Operation Protective Edge which took place between 8 July - 26 August 2014, and was described as ‘genocide’ where entire neighbourhoods were levelled to the ground, internationally banned weapons employed, and hundreds of civilians killed. The impact of this tragedy is still under survey two months past. Up to summer 2014 Operation Cast Lead was considered the worse attack on Gaza (27 December 2008 - 18 January 2009).

47. As often articulated by its state-figures, Israeli withdrawal from the Jordan Valley is not considered an option.

48. Ahmad Qure’i (Abu elAla’) is a Fateh Central Committee member who served as director of the Palestinian Economic Council for Development and Reconstruction (PECDAR),
Minister of Economy & Trade, Minister of Industry, Prime Minister, speaker of the Palestinian Legislative Council, and remains a PNC member and an advisor to the PA.

49. Dov Weisglass is an Israeli lawyer and businessman who – besides private business – served as chief of staff and legal advisor for Ariel Sharon.

50. see Terms section; pg. xx.

51. Transcripts can be found under: http://ramallahsyndrome.blogspot.de.

52. The Table below demonstrates the number of cultural activities and their spaces amongst the districts of the WB starting the third phase of the OAs (PCBS 2014i):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>WB District</th>
<th>Number of Cultural Centres in Operation</th>
<th>In 2012, Number of Operating:</th>
<th>Cultural Activities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jenin</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tubas</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tul-Karem</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qalqilya</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salfit</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nablus</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ramallah</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jericho</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jerusalem</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bethlehem</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hebron</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* includes Art Exhibitions, Concerts, Courses, Lectures, and Symposiums.

53. On 12 April 2014 the Ramallah Governorate organized a performance for an Indian dancing group which was also scheduled to perform in Tel Aviv. The event violates the BDS directives and course of action signed upon by over 170 CBOs, trade unions, universities, etc. A group of BDS activists organized a demonstration in front of the theatre, which was oppressed by the PA security forces and wherein 4 activists were arrested and subsequently presented with charges of ‘disturbing public peace’ by the General Attorney.

54. Israel has established multiple ‘number-graveyards’ in which undisclosed numbers of bodies of war casualties and former prisoners are kept. The naming stems for the fact that graves are market by codified numbers rather than biographic information. Amongst those are fighters from the 1967 war, as well as Palestinians whose last trail ends inside walls of Israeli prisons. Needless to say, this act violates both human rights and international treaties on conduct of states in war. The Jerusalem Legal Aid Centre (JLAC) launched a campaign for identifying and retrieving these human remains in 2008, and has hitherto managed to close 26.5% of the total number of documented cases. For more information see http://www.jlac.ps/index.php?page=inside&pid=24&sectionid=4&parentId=0.

55. A term coined by Emil Habibi. see Endnote 21; pg. 333.

56. Friday and Sunday used to be the weekly days off in Ramallah since its population was either Muslim or Christian. Governmental, financial, and many private organizations switched to a Friday-Saturday weekend after the signature of the OAs. Some Christian organizations – like Ramallah Municipality, Birzeit University – continue to operate with the pre-OAs system. Hence, Thursday is the Palestinian equivalent of the western Friday.

CHAPTER 4 | PA INSTITUTIONS, DISCOURSE, PROJECTS, AND IMPACTS

1. For more information on the plan see ‘2.2.2.iii. Land Alienation: the Drobless Plan’; pg. 89.
2. Naming in reference to the Israeli architect S. Shamshoni who was previously ‘commissioned by the [Israeli] Central Planning Department to prepare plans for about 180 villages within
the Jerusalem district’ and ‘another 103 towns and villages in the northern part of the West Bank’ over the following two years, where ‘the salient feature of these local plans was their total disregard for the facts on the ground’ (Abdulhadi 1990:54).

3. The town of elAzariya which in 1986 had 1,950 dunums of built-up area was designated for this purpose a mere area of 650 dunums that are already constructed (Abdulhadi 1990).

4. ‘In 1983, representatives of the various [Palestinian] districts established the ‘Committee to Follow Up Objections against the Proposed Regional Road Master Plan.’ Letters were sent to representatives of various countries and to the UN, and numerous articles condemning the plans were published in local newspapers’ (Abdulhadi 1990:56).

5. For Droblless Plan see pg. 89.

6. Palestine Reform and Development Plan (PRDP) was declared by Prime Minister Dr. Salam Fayyad in 2008 as his road map for the refinement of PA’s institutions (amongst other items) to suite the establishment of the State of Palestine.

7. ‘The Municipal Development and Lending Fund (MDLF) is a Palestinian semi-governmental institution that works on translating local government policies approved by the Palestinian government into programs and projects that contribute to the empowerment of the local government units through managing funds (grants and loans)” (MDLF 2013).

8. In a sense, the relation simulates that between Palestinian localities and the COGAT pre-OAs, whereby ‘under [Israeli] Military Order 418, issued March 1971, all planning authority was vested in the Higher Planning Council, which was given extensive powers to suspend any plan or license anywhere within the West Bank, including the municipalities which in principle retained the authority to grant permits. While ultimate authority rests with the Higher Planning Council, it is its executive arm, the Central Planning Department, which is directly involved on a day-to-day basis in every aspect relating to planning, including the issuing of permits, carrying out demolitions, ruling on plans’ (Abdulhadi 1990:49)


10. Ibid.

11. ‘The role of the Ministry [of Planning and Administrative Development is] to lead the cross-sector planning, to develop comprehensive development policies with the participation of all relevant Palestinian institutions, and to coordinate and support sector planning in the concerned ministries and institutions so as to ensure their consistency with the comprehensive cross-sector approaches and plans. In this context, the Ministry develops different plans and programs and introduces them along with their policy foundations to the Cabinet for deliberation and approval; then referred to the legislative council for ratification’ (MOPAD 2013).

12. The SDIP is a “four-year participatory development planning process and instrument that intends to steer local development directions in an integrated multi-theme and -stakeholder approach” (SDIP 2009:6). This tool is developed by the MOLG, MOPAD, and MDLF in cooperation with the GIZ towards promoting decentralization, improving responsiveness to needs, enhancing provision of services, and setting basis for integrated development amongst others.

13. This ministry changed names a number of times. Dr. Ghassan Khatib – Minister of Planning 2005-2006 – narrates the process by stating ‘MOPAD started as Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation (MOPIC) and filled the role of both, a ministry of planning and that of foreign affairs. In 2003 or 2004 they separated the two files, so this ministry became Ministry of Planning (MOP). In 2007 Dr. Samir Abdallah was appointed to be minister and at that point the name was changed to Ministry of Planning and Administration. Later, when Dr. Ali Jarbawi was appointed to the position [2009-2012] they changed the name yet again to Ministry of Planning and Administrative Development.’ (Khatib 2012). While officially the renaming came to suit the elaboration of the functions of the institution; people on the street
provide a simpler explanation whereby they believe that the renaming was committed to suit the institution to the profile of the chosen minister each at his the time.

14. Kufur Aqab lies within the Israeli Greater Jerusalem territory. As such, building permits and provision of services is the responsibility of the Municipality of Jerusalem. Noteworthy, this neighbourhood is neglected and highly marginalized by the Israeli authorities.

15. In October 2011 a visit was conducted to the JCU office in Beitunya Municipality where an interview with the head of the unit Arch. Khawla alTaweel was conducted. The only project at hand was that of planning a Ring Road. She indicated that the Ring Road planning is not progressing due to Israeli objections, and simultaneously all proposals mentioned in the MOPAD published plan are frozen pending donor funding. In the same line, interviews as well as unofficial conversations with employees of Ramallah and alBireh Municipalities confirmed that the JCU is a virtual body with no presence in their daily functions. Hamas stands for Islamic Resistance Movement which currently is a right wing political party. In early 2000s the USA named Hamas on its list of terrorist organizations.

16. see Table 4.11 ; pg. 224.

17. ibid.

18. ibid.

19. see Endnote 15; pg. 345.

20. Anani (2010), Arouri (2010) and Huleileh (2012) clarified that private investors avoid engagement with the industry section due to constraints by the Israeli Government. Arouri explains that besides the frequent imposition of closure over the territories and destruction of Palestinian infrastructure, industries require a hard-to-earn Israeli blessing in order to work: 'Simply speaking, if one makes a factory and Israel has not given its blessing, Israel could - and has often done so - block the raw materials the investor imported and needs for production in their customs. With everyday the materials stay in the Israeli customs the investor has to pay numbers for its storage in the Israeli facilities, and in no time the ground fee exceeds that of what he/she had paid for the material itself. This has happened very often, and there are countless stories of Palestinian importers dropping their rights over products they purchased after being held for a period of time in Israeli customs. So Israel can strangle any industry at any time, and this is beside transportation of goods, licenses, etc.' (Arouri 2010).

21. In 1996 the PA held presidential and legislative elections that will ultimately form the PA. Mayors and municipal councils nonetheless were appointed by the PA. Between 1996 and 2000 no particular accomplishments were registered as the dominant aspect was that of efforts to configure scope of mandate while allowing the population to do what it wished 'for the first time' i.e. laissez faire.

22. see section 3.2.2 ; pg. 142.

23. GIS: Geographic Information System.

24. see Terms section; pg. xvii.

