

Dirk Hoerder

A Long-Term Perspective on Labour Migrations and Globalization: Migrant Agency, Socio-Economic Frameworks, Policy Implications

International Congress “From the European social space to the social Europe”, Salamanca, 19th to 21st Oct., 2005.

Contents:

- Migration Between Constraints and Agency: Life-Courses and Regional Inequalities
- A Longue-durée Global Perspective of Europe's Desenclavement
- Transeuropean Social Formations, Intraeuropean Migrations, Intercontinental Connections
- The 1950s and After: Human Rights and Migration in the Face of Growing Global and Internal Disparities
- European Policy-Making: Issues and Recommendations

“Globalization”, as fashionable catchword, implies that working men and women in de-colonizing and newly industrializing societies are a threat to European societies either as cheap labour afar or as in-migrants. I will, firstly, suggest an analytical perspective on

migrant men's and women's agency. I will, secondly, use historical memory as a resource to understand the present changes and migrations, and argue that *longue-durée* globalization began with Europe's mid-15th century colonizing outreach and that these processes provide the frame for today's mentalities and policy-making. Further, I will outline Europeans' late 19th and 20th century mass migrations. Having re-established such memory in order to counter present discourses about migration as a new phenomenon, I will, fourthly, discuss opportunity and constraint structures as well as mentalities of a "Europe in the World" from the 1950s on. In conclusion, I will address issues of European Union admission policies and of inclusion and exclusion.

Migration Between Constraints and Agency: Life-Courses and Regional Inequalities

Men and women develop individual life-projects and, for their children, intergenerational trajectories. Unless immobilized by all-encompassing powerful traditions, they seek options. Socialized in the micro-space of family and community, they act on a regional meso-level of accessible labour market and opportunity or constraint structures. They are also members of macro-level units like states or cultural regions, whether Spain, Europe, the Atlantic World, or other. By self-agency they attempt to balance interests and resources. Even in allegedly immutable rural societies, like 19th century European peasant communities, any change – whether a drought, a new invention, an in- or decrease in the number of surviving children per family, a war, or other – lead to surplus or deficits of mouths to feed and bodies to labour. One strategy to cope is migration to perceived better resources. This individual dimension, once described in terms of "unlimited opportunities" for "self-made men" – women were absent from this adage –, is now conceptualized as departure from "known impossibilities" at *home* to

perceived options elsewhere.¹ The ideology of “home” – in fact – often hides constraints and deprivations, in the 19th century as much as in the 20th. Impoverished potential Senegalese migrants feel that, if in today's European metropolises people are paid to clean up dog droppings, anybody may make it there or do better.²

Historians, to the 1970s, narrated migration under a state-centred “nation to ethnic enclave”-paradigm. Since the 1980s, new sociological approaches to migration³ and syntheses of world-wide migrations⁴ emphasize decision-making in societies of departure, conscious selection of modes of travel, and active insertion into particular segments – regional, cultural, economic, social – of the receiving society.

The so-called “voluntary” migration, both in the 19th century Europe and the 21st century southern hemisphere in reaction to severe economic constraints, occurs either within open political-legal frameworks or by circumventing restrictive ones. From potential migrants' points of view, economic performance of their society of birth (rather than “home” society) implies the availability of jobs, tillable land, or self-employment options; for economists it is indicated by the GNP curve. Social scientists, including historians, would look at family incomes and expenditures, at gender as well as class, at colour of skin (race) and cultural belonging (ethni-

¹ Walter Nugent, *Crossings. The Great Transatlantic Migrations, 1870–1914* (Bloomington, 1992).

² Fatou Diome, *Le Ventre de L'Atlantique* (Paris, 2003), esp. 167.

³ Charles Tilly, “Migration in Modern European History,” in William H. McNeill and Ruth S. Adams (eds), *Human Migration. Patterns and Politics* (Bloomington, 1978), pp. 48–72; Dirk Hoerder, “From Migrants to Ethnics: Acculturation in a Societal Framework,” in Hoerder and Leslie P. Moch (eds), *European Migrants: Global and Local Perspectives* (Boston, 1996), pp. 211–262.

⁴ Mary M. Kritz, Charles B. Keely and Silvano M. Tomasi, *Global Trends in Migration: Theory and Research on International Population Movements* (New York, 1983); Reginald T. Appleyard (ed.), *International Migration Today*, 2 vols (Paris, 1988); Dirk Hoerder, *Cultures in Contact: World Migrations in the Second Millennium* (Durham, N.C., 2002); Patrick Manning, *Navigating World History. Historians Create a Global Past* (New York, 2003).

city). Both, lawful or clandestine migrations actively attempt to re-equilibrate an unequal distribution of macro-economic factors, whether natural resources, terms of trade, or unequal power relationships. Decisions to move change families and societies. For example, migrations of either mainly men or mainly women to specific labour market segments leave marriage markets in disequilibrium and the other sex – or, in the case of prior marriage, the family – follows. Late 20th century coping strategies involve transnational family lives and intercultural marriages. Forced migrations – African slavery, Asian contract work, or 20th century European forced labour – are user-determined acquisitions of labour resources (forced pull) against the interests of those involved and destructive to the society of origin. Like forced push – for example the expulsion of Jews and Muslims from the Iberian Peninsula or of Christians of one creed by dynasties of another creed – they increase economic and political imbalances intentionally or as a side effect.⁵ Does the concept of balancing processes apply over varying historical regimes? In the 19th century, voluntary migrations became self-regulating by means of backward information linkages from actual to potential migrants. Economic crises, i.e. a change of parameters for decision-making, reduced in-migration within a year. While today's means of communication have shortened the time lag between event and reaction, migration flows have become immune to classic retarding factors. Late 20th century migrations from poor or impoverished regions are attempts to rectify, by autonomous action of the disadvantaged, the imbalances created by the strong position of the Euro-North American core.

