

Ailing the Process: Political Parties and Consolidation of Democracy  
in Kosovo

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## Table of Contents

<b>Introduction .....</b>	<b>7</b>
<b>1. Theoretical Framework .....</b>	<b>12</b>
1.1. Theories of democracy .....	12
1.2. Theories of democratisation .....	22
1.2.1. Socio-cultural theoretical approach .....	25
1.2.2. System theoretical approach .....	27
1.2.3. Structural theoretical approach .....	28
1.2.4. The actor oriented theoretical approach (Micro level) .....	29
1.3. Defining consolidation of democracy .....	31
1.4. Theoretical approaches in studying Political Parties .....	37
1.4.1. Definition of political party .....	41
1.4.2. Functionalist theory of political parties .....	44
1.5. Theorising correlation between political parties and democracy consolidation ...	55
<b>2. Political System of Kosovo .....</b>	<b>72</b>
2.1. Historical background up to 1998-99 War .....	72
2.2. Political development after the war and constitutional structure .....	75
2.3. Kosovo electoral system .....	81
2.4. Kosovo context in theories of democratisation .....	82
<b>3. Research Methodology .....</b>	<b>85</b>
3.1. The case of study .....	85
3.2. Research model .....	87
3.2.1. Choosing the data .....	90
3.2.2. Data collection .....	93
3.2.3. Data working through .....	97
3.2.4. Data analysis .....	98
3.3. Validity and reliability issue .....	99
3.4. Criticism .....	101
<b>4. Historical Development of Political Parties in Kosovo .....</b>	<b>103</b>
4.1. Introduction .....	103
4.2. Chronological development of parties in Kosovo party system .....	105
4.3. Conclusion .....	127

<b>5. All but None - the Representation Function of Parties in Kosovo .....</b>	<b>130</b>
5.1. Introduction .....	130
5.2. "Freezing Hypothesis" .....	135
5.3. "Freezing Theory" in Kosovo socio-political context .....	137
5.4. Ideological orientation of Kosovo parties .....	149
5.5. Parties floating above the society .....	160
5.6. Conclusion .....	162
<b>6. <i>Te l'est mon bon plaisir</i> - The Integration Function of Parties in Kosovo .....</b>	<b>165</b>
6.1. Introduction .....	165
6.2. Anchoring citizens by ideas and goals (symbols) .....	174
6.2.1. Individual-party linkages .....	181
6.2.2. Integration, modernization, and provincial-leader based parties .....	188
6.2.3. Movement of party elites from one party to another .....	190
6.2.4. Electoral volatility .....	195
6.3. Orienting citizens toward policy options .....	197
6.3.1. Relation of parties to their social structure .....	197
6.4. Making citizens feel part of the process of collective choice .....	199
6.4.1. Voter turnout .....	200
6.5. Conclusion .....	202
<b>7.0. Discrediting Democracy - The Legitimation Function of Parties in Kosovo ..</b>	<b>204</b>
7.1. Introduction .....	204
7.2. The dilemma of block transition and the legitimacy structure of Kosovo democracy .....	208
7.3. Political parties as legitimation actors .....	210
7.4. Neither members nor voters, rather clients - inner party democracy .....	211
7.4.1. Inclusiveness .....	214
7.4.2. Centralisation .....	223
7.4.3. Institutionalisation .....	229
7.5. Policy making .....	233
7.6. Party Competition .....	237
7.7. Conclusion .....	240
<b>8. Politics without Policies - The Innovation Function of Parties in Kosovo .....</b>	<b>242</b>
8.1. Introduction .....	242

8.2. Emptiness, vagueness, and the populist approach of parties vs. their innovation .....	244
8.3. Policy sectors and innovation function of parties .....	251
8.4. Conclusion .....	265
<b>9. Exploiting the State - The Governing Function of Parties in Kosovo .....</b>	<b>267</b>
9.1. Introduction .....	267
9.2. Power as a “Cake” - Governing to exploit the state .....	274
9.2.1. Party finances .....	275
9.3. First Politicisation, then State Capture .....	279
9.3.1. Public administration and public companies .....	282
9.3.2. Public procurement and government contracts .....	284
9.3.3. Privatisation .....	286
9.3.4. Budget allocation.....	287
9.3.5. Rule of law .....	288
9.4. Establishing, maintaining and expanding clientele, patronage, corruption, clans, nepotism.....	288
9.4.1. Party Patronage .....	290
9.4.2. Clientelism .....	291
9.4.3. Corruption .....	293
9.4.4. Clans and Nepotism.....	295
9.5. Conclusion .....	295
<b>10. Unpredictable Developments - Future Prospects .....</b>	<b>297</b>
<b>11. Conclusion .....</b>	<b>309</b>
<b>12. References .....</b>	<b>314</b>
<b>13. Annex .....</b>	<b>333</b>

## Abstract

System transformation is a process that has its beginning and flow, and gradually arrives at the closing stages, that are likely to bring into being the intended system, though no system is safe from rolling back. Notwithstanding the considerable achievements of Kosovo democracy on system transformation, above all on the transition from an authoritarian to a democratic system, the consolidation phase has so far proved to be overly long and compromised, making the future and end results of the process highly unpredictable. Along with other internal and external multilevel actors determining developments on the consolidation phase within the complexity of the system transformation process, political parties are, generally regarded as irreplaceable institutions in a representative democracy. Their position at the second level of democracy consolidation, influencing the other three levels of the democracy consolidation structure, sets the consolidation process decisively dependent on them. The way and extent to which political parties perform their expected functions: representation; integration; legitimation; innovation; and governing, have a determining effect on democracy consolidation prospects. Indisputably, their short-term poor performance, impedes, and later makes the rolling back of the consolidation process more likely. The impact political parties have on the democracy consolidation process is amplified as it takes place in an environment of high-level state and society party-driven politicisation, as currently is the case in Kosovo. Usually, the consolidation of internationally sponsored democracies entails democracy domestication, a process where parties are unavoidable to teach and inculcate democracy among and within society. Yet, since parties as the major institutions and driving forces within the process of democracy consolidation, fail to perform their normatively expected functions, there is no one to replace them particularly in a highly politicised society offering little space and opportunity for other substitution actors. Likewise, they destructively affect the prospects of the process. Political parties in Kosovo are found to perform their functions poorly, consequently ailing the democracy consolidation process at the current level of visual negative consolidation, with highly unpredicted prospects.

## **Abbreviations**

- AAK** – *Aleanca per Ardhmerine e Kosoves* (Alliance for the Future of Kosovo)
- ADK** – *Alternativa Demokratike e Kosoves* (Democratic Alternative of Kosovo)
- AKR** – *Aleanca Kosova e Re* (New Kosova Alliance)
- BK** – *Balli Kombetar* (National Front)
- BSDAK** – *Bošnjачka Stranka Demokratske Akcije Kosova* (Bosnian Party of Democratic Action of Kosovo)
- CEC** – Central election Committee
- DRK** – *Demokracia e Re e Kosoves* (New Democracy of Kosovo)
- EULEX** – European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo
- GIG** – *Građanska Inicijativa Gora* (Citizen Initiative Gora)
- ICG** – International Crisis Group
- ICO** – International Civil Office
- IRDK** – *Inicijativa e Re Demokratike e Kosoves* (New Democratic Initiative of Kosovo)
- KAP** – Kosovo Agency of Privatisation
- KDI** - Kosovo Democratic Institute
- KDTP** – *Kosovo Demokratik Türk Partisi* (Kosovo Democratic Turkish Party)
- KEK** – Kosovo Energy Corporation J.S.C
- LB** – *Levizja per Bashkim* (The Movement for Unification)
- LBD** – *Levizja e Bashkuar Demokratike* (United Democratic Movement)
- LBI** – *Levizja per Bashkim dhe Integrim* (Movement for Unification and Integration)
- LDD** – *Lidhja Demokratike e Dardanise* (Democratic League of Dardania)
- LDK** – *Lidhja Demokratike e Kosoves* (Democratic League of Kosovo)
- LDSH** – *Levizja Demokratike Shqiptare* (Albanian Democratic Movement)
- LKÇK** – *Lëvizja Kombëtare për Çlirimin e Kosovës* (National Movement for the Liberation of Kosovo)
- LPK** – *Lëvizja Popullore e Kosoves* (Peoples' Movement of Kosovo)
- NCPK** – *Narodna Crnogorska Partija Kosova* (People's Montenegrins Party of Kosovo)
- ORA** – *Inicijativa Qytetare* (Citizens Initiative)
- OSCE** – Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
- PD** – *Partia e Drejtësisë* (Justice Party)
- PBD** – *Partia e Bashkimit Demokratike* (Democratic Union Party)
- PDA** – *Partia Demokratike e Ashkalinjeve* (Democratic Party of Ashkali)

**PDAK** – *Partia Demokratike e Ashkalinjeve te Kosoves* (Democratic Ashkali Party of Kosovo)

**PDK** - *Partia Demokratike e Kosoves* (Democratic Party of Kosovo)

**PDKI** – *Partia Demokristiane per Integrim* (Demochristian Party for Integration)

**PEK** – *Partia Ekologjike e Kosoves* (Ecologic Party of Kosovo)

**PFK** – *Partia Fshatre e Kosoves* (Peasants Party of Kosovo)

**PGJK** – *Partia e te Gjelberve te Kosoves* (Green Party of Kosovo)

**PLK** – *Partia Liberale e Kosoves* (Liberal Party of Kosovo)

**PNDSh** – *Partia Nacionale Demokratike Shqiptare* (Albanian National Democratic Party)

**PPDK** – *Partia e Progresit Demokratik e Kosoves* (Party of Democratic Progress of Kosovo)

**PPK** – *Partia e Pensionistev te Kosoves* (Party of Pensioners of Kosovo)

**PPK** – *Partia Parlamentare e Kosoves* (Parliamentary Party of Kosovo)

**PPSH** - *Partia Popullore Shqiptare* (Albanian People's Party)

**PQLK** – *Partia Liberale e Qendres e Kosoves* (Liberal Centre Party of Kosovo)

**PREBK** – *Partia Rome e Bashkuar e Kosoves* (United Roma party of Kosovo)

**PReK** – *Partia e Re e Kosoves* (New Party of Kosovo)

**PSDK** – *Partia Social Demokratike e Kosoves* (Social Democratic Party of Kosovo)

**PSHDK** – *Partia Shqiptare Demokristiane e Kosoves* (Albanian Christian Democratic Party of Kosovo)

**PSK** – *Partia Socialiste e Kosoves* (Socialist Party of Kosovo)

**PTK** – Post and Telecommunication of Kosova

**SDAK** – *Stranka Demokratske Akcije Kosova* (Party of Democratic Action for Kosovo)

**SDSKM** – *Srpska Demokratska Stranka Kosovo i Metohije* (Serbian Democratic Party of Kosovo and Metohije)

**SLS** – *Samostalna Liberalna Stranka* (Independent Liberal Party)

**SPO** – *Srpski Pokret Otpora* (Serbian Resistance Movement)

**UD** – *Unioni Demokratik* (Democratic Union)

**UNDP** – United Nations Development Programme

**UNIKOMB** – *Partia e Unitetit Kombetar Shqiptar* (Albanian Party of National Unity)

**UNMIK** – United Nations Interim Administration in Kosovo

**UNOSEK** – United Nations Office of the Special Envoye for Kosovo

**UShDK** – *Unioni Shqiptare Demokristian* (Albanian Union of Christian Democrats)

**VAKAT** – *Koalicija VAKAT* (Coalition VAKAT)

## Introduction

Dealing with something formless, being developed, consistently changing, and with unpredictable outcomes, it is not an easy task but a pretty challenging one. This is the best way to describe our research and possible challenges associated with it. The Kosovo party system and its political parties in general have not yet taken their final and stable form. It is characterised by changes on a daily basis with not a foreseeable, straightforward future. The democratization process in Kosovo, particularly the consolidation stage is still highly fluid, standing mostly on foreign legs. Observing, studying, and theorising such currently amorphous processes and phenomena, is very much challenging by itself. Of course, studying and conceptualising stable and already formed phenomena is much simpler. However, intending to shed a piece of light on the process of consolidation of democracy that Kosovo is currently undergoing, and the role political parties play in this process, I decided to undertake a scientific study to discover the relationship between political parties and the democracy consolidation process in Kosovo. Finding out the actual role parties are performing within the process brings out possible workable solutions to thrust forward the consolidation, hitherto appearing not to have given effect.

As a field of study in general, it still lacks sufficient theoretical development. On the other side, as a contextualised case of study, it is, up to now fully unexplored. In this regard, the research is very important for scientific development in general, furthering the growth of theories and adding to scientific knowledge about the role of political parties in democracy consolidation, though contextualised particularly for the process in Kosovo. The field of political parties in general have been researched a lot, even if in terms of meta theories, still not sufficiently. Moreover, democratization as a process and how democracy shapes political parties has also been to a large extent explored. Yet, concerning the role of parties in the consolidation of democracy, it is more to be expected. The theoretical emptiness and vagueness in the field of study, makes the research more challenging, demanding, but also encouraging. Nevertheless, challenges

should be considered as the main thrust to development. It is just one more reason that made up my mind to undertake such a scientific journey into the realm of the role political parties might and do have into democracy consolidation process.

Hopefully, the study will add to scientific knowledge and contribute to moving forward the actual stand of theoretical advancement on the issue in question. Furthermore, the study will help policy makers, and especially political parties themselves, to reconsider their role and contribution on the process of democracy consolidation. It provides an opportunity to better understand their place in the democracy consolidation process and structure, orient themselves to find ways to, and do their best to, inculcate democracy within society and smoothen the consolidation process in general. If irreplaceable institutions such as parties fail to do so, then substituting institutions are hardly able to push forward democracy consolidation. Nevertheless, since being the first study on political parties and democracy consolidation in Kosovo, it will serve as a point of reference as well for international political scientists interested on the issue. It will certainly provide a little knowledge to the younger generation in Kosovo, with currently the majority of them found shut out of the political process, a purer picture of the undergoing system transformation and where Kosovo stands in this regard.

Transplanting theories developed in other contexts is not a wise or doable task. The same applies to theories of political parties. Therefore, they need contextualisation. In our research, the same is applied for available theories developed in other socio-political and economic contexts, referring to them but properly contextualised.

The research is not immune to possible deficiencies that might be associated with it. Firstly, as it is not a highly explored specific area of study, it is hard to find models of research usable that fit our purpose of study. Secondly, there is poor

theoretical development on the relationship of variables, the role of political parties on the one hand, and democracy consolidation on the other, pertaining to insufficient literature on the issue. The subject of analysis is very much fluid and formless, additionally complicates its theorising. Moreover, it is highly challenging to get the information from political parties, usually closed within themselves, especially in terms of valid and reliable data.

Nonetheless, despite many challenges the research is carried out, starting from considering the theories of democracy, then theories of political parties, followed by theories of system transformation and democratisation in general, and lastly trying to theorise the relationship between the role of political parties and the democracy consolidation process. After setting the theoretical groundwork, the study is embodied by the empirical part of the research, comprised of choosing data, collection, analysing, and drawing up the results. Due to the causal relationship between democracy and political parties, I firstly focused on the theories of democracies in general, exploring them and finding the different places and roles political parties have in varieties of democracies. Such consideration facilitated in proceeding to theories of political parties, in order to get a comprehensible view of varieties of theories and approaches in studying political parties and party systems in general. On the other side, it helped to deepen the insight into the theories and approaches of system transformation in general and the democracy consolidation process in particular, though quite varied and requiring to be contextualised in time and space. In this way, the research narrowed down to the theoretical framework of our study, building up a theoretical relationship between the political parties as an independent variable and democracy consolidation as a dependent one. Subsequently, after a thorough and in depth study of the theories and study approaches at all three above-mentioned fields of study, the actor oriented synthesising approach of consolidation structure developed by Merkel (1999) is found to be very useful for our case study. It offers enough space to make an empirically measurable correlation between the role of political parties and the democracy consolidation

process. On the other hand, since the research focus is on the role of parties in this process, we were certain to focus on the functionalist approach of political parties.

After drawing up the theoretical framework to measure the role of parties on the democracy consolidation process in Kosovo, the research initially moved on with explaining the Kosovo socio-political and economic context, its general description and particularities it has as a political system, trying to find out how it fits into such a theoretical framework. It avoids possible mistakes in using and misusing theories not proper to the Kosovo context. Before going to an in depth empirical research to measure the role of political parties in democracy consolidation, a general chapter on the historical development of parties in Kosovo is drawn. In this regard, we shed light upon the historical development of the Kosovo party system, its causes, stability, and future development. Despite the fact that Kosovo counts around 50 parties, it was decided to deal with only five major parliamentary parties of the Albanian community, since they count for 90% of the population, within the time span after the 1999 war, and superficially recalling into the pre-war period.

Relying on the established theoretical framework, after the general picture of the context parties operate, and their historical development, it opened the way to dig out into the empirical part to measuring parties' functions and their impact on the democracy consolidation prospects. For each particular party function there is a single chapter measuring empirically all indicators of each function. The chapter on future prospects of such a relationship based on the actual trends of development, and a concluding chapter summarising overall the research findings.

The empirical part of the research relies on qualitative research. The interviews, document analysis, and content analysis are the three main research methods used. The expert interview is realised through interviewing political party

representatives, civil society activists, and distinguished students of political sciences familiar with the issues. The document analysis and content analysis are used to collect and analyse the data based on the categories and subcategories built on the theoretical framework. In addition to data collected from interviews, party documents such as: statutes, programmes, electoral platforms, and declarations are the primary data on which the thesis research relies. Moreover, media reports, international organisations reports, etc., are used as secondary data. Data collection was not an easy issue, especially conducting interviews. Some party representatives hesitated to respond in the name of parties, while some others agreed to it on conditions of anonymity due to security reasons if information for closed door decision making bodies were to be offered. However, party representatives actually interviewed have offered sufficient information on the issues required. Often the compatibility between the party documents such as party statutes, programmes, and electoral platforms, with the actual functioning of parties appeared unmatched. To omit such a discrepancy, the mentioned documents were related, as well as compared and contrasted, to the parties' inner and outer reality and data collected from interviews. In this regard, most of the time also party declarations were hardly to be found corresponding to the real faces of parties.

Optimistically, the thesis has achieved the attempted aim and it offers a modest contribution to scientific knowledge on the role of political parties in the consolidation of the democracy process. The study is context oriented, but as a model it might be useful, of course with modification, for similar studies conducted in different contexts of time and space designed to measure the role of parties in the democracy consolidation process. Just as our research relied on the research models used for some African democracies, by modifying and making them useable for our case study.

## Chapter 1

### 1. Theoretical Framework

#### 1.1. Theories of democracy

Political parties are considered an indistinguishable and irreplaceable part of democracy. Parties and democracy are interdependent. It is unimaginable to talk of political parties without taking into account modern democracy, which is in turn enabled and designed to function through political parties. Democracies and political parties influence and shape each other. It is almost impossible to study political parties without getting an insight into the democracy, serving as their working and functioning bed. Modern democracies are the environments from which political parties emerge, develop, and are shaped. Both influence and shape each other. Parties affect their environment as much as their environments affect them. Different models of modern representative democracy offer various space and opportunity to political parties, as political parties influence modern representative democracy in a different way.

Hence, in order to understand political parties it is wise from the outset to explore the diversity of theories on democracy. Studying democracy is an intricate task, due to the obscurities some democracies have. The incompatibility between ideal world and complex realities has resulted in varieties of systems and ideologies. As an illustration, it happened with communism. Once encountered with the realities of different worlds, it ended up in communism types of *Maoism*, *Stalinism*, *Enverism*, *Titoism*, and so on. The more spread an ideology is, in more diverse realities, the more likely it is to derivate its forms of varieties. The same experience applies to democracy development. The disparities between the intended ideal democracy and the reality democracy, a transformation that took place throughout history in different political, economic and social settings, resulted in having many and various democracies. Subsequently, diversity of democracies implied the developments of varieties of theories of democracy (Schmidt 2000). The emergence of such democracy diversity is best illustrated

by the study of Collier and Levitsky (1996). Taking into account the large number of democracies, its growth and expansion with the subsequent waves of democratisation, and the persistent danger that due to such transformation and diversity, the concept of democracy itself might deviate from the root bases, Collier and Levitsky (1996) have developed a concept of *democracy with adjectives*. The adjectives are designed to highlight the possible features that assortments of democracies in different contexts have, while preserving the very substance of the basic concept of democracy to be shared among them. Such diversity and variety of democracies is also to be found in the recent wave of democratization that is our concern here, especially a half-way house progress of democracies.

Democracy as a system contains within itself the overall political institutional structure based on social, cultural, and economic conditions. As with each political system, it has its multidimensional aspects presenting complexity in its nature, being, functioning, and structure. Thus, different approaches in studying democracy have so far been set forth, based on what one considers and takes as the focus, be it social bases, cultural prerequisites, constitutional setting, the economic system of the overall political setting, or even the actors inside the institutional structures.

Despite horizontal diversity of democracies, the level of vertical development in democratisation has resulted in the establishment of the minimalist and maximalist scale approach in conceptualising democracy (Collier & Levitsky 1996), placing most current democracies within this scale. Minimalist democracies are considered less demanding, whilst a maximalist one is expected to fulfil a higher democratic standard. Minimalist democracies are conceptualised as an *electoralist* one, whereas *maximalist* democracies are high demanding, performing better in terms of protection of citizens' interests. The label of an *electoralist* democracy covers mainly the presence of a fair, free and competitive election. Its proponents are Schumpeter (1947); Vanhane (1990);

Fukuyama (1993); etc.. The experience of democracy, especially the failure to give its intended effect in some countries, pushed scholars such as O'Donnell and Schmitter (1986); Diamond, Linz, Lipset (1989); Zakaria (1997); and others, to broaden the label of democracy, including other features of a democratic system such as basic civil liberties, freedom of speech, assembly and association. In this way, creating another extended concept of democracy with higher requirements constituting what is known as the *procedural minimum democracy*. Later on, due to the experience of some democracies in certain parts of the world, particularly in Latin America, Turkey, etc., challenged by powerful veto players, or as Valenzuela (1990) calls it *tutelary power*, raised a need to expand further the concept of democracy by involving the principle that democratically elected governments ought to have effective power to govern. It brought up the *expanded procedural minimum democracy*. The proponents of this conceptualization are Karl & Schmitter (1991); Huntington (1991); Valenzuela (1992); etc.. Another concept of democracy that characterises democracies in established industrial countries (including associated political, social, and economic features) is the *prototypical conception of established industrial democracies*. It is close to the *maximalist* conception of democracy counting additional criteria such as socioeconomic equality, and high levels of popular participation in economic, social and political institutions. The last type of democracy is more of an ideal, rather than a type of democracy and is barely evident even in the most developed and oldest democracies.

The main reason for considering different theories of democracy here is that with different types of democracy theories and systems there are different positions, focuses, and levels of importance to the inner and outer actors within the institutional structure of democracy consolidation. In our case, the core concern are political parties, not ignoring the importance of other actors but trying to isolate them as much as possible, prioritising political parties compared to the other potential and actual actors influencing democracy and democratization as a process, and above all the consolidation phase. Therefore, exploring theories of

democracies facilitates the insight into the specific position, role, and functions of parties within the consolidation structure.

In our case study, it would be a fuzzy decision to rely on the *electoralist* - minimalist conception of democracy, since parties are only implicitly among the major actors within the consolidation structure. The conduct of free and partly fair elections is to some extent also a result of the presence of outer actors – the international community in Kosovo, pushing forward democracy advancement, and so it is not exclusively because of the attitudes and behaviours of inner political actors. If that was the case, according to minimalist requirements, Kosovo could already be classified as a consolidated democracy, since three periodic national elections and peaceful change of governments have already taken place. Actually, there are many democracy deficiencies, or as Merkel (2004) calls it, “defects” to be found, especially in terms of citizenship rights, civil liberties, election fraud, and so on. In other words, Kosovo democracy has failed so far to give effect in terms of protection of citizens’ interests.

Moreover, despite minimalist and maximalist conceptualisations of democracy, taking into account different focuses within democracy, various scholars have placed democracies under a range of labels. In order to find out the party positions within democracy, presented in the following are different types of democracies, categorised based on the points of views and focuses of the scholars theorising them.

One of the most well-known and often cited minimalist conceptualization of representative democracy is Dahl’s *Polyarchie*. According to him, a system is valued as a democratic one if it fulfils two major elements essential for democratic order: political competition and participation. The fulfilment of these two elements is dependent on establishment and functioning of eight necessary institutions: *freedom to form and join organizations, freedom of expression, the*

*right to vote, eligibility for public office, the right of political leaders to compete for support and votes, alternative sources of information, free and fair elections, institutions for making government policies dependent on votes, and other expressions of preferences* (Dahl 1971, 3). Dahl's *polyarchie* is mainly considered with institutional and procedural objectives and not an end result definition of democracy, as Schmidt (2000, 395) puts it. Looking from the perspective of Lincoln's famous notion of democracy, it focuses mostly on 'government of the people', and 'by the people' dimensions, but not explicitly 'for the people'. In other words, *polyarchie* deals more with the input rather than the output side of the political system. In this regard, it constitutes a procedural and not a substantive definition of democracy. The political parties in *polyarchie*, though not explicitly highlighted, are implicitly considered as irreplaceable institutions. The elections are at the centre point, and parties in this regard are important actors, but no explicit arrangement for the measurement of their role in the democratisation process is offered, making operational and measurable correlation between parties and democracy consolidation quite difficult and hardly attainable.

Pluralist democracy is another type of representative democracy, derived from general theories of pluralism. In a pluralist democracy the political and social heterogeneity, their representation, and guarantee of such diversity of interests, is of vital importance. One of the key values of representative democracy is the representation of plural interest of different groups of society through different organisations including political parties. Parties in this case unify, aggregate, and represent the diverse interests arising from the existence of various groups. The preservation and sustainability of pluralism is of primary importance for democracy. Thus, parties in a pluralist democracy are largely supposed to form the integration and representation functions, assessed as the intermediary institutions, around which heterogeneity of interests in a pluralist society is organised. Pluralist democracy is a result of a diversity of interests available within a society. The key purpose of a representative democracy is to ensure that

decision-making processes represent, and it is an end result of such heterogeneity. Regarding the representation in a pluralist democracy, Neumann (1986, 133, cited from Schmidt 2000, 229) considers pluralist democracy as the representation of voters through accountable and responsible representatives. Among the proponents of these theories are Robert Dahl (1971), Ernst Fraenkel (1991), Anthony Downs (1957), etc..

The apprehension is that representative democracy has enabled the concentration of great and uncontrollable power to the elite, and as such softened the virtues of democracy; this has led to the emergence of the ideas and theories of modern participatory democracy. It is believed that due to the democratic transformation from a direct to a representative one, less opportunity for people to participate in the decision-making process is offered, which in turn has alienated citizens from the decision making process. Therefore, modern democracy requires that intermediary institutions be much more democratic and open to citizens to ensure opportunities for participation. The goal here is to provide more chances and opportunities for participation and to increase the democratic values through democratic ways of organising participation. In addition, the extension of the democratic ways of organisation should not be confined just to political, but also embrace other social organizations, developing the best way to ensure the chances of participation and maintain democratic principles.

Despite obvious scepticism on the ability and readiness of the masses to participate in decision-making, there is a wide belief that the masses are sufficiently skilful and able to participate, and that the opportunity to participate should be offered to them permanently. The role of parties in a participatory democracy is the transmission one featured by the bottom up approach as a model of organization. Schumpeter (1942) doubts the readiness and capacity of people to participate. However, many have refuted such doubts. Among them

Scharpf (1970) supports the idea of participatory democracy on the grounds (though not everyone will participate) that having chances to participate and more participation is better rather than not having it at all. Regarding the role of parties in a participatory democracy, the inner party organization builds the necessary requirements to ensure and expand participatory democracy. The lack of inner party democracy damages representative democracy itself in general, since people's voice in the decision-making process is less heard, questioning the very reason of democracy. In young and not yet consolidated democracies, and in democracies based on societies with little experience with democratic norms and values, the inner party democracy is an indispensable requirement for democracy, in order for it to be taught and inculcated among and within society, and socialise society with democratic values and norms in general. The relationship between inner party democracy and participatory democracy is articulated well by Poguntke (1994) while he considers the organizational structure of Greens in Germany, their original intention to create a party organisation based on the participatory principles of democracy and challenges encountered on their way to achieve initially intended objectives.

The economic theory of democracy, from the name itself makes it clear that it is highly influenced by economic theories transplanted and applied on the theories of democracy. The main proponent of this theory is Schumpeter (1942), who emphasises the relationship between economics and politics, and in particular the relationship between economic and political actors. Here political parties are considered as a means, and democracy as a method, to arrive at political decisions. In this regard, it is also important to mention his sceptical view about the capacity of the masses to govern, stressing more the elite's functions and competition on the democratic government, and their behaviour as being decisive for democracy. Compared to theories of participatory democracy, there is no need for participatory opportunities since the masses have no capacity to participate and govern. The theory utilises the concept of a 'rational actor' used in economic theories.. Downs (1957) develops further the theory, conceptualising

politics as a market, political parties as profit-oriented enterprises struggling to get their votes, and voters as rational customers. The theory has its implications on the theory in democracy, particularly on the way parties are organised and function (Schmidt 2000), since voters are considered rather as social than rational (economic) beings,

By focusing explicitly on actors rather than structures, this theory takes into account political parties as rational actors trying to get into office by maximizing votes through offering the best (products) policies to voters and making them choose what is best for them, making them too rational actors. In this regard, Downs (1957, 25) defines parties as: “...*a team of men seeking to control the governing apparatus by gaining office in duly constituted elections*”. The main criticism directed to economic theories of democracy is related to difficulties in presenting parties as a unitary actor, ignoring the possible heterogeneity and many interests that different individuals and factions inside the party might have. Parties, even extremely ideological ones, are hardly likely to possess only a single interest, particularly personalistic parties where the only source of party cohesion remains the loyalty and to some extent servility toward the party leader. In addition, the voters cannot always be rational, as often they lack information on what exactly structures their political preferences. The place of political parties on this theory of democracy is stated implicitly, the elite’s competition for votes is organised through political parties. Yet, in democracies with poor competition in terms of the ideas and programmes that parties offer, it is difficult for citizens to benefit. Furthermore, if the elite’s behaviour does not substantially reflect the democratic values, it is meaningless to expect fulfilment of democratic criteria from political parties. Moreover, if the masses are not able to take part in the decision-making process, it brings us to the question of how far they are able to decide what the best offering is for them from political parties. As a theory it excludes possible developments within democratic society, lacks the dynamic and transformable dimension, and their implications into the durability and sustainability of democracy itself if such a setting lasts for long. It is possible for

society at a certain stage of its development still to have a lack of necessary information needed for participation, but as a society develops, they could attain this smoothing participation. If such a transformation is possible, then among the major actors of social and political developments are political parties, depending on which direction in general, they choose to take society.

Another model of democracy is Elitist Democracy, developed by Michel Roberts, Pareto, Mosca, etc.. They contest the very substance of a modern representative democracy as being inevitably an elitist one, with everything concentrated on the elites preventing real representation to take place. Elites are in possession of the means needed to manipulate the masses, who are usually ill informed, powerless and excluded from the decision-making process. For that reason, modern democracy in the substantial meaning of the term is no democracy at all. Michel's prominent and widely cited *iron law of oligarchy* demonstrates best such concern. As a theory of political parties it is in fact among the few of meta level, and quite unchallenged up to date. According to them, since such an exploitative arrangement between the masses and the elites is static and inescapable, it is hard to expect any contribution to democracy from political parties. Parties themselves through their organisation and functioning create and sustain a system disenchanted from society elitism.

Different from above mentioned theories of democracies, the 'system theories' of democracies have at their heart the system of democracy in general. With the system analytical democratic theory, the name associated, among others, is that of Niklas Luhmanns (1970). He conceptualises society as a whole, a system made up of different parts or subsystems, organised and functioning within the system. Political parties or the party system within the system in general, is legitimised and located between politics and society, whose main role is to stabilise the political system. Among the criticism made to this theory is its highly

normative approach, ignoring the complex reality characterising political systems especially in transition or a period of flux.

On the other side, the critic theories of democracy, while criticising democracy, as their starting point emphasize their concern that a number of citizens are not well informed and able to make judgements about politics. Among the well-known proponents of this theory are Jürgen Habermas (1992) and Claus Offe (1984). Habermas' idea is that through deliberative debates people can learn democracy and become more active citizens, able to make judgements about politics, and decide for themselves and by themselves. The deliberative type of democracy can be best applied in a representative democracy through inner party democracy, facilitated through political parties. Nevertheless, Offe focuses on the inability of everyone in a democracy to organize and protect their interest, a thing that hinders the real relevance of democracy where interests of all citizens are supposed to be upheld and protected. Hence, the majority principle of democracy, in terms of the wide extent of citizens' interest protection, places democracy as better than all other systems, compared to other systems where the interest of the majority is taken into account (Dahl 1989). Such appraisal of democracy compared to other systems, if referred to the participation opportunity in decision-making, is also supported by Mill's (1861(1958)) argument that the best way to protect ones interest is for themselves to take part in the decision-making. A thing that is not easily implemented in a representative democracy. Offe goes further criticising parties as being concerned mainly with policies that bring re-election and not long term society objectives.

Taking into consideration the variety of theories on democracy, and trying to understand the role and place of parties within different democratic settings, in order to theorise the role of parties within the democratisation process, there is a need to look at theories of democratisation as well. As observed above, political parties have different roles and positions in different democracy theories; from being implicitly referred to, to explicitly conditioning democracy developments

and prospects. Yet, regardless of the focus of theories of democracy, be it at system level; the masses or the elite level; the institutional level; or at the output or input level; etc., it can be concluded that apart from the priority of political parties, representative democracy is hardly thinkable without political parties. However, since our concern are parties at the system transformation process, not democracy as a stable consolidated system, we should further our research on the role and place of parties in the democracy consolidation process. What is their role in this process?

### **1.2. Theories of democratisation**

The near future of the last years of the communist era in Eastern Europe was surprisingly unpredictable for many scholars. Huntington (1984, 217) foresaw the chances of regime change in Eastern Europe – former socialist Europe - being equal to zero. Nonetheless, it took just a couple of years until the snowball, contagion effect of transition throughout the former “red” Europe started. However, it should be pointed out that the snowball of regime change, is not actually matching the snowball of regime consolidation. Despite uniformity in transition in terms of time it happened, the consolidation phase throughout the region is marked by diversity. Huntington argued that such regime transformation was wholly dependent on external factors, particularly requiring the fall of the Soviet empire, from where socialism in Eastern Europe mainly derived its legitimacy. Nevertheless, the Soviet Union and the communist ideology were unable to deal with internal problems and challenges experienced, happened to be defied by its satellites – former socialist European states whose legitimacy was wholly dependent on the Soviet Union that imposed such regime. The development marked the beginning of the new era for this part of Europe, the second phase of the third wave of democratization, part of which is the democratization process of Kosovo as well. That is our concern here.

The regime transformation in Kosovo is part of the third wave of democratization. In his often cited work, Huntington (1991, 15) defined the wave of democratization as “*a group of transitions from non-democratic to democratic*

*regimes that occur within a specified period of time and that significantly outnumber transitions in the opposite direction during that period of time*". Several scholars, including Huntington himself (1991, 44), claim that transition (that is our concern here) belongs to the second period of the third wave, which started in 1974 with the fall of the dictatorial regime in Spain. The Kosovo transition is a part of the third wave, also because there was no reverse wave in between as was the case with the first and second wave; something that is required according to the definition of the wave of democratisation. Nonetheless, others like von Beyme (1994) considers it to be the fourth wave of democratization due to its specifics in terms of the causes of change and the way the change takes place, thus distinguishing it from the third wave. Throughout our research, aiming to mitigate any possible conceptual confusion, our case study is considered part of the third wave.

On the other hand, scholars divided the regime change within the same wave in different phases. Valenzuela (1990) and O'Donnell (1993), among others, conceptualise the second phase within system transformation in the third wave as the second transition. The first phase of transition is the process of installing the democratic institutions, followed by the second, whereby the system is expected to take roots and be consolidated once the democratic institutions are settled. Merkel (1999) goes further by dividing the transition, or as he calls system transformation, into three phases: the first one is the beginning of and the collapse of authoritarian regime, followed by the installation of the democratic institutions, and finalised by the last phase known as the consolidation. Nevertheless, it should be pointed out that there exists no clear-cut division between the two (three) phases, they overlap and influence each other. In our research the third phase of regime transformation will be considered , the consolidation phase.

Moreover, there is no consensus among scholars on the conceptual definition of democracy consolidation as is the case with the definition of democracy itself.

There is a difference in terms of both time span and the level of democracy development for a regime to be recognised as a democratic and consolidated one. The consolidation of a new (democratic) regime<sup>1</sup>, , is a process where democratic institutions once settled are supposed to be stable and function according to democratic standards. Based on the time frame of development, as mentioned above, some consider it as the third phase, with the first one being the breakdown of the authoritarian regime, and the second the installation of the democratic institutions (Merkel 1999), depending how one counts and what's taken into consideration while counting. The heterogeneity on conceptualisations of democratisations is primarily due to complexities the process is characterised with, in terms of time, space and extent. In addition, the diversity of contextualised experiences of the overall system transformation adds to the plurality of the conceptualisation of democratization. However, such heterogeneity is more an opportunity rather than a limitation. Otherwise, inflexible and rigid concepts provide teething troubles while applying static and non-contextualisable concepts, developed in other time and space contexts and not fit for other cases of research. There have been many studies on democratization undertaken so far, with various approaches and for different parts of the world during diverse waves, which of course due to their own peculiarities affect the process itself on their own way. In order to highlight such scientific progress in the field of democratisation, try to make use of it and even contribute to that through this research, in the following some of the major approaches are considered.

The regime change from a non-democratic to a democratic one, starting from the types of non-democratic regimes to the regime consolidation, as an area of study it has been researched a lot though not sufficiently. Scholars of democratisation are concerned with the causes of system transformation, the process of transition, up to consolidation as the end result of such a system transformation.

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<sup>1</sup> Regime is defined as the overall structure of procedures, institutions, and principles constituting the political system, determining the relationship between rulers and the ruled.

The types of non-democratic regimes, where the system transformation starts off, and takes place with the collapse of the regime are divided into: totalitarian, authoritarian, military, post-sultanist and the other forms this has (Linz & Stepan 1996). On the other side, Merkel (1999) conceptualizes all of them under the umbrella of authoritarian regimes. Furthermore, a range of concepts have been coupled with the process of transformation. The one all-encompassing and synthesising concept is developed by Merkel (1999). He conceptualizes the overall process as a system transformation comprising all the three phases, beginning the shift from a non-democratic to consolidation of a democratic regime. It embraces the system change - necessary leading to democracy, and the transition process, up to the consolidation as the last stage within the process. Our concern here is the last phase.

Despite many theoretical approaches used in studying democratization, with the following b focusing on a variety of them, emphasising different issues and consideration, including the consolidation requirements and particularly the place and role of political parties within the process. Such exploration eases progress toward an empirical model for measurement of the role of political parties on the process of democracy consolidation in the context of Kosovo.

### **1.2.1. Socio-cultural theoretical approach**

One of the important theoretical approaches of democracy consolidation is the socio-cultural approach (Dahl 1971, Huber 1997). This theoretical approach deems the social capital as a cultural requirement for a society to be a safe bed for democracy, as Putnam (1993) argues referring to the pioneering and widely known work of Tocqueville (1835 (1976)). According to this theory, the consolidated democracy entails cultural change. Yet, cultural change in turn takes longer, even generational periods, but once consolidated it is for the long term and is resilient to any number of crises. Based on that, it may be concluded that the most stable and relaxed democracies are these that have already fulfilled the cultural prerequisites. In the model given by Merkel, this type of consolidation is labelled as a consolidation of civil society or cultural consolidation. Culture in

general and the political culture in particular provides the safe and fertile environment on which democracy relies and flourishes. In other words, the focal point here is on the overall cultural settings as a precondition for democracy to expand and deepen its roots, ensuring stability.

In our case study, the necessary culture transformation is far from being attained. The culture of Kosovo society lacks historical experience with democracy. During the previous authoritarian regime, it was shaped to fit this regime. In addition, the current trends of development are less promising due to overextension and delays during the transition process, even at an institutional level, which is in turn reflected in cultural transformation prospects. If cultural transformation requires generational changes, then Kosovo society will wait for decades to grow a sustainable culture deeply enrooting democracy and making it immune to possible crises. Kosovo democracy is not yet immune to potential crisis, which would certainly endanger and seriously damage it. The cultural consolidation is quite broad, the role of parties is implicitly evident, as long as parties are considered social institutions, coming out of society and influencing it decidedly through their way of organisations, functions, and ideological orientations. In this way, parties do lend a hand at cultural transformation by means of teaching and spreading democratic values in society, deepening its roots through their organisation and behaviour, nowadays predominantly reflected in the course of the governing level. Parties also help cultural consolidation through the function of integration, socialising society with democracy.

Nevertheless, the direct, operationalisable and scientifically measurable, correlation between parties and consolidation democracy prospects is tricky to build, since the focus of the socio-cultural theoretical approach is principally concerned with the cultural prerequisites of democracy consolidation. To some extent, it might be obvious how far parties put into a democracy consolidation or whether they present an obstacle to it, through their behaviours and attitudes. In the sense of whether they are generating, cultivating and upholding democratic

or non-democratic values in society, to facilitate cultural change taking place, towards development of democratic civic society. In the case of cultural changes, parties are perceived as socialization agents, socializing people with democratic values. Such a function makes parties exclusively social actors, and for the research to rely exclusively on this perception, might confuse other requirements for democratization. In addition, as a theoretical approach it offers no scientifically measurable model for the role of parties on the democracy consolidation process, in particular today where parties even in established democracies are perceived more as political rather than social actors (Katz & Mair 1994). Among the most famous works on political culture is that of Almond and Verba and their concept on *civic* culture (1989, 1-45). In our case study, this theoretical approach is not helpful because no direct empirically measurable link can be established between political culture and parties, and between culture and democratisation in the process of democracy consolidation.

### **1.2.2. System theoretical approach**

A different widespread approach in studying democracy consolidation is the system theoretical approach, having at its heart essentially socio-economic conditions as a necessity for democracy consolidation. The approach covers also modernization theories concerned with the level of economic development and literacy rate, and their relations to democratization (Lipset 1993, Diamond 1992,...). The higher the level of economic development and literacy rate the greater the chances for democracy consolidation. Yet, as a theory it has sometimes been undermined, in the case of some wealthy countries failing to be democracies or with some having large democracy deficits, for instance the case of Singapore or an even more authoritarian regime like Saudi Arabia, or the survival of Indian democracy without a strong economy. Albania during the communist regime under the Enver Hoxha totalitarian rule, had an illiteracy rate equal almost to zero, yet it is regarded as having been one of the cruellest regimes in the world at that time. After regime change Albania is still among countries in the region performing least well on the democratisation process. It is a good example to show the weaknesses of the modernisation theories of

democratisation. Political parties in this theoretical approach are not of primary focus, which is why considering such an approach in our case study would not be a wise choice. Among the well-known proponents of system theories of democratization is Luhmann with his system theories. His argument is that the sub-system making up the larger system as whole are differentiated, interrelated, irreplaceable, autonomous, and no subsystem can play the function of the other. Referring to the failure of the communist system in trying to control social, political, and economic subsystems, due to a scarcity of resources was unable to control them. What is more, as a result it prevented them from functioning and growing properly, consequently leading to the collapse of the overall system.(Merkel 1999, 81). The model of Merkel on democratization has taken a lot from Luhmann's model. The Party system within the general political system is considered as a subsystem as well.

### **1.2.3. Structural theoretical approach**

The centre of attention of this approach is to class relations and international influences shaping the nature of process of democracy consolidation (Starr 1991, Robinson 1996, Whitehead 1996,...). The case of Kosovo democratisation, mainly internationally sponsored, could suite the use of a structural theoretical approach due to its concern with the role of international influences. However, that is not our concern here, but rather it is the role of inner actors within the system: political parties in the process of democracy consolidation. In addition, within the approach much consideration has been given to the institutional structure of the political system itself, such as presidential or parliamentary systems, and whether these systems make democracy consolidation or democracy breakdown more likely (Przeworski et.al. 1996, ...). Compared to the two above-mentioned approaches that refer mainly to the society and social system as a whole, it pays attention also to the structure of political institutions in the system (Reuschemeyer 1992). Yet, not much attention has been given to *intra* state-society structures; though looking at intermediary institutions supposed to bind or at least bridge society and political system, is of pivotal importance to get insight on democracy consolidation.

#### **1.2.4. The actor oriented theoretical approach (Micro level)**

Most of the above mentioned theoretical approaches of democracy consolidation are of a macro level, dealing with social and system requirements for democratization in general. In other words, they tackle the overall building of the democratization, without going into finer details of where most of creation, maintenance, demonstration, and reflection of values and behaviour crucial for democracy consolidation takes place. In the case of Kosovo, regarding the way democratization is taking place, the role of the international community is not dissimilar to that of the fire brigade, only interfering inside the building under exceptional and grave circumstances, in this instance, when there is a significant break in the rules of democracy. The inner-workings of the 'building', namely democracy and democratisation are best approached by actor-oriented theories. It covers also parties as among the most important actors to be studied in order to get a clear picture of where the democratization and democracy consolidation is and is heading to, its defects and shortcomings needed to be omitted and move forward. The role of parties amplifies where there is a high level of state and society politicization, particularly if parties themselves drive and maintain politicisation.

The actor oriented approach is of micro level, it offers space to penetrate inside the structure and institutions concerned in the system, crucial in exploring their specific role and measure it in the process of democracy consolidation. Closely connected with this theoretical approach is the rational choice paradigm, whereby the actors involved commit to the democratization process based on the cost-benefit logic.

In the process of system transformation from authoritarian to democratic moving to democracy consolidation, involves a number of actors whose importance to democratization varies from wave to wave, from phase to phase, and from country to country. Aside from other institutions, the role of political parties during the system transformation on the first wave of democratization was of primary

significance. Parties were the main driving forces for democratization, around whom the classes' interests were mobilised. During the second wave, international influence was crucial with the importance of political parties being secondary to this influence. Then during the transition from authoritarian regime to a democratic one on the recent wave of democratization, parties are not the key motion setters (Lewis 2001). Yet, the consolidation stage in this wave is directly dependent on the political parties, the way and extent they perform their functions, the way they are organised, the objectives they pursue, the way they behave, their identity, and party system as a whole in general. The role of the international community in the case of Kosovo democratisation seems to have softened the role of parties, though it is hard to expect a stable democracy without an active role by political parties. The international community can offer and provide merely external conditions for democracy consolidation. There are inner-structure institutions expected to domesticate democracy, among the most important of these are political parties, particularly in a highly politicised context at all levels with different degrees. Hence, understanding political parties helps us to see the actual position of the democracy consolidation process and its prospects. The commitments of the international community to sponsor and push democratisation forward are not sufficient, if such political will is not present in inner structural institutions. In such cases, the likely results might be the freezing up of the consolidation process and overextension of the transition phase. Nevertheless, overextension of transition and the inability to move forward with consolidation, if it lasts for too long may possibly end up in a very unpredictable future for democracy, easily making a reverse process likely. In this manner, inner institutions might also ail the internationally sponsored democratisation process currently taking place in Kosovo.

Amongst the theoretical approaches mentioned above, the actor oriented one is more suitable for our case study, since we are dealing particularly with political parties as actors in the process of democracy consolidation, their role in such process, and the extent they enhance or diminish the likelihood of consolidation.

Being at the heart of political system, the role of parties in the consolidation of democracy (within the system itself) is of crucial importance and irrefutable. It is unimaginable to have a self-perpetual and sustainable democracy merely relying on the legs of international actors, without having democratic institutions, especially democratic parties, capable of domesticating and enrooting democracy to ensure consolidation.

### ***1.3. Defining consolidation of democracy***

From the very beginning, it should be obvious that there is no consensus on the definition of democracy consolidation. As realised previously, there exists no single conceptualisation even for democracy itself, leading to variation among scholars on the concept of democracy consolidation as well. As highlighted above, the transformation as a whole is a wide process containing different phases starting from the collapse of the non-democratic regime, transition and then consolidation as the final step. There is no clear-cut division among stages, they are interdependent and overlap with each other. Moreover, the democracy consolidation process is also context based, whose prospects vary from case to case with different socio-political settings, type and causes of transition, cultural and economic peculiarities of political systems, etc.. It complicates further the defining boundaries between them. This illustrates another reason for varieties in conceptualization of democracy consolidation in terms of scope, time span, levels, requirements, and so on. Perceiving consolidation from different points of view resulted in such a flexible and vague conceptualization and naming as: institutionalization; stabilization; perpetuation; negative and positive consolidation; and so on.

In the following, several definitions of the concept of democracy consolidation are presented, indicating different point of view, prioritizing different aspects of democratization and democratisation as a process or as an endpoint. Similar to the definition of democracy, there are also minimalist and maximalist conceptualisations of democracy consolidation. Along with other proponents of a minimalist definition of consolidation, Przeworski (1991, 26) argues that

democracy in a political system is consolidated when "... *it becomes the only game in town...*", no significant actor considers using anything other than democratic ways to achieve the political objectives. Even those losing elections try to win again through democratic mechanisms, adds Przeworski. Turning to our case of research, this conceptualisation seems very broad and generalised, difficult to be operationalised for empirical measurement of developments within the process itself, to what extent democracy has been consolidated, where it has fallen short, etc.. Furthermore, it does not provide an analytical framework for our research case to find out the specific role of parties as important actors in this process. The conceptualisation is very wide and generalised, without specifying the actual and potential actors within the *game*, and the specific functions of each player. Therefore, this minimalist conceptualisation is regarded as a poor analytical conceptualisation, offering no specifications for analytic measurements of a comprehensible correlation between an actor and the process, in our case parties and democracy consolidation.

Unlike Przeworski's definition, Linz and Stepan (1996, 16) conceptualise democracy consolidation in a more specified manner, perceiving it as a process that takes place over three levels of the political system. The first level is consolidation of behaviour at the elite level, meaning the extent of the elite's behaviour compliance with the democratic norms, procedures, and rules of the democracy game in general. The second level includes the society dimension, the values of citizens towards democracy. Usually consolidation at this level takes longer than consolidation at the first level, because it implies socio-cultural changes, yet once consolidated it is more capable of enduring and resisting any possible threat it might face. Lastly, the third structural level of consolidation entails bringing into democratic accountability the veto players like military or other powerful actors (in case of Balkans, where Kosovo belongs, as stated by Merkel (2007) it covers: the authoritarian tendencies of executives, organised crime, mafia, ...) unwilling to allow the democratic process to take place. Such a conceptualisation implicitly places parties at the three levels: the elite, the social,

and even at the veto players' level in the case of the Balkans. However, apparently it does not offer specific outlines to distinguish empirically the role of parties within the structure at the three levels of consolidation. The majority of the elite, above all the political elite, come from political parties. On the other side, parties are supposed to emerge from and be based upon society. In addition, veto players might come from influence, and be influenced by, parties, particularly in states with a high level of corruption in politics. Thus, such a relationship is barely ever empirically measurable on all levels, and as a conceptualization it is of little relevance nor a useful model for our case, since parties are of no explicit consideration. The concept has no explicit and specific reference to parties.

In addition to the above mentioned definitions, Gunther, Diamandouros, and Puhle (1995, 7) regard consolidation of democracy as an end result that “...*all politically significant groups regard the key democratic political institutions as the only legitimate framework of political contestation and adhere to democratic rules of the game*”. It includes attitudinal and behavioural dimensions. The former is the positioning of significant political groups toward a democratic institution, while the latter implies their compliance with the democratic norms and procedures. The focus point is the elite, which although might be the most important actor within parties, they constitute just an important component of parties and not parties as a whole. Such reflection determines perceiving parties merely as political actors and not social actors also. The elitist orientated concept of democratisation passes over democratisation at other levels, particularly cultural consolidation as a precondition for a long-term democracy consolidation. However, it might be argued that the elite is also reflected at a societal level through their behaviour and attitude, but long-term consolidation requires society level integration in the process. Therefore, the definition in question ends up with the elite level, excluding society from the process of consolidation. Such a conceptualisation minimizes the parties as actors, and relying on this for

research might jeopardise getting the true picture of the role of parties in the democratization process.

Furthermore, another conceptualization divides democratic consolidation into two types: negative and positive consolidation. The former refers to the removal of prospects of non-democratic alternatives to a democratic system, while the latter to a democratic system operationally settled, with established credibility and giving effect (Pridham 1995, 168; Pridham & Lewis 1996). Applying it to the case of Kosovo democracy, the negative consolidation is no less than it looks, being developed at a snail's pace due to the heavy presence and democracy commitment of the international community in Kosovo, as well as broad regional support from the *Zeit Geist* on European integration. Therefore, even non-democratic actors that on the surface might offer alternatives to democracy, have to conceal this fact, and be heard to echo democracy. Along with the international influence, European integration should also be mentioned, and that one of the main criteria for membership is democracy. In this way, currently international actors have moved to neutralise any possible alternative to democracy, at least apparently. It is at least perceived this way, keeping in mind the non-democratic attitudes and behaviour of actual top state figures, the current president of Kosovo parliament, one of the leading figures of the largest political party, holding and uprising the statue of former totalitarian communist Enver Hoxha, is among many examples. Such attitudes are not just possible alternatives to democracy, but are more than that; they are a direct threat to democracy, particularly if no international actors guarding democratisation were to be present. Hence, it can be concluded that currently the highest state of democracy development in Kosovo is a visual negative democracy consolidation. As far as positive consolidation is concerned, it is directly dependent on domestic institutions, expected to domesticate and inculcate democracy within the society.

Moreover, Rustow (1970, 385) offers a very generalised conceptualisation of democracy consolidation, identifying it with a habituation phase, a degree of

democracy development whereby political elites and the public employ democratic methods and became used to them, with this reflecting on their attitudes, behaviour and their way of thinking. As a concept, it is very broad and hardly useful for specific arrangements, when looking specifically at certain actors within the process of democracy consolidation. Usually, habituation as an attitude and behaviour takes longer, especially at the societal level, though it is the stabilised form of consolidation. The habituation enables automatic and full implementation of democratic norms and procedures are supposed to be, without contest on the ground.

Having considered the aforementioned conceptualisations of democracy consolidation, it has become obvious that the most useful conceptualization of democracy consolidation, applicable and operationalisable for our case study is the developmental and synthesising conceptualization given by Merkel (1999, 143 - 169). His model is actor oriented, providing opportunity for specific-actor focus. He divides the process of democracy consolidation into four levels, each of them consolidated on its own, and as they overlap, potentially helping or impeding each other's consolidation. In terms of time requirement, the first level of consolidation is the quickest while the last one takes the longest time. The first level is known as constitutional consolidation (orig. *konstitutionelle Konsolidierung*) and is categorised as macro-level consolidation. It covers constitutional and other major democratic institutional settlements, such as the parliament, judiciary, and soon. This level of consolidation is followed by the middle level, called representative consolidation (orig. *repräsentative Konsolidierung*). At this point, the intermediary institutions such as political parties, social movements, and interest organizations, are the main actors intermediating and binding together state and society. The good performance of parties increases directly the legitimation of the first level as well as the consolidation of other levels. This level lies exclusively at the heart of our research, particularly political parties and their role in the democracy consolidation process, and whether they are developing or stagnating it. Their

position at the centre of the consolidation structure increases their relevance. Since the four levels overlap into each other, parties are to be found, in different degrees, at all levels from the first to the last, but at the second level of the consolidation structure they constitute the main actors.

The behavioural consolidation (orig. *Verhaltenskonsolidierung*) is the third level in the consolidation structure. Comprised of veto power actors from military and economic fields, and whose attitude and behaviour to democratic values causes particular concern. The level is considered consolidated once they behave according to democratic norms and procedures. In this regard, it is of importance to add that Merkel (2007, 420) has said the system transformation in former socialist Europe, in particular Balkans, has experienced a triple (in case of Kosovo even quadruple – including state-building) transition. Yet, the military as in the case of some Latin American countries or Turkey for example, does not count as a veto player, but rather actors such as organized crime have infiltrated the government structures of some countries in this region, developing and maintaining authoritarian tendencies for executives. The last level of consolidation structure is the civic society consolidation, different from the other three levels, which focus on the elite, it has at its hub, society and culture. It is widely believed that change at the societal level takes longer than the other three levels. Such consolidation is the most secure one, since logically to reverse the change takes time. Democracy is immune to artificial and short time crises that might challenge the political system. Nevertheless, it should be highlighted that no political system is immune of breakdown, but the more democracy is consolidated the more it is resistant to breakdown.

During our research, we might sometimes consider society while dealing with parties, because parties are socio-political and not just pure political actors (elite level). Therefore, sometimes we need to delve into the societal level, despite Merkel's consideration of this level as an elite one. As Lawson (1994) adds, parties have no clear-cut boundaries, I would add that parties have no clear cut

horizontal and vertical boundaries - it is difficult to see where a certain level of party organization ends and the other level starts. It would be rather messy to consider the level of parties as just an elite one.

The conceptualisation of democracy consolidation given by Merkel provides a very applicable and operational model to study empirically the role of political parties in the process of democracy consolidation, in our case study in Kosovo. The model matches the objective of our study.

Nevertheless, before moving on we have to look at the theories of parties as well and try to find out a theoretical relation between the role of parties and democracy consolidation, to see if there is such a theoretical correlation, and if not, try to create one. Merkel's conceptualisation provides broad space to measure the role of parties within the consolidation structure. The second level, aside from other possible intermediary institutions, is dedicated mostly to parties. The interdependence of all four levels within the structure, confer to the second level – dominated by political parties, an irreplaceable role on the process of democracy consolidation. From such a position, a party's role in the consolidation of democracy can be measured by exclusive focus on studying parties, respectively parties' functions. In the case of Kosovo democracy, the importance of parties in the process of democracy consolidation is disproportionately large, due to the high level of party driven and maintained politicisation. Comparing the role of the second level with the other three levels, the role of parties dominates, influencing heavily consolidation prospects of other levels. Therefore, our study will be based on this correlation, trying to find out and shed light on the parties' functions and such impact on consolidation prospects. Understanding political parties eases the insight into the democracy consolidation process.

#### ***1.4. Theoretical approaches in studying Political Parties***

The best illustration on the state of the theoretical development of political parties is done by Duverger (1957, xiii) in his classical work on political parties. Even half a century later, his statement still persists and is nowadays realised. According to

him, *“the theory building process on parties is in a vicious cycle. Theory formulation should be based upon empirical research, and undertaking of such empirical research should be guided by theories”*. Despite many studies on parties – about 11 000 publications (Montero & Gunther 2003), no sufficient middle-range theories have been developed to capture political parties as a whole in different socio-political settings. Most studies tackle different aspects of parties, from different point of view, and different settings. Some are concerned with organisational aspects of parties, while others with party functions, party origins, parties as political institutions, parties as social institutions, and so on. Furthermore, most research on political parties leading to considerable, though not sufficient theories, concerned with different aspects of parties, is largely based on the experience and particularities of parties and party systems in the North-Western part of the world – already consolidated industrial democracies. This is primarily due to their more established experience with parties, because of a longer experience with democracies compared to other parts of the world. However, applying these theories to other parts of the world with different socio, economic and political settings is often not wise, not applicable, and of limited or no use at all. Most of the theories on political parties and party systems, before being applied to different parts of the world need to be contextualised. In relation to that, it should be highlighted that political parties in north-western parts of the world should be taken as a reference point, since compared to other parts of the world they have performed quite well in their democracies and largely deserve to be taken as a model.

Looking from another dimension, parties have continuously experienced changes, declines, and transformations in general terms. The causes of such changes are of a multidimensional nature, starting from inner forces and outer party, social, political and economic developments. Likewise, it is widely perceived that parties at present, due to several reasons, are not as they used to be in terms of their organizational structure, ideological loyalties and preferences, identity, strategies used to mobilise supporters and voters, their attitude and

behaviour, and the functions they perform. In spite of that, such party transformation is to be qualified more as a party change rather than a party decline (Montero & Gunther 2003, 3-30). In addition, Mair (1994, 1-22) believes that we cannot talk of party decline, rather of party change, as parties are coming closer to the state, or relating to what we stated earlier, parties are becoming less social and more political institutions.

Among the approaches of political science in general applied to study parties, is the traditional inductive approach, applied even today by many studies, which is relatively empirical-findings orientated. On the other hand, from the deductive methods of inquiry, the model-orientated approach is used through paradigms of structural-functionalist and rational-choice theory (Schumpeter 1942; Downs 1957) – respectively ‘soft’ rational choice. Hence, despite their achievements on the study of parties, they are characterised with different shortcomings as well (Schlesinger, 1991). The rational choice approach has been criticised for its one-dimensional nature compared to the multidimensional, complex nature of parties, providing the means to grasp just a little but insufficient sight of parties. The approach is perceived to have employed strictly economic concepts in politics. It considers parties as rational actors pursuing their own monolithic interests, excluding possibilities of there existing, in reality, heterogeneous actors within parties, each one pursuing its own interests. The usefulness of this approach to some extent has been enhanced by undermining the one-dimensionality of pure rational choice theories with the introduction of the ‘soft’ rational approach by Strøm (1990) on his studies on political parties.