25. ‘Calatravalandia’ translates into ‘Calatrava Land’ in reference to its exclusive designer, the Valencia-born international architect Santiago Calatrava.

CHAPTER 5 | REAL-ESTATE CORPORATIONS AND URBAN LANDSCAPES OF RAMALLAH

1. First steps were taken by the appointment of the World Bank schooled technocrat Dr. Salam Fayyad as Minister of Finance in 2002 and till 2006. In 2007 he was appointed Prime Minister, where he oversaw the preparation of the Palestine Reform and Development Plan 2008-
2010 (MOPAD 2007) thus cementing the long launched process of institutionalization of neoliberalism in Palestine.

2. Khabieh in colloquial Palestinian term that refers to a place where things are stored. These could be oil vats of pottery, or shafts of clay inside rooms for storing grains.

3. PECDAR’s Objectives as stated on its website (PECDAR 2013a):
   - Formulating economic and social plans, in accordance with the general policies of national and local institutions.
   - Coordinating the flow of international assistance for the benefit of the Palestinian people.
   - Identifying investment projects and other activities to be financed by the donor countries.
   - Administering and monitoring the implementation of such programs and projects.
   - Evaluating the economic, social and environmental impact of PECDAR’s programs and projects.
   - Implementing a process of institutional strengthening and human resources capacity Building for PECDAR and for other agencies charged by the Council with responsibility for executing particular activities.
   - Undertaking any other tasks assigned to it by the PLO Executive Committee in the area of economic and social development.

4. see Terms section; pg. xix.

5. alGhadeer Neighbourhood is located at the meeting point of the borders of Surda, AbuQash and Jifna villages at about 7 km northwards from Ramallah’s centre. It composes of 34 residential buildings with II apartments in each corresponding to a total of 374 apartments, as well as two commercial services buildings (PRICO 2014). Given that Ramallah’s governorate’s average family size (lowest in Palestine) is 5.1 (PCBS 2013c:20); thereof, the capacity of this neighbourhood is 1870 persons.

6. Given that Gaza’s average family size is 6.0 (PCBS 2013c:20); thereof, the capacity of the Pearl Towers is 3,300 persons.

7. See section 3.1.1; pg. 107.

8. ‘Fayyad, who formerly served as country director in the Palestinian areas for the International Monetary Fund (IMF), became finance minister last June during a Palestinian cabinet reshuffle. His appointment was considered a result of US and international pressure who demanded that the PA carry out intensive financial and other reforms. Israel has also added to the pressure when it froze millions of US dollars in PA tax revenues and refused to release any amount without financial reforms first, in addition to other conditions. Nevertheless, Fayyad rejected in a meeting with reporters in Jerusalem to announce the publication of the report the claims that reforms were carried out as a result of pressure insisting that it was part of the PA’s reform efforts as demanded by the people. Fayyad, from the West Bank town of Tulkarm, has concentrated his efforts since assuming office to unification of all PA accounts into one fund managed by his ministry’ (AbuKhater 2003).

9. Over the decades the PLO had accumulated significant wealth, which in the pre-Oslo era was obtained from third parties (states, political bodies, patriotic businessmen, etc.) in the form of support and financing of the activities and treasury of the organization. In the post-Oslo era most of these caches were represented as private investments, mainly in outsourced monopolies to the PA’s coterie of private entrepreneurs (Calabresi 2002, Abdullah 2012). Under this system private persons cashed the benefits of capitalization and circulation of public wealth, while the government and its people remained poor and dependent on foreign donations (Kassis 2010, Abdullah 2012, a.o.).

10. ‘PIF’s main objective is to promote sustainable economic growth and private sector development in Palestine, through originating and investing in economically feasible, socially responsible and developmentally sound strategic projects in vital and viable economic sectors in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, in partnership with the Palestinian private sector and
international investors. These investments aims [sic] to revitalize the Palestinian economy by creating new job engines to reduce poverty and unemployment, and raise living standards. PIF has been focusing on stimulating the growth of a strong, cohesive, efficient and highly experienced private sector that is competitive locally and worldwide to lead the Palestinian economy a very important factor in building and growing the national economy’ (PIF 2014).

11. In 2013 the PA’s public revenue totalled US$ 2.88 billion (Shaban 2013); which renders PIF’s share at 10.4% of the total revenue.

12. see Studies on Social Capital in the Palestinian Territories by Cavatorta, Ghazawneh, and Andriani, 2009.

13. see Policies to Promote an Enabling Environment for a knowledge-Based Economy in Palestine and Jordan by Ershied and Jabarin 2007.


15. Economic sectors targeted by PIF’s MSME’s ‘Sharakat’ Program: IT, Tourism, Microfinance, Industry and Agriculture.

16. Images can be found under this link: http://amaar.ps/index.php?lang=en&page=1307622865162&item=130857109003

17. Barthe indicates that the initial designs had the towers at 50 floors but later sufficed with 20 floors, as ‘N’est pas Dubai qui veut’ (Barthe 2011:20)

18. Weekend days in Ramallah are Friday and Saturday. As such, on Thursday afternoon thousands commute to their localities of origin, back to Ramallah, or otherwise. In this sense, the situation is comparable to Friday afternoon traffic in western countries. The only alternative to this artery is Nablus Road.

19. Unrecorded conversation with Mr. Khaled Batrawi in October 2012.

20. Nablus Road lies few hundred meters to the east of Ersal Street, and is the original axis connecting north the WB with its centre and south. It passes along the walls of COGAT headquarters and Beit El settlement. Nablus Road was closed from 2000 until recently in 2013, and remains today scene to obstructions and arbitrary closures.

21. A happening confirmed by Dima elTaweel (architect working at alBireh Municipality), Khaled Batrawi (Civil Engineer, co-founder of the Palestinian Centre for the safety on Roads and Environment, and consultant for alBireh Municipality), and the interviewees Barghouthi (2012) and Shaheen (2012).

22. CBS have been connected to cases of urban gentrification, infringing on citizen’s right to space through exclusion, security and surveillance, suboptimal living condition, elevated rates of violence and questions of high costs fuelled by the relative lifelessness of these districts at night, where ‘in many cities, downtowns are now islands surrounded by decayed or decaying areas. True, here too there are encouraging signs of rehabilitation and re-population, partly fed by immigrants from abroad. But the picture is everywhere still partial even contradictory’ (Hall and Tewdwr-Jones 2011: 238).

23. elReehan Neighbourhood; elGhadeer Neighbourhood; Diplomatic Quarter, elItihad Neighbourhood, and elBasateen Neighbourhood to name a few.

24. The execution of elReehan Neighbourhood is planned over four phases. Phase one includes the 18 villas, 27 (16%) of apartment buildings, and the 11-storied hospital.

25. alManara Square is considered as the centre of the agglomerate. In this case the route to elReehan follows the new network via elTireh neighbourhood (north-west of Ramallah), rather than the traditional one through Surda.

26. The residential space composes of 18 villas and 162 apartment buildings. The footprint of these structures values 130.000 sq.m. of the site total of 25.000 sq.m.

27. Open Space (green areas and walkways) is 28.585 sq.m., 11.43%; and Open Space (historical area) is 8.615 sq.m., 3.45% (elArd and CEP 2010:3-2).
28. Officially there are the villas and the eight apartment-building typologies. This work considers a tenth residential typology, namely, the penthouses.

29. Real estate prices are consequential of land-use categorization and geography-sensitive market prices. In this case, the price per sq.m. in Surda is lower than that in Ramallah.


33. PIF’s ‘Aghwar And Dead Sea’ includes ‘Jericho Agro-Industrial Park’, ‘Moonlight Tourism City’ and ‘Madinat AL Qamar’ (PIF 2014c).

34. Beyond the rare publication of its financial reports, Massar’s website provides neither information about its start-up nor current accumulative capital, nor necessary links to some of its subsidiary companies, and some of the provided links lead to limited, aged, cancelled, or inactive web pages. This lack of transparency raises significant doubts about Massar.

35. See terminology section: Fayyadism.

36. Slogan of Rawabi, which has been flagged to distract from the hierarchy of vision of this project. Searching ‘Palestine’s first planned city’ using the Google engine results with about 3.440.000 results.

37. alMasry is the richest family inside Palestine, and probably the most influential.

38. Rawabi was announced at the Palestine Investment Conference, Bethlehem, 21-23 May 2008.

39. MoU: Memorandum of Understanding

40. Through meetings with persons affiliated with Massar, Bayti and Rawabi as a project a number repeated the argument that their delay is partly caused by the PA shortcomings in terms of the promised public social infrastructures. The identities of these persons is protectively concealed by this work.

41. Rawabi’s construction commenced in 2010, which translates to sixty-two years since the Nakba of 1948.

42. In the WB alone, since 1968 – immediately after the 1967 War – Israel has constructed over 125 illegal settlements and over 120 outposts (B’Tselem 2013). The ratio is 5.2 entities per year since 1967. This numbers do not take into account the Israeli colonial settlements in the Golan Heights, Gaza Strip, Sinai peninsula, and the construction of new cities inside Israel proper. Meanwhile, Rawabi is the only new Palestinian city that Israel allowed since 1948.