⁵ Dirk Hoerder, “Labour Markets – Community – Family: A Gendered Analysis of the Process of Insertion and Acculturation”, in Wsevolod Isajiw (ed.), *Multiculturalism in North America and Europe: Comparative Perspectives on Interethnic Relations and Social Incorporation* (Toronto, 1997), pp. 155–83; Dirk Hoerder, “Segmented Macrosystems and Networking Individuals: The Balancing Functions of Migration Processes”, in Jan Lucassen and Leo Lucassen (eds), *Migrations, Migration History, History: Old Paradigms and New Perspectives* (Bern, 1997), pp. 73–84.

Migrants who are able to plan their moves on the basis of information and a realistic assessment of their capabilities often perform better than non-migrants since they learn, at least to function in two cultures and, preferably, to shape satisfactory lives. They show flexibility in coping strategies, enhance their individual human capital, and may rely on social capital in two or more societies. However, they may also face insurmountable obstacles en route or in receiving societies. Societies which intend to attract migrants or, inversely, reduce potential for migration in the region of origin need long-term strategies of data-collection and policy-making to correct macro-regional imbalances. The present-day problems of aging European societies in need of (in-migrant) caregivers as well as the migrant-generating problems of societies in lesser developed parts of the world, on the basis of the data, could have been addressed at the inception – the decline of birth rates after the post-World War Two baby boom and the increase of global inequalities since the 1950s. The exacerbation of the imbalances due – among other reasons – to the total absence of remedial strategic policy-making weighs heavily on the charting of (im)migration policies for the 21st century.

A Longue-durée Global Perspective of Europe's Desenclavement

To understand the present and to shape the future, individuals and societies have to know where they came from. The tri-continental Mediterranean World of the 10th century, the trade emporia of the Indian Ocean, and the trade circuits of the Southeast and East Asian Worlds were connected through caravan and shipping routes.⁶ A particular mid-15th century conjuncture led to the ascendancy of

⁶ Janet L. Abu-Lughod, *Before European Hegemony: The World System A.D. 1250–1350* (New York, 1989) in critique of Immanuel M. Wallerstein, *The Modern World-System*, 3 vols (New York, 1974–1988); Jerry H. Bentley, *Old World Encounters. Cross-Cultural Contacts and Exchanges in Pre-Modern Times* (New York, 1993).

Europe. At the very moment, when for internal economic and demographic reasons, the Portuguese Crown supported merchants' exploratory trading forays along coasts unknown to them, the Chinese Court curtailed its merchants' commercially and technologically far more advanced overseas shipping and deprived them of state protection. Thus European dynastic societies' *desenclavement* was paralleled by the Chinese Empire's *repli sur soi-même*.⁷ The new Portuguese-origin state-military-commercial complex changed the protocols of trade from negotiation between relative equals to imposition of power on any less armed group. In subsequent decades, (sub-) tropical islands in the Atlantic and Indian Oceans as well as the Caribbean Islands and the circum-Caribbean Mainlands were conquered by the dynasties of Europe's Atlantic littoral and subjected to a new "plantation regime" of investment, mono-culture, and forced labour for agricultural mass production. This legacy, too, weighs heavily on migration praxes and policy-making in the present.⁸

Wherever European merchants, investors, settlers, as well as military and administrative personnel – rather than "Europeans" in some generic sense – arrived, some segments of the established societies profited, others lost. The societies of West, South, and East *Africa* were forced to adapt and became slave-catching states "when a warrior transformed a cohort of young, unmarried men into an armed band" as Janet Ewald succinctly characterized state formation.⁹ In the plantation-regime of *Americas*, the worlds the slave-

⁷ Bartolomé Bennassar and Pierre Chaunu (eds), *L'ouverture du monde, XIVe–XVIe siècles* (Paris, 1977).

⁸ Eric R. Wolf, *Europe and the People without History* (Berkeley, 1982); Hoerder, *Cultures in Contact*.

⁹ Janet J. Ewald, "Slavery in Africa and the Slave Trades from Africa [review essay]", *American Historical Review* 97 (1992), pp. 465–85 quote p. 479; Janet J. Ewald, *Soldiers, Traders and Slaves: State Formation and Economic Transformation in the Greater Nile Valley, 1700–1885* (Madison, 1990); Jean Bazin, "Etat guerrier et guerres d'état", in Bazin and Emmanuel Terray (eds), *Guerres de lignages et guerres d'états en Afrique* (Paris, 1982), pp. 319–74; for Europe and the Caribbean Kenneth R. Andrews, *Trade, Plunder and Settlement: Maritime Enterprise and the Genesis of*