On the other side, the structural-functionalist approach as one of the main theoretical approach in political sciences during the 1960s has been borrowed from anthropology and sociology. One of its famous proponents is Easton (1957) with his theory of political system. As an approach in political sciences, its major focus is on the functions the system as a whole have. Thus, in the case of studying parties, it looks at the functions parties are supposed to fulfil within the

overall political system. However, as is the case with almost every approach, due to the deficiencies it has, structural-functionalism is not safe from criticism. It overemphasises system equilibrium and stability, featured with tautological ambiguity and ethnocentrism, inadequate in conducting cross-national studies, leaving aside other important features of vital interest of and to parties, and it is known as a highly static approach. Nevertheless, since our research is not a cross national research, but a single case study dealing with a specific political system, concerned with the role parties play in the consolidation of democracy, the functionalist approach is found to be very useful for empirical measurement of such a relationship. Furthermore, it does not mean that other features of parties in Kosovo, aside from party functions, are going to be outside the coverage of our study. In order to better understand functions, party structures should also be considered, the objectives they pursue, the ideologies they follow, the way they compete with each other, the way they are organised, their identity – whereby most of parties in Kosovo actually have identity crisis, their attitude and behaviour, and so on. All of the previously mentioned dimensions of parties present an operational framework for political parties. They offer parties opportunities and constraints in performing their functions, in our case of the democratization process. That is why observing them lend a hand in finding out the causes and consequences of the performance of functions by parties.

The importance, necessity and indispensability of parties and parties' role on democracy consolidation is historically and empirically proved, as well as theoretically grounded. In his famous assertion of his classical work Rossiter (1960, 1) reasserts the importance of parties in modern democracies “..., *no democracy without politics, and no politics without parties*”. In addition, there is the often cited Schattschneider's (1942, 1) fervour regarding the role of parties in democracy supports the position that “*modern democracy is unthinkable save in terms of parties*”. On the other side, Sartori (1976, ix) in his classical work on political parties praises the importance of parties in modern democracy by

considering them as the central intermediary structures between society and government.

#### **1.4.1. Definition of political party**

The development of democracy throughout history resulted in the establishment of representative democracy, as a modern and applicable model of democracy, fitting into the nation-state institutional structure scale. This development and transformation of democracy to a representative one has been shaped by different historical experiences, cultures, ideologies, and institutional structures of different political systems, resulting in a variety of models of democracy (Schmidt 2000). Hence, the close relationship between democracy and parties, particularly the development of various models of democracy, has led also to varieties of parties and conceptualisations of parties in turn, as diverse as models of modern democracy itself. The attributes given to and expectations from parties differ from one type of democracy to another. For instance, as stated earlier in the participatory type of democracy, parties are expected to involve themselves in society as much as in the governing role, differing from the elitist theory of democracy that associates parties exclusively with governing functions. Minimalist or maximalist definitions of democracy have also affected party definitions, implying the differing substance of properties parties have, from very minimalist to maximalist. .

On the other hand, considering parties from different point of view, depending on the focus on parties, has also led to a divergence in party definitions. Some consider the way they are organised, or objectives they pursue, some others consider them as political or as social actors, while the rest engage themselves with party functions. Nonetheless, in order to grasp a full picture of political parties, as Wiesendahl (1980) argues, defining political parties in four dimensions, the objective, functional, structural, and behaviour dimensions should be taken into account. Such implication offers a possibility for a better and all-capturing conceptualisation in terms of features of parties covered. However,

the need for contextualisation of theories on political parties often also necessitates contextualisation of party definitions.

In the following, some of the numerous definitions of political parties are included, emphasising definitions' relation to our research case, since one of the determinants in the conceptualisation of parties is also what the objective of the study is about. Here we are concerned with the role of parties in democracy consolidation. We should try to theorise on this relationship - parties as an independent and democracy consolidation as a dependent variable on this correlation. In this respect, firstly we should come with an operational definition of political parties.

After a thorough examination of the definitions of democracy and democracy consolidation, follows the endeavour for a conceptualization of parties. It should be pointed out that despite many definitions of parties, some of them are considered in order to find out the most suitable one for our research, or at the end to construct an operational definition that suits our research purpose here. To illustrate the complexity in defining parties White (2006) opens the chapter on party definition by referring to the Bible "*but who do you say I am' Jesus Christ to his disciples, Mathew 16: 15*" (cited from Katz & Crotty 2006, 6)- in this way he points out the wide range of possibilities one has while trying to define parties. Nevertheless, such wide flexibility also offers opportunities for varieties of conceptualisation, depending on what one wants to focus on, often even implying subjectivity as well. According to Edmund Burke (1770) "*a party is a body of men united, for promoting by their joint endeavours the national interest, upon some particular principles on which they are all agreed*". Sartori (1976, 63) defines parties "*as any political group identified by an official label that presents at elections (free or nonfree), and is capable of placing through elections candidates for public office*".

Different from above mentioned minimalist definitions of parties, a more maximalist definition is offered by Sorauf (1964, 13). To him a political party “*is an agency for the organisation of political power characterised by exclusively political functions, by a stable structure and inclusive membership, and by the ability to dominate the contesting of elections*”. The last definition, compared to these stated earlier, is related explicitly to the functions. Parties’ functions in terms of types and degree of performance might be exposed to changes from time to time and from place to place.

Party definition relying only on what parties are is a relatively minimalist definition. Yet, adding what parties do, extends the range of issues to be considered while defining parties, especially in our case study trying to measure the role of parties as expected to influence, and to some extent also determine, the democracy consolidation process. In the case of Kosovo, political parties might otherwise slow and freeze the democratisation process, but in the short and medium term, the reverse transformation is not to be expected due to heavy international influence, particularly European integration. Any alternative system to democracy is currently inconceivable. The failure of parties to invest in democracy consolidation process, might result in a slowing down of the process, freezing it, and later also ailing it.

Thus, considering both dimensions while conceptualising parties - what parties are and what they do - would complete and complement each other. To grasp a picture of what a party can do, first we need to know what a party is. The types of party in terms of organization structure, objectives they pursue, and their identity also determine the functions party intends and subsequently actually performs (Schmitter, 2001).

Since there is no consensus on party definition, and there always exists the possibility of conceptualising in a normative sense, for the purpose of our research political party operationally is defined “**as a group of men/women**

*sharing ideological orientations, organised in socio-political institutions, integrate them into political process, transmit and represent their interests through governing of political system, and consequently make them feel part of the system*". As an operational definition it suits our research case, offering space to measure the direct role of parties by looking at the extent to which parties perform their explicit functions, making democratic consolidation prospects directly dependent on political parties. Such conceptualisation, among other things normatively presents parties to be the shadow of society, reflecting the social pluralism into political system.

#### **1.4.2. Functionalist theory of political parties**

This theoretical approach is going to be explored in detail, because it is the basis for our research. The functionalist theory of political parties has been developed out of a general system approach in political sciences, at whose heart rests the system as a whole and its interrelated parts expected to fulfil their functions making the system able to persist. Regarding the expected functions to be fulfilled by each part of the system, there is a distinction between the consolidated and non-consolidated systems. In a consolidated, highly institutionalised system, there is a well-entrenched division of labour, with predictable functional expectations to be performed by each institution. On the other hand, such clear-cut expectation does not exist in systems with a poor level of institutionalisation, lacking pure division of responsibilities and capabilities in performing their own particular functions.

In this regard, political parties and the party system are considered as a part and a subsystem inside political system as a whole, expected to perform their functions to enable the system to survive and function properly, and in the case of democracy consolidation, to enable democracy to become deeply rooted. Parties' functions as part of the overall system, do not simply sustain the system but also consolidate it. Referring to the classical approach of system theories, the proper function of systems' parts ensures the endurance and self-perpetuation of the system. Later considerations of system theories, such as *Systemzielmodel* –

the *objective oriented model of system* (Pollack 1990) endeavours to make the approach more dynamic as such, applying it to system transformation, using the significance of functional performance on the flux state of affairs, and not only on the stable and well defined system. He applied the theoretical approach also to explain the collapse of the socialist regime. In our case parties' and the party system's (as a subsystem) performance on their functions ensures the arrival of objectives of the system, predominantly democracy consolidation in the Kosovo political system.

However, as mentioned earlier, dealing with functions of parties also means knowing the types of parties, which to some extent determines their possible functional performance, differing in terms of how it was supposed to be, though not necessary matching actual performance. However, with the functionalist approach the functions of parties will be of primary importance and other considerations will help to grasp better clarification of party functions' performance.

Referring to shortcomings of the functionalist approach (mentioned earlier), I believe that in our case study there is a way out of it. The tautological obstacles can be avoided by operationally defining the concepts used. The definition is more easily achievable in a single case study rather than in cases of cross-national research. Defining the parties' expected and actual functions highlights the possible distinction between the normative and real dimensions. It also pays attention to the possible distinction that in reality exists between parties in consolidated and fragile democracies while defining them, but always referring to parties in consolidated democracies as an intended model. Accordingly, confining ourselves within the framework of these definitions closes the ambiguities with concepts, that otherwise would hamper and diminish the study based on the functionalist approach.

The other shortcomings such as ethnocentrism and difficulties in making cross-national studies, in our case are of no relevance since we are not doing a cross-national comparative study but focusing exclusively within a specific socio-political settings – Kosovo. The issue of overemphasizing in system equilibrium and the balance of system - static approach, often associated with the functionalist approach has its relativity. This approach, as mentioned above, is also used in studying system break up as well (Pollack 1990), or in our case, system consolidation or formation, and democracy consolidation. Having said that, it justifies the practicability of functionalist approaches in conducting our research, since there are functions attributed to parties in democratisation particularly the democracy consolidation process.

Political scientists dealing with the functions of political parties in a normative sense, place different importance on different functions depending on the considerations they adhere to - socio-political settings, the way they perceive parties, and what the expectations are from parties. Some focus on the party system functions while others on the parties' functions. Making a distinction between parties and party system functions is not an easy task. What complicates the models of functions more are also the diverse functions performed by different parties in different countries (Helms 1995). Some focus strictly on normative actions while some take more of an empirical and pragmatic stand and adopt the type of functions to the system they have in consideration. To reduce complexity, the possibility of modifications in a normative sense, allows us to emphasize on analytical practicability of parties and party system functions, taking into account recent developments inside parties and party systems and peculiarities of political systems dealt with.

Before we proceed with our conceptualisation of party functions and draw our own normative model that suits best our case study, we should look at some studies done on this issue, so that we can have a better picture of the diversity of importance attached to party functions and variety of functions'

conceptualisations. Among reasons of such divergence from scholars is the way they name them, some putting within the same label, different functions, while other scholars dividing into separate labels. However, considering them helps produce the list of functions through which we can measure and operationalise the role of parties in the process of democracy consolidation.

While considering parties' functions, great concern is given to the party changes and transformations, because ignoring this might bring us skewed results, not presenting the actual knowledge, information and clarification about the issue we are concerned with, expected to be the outcome of our research. For example, it should not be expected that the parties' role is the same as that undertaken during the first wave of democratization, since today there are different social, economic and political settings, not necessarily requiring parties to handle certain issues that earlier in the process they may have been expected to. Furthermore, nowadays parties are conceived more as political rather than social actors, found more at governmental rather than at societal level.

It is of vital importance to consider also the distinction between parties in consolidated democracies, that have undergone different changes at all levels (of society, politics, and economics) and parties in a political system that has no history of having political parties – or rather no experience with democracy. Nowadays there are parties to be found in other parts of the world, quite similar in terms of their functions to parties currently existing in the north-western part of the world. What does such difference mean for fragile democracies, like Kosovo, to have less society driven parties, where there is just a ten-year history of political parties and democratic institutions? The parties that in times gone by have played a vital role to legitimise what today are called consolidated democracies, are nowadays being transformed into parties more detached from society. Hence, having parties so detached from society in new democracies that still have crises of legitimacy, might cause problems to the entrenching of democracy, especially if other representative institutions (such as interest groups

or other social movements) expected to supplement the role of parties, are very weak and highly politicised, or do not function at all. Additionally, even if governing is a greater function of parties in our time, if not performed as expected, then at which level and who is going to legitimize democracy then? How is this related to the democracy consolidation prospects? These are among numerous questions we are going to shed light on.

Emminghaus (2003) has constructed a model on party functions, trying to measure the role of parties in the democratization process in Africa. I find this model very useful, operationalisable and quite related to my field of research, though it is applied to other political systems. Therefore, after consulting (see below) some other party functions concerned, I decided to modify and adapt the Emminghaus' model, for my case study and use it as a general framework for my own analytical model, based on which, I will conduct my research. The model has scientific and empirical values as long as it offers the possibility for empirical measurement of the role parties play in the consolidation process, in our case in Kosovo. It should be stressed also that the model is modified and adapted for our research purpose, taking into account differences between Africa and south-eastern Europe, where Kosovo belongs. In the following, studies of different scholars on party functions are presented starting by Emminghuas.

### ***Party functions according to Emminghaus***

Emminghaus, dealing with parties in Africa and their role in the democratization process, builds up a scientific schema of party functions. He details and makes it operationalisable, for each function, highlighting the method used and the required data to measure each function's indicators. On the (modified)<sup>2</sup> table are presented the functions and indicators of each function according to him.

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<sup>2</sup> It is my own translation from the original German language to English.

<b>Function</b>	<b>Indicators</b>	<b>Procedure</b>	<b>Data</b>
Representation	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. <i>Position of parties along social cleavages</i></li> <li>1. <i>Programme differences among parties</i></li> </ol>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- <i>Analysis of party programmes</i></li> <li>- <i>Analysis of cleavage structure on party system</i></li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- <i>Qualitative Interviews</i></li> <li>- <i>Party programmes</i></li> <li>- <i>Election campaign observance</i></li> <li>- <i>Media analysis</i></li> </ul>
Integration	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. <i>Relationship of party to its social structure</i></li> <li>2. <i>Social support of parties</i></li> <li>3. <i>Individual party linkages</i></li> </ol>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- <i>comparing party programmes with the preferences of their supporters</i></li> <li>- <i>Analysis of individual trust on political parties</i></li> <li>- <i>analysis of electoral results</i></li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- <i>Representative questionnaires</i></li> <li>- <i>Election data</i></li> <li>- <i>Party programmes</i></li> <li>- <i>Volatility data</i></li> </ul>
Legitimation	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. <i>Personal Recruitment</i></li> <li>2. <i>Policy making</i></li> <li>3. <i>Competition</i></li> </ol>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- <i>analysis of candidate nomination</i></li> <li>- <i>analysis of programme formulation</i></li> <li>- <i>analysis of election campaign relations</i></li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- <i>Party statute</i></li> <li>- <i>Media reports</i></li> <li>- <i>Qualitative interviews</i></li> </ul>
Elites recruitment	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. <i>Political Elite fluctuation</i></li> <li>2. <i>Gender structure of political elites</i></li> <li>3. <i>Ethnical cooperation of political elites</i></li> </ol>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- <i>analysis of parliaments composition</i></li> <li>- <i>analysis of social structure of political Elites</i></li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- <i>Election data</i></li> <li>- <i>Media Reports</i></li> <li>- <i>Demographic data</i></li> </ul>

*Table 1. Party functions according to Emminghaus*

***Party functions according to Schmitter***

Philippe C. Schmitter (1999, 475-495) on the other hand, distinguishes four functions of parties as follows. Though he offers no clear indicators for the four functions he focuses on, I have tried to identify them from the discussion he makes in his paper.

**1. Structuring electoral competition** is one of the distinct political functions of parties. Political parties structure the electoral process by nominating candidates for political positions and programmes around whom the elections are conducted.

Function	Indicators
Structuring Electoral Competition	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- are there supraparty candidates, informal elite arrangements undermine the importance of parties in structuring the electoral process</li> <li>- electoral volatility due to loose couplings between parties their candidates and their platforms, independent citizen reactions decrease the importance of parties in this process</li> </ul>

Table 2.1. Function of structuring electoral competition, Schmitter

**2. Providing symbolic identity** is another function that determines the capacity of parties to use symbols and memories helping individuals identify with the party.

Function	Indicators
Providing Symbolic Identity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- card carrying members</li> <li>- due paying members</li> <li>- party newspapers</li> <li>- substitution of voluntary by paid campaign</li> <li>- decline of attendance at party congress</li> <li>- penetration of parties in associations and movements</li> <li>- electoral volatility</li> </ul>

Table 2.2. Providing Symbolic Identity, Schmitter

**3. Forming Governments** is a distinctive function and one that parties do not share with other intermediary actors. Parties are expected to have the capacity to fill up political offices and implement policies based on their programmes. Otherwise, it is difficult to consider their role as agents of democratization.

Function	Indicators
Forming Governments	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- patronage</li> <li>- clientelism</li> <li>- use of government contracts and jobs as a rewards</li> </ul> <p><i>(there is a problem collecting exact data for them)</i></p>

Table 2.3. Forming governments, Schmitter

**4. Aggregating interests and passion** is a function in a normative sense whereby parties offer a programme made up of aggregated interests and passions of a larger part of society. It reflects the will of the public as a whole, and not just of a single group. However, this function in real terms is performed differently from time to time and from place to place.

Function	Indicators
Aggregating Interests and Passions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- relation of parties with other groups</li> <li>- channels of communication: media or party structure</li> <li>- shifts in technology of electoral politics, increased reliance upon opinion surveys</li> </ul>

Table 2.4. Aggregating interests and passions, Schmitter

It should be pointed out, that functions identified by Schmitter have no explicit indicators. The above-mentioned indicators highlighted are an interpretation of the context of his paper.

### ***Party Functions according to Steffani***

Steffani (1988) in his study identifies four main functions of parties found in four sectors of party analysis.

**1. Transmission Function**, “*Ausdruck sozialer Kräfte sowie ideologischer und/oder programmatischer Ziele*“. In the first sector Steffani (1988, 551) focuses mainly on the relationship between ideological differences among society and

their reflection in the parties' programmes, and to what extent the programmes of parties are built upon the divisions of society.

**2. Governing Function, “Parteien als Herrschaftsinstrumente“** (Steffani 1988, 554-557). The second function of parties is that of governing. Political parties are considered as vessels to winning elections, forming the government (or part of it, in coalition) and exercising power through this government. However, this function is dependent on the type of political system, electoral system, and so on. There is to be a distinction, depending on the purpose of taking over the government – to implement policies or make use of public goods for private ends. In our model, special attention is given to that, because it is a common feature of all Kosovo parties and has an implication on democracy consolidation prospects.

**3. Legitimizing Function, “Parteien als Vermittler demokratischer Legitimation“** (Steffani 1988, 557-559). The focus here is the extent to which parties legitimize a democratic system, not only through the way they govern but also through their inner democracy.

**4. Recruitment Function, “Parteien als Interessengruppe und Karrierevehikel“** (Steffani 1988, 559-560). The fourth analytical sector is concerned with pursuance of the interest of the party, the interests inside the party, and the possibilities it offers for the active party members and functionaries to enhance their career.

The four above-mentioned functions offer a clear image of normative party functions, but they lack actual indicators through which one can measure the level of fulfilment of their functions.

### ***Party Functions according to Helms***

Different from Steffani whose concern is mainly on parties (Helms 1995, 642-657), Helms refers more to functions of party systems and tries to offer a

measurable model by highlighting the indicators for each function. In other words, his model is more empirical.

**1. Representation Function** is conceptualised by Helms as a reflection and projection of the social conflict at the political system. The indicators showing the level of representation function are as follows.

Function	Indicators
Representation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- <i>What is the position of parties to their social structures</i></li> <li>- <i>What is the relationship of parties to interest groups</i></li> <li>- <i>Does the party system respond to new social cleavages</i></li> </ul>

Table 3.1. Representation, Helms

**2. Legitimizing Function** is the second function whereby parties are expected to legitimise the political system through their inner democracy.

Function	Indicators
Legitimizing	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- <i>Is there a participation and decision-making possibility through inner democracy</i></li> </ul>

Table 3.2. Legitimizing, Helms

**3. Recruitment Function** includes the elite in politics and other spheres of society.

Function	Indicators
Elite recruitment	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- How long and what is the position in parliament and government for non-party politicians</li> <li>- Is there a relationship between the head of government and the chiefs of parties</li> <li>- What percentage of ministers have a place at the same time on the Chairmanship of parties</li> </ul>

Table 3.3. Elite recruitment, Helms

**4. Integration Function** is conceptualised with linking citizens with political system in general.

Function	Indicators
Integration	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Development in election participation</li> <li>- Development in party membership</li> </ul>

Table 3.4. Integration, Helms

**5. Innovation Function** is the ability of a system to deal with new challenges.

Function	Indicators
Innovation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Structural division of power within systems</li> <li>- The level of difference between objectives of programmes</li> <li>- Planning ability of governing parties</li> </ul>

Table 3.5. Innovation, Helms

After exploring some of the studies on party and party system functions and on democracy consolidation, I will try to build up a scientific relationship between parties as independent, and democracy consolidation as dependent variables on political parties. In this way, we will construct our own model synthesised and

modified from the above highlighted models, measuring the role of parties in democracy consolidation, in our case in Kosovo.

### **1.5. Theorising correlation between political parties and democracy consolidation**

After exploring theories of democracy, system transformation, democracy consolidation, political parties, and outlining the context (see next chap.), we proceed with theorising the relationship between two variables: political parties and democracy consolidation in Kosovo (with its particulars as a political system). A democracy is hardly classified as a consolidated one, if its sustainability and persistence relies mostly on international support, a sponsored democracy by the international community, endangered once they decide to leave. Yet, such fragility and dependency on the international community in a democracy has its deficiencies. The heavy international presence in turn has its negative impact on the democracy consolidation process and prospects. The paternalistic, tutoring presence of the international community principally brings into question the very fundamentals of democracy itself. Yet, taking into account the role of international actors in the democratisation process, especially during the second wave of democratisation, and since the tutors in question happen to be among the most consolidated democracies in the world, it leaves no room for scepticism in whether democracy will last indefinitely, if it does not mean that they have to be there forever. It provides a good opportunity in terms of preserving the overall democracy framework, since its domestic features have many deficiencies. The incompatibility between the behaviour and attitude of domestic actors with the substantial democratic norms and values, to some extent could be covered by a façade of democracy due to the heavy presence of the international community here.

It is clear that the international presence in Kosovo provides a general framework for democracy '*building*' and reduces the possibility, at least visually, of any alternative regimes to democracy coming into being. Nonetheless, it is up to domestic institutions to arrange the inner life of the system, adapting democratic

values and standards, so not requiring the international community to guard democracy indefinitely. If such a position cannot be reached, there would be no one to ensure democracy consolidation and prevent the reversibility of the transformation. Political parties are the major actors influencing and being influenced by almost all other domestic actors inside the building of democratic consolidation. Our research will put a focus within the structure of this building, aiming to find out the role parties have in domesticating and stabilising democracy among society, in other words in consolidating democracy.

If we refer to the aforementioned conceptualisation of negative and positive consolidation and apply that to the current developments in Kosovo, it is clear that Kosovo democracy is currently in the phase of negative consolidation, apparently having no viable alternative to democratic regime. However, this is owed predominantly to the commitment of the international community in Kosovo, considered as guardians of democracy in terms of making any other alternative regime obsolete. In this respect, it should also not be forgotten the *carrot* of European integration as one the main driving forces of democratisation. Nevertheless, the actual international influence constitutes the most achievable results in the case of democracy consolidation in Kosovo, and no further advancement in the process is expected without the will of domestic institutions, primarily political parties as major socio-political institutions in a party-driven politicisation of the system, as it is the case with Kosovo.

If negative consolidation is due to international community presence, positive consolidation is dependent largely on domestic actors. At the level of positive consolidation, democracy is expected to give effect, and cannot be ensured without domestic democracy-purposive actors, particularly parties, as the major domestic institutional actors found at all levels within the system structure. However, if the attainment of positive consolidation is prolonged and delayed it will dry out the negative consolidation also, making the reverse of the process unavoidable. In the case of Kosovo, negative consolidation in the short term is

somewhat guaranteed by the international community, but no one can be sure of the future developments within the international community itself, which might be reflected in their role here, or whether they may become fed up with stubborn political leaders in Kosovo.

The claim that the international community might also push for positive consolidation is refutable, because it is unlikely without the support of domestic institutions. The sphere covered by international intervention barely touches areas covered by the process of positive consolidation. If they try to interfere so deeply, they in turn endanger self-governing - the fundamental principle of democracy, making positive consolidation less likely. Moreover, such interfering increases the probability of the degree of informalities, widening the gap between formal institutions and informal behaviour (at least at the elite level) turning politics, or at least micro politics, into something less predictable. This relationship is best described as a vicious cycle. Lesser domestic democratic institutions (political parties in our case), results in more international interference required. The higher the international actors' influence, the further the breach of fundamentals of democracy, and the less likelihood of positive democracy consolidation. Unless we have domestic democracy-purposive actors (parties), no sustainable, self-perpetual and a non-paternalistic democracy can be established, as it is the case nowadays.

The focus of this research is to find out the irreplaceable role of parties in this process. Parties' positioning alongside society and government attitudes, makes positive consolidation dependent on political parties – the functions they perform, their way of organisation, identity and ideological profile, and the way they compete and cooperate with each other is more related to the party system itself (Sartori, 1978). Political parties give meaning to and enable the very existence and functioning of modern democracy (stable democracy), democracy consolidation as a process, with especially positive consolidation being unthinkable without democratic parties. Their central position, as the main actors

of the political system, and as binders of state and society, means that if not among the main drivers, they are otherwise obstacles to democratization. In this regard, LaPalombara and Weiner in their classic edition (1966) and repeatedly in the 40th anniversary edition, praise parties as the main social and political actors in the political system, due to their role on political development. something that is restated by Dalton & McAllister (2007), Moreover, they signify the role parties have within the political system on the process of democratization. In addition, Dalton and McAllister (2007) reaffirm such assertions, that despite parties' diminishing institutionalization and expansion in new democracies, they are crucial to a stable democracy. Adding to the argument, Mainwaring (1995) referring to political parties as institutions, believes that it is impossible to have a consolidated democracy without having democratic institutions. Moreover, Lewis (2001) avows such a role of parties on the third wave of democratization, if not during the first phase of transition, but especially on the second (third) one - predominantly the consolidation phase.

As observed from much consideration on political parties, on their crucial role in the democracy consolidation process, we assert that the objective of democracy consolidation in Kosovo will be nothing more than wishful thinking if political parties continue to interrogate and ail the democratisation process, failing to perform their necessary and required functions for positive consolidation to take place. Turning to the specifics of the Kosovo political system, we will add that such role at the stage of positive consolidation is directly dependent on political parties. Our research is an endeavour to shed light upon this correlation.

As long as negative consolidation remains the result of the international community's presence here, the role of parties in the phase of positive consolidation is incontestable, unique and irreplaceable. The role of parties in consolidation is amplified due to real and heavy politicisation taking place in Kosovo. Along these lines, parties are found everywhere to a different degree, trying to extend and deepen their control as much as possible. It is the position

of parties in between state and society that requires such responsibility to domesticate and advance democratic norms, values, and methods and socialise firstly themselves and then society as a whole with them. Such a role, of parties being vital for democracy consolidation prospects, can be best measured through the model of party functions, finding out to what extent parties perform their functions, since (not) fulfilling such functions either ensures or impedes democracy consolidation.

From literature review on the subject, it is obvious that not much is done in the way of scientific exploration of relationships between the two variables, political parties as an independent variable and democracy consolidation as a dependent variable. Most studies deal with electoral volatility and system stabilisation or consolidation (Morlino 1995; Toka 1997, etc. ), while some others approach parties as a dependent variable on democracy (Diamond & Gunther 2001; Gunther, et al. 2002, etc.), and so on. I have found the most suitable theoretical relationship to be the model developed by Emminghaus (2003). He tried to construct a theoretical relationship between both variables - parties as independent and democracy consolidation as dependent variables, based on the functionalist approach considered by some earlier studies on party functions (see above). The strength of this model is that it is scientifically operationalisable, and offers space for empirical measurement of such correlation. Nevertheless, we will employ the adapted and modified version of the same model to measure the role of parties in democracy consolidation in Kosovo, by evaluating the performance of party functions. In order to carry out such a measurement and get a complete picture, party typology in Kosovo, parties' organizations should also be explored; along with their identity, objectives they pursue, as well as competition and cooperation within the party system and their reflection on democracy consolidation process.

The problems of creating meta-theories on political parties are widely accepted among scholars. Yet, our theorising is contextualised to a single case-specific

political system level, based on the measurement of parties' functions in the system in question. The theoretical relationship between the two variables, democracy consolidation being dependent and political parties being independent variables, is within the consolidation structure of the aforementioned synthesized model of democracy consolidation developed by Merkel (1999). Of course, the very isolation of an independent variable – political parties in our case, is quite challenging due to the amorphous form of political parties themselves. Yet, such shortcomings are common in social sciences, because of scientific values and the level of science among social sciences, compared to the exact sciences. The democratic consolidation prospects are measured through the performance of parties' functions.

The actor-oriented model of Merkel, despite others being focused on the system and structural requirements, permits the prioritising of the role of parties in the democracy consolidation process; the relativity of importance of the four levels of context based consolidation structure. In a highly politicised society, the dependence of democracy consolidation on political parties is increased, making all other three levels more and more influenced by the second level. Among the four levels of the consolidation structure, at the heart of our research lies the second level (*Repräsentative Konsolidierung*), built up predominantly by political parties as the main actors at this level. Regarding the first level (see next chap.), Kosovo finally has the status of an independent state as well as its own constitution, since 15 of July 2008. After the war, up to the declaration of independence, although it lacked the clear political status of being independent, Kosovo has had a constitutional framework regulating the institutional structure of the Kosovo political system, with the exception of international monitoring of the overall functioning of the system, it was set to have a democratically orientated institutional framework. However, such political status did not entirely prevent Kosovo democracy from being consolidated. All the same, as Tansey (2007) divided the concept of stateness into three dimensions, Kosovo institutions have gradually gained effective power to govern themselves in a larger number of

areas. The four levels of the consolidation structure are interrelated and overlap into each other, assisting or impeding each other on the way to consolidation, the success or failure of one level is reflected into others. For instance, well-established democratic orientated constitutional structure eases the consolidation for the other levels. It provides a general framework setting the overall guidelines and orientations of the democracy consolidation process. On the other side, poor performance of political parties at the second level affects the democratic constitutional structure at the first level, empowering non-democratic veto players, and delaying consolidation at the society level in terms of producing and spreading expected democratic norms and values. In particular, the first level is the most sensitive level, because it covers the overall outer skeleton of democracy. In the case of Kosovo, the first level of consolidation is in reality deeply based on international actors. The constitutional consolidation in Kosovo is merely arranged and guarded by the international community, though more so before the independence, than after. However, the three levels are directly dependent on political parties. The first one in terms of its long-term presence and effect, placing a complete reliance on foreign actors, is not a durable solution. In the long term, it firstly alienates democracy from the other three levels, and later makes its own permanence questionable. At the beginning, such a level of tutored democracy might be reasonable, but later it might turn counterproductive, because it does not provide sufficient space for the breathing space that growth would require. More or less, it appears normal for children in their early life to have a carer, but it will not be effective for caring to last beyond a certain stage, unless the child was not to grow-up. As children grow, they have a need for more space to develop freely. Depriving them of this space and freedom can ultimately become detrimental.

As an illustration of interdependence among the four levels of the consolidation structure, the Kosovo constitution is praised for the democratic and liberal values it comprises. Yet, Kosovo has often been blamed for a lack of rule of law (EU Commission Report on Kosovo Progress 2009). The incompatibility between the

written rules and their implementation best reflects the interdependence among the levels of the consolidation structure, and obstacles of the written rules - created mostly by international mentors, in the face of the implementation process. Nonetheless, the *Kulturelle Konsolidierung* is also directly linked to parties -is their behaviour domesticating, cultivating, and generating democratic or other values disturbing democracy at the society level. The fusion between parties, organised crime and a mafia, as well as the authoritarian tendencies of the executive branch of government coming out of political parties, demonstrates best the interdependence between the second and the third level (Merkel 2007). Throughout our research, we will explore the second level of the democracy consolidation structure. However, focusing exclusively at the second level does not mean that it will prevent us from getting a complete picture of democracy consolidation. In a highly party-driven politicisation context, the influence of the second level at the other levels augments, conveying best the consolidation prospects in general.

While applying the model given by Merkel, it is also important to highlight that it does not provide details within the second level of consolidation, how it specifically looks like, the process within, or indicators used for measurement of consolidation of the level. In this way, such flexibility gives us a room and opportunity to adapt it for our case study, of course within the contours of the consolidation structure, using the functionalist approach, to measure party functions and their contributions in the democracy consolidation process. Furthermore, what makes the functionalist approach easier to use at the second level of consolidation is that the model itself relies on the system approach. Democracy consolidation is dependent on parties' functions' level of performance. the more competently these functions are completed, the greater the prospects of democracy consolidation. Otherwise, the failure to do so is reflected in consolidation possibilities. The longer the consolidation process takes, the more the tutoring by the international community is prolonged, and the formal alienation of delegated representation from the people is higher. If the

international community is to have a role here forever, it puts the very fundamental principles of democracy at risk. Nevertheless, the international community is not going to leave as long as they are convinced that there is a compatibility of values and norms of democracy with values as well as with the norms, behaviour and attitude of domestic actors, making the effects of democracy touchable. In turn, such democracy development requires real and workable democratic domestic institutions. If democratic intermediary institutions – political parties, fail also to establish a self-perpetuating internal democratic consolidated system in need of no external help, there is no one else to guarantee its inner self functioning. The concern of our research is the measurement of functions of the most important actors at the second level, pinching directly democracy consolidation prospects.

The democracy consolidation process, despite currently being characterised as heavily internationally guarded, is directly dependent on domestic institutions, particularly political parties. Through getting a bright picture of political parties, especially the extent to which political parties perform their functions, we can grasp a clear image of the likelihood of democracy consolidation. The better the performance from political parties the faster and healthier the prospects are for consolidation. If there is a weak and deficient consolidation at the second level (political parties) of the democracy consolidation structure, it will affect negatively other levels that otherwise due to the role of other actors could do better. Weaknesses at the second level decreases the space and opportunity for consolidation of other levels. Likewise, political parties have the capability to damage and bring into question the democracy consolidation process. I argue that such a theoretical correlation in democracy consolidation is viable - in political parties' studies in particular and political sciences in general. In addition, the model used to measure such theoretical correlation fulfils scientific criteria grounded on social science methodology.

Moreover, the model on party functions developed by Emminghaus (2003) that we are applying to measure the party functions (at the second level within the model of democracy consolidation structure) developed by Merkel, has been adapted appropriately for our case study. The modifications done include the adding of some new functions based on the peculiarities of the context we are dealing with, while changing and omitting some indicators of certain particular functions. The table below shows the model I am going to use throughout the research.

<b>Function</b>	<b>Indicators</b>	<b>Procedure</b>	<b>Data</b>
<b>Representation</b>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. <i>Position of parties along social cleavages</i></li> <li>2. <i>Programme differences among parties</i></li> </ol>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ <i>Analysis of party programmes</i></li> <li>▪ <i>Analysis of cleavage structure on party system</i></li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ <i>Qualitative Interviews</i></li> <li>▪ <i>Party programmes</i></li> <li>▪ <i>Election campaign observance</i></li> <li>▪ <i>Media analysis</i></li> </ul>
<b>Integration</b>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. <i>Anchoring of citizens by political parties</i></li> <li>2. <i>Orientation of citizens toward policy options</i></li> <li>3. <i>Making citizens feel part of the collective process</i></li> </ol>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ <i>Analysing individual party linkages</i></li> <li>▪ <i>Looking at relation between actual integration and modernisation process</i></li> <li>▪ <i>Analysing movements of party elites from one party to another</i></li> <li>▪ <i>Analysing electoral volatility</i></li> <li>▪ <i>Looking at relation of parties to their social structure</i></li> <li>▪ <i>Analysing voter turnout</i></li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ <i>Election data</i></li> <li>▪ <i>Party programmes, electoral platforms</i></li> <li>▪ <i>Volatility data</i></li> <li>▪ <i>Party membership registers</i></li> <li>▪ <i>Party statute</i></li> <li>▪ <i>Qualitative interviews</i></li> <li>▪ <i>Media reports</i></li> </ul>

<b>Legitimation</b>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. <i>Inner democracy</i></li> <li>2. <i>Policy making</i></li> <li>3. <i>Competition</i></li> </ol>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ <i>Analysing party organisation and inner decision-making: institutionalization (Panebianco), inclusiveness, centralisation,</i></li> <li>▪ <i>Analysis of selectorate</i></li> <li>▪ <i>Analysis of programme formulation</i></li> <li>▪ <i>Analysis of election campaign relations among parties</i></li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ <i>Party statute</i></li> <li>▪ <i>Regulations</i></li> <li>▪ <i>Media reports</i></li> <li>▪ <i>Qualitative interviews</i></li> </ul>
	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. <i>Ability of parties to deal with the current national problems</i></li> <li>2. <i>Planning ability of governing parties</i></li> </ol>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ <i>Analysing party programmes, electoral platforms</i></li> <li>▪ <i>Analysing stands of parties on the pending national issues</i></li> <li>▪ <i>The quality of governing programmes</i></li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ <i>Party programmes, electoral platforms</i></li> <li>▪ <i>Qualitative interviews</i></li> <li>▪ <i>Media reports</i></li> <li>▪ <i>Government programmes</i></li> </ul>
	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. <i>State politicisation</i></li> <li>2. <i>State exploitation</i></li> <li>3. <i>Establishing party patronage, clientelism, corruption, clans, nepotism</i></li> </ol>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ <i>Analysing the use of state resources for particularistic exchanges: employment in public administration, government contracts, privatisation process</i></li> <li>▪ <i>Analysing politicisation of rule of law</i></li> <li>▪ <i>Analysing party finances</i></li> <li>▪ <i>Analysing budget allocations</i></li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ <i>Qualitative interviews</i></li> <li>▪ <i>Employment documents in public administration</i></li> <li>▪ <i>Privatisation and contract documents</i></li> <li>▪ <i>Media reports</i></li> <li>▪ <i>Annual European Commission reports</i></li> <li>▪ <i>Other annual</i></li> </ul>

			development reports, ICG, Transparency International , etc.
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Table 4. The adapted and modified model of party functions

## 1. Representation function

The representative model of modern democracy is hardly imaginable without political parties. They give meaning to and make a representative democracy workable through the representation function they perform. Political parties as intermediary institutions constituting the party system in general reflect society as whole, or different parties represent a plurality of society based on class, ethnicity, religion, or any other group distinguished by socio-political cleavages. At different socio-political contexts, representation is conceptualised and applied differently, leading to a variety of definitions related to the representation function of parties. Parties are supposed to represent various social groups, either symbolically or in advancing specific interests (Gunther and Diamond 2000). Due to the impossibility of the whole society to take part in governing activity, one of the main *raison d'être* of parties in modern democracies is to represent society at the governing level. Helms (1995, 647) among others, offers a very useful conceptualisation of the representation function as “*the durable reflection of relevant social conflicts (like ethnic, religious, or of economic nature) in party system and their projection in political system*”<sup>3</sup>.

It should be pointed out that representation as a function is also performed by other intermediary institutions, such as interest groups, social movements etc.. Yet, usually the most important representative institutions, the political parties, represent the well-entrenched and durable divisions within society. Based on the above mentioned definition, in order to measure the representation function of

<sup>3</sup> It is my own translation from German language: “die dauerhafte Widerspiegelung relevanter gesellschaftlicher Konflikte (etwa ethnischer, konfessioneller oder ökonomischer Art) im Parteiensystem und ihre Projektion in das politische System verstanden werden”.

parties, first the main cleavages within society should be identified, and to try to find out their reflection on the party system, and their representation on the political system in general, to a large extent through the governing activity of political parties. The identity of parties that constitute the party system in Kosovo reflects best how far they represent the social cleavages within society. In this regard, it should also be investigated the positions of parties are along such long term social divisions. After finding this out, we have to relate it and try to measure any relationship between parties and the cleavage structure. If party system is the embodiment of social cleavages and governing activity takes place based on the wants, needs, and preferences of the represented parts of society, it can be concluded that parties do perform their representative function well. To what extent parties do represent certain social groups organised on social cleavages, is best manifested by party programmes, electoral platforms, and interviews with members of the parties' leadership, as well as by media and election campaign analysis. Therefore, measurement will take place by analysing the indicators through data collected from the party documents, interviews, media reports, and so on.

## **2. Integration function**

In addition to representation, political parties make citizens feel part of the political process and system in general. Parties integrate society into the political process preventing apathy, which would not be healthy for democracy, particularly during the democracy consolidation process. Usually such responsibility is dedicated above all others to political parties. The very existence of parties implies the bridging and binding role in two ways, bottom-up and top-down. Integration as a function of political parties is context based and variously defined. For example, Schmitter (1999, 477) defines the integration function of parties as *“providing most citizens with a stable and distinctive set of ideas and goals (symbols) which anchor their expectations about democracy, orient them in a general way toward policy options and make them feel part of the process of*

*collective choice*". The research on the integration function of parties is based on this conceptualisation.

The measurement of integration function relies on three dimensions: the anchoring of citizens by political parties, the extent to which parties orient citizens in policy options, and how far parties make citizens consider themselves and feel part of the collective decision-making process. Exploration of the function is going to be based upon following indicators: relationship of a party to its social structure, individual – party linkages, movement of the elite from one party to another, electoral volatility, voter turnout, and so on. The data will be collected from party programmes, electoral platforms, volatility data, election results, qualitative interviews, media reports, and so on.

### **3. Legitimation function**

Democracy consolidation entails legitimation from citizens'. Political parties are acknowledged as agents of legitimation within the democratisation process. The democratic legitimation is best achieved through transparency and an open decision-making process offering opportunity for participation to citizens. Otherwise, it makes no sense to talk of democracy consolidation if democracy in the eyes and minds of the people is not legitimised, or if intermediary channels for citizens to participate in the political system are closed and monopolised by ruling elites within parties. In such suspicious circumstances, it is apparently difficult to expect democracy to give effect – in terms of citizens' advantages. The issue is more sensitive with young democracies where citizens do not distinguish the ruling elite from the institutions and the regime as a whole, or politicians from institutions (Dalton 2002). People identify the behaviour and attitude of leaders with the democracy itself.

This function is unavoidable and very much important for the democratisation process to be successful. Political parties as key inner actors are expected to legitimise democracy among society. They cultivate, produce, and inculcate

democratic norms and values, by means of following procedures prescribed by such norms and values firstly themselves, pursuing the collective instead of narrow interests, and consequently convincing, society-wide that democracy is best for them. In this way, parties makes democracy tangible to citizens, through benefits that democracy usually offers. Consequently, legitimation strengthens and ensures the consolidation process. The legitimation function is explored through subsequent indicators: inner party democracy, policymaking, and competition among parties. The measurement of these indicators is going to take place empirically looking at: inclusiveness, centralisation, inner institutionalization (Panebianco, 1988), selectorate (Rahat and Hazan 2001), party programmes, electoral platforms, party statues, media reports, and so on. Such examination will shed light into the democracy consolidation process, since legitimation directly touches on the process, making it directly dependent.

#### **4. Innovation function**

The process of democratization in Kosovo has been associated with the process of state and nation building, whereby parties have often been the object of criticism for the lack of vision in how to solve issues that either only recently been solved, or are in fact still outstanding in Kosovo, regarding political, social, and economic systems. The innovation function illustrates best the creativity of parties to handle issues reflected directly and indirectly in the democracy consolidation process. Therefore, it is considered among the functions performed by parties relevant in the consolidation process. The measurement of the innovation function will begin by looking at the planning ability and party commitment to deal with current national problems. The indicators will be measured through analysing party programmes and electoral platforms, analysing the position of parties on pending national issues, analysing the quality of governing programmes made by governing parties (including the long-term strategies). The data are collected from party programmes and electoral platforms, qualitative interviews, reports of organisations, and media reports.

## **5. Governing function**

This is the most important party function in democracy that belongs exclusively to parties - it is not shared with other intermediary actors. Since our focus is reflecting on the governing function done by parties on the democracy consolidation process, we are concerned essentially on widespread characteristics of the way in which they govern and currently reflect on the consolidation prospects. Due to the operationalisability of this function, the centre of attention should be narrowed, highlighting several indicators appearing to spoil the democratization process, such as: state exploitation (Grzymala-Busse 2003, 2007), state and society wide politicisation, behaviour producing party patronage, clientelism, corruption, nepotism, and clans (Kopecky, Scherlis, Spirova 2008; Müller 2006; Marcus & Ratsimbaharison 2005; Fox 1994). Citizens perceive such vices of the governing behaviour of parties as the way the political elite exploit the state for narrow and particularistic benefits. The ability to perform the governing function is reflected in parties' abilities to perform other functions, such as representation, legitimation and integration.

The process for measurement is mainly done by finding out data on party finances, civil servants employment, government contracts – are they used for particularistic benefits, the privatization process, media reports, different reports on Kosovo, qualitative interviews, etc.

## Chapter 2

### 2. Political System of Kosovo

#### **2.1. Historical background up to 1998-99 War**

Kosovo has a long and diverse history. Throughout history, as a political (sub) system, it has been part of a range of political systems. Located in the Balkans where many civilizations have clashed throughout history, it was inescapable for Kosovo to be exposed to such sword crossings and bombs. These historical developments meant Kosovo has at times been the interest of others (Malcolm 1999). This historical background has obviously had an impact on Kosovo, with there sometimes being home-run political systems, and other times externally governed systems. However, Kosovo history is not our concern here and we will not dig into it. All that we will cover here, is an overview of Kosovo history with particular emphasis on the current political system, serving as a bed to the democratization process that is taking place, with political parties operating inside of this.

The current population in Kosovo is 90% Albanian, believed to be the descendants of ancient Dardans - an ancient Illyrian tribe. Beyond Albanians, mainly Slavs, that in the 7th century AD penetrated into traditionally Illyrian inhabited territory, as well as some other minorities, inhabit the rest of Kosovo: Turks, Bosnians, Roma, Egyptian, Ashkali, Gorans, etc.. The main political structure of Albanians was traditionally by tribe. Kosovo as a territory firstly belonged to Illyrian tribes until the occupation by the Romans. Later on, part of it was conquered by the Serbs due to Slavic migration in the 7<sup>th</sup> century to the Balkans. Afterwards, Kosovo was part of the Bulgarian empire from 850 to 1018 until the empire waned. For the following two centuries, the region was under the Byzantine Empire. The Ottoman Empire invasion then included the territory within itself, with the declaration of independence of Albania in 1912, as the Ottoman Empire was being deconstructed. Among the many organised resistances during the ottoman period, the Lidhja e Prizrenit (*League of Prizren*)

should be mentioned. Kosovo was annexed by Serbia, and later with the formation of Yugoslavia, it became part of this. Since Kosovo annexed by Serbia, at the end of the Ottoman Empire, Kosovo has consistently, with different intensities and means, and at different periods, struggled to get its independence (Bugajski 2002). On the other side, Serbia has continuously applied policies expelling particular groups, changing the ethnic structure of the demographic composition of Kosovo, with the intention of increasing the number of Serb settlers. During the first Yugoslavia after World War I, largely known as Serbian driven and dominated, Kosovo was incorporated into it, and the majority of the Albanian population was heavily discriminated. In 1941, during World War II, Kosovo was divided, occupied by Bulgaria, Germany, and Italy. Later on, together with Albania it was occupied entirely by Germany, but this lasted for only a short period of time (Vickers 1998). After the end of the Second World War, Kosovo was a province of the former Federal Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia, without the equal status of the other six republics constituting the federal state. With the constitutional change of 1974, the position of Kosovo was improved due to the extension of autonomous rule and more rights to Kosovo people, especially ethnic Albanians, making it an autonomous province (The constitution of Yugoslavia 1974).

In 1989 under pressure from the Serbian government to modify the Yugoslav constitution of 1974, Kosovo's status diminished. The autonomy was revoked, incorporating Kosovo into Serbia (at that time one of six Republics of the Federation), changing the Kosovo position within the federation, severing it from the Yugoslavia federation and forcing it to be completely dependent on Serbia (The constitution of Yugoslavia 1989).

The constitutional amendments, though legally made, was approved by the then puppet Assembly of Kosovo (filled up with members of the only existing communist party at that time, loyal to The Communist Party at the federal level and not really representing the people of Kosovo) highlighting the existing

legitimacy crisis. The people of Kosovo did not welcome this.. It opened the way for other modes of change, and pushed them to organise themselves into a peaceful resistance to boycott it. Such occurrences marked also the end of the one party system (during communist time, there were also a few other parties, but usually small and mainly secret organizations with mixed nationalist-communist ideologies – cell parties). The eve of social mobilization was associated with developments inside and outside Yugoslavia, the wave of democratization throughout the region, the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the beginning of the break-up of Yugoslavia. The elite of the communist party in Kosovo, together with the communist ideology and socialist system itself was totally discredited. New parties emerged, around whom the boycott and resistance was organised. The largest party, some considering it as a social movement, was LDK – *Lidhja Demokratike e Kosoves* (Democratic League of Kosovo) established in 1989, under the leadership of the charismatic Ibrahim Rugova. LDK was a centre of mobilisation for the majority of people of Kosovo, organising their resistance to Serbia and their struggle for independence. It should be pointed out, that there were also some other smaller parties such as: *Partia Parlamentare* (Parliamentary Party) - taking a more radical position on national issues compared to LDK. Some other small parties, like LPK – *Levizja Popullore e Kosoves* (People's Movement of Kosovo), later on constituted the first cells of the KLA. A number of parties were established even earlier, during Yugoslav communist regime, but due to the monist nature of the regime, were forced to organise themselves illegally, taking the form of cell parties.

This development is coupled with the democratic *wind of change* blowing throughout former communist Europe. In the case of Kosovo, external changes all over former Eastern Europe encouraged the hope of a pluralist way for political organisations. Nonetheless, such an environment was perceived internally as more of an opportunity for mobilisation on a nationalist basis, for independence from Serbia and Yugoslavia, rather than a direct opportunity for democracy. This attitude was widespread among the political elite. Such an

assertion is evident even nowadays, by the incompatibility of attitudes and behaviours of most of the former strugglers for independence with democratic norms and values. Yet, to separate the will for democracy from the will for independence is almost not viable. The unbearable pressure from Serbia and the unfamiliarity of democracy within the population, having no experience of democracy throughout history, made the resistance and striving for independence a priority. After some years, the peaceful resistance started to lose meaning and popular support, because it was stuck with no intended objectives. Many started to perceive it with suspicion, perceiving it as a fruitless way of organization on the way to independence. Subsequently the first armed groups emerged, looking to achieve independence by other than peaceful means. The Kosovo Liberation Army was established in 1996 and was at first forced to operate by secret means, sporadically attacking the Serbian forces wherever possible. Later on, they expanded across most of the territory, increasing their political support linearly throughout the war that started in 1998. The war casualties persuaded NATO to undertake military air strikes against Serbia in 1999, in order to stop the ethnic cleansing that was taking place in Kosovo, exercised by Serbian forces.

## ***2.2. Political development after the war and constitutional structure***


In 1999, with end of war, a political system based on UN Security Council Resolution 1244 (UN Security Council Resolution 1244, S/RES/1244, 10 June 1999) was established in Kosovo. Based on that, The Administration of Kosovo was put under the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), headed by the Special Representative of the UN Secretary General (SRSG) – nominated and changed by the UN Secretary General, serving as head of the political system in charge of decreeing laws among other executive and supervisory functions. Aiming to ensure the withdrawal of Serbian troops from Kosovo and to provide a secure environment, the UNSC Resolution 1244 mandated the KFOR, under the leadership of NATO, to be in charge of that.

Referring to the classification of interim international regimes done by Doyle (2003), UNMIK at the early beginning had a *Supervisory Authority*, then later softened and transformed into an *Executive Authority* sharing the legislative and executive power with domestic actors. The power of UNMIK<sup>4</sup> has been gradually and consistently decreased based on the capacity and developments of provisional Kosovo institutions, helping them to gradually develop and over time endorsing power, though always preserving the ultimate authority for themselves. Kosovo was governed according to the Constitutional Framework that was approved and entered into force on the 15th of May 2001 after being signed by the SRSG (it provided the general institutional structure of the Kosovo political system). According to the Constitution Framework, the highest authority was reserved for the SRSG, and Kosovo had its provisional legislative and government institutions as well as a judiciary, but all of them under UNMIK supervision. The competences and responsibilities were gradually extended to the domestic institutions, based on institutional capacity developments.

The vacuum of political power in Kosovo after the war, was filled partially by UNMIK on one side, with the Interim Administrative Council, composed of

<sup>4</sup> Hereby is provided the structure of the UNMIK divided into four pillars structuring the fields of responsibility.

<http://www.unmikonline.org/constframework.htm/05.02.2007>



predominantly both dominating political forces after the war (LDK and PDK), on the other. Both political forces had an antagonistic approach to each other, PDK accusing LDK of not supporting the KLA during the war – from which the PDK emerged. Such a conflicting attitude and behaviour was adopted by the masses as well, although currently this adoption has been decreased considerably, due in part to militancy depletion among party organisations in Kosovo.

The first elections to take place after the war were the local elections, which took place on 20th October 2000. Among many other small parties, LDK won 58%, PDK 27.3 %, while AAK won 7.7%. The results reconfirmed the shaken support that LDK had before and immediately after the war. Besides, as the international community was very much interested, power for former KLA commanders became unattainable. On 17th on November 2001<sup>5</sup> the first election for the Kosovo assembly took place, under UNMIK supervision. LDK won the biggest share - 47 (46.29%) out 120 seats, needing only a small number of seats from other parties to form the government. It was followed by the PDK who won just 26 seats (25.54%), AAK got 7.8% of votes - 8 seats, and the coalition of Serb parties, under *Povratak* (Return) polled 10.96%, equating to 20 parliamentary seats. In order to keep a balance of political forces and to avoid any possible civil warfare, the international community asked that both major parties form a grand coalition. In the next parliamentary elections in 2004, LDK achieved almost the same result, with 45.42% (47 seats), while PDK marked a slight increase to 28.85% (30 seats), and AAK 8.39% (9 seats). It should be mentioned that there was almost the same outcome, except that voter turnout was decreased from 83% in 2001 to 53.57% in 2004.

The November 2007 elections brought many changes to the Kosovo party system, electoral results, and power relations. The government formation was led by the former main opposition party PDK, winning the biggest share with 34.3% of the vote (37 seats), followed by the LDK, who for the first time in the LDK's

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<sup>5</sup> OSCE mission in Kosovo.

history became a losing party, experiencing a significant drop to only 22.6% of the vote (25 seats), and AAK 9.6% of the vote (10 seats). Two new parties performed quite well, despite contesting elections for the first time. AKR as a newly formed party, under the leadership of known businessman Pacolli, won 12.3% of the vote (13 seats), and LDD - in coalition with PSHDK, as a party coming out of the last LDK split at the sixth Congress, which ended up in them physically beating each other up. It evolved as a party created inside the LDK headed by Daci, formerly considered as the second man after Rugova in LDK. LDD got 10% of the vote (11 seats). Moreover, very low voter turnout characterised the 2007 elections. According to OSCE (mission in Kosovo) data, it comprised only 40.10%. Some believe that turnout could be even lower, but due to the sensitivity of the process that Kosovo is currently undergoing, the number of voters participation was a little inflated<sup>6</sup>. Yet again, with the insistence of the international community, the governing grand coalition was again formed during this mandate.

On the other hand, the relationship between UNMIK and domestic authorities has often featured disagreements. The former tried to some extent to fulfil its mission based on Resolution 1244, providing the self-governing autonomy to Kosovo under the *de jure* Serbian (at times Yugoslavian) sovereignty. However, it stood contrary to ambitions and objectives for the independence of Albanians in Kosovo. In fact, during the UNMIK rule, Serbia had no *de facto* sovereignty. Later on, the international community trying to build peace and reconcile Albanians and Serbs, and also find a solution for the final political status of Kosovo, enabled a negotiation process between Belgrade and Pristina under the auspices of former Finnish President Mr. Ahtisaari. Both parties in the conflict considered negotiations as a zero sum game, making it difficult for any possible compromise by either party. The outcome of the long negotiation process was the well-known

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<sup>6</sup> According to the quantitative research that were organized by the students of political sciences at Fama College, with 1100 respondents, only 38% voted on 2007 and in the coming election the turn out is expected to go down to no more than 32%.

Ahtisaari's Plan (UNOSEK), a draft solution for the final status of Kosovo. Serbia rejected it, while Kosovars accepted as a doable and real solution. However, the UN Security Council, due to a Russian Veto supporting the Serbian stance on the issue, did not recognise the proposal.

Nevertheless, other attempts also proved fruitless, and no compromise was achieved. On the other side, the pressure from the Albanians in Kosovo for independence was increased, making things unmanageable. As a result, the Kosovo provisional government, coordinating with the USA, Great Britain, and some other Western European allies on 17th of February 2008 declared independence, which was quickly recognised by USA and many other states (mainly from EU members and some other countries). After that, Kosovo drafted a democratic Constitution which entered into force on 15-th of June 2008.

Nonetheless, that is not the end of the story on the status of Kosovo. Even though Kosovo declared its independence, some ambiguities regarding authority remain, as do some not yet settled issues, making the status issue on-going, though not the grand priority it used to be. Most of recognitions of sovereignty are granted due to the independence being declared in accordance with the Ahtisaari's proposal (though not approved by the UN Security Council). This proposal offers to the Serbian community in Kosovo, which since the end of war has mostly lived in small enclaves, with a high degree of autonomy and self-governing on many issues, ensuring their direct link to Belgrade (Ahtisaari's Proposal)<sup>7</sup>. This is one of the reasons that this plan created some sort of empirical international legitimacy following the declaration of independence. Due to little development on ethnic reconciliation, there was obvious fear from the international community, that if Kosovo became independent, it might result in new ethnic violence. However, Ahtisaari's proposal ensured that such a thing is unlikely, because of the high level of minority rights it offers on one side, and the extension of the monitoring role of the international community on the other. In

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<sup>7</sup> <http://www.unosek.org/unosek/en/statusproposal.html> / 12.11.2007

addition, Ahtisaari's plan provides some provisional institutions through which the international community ensures the implementation of the plan and makes Kosovo a functional state.

The International Civil Office (ICO) has such a monitoring responsibility. On the other hand, EULEX, an EU rule of law mission has the duty to help Kosovo functionalise the rule of law and security sector. The KFOR mission was prolonged because despite the declaration of independence, the UN Security Council Resolution 1244 is still valid, and is also mentioned on the Independence Declaration itself. However, in the case of KFOR, its mission is unchallenged and will be here as long as there is a need, as its general commanders have repeatedly stated. The Kosovo institutions have to share power<sup>8</sup> with the above-mentioned international institutions, and up to now, (while I am writing) EULEX and ICO have been contested by Serbia and the majority of Serbians in Kosovo, particularly in the northern part of Kosovo. They see them as implementing Ahtisaari's Plan and therefore do not recognise it. The effective functioning of EULEX is still expected to mark its beginning. There are negotiations for that are going on between Brussels – New York- and Belgrade, with few outcomes so far.

As it can be observed thus far, the institutional structure in Kosovo is still very much in flux, constituting a direct challenge to democratization itself, which is our concern here. Furthermore, Kosovo authorities have not yet extended their authority to most of the Serb enclaves, especially in the Northern part on the border with Serbia, divided since the end of war at the *Iber* Bridge.

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<sup>8</sup> There has been a brilliant explanation of the role of ICO in Kosovo by an ICO representative taking part on a public debate on Privatisation in Kosovo, held on 08.11.2008. He declared that the ICO won't interfere, in this case on privatisation affairs but it can be related to other issues as well, as long as things go according to procedures, otherwise we have to intervene. It shows that the presence of the international community is very much and mostly dependent on the way of governance of Kosovo leadership, that comes out of parties. In other words, the presence of the international community in Kosovo will prevent the Kosovo authorities from having effective power to govern, but that is due to bad governance of Kosovo itself, and in turn by such way of governing they push the interference of the international community on governing affairs and consequently delaying the consolidation of democracy in Kosovo.

This is the actual institutional structure of the political system in Kosovo, which by the constitution is a parliamentary republic, and has its own single chamber parliament (120 seats) since the first elections after the war. It is a unitary system with high levels of decentralization, especially in parts populated by the Serbian ethnicity. However, as stated above, the Serb minority still challenges the authority of Kosovo, with just a few of them joining Kosovo institutions. Although the majority of them boycott Kosovo institutions, they have reserved seats in parliament, the executive branch as well as in other institutions. Such developments bring out the many current challenges during the state-building process, highlighting that Kosovo has undergone many transitions, aside from authoritarian to democracy, theoretically creating a challenge to the democratization process as well (Berg-Schlosser 2004).

### ***2.3. Kosovo electoral system***

Taking into account the sensitivity of minority issues, in order to guarantee that all entities in Kosovo are provided with equal opportunity of representation in government, Kosovo has adopted a proportional electoral system with a single electoral district. The minority issue and the pressure of the international community are considered the main reasons why Kosovo has chosen a proportional electoral system. Until the 2007 elections, the country had used a closed list proportional electoral system, while in more recent elections, there was a change in the electoral rules and candidate lists were opened, with the intention of stimulating a closer relationship between voters and candidates, as dictated by the UNMIK regulations<sup>9</sup>. However, that proved to be unsuccessful, because voters could choose 10 candidates on the list. In this way, it was hard for a voter to find out of the ten candidates is really representing him. As a result, this was changed later, with it now possible to choose just one candidate listed.