43. Massar’s evident complicity with Israeli authorities and service providers under the slogan of achieving peace through economy; see Endnote 10; pg. 339. In the same line: ‘Bashar Al-Masri, managing director of Rawabi, said that though no Israeli companies have been involved in constructing the city, hundreds of Israeli suppliers provide it with raw materials such as cement, sand, electric components and plumbing. He estimated that Israeli businesses benefit from the Rawabi project to the tune of tens of millions of dollars a month’ (Miller 2014).

44. Metaphor from ‘the end justifies the means.’

45. Construction sites are rarely policed or regulated. The multi-story skeletons are neither fenced nor is basic labour-mobility throughout them secured. In most cases side-walks are turned into material-storage space, and in several cases streets collapsed due to deep excavation for placing subterranean floors. These streets were thence interrupted for months.

46. Shortest building has 7 apartment floors and the garage in the ground floor, totaling 8.

47. ‘les trentes glorieuses’ is a term used by french-speakers to refer to the three decades following WWII (Lévy-Vroelant et al 2008:37).
48. In the last couple of years the 'Atara Checkpoint has been generally open with little obstruction to traffic. Nonetheless, it has not been dismantled. Thus the threat of its reactivation remains in place.

49. The main road to Rawabi extends through C-Areas which lie under full Israeli sovereignty. The COGAT agreed to the construction of the street on temporary basis, namely, that each year Massar/Bayti is required to apply for the renewal of the permit, otherwise the street will be closed. The alternative connection extends through the village of 'Atara, costing an addition 10-15 minutes. In a similar respect and among others, up to date of this work Israel has granted no permit for the construction of the quintessential water-line for the supply of the city (PBS 2013). This reality has also been reported in the news, e.g. ‘The Civil Administration, an IDF organ entrusted with the civilian governing of the West Bank, objected to the widening of a local road leading up to the city and passing through area C, which lies under Israeli administrative control. And Israel's national water company, Mekorot, has still not guaranteed a water supply to Rawabi’ (Miller 2014).

50. In the early 2000s a corrupt businessman called Fu'ad Mash'al constructed a 14-story building in violation of building regulations, on heritage-protected lands, and without having obtained a construction permit. Upon the launch of investigations against corruption he fled the country. A couple of years ago the PA purchased the non-finished construction for a total of US$ 10 million, at a time it was legally capable of confiscating it (testimony of Abed Mansour, Civil Engineer and construction-site manager currently working on the refurbishing of the Mash'al Tower into its new function, the PA's Media Headquarters).

51. The latest international financial crisis – whose domino effect commenced its sweep from the USA in 2007 – was accompanied by world-wide mass protests against inequality, particularly income inequality. The most renowned series of protests was lead by geographically varied chapters of the 'Occupy Movement', e.g. in NY had the local chapter was 'Occupy Wall Street'. Lately a study by Oxfam has been published where the organization investigated growing inequality. Among other data the study presents the 'percentage increase in share of income of the richest one percent' and 'the share of national income going to the richest one percent', which translates with the wealth of the richest 85 persons on this globe being equivalent to that of three billion persons, albeit, the poorest three billion persons (Wearden 2014). Palestine is no stranger to the slogan of 'we are the 99% (www.wearethe99percent.us).

52. see Endnote 6; pg. 338.

53. 'Nussbaum suggests that a properly designed liberal education cultivates three basic capacities among cosmopolitan citizens to free their minds from narrow tradition, custom and habit including the capacity for critical examination of oneself and one's traditions (Socratic self-examination), the capacity to identify with a global moral and human community, and finally the capacity for narrative imagination, or the ability to imagine cultural difference in order to decipher alternative narratives of the 'other' and relate or connect to them in a meaningful and sympathetic way' (Naseem and Margison 2006:53).

54. For the definition of 'normalization' in the Palestinian context see Terms section; pg. xx.

55. Jacir (2013) speaking of Italian policy, yet the phrase applies to the happenings in Ramallah, and was articulated in conversations with the architect, urbanist and researcher Dr. Yazid Anani in 2013, with whom also an interview was conducted in 2010 by the author.

56. Hong Kong having similar colonial heritage but different scale and context in comparison to Ramallah.

57. Barcelona having a similar economic and cultural history to that of Ramallah, but significantly different geo- and socio-politics than the latter.
CHAPTER 6 | WHAT FOUNDATIONS FOR THE FUTURE RAMALLAH?

1. In his article *A day in the life of the Palestinian Ben-Gurion* which was published in Haaretz (online) on 11 February 2010. The article can be found under: http://www.haaretz.com/weekend/week-s-end/a-day-in-the-life-of-the-palestinian-ben-gurion-1.263177.

2. ‘We came to this country which was already populated by Arabs, and we are establishing a Hebrew, that is a Jewish state here. In considerable areas of the country we bought lands from the Arabs. Jewish villages were built in the place of Arab villages. You do not even know the names of these Arab villages, and I do not blame you, because these geography books no longer exist; not only do the books not exist, the Arab villages are not there either. Nahalal arose in the place of Mahalul, Gevat – in the place of Jibta, Sarid – in the place of Haneifs and Kefar Yehoshua – in the place of Tell Shaman. There is no one place built in this country that did not have a former Arab population’ Moshe Dayan, former Minister and Chief of Staff of Israel’s army (Said 1992:14).

3. Abbas was appointed first Prime Minister for the PA in March 2003 through international pressure to curb corruption and reduce Arafat’s monopoly. The creation of this post was not a pleasant choice for Arafat, who in response cornered Abbas bureaucratically, inducing the resignation of the latter after six months from assuming office, in September 2003.

4. The Umbrella Movement in Hong Kong took to the streets on 26 September 2014 demanding electoral reform and was still ongoing at the time of production of this work.

5. As the architect and planner Lubna Shaheen notes: ‘Unfortunately up to date focus lies on Master Plans, and in turn the latter are being limited to land uses and physical development. Questions of differentiated urban functions corresponding to the varying geographies were not addressed by government institutions, and Ramallah fell within this realm; will Ramallah become the administrative-political services centre? Will is remain tourism-focused? What is the role of future Ramallah in 5, 10, or 20 years? In my opinion this vision was missing, and this is what allowed private investors to define the developmental path for the public institutions rather than the opposite taking place. This reality is what we see translated on the ground, whereby every second day there is a new detached urban project being implemented in accordance with laws, or better said, by taking advantage of legal loop-holes and decision-making hierarchies in light of high rates of nepotism. The problematic of this hierarchy goes further, where many municipal decisions are being imposed on municipalities from higher levels such as the Presidential Office or the HPC issuing approvals over projects; e.g. The Palestine Tower has no file in elBireh Municipality archives as approval and licenses were granted from the Presidential Office. This forms a genuine obstacle in face of development of municipal departments and work’ (Shaheen 2012).


7. Bound by professional ethics I will not reveal the name of the institution.

8. E.g. larger numbers of persons can casually claim the right-of-way in alleys but not on veins or arteries.


10. ibid.
REFERENCES


References


Taraki, L. 2008a. Urban Modernity on the Periphery, A New Middle Class Reinvents the Palestinian City. Social Text 95, 26(2), pp. 61-81.


REFERENCES OF ILLUSTRATIONS AND VISUALIZATIONS

Visualizations in this work are chiefly property of the author. For those that have been obtained elsewhere please note that they have been re-edited, modified and re-presented by the author. This section provides the information on the sources for the base materials which were used to create the final versions present in this work.

DIAGRAMS

Diagram 2.1 courtesy of author.
Diagram 2.2 courtesy of author.
Diagram 2.3 courtesy of author.
Diagram 2.4 courtesy of author.
Diagram 3.1 courtesy of author.
Diagram 3.2 World Bank 2014b.
Diagram 3.3 PCBS 2012b.
Diagram 3.4 PCBS 2011b.
Diagram 3.5 courtesy of author.
Diagram 4.1 courtesy of author.
Diagram 4.2 courtesy of author.
Diagram 5.1 courtesy of author.
Diagram 6.1 courtesy of author.
Diagram 6.2 Ng 2014:43
Diagram 6.3 courtesy of author.
Diagram 6.4 courtesy of author.
Diagram 6.5 courtesy of author.
Diagram 6.6 courtesy of author.
Diagram 6.7 courtesy of author.

IMAGES

Image 1.1 courtesy of author.
Image 1.2 unknown source.


Image 1.7  courtesy of author.

Image 1.8  courtesy of author.

Image 1.9  courtesy of author.

Image 1.10  courtesy of author.


Image 2.2  ibid.

Image 2.3  ibid.

Image 2.4  ibid.

Image 2.5  alJubeh and Bshara 2002:136.

Image 2.6  Ramallah.ps/ar_gallery.aspx?id=JOwXoTa42828885aJOwXoT [Accessed 20 March 2014]

Image 2.7  alJubeh and Bshara 2002:23 & 84.

Image 2.8  courtesy of author.

Image 2.9  courtesy of author.

Image 2.10  courtesy of author.

Image 2.11  courtesy of author.

Image 2.12  courtesy of author.

Image 2.13  courtesy of author.

Image 2.14  courtesy of author.


Image 2.16  courtesy of author.


Image 3.3  courtesy of author.

Image 3.4  courtesy of author.

Image 3.6  courtesy of author.

Image 3.7  courtesy of author.

Image 3.8  courtesy of author.