holders constructed and the worlds the slaves built were inextricably entwined – as are today's global imbalances. On a personal level, from sexual violence as well as from consenting or loving relationships, children were born and, thus, populations of many shades of skin-colour emerged. The societies of the Iberian Peninsula and, in different contexts, of the Apennine Peninsula were part of such *métissage*: ethnogenesis by cultural-carnal contact, peaceful or violent. In the societies of the *Indian Ocean and South Asia*, vast commercial linkages, many-cultured trading cities, high-quality production, cosmopolitan elites and courts, and Islam-Hindu inter-faith transactions characterized political organization and everyday lives. Within *Europe*, population expansion was sustainable because of intercultural (“new”) foods: grains from Central Asia brought by merchants travelling the transcontinental “silk route”; staples like potatoes as well as stimulants and intoxicants came with transoceanic trade from South America. Their cultivation in the Iberian World meant a tropicalization of Andalusia. This globalizing of food production and tastes involved incorporation beyond recognition – or who would consider “our” potatoes and sugar as “their” contribution.¹⁰ Europe in the world meant accumulation of the profits from the labour of others in Europe, but – in terms of culture – it also meant the world in Europe. When migrants today are described as a threat to Europeanness, such fear-mongers would do well to remember the many contributions of the cultures of the world to European ways of life.

Transeuropean Social Formations, Intraeuropean Migrations, Intercontinental Connections

Europe's internal social space with its mobile peoples remained transeuropean in many respects: the nobility's marriage circuits; the elites' modes of thought and political theory; the *linguae francae*:

the British Empire, 1480–1630 (Cambridge, 1984).

¹⁰ Hoerder, *Cultures in Contact*, ch. 11.

French for intellectuals, German for artisans, English for mechanics and engineers. In the 19th century, invented separatist nationalizing narratives and, subsequently, everyday institutional separating of state and mental structures undercut the commonalities. Since each and every contact between different ways of life offers new options, the imposed end of contacts implied reduced choice. Each nation's school system began to mass produce monocultural nationals – a cloning of minds.¹¹

Borders of “Europe” as a space were established by cultural-political-religious gatekeepers when in their particular class interest. 17th century elites across Europe faced a contrasting political and socio-economic regime, the expanding Ottoman Empire with its non-ethnic elites, its neutral *lingua nullius*, the Osmanlica, to avoid Turkish cultural hegemony, its low impositions on the peasants, its regulated coexistence of ethno-cultural and ethno-religious groups, and its open lineage (the sultans married immigrant highly educated non-Turkish bound women). When this polity expanded into Hungary and Austria, a European transdynastic coalition of the willing sent troops of many ethnicities to stop the advance of what was said to be an axis of infidel/Muslim evil. The Christian courts' and institutions' intellectual elites constructed a “fortress Europe” to fend off the gendered “bloodthirsty Turk” and his “harem”. To drive the message home on common people, a “Turk tax” was levied on them to finance the war. This borderline is still part of Western-Christian-capitalist thought in Europe – but not of migrants' trajectories.¹² Further to the north, against the Romanov Empire no fortress-like ideological ramparts were needed. The ruling family was part of the transeuropean nobility; the peoples, as “Slavs” said to be inferior to Anglo-Saxons and Teutons, had at least been Christianized. Exchange by migration was low; to the late 19th century a dividing line from Lake Peipus along the Dnepr to the Black Sea separated mainly eastbound from mainly west-

¹¹ Hoerder, *Cultures in Contact*, ch. 5.2.

¹² Hoerder, *Cultures in Contact*, ch. 5.1.

bound migrations.¹³ However, the late 19th century bourgeois-dynastic nationalizing Russification resulted in millions of westbound migrants either of Jewish faith in the Ashkenazi variant or of Ukrainian culture in the peasant variant. In quick reaction, intellectual elites in the receiving societies drew borderlines: “scientific” racism made East Europeans “dark” – as well as migrating South Europeans “olive” while Jews and the colonized Irish needed no colour-coding to be recognized as different.¹⁴ Thus the interactive East Central European borderlands were constructed as a *line* and the mono-cultural school systems formatted the minds of each new generation without giving them access to the source code.

Europe, in the 19th and early 20th century, was part of four migration systems across the globe: the Afro-Atlantic Slave Migration System (2 million to the 1870s);¹⁵ the Russo-Siberian System (10 million to transustralian and transaralian regions); the Asian Migration System of mainly contract labourers (“coolies”), credit-ticket migrants who had to work off the passage, and free (“passenger”) migrants (14.5 million internally transnational,¹⁶ approximately 0.75 million to Africa and Australia) with a branch across the Pacific to the Americas (1 million); and the Euro-Atlantic System (35 million to North America, 8 million to South America, 5 million to rest of the world, 7 million returnees).¹⁷ White historians of the At-

¹³ Technicians, administrators, musicians, and intellectuals crossed this line east-bound. Hoerder, *Cultures in Contact*, chs 5 and 12.

¹⁴ Donna Gabaccia, “The ‘Yellow Peril’ and the ‘Chinese of Europe’: Global Perspectives on Race and Labor, 1815–1930”, in Jan Lucassen and Leo Lucassen (eds), *Migrations, Migration History, History: Old Paradigms and New Perspectives* (Bern, 1997), pp. 177–96.

¹⁵ Philip D. Curtin, *The Atlantic Slave Trade. A Census* (Madison, 1969), pp. 47–49, 268, 119, table 77.

¹⁶ Estimates for these migrations vary widely and the figures may have been higher. High estimates have been proposed by W. Arthur Lewis, Philip D. Curtin, and Neville Bennett among others, low estimates by Colin Clarke / Ceri Peach / Steven Vertovec, and David Northrup among others. Hoerder, *Cultures in Contact*, ch. 15.