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<sup>9</sup> <http://www.unmikonline.org/regulations/index.htm>

Recently, the electoral law<sup>10</sup>, legislated by the Kosovo Parliament and entered into force in 2008, has changed some of the rules (local elections) but not the electoral system as a whole. Kosovo still has a proportional system, with a single electoral district. Yet, it will not now be possible to vote for ten candidates but just for one. The reasoning for this is that it is difficult as a voter to seek responsibility from ten people, for whom he might have voted. The law has further empowered party leaders, whereby the first on the list gets the votes of the party automatically, without needing to enter into competition with others inside the party. It is usual (although not obligatory) for party leaders to take this privileged position.

#### ***2.4. Kosovo context in theories of democratisation***

Having introduced the Kosovo political system, it brings us to several theoretical challenges regarding the democratization of Kosovo. Most of the theories and conventional knowledge on democratization refer to states, excluding other political systems. The Kosovo political system, even after the independence declarations, still lacks many components to make it fully sovereign and independent. One of the major components of a democratic system is the effective power of those elected to govern, not sharing governing power with any non-elected actor. Hence, as stated earlier that is not the case in Kosovo yet. Gunther, Diamandours, Puhle (1995, 6) very clearly point out that in order for a country to be considered a democracy, first of all it should not have any policy under the authority of unelected officials, because in such circumstances they fail to be accountable to the citizens. Moreover, Linz & Stepan (1996) among many others concerned with the democratization as a process and conditions required for it, include stateness as a precondition for the consolidation of democracy to take place. Therefore, in the case of Kosovo, democracy consolidation might encounter theoretical shortcomings, because its political status still lacks such a prerequisite.

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<sup>10</sup> Law on Election

Nonetheless, the experience of some not-entirely state actors with democratisation has necessitated that theories on democratisation to be reconsidered and re-conceptualised to also include political systems lacking full stateness, or not meant to be states at all. Taking into account democratization in some non-state actors such as Taiwan or the EU for example, opens up the way for a feasible approach to democratization comprising the Kosovo political system as well, if not as the end-product at least as a process. Therefore, it is more a shortcoming on the side of theories of democratization excluding non-state political systems, rather than with not being able to apply theories of democratization to non-states. It necessitates development and a stretching of theories of democratisation, covering also the democratisation of other political systems that aren't states. Since democratization is perceived as a process, it enables the measurement of developments within that process, though in a more complicated way due to the increase of the number of actors, particularly outer actors, involved in the process.

Referring to the aforementioned contested theoretical issue, Whitehead (2005) highlights this deficiency and calls for theoretical revision, to swell their applicability to non-state systems already undergoing the democratization process. In an attempt to overcome such a theoretical limitation, Tansey (2007) while dealing with the democratization process in Kosovo, chewed over the concept of the state from its root meaning, dividing it into three essential dimensions: *capacity*, *cohesion*, and *international recognition*. Although Kosovo (which up to now is recognised by 64 states) before the independence declaration lacked more than what is now limited to the element of international recognition, and even today still experiences a fragile cohesion. Regarding the capacity dimension, this was very much in place and increased consistently, particularly after independence, for the most part at the hands of Kosovo political parties. This specific conceptualization puts into focus the existence of a degree of stateness despite being short of full stateness. The capacity dimension has been continuously augmented with the incessant power transfer from UNMIK to

Kosovo provisional institutions. Even though, the full effective power of domestic institutions to govern at all sectors is still missing, their governing responsibility is extended to most policy areas.

The settlement of a democratic institutional structure, as a division point between transition and consolidation, Kosovo has passed the transition phase from an authoritarian to a democratic regime and it is in the phase of democracy consolidation (though as mentioned earlier it should not be ignored the heavy presence of the international community, in the long term increasing democratic deficiency). Referring to Merkel's (1999) model, Kosovo has almost passed the constitutional consolidation, the first level of consolidation, or if we refer to Pridham's (1995) conceptualisation there is already a negative consolidation, at least visually, because no alternative to a democratic regime seems viable at the moment.

The Kosovo political system actually finds itself within the process of democracy consolidation, with not yet clear prospects of future democratic developments. During our research, we will measure the likelihood of democracy consolidation in the Kosovo political system, by looking at the role of parties in this process. Overcoming the theoretical limitations, the models of democratisation studies used for state actors can also be applied to not fully state settings, as is the case with Kosovo.

## Chapter 3

### 3. Research Methodology

The literature review on the field of study brought out the stage of theory and study development, enabling the construction of the research design. The research principally relied on qualitative empirical research methods, primarily deductive orientated but often accompanied by an inductive way of research. Nevertheless, the research design is based on two types of data, largely primary, supplemented by secondary data as well. In order to shed light on the research methods and instruments used in the thesis, in this chapter are elaborated the methods, instruments, techniques used, the data chosen, the collection of this data, working through this and finally analysing it to draw up the results has been elaborated. In other words, here, described thoroughly, is the research process of the thesis. Additionally, it includes a critical point of view, looking at the possible shortcomings, as well as advantages of the methods and instruments used in the research process.

#### 3.1. *The case of study*

The case for study in our dissertation thesis is a single case study, within the Kosovo cultural, political and socio-economic context. Usually, the case study is not chosen by chance, force, or by accident, but mostly it is the researcher's interest that dictates what he is going to focus on (Detlef 2006, 321). In addition, the relevance of the case study and the degree it has been explored has a determining effect on the case selection. The researcher's decisive role in the case study selection might possibly influence the research process in terms of the units of analysis, methods and instruments used to collect the data, data processing and analysis, as well as the research results. Yet, though the researcher comes from the Kosovo context making up the case study in question, as much possible effort, at least consciously, has been made to ensure objectivity and a scientific approach rather than being subjective. As Detlef (2006, 336) points out, such an impact by the researcher on the research is possible, due also to ethnocentrism, and as theories themselves to a large extent

colour the outcomes and methods themselves, in our case study that has not been the case. Subjectivity in our thesis research has been avoided as much possible.

The difference from comparable case studies, is that this single case is more isolated, lacking prior experimental variance, and having uncontrollable external variance, unable to ensure the external reliability. In order to prevent a possible shift from the level of scientific research, the research design is built primarily based on the applied theories to the case study. The advantages of single case studies are their strategy for explorative studies, and enabling an intensive discussion of ideas, hypotheses, and empirical evidences. Moreover, different from other research strategies, single cases are context specific, based on historical and cultural features, they allow better interpretation and possible multiple causation (Detlef 2006, 321). On the other hand, such a research strategy has its disadvantages as well. It has no prior experimental variance, or a controlled external and error variance. Moreover, it has limitations in terms of generalisation possibilities, due to its focus on a specific case, no scientific criteria exists for making the results valid when applied to other case studies.

Within the context of this single case study, the specific number of parties to be included in our study has been defined. Despite the fact that Kosovo is home to around fifty political parties, most of them are very small and irrelevant, while some others are ethnic-based parties covering less than 8% of the total population. Hence, the research has been narrowed to the study of the five major Kosovo parties, currently major parliamentary parties. In this regard, in a single chapter the trend of parties' size and development since 1989 is described, in order to get a picture of trends and the scale of party development, though our research focuses just on the major five, measuring their performance and consequent impact on the democracy consolidation process in Kosovo. Being the most important parties, their impact on the democracy consolidation process is key compared to other small, irrelevant, or ethnic parties. The research

measures the performance of political parties' functions and their impact into democracy consolidation, through exploring the current five major parties.

Regarding the time scale and the period covered within the research, it includes the period after the war in 1999 up to the present time. The reason for this time scale is that most of the major parties, except LDK, emerged after the war. In addition, the period before the war was mainly concerned with the independence issue, heavily shadowing the democracy consolidation prospects.

The five key party functions measured in the research are as follows: representation, integration, legitimation, innovation, and governing. Herewith, they are operationally conceptualised, within their definitions not distorting their substantial meaning, ensuring the measurability of indicators to explain the level of functions fulfilment. From each conceptualisation of the function there are indicators drawn through which is measured the performance of parties on the function in question, built as categories and sub categories.

### ***3.2. Research model***

After the decision on the case study, it opened the way to find out the current state of affairs on the theories and work on the issue, and in fact, the extent to which it has been explored. In deciding, a thorough brainstorming was needed to research extensively on the literature review on political parties and democracy in general and with democracy consolidation in particular, the different regions of the world and the different waves of democratisation. The thorough examination of the literature revealed the issue to be generally unexplored, particularly the relationship between political parties and democracy consolidation, and the role of political parties in the process of democracy consolidation in the third wave of democratisation. Moreover, the issue within the single case study, the context of our concern, has not been explored at all.

After the literature review, before moving to the empirical part of the thesis to measure the relationship of the role of parties in the democracy consolidation

process in the Kosovo context, there was a need to draw up a model of research that enables such measurement to take place scientifically. In order to come up with such a model, initially there was a need to start up with theories of democracy placing parties within diverse models of democracy. Subsequently, narrowing down to theories of the democratisation process, system transformation theories in general, regime change and transition, and consolidation in particular taking into account the research focus. Along these lines, various theories and conceptualisations of democratisations built upon the contexts of different parts of the world and for different waves of democratisation were explored. Among them, the more applicable and operationalisable theory, with drawing up the framework of the research model in general, and explicitly referring to political parties within the general structure of democracy consolidation, is found to be in Merkel's (1999) model. It is broad and offers enough space and opportunity to construct within the skeleton of the empirical research model, the ability to measure the role of parties on the democracy consolidation process. Obviously, the framework model is contextualised for our case study. Bearing in mind the inner and international actors influencing the democracy consolidation process, they were isolated as much as possible.

The research moves down to theories of parties and party systems. From the literature review, it is found that the majority of the theories on political parties are based on the experience of political parties in north-western parts of the hemisphere. Therefore, their application necessitated contextualisation. After a thorough review of different approaches in studying political parties and party systems, the functionalist approach was perceived as suitable to measure political parties' performance, to the extent of what parties perform their functions, without alleviating other party features. Nonetheless, the approach is not free from deficiencies: tautological ambiguity - while conceptualising party functions, its static nature, or the inappropriateness in doing cross national research. In order to avoid the shortcomings of the approach used, eliminating the tautological ambiguity of the concepts of party functions, after looking at

different conceptualisations of party functions done by several students of political parties, appropriate and operational definitions were chosen. In this way, operational definitions of the concepts of party functions limit and even steer clear of the possible tautological ambiguity. The static nature of the functionalist approach is to lighten and soften up as much as possible through analysing the actual state of affairs and predicting the future prospects, preventing the normative standpoint from overshadowing the existing developments. While the inappropriateness of the approach in doing cross-national research does not hold relevance as long as our research is a single case-based research. Moreover, the literature review shows that the functionalist approach is used on some studies on the role of parties in the democracy consolidation of some African countries (Emminghaus 2003). The modified and adapted model of this study is operationalisable and fits within the aforementioned general model of democracy consolidation. It enables the measurement of the role of political parties in democracy consolidation in Kosovo. The main reason for using the functionalist approach to study political parties and their role in the consolidation process, through the model of democracy consolidation offered by Merkel (1999), is that it offers the possibility for empirical operational measurement of the role parties have in the democracy consolidation structure and process. Their role is particularly at the second level of democracy consolidation structure – the representation level, which obviously influences the other three levels of the structure. Exploring the degree of party performance in terms of the extent they fulfil functions, facilitates the working out of how far parties contribute directly to the second level of the democracy consolidation structure, and indirectly to the other three levels.

On the other hand, after a normative conceptualisation and prioritisation of party functions, five main functions are decisively selected and operationally defined, enabling empirical measurement to find out how far parties fulfil their functions. However, it does not mean that other aspects of political parties are neglected from concern. In order to understand what parties do, we need to know first what

parties are, and before getting to know what parties are and do, we have to be aware of what parties are supposed to be and do.

Moving further from the literature review, and above the general framework of the research model, in order to operationalise the research, we moved into the practical steps of the empirical research process: choosing the data, collecting it, working through it, and analysing it in order to draw up research results.

### **3.2.1. Choosing the data**

Before progressing to the step of data collection within the research process, first it needed to be decided what sources of information were necessary for the research. The case study itself, to a considerable extent, implies the source of information. Despite that, there is still space to choose from various sources, based on the availability of information, the possibility of having access to it, the validity of information, usefulness, as well as the likelihood of processing. In order to have a brighter and more diverse range of views, it was considered important to focus on data from a variety of sources: political parties themselves, civil society activists, the academic community, various organisations linked with the case study (or having interest in the field of study), the media, as well as earlier researches related in one way or another to our study. Political parties themselves are the major sources of data and provide the insiders' perspectives - how are they organised, work and function, their attitudes, behaviours, and values, reflecting a sort of self-evaluation. Such data is considered of vital and primary importance, on which relies the research. On the other hand, civil society activists from an outsiders' perspective have an attractive and important position within society, follow the issues that impact and are impacted on by parties. They offer more or less a critical outsider position, and have a critical role on the overall political process, including the consolidation of democracy. Furthermore, science milieu on the field of study are also a supportive source of data. They have specific knowledge on political parties and democracy consolidation, and most importantly they are objective. Additional sources, such as various organisations dealing with parties, are supplementary to the main sources of

data. They have frequently drawn reports and analysis on the issues that are our object of study. Moreover, the media is a rich field of information, highlighting parties' positions, attitudes, behaviours, policies so on. Previous research related to any of the points within our focus of study is helpful and offers useful data indeed.

However, deciding on the sources of data in general requires a specification. The question remains as to what and whom within parties, which civil society activists, whom from the scientific community, which organisations and institutions, which media for what specific period of time? It is considered useful to interview people as high up in the party hierarchy as possible. They have the deepest and most guarded information, though often will not be willing to reveal it. Despite the intention to interview party leaders, due to their timetables it was impossible to arrange interviews. Instead, from the five major parties interviews were arranged with members of parties' chairmanships, normally close to the party leader, having inner information and being a possible substitution to parties' leaders. Moreover, party documents are considered a reliable and valid source of information on party organisations, functions, behaviours, and attitudes. The party statute is the highest legal act within the party and discloses the normative way of how a party is supposed to be organised and function. Therefore, party statute is considered as one of the major sources of data within the party. In addition, the party programme reveals party ideological orientation, mission, and vision, through which party objectives, values, and attitudes are normally made public. Furthermore, party programmes offer important data for the research. Besides, with electoral platforms being more specific, they provide more dynamic data about party policies, priorities, emphasis, and so on. Based on that, it was decided that the above-mentioned sources of data within the parties would be used. The data from party documents might not necessary paint a real life picture of parties, but when compared and contrasted with party representatives' interviews their validity and reliability can be enhanced, even if not fully ensured. Contexts, like Kosovo in our case, are known for a high level of informality,

reflected by political parties and to some extent they also cause this. Hence, the rules and regulations specified on party statute are not always followed by party structures, neither are the objectives set out by parties. From the insider point of view, such a gap within the party data can be minimised, though not closed. The aforementioned sources of data are considered to be the most important within the parties.

On the other hand, from the civil society activists, representing important sources of data from the outsider perspective, it was decided to interview some of them known to have reflected the political process positively, being active and conscious about political developments, including parties' activities, behaviours, and attitudes within the democratisation process. Civil society activists being close to or in the service of parties or government, intentionally are not selected, since the information abstracted from them might be tainted with bias towards one or another party that they support. Different from the insider point of view from parties, civil society activists see things from another angle, enriching the data and putting more light into the thesis's research.

Nevertheless, people from the political science community in Kosovo were also selected for interviews. They have knowledge and expected objectivity on the case study. Yet, it should be pointed out that Kosovo has no specific specialists on political parties or democratisation. Notwithstanding, it was decided to select some distinguished students, doing their PhD on political sciences overseas.

Furthermore, other supplementary sources of data used are media reports, from all daily newspapers, with the major focus, but not exclusively, on the election campaign at national elections. Some newspapers are supporters of certain parties, therefore I decided to rely on all and not just few of them, and compare them among themselves. Additionally, the three national TV stations were also used as a source of data. The election data needed was merely taken from CEC and OSCE missions in Kosovo. Kosovo laws, UNMIK regulations, and CEC

regulations are utilised as supplementary data. Furthermore, reports from international organisations and institutions such as: European Commission annual progress reports, OSCE mission in Kosovo, ICG, TI, and so on, are considered as supplementary data.

### **3.2.2. Data collection**

The various methods in qualitative research used in data collection are: observation, interviewing, and document analysis. The data collection, as one of the main steps within the research process, is based on two major methods: interviews and document analysis.

#### ***Interviews***

Following the research model construction, and decision on the data selection, is the stage of data collection, which primarily needs the choosing of methods and instruments to collect the data from the already decided sources. The type of research, being quantitative or qualitative, often determines the methods and instruments used. Our thesis research is exclusively qualitative research, providing the space to choose among the methods and instruments appropriate for qualitative research. One of the major methods used to collect the data is interview, and the interview schedule as an instrument of research (Kumar 1999, 109). The type of interview used to collect the data is the open ended structured interview schedule. The interview schedule is considered a written list of questions, open ended or closed, prepared for the interviewer, in a person to person interaction (face to face, by telephone, or by other electronic media) (Kumar 1999, 109). Though unstructured interviews offer more opportunity to penetrate deeply into the interviewees' thoughts and ideas about the issue discussed, there is always a danger of shifting to an uncontrolled interview, moving away from the topic he is being interviewed on. However, the structured and open-ended interview gives sufficient opportunity to the interviewee to express himself, while still being within the order of the questions specified on the interview schedule. Moreover, different from the unstructured interview it does not require much knowledge from the interviewer.

Interviewing as the research method of data gathering has its advantages and disadvantages compared to other methods. It is a very useful instrument to gain in-depth data, and the interviewer can complement the information taken by other methods. In addition, if required, the interviewer has the possibility to offer supplementary information to the interviewee. Furthermore, it enables the research to be conducted with any type of person. However, it is considered expensive and time consuming, while often the quality of data is affected by the quality of interaction. The quality of data may also vary if many interviewers are involved, as the interviewer might introduce a bias.

Among the different types of interviews, in our case study, the type of expert interview is used. One of the features of this type of interview is that the interviewee's personality is not at the centre of the interview, but his knowledge (for example due to his profession, career, or position he has) about the issue on which the interview is conducted. In this type of interview, the interviewee is considered as a provider of knowledge (Westle 2009). There are no clear-cut rules for the conduct of expert interviews, and some see it as easier due to the knowledge the interviewee has. Nonetheless, there are difficulties associated with it as well, such as the blocking of theme by the expert, while he does not want to offer some insider information, or if he does not feel competent to do that – therefore moving away from the topic. In a single case study then he should be pressed just at the explorative level. The interviewer should show competence as well in order to be accepted so by the interviewee. Often they might come to a contradiction, as not distinguishing between knowledge, knowing, experience, and opinion.

The schedule expert interview, as an instrument used to collect data in our research, is constructed based on the five main party functions meant to be measured. For each particular function open-ended questions are drawn based on the theories, concepts, and sub concepts building up the party functions into

question, used as categories and sub-categories. Some of the questions were also constructed from an inductive way of research, intended to collect data to measure the party function performance. The concepts and sub concepts within a party function, based on which interview questions were drawn, are used also as categories and sub-categories on data analysis. The expert interviews for political parties, civil society activists, and political scientists, have similarities but also differ on some points, since they are perceived as two different sources of information, the former an insider while the later as an outsider source of information. Moreover, there are differences on some questions to government and opposition parties, since some parties studied have never been in government. Yet, regardless of their differences, all interviewee schedules are structured with party functions as the main categories, and their indicators as sub categories.

The expert is considered to be someone that possesses certain specific knowledge on the issue because they hold a certain position within an organisation or institution (Meuser & Nagel 1991). Moreover, as experts they can be valued in one way or another to the issue studied, as was the case with two of interviewees in our case: Gezim Krasniqi and Gezim Selaci, currently doing their PhD on political sciences overseas. Based on that, the interviewees are considered experts since they are either members of the party chairmanship, activists within civil society, or people merely having interest in the issue, or students of the topics researched. The interviews lasted between 45 minutes (the shortest), to two and a half hours (the longest). Four of the interviews were conducted by email, also considered as an acceptable form of interviewing (Bortz & Doering 2006). Two of the interviewees, Gezim Krasniqi and Gezim Selaci, are currently studying overseas, and the only way for them to interview was by email. Halil Matoshi expressed his willingness to respond by email, as he wanted more time to think about the questions asked. While Jetullah Aliu from the Kosovo Agency against corruption also asked to be interviewed by email, though he answered just a few questions, arguing that the agency does not deal directly

with parties, though the interview schedule comprises questions also indirectly related to parties, and touch upon issues dealt with by the agency. During all face-to-face interviews notes were taken on the responses, and later turned into a transcript. Moreover, the interviewees were informed and ensured that the information derived from interviews would be used for academic/scientific rather than journalistic purposes..

### ***Document analysis***

Furthermore, despite interviews being the method of data collection, in our research an additional method, supplementary to the expert interview, known as document analysis (Westle 2009, 325-334) was used. The document analysis method is one of the two main research methods used in our research, in the data collection stage, complemented by content analysis on the phase of data analysis in the research. The primary data collected by the document analysis method are party documents: party programmes, statutes, and party electoral platforms. The party statute is a normative description type of the document, specifying the overall inner party organisation. The statutes analysed are the most recent ones, despite the fact that parties often keep changing statute depositions from one party congress to another. Party programmes and electoral platforms express the orientation of a party's values, while electoral platform is more specific in nature. The parties' documents were collected from parties themselves, or downloaded from parties' websites, most of them published in a form of booklet ensuring their authenticity. The data collected from party documents offer static information, but are very useful when compared and contrasted with the data collected from expert interviews, being more dynamic, improving the validity through the triangulation method (Westle 2006, 259). Laws, UNMIK, CEC, and OSCE regulations and other information, were collected from internet, from their respective webpage. The laws were downloaded from the electronic Kosovo Parliament official journal, while UNMIK regulations are from the official journal of the UNMIK. The CEC regulations are downloadable from

CEC official website. The same applies to OSCE regulations and other election data.

The newspaper articles as another unit of analysis were borrowed from the archive of the city library of Ferizaj, a city in Kosovo. The archived newspapers are the daily national newspapers from the year 2000 up to the beginning of 2010. The newspapers are considered as a substantial field of information about political parties. Due to the large number of newspapers for quite long period of time, the newspaper articles dealing with any of the issues and sub issues of our research were considered and selected, and also categorised based on the categories of the research. The specific and exclusive focus is drawn during the periods of the electoral campaign of the three periodic national elections from 2001, 2004, and 2007. In addition, the national TV stations provide sufficient information on parties. The data from three national TV stations were selected as on the consideration of importance and relation to the issues of the study, especially news and other reports of interest for our case study. Moreover, various organisations' reports about Kosovo, are used as secondary data, such as: ICG reports from 2000 to 2009, European Commission annual progress reports for Kosovo starting from 2005 to 2009, TI reports including Kosovo, and so on. Hereby, the data are collected from their respective official webpage, particularly the published reports in question. Their authenticity in our research is based on their reference, of information from their webpages and their publications.

To sum up, interviews and document analysis are the two main methods of data collection used in our research process.

### **3.2.3. Data working through**

After their collection, the data was worked through to purify, arrange, and then clean it up. The interviews were made into transcripts. Excluding the four interviews conducted through e-mail, the rest of the interviews were written down, but not recorded by any electronic mean.. Usually, it is not a rule that the

transcript is left unedited, and it is up to the researcher which part should be transcribed, paraphrased, cited, or not to be considered at all, based on the relevance of data (Meuser/Nagel 1991, 455). The main consistent parts of interviewees' responses for each question were written down, though not fully and not word for word. Therefore, during working through the data there was a need to arrange it, recalling information, checking if anything is missing and whether it can be retrieved from the interviews. Since open-ended interview questions are structured based on the categories and subcategories of the variables and concepts used, they were already grouped into topics of research. Such arrangement was very helpful for comparing and contrasting the data, looking at similarities and differences, as well as for analysing it.

Additionally, the other primary data collected by the method of document analysis, was read thoroughly. After the first reading, they were further categorised based on the structure of the thesis - party functions as categories, and their indicators as sub categories, and prepared for the step of data analysis. The data from the documents were grouped into these categories, particularly the main themes of the documents compared to the research categories and subcategories. The newspaper articles and the data taken from TV stations were categorised based on the indicators of the variables. The reports of the above mentioned organisations were thoroughly read and checked to establish which of them and which parts are relevant to our research, in other words which deal with Kosovo parties and are related to the concepts we use in our research. The same categorisation was applied to these relevant parts of the reports.

#### **3.2.4. Data analysis**

The primary and secondary data on which our research relies was collected through interviews and document analysis (as the main methods of data collection). Then after working through the data and arranging it to prepare for analysis, the content analysis method is used to analyse the data collected. The content analyses in general is known as the systematic, ordered, and inter subjective description of communication contents (Westle 2009, 334). As a

research method, it is not used just as a data collection method, but rather, also as a data analysis research method. At the heart of the content analysis relies the categorisation process, and coding for the process of ordering the category to the units of analysis. In order to alleviate an initial possible conceptual misunderstanding and then deviation, the categories and sub categories used are well defined. The category schema in our research is built in a mixed form, dominated by deductive and supplemented on a winning streak by inductive means of categorisation. Most of the categories are built from the theories constructing the research, but often within the research process categories are also introduced at some point in the exploration process. The category schema was developed prior to data collection, based on the theories channelling the research (see Table 4). Such categorisation has guided the structuring of the interview schedule. The questions put forward were based on the categories and subcategories coming out the concepts and sub-concepts deduced from the theories used on the research.

To analyse the texts of the data in our case of research the summarising technique (that relies merely on the systematic paraphrasing of the text within the data) was used. However, often parts of the texts, wherever considered as making sense, are also quoted. The conceptual parts of the texts are related to the categories and subcategories. Following that, the empirical findings from the data collected by the methods and instruments mentioned above, are related to the categories and sub categories within the research, confronting them with theories. The interpretation of the materials is done based on the data, in order to come out with the results of analysis. Moreover, it should also be mentioned that no computer programme was used to analyse the data, and the researcher has done the whole work manually.

### ***3.3. Validity and reliability issue***

Validity is defined as the degree to which the researcher has measured what he has set out to measure (Smith 1991, 106). In the case of the instrument used, it implies whether the instrument measures the intended measurement. In case of

the interview as a method of data collection, the thesis has a content validity (Kumar 1999, 138) based upon a logical link between the questions of the interview schedule and the objectives of the study. The large and extensive number of open-ended questions in the structured interview schedule, constructed based on the concepts and sub concepts comprising the study, offers plenty of space for a close relationship between the instruments used and the objectives of the study. Each party function, from the central five functions structuring the empirical part of the research, is highly and extensively represented on the interview schedule. The questions are divided for each particular function, and are meant to exhaust and explore deeply the functions in question. However, the content validity itself suffers through weaknesses. Such judgments might be based on subjective logic. Various people may perceive the content validity of an instrument differently. In addition, the extent of variance of questions from the objectives of the study might be noticeable, as the selection of questions themselves might influence the research validity.

On the other side, dealing with the external reliability in the single case study is not an easy issue, due to an inability to test the measurement. Reliability requires re-measurement of the case study, which in reality, in social sciences and in single cases of study often implies measuring two different things, that are unable to provide the same results. A measurement is reliable to the extent that it gives the same result repeatedly if the measurement is repeated (Schively 1998, 41). The inability of applying the research done in a single case to other cases and expecting the same results is one of the weaknesses of the single case study research model.

However, in order to increase the validity and reliability of our research in general the known technique of triangulation is used: the data and the methods triangulation (Denzin 1978). By combining multiple methods and empirical data sources, a researcher can hope to overcome the weakness, intrinsic biases and the problems that arise from a single research method and single data sources.

Triangulation does not necessary imply the same results (Westle 2006), but at least enriches the research through various points of view from diverse angles, offering a more detailed and balanced picture of the issue. The methods of triangulation in our research process is ensured through various methods used, as mentioned above, for the data collection, the interviews, and document analysis, and as for data analysis, the content analysis method. On the other hand, various aforementioned sources of data, including a variety of primary and secondary data, enables the data triangulation. The triangulation technique was applied to improve the validity, reliability, and credibility of our research in general.

### **3.4. Criticism**

The research is not safe from possible criticism, ranging from the context, the research design and process, to the possibility of drawing up generalisations. The research is conducted within the context of where the researcher himself belongs, implying possible subjectivism. Yet, the researcher has tried consciously to be objective and value free as much as possible. However, one the most difficult limitations to our research is the case study itself. The case study's focus is very much in flux making the theorising process quite difficult. The democracy consolidation process and political parties in the Kosovo context, are still being developed, and have not yet taken their final and stable form. Theorising on an evolving thing is quite challenging.

Regarding the choice of data to be collected, the interviewees were selected from the same positions within the party hierarchy, excluding party leaders, choosing those more willing to be interviewed, which might to some extent imply non-systematic selection. The data taken from TV stations include only the time period when the research started, form the beginning of the research up until the end, but not earlier.

During the data collection process, there were some shortcomings accompanying the process. Some responses provided by interviewees were too

short, and some theoretical issues of interview schedules were left unanswered by the position of daily politics, providing difficulties for some to respond properly to some questions, despite the possibility offered by the interview method for a further explanation to the interviewees. Moreover, some interviewees did not respond to all questions. Perhaps, also the large number of questions in the interview, discouraged interviewees from completing. Despite that, it has not distorted our research. Perhaps using specific computer programs such as NVIVO, or others, could ensure greater accuracy in the data.

Lastly, the single case of research suffers from one of the main weaknesses, the impossibility of generalisation. The findings and theories of the single case study cannot be generalised and applied to other cases studies, as the research is so context based.

## Chapter 4

### 4. Historical Development of Political Parties in Kosovo

#### 4.1. Introduction

The origin of parties in non-single party-state systems is usually accompanied by democracy expansion, specifically, a representative democracy. The origin of parties in different parts of the world is very much context related, varying in terms of space and time. Regarding the origins of political parties, among others LaPalombara and Weiner (1990, 25-31), referring to western European party systems, theorise the origins of political parties. From the indicators of the origins of parties offered by the authors, two of them can be used for the case of Kosovo- democratisation and ideology as the main driving forces and impetus for party origins and developments.

Kosovo tradition is of a one party system - the lonely unchallenged communist party, which dates back to the Second World War, as being part of the former Yugoslavia. The Yugoslav communist party extended itself all over former Yugoslavia, enjoying flattering forced integration. Those not loyal to the communist party were discriminated against, and if they tried to challenge it, could be forced into isolation, or even executed. Parties in a democratic context in Kosovo are something new. Their origin is associated with the beginning of a snowball effect of the third wave of democratisation throughout the former socialist bloc of Europe and the former Soviet Union, marked by the fall of the Berlin Wall and the beginning of the disintegration of the former Soviet Union and the former Yugoslavia of which Kosovo was a part. Such development is coupled with independence ambitions flamed by nationalist ideology borne out of Serbian repression, unfair treatment of Kosovo during the time of Yugoslavia, and the belief of Kosovo people that they should not belong to Yugoslavia and Serbia.

The democratisation process opened up the door of pluralism that was not allowed during the socialist Yugoslavia. No party was allowed to contest the

ruling of the Yugoslav communist party. However, by late 80's it came to an end as the domino effect of the democratisation proceeded through former socialist Europe. For the Albanian majority population in Kosovo, pluralism offered a chance to form other parties separate from the already discredited communist party. It has been usual for the masses consistently to treat the communist party with suspicion - as a foreign body imposed on them, but were forced to follow and had no alternative but to do so.

At the same time, the democratisation process apart from opening the door to pluralism, the opportunity opened up for political parties to organise the political process in a democratic manner. It also provided the opportunity for Kosovo Albanians to rise-up and openly organise their ambitions for freedom, outlining efforts to get independence. The winds of democratisation raised ambitions in almost all nations belonging to the artificial multi-nation state called Yugoslavia. Hence, the process also marked the beginning of the break-up of Yugoslavia.

Parties in Kosovo emerged<sup>11</sup> on the commencement of the democratisation process and were primarily nationalist-driven. The pluralist system provided the space and opportunity to feed and mobilise ambitions for independence through political parties. It should be clear that such ambitions did not appear at the same time as the start of the democratisation process. They were continuously present to the Kosovo Albanians, time and after manifesting themselves, as in the 1968 protests, then in 1981 with more widely known demonstrations, having in one way or another an ideological, nationalist orientation. Pluralism brought just a possibility to organise more openly (though not fully), through political parties, in a pluralist way.

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<sup>11</sup> It should be mentioned that prior to formation of parties by the end of 80's as a result of democratization process, in Kosovo there were illegal movements mainly nationalist driven. They are not considered as parties but movements, mainly marginalized from society, acting illegally, not allowed due to their programme for Kosovo independence or to join together the Albanian territories as a whole. As an example of such is LPK – Levizja Popullore e Kosoves (People's movement of Kosovo), ....

The two main driving forces for the creation of parties and developments in pluralist Kosovo were the democratisation process, and nationalism as an ideology. Which one has prevailed over the other is a matter of time and priority. Democratisation was a good opportunity for nationalism. After the nationalist ambitions were somewhat fulfilled, with the withdrawal of Serbia's troops from Kosovo in 1999 and then the declaration of independence in February 2008, the completion of the time for democratisation process (in terms of consolidation), should have taken priority. This has not however entirely taken place. It remains to be seen as to what extent Kosovo society, and in particular, parties, believe in democratic values, whether democracy was used merely as a means to achieve nationalist ambitions.

Besides the two above-mentioned reasons for party emergence in the Kosovo party system, there are also individual ambitions of several politicians as another impetus for the increase in the number of parties, like mushrooms after the rain. Many current mostly small party leaders, formed parties purely to become leaders. However, the electoral threshold of 5% fixed later, largely challenged their existence. The order of parties placed in this chapter is based on the year they were established, and does not hinge on the importance or relevance of parties at all.

#### ***4.2. Chronological development of parties in Kosovo party system***

In the following, the emergence of all parties in Kosovo starting from 1981 up to now will be superficially introduced.. The chapter will help us to grasp a picture of party system development in Kosovo. There is no deep consideration, because our research focus is predominantly on the five largest parties in Kosovo. However, it provides a general knowledge about how a huge number of parties appeared at the beginning within a political context of around a population of 2 million.

### **LPK – Lëvizja Popullore e Kosoves (Peoples' Movement of Kosovo)**

Following the 1981 demonstration in Kosovo (considered the first one following 1968), asking for more freedom and equal status for Kosovo inside Yugoslavia, LPK was founded on the 17<sup>th</sup> February 1982. LPK was characterised primarily with nationalism and communism together, identified with and highly influenced by Enverism, as a version of communism. The government of former Yugoslavia accused them of being against the constitution, and their closeness to Albania's communist rule, was seen as an irredentist ambition - a chance to unite territories populated by Albanian ethnicity creating a greater Albania. Such a worldview and ambition forced them to function in an underground manner, in a form of cell organisation.

The clandestine way of organisation made it impossible for LPK to be a massive party. In addition, they had a widely spread structure of organisation, in places such as Switzerland, from hounded out people of the Yugoslav regime. Their stand on the national issue made them nationalist hardliners. During the 90's when the Kosovo Albanian peaceful resistance was organised, they would not conform to that, and saw the armed resistance as the correct solution. Moreover, LPK is known for organising the first cells of the KLA, while during the war, it was not present on the political scene, and some of its members formed and joined other parties.

In the 2001 as in the 2004 elections, LPK won a single seat at the Kosovo Assembly. In 2007 they joined the PDK electoral list and got a single seat in parliament. One of the figures of LPK is Bajrush Xhemajli, a former prisoner and one of the deputy administrators of KLA. In 2009, LPK was transformed into the socialist party of Kosovo (PSK), however it would be more accurate to say that the party merely changed its name.

### **LDK – Lidhja Demokratike e Kosoves (Democratic League of Kosovo)**

Pushed by the democratisation wave and motivated by nationalist ideology, a group of intellectuals under the leadership of Ibrahim Rugova decided to form a political party, holding its first establishing congress on the 23<sup>rd</sup> December 1989. Since then the party has been called LDK - Lidhja Demokratike e Kosoves (Democratic League of Kosovo). Very quickly, the LDK expanded all over Kosovo and became the largest and most popular party in Kosovo. Due to its mass support, some consider it as a mass movement. However, contesting elections defined it as a party. LDK became the main political force and party to handle the nationalist issue, around which, the majority of Kosovo Albanians mobilised themselves in the struggle for independence. However, the danger of that time often forced LDK leaders to hide the independence agenda, turning to issues for more rights within Yugoslavia, though the desire for independence as the main objective prevailed. LDK became what Schmitter (1999) calls a **forum party**, like Solidarnost in Poland for instance. Identified as a party of independence, and a single objective party, it largely lost its relevance once the intended objective was attained.

Looking from Janda's (1980) conception of party institutionalisation, the *reification*, a massive party like LDK was highly institutionalised, due to a large support from the masses. Its leader Ibrahim Rugova soon became the leader of those masses as well.

LDK up to the eve of war 1998 was a mega party in Kosovo. Its main policy was peaceful resistance, for which they got a lot of criticism and pushed many intellectuals into leaving and forming or joining other parties. Afterwards, the aggressiveness of parties coming out of the KLA, pressured the position of LDK, which diminished during the war. In the 2001 election, LDK again got almost half of the votes. Since then it has started to decline, especially with the death of its leader Ibrahim Rugova in 2006. The split into two, by forming LDD out of it in 2007, led LDK to lose the elections for the first time in its history.

**SDAK – Stranka Demokratske Akcije Kosova (Party of Democratic Action for Kosovo)**

SDAK is a party of the Bosnian minority in Kosovo and southern Serbia founded in 1989 by Numan Balic. The party strives to improve the condition of Bosnian minority. Since the war, it has been an ever-present part of the Kosovo parliament and at times part of the government.

**PPK – Partia Parlamentare e Kosoves (Parliamentary Party of Kosovo)**

PPK was founded in 1990 as an alternative party to LDK, holding a more hard-line position. It was composed of a group of active intellectuals and youths in politics. Its position put it between the pacifist LDK and extreme hardliners, also striving for Kosovo independence. PPK could not enjoy massive support as LDK did, but was one of the alternatives to it. However, as a party it did not take part in armed resistance. One of its main leaders Adem Demaci left the party and became a spokesperson for the KLA for a short while. PPK later joined LDB, and after the war in 2001, it merged into AAK. Hence, it appears that it has lost its identity, as it has for a long time been under the umbrella of AAK.

**PFK – Partia Fshatare e Kosoves (Peasants Party of Kosovo)**

It was established at the beginning of pluralism in 1990, as a party that strived to protect the interest of peasants in Kosovo. One of the main economic potentials in Kosovo is agriculture, employing a considerable number of peasants. In the 1991 parliamentary elections, it got seven seats, a small party, compared to the 86 seats of LDK. Since the 1998 elections and the beginning of the war, PFK decided not to contest elections and to freeze activity. The party no longer exists.

**PRK – Partia Republikane e Kosoves (Republikan Party of Kosovo)**

PRK was established in 1990 with the intention of creating an alternative to peaceful resistance. It also promoted the idea of an armed resistance. PRK could not spread activity across Kosovo due to its objectives, but was made up of a

small number of intellectuals having a more radical stand. In 1998, PRK with some other parties merged into LBD. PRK ceased as an autonomous party, following the merger into LBD.

### **PSDK – Partia Social Demokratike e Kosoves (Social Democratic Party of Kosovo)**

PSDK was formed in 1990, based on the social democratic ideology. Its leadership was composed mainly of former communist party members (such as its leader Kaqusha Jashari), who were part of the Kosovo government during communist times. However, PSDK was and continues to be a marginalised party in terms of votes they get and the influence they have on the Kosovo party system. In the 2007 election, they got a seat in parliament by joining the PDK list.

The main reasons why PSDK, although ideologically oriented, could not establish itself into an influential party, are as follows. They did not extract and offer a practical programme to deal with current issues in Kosovo from the social democracy perspective. It would not be sufficient just to mention social democracy and try to legitimise itself by simply referring to successes the social democratic mega parties such as SPD in Germany has achieved. PSDK up to now has not offered any convincing programme. Furthermore, the Kosovo political scene was concerned more with the issue of nationalism, and dominated by parties directly dealing and identified with that. On the other hand, Kosovo has countless social problems, but they are not handled as they should be. Moreover, PSDK was headed mostly by people of the former regime, perceived by the eyes of the people, with scepticism. In 2008, former Kosovo prime minister Çeku came to chair the party. Nothing seems to have changed so far, except that party holds press media conferences more often. Currently, it is identified more as Çeku's party rather than a social-democratic one.

### **PSHDK – Partia Shqiptare Demokristiane e Kosoves (Albanian Christian Democratic Party of Kosovo)**

PSHDK<sup>12</sup> was established in 1990. It is a party based on Christian-Democratic ideologies. Since the composition of the Kosovo population is just few a percent Christian<sup>13</sup>, it always remained a minor party, never getting more than 2% of the votes. It is also a nationalist party, since it includes only Albanian Christians. Usually it was a strong supporter of LDK and most of time they were in coalition with LDK. It should be mentioned that PSHDK as a party has a stable electorate since it represents those belonging to the Catholic Church..

Unable to shake off the chairmanship dilemma, as a result of the struggle for leadership among party leaders, in 2007 it split into two parties, PSHDK and PDKI.

### **BSDAK – Bošnjačka Stranka Demokratske Akcije Kosova (Bosnian Party of Democratic Action of Kosovo)**

It is another ethnic party of the Bosnian minority in Kosovo, founded at the beginning of pluralism in Kosovo in 1990. The difference of BSDAK from another Bosnian party established a year earlier - SDAK, is that the former is chaired by a different person - Hilmo Kandič. The main purpose of the party is also the protection and development of Bosnian interests in Kosovo.

### **KDTP – Kosovo Demokratik Türk Partisi (Kosovo Democratic Turkish Party)**

KDTP is a party of the Turkish minority living in Kosovo, established in 1990. The key objective of KDTP is protection of Turkish ethnicity interests in Kosovo. Due to the Kosovo constitutional framework during UNMIK time, and now under the Kosovo constitution, KDTP is a part of the parliament and has always been in

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12 [www.pshdk-ks.org](http://www.pshdk-ks.org) /16.05.2009

13 The Christians in Kosovo belonging to Albanian ethnicity are mainly Catholics. The orthodox in Kosovo are mainly Kosovo Serbs.

government, even with a ministerial position. Its HQ is in the city of Prizren where the majority of the Turkish minority live.

### **PPSH - Partia Popullore Shqiptare (Albanian People's Party)**

It was founded in 1991 under the leadership of Milaim Kadriu. Different from LDK, they had a more radical approach. It usually remained a small party, with mostly clandestine activity in the region of *Llapi*. Besides, PPSH was very much identified with its leader, and in 1998 PPSH joined LBD, and afterwards it ceased to exist.

### **PLK – Partia Liberale e Kosoves (Liberal Party of Kosovo)**

It was founded in 1991, as its leader came out of PSHDK. The party is based on liberal ideology. At the beginning, it used to be called PLSH (Albanian Liberal Party), strongly supporting the LDK. PLK has always remained a small party in terms of the number of followers it has. In addition, it is associated completely with its leader, somehow damaging its reputation as a liberal party. Among other reasons why PLK could not penetrate deeply into society, is the high level of tradition among society, and also the inability of the party to offer a real workable programme. In 1998 it joined LBD, and it now functions again as PLK.

### **UNIKOMB – Partia e Unitetit Kombetar Shqiptar (Albanian Party of National Unity)**

Not being happy with LDK's policies and internal organization, another party with more hard-line nationalist ideology was created in May 1991. UNIKOMB had a mainly nationalist ideology and was determined to struggle for the unification of Albanians into a single state. One of its leaders was the well-known imprisoned (and one among many still missing from the war) Ukshin Hoti. Most of the party's activities were carried out in a clandestine manner, and in Diaspora. After the war, they joined AAK only to leave it in 2002. Currently, it seems the party is not active anymore, since its actual leader has joined other parties.

### **BK – Balli Kombetar (National Front)**

BK was created as a political party in October 1991. It is the successor to the National Front established at the beginning of Second World War in 1939. Its main guiding ideology was nationalism, with the objective to protect the Albanian population persecuted by the more hard-line nationalist Serb forces during the Second World War. As such, during the war they were separated from the partisan forces fighting against occupiers. The reason behind this was the ill treatment of the Albanian population by Serb forces during the war. The end of the war and the victory of partisan forces meant it became difficult for BK to exist any longer. Therefore, since then they operated underground and could never reach the masses. Most of its followers were located at rural traditional areas.

Up until now, BK have not been able to get a seat in parliament, but they try at least to create opinion and spread the idea through their activities and debates. However, their main purpose remains the creation of a greater Albania. It can be categorised as an anti-system party, looking forward not just to changing the government but also the system, by unifying Kosovo and Albania into a single state.

### **PGJK – Partia e te Gjelberve te Kosoves (Green Party of Kosovo)**

PGJK is an environmentalist party concerned with environment protection. PGJK was established in 1991 and is still active, though it has always been among the marginalised parties of Kosovo. Environmental protection was not considered a priority compared to other issues. PGJK was not successful in developing society awareness on environmental protection issues, and the lack of power sharing within the party, are among the explanations why PGJK remains a very small party in such a polluted environment. If one looks at the party's webpage<sup>14</sup> from Google's search engine, there are just a few photos of the party leader. In other words, the party could not get away from the personalistic domination of the party. Consequently, another environmentalist party was created in 2007,

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<sup>14</sup> [www.pgjk.org/01.04.2009](http://www.pgjk.org/01.04.2009)

unfortunately bringing no changes, and with the same concern of a leader-dominated image.

### **PNDSH – Partia Nationale Demokratike Shqiptare (Albanian National Democratic Party)**

PNDSH was established on the 3<sup>rd</sup> May 1992, as an offshoot of the Albanian National Democratic Movement – functioning for more than 50 years. The movement was mainly organised based on nationalist ideology, but different from PLK, insofar as it is not inspired by communism. The only way for them to exist as a nationalist movement during Yugoslavia era was by clandestine means.

PNDSH considers themselves as a right wing party. It has never got a seat in the Kosovo parliament and it is ranked among the small parties.

### **LKÇK – Levizja Kombetare per Çlirimin e Kosoves (National Movement for the Liberation of Kosovo)**

LKÇK was established in 1993. As the main purpose was the liberation of Kosovo, it operated underground. LKÇK did not see the pacifist resistance (followed by LDK) as a proper way to Kosovo independence. Therefore, they founded LKÇK as a clandestine way to mobilise the masses, through pamphlets, and to organise armed forces to liberation. During the war, LKÇK was a strong supporter of the KLA. After the end of war, as supporters of the KLA, the provisional government under the leadership of Thaqi, offered them two seats.

LKÇK in itself has a more hard-line nationalist ideology. It could not spread into a mass ideology, but usually included members highly committed to the national issue. In 2008, it changed its name to LBI.<sup>15</sup>

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<sup>15</sup> It very interesting, how many small hard-line nationalist parties emerged in Kosovo. It is believed that if they could function as a single party they could be more effective and efficient. But, it seems that the main reason why they could not join together was the leadership issue, who is going to be the leader. Therefore, an intellectual with strong belief in nationalism collected few others around him and established a party. So, it sounds that they were more concerned with themselves to be leaders than to push the national issue forward.

**UShDK – Unioni Shqiptare Demokristian (Albanian Union of Christian Democrats)**

It was formed in 1995 as an ideological unification between PSHDK of Kosovo and Demo Christians of Albania. Later on, they joined LBD.

**LDSH – Levizja Demokratike Shqiptare (Albanian Democratic Movement)**

It was founded in June 1998 under the leadership of Rexhep Qosja, trying to form a new LDK because of not agreeing with the pacifist policies of LDK. On the establishing congress of the party, the openness of LDSH to be joined by other parties or individuals from inside the LDK, that were not happy with it, was highlighted.<sup>16</sup>

**LBD – Levizja e Bashkuar Demokratike (United Democratic Movement)**

LDB was formed in 1998 as a joining of several parties under the leadership of Qosja: LDSH, PPK, UNIKOMB, PLSH (PLK), UShDK, PGJK, PRSH, PPSH. They were not happy with the LDK's stance toward the KLA and the war. Headed by the well-known academic Rexhep Qosja, it attracted several intellectuals and former prisoners that during communist Yugoslavia left LDK, among them the well-known Mehmet Hajrizi and Hidajet Hyseni. LBD was a strong supporter of armed resistance and the KLA<sup>17</sup>.

**PBD – Partia e Bashkimit Demokratike (Democratic Union Party)**

PBD was established in June 1999 as a successor to the KLA. Its leaders were Bardhyl Mahmuti, Jakup Krasniqi, and most of its followers were from LPK as well.

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<sup>16</sup> [www.kosova.com/12.03.2009](http://www.kosova.com/12.03.2009)

<sup>17</sup> ICG Balkan Report NR. 76, [www.icg.org/15.05.2009](http://www.icg.org/15.05.2009)

**PPDK (PDK) – Partia e Progresit Demokratik e Kosoves – PDK - Partia Demokratike e Kosoves (Party of Democratic Progress of Kosovo – Democratic Party of Kosovo)**

Not all former KLA members that joined politics became part of PBD, therefore PBD decided to unite with Thaqi's supporters and some LPK activists, being active in Switzerland. In September 1999 they formed PPDK and Thaqi became the chairman of the party, Mahmuti was vice chairman but later resigned. PPDK was soon renamed PDK. After the war the PDK became the main political force on the Kosovo political scene, aside from LDK. It represented the entire succession and transformation of the KLA into politics, until the AAK emerged, and identified with the KLA in the *Dukagjini* region.

**SPO – Srpski Pokret Otpora (Serbian Resistance Movement)**

The Serb community in Kosovo, since the beginning of pluralism in former Yugoslavia, was organised mainly into political parties, acting as a snap-shot of parties in Serbia, such as: SPS – Socialisticka Partija Srbije (Socialist Party of Serbia), SPO – Srpski Pokret Obnove (Serbian Revival Movement), SRS – Srpska Radikalna Stranka (Radical Party of Serbia), among the largest parties. The Serb community in Kosovo were organised into parties, as an extension of parties in Serbia. In addition, their stand toward Kosovo and Kosovo Albanians was very similar to that among these parties in Serbia.

With the end of the war, many Serbs left Kosovo, with some of them returning later. As a result, the political organisation of the Serbian community, to some extent started to be organised in other ways. Some of the snap-shot parties were disbanded. The Serbian community in Kosovo after the war had other priorities. They were mainly concerned with the issue of the return of the fled Serbs, and the free and secured movements and integration of Serbs in Kosovo institutions, or opposing the withdrawal of Serbs from Kosovo, through boycotting Kosovo institutions. Consequently, many other new political parties from the Serbian community were created. Among the parties that survived after 1999 were SPO –

Srpski Pokret Otpora, but its main concern became the return of Serbs to Kosovo.

### **PD – Partia e Drejtesise (Justice Party)**

PD was founded in September 1999. Culturally it belongs to conservative parties, having a large focus on the religion of Islam. Most of its followers are religious people, or at least mosque goers. Although the majority of the population are Muslims it could not get a large base of support, because the middle-ground are not concerned with religious issues. In the first and second national election they managed to get a seat in parliament, but in 2007 could not pass the electoral threshold. Its characteristic is that it has a small but stable electorate, usually those more concerned with religious issues. Nonetheless, it should be mentioned that they stand for a moderate and not extreme form of Islam, or as some call it *European Islam*.<sup>18</sup>

### **PREBK – Partia Rome e Bashkuar e Kosoves (United Roma party of Kosovo)**

With the end of the war in 1999, many communities in Kosovo decided to choose for their future. Heavy influence from the international community in Kosovo set out the objectives also including the concern of communities' rights. Therefore, the Roma community found a very fruitful environment to establish an ethnic party, in order to uphold the interests of its own community. It started as an NGO and in 2000 PREBK<sup>19</sup> established itself into a political party. Based on community rights in Kosovo, they have always been represented in the Kosovo parliament. The Roma community in Kosovo makes up around 1% of the total population.


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<sup>18</sup> [www.drejtesia.org/27.03.2009](http://www.drejtesia.org/27.03.2009)

<sup>19</sup> Discussion with chairman of PREBK Mr. Haxhi Zylfi Merxha / 10.09.2009

**PDAK – Partia Demokratike e Ashkalinjeve te Kosoves (Democratic Ashkali Party of Kosovo)**

They started political activity as an association in 1996, but immediately after the war in 1999, when the conditions for the political organisations were set, they decided to establish themselves into a political party. The party is the Ashkali ethnic party. Its HQ is in Ferizaj where most of the community lives. They are part of the parliament based on





minority rights in Kosovo. PDAK's objectives are to strengthen the position of the Ashkali community in Kosovo. The community currently counts approximately for less than 1% of the total population.

### **PQLK – Partia Liberale e Qendres e Kosoves (Liberal Centre Party of Kosovo)**

It was founded in 2000, by the former KLA commander Naim Maloku. As with the majority of other small parties it was personalistic, identified with its founder. The party was short lived, because in 2001 it joined the formation of AAK. It has now merged into AAK and PQLK does not seem to exist anymore as a party. Its leader is well comforted in a high position in AAK. Normally, the fate of such small personal parties depends on the fate of the leader in politics. If he is well accommodated in another party, the objectives of the party established seems to have been fulfilled.

### **AAK – Aleanca per Ardhmerine e Kosoves (Alliance for the Future of Kosovo)**

AAK has its genesis routed in the entrance of Ramush Haradinaj from the KLA (through KPC) to politics. He was a former commander of the KLA for the *Dukagjini*<sup>20</sup> region. Primarily he formed AQK (Citizens' Alliance for Kosovo). Recognising the impossibility of having success when going it alone, (especially with the existence of two mega parties - LDK and PDK) some small parties decided to join forces. AAK was founded in April 2001 as a coalition made up of AQK, PPK and UShDK, at the beginning it also included LKÇK and LPK, and up to 2002 also UNIKOMB. The AAK coalition, except those that left, was soon dominated by its leader, and is now a highly personalistic and regional based party. In the 2001 election it won 8 seats at the parliamentary election and became the third largest party.

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<sup>20</sup> Dukagjini includes almost one fourth of Kosovo territory in south-western part. KLA during the war is widely known for the lack of organizational capacity. It lacked the single commanding chain, and Haradinaj was chief commander for this region. While entering into politics he deepened such division and despite acquiring legitimacy from part of KLA also try to spread its regional bases.

### **IRDK – Iniciativa e Re Demokratike e Kosoves (New Democratic Initiative of Kosovo)**

IRDK is a minority political party, that was established in 2001. Its main objective is the highlighting of interests of the Egyptian community in Kosovo. It is the only party for the Egyptian community in Kosovo. Having a reserved place at the Kosovo Assembly, IRDK has a member at the Kosovo parliament and it has been part of the government since the war.

### **GIG – Građanska Iniciativa Gora (Citizen Initiative Gora)**

GIG was created as a citizen initiative to take part at the 2000 election. In 2002 they transformed into a political party. It is also a minority party with objectives to protect the interests of the Gorani community, mostly located in the Dragash municipality.

### **PReK – Partia e Re e Kosoves (New Party of Kosovo)**

It was established in April 2002 by Bujar Bukoshi. He was a former LDK member and before the war, nominated by President Rugova as the prime minister of Kosovo in exile. He was responsible for the widely massive supported financial funds known as “3%”, where much mismanagement and loss is evident. Furthermore, by the beginning of the war, he started not to recognize the authority of Rugova, and as a result left LDK. Returning to Kosovo sometime after the war, as a very rich person, he decided to “*open up*”<sup>21</sup> his party known as PReK. Since the return of Bukoshi in 2007 to the old family – LDK, PReK seems not exist anymore, due to it being created by a single person and for a single purpose. It illustrates the fate and practice of such small parties, very much known in Kosovo until 2007 when the electoral threshold of 5% was put in place.

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<sup>21</sup> I intentionally use the term open up because the end of the 90's beginning of 2000 it is known as a period where many people decided to establish a party with a small number of members, without any particular ideology, with a single selfish purpose to be a leader (of course leader of a few people) and be somewhere in power. It should not be forgotten that Kosovo has approximately just 1.5 million voters.

### **UD – Unioni Demokratik (Democratic Union)**

In its beginning, it was a local political entity, mostly based in the municipality of Gjakova. In 2003, they decided to widen the geographical scope of activity and participate at the parliamentary election. However, it remains almost irrelevant in terms of the influence it has at national level. Its main concern was to implement the idea of integrating into politics many educated people in Gjakova, currently out of the political process.

### **ADK – Alternativa Demokratike e Kosoves (Democratic Alternative of Kosovo)**

ADK is another example of a party formed by a few political activists, following the initiative of a single person – the party leader. The absence of a possibility to formalise factions within a party had its role in the establishment of ADK in 2004. Edita Tahiri, unhappy with developments in LDK, decided to leave and form a new party under her leadership. Yet, it was not successful and remained as a small party, whereby in the 2007 parliamentary election joined the list of PDK managing to get a single seat in parliament. Ideologically, with most of parties in Kosovo being similar, the party, ideologically does not differ from LDK.

### **ORA – Iniciativa Qytetare (Citizens Initiative ORA)**

Citizens' Initiative ORA was formed in 2004, following the decision to take part in the 2004 parliamentary elections. Unlike most of the other parties, ORA came out of civil society, under the leadership of Veton Surroi. The civil society development in Kosovo is at a low level, inescapable from criticism of corruption, having a project-sponsored orientation, and often lacking a true belief in democratic values. It is perceived to be one of the reasons, why ORA though coming out of civil society, could not materialise itself as a real alternative in the Kosovo party system. ORA proclaimed itself to be an alternative to other parties, identifying itself as a reformist party, in a time of a heavily politically electrified party system between major parties PDK and LDK. Despite many expectations for an alternative, ORA failed to provide this. In 2004, they achieved in getting

seven seats in parliament, but in 2007 could not pass the required 5% electoral threshold.

### **VAKAT – Koalicija VAKAT (Coalition VAKAT)**

VAKAT is a coalition of three parties from Bosnian and Goran communities in Kosovo. It was formed in 2004 out of three parties from both communities, mainly living in Prizren and Dragash. The parties forming VAKAT are: DSB – Democratic Party of Bosnians, DPV – Democratic Party Vatan, and BPK – Bosnian Party of Kosovo. It is part of the Kosovo Parliament.

### **SDSKM – Srpska Demokratska Stranka Kosovo i Metohije (Serbian Democratic Party of Kosovo and Metohije)**

SDSKM is another Serb minority ethnic party founded at the end of 2004, by Mr. Slavisa Petkovic. Its objectives are the protection of Serb minority rights and interests. SDSKM had joined Kosovo institutions until Kosovo declared independence, which was different from some other parties that had a more radical stand, opposing the integration of the Serb community into Kosovo institutions. Petkovic was also a Minister of Return and Communities, in the government that formed following the 2004 election.

### **SLS – Samostalna Liberalna Stranka (Independent Liberal Party)**

SLS is an ethnic party, founded in 2006. Its main concern is the protection of interests of the Serb community living in Kosovo. In spite of that, SLS is also a liberal oriented party. SLS<sup>22</sup> is not the only Serb minority party in Kosovo. The Serb minority in Kosovo has a plurality of many parties. In other words, no Serb party has a monopoly, but there is competition among them to protect Serb minority interests. SLS differs from many other Serb community parties in terms of their position toward Kosovo independence, owing mostly to its liberal ideology. Moreover, an important impetus from the liberal party of Serbia on the

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<sup>22</sup> <http://sls-ks.org/> 05.05.2009

issue of pro-independence is an additional support of the SLS's stand on the Kosovo pro-independence issue.

### **AKR – Aleanca Kosova e Re (New Kosova Alliance)**

AKR<sup>23</sup> was founded in 2006 by a Kosovo Albanian businessman - multi-millionaire, Behgjet Pacolli. Many considered him as a saviour, because of the current high level of poverty in Kosovo, they hoped that his success in business could also be translated into politics. Pacolli is very much known for his populist approach, In the party's first election in 2007 they achieved in becoming the third party in the Kosovo party system by getting 13 parliamentary seats. Up to now, they have not proved themselves an alternative on the Kosovo political scene, as many perceived they would do.

### **LDD – Lidhja Demokratike e Dardanise (Democratic League of Dardania)**

LDD<sup>24</sup> was created in 2007 after the split of LDK. The death of LDK leader Ibrahim Rugova, who used to enjoy absolute power inside the party, meant the creation of a huge power vacuum. A leader of such absolute power means also weak power transferring institutions within the party. Nexhat Daci being the second person after Rugova, started to be challenged by others. Other parties, mainly PDK was very much interested to weaken its largest rival LDK, by splitting it. Furthermore, Daci also exchanged few words with the US Ambassador in Kosovo at that time, an action that very much lowered the Ambassador's expectations of him. Other members of LDK's chairmanship decided to change the position of Daci, even without first informing him. Daci perceived it as unacceptable, which brought the party to a new national congress, which ended up with people physically beating each other with chairs. Consequently, Daci with his followers, left the party and formed LDD.