Image 3.9  courtesy of author.

Image 3.10  courtesy of author.

Image 3.11  courtesy of author.

Image 3.12  courtesy of author.

Image 3.13  courtesy of author.

Image 3.14  courtesy of author.

Image 3.15  courtesy of author.

Image 3.16  courtesy of author.


Image 3.18  collected advertisement


Image 3.20  collected advertisement

Image 4.1  courtesy of author.


Image 4.3  courtesy of author.

Image 4.4  courtesy of author.

Image 4.5  courtesy of author.


Image 4.7  courtesy of author.


Image 4.9  courtesy of author.


Image 4.11  courtesy of author.

Image 4.12  courtesy of author.

Image 4.13  courtesy of author.

Image 4.14  courtesy of author.

Image 4.15  courtesy of author.

References


Image 4.20 Ramallah Municipality 2011. Illustration of chosen design for the extension and upgrading of the municipal building and surrounding area [Photograph]. Ramallah Municipality [Archive].

Image 4.21 Ramallah Municipality 2010a:78.


Image 4.23 courtesy of author.


Image 4.25 courtesy of author.

Image 4.26 courtesy of author.


Image 4.28 courtesy of author.

Image 4.29 courtesy of author.


Image 4.31 courtesy of author.

Image 4.32 courtesy of author.

Image 4.33 courtesy of author.

Image 4.34 courtesy of author.


Image 4.36 courtesy of author.

Image 4.37 courtesy of author.

Image 4.38 courtesy of author.

Image 4.39 courtesy of author.

Image 4.40 courtesy of author.

Image 4.41 courtesy of author.

Image 4.42 courtesy of author.

Image 4.43 courtesy of author.

Image 4.44 courtesy of author.

Image 4.45 courtesy of author.

Image 4.46 courtesy of author.

Image 4.47 courtesy of author.

Image 4.48 courtesy of author.

Image 5.1 PECDAR 2013b.

Image 5.2 courtesy of author.

Image 5.3 CCC and Tukan 2010.
Image 5.4  CCC and Tukan 2010.
Image 5.5  courtesy of author.
Image 5.6  AREG 2014b.
Image 5.7  AREG 2014b.
Image 5.8  courtesy of author.
Image 5.9  Rawabi 2014b
Image 5.10  Rawabi 2014b
Image 5.11  Rawabi 2014b
Image 5.12  courtesy of author.
Image 5.13  courtesy of author.
Image 5.14  courtesy of author.
Image 5.15  courtesy of author.
Image 5.16  courtesy of author.
Image 5.17  courtesy of author.
Image 5.18  courtesy of author.
Image 5.19  courtesy of author.
Image 5.20  courtesy of author.
Image 5.21  courtesy of author.
Image 5.22  courtesy of author.
Image 5.23  courtesy of author.
Image 6.1  courtesy of author.
Image 6.2  courtesy of author.
Image 6.3  courtesy of author.
Image 6.4  courtesy of author.
Image 6.5  courtesy of author.
Image 6.6  courtesy of author.
Image 6.7  courtesy of author.
Image 6.8  courtesy of author.
Image 6.9  courtesy of author.
Image 6.10  courtesy of author.

TABLES

Table 3.1  World Bank 2014a.
Table 4.1  Khamaisi 2006:16, expanded by author.
Table 4.2  Khamaisi 2006:16, re-created by author.
Table 4.3  Khamaisi 2006:16, re-created by author.
Table 4.4  Khamaisi 2006:16, re-created by author.
Table 4.5  Ramallah, elBireh & Beitunya 2007:10.
Table 4.6  Ramallah, elBireh & Beitunya 2007:11, re-created by author.
Table 4.7  courtesy of author.
Table 4.8  Engineering Union 2014.
Table 4.9  Engineering Union 2009:22-26, 46.
Table 4.10  Engineering Union 2009:42.
Table 4.11  Khamaisi 1998, 2005
Table 4.12  courtesy of author.
Table 6.1  Khamaisi 1998, 2005
MAPS


Map 1.25  B’Tselem 2014e.


Map 2.1  courtesy of author.

Map 2.2  courtesy of author.

Map 2.3  courtesy of author.

Map 2.4  Arij 2014


Map 4.2  BM 2. Ring Road as suggested by JCU [Map]. *elBireh Municipality* [Archive].


Map 4.4  ibid.
Map 4.5  ibid.
Map 4.6  ibid.
Map 4.7  ibid.
Map 4.8  courtesy of author.
Map 5.1  elArd and CEP 2010:3-11; customized by author.
Map 5.2  courtesy of author.
Map 5.3  Shohan 2013:5
Map 6.1  courtesy of author.
Map 6.2  courtesy of author.
Map 6.3  courtesy of author.
Annex 1  FaceBook Search for Ramallah and alBireh

find all pages named 'Bireh'

find all pages named 'Ramallah'
### Annex. Table of Conducted Interviews and Focus Groups

Table A.1: List of interviews conducted between 2010 and 2012

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Interviewee</th>
<th>Position / Affiliation</th>
<th>Field</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>Basem Khoury</td>
<td>CEO of Dar el-Shifa’ Pharmaceuticals &amp; Former Minister of Commerce</td>
<td>Politician / Investor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>Mohammed alAtar</td>
<td>Film maker and director</td>
<td>Media</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>Shuruq As'ad</td>
<td>Radio Monte Carlo</td>
<td>Journalist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>Elias Zananiri</td>
<td>Speaker of Ministry of Civil Affairs</td>
<td>Journalist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>Mahmoud Abdullah</td>
<td>Member of Ramallah Municipal Council</td>
<td>Engineer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>Janette Michael</td>
<td>Mayoress of Ramallah City</td>
<td>Educator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>Dr. Samih El-Abed</td>
<td>Palestine Investment Fund, Consultant + Former Minister of Planning &amp; International Cooperation</td>
<td>Architect / Politician</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>Alia Rayyan</td>
<td>Heinrich Böll Foundation, Consultant</td>
<td>NGO worker</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>Dr. Mudar Kassis</td>
<td>Prof. of Philosophy and Political Science &amp; Dean of the Faculty of Law &amp; Public Administration at BZU</td>
<td>Analyst / Educator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>Dr. Lisa Taraki</td>
<td>Researcher and Prof. of Sociology, BZU</td>
<td>Researcher</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>Dr. Yazid Anani</td>
<td>Prof. of Urban Planning &amp; Architecture, BZU + Head of Academic Board, International Arts Academy</td>
<td>Researcher / Architect / Artist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>Tayseer Arouri</td>
<td>Prof. of Physics, BZU Civil Society Activist &amp; Former PLO Politician</td>
<td>Politician / Activist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>Samir Huleileh</td>
<td>CEO of Palestine Real Estate Investment Company - PRICO</td>
<td>Businessman / Investor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>Yazan Khalili</td>
<td>Freelance Artist, Urbanist and Architect</td>
<td>Artist / Urbanist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>Bashir Barghouthi</td>
<td>Head of the Policies Department at the Ministry of Local Governance</td>
<td>Engineer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>Dr. Ghassan alHatib</td>
<td>Vice President for Advancement and Communication at BZU + Former Minister of Labor, Minister of Planning, and Head of Government Media Centre</td>
<td>Politician / Administrator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>Dr. Samir Abdullah</td>
<td>Director of Palestine Economic Policy Research Institute - MAS + Former Minister of Planning &amp; Administration</td>
<td>Economist / Politician</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>Dr. Samia Botmeh</td>
<td>Head of Centre for Development Studies, BZU</td>
<td>Economist / Researcher</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>Ali Ziadeh</td>
<td>Lead Architect of Rawabi (Planned City)</td>
<td>Architect</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>Dr. Lubna Shaheen</td>
<td>Prof. of Architecture &amp; Urban Planning, BZU</td>
<td>Researcher / Architect</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table A.2. List of Focus Groups conducted in October 2011

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Age Group</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>No. of Participants</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Male</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>17 - 18</td>
<td>Arab Evangelical Episcopal School</td>
<td>13.10.11</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>35 - 45</td>
<td>Arab Evangelical Episcopal School</td>
<td>15.10.11</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>25 - 30</td>
<td>GIZ Development Unit</td>
<td>18.10.11</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>17 - 18</td>
<td>Friends Boys School</td>
<td>20.10.11</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>17 - 18</td>
<td>Evangelical Lutheran School of Hope</td>
<td>20.10.11</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>50 +</td>
<td>Birzeit University Housing Cooperative</td>
<td>24.10.11</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>17 - 18</td>
<td>Ramallah Boys High School</td>
<td>25.10.11</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>20 - 22</td>
<td>Birzeit University, Department of Architecture</td>
<td>25.10.11</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Focus Groups that were cancelled:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age Group</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>30 - 50</td>
<td>Business Women Forum</td>
<td>22.10.11</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 - 35</td>
<td>A group of local artists</td>
<td>26.10.11</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 - 18</td>
<td>Ramallah Girls High School</td>
<td>27.10.11</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 - 22</td>
<td>Birzeit University - non-Architecture students</td>
<td>28.10.11</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
(NAD 1993)

The Government of the State of Israel and the PLO team (in the Jordanian-Palestinian delegation to the Middle East Peace Conference) (the "Palestinian Delegation"), representing the Palestinian people, agree that it is time to put an end to decades of confrontation and conflict, recognise their mutual legitimate and political rights, and strive to live in peaceful coexistence and mutual dignity and security and achieve a just, lasting and comprehensive peace settlement and historic reconciliation through the agreed political process. Accordingly, the two sides agree to the following principles:

Article I: Aim of negotiations:

The aim of the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations within the current Middle East peace process is, among other things, to establish a Palestinian Interim Self-Government Authority, the elected Council (the "Council"), for the Palestinian people in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, for a transitional period not exceeding five years, leading to a permanent settlement based on Security Council resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973). It is understood that the interim arrangements are an integral part of the whole peace process and that the negotiations on the permanent status will lead to the implementation of Security Council resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973).