¹⁷ All figures in the summary follow Aaron Segal, *An Atlas of International Migration* (London, 1993), pp. 16–17. The generally accepted figure for 1815 to the 1955 is 55 million. Klaus J. Bade, *Europa in Bewegung: Migration vom späten 18.*

lantic World have focussed on the northern transatlantic migrations and excluded all other mobility – a scholarly racialization criticized by the new “Whiteness Studies”.

European scholars and public discourses have misinterpreted historic migration in many respects. Firstly, nation-state historiography, concentrating on emigration, has denigrated those leaving as lost to the nation and as arriving in the un-cultured Americas. Secondly, the far more voluminous transregional and transnational intraeuropean migrations have been excluded from analysis and memory. Thirdly, towards the end of the 19th century, the social space of Europe became divided into a labour-importing core – England and the Scottish Lowlands, France, Germany, Switzerland, eastern Austria – and a labour-exporting periphery, a circle extending from Scandinavia via Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean societies to Ireland. Fourthly, labourers from other cultural macro-regions and of different colours of skin arrived: Asian and African sailors and some 1.3 million South Asian and Chinese contract labourers during World War One. The late medieval and early modern “Africa in Europe” was supplemented by an “Asia in Europe”. Then, from the Balkan wars of the 1880s to the late 1940s, Europe made itself the globally most vicious refugee-generating social space or, perhaps, better: anomic space. Again, Europe's space and its economic-military regime were inextricably entwined with spaces across the world.

The 1950s and After: Human Rights and Migration in the Face of Growing Global and Internal Disparities

The decade from 1945 to the Bandung conference in 1956, the first meeting of what was then the “Third World” which claimed a voice

Jahrhundert bis zur Gegenwart (München, 2000), Engl: *Migration in European History*, transl. Allison Brown (Oxford, 2003), Fr: *L'Europe en mouvement. La migration de la fin du XVIIIe siècle à nos jours*, traduit par Olivier Mannoni (Paris, 2002), Span 2003, Ital 2001.

like the “Third Estate” had done in Europe's Age of Revolution, was marked by a decisive caesura: the consequences of fascist destruction in Europe, the beginning of decolonization, the shift of refugee-generation from Europe's war zones to the decolonizing Worlds, the end of the Atlantic Economies' Migration System, and the beginning of both the intra-European and the inter-American south-north migrations. Contrary to the 15th century conjuncture, challenges to the Atlantic World's dominance coincided with Europe's internal integration – or re-integration after the century-long interlude of nationalist-separatist hegemony. At the time of this caesura, inequalities internal to societies or worldwide inspired the United Nations' Declaration of Universal Human Rights of Dec. 1948 which called for political and civic or “first generation” human rights but came at a time when material social and economic well-being was also defined as a right of citizens and of human beings in general, the “second generation” of human rights,¹⁸ and when a third generation, the right to societal and individual development and solidarity, began to be discussed. However, imbalances between Third and First World countries increased significantly: The gap has doubled since 1960 and continues to grow.¹⁹

Political actors, less flexible than migrants, refused to adapt migration policies to circumstances. When Mediterranean Europe became the supplier of labour to northwestern Europe in the 1950s (and Latin South to Anglo North America), the legal frame perpetuated the German Reich's 1880s-to-1914 policy of temporary labour importation from the East: *Fremdarbeiter* (alien workers) were to be prevented from acculturation through imposed rotation and return. To veil this continuity, the terminology was changed to *Gastarbeiter*, guest worker. Or working guest? In the colonizer countries, France, Great Britain, and the Netherlands, such work-

¹⁸ T.H. Marshall, *Class, Citizenship, and Social Development* (1st ed., 1949; Westport, Ct., 1976).

¹⁹ United Nations. Development Programme, *Human Development Report* [annual] (New York, since 1990).

ers, at first, often came from the former possessions outside of Europe, either as workers, e. g. from Jamaica to Britain, or as refugees, e. g. the Moluccans in the Netherlands. They, too, were expected to return – more so, in fact, because of the colour of their skin.

The in-migrant working men and women with their children remained excluded from the polity's citizenship but they were included into collective wage agreements and the social security systems (denizen-status) – often on demand of the respective country's trade unions. Though in some industries low-wage sectors for allegedly light workloads, esp. women's work, were introduced, other sectors invested in the training of in-migrating working men and women and, to recoup investments, demanded that the length of stay be extended. When, from the 1980s, economic migrants from the de- and re-colonized segments of the world began to arrive, the European labour markets' absorptive capacities were decreasing due to the export of production facilities in the primary producing sector to societies with lower levels of income and, thus, lower wages – and often with less developed institutions and practices of working-class self-organization. At the same time, denizen status in the social security systems – developed to their full extent in the 1950s and 1960s – offered benefits that power-driven global terms of trade as well as dependency relationships prevented from emerging in the regions of out-migration.