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23 [www.akr-ks.com/](http://www.akr-ks.com/) 03.05.2009

24 [www.idd-kosova.org/](http://www.idd-kosova.org/)26.06.2009

Both parties look up and refer to president Rugova, claiming to be his successor. However, the split was successful in weakening LDK with their vote share coming down to just 23% at the 2007 election, with LDD alone getting 10%. LDD as a party is highly personalistic, identified closely with its leader.

### **PDKI – Partia Demokristiane per Integrim (Demochristian Party for Integration)**

It was formed in 2007 due to the split that took place in PSHDK. Zef Morina could not agree with the leadership by Mark Krasniqi of PSHDK, and decided to form a new Demochristian party, by separating part of the PSHDK under his newly formed party PDKI. The ideology of the party is the same as PSHDK, based on Christian values, with the only difference being the person who chairs it. In 2009, a memorandum between both parties to unite has been achieved, but they still seem to function separately.

### **PEK – Partia Ekologjike e Kosoves (Ecologic Party of Kosovo)**

In April 2007, the second environmentalist party in the Kosovo party system was established called PEK<sup>25</sup>. It was founded by one of the former activists of PGJK. Like the other environmentalist party, PEK is up to now not very active or influential on the Kosovo political scene. In the 2007 election they did not achieve successful results.

### **PDA – Partia Demokratike e Ashkalinjeve (Democratic Party of Ashkali)**

This is also a minority party established as a result of a split that took place in PDAK in 2007. Few of the PDAK party leaders, being accused of corruption, and under pressure from the majority of the PDAK chairmanship, decided to form a new Ashkali party under the leadership of Sabit Rrahmani and Danush Ademi. Since then, two parties in rivalry with each other, represent the Ashkali minority.

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<sup>25</sup> <http://partiaekologjike.net/04.04.2009>

### **DRK – Demokracia e Re e Kosoves (New Democracy of Kosovo)**

DRK is among the newest parties on the Kosovo political scene, established on the 18<sup>th</sup> May 2008 by Gojart Lubeniqi. Ideologically it is not much different from other parties standing for a market economy. Up to now, it is still a small party. In the 2009 local elections they ran candidates for just a single municipality compared to the 38 that exist. It remains to be seen how far DRK can penetrate into Kosovo society.

### **LB – Levizja per Bashkim (The Movement for Unification)**

Some former activists of LKÇK and former political prisoners, such as Avni Klinaku established LB in May 2008. The party aims for the unification of all Albanian territories within a single state. As such, it is categorised as an extreme right wing party that could not deepen its roots in society. Most of its followers are former activists of parties, sharing similar values with LB<sup>26</sup>.

### **LBI – Levizja per Bashkim dhe Integrim (Movement for Unification and Integration)**

On its 8<sup>th</sup> Congress, on 27.09.2008, taking into account the political changes in Kosovo, such as Kosovo's independence, LKÇK decided to change its name and transform itself into LBI<sup>27</sup>. Smajl Latifi chairperson of the former LKÇK remains the LBI leader. The unification of Albanian territories within a single state remains a major concern of LBI. Ideologically it is almost the same as LB, but due to a leadership issue, they cannot join forces. Nevertheless, both remain small and marginalised parties.

### **PSK – Partia Socialiste e Kosoves (Socialist Party of Kosovo)**

In 2009, the Kosovo party system gained a socialist party. Having awful experience with the former socialist regime, socialism by name and by attributes does not sound easy on the ears of the people of Kosovo. A number of parties

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26 [www.levizjaperbashkim.com](http://www.levizjaperbashkim.com) / 13.11.2009

27 [www.lib-ks.org](http://www.lib-ks.org) / 15.10.2009

with purely socialist leaders hesitate to identify themselves as socialist parties. The former LPK changed its name to PSK. It remains to be seen as to what sort of socialism they adhere to, a moderated one or the one they used to believe, Enverism in Albania.

### **NCPK – Narodna Crnogorska Partija Kosova (People’s Montenegrins Party of Kosovo)**

NCPK is an ethnic minority party of Montenegrins living in Kosovo, established in August 2009. It is among the newest parties in Kosovo, aiming to promote the interest of the minority they represent. The minority in question is among the smallest one in Kosovo in terms of population.

### **PPK – Partia e Pensionisteve te Kosoves (Party of Pensioners of Kosovo)<sup>28</sup>**

The drama of new parties’ emergence in Kosovo seems not to be ending. The newest party is one of the pensioners of Kosovo, recently founded on 05.01.2010. Their main objective is to promote the interest of the social class it represents. Its prospects are doubtful due to the power the social class in question has and the 5% electoral threshold required for parliamentary representation.

### **4.3. Conclusion**

According to many reports, Kosovo remains the poorest and most underdeveloped country in Europe. Yet, casting an eye on the Kosovo party system, its development and future prospects, it looks to be the richest one in Europe in terms of the number of parties, compared with size of the population. It seems that for each 40000 citizens and 30000 voters, there is a party, apparently illustrating a very high level of representation. Ironically, it sounds good, but the reality confirms the opposite. Despite such a great number of parties in Kosovo voter turnout at the last election was just 40% , with some municipalities reporting a turnout of less than 20%.

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<sup>28</sup> PPK has the same abbreviation with previously existing party (see above) in Kosovo (PPK – Partia Parlamentare e Kosoves – parliamentary party of Kosovo) but it merged into AAK in 2001, and since then does not exist anymore.

There are several driving forces behind the creation of most of the parties in Kosovo. The first one is the democratization process all over former Eastern Europe, opening the door to pluralism. Secondly, nationalism as an ideology, with many of its varieties, from the extreme to a more moderated version, drove the creation of parties forward. The last factor that triggered such a huge number of parties within a small country like Kosovo, is the personal interest or chiefdom issue. Many small parties despite being ideologically the same, were primarily created to promote the chiefdom of an individual. The tradition of Kosovo Albanians is highly based on the chiefdom, largely being transmitted into political parties, as well. Ethnicity was the main driving force for the establishment of ethnic parties on the other side. Pluralism within the same ethnicity was driven mainly by chiefdom, and in the case of the Serb minority, their stand towards Kosovo independence could also be added as a motivation for the creation of new parties.

The Kosovo party system seems to be rich in terms of the numbers, emerging like mushrooms after rain, but they have proved to be very poor in terms of ideas and ideology. Most of Kosovo's parties are ideologically almost the same, the only difference remaining being their physical chiefs.

The party creation in Kosovo took place in three phases. Firstly, parties were created at the beginning of pluralism. Among them LDK became a massive party, supported by around 90% of Albanians in Kosovo. It took the lead on the nationalist movement up to the eve of war in 1998. Some other small parties at that time strived to follow a hard-line course on the national issue, but they could not achieve support as LDK did. The time before the war is also known for the emergence of other parties, especially parties not agreeing with the peaceful resistance policies of LDK. The period after the war is also marked with many changes within the Kosovo party system. Many parties appeared, among them some major parties. Nonetheless, new parties are consistently being created,

even after the introduction of the electoral threshold of 5% since 2007. Some of new parties, such as AKR, who achieved in getting third place at an election, leave behind many older parties.

The issue to be worried about, is that despite the many parties that Kosovo has, and many others being created, no alternatives are obvious so far, and even less and less people go to vote, and normally with such a huge number of parties it would be expected to be the other way around. No party that offers ideas, vision, or a programme as to how to solve society's problems appears to be on the ground. The large number of parties for Kosovo's unconsolidated democracy means further instability, vulnerability, and an unpredictable party system.

## Chapter 5

### 5. All but None - the Representation Function of Parties in Kosovo

*“Kosovo parties principally do not differ from each other, have the same ideas, vision and promises; none of them made it clear how they are going to fulfil them”*

Daily Newspaper Zeri - *Editorial*, 1 November 2001

#### 5.1. Introduction

Even in consolidated democracies, political parties are losing the reputation and trust they once used to enjoy from the people (Dalton 2006). Yet, modern democracy – representative democracy, except in some mini island states, is hardly imaginable without political parties. As it is Impossible to implement a system where a whole society takes part directly in governing activity, this necessitates the existence of parties and their main *raison d'être* in modern democracies, facilitating the governing activity, as channels of representation reflecting society at the governing level. Political parties as intermediary institutions and party system in general, mirrors the composition of society and the social structure, embodying long term socio-political cleavages, producing a party system which epitomizes the society as a whole. In other words, political parties represent the long-term social and political cleavages within society, constituting one of the major functions of parties.

The representation function of parties is conceptualised in a variety of ways by different students of political parties. The lack of consensus in defining representation is also due to inevitability of contextualisation in terms of time and location. Gunther and Diamond (2000) conceptualise representation as a function of parties to represent various social groups, either symbolically or by advancing their specific interests. On the other side, Helms (1995, 647) offers a very useful and more empirically measurable conceptualisation of the representation function, defining it as the “durable reflection of relevant social

conflicts (of an ethnic, religious, or an economic form) in a party system and their projection in the political system”<sup>29</sup>.

This definition is very applicable for our case study. It offers sufficient and precise scope to measure the representation function of parties, through examining the extent to which the socio-political divisions are reflected in political parties, the party system, and the political system in general. Relying on the definition in question initially requires the identification of the main cleavages in the society, followed by the assessment of the degree of their reflected presence in the party system, reaching the governing activity through political parties.

Nevertheless, it should be pointed out that representation as a function is performed by other institutions as well, such as interest groups, social movements, etc.. Normally the representation function of these additional institutions is of a supplementary and complementary nature. On the other hand, the level and quality of representation through complementary institutions is dependent on their level of their development and functionality. For instance in the case of Kosovo, these institutions are highly underdeveloped and operate in an extremely politicised (by political parties) environment, resulting in most of them being influenced and often even dictated to by the political environment. Most of interest groups in Kosovo are extremely dependent on politics. The clientelist structure being developed currently narrows the breathing space of these organisations, meant to represent primarily the interest of their followers. For instance, the actual position and strength the workers organisations and syndicates illustrates best the ability of complementary institutions to perform the representation function. For the time being, and the near future, their poor representation function is not likely to be improved. Moreover, compared to political parties in general, the representation function of these institutions is

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29 It is my own translation from German language: “die dauerhafte Widerspiegelung relevanter gesellschaftlicher Konflikte (etwa ethnischer, konfessioneller oder ökonomischer Art) im Parteiensystem und ihre Projektion in das politische System verstanden werden”.

more specific and narrower in substance, time, and breadth. Up to this point, political parties, as the most important representative institutions in modern democracy, mainly represent the well-entrenched and durable divisions within society.

The identity of the party is the epitome of the segment of society represented by the party in question. The elements, characteristics, and attributes, comprising the substance of such long-term divisions, generate parties whose identities manifest such social groupings. Exploration of the identities of parties that constitute the party system, reveals best the relationship between the two sides, the social groups within society and their projection onto the party system. In turn, it makes obvious the extent of representation in the party system of the social conflicts within society. Party identity is dependent on such divisions, and influences the projection of such cleavages firstly onto the party system and then the political system as a whole. Social pluralism at society level is meant to be organised politically through political parties, hence establishing political pluralism as well.

The performance of the representation function by parties has a direct impact on the democracy consolidation process. If parties function through bunged up channels of representation, not reflecting the social composition of the governing level, they might bring into question the very meaning of representative democracy. How far can we talk of a representative democracy if there is no one to represent society? Nonetheless, it is meaningless for parties to exist if they do not represent society in the political process. In political systems that have a well-established institutional structure for possible alternative representation, there is the possibility to some extent to supplement the role of parties on this function. For non-consolidated democracies, currently experiencing the process of consolidation, if parties do not reflect the social composition and do not represent society at the governing level, then democracy consolidation is less likely to take place, particularly positive consolidation. The governing activity is less likely to be

guided by the citizens' interest, since they do not take part in decision making, and there is no one to take their interests into account. Likewise, the political process features non-democratic behaviour, not based on collective interests, as supposed to be maintained and developed by those representing social compositions – political parties. The lack of representation impedes democracy to give effect, and democracy consolidation to take root. Unless, democracy is developed to the extent that it can give effect in terms of citizens' benefit, it is hard to talk of democracy consolidation. The failure of parties to perform their function of representation has a negative impact on the other three levels of the consolidation structure. Governing is not based on collective interests, as long as the channels to transmit these interests are closed. Consequently, it erodes constitutional consolidation leading to an incompatibility between written rules based on collective interests, whereas the actual rules fail to reflect this due to the lack of representation through political parties. In Kosovo, the international community often imposed most of the laws and institutions leading to a kind of constitutional consolidation. They do not necessary mirror the behaviour and attitudes of the political elite. Political parties at different levels of governing, lead the process, or are at least involved, in the implementation of these rules. The direct relationship of political parties with institutions at the level of constitutional consolidation amplifies the importance of parties in consolidation process. Parties are prone to exercise positive influence on institutions, if driven by collective interest enabled through open channels of representation.

On the other hand, at society level, no or poor representation means deficiency in their representation of interests, having no opportunity to taste the fruits of democracy. In this way, the failure of the pillars of democracy to fulfil their actions, introduce to society a false image of democracy. As far as the third level of the consolidation structure is concerned, poor performance gives opportunity to veto players, in the case of Kosovo – organised crime and authoritarian leaders, to increase their power into an inconstestable one . If parties do not

perform the representation function, society has no mechanism to hold authoritarian party leaders accountable.

Hence, the representation function of parties has a direct impact on democracy consolidation prospects. Right and proper representation helps consolidation, and opens the way for democracy to take root and be habituated among society.

The research process of the performance of the representation function of parties in Kosovo involves several steps. Initially the social cleavages will be identified, principally the long-term cleavages within society in Kosovo. Knowing the actual long-term socio-political cleavages makes it possible to find out whether parties are created based on such cleavages and whether they reflect such divisions. To measure such correlation, the ideological positions of parties should be surveyed. Do they happen to be along such socio-political divisions? The relationship is observed based on the *freezing theory*, assessing the relevance of the theory in the case of the Kosovo party system. However, since there has been no research conducted on Kosovo social structures after the war, we are forced to measure the intensity of social divisions reflected at party system level. Parties' documents and declarations mirror best, what parties actually represent, even if it is not clear to parties themselves. Moreover, the link between parties and the cleavage structure is best manifested on the ideological positions of parties along the left right scale. The values and expectation of social divisions within society are present directly in party documents: party programmes, electoral platforms, and interviewees from party representatives. Actually, in a normative sense these documents should be the embodiment of values and interests of the relevant groups represented by parties. Therefore, the research of the representation function of parties should primarily rely on the data collected from the documents in question. Moreover, the interviews conducted with party representatives and political analysts, as well as media and election campaign data, broadens the amount and quality of information, particularly explaining the dynamic stance of parties on the variety of issues that parties identify with. In addition, the data collected from interviews, and media and other

reports, are compared and contrasted with the static data found in party documents. It prevents any possible misperception appearing from party documents' data, often not presenting the real faces of parties. If the relationship between political parties and long term socio-political cleavages exists and is firm, then it can be theorised that Kosovo political parties do represent society, and do well in the representation function.

## **5.2. "Freezing Hypothesis"**

Based on the definition of the party representation function given by Helms (1995), the party system (Sartori 1976) should reflect plurality involving the long-term divisions within society. The relationship between society and the party system is best illustrated by the theory of Lipset & Rokkan (1967). The widely known freezing theory is built on the experience of western European society in the late 19<sup>th</sup> and up to the middle of the second half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. The theory identifies four long lasting socio-political cleavages: capital-labour, centre-periphery, religious-secular, and urban-rural. These long-term social cleavages helped construct parties and party systems in general. For instance, among others the social cleavage between capital and labour resulted in the creation of socialist, social democratic and labour parties developing and upholding the interests of the working class on one side, and conservative parties on the opposite side. Nevertheless, besides the cleavages identified by the founders of the freezing theory, the theory does not exclude other possible social divisions. They might be more or less short term in nature, and have no capacity for transformation into long-term political organisation. Yet, they might crop up and then disappear soon after, or be swallowed by any party ideologically closed to the issues, by simply extending the number of issues the party stands for. The existing parties often expand the range of issues they represent, and cover short-term cleavages, considering them as sub-cleavages. If this is the case, for each short term social cleavage to be organised by a particular political party, would result in countless parties, and a very fluid and unstable party system, consequently leading to an unstable political system.

According to the theory in question political parties are created bottom-up, emerging out of long-term social divisions, transforming cleavages from a social into a socio-political one. One such relationship between society and the party system is its set up; it is frozen and consequently produces a very stable party system and political system in general. Based on that, political parties within a party system reveal the politically organised major long-term social cleavages. Through the representation function, parties represent and transmit the interests of each long-term cleavage within society. The structuring of issues is organised around cleavages, having decisive effect on the party system. Such party systems are valued as being very stable and healthy for democracy. Party programmes, platforms, declarations, and activities in general, derive from the values and expectations of the social groups represented by the party in question.

The theory as such is grounded based on the experiences of Western European party systems. It was applicable and unchallenged up to the 1970s, when political developments coupled with the emergence of post-materialist values (Inglehart 1977), brought to the surface other symbols around whom relevant political parties organised, identifying other significant cleavages in addition to those recognized by Lipset & Rokkan. In addition, up to then the party ideological profile was mainly one dimensional, based on economic values due to the prevalence of the materialist approach after the Second World War up to the 1970s, whereby also politics was mainly defined as *who gets what when and how*. Starting in the 1970's, as a result of the development of post-materialist values, alongside economic dimension, the cultural dimension of party ideological profile also started to find place, which later established into long-term cleavages around whom influential parties were organised (Moreno 1999). Thus, the frozen theory happened to be contested on time and space terms, opening the way to conceptualise it as a melting hypothesis, even in socio-political contexts from where it appeared as a theory. Later on, the theory lost further ground and is now hardly applicable in not western European contexts,

such as in Latin America, Africa, Asia, as well as some parts of post-communist Europe.

Furthermore, the theory was challenged as a result of the evolution and appearance of other types of parties in Western Europe, like the *catch all parties* as described by Kirschheimer (1972). Organisational transformation of parties, due to party cartelisation getting closer to the state than to their members, as previously was the case, started to sap parties of their members, shaking the main root of frozen party systems. The working class, which used to be the foremost basis of leftist parties, because of a socio-economic transformation was gradually being diminished in number, and was no longer sufficient for large parties to rely exclusively on them. Consequently, parties were forced to make more and painless ideological compromises, mitigating the cleavage structure and getting closer to the centre of an ideological profile dimension, in order to survive at the election 'market'. This development led to the appearance and development of *catch all parties*, challenging the freezing theory as such.

The *catch all* type of parties, very common in consolidated western democracies, if applied to a Kosovo context, it is perceived that the fierce struggle to put the state resources under control makes Kosovo parties set out even further - *do everything what so ever possible*, which in turn prevents them from having a chance to create a certain ideological profile. Yet, though *catch all parties* in consolidated democracies make ideological compromises, they still stick to their own easily distinguishable ideological profile and identity.

### **5.3. "Freezing Theory" in Kosovo socio-political context**

Kosovo belongs to a European post-communist context, experiencing a block<sup>30</sup> system transformation. The transition was not an utterly inner driven, but was encompassed by the entire regional regime transformation. The snowball effect or the so-called domino effect of regime transformation clouded Kosovo as well.

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<sup>30</sup> Its consequences will be more in details discussed at the chapter on the legitimization function of parties.

In this regard, the type of causes of transition have an impact on consolidation in terms of time requirements and substance dimensions. Society as such was not entirely prepared for the transformation from socialist to free market democracy within such a short period of time, using a *shock therapy* model of transition. The *classless society* objective, aimed for by socialism in former Yugoslavia, in economic terms, was to a considerable level achieved.<sup>31</sup> With the exception of the political level where Kosovo faced discrimination, economically the country was doing fairly well compared, for instance, to the present time. System transformation also required the transformation of socio-economic and social structures, so far not yet perceived to have been crystallised and established. Actually, the socio economic transformation is underway, not accomplishing the level of a clearly defined social structure, and with the exception of ethnicity as a sharp and deep entrenched social cleavage.

Therefore, the prominent freezing hypotheses given by Lipset & Rokkan, is hardly applicable in the case of Kosovo, except on the issue of ethnicity as a social cleavage, but in our case study we are dealing with the major single ethnicity - Albanian parties of Kosovo, comprising the majority of 90% of the population. Political parties of other ethnicities are of little significance (excluding parties of Serb minority due to the extension of constitutional privileged rights for them). The research is not focused on the issue of ethnicity, so far being the only clearly drawn long-term cleavage.

Based on studies dealing with ex-communist countries, in particular general theories offered by Kitschelt (2000) and Inglehart (1990), it is hard to find cleavage based parties in post-communist countries of Eastern Europe. The same is valid in the case of Kosovo, implying that *freezing theory* is hardly found in the case of Kosovo. Regarding the level of value developments in Kosovo, at a

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<sup>31</sup> However, some authors emphasize that Kosovo politically was left aside in terms of political and economic development, compared to other parts of former Yugoslavia (Magas 1993).

materialist or post-materialist phase, Helen Taylor (1998)<sup>32</sup>, though concluding about some African countries, was right, and such conclusions to a large extent are applicable in the case of Kosovo as well. While talking about value system developments from materialist to post-materialist values, she conceptualised the level of value development in some African countries she was referring to, as being at the stage of a pre-materialist value system, heavily traditional and featured with tribal, clan, and clientele institutions, dominating over the modern institutional structure. Kosovo is also still a heavily traditional society, with a considerable degree of legitimacy relying on traditional rather than modern state institutions.

Observing the class structure in Kosovo, most of the wealth belongs to a small percentage of people, approximately no more than 7%. 48% of the population are below the poverty line and 17% below the extreme poverty line (UNDP mission in Kosovo 2007, World Bank 2007). Such statistics are not promising in terms of the establishment of a middle class, which a stable democracy would require. On the other hand, a large percentage of the working class is employed in the private sector, most of them having no rights to establish even trade union or syndicates. The rest are employed by the government or public sector, both of them extremely politicised, icing over any opportunity for workers to organise to protect their own rights and interests. Up to now there is even no labour law legislated. Most of them constitute the clienteles structure, heavily developed in Kosovo and comprising the bases of most of parties in Kosovo, are forced to be accountable to their patrons – parties, rather than labour organisations, or at most mobilise themselves into labour interests centred around a political party. Moreover, it constitutes one of the main reasons why currently labour organisations are paralysed and existing just for the cosmetic use of the system

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<sup>32</sup> Taken from the citation done by Emminghaus (2003).

make up. The sterility of such workers organisations is proved by many of their attempts to organise protests failing<sup>33</sup>, either at the start or on the way.<sup>34</sup>

Such an unstable and highly politicised society is not a safe bed for the development of a sound middle class, capable to organise themselves politically. The values that the middle class uphold are currently not the centre around which the real power in the Kosovo political system is structured. Some of them are victims to apathy, considering themselves powerless to make any changes; some are forced to be part of a clientele – due to reasons of economic survival, and so on. The high level of politicisation driven by actual parties, at almost every sphere of activity, starting from universities under direct control of political parties of a personalistic type, up to most other institutions, narrows the available space for political activity, reflected in turn to other possible areas where the middle class belongs.

Nevertheless, though none of the social cleavages identified by Lipset & Rokkan, is of primary importance after the recent war in Kosovo, there are other cleavages around whom parties and to some extent, by inertia, the electorate were also identified. The main cleavage divided those who supported the armed war and those sticking to a more peaceful approach to gain independence from Serbia. This cleavage seems to be short-term in nature, hence one of the main reasons why parties in Kosovo, relying merely on such a short-term cleavage, are declining nowadays. Their reliance on the short-term cleavage, the inability to transform their loyalty to other long-term cleavages, and the absence of other long-term cleavage based parties, are among several reasons for party decline in Kosovo.

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33 See for example the strike of medical workers for better working conditions and payments, September and December 2008.

34 Though this is not the issue of our concern here, it is related and puts light on the position of workers in Kosovo and their ability to organize themselves as a social class.

Two major parties LDK and PDK are organised based on the ideology of nationalism. The only difference between them primarily was the level of nationalism, LDK having a more moderate approach on the independence struggle and the PDK maintaining a more hard-line attitude, since it emerged out of former KLA warriors. In addition, within hardliners themselves appeared another cleavage, the regional one. In the region called *Dukagjini* AAK was organised, another party made up of former KLA warriors predominantly from this region. Such division started before and during the war, reaching its peak by the end of the war. The KLA lacked the single organisation structure in terms of chain of command, an organisation structure highly shadowed by the regional provincial bases of Kosovo – traditionally maintaining sub-cultural differences. This type of political division was used as a mechanism to split up society and create cleavages, though it could not be transformed into a symbol around whom parties could construct their visions to respond to social needs and develop Kosovo after the war. The cleavages of such type, were short-term in nature compared to cleavages given by Lipset & Rokkan, and started to decline shortly after the war, making no sense at all after independence. The cleavages are more or less employed as a working tool to advance the position of parties towards the government, although in turn it fuelled hatred among society in Kosovo.

These parties are leader-dominated parties, or as Gunther and Diamond (2000) call such parties - a personalistic one. They used such political cleavage to appeal to voters aiming to extend the range of supporters beyond provincial and personal bases that would otherwise be insufficient to dominate the political scene. In other words, as Mainwaring (1999) observes for other contexts, but quite similar to the case of Kosovo, the political elite established parties to fulfil their own ends. Provincial adherence was present also during the war with its roots traditionally highly transmitted into political parties as well. Such party reliance challenges directly the modernisation process of the Kosovo political

system, in need of legitimation as a new state democracy consolidation, as it is in Kosovo.

Moving on from society level, looking at social cleavages in Kosovo, to parties themselves examining what type of socio-political cleavages they represent, it should be commenced by exploring the party level, looking to what extent parties reflect various social divisions and cleavages. What values do parties represent and stand for, which social cleavages if any identified, manifest inside party programmes, electoral platforms, interviews with party representatives and others? It helps to understand what parties in Kosovo represent, based on what formulates their programmes, electoral platforms, electoral promises, declarations, and political positions on particular issues. In addition, the ideological profiles of parties reflect best the representation of parties, particularly the left-right schema used for Western European party systems. Due to the lack of research on social cleavages in Kosovo, the research on the representation function of parties in Kosovo takes place only at the party level. The representation is illustrated by their programmes, interests and values for various parts of society and is reflected by their party programmes and platforms. Whom do their programmes represent and is there a difference among them? If there is no difference among programmes, then is it because Kosovo society so monist with such homogenous interests? If such homogeneity is found, why so many similar parties represent the same interests?

**Ailing the process: political parties and consolidation of democracy in Kosovo**

	<b>Party – Ideological Profile</b>	<b>National Issue</b>	<b>Decentralisation</b>	<b>Multiculturalism</b>
<b>P D K</b>	...PDK is a successor of KLA political structures and of the system of national political values for freedom, democracy, and independence of Kosovo... In this phase it is necessary to show our full and dignified ability to govern, to build democratic state based on law, to build democratic institutions, to reconstruct political, economic and social life, to reconstruct the country and to achieve and maintain stability and security in Kosovo and region... PDK will support all positive efforts of international community for creation of conditions to settle the final political status of Kosovo... PDK shares with people its sadness. We should do more. We should move forward the process and move it faster...	...To PDK the Kosovo independence remain the necessary condition for peace and stability in the region. Kosovo independence is a real solution and endangers none. PDK takes it as its aim to fulfil the civil society aspiration in Kosovo to achieve the Kosovo independence through democratic processes.		PDK strives for equality to the law for all citizens regardless their nationality, religion, and race. PDK will protect and guarantee rights and freedoms of national minorities that live in Kosovo, according to the standards of international conventions.
<b>L D K</b>	LDK preserves the vision of its founder, Dr. Ibrahim Rugova, for Kosovo a sovereign, independent, and democratic state. LDK is a here grown party in Kosovo, a living spring that with democracy defeats force.	... since its establishment its main point in the political programme is creation of independent state of Kosovo. ... it is a fundamental precondition for the existence of the people in Kosovo and an instrument for the fulfilment of its interests.		An independent Kosovo fulfils the joint interests of Albanians and citizens of Kosovo regardless of their ethnicity, religion, or social background.
<b>A K R</b>	... a group of citizens with liberal-democratic beliefs are united to form New Kosova Alliance.	... the major motive of us is the independent and sovereign state of Kosovo, prospered, economically developed, and integrated into Euro-Atlantic structures.	... bureaucratic barriers and state controls can be minimised through ..., decentralisation, ..., ...financial decentralisation, responsibilities and competences of communes in local taxation.	Every human being is unique and different, deserves equal treatment. Multiplicity of diversity of people living in Kosovo is a spiritual ,cultural, and historic wealth of Kosovo.
<b>L D D</b>	... is a centre-right party, bases its activity on political philosophy of President Rugova. ... includes all strata of society...	... strives for Kosovo an independent and sovereign state.		... respects ethnic, cultural, religious diversity, and strives for full rights of minorities in Kosovo according to European and international standards.
<b>A</b>	... is a centre-rightist party and the starting point of its overall activity is the	Our members and leaders ... made sacrifices by serving the		

**Ailing the process: political parties and consolidation of democracy in Kosovo**

<b>A K</b>	citizen of Kosovo.	fatherland. Let it be each one a lord in its home, its state, also the people of Kosovo should be the lords of their home.		
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	<b>Economy</b>	<b>Labour policy</b>	<b>Welfare policy</b>	<b>Fiscal Policy</b>
<b>P D K</b>	PDK strives for private economy in Kosovo, based on laws of free market economy, open and free, integrated in regional and euro-Atlantic institutions... will strive for the privatization of public property to be done as soon as possible... PDK strives for a strong and competitive market... PDK will stimulate, favours and enables the creation of entrepreneurs by making lenience and softening administrative measures... We will decrease the corporate tax... we should create a minimal wage for our people...PDK has a plan to ensure loans with low interest rates for businesses...	...better paid jobs...low interest rates loans for businesses that guarantee to offer new working places...to set the minimum wage...	PDK has first its objective to take care of poor and middle classes of society which mostly bear the consequences of war ... especially families of martyrs, political prisoners and victims of Serb aggression... to institutionalise new welfare spirit compatible with creation of equal opportunities... retirement benefits or all retired citizens ... 100% increase of pensions... a programme for medicine given to old people...	... corporate tax reduction ... tax reduction for contemporary technology that does not pollute the environment ... tax increase for companies polluting the environment.
<b>L D K</b>	... we strive for a knowledge based society, with a sustainable and competitive economy in international market. ... opening Kosovo to world market. ... for an economy based on private property and entrepreneurship.	... reviewing fiscal policies to improve the possibilities for employment... employment and attracting the foreign capital ... micro loans for business lees developed at the region... employment	... social welfare as prerequisite for success at other fields.	... selective decrease of tax norms and widening the tax bases.
<b>A K R</b>	... Kosovo economically prospered. ... free market economy and plurality of property. ... regulation and monitoring economy, and not state intervention, except in cases on national interest.	... also the possibilities of regular periodic employment overseas. ... economy to experience growth and decrease the number of unemployed.	... social welfare will be practiced. Welfare ... are mission of AKR. ... strive for useful strategy on social policy ... with focus on marginalised parts of society.	... fiscal policies ... to encourage investments. Organisation of fiscal policy based on middle range interest of economy.
<b>L D D</b>	... strives for development of free market and free initiative economy, using rationally the nation's wealth without endangering renewable potential.		... the elder generations to have institutionally guaranteed care, to empower solidarity, humanism, and respect among generations.	

**Ailing the process: political parties and consolidation of democracy in Kosovo**

<b>A A K</b>	... economic development based on free market and private sector. Increasing economic activity – enhancing the business environment and the increasing public investment.	... strives for further creation of conditions for new job places, always preserving the flexibility of employment market. ... legislating law of employment, ...seasonal overseas employment, ... temporary supporting businesses with large number of employees, ... increasing incomes through grey economy.	... formulation of a clear strategy ... to decrease and prevent the poverty will be a priority.	... to apply measured fiscal policy based on scientific analysis. ... oriented on budget revenue and budget expenditure.
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	<b>Security policy</b>	<b>Agriculture</b>	<b>Education</b>	<b>Gender Policy</b>
<b>P D K</b>	... we should feel secure at our home. ... PDK is engaged in securing strong leadership ability need for Kosovo to be a secured placed to live, work and rise up family. ... restructuring and modernisation of Kosovo defence forces, ... its integration in euro-Atlantic structures... professionalism and enhanced defence ability ... generically oppose any tendency for its politicization ... its status, place, role and material position to be regulated systematically and by law.	PDK will have as its priority immediate reconstruction and distribution of economic help to regions mostly damaged by war on the fields such as: ..., agriculture production, ...	...modernisation of the education system in Kosovo, its levelling to the standards of the western democratic states....special attention will be paid to spread of primary and secondary education as obligatory to all citizens of Kosovo. ...consistent improvement of general conditions at all levels of education – computer centre at each school, adequate stimulation - a salary from which they can live and be motivated. depoliticisation of education system, ... for private education. We will establish a university for high tech of 21 century. In order to face the challenges of new century we should educate our people.	... for emancipation in general and women emancipation especially. PDK highly values the role and importance of Albanian women during the war for freedom. ... equal payment for man and woman, and against any discrimination. We will take all measures including legislative one to fight against women trafficking and prostitution as deformations of modern society.
<b>L D K</b>	Security is required for all other areas of development. ... creation of overall security strategy..., reviewing the overall functioning of policy..., founding the Kosovo Force, ...	... rational use of land..., development of market for agricultural products,... investing on the infrastructure of rural areas, ... easier mechanisms for loans on agribusiness, ...	Education as a priority for development, ... attracting investments, ... diversity on education ..., a knowledge society...	... supports the equal competition of women on representation and governing...

**Ailing the process: political parties and consolidation of democracy in Kosovo**

<b>A K R</b>	... Kosovo safe and secured place, ... security at the state level is possible if there exists individual and collective security. ... legal infrastructure for security.	... the more important sector of Kosovo economy. ... subvention of farmers. ... better loan conditions for farmers. ... application of economics of scale.	... modern reform at all levels of education. ... obligatory pre-primary schooling. ... better wages for teachers. ... establishment of new public universities. ... helping students overseas to study. Cooperation with overseas universities.	... society based on principles of gender equality.
<b>L D D</b>			... modern education. ... strives to improve the quality of education, ... public and private education, ... research and scientific development...	... and women as a special category to have institutionally guaranteed support for participation...
<b>A A K</b>	Security is a fundamental need, ... , of all citizens of Kosovo. Independent Kosovo needs adequate security institutions to ensure the rule of law.	... subsidising the agriculture and rural development, ..., decreasing the import of agricultural products, ..., subsidising farms and food industry, ..., support bio agricultural products.	... without a modern and national education system there is economic sustainability, consolidation of democracy, and regional and economic integration.	... supports the gender integration ... at all levels of policy-making.

	<b>Environment</b>	<b>Energy Policy</b>	<b>Culture and Sport</b>	<b>Rule of Law and Fighting Corruption</b>
<b>P D K</b>	... for quality ecologic environment, ... we will strive to protect the living environment from ecological pollution, irresponsible damages, especially the forestry. ... space and urban planning. Tax reduction for modern technology that does not pollute the environment and tax increasing for those polluting the environment.		... protection, cultivation, enriching and spreading of our national culture. ... for wide national and international cultural cooperation at all fields ...	... establishment of state based on law, developing of all democratic institutions, new law system at all levels, ... thus, legislative executive and judiciary power. ... we promise an open and transparent government. ... PDK will bring to an end the unending lost, cheating, and abuse of people's money and will be a trustful servant to the trust of people.
<b>L D K</b>	... to safe, protect, and humanise the living environment.	... securing capacity for generation of electricity, ... strengthening the corporative governance of KEK...	... preserving and promoting the cultural values, ... a party of modern and traditional values..., promoting and presenting the Kosovo sports... on the world.	... zero tolerance against corruption. ... strengthening the rule of law and good governance.
<b>A</b>	... "green tax" where applicable. ...	Objective ... supplying	... will strive to preserve the	... guarantee that everyone is equal

**Ailing the process: political parties and consolidation of democracy in Kosovo**

<b>K R</b>	environment policy conform international standards.	Kosovo with electricity consistently. ... Kosovo to join the European Charter of Energy. ... building the thermo central with green gas... , building the hydro central with capacity of 300 MW.	cultural diversity in Kosovo. ... preserve the cultural monuments. ... will strive to develop the sport activities.	to the law. ... strive for creation of independent and efficient judiciary. ... There is a need to be established a non-corrupted administration.
<b>L D D</b>	... a healthy life and environment ... according to European standards...		... special support for all fields of arts and culture, ... promotion and education of young actress, ... promotion their creations internationally.	... for the rule of law.
<b>A A K</b>	... sustainable development based on: ..., environmental implications.	... independence on the energy sector is equal to independence and sovereignty of the state. ... making use of potential energy resources of Kosovo, ... at the regional level ... ensuring the consume of energy for the future. ... basing on lignite, ..., hydro systems,	... strive to create a society, that highly values culture, artistic creations and sports.	... fully devoted to fight corruption and the organised crime by developing and building the legal mechanism for the rule of law. Law implementation – war against corruption and organised crime. ..., zero tolerance principle.

	<b>Human Rights Protection</b>	<b>Youth</b>	<b>Healthcare Policy</b>	<b>Integration Policy</b>
<b>P D K</b>	... rights and freedoms according to international standards, UN Universal Declaration for the rights and liberties and OSCE documents, ... coordinating individual rights with rights of society and spiritual, national and democratic values.	Youth was the main pillar of our war of liberation, it will be a cohesive force of society in an independent and democratic Kosovo. ... it is necessary to support overall the youth in education, employment and its inclusiveness in political and social life. ... their specialisation, employment and professional preparation overseas. ... stimulation for sport and free time activities.	... health improvement of all citizens of Kosovo. ... healthcare policy will be based on healthcare planning as a main duty toward overall reconstruction of healthcare system through global elaboration and political coordination without forgetting the priority in allocating funds for these policies. ... PDK will offer to doctors the necessary means to save lives. ... fight infant mortality by highlighting the importance of education and parental	... to be part of the EU. ... through participating in the regional and European integration process to achieve the incontestable wide national rights. Being part of European continent we strive to attain political and economic integration. ... a Europe that respects characteristics of each nation. ... Integration through efforts for democratisation.

**Ailing the process: political parties and consolidation of democracy in Kosovo**

			and mother's care. ... a system where everyone has a secured health. ... old people will have special treatment with cheaper rates...	
<b>L D K</b>	... will sign conventions and declarations on ... human rights protection ...	Nothing for youth without the youth!	... to build a unique healthcare system, able and functional to offer high quality services to all citizens.	... EU integration and fulfilment of its requirements...
<b>A K R</b>	... we will standardise and guarantee human rights protection based on most advanced international conventions.	... facilitates to the youth the self actualisation. ... youth will find the path to prosperity and development.	... radical reforms. ... establishment of public and private healthcare system.	... strive to fulfil the requirements for EU integration. One of main pillars of Kosovo foreign policy is integration in NATO. ... integration in other international organisations.
<b>L D D</b>	... full minority rights.	... youth as a special category to have institutionally guaranteed support for participation...	... for a decentralized, high quality and functional healthcare system ...	... integrated in EU, NATO and permanent friendship with the USA.
<b>A A K</b>	In our country the right to live, equality to the law, right of property, right of religion, right of using the language, right of national identity, right of education, right of freedom of speech and political activity, the right of free association, and other rights coming out of the human nature are indispensable rights of Kosovo citizens.	... <i>Youth is not just the future but also the present of Kosovo.</i>	... increasing the public funds for healthcare system. Decentralisation of healthcare system.... . Empowering the managerial capacity of healthcare institutions.... .	... we will work intensively to prepare Kosovo, so that by 2014 to be ready for EU integration, ... Kosovo will realise the integration in NATO and other international organisations.

	<b>Development</b>	<b>Fighting Poverty</b>	<b>Investment</b>	<b>Regional Cooperation</b>
<b>P D K</b>	... to make Kosovo a Silicon Valley of Western Europe	... minimal wage policy will offer a living standard that can take our people out of poverty and bring them to a status of a country that deserves to be part of EU.	... to make it easy for foreign investors to invest in Kosovo. ... corporate tax reduction will send a message that Kosovo is open to businesses.	... Kosovo to be in peace and democracy with all states of the region. ...for bilateral and multilateral cooperation in all fields ... , ... to build policies of closeness and uniqueness with Albanian state, nation and international as well. ... without respecting the rights and will of all nations we can't even talk about democratisation of Balkans.

<b>L D K</b>	... economic, political, social and cultural development of Kosovo.	... economic growth reduces poverty.	... stimulating investments, ...attracting foreign investments...	... integration into regional institutions and organisations...
<b>A K R</b>	... economic development and welfare. ... overall development. ... intensive and consistent economic development.	... one of the reasons to found AKR is to fight poverty.	... foreign direct investment, public investment on infrastructure. Investment on energy, ... on education...	... cooperation with neighbour countries. ... regional roads...
<b>L D D</b>	... development of free market economy.			... creating neighbourhood relations with all neighbour countries in terms of joint partnership. ... relation with Albania at the nation and state level...
<b>A A K</b>	Development based on: human resources of the nation, natural potentials, skills and initiatives of Kosovo enterprises.	As an objective... decreasing the poverty.	... to create conditions for a secure an favourable environment for foreign investments. ... legal framework for investments, physical infrastructure, less bureaucratic procedures, ....	Kosovo will play its role in creation of the peace, security and stability in the region and wider. ... cooperation among nations ...

*Table.5 citations from Kosovo parties' programmes and electoral platforms*

#### **5.4. Ideological orientation of Kosovo parties**

The programmes of parties are usually generated and shaped based on the values and interests of the party members and supporters, constituting groups within society divided by social cleavages, and organised politically through political parties. Each party programme and electoral platform reflects the values and interests of the parts of society they represent, guiding their activities and behaviour in general. The ideological orientation of parties relies on these values, while in turn such orientation develops and sustains them in a cyclical way. Political parties themselves reflect the social composition and pluralism at the party system level. If the social cleavages constitute the basic orientation of the party programme in general and electoral platforms in particular, it can be concluded that there is a clear relationship between parties and society, and parties exist to represent the divisions within society, organised at the political level. However, taking into account party evolution from earlier time, they have

been considered purely social actors, emerging exclusively from society. Yet, such an attribute of parties in general has been softened somehow, and it would be unreasonable to expect a firm and frozen relationship between parties and the social groups they represent. Particularly, such expectation in new democracies would be disappointing as often parties happen to be created from the top. Nevertheless, there should still exist a relationship, though not as it used to be earlier, otherwise it would be hard to talk of representation, and consequently makes modern democracy senseless. Yet, if some parties emerged from the top, if they wish to have long-term sustainability and persistence for themselves, they still have to find ways to associate and relate to society.

Party performance on representation is directly linked with the democratisation process, since it constitutes one of the fundamental functions, giving meaning to democracy in general, needless to say, the influence it has on the other party functions is explained in the following chapters. Moreover, as comprising the major part of the second level of the consolidation structure, its consolidation has a direct impact on all the other levels making the democracy consolidation process warded on the representative level. In circumstances of party detachment from society, party activities in general are guided by interests other than those of citizens, bringing to issue how far democracy can be talked about if without citizens. Furthermore, the governing activity is no longer based on these expectations, as democracy standards require. It proves that the representative, as the most important part of the general structure of the democracy consolidation structure, has not yet taken place and does not even have promising prospects. If there is no, or a very slight and chaotic relationship between parties and society, then it makes no sense to talk of the representation function of parties. In other words if parties' programmes and electoral platforms do not illustrate such relationships then the Kosovo party system does not reflect the socio-political cleavages, and along with it, is disenchanting from society. Such a state of affairs, having no or very poor representation, impinges directly on the democracy consolidation process.

In this regard, Kosovo parties and the party system in general appears to be centre-rightist. Each and every party declares themselves to be moving from the centre to the right. Based on such a proclaimed ideological party position, it can be concluded that if the Kosovo party system is to reflect society, then Kosovo society ideologically seems to be very homogenous and closed to becoming a monist society. However, the reality reveals something else: a high level of poverty, a high rate of unemployment, a working class with highly restricted rights and lacking even a labour law, a state without a healthcare system, and so on. All the current characteristics of Kosovo society, during the last ten years, demonstrate the urgent need for leftist parties as well, yet there are none among the relevant political parties in Kosovo. Every one of the relevant parties (not less than five of them), among Kosovo's population of two million, labels themselves either as rightist or centre-rightist.

Looking to what extent the Kosovo party system reflects the social structure and pluralism of Kosovo society, it appears that Kosovo parties are ideologically more or less similar. The parties' programmes in substance are the same. Their identicalness is best described if we look at the first column of the table 5. (see above), cited from parties' programmes and electoral platforms, stating in general terms what parties stand and strive for. The major content of the programmes is dominated by highlighting some of the actual key issues, and their attitude towards very general and populist ways and commitments. Most of the issues mentioned do not include any possible solutions available to them, offered by the parties in question. Furthermore, the ideological dimension within the programme is not clear and often characterised with ideological clashes, contradictions, and ambiguities on different parts of the same programme. For instance, such ideological ambiguity is often to be found in the economic dimension (table 5), as all parties applaud the free market economy, but in the same programme they prioritise a welfare policy to help the needy. It is worth noting here that PDK

prioritises the protection of middle-class interests and increasing pensions by 100% (table 5).

To some extent it is understandable that parties in post-communist European countries (in our case including Kosovo parties) had not much alternative to choosing between left and right, due to the specifics of the wave of democratisation they belong to - covering also market liberalisation, and the discredited experience of the former regime associated with leftism, perceived exclusively as communism. Therefore, parties themselves often hesitated to relate to leftism. In this regard, Zhinipotoku<sup>35</sup> adds that currently there is a trend for parties to proclaim themselves as rightist, because of society's awful experience with the former leftist regime, usually linked with political discrimination. Besides that, looking at the current position of Kosovo society, particularly the economic dimension, the leftist parties, on a true meaning of left ideological profile, not necessary communism, can best represent a significant part of society.

The only popular ideology prevailing on the programmes of all parties is nationalism, or as Matoshi<sup>36</sup> defines it, an ethno nationalist ideology, due to the prevailing ethnic cleavages earlier fought along. Referring to the independence issue, it is a common thing for all parties to open and close their programmes with echoing commitments to independence. Therefore, nationalism is regarded as an ideological orientation common to all parties, though often blind and in a populist way. However, up to now it is used as a workable ideology, through which all parties tried and managed to infer their legitimacy and extend their support from such an appeal. Of course, the independence is a nation-wide issue, emotionally enthralling social support. However, if nationalism it is found in all parties, why then should there exist so many parties representing this same issue of independence? In addition, nationalism, as the only major ideology

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<sup>35</sup> Enver Zhinipotoku, sociologist and political analyst, interviewed on December 2009.

<sup>36</sup> Halil Matoshi, Kosovo political analyst, interviewed on December 2009.

present in all parties illustrates best the sameness of political parties. Looking from the perspective of the representation function, there is no need for so many actors to represent the same thing. In such a case as this, there are two possible scenarios, either an overrepresentation, or a chaotic under representation. Apparently, the latter is more likely rather the former.

Under representation is due to the one dimensionality of representation, taking into account only a single issue, such as independence. The other current issues arising from such acute social and economic needs are hardly tackled. Recently, after the declaration of independence, the issue as such started to lose its relevance. One dimensional representation is usually a feature of single issue parties. Such narrowly oriented parties have difficulties in adjusting themselves, once the single issue pursued is attained. Recently, this can be considered as one of the reasons why parties in post-independence Kosovo face difficulties to appeal to wide social support and consequently are forced to look for reliable support by establishing clientelist institutions, implying other structures in the power relationship, not healthy for the democracy consolidation process.

Moreover, another shortcoming of one dimensional representation, principally since it also involves emotional attachments, as nationalism often does, is that the development of accountability structures is hardly to be expected, though essential for democracy consolidation. The only indispensable institutions within the democratic system, to ensure the protection of citizens' interests, are the functional accountable institutions, as the best instruments to limit otherwise uncontrolled power of those mandated to rule. Nationalism as an ideology includes within itself a dose of irrationality, in this way citizens do not demand from parties' leadership and do not hold them responsible and accountable, as long as they continue to refer, at least declaratively, to independence. Actually, most legitimacy and social support that parties have enjoyed, especially LDK at the beginning and then later PDK and AAK, is through referring to independence and the war for independence issue.

Omitting the presence of nationalism as an ideology at parties' programmes, there is no other well-articulated ideology found there. Of course, there are elements of different ideologies, but not a crystallised and well-uttered guiding ideology to orient the party behaviour at all levels. For instance, all of them uphold to a free market economy, without defining and specifying what type of capitalism they stand for. Like Kosovo political analyst Maliqi declared (Epoka e Re 06.09.2004), Kosovo political parties lack financial capacity and ideas to determine themselves for what type of capitalism and social state are they, but persist to be huge ideological mishmashes. Such ideological chaos is mirrored in parties' programmes, electoral platforms, declarations, behaviours and policies they pursue.

Relying on party programmes is insufficient to place Kosovo parties along a left right ideological spectrum, because substantially they have quite similar programmes. Such amorphous party identity, illustrates the level of disenchantment of parties from society, not existing in line with and not representing society, but standing on their own, very much independent and free from society, subsequently performing very poorly on the representation function.

Certainly, almost no worldview, value, or action is free of some sort of ideological framework, but in order to be considered as ideologically based, it should be shaped and guided by the ideology in question, and should not be ideologically at odds from time to time. The parties' programmes, electoral platforms, behaviours, attitudes, and activities are supposed to be within ideological contours, particularly party programmes usually meant to be more static, rather than electoral platforms or declarations often influenced by day-to-day politics. Yet, the quandary arises if parties are known to have no clear ideological orientations found in their documents, interviews, declarations, activities, behaviour and attitudes in general. Political parties in Kosovo are perceived as highly chaotic in terms of the ideological orientations they possess. Their

ideological mishmash can hardly be expected to produce and reflect the orientations of citizens at society level, usually lacking necessary information for political decisions. Normally, political parties provide citizens with a compass reading, typically entailing a well defined ideological profile, to support them on their political decisions, through which citizens could find it easier to acquaint themselves within a complex political environment. Yet, such an offer has not been seen so far, preventing this sense of the representation function being fulfilled.

The high ambiguity of parties' ideological profile augments, since most programmes are used just as a technical and officially required document for registration as a political party. Parties do not feed and guide their objectives, behaviours, attitudes, and activities based on their programmes. Likewise, it obscures citizens' orientation within the contemporary, already messy representation structure. Additionally, it makes the behaviour of parties more unpredictable and less controllable from the citizens' side. Albeit with even members of parties' chairmanships themselves having no clear conception of the ideological profile of their respective party. In this regard, there is inner ideological chaos and disagreement on whether their party is left to right or centre to right. For instance, during the election campaign in the 2001 election, the AAK leader Haradinaj was using as the party slogan "neither left nor right, but straight". On the other hand, a study on ideological profiles of the parties in Kosovo, conducted by NGO "Qelnaja" (2008), ranks AAK as a rightist party. Moreover, AAK spokesman Luma in the interview declared AAK as a centre-right party. Likewise, PDK usually used to have close relations with the socialist party in Albania, also participating at the socialist international conferences. Its closeness to the socialist party of Albania might have incentives other than those ideological, such as their relations from pre-war and war-time when the socialist party of Albania was in power. The PDK leader during 2004 elections (Lajm 21.10.2004) declared that "PDK is neither rightist nor leftist". One of the members of the PDK chairmanship Sabri Kiçmari, in 2008 asserted that PDK is a

leftist party. Another PDK chairmanship member Memli Krasniqi, in the same year announced just the opposite, that they are rightists (Qelnaja publication 2008). Moreover, a PDK's MP and a member of the party chairmanship Rame Buja<sup>37</sup> in the interview declared that in Kosovo, parties are not ideologically profiled, and PDK as well is one of Kosovo's parties. Actually, we are discussing the party profile, a decision that in the end should be taken by the party congress, though we stand for a free market economy, adds Buja, without specifying the extent of such freedom. On the same study (Qelnaja publication 2008), it is mentioned that AKR plans to join the international socialists, while in turn they recently became an affiliated member of ELDR. Yet, despite its membership at the ELDR, one of its chairmanship members Kelmendi<sup>38</sup>, in interview declared that although we aim to be a centre-right party, due to current social problems in Kosovo, for the time being we cannot go for a clear ideological profile. LDK on the other hand, is also declared as a centre-right party. Ismet Beqiri<sup>39</sup> states that they are a centre-right party, but also in the process of establishing their own ideological profile, without pointing out how long it may take and to what extent it is achievable. The same applies to LDD that emerged as a party due to the LDK split. Naser Rugova member of LDD chairmanship, asserts that [they] are a centre-right party. Taking into account the above mentioned statements and declarations of parties, the Kosovo party system seems to be more or less, at least declaratively, as a centre-right party system. These are just some of the many examples illustrating the ideological ambiguity, chaos, and confusion building up in the Kosovo party system. The ideological ambiguity and confusion that Kosovo parties have, is evident even at the high rank party leadership level no wonder among to mention ordinary members or citizens. Surprisingly, one wonders why there are so many parties declaratively standing for the same ideological profile, when no leftist party is perceptible.

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37 Interviewed on 10th of December 2009

38 Muhamet Kelmendi AKR chairmanship member, interviewed on December 2009

39 Ismet Beqiri LDK member of chairmanship, interviewed on January 2010

The same applies to electoral platforms. Most of them spell out generalisations, covering and mentioning some of society's problems, but lacking any workable and specific solutions to them; they are confusing on ideological orientation, and coloured with ideological contradictions. Until the 2007 elections where parties started to talk about the economy as well, the independence issue (Electoral Platforms 2001, 2004, and 2007) largely dominated electoral platforms. Inside electoral platforms, it is hard to find any solutions to these problems. In general, they may be described more-or-less as wishful platforms, rather than responses to society's concerns. On the other hand, electoral platforms essentially differ little from each other, giving citizens difficulty in perceiving themselves and their interests protected and represented by the possible coming governments. On the other side, party declarations prove feeble as well, in terms of identifying their ideological positions. It is common within the same declaration to find various and even contradictory ideological orientations, at the beginning proclaiming pure capitalism, and at the same time affirming the priority to increase public sector spending, for instance.

On most of the interviews conducted, party representatives declared their party to be the party of citizens, presenting a heavy dose of populist attitude among them. For example, Naser Rugova<sup>40</sup> from LDD stated that [they] are a party of citizens, not limited in specific representation, but appealing to all citizens. The same is confirmed by the AAK spokesperson, representing and appealing to all citizens. The identical applies to other parties as well. Such an attitude is a clear indication of the populist stand of parties, trying to appeal and widen their support to the electorate through populist jingles. In addition to that, Rame Buja (PDK) declared that [they] are a party for the masses and not a party of the elite. Moreover, Hajzeraj<sup>41</sup> (AKR) admits that though [they] are a centre-rightist party [they] have no particular social structure targets, and try to get the support from all citizens wherever possible. Such a *catch everyone possible* behaviour of

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40 LLD chairmanship member and LDD MP, interviewed on January 2010.

41 AKR chairmanship member and AKR MP, interviewed on December 2009.

parties articulated by populist avowal is also due to the strategy used by parties to get as broad and as much support as possible (Selaci<sup>42</sup>, Tahiri<sup>43</sup>).

However, among the main reasons for such an ideological chaos and mishmash of political parties in Kosovo, is the political development itself, bringing to the top of all priorities the independence agenda. In this way nationalism as an ideology, present in one way or another in all Kosovo parties, was able to swallow all other possible ideologies, encompassing within parties individuals and groups from the extreme left to the extreme right. As a result, the ability of nationalism, during particular times, to swallow and put under its shadow other ideologies, created the ideological mishmash of parties. Such development is supported by, as Krasniqi<sup>44</sup> observes, the role of personal interests in politics, causing the personalisation of politics to structure the inner party decision-making power around a narrow circle and making politics revolve around the interests of a few individuals.

Looking from the perspective of citizens as to what extent they are aware of being represented by such an ideologically chaotic party system, it is widely agreed that such awareness is scarcely to be expected by such undefined parties with highly indeterminate and unpredictable politics. Matoshi, Zhinipotoku, Selaci and G. Krasniqi are of the opinion that such perception is mostly clientelist, regional, and blood based. The rest of society from such a representation structure has difficulties identifying the supposed institutional representation, since even people within the inner party organisational structure are not aware of who and what the ideological terms are, it cannot be expected that the masses, usually not informed about such topics, will have any consciousness of the issues. Actually, at the policy level there exists a high level of disenchantment between policies pursued by political parties and citizens'

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42 Gezim Selaci, political scientist, interviewed on January 2010.

43 Ramush Tahiri, political scientist and political analyst, interviewed on December 2009.

44 Gezim Krasniqi, political scientist, interviewed on December 2009.

expectations. In relation to that, a study conducted by the Kosovo Democratic Institute (2008) proves it empirically, finding a very poor, and mostly by chance, accordance between policies pursued and citizens' expectations. The strongest relationship is found between the direct linkage between parties and economic actors financing them, often *invisible*.

Structuring representation on such a chaotic, narrow, and depleted base of parties among society implies the exclusion of the majority of society from the representation structure. Such omission triggers difficulties on the other party functions, necessary for democracy consolidation, such as integration, legitimation, innovation, and governing (see the following chapters). Consequently, it entails also the depleted modern democracy - representative democracy, featured with poor representation performance of parties.

Furthermore, parties did not specify which groups were consulted while drawing their programmes and electoral platforms. Most of them mentioned experts, but none any specific organizations or interests groups. They do not take into account any specific interests, looking to include everything possible producing a so-called mishmash ideological identity.

Regarding the ideological profile, parties admit they lack a clear profile and are going to start considering the elucidation of their ideological profile. One of the chairmanship members, Ismet Beqiri<sup>45</sup> stated that LDK is planning to start building its ideological identity. Since independence, parties have been pushed to find their place and position on the ideological spectrum. Yet, to what extent parties develop interests and have the political will and capacity to do so, remains to be seen, and leaves a lot to wish for. The current trajectory of party development in this respect is less promising. Parties are in intense competition with each other to build up and structure their clientelist support, although this is not ideologically driven. Likewise, they arrange representation on other lines,

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<sup>45</sup> LDK chairmanship member and LDK MP, interviewed on January 2010.

thinning it horizontally and vertically, to merely a part of society at the cost of the leftover majority.. In addition, such representation is substantially very constricted; it includes a pure and simple transaction of political rights with support for an immediate (usually economic) compensation, in terms of jobs, contracts, or other direct benefits. On the path to democracy consolidation, such developments are not compatible with the end-result and process expectations run counter to it, challenging and ailing the process as such.

### ***5.5. Parties floating above the society***

Bearing in mind the system structure, government at the top with society at the bottom, and parties in between bridging and often binding both, according to *freezing theory*, parties are supposed to come out of society intermediating between government and society structures. On their own, parties have their roots within society and reflect society in their organizational structure, governing activity, behaviour, attitudes, and documents they rely on. Yet, the experience of parties in Kosovo stands out in being poles apart. From parties' programmes, electoral platforms, party declarations, and interviews conducted, it is perceived that the Kosovo party system does not reflect social composition, and as such society is not projected on the party system. Parties are predominantly alike, all of them claiming to be from centre-right to the right on the ideological spectrum, akin and untouched by society. Parties are not even shallowly navigating within society, but merely seem to fly above, losing the pulse completely. Most of them are created from above, in need of finding ways to penetrate into society. Few others, such as LDK, a former *forum party* considered as being created bottom up, at its eve up to the beginning of the war used to enjoy broad social support. Nonetheless, LDK is continuously and intensely getting shallower roots in society, ending up with a very superficial position. The low number of votes they got in the 2007 election, and the very low level of electoral turnout, brought LDK from a movement party with wide society support based on the independence issue, down to a loser in elections. Normally, parties with shallow roots are exposed to more dangers as opposed to parties more deeply rooted. The upshot of such an on-going process makes the freezing theory in the case of Kosovo

parties not viable. Parties are primarily created from above, and have not managed to reflect social cleavages. Parties are fairly similar, in general having no ideological differences in their programmes, platforms, and their behaviours. Along these lines, Kosovo parties seem to represent everyone, but indeed none. The detached-from-society party system indicates that parties are floating above and have very trivial roots in society. The cleavages they base themselves on are short-term. Usually, short-term cleavages remove parties from society very easy, as they happen to seal very fast. Despite their resemblance, the only current difference among parties that remains viable are the names of their leaders. The distinction between leaders remains not on their values, attitudes, and behaviour, since all of them more or less share authoritarian values, but rather in their names, largely substituted by the province of their origin.

Hence, political parties in Kosovo poorly reflect the social structures in their programmes and platforms. Most of that reflection was by the LDK before the war, as the major social movement of independence, and then PDK and AAK, immediately after the war, as supporters of the war were complemented by regional bases. At the moment, with the fulfilment of the objectives that these parties were supposedly created for – the independence issue, even the one-dimensional representation is being alleviated. The majority of the rest of the parties, from their very starting point have been flying above and out of touch with society. This brings us to two issues. Firstly, who then is going to represent society if not parties? Then, what and whom do parties represent?