Article II: Framework for the interim period:

The agreed framework for the interim period is set forth in this Declaration of Principles.

Article III: Elections:

1. In order that the Palestinian people in the West Bank and Gaza Strip may govern themselves according to democratic principles, direct, free and general political elections will be held for the Council under agreed supervision and international observation, while the Palestinian police will ensure public order.

2. An agreement will be concluded on the exact mode and conditions of the elections in accordance with the protocol attached as Annex I, with the goal of holding the elections not later than nine months after the entry into force of this Declaration of Principles.

These elections will constitute a significant interim preparatory step toward the realisation of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and their just requirements.

Article IV: Jurisdiction:

Jurisdiction of the Council will cover West Bank and Gaza Strip territory, except for issues that will be negotiated in the permanent status negotiations. The two sides view the West Bank and the Gaza Strip as a single territorial unit, whose integrity will be preserved during the interim period.

Article V: Transitional period and permanent status negotiations:

The five-year transitional period will begin upon the withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and Jericho area.
2. Permanent status negotiations will commence as soon as possible, but not later than the beginning of the third year of the interim period, between the Government of Israel and the Palestinian people's representatives.

- It is understood that these negotiations shall cover remaining issues, including: Jerusalem, refugees, settlements, security arrangements, borders, relations and co-operation with other neighbours, and other issues of common interest.
- The two parties agree that the outcome of the permanent status negotiations should not be prejudiced or pre-empted by agreements reached for the interim period.

Article VI: Preparatory transfer of powers and responsibilities:
- Upon the entry into force of this Declaration of Principles and the withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and the Jericho area, a transfer of authority from the Israeli military government and its Civil Administration to the authorised Palestinians for this task, as detailed herein, will commence. This transfer of authority will be of a preparatory nature until the inauguration of the Council.

2. Immediately after the entry into force of this Declaration of Principles and the withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and Jericho area, with the view to promoting economic development in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, authority will be transferred to the Palestinians in the following spheres: education and culture, health, social welfare, direct taxation and tourism. The Palestinian side will commence in building the Palestinian police force, as agreed upon. Pending the inauguration of the Council, the two parties may negotiate the transfer of additional powers and responsibilities, as agreed upon.

Article VII: Interim agreement:
- The Israeli and Palestinian delegations will negotiate an agreement on the interim period (the “Interim Agreement”).

2. The Interim Agreement shall specify, among other things, the structure of the Council, the number of its members, and the transfer of powers and responsibilities from the Israeli military government and its Civil Administration to the Council. The Interim Agreement shall also specify the Council’s executive authority, legislative authority in accordance with Article IX below, and the independent Palestinian judicial organs.

- The Interim Agreement shall include arrangements, to be implemented upon the inauguration of the Council, for the assumption by the Council of all of the powers and responsibilities transferred previously in accordance with Article VI above.

- In order to enable the Council to promote economic growth, upon its inauguration, the Council will establish, among other things, a Palestinian Electricity Authority, a Gaza Sea Port Authority, a Palestinian Development Bank, a Palestinian Export Promotion Board, a Palestinian Environmental Authority, a Palestinian Land Authority and a Palestinian Water Administration Authority and any other Authorities agreed upon, in accordance with the Interim Agreement, that will specify their powers and responsibilities.

- After the inauguration of the Council, the Civil Administration will be dissolved, and the Israeli military government will be withdrawn.

Article VIII: Public order and security:

In order to guarantee public order and internal security for the Palestinians of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, the Council will establish a strong police force, while Israel will continue to carry the responsibility for defending against external threats, as well as the responsibility for overall security of Israelis for the purpose of safeguarding their internal security and public order.
Article IX: Laws and military orders:
1. The Council will be empowered to legislate, in accordance with the Interim Agreement, within all authorities transferred to it.
2. Both parties will review jointly laws and military orders presently in force in remaining spheres.

Article X: Joint Israeli-Palestinian liaison committee:
In order to provide for a smooth implementation of this Declaration of Principles and any subsequent agreements pertaining to the interim period, upon the entry into force of this Declaration of Principles, a Joint Israeli-Palestinian Liaison Committee will be established in order to deal with issues requiring coordination, other issues of common interest and disputes.

Article XI: Israeli-Palestinian cooperation in economic fields:
Recognising the mutual benefit of co-operation in promoting the development of the West Bank, the Gaza Strip and Israel, upon the entry into force of this Declaration of Principles, an Israeli-Palestinian Economic Co-operation Committee will be established in order to develop and implement in a co-operative manner the programmes identified in the protocols attached as Annex III and Annex IV.

Article XII: Liaison and co-operation with Jordan and Egypt:
The two parties will invite the Governments of Jordan and Egypt to participate in establishing further liaison and co-operation arrangements between the Government of Israel and the Palestinian representatives, on the one hand, and the Governments of Jordan and Egypt, on the other hand, to promote co-operation between them.

These arrangements will include the constitution of a Continuing Committee that will decide by agreement on the modalities of admission of persons displaced from the West Bank and Gaza Strip in 1967, together with necessary measures to prevent disruption and disorder. Other matters of common concern will be dealt with by this Committee.

Article XIII: Redeployment of Israeli forces:
1. After the entry into force of this Declaration of Principles, and not later than the eve of elections for the Council, a redeployment of Israeli military forces in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip will take place, in addition to withdrawal of Israeli forces carried out in accordance with Article XIV.
2. In redeploying its military forces, Israel will be guided by the principle that its military forces should be redeployed outside populated areas.
3. Further redeployments to specified locations will be gradually implemented commensurate with the assumption of responsibility for public order and internal security by the Palestinian police force pursuant to Article VIII above.

Article XIV: Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza strip and Jericho area:
Israel will withdraw from the Gaza Strip and Jericho area, as detailed in the protocol attached as Annex II.

Article XV: Resolution of disputes:
Disputes arising out of the application or interpretation of this Declaration of Principles, or any subsequent agreements pertaining to the interim period, shall be resolved by negotiations through the Joint Liaison Committee to be established pursuant to Article X above.
2. Disputes which cannot be settled by negotiations may be resolved by a mechanism of conciliation to be agreed upon by the parties. The parties may agree to submit to arbitration disputes relating to the interim period, which cannot be settled through conciliation. To this end, upon the agreement of both parties, the parties will establish an arbitration committee.

Article XVI: Israeli-Palestinian cooperation concerning regional programmes:
Both parties view the multilateral working groups as an appropriate instrument for promoting a “Marshall Plan”, the regional programmes and other programmes, including special programmes for the West Bank and Gaza Strip, as indicated in the protocol attached as Annex IV.

Article XVII: Miscellaneous provisions:
- This Declaration of Principles will enter into force one month after its signing.
- All protocols annexed to this Declaration of Principles and agreed minutes pertaining thereto shall be regarded as an integral part hereof.

Done in Washington, DC. this thirteenth day of September 1993.

For the Government of Israel: (Signed) Shimon Peres
For the PLO: (Signed) Mahmud Abbas
Witnessed by: The United States of America (Signed) Warren Christopher
and The Russian Federation (Signed) Andrei V. Kozyrev

Annex I: Protocol on the Mode and Conditions of Elections:
- Palestinians of Jerusalem who live there will have the right to participate in the election process, according to an agreement between the two sides.
2. In addition, the election agreement should cover, among other things, the following issues:
   - The system of elections
   - The mode of the agreed supervision and international observation and their personal composition
   - Rules and regulations regarding election campaigns, including agreed arrangements for the organizing of mass media, and the possibility of licensing a broadcasting and television station.
- The future status of displaced Palestinians who were registered on June 1967 will not be prejudiced because they are unable to participate in the election process owing to practical reasons.

Annex II: Protocol on Withdrawal of Israeli Forces from the Gaza Strip and Jericho Area:
- The two sides will conclude and sign within two months from the date of entry into force of this Declaration of Principles an agreement on the withdrawal of Israeli military forces from the Gaza Strip and Jericho area. This agreement will include comprehensive arrangements to apply in the Gaza Strip and the Jericho area subsequent to the Israeli withdrawal.
2. Israel will implement an accelerated and scheduled withdrawal of Israeli military forces from the Gaza Strip and Jericho area, beginning immediately with the signing of the
agreement on the Gaza Strip and Jericho area and to be completed within a period not exceeding four months after the signing of this agreement.