While new policies and discourses would have been required, governments and elites stuck to out-dated pre-1940s discourses. Germany and Switzerland explicitly declared themselves to be non-immigration societies; France, the Netherlands, and Britain reduced the right of citizens of their former colonies to enter. Only two countries, Sweden and the Netherlands, revamped policies and attitudes from monocultural-national to multicultural. Both countries' – small – administrations delegated the analysis of the issues as well as the reconceptualization of policies to outside experts, to university scholars. These recommended reinsertion of migration

traditions into public memory and political culture as well as inclusion of the newcomers into political processes and societal structures. In both countries, legislatures and executives accepted such recommendations as did the public and the educators.²⁰

During the mid-1970s recession, labour mobility remained informed by migrants' life-course strategies while the receiving economies' governments began to shut down recruitment programs and to close lawful ways of entry – thus disrupting family migration trajectories. Parallel, the worldwide terms of trade imposed by international financial institutions and multinational companies resulted in dependency and poverty in the southern “hemisphere,” i.e. south of the Mediterranean and the Rio Grande. Entry options to the Developed World, few and highly selective, might be called a “body-parts approach”: Some societies wanted comparatively cheap brains and initiated brain drain elsewhere. Other societies wanted physical strength (“hands” or “braceros”) or nimble fingers (women in electronics) but refused to accept the in-migrants' culture and personalities, their hearts and minds. Such migrations involve a kind of development aid for highly developed countries: Migrants are reared, schooled, and, in some cases, university-educated at the cost of the society of origin and contribute their capabilities and taxes to the receiving societies.²¹

When the intra-European labour migrations came to be supplemented by “Third World”-migrations, first to the former colonizer

²⁰ Christiane Harzig, *Einwanderung und Politik. Historische Erinnerung und Politische Kultur als Gestaltungsressourcen in den Niederlanden, Schweden und Kanada* (Immigration and Policy-Making, Historical Memory and Political Culture as a Creative Strategic Resource in the Netherlands, Sweden, and Canada) (Transkulturelle Perspektiven 1 Göttingen, 2004).

²¹ In Aug. 2005, 6000 trained doctors in the Philippines (up from 2000 in 2004) were enrolled in retraining programs to become nurses in order to emigrate into nursing jobs in Europe, the U.S., the Persian-Gulf states, Singapore, or Japan. Doctors in the Philippines may earn up to \$ 500, as nurses overseas they may earn up to \$ 5000 per month. This created a “threatening situation for [...] the health-care system” in the Philippines according to government officials. *Toronto Globe and Mail*, 6 Aug. 2005, p. S3.

states, then to all of Europe, (sizable) segments of receiving societies perceived a threat not only to their culture but also to their whiteness and, in some white men's imaginations, to white women. Even in self-perceived immigration societies, language connotations subtly changed: "Coloured" newcomers were said to demand and to require services rather than to contribute to the economy and to make it on their own. Such clichés overlook that pre-World War One white migrants came to societies which had not even developed concepts of institutionalized social security. These South-North disparities are paralleled by structurally different East-West European disparities. The post-1989 option to move from the East was again perceived as a threat in the West. This present migration for economic improvement might be compared to the working-class struggles in the late 19th century: Working people did not accept as sufficient what each nation-state's capitalist system allocated to them. People in developing countries do not accept as satisfactory what the Capitalist (or white) World considers sufficient for them. Nor do men and women in post-communist societies accept the standard of living imposed on them by circumstances. In the terms of present-day liberalist discourse, migrants are entrepreneurs of their own lives and they want to be able to invest their social and human capital regardless of borders – a right owners of capital do have.

The standard of living in present-day Western Europe and North America continues to be supported by the global capitalist re-colonization of the Lesser Developed Countries (LDCs). Price levels for many consumer and increasingly for investment goods are pegged to production at low cost of labour. In addition to self-willed economic migrants, Europe's societies face *policy-generated refugees*, a category which since 1990 includes those persecuted because of gender. The Geneva Convention definition (1951, Protocol of 1967), based on the political theory of sovereign states, does not cover refugees from internal civil wars and dictatorial regimes – situations in which whole state apparatuses lose the trust

of the territory's people.²² Just as the fascist states in 1930s Europe were surrounded by refugee-refusing democracies, the refugee-generating post-colonized societies of the present are surrounded by refugee-refusing post-colonizer societies.²³

In contrast to Europe's 19th century America-bound refugees from economic stagnation, migrants departing from economic inequalities have no right to admission to other countries. *Disparities of global economic power* accepted and advocated by theorists of economic liberalism are not matched by a concomitant liberal theory of admission policies for economic refugees. According to the

²² In July 1998, a treaty for an International Criminal Court to prosecute genocide, crimes against humanity including "forced pregnancy," and war crimes was completed.

Major policy-generated refugee streams may be summarized under seven headings: (1) creation of new societies and displacement of religious, ethnic, and political "enemies" as in Palestine/Israel, China/Hong Kong/Taiwan, former Yugoslavia, the dissolution of the Soviet Union; (2) decolonization-induced reverse migration of imperial settlers and colonial auxiliaries, refugee movements across colonizer-shaped political boundaries, impoverishment through core-imposed export economies; (3) post-decolonization armed conflicts (a) among competing native elites about concepts of social order as in Mozambique and in Angola or (b) between superpower supported war-lords as in Somalia or (c) struggles connected to interests of a hegemonic core state and multinational capital as in Zaire, Haiti, or Nigeria – to give only some cases; (4) non-elective rule, differentiated into personal, clan, or group "kleptocracies" as in the case of the Marcos and Duvalier regimes in the Philippines and Haiti; (5) genocidal regimes as in Cambodia or in Rwanda and politically exacerbated famines in Ethiopia, Sudan, and North Korea; (6) fundamentalist rule or raiding as in Afghanistan, Iran, and Algeria, fundamentalist positions against non-national peoples such as the Palestinians in Israel; (7) rule of right-wing (superpower-supported) elite segments as in many Latin America societies. In such conflicts a specific interest – purity of religion, male domination over women, power spheres of Western capitalism or of Russian socialism, profits for ruling elites – is imposed on the common weal of society, reducing opportunities or threatening survival.