By definition, if not at organisational level, at least at the governing level, the parties are supposed to be the expression of society. The failure of parties to mirror society, brings into question representative democracy in itself, if there is no one to represent society? As stated earlier, parties in representative democracies are valued as the main institutions of representation, despite other merely complementary and supplementary intermediary institutions such as NGOs, interest groups, social movements, etc.. In the case of Kosovo, most of

such organizations are either corrupt, government controlled, or functionally weak due to the high level of politicisation produced and maintained by political parties. Political parties are not just failing to represent society, in addition they are preventing other possible intermediary institutions to play their representation function. As an illustration, among many others to mention, is the role of an employers' syndicate on representing the workers' interests. Most of their attempts for protest were neutralised because of parties' interference. Workers syndicates have proved to be unsuccessful at least in raising issues pertaining to their interests. The same applies to other civil society organisations, a considerable part of them maintained just for cosmetic use to make up the system, for the government to claim that they are upholding democratic values.

Without proper representation of society, the democracy consolidation process will have teething troubles to move on, because it is coupled essentially with undemocratic practices such as poor representation. Consequently, in the short term the democratisation process might freeze up, and later even reverse as a process, making democratisation politics in Kosovo highly unpredictable. Such a state of affairs offers no opportunity for consolidation of the representation structure. Democracy finds itself unable to give effect, in deficiency of the required pressure exercised from the citizens' side, and currently disorientated within messy politics generated by a chaotic party system. Moreover, it questions the very likelihood of citizens' interests protection, hazing the essential objectives of Kosovo democracy. Apparently, personalistic parties might see it as being less demanding and trouble-free affording them the platform to pursue objectives consistent to such parties, but in the long term, it has an irreversible negative impact in general.

## **5.6. Conclusion**

The research of the extent to what political parties and the party system of Kosovo in general represent society, shows that social composition is barely reflected at the party system or political system level. This is best illustrated in the content of party documents and the way these are built. Party programmes,

electoral platforms, and their behaviours and activities are not grounded in the long-term socio-political cleavages. Therefore, it can be concluded that there is no such established relationship. Parties' programmes, electoral platforms, attitudes, and behaviours do not reflect the composition of Kosovo society, consequently not projecting society in party activities, including also the governing level. Moreover, Kosovo parties represent an ideological mishmash, and are experiencing an identity crisis, and do puzzle citizens' awareness of which political party specifically does represent them. This is even more challenging while all parties declare themselves as having the same ideological profile and to substantially have almost similar programmes meant to confine parties' behaviour. It rather brings into being politics and policy making, in terms of representing citizens' interests, as a very unpredictable outcome.

Furthermore, the impossibility for citizens to create their consciousness and be oriented on their positions on the party system structure of representation, due to a hazy ideological spectrum of party system, diminishes continuously the roots of parties within society. The new parties face snags to make a way into society, while the old ones, due to nationalist appeal, used to have reasonably profound, though shrinking roots within society.

Political parties are found to perform poorly on the representation function, and consequently have a very negative effect on democracy consolidation prospects, above all for a democracy having no experience earlier, like the case with Kosovo. Constituting the second level of the democracy consolidation structure, it affects negatively on the other three levels. Particularly, it thwarts consolidation at the fourth level, the cultural consolidation, since society is not oriented toward democratisation due to underrepresentation, firstly within parties themselves and then at the governing level as well. Poor representation does not ensure the protection of citizens' interests, as an essential element for cultural consolidation. Representation opens the door for cultural consolidation, and makes citizens part of the process as a necessary requirement, enabling participation as a first step

to get citizens used to democratic values and norms, later possibly leading to habituation. However, it is meaningless to expect such a thing if initially no sufficient representation is actually ensured by the institutions primarily in charge of that, political parties.

In the foreseeable future, there is less hope for improvements in these areas. Instead of society projection at the political system, the party system through party behaviours and governing activities reflects and projects the high level of personalisation of politics, constantly fed by the personalistic type of Kosovo political parties.

## Chapter 6

### **6. *Te l'est mon bon plaisir* - The Integration Function of Parties in Kosovo**

#### **6.1. Introduction**

The function of parties are left with in a modern democracy is the representation function. In addition to the representation of citizens, political parties also make citizens feel part of the political process and system in general, integrate them into the system and shield them from political alienation and with it apathy. If political apathy consumes a large part of society for a considerable period, it could destabilise and undermine the self-perpetuation of the system itself. Usually, binding citizens into the political process and making them part of decision making at a political level is a task dedicated merely to political parties.

The political system that comes out of the human nature of a living community, in order to be functional, the participation of those human beings in the political process is a necessary requirement. Regardless of the size and type of community organisation, those belonging to it have to participate in one way or another. Each human being has their own interests, structured on his own needs, wants and values, evolving and developing continuously. The best way people inside the political system can protect their own interests is through being a part of the decision making political process (Mill [1861] 1958). Political decisions in one way or another impact their lives, since they are made for the community and the people within. Nothing would protect interests better than deciding for themselves. Participation is best ensured by the direct participation of citizens. Yet, such a mechanism in today's democracies is hardly applicable or doable. As a substitution to that, representative democracy offers the best possible opportunity for participation through integration and participation in the political process, necessitating intermediation as a viable mechanism and opportunity for a willing and pluralist integration. Pluralist integration in turn is different from enforced and monist, *no choice* integration was the case in party state regimes in

former socialist Europe, which not much longer than two decades ago, Kosovo belonged also. Such a model of integration, in contrast to a forced monist integration, offers more space and opportunity for people within the political system to organise themselves in various different political and non-political organisations, found to be most suitable to their own interests. Moreover, willing integration is set to be more productive, given that it is citizen driven, ensuring the plurality of integration rooted in the plurality and diversity of human nature from which a variety of interests arise and develop. Fulfilment of citizens' interests is pre-eminently guaranteed through being part of the decisions related to their interests in one way or another. The more citizens, and the better organised the citizens in the decision making process, the higher the chances of attaining the targeted objectives – to look after their own interests.

In representative democracies, political parties structure political participation through intermediation. Despite party decline, or as Katz & Mair (1995) define it, as merely a party transformation not necessary constituting a party decline, parties remain the major anchors (among others) of society in the political process. Parties offer a great opportunity for society to be organised politically and in a plural manner, bringing society closer and making it part of decision making in the political process. Likewise, it makes democracy meaningful in itself and eases consolidation prospects. The deeper the roots of parties in society, the more integrated society would be in the political process. The higher the level of integration, the better the chances would be for a qualitative integration. However, in new democracies such as Kosovo, parties are merely floating above society, because the majority of them are created top-down and have difficulties in weaving their way into society. Bottom-up created parties are proved to be more successful in the integration function, because they spring up from within society, automatically binding citizens in the political process. However, with time, even bottom-up created parties' roots in society may wane, in particular single-purpose created parties, unable to widen their scope of objectives after their pursued issue is realised. Yet, parties that originated the other way around,

and are floating above the society, face more challenges to integrate society into the political process, and are suitable illustrations of the low level of social integration into the collective decision-making process.

Nevertheless, it should be pointed out that social integration is complemented and supplemented by other non-party organisations as well, such as NGOs, social movements, interest groups, and other forms of organisations established based on certain shared interests of various groups of society. Compared to the integration function previously being largely dominated by political parties, nowadays there has been an increase in the role of such organisations in this function.

Individuals and groups of society in a democratic system establish new, or join, already established parties or other organisations in order to protect their own interests in a competitive manner. One of the differences between parties and other forms of organisations is that parties cover a wider range of issues, sometimes including also the specific issues highlighted by certain organisations. Primarily parties in a pluralist democracy integrate society through their organised structure, determining the effects and extent of society integration<sup>46</sup> into the political process. Party organisational structure is built up by the manner in which the integration takes place. The more massive the organisation structure, the higher the integration. Principally in political systems with an underdeveloped alternative integration structure made up of NGO-s, social movements, or other interest groups, as is the case in Kosovo, parties' organisation structures illustrate best how much opportunity society has of integration, and to what extent the society's interests are being protected, by measuring their inclusion in the decision making process. The more integrated society, the higher the chances are for the protection of citizens' interests. On the other side, the extent of social integration in the political process has a direct

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<sup>46</sup> I am always referring to willingly pluralist democratic integration.

impact on the consolidation structure. Better integration consequently means better chances for democracy consolidation to take place.

The actual transformation of parties is reflected in the integration function as well. In this regard, Katz & Mair (1994) conclude that modern parties, even in consolidated democracies, are transformed in terms of the state/society relationship, getting closer to the state and further from society. Such a transformation has a direct impact on the way and extent citizens' interests are protected, different from when previously parties were regarded more as socio-political institutions, often playing the role of the driving force for even revolutionary changes. The anticipation that state-parties suffer from cartelisation, implies the protection of social interests largely at the output level, has not given the expected effect, principally for new unconsolidated democracies that have a fragile institutional structure, and weak accountability institutions to ensure that rules and procedures are followed as specified by laws and regulations. In addition, institutions holding the government to account are very much in their infancy or are institutions that are in fact still only on paper, since in a new state with an unconsolidated democracy, such as Kosovo, the level of informality means repeatedly bypasses formal institutions.

Cartelisation of parties is one of the major reasons of party shortcomings in performing the integration function. Principally, the cartelisation of parties in failed states goes even further, parties are not only financed by the state, but are also twinned with it and make use of it, habitually perceiving the state as their own property. The issue goes downhill and deteriorates in the case of a failed state to *carteled* with personalistic authoritarian parties.

### ***From cartelisation to colonisation of the state by parties***

Katz & Mair (1995) elaborating party transformation throughout the centuries, conceptualise that a new model of party has developed since the 1970s, known as the cartel party. Although they do not offer a decisive definition of such a

model, they specify features classifying a party of cartel type. The key attribute of cartel parties is the state-party penetration. The cartel model of the party is conceptualised from the experience of parties and party systems in western European consolidated democracies. Nevertheless, it does not mean that cartel parties are confined only to the context from which they emerged. They are found in other socio-political contexts as well. Party-state penetration is present in almost all electoral democracies. However, the difference remains in the level and type of penetration. In consolidated democracies, it mainly happens through a reliance of parties on state finances. Suspicions linger on the issue of parties getting closer to the state and moving away from society, instantaneously impairing and weakening the integration function through parties' roots being depleted within society. However, our concern is what happens if such penetration is between parties and states categorised as *failed states*. The apprehension in consolidated democracies is that state subsidies on parties somehow loosen party links with society. Therefore, nowadays parties are conceptualised more as political rather than social institutions, empowering the state in its relation to civil society.

Nonetheless, on the case of failed states, the penetration goes even deeper and wider, beyond cartelisation to state colonisation. A failed state in general is characterised by weak institutions, not able to perform their expected functions. Such a state with weak institutions is a great opportunity for parties not only to use such weaknesses of the institutions for their subventions from the state, but also to use the state in general as much as possible for their own specific purposes. Parties in a failed state might not only enter into a cartel relationship with the state, but they might also colonise it. State colonisation by parties implies parties' interests in keeping such colonisation, in terms of preventing the state to develop its own institutional capacity. The issue is even worse in the case of Kosovo who recently celebrated its second anniversary of statehood.

The type of party organisation furthers party appetite for state colonization. In Western Europe parties use state subvention, in addition to membership fees and other possible financial sources to carry on their activity. In the case of Kosovo, major parties actually have no membership fees, and to fund their activities, they have to pay a heavy price for their clientelistic structures. Clientelism as a way of mobilising party support is costly and barely affordable. The colonisation of the state by parties – mostly parties in power, provides the best solution to pay for their clients, using government subsidies, employment in the public sector, contracts, tenders, tax evasion, and so on. In this way, parties reimburse the support they get from their clients. The more prosperous parties are those that perform well in getting the number of votes, which in turn provides more opportunity they have to colonise the state. This is acknowledged as being a state exploitation (chap. 9).

State colonisation lowers the prospects for the integration function of parties and for the process of democracy consolidation in general. It deludes the first level of consolidation, constitutional consolidation largely at the implementation level, keeping state institutions underdeveloped and unable to fulfil their constitutionally and legally prescribed roles. In this case, informal institutions empowered through the state colonisation process, clash with formal legal institutions. As long as formal institutions are still in their infancy and informal institutions enjoy the actual power, the latter obviously supersedes the former, constantly challenging them and warding off the stabilisation and empowerment that would enable them to fulfil their prescribed duties and responsibilities.

The ability to integrate citizens through direct reimbursement at the output level is not feasible. Colonisation itself does not allow state institutions to develop, which in turn undermines the very basis of democracy consolidation. The clients benefiting directly through direct reimbursement constitute only a small part of society. Such a direct profit by so few relies on the backbone of the rest of society, usually comprising the majority. For emerging new parties it is almost

impossible for them to establish themselves, because the state resources in possession by colonisers – parties in power, makes these parties powerful and capable enough to prevent any other new party from challenging them. Thus, parties in power are able to quash competition and fair conditions essential to democracy.

### ***Parties and other integration actors***

Political parties are not the only actors in the integration structure. They share the integration function with other complementary and supplementary institutions to integration like NGOs, social movements, interest groups, trade unions, and so on. In consolidated democracies, such institutions are fairly well developed, and often surpass even parties' standard of integration function. In new democracies, such as Kosovo, the integration structure is less consolidated; the complementary and supplementary institutions of integration are not developed. Yet, even consolidated democracies have lately been marked by a decline in voter turnout and less integration of people through political parties into the political process. However, despite such a decline there are other additional institutions facilitating participation by means other than voting. In the case of Kosovo, such institutions are barely established, most of them politicised by existing parties. It implies that there is less alternative space and opportunity to organise and protect one's interest through additional intermediary institutions. The soaring level of politicisation leaves space for supplementary participation dwindling. The higher the horizontal and vertical level of politicisation, the lesser the developments for alternative integration. Moreover, the high level of politicisation<sup>47</sup> taking place in Kosovo has eroded the issue. Therefore, such little level of society integration is a worry, jeopardizing democracy and democracy consolidation, unlike in the north-western hemisphere where more room for

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<sup>47</sup> A very good illustration is the functioning of employees' syndicates. They tried to organise strikes but government parties achieved in dividing them, and make them end the strikes without pursuing their requests. The decision to end strikes was done by syndicate leaders without even prior information of syndicate chairmanship. It happened at the strike of medical workers by the end of 2008. Such political influence has paralyzed the functioning of other syndicates as well, making them just numbers and not institutions able to protect employees interests.

participation is institutionally ensured. Furthermore, Kosovo parties are also known for the shift of their members from one party to another. Such a movement of party members is increasing with the transformation of party structures towards the increasing reliance on clientelism. The ICG Report (May 2005) describing Kosovo parties' support, among other factors, affirms that voter loyalties are largely determined by patronage, clan, and regionalism.

On the other hand, the rules of the electoral system recognising Kosovo as a single electoral district does not offer space for a direct and clear relationship between MPs and voters, yet such a relationship is expected to be fully realised through political parties dominated by authoritarian leaders keeping parties apart from society.

### ***Definition of the issue and research proceedings***

The integration function of parties has been conceptualised differently by various scholars such as Helms (1995). In this regard, Schmitter (1999, 477) defines the integration function of parties as providing most citizens with a stable and distinctive set of ideas and goals (symbols) which anchor their expectations of democracy, and orient them in a general way towards policy options and make them feel part of the process of collective choice. The study of the integration function of parties and their role on consolidation of democracy in Kosovo is structured based on Schmitter's definition of the integration function. Therefore, the evaluation of the party integration function in Kosovo starts initially by exploring the party organisational and inner power structure determining the level and scope of society integration into the political system through parties. The further away parties are from society, the less integrated society is in the political process. Based on this we can say that mass appealing parties, in terms of organisational structural, perform better the integration function than the electoralist or an elite-based party. By looking at the type of parties in Kosovo, particularly in terms of organisational structure, the level of citizens' integration through political parties can be assessed. In this way the opportunity that parties

offer to society for integration is measured, regardless of the will and readiness of citizens to participate.

Shedding light on parties' typology highlights the chances parties offer to citizens to anchor them in the decision-making process. Furthermore, individual party linkage is measured, as one of the main indicators of the level and type of anchoring of society in the political process. Mass appealing parties perform better in integration than parties of the elite. In addition, movement of the elite from one party to another is very much common to Kosovo parties. Such a shift is a demonstration that even the closest inner circle of parties is not stable and well consolidated, in terms of recruiting or maintaining the loyalty of the elite that constitute the brainpower of the party. How far can it be expected for parties to anchor sympathizers, if they cannot anchor even the closest persons within the party structure? Moreover, as other indicators measured, there is electoral volatility illustrating the stability of the linkage between parties and their voters, representing the outer circle of party structure.

Nevertheless, the measurement also involves another indicator - the extent of orientation of citizens by political parties through policy options. Such a level of integration is manifested through the relation of parties to their social structures. Finally, the extent to which parties make citizens feel part of the process is the final indicator of the integration function. Normally, such a feeling develops as a result of good performance by parties of the above mentioned indicators of integration function. If citizens are healthily anchored by parties, and well oriented in policy options, the feeling among citizens that their says matters should naturally follow. It develops a sense of belonging and being part of a collective decision making process. However, it remains questionable how far integration and the roots of parties are developed in society, since electoral turnout has been constantly diminishing, and is likely to come down to about 30%?

The proceeding research and data are based on interviews and document analysis methods, analysing the data by content analysis. The data are taken from party programmes and electoral platforms<sup>48</sup>, preferences of their supporters, analysis of electoral results, party statutes, election and volatility data, media reports, various reports, and others.

## **6.2. Anchoring citizens by ideas and goals (symbols)**

### **Party Typology**

Political parties in Kosovo, in terms of their organisation structure, find themselves between two models. On one side, there is an ideal model of party organisation with inner structure power, like the one in western European consolidated democracies<sup>49</sup>. Such an organisation model is found in papers in party documents, party leaders' declarations, speeches and interviews, as well as conferences and round tables. In other words, parties try to sell a fictitious model to the public. One of the reasons for such a fake appearance is the broad support of the democratisation process in Kosovo by countries that have consolidated democracies already. Democracy and democratisation in the region is widely considered as the *Zeit Geist*. There is wide public perception that western European democracy is the right model. Yet, in reality it remains just a wishful model and to some extent has a cosmetic party outlook. In fact, it represents, with exceptions, only the formal structure of decidedly informal functioning parties. Some parties have yet started to formalise personalistic features, but it is possible to suggest, they still try to elaborate these features as being within the democratic space (role of parties' presidents, form AAK and AKR statute). As a matter of fact, the actual model of party organisation does not match the formal one. To a large extent, the rules of the inner party game differ tremendously from those proclaimed to the public. Most parties in Kosovo prove to be exceedingly personalistic in nature, according to the Diamond and Gunther (2001) models of parties. In some cases, the party leaders tend to share some

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48 I use also a study done by the Institute in Kosovo (KDI) on do the compatibility between electoral programmes of parties and voters preferences.

49 Of course they are not of a unified model, but in general at least do share more power with other organs of parties.

power with a few due to the impossibility of a monopoly, dictating the oligarchic party structure. This comes about mainly in PDK and LDK. The circumstances of the creation of PDK and the power relation among the PDK founders necessitate such relationship. In the case of LDK it happened after the death of Rugova. In such type of party structures there is less space for integration, since there is less possibility for a say from society level. The more centralised the decision-making power, the more restricted the range of collective decisions would be, and in turn the smaller the prospects for integration.

Referring to party typology developed by Diamond and Gunther (2001) based on three dimensions: ideological, organisational, and party stand toward the regime, it is obvious that in terms of ideology, excluding nationalism - found more or less in each party, parties in Kosovo are not ideologically driven in the sense of the left/right ideologies common in western Europe. Of course, almost every political action is within a particular ideology, but the fact remains that parties' actions are not ideologically shaped, or most of them appear not to be aware of such required guiding principles at all (see chap. 5). Parties actions are not oriented on particular ideology. Regarding the party stand towards the regime, no party publicly denounces a democratic regime, though their behaviours hardly match democratic principles. A democratic regime rhetorically is considered as the *Zeit Geist*, although what is proclaimed has a different direction to the actual practice. The behaviour of parties is scarcely equivalent to democratic values. Among the main species of parties, identified<sup>50</sup> by the authors, in the case of Kosovo elements of elitist parties are present, electoralist parties, and in a formal sense also elements of massive parties currently in decline. Before and immediately after the war major parties were massive in nature, due to the nationalist

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50 I consider just three of them, because the major parties in <sup>the</sup> Kosovo party system I deal with have elements of the three species. However, there are also ethnicity\_based parties as well, but I have dealt briefly with them in the historical development of parties chapter, they are small parties in terms of the number of people they represent, and my study is mainly focused on five major parties dominating the Kosovo party system. Regarding the movement parties variety identified with left libertarians and post industrial extreme rightist parties that mainly are based on post-materialist values, Kosovo lack behind in terms of such value developments. Extreme rightist parties in Kosovo are considered just a few small parties that I have mentioned briefly at chapter on historical development of parties.

ideology, mobilising the masses and the electorate in general. As the settlement for the status of Kosovo grew closer, the nationalist ideology began to vanish, consequently making the mass support for said parties less reasonable.

### ***Elitist Parties***

This is one of the main species of party models identified at the early stages of party development in Western Europe, characterised with a thin organisational structure and a low level of accountability. Its major types are known the party of notables, and later with socio-economic transformation, the clientelist party also emerged. Elements of elitist parties are instituted on the actual inner decision making of parties and modern clientelist structures. Certainly, modern clientelism (see chap. 9) differs from the old one, being more horizontal and is not merely at the individual linkages level.

### ***Massive Parties***

Massive parties are considered the most successful parties in terms of social integration and the revolutionary changes they brought. Their wide organisation structure mobilised massive support and is categorised as the type of parties with a high level of social integration in the political process. LDK before and immediately after the war, and to some extent PDK in its beginning, can be considered the massive parties in Kosovo. Astonishingly, parties in Kosovo at their formal organisational structure also have branches and sub-branches at the local level. Yet, they differ from traditional 'mass' parties due to the autonomy of these institutions within the power structure. As Grzymala-Busse (2008) added, they are kept more or less to identify with clienteles rather than to widen the range of the decision-makers and to augment the say of party members.

### ***Electoralist Parties***

The major party types within this specie of parties are the programmatic, catch all, and personalistic parties. They are usually active at election campaign and have no thick organisational structure as massive parties have. The elements of

the last two types of electoralist parties are widespread in Kosovo parties. Parties are highly personalistic since everything is predominantly centred around a single leader. The name of leader and party are interchangeable, and the rest of the inner party institutions are more or less a technical support to the will of the party leader. Such parties are also prone to serve very particularistic interests. Whatever the leader says is incontestable. In this regard, Kosovo parties are principally dependent on their leaders. The unassailable authority of the leader is exemplified also in the law for the general election, whereby the first on the electoral list gets the votes of party automatically (Law on the general election, Law Nr. 03/L-073, Article 110), not having to enter into intra party competition. Past experiences prove that always the first on the electoral list is the name of Kosovo parties' leaders. Furthermore, parties tempt to justify such authoritarian values referring to society tradition, in this way contesting the very compatibility of democracy with Kosovo society. For example in a TV Debate (RTK, Forumi, 06.04.2009) the Organizational Secretary of AAK, Blerim Kuqi, among others claimed that it is a tradition of Kosovo society, to follow the leader, and to have a powerful authoritarian leader. The iron law of oligarchy (Michels 1908) – “*Te l'est mon bon plaisir* - One commands, all others obey” is highly embodied in Kosovo parties.

### **LDK**

Since the death of its leader Ibrahim Rugova, The party is experiencing apparently unsolvable inner crises. Rugova enjoyed uncontested authority within the party, his charisma broadly penetrating the hearts of the masses. The absolute decision-making power within the party rested in his hands. Subsequently, other party institutions remained powerless and underdeveloped, particularly the mechanism of inner decision-making power transformation. The death of the LDK leader produced (among other crises) a leadership crisis within the party, ensuing the split of the party into two in 2007. At present the position of party chairperson is frozen.

In terms of a model massive party, LDK before and immediately after the war used to be a good example of a massive party, attributed to its wide social support. Therefore, for a certain period of time LDK might be counted as a massive party, and from Janda's (1980, 14) perspective on party institutionalisation, in view of the reification as an outer party institutionalisation, LDK enjoyed a very high level of party institutionalisation. The mass support was also merely fed by the nationalist ideology, mobilising the masses based on emotional sentiment common to nationalism. In recent developments since nationalism does not count for the major society priority anymore, the party is shifting toward an elitist model developing its clientelist structure.

### **PDK**

PDK is also highly personalistic in nature, but different from other parties, because its leader finds itself in not such a relaxed position, since few others at the top of the party might challenge their authority. This is mainly owed to the way the party was founded. A few oligarchs of the KLA founded the party, bringing along the oligarchy to the party. However, PDK leader Thaqi remains the highest personality of party, as most of its supporters identify PDK with him.

Immediately after the war, PDK was largely a massive party. It mobilised mostly those directly linked with participation in the war and the region of Drenica, where most of the war took place and where the majority of the party chairmanship comes from. It has branches and sub-branches in most parts of Kosovo. Recently they are cultivating an elitist model of parties through developing a modern clientelist structure.

### **AAK**

AAK also is very much a personalistic party led by former KLA commander Ramush Haradinaj in the region of Dukagjini. Although AAK was founded in 2001

as an alliance of some parties<sup>51</sup> its leader managed to bear down the voices of other party leaders that joined AAK, dominating the party as an unchallenged absolute authority within the party. Such dominance is formalised by the party statute, turning the party into what they call a presidential party, not a known party model before, emphasising the unfringeable power of the party leader. The authoritarian values of decision-making within the party among others are also made public by the former member of AAK, Bujar Dugolli. According to him, he was ousted from the party with a totalitarian decision akin to a decision from the communist era, asserting the lack of debate within the party of anything worthy (Epoka e Re 31.08.2009).

At the beginning, the party was mainly based on a provincial level in the *Dukagjini* region, but later it spread its formal organisational structure of branches and sub-branches to other parts of Kosovo. However, it still remains a largely region based party. Apart from provincialism, the party has managed to establish its own modern clientelist structure, reimbursed previously from state resources while being in power, and now from businesses supporting the party financially with the intention of getting this back if the party comes to power.

## **LDD**

It was founded as a result of the way its leader being treated unfairly when a member of LDK, after the death of Ibrahim Rugova. The party leader Nexhat Daci's followers at the LDK, left LDK and established LDD with Daci as the ultimate leader. The party is identified with him and people use the name of the party and its leader interchangeably.

Until 2007 it was part of LDK. It has spread its branches to most parts of Kosovo, many of them split from LDK. While in opposition and lacking the possibility to pressure businesses into work for them, and having no personal capacity for business activity of its own to pay for a clientelist structure, it seems to be

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<sup>51</sup> See chapter on historical development of parties in Kosovo.

gradually losing its ground and influence as a party. Some of LDD's members might go back to LDK.

## **AKR**

The same personalistic nature applies to AKR, with its leader Behgjet Pacolli a widely known multimillionaire. He derives his authority from being the founder and sponsor of the party. His absolute authority inside the party is unchallengeable. Some consider AKR as a private organisation, not a political party due to the way it was established, is financed, functions, and organised. The absolute authority is formalised by the party statute by a formal power aside the actual one. For instance, the party leader (AKR Statute 2007, Article 14) appoints one third of the directing council of the party. Most of the organisational competences and exclusively party finances are competences of the organisational secretary and according to Article 15, is nominated and ousted by the party chairman (AKR Statute 2007). It illustrates best the uncontested power of the leader since he has direct and sole control of party finances. Furthermore, the way party organs function highlights also the personalistic nature of the party. The Directing Council on paper is the highest body between Congresses, but it is very seldom commenced, neutralising its prescribed formal power. The party is highly identified with its leader, often when referring to AKR people say Pacolli's party.

AKR has branches and sub-branches all over Kosovo, giving it elements of massive parties, but the decision-making power they have refutes this. In terms of elements of an elitist party, it has a widespread clientelist structure funded mainly by private business activities in and outside Kosovo by the party leader, through employment and humanitarian activities. The authoritarian values of AKR decision-making powers are also highlighted by the AKR electoral platform of 2007, part of which was published by a daily newspaper: *"the core of success is the new model of leadership, with the Leviathan in the centre; the state's president elected through direct citizen's votes. We offer a president that guaranties citizens' respect, and a president that guaranties a healthy synergy of*

*public institutions. The president, elected through people's vote will be endowed with different mechanisms enabling him to supervise the performance of other pillars of government including legislative, executive and judiciary as well as the prevention of eventual abuses of their functions" (Lajm 3.11.2007).*

### **Catch all parties**

Despite the above mentioned models of parties, *catch all* (Kirchheimer 1966) type of parties also belong to electoralist type of parties. It is emphasised here because there is a tendency by Kosovo parties to go even further. In Kosovo, such a type of party can be complemented as a ***catch all power*** type of party. The former are concerned with catching all issues regardless of the ideology they belong to, the latter is an attitude to catch all power and makes use of it for particularistic interests. Parties have no concern at all with ideological compromises stipulated by *catch allism*, since they are not ideology driven parties. Yet, their main concern is to *catch all power* possible. Such party behaviour is very much linked with party survival as well, because of the desperate need for finances by parties in order to reimburse their clientele's support, implying direct exchanges, and to ensure the possible way of doing business through politics. Those in power have more chances to extend the clientele because they can reward them directly through using state resources. This leads us to the concept of unstable clientelism<sup>52</sup> as well.

#### **6.2.1. Individual-party linkages**

As long as parties float above society, have no deep roots in society, and are merely created top down, they are prone to teething-troubles in terms of their capability to provide symbols that Schmitter (1999) calls ideas and goals. Citizens find it easier to identify themselves with a particular party through symbols, facilitating participation and integration into the political process.

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<sup>52</sup> By unstable clientelism is meant the only way to secure the clients is by being in power, because such a relationship is very costly, and the only way to afford it is through using state resources. State resources can be used by being in power. If you lose power your clientele is more vulnerable to shift to others coming to power. This is what we mean by unstable clientelism.

Independence was the main idea and goal offered by parties before and immediately after the war. However, it does not mean that Kosovo was free and not in need of other priorities, around which ideas and goals could be established. Nationalism was used as a workable tool to mobilise the masses, and later also to detract the attention of society from other societal needs emerging at the top of society agenda, as parties could not and did not offer any solution to them. Recently, they have mentioned also poverty and economic development, but none of them has so far offered a vision and a workable programme on how to achieve it.

The only symbols parties in Kosovo can actually provide to society are the party leaders. LDK, even in 2009, was largely referring to their former leader Rugova, who died in 2006. This is an indicator that parties in Kosovo are not dominated just by leaders that are still alive, but also by those already dead. The ideal and goals of nationalism that up to the declaration of independence was offered by parties alongside their leaders, seems not to be relevant anymore, and the only symbols prevailing are party leaders, structuring personalistic linkages between parties and voters. Citizens identify themselves with parties through party leaders. If a certain leader of a party is mentioned, it is meant to refer to the party itself, or the other way around. The name of the party leader and the name of the party are used interchangeably. The point is that, parties are very poor in terms of importance and the value of symbols they offer to society, especially in terms of the ability to anchor their expectations about democracy and to integrate them into the decision making political process.

***Programmatic, personalistic, or clientelist linkages***

Dealing with a party - individual linkages, Kitschelt (2000) identifies three types of such linkages in different socio - political contexts: programmatic (ideological), personalistic, and clientelist linkages.

The first type of linkage is dominant mostly in developed industrial consolidated democracies. It is the best linkage in terms of democratisation prospects; the actions of parties and citizens become very clear. The programme based on a particular ideology arises from the citizens' values being clearly represented by parties, including solutions to citizens' concerns in adhering to such an ideology. Citizens are highly integrated producing a stable and predictable democratic governance. In addition, it involves a high level of accountability based on carrying forward what is spelt out in the programme. Usually, programmatic linkages endure longer compared to other linkages, since ideologies live longer than leaders. It ensures a high level of integration and active participation, and is fertile ground for development of civic culture – cultural consolidation. No asymmetric relationship is viable and citizens have an advanced position compared to the other two types of linkages. In the case of Kosovo parties, the programmatic linkage was partly present through nationalism and the independence issue, though it was more an ideology transferred into emotional linkages rather than into a practical programme. The programme was mainly a single issue and one dimensional, overwhelmed by the independence issue. As independence became nigh, and with declaration of independence, the nationalist ideology waned, and no other programmatic linkage is obvious on the surface of the Kosovo party system. The theory points out, that parties find it very thorny to integrate citizens into the political process through the poor programmes<sup>53</sup> they actually offer. Parties contain less and less militants, since they lack ideology to mobilise them. Having poor programmatic linkages, parties impede the development of democratic accountability institutions, making the emergence of civic culture unexpected in the near future. In general terms, it also means less prospects for democracy consolidation.

Personalistic linkages usually prevail in party systems that have a weak tradition of democracy. Despite the other two possible linkages, personalistic linkages in the short term might still offer pluralism, but in terms of other democratic

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<sup>53</sup> Refer to the chapter on representation function.

institutions required for democracy consolidation, such as accountability institutions, it is not wise to rely on them. The promising issue of personalistic linkages is that it maintains the parties' existence and to an extent party survival, as everything about the party is structured around the leader. In terms of citizen and civic culture developments – cultural consolidation, personalistic parties are not to be valued as anchors of a society with democratic values. Just as authoritarian and totalitarian regimes provide an enforced system of stability and continuity, also some sort of stability and endurance within parties is afforded based on personalistic, authoritarian inner party structure. They provide steadiness within the party structure, keeping alive their parties, at least as long as they live. Likewise, most authoritarian regimes rely wholly on the leader around whom the power is structured, but once gone, it results in the downturn of the regime as well. The same happens to these type of parties, if they find it impossible to find a replacement (virtually impossible) leader, parties decline together with them.

Nevertheless, with personalistic linkages the relationship between parties and individuals is an asymmetric one. There is no accountability of leaders to their followers, since parties get their support because of their leader, from where also the personalistic linkages arise and are maintained. Usually, the party leader has “*blanco support*”, with parties not needing to bother to offer solutions to their supporters' priorities. Such a level of integration is a poor performance in terms of democracy developments.

In the Kosovo party system, personalistic linkages are extremely well developed, structuring the relationship between parties and individuals. As stated earlier, parties in Kosovo mostly be classified as personalistic parties (Maliqi 2009). The unchallengeable power of parties' leaders conceded even by the party representatives interviewed (Kelmendi 2009, Buja 2009, Luma 2010, Rugova 2010, etc). With the exception of LDK, that after the death of its unmatched leader, found it impossible to choose its functioning leader, and have frozen the

position of party leader and the decision-making structure in general, all other parties have accepted the supremacy of their respective leaders. In LDK this has also mainly been done due to the inner battle of a few oligarchs not allowing to pass over each other. The main reason from the parties' side for personalistic parties prevailing in Kosovo is the unrivalled decision-making power that parties' leaders have. Such parties derivate personalistic linkages, integrate citizens into the political process through parties due to their leaders. Consequently, the asymmetric relationship determined by personalistic linkages, does not require parties to be responsible and accountable to their followers. The personalistic arrangement in Kosovo offers fewer prospects for democracy consolidation. Moreover, it leads to the personalisation of politics, standing counter to democracy consolidation anticipations. In addition, the prevalence of personalistic linkage is due also to the historical experience of Kosovo society under Tito's authoritarian regime, and the level of social development in terms of the low stage of education. Reliance of voters in party leaders inculcates more authoritarian values than democratic values. For an unconsolidated Kosovo democracy, personalistic linkages are thrusting democracy maturity backwards, sustaining patronage, clientelism, clan and regional bases of party support. Kosovo parties are known for relying profoundly on such support (ICG Europe Report Nr. 163, 26.05.2005). Patronage and clans have their roots in society tradition, while regionalism in historical experience.

An additional negative impact of personalistic linkages on the process of democracy consolidation is the personalisation of politics, considered as a cancer of institutions and the institutional structure of new states and new democracies. Individuals or persons personalising politics exceed the institutions and diminish their breathing space. Such individuals perceive institutions as challenging their unlimited power. Instead of allowing institutions to take the role they are supposed to have, they prevent them, enabling faster and better consolidation of informal institutions than formal ones. Authoritarian individuals consider an institution's empowerment as a direct threat to the absolute power

they enjoy. Personalisation of politics is a norm in Kosovo, above all, parties in Kosovo are fully identified with the names of their leaders. Likewise, the first level of consolidation is challenged – the constitutional consolidation, particularly in polities where such consolidation is mainly carried out and supported by outsiders, as in Kosovo, a democracy in need to be habituated by the elite and then at society level. Personalisation of politics impedes democracy consolidation, as is actually the case in the Kosovo democracy consolidation process. Essentially, the offspring of the personalisation of politics in Kosovo are Kosovo parties, recognised as personalistic parties, generating and upholding authoritarian rather than democratic values.

The third type of party – individual linkages is the clientelist linkage. Such linkage is found in early parties at the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century as the first parties emerged. In modern times, it has taken the form of a modern clientelism widely spread in underdeveloped countries. Elements of clientelism are present even in consolidated democracies, but not as a dominant linkage, but rather as a substituting one. Moreover, the clientelist linkage develops direct accountability. Yet, such accountability is substantially very narrow, covering only the clientele, usually a small part of society. Furthermore, clientelist accountability is not directed to citizens but rather to clients, an important distinction to be made while dealing with democratic accountability. The clientele is integrated through an exchange of political support to parties, or political rights, with the direct reimbursement they receive. In modern times, such a transaction is translated as votes-for-jobs, government contracts, tenders, employment in the public and possibly private sector - in cases where the party leaders have their own businesses, other various direct benefits, or often even cash. The problem with such a direct exchange is that once clients are reimbursed they have no right to speak-out anymore, and lose their political rights. Such individual party linkages produce clients rather than citizens, not matching democratic expectations.

In addition to personalistic linkages, parties in Kosovo are consistently cultivating clientelist linkages (G. Krasniqi 2009, Matoshi 2009, Tahiri 2009). Parties themselves openly recognise that they are developing their clienteles as a reliable structure of support (Buja 2009, Kelmendi 2009, Luma 2009). This is also because the country is not prospering in terms of economic development, and poverty is rising day by day. People have started to get fed up of leaders, as their desperate needs and demands are not being prioritised and brought onto the agenda by parties. The political class is getting richer within a night, as an AKK representative stated<sup>54</sup>. Party leaders have somehow started to lose their influence, compared to their previous position. It should also be mentioned that most Kosovo party leaders are not very convincing charismatic leaders, apparently lacking the adequate education to be leaders. Such behaviour is often proved in their speeches, frequently being confused and not convincing at all. Since such underdevelopment has happened consistently for many years, it is the time factor facing off the real values of party leaders. With time, the importance of party chiefs is declining. Kosovo democracy is experiencing poor economic performance, in this way society starvation is consistently discrediting party leaders. Consequently, it is deleterious to personalistic linkages. Therefore, clientelistic linkages are gradually substituting such linkages. As a reflection of citizens' disappointment with the performance of parties, the majority of them recently are not showing up even at the polling stations. Within such a process, parties are trying to create their clienteles and establish a clientelistic structure, on whose votes they can rely on most. However, a clientelistic linkage has its high cost in economic and particularly political terms, an unhealthy linkage for democracy consolidation. Nonetheless, this does not mean that personalistic or clientelist linkages are not also found in consolidated democracies. The distinction is that in Kosovo, the individual and clientelistic party linkages are dominating the party system.

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<sup>54</sup> Jetullah Aliu, high representative of the Kosovo Agency Against Corruption, interviewed on December 2009.

### **6.2.2. Integration, modernization, and provincial-leader based parties**

The integration function of parties also helps political development, transforming society from a traditional to a modern one, directly linked to the democratization prospects of traditional societies. For new states, with features of a traditional society, political modernisation process is of vital interest, since new institutions lack the necessary legitimacy to function properly. Usually, legitimation takes time. In such cases, most legitimacy relies on the previous institutions people used to identify with. Political parties through the integration function can anchor society to new state institutions, making citizens shift their loyalty from provincial to central state bases. Huntington (1968, 32-39) links such developments with the role of parties as political institutions empowering and developing a modern political system with modern institutions, over waning traditional institutions such as political organisation at the village or provincial level. Political parties link society to the political system in general, creating the loyalties to the system itself in general, not just to the province. Linkages of such type have a direct impact on democracy and democratic consolidation as a process, making society willingly<sup>55</sup> integrated into the political process, enabling the legitimation of democracy itself (our concern in the coming chapter), as a necessary requirement for consolidation.

Based on that, Kosovo political parties are distinguished for their provincialism, largely relying on the regional level for mobilising their supporters, and integrating society based on provincial bases. Kosovo society is a traditional one, with delightful blood relationships, clans, and provincialism. For a long time throughout history, most political activities were organised at tribal level, and later at village and provincial level. There the chief of village was the main authority within the village structure. In addition, most of the people identified mainly with the region. Within such a structure, the clan relationship substituted the regional identification.

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<sup>55</sup> It should be highlighted that in democratic system differing from the former socialist system there is a willingly integration not enforced integration as it was in a totalitarian socialist states.

Now Kosovo is a newly independent state, expected to transform the loyalty from such traditional structures of political organisation to modern state institutions. Yet, political parties in Kosovo remain largely based on their provinces. Excluding the mass movement for independence led by LDK before the war, that had more nationwide character after the war, most parties, including LDK, were and continue to be largely provincial based. LDK has major support in Podujeva and in the Pristina region in general. Since the death of Rugova, LDK has started to lose influence in some regions, limiting itself around the capital city and the region of Llap (Ismet Beqiri 2010). It also provided the way to widen and deepen the influence of AAK in Dukagjini, and to extend the number of municipalities it won in Dukagjini in the 2007 elections. The LDK leader himself came from Dukagjini, and his death made many from this region alter their loyalty to another Dukagjini leader, the respective AAK leader. On the other side, PDK is mostly based and identified with its bastion of support in the Drenica region, and recently in some other parts of Kosovo, due to clientelist developments while being in power (Buja 2009, Stavileci 2010). AAK is vastly provincially spread in the Dukagjini region where its leader comes from (Luma 2010, Ramadani 2010). AKR is based in Gollak and the surrounding area, because its leader is from the same region (Kelmendi 2009, Hajzeraj 2009). LDD relies mainly on Kamenica and Gjilan – as its leader comes from Anamorava. It is important to say that this relationship is due also to the origin of the party leaders. In this case, there appears a mix up of personalistic and provincial features of parties. Parties identified with provincialism, started to break such boundaries looking for support in other parts of Kosovo as well, because sole reliance on regional support is not considered sufficient. As a substitution, parties are trying to expand their clientelist structure as a mechanism to penetrate into other parts as well. Thus, it can be concluded that gradually provincialism also, despite personalistic linkages, is opening the way to clientelism as the major structured anchor of society in the political process.

Such provincialism offers difficulties in the state-building process that Kosovo is currently undergoing, consequently affecting the democratisation process itself. Therefore, parties in Kosovo are to some extent integrating society based on regions, more at a regional level rather than making society feel part of the political process at the national level. Further, parties are cultivating regional rather than modern national identities and state national institutions, essential for democracy consolidation.

### **6.2.3. Movement of party elites from one party to another**

The party elite are considered the closest circle in the party organisational structure. Usually, people at the top of the party are those considered loyal to the party. In programmatic parties those more loyal to the ideology of the party are at the top. Yet, in personalistic parties those at the top are usually the more trusted to the leader, since party organs are usually meant to be the technical support to the party leader.




Fig. 2. The formal structure of political parties in Kosovo




Fig. 3. The actual structure of political parties in Kosovo

Since the closest linked with the party are supposed to be the party elites, their loyalty to the party is an indicator of the performance of the party integration function. Party elites widely known to be unstable and not loyal to the party, illustrates the thinness of anchoring the individuals to Kosovo parties, as holders of high positions in parties keep shifting, from one party to another. This is an indicator for a low level of social integration through political parties. If people at the top of the party hierarchy are not well integrated within the party, keep shifting from one party to another, how integrated are party members at lower structures, or even supporters and voters from the outer circles of the party structure (Fig. 2)?

Among Kosovo parties, the movement of party elites from one party to another is a frequent thing. In relation to that, there are three types of elite movements from one party to another. Firstly, shifting as a group to form other parties; secondly, the departure of individuals to establish their own parties, and thirdly, a recent one, is the movement of individuals or groups from a party to other parties on a provincial basis or on individual arrangements for individual direct profits.

The first type of elite movement was more common previous, during, or immediately after the war 1998-99, as a clash between two concepts on the way the resistance against Serbia should take place. Many left LDK, unhappy with its peaceful way to independence, and joined KLA or even formed new parties such as LBSH, LBD, PBD, PDK, AAK, and so on. There are suggestions that some members of the PDK elite, having more leftist values, due to inner divisions are expected to later join Socialist Party of Kosovo (small party), currently transformed from LPK or possibly any other(see chap. 4). This is not likely to happen as long as they are in power and have a good opportunity to systemise them in a different governing position. The problem might arise when they have nothing to share, once out of power.

The second type of elite movement is a characteristic of the Kosovo party system after the war up to the November 2007 election as the electoral threshold of 5% was put in place. Some individuals, unhappy with the inner party climate, decided to depart from the parties they belonged to, and establish their own parties. One of the main driving forces behind them was the opportunity to be a leader of a new party. Most of the parties formed from such shifts were usually small parties in terms of membership and votes polled. At the beginning of pluralism they were welcomed, but later when the number of parties in Kosovo raised to more than 50, in a population of approximately two million, the electoral threshold made it tricky for such new parties to emerge. Many calculated it to be better to stay inside a larger party lower in the chairmanship hierarchy, than to establish new parties having no chance to get any parliamentary seat, especially now with the consistent decrease in voter turnout. An illustration of such movement was the departure of Edita Tahiri from LDK in 2004, unhappy with LDK leadership, joined by a few other people, she established ADK. Furthermore, Bujar Bukoshi accused of mismanagement of Funds of Kosovo Albanians, known as “*three percent found*” raised during the peaceful resistance and the war, ran away from LDK and formed PReK in 2002, adding to the Kosovo party system another small party.

The other type of elite movements has broadened recently and is mainly provincial or individual, direct benefit oriented. Such party behaviour is better explained by the individual rational choice approach. Individuals within the party elite calculates his/her private benefits when deciding to shift to another party. Some from the Dukagjini province including MPs form LDK and AKR, as well as the CEO from LDK moved to AAK, the Dukagjini province based party. Their cases are also individual direct profit oriented, since most of them received positions in the AAK Chairmanship hierarchy. Haki Shatri an MP and a member of the LDK chairmanship moved to AAK in 2008 as a member of the Chairmanship also. Shkumbin Demaliaj an MP as well as a Deputy Chairman for party organisational issues at AKR, moved to AAK in 2009 as a member of the

Chairmanship. Blerim Kuçi, nominated as CEO at LDK to lead the reforms within LDK, moved to AAK as Organisational Secretary, in charge of organising the party.

There are other movements of elites from party to party, taking place also as a result of dwindling party members, forcing parties to be more elite-concentrated. The current MPs are attracted to circuit within the parliament from one side to another. In this regard, parties increase the number of parliamentary seats, or enlargement of the number of votes from MPs having a direct link with certain voters – normally at localities level. They can also boost their material support from MPs having successful businesses, as party financing is one of the big challenges for Kosovo parties, as is the case with Blerim Kuçi<sup>56</sup> for instance. Recently, one of the LDD deputy chairman Berim Ramosaj deserted LDD and returned to the party he came from – LDK. There is actually currently no such movement from PDK – the coalition leader, because it offers great possibilities for individuals and personal benefits through capturing the state, facilitated to comfort them while being in power.

Such a movement of elites from a party to another is one of the best indicators of how weakly consolidated the parties are, the low extent to which they have developed their own labels, brands, or symbols sufficient for people to identify themselves with the party, and integrate them into the political process – democracy. The larger the number of citizens integrated into the system, the more likely there would be stability of democracy. If the party elites, constituting the top and most integrated circle within the party, demonstrate a high level of distrust and deficiency in loyalty with their parties, maundering from a party to another, then what is to be expected from members, supporters, or voters constituting the peripheral structure of the party (Fig. 2).

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<sup>56</sup> At the local level three AKR directors of the local government in Prizren moved to PDK.

It should be pointed out, that elite movements of the second and third, and to some extent the first type, are not ideologically driven, but merely personal, individual, and provincial based. Such flow is also straightforward due to no ideological identities and differences existing among parties, and the prevailing leader and provincial determinants, wherever you depart ideologically it is the same.

#### **6.2.4. Electoral volatility**

Party systems with a high level of electoral volatility are prone to instability, generating democracy unsteadiness as well. Electoral volatility is one of the main indicators of the degree of citizens' integration into the political system, anchored by political parties. It illustrates society integration into the political process; in other words, how well parties keep their electorate loyal to them through integration. Electoral volatility is widely defined as the level of voters shift within a party system, from one party to the other, from one election to another. While mathematically the net volatility is calculated as the sum of the percentage of shift of voters of all parties from elections to another, divided by two.

In the Kosovo party system there has been a steady increase in the electoral volatility from the 2001 elections up to the last national elections in 2007 (table 6). It is common for parties to seize members from other parties, and use it as a boosted medial effect, distributing the party IDs publicly at the TV. As an illustration, among others, as daily newspaper Kosova Sot (30.03.2009) reports, an AAK sub-branch in Gjilan moved to PDK branch, and many members of LDD, PDK, and AAK fled to LDK in Viti.

Name of the Party	Election Results in 2001 (Voter Turn out 84.8%)	Election Results in 2004 (Voter Turn out 53.57%)	Election Results in 2007 (Voter Turn out 40.10%)	Percentage of volatility 2001-2004	Percentage of volatility 2004 - 2007
LDK	45.65% (359 851) votes	45.42% (313 437) votes	22.6% (129 410) votes	0.23%	49.6 %
PDK	25.70% (202 622) votes	28.85% (199 112) votes	34.3% (196 207) votes	3.15%	5.45%
AAK	7.83% (61 688) votes	8.39% (57 931) votes	9.6% (54 611) votes	0.56	1.21%
AKR	----- <sup>57</sup>	-----	12.3% (70 165) votes	---	12.3%
LDD	----- <sup>58</sup>	-----	10.0% (57 002) votes	---	10.0%

Table 6. Electoral volatility in the Kosovo party system between 2001 and 2007 elections <sup>59</sup>

As it demonstrates, electoral volatility has increased especially in recent years; while a bit lower from the 2001 to 2004 elections, it jumped in the 2007 elections. Many indicators suggest a further boost of volatility in the near future. The direction of party developments, transforming toward a clientelist structure of organisation, and fierce competition from parties for clients' votes, turns clients into being less trustful and less loyal, available for a shift to whoever pays or rewards them better. Those more capable to reimburse clients are those in power (see chap. 9).

Such a high level of volatility proves the low level of binding citizens into the political process via political parties, implying a poor integration into the political system as well. The failure of parties to perform the integration function produces an unstable party system, setting Kosovo democracy as more vulnerable and

<sup>57</sup> AKR for the first time contested election in 2007.

<sup>58</sup> LDD was inside LDK, it was found in 2007 and for the first time contested 2007 elections.

<sup>59</sup> Based on OSCE mission in Kosovo, [www.osce.org](http://www.osce.org)

democracy consolidation prospects as unpredictable. Moreover, the high level of electoral volatility proves that parties perform poorly in integrating most citizens through symbols actually offered by parties. Parties with undemocratic objectives might appear, and attempt to capture the majority of undecided voters, and change the course of politics in general, firstly limiting and later even banning completely democracy, making Kosovo an officially authoritarian regime. Such a development is very much likely if the current social movement known as “*Vetvendosja*” (“Selfdetermination”) decides to transform into a political party and contest elections. As a movement, it is mainly joined by idealist young men, heavily influenced by leftist literature, supplemented by nationalist symbols, and standing against the presence of the international community in Kosovo. If they are to join politics, they might be fairly successful in terms of the number of votes they are able to achieve. This is attributable to the existing high level of electoral volatility, low electoral turn out, steady increase in poverty, high level of dissatisfaction with the current politics, the populist appeals used, and the fact that no viable alternative from other parties is apparent. *Vetvendosja* is perceived as an alternative, seeing as no other alternative is on the horizon. Moreover, current authoritarian attitudes are consistently decreasing the space for democracy in Kosovo, despite the international community’s persistence on democratic values.

### ***6.3. Orienting citizens toward policy options***

#### **6.3.1. Relation of parties to their social structure**

The second element of integration definition is orienting most citizens in a general way towards policy options - a very important element in the relationship of parties with their social structure, normally performed better by parties of a programmatic type. The parties offering policies to solve the public problems of their followers and citizens in general integrate them directly through addressing their concerns. Ideological orientation of parties makes it easier for citizens to orient themselves on their decisions in pluralist system. Usually, citizens often

lack information needed to decide on the policy options offered. Therefore, it is the job of parties to orient and embrace them into the decision-making process.

*“You ask too much of us. We produce just MPs”*. This is the answer of one of the top party leaders as he was criticised by others that parties should also sell policies as products (ICG Europe Report Nr. 163, 26.05.2005). Such an attitude does not only manifest the dearth of Kosovo parties in terms of policies they offer, but also the parties’ attitudes and values, not being concerned with providing solutions to citizens’ public problems. Likewise, parties do not orient citizens in policy options, since they do not demonstrate awareness of the responsibility to provide policies.

Policy orientation is not greatly expected in personalistic and clientelist models of parties prevailing in Kosovo. However, it does not mean they make no politics or no policies at all, but what is clear is that it does constitute the heart of parties. Leaders and clients take priority over policies. Parties in the Kosovo party system offered merely the policy of independence to citizens. As stated above, such a policy is not valid anymore and currently parties in Kosovo seem incapable in putting forward viable and practical solutions to citizens’ public problems, articulated in policy formats. Since February 2008 with the declaration of independence, parties have to look for other policies through which they can anchor society into politics. Despite the many problems that Kosovo society has, parties do not provide creativity in offering policies to solve these problems, and consequently to integrate citizens into the political process<sup>60</sup>. The chapter on the representation function of parties also confirms the disenchantment of parties to their social structure, merely floating above society with their consistently depleting roots in society.

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60 See party promises at election campaigns 2001, 2004, and 2007 (chap.8). The electoral platforms are more wishful thoughts to attract voters’ attention, rather than real solutions to society’s problems. For example, PDK electoral platform of 2007 election, among others stated “we will make Kosovo a silicon valley” (chap.5).

#### **6.4. Making citizens feel part of the process of collective choice**

Another dimension of integration definition is that parties endow citizens with a feeling of belonging in the process of collective choice. After exploring party models in Kosovo, individual – party linkages, and policy orientation of citizens by parties, it can be asserted that if parties were convincingly successful in these elements of integration, the development of citizens' feeling a part of the collective process of decision-making comes automatically. Yet, the performance of parties on the above-mentioned indicators confirms the opposite. The high level of electoral volatility, low level of voter turnout, personalistic and clientelistic linkages and a low level of policy orientation makes it hard for citizens to have a sense of a feeling of belonging to the collective decision-making process.

Such a feeling is attained through widening the scope of the collective decision-making process, at each level of the party organisational structure, enhancing the possibility of participation as much as possible. Hitherto, actual closed personalistic parties are not expected to afford such *luxury* – according to parties' mentality, to broaden the range of collective choice. For most citizens it makes no sense to perceive themselves part of a collective choice, as long as decisions for almost each and every issue are decided far away from them, inside the closed circles of a few, or by a single person, frequently even outside party institutions. Therefore, the rise and maintenance of citizens' feeling of belonging is not to be expected, given that citizens are ignored and neglected by the major institutions meant to generate and further expand such feelings. Moreover, such party behaviour has a worse impact for new democracies with no tradition of democracy at all. They are unable to deliver democratic values and socialise society with them. Such party behaviour is consistently drying out the party members' enthusiasm, and gradually feeding the indifferent attitudes among them leading to apathy and alienation. Normally, apathy is not considered healthy for new democracies. This attitude is best illustrated by the current rate of voter turnout.

### **6.4.1. Voter turnout**

Voters constitute the last outer circle of the party structure. Despite clients, members, supporters and militants, some voters might be from those undecided as well. If the number of people who go to vote is low, it points out the low level of participation and integration. Low voter turnout has recently also been a concern for consolidated western democracies as well (Dalton 2002). The decline has taken place also in many post-communist countries despite highly enthusiastic participation at the beginning. However, the reasons for low voter turnout in post-communist countries differ from western democracies (Mason 2003/2004). If there is a political monotony and less to be changed in consolidated democracies, the same does not apply for countries with poor performance in the economy, welfare, education, a high level of corruption, a weak rule of law, and so on, as is the case in Kosovo.

Low level turnout among other things is an upshot of disenchantment - citizens are dissatisfied, they feel quite apart from the collective decision-making process and see their vote as meaningless, therefore potential voters find no reason to vote. Voter turnout in Kosovo has been constantly dwindling from 84.8% in 2001 to 53.57% in 2004 and then 40.10% in 2007 (table 7). There is a possibility in coming elections for participation to be even lower. It is an alarming issue for Kosovo democracy, and a frightening signal for democracy consolidation. Nevertheless, the question remains as to whether the electorate are disenchanted only from parties and elections, or from the political process, the political system and regime in general?

The most responsible for such a low turnout are the parties themselves. They are not capable to mobilize the electorate to cast their votes and be part of the collective choice. Parties have closed up their structures for citizens giving priority to clients' concerns. If one counts the number of clients in the Kosovo political system, it becomes clear that they largely dominate the number of voters. This is so also due to the large number of parties in a small country like

Kosovo with approximately<sup>61</sup> little more than 2 million people. In Kosovo, clients go to vote because they benefit directly from it. The rest that do not get anything directly see less reason to do that. Nevertheless, clans and nepotism, coming from society tradition, complement the number of clients into the overall structure of voters.

<i>Election Year</i>	<b>2001</b>	<b>2004</b>	<b>2007</b>
<i>Percentage of voter turnout</i> <sup>62</sup>	84.8%	53.57%	40.10%

Table 7. Voter turnout in Kosovo from 2001 to 2007

It is important to mention the drastic decrease in voter turnout, from enthusiastic participation of 84% in 2000 to 40% in the 2007 election. The recent trends show a further downturn in coming elections. Hence, the low level of citizens' integration by political parties is indicated by citizens' apathy and a large percentage of non-voters, 60% do not even vote and are not a member of any party. Consequently, they do not see and feel themselves as part of the process, and believe less in this process called democracy. The worst problem here is not just the current trend, but lack of signs of any positive change in this regard. Regardless, of the readiness of citizens to participate, parties should offer practical space and opportunity for better integration of society in the political process. Parties are actually finding it difficult to mobilise citizens, at least to vote once in three or four years. Moreover, the complementing institutions of integration such as associations or movements are very poorly organised, and largely manipulated by existing parties. Parties are not only failing to integrate the majority of society into the political process, but are also preventing other institutions, supposed to perform the integration function as well. Hence, parties are not fulfilling their fundamental functions, but also averting others that could otherwise supplement them in such a function.

61 Approximation is a result of the issue that after 1989, no official registration of population has taken place.

62 Based on data taken from OSCE mission in Kosovo.

### **6.5. Conclusion**

After exploring the performance of political parties in Kosovo in the integration function, based on measuring its indicators, it can be concluded that the stumpy level of citizens' integration into the political system is not a promising sign for democracy consolidation. Unlike other regimes, democracy is highly reliant on the willing integration of society into the political process. Otherwise, democracy, without citizens, no longer makes sense. As long as major anchors of society in the political process, political parties, fail to perform the integration function, it further obscures the process of democracy consolidation.

The current type of Kosovo political parties makes them supremely capable in offering citizens only skinny and crude ideas and goals, and not long-term convincing to most of them. The supremacy of party leaders as the main symbols to anchor society in the political process is short-term in nature and not sufficient for integration. Moreover, it does not imply a stable anchoring of democracy expectations. The principal linkages between individuals and parties remain personalistic linkages, with the current trend of Kosovo parties structural development (Fig. 3), actually leaving the way to more clientelistic linkages.. Such linkages generate more authoritarian rather than democratic values. In addition, the traditional institutions such as clans, provinces, and blood relationships, common in Kosovo social structures, are substituting these linkages. Furthermore, the movement of parties' elites, as a top organisation hierarchy, from one party to another, brings to the surface a weak integrated structure of parties. What's more, a high level of electoral volatility with its growing trend deteriorating society integration prospects.

On the other hand, Kosovo parties puzzle citizens as they fall short to orient them on the policy options. It would be unreasonable to expect such orientation to be provided by parties, as long as they continue to have an ideological identity crisis. Their ideological confusion and mishmash is transmitted to major parts of

society, usually those having a lack of necessary information about politics milieu and political decisions.