The above agreement will include, among other things:

- Arrangements for a smooth and peaceful transfer of authority from the Israeli military government and its Civil Administration to the Palestinian representatives
- Structure, powers and responsibilities of the Palestinian authority in these areas, except: external security, settlements, Israelis, foreign relations and other mutually agreed matters
- Arrangements for the assumption of internal security and public order by the Palestinian police force consisting of police officers recruited locally and from abroad (holding Jordanian passports and Palestinian documents issued by Egypt). Those who will participate in the Palestinian police force coming from abroad should be trained as police and police officers
- A temporary international or foreign presence, as agreed upon
- Establishment of a joint Palestinian-Israeli Co-ordination and Co-operation Committee for mutual security purposes
- An economic development and stabilisation programme including the establishment of an Emergency Fund, to encourage foreign investment and financial and economic support. Both sides will co-ordinate and co-operate jointly and unilaterally with regional and international parties to support these aims
- Arrangements for a safe passage for persons and transportation between the Gaza Strip and Jericho area.

The above agreement will include arrangements for co-ordination between both parties regarding passages: (a) Gaza-Egypt (b) Jericho-Jordan;

The offices responsible for carrying out the powers and responsibilities of the Palestinian authority under this Annex II and Article VI of the Declaration of Principles will be located in the Gaza Strip and in the Jericho area pending the inauguration of the Council.

Other than these agreed arrangements, the status of the Gaza Strip and Jericho area will continue to be an integral part of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and will not be changed in the interim period.

Annex III: Protocol on Israeli-Palestinian co-operation in economic and development programmes:

The two sides agree to establish an Israeli-Palestinian continuing committee for economic co-operation, focusing, among other things, on the following:

Co-operation in the field of water, including a water development programme prepared by experts from both sides, which will also specify the mode of co-operation in the management of water resources in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and will include proposals for studies and plans on water rights of each party, as well as on the equitable utilization of joint water resources for implementation in and beyond the interim period.

Co-operation in the field of electricity, including an Electricity Development Programme, which will also specify the mode of co-operation for the production, maintenance, purchase and sale of electricity resources.

Co-operation in the field of energy, including an energy development programme, which will provide for the exploitation of oil and gas for industrial purposes, particularly in the Gaza Strip and in the Negev, and will encourage further joint exploitation of other energy resources. This Programme may also provide for the construction of a petrochemical industrial complex in the Gaza Strip and the construction of oil and gas pipelines.
4. Co-operation in the field of finance, including a financial development and action programme for the encouragement of international investment in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, and in Israel, as well as the establishment of a Palestinian Development Bank.

5. Co-operation in the field of transport and communications, including a programme, which will define guidelines for the establishment of a Gaza sea port area, and will provide for the establishing of transport and communications lines to and from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip to Israel and to other countries. In addition, this Programme will provide for carrying out the necessary construction of roads, railways, communications lines, etc.

6. Co-operation in the field of trade, including studies, and trade promotion programmes, which will encourage local, regional and interregional trade, as well as a feasibility study of creating free trade zones in the Gaza Strip and in Israel, mutual access to these zones and co-operation in other areas related to trade and commerce.

7. Co-operation in the field of industry, including industrial development programmes, which will provide for the establishment of joint Israeli-Palestinian industrial research and development centres, will promote Palestinian-Israeli joint ventures, and provide guidelines for co-operation in the textile, food, pharmaceutical, electronics, diamonds, computer and science-based industries.

8. A Programme for co-operation in, and regulation of, labour relations and co-operation in social welfare issues.

9. A human resource development and co-operation plan, providing for joint Israeli-Palestinian workshops and seminars, and for the establishment of joint vocational training centres, research institutes and data banks.

10. An environmental protection plan, providing for joint and/or co-ordinated measures in this sphere.

11. A Programme for developing co-ordination and co-operation in the field of communications and media.

12. Any other programmes of mutual interest.

Annex IV: Protocol on Israeli-Palestinian co-operation concerning regional development Programmes:

The two sides will co-operate in the context of the multilateral peace efforts in promoting a development programme for the region, including the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, to be initiated by the Group of Seven. The parties will request the Group of Seven to seek the participation in this programme of other interested states, such as members of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, regional Arab states and institutions, as well as members of the private sector.

2. The Development Programme will consist of two elements:
   - (a) An Economic Development Programme for the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. The economic development programme for the West Bank and the Gaza Strip will consist of the following elements:
     - A Social Rehabilitation Programme, including a Housing and Construction Programme
     - A Small and Medium Business Development Plan
     - An Infrastructure Development Programme (water, electricity, transportation and communications, etc)
     - A Human Resources Plan
     - Other programmes.
   - A Regional Economic Development Programme. The regional economic development programme may consist of the following elements:
• The establishment of a Middle East Development Fund, as a first step, and a Middle East Development Bank, as a second step
• The development of a joint Israeli-Palestinian-Jordanian Plan for coordinated exploitation of the Dead Sea area
• The Mediterranean Sea (Gaza) - Dead Sea Canal
• Regional desalination and other water development projects
• A regional plan for agricultural development, including a coordinated regional effort for the prevention of desertification
• Interconnection of electricity grids
• Regional co-operation for the transfer, distribution and industrial exploitation of gas, oil and other energy resources
• A regional tourism, transportation and telecommunications development plan
• Regional co-operation in other spheres.

The two sides will encourage the multilateral working groups and will co-ordinate towards their success. The two parties will encourage inter-sessional activities, as well as pre-feasibility and feasibility studies, within the various multilateral working groups.

Agreed minutes to the Declaration of Principles on interim self-government arrangements:

A. General understandings and agreements:
Any powers and responsibilities transferred to the Palestinians pursuant to the Declaration of Principles prior to the inauguration of the Council will be subject to the same principles pertaining to Article IV, as set out in these agreed minutes below.

B. Specific understandings and agreements:

Article IV: It is understood that:
☒ Jurisdiction of the Council will cover West Bank and Gaza Strip territory, except for issues that will be negotiated in the permanent status negotiations: Jerusalem, settlements, military locations and Israelis.
2. The Council's jurisdiction will apply with regard to the agreed powers, responsibilities, spheres and authorities transferred to it.

Article VI (2): It is agreed that the transfer of authority will be as follows:
☒ The Palestinian side will inform the Israeli side of the names of the authorised Palestinians who will assume the powers, authorities and responsibilities that will be transferred to the Palestinians according to the Declaration of Principles in the following fields: education and culture, health, social welfare, direct taxation, tourism and any other authorities agreed upon.
2. It is understood that the rights and obligations of these offices will not be affected.
☒ Each of the spheres described above will continue to enjoy existing budgetary allocations in accordance with arrangements to be mutually agreed upon. These arrangements also will provide for the necessary adjustments required in order to take into account the taxes collected by the direct taxation office.
Upon the execution of the Declaration of Principles, the Israeli and Palestinian delegations will immediately commence negotiations on a detailed plan for the transfer of authority on the above offices in accordance with the above understandings.

Article VII (2):

The Interim Agreement will also include arrangements for co-ordination and cooperation.

Article VII (5):

The withdrawal of the military government will not prevent Israel from exercising the powers and responsibilities not transferred to the Council.

Article VIII:

It is understood that the Interim Agreement will include arrangements for co-operation and co-ordination between the two parties in this regard. It is also agreed that the transfer of powers and responsibilities to the Palestinian police will be accomplished in a phased manner, as agreed in the Interim Agreement.

Article X:

It is agreed that, upon the entry into force of the Declaration of Principles, the Israeli and Palestinian delegations will exchange the names of the individuals designated by them as members of the joint Israeli-Palestinian liaison committee. It is further agreed that each side will have an equal number of members in the joint committee. The joint committee will reach decisions by agreement. The Joint committee may add other technicians and experts, as necessary. The Joint committee will decide on the frequency and place or places of its meetings.

Annex II:

It is understood that, subsequent to the Israeli withdrawal, Israel will continue to be responsible for external security, and for internal security and public order of settlements and Israelis. Israeli military forces and civilians may continue to use roads freely within the Gaza Strip and the Jericho area.

Agreed in Washington DC, on 13 September 1993.

For the Government of Israel: (Signed) Shimon Peres
For the PLO: (Signed) Mahmud Abbas

Witnessed by: The United States of America, (Signed) Warren Christopher
and The Russian Federation, (Signed) Andrei V Kozyrev.
Annex. Palestinian National Council
Declaration of Independence (NAD 1988)

_In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful_

Palestine, the land of the three monotheistic faiths, is where the Palestinian Arab people was born, on which it grew, developed and excelled. Thus the Palestinian Arab people ensured for itself an everlasting union between itself, its land, and its history.

Resolute throughout that history, the Palestinian Arab people forged its national identity, rising even to unimagined levels in its defense, as invasion, the design of others, and the appeal special to Palestine's ancient and luminous place on the eminence where powers and civilizations are joined. All this intervened thereby to deprive the people of its political independence. Yet the undying connection between Palestine and its people secured for the land its character, and for the people its national genus.

Nourished by an unfolding series of civilizations and cultures, inspired by a heritage rich in variety and kind, the Palestinian Arab people added to its stature by consolidating a union between itself and its patrimonial Land. The call went out from Temple, Church, and Mosque that to praise the Creator, to celebrate compassion and peace was indeed the message of Palestine. And in generation after generation, the Palestinian Arab people gave of itself unsparingly in the valiant battle for liberation and homeland. For what has been the unbroken chain of our people's rebellions but the heroic embodiment of our will for national independence. And so the people was sustained in the struggle to stay and to prevail.