²³ Aristide Zolberg, "The Formation of New States as a Refugee-Generating Process", *Annals of the Am. Acad. of Pol. and Soc. Sciences* 467 (1983), pp. 24–38; U.S. Committee for Refugees, *World Refugee Survey* [annual] (New York, since 1980); Michael S. Teitelbaum and Myron Weiner (eds), *Threatened Peoples, Threatened Borders. World Migration and U.S. Policy* (New York, 1995), pp. 13–38.

UN *Human Development Report* of 1995, the richest 20 percent of the world population are almost 60 times as wealthy as the poorest 20 percent and the net capital transfer from the poor to the rich states continues.²⁴ According to World Bank estimates, import restrictions by industrialized countries reduce the LDCs' GNP by more than the latter receive in development aid. *Ecological displacement* results from natural climate change, from man-made pollution and hot-house emissions, as well as from population increase and usage of particular lands beyond their "carrying capacity". In 1995, the ecologically displaced amounted to an estimated 25 million, 135 million people were threatened by severe desertification, and 550 million lived with chronic water shortages.²⁵ *Development displacement* occurs when infrastructural projects like water reservoirs, open-pit mines, and transport networks are imposed on densely settled populations by governmental or international planning agencies, or when urban fringes expand rapidly into rural areas. People benefiting from such developments usually have bet-

²⁴ Michael P. Todaro, *Internal Migration in Developing Countries: A Review of Theory, Evidence, Methodology and Research Priorities* (Geneva, 1976); UN Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ed.), *Migration and Urbanization in Asia and the Pacific: Interrelationships with Socio-economic Development and Evolving Policy Issues* (New York, 1992), p. 9, noted that entrepreneurs from Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan were leaving Thailand in the early 1990s for "cheaper labour countries due to increased labour cost and infrastructure bottlenecks". World Bank, *World Development Report 1995: Workers in an Integrating World* (Oxford, 1995); United Nations, Development Programme, *Human Development Report* [annual] (New York, since 1990); Reinhard Lohrmann, "International Migration Dynamics and Immigration Policy in Europe: an International Perspective", in Albrecht Weber (ed.), *Einwanderungsland Bundesrepublik Deutschland in der Europäischen Union* (Osnabrück, 1997), pp. 31–43, quote p. 35–36; Dieter Nohlen and Franz Nuscheler, *Handbuch der Dritten Welt*, 8 vols (second rev.ed., Hamburg, 1983).

²⁵ Norman Myers and Jennifer Kent, *Environmental Exodus. An Emerging Crisis in the Global Arena* (Washington, D.C., 1995); "Environmental Refugees," special issue of *Refuge* 12.1 (June 1992); Arthur H. Westing, "Population, Desertification, and Migration", *Environmental Conservation* 21 (1994), pp. 110–14; Gerald O'Barney et al., *The Global 2000 Report to the President: Entering the 21st Century*, 2 vols (Washington, D.C., 1980).

ter access to societal institutions than those displaced by them who need remedial support.²⁶ Development of industries without proper safety standards also dislocates people worldwide whether in Seveso (Italy), Bhopal (India), or Chernobyl (Soviet Union).²⁷ Globally, the required “average of about 2,700 calories of food per person per day” is available but world market prices and substitution of export for subsistence crops imposed by multinational companies (MNCs) raise local cost of food beyond the reach of the local people.²⁸ Effects of the food-providing “green revolution” are being eroded by MNC control over seed cultivation. All of these developments influence human migrations.²⁹

Governments' and the general public's anti-immigrant exclusionist policies may be understood in terms of economist John K. Galbraith's concept of a “culture of contentment”:³⁰ Just as wealthy societies remain unconcerned about poverty in their midst,

²⁶ Essays by Anthony Oliver-Smith, Andrew Gray, Darrell A. Posey in Christopher McDowell (ed.), *Understanding Impoverishment. The Consequences of Development-Induced Displacement* (Providence, 1996), pp. 77–135; Jeremy Seabrook, *Victims of Development: Resistance and Alternatives* (London, 1993).

²⁷ The near-disaster of the Harrisburg (U.S.) nuclear facility would have displaced even larger numbers than the Chernobyl disaster.

²⁸ This has recently been the topic of the French-Austrian-Belgian documentary film “Le cauchemar de Darwin” (2004) on fish production in Lake Victoria, Tanzania.

²⁹ Michael S. Teitelbaum and Jay Winter, *A Question Of Numbers. High Migration, Low Fertility, and the Politics of National Identity* (New York, 1998); United Nations. Food and Agriculture Organization, *Dimensions of Need. An Atlas of Food and Agriculture*, eds Tony Loftas and Jane Ross (Rome, 1995), pp. 14–19; Joni Seager (ed.), *The New State of Earth Atlas* (New York, 1995), maps 2, 3, 6, 15, 18; Michael Kidron and Dan Smith, *The New State of War and Peace. An International Atlas* (New York, 1991); Dan Morgan, *Merchants of Grain* (New York, 1979); Susan George, *How the Other Half Dies. The Real Reasons for World Hunger* (Harmondsworth, 1973); David L.L. Shields (ed.), *The Color of Hunger. Race and Hunger in National and International Perspective* (Blue Ridge Summit, Pa., 1995); Carrying Capacity Network, *The Carrying Capacity Briefing Book*, 2 vols (Washington, D.C., 1996); Joel E. Cohen, *How Many People Can the Earth Support?* (New York, 1995).