At the top of such development is the expected development of the feelings among citizens, coming out of their experience with democracy merely through political parties. A low level of integration is less likely to produce the feelings of belonging to the system. Participation is a prerequisite to construct a feeling of belonging. This is also illustrated by the low voter turnout coming out of citizens' disappointment with the performance of parties, and correspondingly democracy in general, reflected by the low level of opportunity that Kosovo political parties offer to citizens to be part of the system.

The integration function pinches directly on the other functions as well, especially the legitimation function that is our concern in the next chapter. In addition, it is directly reflected on the other three levels of the consolidation structure, particularly at the fourth level, the cultural consolidation where citizens are expected to socialise themselves with democracy through being part of the political process, anchored by political parties. The integration level is less promising, since the complimentary institutions of integration are underdeveloped. In this regard, Matoshi (2009) adds that most of these organisations are largely government controlled.

## Chapter 7

### **7.0. Discrediting Democracy - The Legitimation Function of Parties in Kosovo**

#### ***7.1. Introduction***

For every regime capable to function, it should primarily be recognised either willingly by the ruled themselves, as in the case of democracy, or forced as in authoritarian regimes, or of a mixed type in between. It is an outcome of an agreement based on which the system is run. Democracy has no guarantee of legitimacy; on the contrary it is directly reliant on broader legitimacy compared to non-democratic regimes. Moreover, a fundamental requirement for a consolidated democracy is the attainment of legitimacy. In order for democracy to be consolidated, it should first and foremost be perceived as legitimate by citizens. The legitimation is best achieved through transparency and a decision-making process offering the opportunity for citizens to participate in such a process (Rosenau 1973, 50), acknowledged as legitimation through participation.

Democracy consolidation makes no sense if in the hearts and minds of the population democracy is viewed with suspicion, or if the mainstream intermediary ways for citizens to participate in the political system are closed or monopolised by gatekeepers - the ruling elites of parties, or whoever might play that role. Doubt, impedes democracy from giving effect – in terms of citizens benefits, particularly new democracies where citizens do not distinguish the ruling elite from institutions and the regime as a whole (Dalton 2002), people identify the attitudes of leaders with the values of democracy itself.

The performance of the legitimation function, as for every democracy, is also a necessity for the consolidated of democracy in Kosovo, currently characterised by a towering level of personalisation of politics and the scarcity of inner party democracy. As a party function, legitimation has a fundamental and determining effect on the democracy consolidation prospects. Legitimation ensures stability of

democracy since the majority of citizens are convinced by political parties to consider a democratic regime as legitimate and to believe in democracy as well.

Legitimacy as a structure of the political system is a necessary requirement for a regime to function. Different regimes have different structures of legitimacy, but none of them can be sustainable without it. As a concept, legitimacy is one of the basic concepts in political science, widely and variously defined and conceptualised by many scholars. Most of the definitions given deal with the relationship between the rulers and the ruled, illustrating that legitimacy is an open ended dynamic process, imperative for a system to function, always requiring attention, and a liquid phenomenon in need of constant cultivation.

Max Weber (1968) is among the first who gave his conception of legitimacy while speaking about the right of the ruler to issue commands and the obligation of the ruled to obey. Such a relationship according to Weber is principally based on the belief and legality compiling the legitimate order. Yet, his conception has been criticised on many grounds, like equating legitimacy with belief and perception, able to continuously lead to misinterpretation and misconception, measuring legitimacy through public opinion, and so on.

On the other side, legitimacy is also conceptualised as “*the popular acceptance of a governing regime or a system of governance*” (*Encyclopaedia of Governance* 2006). However, this is a very generalised definition and not practical to be operationalised for the measurement of the legitimation function. As a definition, it is very broad and needs more focus. Nonetheless, Rousseau (1762) conceptualizes the ruled - rulers relationship as “anyone who believes himself the master of his fellow men, is...more of a slave ... unless he transforms force into right and obedience into duty - is never strong enough to have his way all the time”. He offers a luminous explanation emphasizing the necessary requirements of popular belief in order to extend authority, omitting the force as a long-term solution to it.

However, the concept of legitimacy is widely considered as a dynamic one, needing constant definition, often on a contextual bases. Another conceptualisation of legitimacy is offered by Alagappa (1995, 15) an all-encompassing and measurable definition useful for our case study. To him “a command-obedience relationship might be defined as legitimate if the political order in which it is rooted is based on shared norms and values, if the government in concern acquired power in conformity with established rules, if that power is exercised within prescribed limits for the promotion of the community’s collective interest, and if the governed have given their consent to the incumbent government”. Such a conceptualisation includes four elements in four dimensions. The normative dimension relies on shared norms and values. The procedural dimension includes the acquisition of power while conforming to the established rules. On the other side, the dimension of performance is identified as the exercising power within the limits for the promotion of collective interests. Then, the last dimension is the resulting consent of the governed to those governing (Alagappa, 24). Such a definition is all encompassing, describing the overall structure and functioning of the system and the regime’s legitimacy, its bases, procedures, performance and the consent.

Norms and values refer to the general basis of a belief system or ideology, determining how things are supposed to be. Values specify the goals to be achieved - what ought to be attained. The normative dimension constitutes the basis and the overall structure of the power relationship in different regimes: authoritarian, totalitarian, or a democratic regime. In the case of democracy, it refers to widely known norms and values of democracy, with a bottom-up structure for the power relationship. Norms and values are in general more abstract in nature.

The procedural dimension made up of the acquisition of power in conformity with the established rules is another main element of the legitimacy structure. This

element includes the procedures to be followed when aiming to achieve the 'what' and 'how' norms and values specified, normally embodied in the constitution and law. It reflects the extent to which shared norms and values are respected, highlighting the degree of legitimacy. Its failure to comply with this, has an impact on the reduction of the acceptance of shared norms and values, lowering the number of those sharing values of democracy and believing in the same general norms, diminishing the legitimacy of the system as such, or even eradicating the democracy legitimacy. If the procedural dimension falls short, it promotes the acquisition of alternative norms and values because of a change of power structure, opening the way for other structures of legitimacy.

Performance of those who govern is another key dimension in the conceptualisation of legitimacy manifested through the exercising of power within the prescribed limits for the promotion of collective interests. It is related more to the output level of government, and has a direct impact on the other elements of legitimacy, especially in new, not yet consolidated, regimes and if bad governance is expected to last longer.

Shared norms and values held by the majority of society, respecting procedures extracted from them, and a good governing performance based on the collective interest, develops and triggers the fourth element of the legitimacy structure known as the consent of the governed, a prerequisite for any system's survival and sustenance.

The position and importance of the elements of legitimacy in the structure of a system's legitimacy vary from regime to regime and from the degree of regime consolidation. They are interrelated and overlap into each other. Yet, the norms and values constitute the basis of the structure of legitimacy, determining the direction of the other three elements, with these elements in turn upholding the structure of legitimacy, which otherwise may endanger and necessitate its change.

The Kosovo political system is still fragile and not yet a consolidated democracy. Relating the actual definition of legitimacy to the case of Kosovo, normally a new regime has legitimacy crises when in search of legitimation - to obtain the consent of the majority of the governed. The whole legitimacy structure, with its included four elements, also applies in the case of Kosovo democracy, but of course as mentioned earlier, the definition of legitimacy often has to be contextualised.

The legitimation function of parties in our study is explored based on Alagappa's definition of legitimacy, because it is considered very practical. Party behaviour is the major part of the legitimation structure, influenced by and influencing the legitimation process. The party behaviour reflects society's attitude towards the regime run by parties on a pluralist basis. The measurement will include inner party democracy and inter party competition, through exploring party organization in terms of: inclusiveness, centralisation, inner institutionalization (Panebianco, 1988) – *systemness*, participation and the decision making process within the party, analysis of programme formulation, analysis of electoral campaign and selectorates (Rahat and Hazan 2001). In addition, policymaking will be considered as an important mechanism dependent on inner party democracy and having a direct impact on citizens' expectations. The data will be collected from party statutes and regulations, qualitative interviews and media reports, etc..

### **7.2. The dilemma of block transition and the legitimacy structure of Kosovo democracy**

The shared norms and values constituting the belief system of democracy in Kosovo are not exclusively or necessarily grown at all from within society. Kosovo belongs to a block transition of former socialist Europe, experiencing what I would call a *dilemma of block transition*. Not all members of the block were in the same trend of development of democratic norms or wider shared values of society, ready to experience transition and directly embrace democracy. The snowball effect of system transformation, confining the region as a block with no

choice but to transform to democracy, has its cost, extending the life of the remnants of high level non-democratic values (among the elite) coloured with democracy. In this regard, Offe (1991) referring to the post – communist transition, points out what he calls the *dilemma of simultaneity*, the problem of experiencing political and economic transition at the same time. Kosovo, despite the dilemma of simultaneity of political and economic transformation, has also experienced at the same time the state and nation building process, a highly emotionally driven transformation able to override the vertical and horizontal development of democratic norms and values. This is further complicated due to the historical experience of Kosovo society, having a lack of democratic tradition, and a long-term socialisation with authoritarian, or to some extent even totalitarian, norms and values. Actually, there are tendencies for an authoritarian governing structure in Kosovo, as further governing competences are transformed from the international community, such tendencies are demonstrated more and more<sup>63</sup>.

Moreover, the advancement of democratic norms and values in Kosovo are also internationally sponsored and supported. Therefore, in order for such norms and values to take effect, it is essential for these to first be inculcated and domesticated into and through the legitimacy structure of the Kosovo political system. If democratic norms and values are to be developed vertically - in terms of quality, and horizontally – in terms of broadness, they have to be taught to society and socialise society with such norms and values. Shared norms and values forming the basis of the belief system, and being highly abstract in nature,

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63 European Broadcasting Union (EBU) send a direct letter to the Kosovo Prime minister accusing him of making the only public television channel of Kosovo (RTK) as a tool of his party and trying to transform it from a public to a state television channel (26.10.2009). In response to that, the Prime minister on 05.11.2009 at the regular government meeting stated that there are journalists, editors, media owners who approach politics, but not politicians themselves (KTV Interaktiv, 23.00, 05.11.2009). It does not mean that the media earlier was free of political interference, but I just cited it as a fresh example. The last report of the EU Commission on the Progress of Kosovo in 2009, has found many weaknesses in terms of democratic governing. Journalists without borders, ranked Kosovo in 2009 amongst the worst in the region in terms of media freedom. Many other examples not listed here, happen on daily basis.

involves the necessity of the other three elements of the legitimacy structure, required to lay the basis of a consolidated democratic regime in Kosovo.

### ***7.3. Political parties as legitimation actors***

Among the most suitable institutions to teach, inculcate and entrench the routine of democratic norms and values in society are political parties. One of their main functions is legitimation – developing, inculcating, domesticating, and habituating democratic norms and values in society. Though, mainly democratic norms and values came out of block transition, parties as the main (amongst other) intermediary institutions, have to adapt and make them acceptable for the majority of society. This is one way parties can legitimise the democratic regime in Kosovo, and further develop horizontally and vertically, the basic element of the legitimacy structure – democratic shared norms and values. Nonetheless, parties should firstly establish such norms and values as routine for themselves, respect decided procedures, govern based on collective interest, and develop the consent of the governed. Subsequently, in this way they improve their capability to teach values across society.

The legitimation function of parties in this case is fulfilled through development and consistent maintenance of elements of the legitimacy structure. Since, in Kosovo, initial development of democratic norms and values was very much triggered by international pressure, their further development and maintenance has to take place from inner institutions, in our case political parties. By its definition, even a highly stable legitimacy structure is a liquid thing in need of consistent maintenance.

The elements of legitimacy are interrelated and overlap into each other. Shared values and norms are dependent on the other three elements, respecting procedures arising from norms and values, performance in terms of achieving objectives set by norms and values – governing to achieve collective rather than narrow, private, clientele, or clan interests, followed by flourishing consent, which in turn means also further development of the shared norms and values. In

a cyclical way, political parties may legitimise a democratic regime in Kosovo and as a result, offer better prospects for Kosovo democracy to be consolidated.

Political parties also legitimise the second element of legitimacy, which are the procedures, in our case democratic procedures. Parties are very fertile ground for society to be socialised with democratic procedures. Developing and respecting such procedures within the party structure, widening the participation of decision making within the party structure, offers citizens the chance to learn and familiarise themselves with democratic procedures. The higher the participation opportunities, the higher the chances of developing and respecting democratic procedures, which constitutes the second element of the legitimacy structure.

One of the best ways of measuring the development and respect of democratic procedures, is by looking at the level of inner party democracy, relying also on the procedure of candidate selection. Therefore, we will enter into the intra party organisation – exploring the extent to which it is institutionalised, decision-making within the party – where the decision-making power within a party lies, and so on. In addition, party competition affects the procedures and extent to which they are followed.

#### ***7.4. Neither members nor voters, rather clients - inner party democracy***

Not all theorists of democracy and political parties agree with the necessity of party inner-democracy. Some refute the importance of party inner-democracy as needless, inefficient, and an obstacle to protecting the interests of the voters, narrowing it just to party members (Schumpeter 1942, Downs 1957, ...). In the case of Kosovo, party leaders may see the shortage of such inner-democracy for models of parties in Kosovo as a very easy way for them to function freely and be left undisturbed. In such circumstances they would be free to pursue what they as individuals deemed important, take whatever decisions they want, make coalitions on their own, govern and use public resources without any constraints,

and so on. The claim that, inter party competition for voters is a sufficient constraint for parties to protect citizens' interests (Schumpeter 1942), is for the case of Kosovo not feasible. Usually, it applies for societies with a large percentage of citizens ready and able to participate. At present in the Kosovo party system, each party tries to establish its own clientele, and finance it through public resources. It pushes parties into primarily competing for clients as reliable voters. Their strive for clients, structures the competition not based on programmes and platforms, as Schumpeter asserts, through which citizens would benefit, but rather parties struggle to extend the number of clients - as more reliable and less demanding on parties than the general public. Parties simply reimburse using public budget, contracts, and other illegal means. As an illustration, an EU Commission Report (2009) on the Progress of Kosovo towards the EU, criticised public procurement, for a tremendous misuse of public funds, public contracts, tenders, and so on. It is here, where most of the reimbursement for the clienteles of parties in power takes place. Parties find it less costly, according to their logic, to compete for clients rather than citizens' votes, in particular with a substantive increase of voters' rationality, manifested in the voter turnout rate declining continuously. With poor policy on offer, it is not easy to attract unreliable voters. The clientele, as long as they are reimbursed, are more loyal, and do not require policy solutions. Usually, parties more prepared to pay back clients are these in power. It is affordable for them, as they use government resources, such as public sector jobs, contracts, and so on. Such an arrangement in turn implies exploitation of the state by parties. On the other hand, competition for clients brings direct benefit, but only to a part of society, on particularistic interests' arrangements, and not to citizens and society as a whole.

Therefore, inter party competition, as a replacement to party inner-democracy, is not adequate or workable in the case of the Kosovo party system. Such a mechanism is not sufficient to fulfil the democratic criteria, even a minimalist one, as offered by Schumpeter, Downs, and other minimalists alike. Schumpeter's theory is not applicable in a new state, with a not yet consolidated democracy,

poor economic performance, and young fragile institutions. Inner party democracy is essential for development and ensuring democratic procedures, appearing from democratic norms and values. In this regard parties are expected to socialise society with democracy, through adapting democratic norms and values primarily within themselves and then spreading them widely within and among society.

As mentioned earlier, democracy in Kosovo has yet to be widely taught among society. Parties can afford that, through deliberation by using inner democracy as a mechanism. Such deliberation helps in socialising society with democratic norms, values, and procedures, generating and developing the legitimacy structure within Kosovo democracy, and serving the other levels of consolidation, especially cultural consolidation, according to Merkel's model of consolidation. Democratic values and norms at the level of inner party structure are brought along to governing institutions once the party is, in one way or another, in power. Moreover, they also distribute such norms and values even while out of power, in the course of their organisational structure and political activity. The same goes with non-democratic values, if applied at the inner party structure.

In this regard, Teorrel (1999) emphasizes the crucial role of parties through opened channels of communication within the party structure, putting into effect deliberation from civil society to public office. On the other side, Lawson (1988) defines parties in terms of their role in deliberation as “ *the agencies that can claim to have as its raison d'être the creation of entire linkage chain, a chain of connections that run from the voters through the candidates and the electoral process to the officials of the government*” (Teorrel 1999, 373). Likewise, inner party democracy is a necessary requirement for the growth and expansion of the legitimacy structure, especially at the procedural dimension, but also upholding the collective interests to attain the wide consensus.

As stated in the introduction of the chapter, the measurement of the legitimation function of parties, among others, is based on the level of inner party democracy of Kosovo political parties. In this case, the conception of inner party democracy offered by Scarrow (2005, 7) is used, comprised of three elements: *inclusiveness, centralisation, and institutionalisation*. Inclusiveness is defined as the breadth of the cycle of the party decision maker(s). The centralisation is conceptualised as the extent to which decisions are made by a single group or decision-making body. The third element is Institutionalisation, based on Panebianco's conception – *systemness*.

#### **7.4.1. Inclusiveness**

Inclusiveness is one of the main indicators of democracy, not just at the level within parties. The level of democracy can be measured through inclusiveness, the higher the level of inclusiveness in decision making, the higher the level of democracy. The larger the percentage of people included on issues decided, the greater the chances for better and wider protection of the interests of the people. Contrary to this, the fewer number of people taking part in decision making, the less democratic the decisions taken. However, the distinction between inclusiveness in a totalitarian and democratic regime should be pointed out. The former is organised in a monist way, not upraised from the will of the people. Such inclusiveness takes place mostly on following and implementation, rather than on decision-making. The citizens are integrated just as followers, but not as decision-makers. In other words it is an inclusiveness without contestation, as van Biezen (2003, 20) calls it, the inclusive hegemony. The latter, on the other side, in a democratic regime it is known as inclusiveness through contestation, embracing citizens as decision makers. The same applies in the case of parties, regarding decisions within party structures, from inside the framework of representative democracy, up to inclusiveness from the perspective of participatory democracy. Hereby, the measurement of inclusiveness is for decisions taken within the levels of the party structure. Through the element of inclusiveness the level of inner party democracy necessary for parties to perform

their legitimation function is measured, highlighting the consequences for facilitating the development of prospects for consolidation of democracy.

The model of parties in Kosovo offers little space for inclusiveness in the decision-making process. As concluded in a previous chapter (chap. 6) the Kosovo party system is dominated by the model of personalistic parties. Such parties are characterised by authoritarian values, whereby decisions are taken by one or few. The term *personalistic parties* itself implies the opposite to a possibility of inclusiveness, and one of the reasons for such a conceptualisation, is the narrow scope of participation in decision making. Personalistic comes from the word person, meaning a personality is the main attribute that the party is identified with. Moreover, such a type of party has its own model of organisation structured relying on a personalistic basis. The organisation structure of personalistic parties is principally an extension of the hand of the party leader/s, or it can be said it is just a technical support of the party leadership. Party organs, after the leader, are not there to take political decisions, but just to implement the leader's wishes transformed into his decisions. Matoshi (2009) is of the opinion that party leaders in Kosovo have unchallengeable and absolute power. Furthermore, G. Krasniqi (2009) believes that leaders of Kosovo parties are everything within their own parties. Nevertheless, Selaci (2010) in this regard, points to the parties' leaders as the main obstacle to the development of inner party democracy. Tahiri (2009) shares this perception. According to him Kosovo parties are led totally by their leaders and their mechanisms on their possessions. On the other hand, a Kosovo sociologist, Zhinipotoku (2009) softens the view of the solitary iron hand of party leaders, attributing the ownership of the party to oligarchs, not only to the single leader.

Nonetheless, it should be highlighted that Kosovo parties are featured with two faces. The first one is the formal face, spelt out in party documents such as statutes, in party declarations, as well as interviews with the elite of the parties. The formal model is mainly based on democratic values, with a few exceptions

such as the role of party leader in statutes of AAK and AKR. In general, it takes as a model of reference, parties in consolidated democracies. All party organs and their specified power are spelt out in the statute. The party congress is the most powerful authority, followed by the directing council, then the party chairmanship as executive body. Aside from these bodies, parties specify the party leader as a powerful organ. Moreover, parties always proclaim in public that they base their activities on, and always follow strictly, the written rules.

However, in practice this does not constitute the real face of parties in Kosovo. Most party statutes are simply copied from each other, or from statutes of several parties abroad. In other words, they are not meant to organise, regulate, and constrain the inner decision-making power of parties. The application of other statutes built to construct the structure and functioning of parties or organisation operating in other political and socio-economic environments, implies using documents not matching the actual party organisation structure, objectives, interests, priorities, and overall functioning. To Kosovo parties it is common not to respect their statutes, normatively considered as the highest legal and political act within the parties. In reality, parties do not function as statutes and other party documents specify. Moreover, some parties even in their statutes have dispositions that stand in contradiction with the current laws in power. For example, according to Regulation 01/2008 the parties are obliged to hold party congresses every 36 months (Art. 11). Yet, LDK on its statute (Art. 19) specify that a party congress be convened every four years.

The party leaders, except in the case of LDK party leaders (since the death of Rugova), and to some extent PDK as well (due to factions within it), are the absolute powerful and unchallengeable leaders. They are most of time chosen without opposition candidates, or rarely there might be a superficial challenge by an opposing candidate for cosmetic purposes. In the case of PDK, at both first party congresses there was a counter candidate. Pluerat Sejdiu was one of them, known to be incomparable to the actual leader Hashim Thaqi, unable to pose any

possible challenge to him. In the last congress, Thaqi was elected without a single counter candidate (Buja 2009). On the other side, at the last LDK congress, which resulted in the party being split into LDK and LDD, the party leader position was contested with highly comparable candidates challenging each other, though the scene was to end up with delegates beating each other with chairs. In other parties so far, it has never happened that the position of the party leader even formally to be challenged by anyone. The other institutions inside the parties might sometimes be consulted, but they do not count towards the ultimate decision making bodies, though party documents prescribe it (the within-party power structure to be discussed in the institutionalisation dimension).

The breadth of scope of inclusiveness of party organs is written in party statutes and regulations. It is mostly respected, since it is to do more with numbers rather than the real power to take decisions on their own. This disposition of the statute is to a large extent respected by leaders, since it does not threaten the position and power they enjoy. Likewise, the inclusiveness of party organs is specified in party statutes. If such institutions within the party have the power they are formally entitled to, as statutes specify the level of inclusiveness of party organs, that would constitute a high level of inner party democracy. Nonetheless, the level of inclusiveness in party organs in this case, does not manifest a high level of inner party democracy, because it is more related to a quantitative rather than qualitative inclusiveness, and such organs have no real decision-making power. The absolute power still relies in the hands of party leaders. Therefore, such a decision-making structure within parties damages the level of inner party democracy. The level of inclusiveness for the bodies possessing the real power to take decisions is very small, mostly counting only one - the party leader. In other words, it can be concluded that inner party democracy formally exists as written on paper, yet in reality, it is barely found. It is purely an authoritarian way of party organisation and functioning.

Such a dualism of faces featuring in Kosovo parties is a compromise of two forces making their way through. On the one hand, there is a regional trend of democratisation, coupled with European integration – largely bringing forward democratisation. The values promoted and uplifted by this force are spelt out in written party documents, theoretically meant to set up the type of party structures and ways of functioning. Yet, on the other hand, at present, the absolute and unchallengeable powers of party leaders believing and behaving based on authoritarian values, have established parties of a personalistic type, having a shortage of inner party democracy, and in general being structured and functioning in contradiction to what their documents normatively specify.

The low level of inclusiveness within Kosovo parties is mentioned also by the ICG Report (September 2008), illustrating the large discrepancy between what is declared and what really takes place in parties, describing the decision-making by actual governing parties as: “*centralisation of decision making in a very narrow circle around the prime minister... . The government has trumpeted transparency as a virtue, but its decision-making is opaque*”. Furthermore, after the 2004 elections, one of the PDK chairmanship members declared regarding the distribution of government positions after the elections, that the party leader will decide on that (Kosova Sot 24.09.2004). The issue of *leaderism* as a social value, available and powerful everywhere, even among the NGOs, seems to have its roots in the culture of Kosovo society.

To illustrate the level of inclusiveness and the dual faces of identity of Kosovo parties, the level of inclusiveness is measured through the *selectorate* – the candidate selection body of parties. The measurement relies on the model of selectorate measurement given by Rahat and Hazan (2001).

### ***Candidate selection***

The model developed by Rahat and Hazan (2001) to evaluate the level of inclusiveness in the body that selects the party candidates is very practical to

measure the inclusiveness within a party, as a direct indicator of the inner party democracy. Candidate selection within the party is among the core sensitive issues in the decision making process within the party. It has a significant effect on the party role in the governing function, in parliament and in government. Therefore, it is considered as a vital decision of parties, having direct consequences at the governing level, inner party democracy, as well as society wide. In the case of Kosovo, as mentioned above, parties have two faces, the formal one and the real one. Hence, both contradictory features are presented, the formal one, as it is regulated by the statutes and regulations, and the real one mirroring the actual party structure and functioning. Referring to the statutes of parties in Kosovo, the selectorate is a party agency, or a body known as the Directing Council of parties (party statutes). The directing council is formally empowered to approve the list of candidates. It is noteworthy that party representatives interviewed affirmed that the lists of candidates is also decided by the chairmanship (Kelmendi from AKR, Buja from PDK, Beqiri from LDK). The AAK secretary general Burim Ramadani goes even further, placing the chairmanship as the highest decision-making body in the party, in charge of deciding the candidates' list, although formally it stands counter to what is written in the party statute.

Nevertheless, the real selectorate in Kosovo parties are party leaders, or selected party leaders. Matoshi (2009) believes that the party leader is the ultimate decision-maker, with his intelligence service comprised of his closest circle helping him in decision-making. His closest circle might include starting from family up to members of the clan. It is important to point out that the election of leaders is mostly without counter candidates, using acclamation as a voting mechanism, which in cases of an incomparable power relationship within a party structure, is often not the expression of the will of those who vote. Moreover, the selectorate in Kosovo parties goes even further in the exclusiveness scale, coming close to non-selected leaders. The model itself does not include other possible bodies outside the party structure that might have a heavy influence or

even sometimes embody the selectorate itself. It often happens that candidates' lists are drawn in the hushed, dark, cafeterias, entirely outside party offices and structures. The list might be brought to the directing councils to be formally legalised, but rarely, or ever, a name that the leaders want to be on the list removed by the directing council. One of the party members<sup>64</sup> was thrown off a list, a night after it was formally approved, as the list was altered outside of the party he used to belong, from someone who never became known to him. This is another example of powerful informal bodies playing the role of selectorate. It should be added that other party organs could exercise their formal rights on the candidate selection process, as long as they do not act in contradiction with the interest and objectives of the party leader.




Fig.4 Formal level of inclusiveness




Fig. 5 Actual level of inclusiveness

The figures illustrate the low level of inclusiveness in party decision-making organs, holding back inner party democracy development. As a party attitude and

<sup>64</sup> Due to security reasons he was declared just on conditions of anonymity.

behaviour, and as a way Kosovo parties are organised, it does not offer sufficient opportunity for participation to be labelled as democratic. They possess an extremely closed structure of decision making, producing decisions largely and primarily taking into account the interests of the small circle of decision makers. Likewise, parties with closed doors for citizens, generate distrust from citizens initially towards parties and consequently towards democracy itself, straining the democracy consolidation process. In such a case, democracy legitimation can hardly be expected, as long as parties continue to be closer to a model of authoritarian rather than democratic decision making. Parties generate and spread authoritarian rather than democratic values, primarily at the organisation level, but also at the level of society and governing since candidates chosen by such a type of selectorate, should be elected to take governing power. Most of the candidates selected, must in one way or another be loyal and have servile attitudes to the leader, they in turn empower him and enroot further the authoritarian values and norms, contrary to democratic ones, as required in the legitimacy structure. Since parties are expected to inculcate democratic values in Kosovo through socialising citizens with practices of such values and behaviour, the high level of exclusiveness provides no opportunity or hopes for democratic socialisation. Kosovo parties so far have not proved to be the fertile ground for development and the inculcation of democratic values in society. This is an indication of the legitimation function not being performed, because parties do not generate and spread democratic norms and values, on the contrary, through their practices they do just the opposite, cultivating authoritarian values within themselves, and providing awful examples to identify with democracy. It leads to citizens creating their perceptions about democracy based on the undemocratic behaviour of parties. Kosovo democracy needs to deepen its democratic norms and values horizontally in terms of numbers, and vertically in terms of quality. The democratic transition in Kosovo did not develop entirely from within society. It was largely internationally driven and supported. Therefore, democracy consolidation in Kosovo requires the development of democratic norms and values, expected to take place mainly through party behaviour. The closed

structure of Kosovo parties means there is no capability to produce and expand democratic behaviour. The squat level of inclusiveness implies less opportunity for citizens for participation in decision making, and even less prospect that decisions will take into account their interests. Consequently, citizens have less reason to trust in parties, because their behaviour is not in accordance with citizens' interests, as democratic norms and values require, which in turn means less people are integrated into the political process, less people trust the system, there is less legitimacy for democracy, and more unpredictable democracy consolidation developments. On the other side, such a legitimacy structure is expected to be grown up and developed by political parties through performing their legitimization function.

The failure of parties to respect the democratic procedures within themselves has an impact on the structure of legitimacy. The impertinence of democratic procedures within political parties themselves affects the first element of the legitimacy structure, avoiding the inculcation of democratic norms and values within parties, to be spread broadly among society. Furthermore, it impacts on the general performance that is a result of the *closed small rooms* decisions. Lastly, the overall structure of legitimacy is vulnerable, as the dimension of consent shrinks due to the failure of the other three elements of the legitimacy structure.

Referring to Merkel's model of democracy consolidation on which the study is based, the low performance of parties in the legitimization function has an impact on the other three levels of consolidation. It impedes functioning of constitutional consolidation, and *verhaeltnisse* consolidation, further empowering individuals, instead of institutions. Lastly, civic consolidation is less likely and has less opportunity due to the exclusiveness of party behaviour, standing contrary to norms and values normatively expected to be developed and inculcated into society by political parties.

### 7.4.2. Centralisation

Centralisation is another dimension of inner party democracy indicating the willingness and readiness of parties to legitimise democratic norms and values. The lower the level of centralisation, the closer the decision making would be to citizens, or party members in the case of parties. The level of centralisation is measured by looking at the power party organs have under both the vertical and horizontal hierarchy. The more decentralised power is to party branches and sub-branches, the nearer party members are to the decision making. Among the issues that party organs at horizontal hierarchy are supposed to have the power to decide on, are the selection of candidates, policy issues, coalitions at a local level of government, and so on, depending on the level of decentralised power.

Obviously, decentralisation of power to organs of parties has its costs, and would not ensure inner democracy if it does not reach at least party members. Often, some sort of power is decentralised to one level, but becomes congested there and can go no further. A branch might centralise such power on its own and avoid such empowerment to continue to have an effect at sub-branches for example. However, there is no doubt that centralisation stands contrary to inner party democracy, but also with decentralisation, in order to ensure the inner democracy of the entire party structure, it should be implemented with caution, not allowing any other possible types of centralisation to be developed along the way. In other words, decentralisation should be introduced to citizens as the last circle of the party organisation structure, and not come before this, at branch or sub-branch level, setting up just another oligarchy at another level of party structure. By definition, centralisation of power pushes autocrats to take whatever decisions and follow whatever course of politics perceived by them as boosting their power, be it even at the great expense of citizens.

Kosovo political parties have their horizontal structure based on a territorial basis, organised in the centre, branches, sub –branches, and some of them have also the active as the first cell of party structure. Parties' statutes spell out such a

formal organisational structure, resembling an organisational structure of mass-supported parties. LDK, LDD, and AAK (if necessary) have the actives at the first political cell of organisation, followed by sub-branches mainly organised at village, district or city level. Through delegation procedures, on a communal administrative basis, are organised branches, which through delegation at the central party congress, they choose organs of the party centre. Different from other parties, PDK calls the first cell of organisation a section, and AKR does not have activities but goes directly to sub-branches, then branches and then the centre. This constitutes the formal structure of parties in Kosovo. Yet, the question now arises as to what power these levels of party organisation have? What type of decisions and for what can they decide? What is their relationship to the centre?

As mentioned earlier Kosovo parties are widely known for their dual faces of identity, which is extended also to the organisational structure. There is a huge gap between how they are supposed to function and how they actually function. The candidate selection procedure in all Kosovo parties is centralised. Branches and sub-branches may propose, but in the end it is the party selected body that decides on candidate lists, which is also true for local elections (Parties' Statutes). In this regard, AAK goes even further, as the list should first go to the party leader, then he proposes it to the directing council of the party (AAK statute, Art. 18). In this case, the tendency for centralisation is even formalised, since a formal centralised filter is set up to scan the proposed list from the lower levels.

Looking at the political parties in Kosovo in practical terms, and how they actually function, they are organised in a very personalistic way, with authoritarian models of inner decision-making. Party leaders have absolute power within the party with a mostly centralised system of decision-making. Even the power that branches and sub-branches have is always shakeable due to the absolute power of party leaders. They can interfere at any time, for anything important according to their views. For instance, Rugova (2010) talking about such relationships and the

inner decision-making of the party he belongs to – LDD, confirms the uncontested power of Nexhat Daci, the LDD leader, on making a coalition with AKR in the local elections of 2009, , deciding terms largely on his own without even consulting the party organs. The same happened in AKR, the decision was imposed unilaterally to most of the branches that were part of the coalition.

Referring to party statutes, the branches and sub-branches elect their leadership structure. However, in practice it does not mean that the party leaders cannot override such a decision. On the other hand, in the case of sub-branches, the branch elite often override decisions of sub-branches. The behaviour of personalistic parties with a centralised decision-making system, makes party members at the lower end of the hierarchy feel less important, discouraging them from political activity, shaking the legitimacy of party decisions in the eyes of party members, and also reflecting an impression of lowly legitimated political activity by parties also at the governing level. With time, such scepticism might in turn be shifted to democratic institutions as well. Besides, centralisation by definition implies a concentration of power to a few people, meaning less power to the lower party structure, and even less to party members. Such a power relationship within a party makes party members initially feel not worthy of being a part of the party at the and later on of the democracy process in general.

In addition, centralisation limits the ability of parties to function properly, because the number of people dealing with issues being handled by parties is very small compared to required duties, leading to a scarcity of resources. A centralised way of organising political life, according to system theories, is meant to fail, as was the case with the former socialist system distinguished by a high level of centralisation. It is incompatible with the availability of resources to control, plan, and make decisions for everything. What makes centralisation even more ineffective in our case is that it reflects an attitude and behaviour that runs counter to democratic values and norms. The way of inner party organisation stands contrary to the expectations of a consolidated democracy. The socialist system failed due to oversized demands for resources from the central office, but

the whole system was functioning in that way for a certain period of time until it collapsed, and no alternative way of functioning within the system, that could delegitimise the centralised system was viable. Yet, the current parties' practices run counter to democracy, regionally considered as a *Zeit Geist*. Therefore, an authoritarian and centralised manner of functioning for political parties in Kosovo have constraints outside parties, making them reluctant to open up, forcing parties to instead close up further, as the only way to prevent the inner-unchallenged absolute power of their leaders.

The authoritarian attitude and behaviour of parties disassociates citizens from the process, causing the disenchantment of citizens from democracy itself, and consequently in this manner, delegitimises democracy as a whole in the Kosovo political system. Thus, instead of parties presenting democracy through democratic behaviour and attitudes, they generate, stand for, and legitimise the authoritarian values and system.

It should be pointed out that democracy is a process that is teachable to citizens, particularly in our case with international monitoring. The question then, is what do Kosovo parties teach citizens, democratic or authoritarian values? From their practice, the answer is obviously a negative one. Hence, political parties in Kosovo thwart consolidation of democracy as long as they inculcate and cultivate authoritarian and not democratic values.

Party leaders, uncompromisingly trying to preserve their absolute power within the party, do not take into consideration the possibility of losing votes because of such party behaviour. Therefore, they have to look for other means to win elections through clienteles, clans, or other province based mobilisation of voters. All these may harm democracy prospects, because Kosovo democracy instead of producing citizens and citizens' attitudes and behaviours that feed democracy, they produce instead clients and subordinates to the ruling authoritarians in the electoral democracy. This is among the reasons for the development of corruption and the misuse of public resources for private particularistic ends,

because authoritarians have to reimburse directly those endorsing votes to them.

In other words, they do not use legitimate ways to obtain and exercise power but other informal means, because in this way they might still preserve their absolute power within the parties. Otherwise, if they wish to get power through democratic channels, they have to modify their behaviour, attitudes, and values, meaning they have to decentralise power and reform parties, among other things. However, leaders of Kosovo parties are not yet ready or even interested to do that (Matoshi 2009, G. Krasniqi 2009, Selaci 2010, Tahiri 2009, Maliqi 2009). Likewise, they prevent democracy consolidation, and perceive it as a direct threat to their uncontested power. Their personal interests might be threatened, as they have to compromise their absolute power with democratic norms and values currently incompatible with such a power relationship.

On the other side, van Biezen (2000) while talking about the power of the central party office argues that power in new democracies is in the hands of the central office of the party and those in public office. Along these lines, it facilitates the preservation of the party's cohesion, in the face of a low level of public support and a small number of party members. However, that seems an effort to make the way even when devoid of citizens (voters) that normally constitutes the depth of democracy. In other words, it means taking drugs not to feel the disease, though not to cure it. If citizens are ignored, it impacts the political process, leading to politics without citizens, broadly considered as unhealthy for democracy. Moreover, if that persists for a considerable period, citizens might be pushed to look for other possible alternatives to participation in the decision-making process, including even undemocratic alternatives, since democratic ways happen to be monopolised by absolute power holders, the party oligarchs. It might be arguable that due to the presence of international actors in Kosovo, the contestation in elections, as a democratic institution, might still be preserved, in spite of many irregularities and manipulations noticed in the election process in Kosovo, as was the case with the 2007 and recent 2009 local elections. The

election committee for appeals proposed the election be repeated in almost 10% of municipalities due to the high level of irregularities. Yet, it does not mean that no other manipulations of the election were present elsewhere. Parties are now considering the possibility of sending physically trained election commissioners due to the need to use force, especially at night and in the evening when dark, mainly with blackouts that are common in Kosovo offering space to veil any fraud. Such practice by parties is principally a result of the prisoners' dilemma. The international election observers, concerned more with short term stability, close their eyes in front of such undemocratic behaviour. The election fraud blemishes possible fair contestation, avoids meaningful participation in decision making, and can be used as a justified reason for taking into account other, even non democratic, ways to come to power. Such a process means the killing of democracy itself; it is senseless to talk about consolidation prospects. Parties should be worried about their lost supporters and citizens, and find ways to bring them back. Authoritarian measures even trigger people to move away from the political process, bringing along the question of whom and what are parties standing for? Are they a means of democracy, are they serving democracy or a few party leaders with their clans, are they cultivating non-democratic values challenging the very being of democracy itself?

Moreover, such party behaviour and attitudes carries forward the personalisation of politics, perceived as harmful for a democratic system, not yet consolidated and having fragile institutions. Kosovo democracy has weak and not yet consolidated democratic institutions. Constitutional consolidation is still at the formal level of development, not fully set into place in terms of implementation. The distrust of leaders and associated persons, persisting for too long, turns into distrust of democratic institutions and democracy as a whole.

To sum up, Kosovo parties have a very centralised and often disordered and inconsistent structure, implying bad prospects for the ability of parties to legitimise democratic norms and values, since within themselves they primarily do not respect democratic procedures that stand counter to their centralisation

behaviours and attitudes. Consequently, parties offer less than expected in terms of legitimising democracy in general and in the process of consolidation. Such a high level of centralised procedures within parties is incompatible with democratic norms and values, making parties incapable to inculcate democracy into society, as legitimisation of democracy requires, to make it trusted in the hearts and minds of citizens, as democracy consolidation requires.

### **7.4.3. Institutionalisation**

Party institutionalisation is another element of inner party democracy, conceptualised differently by various authors, depending on their focuses on political parties. Mainwaring & Scully (1995) deal with party system institutionalisation, Panebianco (1988) focuses on inner party organisation, while Janda (1980) highlights the outer party institutionalisation. Among the first to deal with the concept of party institutionalisation was Huntington (1968), putting across inner and outer party institutionalisation. However, the concept of party institutionalisation is vague and has no clear-cut one dimensional meaning. Since in our case the concern is inner party democracy, the Panebianco's (1988) concept is applied to find out the level of inner party institutionalisation, or *systemness* as he calls it. The power relationship among the inner party institutions has a direct impact on the level of inner party democracy. The *systemness* is conceptualised as the extent to which within-party institutions perceive each other as interrelated and unable to override each other's decisions.

The fact that Kosovo parties are highly personalistic impinges consistently on everything related to them. Their identity is developed and sustained around such interests, values, norms, attitudes, and behaviours. Personalistic identity of parties automatically implies an imbalanced power relationship among a party's inner institutions, not considering themselves as interrelated. The absolute power within a party is largely vested in the party leader or leaders. In the case of institutionalisation, the dual faces of Kosovo parties, the formal and the real one, should be recalled back. The formal organisational structure is specified in the

parties' statutes, whereby the inner power structure of parties is defined. Hereby, AAK, AKR, and LDD to some extent, even on their own status point out the asymmetrical relationship of party organs, empowering party leaders compared to other party organs. In practice, they actually have uncontested power, though party documents formally provide otherwise (Statutes of three other parties).

According to what is written in the parties' statutes (AAK Statute Art. 13; PDK Statute Art. 13; LDK Statute Art. 17; LDD Statute Art. 17; AKR Statute Art. 11) the party congress is considered the highest authority of a party. The organ represents the horizontal structure of the party, elects the party bodies, and holds accountable all other institutions within the party. From a representative democracy point of view, it reflects the high level of inner party democracy. Nevertheless, in reality such an organ amounts more or less to a ceremonial procedure, rubber stamped by party leaders. The party congress is valued more on a visual basis, rather than as a body to represent the wide interests of party members through their delegates, or to hold accountable other party organs. It is more a ceremonial rather than a policy and decision-making activity. Other organs' elections are merely formally approved at a party congress. The main reason for a powerless party congress is its inferior position in relation to the party leader. Often parties even surpass the legally specified dateline to hold regular congress meetings. PDK chairmanship member Buja (2009) recognised that although legally [they] were supposed to assemble the party congress every two years, there has been more than three years that [they] have not done this. Moreover, the LDK Congress of 2006, trying to follow democratic procedures, was ended by beating each other with chairs, and the split into LDK and LDD. One of the main reasons of such an ending was the absence of the LDK leader who died in 2006. The delays in holding the party congress sessions are contrary to the law in power, particularly CEC Regulation 01/2008 defining that party congresses should be commenced at least every 36 months. The costs of quashing a decision of congress by the party leader is almost zero, all they have

to do is to put a facade on it; the difficulty to do that is non-existent, since party leaders have uncontested power within their parties.

Following the party congress, the highest institution within the party is the directing council, sustaining congress in between congress meetings (AAK Statute Art. 17; PDK Statute Art. 21; LDK Statute Art. 23; LDD Statute Art. 23 - calls it the National Council; AKR Statute Art.14). The Directing Council organ is formally above other party institutions after congress. Usually, the directing council overall guides the party, the chairmanship reports on a periodical basis to it, and it approves the candidate lists after receiving them from the party chairman that collects proposals from the party branches, as in case of AAK and AKR, or from the chairmanship in case of other parties. The power of the directing council is challenged and minimised by the absolute power of party leaders. If looking at how often the directing council assembles, impeding and postponing of directing council meetings is a useful mechanism to minimise the formal power of the directing council. The directing council of AAK, according to statute, should sit on a monthly basis, whereby the chairmanship reports on its activities. However, according to Ramadani – secretary general of AAK, and the AAK spokesman Luma, the directing council is not assembled on a monthly basis. It shows very clearly the inconsistency between the formal rules and actual rules of the game. Moreover, often, even members of the party chairmanship are not even aware that such a thing is regulated by the party statute. Nonetheless, it brings to the surface the actual powerlessness of the directing council. In PDK, LDK, LDD, and AKR the council sits every three months, though in reality it does not happen as often as it is formally regulated. In AKR for example, the directing council after its first meeting, following the first congress, was not assembled for more than a year. The same applies to other parties as well. In general, party leaders ignore the directing council as a vehicle to override their formal power and preserve their own actual absolute power that should otherwise be shared with the directing council.

Furthermore, Kosovo parties in their organisation structure have the chairmanship, chaired by party leader. It is an executive body beneath the directing council in the party hierarchy. Practically, it is under the shadow of the leader. In the case of AAK, they proclaim to have built up a so-called presidential party. The party leader (AAK Statute Art. 23) proposes the complete chairmanship to the directing council for approval. While in AKR the party leader nominates one third of the directing council members. In the other three parties, the chairmanship is not proposed exclusively by the party leader. Nevertheless, in reality, whatever the way of its organisation, it is entirely under the control and domination of the party leader.

Another means used to ensure the unmatched power of the party leader within the party is the control of party finances. In the case of AKR the full responsibility for party finances belongs to the organisational secretary of the party (AKR Statute Art. 23), selected and dismissed directly by the party leader himself. Although, he is supposed to report to the directing council on finances, such a thing has so far never happened. It is widely known that one of the main instruments to hold uncontested power within the party is through controlling its finances. In the case of other parties, the issue of finances is not very clear, yet it is still used as an instrument to keep control within the party. Furthermore, up to now the Kosovo party system has no law to regulate party finances

Thus, Kosovo parties have a low level of *systemness*, and consequently a low level of institutionalisation. Party organs do not see each other as interrelated and interdependent, but merely as dominated by the party leader, and the costs of turning down decisions by the party leader of formally higher organs is almost zero. G. Krasniqi (2009) ironically stated that there is no need to override such decisions, since no decision is taken against the will of the leader/s. Such a low level of institutionalisation means also a low level of inner party democracy, and a pathetic capability of parties to legitimise democracy among society. The poor performance of parties in legitimation is impeding democracy consolidation in

Kosovo. The shortage of inner party democracy indicates the failure of parties to develop the second dimension of the legitimacy structure, in other words the failure to develop and respect democratic procedures, constraining party performance as well.

### **7.5. Policy making**

Political parties are the key filters in the policy-making process, playing the role of policy gatekeepers. Parties decide on policy priority - which policies should be dealt with, postponed, or even ignored totally. Policy making as an output level is handled in the following two chapters, dealing with the innovation and governing function. The focus here is on performance as the third element of legitimacy structure. Policy making is directly related to the performance dimension in the legitimacy structure, whether it takes place based on collective or personal interests. Personalistic parties are more likely to make and follow policies based on their own rather than collective interests. The above mentioned indicators point out that the collective interests are hardly taken into account, with the low level of pursuance of democratic procedures, obvious by the shortage of inner party democracy, facilitated through a low level of inclusiveness, and a high level of centralisation and minor institutionalisation.

Political parties, as the major gatekeepers between society requirements, and its transformation into inputs, decisions, and policies, have the leading role in the process of legitimation of democracy to citizens. The more and better articulated and transformed these needs are into inputs and outputs, the better the performance of parties would be and the higher the support of citizens for the regime in question, the democracy. Political parties, as gatekeepers are in a position to determine the fate of citizens' wants and needs, expected to be transformed into inputs and further processed into policies. The best way to smoothen such a transformation is parties' inner democracy, as an organisation including into decision making, as many people as possible. The balanced distribution of the power structure within the party, limits the ability for gatekeepers to act on individual interest, and to decide easily against the wants

and needs of the majority, as is actually the case. The larger the number of citizens involved, the more interests are likely to be taken into account when deciding and acting. The more society requirements are processed and transformed into policies, the more likely support for democracy will grow, and the easier it would be for the development of the consolidation of democracy.

The best performance of parties in policy making, requires a high level of inclusiveness, a low level of centralisation, and a high level of institutionalisation. The high level of inclusiveness, means that gate keepers, or parties, include a large number of people, the best result would be all citizens, where filtering is made by taking into account the interests of all participants. In the case of Kosovo parties, they are highly personalistic parties with leaders holding absolute power. The gatekeepers here include mostly the party leader with the rest being more or less technical support for him. Therefore, such exclusiveness is less likely to take into account collective interests since the filter is monopolised by party leaders. Parties make policies based on their narrow interest, because of the low level of people included in the gatekeeping filter. The low performance has an impact on the legitimacy structure, as parties with such performance have difficulty in legitimising democracy. Political parties fail to fulfil the legitimisation function required for democracy consolidation development.

Kosovo parties are known for their high level of centralisation, that stands counter to the possibilities of making policies based on collective interest. Most of the decisions are taken by a small and highly centralised structure. Furthermore, the low level of institutionalisation is also an impediment for the party to act based upon collective interests. This is because decisions taken even at lower levels are always in danger of being turned down, by those at the core circle of the party leadership. The bad performance of parties in Kosovo, related to policy options, is proved in practice as well (see the following chapter). The policy formulation as one of the steps in the policy making process, takes place mainly in centralised circles, with low inclusiveness and institutionalisation, making the

process very unpredictable. In all interviews conducted with party representatives, the mentioning of the problems in Kosovo was most common, though no one was able to offer any written policy on paper, as an alternative. Naser Rugova from LDD affirmed that they have established within their structure, the commissioning of experts in different fields, but nothing written was able to be provided regarding policies. While PDK was in opposition from 2005 – 2008, they formed a shadow government as an opposition. The major part of their activity was limited to criticising the government and highlighting the problems Kosovo has, without offering any policy solution to that. Other parties, as well, mostly criticise, but lack actual policies. Except electoral platforms, parties have no policies formulated for many of the problems that Kosovo society faces. In this regard, usually they have a passive approach, reacting after something happens, even though it includes merely declarations, no formulated policy is found in Kosovo parties, except those in government doing it through government positions. In addition, Kosovo for many years has been governed without a medium term and long term framework of development. On the study conducted by KDI<sup>65</sup> a poor relationship between policies offered by parties and citizens' expectations is found. Kosovo parties have used the independence issue as a roof to cover themselves from the failure to offer policy options. The only thing they dealt with as a policy option, though very general and often through populist rhetoric, was independence. Later, after the declaration of independence, parties have started to talk about other needy issues for society, such as economic development. However, none offer a clear spelt out policy on how to achieve this. In general, it can be concluded that Kosovo parties perform poorly in the policy option, not facilitating democracy consolidation to develop a legitimacy structure through the legitimation function.

The failure of parties to consider citizens' desires into at least inputs, increases their dissatisfaction with parties and the people in charge of the relevant

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<sup>65</sup> Kosovo Democratic Institute (2008), there is no match between the electoral party offers with voters' expectations, as spelt out at the electoral platforms in the 2007 elections.

institutions. It makes citizens perceive such a way of functioning as not beneficial to them, raising suspicions of democracy as a workable regime. Some studies done for this part of Europe have found that for many citizens, democracy is perceived as economic development and prosperity. Therefore, it is the duty of parties, among others, to teach democracy to citizens in a way of making it give effect to society. The performance at the output level effects directly the citizens' consent, and the level of shared norms and values, especially in newly established and still fragile democracies, where no distinction between personalities and the regime is made, and democracies facing economic and political reform simultaneously, where many associate democracy with welfare and economic prosperity as well (Dalton, et. al. 2007).

The citizens' consent that constitutes the fourth element of the legitimacy structure is cultivated as a result of good performance and pursuance of democratic procedures, directly influencing the spread and routinisation of democratic norms and values in society. Through the legitimation function, parties socialise citizens with democratic norms and values by firstly respecting democratic procedures themselves. The best way parties can teach democracy to citizens is through deliberative democracy, enabled through inner democracy and this in turn increases the support of citizens for the regime in question - a democratic regime. In a new democracy like Kosovo, with no tradition on democracy at all, and mostly an internationally sponsored democracy, society expects to taste the fruits of a democratic regime. The best way they benefit from democracy is through good governing, since it is directly tangible for society.

The independence issue consistently shadowed system transformation in Kosovo. After the independence issue is settled, democracy needs to be accepted and recognised as the *only game in town*, firstly by the political elite, constituting primarily party leaders, currently having more authoritarian rather than democratic values. After that, it is to be expected that these values need to be recognised by society as well. Parties should serve as cultivators, producers,

and even advocates of democracy, and not of something else standing contrary to democracy. In other words, if society is to trust democracy, it primarily needs to learn it. Such a process is facilitated through political parties as they stand in between state and society, commanding both directions of communication. Using mechanisms of deliberative democracy, political parties in Kosovo might teach democratic values to society, making democracy more enduring and consolidated, and increasing its legitimacy among society. In this way the consent of people with democracy can be increased.

### **7.6. Party Competition**

Party competition has a direct effect on the legitimation function of parties. It is related to the fourth level of the legitimacy structure. Party competition can be based on democratic norms and values, and democratic procedures, having an impact on performance and consent as well. Different from the inner functioning of a party, party competition covers more the parties' behaviours at their outer level, their interrelationship. The way they compete reflects directly on the democratization prospects through the performance that parties manifest in their competition behaviours. Norden (1998) identifies three modes of competition between parties influencing democracy consolidation prospects: combative, moderate, and collusive. The moderate mode is the best for democracy, while the first can send the country into civil war, and the last one can transform the country into a tyranny by excluding the pluralist way of participation. The three modes comprise the performance of parties touching directly the legitimating function of parties. Parties' competition behaviour that legitimate democracy best, is moderate competition.

Political parties in Kosovo are known for using the three ways of competition. Immediately after the war there was high tension in party competition, especially between LDK and PDK leading the country close to civil war, which was mainly prevented by the presence of international community. This is best pointed out by the declaration of, at that time the deputy chairman of LDK, and currently LDD leader Nexhat Daci (Zeri 11.10.2004). According to him, the ground coalition

among the largest parties in Kosovo LDK-PDK-AAK was arranged for the simple, core reason to avoid civil war and the killing of each other. It reveals best the combative attitude of party competition among political parties in Kosovo. Furthermore, such an attitude was harmfully transmitted to society level, creating an enmity essentially based on regional bases, where parties mostly relied. Moreover, threats and violence were often present, especially during electoral campaigns. The daily newspapers reported among other things, that LDK candidates have received threatening letters (Kosova Sot 02.11.2001). In Skenderaj the office of LDK was attacked by fire arms (Bota Sot 05.11.2001), and so on. It should be highlighted that for many years after the war, some of the LDK chairmanship members and activists were assassinated, such as: Xhemajl Mustafa, Enver Maloku, Uke Bytyci, as well as many others. Up to now, the Kosovo and UNMIK justice present in Kosovo could not find and bring to justice those who assassinated them. However, one thing that is clear and is widely believed is that most of the assassinations were politically motivated.

Such party behaviour was a bad signal and example of democracy to society, especially at the beginning of democracy in Kosovo, immediately after the war. People started to correlate democracy with this combative behaviour between the parties. These party behaviours are not a safe mode for legitimating democracy, to make people believe in democracy, or in spreading and deepening democratic values and norms, as was the need in Kosovo's new democracy. In addition, such party behaviours reveal bad prospects for democracy consolidation and are irritating for society. The political tension has actually been decreased, though potentially it is still there, always ready to be actualised. Currently, most of the violence used by parties is on the day of elections, with many physical and armed skirmishes registered. The main reason for such behaviour is the party reliance on clienteles, and the only way to afford the support of the clientelist structure is through the means of being in power (see chap. 6 & 9). Such behaviour is known to persist between AAK and PDK, largely as a result of enmity between leaders of both parties. In the case of LDK

and PDK it is found also among the electorate, though with decreasing consistency. An excellent illustration of such party behaviour, still viable among Kosovo parties, is illustrated by the declaration of AAK leader Ramush Haradinaj, a day after the second round of local elections in 2009: *“there was a need for just a very small thing, and then the worst would happen”*, meaning a civil war was likely to happen (KTV 19.30 Lajmet, 26.12.2009). He declared so while commenting on the election process that took place a day before. Again, the inner party democracy should be recalled, that the absolute power of leaders is one of the main reasons for such combative behaviour, as long as they bring political competition to a personal level.

On the other side, in the Kosovo party system, a collusive way of competition is found whereby parties collude with each other, even those in opposition to those in power. Such was the case between PDK and AKR, and LDD to some extent. The collusion in this case could not have the impact of murdering pluralism, because of the multi-party system in Kosovo, but it weakened democracy through reducing the opposition and horizontal accountability of Kosovo democracy. Kosovo currently has a ground coalition between the two largest parties, while remaining in opposition are three other smaller parties.. These parties in opposition could not join forces to make a strong voice. Moreover, when the largest opposition party, AKR collided with the largest party in power, PDK, the damage to democracy was immediately felt in terms of democratic backwardness, such as freedom of speech, politicisation of the media, and so on (Reporters Without Borders Report 2009; Letter of EBU to Prime Minister 26.10.2009; EU Commission Report 2009, etc.). Nevertheless, such collusive behaviour was perceived as an opportunity by parties to benefit directly from the state through party collusion at the cost of citizens. The roots of such party behaviour are personalistic types of parties, trading-off on a personal basis. In the eyes of citizens, it was considered as a weakness of democracy itself, a behaviour that did not help to legitimise democracy, as long as it benefited the party elite, but not citizens.

Lastly, Kosovo parties' ways of competition does not offer a good performance based on democratic procedures. Likewise, they hinder the deepening of roots of democratic norms and values, impeding the achievement of the consent of society needed to push forward the prospects of democracy consolidation.

### **7.7. Conclusion**

Democratic consolidation requires primarily the legitimation of democracy in the eyes, minds, and hearts, of the majority of society. The wider and deeper democracy is legitimised, the better the prospects for democracy to be consolidated. The main institutions having a key role in the legitimation process are political parties, constituting almost entirely the second level of the consolidation structure, and having an impact, in one way or another, at all three other levels. As such, their role in legitimation is irreplaceable. The legitimacy structure offered by Alagappa (1995) made up of four levels, can be developed and cultivated by political parties. Although democratic norms and values might be brought and sponsored by international actors, they still have to be adapted, domesticated, and further developed, by following the procedures specified by democracy, behaving based on collective interest and consequently generating society wide consent for democracy. Parties in practice can develop such a structure through their inner and outer behaviours and attitudes, having an impact on each other. With their behaviours relying on democratic norms and values, and developing inner democracy, parties find it indispensable to perform based on collective interests. Otherwise, if they have a shortage of inner democracy demonstrated through a low level of inclusiveness, a high level of centralisation, and a low level of institutionalisation, parties fail to use democratic norms for themselves, and are not expected to spread them widely among society. Kosovo parties so far have proved a lack of inner democracy, and to be highly personalistic. The failure to respect democratic procedures renders meaningless an expectation for parties' performance based on collective interests, expressed in policy options offered by parties. There is still a lot to be done, in order to develop society consent about democracy, as the process of

democracy inculcation and legitimation dictates, required by the democracy consolidation process.

Nonetheless, the type of party competition dominating the Kosovo party system has also reflected vastly undemocratic values to society, often jeopardizing democracy itself, which would have likely brought the country close to civil war, if no international community has been present to prevent it.

## Chapter 8

### 8. Politics without Policies - The Innovation Function of Parties in Kosovo

*"You ask too much of us. We produce just MPs".*

Party Representative, cited from ICG Europe Report (Nr. 163, 26.05.2005)

#### **8.1. Introduction**

Along with the other functions that political parties have, parties offer innovations within their scope of ideological orientation and activity. They innovate in the way of fulfilling their own objectives, in terms of promoting the interests of citizens, or at least the interests of their supporters. In this regard, parties innovate best policies to solve citizens' public problems, or the best means to tackle such issues. More often than not, citizens themselves have lack of time, resources, information, or often even interest to deal with the public problems they encounter. Therefore, parties are more responsible, have instruments, and are better prepared to do this, and to guide citizens in that direction, obviously through citizens' participation. Party innovation function has a direct impact on citizens, by means of guiding them, offering solutions to their problems, triggering development, and enhancing creativity in society. Innovation in general is associated with creativity. Unlike individual creativity, party creativity involves the creativity of the community. Operating within the environment of the democracy consolidation process, parties' creativity is crucial in this process with an impact on such environment, in terms of innovating policies and ways possibly to speed up the process, and deal with problems currently impeding democratic consolidation.

This innovation function of parties is very much useful in the case of Kosovo. As stated earlier, the process of democratization in Kosovo has experienced block, simultaneous and a quadruple transition, coupled with the process of state and nation building. The democracy consolidation prospects are directly dependent on such developments (Berg-Schlosser 2004). Kosovo parties have often been

the object of criticism for having deficiency in vision and creativity as to how to solve numerous extensive issues still pending for Kosovo society. As an illustration, most parties are consistently declaring on the stateness of Kosovo, and recently also on the need for UNMIK to leave as soon as possible, because Kosovo is sustainable itself. However, none of the parties has offered a plan on UNMIK's withdrawal from Kosovo (Koha Ditore 25.03.2009).