When in the course of modern times a new order of values was declared with norms and values fair for all, it was the Palestinian Arab people that had been excluded from the destiny of all other peoples by a hostile array of local and foreign powers. Yet again had unaided justice been revealed as insufficient to drive the world's history along its preferred course.

And it was the Palestinian people, already wounded in its body, that was submitted to yet another type of occupation over which floated that falsehood that 'Palestine was a land without people.' This notion was foisted upon some in the world, whereas in Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations (1919) and in the Treaty of Lausanne (1923), the community of nations had recognized that all the Arab territories, including Palestine, of the formerly Ottoman provinces, were to have granted to them their freedom as provisionally independent nations.

Despite the historical injustice inflicted on the Palestinian Arab people resulting in their dispersion and depriving them of their right to self-determination, following upon U.N. General Assembly Resolution 242 (1967), which partitioned Palestine into two states, one Arab, one Jewish, yet it is this Resolution that still provides those conditions of international legitimacy that ensure the right of the Palestinian Arab people to sovereignty.

By stages, the occupation of Palestine and parts of other Arab territories by Israeli forces, the willed dispossession and expulsion from their ancestral homes of the majority of Palestine's civilian inhabitants, was achieved by organized terror; those Palestinians who remained, as a vestige subjugated in its homeland, were persecuted and forced to endure the destruction of their national life.

Thus were principles of international legitimacy violated. Thus were the Charter of the United Nations and its Resolutions disfigured, for they had recognized the Palestinian Arab people's national rights, including the right of Return, the right to independence, the right to sovereignty over territory and homeland.
In Palestine and on its perimeters, in exile distant and near, the Palestinian Arab people never faltered and never abandoned its conviction in its rights of Return and independence. Occupation, massacres and dispersion achieved no gain in the unabated Palestinian consciousness of self and political identity, as Palestinians went forward with their destiny, undeterred and unbowed. And from out of the long years of trial in ever-mounting struggle, the Palestinian political identity emerged further consolidated and confirmed.

And the collective Palestinian national will forged for itself a political embodiment, the Palestine Liberation Organization, its sole, legitimate representative recognized by the world community as a whole, as well as by related regional and international institutions. Standing on the very rock of conviction in the Palestinian people's inalienable rights, and on the ground of Arab national consensus and of international legitimacy, the PLO led the campaigns of its great people, molded into unity and powerful resolve, one and indivisible in its triumphs, even as it suffered massacres and confinement within and without its home.

And so Palestinian resistance was clarified and raised into the forefront of Arab and world awareness, as the struggle of the Palestinian Arab people achieved unique prominence among the world's liberation movements in the modern era.

The massive national uprising, the intifada, now intensifying in cumulative scope and power on occupied Palestinian territories, as well as the unflinching resistance of the refugee camps outside the homeland, have elevated awareness of the Palestinian truth and right into still higher realms of comprehension and actuality. Now at last the curtain has been dropped around a whole epoch of prevarication and negation.

The intifada has set siege to the mind of official Israel, which has for too long relied exclusively upon myth and terror to deny Palestinian existence altogether. Because of the intifada and its revolutionary irreversible impulse, the history of Palestine has therefore arrived at a decisive juncture.

Whereas the Palestinian people reaffirms most definitively its inalienable rights in the land of its patrimony:

Now by virtue of natural, historical and legal rights, and the sacrifices of successive generations who gave of themselves in defense of the freedom and independence of their homeland; In pursuance of Resolutions adopted by Arab Summit Conferences and relying on the authority bestowed by international legitimacy as embodied in the Resolutions of the United Nations Organization since 1947; And in exercise by the Palestinian Arab people of its rights to self-determination, political independence and sovereignty over its territory, The Palestine National Council, in the name of God, and in the name of the Palestinian Arab people, hereby proclaims the establishment of the State of Palestine on our Palestinian territory with its capital Jerusalem (Al-Quds Ash-Sharif).

The State of Palestine is the state of Palestinians wherever they may be. The state is for them to enjoy in it their collective national and cultural identity, theirs to pursue in it a complete equality of rights. In it will be safeguarded their political and religious convictions and their human dignity by means of a parliamentary democratic system of governance, itself based on freedom of expression and the freedom to form parties.

The rights of minorities will duly be respected by the majority, as minorities must abide by decisions of the majority. Governance will be based on principles of social justice, equality and non-discrimination in public rights of men or women, on grounds of race, religion, color or sex, and the aegis of a constitution which ensures the rule of law and an independent judiciary. Thus shall these principles allow no departure from Palestine's age-old spiritual and civilizational heritage of tolerance and religious coexistence.
The State of Palestine is an Arab state, an integral and indivisible part of the Arab nation, at one with that nation in heritage and civilization, with it also in its aspiration for liberation, progress, democracy and unity. The State of Palestine affirms its obligation to abide by the Charter of the League of Arab States, whereby the coordination of the Arab states with each other shall be strengthened. It calls upon Arab compatriots to consolidate and enhance the reality of state, to mobilize potential, and to intensify efforts whose goal is to end Israeli occupation.

The State of Palestine proclaims its commitment to the principles and purposes of the United Nations, and to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. It proclaims its commitment as well to the principles and policies of the Non-Aligned Movement.

It further announces itself to be a peace-loving State, in adherence to the principles of peaceful co-existence. It will join with all states and peoples in order to assure a permanent peace based upon justice and the respect of rights so that humanity's potential for well-being may be assured, an earnest competition for excellence may be maintained, and in which confidence in the future will eliminate fear for those who are just and for whom justice is the only recourse.

In the context of its struggle for peace in the land of Love and Peace, the State of Palestine calls upon the United Nations to bear special responsibility for the Palestinian Arab people and its homeland. It calls upon all peace-and freedom-loving peoples and states to assist it in the attainment of its objectives, to provide it with security, to alleviate the tragedy of its people, and to help it terminate Israel's occupation of the Palestinian territories.

The State of Palestine herewith declares that it believes in the settlement of regional and international disputes by peaceful means, in accordance with the U.N. Charter and resolutions. With prejudice to its natural right to defend its territorial integrity and independence, it therefore rejects the threat or use of force, violence and terrorism against its territorial integrity or political independence, as it also rejects their use against territorial integrity of other states.

Therefore, on this day unlike all others, November 15, 1988, as we stand at the threshold of a new dawn, in all honor and modesty we humbly bow to the sacred spirits of our fallen ones, Palestinian and Arab, by the purity of whose sacrifice for the homeland our sky has been illuminated and our Land given life. Our hearts are lifted up and irradiated by the light emanating from the much blessed intifada, from those who have endured and have fought the fight of the camps, of dispersion, of exile, from those who have borne the standard for freedom, our children, our aged, our youth, our prisoners, detainees and wounded, all those ties to our sacred soil are confirmed in camp, village, and town.

We render special tribute to that brave Palestinian Woman, guardian of sustenance and Life, keeper of our people's perennial flame. To the souls of our sainted martyrs, the whole of our Palestinian Arab people that our struggle shall be continued until the occupation ends, and the foundation of our sovereignty and independence shall be fortified accordingly.

Therefore, we call upon our great people to rally to the banner of Palestine, to cherish and defend it, so that it may forever be the symbol of our freedom and dignity in that homeland, which is a homeland for the free, now and always.

In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful:
“Say: 'O God, Master of the Kingdom, Thou givest the Kingdom to whom Thou wilt, and seizes the Kingdom from whom Thou wilt, Thou exalted whom Thou wilt, and Thou abasest whom Thou wilt; in Thy hand is the good; Thou are powerful over everything.”
## Annex.