³⁰ John K. Galbraith, *The Culture of Contentment* (Boston, 1992).

industrialized states have become democracies of the well-fed and the contented with no compassion for people in LDCs. Annually, the EU countries pay 65 cents per person for the poor in Africa and 848 euros for each cow in Europe.³¹ 19th century chauvinism of nationality has become a chauvinism of wealth. Anthony Richmond has conceptualized worldwide exploitative relationships as “global apartheid”.³² Migrants react by circumventing restrictions, by crossing borders without documents. Individually, they attempt to equalize life-course opportunities. “Illegal” immigrants challenge illegitimate global disparities and apartheid. To apply U.S. President Roosevelt's 1941 anti-fascist rallying call – freedom from want and fear, freedom of spiritual life, speech, and expression – into migration policy requires a vision of sustainability, of equity, and of human rights.

European Policy-Making: Issues and Recommendations³³

In order to develop migration policies and support for them, first, a change of mentalities is necessary. Secondly, clear and relatively open entry and exit rules need to be defined and operationalized. Thirdly, a global application of first- to third-generation human rights including a change of the global terms of trade is a prerequisite to reduce the potential for out-migration from LDCs. Under equity-oriented distributive regimes these changes may imply a reduction of consumption, in particular its gluttonous aspects, in Highly Developed Societies. A social Europe in a global approach might strive to feed children in poor societies as well as pets are fed, for example, in France and Germany.

³¹ This was highlighted by critics in connection with the Edinburgh G8 summit of July 2005. *Metro* (Paris) Lundi, 20 juin 2005, p. 4.

³² Anthony Richmond, *Global Apartheid: Refugees, Racism and the New World Order* (Toronto, 1994).

³³ This section has been developed jointly with Christiane Harzig, Arizona State University.

A change of mentalities would comprise

- (1) acceptance of the historical continuities of migration in the multiple aspects of intra-European migration and cultural exchange, of in-migration from outside of Europe, and of emigration from Europe and its lasting consequences as discussed above;
- (2) acceptance of the agency and life-course projects of migrants – which differ in gender and age-group – and provision of an open frame for agency;
- (3) replacement of the “social problem”-attitude to migrants by recognition of the cultural capital brought into receiving societies as an asset;
- (4) acknowledgement of diversity as an increase in options for all members of a society and as an enhancement of future-oriented development strategies;
- (5) acceptance of acculturation as a long-term process that continues over generations and involves cultural change and responsiveness of receiving societies.

As to the entry and exit rules, a strategic frame for European Union migration policies might be based on the Canadian experience.³⁴ The “free mobility” aspect of human rights notwithstanding, it has become accepted that receiving states/societies may both put a cap on annual immigration and select entrants according to contributions (skills, education, investments) needed in the economy and according to skill to insert themselves (esp. language and civic knowledge as prerequisite for citizenship) as long as humanitarian considerations, family-class entry and refugee admission, are not short-changed. Such selectivity is in the interest of immigration applicants since – ideally – it prevents those from coming who would experience major difficulties during the insertion process. Options for recently arrived newcomers after acquisition of cit-

³⁴ Canadian policies are more open and humanitarian than European policies but, viewed from the inside against ideal-types, are certainly found wanting. In this essay I will use them as a yardstick. My criticism will be received for a Canadian audience.

izenship to sponsor relatives without the means to support themselves and for resident citizens – in NGO, community, and religious groups – to sponsor non-selected applicants, including refugees without means, mitigates the policy's exclusionist aspects. Sponsored immigration of indigent people does not burden social security institutions as a whole, it requires sponsors to assume material and emotional responsibility. Access to citizenship is relatively open, it may be obtained after four years of residence of which three have to be spent in Canada. It requires knowledge about Canada's languages, institutions, and human-rights values.³⁵

Before the 1990s, migrants usually did not pose a threat to job security of resident members of a society since they could enter only those labour market segments commensurate with their skills. Only when two groups differ in the price for their labour and compete for the same labour market segment do competition, displacement, and ethnicization or racialization of hiring occur. With the decline of the primary sector in highly industrialized countries through export of jobs to industrializing countries, the issue of competition for jobs has increased or, in a historicized perspective, factors slowing down development are shifting from dependent societies to the formerly powerful beneficiaries of the global dependency structures.

A liberal admission policy served the 19th century states in Europe and North America well and explains part of the strengths of the 20th century United States and Canadian societies. It may serve the societies of the 21st century but, in Europe, it is politically not feasible. Aside from reservations because of old-style nationalist thinking, implementation of such a policy would have to face the problems created by more than half a century of non-policy. Thus admission regulations including restrictions are necessary and they are justified both from the interest in social development of the receiving societies and the human interests of migrants.

³⁵ Sponsorship assumed a new dimension after the Dec. 2004 tsunami since in many of the regions family members of Canadians of immigrant origin lived.