In order to measure this party function, the creativity and innovation capacity of parties to deal with current national problems is explored, including the planning ability of governing parties. These indicators are measured through analysing party programmes and electoral platforms, finding out the positions of parties on pending national issues, and the quality of governing programmes (including long-term strategies). The data are collected from party programmes, electoral platforms, media and other reports, through the document analysis method. While additional primary data are collected by the method of interview, particularly through expert interview. Political parties spell out and articulate their innovations and creativity on their visions on issues to be handed, in their programmes, electoral platforms, declarations, interviews, or any other policy papers. The extent of the development of such vision, including practical terms, illustrates the level of performance of the innovation function. The pending issues in Kosovo, requiring the approach of parties in one way or another are many, and are in need of prioritisation. At the centre of the research are the issues considered most important at the national level, looking to what extent parties offer solutions to them. The current pending issues in Kosovo are considered to be the increase in the number of state recognitions (of Kosovo), the extension of state authority over all territory and the integration of the Serb community, solving the Mitrovica problem, economic development, reducing poverty and unemployment, ensuring the rule of law, fighting corruption, improving energy supply, education and healthcare system, EU - NATO integration, and so the endless list continues. Though, there might be other issues as well, the study is concerned only with those considered more important and requiring immediate

solutions for a well-functioning state, pertaining to democracy consolidation, making democracy give effect, as well as the economy. In order to grasp the clear picture of the party innovation function, policy sectors are explored to understand the capability of parties to offer solutions on specific policy sectors.

### ***8.2. Emptiness, vagueness, and the populist approach of parties vs. their innovation***

The solutions to some of the issues mentioned do not depend entirely on the role parties have, since the international community was and is still an important actor in Kosovo politics, though its influence differs from one policy to another. Hitherto, it does not leave parties free of responsibility, taking a just wait and see approach. If in some areas it is not possible to act through government policies, without the approval of the international community<sup>66</sup>, they should at least have the vision of how to tackle and solve problems, offer alternatives, and take initiative, which could count as pressure and an impulsive force for the international community to act as well. Most of the time, especially on issues involving the Serbian community, the international community used to handle it by standing in between, playing the role of fire-fighter, due to required neutrality, to calm the objections of both sides, without offering any durable and sustainable way out of problems. Moreover, in some areas, political parties have free hands, as in the case of healthcare and education, but despite that, both sectors are left far behind and highly corrupted.

Political parties of Kosovo are very poor in innovation and creativity. Zhinipotoku (2009) believes that Kosovo parties act on an ad hoc bases, are passive and always react without any prior plan. In addition, Matoshi (2009) considers that parties have no policies at all and usually make them up on a daily basis. G. Krasniqi (2009) goes even further, whereby according to him Kosovo parties are not only unable and not-creative to solve Kosovo problems, but in fact add to the problems and cause many of the problems that Kosovo has. In this way, parties

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<sup>66</sup> By international community it is meant all international actors involved in Kosovo, especially these more powerful and directly linked, such as KFOR, UNMIK, EULEX, EU, USA, UN, ....

are not perceived as capable actors to tackle Kosovo's problems. Moreover, they are perceived more as a problem and as trouble makers. This is best proved, among other things, on the quality of party programmes, their electoral platforms, declarations, and their policy shortages. The programmes of parties in Kosovo on a broad-spectrum are very generalised, coloured with populism, rarely stating the commitments of parties to solve issues, just highlighting them – often targeting the emotional social support. For instance, the vagueness, populist nature, and emptiness of the LDK program was portrayed by the words used by Ibrahim Rugova in an election campaign: “the LDK programme is the programme of dreams and sacrifices of generations of Albanians” (Bota Sot 08.11.2001). The dominant issue on all party programmes, opening and closing programmes with, is the independence issue. Other problems less frequently mentioned are: fighting corruption, raising the number of jobs, fighting poverty, EU integration, and so on. However, all of them are merely proclaimed, devoid of any concrete policy or measure (Programmes of LDK, PDK, AAK, AKR, LDD; see also the chap. on the representation function). One of the reasons for that might be the usually generalised nature of party programmes. Following the pervasiveness of the independence and stateness issues, some parties later on started to transform their programmes, adding some commitments to economic issues as well.

Regarding the electoral platforms, they are very empty, and vague. Most of them cite the current problems, but none offers a practical policy on how to handle them. It is pointed out what should be done in certain sectors, without explaining how to achieve it, or the related budget implications. Moreover, they sound more like populist rhetoric, rather than constituting an innovation to policy approaches. The main reason behind the presence of such populism is the endeavour to fill up the emptiness of their policy platforms. From the interviews conducted with party representatives (Buja - PDK 2009, Rugova - LDD 2010, Hajzeraj – AKR 2009, Beqiri - LDK 2010, Ramadani - AAK 2010), all of them stated only some of

the problems Kosovo has, but none could provide any solution from the party he/she belongs to. In addition, they could not offer any written policy.

The party leaders' declarations on the other side try to mobilise the support of the masses by attracting citizens' attention as much as possible by just bringing into sight the problems Kosovo has, often in an emotional and populist way, sometimes also extending wordy commitments to solve them.

To illustrate the current state of affairs, looking at the promises of parties at the electoral campaign, they are obviously dominated by the populist approach. Moreover, in Kosovo parties also contend demagoguery and irresponsible declarations as an effort to substitute the absence of clear policies. Such examples are very common, among them the following: PDK leader declares "positive change is coming" (Infopress 16 November 2007); LDK leader states "LDK knows to govern further" (Koha Ditore 28 October 2007); Hamiti asserts "LDK can make dreams reality" (Koha Ditore 29 October 2007); or "it has snowed to show that LDK has a white soul"; and so on. The same applies to AAK, AKR, and LDD on the other side. By looking at parties' declarations since the 2001 election, it became obvious that most of them are highly populist. The most influential leader in Kosovo, the LDK former leader Ibrahim Rugova (died in 2006), finding the right moment to chair the Kosovo Albanian mass movement for independence, since 1989, became famous also due to his use of a populist approach. The majority of society was following him blindly due to the authority he created among the masses, particularly during the pre-war period. He often used the opportunity and found it a very useful vehicle to make populist appeals on electoral campaigns. For instance in the 2001 election campaign he declared "the people of Kosovo are a fantastic one, they make miracles with the few things they have" (Bota Sot 07.11.2001). The appeal and words used were entirely populist, representing no practical solution, despite the fact that at that time Kosovo was a society that had recently experienced the war, in desperate need for essential things for life. Furthermore, on another electoral meeting (Bota Sot

15.11.2001) Rugova stated “the independence is the objective and the holy word to Kosovo citizens”. While another member of the LDK chairmanship Eqrem Kryeziu, appealing to the electorate, praised highly the LDK leader “Dr. Ibrahim Rugova is the miracle of Kosovo” (Bota Sot 16.11.2001). Instead of offering practical policies for the youth of Kosovo, Rugova directed at them “for you youth we will create jobs so that you remain young, and inherit your life with your kids” (Koha Ditore 02.11.2001); “man feels good when he is together with the youth” (Zeri 02.11.2001). As a statement it implies a lack of seriousness such as, mentioning kids to the youth. Another appeal used by LDK was “with us you have a more secured future” (Kosova Sot 06.11.2001).

Three years later, no changes in the party’s approaches to society’s problems and innovation developments seem viable. The party preferences and priorities apparently have not changed. In the 2004 election campaign Rugova’s declaration almost had the same composition as the message delivered to the electorate in 2001: “the grass of the football field of Gjilan is bringing the victory to LDK” (Koha Ditore 19.10.2004). Fatmir Rexhepi and Sabit Rrustemi, LDK chairmanship members added “LDK is offering everything Kosovo needs” (Koha Ditore 12.10.2004). However, they failed to demonstrate, for at least a single issue, how LDK would concretely tackle it. On the other side, Rugova making a purely populist appeal to citizens among others, declared “LDK will serve all citizens” (Kosova Sot 15.10.2004); “LDK is for Kosovo and for the whole of Kosovo” (Bota Sot 01.10.2004).

Nonetheless, the expected positive developments in terms of the innovation and creativity of parties, even in the 2007 elections seem to be absent. LDK carried on with old populist and empty promises. Since they had to go without their leader, who died in 2006, and having no vision to cover other issues, they tried to use the name of Rugova as an appeal for votes. Another reason they emphasised the name of Rugova, was the competition with LDD, coming out of LDK in 2007, trying to present that it is them, on their own, that inherit the name

of Rugova. In this regard, in the election campaign, LDK proclaimed “LDK has the key of Rugova” (Lajm 14.11.2007). It is more or less an attempt to create a myth about Rugova. Lutfi Haziri, one of the LDK deputy chairmen declared “the vision of Rugova is inside the people of Kosovo”. In this way, the LDK electoral campaign was shadowed largely by the name of Rugova. However, the populist approach was not absent even in the 2007 elections, on the electoral meeting, LDK among others declared “the LDK victory, is the victory of citizens” (Epoka e Re 01.11.2007).

On the other side, social development took place faster and on a different level from political parties. Eight years after the war, the majority of society is fed up of empty promises, missing tangible changes and offers. Therefore, the name of Rugova did not work as it previously had done; LDK lost almost 50% of their votes and seats. Even today, the name of their leader, Ibrahim Rugova who died in 2006, is still used as the main vehicle to mobilise society’s support. There is no doubt, that he enjoyed great support as a leader on the organisation of peaceful resistance on the way to independence, but other issues were not part of his agenda or priorities. Nowadays, Kosovo no longer has the problem of independence, but needs to address other problems to sustain their independence. One of the deputy LDK chairmen Eqrem Kryeziu states that the “LDK programme is based on the programme of Ibrahim Rugova” (Infopress 28 October 2007). Relying utterly on Rugova’s programme in 2007, means offering nothing of what society needs. LDK stresses mainly the leader Ibrahim Rugova and does not actually offer creativity to innovate policies, or ways of how to handle current pending social or economic problems. Furthermore, an LDK deputy chairmen Fadil Ferati (Infopress 9 November 2007) proclaims “on the Rugova’s way”. In addition, the LDK programme as such was more or less a collection of slogans and commitments. It is understandable that LDK tries to use the authority of Rugova enjoying broad support in society, but as a programme and as an innovation offer, it is poor and has nothing to endow the party with apart from symbolic remembering of a charismatic leader. What seems more

worrying, is that they still refer to the past and ignore the reality, as LDK deputy chairman Sabri Hamiti declared “LDK has nothing to change on its programme” (Koha Ditore 27 October 2007). In the absence of vision and creativity to innovate policies and mechanisms, LDK in this way tries to fill up that gap with the charismatic figure of Rugova, though dead.

On the other hand, PDK has so far in general not proved that they perform better in terms of creativity and innovation. Its electoral campaign appears not to differ much in terms of the substantial meaning offered to the electorate. PDK declarations are full of populism and emptiness, and offer no meaningful policy for pressing issues. Limaj, one of the PDK founders and deputy chairman asserts “If PDK wins, Kosovo and all its citizens are going to win ” (Koha Ditore 06.11.2001). It sounds very populist and says nothing particular or different from what other competing parties offer. Even more populist appeal comes from PDK leader Hashim Thaqi “we will not do anything without asking the people” (Koha Ditore 10.11.2001). Some of the parties’ statements during the election campaign also sound funny, such as the Thaqi’s declaration “the victory for PDK will make the whole world happy” (Koha Ditore 16.11.2001). Later on, following the subsequent election and the 2007 elections, not much change was recognised. In the 2007 elections, no creativity was apparent, PDK continued with the old populist and empty messages in their electoral approach. At an electoral meeting Thaqi asserted that “the address of success is PDK” (Lajm 04.11.2007). PDK tried to make use of the war of the KLA as a vehicle to mobilise the electorate. In this regard, for example Thaqi states “a vote for PDK shows respect for the commander Adem Jashari” (Koha Ditore 09.11.2001). While talking about the lack of healthcare as a problem, instead of opening up the party’s policy for the healthcare system, he declares “health to all” (Express 10.11.1007). PDK leader Hashim Thaqi in the 2007 electoral campaign pronounced: “I will serve all citizens” (Infopress 27.11. 2007). Furthermore, it is common for party leaders to use “I” instead of “We”, indicating the absolute power leaders have within the party. Such expression is awfully blurred, general, and pure demagogy. On the

other side, it shows the inability of parties in innovating to handle the problems society has, instead trying to fill the gap by using very general and vague appeals and calls to citizens.

The same applies to AAK, featured with a high level of populism and poor performance in innovation. Looking at the electoral promises of AAK at the three periodic elections, one finds no difference at all from other parties; in other words, no creativity, no innovation, and no policies available. Party statements in elections support such an argument. AAK leader Ramush Haradinaj, in the 2001 elections, while trying to appeal to voters by praising his party declared “the alliance sleeps late, and wakes up early” (Koha Ditore 08.11.2001). The esteem held for the party leader is also used as a tool to attract voters. Mahmut Bakalli, one of the chief advisers of Haradinaj, and a widely known politician during the socialist period, affirmed at an electoral meeting “Haradinaj is the future of Kosovo politics” (Koha Ditore 05.11.2001). Besides this, Haradinaj assured that “there is no one that can do more for Kosovo than we have done” (Koha Ditore 16.11.2001), referring to his and his family’s contribution during the war. Moreover, a doubtful assertion “we will do more than we promise” (Kosova Sot 02.11.2001) was given by AAK. Haradinaj himself continued making another populist claim “state, welfare, and democracy are in the hands of people” (Zeri 02.11.2001). Yet, in the following elections in 2004, nothing changed for the positive. Talking about the AAK 2004 electoral programme, Haradinaj commented that the electoral programme of AAK is a public signature for successful governing” (Koha Ditore 20.10.2004). The 2007 elections found Haradinaj accused in the Hague, at an International tribunal on former Yugoslavia. His absence was reflected in the AAK electoral campaign as well.

LDD as an independent party took part in elections for the first time in 2007, as it had split away from LDK. Despite the split, and the adding of a new party to the numerous parties in the Kosovo party system, no further creativity appeared. Divided from LDK, they tried to promote themselves as inheriting and following

the Rugova tradition. Based on that, most of its campaign was pitched against its main rival LDK, both trying to sell themselves to the electorate as being in line with Rugova's spirit. Yet, this represents more the emptiness of both parties, in terms of their offer to the electorate, having nothing else to offer. One of the chairmanship members of LDD, Adem Salihaj claims that "LDD is the pursuer of the breath and vision of Rugova" (Lajm 01.11.2007). The LDD leader also promised very generally without concrete policies "we guarantee a life with prosperity" (Kosova Sot 05.11.2007). In addition, they could not escape the populist approach either, "we are the only solution" (Kosova Sot 08.11.2007).

The 2007 election welcomed the newly formed party AKR, founded by an Albanian multimillionaire. Although they tried to promote and raise awareness of economic more than other issues, the populist approach of its leader Behgjet Pacolli, proved inescapable. Despite, talking about and trying to offer some solutions to economic issues, AKR failed to translate them into policies, and to explain to what extent they were achievable. The populist spirit of AKR is manifested in the party declarations during the 2007 elections. For example, Pacolli believes that "AKR is the last chance for resurgence" (Lajm 01.11.2007). Moreover, demonstrating his strong authority, he declares that "now it is my time" (Lajm 04.11.2007). Additionally, he proclaims that: "enough with all negative phenomena lying above the backbone of this population" (Express 12.11.2007); "the concerns of citizens are also the concerns of myself" (Bota Sot 07.11.2007); "the coming government is going to work like a *Swiss watch*" (Epoka e Re 01.11.2007). AKR leader Behgjet Pacolli, at the first founding Congress in 2006 declared that "we will return to society its lost dignity" (AKR first Congress 2006). Usually the notion of dignity is part of a populist vocabulary, employed to mobilise the masses.

### **8.3. Policy sectors and innovation function of parties**

However, to shed more light on the creativity and performance of parties on the innovation function, the major national pending issues are going to be explored, issue by issue, in a specific way, to see what parties make concrete offers to

solve the issues in question. The issues included are those most important and having an immediate need to be settled.

### ***The Independence issue***

The independence issue has been one the main concerns of Kosovo parties, dominating their agendas, programmes, platform, and speeches. It is also one of the key elements of nationalist ideology, considered one of the driving forces in the development of pluralism in Kosovo. The independence issue has largely overshadowed and often surpassed democracy and democratisation. Parties have mobilised the masses vastly around the independence issue. Due to the nature of the issue, parties repeatedly used populist words to articulate their concern about independence, and mobilise the masses in turn. It was independence, especially the way to independence, as a leading issue, that marked the major cleavage among the largest parties in Kosovo after the war. Almost all other issues were overshadowed by the independence.

From the interview conducted by the daily newspaper Kosova Sot (09.11.2001) with party representatives in the 2001 election campaign, most of them declared independence as their priority. The secretary general of LDK laid out their priorities for the 2001 elections as follows: independence, economic development, integration into Euro-Atlantic structures and a special relationship with the USA. Rame Buja, a member of the PDK chairmanship, identified PDK priorities as follows: transforming the constitutional framework into a constitution, inclusion of a referendum on the constitution, independence based on the blood that was shed. While the AAK deputy chairman declared party priorities as: creation of a stable government, legislating laws to protect the local producers, and general reforms.

Yet, as independence was getting closer, its relevance was decreasing and pressure from society about other concerns was growing. Failure of parties to respond to such forces shows the asymmetric developments in the society and

party system level, leaving parties behind, in terms of demanding development at the society level, with less actual development at the parties' level, increasing tremendously the scale of citizens' alienation and political apathy in Kosovo. Parties are still referring to independence, even since Kosovo declared its independence in 2008. Before that, parties tried to make use of it, calling the day of independence close. The PDK leader among others stated that "independence is very near" (Infopress 25 October 2007). PDK also declared "it is the time of PDK and we will declare independence" (Infopress 30 October 2007). LDK assured that "independence is a matter of days" (Infopress 31 October 2007). The AAK leader referring to independence, said that "we will achieve independence". LDD praised its leader Nexhat Daci, as one of the main actors in the struggle for independence. AKR as a new party did not concentrate on the independence issue, but since its leader was of a business background, they focused more on economics, though not offering practical policies except several irresponsible promises such as 170000 jobs, without explaining how that was to be achieved. Many uneducated, uninformed, and needy (counting a huge number) citizens rested their hopes on such promises, yet it is not considered as an innovative policy on economic development, due to its impracticability and lack of translation into workable and achievable policies.

Kosovo parties in general, perform poorly in the innovation function, and as such do not lend a hand in democracy consolidation process, which they could otherwise be more convincing with, and give good examples in terms of offering solutions to society's problems. During the 2001 and 2004 elections, the independence issue dominated almost 90% of electoral meetings of parties, each one of them making similar commitments. Other issues were often not even mentioned. In this regard, Ibrahim Rugova declared "LDK strives for an independence and democracy for all" (Bota Sot 02.11.2001); "the years of international recognition of independence have come" (Bota Sot 03.11.2001). On another meeting, it is also asserted that "LDK will strive for a formal independence" (Kosova Sot 01.11.2001). From the PDK side the same

commitments could be heard, focusing totally on the independence issue. PDK leader Thaqi declared “this election will open the way for the referendum for independence” (Kosova Sot 01.11.2001). The AAK leader not differing from their rival parties in terms of offers made to citizens claimed “independence first” (Kosova Sot 01.11.2001). After the war, parties tried to create a perception among the masses that Kosovo was already independent, and needed just formal recognition. However, most statements regarding independence were also clothed with populist and demagoguery appeal, for example Melihate Termkolli, one of the LDK chairmanship members asserted “a vote for Rugova and LDK is a vote for Kosovo independence” (Bota Sot 04.11.2001). Rugova, on the other side, describing the party programme, claimed that “the electoral programme of LDK is a national programme for Kosovo independence” (Zeri 15.10.2004). Most of the LDK support among the masses was a result of the party being the leader of peaceful resistance for almost a decade before the war. Therefore, LDK tried to mobilise its support by reminding the citizens that LDK led the independence mass movement. Likewise, Kule Berisha at an electoral meeting reminded, “LDK is a party that knows how to finalise the process of independence” (Zeri 04.10.2004). In this regard also, PDK claimed about themselves “the PDK victory is a guarantee for the Kosovo state” (Koha Ditore 22.10.2004). As the independence issue was coming close to settlement, parties started to compete on who was going to declare it faster. Fatmir Sejdiu, the LDK leader after Rugova, stated that “just a few days after the 10<sup>th</sup> of December we will have independence” (Lajm 03.11.2007). Even in 2004, the AAK leader exceedingly convincingly promised “independence in one year” (Kosova Sot 01.10.2004). PDK also claimed that “within six months we will have a Kosovo constitution” (Zeri 04.10.2004). One of the AAK deputy chairman Ahmet Isufi, among others asserted “if you vote for the alliance (AAK), in January together with Ramush Haradinaj we will make Kosovo a state” (Express 12.11.2007).

Not surprisingly, even the most burning issue - independence, was not clearly presented to the electorate. None of the parties offered any practical strategy on

how to achieve such an objective. Most of what they actually did was to keep it alive as an issue and utilize it as a workable tool to mobilise the emotional support of society. The worst thing was that independence left many other important and acute issues under its shadow. Somehow, it also prevented the growth of society's other needs and requirements, including democracy developments, keeping society under the fever of independence.

### ***Recognition and extension of sovereignty***

After the declaration of independence, the most important issue related directly to state building, and influencing the democratization process, was recognition of Kosovo by as many states as possible. So far, just more than one fourth of UN member states have extended their recognition to the Kosovo state. Parties in Kosovo have not offered any strategy and policy on how to handle the issue on the best way to increase the number of recognitions. Parties in power seem to have approached the matter negligently, manifested by the small budget allocated to the ministry of foreign affairs, compared that of many other ministries. AKR leader Pacolli, tried personally to use his private business connections to lobby for the recognition of Kosovo independence in some states, but as a party did not offer any workable policy on that. In this regard, parties did not prove creative in innovating policies to increase the number of recognising nations. From the interviews conducted with party representatives, more or less the same answers were given. They mentioned the importance of international recognition and the failure of Kosovo policy in this direction. Yet, none of them presented any formulated policy about the issue in question. The opposition parties (Naser Rugova - LDD, Ramadani - AAK, Hajzeraj - AKR) accused the government of policy failure. On the other hand, coalition parties (Buja - PDK, Beqiri - LDK) mentioned different reasons trying to justify it.

Kosovo as a new state still has problems of extending sovereignty over all its territory, especially in enclaves populated with Serb minorities, covering one third of Kosovo territory. Political parties use such a malfunction as a rhetorical

mechanism to criticise each other, but none of them have yet innovated any feasible policy on how to tackle it (Interviews with PDK, AAK, LDK, AKR, LDD representatives). Even parties in government have no vision and have no policies on paper on how to solve it. Most parties try to escape from dealing with it.

The number of states recognising Kosovo as a state is still low, and as such makes the Kosovo state vulnerable, impacting directly on democracy consolidation prospects. Limited sovereignty and an inability to extend state authority over all its territory prevents the development of cohesion, making Kosovo democracy easily breakable and unable to give effect, consequently making democracy consolidation prospects highly unforeseeable. On the other side, political parties manifest the just wait and see attitude of such developments.

### ***Integrating the Serb minority***

Since the withdrawal of Serb troops from Kosovo in 1999, most Serbs did not recognise the new reality. They did not accept being under Kosovo authority and consider themselves and the enclaves where they live as being part of Serbia. Some of those that later recognised the UNMIK administration, boycotted Kosovo institutions after the declaration of independence, though constitutionally they have reserved seats in parliament and the government (Kosovo Constitution 2008). Nevertheless, the majority continue to ignore Kosovo institutions and do not consider themselves as a part of Kosovo, in particular those living on the other side of the *Iber* river, in the north of Kosovo.

Inclusion of the Serbian minority into Kosovo institutions, and society as well, is a great challenge for the Kosovo government and Kosovo democracy consolidation developments. Until now, parties have failed to offer any viable and workable plan and strategy on how to integrate them. Of course, as such it is a wider problem and involves a number of actors as well, but government parties should at least have plans on how to deal with it, and opposition parties should have

policy papers. In the interviews with parties' representatives, none of them was able to offer any solution on how the Serb minority could best be integrated. Moreover, they did not show any policy options in the paper on that. In interviews, they tried to accuse each other on such failure but offered no alternative. They also accused Serbia directly as it has politicised the process of integrating the Serb community in Kosovo. Kosovo authorities are not able to extend their authority in Serbian enclaves; as a result, such a relationship maintains the vulnerability of the security situation and keeps Kosovo democracy fragile. What also endangers Kosovo democracy consolidation is that a significant part of society (on a constitutional basis, they have the power of veto on all legislation related to minorities and on constitutional changes) of Serb ethnicity boycotts Kosovo democracy.

### ***Unification of Mitrovica***

The Mitrovica problem has persisted since the end of war and the NATO intervention in Kosovo. The bridge above the *Iber* river is used as a point to stand in between two parts of Mitrovica city. The northern part and beyond populated by a majority of Serbs and the south by a majority of Albanians. Since then the issue has not been settled and political parties offer no practical plan on that. The problem of Mitrovica includes other actors as well, but parties should at least offer policies on paper of how to integrate the city, and have a clear stand on the issue. Instead, parties have used it merely as a burning issue to develop their populist declarations. In the interviews conducted with political parties, no policy paper on the issue was provided from them. They have no idea even on how to approach the problem. On their electoral platforms no innovation on the issue is found. However, during electoral campaigns it has often been mentioned as an issue, starting from the 2001 election up to the present day, without a vision of how to integrate it. Flora Brovina, a member of the PDK chairmanship declared "Mitrovica will not remain a hostage of Serbia" (Epoka e Re 01.11.2001). The approach is highly patriotic, but the issue remains unsettled up to now. Bajram Rexhepi too, claimed "we can guarantee that there will be no partition of

Mitrovica” (Zeri 01.10.2004). PDK also tries to get votes by mentioning Mitrovica on the electoral campaign, among other things they declared that “independence is nowhere better celebrated than in Mitrovica” (Koha Ditore 29 October 2007). Moreover, Thaqi added “we will build roads up to Leposavic” (Kosova Sot 03.11.2007). It sounds a very populist and vague declaration, and does not constitute an innovation on the policy of the issue. Such populism is not absent from LDK either, trying to mobilise the electorate by suggesting the unification of Mitrovica is conditional to LDK coming to power “if LDK wins, Mitrovica will be united” (Koha Ditore 30 October 2007). Fatmir Sejdiu from LDK also shows their commitment on the issue “we are committed to continue for integration in Mitrovica” (Koha Ditore 12.11.2007). However, AAK tried to personalise the issue, relying on their leader’s personality. High-profile party officials declared “it is only Ramush Haradinaj that can guarantee integration of Mitrovica” (Express 10.11.2007); “the guarantee for territorial integration of Mitrovica belongs only to Ramush” (Koha Ditore 10.11.2007). Furthermore, AAK leader Ramush Haradinaj himself, used his version of empty declarations “if I come to power we will have coffee together in Leposavic” (Koha Ditore 29.11.2009) meaning the unification of Mitrovica.

Parties have so far failed to perform their innovation function on solving the Mitrovica issue. The problem goes on and no vision for its solution seems on the horizon.

### ***Economic development, fighting poverty and unemployment***

Kosovo remains one of the poorest and most un-developed states in Europe. It is the country with the highest rate of poverty in the region, with 40% of the population living in poverty and 17% in extreme poverty, a high level of economic stagnation, and an unemployment rate of more than 45% (World Bank report on Kosovo 2007). Kosovo parties not so far have demonstrated a clear vision or an innovative way on how to deal with these issues. Most of Kosovo’s neighbours pursuing development policies have performed better. Kosovo seems to lack the

vision on how to pursue and achieve economic development. The government programmes, party programmes and platforms consist more or less of wishful thinking. On the other side, parties make use of that, in a populist way to accuse rivals from other parties for not doing anything on that.

Most of Kosovo's governments after the war governed Kosovo without a plan at all, having no middle or long-term economic development strategy. Opposition parties are not faring better, possessing no methods on how to develop the Kosovo economy. Even today, they do not show capability in innovation to develop Kosovo. However, LDD has inside its structure, committees responsible in dealing with different policies, but they do not function as expected (Naser Rugova – LDD, 2010). They have not offered policies or alternatives to current policies on how to develop the Kosovo economy, or to fight poverty and unemployment. Moreover, the high level of poverty is employed as a populist tool to improve the rhetoric of rival parties. All parties promise jobs, but no concrete policies on how to create these jobs. The lack of such creativity of parties makes the government take a passive approach, often following but not initiating issues. During electoral campaigns, parties do not hesitate to make promises without any responsibility, or electoral platforms not representing workable solutions. The PDK leader promises “roads of European quality” (Infopress 26 October 2007). The AKR leader promised employment for a large number of people, yet not clarifying how this was to be attained. The other parties as well promise anything that comes to their mind. During the electoral campaigns, parties also refer to economic development, though less than independence. One of the PDK chairmanship members stated “without economic development we will not have independence” (Epoka e Re 01.11.2001). Often parties have tried to refer to developed countries, while talking about economic development, “PDK considers economic development according to standards of European civilisation” (Koha Ditore 06.10.2004). Other parties as well try to maximise votes by rhetorically highlighting economic development. Ibrahim Rugova in one electoral meeting stated: “one of the realities is the buffalo of this region tracing back to ancient

Dardania” (Kosova Sot 14.11.2001). On another occasion, LDK proclaimed that “if LDK wins all investors will invest in Kosovo” (Koha Ditore 02.10.2004). AAK referring to economic development stated “on the first days of governing we will make the state and economic development” (Koha Ditore 19.20.2004). An article in Zeri (01.20.2004) ensured that AAK mentioned agricultural problems, but without any details on them.

Another party that tried to switch the political priority in Kosovo to economic issues was AKR. All they did was give high promises, devoid of empirical support for their possible implementation, and often coloured with the populist attitude of its leader. In some electoral meetings he asserted that: “I did not come here to touch the pockets of the citizens of Kosovo” (Zeri 05.11.2007); “I will also make Kosovo independent of poverty within six months” (Koha Ditore 12.11.2007); “within two years we will generate 70000 jobs” (Lajm 04.11.2007); “citizens do believe in the AKR programme to lessen poverty” (Bota Sot 06.11.2007).

All above mentioned promises on economic development and fighting poverty are short of the support of clear policies. Kosovo even today, has the same trend of economic development that it used to. Democracy prospects are decidedly dependent on economic prosperity. The increasing level of poverty makes Kosovo democracy shakeable, causing a high level of electoral volatility and an unstable party system. In Kosovo, new parties are still emerging able to use the level of poverty to change Kosovo from a democracy into an authoritarian regime. Last but not the least, the high level of poverty makes Kosovo democracy more prone to clientelism.

### ***Rule of Law***

One of Kosovo’s current democracy defects is the lack of a rule of law. All EU Commission Reports (from 2005 – 2009) on the progress of Kosovo in fulfilling the standards for EU integration, have made objections on the failure of Kosovo to functionalise the backbone of a democracy, the rule of law. One of the main

reasons that Kosovo, even after 10 years of paternalist overseeing, still needs further international monitoring, as EULEX or ICO are mandated to do in Kosovo, is the failure of Kosovo institutions to functionalise the rule of law. There is a high level of politicization of courts, lawyers, judges, and prosecutors as well. The judicial system is suffocated and has no space to breath due to politics - government control of judiciary, informal pressures from parties' leaders, and "invisible" hands as well. The politicisation is also criticized in the above-mentioned reports of the EU Commission.

Parties do not offer any plan to functionalise the judicial system and the rule of law, some of them still strive to control them, especially through government control. Party platforms embrace no reasonable and workable solution on functionalising the rule of law, except empty commitments. Furthermore, in this policy field, most work done by parties is only criticising each other, devoid of any offers of a policy solution. Contrary, parties compete on who is going to extend quicker and deeper control on the judiciary, being closed into the so called *prisoners' dilemma*. Likewise, parties are identified more as problem generators rather than problem solvers. The shortage of a rule of law makes democracy senseless, diminishing democracy consolidation prospects.

### ***Fighting Corruption and Organised Crime***

Corruption and organised crime are among the main vices of Kosovo democracy. Kosovo is acknowledged as the source, transit, and destination of organised crime (EU Commission Report 2008). Up to now, Kosovo has not yet adapted a functional strategy on how to fight organised crime and corruption. Surprisingly, parties do not address such a problem seriously. From the interviews conducted, no party has written policy on fighting corruption and organised crime; they talk about the problem, confirm that it exists and that there should be a solution to it, but no one was concrete in showing what their party was doing in this regard.

On the other hand, in terms of corruption, Kosovo is placed alongside many sub-Saharan African countries. Political parties in power or in opposition are not doing anything to fight corruption, on the contrary they encourage it. The law on fighting corruption is not sufficient to fight corruption (Aliu 2009). Parties have shown no interest so far to undertake such an initiative. This is supported by the fact that up to now no law on party finances has been legislated.

Furthermore, parties continue to be among the driving forces of corruption. Moreover, they lack the will and readiness to fight corruption. Most development of corruption takes place directly from the parties in government. All parties do in this regard is rhetorically put dust in the eyes of voters without doing anything practical. Party leaders often portray words such as “zero tolerance to corruption”, though it stands in contradiction with party activities on that issue. They would be more sincere if they were to proclaim just the opposite. On parties’ programmes and electoral platforms there is no such policy to be found, except wordy commitments. For instance, in the 2007 electoral campaign LDK declared “we are committed to fight corruption with non-corrupted people” (Koha Ditore 8 November 2007). AKR in this respect affirmed “we will lead the war against corruption” (Epoka e Re 09.11.2007). From LDD as well, Shefki Gashi raised its party commitment to fight corruption “we promise to fight corruption” (Zeri 09.11.2007). However, after the dust of the election campaign rests, up to now no one has taken any steps in that direction.

The high level of corruption affects democracy consolidation developments, limiting the space for democracy to give effect in terms of citizens’ benefit. Despite the high level of corruption, the anxiety remains with the lack of fight against corruption, and the shortage of vision and political will from parties to fight corruption.

### ***Healthcare***

Since the collapse of socialism where the healthcare system was publicly owned and run, the Kosovo healthcare system has been in chaos, and is not yet established. It is neither public nor private. Kosovo remains the only country in Europe without a healthcare insurance policy. Parties in government tried just to meddle with the chaos of healthcare without providing a policy on how to functionalise the system. It should be pointed out that the pharmaceutical industry is among the most corrupted sectors in Kosovo. Some high level decision makers have illegal profits from it in the hundreds of millions, preventing any possible arrangement for the healthcare system. Parties in opposition often assert as well that there is a collapse of the healthcare system, without innovating any policy to fix it. During electoral campaigns, in order to maximise votes, unrealisable and populist promises are found. PDK for example in the 2007 electoral campaign declared “health for all” (Infopress 10.11.2007), and promised “80 million for healthcare in 2008” (Koha Ditore 10.11.2007). In addition, LDK promised “we will invest in education and healthcare” (Kosova Sot 29.09.2004).

Such promises are very empty, irresponsible, and never followed through. Party programmes and platforms do not offer any innovation in policy on how to tackle the problem. In the interviews conducted with party representatives, they confirmed that they still have no policy options on healthcare.

### ***Energy policy***

The energy sector since the end of war has been one of the greatest black holes in the Kosovo economy. It swallowed huge funds from the Kosovo budget and international donations, but still constitutes as one of the biggest problems in Kosovo. Electricity supply is a concern of every Kosovo citizen, because very often it is in short supply. Yet, also in this sector Kosovo parties have not offered any policy on how to solve it. Economic development is highly dependent on energy supply; though they promised a lot, so far they have not offered any

workable solution to it. The PDK leader promised “24 hours electricity supply” (Infopress 31.10.2007). In another electoral campaign Thaqi also pledged that “we will provide energy to the entire region” (Koha Ditore 31.10.2007), which sounds funny, since actually often people in Kosovo have no electricity for up to 12 hours a day.

### ***Education***

The Kosovo education system is not better-off than the other sectors. Less than half passed the Matura State exam in 2009, there is high percentage of schoolchildren leaving schools, and a very low quality of education in general. Parties instead of trying to find ways on how to functionalise the education system, they are competing on who is going to extend political control of it. As in other policy sectors, in education policy also, parties have not provided any policy on how to get out of such chaos. One of the greatest problems of the education system in Kosovo at all levels is the politicisation of education. There is an eager competition among parties on who is going to extend their control over the education system. The major contribution of parties in the education system remains their empty words and promises during electoral campaigns.

### ***EU and NATO Integration***

EU and NATO integration is considered one of the main priorities for all Balkan countries. The standards required for integration do not seem to have been on the practical agenda of workable policy offers by parties in power or in opposition. In the interviews conducted with party representatives, no such policy, as to the best way to push forward the reforms needed, was provided. A few of them lack even information on how the process of integration takes place. Yet, in Kosovo, the rhetoric on integration is not missing. European integration also means better prospects for democracy consolidation, since the EU is among the main guardians of democracy in Kosovo, and all the required reforms for integration add to democracy consolidation. Nevertheless, the commitments of parties for integration are not absent, but in practice they present little, frequently

hindering many reforms required by the EU, delaying the process of integration. Some parties even formulate promises that cannot be taken seriously. The AAK leader promised that “with AAK Kosovo will be a member of the EU by 2005” (Koha Ditore 05.10.2004). Such promises do not take into account the complexities of the process of integration and the challenges Kosovo has in that process. Another laughable promise came from AKR by “promising the movement of Kosovo people in Europe without visa restriction” (Koha Ditore 11.11.2007).

#### **8.4. Conclusion**

From the exploration done on the innovation function of parties, through looking at party programmes, electoral platforms, declarations, interviews, various reports, and particularly the media during the electoral campaigns of the three national elections, it can be concluded that Kosovo political parties perform very poorly in their innovation function, with good performance required to facilitate democracy consolidation. Particular attention was paid to the party promises on the election campaigns of the three national elections: 2001, 2004, and 2007. What became obvious were the pie-in-the-sky, irresponsible promises made by parties. The deficiency of parties on creativity, vision, and the political will to innovate solutions in line with policies to the public problems of society is not a promising signal for the consolidation of Kosovo democracy prospects. The inexperience of Kosovo with democracy and pluralism might be to some extent a justification, as a shortage of expertise for innovation needed by parties. Nevertheless, it should be pointed out that the majority of well-educated people are not in parties and politics at all. However, the dilemma remains with the absence of the will among parties to innovate solutions to such problems. Why have parties closed the doors to educated people, and not mobilising the expertise Kosovo has? Is it that the party leader and the party elite are not interested in offering such innovation? Solutions to such problems would be a strong reason for a young democracy like Kosovo to be widely legitimated. Yet, Kosovo parties have built iron doors to creativity that might be included within the

policy making process of parties. All this has only one reason, in no way can the absolute power of the parties' leaders be challenged.

Thus, parties have no capacity or creativity to innovate policies as solutions to the public problems of society. There is no single policy sector covered by the policy solutions of parties. Likewise, parties' failure in the innovation function means also the blight on democratic institutions and democracy as a whole to offer to citizens what they otherwise expect from them. The innovation function should not be taken as being separated from other functions, but rather to rally around them and is supplemented by other functions as well.

## Chapter 9

### **9. Exploiting the State - The Governing Function of Parties in Kosovo**

#### ***9.1. Introduction***

Governing is one of the most important functions of parties in a representative democracy. In recent times, parties have experienced a decline (Dalton 2006) in terms of the public trust they used to enjoy at society level, including party functions performed at this level. The integration, representation, legitimation, and to some extent innovation functions are being performed less by parties, compared to the first half and the beginning of the second part of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. However, in a different way, particularly since the cartelisation (chap. on integration function) of parties, the governing function of parties has been intensified, empowered and enlarged. Such a development has been coupled with the decline of the two faces of parties. Katz & Mair (1994) emphasise that even in consolidated democracies, despite the decline in the two faces of the parties, at the organisation and electorate level, there has been a significant increase in the role played by parties at the governing level. In addition, it is not counted as a decline but rather as a transformation of parties. Yet, if such a transformation is taking place in consolidated democracies with a highly developed complementary structure of intermediary institutions, what would then be the case with fragile democracies, with a pitiable level of development of such institutions? Though a crucial issue for the democratization process, it is out of the coverage of the topic we are dealing with.

Such a transformation of parties means that through the governing function parties compensate for their dwindled role in other functions at society level. Putting it through Lincoln's definition of democracy, it is a governing for the people, but less by the people, and even lesser with the people, as the level of participation and integration from the masses is depleted. The question arises whether in the long-term, parties can govern for the people, since lesser by, and

even without people. It is barely anticipated - a democratic governing for the people without people, since they are not part of the decision making process, implying lesser protection of majorities' interests, and lesser democracy in turn. Such scepticism is manifested through the consistent decrease of participation indicated by low voter turnout, among other things.

Nevertheless, the only function that parties in a representative democracy do not share with any other intermediary institution is the governing function. Since other intermediary institutions, NGOs, social movements, interest groups, or any other organisation, might to some extent complement and sustain other party functions, the governing function is in turn an exclusively party function. Yet, within the policy process, in particular, the level of agenda setting and policy formulation issues can be raised by others as well, aside from political parties. However, the issue here referring to the governing function has to do merely with decision making of government and parliament, consisting mainly of governing and opposition parties. The party role and responsibility at this level amplifies the importance of parties at the governing level compared to other functions. The governing function includes the decision-making and the output level of a democratic system. It touches the citizens directly through government performance in terms of policies and decisions, and as a result has a direct impact on the democratization prospects that are our concern here.

Therefore, since the focus is the reflection of the governing function of parties in the democracy consolidation process, several widespread characteristics of the way the governing is taking place, impacting directly the consolidation prospects, are considered here. The operationalisability of measurement of this function confines the scope of indicators that have a damaging effect on the democratization process. The focus will not be on some routine procedures such as elections for example, since there is no way to question the very existence of such institutions due to the presence of the international community in Kosovo, , despite many cases of violations where *darkness* enabled such activity – election

fraud<sup>67</sup>. Political parties in the Kosovo democratization process are identified with developing party patronage, clientele, corruption, nepotism, clans and fraud, socio-political relationships conceptualised in various ways, among others by Kopecky, Scherlis, Spirova (2008); Müller (2006); Marcus & Ratsimbaharison (2005); Fox (1994); etc.. Likewise, such government (made up of parties) behaviours and attitudes are perceived by citizens as a model of democratic governing, and as an opportunity for political elites to exploit the state (Grzymala-Busse 2003 & 2007) for private ends and particularistic benefits, at the expense of citizens. Yet, the parties' behaviours and attitudes in the governing function are reflected in the ability of parties to perform other functions, such as legitimation, representation, innovation, and integration.

Nonetheless, the opposition parties also have their role in the governing process, in terms of offering alternatives to governing practices, holding the government accountable – horizontal accountability, taking initiatives, and offering policy alternatives. Opposition parties have a great role, particularly in preventing, if not in triggering, the exploitative government behaviour. Grzymala-Busse (2008) discovered that in countries with a strong opposition there was less space for state exploitation, in reverse, a high level of such exploitation took place.

In the case of an internationally monitored process of democracy consolidation, to which Kosovo belongs as well, the failure of parties to perform other functions is compensated in the short and medium term at the governing level, repaying citizens through good performance at the governing function, in terms of a high level of socio-economic development in general<sup>68</sup>. In Kosovo, the opposite happened; parties hid themselves and their failures at governing level behind the international presence, throwing the ball of failure to the international community.

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67 The weekly TV programme "Life in Kosovo" organised by BIRN, showed on RTK cases on election fraud in 2007, captured by phone cams.

68 See for example the case of Germany and Japan after WWII, where they achieved the leading economies of the world. People could feel that benefit through employment opportunities and better standards of living.

Therefore, the governing function of parties is of vital importance in the process of democracy consolidation, in terms of enabling or preventing democracy to give effect, of citizen's interests. If parties perform other functions poorly, they can make and implement the best policies and inculcate democratic values by increasing the level of performance at the governing function. It amplifies the citizens' trust in democracy institutions, and consequently makes democracy more stable and enduring, at the level that Scharpf (1998) calls it *output democracy*. On the other side, if parties perceive the governing power only as a means to fulfil their particularistic interests through public goods, they fuel distrust and create a legitimacy crisis not only for them to be ousted from power, but also for democratic institutions in the eyes, minds and hearts of citizens. What makes things worse, is the absence of a better alternative to such behaviour, as parties find themselves closed into the *prisoner's dilemma*, striving to defeat each other with similar games and consequently for the same purpose, to exploit the state. In such a case, Kosovo democracy would become more vulnerable and shakeable, with lesser prospects for consolidation. Most of the legitimacy for democratic institutions in Kosovo emerged as enthusiasm against the previous regime. If the current regime fails to perform better than the previous one, the enthusiasm might dwindle with time and later on even disappear altogether.

Kosovo political parties through good governing (economic development, transparency, better education, rule of law, better chances for employment, accountability, responsibility, and so on) can enhance the chances of democracy consolidation. In this way, they can compensate for the low level of people's participation in the political process. However, if parties fail also at the governing level then it is hard to wait for democracy to give effect, or be optimistic on the prospects for democracy consolidation. In Kosovo, there are many indicators of the failure of parties also at the governing function, restraining and even freezing the hopes for good prospects of democracy consolidation. As such, parties also fail to develop democracy through the output level. In this regard, Pieter Faith the head of ICO, on a debate at the European Parliament, criticised the Kosovo

government and parliament, composed of parties, as failing to act in an accountable and transparent way, failing to fight corruption and organised crime, despite their proclamation at a declarative level (conforming the dual faces of parties in Kosovo, see chap. 7). Moreover, The Kosovo parliament has failed to develop the culture of political debate in parliament, and to control the executive as one of the primary duties of the parliament. The government often takes many decisions without any prior consultation with parliament as it is required (Express 12.02.2009).

Kosovo has experienced a quadruple transition, whereby the governing role of Kosovo parties to manage the democratisation process has been of crucial importance, despite other simultaneous transitions taking place and having an impact on democratization. Due to their position in the social and institutional structure of the Kosovo political system, parties are the key carriers of the democracy deepening process in Kosovo. The system transformation in Kosovo was and is still characterised by the so-called dilemma of Simultaneity (Elster 1990), a transition that political transformation is also associated with the transformation of the economic system. (Mis)Management of such a transformation, aside from the role of the international community, was primarily a responsibility of political parties in power and those in opposition. Yet, their performance up to now has not shown promising results. Kosovo is placed among the most corrupted and poorest places in Europe, with a very high level of corruption, organised crime and trafficking (World Bank report on Kosovo 2007; Annual EU Commission Reports 2003 to 2009; Annual Reports of Transparency International, ICG Reports on Kosovo; etc.). Mismanagement of the complex transition affects directly the consolidation possibilities.

This is one of the reasons why, in the governing function of parties in Kosovo, the focus of measurement is in the extent to which they make use of public goods, or state resources for their private and particularistic interests. Therefore, the multi transformation process in Kosovo is brought up, because transformation from

centrally planned, to a free market economy has given a great opportunity to parties in power, and to some extent to those in opposition, to (mis)use these resources. Previously such resources were state centralised. Transforming into the free market economy has sent ownership and management into a state of flux, in a non-functional institutional structure meant to manage such a transition. This state of affairs was and is still very practical and easy useable for their particularistic interests, thus making the overall Kosovo democracy and system entirely vulnerable, tremendously increasing the opportunity, ambitions, and the degree, of politicisation at almost every level. Instead of looking for the best policies to manage the dilemma of simultaneity, Kosovo parties found it to be a very useful opportunity to make use of it for their particularistic interests. The political transition was completed by weak institutions, incapable of managing the transition in a proper way. The transformation of property from state owned to private ownership is often used for the benefit of a few individuals, thus making such exploitation a norm in itself.

Such exploitative behaviour by parties has a spill over effect on the process of democracy consolidation in Kosovo, primarily preventing the empowerment of institutions. Weak institutions have no capacity to push forward the consolidation of democracy. On the other side, exploitation gives power to those benefiting from it in one way or another. Subsequently, they strive consistently to increase their power, which in turn means less and less power for institutions in general, and democratic institutions in particular. The state-exploiting behaviour of parties, at the third and fourth level of the democratisation structure, maintains and develops institutions that consistently interrogate democracy and democracy consolidation developments. Most exploitation takes place in arrangements with veto actors to democracy, constituting the third level of the consolidation structure. Moreover, it encourages the criminalisation of politics, increasing authoritarian tendencies of the political elite in alliance with organised crime, and enables contracting state property through the economic and social clientele of

parties. Likewise, political parties empower and habituate informal institutions, behaving contrary to democracy and the democracy consolidation process.

In addition, such party behaviour influences the fourth level of the consolidation structure, spreading and inculcating exploitative behaviour widely among society, instead of civic culture. It makes state exploitation and informal institutions the norm among society. Yet, it leads to the prioritisation of other rules of the game, different and challenging to democracy. On the other side, such developments among society, are more likely to create a safe bed for parties having more exploitative behaviour. As a result, the current trend of developments is not on the same track with democratic norms and values, determining the pursuance of objectives other than those democratic. The tendency within the process offers fewer prospects for democracy consolidation. Furthermore, it means the delay and overextension of the process, with unpredictable results in terms of time and content. This spill over effect occurs, as long as such a development is currently going on in Kosovo.

However, it should be pointed out that in the case of Kosovo, the governing function was shared with the international community, though today not as much as it used to be. Governing competencies of inner actors are increased continuously and gradually. After the war up to independence, it was shared with UNMIK, currently there is ICO and EULEX with lesser and lower competences compared to UNMIK.

The focus of the research here are the party tendencies to politicise and then exploit the state for their particular ends, largely related with party finances, through the governing function. Such party behaviours generate clientelism, patrimonialism, clans and nepotism, considered unhealthy for democracy. The procedure of measurement takes place merely through collecting data by interviews and document analysis methods. The data are taken from civil service employment, procurement procedures (government contracts, tenders, etc. –

used for particularistic benefits, the privatization process, and so on), party policy formulation, media and other prestigious organisations reports on corruption, governance, and so on.

## **9.2. Power as a “Cake” - Governing to exploit the state**

The decision-making and the policy process at the output level of the governing function of parties, so far proves to be different from that normally expected. States having weak institutions, in terms of capacity and functionality, serve as safe havens for parties to grab state resources. System transformation in Kosovo led to a break-up of the monopoly held by the former communist party, but failed to decrease the level of politicisation<sup>69</sup> – common in monist regimes like the former socialism. In this way, it created a very fertile environment for parties to exploit the state. Transformation was an inevitable and indispensable part of the democratic transition at the region level. However, it could have been managed better if parties were organised differently and better, having and pursuing democratic objectives, cultivating democratic values within themselves first, and then expand them society wide, representing citizens’ interests. The break of the monopoly characterising the former communist system, offers the possibility for parties (in a sense oligarchs) to struggle and compete to capture the state at each election. As proved in earlier chapters, the way Kosovo parties are organised, their identities, and the objectives they pursue, present features of state capturing parties. New states, such as Kosovo, provides enormous space and opportunity for parties to make use of a weak institutional structure, and utilize public resources for private, narrow, and particularistic interests.

Nevertheless, the transformation process from an economic point of view meant transforming also the state owned property into private hands. Such a process offered fertile ground for corruption and state exploitation, since it put into play

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69 Politicization is defined as the ability of the state to directly influence the behaviours of the socio-economic activity of society (McMenamin 2004, 2). He focuses just on the influence on individual enterprises, because of his case of study. I rather added influence on socio-economic activity, because of the wide and deep range of issues and fields at many levels where the state, and parties through state and other informal institutions as vehicles try to influence their behaviours.

most state property, which was meant to be privatised, and managed by very weak institutions easily ignorable by informal rules of the game. Transformation takes place, mainly through government institutions, the international community – fourth pillar of UNMIK, and the privatisation agency – KAP, headed by internationals and by local authorities as well. The privatisation process, is believed mathematically to be the largest sector where state exploitation took place, due to the largest transformation of resources from state to private property.

Nonetheless, such party behaviour is closely related with the very existence of parties, being financially dependent on such exploitation. Actually, Kosovo parties barely rely on finances from their membership fees or other legal means. The high level of poverty and parties' detachment from society drives parties to look for other sources of finances in order to survive and afford their organisation structure, based largely on clientele, usually more expensive than other types of organisation structures employing mainly the will of the people. Therefore, party finances are briefly explored in order to have a clear picture of them, as they are one of the main driving forces for the development of state exploitative party behaviour in the Kosovo party system, having a negative impact on the consolidation prospects.

### **9.2.1. Party finances**

Among the current developments in party transformations, even in consolidated democracies, is the way parties are financed. Party cartelisation in Western Europe was mostly the result of the public finance of parties that brought parties closer to the state. One of the main reasons for such a transformation was to prevent parties from being bribed by those keen to corrupt decision-makers. However, it does not mean that party corruption has been prevented successfully and completely, but reduced to a somewhat controllable scale. This constitutes one of the ways parties have interpenetrated with the state, to some extent leading to further state control of parties. Nonetheless, the problem augments in the case of failed and new states, featured with weak institutions not able to hold

the state above the parties' influence and domination - parties find it easy to colonise the state and use it by trading their support with state resources. Parties have to rely on various financial resources in order to survive, therefore corruption is found to them to be a very suitable means to rely on financially, without taking into account the political costs it has. On the other side, corruption of parties means also the corruption of democracy and the process of democratisation itself. The heavy dependence of parties on alternative and even *black* funds, make them prone to corruption.

Nevertheless, not surprisingly, up to now there is no law (KTV News at 19.00, on 25.03.2009) on party finances. This is merely due to the vicious cycle closed by Kosovo political parties. They keep most of their finances in the black box, not being public and not enabling the public to understand their sources. The high level of poverty and the increasing gap between parties and society posed obscurity for parties to rely solely on finances from party membership. Parliamentary parties get part of their finances from the democratisation found in the Kosovo budget of 15000 Euros per MP on a yearly basis, part of the budget allocated for democratisation. This is known as public finance of parties. Yet, it is not sufficient for their activities and the type of organisational structure they have. Parties have to look at other possibilities, for cash, or other arrangements for exchanges by state resources once in power. Despite the funding from the Kosovo budget, parties declaratively explain some of the sources of finances. All of them, except AKR, declare that part of their finances come from membership fees. Yet, looking at the poverty rate of Kosovo society and the actual structure of parties, that is hardly reliable. AKR members, by statute, are not asked to pay membership fees. Regarding AKR finances, deputy chairman Ibrahim Makolli declares (Zeri 20.06.2009) that despite the funding it gets from the Kosovo budget, its main financer remains the party leader Behgjet Pacolli. The party finances in that way stand contrary to the CEC Regulation (Nr.1/2008, Art. 17) specifying that a party can get annually not more than 20 000 Euros from a single person, and only if that is compatible with the UNMIK Regulation 2004/2 on

preventing money laundering (Art. 5). Moreover, AAK, PDK, LDK, LDD declare that they are dependent on donations, mostly not made public, implying a lack of transparency and the danger of being pushed into taking decisions in favour of the donors (legal and illegal), not excluding that, though that might be at the cost of the Kosovo state and society. The non-transparency of financing parties is contrary to the dispositions of UNMIK Regulation 2004/2 on preventing money laundering. The aim of the regulation was to prevent party financing from money laundering activities, highly common in Kosovo (there is no law on preventing the money laundering). If party financing does not conform to this regulation (Art 5), then there is plenty of room to doubt that money laundering is taking place in Kosovo party finances, because Kosovo is widely known as a safe place for money laundering at all levels. Party finances are also based on suspicious funding, not excluding criminal activities as well (Krasniqi 2009), which in turn strengthens the politician-criminal interpenetrations, ensuring criminalisation of politics, and making democracy consolidation at the third level of consolidation less likely. In other words, the veto actors are further empowered.

This is the main grounds, why legislatures made up of parties, have not yet legislated on party finances. The lack of a law on party finances stimulates party corruption. They have free reign to enter into various arrangements of exchanges not sanctioned by the law. Consequently, corrupted parties are given a good reason not to legislate for the regulation of their finances. As they become more corrupted, less and less space and incentives are provided for the legal regulation of party finances, and so continues the spill over effect. In this way a vicious cycle of corruption is created at different levels of society including the governing structure, forcing parties to trade state resources for financial support. Such party corruption also leads to the development of corruption and institutions enabling corruption, which is a challenge to the democratic institutional structure.

It is no wonder Kosovo is among the most corrupted democracies in Europe (Transparency International Reports 2008, 2009). The governing function of

parties in Kosovo is expected to be performed by already corrupted parties, despite their denial, corruption is reflected in their governing activity at all levels. Decisions taken are affected by the bribes and support, often illegal, provided to decision-makers. Therefore, parties are forced to exploit the state in order to pay back the financial support they get from those corrupting parties. Consequently, it can be concluded that party financing is strongly correlated with party corruption, and corruption of politics, mirrored in corruption of democracy and democracy consolidation prospects. This constitutes one of the explanations why there is no real fight against corruption in Kosovo democracy, merely at the declaration level. The spill over effect in the case of corruption is transmitted to the whole system and jeopardises the existence of democracy.

Accordingly, the major role of such party behaviour is their striving for existence. The ideals of parties such as LDK before the war and PDK and AAK immediately after the war are vanishing. The closer the achievement of their ideals, though quite similar - the independence issue, the smaller the parties' support would be. For example, LDK before the war was a massive party, with some considering it a mass movement. It relied merely on wide society support. However, later on as the independence issue was coming closer to being achieved on the one side, and with the socio-economic needs of society deteriorating on the other side, the symbolic issue of independence no longer worked in feeding the expectations of society. Therefore, parties were pushed to look for alternative support, substituting the shrinking reliance on broad social support. A reduced number of party members, from where parties collect the money and other support they needed, enforced by the high level of poverty in society, strained parties to rely on the clientele – having high costs, and normally affordable only by parties in control of state resources, or those coming into that position. The governing taking place in such way affects directly democracy development prospects, as well as the state capacity developments.

### **9.3. First Politicisation, then State Capture**

The state capture is a common phenomenon, particularly in cases where parties capture the state for their narrow ends. This happens merely through widening the scope of politicisation, extending and deepening the fertile ground for the state capture. Hereby, to measure such a role of parties through government behaviour, which have a direct impact on the democratisation process, the concept developed by Grzymala-Busse (2008) is used. It measures to what extent parties capture the state to use its resources for particularistic goals. In the case of Kosovo parties, whereby most of them are personalistic and oligarchic in their way of organisation, these state resources are employed primarily for individual interests, different from what Grzymala-Busse claimed - using them just for their clientele. The actual high level of poverty reduces the costs of clientele, as the higher the level of poverty, the cheaper the clientele would be. It is obvious, that such poverty implies a very low level of redistribution, as most of the means ends up in a few pockets of the parties' top elites, or leaders, usually while in power.

Grzymala-Busse (2008) defines state capture as "*the extraction of private benefits by incumbent officeholders from the state*" (p. 638). Among the four regimes she identified in terms of two indicators, redistribution and competition (p. 640), the case of Kosovo seems to be in between clientelism and exploitation. There is competition (though some might consider it as internationally and paternalistically monitored), and in some sectors there is no redistribution at all, while in some others such as public administration – civil servants, government contracts, tenders, privatisation, and remaining public companies, there is a distribution for their clientele. Parties reimburse their clientele's support through state resources.

State exploitation is directly linked with democratization as a process. It causes alienation, apathy, and the disenchantment of people, considering themselves not a part of the system – democracy, since they do not benefit from that,

excluding a minority of them – constituting the clienteles of parties. Citizens perceive democracy as a system that facilitates the political elite to get rich within a night, and leave society poorer day by day. This is a very bad image of democracy demonstrated through party behaviours in the governing function. Such practice creates the worldviews of citizens about democracy, raising suspicion, scepticism, and distrust in democracy, firstly in the public's minds and later in their hearts as well; furthermore, citizens pay a heavy price for it. The perception and worldview created about democracy, conceptualises democracy as a system that enables parties smooth state exploitation. State exploitation in other words means exploiting people because they make up the public goods, citizens pay for them, and do not get them back as they are supposed to be, because such goods are utilised for the private or particularistic interests of the few. As an exploitative behaviour, it narrows the space and ground for strengthening the first level of the consolidation structure, preventing the constitutional arrangements and institutions from functioning as legally prescribed, since if the constitutional order functions, exploitation would be more troublesome.

In addition, the same author defines the state “*as the set of formal institutions that administers citizen's obligations, enforces legal sanctions, and regulates public provisions*”. The political parties at the governing level fill up the political positions of these institutions. Moreover, political parties' clienteles hold positions even at the lower levels – including civil servants, aside from political positions, due to a high level of politicisation. What citizen's obligations are supposed to be is also largely decided by political parties. Legal sanctions are specified by the law legislated from parliament, filled by political parties. Additionally, public provisions are regulated by legislation coming out from representative institutions – political parties, and implemented by government agencies or companies contracted and supervised by the government and parliament made up of parties as well. Therefore, parties' governing function is crucial in governing the behaviours and outcomes of institutions. State exploitation impedes democracy

consolidation prospects, therefore in order to alleviate and ensure a smooth consolidation process, parties should be brought to accuracy.