### Regulatory Framework and Authorities for Planning in the West Bank

(World Bank 2008:35-6)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Legal and regulatory framework and authorities</th>
<th>PA administered areas (A &amp; B)</th>
<th>Area C – Palestinian localities</th>
<th>Area C – Israeli settlements</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Building and Planning Regulations for Local Councils, Draft Regulation No. 2 (1996)</td>
<td></td>
<td>• Military Order 418</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Building and Planning Regulations Outside the Planned Areas Draft Regulation No. () (1996)</td>
<td></td>
<td>• Military Order 604</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Agriculture Law</td>
<td>• Military Order 783</td>
<td>• Military Order 895</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Registration Law</td>
<td>• Military Order 860</td>
<td>• Military Order 1043</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- Note: This list of laws, regulations, and military orders includes most of the key pieces of regulation, but is not comprehensive, particularly in the case of Israeli military orders.
- Sources: Based on information from interviews with officials from the PA Ministry of Local Government as well as Coon, Anthony, “Town Planning Under Occupation: An Examination of the Law and Practice of Town Planning in the Occupied West Bank”, University of Strathclyde, Al Haq, Ramallah 2002.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Legal and regulatory framework and authorities</th>
<th>PA administered areas (A &amp; B)</th>
<th>Area C – Palestinian localities</th>
<th>Area C – Israeli settlements</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Regional Plans</strong></td>
<td>• Higher Planning Committee (PA Ministries and service authorities.) • District Planning Committees</td>
<td>Supreme Planning Council – General Sub-committee and Central Planning Department – Israeli Civil Administration</td>
<td>Supreme Planning Council – Settlement Sub-committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Municipal/ Local Master Plans</strong></td>
<td>• Higher Planning Committee • District Planning Committees • Municipalities and local planning committees (village councils) may prepare plans</td>
<td>Supreme Planning Council – General Sub-committee and Central Planning Department – Israeli Civil Administration</td>
<td>Supreme Planning Council – Settlement Sub-committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Detailed Area Plans</strong></td>
<td>• Higher Planning Committee • District Planning Committees • Municipalities and local planning committees (village councils) may prepare plans</td>
<td>Supreme Planning Council and Central Planning Department – Israeli Civil Administration</td>
<td>Supreme Planning Council – Settlement Sub-committee Jewish Regional Councils designated as &quot;special planning committees&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Within municipal master plan</strong></td>
<td>Municipal authorities</td>
<td>Not applicable (no municipalities exist in Area C, only village councils)</td>
<td>Jewish municipal or regional councils designated as &quot;special planning committees&quot;, otherwise Supreme Planning Council and Central Planning Department – Israeli Civil Administration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Within village master plan</strong></td>
<td>District planning committee</td>
<td>Supreme Planning Council and Central Planning Department – Israeli Civil Administration</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Outside master plan area</strong></td>
<td>District planning committee</td>
<td>Supreme Planning Council and Central Planning Department – Israeli Civil Administration</td>
<td>Supreme Planning Council and Central Planning Department – Israeli Civil Administration</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Annex 6: Structure of donor Coordination in the WB & GS, 1998

(Brynen 2000:88)

Steering Committee of Multilateral Track, Middle East Peace Process

- Ad-hoc liaison Committee (AHLC)
  - Senior representatives of major donors

- World Bank
  - Holst Fund; Technical Assistance; Trust Fund; Emergency Rehab. Program

- Joint Liaison Committee (JLC)
  - PNA, Israel, Norway, US, EU, Japan

- Local Aid Coordination Committee (LACC)
  - PNA local donor representatives

- UN Special Coordinator’s Office (UNSCO)
  - Coordination of UN agencies (UNRWA, UNDP, UNICEF, WHO, others)

- Multilateral working groups
  - Arms Control and Regional Security (ACRS)
  - Environment
  - Refugees (RWG)
  - Regional Economic Development (REDWG)
  - Water

Consultative Group (CG)
- Senior and technical representatives of all donors, UN agencies

Task Force on Project Implementation
- PNA, local donor representatives, UN agencies

Sectoral Working Groups (SWGs)
## Annex.

Edited edition from: PA General Budget for Ramallah

(PMOF 2014:20-22)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank Per Budget Size</th>
<th>Institution</th>
<th>Financial Budget in ₪100 × NIS</th>
<th>Percentage of Total Budget</th>
<th>Sector</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>51</td>
<td>Negotiations Affairs Department</td>
<td>2,080</td>
<td>0.02%</td>
<td>Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50</td>
<td>Investment Encouragement Authority</td>
<td>4,271</td>
<td>0.03%</td>
<td>Economy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>49</td>
<td>Industrial Cities General Authority</td>
<td>4,840</td>
<td>0.04%</td>
<td>Economy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>48</td>
<td>Ministry of Women Affairs</td>
<td>6,128</td>
<td>0.05%</td>
<td>Social Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>47</td>
<td>alIfta’ House</td>
<td>7,021</td>
<td>0.05%</td>
<td>Social Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46</td>
<td>Standards and Quality Authority</td>
<td>8,310</td>
<td>0.06%</td>
<td>Economy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45</td>
<td>Ministry of Media</td>
<td>9,498</td>
<td>0.07%</td>
<td>Social Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44</td>
<td>Central Elections Committee</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>0.08%</td>
<td>Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43</td>
<td>Ministry of Planning and Administration (MOPAD)</td>
<td>10,296</td>
<td>0.08%</td>
<td>Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42</td>
<td>Diwan of Financial and Administrative Monitoring</td>
<td>13,715</td>
<td>0.10%</td>
<td>Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41</td>
<td>Environment Authority</td>
<td>13,860</td>
<td>0.10%</td>
<td>Infrastruct.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40</td>
<td>Public Expenditures</td>
<td>16,000</td>
<td>0.12%</td>
<td>Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39</td>
<td>Ministry of Culture</td>
<td>18,690</td>
<td>0.14%</td>
<td>Social Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38</td>
<td>Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics</td>
<td>19,445</td>
<td>0.15%</td>
<td>Economy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37</td>
<td>Ministry of Tourism and Archaeology</td>
<td>20,222</td>
<td>0.15%</td>
<td>Economy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36</td>
<td>Palestinian News and Information Agency – Wafa</td>
<td>20,082</td>
<td>0.15%</td>
<td>Social Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>Land Authority</td>
<td>20,542</td>
<td>0.16%</td>
<td>Social Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34</td>
<td>Border Control Authority</td>
<td>20,810</td>
<td>0.17%</td>
<td>Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33</td>
<td>NGOs, CBOs and Human Rights Affairs</td>
<td>22,326</td>
<td>0.18%</td>
<td>Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>Diwan of Supreme Judge</td>
<td>28,000</td>
<td>0.20%</td>
<td>Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>Ministry of Communications and IT</td>
<td>30,029</td>
<td>0.20%</td>
<td>Infrastruct.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>Council of Ministers</td>
<td>34,261</td>
<td>0.26%</td>
<td>Infrastruct.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>Ministry of Labour</td>
<td>35,914</td>
<td>0.27%</td>
<td>Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs</td>
<td>44,410</td>
<td>0.34%</td>
<td>Social Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>Palestinian Water Authority</td>
<td>49,824</td>
<td>0.38%</td>
<td>Infrastruct.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>Ministry of Jerusalem Affairs</td>
<td>50,725</td>
<td>0.38%</td>
<td>Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>Ministry of Public Works and Housing</td>
<td>52,393</td>
<td>0.40%</td>
<td>Infrastruct.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>Ministry of Justice</td>
<td>53,576</td>
<td>0.40%</td>
<td>Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>Ministry of Economy</td>
<td>55,016</td>
<td>0.42%</td>
<td>Economy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rank</td>
<td>Institution</td>
<td>Financial Budget in ₪000 × NIS</td>
<td>Percentage of Total Budget</td>
<td>Sector</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>PLC</td>
<td>56,976</td>
<td>0,43%</td>
<td>Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Ministry of Transportation</td>
<td>58,470</td>
<td>0,44%</td>
<td>Infrastruct.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Power and Natural Resources Authority</td>
<td>61,415</td>
<td>0,46%</td>
<td>Infrastruct.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Higher Council of Youth and Sport</td>
<td>67,570</td>
<td>0,51%</td>
<td>Social Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Higher Council of Justice</td>
<td>86,726</td>
<td>0,65%</td>
<td>Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Ministry of Agriculture</td>
<td>98,202</td>
<td>0,74%</td>
<td>Economy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Financial Reserves</td>
<td>100,000</td>
<td>0,76%</td>
<td>Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Radio and Television Authority</td>
<td>101,867</td>
<td>0,77%</td>
<td>Social Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Diwan of Public Employees</td>
<td>108,446</td>
<td>0,82%</td>
<td>Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Ministry of Waqf and Religion Affairs</td>
<td>130,889</td>
<td>0,99%</td>
<td>Social Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Ministry of Finance</td>
<td>142,014</td>
<td>1,07%</td>
<td>Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Ministry of Local Government (MLOG)</td>
<td>161,130</td>
<td>1,22%</td>
<td>Infrastruct.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Embassies</td>
<td>200,253</td>
<td>1,51%</td>
<td>Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Presidents Office</td>
<td>209,847</td>
<td>1,58%</td>
<td>Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Public Lending Service</td>
<td>220,000</td>
<td>1,66%</td>
<td>Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>PLO Institutions</td>
<td>310,979</td>
<td>2,35%</td>
<td>Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Ministry of Prisoners</td>
<td>442,407</td>
<td>3,34%</td>
<td>Social Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Affairs of the Retired</td>
<td>900,000</td>
<td>6,80%</td>
<td>Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Ministry of Health</td>
<td>1,405,971</td>
<td>10,62%</td>
<td>Social Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Ministry of Social Affairs</td>
<td>1,411,579</td>
<td>10,66%</td>
<td>Social Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Ministry of Education and Higher Education</td>
<td>2,544,698</td>
<td>19,22%</td>
<td>Social Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Ministry of Interior and National Security</td>
<td>3,702,012</td>
<td>27,96%</td>
<td>Government</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TOTAL BUDGET** | ₪13,240,637 | 100,00% |

**A** | Government Sector | ₪6,362,978 | 48,06% |
| **of which** | Control and Security Sector | ₪3,728,338 | 28,16% |
| **of which** | Judicial, anti-Corruption and Human Rights Systems | ₪209,363 | 1,58% |

**B** | Social Affairs Sector | ₪6,211,270 | 46,91% |

**C** | Infrastructure Sector | ₪433,437 | 3,27% |

**D** | Economy Sector | ₪232,952 | 1,76% |

**MOPAD and MOLG combined** | ₪171,426 | 1,30% |
imaginations, otherness, and (de)colonization in antispaces of sumud

1914 - 2014

© Natasha Aruri