Canada admits – roughly – one percent of its resident population annually. This non-partisan policy, at its inception in the 1960s and 70s, meant an annual intake of 250,000. Actual figures in the 1990s were 220,000 annually with the population increasing to almost 30 million. Recently the government announced an increase to about 310,000 annually. Plans to take in a certain percentage of refugees from each conflict or natural catastrophe worldwide foundered on the ever-increasing number of conflicts. From the applicants, immigrants are selected by qualification in the official languages, education, and age as well as demand within Canada's economic and social sectors. Thus the frame (1) sets a target level for economic migrants – mainly investors, people with certain skills, caregivers. (2) It permits “family class” immigration – spouse and children under 18 years of age – of the economic migrants³⁶ and it grants the right to sponsor relatives. (3) The frame reserves a quota for refugees with a comparatively speedy admission process but again selects immigrants in refugee camps according to assumed capability for acculturation. Finally, visitor programmes for young people provide them with a chance to learn about Canadian society and thus to form an empirically-based opinion on whether they might want to immigrate. While it has been criticized that such policy brings in only the brightest and the fittest, selection according to presumed “fit” does permit a comparatively easy transition into the new society. Thus, before the economic crises of the mid-1990s, immigrants to Canada achieved parity with wages for native-born Canadians within ten years after admission.³⁷

Canada, like Europe, consists of many culturally and economically distinct regions and faces inter-regional disparities. Accordingly, immigration policies may be adjusted regionally. Quebec and Alberta, for example, may select migrants on their own but within

³⁶ Under certain conditions, vertically, ageing parents but not, horizontally, brothers and sisters.

³⁷ Harzig, *Einwanderung und Politik*.

the general legal frame. Quebec emphasizes Frenchness, Alberta particular job skills in view of labour shortages in its expanding economy. On the federal level, preferences are accorded to immigrants in sectors with high demand with the stipulation that they work for a number of years in the job category or location assigned – doctors and nurses in rural regions or northern communities, caregivers in families. However, after the period of regulation these migrants are free to move geographically, to choose another occupation, to acquire citizenship, and to bring in relatives.

In view of ascribed gender roles, a feminization of migration – noticeable since the Depression of the 1930s – has resulted from the shift to service economies since the 1960s, and is presently fuelled by refugee-generation in societies in which large groups of men are involved in civil strife. While nurses, domestic workers, and caregivers enter labour market segments shunned by native-born workers and earn their own living as did immigrant industrial workers, refugee migrants often need supportive measures to overcome trauma and to prepare for the receiving society. Thus, sometimes, the stereotype that today's (non-white) migrants use resources rather than to contribute to them is reinforced. Of course, much of the weaponry used in refugee-generation is supplied by the refugee-refusing northern hemisphere's armament industries.

In general, migrants need space to manoeuvre their lives and to negotiate their projects:

- room for entrepreneurship, self-exploitation – hard work, long hours, etc. – included,³⁸

³⁸ Such insertion requires easy entry possibilities for newcomers. In this respect, the European highly regulated societies differ from the less regulated Canadian society. A standard example is the food business. Small restaurants may be opened with minimum of capital, relying on cooking skills available in the family, and they may open long hours because of self-exploited family labour. If the host economy has complex licensing procedures, high sanitary requirements for customer/consumer protection, and regulated hours, such initiative may be smothered – though regulated hours for working staff and consumer protection is certainly to be valued. Similarly union- or state-regulated working hours for waged workers and salaried employers may prove a hindrance for insertion into labour markets. Rather than

A Long-Term Perspective on Labour Migrations and Globalization

- wages equivalent to the region's union-negotiated wage and benefit levels,
- recognition of previously acquired skills,³⁹
- educational opportunities both for improving their own position and to open avenues for improvement to their children,
- access to political participation, i. e. easy acquisition of citizenship under the stipulation of knowledge of language of communication, institutions, and core values of the receiving society,
- recognition of cultural Otherness with emphasis on sharing cultures and on cultural interaction rather than on preservation of traditions and essentialization of “ethnicity”, i. e. multiculturally interactive social life with, ideally, transcultural practices
- anti-racism and anti-discrimination provisions in laws, programs of societal change, and in educational facilities,
- a social security system that is not tied to workplace but requires individual contributions and responsibility, benefits to accrue only after contributions.

In view of the backlog of problems of Europe's “era of non-policy” – some countries, of course, excepted – an amnesty for undocumented migrants is urgent. Only legal or legalized status permits insertion into the receiving society on terms of equality and permits usage of the migrants' individual and social resources to the best.

The issue of belonging to the new society – in an older, outdated perspective: assimilation to the nation – has been debated intensively in Canada. But, in analytical retrospect, it was an issue of concern mainly to resident Canadians who did not accept difference and new options. The policy of providing opportunities to

long hours, late or weekend hours provide flexible newcomers with insertion options.

³⁹ As regards professionals, certification of their diplomas obtained in the society of origin is often painfully slow in the receiving society because of bureaucratic red tape, opposition of resident professionals' interest groups, or difficult comparability of educational and training achievements and careers.

Dirk Hoerder

newcomers to negotiate their own life-projects on the basis of their pre-migration everyday lives and cultures within the legal frame and the core values of the new, Canadian society has led to a feeling of belonging. The new society thus appears as a shared opportunity structure to which every person contributes rather than as a monocultural nation-state straightjacket, a constraint structure. “Diversity is our strength!” Such a concept and policy would indeed turn the social space of Europe into a social Europe as one cultural macro-region of a socially equitable world.