Wide and deep state capture and exploitation by parties is enabled merely through politicisation. For that reason, the first thing parties do in order to use state resources for particularistic interests, is to extend and deepen as much as possible the level of politicisation. Politicization here is conceptualised as the ability of the state to influence directly the behaviours of the socio-economic activity of society (McMenamin 2004, 2). He focuses just on the influence on individual enterprises, because of his case of study. I added influence on socio-economic activity, because of the wide and deep range of issues and fields at many levels where parties through the state as a vehicle and other informal institutions, try to influence their behaviour. In a state with a non-consolidated structure, as happens within states experiencing a transition of structuring power in the institutional state structure, the institutional structure of the state with all accompanying institutions is very easy to be politicised. In the case of Kosovo, most of the state institutions were just established or still being created. One of the major requirements from the EU Council (EU Council Decision 18.02.2008, 2008/213/EC) was for Kosovo to stop political control over many supposedly independent institutions, among them the judiciary, public administration, and so on. Moreover, the independent overseeing bodies created and managed by the parliament have not been safe from politicisation. However, their level of politicisation makes such bodies irresponsible to parliament since they rely on political support in turn. Most of them often do not appear in parliament at all, as required, simply just ignoring parliament (Koha Ditore, 03.04.2009). Recently, the high level of politicisation was manifested directly also in the decision of the Kosovo Prime minister to oust all temporary secretary generals of eight ministries (Ditari 19.30, *RTK*, 25.03. 2009), which is a competence of the Independent Council for Higher Nomination. Secretary Generals of ministries are civil staff, but such a decision shows among other things the politicisation of this level of civil servants as well. Moreover, after the declaration of independence, since OSCE

passed the competences to the Kosovo institution, political parties have tried to extend their influence to the Central Election Committee (CEC) - an independent body in charge of election and parties, . They competed for the position of secretary of the CEC (Zeri 24.02.2009; Lajm 20.03.2009), though legally such a position is not allowed to be filled by a political person. Political parties consider their control in the electoral process as of crucial importance, therefore they try to politicise such a sensitive institution, in charge of administering elections.

As mentioned earlier, though the monopoly known in the former communist regime in Kosovo was broken down, the second element of such a totalitarian regime - the politicisation, is still present and actual, with no signs of decline on the horizon. In the following several fields are touched upon, shadowed by political parties for politicisation and then exploitation.

### **9.3.1. Public administration and public companies**

One of the main concerns of society after the war, due to the high level of poverty, was jobs. Lacking the vision to trigger economic development, that could offer many jobs among other things, parties found it easier to buy the political support from clientele, reimbursing many of them through employment in public administration, raising the number of civil servants to 73000, from the 30000 required by the EU Commission. Each and every party PDK, LDK, AAK, being in government in one time or another after the war, found the public service sector a fertile ground for paying back the political support of their clients, relatives, clan relatives, and so on. Despite many requests from the IMF, EU Commission, and other international bodies to depoliticise and reduce the number employed in the public administration, the government (Koha Ditore 30.03.2009), and parties in opposition as well, did not give an indication, or present a plan and will to do so. Public administration remains highly politicised, and it would be better to call it the state (captured by parties) administration and not a public one.

Public companies suffered the same from the identical fortune. Their employees are made up of parties' clientele. The PTK, Airport, KEK, and so on, are floated

by party clients, party elites' relatives, etc.. Referring to such politicisation, an ICG Report among other things (February 2006) states: "cronyism seems to inform government choices of candidates for the new boards of the public utilities and regulatory bodies". Consequently, in the course of politicised boards, they extend their control over them, and among other exploitations overemploy as it suits them.

It is widely known that unproductive employment harms public institutions and public companies in many ways. Civil servants have no loyalty towards the state, as they should, as clients are loyal to their bosses, parties. As such, they are always putting in danger the state, as parties keep coming in and out of power. Secondly, clientele are employed without professional criteria, they are not qualified to do their expected job. They are not effective and efficient, producing weak and unprofessional public administration. Moreover, it costs a lot of the budget and cannot be considered anything else than a use of public goods for particularistic ends. In addition, the EU has consistently required the depoliticisation of the public administration as one of the criteria to join the EU.

In the case of public companies, such governing party behaviour is not a recent one, it is found immediately after the war and still persists even today, with increasing linearly. An ICG Balkan Report (December 2001) states that "Political interference in the former state companies and even public institutions by the main Kosovo Albanian parties is endemic". Such politicization harms companies in a way that makes them unproductive and very wasteful, decreasing the companies' efficiency. On the other side, the boards of directors of those companies are highly politicised, as a result, international bodies are needed to intervene to prevent the political appointments on boards of public companies, trying to minimise it though not alleviating it entirely. Peter Faith the Head of ICO has been highly fretful of political appointments at the directing boards of public companies (KEK, PTK, Airport) and government civil servant positions, by parties in power (Koha Ditore 24.02.2009; Zeri 20.03.2009). Officials of ICO have

declared that 15 out of 85 members of boards of public companies will be ousted, since they are political persons (Express 02.03.2009). Political appointments are in contradiction with the law on public companies, as they should be composed of professionals and non-party people. Yet, the reality has proved to be the opposite, most of them come from parties, people loyal to parties, or serving parties. Those people are there actually to protect their respective parties' interest. In this way, public companies are transformed into vehicles of parties, of merely parties in power, whereby parties use them for their own interests and the reimbursement of clients, but at the cost of public interest, since public companies belong to and are the property of the public in general. Nonetheless, parties establish politicisation as a mechanism to exploit the state, purposely to utilize public companies for their interest. Likewise, they exploit at any cost to the company, bringing companies close to bankrupt, and often later privatising them for themselves or their clients at very low costs. For example, KEK is among the largest *consumer* of the Kosovo budget (Kosovo Budget Allocations), after the war, it could never sustain itself, but it was a useful way to get at the Kosovo budget. Regarding PTK, among overemployment, which is common to it, there was also no transparent decision to extend its business in Albania, arranged in quite a closed book manner. It is believed that the decision resulted mainly due to political pressures and decisions (Koha Ditore 23.02.2009).

The examples of politicisation and state exploitation are many, but here some are presented, illustrating the issue sufficiently. In such a way, political parties through the governing function, politicise, among others, public companies in order to use them for their particularistic interest.

### **9.3.2. Public procurement and government contracts**

Public procurement is another sector with a very attractive and smooth way to misuse public money, therefore hunted for politicisation by parties. The procurement procedures are not properly regulated by the law legislated in 2003. It needs modification according to EU directives. The Kosovo Progress Report in 2009 by the EU Commission stated explicitly that the largest sector of corruption

is found in public procurement, suggesting an urgent amendment of the law on procurement according to EU Directives. As such, it highlights a very high level of state exploitation taking place by parties in power, in terms of utilising public money for their narrow ends. The initiative for amendment of the law has not yet taken place by any party, be they in government or in opposition. Therefore, such procurement procedures fuel corruption, weakens the state institutions, omits the democratic accountability of institutions, and consequently weakens the democracy and democracy consolidation prospects in general. On the other hand, Faith the head of ICO, at the European Parliament, stated that the highest abuses of public money are happening in public procurement and public tenders. Arllaki, an EMP from Italy, in this regard adds that in Kosovo there is an interconnection between politics and organised crime, posing a danger not just for Kosovo, but for the entirety of Europe (Koha Ditore 02.10.2009).

The breaches of public procurement were characteristics of all governments after the war. The General Auditors for 2007 found many misuses of public money at the Ministry of Trade and Industry (Koha Ditore 05.03.2009). Such misuses and exploitative behaviour of governing parties have produced the broad spread phenomena of *Tenderomania*, turning Kosovo democracy somehow into a *tenderocracy*. The government contracts given to companies, or as it is widely known *tenderomania*, is a very useful tool to compensate for the political support companies give to parties. Usually, companies support parties in two ways. It employs clients, and with Kosovo being a very much traditional society still with strong blood relationships, their relatives are also forced to vote for the party the company in question supports. In addition, the company supports the party financially. Yet, as parties come to power they have to pay this support back to companies. Therefore, these companies are privileged in terms of getting government contracts for various projects. Such favouritism is linked with public procurement as well. The process itself lacks transparency and stands contrary to democratic norms, values, and procedures. Usually, each party coming to power favours the companies supporting them and fights as much as possible

against companies supporting other parties. As the governing parties' behaviour, they produce values and norms of favouritism, increase the level of corruption, and impede the foundation of a democratic system based on openness, equal opportunity to all, and values of open competition.

Such behaviour, at the representation level of democracy consolidation also damages the constitutional level, since it does not allow the constitutional structure to take effect due to the state exploiting behaviour of parties.

### **9.3.3. Privatisation**

Transition from a central commanded to free market economy necessitated privatisation. During the socialist system the medium and largest sectors of the economy were publicly owned. With system transformation, both sectors were to be privatised under the model of a *shock therapy* transition in general, coordinated with the international community in Kosovo. Privatisation as a process and as an output failed. The majority of producing factories privatised ended up as cafeterias, bars, and so on. Parties used such a flux in the state of affairs and institutional arrangements, in which privatisation took place, to try to benefit from it as much possible. Naser Rugova from LDD (2010) believes that privatisation could be more successful if it was not politicised by political parties. It should be made clear also, that many international staff in this sector were highly corrupted as well. On the other side, privatisation as a process generated and supported corruption, non-transparency, favouritism, clientelism, clanism, and so on. The use of privatisation for the benefit of parties is affirmed by Zhinipotoku (2009), too. While according to Matoshi (2009) the privatisation process, has indeed established a class in itself, constituting a network of politicians (from parties) and businesses, abusing public property. On the other hand, Gezim Krasniqi (2009) is of the opinion that parties have done whatever possible to prevent enterprises from being privatised by people outside their parties and their interest groups. It means they endeavoured to reimburse their clienteles through the privatisation process. However, party representatives, in particular those actually in power, tried to blame the international community for

the failure of the privatisation process, as the PDK spokesman did (Stavileci – PDK spokesman 2010). While those in opposition believe that from the privatisation process, political parties and individuals have benefited mostly (Ramadani – secretary general of AAK 2010).

The transformation of responsibility of the agency from the international community to the locals from AKM to AKP best proves the misuse since all the documents and archives were burned, raising doubts of the process.

#### **9.3.4. Budget allocation**

The budget allocation is highly influenced on a party basis. Despite the allocation of the budget based on certain ministries and municipalities governed by the powerful parties, there is a tendency to extend the control of the composition of the department of the budget that should usually be made up of civil servants. The government has changed the structure of the budget department as often as the ministers of finances were changed (Koha Ditore 09.03.2009). Most of the budget is allocated to the municipalities headed by the parties in power (Kosovo budget allocation being on a yearly basis). On the other side, the strategy for communes led by opposition parties, was for less resources to be allocated from the budget, in order to make them fail and lose at the coming election, despite the fact that the citizens of the communes in question were directly harmed. Yet, that is to be considered as mismanagement of public money, or referring to the Grzymala definition of the state, it is known as awful administration of public resources.

Furthermore, parties in the coalition, having more power, tried to allocate more money to the ministries run by them (Kosovo budget allocation being on a yearly basis). In this way, they tried to highlight their success compared to the ministries run by the other partner of the coalition. In addition, through a bigger budget they could more easily reimburse their clients from state resources.

### **9.3.5. Rule of law**

All above-mentioned cases of politicisation are less likely to occur if the rule of law is functional. Favouritism, corruption, and so on can be fought if there is an implementable law on that. Therefore, parties were first and foremost forced to politicise the rule of law sector including: judges, lawyers, prosecutors, and the police as well. However, such politicisation does not endanger only the functioning of democracy, but also makes the backbone of the state easily breakable. The level of politicisation is mentioned in the Kosovo Progress Reports by the EU Commission on a yearly basis, and they recommend for politics to be far away from the rule of law (EU Council Decision 18.02.2008, 2008/213/EC). Maria Guilian Civinini, the president of EULEX judges in Kosovo, has openly admitted that local judges in Kosovo are under political pressures, and EULEX judges often have to take over, due to the danger of political pressure (Koha Ditore 04.06.2009). Moreover, the Director of the Judicial Council of Kosovo, Halit Muharremi talking about the difficulties to functionalise the rule of law in Kosovo, also confirmed that the Kosovo judiciary is in the hands of the government and parliament (Kosova Sot 12.11.2007).

### ***9.4. Establishing, maintaining and expanding clientele, patronage, corruption, clans, nepotism***

The irreplaceable governing role of parties is obvious even in consolidated democracies, but for these parties in consolidated democracies the very being in power = is not necessary for their survival. However, for parties in Kosovo's fragile democracy, the importance of such a function goes even further. It determines also the existence and prospects of parties. The parties doing better are those in power. Normally, political parties strive to come to power to achieve ideological objectives – those more ideologically oriented, or fulfilling electoral promises – those electorally oriented. How about parties having none of the above-mentioned objectives as incentives for coming to power? Political parties, especially those known as personalistic–clientelist in nature, relying less on members and more on clientele support, perceive power from a different point of

view. The very existence and prospect of such parties depends heavily on being in power. Clientelism is very costly to democracy. A democracy whose main parties rely mainly on clienteles has a lot to pay, with unbearable bills. Perceiving the government power in such a way, makes parties generate and maintain tremendously the party patronage, corruption, and nepotism. The development of such socio-economic and political power relationships costs a lot to democracy or democracy development, and in particular democracy consolidation. Such power relationship structures stand counter to and challenge persistently democracy consolidation

There is no doubt that parties' behaviours shape the attitudes of citizens in one way or another. This is more obvious in a less educated society, as citizens are easily manipulated through manipulation of information, enabled through government control of the media. Exploitative behaviour of parties at the governing level brings into sight values signalling the only actual workable way of doing things. In this way, it encourages citizens to try their best to place and find themselves somewhere in the structure of state exploitation, founded and developed by political parties. Such power relationship structures produced by political parties at the governing level through state exploitative behaviours include the following informal institutions: patronage, clientelism, corruption, clanism, and nepotism. All of them represent informal, but actually very powerful institutions, most of the time challenging firstly the functioning of formal institutions, and later their very existence. Subsequently, it directly spoils the constitutional consolidation, overriding and avoiding them from being functional.

The aforementioned ways of exploitative behaviour by Kosovo parties at the governing function include the party rent-seeking approach, obviously producing political pathology by a clientelist, patronage, clan, nepotistic, and corruptive attitude. Such party behaviour distorts democratic standards and institutions, since it includes the trading of political support with state resources, or using state resources for particularistic and not collective (citizens) purposes. Political

parties having no other ways to attract support expect on the personality of the leader, are forced to narrow such a gap of support using the clientele as a substitution. The clientele relationship is very costly economically and institutionally (there is no accountability of rulers to the ruled, because after they get the cash (a direct benefit), no political accountability is required or expected). Clients require immediate pay back in order for them to offer political support, in the case of parties, to offer votes. Not all parties can afford such a relationship.

#### **9.4.1. Party Patronage**

Party patronage (van Biezen & Kopecky 2007) involves the allocation of jobs in public and semi-public positions such as the civil service, public sector companies, universities, and so on. As mentioned earlier, the high level of politicisation of the state by political parties has enabled political parties to perceive public administration as a fertile field in which to employ their supporters, as a direct exchange for the votes they got from them. Such employment has taken place in other sectors as well, including public companies, universities, hospitals, public schools, the police, and wherever possible. A study on the public opinion of employment opportunities in Kosovo, conducted by the Kosovo Institute for Media and Politics (Koha Ditore 1.12.2008), found that 91.4% of respondents believe that in order to find a job in Kosovo, one needs to have political support – party support, and just 8.6% believe that education is important to get a job. Examples illustrating party patronage according to the definition in question are countless, here are provided only a few of them. Regarding the politicisation and exploitation of the institutions of education, Gezim Krasniqi in an article at Koha Ditore (20.10.2004) with the title “*the noticed death of the Public University*”, explains the “war” between PDK and LDK to “conquer” (politicize) the only public university in Kosovo. The lower level of educational institutions are also not immune from politicisation by parties. Losing a job as teaching staff, or as a school director, together with the change of, mostly local governments, often happens. For example, despite the still valid contracts of school directors in the municipality of Prizren, the ruling party PDK, after taking power, advertised job opportunities for directors of schools (Lajmet,

KTV 19.00, 24. 04.2009). Although, such advertising is just a formality, as people are appointed on political preference. Furthermore, institutions of arts and culture are not safe from politicisation. The director of the National theatre of Kosovo, Arianit Krasniqi was forced to resign from the position, due to political pressure (Lajmet, RTK 19.30, 14.08.2009).

Patronage helps party leaders to build up, maintain party organisation, and increase the loyalty through the distribution of selected incentives to certain groups of people within society. In this way, parties pay their support through state resources, meaning the use of collective resources for their particularistic purpose, and provide competition among parties on unequal terms, those in power have the means to pay their support, while those in opposition lack such advantages. Moreover, such control of the state by parties does not allow the state to function according to the prescribed constitution and its formal structure. Comparing to the previous non-democratic regime, the Kosovo democracy also involves deep political state control at society level (through parties in power), and the only difference between both regimes is contestation outside government. Once in power the distribution of state resources means deepening the control of society by the state, which stands contrary to democratic values and resembles the previous authoritarian regime.

#### **9.4.2. Clientelism**

Clientelism is an old phenomena that remains present even today, but in different ways and with different subjects. Clientelism is conceptualised differently. One of its definitions is that "*clientelism is a relationship between individuals with unequal economic and social status ("the boss" and his or her "clients") that entails the reciprocal exchange of goods and services based on a personal link that is generally perceived in terms of moral obligation*"<sup>70</sup>. On the other side (van Biezen & Kopecky 2007) party clientelism is defined as a form of representation based on the selective release of public (material) resources – contracts,

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<sup>70</sup> Clientelism - Encyclopedia of Governance. 2006. SAGE Publications. 9 Sep. 2009

housing, subsidies, pork – barrel legislation, etc., in order to secure electoral support from individuals or selected sectors of society.

Compared to old forms of clientelism, the modern one is more horizontal and at the group level rather than the individual level as it used to be. Such a clientelist network is considered, by some, as a substitution, since informal institutions may sometimes substitute the formal ones. If this is the case, clientelism still by definition includes the distribution of benefits to some, or for particularistic interests. Nevertheless, such particularistic interests are fulfilled at the cost of the collective interest. The clients, in exchange of their votes, have to be paid ranging from cash to government employment, public contracts, privatisation, and so on. Though some might consider it as direct accountability of parties to their clients, such accountability is very narrow in scope and is not accountability to citizens or the public in general, but to clients. Moreover, the public in general have to pay the bill of parties' clientele.

Therefore, the fierce competition between parties comes due to clientelism. In order to form, keep, and expand the clientele network, the best way is for parties to get into power. Being in power, parties can pay back the votes they received from clientele through jobs in the government sector, public contracts, tenders, and privatisation. Besides, such party values and behaviours ties parties in Kosovo to the *prisoners' dilemma*. Instead of competing with policies as their products, they see clientelism as a more direct, and in the short-term, also a more secure way of coming to power, even though in the long-term it might bring the collapse of institutions and the economy, as well as suicide for themselves. Clientelism is more affordable for economies relying heavily on raw materials, especially oil exporting countries. Kosovo does not belong to such economies, and has to rely mostly on investments. Normally, investors are more interested to invest in stable environments with stable institutions.

Clientelism damages democracy in two ways. One is at the government institutional level, and the second is at society level. The governing activity is at the service of the party/parties taking power, because they use it for their own clientele. In order to do that, they have to increase the level of informalities in the institutional structure, bypassing many procedures, rules and regulations. In this way, it also harms the constitutional level of democracy consolidation, because if governing takes place in the legal way, they cannot make the exploitation in question. Likewise, parties automatically and directly develop corruption.

At society level, they do not create and develop citizens and civic culture – constituting the fourth level of the consolidation structure, but rather clients and directly or indirectly subordinated people to their party bosses, because the clientelistic relationship includes a necessary unequal and asymmetric power relationship.

#### **9.4.3. Corruption**

Corruption, on the other hand is considered as the exchange of money for public decisions, and the most common form of corruption in the case of parties is through financial donations to parties and politicians in exchange for favourable public decisions. Based on this, the most likely to be corrupted are parties closer and more influential to decision making. Since parties in power or governing parties are most influential in decision-making, they are the most likely to be corrupted. According to Ismet Beqiri (LDK chairmanship member 2010) most of the corruption at the government level is taking place through government contracts - *tenderomania*. In a system where there is a change of government composition, the more parties that take part at different times in the governing process, the more likely they are to be corrupted. However, it does not mean that parties not in executive power, and not directly linked to decision-making, are immune to corruption. In relation to that, Mazreku (2010) considers also the possibilities of parties corrupting each other. It might happen in cases of opposition parties being bought by governing parties to prevent criticism and the performance of their oversight function of government. This is usually attained by

offering a piece of the cake to opposition parties as well. Some allude to such a recent relationship between PDK and AKR, and not excluding other parties either. According to the report of Transparency International (2007), political parties are among the most corrupted institutions in Kosovo .

The report of the Anti-corruption Agency in Kosovo has shown a high level of corruption especially at the government level, with no improvements so far to reduce the corruption. What is worse, in the process of fighting corruption is a high degree of politicisation of the institutions involved. The report states that many cases of corruption end up here, and are not pursued further at the prosecutions or courts levels (Report of Kosovo Anti-Corruption Agency 1 January – 31 December 2008). Moreover, the report states that during 2008 there was information of 37 cases of corruption taking place in the government, 15 of them stalled on the lack of proof, 16 proceeded to prosecutors and six are still to be proved. However, even the independence of the agency itself is questionable, often seen more as a cosmetic gesture to international pressure, to try to show their commitment to fight corruption. However, up to now there has been no high level politician captured for corruption. It should be taken into account the political pressure exercised on the agency, and that the number of cases reported are just a few among wide spread cases of corruption at all levels. The reason why cases of corruption are not processed further are stated clearly in the EU Commission's annual Reports of the Progress, asserting that there is a high level of politicisation of the courts, prosecutors, and the police as well. Such politicisation is mainly produced and developed by political parties, mostly those in power.

Nevertheless, the draft strategy against the corruption, offered by the government, is apparently considered in being concerned just with the outlook - as showing that something is being done, rather than offering a workable way to tackle the corruption problem. Objections were made by some NGOs as well,

levelling it as an impracticable and non-implimental strategy, not really meant to fight corruption (Koha Ditore 25.02.2009).

#### **9.4.4. Clans and Nepotism**

Despite patronage, clientelism, and corruption, parties in Kosovo are influenced by, and at the governing level reflect, and help develop, clan institutions as a way of thinking. Kosovo society is widely known for having clans as one of the workable ways of functioning. Most clans in Kosovo are also organised by blood relationship. On the way, politicisation was widely sustained by traditional attitudes of Kosovo society. Despite clients, parties also get support from clans and blood relatives, likewise triggering the development of nepotism. Parties in Kosovo, as widely in traditional society, supplement their clientele's network with clans and tribal identification, spreading nepotism, as a common phenomenon across Kosovo.

#### **9.5. Conclusion**

Looking at the importance that the governing level of parties in a democracy normatively has, and the governing practice of parties in Kosovo, one comes to the apprehension raised by Mazreku (2010), that political parties in Kosovo are governing or ruling in an authoritarian sense. Different from the previous authoritarian regime only in terms of contestation, and not depoliticisation, Kosovo parties through the governing function, are able first to capture the state, and then to use its resources for their narrow ends.

Likewise, they consider the state as their own private and personal property, preventing the implementation of the constitutional structure in terms of it giving practical effects. Their organisational structure is one of the main reasons that drives parties to pursue such objectives. Being forced to pay the clientele, as the backbone of their political support, they have to use public resources to reimburse them for their votes. In order to this, they have to weaken the formal institutions standing counter to such practices. This is achieved merely through politicisation. Likewise, it also obstructs consolidation at the constitutional level.

Furthermore, they use purely public resources for their clientele and for their personal benefit as well, in public administration, public procurement, public companies, educational institutions, the rule of law, and so on.

As such, they produce, maintain, and expand informal institutions considered challengers to democracy consolidation: clientelism, patronage, corruption, clans, nepotism. These informal institutions ail the democratisation structure at all of its four levels.

## Chapter 10

### **10. Unpredictable Developments - Future Prospects**

Kosovo democracy is still institutionally weak with democracy consolidation prospects vastly unpredictable. International oversight of the democratisation process in Kosovo is not matching the objectives of political parties, expected to be the main driving force of the democratisation process. The completion of system transformation in Kosovo is taking longer than expected. Hitherto, the international community operating in Kosovo is still considered as the major guarantee of the stability of the status quo in the democratic system in Kosovo. Yet, the inner functioning of the system, largely run by political parties, is essentially in contradiction with the overall formal regime expectations. In other words, the international community preventing, for the time being, any significant alternative regime to democracy ensures the visual negative consolidation . It is said for the time being, because if the current state of affairs lasts for long, it is very likely to ail even the negative consolidation, producing a viable alternative to democracy, and even triggering the reverse of the process. Yet, the deficiency in the trend towards positive consolidation might bring into question the process in general. No international presence, regardless of its power and influence, is able to ensure democracy consolidation, if institutions of the inner structure of democracy, in this case political parties, have no political will to push the democratisation process forward. The political will of Kosovo political parties to move along democracy consolidation is best illustrated through their performance of functions, which up to now has not been satisfactory. The worrying issue is the contradiction between the objectives, norms, and values of democracy with objectives, norms, and values of political parties, normatively supposed to sustain and develop a representative democracy. Poor performance of parties in a representative democracy challenges democracy itself.

As observed from the previous chapters, Kosovo political parties perform very badly on the functions they are expected to fulfil. Likewise, due to their crucial

and irreplaceable position within the democracy structure, parties make the future of Kosovo democracy and its consolidation prospects extremely uncertain. Despite developments in formal constitutional consolidation, constituting the first level of the consolidation structure, the representation level is still a distance from consolidation. Its actual level of development affects and, in a way, also impedes the consolidation at all three levels. The term 'formal constitutional structure' implies the vast gap between the constitution and implementation of written laws..

One of the core obstacles delaying the consolidation of democracy in Kosovo is that there is no better alternative offered by any of the existing parties. They are almost the same, have an undefined and blurred ideological profile, an equivalent organisational structure, pursue identical objectives, have matching governing behaviour, and so on. Furthermore, they are closed into the prisoners' dilemma, unable to break up the current non-democratic behaviours and attitudes within and among themselves. An available alternative, could apparently serve as an impulsive force to acquaint competition with issues healthy to democracy. In the near future, better alternatives to stimulate democratisation are hardly to be expected, be it from existing parties transforming themselves or new, emerging parties. Often, new parties do not necessarily mean to be new alternatives. For instance, when AKR was established as a new party, many perceived it as an alternative, but soon its failure to be an alternative was proved. Recently on 05.01.2010, the Party of Pensioners PPK was established – the Party of Pensioners of Kosovo, meant to look after the interests of retired people, as after the war they were among the most discriminated class within society. However, not much is expected from PPK. At the first instance, the 5% electoral threshold, poses an issue to get a seat in parliament. Moreover, being a single-issue party does not promise a lot, other than raising issues and creating opinions about the interests of the retirees' class.

If the current conditions are going to last for long, they will also shape the type of democracy taking place in Kosovo very much featured with authoritarian norms and values. Therefore, one of the possible scenarios is the blocking of the consolidation process, halting it at the current level, into a sort of halfway house democracy, an authoritarian system coloured with democratic colours, whereby people go to the election to choose among a few authoritarians. Another possible scenario is the prolongation of the democracy consolidation process into the unforeseeable future, making the reversibility of the process more likely.

Usually, the process of system transformation is an on-going one, consisting of competing democratic and non-democratic forces, of various degrees and at various stages. The consolidation comes closer the more democratic forces prevail over those being non-democratic. However, as long as democratic forces are unable to defeat non-democratic forces in the process, consolidation will be prolonged and become less likely. The longer the process goes on, the more authoritarian will be surfaced and to some extent will even become enrooted, no longer remaining underground as they used to. Such opposition to democratisation developments are currently increasing at various levels of governing, including essential institutions of democracy, such as freedom of speech and the press, among others. Cases of journalists being fired as a result of political pressure on the media are widely reported. The TV reports made by BIRN "Life in Kosovo" aired by RTK (27.05.2009), has shown many cases of journalists losing their jobs because of politics interfering in the media. Jeton Llapashtica, a journalist working for TV Besa, was fired because while interviewing the government spokesman Memli Krasniqi, he posed a question about a song (*Amaneti i Clonit*) dedicated to the class of politicians, blaming them as the main actors of the underdevelopment taking place in Kosovo. Furthermore, regarding the freedom of press, many cases of the government exercising pressure on the media through advertisement opportunities for newspapers and other media are observed.

Turning back to the representation function of parties, its improvement at least in the foreseeable future is not promising. The current chaotic, undefined representation structure of political parties, presents no signs of change. Actually, most of the time parties declare themselves as being rightist or centre-rightist, sounding as though there is no need or viability for leftist parties. Though, in practical terms that is not the case, parties themselves are not aware of what they ideologically stand for, or what makes them leftist or rightist. The ideological mishmash of the party system in Kosovo will remain for the time being, increasing the confusion and puzzlement of society on political orientations. Citizens cast their votes without it being clear to them what they really get in terms of policies, from the parties they support, since parties are not guided by any ideology that could serve as a guiding framework for both parties and voters. The policies followed out of any ideological constraints, makes party politics very unpredictable. One of the main driving forces pushing parties towards ideological orientation developments are international organisations operating in Kosovo, such as OSCE, NDI, and so on. Moreover, political parties at the EU level are utilising their influence as well, enabling parties to join the EU parties' families, and then from within such a family, pressuring them to purify their ideological identity. The international pressure exercised on the political parties to create their own distinguishable identity and well defined profiles, might lead to just an artificial, cosmetic, and easily removed profile of parties, manifested in the written programmes and declarations, not matched by their behaviours and attitudes. Such ideological profiling will not give effect in terms of constraining party objectives, activities, and the interests they pursue. Currently, there is no consistency between the ideological belonging proclaimed by parties, with their conscience, activity, and objectives. Therefore, the international pressure, lacking the inner forces for such an ideological crystallisation of parties, is an endeavour that does not constitute a sustainable solution.

Another issue hampering party profile and party system crystallisation is the lack of a clear social structure, whose establishment takes time and is dependent on

economic and social developments. The clear social structure would be the best solution to thrust the party label among the party system ideological spectre. Then either parties will transform themselves, which is hardly expected, or it will lead the way for parties to come out of social structures divided by the long-term socio-political cleavages. At present, both possibilities are barely able to take place. Firstly, political parties by their actual organisation structure, of a personalistic and authoritarian nature, find ideological crystallisation in its true meaning, as a direct challenge to them, confining somehow their absolute power. Therefore, their incontestable and unchallengeable authority within the party prevents any possible move in that direction. The most they can do in this regard is to make a visual change, in terms of public relations. The first possible setting also defies the second option. In desperation for votes, the only way for the party authoritarians to preserve their power, is the politicisation of society as much as possible, and the extension of the clientelist social structure. The high level of politicisation, in turn leaves dwindling the space and opportunity for possible successful new political parties. The chaos in the still undefined party system in Kosovo will continue, and is very likely to be iced over, in the short-term, as it currently is.

On the other hand, the existing inclination of society's apathy is growing day by day, depleting the level of social integration in the political process and enlarging society's alienation from democracy. The parties' organisation structure is a powerful incentive for clientele structure development, since it boosts party reliance on their votes. However, one of the positive things about personalistic parties is that their leaders maintain the party cohesion. A parties' life is closely dependent on the life of their leaders, and all of them lack the mechanism to transform the inner decision-making power. Moreover, most Kosovo party leaders are quite young, for parties to be transformed it means waiting for a long time until they die. Yet, as time passes, they inculcate and spread their own values, standing contrary to democracy and questioning democratisation. Such

an organisation structure, shrinks participation opportunities, necessary to ensure and maintain society's collective interests.

Parties will carry on with their concern merely to integrate and expand their clienteles into the political process. The only viable symbol through which parties anchor society into politics remains their leaders. The personalistic – clientelist relationship dominating the integration structure through parties, lessens the potential for democratic consolidation. It generates clients rather than citizens, not entailing the institutionalisation of institutions of accountability, essential to make certain the protection of society's interests in a representative democracy. Along these lines, indicators of a low level of integration will develop further. Parties will rely less and less on their members, and electoral volatility amplified including the clientele volatility, as all competing parties chase after them. Parties will continue to have no capacity to orient citizens on the policies they pursue, known to be highly unpredictable. Subsequently, less integration of society into the political process means less trust in democracy and an uneasy consolidation. The trend is very likely to be the same, leading to a state of development where all those considered a part of the process will be confined within the clientele, though the majority of society are excluded.

Internationally sponsored positive consolidation of democracy can scarcely take place, if the inner institutional structure does not hold up to it. Kosovo parties are normatively expected to teach democracy (that is internationally sponsored) to citizens. Likewise, they socialise society with democracy norms and values, convincing the majority of them to hold trust and believe in democracy, subsequently enabling legitimation, a prerequisite for consolidation. Hitherto, parties have proved themselves to perform very poorly in this function. Parties' inner and outer behaviour has a direct impact on legitimation prospects. The best way parties can teach and then legitimise democracy is by primarily generating, respecting, and inculcating democratic values themselves. This is attainable principally by functionalising inner party democracy, extending the existing low

level of inclusiveness, decentralising the decision-making power, and increasing the level of *systemness*. This in turn means to reduce, limit, and control the actual absolute power that party leaders have, standing as the major obstacle to inner party democracy developments. Party leaders having absolute power, are able to prevent any tendency for democratisation, perceived as a challenge to them. Therefore, it can barely be expected from parties, being not democratic themselves, to legitimise democracy among society, considered vital to democracy consolidation.

At the outer level, parties through their bare-faced behaviour during inter party competition lower democracy legitimation prospects. The combative way of competition among them might bring society to civil war. Such behaviour is going to be amplified as competition to get clientele gets fiercer and with parties' objectives not seeming to change in the near future. For instance, as stated earlier, in the recent 2009 election, AAK leader Ramush Haradinaj, was not alone in declaring that "there was a need for just a very small thing to happen, and we were about to reach the unexpected..." (KTV Lajmet 19.00, 14.12.2009), meaning a civil war was about to start. Parties will use whatever means possible, legal and illegal, to get to power through votes, to colonise the state, and use its resources to extend their support. Being in power enables parties to reimburse their clientele's support, from whom they get votes. Therefore, among parties a harsh combative competitiveness is to be expected. Such a trend has also been demonstrated in the recent local elections in 2009, whereby the election committee for appeals asked for three municipalities to repeat elections due to a high number of irregularities and election fraud. A large number of election irregularities were noted in other places as well, but the international community, due to stability concerns, seem to have looked the other way. The peak of such development was the declaration of Kosovo prime minister Hashim Thaqi (PDK), while talking about the elections in Prizren (the third round of elections due to irregularities) declared that "*Prizren is Jerusalem for us*". It illustrates best the party's combative, competitive behaviour and the

unpredictable future of the democracy consolidation process, always endangered by such party behaviour.

Within the innovation function of parties, no change is not to be expected. Parties are lacking the knowledge to improve their creativity and find solutions for the current problems society has. A large portion of educated people, who could be used by political parties as a human resources potential to improve the capacity of creativity, do not find themselves to be within existing parties. The low level of inner democracy, automatically excludes them from the policy-making process. Parties will go on with following, instead of initiating, issues. This is directly linked with democracy consolidation prospects, whereby parties are not just unable to deal with issues, but instead constitute the problems themselves.

Furthermore, at the governing level less positive change is also to be expected. This might get even worse. Kosovo has a very poor and underdeveloped economy. The state exploitation by parties cannot last forever, in particular a poor state like Kosovo may not afford it for long, as its resources may perish. Nevertheless, state exploitation will go on as the best opportunity for parties to enlarge their support and even enable them to exist. Despite international requirements, such as EU membership criteria fulfilment, such as to stop politicisation among other things, parties continue with their behaviours and activities, hiding them whenever possible; state exploitation will occur as much as possible. The privatisation process will continue with the few remaining public companies, always taking into account the particularistic benefits. Recently the KAP announced that it is going to give "as a gift" 39 "Kosovo Petrol", petrol stations that after the war were owned by a member of the PDK directing council, seized by him immediately after the war. During socialist time and before the war they used to be public property. The KAP announced that they will not be under the privatisation procedures, illustrating that this is nothing else other than exploiting state resources for particularistic party clientele needs. It does not resemble anything else except state exploitation (Koha Ditore 11.12.2009). The

exploitation will continue to take place in all sectors possible. *Tenderomania* will remain as one the main rules of the game, with the largest exploitation taking place in sectors using more public funds. The road building industry is currently the largest sector of exploitation. The price of road building, surprisingly, is incomparably higher than in industrialised countries such as in Germany or the USA. A square metre of asphalt in Kosovo costs 25 Euros while in the EU it is about 16 Euros, and in the USA just 6 Euros (BIRN “Jeta ne Kosove”, RTK, 12.01.2010). The quality of roads is also not comparable. Roads that survive a single year without being damaged are considered to be of high quality, though hardly found. New roads are repaired after a few months, usually in the spring season instead of planting flowers.

Moreover, the high level of politicisation of public servants was also shown recently by statistics. In the 2009 local elections, out of 6000 candidates on the lists for local elections, 1300 of them were civil servants (KTV, 17.00; 06.12.2009). Although they are free to choose either public administration or political positions, it shows the current high level of politicisation in public administration. The trend of politicisation of public administration and the hunt for clientele was also recently reconfirmed by LDD leader Nexhat Daci, where employees being members of LDD were threatened, either to change their party or lose their jobs (Express 27.01.2010).

The chase for clientele will remain as the major incentive of party competition, choosing a variety of means to reimburse them, starting at the village level for instance by distributing flour in the village of Varigoc, in the municipality of Lipjan (Koha Ditore 27.01.2010), up to cash and other possible direct exchanges. Both parties, LDK and PDK, distributed 50 to 100 kg per family in exchange of votes a few days before the third round of the election was to take place, as a result of high irregularities and election fraud. Such party behaviour expands further the informal institutions that obstruct the democratisation process, such as clientelism, patronage, corruption, clans, nepotism, and so on, resulting in

institutional structures challenging the formal institutional structure essential for democracy consolidation.

Overall, political parties will continue to be and behave as they currently are, since they lack capability, will, and mechanisms to transform themselves. No performance improvement on their normative functions is expected, behaving principally in contradiction with democracy standards. Their behaviour and attitude, despite international sponsoring of democracy in Kosovo, is going to affect the three other levels of the consolidation structure. In the short and medium term, the most that can be achieved is democratisation at the level of *forced* negative consolidation, due to international pressures. However, if the trend does not change, in the long run it might also place in peril that level of negative consolidation.

Nonetheless, another development that has been covered and has operated underground for a considerable time, affecting party behaviour, attitude, and the democracy consolidation process in general, is the issue that most parties possess within their structure, invisible and shadowy security and intelligence service structures. They support their parties and are even considered the most powerful organs, often in the service of the party leader, empowering him and making him unchallengeable within parties. On the other hand, it drives parties and then politics towards criminalisation. One of the civil society activists Veton Surroi (koha.net / 12.12.2009), referring to this, stated that politics in Kosovo should firstly be decriminalised. The power and operation of such shadow structures has been emphasised by an ICG Report as well: “problems that will come back to haunt Kosovo like toleration of widespread corruption and of powerful, unaccountable partisan political intelligence agencies are being swept under the carpet rather than addressed” (Kosovo after Haradinaj, Crisis Group Europe Report N°163, 26 May 2005, i). Such structures persist and have a great impact on the parties itself in general.

In conclusion, a possible scenario that might directly challenge the democracy consolidation process in Kosovo might come out, because of the absence of alternatives, despite so many existing parties. In this regard, a social movement known as “*Vetvendosja*” (“*Selfdetermination*”) is developing, and has already declared to join politics. *Vetvendosja*, as a social movement has recruited within its ranks many young, educated, committed people, disappointed with the current state of affairs. Moreover, its leader Albain Kurti, is known for dissidence. Ideologically they are very much influenced by leftist literature, motivated by the Che Guevara resistance, and often echoing even nationalisation of the economy. Furthermore, they stand against the presence of the international community here, Ahtisaari’s proposal, and lately openly proclaiming the unification of Albanians within a single state. Such attitudes are incompatible with the democracy consolidation prospects in Kosovo, constituting other than democratic rules of the game.

*Vetvendosja* has a great potential, at least to be a determining factor in governing power, favoured by the existing conditions in Kosovo. The high level of poverty, the state exploitation taking place (among others) through the privatisation process, the high level of unemployment, the economic downturn, are handled by *Vetvendosja* through their own worldviews. On the other side, the high level of corruption, the high level of dissatisfaction of society with the political class, is addressed through the populist behaviour of the movement, which is easy to penetrate into society. Their nationalist attitude might be used to mobilise a large part of society, not happy with the compromise made on status issues, such as Ahtisaari’s proposal, decentralisation, reserved and privileged rights for the Serb community, the presence of the international community, and so on. Many perceive *Vetvendosja* as the only hope for the issue of the settlement of all Albanians. Moreover, what ensures wide social support for Kurti’s movement is that actual parties, as mentioned earlier, though many in number, do not offer an alternative to each other, being almost the same, and do not serve as promoters of democracy consolidation. *Vetvendosja* compared to current political parties

can offer an alternative, but the alternative they offer seems apparently not fully compatible with democracy in general and democracy consolidation. In the current state of affairs in Kosovo, *Vetvendosja* affects negatively the democracy consolidation process. Therefore, it is mentioned despite the fact that it is not a political party and a subject of our study here. Since, we are dealing with future prospects of democracy consolidation in Kosovo, it is worth taking them into account, due to the direction they might give to the currently envisaged negative consolidated democracy in Kosovo.

## Chapter 11

### 11. Conclusion

*“Kosovo parties should serve democracy and not anarchy”*

Jakup Krasniqi – Kosovo Parliament Speaker, *Radio Free Europe (in Albanian)*,  
20.07.2009

The Kosovo political system has not yet achieved to consolidate the *representative* consolidation in the democracy consolidation structure. There is demonstrated progress in terms of formal constitutional consolidation, possessing a democratic written constitution (with exception, it shares power with international institutions). A large number of laws has been legislated in this regard, though failing in implementation. A considerable part of constitutional consolidation is also directly dependent on the level of representative consolidation.

Political parties in Kosovo have proved they perform very poorly in fulfilling their functions, therefore impeding rather than ensuring the smooth consolidation of democracy in Kosovo. Different from many countries of the region, Kosovo system transformation has been overextended and prolonged, making the process exhausted, and providing very little light at the end of an unusually long tunnel.

Political parties in Kosovo, though many in number fall short in representing society in the political process. They are considered more as agents to exploit the state rather than as socio-political actors meant to organise society politically and anchor them into the political process. The long-term social divisions are not reflected in their programmes or platforms. Most programmes of the parties considered - major parties, are almost the same and often copy each other, generating and maintaining a blurred ideological mishmash in the Kosovo party system. In other words, parties are not programme or ideology based. As a

result, the interests of society are not projected into the policy-making and decision-making process. All of them stand for a free market economy, but none define the level of it. Practically, in terms of cultural values they are merely conservatives, often sounding like populists. What is more important, parties themselves are not conscious of their ideological profile, have an identity crisis, which consequently confuses society further, the majority being highly uninformed and having difficulties in orienting themselves into the party system while casting their votes.

The low level of representation is in turn accompanied with a low level of integration. The dual faces of parties, the formal democratic one as it is described in party documents, does not correspond with the actual one known as more authoritarian. It offers less opportunity for parties to bind society into the political process. Political parties possess insufficient symbols and ideas capable to anchor citizens into the political process. Most of what parties provide are their leaders, and the direct benefit to clientele, usually not constituting a large part of society. This is in turn manifested through a low level of electoral turn out, a high level of volatility, a depleting number of party sympathisers, and the shift of party politics towards establishing the clientelist structure. Often at election campaign meetings primary school children are seen filling up the halls of meetings, as parties day by day are being dried out of party supporters. The fate of a democracy, particularly a not yet consolidated democracy, is unforeseen if such a huge number of citizens turn their back to the main channels of political communication and the political process as a whole. Excluding the independence issue around whom a large part of society was organised for a considerable time, parties in general have failed to orient citizens on the policy options, and to make them feel part of the collective process. The recent developments of party-society-government relations are proving it. Moreover, parties are contributing in preserving the traditional institutions of authority, and preventing the modernisation process of the Kosovo political system to take place. Parties are upholding and still cultivating provincial identification and loyalty within Kosovo,

trying to ensure their support in the regional bases from where party leaders come from. Likewise, they hinder the transformation of loyalty to the state institution as a modern political organisation, needed for a new state. On the other hand, the modernisation process is closely linked with democratisation prospects.

Hence, parties are performing very pitifully in the legitimisation function. The inner and outer practice of Kosovo parties brings to the surface parties' behaviour, hardly compatible with democracy norms, standards, values, and expectations. The lack of inner democracy in Kosovo parties is directly linked with the ailed legitimisation scenario, as a result of infeasibility of society to learn democracy through the institutions meant to teach it to them. Yet, parties have a deficiency of democracy themselves, and do not consider democratic inner rules of the game to be important to them. In this way, parties offer no opportunity to citizens to learn democracy, diminishing their loyalty to democracy, and consequently ruin democracy legitimisation that is an essential prerequisite for the consolidation process to move forward.

Furthermore, the combative competitive attitude among parties is not a promising signal to the wider society, it irritates citizens from participation in the process, and later might even bring the country to civil war, especially in a country having organised parties based on leaders' regional camps. For a young unconsolidated democracy, such as Kosovo, a legitimacy crisis constitutes anxious prospects. Such illegitimacy easily breaks through into democracy institutions as well, and the regime in general, particularly for states having still young institutions.

In terms of the innovation function, parties have so far proved uncreative in presenting solutions even to the acute problems that Kosovo has. Kosovo continues to be the only state in Europe with a collapsed health care system, for instance. There is still a low quality of education, a high level of poverty, a high level of politicisation of the judiciary preventing the rule of law, and so on.

Hitherto, no party has a vision or a concrete platform on how to tackle them. Most of their platforms merely state the problems Kosovo has, without providing policies on that. Their declarations are coloured with populism, and vague promises.

As an apex of all that was earlier stated, parties continue to exploit the state and its resources for their own narrow, personal, clan, and clientelist purposes. The governing function of parties is the secured place where parties utilise state resources for their interests. In this manner, the governing function does not take place based on citizens' interests. The governing does not take into account collective interests, neither at the input nor at the output level. Instead, they use the taxes of citizens and all other state resources to fulfil their own interest. Therefore, the governing function of parties in Kosovo is equated with state exploitation, taking place at all levels, and wherever possible.

The exploitation is enabled through politicisation. The high level of politicisation initiated, developed, and maintained by the political parties – the main institutions of a representative level of consolidation structure, has a negative impact on the three other levels of the consolidation structure. It prevents the proper functioning of the constitutional level of consolidation. Moreover, the third level, embracing the veto players, as Merkel (2007) names, the mafia, organised crime, and authoritative tendencies of the executive in Balkans are hardly likely to shrink, due to the interconnection between politics and crime. On the other side, civic consolidation is hardly likely to take place in the near future due to the high level and deep politicisation at the society level and personalisation of politics through party leaders, producing no fertile ground for democracy, but institutions hardly compatible with democracy, such as clientelism, clanism, nepotism, patronage, etc..

Therefore, the high and deep level of politicisation taking place at the second level increases the role and influence of parties in the democracy consolidation

structure, since all levels are interrelated with the representation level capable of exercising more influence on the others, rather than being influenced by them. As Schmitter (1999, 478) argues, if parties fail to perform or perform very poorly their functions, they are not anymore to be considered as indispensable institutions for the consolidation of democracy.

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PDK Statute 2005

PDK Programme 1999

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- **AAK**

AAK Statute 2008

AAK Programme 2008

AAK Electoral Platforms 2001, 2004, 2007

- **AKR**

AKR Statute 2007

AKR Programme 2007

AKR Electoral Platform 2007

- **LDD**

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LDD Programme 2007

LDD Electoral Platform 2007

## Interviewees

- Rame Buja, member of PDK chairmanship, currently chief of parliamentary group of PDK, interviewed in December 2009
- Blerand Stavileci, PDK spokesman, interviewed in January 2010
- Ernest Luma, AAK spokesman, interviewed in January 2010
- Burim Ramadani, AAK secretary general, interviewed in January 2010
- Ismet Beqiri, member of LDK chairmanship and MP, interviewed on December 2009
- Eqrem Kryeziu, LDK deputy chairman, interviewed on May 2007
- Rita Hajzeraj, member of AKR chairmanship and MP, interviewed on December 2009
- Muhamet Kelmendi, member of AKR chairmanship, interviewed on December 2009
- Naser Rugova, member of LDD chairmanship and MP, interviewed on January 2010
- Ramush Tahiri, political analyst, interviewed on November 2009
- Halil Matoshi, political analyst, interviewed on November 2009
- Armend Mazreku, political scientist, interviewed on October 2009
- Gezim Krasniqi, political scientist, interviewed on December 2009

- Gezim Selaci, political scientist, interviewed on January 2010
- Shkelzen Maliqi, political analyst, interviewed on December 2009
- Enver Zhinipotoku, sociologist, interviewed on November 2009
- Jetullah Aliu, Kosovo Agency against Corruption, interviewed on December 2009

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- *Lajm*
- *Infopress*
- *Express*
- *Epoka e Re*
- *Zeri*
- *Radio Evropa e Lire (online)*

**TV Stations**

- *RTK*
- *KTV*
- *RTV 21*

## 13. Annex

Interview questions were used for political parties' representative, political analysts, political scientists, sociologists, and Kosovo Agency against Corruption.

### Interview Questions for Political Parties

#### *Representation function*

1. *What is the ideology of your party? Why?*
2. *What is the profile of your party: left, right, centre?*
3. *What you think makes your party to be on that position and not on the others?*
4. *Does ideology guides the activity of your party? How much? Example?*
5. *Which part of the society do you represent? Is any specific class or group that you represent? Are they aware that they are represented by your party? Is any other party in Kosovo representing the same strata you do?*
6. *What is your stand on economic policies, role of government in economic activities?*
7. *How about your stand in politics?*
8. *How your party values cultural transformation?*
9. *Do you think your party change the profile?*
10. *Do you involve any organisation of the part of society you represent to consult for electoral platform formulation or for the drawing up of the party programme, or any other policy?*
11. *Who formulates the party programme? Who approves it?*
12. *Who formulates the electoral platforms? Who approves them?*
13. *What is your stand on the following fields?*

<b>About party – profile</b>	<b>National Issue</b>	<b>Decentralisation</b>	<b>Multiculturalism</b>

<b>Economy</b>	<b>Labour policy</b>	<b>Welfare policy</b>	<b>Fiscal Policy</b>

<b>Security policy</b>	<b>Agriculture</b>	<b>Education</b>	<b>Gender Policy</b>

<b>Environment</b>	<b>Energy Policy</b>	<b>Corruption</b>	<b>Rule of law</b>

<b>Human Rights Protection</b>	<b>Culture, Youth, Sports</b>	<b>Healthcare Policy</b>	<b>Integration Policy</b>

<b>Development</b>	<b>Poverty</b>	<b>Investment</b>	<b>Regional Cooperation</b>

<b>Integration function</b>	
1.	<i>How many members do you have now?</i>
2.	<i>How many members did you have at the beginning?</i>
3.	<i>Is your party membership increasing or decreasing?</i>
4.	<i>Does your party have stable membership?</i>
5.	<i>How many supports approximately do you have?</i>
6.	<i>How many supporters did you have earlier?</i>
7.	<i>Where do u rely more in terms of the support?</i>
8.	<i>Do they support because of your programme (if yes, which group for which part), or because of your leader, or because that they get direct benefit from your party (jobs, contracts, tenders, and so on)?</i>
9.	<i>Are party members well informed by party policies and position of parties in different policies?</i>
10.	<i>Do you think that your party have deep roots in society?</i>
11.	<i>Do you have many militants and supporters?</i>
12.	<i>From which part of Kosovo are most of your supporters?</i>
13.	<i>How stable is your electorate?</i>
14.	<i>What makes citizens to support you?</i>
15.	<i>Do you think that in some regions of Kosovo you have more support?</i>
16.	<i>Do you compensate your supporters by anything?</i>
17.	<i>Does your party have clientele also? Can other parties take your clientele?</i>
18.	<i>Do you rely also on blood relationship support as a party?</i>
19.	<i>How stable is your party elite?</i>
20.	<i>Did they come from other parties?</i>
21.	<i>Has any of party elites leave the party and moved to other parties? Why do they usually do it?</i>
<b>Legitimation function</b>	
1.	<i>How is structured power within your party?</i>
2.	<i>Where relies the ultimate decision making power?</i>
3.	<i>What is the hierarchy of the decision making bodies, how wide are those bodies?</i>
4.	<i>Is it clear for each organ within the party what is their scope of competences?</i>
5.	<i>How powerful is the party leader?</i>
6.	<i>Does it happen that he might be challenged by any inside it? What happens in such cases?</i>
7.	<i>Does it happen that the leader comes into contradiction with other party organs? Which one prevails over the other?</i>
8.	<i>Is the party leader ready to decentralise power to other party organs?</i>
9.	<i>How decisions are taken? What system of voting?</i>
10.	<i>Is the vote of leader weighted equal to the vote of others?</i>

11. *What if any organ within the party steps over the decision of other organs, what measures are taken on that case?*
12. *How is the leader chosen, is any other candidate competing for that position?*
13. *Is any important issue that can be decided without the prior knowledge of the leader?*
14. *Does the leader deal with everything?*
15. *Which organ is more important after the leader?*
16. *Who is eligible to offer the candidature on the list of your party?*
17. *Who is part of the selectorate, who selects candidates on the list, who decides for the list?*
18. *How is the procedure of drawing the lists?*
19. *Do you consult ordinary party members for the list of candidates?*
20. *How often the party organs hold meetings and who draw the agenda of the meetings?*
21. *Are the meetings open to other members or not?*
22. *Are the decisions taken from these organs respected and implemented? What if not?*
23. *How do you formulate your party programmes and electoral platforms? Do you consult the ordinary members for that?*
24. *Is any dialogue or debate on that?*
25. *What is the power of party branches and sub-branches?*
26. *What do they decide for?*
27. *Can their decisions be turned down by the central office or the leader?*

**Innovation**

1. *Does your party has a governing programme?*
2. *What are your solutions for the current national problems?*
3. *Does your party have formulated policies for the current public programmes? If yes, which one?*
4. *What is the solution of the northern part of Kosovo?*
5. *How do you plan to reduce poverty?*
6. *What is policy on fighting corruption, organised crime, ...?*
7. *What is the strategy of your party to develop the country?*
8. *What is the strategy of your party how to increase the recognition of the state in international community?*
9. *What is the strategy of your party how to improve the rule of law and fight organised crime?*
10. *What is your energy policy, to make regular energy supply?*

**Governing function**

1. *How does your party perceive the power?*
2. *What are the motives behind your struggle for power?*
3. *Do you think that by being in power you can protect better citizens' interests? How? In what way?*
4. *Are you concern that power might corrupt you as a party? What would you do on that case?*
5. *What do you think about such large corruption at the government?*
6. *What has your party done to fight corruption?*
7. *Do you have any written policy on how to fight corruption?*

8. *What are the concrete measures that your party has undertaken or will undertake since you came in power, or once you were in power, or if you come to power?*
9. *What do you think about existing legal infrastructure in fighting corruption?*
10. *How do you see the role of Kosovo Agency against corruption, its power, functioning, and objectives that such agency has?*
11. *Do you think such agency is politicised and manipulated by political parties?*
12. *Do you think that there is a wide and deep state and society politicisation by political parties?*
13. *Why is happening such fierce competition among parties to control everything?*
14. *What parties are exploiting the state?*
15. *Are they reimbursing their clientele, or their relatives through state resources?*
16. *Is that taking place through government contracts, employment opportunities, privatizations, etc.?*
17. *How do you over employment at public administration in Kosovo? Why parties do that?*
18. *Do you believe that such behaviour is against collective interest of society?*
19. *Why such high level of politicisation is taking place? What pushes parties into such undemocratic game?*
20. *Do you believe that politicisation is not healthy and might endanger democracy in Kosovo?*
21. *Does your party offer any strategy how to decrease the level of politicisation? What would you do in this respect if you were in power?*
22. *Can it be considered as a struggle of parties for financial means? Why up to now there is no law on party finances?*
23. *Do you believe that parties do right thing by reimbursing their supporters through being in power?*
24. *How do you think can public administration be depoliticised? Does your party has any written policy on that?*
25. *Do you believe that parties through politicisation are exploiting the state, by using state resources for narrow and party ends? Can we say in this regard that parties in Kosovo have colonised the state?*
26. *How do you see the misuses at public procurement, meaning misuses of public money? How would you correct that being in opposition or in power? Do you plan to initiate amendments on the law of public procurement as it was suggested by European Commission*
27. *How is your party financed?*
28. *Do you believe it would better, if Kosovo parties rely also on membership fees and other legal funds, and not to cover the financial shortages by misusing state resources while being in power?*
29. *How do you think can be depoliticised the judiciary, education, healthcare, police, and other spheres politicised? How would your party do that?*
30. *Is depoliticisation achievable and how long would it take as a process? If you were in power how long would you need to achieve it?*
31. *Do you think that if privatisation process was not politicised by political parties, could it be more successful than it is today?*
32. *How far could parties benefit for their narrow interest from the privatisation process?*
33. *While being in power how far have you make pressure on government for better governing?*
34. *What have you offered as an alternative?*

35. *As an opposition party, how far have you developed the accountability of government to the parliament, increasing the level democratic governing?*
36. *Do you believe there is a way of this? How?*
37. *Do such party behaviour help or prevent development of democracy in Kosovo?*
38. *What should parties do in order to change their behaviour to democratic one?*

**Interview Questions for Political Analysts, Political Scientists, Sociologists,  
Kosovo Agency against Corruption**

**Representation function**

1. *How far do think political parties in Kosovo (always in those questions we are referred to five actual major parties) are based on any ideology? Why?*
  2. *How far are their activities based on any ideology? Why?*
  3. *What ideological profile do they have: left, right, centre? Why?*
  4. *How can be identified their ideological profile: programme, electoral platforms, policies they pursue, declarations, etc.?*
  5. *Do parties represent any specific part of Kosovo society, such class or any other groups?*
  6. *Are social groups aware that they are represented from which party? Why?*
  7. *Are interests of those social groups founded on programmes and the activities of political parties?*
- Do parties protect the interests of groups, classes they represent?*
8. *If yes, why? If not, why?*
  9. *Is the ideological profile of political parties going to be clarified? When and how?*
  10. *How is it reflected in general into the development of democracy in Kosovo?*

**Integration**

1. *How far do you think that Kosovo society is integrated into political process through political parties?*
2. *Do parties in Kosovo have large number of members?*
3. *Is it the number of party members in decline? Why?*
4. *On what do parties rely if not on the support of their members?*
5. *Are parties in Kosovo developing their clientele? How?*
6. *What makes citizens of Kosovo to support a political party: programme, leader, or being part of clientele?*
7. *How far it can be considered that there is a trend that party members are being replaced by clientele structure of parties?*
8. *Why recently there has been a tremendous increase of volatility compared with time after the war? How is that going to be in the future? Does it have impact on the stability of democracy in Kosovo?*
9. *How do you see the movement of members of party elites from a party to another?*

10. *Can we say that the degree of integration of society through political parties is deepening or being depleted? Why? How far do citizens in Kosovo have opportunity to be integrated into decision-making through other organisation outside political parties?*

11. *How does it impacts on Kosovo democracy?*

**Legitimation**

1. *How far do parties have inner-party democracy?*

2. *How far are included party structures and members into decision-making within the party? Why?*

3. *Where does it relies the absolute decision-making power within parties? Why?*

4. *How fan the party leaders be challenged within the parties? Why leaders dominate in Kosovo parties?*

5. *Would it be a problem for a leader to step down a decision of higher party organs? How much costly is that?*

6. *How far centralised is decision-making within the party?*

7. *Who constitutes the filters of policies within the parties?*

8. *How far do Kosovo parties offer alternatives in terms of offering policies to citizens?*

9. *Does Kosovo democracy needs parties with high level of inner-party democracy? Why?*

**Innovation**

1. *How much creative are Kosovo parties?*

2. *Do they offer solutions for actual problems Kosovo has? If not, why? If yes, why, which one?*

3. *How far did they innovate solutions for the acute problems that Kosovo has: unification of Mitrovica, economic development, increasing the number of state recognition, extending the sovereignty all over territory, etc.?*

**Governing**

1. *What is the role of Kosovo parties in governing?*

2. *Kosovo is among the most corrupted countries, what is the role of parties in this case?*

3. *Why parties have not proven successful in fighting corruption?*

4. *How and how far are the parties making use of state resources?*

5. *How do they manage the public money?*

6. *Are they exploiting the state, in terms of making use of state resources for particularistic parties' needs?*

7. *How far do u think that the Kosovo society and the Kosovo state is politicised from political parties?*

8. *Why such politicisation? How does it serve to political parties?*

9. *Do you think that public administration and public companies are over employed by parties' clients? Why?*

10. *Is that good for parties? How?*

11. *How that can be stopped and changed?*

12. *Does this level of politicisation damages democracy, how and how far?*

13. *How do you see the future, can such trend be changed?*

14. *Are parties corrupted?*
15. *Why do they not initiate the legislation of law on party financing?*
16. *Do the parties have made use of privatisation process for narrow parties' needs?*
17. *Why parties in Kosovo are so thirsty to get power? Can that be related to their very existence as parties with impact on society?*